Human DevelopmentResearch Paper

2011/02Heterogeneity

and Collective Actionfor Forest Management

Harini Nagendra

United Nations Development ProgrammeHuman Development ReportsResearch Paper

November 2011

Human DevelopmentResearch Paper

2011/02Heterogeneity

and Collective Actionfor Forest Management

Harini Nagendra

United Nations Development Programme

Human Development Reports

Research Paper 2011/02

November 2011

Heterogeneity and Collective Action for

Forest Management

Harini Nagendra

Harini Nagendra is Ramanujan Fellow at the Ashoka Trust for Research in Ecology and the Environment, India and

Asia Research Coordinator at the Center for the Study of Institutions, Population, and Environmental Change,

Indiana University, USA. E-mail: nagendra@atree.org; nagendra@indiana.edu

Comments should be addressed by email to the author(s).

Abstract

Heterogeneity influences the likelihood of collective action for forest management. Theoretical

examinations, focusing largely on economic heterogeneity, suggest that heterogeneity increases

the likelihood of collective action. Field research however indicates that heterogeneity, whether

in economic, social, or other dimensions, presents a challenge for collective action with

variations in perceptions of costs and benefits amongst different groups, high transaction costs

faced by the disadvantaged, decrease in trust because of differences in power hierarchies, and

challenges posed by differences in resource access. The costs of collective action tend to be

disproportionately borne by the poor, by women, and artisanal castes who are especially

dependent on forest products. Elite capture of benefits of community action can also further

exacerbate relative poverty and inequity. These challenges can be dealt with effectively by strong

local institutions and federations. Governments and donor agencies have had mixed success in

addressing heterogeneity, largely due to a tendency to engage in blueprint thinking, seeking

standardized large scale solutions.

Keywords: Inequity, Institutions, Poverty, Gender.

JEL classification: D63, Q23

The Human Development Research Paper (HDRP) Series is a medium for sharing recent

research commissioned to inform the global Human Development Report, which is published

annually, and further research in the field of human development. The HDRP Series is a quick-

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practitioners from around the world, as well as UNDP researchers. The findings, interpretations

and conclusions are strictly those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of

UNDP or United Nations Member States. Moreover, the data may not be consistent with that

presented in Human Development Reports.

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1. Introduction

Forests constitute critical habitat for humanity, providing a range of ecological and

environmental services including protection of biodiversity, sequestration of carbon,

provisioning of fresh air, renewal of soil fertility, and maintenance of hydrological flows. Rural

communities worldwide also depend on forests heavily, as these contribute significantly to their

livelihoods, providing basic needs, cash resources, and safety-nets during times of crisis

(Shackleton et al. 2007). Unfortunately, despite widespread recognition of the importance of

forests, it has been very difficult to tackle deforestation, which continues to represent a major

global challenge. Yet, there have been signs of hope in recent decades, with some recent global

datasets (FAO, 2011) and regional studies of forest change (Nagendra and Southworth, 2010)

pointing to a rising trend of reforestation in some parts of the globe as diverse as India, Costa

Rica and Estonia.

While decrease and degradation in forest cover has been closely linked to the impact of

local forest dependent communities, the acknowledgement of local communities as drivers of

positive change has been muted in comparison. Yet, as the global increase in the area under

community forests demonstrates, varied forms of participatory forest management are

becomingly increasingly influential globally (Agrawal 2007). It is also becoming

overwhelmingly clear that strict approaches to protection are economically costly and fraught

with social conflict, while community conservation - when effective - has a better likelihood of

being more locally accepted, providing greater economic and social benefits to the community,

and achieving some of the goals of conservation more easily than government parks can (Ostrom

and Nagendra 2006). It is therefore critically important for policy makers, planners, managers

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and donors to understand the conditions that can facilitate successful collective action for forest

management in different contexts around the world.

A number of scholars working on challenges of collective action have attempted to

address this challenge by identifying the variables that impact the likelihood of success of

collective action for the management of forests, pastures, fisheries, irrigation networks, and other

natural resources, using theoretical, experimental and field research methods. A central challenge

that continues to challenge scholars is to understand the role of heterogeneity in impacting the

likelihood of collective action. This issue is relatively well understood in irrigation systems

where much of the research has been focused in the past (Baland and Platteau 1998, 1999;

Baland et al. 2007; Bardhan and Dayton-Johnson 2001; Dayton-Johnson and Bardhan 2002). In

contrast, the impact of other types of heterogeneity, and of inequalities on forest management

remains less studied (Adhikari and Lovett 2006 a; Andersson and Agrawal forthcoming). This is

in large part because participatory forest management focused initially on achieving ecological

goals, and it is only in recent years that issues of economic development and equity have been

targeted by policy makers and analysts as “second generation” issues (Ghate 2006; McDermott

and Schreckenberg 2009).

Poverty remains the most studied of all group characteristics, especially because “the

poor and forests occupy the same space” (Sunderlin et al. 2008: 24). Also, issues of economic

heterogeneity are relatively easy to tackle using economic models, whereas modeling the impact

of other types of heterogeneity such as ethnic, social and gender variability has proved more

challenging. Other group characteristics are known to be critical to the success of cooperation

outcomes related to sustainability of forests. For instance, Chakraborty (2001) states that it is

possible for greater inequality in the distribution of agrarian resources, larger group size and

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increased ethnic diversity to constitute an obstacle to community cooperation, resulting in

increased degradation. Resource ownership also plays a role in determining incentives to

cooperation and the quality of local institutions, which is very important in order to prevent

perverse incentives for corruption and illegal harvesting that negatively impacts sustainability

(Gautam 2002).

Yet, the impact of heterogeneity on forest governance is highly contested, and some

scholars argue that heterogeneity can be dealt with quite effectively by institutions that craft

appropriate local rules (Ostrom 2000; Varughese & Ostrom 2001; Andersson and Agrawal

forthcoming). Developing a proper understanding of this issue is critical not only for scholars, as

many policy makers, planners and managers remain wary of taking on the challenge of applying

participatory approaches in contentious, fragmented areas with heterogeneous communities. On

the other hand, rapid and widespread implementation of community-based or participatory

projects are likely to either fail, or result in widespread elite capture, unless sufficient attention is

paid to tackling the challenge of heterogeneity (Baker 2000; Springate-Baginski et al. 2003;

Platteau 2004).

Given this background, this paper will review evidence about the determinants of the

cooperative outcomes related to sustainability, explore how political economy factors impact the

management of common resources, and assess whether externally driven initiatives that promote

decentralization can in turn have unintended consequences on heterogeneity and inequality

through mechanisms such as elite capture (Iversen et al. 2006; Pokharel 2008). The focus is to

understand how inequality and heterogeneity can adversely affect and in turn be impacted by

sustainable forestry resource management, especially in the context of rapid rates of

deforestation in many developing countries.

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2. Types of heterogeneity and levels of institutional impact

The continued debate on the impact of heterogeneity on collective action remains

unresolved in part because of a variety of aspects of heterogeneity that are quite different in

modes of action and influence, but often confused. Before entering into a detailed examination of

the evidence linking heterogeneity and collective action, it is consequently important to have a

better understanding of what heterogeneity itself can mean, and the kinds of indicators that can

be used to measure this in the field. Communities are not completely homogeneous units. Each

actor within a community will vary in his or her own perception of the costs and benefits of

community action, which will influence the degree to which they choose to participate in such

activities (Ostrom 1990; Varughese and Ostrom 2000). Yet, these perceptions of benefits and

costs are not transparent to researchers, who must therefore look for indicators of variations in

perception. Broadly, these can be treated as a combination of economic and social

heterogeneities, both within a community and between different communities.

At a more detailed scale, the most commonly used indicators of intra-community

heterogeneity examine differences in wealth, including heterogeneity in endowments (access to

land and common property resources), heterogeneity in entitlements (differences in agricultural

income and livestock holdings), and in economic interests (differences in the types of use of a

common property resource, whether for timber, firewood, or non wood forest products). Political

heterogeneity indicates the degree of agreement within a community on the legitimacy of

leaders, and is an important factor that determines the levels of trust in leadership (Vedeld 2000).

Heterogeneities in sociocultural backgrounds, such as caste and ethnic group can shape

differences in trust, social capital and world views on the importance of a forest, as well as the

need for sustainable collective or communal management (Bardhan and Dayton-Johnson 2001).

5

Power inequities can result from differences in caste, tribe, education, wealth, gender, or other

indicators of social status. Gender and age differences constitute perhaps the least addressed of

heterogeneity challenges, with women and youth often playing a particularly insignificant role in

decision making. To add to the complexity and challenges of such studies, many aspects of intra-

community equity and heterogeneity are often, but not always, related (Adhikari and Lovett 2006

a).

Heterogeneity between communities is also important. Certain occupational groups can

be differentially impacted by forest management, providing another important axis of

heterogeneity. For instance, timber dependent communities may be willing to fence off a forest

for a few years to wait to harvest trees, but Non Timber Forest Product (NTFP) collectors may

require continued access to the forest (Adhikari and Lovett 2006 a). Differences in location can

be important, with users who live near a forest more willing to participate in forest monitoring

activities compared to users who live away from a forest (Varughese and Ostrom 2000; Adhikari

and Lovett 2006 b). Some families may have access to additional forest patches, and may thus be

more willing to set aside one area for protection, while other families that are solely dependent

on one area may be less willing (or able) to commit to complete protection. Some groups, such

as the educated or youth who work in nearby towns and cities, may have a greater level of access

to external agencies such as political parties, who can influence their levels of bargaining power

within the community. Finally, certain villages may benefit from the presence of NGOs and

environmental advocacy groups who can help in crafting appropriate rules to tackle challenges of

collective action (Ghate and Nagendra 2005; Adhikari and Lovett 2006 a).

Different types of heterogeneity can make their impact felt at different levels of the

institution - at the operational choice level, the collective choice level, or the constitutional

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choice level (Ostrom 2000; Agrawal and Ostrom 2001). At the operational level, for instance,

rules that determine the levels of firewood can make allowances for heterogeneity, for instance

permitting women, poor families and disadvantaged castes to harvest additional allowances of

fuelwood to support their families. Alternatively, operational rules can exacerbate

heterogeneities by disadvantaging specific livelihood users such as blacksmiths by disallowing

charcoaling activities. Such institutional flexibility can be adversely impacted by expectations of

rule uniformity often imposed by governments and aid agencies (Dill 2009). At the collective

choice level, the proportion of elites in the group that makes decisions on the allocation of

fuelwood quotas to different families can impact the degree to which allowances are made for

heterogeneity, either exacerbating or reducing existing inequities. Finally, at the constitutional

choice level, the composition of the decision making committee may be determined through a

lengthy, equitable democratic process involving negotiations and deliberations, or in a hasty

manner by elites in collaboration with external government agencies. Unfortunately, these levels

of action are not always clearly differentiated either by communities or external actors such as

governments and policy makers. Although this is a critical issue for scholars to address, the

literature on heterogeneity and collective action also does not provide sufficient information to

enable an adequate understanding of the institutional mechanisms through which heterogeneity

influences, and is impacted by, collective action (although Bardhan and Dayton-Johnson (2001)

provide an in-depth discussion of this issue as it relates to irrigation systems).

3. The impact of diverse aspects of heterogeneity on collective action

a. Economic heterogeneity

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Perhaps the most obvious indicator of heterogeneity, and the aspect most often referred to

in studies of collective action, is that of differences in assets and endowments (Baland and

Platteau 1998, 1999; Bardhan and Dayton-Johnson 2001). Bardhan and Dayton-Johnson provide

a detailed taxonomy of the various types of economic heterogeneity that are important to

consider. These include inequality in wealth, income, assets, and endowments amongst the

members of a group collectively accessing a common pool resource. Also important to consider

are the variations in transaction costs borne by different members while engaging in cooperative

and deliberative activities and following harvest restrictions and community rules, inequalities in

the benefits derived by members participating in a common property regime, and inequalities in

the access that they have to alternate income outside the common pool resource (“exit options”).

Mancur Olson (1965) provided one of the first fundamental theoretical explorations of

the impact of heterogeneity on the likelihood of collective action. He argued that the initiation of

collective action requires considerable expenditure of time, effort and money, which is less likely

to happen in instances when a community is homogeneous. In a heterogeneous community, the

rich and powerful are more likely to take on the burden of organizing collective action, and the

poor can act as “free-riders” on these programs. Baland and Platteau (1998) expand on this

argument, stating that organizing a community for collective action involves large start-up costs,

or “non-convexities”, which the poor are less likely to be able to contribute. Wealthy elites who

have a greater economic interest in the common property resource can invest extra effort in

getting community efforts initiated and maintained, as they stand to benefit substantially from

sustainable collective management.

These authors cite research by Jodha (1989) on communal grazing lands in the former

princely province of Rajputana in northern India, where large land owners who received

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significant benefits from grazing areas had formerly invested a great deal of effort in imposing

restrictions on access to pastures, resulting in the sustainable maintenance of rotational grazing.

After Indian independence, following land reforms, the investment of these landowners into

sustainable management of the common grazing lands reduced. The poor families did not

collaborate in collective efforts, presumably because they received such a small share of the

benefits that they were unwilling to bear the large start up costs of initiation. Thus, what was

once a sustainably managed pasture land, though under conditions of exacerbated economic and

social inequities, became a rapidly degrading area after land reform.

Baland and Platteau (1998, 1999) also argue, using a theoretical model, that wealth

inequalities amplify themselves when it comes to distribution of outcomes, often leaving the

poor families even worse off. They point to case studies in field settings by McKean (1986) in

Japanese forests, and by Wade (1988) in south Indian irrigation systems, who document

situations where poor families enter into conditions of crisis caused by extreme wealth inequities

resulting in frequent and unsustainable extraction, while such violations are tolerated by

sympathetic monitors and inspectors. Thus, some levels of inequality may promote the

organization of collective action, but this often leads to amplification of inequities, and reduces

the acceptability of rules restricting harvest, sometimes resulting in a breakdown of the entire

system. Baland et al. (2007) also describe other contradictory effects that wealth inequality may

have on cooperation. Wealthy participants may have a greater economic requirement for the

environmental services provided by common pool resources, but may not be interested in

collective action as they also have to expend greater amounts of energy to receive these benefits.

Further, while the poor may have a lower stake in participation, this may not matter since their

ability to overharvest individually is probably limited. Bardhan and Dayton-Johnson (2001) and

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Dayton-Johnson and Bardhan (2002) develop on this exploration of the contradictory effects of

wealth heterogeneity on collective action, using theoretical models to postulate a U shaped

relationship between asset heterogeneity and cooperation.

Yet, the field evidence is contrary to these expectations. Andersson and Agrawal (2011)

analyze evidence from 228 cases of forest groups from South Asia (India and Nepal), East Africa

(Kenya and Uganda), and Latin America (Mexico and Bolivia), using data from the International

Forestry Resources and Institutions (IFRI) network, a global research network that provides long

term comparative data on forests and institutions across multiple countries (Ostrom and

Nagendra 2006). These authors find that two types of wealth inequality have a negative impact

on the efficacy of collective action for forest management. The first type of inequality they study

documents differences in wealth within groups, and was assessed through a questionnaire that

asked whether group members perceived great differences in wealth within the user group. The

second aspect assessed differences between user groups, assessing whether there was a

difference in the proportion of rich user group members between groups that accessed the same

forest. Using a regression model, they find that a 10% increase in intra-group inequality

corresponded to a 2.4% decrease in relative forest condition (derived from ratings by

professional foresters and local users). Differences between groups played a much more

significant role, and a 10% increase in inter-group inequality corresponded with a decrease in

relative forest condition of as much as 11.2%.

Baker (2000) demonstrates a negative U-shaped relationship between heterogeneity and

the persistence of community forests in 18 villages in north India, where slightly unequal

patterns of wealth distribution promote forest conservation, but large differences in wealth make

community forests vulnerable to elite capture, and lead to degradation by poor harvesters in

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desperate economic conditions. This negative or negative-U shaped relationship seems to be

robust in a variety of field settings, with Molinas (1998) finding similar evidence based on a

study of 104 peasant cooperatives in Paraguay, as does Naidu (2009) while studying 54 forest

communities in India.

Other studies find weaker relationships, or fail to find relationships between wealth

heterogeneity and collective action. Adhikari and Lovett (2006 a) find that economic

heterogeneity, as measured by a Gini coefficient of inequality in land holdings, appears to have a

negative impact on the likelihood of collective action, although there were some exceptions to

this trend. They did not find heterogeneity in livestock holdings to have any consistent effect on

collective action, however. Somanathan et al. (2007), in a study of Van Panchayat forests in the

Indian Himalayas, finds that land equality has a significant positive association with the

frequency of panchayat meetings. They do not find a consistent impact of economic

heterogeneity on any other direct or indirect indicators of collective action, or of forest quality.

Similarly, Chakraborty (2000) and Buffum et al. (2009) do not find any evidence that economic

differences impact the likelihood of collective action in community forests in Nepal or Bhutan

respectively.

Meshack et al. (2006) provide explanations for the failure of field studies to find a

consistent positive relationship between economic heterogeneity and collective action. They

question the basic assumption of Olson (1965) that a number of other scholars have built on,

finding evidence from field settings in Tanzania that the poor bear the greater burden of

community forestry in terms of transaction costs, while the rich get a disproportionate share of

the benefits. The time spent in attending meetings and in protecting the forest account for a

major proportion of these transaction costs, which are especially difficult for poor households to

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meet. Adhikari and Lovett (2006 b) examine a very different social context in Nepal, and find

that although the poor bear a higher share of transaction costs associated with the initiation of

collective action, they also receive lower benefits in terms of access to forest products, thus their

overall cost-benefit ratios are higher than that of rich households. Consequently, these authors

conclude that it is unlikely for wealth heterogeneity to positively influence collective action.

Another study by Andersson and Agrawal (forthcoming) looks at a larger dataset of 319

forests from Bolivia, Kenya, India, Mexico, Nepal, and Uganda, also derived from the IFRI

database. This research provides an alternative explanation for the lack of consistent association

between income heterogeneity and sustainable collective forest management. Intra-group

differences in wealth did not show a consistent relationship with perceptions of relative forest

condition provided by foresters, but communities with a high proportion of poor members were

much more likely to exclude some members while making decisions about forest management.

Further, they find that groups that have greater income equality are also more likely to

demonstrate community ownership rights. Thus, it appears that effective local institutions can

play a major role in cancelling out the impacts of socioeconomic inequalities. It is only when

institutions are weak that the impacts of heterogeneity become apparent – a significant finding

with major implications for policy.

We also have some evidence of the levels of institutional organization at which poverty

impacts collective action. Springate-Baginski et al. (2003) in a regional study in Nepal found that

while community forestry has been successful in providing benefits to poor users at the

operational choice level, by enabling them to have greater access to forest products, the rich

continued to capture the collective choice level by formulating most of the rules. Government

foresters exerted undue influence at the constitutional choice level by deciding which households

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should be included as members of the group. Thus, they conclude, while community forestry has

made some gains in impacting poor people’s livelihoods, true equity continues to be a long way

off.

Schreckenberg and Luttrell (2009), in a study of participatory forest management in three

countries – Kenya, Tanzania, and Nepal – also conclude that poor households are also less likely

to be represented at meetings because of lack of money to pay membership fees, and lack of time

to attend the meetings. They point out another critical issue - merely ensuring participation in

meetings is not enough. Even when the poor do come to meetings, they are less likely to speak

up. Andersson and Agrawal (forthcoming) also find that economic heterogeneity impacts

community forestry at the collective choice level, with groups that have a greater proportion of

poor members being more likely to exclude some members from decision making, One way of

dealing with this is through awareness building and pressure from larger federated groups of

community forest users. Initiatives in Nepal where community forest groups have been mentored

by the Federation of Community Forestry User Groups of Nepal (FECOFUN) have been more

sensitive to issues of equity and participation, with an increase in the number of community

groups dominated by the poor, by disadvantaged caste groups and by women holding decision

making positions on committees (Dahal and Chapagain 2008; Schreckenberg and Luttrell 2009),.

b. Political and social heterogeneity

While differences in economic endowments often parallel differences in political power,

there are variations to this general theme. For instance, in the inland Niger delta, disadvantaged

former slaves have larger private agricultural fields, but the noble leaders have greater access to

common property resources (Vedeld 2000). The clergy, who form another socially powerful

group, are relatively poor, especially in terms of cattle ownership (which forms a significant

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indicator of economic wealth in this cultural context). Thus, assumptions of perfect

correspondence between political power and wealth do not always hold true, and can vary

significantly depending on the local context.

Political heterogeneity can be defined in a variety of different ways. Vedeld (2000)

adopts a definition used by Baland and Platteau (1996), considering the degree of agreement or

conflict about the legitimacy of leadership as an indicator of political heterogeneity. Using this,

he found that despite a strong hierarchical structure in village councils in the inland Niger delta,

councilors are relatively approving of their chief. A large proportion of the burden of collective

action was taken up by local elites. While some elites such as the village chief and traders

engaged with community action in the expectation of increased monetary benefits, other groups

of elite such as the clergy did not stand to benefit directly in economic terms, but perceived other

benefits in investing in community management, seeing this as ways in which to build their

authority. Despite the fact that the legitimacy of the chief’s role was called into question by ex-

slaves, who were relatively disadvantaged by the rulings of the political elite, the system

remained sustainable. Vedeld thus considered homogeneity amongst the leadership to be more

important than homogeneity within the entire community, stating that heterogeneous

communities are capable of collective action as long as the elite agree on institutional solutions.

This parallels the previously discussed conclusions of research by Jodha (1987) who stated that

elite dominated institutions were able to enforce community management when the elite

landowners had common interests in preserving grazing land.

Pérez-Cirera and Lovett (2006) however arrived at different opinions about the role of

elites in a study of 38 common property forest user groups in Mexico. They concluded that

powerful leaders can force a group to cooperate and restrict harvest, but such restrictions were

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typically unsustainable over the long term and generate significant levels of social conflict.

Further, when leaders built strong connections to outside sources of political power, they were

able to engage in substantial illegal logging, exacerbating economic inequalities within the

community, and degrading the forest instead of conserving it. While formal institutions of

community forest management are supposed to provide checks and balances against the misuse

of power by local elites, these are often circumvented by approaches that range from intimidation

of supervisors, to the rigging of elections using bribes and violence. Thus, a report from Mexico

describes a local dissident eloquently summarizing this process by saying “some threaten, others

invite you to drink” (Klooster 2000).

c. Social heterogeneity

Social heterogeneity is often closely related with political heterogeneity. When groups

share a common caste, ethnic or cultural background, this can shape a shared world view and

form a basis for increased trust (Poteete and Ostrom 2004). Varughese (1999), Chakraborty

(2001), and Gautam (2002) examined community forests in Nepal during early stages of

community forestry, and indicated that ethnic and caste diversity did not appear to have an

impact on collective action. Somanathan et al. (2007) do not find any impact of caste

heterogeneity on direct and indirect measures of collective action, or on outcomes in terms of

successful forest management. They speculate that this could be because the van panchayats that

they study are relatively homogeneous in terms of their membership, and caste differentials may

not play a major role here as compared to other parts of South Asia. Ray and Bhattacharya

(2011) found a positive correlation between caste heterogeneity and transaction costs in seven

Indian forests, but this was not consistent, and rather weak in effect. Naidu (2009) studied 54

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forest communities in India, and found that social heterogeneity has a negative-U shaped

relationship with cooperation. Cooperation is more likely at high levels of social homogeneity

and heterogeneity, while intermediate levels of heterogeneity are not conducive to collective

action. It is not surprising that there is more cooperation in highly homogeneous social caste or

ethnic groups, as the likelihood of trust and density of social networks is likely to be high in such

contexts (Ostrom 1990). The finding of cooperation in situations of high heterogeneity is harder

to explain, and the author concludes that further research is required to examine if this is true in

different contexts.

Adhikari and Lovett (2006 a) in their study of community forest user groups in Nepal,

provide a more nuanced discussion of caste heterogeneities. They find caste homogeneity to be a

necessary, but not a sufficient condition for collective action. Communities with a high

heterogeneity of caste distributions were associated with a lower degree of collective action.

Communities that were more homogeneous in caste membership did not necessarily have a high

degree of collective action, however. Interestingly, they report that mere representation of the

disadvantaged castes on the executive community did not guarantee better collective action,

Often, many of the disadvantaged caste groups were not even aware of forest operational plans,

rules and regulations, let alone having opportunities to participate in making or implementing

rules.

d. Gender

Gender plays a vital role in collective action, yet its impact is insufficiently understood or

studied compared to other forms of heterogeneity (Agarwal 2000, 2010). A variety of studies in

contexts across the world have indicated that participatory initiatives tend to be dominated by

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powerful men, while women - particularly poor women – tend to be excluded from involvement

in decision making (Agarwal 2000, 2010; Cleaver, 1999; Mayoux 1995, 2001). Yet, women

often tend to be called upon for labor intensive activities such as forest monitoring, increasing

their transaction costs, but providing them with few benefits (Agarwal 2000, 2001).

Somanathan et al. (2007) do not find any significant association between the proportion

of women in the panchayat and direct and indirect measures of collective action, or outcomes of

successful forest management. Lise (2000) studied participatory forest management in three

states in India. In only one of the states (Uttar Pradesh), she found a statistically significant

relationship between the proportion of women at a household level, and the extent to which

people appreciate community meetings and identify the decisions taken in them. Yet, the fact

that gender diversity does not emerge as a significant variable in the other two states calls into

doubt the universality of this finding. Mayoux (1995) provides a possible explanation for these

findings, indicating that mere quantification of the level of formal representation of women in a

group is unlikely to be a good indicator of actual participation.

Other authors suggest that the lack of gender heterogeneity can have adverse impacts on

the efficiency of collective action. Thus Molinas (1998) suggests that groups with a greater

proportion of women may exhibit a greater propensity to cooperate, while Agarwal (2000) finds

partial support for this hypothesis, arguing that the greater interdependence of women on social

networks makes it more imperative for them to resolve conflicts and find ways of cooperation.

She argues that heterogeneity effects within groups of women are less prominent than for men,

as women often share critical forest-related interests, for instance bearing the sole responsibility

in many instances for the provisioning of firewood for cooking family meals. Cleaver (1999)

discusses the variation in motivations of rich and poor women involved in water supply

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management, which is often discounted by planners. The same is also true of forest users,

wherein women shoulder the main burden of responsibility for firewood collection (Agarwal

2000, 2001), but rich women may have access to firewood from private land holdings, leaving

poor women especially disadvantaged.

Such diversity in the interests of women playing different roles as users (direct collectors,

beneficiaries of others’ collection, employers of collectors, employees who collect on someone

else’s behalf either for money, familial connections, or as part of reciprocal exchanges) is often

neither adequately understood nor represented during participatory decision making (Cleaver

1999; Mayoux 2001). For instance Mayoux (2001) finds that poor women are particularly

underrepresented in collective micro-finance initiatives in Cameroon. Mayoux (1995) also points

to the widespread, naïve assumption amongst scholars and practitioners that cosmetic changes

that achieve formal representation can count as an indicator of participation. She describes the

family constraints and time constraints that make it difficult for poor and young women with

increased familial responsibilities to spend the amount of time required for meaningful

participation in decision making.

Agarwal (2010) corroborates this, pointing out that it is not just important to ensure that

women attend meetings, but to also understand which women were more likely to speak up.

Older women, and women from poor and landless families were less likely to be subject to social

constraints in South Asia, and consequently more likely to attempt to participate actively at

meetings. Buffum et al. (2010) add to this by documenting a scenario in Bhutan where a well

intentioned decision to incorporate a literacy requirement for forest executive committee

members has had a negative impact on gender representation because of the association between

education and age. The educated women are mostly young and unmarried, with little influence in

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their communities. Thus, these authors conclude that restricting membership to educated women

has actually resulted in less representation than if older, illiterate but confident women who had

greater experience of forest use and management had been allowed to participate.

There are important threshold effects of gender heterogeneity, such that when the

representation of women approaches 25% to 33%, maximum attendance at meetings is ensured

(Agarwal 2000). The participation of women is perhaps maximum in women-managed

community forests in Nepal, but Maharjan et al. (2009) note that the forests handed over to

womens’ groups tend to be degraded, forcing these groups to deal with higher transaction costs

and lower benefits in the early years in order to protect and improve the quality of these

degraded forests. Women have also organized to demand and receive governance literacy classes

to help them understand the processes of deliberation at community meetings, and gain the

confidence to actively participate in discussions and decision making. Over time, initiatives like

this should have a more long lasting impact compared to cosmetic changes in formal institutional

representation of gender.

e. Age

Many community projects are dominated by older generations of elites, who tend to come

from influential sectors of society, such as local leaders, teachers, civil servants, or wealthy

merchants. In such communities, the initial stability and guidance these elders provide can serve

very useful but with time, this can lead to conflicts. Dasgupta and Beard (2007) describe a

situation in Indonesia, where conflicts have arisen in a community driven poverty alleviation

program as younger people have been unsuccessful in joining the ranks of the decision makers.

One ward, for instance, has had a seventeen year unbroken streak of re-electing the same leader.

19

Vedeld (2000) describes a protracted period of forced leadership stability in the Niger delta,

which was followed by an abrupt change in political leadership, leading to conflict between two

influential local groups and resulting in collapse of the community institution. Adhikari and

Lovett (2006 a) documented community forest user groups in rural Nepal where a large

proportion of the executive committee members have remained unchanged since establishment

of the group, leading to significant dissatisfaction within prospective leaders, eventually

spreading to the community. Thus, domination of community forest programs by elders can have

adverse impacts on the sustainability of collective action.

f. Literacy

Levels of education are often correlated with wealth (Adhikari and Lovett 2006 a;

Schreckenberg and Luttrell 2009), thus few studies consider the impact of literacy separately.

Adhikari (2005) finds that education is negatively correlated with income from forests, as the

educated prefer to seek employment outside, reducing their engagement with forest extraction

and community participation. In Bhutan, community forest group meetings often deliberately

exclude the illiterate from participation (Buffum et al. 2010). This has an unintended effect on

participation, especially of women, as literate women are mostly young and unmarried, and do

not feel confident enough to voice their opinion in community meetings. These authors argue

strongly for the need to include both the educated and the uneducated in community forestry.

Yet, even when this is done, illiteracy continues to remain a barrier to participation. Thus

Iversen et al. (2006) described an interview with a Tharu (disadvantaged ethnic group) woman in

Nepal, complaining that her illiterate husband was unable to make any sense of the deliberations

at group meetings. These authors argue that the barriers to meaningful participation are high for

20

uneducated members, and conventional training programmes are incapable of addressing these

issues. Maharjan et al. (2009) describe new initiatives in the Churia hills of Nepal, where

governance literacy classes are being conducted, particularly targeted at women, so that they can

understand the processes of deliberation at community meetings, and gain the confidence to

actively participate in discussions and decision making.

g. Group size

Discussions of group size become important because of their link with heterogeneity.

Thus Olson (1965) considered differences between small and large groups to be important,

stating that the likelihood of free riders destabilizing a group was substantially lower for smaller

groups. The literature on collective action frequently adopts similar positions, considering that

small groups are more likely to cooperate, simply because they are more homogeneous compared

to large groups (Baland and Platteau 1999). Ostrom (1990) and Poteete and Ostrom (2004)

challenge this view as being too simplistic, and state that individuals can effectively work

together in small or large groups, if they organize themselves effectively into collective

institutions that prevent free riders from taking over by employing a combination of monitoring

and sanctioning. In fact, Poteete and Ostrom (2004) argue that the importance of collective

action actually increases for larger groups, and it is very important for such groups to develop

effective institutional mechanisms for dealing with the challenges of large group size.

Nagendra (2007) studied 53 forest communities in Nepal, and found a negative U shaped

relationship between group size and successful collective forest management. She argued that

small groups face challenges of collective action due to the lack of human capacity for

monitoring and maintenance, while large groups face challenges of coherent decision making.

21

Thus, groups of intermediate sizes are best equipped to deal with issues of collective action.

Agrawal and Goyal (2001) demonstrate similar results from a sample of 28 village councils in

India. Varughese (1999) and Gautam (2002) also illustrated the difficulties that very small and

very large communities face while dealing with challenges of sustainable forest management.

Yet Maharjan et al. (2009), following on Poteete and Ostrom (2004), demonstrates the capacity

of communities to innovatively deal with the challenges of group size variation through

institutional arrangements. One exceptionally large forest in Nepal was able to derive substantial

incomes from community forestry, and could use some of these to specifically address issues of

the poor and disadvantaged castes. Another tiny forest in the same landscape managed to provide

alternate sources of income for poor households by allowing them to cultivate NTFPs such as

ginger and turmeric in the forest for sale.

h. Heterogeneity in access to forest resources

Heterogeneity in access to different common pool resources also plays a role in

impacting the degree of social conflict in collective groups. Kumar (2000) assesses Joint Forest

Management in the Indian state of Jharkhand, and finds that collectors of NTFPs have been

especially disadvantaged because of the focus of the program on forest protection and timber

regeneration, impacting the expansion of the program to other areas. Adhikari and Lovett (2006

a) find that wealthier households with more cattle and agricultural holdings derive greater

benefits from the community forest by extracting leaf litter and grazing material, while NTFP

collectors have a lower likelihood of participating in the benefits of community forestry. Luintel

and Bhattarai (2006) document the challenges faced by many artisanal groups such as basket

22

weavers and blacksmiths following community forestry, as they are deprived of continued access

to essential forest raw materials such as bamboo and charcoal.

Variations in economic interests associated with CPRs are also illuminating to consider.

Vedeld (2000) finds that migrant pastoralist groups in the Niger delta were the only group in

favor of protecting pastures. In contrast, agro-pastoralism emerges as a significant interest for

many types of users, including two powerful sets of leaders - the clergy and the craftsmen – thus,

increasing the likelihood that these landscapes would be managed for a mix of both uses, with

some conversion of common property pasture land to private agricultural land. Ray and

Bhattacharya (2011) add to this discussion, stating that as the availability of exit options

increases for some members within a community, such that they do not need to depend solely on

the availability of forest resources for their survival, transaction costs associated with community

forestry also increase.

Dispersion of forest users can add to the challenges of communication and monitoring

(Chakraborty 2001; Van Laerhoven 2010), and increase transaction costs associated with

collective forest management (Ray and Bhattacharya 2011). Yet, institutional accommodations

can be made for these scenarios. Varghese and Ostrom (2000) and Adhikari and Lovett (2006 a)

describe community forestry groups in Nepal that have developed arrangements to permit

households that live far away from the forest to pay cash instead of providing voluntary labour,

and contrast these with the conflict generated in other communities where no such

accommodation has been made.

Frequently, governments refuse to hand over high value timber forests to communities,

arguing that this opens up opportunities for corruption and elite capture, exacerbating forest

degradation (Poffenberger 1996; Nagendra 2002; Springate-Baginski et al. 2003). Mahanty et al.

23

(2009) find extensive evidence of elite capture, particularly of high value forests, in Asia. Studies

by Iversen et al. (2006) and Pokharel (2008) in Nepal confirm this, finding that many wealthy

households misuse the access to subsidized timber offered by community forestry membership,

selling trees on the market for private benefits. Yet, Schreckenberg et al. (2009) document

instances of effective participatory forest management in high value forests in Tanzania and

Kenya, while Buffum et al. (2010) describe effective, sustainable community management of

valuable timber forests in Bhutan. Thus, it is not necessary that elite capture will take place in

economically valuable forests – conversely, it is also possible for elites to dominate community

initiatives in degraded forests. More important perhaps is the level of attention paid to issues of

heterogeneity and equity, and the degree of support or interference provided by external

agencies. This is clearly brought out by Nayak and Berkes (2008), who document a case of elite

capture in a formerly equitable community forest group, after a government initiated Joint Forest

Management approach was adopted, involving the injection of large amounts of funds into the

system.

i. Heterogeneity between community forest groups

As community forestry has consolidated its ground and expanded its scope, secondary

associations of forest communities have emerged in many countries to provide support to local

communities. These associations have a larger focus on “second generation” issues, with equity

being at the forefront for many groups (Taylor 2009). They are considered by many scholars as

being truly “representative” of peoples’ concerns, and relatively free of vested interests in

comparison to development agencies, governments and NGOS (Bebbington 1996). Yet, as these

federations and associations become more effective at mobilizing funds, challenges emerge of

24

how to distribute benefits in a manner that is perceived to be both fair and equitable. In the Maya

Biosphere Reserve in Guatemala, the Association of Forest Communities of Péten (ACOFOP)

has struggled with these issues (Taylor 2009). When the association was formed initially, not all

communities wanted to become members. As the success of the association in generating

resources became apparent, more communities wanted to join in. This led to protests from the

initial members, who had invested a great amount of time and effort, and did not want to share

benefits with new members. Diversification in commercialization of forest resources has

addressed some of these concerns (while generating new ones). For instance, while returns from

commercial timber harvest are distributed amongst all members, arguments have been made that

benefits from NTFP collection, which is more localized, should only be shared amongst those

that participate in these activities.

Heterogeneities within the association, between different groups, also generate

challenges. Different forest groups have different cultures, histories and interactions with the

forest, and there is also, of course, significant internal variation within communities. Some of

these differences impact the association indirectly, making it difficult to agree on joint decisions.

Other forms of heterogeneity have a more direct impact, for instance when some communities

are unable to protect their forest, leading to a negative impact on the entire federation (Taylor

2009).

Van Laerhoven (2010) studies a different component of heterogeneity, looking at

variations between groups of users that harvest the same resource. This author studies a set of

247 forests in 15 countries, using another dataset from the IFRI network. Countries from Africa,

Asia and America were included in the study, with case studies coming from Bhutan, Bolivia,

Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Kenya, Madagascar, Mexico, Nepal,

25

Tanzania, Uganda, and the United States. Of these, 82 forests, roughly a third of all forests

studied, were accessed by two or more sets of users. This study finds that when multiple groups

access the same forest and compete for resources, the likelihood of monitoring decreases

significantly, from 51% (when there is only one group) to 20% (when there are two or more

groups). Monitoring is a variable that has been found in multiple studies to have a significant

impact on the effectiveness of collective action (as summarized in Nagendra 2007), and thus this

is an important finding that throws light on another aspect of heterogeneity, that between groups,

which has been insufficiently considered until now. Adhikari (2005) also documents differences

between households in Nepal that are located close to pine forests, who see fewer benefits from

community forestry as pine forests do not provide useful leaf litter or grazing material, and those

located close to broadleaf forests, which provide greater benefits to them.

4. The converse effect: assessing the impact of collective action in reducing or exacerbating

heterogeneity

Schreckenberg and Luttrell (2009) distinguish between the generation of two kinds of

economic benefits from the forest. Some benefits are contributed by participating community

members, through the collection of fees, permits and fines. This category can actually constitute

a barrier for poor families, who may not be able to afford the membership fees required to

participate in community management activities. The other category constitutes a new kind of

income previously not available to anyone in the community, from sources such as ecotourism or

sale of community generated forest products. This latter category can inject unprecedented levels

of income into the community, providing thousands of dollars in some instances, and generating

new opportunities for elite capture, as well as significant challenges for communities grappling

26

with issues of equitable distribution of funds (Iversen et al. 2006; Pokharel 2008; Maharjan et al.

2009; Schreckenberg and Luttrell 2009). At an individual level, Pokharel (2008) find that only

24% of the economic benefits of community forestry reach the poor in Nepal. Malla et al. (2003)

also find that rich households have greater access to common pool forest resources ranging from

timber to leaf litter. They attribute this to the fact that the institutions are dominated by the

wealthy at the collective choice level, resulting the devising of operational rules that selectively

benefit the wealthy. Luintel and Bhattarai (2006) also conclude that community forestry in Nepal

has largely failed to address the needs of the poor.

At a community level, while forest groups in Tanzania and Nepal have utilized their

community funds to construct school buildings, this does not benefit poor households whose

children cannot afford to attend school (Schreckenberg and Luttrell 2009). Thus, some groups in

Tanzania and Nepal have made special efforts to address equity issues by using community

funds to provide educational scholarships to poor families, or to repair thatch roofs of

economically disadvantaged households. McDermott and Schreckenberg conclude that poor

households are more likely to be disadvantaged individually as a consequence of community

forestry, but they share in the benefits generated at the group level, such as the use of community

funds for infrastructure development, schools, or health clinics. More intangibly, the

revitalization of local communities and increase in social capital and social networks expand the

decision making spaces available to poor and disadvantaged households, women and youth,

building their capacity for economic improvement. Yet Vyamana (2009) contradicts this

assertion, pointing out that in Tanzania participatory forest management has failed to improve

social capital for poor households, and has excluded the poor from training in income generating

activities.

27

Maharjan et al. (2009) describe a third, important category of income from community

forest management that is largely accessed by the poor, i.e. employment as forest guards, or in

forest management activities. These authors find that middle income and poor households

experience an overall increase in income levels after initiation of community forestry, largely

due to an increase in off-forest and off-farm activities including wage labour and remittances,

while the income derived from forest associated activities decreases over time as forests become

closed off for protection. The ultra poor suffer disproportionately during this process, as they

continue to remain highly dependent on the forest for products such as fuelwood. Other scholars

have also found that rich households are better able to deal with situations of community forest

closure due to their capacity to harvest wood and fodder resources from private lands (Adhikari

2005, Thoms 2008).

Elite capture can also disproportionately impact the distribution of benefits from

community forestry. Pandit and Thapa (2004) describe a situation in Nepal, where although

grazing has been prohibited in community forests, in practice, influential members continue to

graze their cattle in forested patches adjacent to their farms or homes. Springate-Baginski et al.

(2003) discuss a community forest in Nepal where timber traders were included in the group by

foresters against the wishes of the local community, and ended up influencing the decisions of

the executive committee to receive disproportionately high levels of timber.

Agarwal (2000, 2001, 2010) documents the impact of community forest closure on

gender equality, increasing the distances that they have to travel to collect firewood that is

essential for cooking family meals, and adding to the burden of disadvantage that they already

face. Barrett et al. (2001) corroborate this evidence, pointing out that many NGOs that

supposedly focused on gender issues actually devise programs of intervention that pay little

28

attention to the requirement of women, and leave them worse off than they were prior to

intervention. Mayoux (2001) also highlights the negative impact that participation in community

activities has on women’s health, due to the added burden that such activities place on their

already limited time and energy.

5. Mitigating the impacts of collective action on heterogeneity

Most studies of “second generation issues” of equity conclude that special efforts must be

made to focus on the poor and disadvantaged groups in order to have any meaningful impact on

equity (McDermott and Schreckenberg et al. 2009). This is especially important in the case of

developing countries, where forests constitute a major component of local livelihoods (Padgee et

al. 2006; Shackleton et al. 2007). When strong wealth heterogeneities exist, well designed

community institutions frequently come up with innovative and varied solutions to ensure

satisfaction of all members. While equality (homogeneity) may be an implicit goal, it seems to

be more important to ensure a sense of fairness or equity (Baland and Platteau 1998; Buffum et

al. 2010). Poverty is a relative term, and even when a community improves in overall wealth,

individual members may continue to identify themselves as poor based on comparisons with

others (Barret et al. 2001; Zoomers 2006). Thus, perceptions of fairness and equity are more

important than attempts to achieve elusive equality (Poteete and Ostrom 2004; Ghate 2006).

It seems to be clear that attempts towards ensuring equality of distribution of shares of

products are likely to fail, as these are often perceived as unfair. For instance, many groups have

assigned equal shares of products such as firewood to all households, irrespective of the number

of members in the household, or their economic need. This can lead to conflict, as reported in

some Nepali forests where households with more members and less need for firewood are able to

29

sell their surplus on the local market, while other households face problems of scarcity (Adhikari

and Lovett 2006). Schreckenberg and Luttrell (2009) document similar situations in Nepal,

where users were permitted to collect unlimited quantities of leaf litter for animal bedding, and in

Tanzania, where all households received similar quantities of fuelwood, while Ghate (2006)

describes exacerbated harvest by wealthy households in central India, under rules that allow each

household to harvest “as much as it needs”.

Attempts to treat all households equally often appear to exacerbate existing inequities,

with rich households effectively receiving more than they needed, while the poor remain

disadvantaged (Bhattarai et al. 2009). Mahanty et al. (2009) state that social entrepreneurship is

another, often ignored aspect that needs to be effectively rewarded, with those who invest more

in the forest being allowed to harvest greater benefits. Andersson and Agrawal (2011) support

this conclusion with a description of a forest in Bolivia, where six users who shouldered most of

the burdens of collective action, but benefits were shared equally amongst all community

members. This disincentivized the group of six, resulting in collapse of the institution after just a

year of action.

In Japan, McKean (1984) documented an alternative approach to dealing with problems

of equity, where each family was allotted rights to specific parcels or products by random lottery,

and variations in quality were dealt through frequent rotations. This process was widely

perceived as fair, transparent and legitimate by the members of these groups. Andersson and

Agrawal (2011) also describe a forest in Nepal where poor households are given the opportunity

to select premium locations for cardamom cultivation, allowing them to benefit more from

community forestry. Varughese and Ostrom (2000) similarly point to the capacity of

communities to come up with effective local solutions to address other types of heterogeneity.

30

For instance, those households which cannot participate in forest monitoring and maintenance

activities due to distance from the forest can pay a fee to access forest products at discounted

rates.

While the studies mentioned above do not discuss what factors may have led these

communities to be more responsive to needs of heterogeneity, some studies point to the role of

external facilitators. In Bhutan, communities dealt with the issue of poverty by giving poorer

households a greater share of timber trees, and women a greater chance to collect timber and

firewood from within the community forest, which compensated to some degree for the fact that

wealthier households owned more cattle and thus utilized the community forest more for grazing

compared to other groups (Buffum et al. 2010). The impetus for this seems to have come from

forest extension officers who were in charge of implementation of these programs, and who paid

particular attention to issues of equity. In the Churia hills of Nepal, Maharjan et al. (2009) find

that ultra poor households were especially disadvantaged by the closure of community forests.

However, sensitization of the communities by external donor agencies resulted in the allotment

of specific patches of community forests to these households to derive income from agricultural

intercropping, which compensated for some of these losses. In addition, most of the user groups

provided low interest loans to poor households for income generating activities, and provided

preferential employment in forest activities such as plantation or protection to these households.

Similarly, Luintel (2006) documents three instances of community forestry groups in Nepal that

made special provisions for low income families after interventions by civil society

organizations.

Yet, government or donor initiated programs often pay little attention to the need for

sensitization of local communities, instead trying to force the implementation of uniform rules to

31

address equity concerns across different contexts, in a manner deleterious to collective action

(Dill 2009). For instance, Nayak and Berkes (2008) describe a situation in an Indian forest where

an existing, successful community forest which had devised its own effective rules for increasing

participation of different villages and caste groups, was subsumed within a uniform Joint Forest

Management program that paid little attention to such heterogeneities, resulting in the collapse of

a well functioning system. Nagendra et al. (2005) similarly document the failure of government

promoted leasehold forestry poverty alleviation programs in Nepal, while alternative approaches

developed by local communities were more been successful, and received greater legitimacy

from the community. Naidu (2009) also identifies a negative interaction between wealth

heterogeneity and resource dependence in Indian forests, indicating that those with the greatest

ability to contribute to the costs of cooperation are not necessarily those who have the highest

incentives in the resource. Thus, planning for collective action needs to take this into account, by

providing incentives for those resource users with a greater stake to contribute a larger share of

transaction costs.

Governments can also play a positive, major role in ensuring the equity and sustainability

of collective forest management. For instance, governmental audits can be effectively employed

by communities to uncover instances of corruption by local elites, as has been done in some parts

of Mexico (Klooster 2000). Forest extension agencies have played a major role in getting

community forestry off the ground in Bhutan, and ensuring that communities pay attention to

issues of social, economic and gender equity (Buffum et al. 2009). Federations of community

groups, such as FECOFUN in Nepal, and possibly some international donor agencies also have a

major role to play in ensuring attention to issues of equity in a sustainable manner (Mahanty et

al. 2006; Ojha and Timsina 2007; Maharjan et al. 2009; Schreckenberg and Luttrel 2009).

32

These initiatives largely focus on the operational choice arena, yet there are also efforts to

increase participation at other levels. In Nepal, aid agencies and community forestry federations

have also focused on the collective choice level, trying to ensure that the poor, women and

disadvantaged castes have a greater voice at executive meetings. To build the capacity and

confidence to address issues specific to their situation, they have focused at the hamlet level,

bringing smaller, homogeneous groups of women, or disadvantaged castes together to identify

important issues, which are then taken up to the executive committee by representatives (Thoms

2008). Poverty alleviation programs such as interest free loans are also disbursed through such

groups, resulting in identification of needy recipients in a manner that is perceived as fair and

equitable (Paudyal et al. 2006). Similar approaches have been employed with success in other

poverty alleviation programs in India as well (Williams et al. 2003). although Luintel and

Bhattarai (2006) point out that that much needs to be done for the poor additionally through

programs aimed at increasing technical and business skills.

Yet, there are limitations to this approach of focusing on modification of rules to address

inequities at the operational and collective choice levels, without paying attention to the role of

power inequalities in these societies that are fundamental to ensuring the continued existence of

unfair heterogeneities. Thus, Sunam and McCarthy (2010) point out that most national or

regional efforts to deal with issues of equity by governments, NGOs and civil society

organizations tend to focus on modifications to distributional rules at the collective choice level.

For instance, in Nepal, government regulations stipulate that women should form at least 33% of

user group committees, while the national federation of community forest user groups,

FECOFUN, goes one step beyond this – specifying that the proportion of women in a user group

committee should be 50%. Although these efforts are well intended, as several studies (including

33

Thoms 2008; Agarwal 2010) point out, merely increasing the proportion of women, poor and

disadvantaged caste groups does not mean they will speak up at meetings, or that their opinions

will be heard and will make an impact on decisions. Power imbalances inherent within many of

these societies often lead to a lack of recognition of disempowered participants, but this factor is

insufficiently considered in current theoretical discussions about the enabling factors required for

successful institutional organization (Baland and Platteau 1999; Ostrom 2000).

Luintel (2006) describes experiences with three community forest user groups in Nepal

that are very constructive in providing concrete examples of cases where power imbalances can

be addressed through directed efforts by civil society organizations. In these three case studies in

Nepal, external NGOs worked with local communities to sensitize them to the needs of poor and

marginalized households. In the two groups that were more heterogeneous in ethnic composition,

these measures were initially opposed by middle income households. The external facilitators

recognized that a political strategy was required to deal with this. Luintel defines four major

stages that were crucial to the success of these interventions – “firstly a coaching role as

sensitization, knowledge and empowerment are needed for facilitating change; secondly a

process facilitation role while marginalized sections are becoming empowered and taking the

lead role in the discussions; thirdly an advocacy role to push the agenda of marginalized sections

while the powerful and elite attempt to dominate them; and fourthly, a negotiating role as

conflicts erupt among sub-groups.” (Luintel: 133). Thoms (2008) also describes other

approaches adopted by facilitators, wherein smaller homogeneous groups of households living

within hamlets in Nepal are first brought together in groups to discuss issues of importance to

them. These groups then individually identify leaders who will represent them on important

34

issues at user group meetings. Such strategies tend to have a greater chance of success in terms

of getting representatives to speak out, and to be heard.

Policy is important in shaping the boundaries of the discourse, and enabling advocacy

and empowerment – however, unless power structures are tackled on the ground through

innovative, dynamic approaches that can evolve to fit local contexts (and be disseminated from

group to group through networks engaging in sharing of best practices), no effective change is

possible merely through changes in laws, policy, and representation. Thus, policy interventions

appear to be necessary but not sufficient conditions for supporting change, which can be assisted

significantly by engaging with existing local power structures, through a combination of

education, empowerment, contestation and negotiation.

The experience with federations and user group collectives in Nepal throw light on how

negotiated spaces can be created for the empowerment of disadvantaged groups. A great

diversity of federations, cooperatives and other formal and informal networks and groups of

community forest users can be observed in Nepal, sometimes initiated with support from external

donor agencies, at other times the outcome of informal networks of local people and

disadvantaged groups (Biggs 2007). Perhaps the best known of these is FECOFUN, the national

federation of community forest user groups that represents over 11,000 groups in the country,

and constitutes Nepal’s largest civil society organization (Ojha and Timsina 2007).

FECOFUN is a politically active group which has orchestrated a number of campaigns to

pressurize Nepali government actors and agencies to alter their policies and implementation

strategies to directly consider issues of equity. Initiated with support from external donors and

NGOs, who envisaged the need for a strong network of community forest user groups that could

engage on an equal footing with the Department of Forests in Nepal, FECOFUN was started in

35

an enabling environment with the initiation of democracy in Nepal, by a group of politically

active leaders with strong interests and experience in working on issues of social democracy and

equity. Over the last two decades, this organization has expanded to become a major independent

force often engaging antagonistically with the Nepali Forest Department to lobby for the needs

of local communities (Biggs 2007; Dahal and Chapagain 2008). Although sometimes critiqued

for its dependence on external funding from donor agencies, and its engagement with politics,

FECOFUN has been very effective in raising national awareness and attention to problems of

equity and representativeness in community forestry. They have done this through a number of

approaches. This includes direct engagement with community forest user groups, conducting

awareness building and capacity building campaigns to raise awareness about issues related to

community forest management (of which equity forms a major component), and engaging at

larger scales through training programs, newsletters, radio broadcasts, facilitating exchanges of

“best practice” between different groups, and a variety of other innovative strategies (Ojha and

Timsina 2007). FECOFUN also provides legal advice to forest groups, and technical inputs

especially targeted at income generation for disadvantaged forest users and groups (Dahal and

Chapagain 2008).

ForestAction, another important NGO working on forestry issues in Nepal, has also

played a major role in influencing intellectual debate on this issue. This group has organized a

number of seminars, workshops and discussions on equity issues over the past decade, and

produced a number of written materials in Nepali and English, in conjunction with the effective

use of radio and television programs to build awareness and engage users and state actors in

debates at the local, regional and national level (Luintel 2006).

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6. Summary and conclusions

Heterogeneity plays a major role in impacting the likelihood of collective action for

natural resource management. Its impact on forest management has been relatively less studied,

partly because issues of equity and heterogeneity related to community forest management have

only gained importance in recent years. Further, more attention has been paid to understanding

the impact of economic heterogeneity, while the role of other types of heterogeneity including

variations in caste, political power, gender, education, age, locational heterogeneity,

heterogeneity in resource dependence and access to alternate forest resources have been

relatively less discussed.

Theoretical explorations of the impact of heterogeneity on collective action have largely

focused on economic heterogeneity, because this is easier to model. Because economic

heterogeneity was thought to be correlated with many other forms of heterogeneity including

social differences, power inequalities and differences in education and caste, the findings of

these studies were thought to apply more broadly to all kinds of heterogeneities. These

theoretical models were largely in agreement with the fact that people would not organize for

collective action when levels of heterogeneity were low, as the transaction costs associated with

forest organization were high, and could only be borne disproportionately by the rich. Some

studies did concede that high levels of heterogeneity could be dangerous for collective action,

arguing that the relationship between heterogeneity and collective action was U shaped

relationship rather than negative.

Experience from the field does not bear this out. While several studies have found that

some types of heterogeneity have no perceptible impact on collective action or forest outcomes,

the majority of studies indicate that communities are more likely to organize under conditions of

37

relative homogeneity, when there is a likelihood of higher levels of trust. This applies across

multiple kinds of heterogeneity, whether economic, social, or gender related. Heterogeneity

makes it difficult for local actors to organize themselves for collective action, because different

actors will have varied perceptions of the costs and benefits of community action, and may not

perceive the net benefits of cooperation in the same way. In particular, the relatively poor in the

community will face higher transaction costs – even though their net benefits may also be higher,

managing these transaction costs can constitute a major barrier to cooperation. Further,

differences in power hierarchies between the wealthy and poor, between men and women,

educated and illiterate, and differently advantaged and disadvantaged caste and ethnic groups,

can lead to mistrust, lack of communication, and create challenges for effective democratic

deliberative processes at the local level. Finally, differences in resource dependence, location and

access to alternate forest resources provide a different sort of challenge to collective forest

management, but again, increased heterogeneity generally makes the task of collective action

more challenging.

Yet, the impacts of heterogeneity are felt most strongly when institutions are weak. When

strong institutions exist, they are able to craft effective solutions to address challenges of

heterogeneity, usually at the operational choice level, but sometimes also at the collective choice

level (Varughese and Ostrom 2001; Adhikari and Lovett 2006 b; Andersson and Agrawal

forthcoming, 2011). This can be done by providing poor households with more opportunities for

income generation or collection of important products such as firewood, incentivizing social

entrepreneurs, increasing levels of formal participation by disadvantaged groups, conducting

hamlet meetings to identify group-level issues and empower leaders from low income and

disadvantaged caste groups, allowing heterogeneous participation in costly group activities like

38

monitoring that account for differences in the transaction costs of community participation, and a

variety of other locally adaptive measures.

The impact of community forestry and participatory forest management on heterogeneity

is less clear, varying greatly in different contexts. In general, community forestry has resulted in

substantial increases in forest incomes for many local communities. The benefits in terms of

income can be shared amongst the poor and disadvantaged directly (through access to forest

products, distribution of income from sale of forest products, or access to employment), or

indirectly (through community development activities). Unfortunately, in many cases, elite

capture has resulted in the substantial accrual of a large proportion of the direct and indirect

benefits to rich and medium income families. Even though some poor families may have

improved in income, in relative terms, levels of poverty and inequity may be exacerbated.

External institutions can have a positive or negative role to play in influencing the

capacity of institutions to deal with challenges of equity. Federations such as FECOFUN in

Nepal, and ACOFOP in Mexico, have attempted to address issues of inter- and intra-group

equity, sometimes in conjunction with donor agencies and NGOs. These attempts have been

largely successful, yet they require substantial investments of time and effort in building the

capacity of communities to address their own issues. When governments attempt to impose

formal, uniform, cookie cutter approaches to deal with heterogeneity, however, these tend to be

spectacularly unsuccessful, sometimes resulting in the collapse of existing, successful institutions

(Nayak and Berkes 2008).

The costs of collective action also tend to be disproportionately borne by the poor and

ultra poor, by women, and by artisanal castes who depend on the forest for continuous supplies

of forest products, and are adversely impacted by the restrictions on harvest that inevitably

39

accompany the advent of community forestry. The wealthy, in contrast, are usually better able to

deal with such situations because of their capacity to access private resources and exit options.

These problems are not universal, however, and several communities have made an effort to deal

with inequities of costs and benefit sharing by engaging with a variety of mechanisms at the

operational choice level for buffering costs or participation, and providing fair and equitable

access to benefits. McDermott and Schreckenberg (2009) also point out that the social

empowerment provided by community programs can help disadvantaged groups to access the

resources they need (such as through governmental aid programs) to move out of poverty. Many

governments, donor agencies and federations of user groups have focused on issues of collective

choice and constitutional choice, trying to develop mechanisms to encourage more participation

in decision making among historically disadvantaged groups. These efforts have largely been

successful when driven by local federations (prominent amongst which is FECOFUN in Nepal),

but with mixed success when done by governments and donor agencies who have a tendency to

engage in blueprint thinking, seeking for easily and immediately implementable large scale

solutions.

While challenges of heterogeneity are real, and significant, there are ways in which these

can be addressed. It is important to do so carefully and constructively. Else, the true potential of

community forestry will remain unrealized. As participatory approaches to forest management

expand across the globe, and communities engage with new market mechanisms such as

REDD+, it is increasingly important to understand and address challenges of heterogeneity, as it

impacts and is in turn impacted by collective action. This will help ensure the long term

sustainability of community forest management, which is already beginning to make significant

40

impacts on protecting and regenerating forest cover worldwide, but has a long journey ahead

(Nagendra and Southworth 2010).

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