hegel's dialectic of perception a critique

8/4/2019 Hegel's Dialectic of Perception a Critique

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Subject, Object, and Representation:A Critique of Hegel's Dialectic of PerceptionInternational Philosophical Quarterly1988 June Vol X X VI, No . 2 CarlG.VUght

IN THE PAST three decades, two radically different ways of interpreting Hegel'sphilosophical intentions have emerged in the critical literature. The first is selfconsciously conservative and is concerned primarily with the implications of Hegel'slogic,1 while the second is implicitly revolutionary and is committed to the thesis thatHegel is an open-ended thinker who willingly embraces contingency as a fundamentaldimension of the human situation.2 According to the first approach, the real Hegel isengaged in a quest for complete comprehension and produces the Science of the Experience of Consciousness as the first step in framing a comprehensive philosophical system.3 In addition, he is the one who asserts that the true is the Whole and that thisWhole is tobe identified with the structured process of its own articulation:4 whoclaims that the necessary progression and interconnection of the forms of consciousness will by themselves bring to pass the completion of the series;5 who insists that thegoal of this process is as necessarily fixed for knowledge as the serial progression:6 andwho suggests that the logic which forms the dialectical superstructure of this process ofdevelopment is what God himself was doing prior to the creation of the world.7 By contrast, the other Hegel is a finite thinker who places a romantic conception of Spirit atthe center of his system:8 who acknowledges the limitations of any philosophical framework that comes upon the scene only at the falling of dusk;9 who speaks of the cunningof Reason and of a dialectical process that sometimes does its work behind our backs:10and who makes his own "logical" intentions clear by including the category of contingency as an inescapable dimension of any dialectical articulation of the structure ofthought or experience.11 If the first Hegel is a dialectical logician, I am tempted to claimthat the second is a romantic existentialist, who prefers power to structure, and who

Alexandre Kojve. introduction to the Reading ofHegel, trans. James H. Nichols, Jr. and ed. AllenBloo m (Ne w York and London: Basic Books. 1969) and Stanley Rosen . G WE Hegel. A n Introduction to theScience of Wisdom (Ne w Haven and London: Yale Univ Press. 1974)2J.N. Findlay, Heget: A Re-Examination (N ew York: Collier B ooks , 1962), pp 17. 79, 213-16, 309-10.

3 Hegels original description of the Phenomenology is instructive in this respect, for in his own account olthe book he refers to it as the first volume in the System of Science. See Walter Kaufmann. Hegel. Reinter-pretation. Texts, and Comm entary (Garden City. N.Y Doub leday. 1965), p 366

*G.W.F. Heg eL Pheno menology of Spirit, trans A.V. M iller (Oxford: Clarendon Pre ss, 197 7), p 11.*Ibid.,p. 50.*Ibid.,p. 51''Hegels Scien ce of Logic, trans. A.V. Miller (New York: Humanities Press, 1969), p. 508For aview ofthis sort, see John Burbridges review of my recent book. The Quest for Wholeness (Al

bany: State Univ. of New York Press. 1982) in Man and World. Vol. XVI (1983), 407-13"Hegel sPhilosophy of Right, trans T.M. Knox (Oxford: Oxford IJniv Press. 1952), p. 13lQHegels Science of Logic, p 746 and Pheno menology of Spirit, p. 56.15Findlay. Hegel. A Re-Examination, pp. 213-16. 309-10.

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118could never be accused of attempting to bring the Western tradition to completion inphilosophical terms.

It is not my intention in this paper to choose between these two'versions of theHegelian enterprise or to discuss some of the ways in which this distinction between thetraditional and the revolutionary Hegel is related to the more familiar contrast betweenhis right and left wing interpreters.12 Instead, I want to focus on the central thesis whichall these interpretations have in common, despite the radical differences that otherwisedivide them. I have in mind the claim that Hegel's system transcends the subject-objectopposition and that he attempts to m ove beyond representational discourse to a new wayof thinking in which the subject and the object are subordinate elements in the largerprocess of dialectical reflection.13 The more traditional interpreters of Hegel are committed to this thesis, for the goal of complete comprehension can only be achieved if theopposition between subject and object, which defines preliminary stages of the processof cognition, can be transcended in the absolute standpoint. But those who defend anopen-ended Hegel are committed to this position as well, for the willingness of Hegel toconfront contingency presupposes a flexibility of categorial structure that underminesthe structural rigidity of the subject-object opposition. In the first case, the quest forcompleteness drives us beyond the subject-object opposition toward dialectical unity,while in the secon d, the open-endedness of con sciousn ess explodes the sheer externality of the subject-object relation as a structural matrix. In either case, the Hegeliantransformation of Vorstellung into Denken attempts to move us beyond the subject-object opposition to a new way of thinking. According to both views, the process of reflection is more fundamental than its terms, and this process requires the use of non-representational discourse, whether it leads us to complete comprehension or simply toa way of knowing that can deal successfully with the unexpected contents it encounters.

There can be little doubt that Hegel attempts to transcend both the subject-object opposition and the representational discourse that expresses this external relation. As hesays himself in the Preface to the Phenomenology,

The disparity which exists in consciousness between the T and the substance which is its object is the distinction between them, the negative in general. This can be regarded as the defectof both, though it is their soul, or that which moves them. That is why some of the ancientsconceived the void as the principle of motion, for theyrightlysaw the moving principle as thenegative, though they did not as yet grasp that the negative is the self. Now, although this negative appears at first as a disparity between the T and its object, it is just as much the disparir>of the substance with itself. Thus what seems to happen outside of it, to be an activity directedagainst it, is really its own doing, and Substance shows itself tobe essentially Subject. When ithas shown this completely, Spirit has made its existence identical with its essence; it has itselffor its object just as it is, and the abstract element of immediacy, and of the separation ofknowing and truth is overcome. Being is then absolutely mediated; it is a substantial contentwhich is just as immediately the property of the T, it is self-like or the Notion.14

However, the crucial question about the status of the subject-object relation in Hegeland about the representational discourse that gives us access to it is not whether Hegel

,2 See Karl Lowith. From Hegel to Nietzsche: The Revolution in Nineteenth Century Though t, trans. DavidE . Green (Garden City. N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967) for the classic study of Hegel's successors.l3 HegeI. Phenom enology of Spirit, pp. 46-56.l4 /W


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119attempts to move beyond them, but whether he in fact succeeds in doing so. It is thiscrucial question, which is at once so fundamental for the Hegelian enterprise and socentral for many strands of the contemporary philosophical situation, upon which Iwish to focus my a ttention.

IThe best place to turn in order to discuss Hegel's attempt to transcend the subject-

object opposition is the perception section of the Phenomenology, for it is here that hefocuses most clearly upon the subject's attempt to represent the object from an externalpoint of view. Unfortunately, this section of the phenomenological Odyssey, placed as itis between the well-known discussions of sense-certainty and understanding, has notreceived the attention it deserves. The dialectical transformation of particularity intouniversality in sense-certainty and the even more dramatic inversion of the world inHegel's treatment of the understanding has perhaps obscured the importance of the dialectic of perception for the task at hand. However, we must not overlook the fact thatthe problem of perception constitutes the middle term in the development of consciousness. It is the place where universality and particularity meet explicitly for the firstt ime, and it is the context where all the elements are first at hand for a detailed discussion of the problem of representation as an epistemic relation between subject and object. Thus, a careful consideration of this section will not only supplement the alreadyfamiliar discussions of sense-certainty and the understanding, but will also allow us tofocus upon what Hegel himself regards as the pivotal term upon which the entire examination of the development of consciousness depends.15 More fundamentally, an examination of this section will allow us to raise the central questions about Hegel's attempt to transcend the subject-object opposition and will provide the framework inwhich we can begin to develop a critique of Hegel's entire dialectical enterprise.

At the beginning of his analysis of perceptual consciousness, Hegel assumes that toperceive an object means to apprehend it truly. However, since truth is impossible apartfrom the presence of universality, he also assumes that universality is the essence ofperception as a cognitive activity. Unlike sense-certainty, which attempts to begin withthe particularity of what is given, perception begins with the apprehension of the givenas an intelligible unity.16 Yet Hegel also claims that what is most important about perception is that the subject and the object belong together in cognitive interaction andthat as a consequence, these two poles are merely abstractable aspects of the process ofperception understood as a unified activity. As he formulates the point in characterizinghis phenomenological method:

Consciousness simultaneously distinguishes itself from something, and at the same time re lates itself to it, or, as it is said, this something exists for consciousness; and the determinateaspect of this relating, or of the being of something for consciousness, is knowing. . .Consciousness is, on the one hand, consciousness of the object, and on the other, consciousness of itself: consciousness of what for it is the True, and consciousness of its knowledge of the truth Since both are for the same consciousness, this consciousness is itself theircomparison; it is for this same consciousness TO know whether its knowledge of the object cor-,5For Hegels discussion of the central role of the syllogism and the importance of the middle term in it.

soelbid, p M5 and Hege!'* Science ff l/wir. p 165,6 Hegel , Phenomenology of Spirit, p 67


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120 VAUUHlresponds to the object or not. The object, it is true, seems only to be for consciousness in theway that consciousness knows it; it seems that consciousness cannot, as it were, get behind theobject as it exists for consciousness so as to examine what the object is in itself, and hence,too, cannot test its own knowledge by that standard. But the distinction between the in-itselfand knowledge is already present in the very fact that consciousness knows an object at all.Something is^r it the in-itself, and knowledge, or the being of the object for consciousness,is, for it, another moment. Upon this distinction, which is present as a fact, the examinationrests.17Having suggested, however, that the activity of consciousness is the fundamental

term and that both the knower and the known are merely abstractable elements of it.Hegel begins his analysis of perception from the standpoint of the object, for as he sayson more than one occasion, consciousness always assumes that the object of knowledgeis more fundamental than knowing itself.18 Thus, the first step in Hegel's analysis ofperceptual consciousness can apparently be assimilated to the familiar view that perception is an intentional act and that it ultimately depends upon the object of consciousness that stands in contrast w ith it.

Beginning from the standpoint of the object, Hegel claims that the object of perception is a thing with many properties. Yet he quickly reminds us that though these properties are sensuously given, they are also to be understood as a cluster of universalcharacteristics. As a result, the object of perception displays from the outset the universality required to make it intelligible to the cognitive consciousness. Hegel says thateach of these universals is self-identical and indifferent to all the others, but he also saysthat each exists together with the others in a universal medium that comprises the intelligible dimension of things understood as particular entities. An object is what it is because it presupposes a cluster of abstract characteristics which constitutes a realm of itsown, bound together by the fact that they are the intelligible ground in terms of whichthings within the world are to be understood. Of course, each universal characteristiccan be sensuously given in the real order, and as such , it will beco m e the intersection ofa plurality of universal properties. For example, salt located at a particular place iswhite and tart and also cubical. However, these properties that overlap experientiallyremain distinct in conceptual content, suggesting once more that they have a place in anabstract universal medium in which they constitute the intelligible nature of the thing inwhich they all converge. Any property u pon w hich we focus our attention is thus a sensuously given element that is also intelligible, and this dimension of intelligibility ismediated by the abstract universals it presupposes as the ground of perceptual consciousness.19

Yet Hegel also insists that there is a second dimension of the issue that must be understood if we are to give a satisfactory account of the determinate unity of an object ofconsciousness. He says that if properties are to be the ground of sensuously given contents, each of which is distinct from all the others, they must not only exist together inan abstract, universal medium, but must also differentiate themselves from one anotheras a cluster of abstract entities. As Hegel formulates the point in his own baroque andsometimes paralyzing style, the abstract medium in which properties exist as universalcharacteristics is not:

x''Ibid , pp. 52-54"Ibid , pp. 59. 67."7W.,pp 67-69.


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121an indifferent unity, but a One as well, a unity which excludes an other. The One is the mo-ment of negation; it is itself quite simply a relation of self to self and it excludes an other; andit is that by which 'thinghood' isdetermined as a thing Negation is inherent in a property as adeterminaieness which is immediately one with the immediacy of being, an immediacy which,through this unity with negation, is universality As a One, however, the determinateness is setfree from this unity with its opposite, and exists in and for itself.20

In a somewhat more straightforward formulation, the universals that make objects intelligible are not merely universal, but individual as well, standing out from the largercontext in which they are embedded as a set of individuated elements. Thus Hegelclaims that objects not only exist as individuated things in contrast with the universalsthat make them intelligible, but that these universals are also individuated as elementsof the universal medium in which they occur.

Having made this distinction between two dimensions of the universal medium thatmake objects intelligible, Hegel summarizes the stages of the development of perceptualconsciousness as it comes to focus on an object of cognition. First , he claims that perceptual objects presuppose a domain of universal characteristics in t e rms of which particular things are to be understood. It is this cluster of abstract universals that allowsperception to grasp the truth about an object and that permits it to be defined as an actthat takes things truly. Hegel insists, however, that objects of consciousness would notexist unless they were determinate, and that this in turn presupposes that their determinate characteristics are both distinct and distinguishable from all the others with whichthey can be compared . Thus , a property displayed by a particular thing must exclude allothers if it is to present itself as an intelligible unity. Finally, Hegel suggests that themany properties that can be distinguished may be regarded as determinate unificationsof universality and particularity, for each property is both universal and sensuous at thesame time. As a result , he concludes that sensuous universality is a synthesis of the firsttwo stages and that it binds universality and particularity together in the object of perception. Hegel also claims that the analysis of the object is completed in this series ofstages and that consciousness should simply observe what is given in this three-foldform without adding any contribution of its own. In fact, if the observer added anything, he would introduce a distortion in the object that would disrupt the natural development of consciousness as dependent upon it. Hegel therefore expects the perceptualconsciousness to conclude that its object is a dialectical unity and that any errors introduced in the process of perception will be of its own making.21

IIAt a number of places in the Phenomenology, Hegel distinguishes between two per

spectives from which his dialectical discussion of the experience of consciousness canbe understood. The first is the point of view of the philosopher who simply observesthe phenomenological process, knowing in advance that both the subject and the objectof experience are abstractable aspects of a more fundamental process of development .This is the point of view of the phenomenological "we," whose participation in the inquiry Hegel characterizes in some detail at the beginning of his introduction.22 How-

20Fbid., p 692 l / Wd . . p p 6 9 -7 022Ibid., pp. 55-56


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12 2 VAUGHTever, there is a second perspective on the discussion which the nonphilosophical consciousness adopts and in which the subject assumes that a radical distinction obtainsbetween subject and object.23 In order to approach the problem of perception from bothperspectives, Hegel therefore turns to the standpoint of the natural consciousness andbegins to examine the dialectic of perception from this second point of view. At the beginning of this stage of his argument, however, Hegel tells us explicitly that contradictions will arise in the course of the discussion which will finally drive the natural consciousness to embrace the analysis of perception given already from the philosophicalperspective of his earlier analysis. This second stage of the argument is therefore intended to make it clear that the contrast be twee n subject and object cann ot ultimately bemaintained and that both poles of the subject-object relation must be reinterpreted asaspects of a larger dialectical unity. Given our own intention to develop a critique ofHegel's attempt to move beyond the subject-object opposition, this is therefore the mostimportant section of his presentation for appraising the validity of his dialecticalprocedure.

In developing the contradictions betw een subject and object as the experiencing con sciousness undergoes them , H egel claims that the object of c onsciousn ess first presentsitself as a unity and that it appears as an individuated thing in contrast with the knower.However, since this unified object is intelligible only in terms of properties that transcend the individual, he also says that consciousness is apparently mistaken in takingthis object as a unique individual. Instead, the universality of its properties, which havemeaning only in relation to others, suggests that the thing itself is a community of general features bound together in a universal nexu s. In this way, the original individualityof the object is displaced by a thing understood as a cluster of abstract characteristics.On the other hand, since each property that this cluster displays is determinate and isthus opposed to all the oth ers, it is tempting to conclude that what is really fundamentalabout a set of properties is not the community that binds them together, but the differences that hold them apart. As a result, the unified cluster of general features breaks upinto a plurality of properties that exist in contrast with one another. When we focus onthese properties, w e find that they are m utually indifferent to one another and that theyconstitute a universal medium of elem ents that are both universal and determinate at thesam e time. Yet this m eans that what I perceive is neither a purely universal medium nora determinate set of properties that stand in contrast with one another, but merely aproperty as such which is neither purely universal nor purely individual. In fact, Hegelconcludes that because the content of our apprehension is neither merely universal norabsolutely particular, what we apprehend is sensuous being as such, prior to its articulation into universal and particular dimensions. But this implies that the propertieswh ich were embed ded originally w ithin the object and were subsequently d istinguishedboth from it and from one another now collapse into the unity of an undifferentiatedcontinuum. As a result, Hegel claims that the dialectical transition from the originalunity of the object to a plurality of properties that are both universal and individualfinally leads us back to the object of percep tion understood as an unarticulated totality.24

At this stage of his discussion, Hegel tells us that if the contradictions of perceptionare to be overcome, the subject of the perceptual process must now take the respo nsibility for drawing the distinction between simple apprehension and perceptual consciousness. Moreover, he says that since diversity can no longer be found in the object as a

Ibid, pp. 55-56.70.ulbid.t pp. 70-71.


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124 VAUGHTIn giving an analysis of this cluster of independent entities, Hegel first suggests that

each of these objects is essentially different from every other, and that its simple unityis necessary for the object in question to be just the thing it is. Of course, Hegel admitsthat there is a manifold of differences internal to the object, but he says that this manifold is inessential in comparison with the more important feet that the object differs inprinciple from all other things. Thus, he claims that unity is essential to a thing; that itsabsolute uniqueness keeps its apart from other things; and that though internal differences are to be found within the thing, these differences are merely secondary and inessential aspects of its existence as a unified being. Hgel also insists that even here contradictions arise, for as an individual thing attempts to maintain its independence, it canbe an absolute unity only if it remains unrelated to other things. And if it is related afterall, as it clearly must be i f it is to be intelligible, it ce ase s to exist sim ply on its own. Yetthis fact finally negates the indep enden ce of the thing, su ggesting that its essential beingis not to be found in separation from others, but precisely in the relations that bind themtogether. However, this means that the dialectical dimension has now reasserted itself,and that relation to others which was first regarded as inessential is now an essentialdimension of the thing, while the independence of the thing has vanished into the tissueof relations in which it stands to other things. Thus, the last attempt of perceptual consciousness to preserve the independence of the object collapses,26 leaving the naturalconsciousness with only two alternatives. On the one hand, it can return to the beginning of its dialectical development and simply repeat the process, emphasizing now oneand then another dim ension of its fruitless quest for unity. In this way, perception wouldremain imprisoned in its contradictions, simply recapitulating them as symptoms of itsincapacity to understand its own nature. On the other hand, it can disavow what Hegelcalls this "whirling circle" of abstractions and attempt to move beyond the inferno ofperceptual consciousness to the dialectical stability of philosophy where these abstractions can be mastered.27 It is this quest for mastery that finally defines Hegel's projectand that drives him beyond the opposition of consciousness which is to be found at thecenter of the dialectic o f percep tion.

HIAs many of Hegel's recent interpreters have insisted, his version of the dialectical

process is a rich and powerful account of human experience and is not to be reduced tothe abstract structure that was so often embraced by his British and American successors.28 How ever, it is also true that at a numb er of p laces in both the Phenomenology andthe Logic Hegel uses arguments that are typically idealistic in structure to make possible som e of his most important dialectical transitions. Th is is indeed the case in the discussion of the perceptual co nsc ious nes s w e have just undertaken, for in the course ofhis argument Hegel tacitly employs the principle of the identity of indiscemibles andthe doctrine of internal relations in order to establish his claim that the subject-objectopposition can be transcended.29 It is these arguments as Hegel employs them that Ishall focus on in this concluding section, for unless he is justified in employing them atthe crucial junctures in which they occur, the dialectic of perception will collapse and

ibid., pp. 74-76.21Ibid., p. 79."See, e.g. , J .N. Findlay, Hegel: A Re-Examination, pp. 17-18" H ege l , Phenomen ology of Spirit, pp. 74-76.


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CRITIQUE OF HEGELS PERCEPTION 125will make it necessary for us to reappraise the subject-object relation as definitive of thenature of perceptual consciousness. Thus, in what follows the crucial question thatmust be considered is this: "Is Hegel correct in claiming that the contradictions to befound in perceptual consciousness drive us beyond the subject-object opposition to anew way of thinking, or are Hegel's own arguments that this is the case subject to arefutation of their own?"Before w e turn direcdy to this question, one important fact to notice about the d ialectic of perception is that it leads us through a series of theoretical positions about thenature of perception that are a familiar part of the philosophical tradition, however unfamiliar Hegel's dialectical examination of these views might be. Naive realism, Plato-nism, Lockeanism, and Kantianism all appear as moments of Hegel's systematic account, bound together in the larger unity of his own dialectical discu ssion of the percep tual consciousness. But in appraising Hegel's philosophical account of the dialectic ofperception, the most important point to notice is the mistaken conclusions to which hecomes by using arguments that are characteristic of his idealistic predecessors. At acrucial stage in his discussion of the nature of perception, H egel cla ims that bec ause thesubject and the object undergo the same dialectical development, they are indiscernible, and as a result, he collapses both subject and object into one another as m erely different ways of expressing an identical dialectical process. The identity of indiscemiblestherefore lies at the found ation of Heg els attempt to transcend the subject-object opposition an d is the typical idealistic presu pposition upon w hich this crucial stage of hisown dialectical position depend s. Moreover, w hen H egel turns to a consideration of theobjects of perception as a plurality of objective contents that are both separate andrelated, he suggests that the relations in which they stand cancel their autonomy andthat the relation of difference by which separate things are distinguished in fact bindsthem together into a un iversal nexu s. O f course, this familiar argum ent is again typicalof the idealistic tradition and is the ground in terms of which the separation betweenone object and another is cancelled in larger unity of a system of merely internal relations.

But what precisely is mistaken about these arguments, and how does a rejection ofthem serve to undermine Hegel's account of the dialectic of perception? More fundamentally, if these arguments are rejected, what is the form of the subject-object relationthat must be em braced, and how is it to be related to the dialectical attempt to m ove usbeyond it to a new and more powerful way of thinking? Perhaps the clearest way to respond to these questions as they first pertain to the principle of the identity of ind isce m ibles is to indicate that in his discu ssion of the perceptual co nscio usne ss, Hegel ignoresthe order in which the dialectical transitions oc cur within the subject and the objectrespectively. As a result, he conflates these two poles at the level of conceptual content,while failing to acknowledge the crucial difference of vector directionality that distinguishes them and that will always hold these two dimensions of perceptual experienceapart. In the particular dialectical transitions we have considered, the object movesfrom its original unity into a plurality of properties before it collapses into the originalsensuou s unity w ith which it begin s, wh ile the subject moves from its original diversityinto a unity of properties before it collapses into the undifferentiated unity which Hegelthen identifies with the unity to be found in the object. Yet this means that the subjectand the object traverse different paths in their dialectical development, one beginningwith unity and the other beginning with difference, while the object moves toward dif-ference as the subject moves toward unity. As a result, however much these two poles


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U VAUGHTmight be identical in conceptual content, they are not identical in directional orientation, and it is this vector difference tliatfinallyholds them apart as really distinct dimensions of the perceptual process. In collapsing subject and object into one another,Hegel ignores the directional differences displayed by the development of the subjectand the object, overriding in this fashion the irreducible moment of difference that liesat the center of perception as a process of cognition. Formulated in somewhat differentterms, Hegel uses the identity of indiscernibles to argue for the identity of subject andobject at the level of conceptual content, but in doing so, he ignores the irreducible moment of difference to which the equally important concept of vector directionality callsour attention.At one juncture Hegel himself seems to acknowledge the crucial distinction, for having pointed out that the act of perceiving and the object perceived are the same, he says:

In essence the object is the same as the movement: the movement is the unfolding and differentiation of the two moments, and the object is the apprehended togetherness of themoments.30

Of course, this is to suggest once more that the conceptual content of the two poles isidentical and to imply that the subject and the object can therefore be collapsed into oneanother as an undifferentiated unity. However, this same passage suggests that the analytic mom ent of unfolding and differentiation is clearly to be distinguished from the synthetic moment of apprehended togetherness with respect to directional orientation. Butif this is so, and unless it can be shown that vector directionality is reducible to structural content, Hegel will never be able to demonstrate that the subject and the objectultimately dissolve into one another in the process of cognition. In feet, just the opposite is the case, since the vector differences displayed by the development of subjectand object hold them apart in a mirror-image relation that can never be canceled out bystructural considerations alone. The development of the object from unity to diversity(analysis) and the corresponding development of the subject from diversity to unity(synthesis) are similarities that bind the knower and the known together, but they arealso differences that allow these terms to remain separate as really distinct terms in theunfolding process of cognition. Thus, even if an appeal to the identity of indiscerniblescan succeed in reducing two terms to one another with respect to conceptual content,this principle can never override the vector differences displayed by the subject and theobject in the developmnt of perceptual consciousness. As a result, these two terms re-emerge in contrast with one another, and the opposition of consciousness which Hegelso persistently attempted to transcend must therefore be reinstated.

But if Hegel is mistaken in his application of the principle of the identity of indiscernibles, what can be said about his use of internal relations to override the differences between two objects of consciousness that attempt to preserve their own integrity as uniqueindividuals? This question shifts the discussion from the subject-object relation to therelation between two or more independent objects of consciousness, and in doing so, itconfronts us with the problem of the One and the Many in one of its most traditionalforms. As Hegel formulates this familiar problem, the first object is a One in contrastwith a Many, but since it is what il is only by contrast with the others, the One is notsimply an independent entity, but also depends for its integrity upon the relations inwhich it stands with whatever else there is. As a result, these relations are definitive of

*>Ibid..p. 67.


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127the thing, and what began as an independent entity ends as a term in a relational net-work of other terms which define the very being of the thing in question. Once moreHegel attempts to override the externality of dualistic opposition, this time by employing a set of internal relations to undermine the apparent externality that holds a pair ofobjects apart as independent entities. In the course of his argument, however, Hegejoverlooks once more the crucial distinction between conceptual content and vectordirectionality, mistakenly suggesting that they collapse into one another as terms on thesame logical level. In order to discuss this issue in the most perspicuous fashion, let usreturn to Hegel's own presentation, noting in particular the order in which the dialectical transitions unfold as an interplay betwe en two or more objects of co nsc ious ne ss.

If we begin with an initial object, what is essential to it is its own independe nce, andthis independence can first be expressed by the vector orientation of the thing within thereal order as a spatio-temporal continuum. At the outset, a thing is what it is because itoccupies a determinate region in which it is oriented both spatially and temporally. Inaddition, the thing displays a set of properties in terms of which its structure can be articulated, but these properties are inessential when they are compared with the originalvector orientation that allows the thing to be what it is. Of course, as oriented in spaceand time, the original individual is related to other things, not only in sharing properties with them, but also by being at a different but connected spatio-temporal region. Asa result, there are two leve ls of relation that a thing bears to other individuals: first, it isrelated to them by the nexus of properties it displays; and in the second place, it is related as well by the spatio-temporal framework that binds the thing together with othersas elements of the real order. But since both are relations, and since Hegel assumes thatthe thing could not be what it is apart from relations of both kinds, he concludes thatboth are essential to the thing and that the original entity thus dissolves into a tissue ofinterconnections that cancels its alleged independence. The One with which we begandisappears into the Many upon which it depends, and the truth of perception becomesonce more the dialectical interplay between two or more elements that were originallyheld apart in absolute opposition.31 In this way, the opposition of consciousness is cancelled again, and the truth of perception becomes accessible only to a way of thinkingthat moves beyond the externality of representation to the larger unity of dialecticalarticulation.

There is of course a sense in which the spatio-temporal network in which individualsstand is just as relational as the network of abstract characteristics that a thing displaysin contrast with others. And if this were all that could be said about the matter, Hegelwould have succeeded in moving beyond the externality that might first appear to holdthe objects of consciousness apart. However, it is important to notice that an object ofconsciousness is first oriented in space and time, and then related to other things, andthat unless these two moments could be distinguished, there would be no object in thefirst instance with respect to which we could raise the problem of the One and theMany which leads to its typically dialectical results. But if this is so, order once moreproves to be an essential ingredient in the discussion, and an ingredient that must not beoverriden if the problem of the One and the Many is to be posed for reflective consideration. The importance of the concept of order in this context becomes clear when wenotice that when a second object is related to the first, what is first for it is its own vector orientation, and what is second is the relational network in which it stands in interconnection with others. This means, however, that what is first for ob ject2 is second for

ilIbi


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12 8 VAUGHTobjecti and what is first for object, is second for object2. Thus, it is again the dim ensionof order that serves to keep these terms apart, even though they also stand together in alarger spatio-temporal framework. The classical example of this kind of situation is ex-pressed most clearly in the case of asymmetrical relations. The relations, aRb and bRa,contain the same constituents from an abstract point of view, but these relations cannevertheless be distinguished from one another when the order of their terms is takeninto account.32 Thus, aRb and bRa are identical with one another in conceptual content,but are also different in the order of their terms, and it is once more this crucial dif-ference of orientation that holds them apart as really distinct elements of the real order.

In summary, then, we can draw the following conclusions about Hegel's dialectic ofperception and about the validity of the typically idealistic arguments upon which itrests. First, Hegel is mistaken in collapsing the subject and the object of perceptualconsciousness into one another, and this mistake hinges on a mistaken application ofthe principle of the identity of indiscernibles which ignores the order of developmentdisplayed by the subject and the object in the course of dialectical reflection. The objectmoves from unity to diversity, while the subject moves from diversity to unity. In doingso , they are bound together by conceptual content, but are held apart by directional dif-ference. In the second place, Hegel is also mistaken in using the argument from internalrelations to collapse two distinguishable objects into terms in a larger relational network. This argument assimilates spatio-temporal differences to abstractly conceptualdifferences, and having done so, reduces an independent entity to a function of the relational network in which it stands. What Hegel fails to acknowledge, however, is that thething with many properties is first oriented in space and time and then related to otherelements within a spatio-temporal nexus, and that this order in the thing is essential forpreserving its integrity in its encounters with others, and even for posing the problem ofthe One and the Many for reflective consideration. Finally, the subject-object matrix asa m irroring relation, wh ich can be pictured in the following way,

O b j e c to n e ^ m a n y

Xman y ^ o n eS u b j e c t

is reflected at the level of two or more objects in the fact that what is one for a given ob-ject is many for another, and that what is one for another is many for the first. Thus, theoriginal subject-object relation can be ramified to display an even more complex universe, where the subject is related to tw o or more objects of perceptual consciousness atthe same time.

32Bertrand R ussell. Principles of Mathem atics (New York: W.W Norton, 1903), pp. 218-226


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CRITIQUE OF HEGELS PERCEPTION 12 9

Objectj Object^ many many

hegel's dialectic of perception a critique

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