harrell w & harrison r (1938) the rise and fall of behaviorism

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The Rise and Fall ofBehaviorismWillard Harrell a & Ross Harrison aa Departments of Psychology, University of Illinoisand Johns Hopkins University, USAVersion of record first published: 06 Jul 2010.

To cite this article: Willard Harrell & Ross Harrison (1938): The Rise and Fall ofBehaviorism, The Journal of General Psychology, 18:2, 367-421

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T h e Journal of General Psychology, 1938, 18, 367-421.

THE RISE A N D FALL OF BEHAVIORISM* Departments of Psychology, University of Illinois and Johns Hopdins

University

WILLARD HARRELL AND Ross HARRISON

I. Behaviorism originated only a quarter of a century ago and its

most active period is hardly a decade past, so it is not surprising that an entirely satisfactory evaluation of the movement has not been published. While such a treatment must wait for the more leisurely historian, certain remarks may be in order concerning what was at once one of the most strident and yet most significant of modern developments.

In one sense behaviorism is merely another brand of materialism. A list of materialists would go back two thousand years to Leucip- pus and Democritus. Among some of the familiar materialists in the history of philosophy who have had an indirect bearing on such a contemporary trend of thought as behaviorism are Hobbes, Hume, Diderot, L a Mettrie, CondilIac, Hehitius, L’Holbach, and more recently Comte, Cabanis, Cour@t, Vogt, Moleschott, Buchner, Lewes, de Tracy, Herder, Mach, Haeckel, and T. H. Huxley. Of historical interest is the forgotten figure, Johann Nicholas Tetens, who in Philosophische Yersuche iiber die Menschliche N a t u r und l h r e Entwickelung (1777) made several gestures in the direction of an objective psychology but failed to carry his attempt through to any decisive conclusion.

Disefens has dealt with most of these writers at some length (74). I t is our purpose qerely to point out certain of the more radical and immediate materialists like La Mettrie, who in M a n the Machine attempted to establish man as a complete, physiologically governed automaton. Cabanis, who is often regarded as the father of physiological psychology, produced an elaborate analysis of mind in terms of neural constitution and other objective factors without, however, submerging consciousness completely. Herder believed all psychology

*Received in the Editorial Office on November 12, 1937.

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must be physiological, while the cavils of Comte against introspection and mentalism are well-known. T h e investigation of psychic functions as brain changes was advocated by Comte who argued for a study of the organism in place of the futile pursuit of an “illusory psychology which is the last phase of theology” (53). I n the middle of the last century Cournot insisted that our worldly knowledge is derived from a study of the behavior of human beings in actual life situations and not from a profound scrutiny of the conscious process. G. H. Lewes, writing in the positivistic tradition which has so affected modern currents in psychology, was convinced that psychology should reduce all mental phenomena to organic correlates. Finally there was the proposal by John Stuart Mill of a science of behavior, conduct, and character to be designated as “ethology,” which was followed much later by Mercier’s sug- gestion of a science of human conduct that might be called “praxiology” as distinguished from psychology (228, viii et seq.) .

T h a t they had any effect on the founder of radical behaviorism is extremely doubtful, although the historically logical antecedents, if not the historically causative ones, were more numerous than Watson suspected.l Among them must be counted the German objectivists-Beer, Bethe, Nuel, and von Uexkull-who renounced subjectivism to the point of substituting an unwieldly but “objective” nomenclature for all psychological categories but withal maintaining a parallelistic epistemology. I t was this last fact, according to Watson, which separated the German physiologists from his school. T h e reflexology of Bechterev, the Russian physiologist, was behavioristic in one sense but not, strictly speaking, psychology. Like Pavlov, Bechterev denied traditional psychology any validity as a science. H e scorned introspective methods, and maintained that his interest in the phenomena called mental was only to the extent that they might be studied neurologically as modifiable or unmodifiable reflexes.

I n the field of psychology proper, a large body of data had been gathered by the use of apparatus. T h e picture Watson had given

Such names merely give an historical setting.

‘Watson, however, insisted that contrary to the general impression his formal training in philosophy w a s more extensive than in psychology (letter dated June 16, 1936) . In the same communication he admitted an influence in his youth from Hume, Hobbes, and the British school of philosophers. Furthermore, “Sumner’s Folkways gave me intellectual and moral freedom as no other course or point of view.”

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WILLARD HARRELL AND ROSS HARRISON 369

of psychology as a barren waste of subjective analyses, while partially true, was a simplification to the point of distortion. T h e eighties and nineties had produced much work on certain problems of perception, reaction time, psychosomatic relations, psychophysical measurements, learning and memory, and all by behavioristic methods. Pieron in France, early in the present century, was advocating a more widespread use of instrumental techniques (272, 273), at the same time that Cattell, in an address before the Congress of Arts and Sciences a t the World’s Fair in St. Louis in 1904, was stating the objectification of psychology as almost an accomplished fact.2 A few years before in 1899, Woodworth pleaded for the extension of objective methods in psychology (417, p. 25); and for this he was later sharply rebuked by Titchener (335, p. 367). I n 1897 Scripture published The New Psychology (316), an elementarv book modeled after a physical schema, which had no recourse to introspection; and in 1911 M a x Meyer wrote a completely objective textbook (232). None of these writers took the bold step of denying the value of introspection, although a few like Meyer ignored it as a working technique. Wi th even the most advanced psychologists it was either stated explicitly, or implicitly understood, that introspective analysis and the behavior methods of the laboratory should complement one another.

Behaviorism was a left deviation from American functionalism, which in turn came out of German Akt and Funktion and English evolutionary biology. Functionalism stressed adaptation to environment with the subject considered as a psychophysical unity, and represented an approach to the problems of psychology from the point of view of mental process instead of the traditional “structure.” I t aimed to give psychology a place in the field of the biological sciences but possessed neither the fortitude nor the vigor to fulfil any such manifest destiny or historical necessity as was becoming evident in the evolution of psychology. And it was this functionalist

’“It seems to me that most of the research work that has been done by me or in my laboratory is nearly as independent of introspection as work in physics or zoology. The time of mental processes, the accuracy of perception and movement, the range of consciousness, fatigue and practice, the motor accompaniments of thought, memory, the association of ideas, the perception of space, color-vision, preferences, judgments, individual differences, the behavior of animals and of children, these and other topics I have investigated without requiring the slightest introspection on the part of the subjcct. . . .” (quoted by Woodworth, 419, p. 48).

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3 70 JOURNAL OF GENERAL PSYCHOLOGY

movement of Dewey and Angell which was one of the roots of behaviorism, which developed out of the Chicago school as a virtual elaboration and extension of the biological premises postulated in the functional program. Such a view is necessary despite the dis- avowal of kinship by Watson. T h e famous Dewey reflex-arc analysis contained the germs of ideas-the influence of previous experience on present reaction and the integrative action of neural mechanisms as a whole-which were to assume major importance in the behavioristic panorama. Angell adopted an almost paternal and only mildly disapproving attitude toward the behavioristic growth in its earlier period (5). T h e University of Chicago, which was the hotbed of functionalism, was also the training ground of Watson. This fact is pertinent when it is recalled that one’s teachers inevitably influence one, if only by way of reaction. I n 1903 Irving King, a functionalist who received his doctorate at Chicago, wrote The Psychology of C h i l d Development ( 1 7 7 ) , which contained stric- tures on structural psychology and laid great weight on the signifi- cance of observing overt behavior patterns, all of which may be understood as definite forebodings of the coming avalanche. T h e functionalist Judd had, before Watson, emphasized the place of the muscles in psychological processes, while Mead, who was one of the original group at Chicago, went further in his later years to develop a peculiar nominal behaviorism. This natural evolution of a functionalist into a behaviorist is attested, not only by Mead, but by Kantor in his earlier phase, perhaps by Holt, D e Laguna, Frost, and several other writers who are difficult to classify under either category. Tilquin even sees the functional tradition strong in Tolman (334). Finally, behaviorism like functionalism was a psychology of capacity and adaptation, stemming out of Darwinian biology, as illustrated in Watson, where adaptation to environment is prominent as an implicit assumption. From the functionalist emphasis on the psychophysical organism, Watson extracted the physical, accentuating it to the neglect of the psychic; here as elsewhere it was characteristic of him to borrow the ideas of others, giving them a more vigorous expression at the same time forcing them to their logical extreme.

Diehl (73) accords Pierce and James prominent places in fashion- ing behaviorism by some such reasoning as the following: Pierce and James were leading American thinkers, behaviorism is distinctly an

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WILLARD HARRELL A N D ROSS HARRISON 371

American product ; therefore, behaviorism must have been greatly influenced by Pierce and James.* I n another place Diehl draws the more plausible conclusion that James, Pierce, and other pragma- tists made the way of behaviorism easier by accustoming students to similar ideas. James’ query, “Does consciousness exist ?” suggests the later negation of consciousness.

Certain proponents of pragmatic and neo-realistic currents in the American philosophy contemporaneous with Watson have tended to argue that psyche and soma were two phases of the same fundamental reality. Their point of view is in consonance with the materialistic monism of Watson, for while less radical they were proceeding in the same general direction as Watson. Particularly was this true of Singer (320) who in 1911 analyzed mind into behavior withoiit, however, exerting any direct influence on Watson, who was unacquainted with his ~ r i t i n g s . ~ Other critical realists like Holt, Perry, and Woodbridge wrote sympathetically on the behaviorist movement, although their interest as a group was on the epistemological problem.

Watson’s physiological orientation toward psychology owed its greatest debt to Jacques Loeb and to the neurologists Donaldson and Sherrington. Loeb was a molding influence not only through his writings but from personal contact; as professor of physiology at Chicago he directed Watson in some of his earliest research. Loeb with his pronounced mechanistic materialism ridiculed the older teleological conception of instinct and reduced the native equipment of man to bundles of reflexes (201). Consciousness and will he regarded as metaphysical terms for the underlying physiological mechanisms, for which he employed the rubric “associative memory.” Loeb credited Mach as the source of his mechanistic conception of life; consequently Mach may be said to have exerted some influence on Watson indirectly through Loeb. Without doubt the chief causal agent in the birth of behaviorism was Watson’s enthusiastic experimentation in animal psychology, a field cultivated by Lloyd Morgan and later developed into an experimental science by Small, Kline, and Thorndike.

T h e exact quotation is: “But since behaviorism in its present form at least is said to be peculiarly an American product, it has seemed natural to think that it should owe a great deal, if not the most, to our typical American thinkers, such as Pierce, James and Dewey.”

‘Personal communication.

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Thus Watsonian behaviorism may be thought of as deriving from the union of the objective methods of the animal laboratory with certain pragmatic and empirical traditions in philosophy and psychology. These last, while less direct, give the historical background necessary for an evaluation of behaviorism in terms of a continuous historico-evolutional process. While unsympathetic, Watson was not unacquainted with the history of philosophy, nor can he be regarded as uninfluenced by American functionalism. I n the larger sense, functionalism and behaviorism were treading the same path- way with the one developing whether by reaction or elaboration out of the other. An analogue historically perhaps would be the development, largely by way of reaction, of the psychologies of Jung and Adler from the original font of Freudian psychopathology.

As far back as 1903 Watson was formulating his theories con- versationally only to be told that they might work very well for animal observation but not for human psychology. H e met with similar results in a lecture before the psychology department of Yale University in 1908 when he espoused a moderate form of behaviorism. H e encountered the argument that behavioristic psychology could exist only at a descriptive level, that it could never

explain.” A course of public lectures entitled Psychology as the Behaviorist Views I t , delivered at Columbia University in 1912, was published in abreviated form as an article in the Psychological Re- v i m for March, 1913 (362). This article constituted the first open statement of the incipient movement. As a result of the Columbia lectures Watson was challenged to cope with images and affection, and this he proceeded to do before the psychological sem- inar at Columbia in the April of 1913. His formal statement was contained in the paper, Image and Affection in Behavior (361).

Watson next published Behavior, an Introduction t o Comparative Psychology (363), a volume which fully summarized the progress of animal experimentation up to 1914. In a long introduction be restated his case for behaviorism as a methodological principle. T h e general tone of his remarks was more cautious, and he was both more suave and conciliatory than one came later to expect. His basic contention was that behaviorism be allowed to employ consciousness in the same way that other scientists do-without attempting to make it an object of study. Consciousness had previously been the central problem in psychology, and many of the

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older psychologists had wondered: After all, what was the good of animal psychology? Watson, on the contrary, demanded what was the good of the older psychology? His castigation of introspective methods may be partially interpreted as defensive. Students of animal behavior were continually being called upon to relate their results to human consciousness. Watson rebelled and declared that the study of animal behavior was legitimate for its own sake. H e urged that psychologists adopt the objective methods of the animal laboratory for human psychology, developing them meanwhile toward a greater refinement but at the same time ignoring conscious processes. Psychology was unscientific, Watson said, even esoteric ; for when an experiment turned out badly, introspectionists excused themselves by saying that their subjects were not properly trained in subjective methods. T o Watson such a procedure was more com- patible with the methods of erring vaudeville tricksters than those of men of science. H e contended that psychology was not objective, that the results of psychological experiments could not always be duplicated by other psychologists, and that a science which excused inconsistency of results by finding weaknesses in the subjects’ training rather than uncovering objections in the experimental methods employed was not above suspicion. Moreover, the older psychology was useless, for no practical applications could be discovered for it except in those branches like applied psychology which had withdrawn from the introspectional approach, and these were vigorous and flourishing.

T h e next ambitious systematic exposition was not until the 1919 edition of Psychology f r o m the Standpoint of a Behaviorist (369). T h e publications that followed were popular presentations-Be- haviorism (373), T h e W a y s of Behaviorism (378), and T h e Psy - chological Care of the In fan t and Chi ld (387).

Already sufficient evidence is available to suggest that here, as elsewhere in scientific developments, there was no sharp break with the past. Often there are several scientists who advance a theory almost simultanously ; e.g., Wallace and Darwin with the theory of organic evolution and James and Lange with their theory of emotional resonance. While no theorist developed a complete behavioristic system either before or at the same time as Watson, ideas possessing commonality with his were in the air. Even the definition of psychology as the science of human behavior was anticipated, for

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that was the manner in which McDougall in 1905 (218) and Pillsbury in 1911 (278) defined psychology. Neither author, however, was prepared to support his conception of psychology by excluding introspective data or terminology.

Singer in his book Mind as Behaoior (322) collected opinions which he had voiced in journal articles from 1898 to 1915. H e had been teaching the doctrine of mind as an observable object to his classes a t the University of Pennsylvania since 1901, but did not feel that his writings had any effect on Watson. T h e point on which behaviorists follow him is his identification of mind with behavior. Singer based this identification upon a pragmatic argument which is more thorough than some of the arguments used by the later behaviorists. In brief, Singer examined the inference that similar acts in other organisms were accompanied by like states of mind, and he concluded that this inference can be neither proved nor disproved. Further, he questioned the self-evidence of the contention that the mental state of each individual is his own indisputable possession, since a t times a neighbor may know a person’s state of mind better than the individual himself. T h e analogy argument was dismissed because it is an inference based upon one case. Singer quoted James’ statement that “the serious meaning of a concept lies in the concrete difference to some one which its being true will make. . . . If it can make no practical difference whether a given statement be true or false, then the statement has no real meaning” (322, p. 6) . Singer accepted the Jimian criterion of truth and concluded that the analogy argument is a prime example of a meaningless hypothesis. Con- sciousness for him was “an expectation of probable behavior based on an observation of actual behavior, a belief to be confirmed or refuted by more observation as any other belief in a fact is to he tried out” (322, pp. 10-1 1 ).

It is difficult to trace Watson’s stand on consciousness, since it is not always clear. His views on the subject changed from time to time. I n 1913 consciousness and introspection were criticized as being unscientific and unverifiable, as intangible will-o’-the-wisps which would always elude any natural science technique. T h e study of behavior was advocated as being more in harmony with the universal method of science. T h e argument against consciousness was along pragmatic lines, characterized by zeal and dogmatism, but relatively undeveloped and unsophisticated from a strictly

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philosophical point of view. Watson’s main concern was the removal of consciousness as the prime objective of scientific study; nothing more in the early methodological behaviorism, for as he frequently proclaimed, he had no desire to become involved in metaphysical disputes. Because of the failure to clarify his position, he has been misunderstood and even ridiculed for stupidity. T h e reduction to absurdity of his much heralded rejection of consciousness is attempted by those who assert that, carried to the logical conclusion, a true behaviorist would say that he could not feel a pin prick. A careful study of Watson’s writings fails to reveal a genuine basis for this or any similar caricature. Watson left himself open to criticism by his later writings for popular consumption. T h a t he is not unaware of this is evident in his autobiography (382).

One error in evaluations by abusive critics has been a misunderstanding of what Watson represented. Wha t he sometimes put forth, especially in the early days, as scientific hypothesis, was often attacked as presumptuous attempts at the solution of long standing culs-de-sac in metaphysics. His manner of writing was dogmatic and direct, devoid of subtlety and overburdened with a misplaced crusading spirit. Many persons of reputable standing believed that he had assumed the r6le of Don Quixote in a blunt denial of the existence of those strange realities that we designate as mentation and experience. Undoubtedly what he meant was the denial of the existence of any non-corporeal “stuff” and a hearty affirmation in that faith, to which many scientific men subscribe-that research would ultimately provide a description in biochemical or physico- chemical terms of all mental phenomena. It was nothing more than the old reductive materialism of the latter half of the nineteenth century, somewhat more tactlessly and unpersuasively rendered, and should not have alarmed anyone unduly.

Watson believed that the rejection of introspection was the major contribution of behaviorism notwithstanding the fact that, historically, many philosophers and scientists including Comte and Mobius had denied its validity as a tool sufficiently exacting for scientific purposes. Limitations of the method were pointed out more recently by James and several of the functionalists, and the sterility of an exclusively subjective psychology was becoming more generally recognized by 1912 when two new criticisms appeared. Dodge (75) pleaded for the recognition of other methods than self-observation,

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376 J O U R N A L OF GENERAL PSYCHOLOGY

which he criticized after a somewhat cautious fashion. Dunlap (84) struck out more vigorously against traditionalism, denying introspection in the sense of observing awareness, or as retrospection, and advocating the continuance of the term only to denote the observation of kinesthetic and coenesthetic sensations. T h e two papers were not precisely antecedent to Watson, but they were indicative of a rising tide of discontent with subjectivism. T h e principal difference between Watson and the other critics lay in the lightness of their censure as contrasted with the characteristic outrightness and blun;- ness of Watson’s position.

T h a t Watson did not originate objective methodology must be obvious to even the most superficial student of psychological history. A considerable body of instrumental work in psychophysics and physiological psychology was in existence when Watson first appeared on the scene, not to speak of the beginnings that had been made in animal laboratories by Small, Kline, and Thorndike. W h a t Watson did was to stress the practical need for an extension of objective methods to replace introspective study as the primary method in psychological investigation, although even here he was anticipated in appealing for a shift of emphasis by several less forth- right advocates, including Cattell, Woodworth, PoincarC, Dodge, and Dunlap.

Watson admitted that the existence of centrally aroused processes would be fatal to a thorough-going behaviorism. For some time he was at a loss as to how he might explain the image. T h e way was shown by Dunlap; according to the latter the image was not a centrally aroused process but was aroused instead by peripheral stimulation of a kinesthetic nature. Strain sensation in the eyeball was the basis of a visual image. T h a t the evidence was derived from an introspective technique, which he held to be invalid, seemed not to have troubled Watson. Affection, another stumbling block, was avoided by postulating a bodily theory in which the feelings were construed not as attributes of sensation but were given independent status in a rather puzzling modification of the Stumpf-Woolley view. Watson postulated vascular changes in the mucous membranes and connective tissue pertaining to the sexual apparatus as the basis of affective states. T h e feeling of pleasure was associated with the tumescence of erogenous tissue such as the nipples and external genitalia, the feeling of unpleasantness was connected with

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the detumescence of these tissues. This doctrine of affection, notwithstanding that it was more novel than most of the Watsonian theories, was admittedly developed from the Stumpf-Woolley theory, but with the addition of a distinctly Freudian note.

T h e conditioned response technique was advanced by Watson to supplant introspection as the central method in psychology. T h e conditioning of reflexes had been an active field of research in Russia for at least a decade before the birth of behaviorism. Although there was some knowledge of the Russian work, it received scanty attention among American psychologists before the World W a r , no doubt because of the language difficulty. Pavlov was the historically important figure for pioneer researches on the conditioned reflex, but Watson felt that he owed more to Bechterev, since the behaviorists employed the conditioned motor reaction rather than the glandular reflexes investigated by Pavlov. Lashley was the one exception ; he adapted the salivary reflex technique to human experimentation ( 194). Watson disclaimed any close alignment with the reflexological school of Bechterev, just as earlier he had rejected German Objectivism; both were under the domination of a parallelistic philosophy, whereas his own system he considered free from such assumptions. Even though Watson incorporated the conditioned response into his theories after Pavlov and Bechterev, he extended its experimental possibilities into the field of human psychology. Moreover, he has claimed to be the first to identify the conditioning of reactions with the older conception of habit-formation, and the first to employ the principle as an explanatory device for the so-called higher mental processes.

T h e rejection of human instincts, commonly regarded as one of the major tenets of behaviorism, was not in reality an original contribution. T h e viewpoint seems to have been common fifteen and twenty years ago, and more than once had found expression previously in psychological history. Bohn had stated many years before that instinct was only a word, and Condillac, when asked for a definition, had replied, L'instinct n'est rien. Jacques Loeb in 1903 had denied instincts in the teleological sense and had dealt with them merely as chains of reflexes (201). I n 1915 Herrick, in a rather casual fashion, declared that the instinct concept had outlived its usefulness for science, and that all behavior could be classified as both instinctive and learned because both were involved (129). I n

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his 1916 doctoral dissertation, which was not published until 1922, Link wrote critically of the instinct doctrine (200). But it was Dunlap’s article, Are There A n y Instincts? published in 1919, which really began the famous anti-instinct crusade among psychologists (88). Dunlap followed Herrick but greatly amplified and elaborated his line of argument, stressing the complete inseparability of innate and learned response in the complex behavior flux, but stopped short of the extreme view of 2. Y. Kuo (184-186), who denied the theory of instinctive behavior with a vigor and thorough- ness which more than equaled Watson. A number of anti-instinctive writings followed these initial thrusts, usually from social psychologists in whose province the instinct doctrine had demonstrated its sterility as an explanatory principle.5

T h e early methodological behaviorism did not involve a rejection of instinct. On the contrary “Behavior” contained a long list of nine types of instincts manifesting themselves in man. Even Psy- chology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist followed Loeb in re- taining the term while reducing instincts to reflex chains. Watson was late in getting on board the bandwagon led by Dunlap and Kuo, but once he had clambered on board, after finding his elaborate classificatory schema placed him in the embarrassingly conservative company of McDougall, he compensated for any tardiness by characteristic radicalism. TypicalIy enough Watson followed the views of Kuo rather than the more moderate opinions of Dunlap. H e not only rejected the existence of instincts but in his effort to emphasize the importance of environmental conditioning denounced the inheritance of any capacities, tendencies, temperaments, mental constitutions or characteristics as the grossest of superstitions. O n occasion this became an awkward position because of the obvious hereditary etiology in feeble-mindedness. Just how much such extreme views may be ascribed to an effort to hold the attention of the public is not known. Watson has admitted that he went beyond the evidence on the heredity issue in order to “shake the people out of their complacency.” Although Watson wrote that his rejection of heredity resulted from failure to discover instincts in infants, this claim does not fit chronologically since his denial of

‘Prominent among these writers were Bernard (19 ) , Kantor (l69), Ayers (7, 8 ) , Faris ( 9 6 ) , Josey ( 1 6 7 ) , and Allport (4) .

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instinct came years after his infant studies.e T h e negative result of these investigations was probably coupled with the logical attacks of Kuo and Dunlap to influence his thinking. Some critics have suggested that he merely bartered instincts for his scheme of three specific emotional patterns.

T h e notion of thinking as subvocal talking was originated by the philologist Max Miiller (241, 242). Miiller has cited Geiger and NoirC as partial forerunners of his theory. T h e motor conceptions advocated by Dunlap (86 ) have some relation to the theory of Watson, but the influence is not so clearly evident. Watson was unfamiliar with Miiller but was impressed by the peripheral direction taken by the Dunlap theories, and since Dunlap was influenced by Miiller, the indirect action of these philological hypotheses on Watson must be inferred. L. W. Max pointed out the close parallel between the controversy in Nature following the announce- ment of the Miiller doctrine and the debates that centered about Watson’s theory at the British Symposium on Thinking during the International Congress of Psychology in 1920 (214). Although Watson carefully differentiated manual organization, emotion or visceral organization, and laryngeal organization or subvocal talking as comprising all human higher-level reactions, he was much given to the emphasis of implicit motor reactions in the larynx as a substitute for the older conception of thinking as a function of cortical areas almost exclusively. Critics have often quoted him as believing that thinking was subvocal talking and nothing more. Watson apologized for this overstatement at the British Symposium, maintaining that if he had ever made the remark it was merely for the sake of clarity to students. In more serious writings (372, 374) Watson explained that thinking behavior was performed by the whole bodily musculature and that, even though the vocal mechanism becomes more and more important ontogenetically, mentation could not be limited to the larynx. While frequent oscillations and simplified popularizations obscure his real meaning, such a construction of Watson probably does him the most justice.

‘His major infant researches were terminated in 1920 while the 1924 edition of Psychology f r o m the Standpoint of a Behaviorist still retained the concept in modified form.

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11. Even such a cursory summary brings into striking

paucity of original ideas in the systematic formulations relief the of radical

behaviorists. T h e non-originality of Watsonian hypotheses is a thesis which may be easily maintained. Anti-instinctive writers included Loeb, Bohn, Herrick, Dunlap, Link, and Kuo among the predecessors, and a larger number among those who were attacking mental heredity simultaneously with Watson. Miiller and Dunlap antedated the muscular theory of thought, while the emphasis on the large r6le of the striped musculature in psychologically integrated functioning had been stressed by Judd and by authors of numerous motor theories of consciousness. T h e conditioned response emerged out of the laboratories of Pavlov and Bechterev. Behavior study was not a novelty and neither was the behavioral definition of psychology. T h a t philosophy of the relation of psyche and soina which may be called materialistic nonism, the philosophy most con- genial to behaviorists, was as ancient as Greek thought. T h e aboli- tion of the image was derived from Dunlap, and the theory of affection came in part by way of Stutnpf and Woolley. Finally, disbelievers in introspection as an accurate scientific technique went back at least as far as Comte and included Mobius, Bechterev, Nuel, Bohn, et al. Originality, however, is not the only thing to consider in evaluating behaviorism ; behavioristic principles led to considerable experimental work as well as to many controversies.

Chief among those to whom Watson was indebted was Dunlap whose major contributions to behaviorism were on the problems of images ( 8 6 ) , introspection (84), and instincts (88, 89). T h e motor theory of thought developed by Dunlap bears some relation to that of Watson, but the influence was less direct and the original modifications by Watson more apparent. O n most of these scores Watson has admitted his debt (382). Undoubtedly the years of association between the two men at the Johns Hopkins University account for these interacting influences, though the effect Watson may have had on Dunlap is less evident and the latter has emphati- cally repudiated the speculative extravagances of behaviorism. Yet, though he has been inclined to disavow any paternity, Dunlap may justly be called the spiritual parent of radical beha~iorism.~ T h e

~ ~

‘Professor Lovejoy recalls Dunlap’s reply when confronted with the

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WILLARD HARRELL A N D ROSS HARRISON 38 1

attitude of the one was that of a critical behaviorist, the other of a radical or pure behaviorist who took embryonic ideas and pushed them relentlessly, if courageously, to their logical conclusions. This judgment may be borne out by the development from cautious and tentative treatment in moderate hands of each and every one of the major hypotheses in behaviorism to their final dogmatic exprrs- sion by Watson. T h e recent demise of radical behaviorism gives mute testimony to the barrenness of slowly evolving theories when they find their terminal or logically extreme utterance, from which there is possible no further progression but only a reaction.

W e have had occasion already to indicate some of his vacillations on controversial matters, including shifts of opinion from one time to another on the laryngeal theory of thought and the varying degrees of certainty with which he faced the problem of body and mind. In all cases the last decade of his professional writing saw a movement leftward, a more radical and more positive statement of belief. Theory became fact. I n the beginning psychologists had been asked to ignore the study of conscious processes; at the last they, and the public at large, were informed in no uncertain terms that there were no such phenomena and that with the progress of materialistic science the old issues would become meaningless as they were engulfed by the newer knowledge of physiology and behavioristic psychology. T h e seeming novelty of Watson’s denial of consciousness was spurious and largely a novelty of manner rather than of content, but the fact persists nevertheIess that the opiniative statements of personal philosophical beliefs, which came to be characteristic of Watson in his pronunciamentos to an enraptured lay audience, were altogether misleading.

T r u e to his Darwinian and his functional heritage, Watson initially published elaborate lists of instincts and only performed a oolte face after the attacks of Dunlap and Kuo. His works present chronologically an ever decreasing enthusiasm for instinct which was reinforced by the introduction into psychology of the conditioned response. Turning to introspective technique, one finds that originally his position was clear and irrevocable. Introspection was in

statement by Watson that he was the father of behaviorism, “The paternity, if true, was entirely inadvertent.” But this would not be the first time that a father had thrown up his hands aghast at the waywardness of his progeny.

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cult usage and prevented rigid experimental rechecking of findings because subjects must be trained in its occult ways before desirab!e results could be obtained ; consequently its continued use was tantn- mount t o admitting that psychology could never take its rightful place among the biological sciences. Later some of the behaviorists by means of camouflages readmitted a species of introspection by the backdoor : the subject’s instructions could be called “verbal audi- tory stimulation” and his introspective report “language behavior.” In justice to Watson and his fight against structuralistic sterility, it must be admitted that, while verbal reports were shown to be a practical necessity in many kinds of psychological experiments, W a t - son succeeded in persuading his colleagues of the desirability of demoting introspection in the strict sense to a secondary r6le in ordinary laboratory procedure.

Curiously enough, in Behavior which was published in 1914, Watson opposed the then little known Pavlovian method as a substitute for the discrimination box in investigations of the sensory capacity of animals. W i t h a journal article in 1916 (364) and the later publication of P s y c h o l o g y from the Standpoint of n Behaviorist, Watson welcomed the conditioned reaction into his system; by 1924 with the appearance of Behaaiorism, he had evolved to the point of placing the burden of emphasis in treating habit and personality upon the conditioned reaction. A minor alteration of interest is evident from his earlier and more sympathetic treatment of psychoanalysis as contrasted with his later castigations of Freud and all his works as modern medical Voodooism. One need not, however, be too severe with either sudden or gradual oscillations by a leader of psychological thought in a period characterized by such a deep unrest that it has been the rule, not the exception, for theorists and system-builders constantly to change their positions, moulting old opinions in their course.

Regardless of occasional thrusts at psychoanalysis, there existed a curious and paradoxical sympathy, a certain striking compatibility between the original radical behaviorist and Freud. A number of passages in Watson’s writings may be quoted to bear out the actuality of this threadlike but nevertheless sure bond between two rival and presumably diametrically opposed psychoIogists. H e professed a constant and absorbing interest in the activities of the analysts and admitted the stimulating effect of Freudian teachings on all

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psychologists and psychiatrists (378, pp. 95-96; 80, p. 93). H e was very sympathetic in a review of E. B. Holt’s Freudian W i s h . Holt had suggested the wish as a psychological unit, and Watson expressed himself as favorably disposed providing the wish could be translated in terms of motor set. Freud and Watson were in harmony in their mutual insistence on the genetic approach in understanding adult behavior, stressing the great importance of affective responses of the infant for personality formation, although from the somewhat different standpoints of mental mechanisms and physiological basis. Again, in the Watsonian trinity of primary emotions love was so broadly interpreted as to be, for all practical purposes identical with the l ibido. A continued interest in Freud is indicated in Watson’s autobiography (382).

T h e Watson article which more than any other distinctly bears the psychoanalytic stamp was T h e Psychology o f W i s h Fulf i l lment (365), published in 1916 in the Scientific M o n t h l y . This article, which explains and illustrates the Freudian concept of wish fulfillment with obvious enthusiasm, now reads like the lay commentary of a Freudian exponent! Readers of T h e Psychological Care of the I n f a n t a n d C h i l d may recall how mothers were cautioned against overly affectionate displays toward their young offspring. T h e origio e t f o n s of this preventative against familial fixations may be found in the Scientific M o n t h l y article :

In childhood the boy often puts himself in his father’s place; he wishes that he were grown like his father and could take his father’s place, for then his mother would notice him more and he would not have to feel the weight of authority. The girl likewise often becomes closely attached to her father and wishes her mother would die (which in childhood means to disappear or go away) so that she could be all in all to her father . . . now and then we find a young man whose mother has long since died who can find little attraction in the girl with whom he associates. He is totally unaware of the cause of his apathy and would probably be the first one to scoff at the true explanation. In a similar way adults may become too much attached to children. . . , When I have expressed these views I have been often indignantly asked if parents should not caress their children. Of course I answer “yes,” but certainly if Freud has taught us anything, it is to give heed to our relations with our children. Overindulgence in caresses

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is f a r worse for their future happiness and poise than is overindulgence in material things (365, pp. 486-487).

In a paper on The UnverbaIized in Human Behavior (371), Wat- son analyzed the Unconscious of the psychoanalysts according to a physiological schema, equating or reducing it to his concept of unverbalized organization of reactions. Actually what happened was that for the Unconscious another abstraction impressively entitled the Unverbalized was substituted ; the main difference lay in the fact that the one was conceived on the basis of a speculative metapsychology while the other was founded on a speculative physiology. Another possible source of the Freudian entelechy was suggested when verbal organiaation is blocked-as in the case of an individual in whom there are simultaneously present an impulse to say a girl’s name in a love affair and an impulse to refrain- and only the visceral organization appears with such manifestations as blushing and incoherent sounds.

One may compare also the theory of affection which equates pleasure and displeasure with the tumescence and detumescence of the mucous membranes of the body surface, a theory which sounds like the contribution of a biologically-conscious psychoanalyst like Kempf. Relating affective tone to the tissues of the reproductive organs and related erogenous zones such as the mouth and nipples opens the door to such typical analytic explanations as deriving the pleasures of smoking from infantile suckling. Watson says of thumb-sucking that, since the lips belong to the erogenous areas, thumb-sucking may be considered a sexual response, “using this word in its broad modern sense” (387, p. 134).

Some amazingly Freudian passages are contained in Psycholoijy from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist. Even friendship is given a sexual twist :

T h e second element underlying judgments of personality . . . is the sexual o r emotional one, sex being used here not in the popular sense but in the modern psychopathological one. When the element is strongest-that is, when the speaker o r associate (the stimulus) brings out these positive reaction tendencies, the popular chaiacterization is put into a little different words. T h e man or woman has a “pleasing,” “thrilling,” or “engrossing” personality. Friendships a r e almost instantaneously begun largely upon the basis of this

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element. It must be recalled that according to modern usage this kind of reaction tendency is aroused not only by members of the opposite sex but also by members of the same sex (374, p. 415).

Reconciliations of psychoanalysis with a more objective psychology were attempted by Holt (133) and Kempf (176). Kempf tried t o erect a physiological framework for Freudian mental dynamisms which would be acceptable to the organically-minded physician. Watson once commended him on his “whole rich field of observation” (372, p. 345), and in reciprocation Kempf expressed his approval of Watson’s affective theory, declaring it identical with his own except that Watson ignored the “neutralization of affective disturbance” ( 176, p. 78). Sporadically there have appeared other reconciliations which have essayed the transformation of such Freu- dian mechanisms as sublimation into behavioristic language. One of the most interesting of these from the historical standpoint has been the activity of the early objectivist Scriptures in suggesting some rather unconvincing biological foundations for the tripartite divisions of the libido (317).

O n many, such as the position favoring environment over heredity, the last word has not been said, and may not be for many generations. The instinct doctrine is still highly unpopular in this country and the term avoided by fastidious psychologists ; nevertheless Watson’s extreme anti-hereditarian stand has not been widely accepted. An appraisal of the work on heredity and environment would be entirely too sanguine an undertaking in this place, but reviews of the experimental literature by Schwesinger (315), Jennings ( 165), and Holmes (130) demonstrate unequivocally the specificity of the problem. Their matured views only serve to emphasize again the complexity of the whole issue and the constant interaction of the two factors in all life behavior, to the neglect of any hypothesis which would weight either member of the equation disproportionately.

T h e theory of three primary emotions may be an approximation to the facts, but the sources of error in Watson’s pioneer investigations have been pointed out by Sherman (319), who showed experimentally how difficult it was for even experienced observers to agree

Wha t is the experimental history of Watson’s proposals?

*In his autobiography Scripture tells the story of his conversion to Freud ( 3 1 8 ) .

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on the nature of the emotion portrayed by infants or on the stimulating situation which produced the behavior pattern, and furthermore showed to what a large extent the emotion named is determined by a knowledge of the stimulus. Davies (64) , moreover, has criticized the hypothesis from the standpoint of the clinician. T h e observations of Bryan (36) indicated that so-called emotional behavior patterns are no more than part reactions of the complete repertory of infants and that the responses probably are common to many other varieties of stimulation than those set forth by Watson. T h e most comprehensive studies of infant life are the observations of Pratt, Nelson, and Sun (282), who failed to confirm any discrete emotional patterns in the neonate but found instead a great deal of mass or random movement characteristic of most reactions. These findings are also confirmed by Irwin (147).

In a review of the present status of the conditioned response Hul l (135) considers conditioned reactions as possible prototypes of all learning in his own more involved theories, hut criticized the narrow reflexological principles of Watson. T h e work of Coghill (52) is generally interpreted as showing the improbability of building up the complexities of behavior-trends from reflexes and simple muscle reactions. O n the other hand Razran (286) and Hilgard ( 1 2 9 ~ ) have cited numerous instances in the literature of the conditioning of voluntary responses from Bechterev to the present.

Watson’s insistence that thinking is a function of the whole organism and his emphasis on the motor side of the neural flux have been largely supported by experimental findings. G. L. Free- man (103) has summarized a great body of work, including his own, which demonstrates the value of muscular tension and pro- prioceptive reinforcement in mental life generaily. Further evidence along the same line has been furnished by Golla and Antonovitch (110). Duffy (79) and h r i a (206) have indicated the relation between emotional upset and muscular hypertension, while out of his research Jacobson ( 148) has evolved a muscular relaxation therapy. Jones (166) has presented some slight indirect evidence for behavioristic explanations of perception. M a x (214-216), experi- menting with deaf mutes, found action currents indicating finger contractions while his subjects were dreaming or were being exposed to external stimulation. H e could detect dreams because they

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coincided with activity of the fingers, whereas in the normal control group galvanometric deflections were absent.

T h e problem of the dependence of thinking upon the speech musculature has undergone a long experimental h i ~ t o r y . ~ Thorsen’s conclusions that tongue movements do not necessarily accompany thinking have frequently been accepted by textbooks, but actually none of the earlier experiments was decisive because of the inadequate mechanical systems employed for registration of implicit speech activity. T h e painstaking work of Jacobson (149-159, using re- fined electrical methods for the first time, has confirmed the implicit activity of the speech muscles for verbalized thought. Extending his observations to other muscle segments, he has shown that thinking in terms of visual images involved the ocular muscles and thinking dealing with parts of the skeletal musculature tended to involve those parts in minimal amounts. All thought is not verbal in the sense of involving the speech muscles implicitly, but all thought seems to be broader than brain activity-mentation is not confined to closed brain circuits but specific neuromuscular regions are involved. I n confirmation of Jacobson stand not only Max but Stoy (327) and Totten (348). T h e latter, using a photographic technique, secured preponderantly positive results for the extrinsic ocular muscles. Eye movements such as would be required in the perception of an object occurred in visual imagery of that object. Stoy by means of a keratometer has shown that eye movements occur when subjects think of spatial relations. In short it appears that Wat - son’s belief that thinking involves muscular activity has the weight of experimental evidence.

One aspect of Watsonian behaviorism remains for brief evaluation, and that concerns the personality of the man who has been called the most conspicuous reooltk in the history of psychology- John B. Watson. For when all is said and done, behaviorism was inaugurated and propounded mainly by Watson and was for a long time a one-man movement. A study of the personality and development of Watson would throw searching light on the movement. Hence the fact that Watson at one time confessed that he had wanted

‘Mechanical methods of recording brought divergent results, mainly positive, from the work of Curtis ( 5 9 ) , Courten ( 5 6 ) , Wyczoikowska (423), Reed (287), and Clark ( S O ) , but negative findings from Krall ( 1 8 3 ) and Thorsen ( 3 3 3 ) .

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to be a medical scientist (365) yields us some explanation for the predominatingly physiological tone of all his writings. In a letter to Diehl he spoke of his embarrassment over introspective questions when serving as a psychologicaI subject. Carr in conversation has recalled his “objective temperament” and spoken of his annoyance as a young instructor in having to ask students for the introspective reports which were called for in laboratory manuals. More than objective, he was direct, practical, with a preference for the usable and an inclination to make something simple out of problems inher- ently knotty and abstruse. For a study of the interaction of his personality and his development in psychology one might profitably probe his anti-theological animus, his later contempt for the academic type of man, and the prodigality and profuseness of his popularizations. Nowhere was Watson more simpliste than in his stand on consciousness and in his attempted elimination from psychology of the psychic. This was carried to such an extent and put forth with such vigor that nayve readers of his popular effusions might easily have been misled into thinking that all the main problems of psychology were solved. Watson is a prime example of the influence of the temperament of a man on the history and the development of a science. T h e results of his later development, however, were more influential with the public than with psychologists, who have accepted him with ever-increasing reservations. Paralleling this last phase, though he continued research for some time after entering the advertising business, his experimental work tended to decline. Watson eventually exhausted his interest in psychological proselytiz- ing so that he reached the inevitable conclusion-complete with- drawal from psychology.

Watson started out as a careful worker in animal psychology, a sound scientist, and sufficiently cautious in drawing conclusions ; only later did he develop into an incautious theorizer, jumping at conclusions without warrant of experimental fact. T h e increasing publicity for his ideas coupled with his entrance into the advertising business, so far removed from academic life, was responsible for his exhortation and extremism as exemplified in his anti-hereditarianism, his prophecies and “experimental ethics,” and in his activity as an evangelist urging his clients on to the “glories of redemption through reconditioning.” It might not be altogether ad hoc reasoning to say that even in his years as a very capable and enterprising laboratory

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scientist there were suggestions of the practical man of affairs in laboratory harness. Any such latent tendencies were fully realized with Watson’s emergence as an advertising executive, and indeed the exuberancy of his popularizations may be attributed to the common hyperbole of advertising statements. In support it should be recalled that he entered advertising in 1920 and that it was precisely in the twenties that behaviorism enjoyed its greatest vogue. One may be referred to the changes in his systematic position and even in his style of writing from the relatively conservative and guarded methodological behaviorism of Behawior to the flagrant dogmatism of Behwiorisrn. Mortimer Adler was once unkind enough to call him-and perhaps with some justice when applied to his later period--“the Billy Sunday of psychology.” In 1929 Jastrow (162) declared that the present status and claims of Watson were an outgrowth of advertising. If we may folIow these writers, instead of “science in advertising,’’ psychologists were presented with the rather less commendable spectacle of advertising in science.1°

Certain stock objections against Watson are usually raised by all who write critically on the subject. One is the epistemological difficulty of how the thinking behaviorist knows anything if conscious processes are not recognized. If one is uncharitable enough to construe Watson literally, one may very well inquire how the thinking behaviorist accounts for his thinking since he knows nothing about it from an awareness of his own inner speech because such

10 I t is only fair to give Watson’s defense which, written subsequent to these lines, somewhat weakens their strength. “Very shortly after leaving Johns Hopkins, W. W. Norton . . . got hold of me and practically forced me to write up a course of lectures I was giving for Everett D. Martin at the Cooper Institute. . . . This was strictly a rush job. . . . Later they were rewritten as ‘Behaviorism.’ “ ‘Psychological Care of Infant and Child’ was another book I feel sorry

about-not because of its sketchy form, but because I did not know enough to write the book I wanted to write. I feel that I had a right to publish this, sketchy as it is, since I planned never to go back into academic work. . . .

“I had learned how to write what the public would read and since there was no longer an opportunity for me to publish in technical journals, I saw no reason why I should not go to the public with my wares. Yet these articles have brought criticism greater than the offense I believe, from no less a person than President Angel1 of Yale. His Commencement Day Address at Dartmouth some years ago left me with no bitterness but rather with a poignant sadness. I just wonder whether he or other of my colleagues confronted with my situation would not have sold himself to the public” (382, pp. 280-281).

This book still shows its hasty origin.

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awareness is impossible by hypothesis. In saying psychology should limit itself to observation, behaviorism would seem guilty of begging the question, for observation involves the same problem as consciousness. In supposedly ejecting consciousness from psychology Watsonian behaviorism projected a philosophy equally undemon- strable, because the doctrine that only physical reality can be known is in itself a philosophical assumption. Furthermore, a flat denial of consciousness and a curt dismissal of the mind-body problem constitute no answer and solve no problem, except for the dissenter. Such a stand, moreover, limits the scope of psychology. T h e behavioristic attitude runs into innumerable difficulties such as recon- ciling its position with the conventional psychology implicit in law, ethics, art, and literature. It seems equally untenable in psychopathology where all the behaviorist offers are faulty habit formation and certain indeterminant rubrics-reaction-pattern, conditioned response, behavior cues, habit distortions-in place of the serviceable if mentalistic dynamisms commonplace in the psychiatric repertory. I n other fields radical behaviorism offered simplifications of problems of long-standing with a tendency to identify physical concomitants with the experimental and thus to explain it away. Hence a thought is not a thought but a muscle reaction, and the Jimian stream of consciousness becomes the Watsonian stream of neuromuscular activity. I n short, too much of behaviorism was unverified and unverifiable hypothesis, and Watson was inconsistent in clamoring for facts and at the same time inventing theories faster than facts could be assembled.

Every conceivable variety of opinion has been exercised on the subject. Rabid partisanship on the one hand and vituperative abuse on the other have been characteristic of a major portion; a great deal may be put down to misunderstanding or to an unfamiliarity with the breadth and variety of the literature. Sometimes this unfamiliarity extended to the writings of Watson, which should be viewed in their entirety, for we have seen how his position vacillated extensively ; to criticize merely his more popular writing is to attack a straw man unjustly. I n the flood of comment behaviorism has been variously taken to be a method, a system of psychology, a program of research, a publicity act, a new science, and a philosophy. Among the misapprehensions which arose f rom an uncritical reading of Watson, none was less relevant than the charge of certain con-

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tributors to BehaePiorism : a Battle Line ( 178) that behaviorism was an attack on moral stability and might upset the ethical apple cart if ever fully accepted.ll There was also the tender-minded objection of Wallis (353) that the closed, scientifically understood, mechanistic universe of the behaviorists was not desirable for human beings. Such a universe might be satisfactory for material objects, but if all human behavior were reduced to prediction and formula he thought that there would no longer be any spontaneity or enjoy- ment in living. Allied to this objection was the affront to human dignity implied in reducing men to “muscle-twitch” machines, as exemplified in the frequently discernible latent content of many philosophical writers in their obvious recoil at being thought of as mere response mechanisms. Dunlap’s criticism that behaviorists, in their haste to accumulate data, sometimes actually forgot to be interested in behavior is noteworthy since he cites several convincing examples (91 ) . In his opinion behaviorism was primarily an attempt to short circuit the laborious procedure of experimental psychology. T h e difficulty is that a subject thinks, and his thinking changes his reactions to the stimulus. If we assume that the subject does not think or if such thinking is disregarded, the experiments are simplified and the interpretations very much so, but such simplified interpretations are damaging to the causally relevant facts.

Behaviorism was taken seriously mainly in this country. Only when discussion in periodicals began to wane here were there occasional reverberations abroad and these were chiefly hostile. Duncker (81 ) has adequately expressed the European viewpoint when he says of behaviorism that it represented an utter disregard for tradition and was a natural outgrowth of that American character which thinks that it can do anything if only it has the necessary energy and method. And in truth behaviorism was a typical juicy Arneri- canism. Where else could it have flourished? T h e literate popu- lation of the United States was ripe for it, for the buoyancy and optimism of latter-day Watsonianity were also characteristic of the economic scene before 1929. Moreover, its extreme antihereditarian views were along democratic lines, allowing great possibilities for reconditioning Everyman.

Behaviorism represented a new orientation in this country to the

UAn anxious anticipation echoed in various degrees by Russell (307), J. Laird (191), Roback (297) , Roberts (299 ) , and Wickham (411).

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younger psychologists who had no taste for Titchenerian introspection and little more for the compromise position of the functionalists. Behaviorism was tough-minded and promised miracles, and in the hands of Watson it became a moral faith in science, “a religion to take the place of religion.” T h e ironic fact remains, however, that the more crusading Watson became, the more his science passed over into pseudo-science, taking dogmatic stands on little evidence and systematically denying other explanatory possibilities.

I n order that the ledger appear not too unbalanced, quotations could be cited from even the severest critics of Watson to show the debt which all psychologists owe him. It is not uncommon to find an otherwise highly unfavorable commentator like Berman (18) crediting behaviorism with ejecting the anecdotal method from comparative psychology, though parenthetically it might be observed that this was accomplished more by the objective experimental methods out of which behaviorism grew than by behaviorism itself. Koffka (180) is one of many who has praised Watson’s experiments with infants. It is certainly true that in various fields Watson was a trail blazer in introducing objective methods of research; he was a pioneer not only in comparative psychology but in stressing the psychological importance of the voluntary musculature, in investigat- ing the instinctive-affective life of the infant, and in spreading the experimentally fruitful conditioned reaction method. In losing him, psychology was deprived of one of its boldest, most ingenious, and most original research workers; and we must beware of confus- ing the excesses of behavioristic doctrine with the high qualities of Watson as a laboratory scientist.

111.

Although the impression that Watson represented the whole behavioristic movement still lingers, an examination into the pertinent literature reveals a surprisingly large array of behaviorists and quasi-behaviorists and an even larger number whose thinking has been affected by the main currents of behaviorism. Chief among these is A. P. Weiss who in one controversy after another acted as first lieutenant to Watson. T o such an extent did he play the valiant henchman that his r6le may fairly be compared to the auxiliary relation between Huxley and Darwin in the wrangles

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that arose out of the evolutionary theory of the last century. Weiss deviated only slightly from orthodox behaviorism ; his main contribution has been in giving behaviorism a philosophical and formal setting where Watson had been content with the barest outlines of any philosophical foundation. More ambitious philosophically, Weiss sought to lay the ghost of the mind-body problem for scientific psychology and in so doing to obtain for psychology a place in the framework of the natural Sciences. I n his major work, A Theoretical Basis for Human Behmior (396), he urged that psychologists recog- nize only those assumptions of a physical world that were implicit in other natural sciences. His molecular view considered the movement of protons and electrons as the only kind of activity and the individual was treated as “a locus in the movement continuum of the physical world.” Yet psychology should not be content with the biophysical aspects of behavior but should study also what he called the biosocial relations, or the interaction of the individual with his social milieu. T h e verbal athletics employed by Weiss and other behaviorists to avoid conventional language uncomfortably remind one of the awkward and ponderous neologisms of the Germrln Objectivists, who found themselves in the same dilemma several decades before when they attempted to put their anti-mentalistic tenets into practice. At the inception of behaviorism Watson was unwilling to accept such barbarous jargon, but later his followers were driven time and again to the use of clumsy circumlocutions. T h e resulting contributions to our understanding have been little mare than the transformation into behavioristic terminology of ordinary psychological nomenclature with the net consequence that the language sounds more objective but the facts remain the same.

Hunter is another outstanding psychologist who is definitely behavioristic, even though he may have chosen to call his system anthroponomy to distinguish it from Watsonian behaviorism. Anthro- ponomy, which is defined as the science of the laws that govern human action, seems to add little except another name to the already existing babel of tongues among the psychological schools. Its claim to a school lies in certain deviations of its founder from other brands of behaviorism. T o Hunter consciousness appears reducible to a relation between sensory process and language, and language is understood broadly to include any symbolic response. Thought is distinguished from trial and error behavior by language formulations

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of the problems, and these formulations are either from instructions given by the subject himself or by objects or persons in the environment. Hunter like Watson has vacillated, for in the 1923 edition of General Psychology ( 137) both consciousness and behavior were the subject matter of psychology and introspective data were employed throughout the text, but with the publication of Human Behavior (142) in 1928 the subject matter included only behavior and the introspective data had been converted into behavioristic terminology.

Tolman, whose work has been praised as “behaviorism come of age,” is an eclectic whose purposive behaviorism includes increasing emphasis on Gestalt-psychologie, but he still maintains the natural science approach so favored by Watson. While nominally behavioristic, the Tolman system is peculiarly distinctive and sui generis. Tolman observes a differentiation between molar and molecular behavior and favors the former as the primary subject matter of psychology. This contrasting of larger non-physiological units and patterns of behavior, or behavior at the socio-psychological level, with the successive reduction of behavior downward through physiology to its elements in biochemistry and physics had previously been drawn by Broad (35) .I2 T h e demarcation between Tolman and his behavioristic fellows may be seen in his admission of such mentalistic terminology as sensation, image, and “raw feels.” Consciousness for Tolman has a “behavioral meaning” in the moment of readjustment or re-gestalting. Learning is conceived as a dynamic process and may be either conditioned reaction, trial and error, or an inventive adjustment, following an hierarchal arrangement. Purpose refers to the “persistence until” aspect of behavior and is not a mental entity or special functioning. This idea of purpose as goal-oriented behavior may be found first in Perry (269), but is more elaborately developed by Tolman. Tolman’s system is too complex and b d i n g in its nomenclature to be fully discussed here, but it may be recalled that Tolman views all his central concepts such as purpose and cognition as functional determinants of behavior which are inferred as Gestalten but are no more mysterious or transcendent of the physical world than the configurations of the physicist. T w o other

=Antecedents of the view may be found in Holt (133) , De Laguna (67) , Kantor (174) , and more especially in the biosocial-biophysical distinction of Weiss (396).

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purposive behaviorists who have become articulate are Muenzinger (240) and Pepper (262) ; the latter in an early article (261) wrote in defense of radical behaviorism but later adopted the purposive variety of Tolman.

As Williams (415) has pointed out, these various species of behaviorism differ sharply on several points. It was one of the original charges of Watson against structural and other psychic psychologies that there could only be hopeless disagreement among them. H e was later to discover that there was an almost equal lack of agreement among behaviorists, even though it may be granted that objective methodology is more favorable to an ultimate settle- ment of dispute than subjective techniques. Hunter admits purpose and Tolman makes a cardinal issue of hormic strivings where others like Watson or Weiss either deny or ignore their existence. Instinct was virtually denied by Watson but admitted by Hunter and Tolman. T h e reflexological learning theories favored by Wat - son and Hunter are energetically denied by Lashley, and the molecular behavior of Watson and Weiss is replaced by the molar behavior of Tolman. All these writers are unanimous in defining psychology as the study of behavior and in excluding all but objective methods of investigation ; and the majority agree in stressing speech reactions in overcoming the difficulties in explaining away consciousness.

In China, Kuo (190) has recently formulated a new theory called prnxiology which, in his opinion, is the truly radical behaviorism, in place of Watson’s, for Watson was confused and changeable and almost too obeisant to traditional psychology. Kuo at first vigorously defended the pure behaviorism of the master and produced some of the most anti-hereditarian writings extant. H e has since developed a system even more revolutionary and extreme than the Watsonian theories. Evolving gradually from his early opposi- tion to teleological instinct (184, lSS), he now denies completely the validity of heredity in psychology and is opposed likewise to all such concepts as ideation, drive, insight, purpose, trial and error, and habit; “no single concept or nomenclature of the traditional psychology is of any use for the scientific description of behavior”

Because of his many neurological hypotheses and the objective slant of all his writings, Max Meyer has conventionally been listed as a behaviorist ; more precisely he might be designated a neurological

(188, pp. 191-192).

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behaviorist showing little direct influence from Watson. Another possible behavioristic candidate is Peterson, who studied under W a t - son at Chicago. Conscious processes were for him an inner aspect of organismic processes but possessed no causal efficacy in themselves. Sympathetic to a monistic or a t least an epiphenomena1 philosophy, he worked out behavioristic resolutions of such terms as idea, like, and will (193). His conception of forced adaptation in learning is reminiscent of Loeb’s tropism, except that it is moved up to a psychological plane (271). Two other prominent psychologists with behavioristic leanings are J. F. Dashiell and F. W. Allport. Dashiell has remained out of the controversial field, but he has developed several behavioral interpretations of traditional concepts and his textbook has definitely behavioristic foundations (62). T h e social psychology of Allport (4) contains fragments of both behaviorism and psychoanalysis. A younger group of ac- knowledged behaviorists who have more recently emerged with analyses of ancient psychological problems include Gray, Rexroad, Copeland, Markey, Norris, and Woolbert. Gray particularly has been an ardent advocate of radical behaviorism but has varied several of the older interpretations. H e has written in addition a manual of educational psychology from the standpoint of the strict objectivist ( 115). Rexroad is another author who has published one of the few thoroughly behavioristic textbooks for college students (293).

Many psychologists following McDougall and Pillsbury have defined their science as the study of behavior. Among the first of these were Bagley and Colvin, who in 1913 published H u m a n Be- havior ( 9 ) , wherein psychology was defined in the new mode, but with that their concessions ended. T h e same is more or less true of Givler’s Psychology, the Science of H u m a n Behavior (108). Kate Gordon defined psychology behaviorally in 19 17, although hers was less a behaviorism than a hybrid product which admitted both structural and behavioral elements (111). T h e Science of H u m a n Be- havior (257), an ambitious book by Maurice Parmalee, attempted to erect a kind of super-science that studied behavior psychologically but also from the standpoints of sociology and biology as well; his inclusion of conscious data, however, would preclude his admission to the ranks of the orthodox behaviorists. Leary produced a textbook which gave psychoanalysis a behavioristic twist but it is not

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consistently behavioristic enough to be classified as more than quasi- Watsonian (197). From a psychiatric outlook Paton published in H u m a n Behavior (258 ) a volume which construed consciousness “biologically” and was in general mildly favorable to Watsonian reforms. General Psychology in T e r m s of Behavior (325), an introductory book by Smith and Guthrie, defined psychology in Se- havioral terms and emphasized behavior throughout but admitted conscious phenomena. Guthrie, who has recently recorded his early indebtedness to Singer, when writing alone has followed Watson more consistently, showing distinct leanings for pure mechanism and stubbornly defending the conditioned reaction theory of learning (121, 122). Such a catalogue of names could be continued indefi- nitely, but the point requires little laboring: the change from a conception of psychology as the study of mind and consciousness to the present widespread acceptance of the behavioral definition .is fundamental is obvious, at least in this country.

I n his critique of behaviorism Roback (297) has included many who are not usually considered behaviorists. A little known writer, S. Bent Russell, was classified as behavioristic because of his occasional cavils against introspective pursuits. His main interests, however, were the formation of neurological hypotheses to explain mental phenomena. T h e case of Yerkes is somewhat ambiguous. H e might be classed as a methodologica’l behaviorist, as Roback suggests, despite his earlier position as the author of a conventional textbook with structural elements. Curt Richter, like Yerkes, is a methodological but non-controversial behaviorist who, more recently, has passed over almost completely into physiological research.

There were few sympathetic philosophical writers who were mildly behavioristic. T h e majority of this group were either active members or belonged on the fringe of that school of philosophy called critical or neo-realism. Among these was E. P. Frost, who was considered by Moore as having anticipated Watson by a few months in his treatment of consciousness as merely physiological processes subject to mechanistic causation. R. B. Perry was a critical realist who as early as 1909 expressed the opinion that the “mind within” was an incomplete expression of mind and that we must look PO the “mind without,’’ which is to say mind as an observable object, for the neglected evidence that is necessary for any rounded knowledge of mind in its totality (266). It was Perry who, before Tol-

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man, interpreted purpose behaviorally in a mechanistic manner, and it is the nucleus of this idea which became an integral part of Tolman’s purposive behaviorism. Another who wrote often in a philosophic vein was Bode. H e was favorable in his earlier writings but cannot be looked upon as anything but a partial behaviorist, i f that, because he reversed hys stand in later articles to criticize all radical behaviorism. Bowden, another of the philosophic group with an inclination toward neo-realism, was somewhat too vague for inclusion. H e considered mind a relation and a generalization from the facts, and drew an analogy between consciousness and the gravi- tation concept in physics. I n several skirmishes with the enemy De Laguna was one of the most ardent champions of behaviorism and more than any other of those with a philosophical background was sympathetic to Watson; however she made it clear that she would admit consciousness and even a proper use of the introspective technique. Unlike other writers in this group, epistemology was not her sole reason for interest in behaviorism; she developed several behavioristic interpretations of psychological categories, including sensation, perception, and emotion.

Kantor, who once wrote as a functionalist, developed a system of psychology which insisted on the absolute inseparability of stimulus and response and stressed the interaction of the organism and objects in the social environment as the proper matter for psychological emphasis rather than a limiting of the field to comparatively simple biological events like reflexes. This of course was opposed to the molecular view of Watson, though it is noteworthy that in 1920 Kantor praised Watson whereas later he came to criticize him. Al- though the relation of Kantor’s organismic psychology to radical behaviorism is not so evident as some other systems, if put into the skeleton of modern theory it must be thought of as a quasi-behaviorism. G. H. Mead in his last years called himself a social behaviorist but his variety was far removed from Watsonian psychology. In Europe Newrath has postulated a Sozial-behaviorismus with a pre- dictive sociology as its ideal. PiCron in France has independently derived a modified behaviorism which included the early advocation of Pavlovian methods in mental science and the definition of psychology as the study of l e comportement; while PiCron has espoused such views since the beginning of the present century, he has done so neither with the vigor nor the insistence, and consequently the

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effect, that Watson exerted. His compatriot, Pierre Janet, has been described by McDougall as reconciled to a purely objective psychology as basic to a psychopathology which may some day consider all anomalies in terms of action and conduct (222, p. 17). I n an autobiographical sketch Janet has lent credence to this view by stating that for the last thirty years he has taught a form of beaviorisrn according to which “one must regard the phenomenon of consciousness as specialized conduct, a complication of the act which is super- imposed on the elementary conduct ” (159, p, 131).

Knight Dunlap and Adolf Meyer are two names one hesitates to mention in this connection, yet each has exerted influence on the movement and perhaps not been uninfluenced by it. T h e effect of Dunlap has been widespread in numerous ways, but he had diverged greatly from Watson on theoretical issues and his destructive forays against behavioristic doctrine, despite the objectivism of his own work and his critiques of introspection and instinct, make it doubtful if he may justly be classed with the general behavioristic tendency. If a characterization must be found, the category of critical behaviorist is suggested for his reaction psychology. T h e influential psychiatrist Adolf Meyer was associated with Watson in his last years at the Johns Hopkins, and he was one of the men to whom Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist was dedicated. As a basis for psychiatric practice Meyer developed independently a psychobiology which insisted on a factual and objective approach and denied the usefulness to medicine of any psychosomatic schism. His term “ergasia” seems equivalent to reaction or behavior, and his ergasii or psychobiological integration concept is evidently akin to the molar or biosocial behavior of Tolman and Weiss, though much more elaborated. Meyer, long before Watson, was interpreting psycho- pathic life in terms of the formation and systemization of habits and stressing the importance for medicine of a frankly biological view of the behavior of men which would be in its emphasis neither mind-shy nor body-shy. It is probable that he and Watson mutually influenced one another in their years of association together.

T h e essays of G. V. Hamilton toward an objective psychopathology which would utilize the methods of experimental psychology probably received some inspiration from the behavioristic movement. Like Kempf from the psychoanalytic school, E. B. Holt in his Freudian W i s h combined Freudian ideas and objective psychology, even though

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in some passages the writing had a more functional than a behavioristic tone. W. R. Wells showed an early inclination toward the new viewpoint but has since become severely critical; and Mur- sell, while sympathetic, has tended toward a middle of the road position. One of the most curious of the innumerable varieties was the “spiritual behaviorism” espoused by Reiser, who believed that behaviorism should avoid the pitfalls of mechanism and be open to a more idealistic interpretation. Finally Mary Whiton Calkins re- vamped her self-psychology into a more fashionable “truly psychological behaviorism” ; but if contrasted with radical behaviorism she, like Reiser and so many others who appropriated the term, would seem at the opposite pole from anything resembling the usual impression of a behavioristic psychologist. One must insist that many of these conceptions were behaviorism in name only, for if every author were accepted a t his word, behaviorism would be an amazing polyglot and agglomeration of theories and cross-currents which run the gamut of contradictory opinion; but fortunately the historian may evaluate the core of the movement and the central figures in its genetic unfolding with only minor consideration re- served for later divergences and accretions.

Behavioristic constructions of psychological problems were so popular that a representative list makes instructive reading because it suggests the extensive ramifications of the movement. Among the concepts which have most frequently been reworked in accordance with behavioristic principles are the following : consciousness, sleep, sensation, perception, intelligence, thinking, concept-formation, meaning, belief, instinct, purpose, desire, volition, and emotion.J3 T h e majority of these behavioristic expositions appeared in the

“Behavioristic interpretations, which do not include accounts in the more systematic treatises and textbooks, are found in the following refer- ences: consciousness, Hunter (139) , Tolman (343) , Markey (208) , Norris (253) , Lashley (195) , Weiss (391) ; sleep, Woolbert (420) ; sensation, D e Laguna (67) , Mursell (247), Tolman (338) ; perception, Kantor (170), Peterson (271) , De Laguna (67, 7 0 ) ; intelligence, Gray (113) , Norris (252) ; intellect, Woolbert (421) ; thinking, Dashiell (60, 62) , Hunter (139) ; ideas, Tolman (342) ; concept-formation, Gray (112) ; significant symbol, Mead (223) ; meaning, Wells, W . R. (405) ; belief, Wells, W . R. (406) ; Taylor ( 3 3 1 ) ; instinct, Kantor (169) ; purpose, Perry (267-269), Tolman (341) , Copeland (54) , Rexroad (294) ; desire, choice, Copeland (54) ; volition, Kantor (173) , Hunter and Hudgins (146) ; legal intent, Dashiell ( 6 3 ) ; emotion, Kantor (171), De Laguna (70), Tolman (339), Gray (114) , Woolbert (421) ; value, Pepper (260) ; jazz, Eggen (93) .

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twenties when behaviorism was a word to conjure with. Quite recently there has been a dearth of interpretations which were avowedly behavioristic, pointing rather definitely to the lack c,f vitality among the few remaining psychologists who are outright behaviorists.

T h e far-reaching influence of behaviorism has already been indicated, but much more has been indirect and less tangible, such as might come from the training of graduate students by psychologists of behavioristic bias. Besides Watson, there were Weiss, Lashley, Tolman, Max Meyer, Hunter, Peterson, Dashiell, and Kuo in China, to name a few, who have occupied important chairs and who may reasonably be expected to have indoctrinated their students in behaviorism. Outside of psychology, the social sciences have seen reverberations with Allport, Mead, and Newrath as notable examples; and in more metaphysical disciples there have been echoes of the behavioristic disturbance with the neo-realist current in contemporary philosophy and with such partially sympathetic philosophers as Bertrand Russell. I n psychopathology the time-spirit was reflected by such leaders of psychiatric thought as Meyer, Janet, Kempf, and Hamilton. Roback is the authority for the statement that behaviorism sporadically penetrated the fields of religion and value with such invasions as the behavioristic resolutions of belief and value by Taylor, Wells, and Pepper. There was bitter opposi- tion in certain religious circles because of the assumed threat of mechanistic psychology and philosophy to the institutions of church and family. How pronounced was the effect of Watson not only on professional scientists but on semi-scientific and popular writers is shown in Dorsey’s best-seller, W h y W e Behave Like Human Beings (76) . I t remained for Woodworth to record the ultimate in public reaction when he reminded us how reviewers on leading newspapers hailed the later works of Watson with such encomia as “perhaps this is the most important book ever written’’ and “it marks an epoch in the intellectual history of man” (419).

Behaviorism must be viewed now as essentially an historical development of the recent past. Watson has withdrawn from psychology, Lashley has become quiescent on controversial matters, and bath Peterson and Weiss are dead. Tolman has been drawn under the mantle of Gestalt and purposive psychologies and the resulting eclecticism is behaviorism in name only. Hunter and Kuo have

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forsaken the Watsonian orthodoxy but their deviations have at- tracted few followers, while the younger converts t o behaviorism have become strangely silent. Of recent years the volume of literature on behaviorism has dwindled into a barely perceptible stream, and psychologists have grown weary of the very words. A portion of the theory has been assimilated into the main body of psychology with consequent loss of identity as “behavioristic.” Radical bz- havioristic psychology in brief has been safely confined to that limbo of abandoned theories whence there is escape only through a process of theoretical reincarnation or resynthesis.

Behaviorism was in the beginning a methodology but later by proclamation became almost a science in itself, or at least a definitely schismatic system. T h e presumptuous claims of Watson, following some initial success, do not represent an isolated example of experi- menters who project comprehensive beliefs, pyramid hypotheses 3n inadequate facts, stretch and overconstruct theories ambitiously-in short, overshoot the mark. I n evaluating behaviorism a distinction must be made between appraisals as to its soundness and adequacy on the one hand and its stimulating effect on the other. A theoretical position need be neither original nor valid to be effective. Be- haviorism has unquestionably modified psychology by altering method and terminology; it fostered a reflexological theory of learning and a muscular theory of thought; led to an experimental child psychology with an accent on infant behavior ; emphasized environmental conditioning a t the expense of heredity, peripheral in contrast to central factors.

While more psychologists wrote against behaviorism than in favor of it, many concluded that there were some benefits to be derived from its seemingly startling proposals. Cavil at behaviorism as we may, its errors were probably more than overbalanced by its assets. If nothing else, the movement precipitated a large amount of controversy and for a while, through the blunderbuss polemical methods of Watson, made of psychology in America a vastly more colorful and interesting calling. W h a t is more important, it called forth a healthy re-examination of premises and methods. Behaviorism tried to explain and describe in bodily terms, keeping psychology firmly rooted to solid ground. I t signified a valiant if premature effort to remove all the mystery from mind. Whereas functionalism was only a partial and somewhat half-hearted movement away from a

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structural analysis which was too sterile and academic, behaviorism completed that evolution which moved slowly out of intellectual and speculative psychology through introspective analysis to the study of mental function and ultimately to the study of behavior. Artifi- cially dissected psychic entities were transformed by the functionalists into the more serviceable functional conceptions, but the attempt to reduce them to physical movement remained the unwel- come task of behaviorists. Hence the deep scrutiny of mind as structure became the pursuit of mind as function and finally, En- evitably, the emphasis evolved to the objective recording of overt behavior in its psychobiological functioning.

It is apparent that behaviorism has had something to do with mak- ing psychology more objective than it was at the turn of the century. T h e general tone of journal articles is less personal, more scientific, objective, quantitative. Behaviorism was probably not the sole cause, but out of all the controversies and Watsonian polemics some younger men got oriented in a different direction than they would have had there been no sound and fury. If the major r6le of introspection thirty or forty years ago is compared with its reduced r6Ie as verbal report in the literature of today, one is forced to concede much of the credit for the change to the much-abused behaviorists. Dunlap should be credited for his writings along these lines, but the greater publicity for Watson must be borne in mind.

Although many aspects of behaviorism were ill-advised, nevertheless i t was responsible in large measure for liberating American psychology from a cramping tradition because, as Hunter once said, Watson found the Achilles heel of the older psychology. Behs- viorism extended the methods of the animal laboratory into the broad territory of general psychology, helped to spread a more objective terminology and outlook, and persuaded psychologists to work more with behavior and performance than with a ghostly entity called consciousness. T h e behavioristic movement exerted a tremendous influence for good in changing the whole psychological emphasis away from subjectivity toward an objectivized, biologized psychology. For that service it may be forgiven its many evils.

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