Was England’s Aircraft Carrier Program Sunk Before it Could Get Underway?

By

MAJ Eloy Martinez

CGSC Class 11-01, Section 10D

18 February 2011

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Throughout the history of warfare countries have applied similar technologies in varying

degrees based on differences in commonality, religion, customs, beliefs, and history. Analysis of

England’s adaptation of aircraft carrier technology reveals a slowed development, progression,

and implementation of naval airpower, which relegated the Royal Navy to a distant third behind

the United States and Japan. England’s progress was encumbered by its failure to realize the full

potential of the emerging technology, its differences in existing hierarchies and military cultures,

and its leadership’s resistance to change and inability to identify a true threat. The irony of

England’s slow development stems from the fact that they possessed the only navy in the world

that operated aircraft carriers during the First World War.

The Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS) enjoyed technological advancements during World

War I and solved integral issues surrounding aircraft carrier operations (e.g. launching and

landing aircraft, arrester gears, aircraft lifts, and etc…) that carried over into the 21st century.1

The RNAS’s operational experience ranged from naval reconnaissance and air cover for fleet

operations to spotting for naval artillery against sea and shore targets. Their knowledge,

experience, and advancements dwarfed every other naval power in the world at the end of World

War I. British naval decision makers’ failure to realize the full potential of naval airpower

slowed its progression, and forced England to pursue an alternate course of implementation that

differed from other major navies.

British naval decision makers struggled with the application of naval airpower and its

overall contribution to strategic and tactical operations. Lieutenant Hugh Williamson, a

pioneering British naval officer, proposed the construction of an aircraft carrier capable of

1 Geoffrey Till, Adopting the Aircraft Carrier; The British, American, and Japanese case studies, (Military Innovation in the Interwar Period , Murray and Millett 1996), 194

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operating wheeled aircraft as early as 1912, but was rejected for a more conservative approach.2

The Royal Navy had rejected Williamson’s proposal based on a more conservative views that

seaplanes were better suited for the current navy. Lieutenant C.R. Samson, another young

pioneer, proposed a counter argument based on the unreliability of the current aircraft engines.

Samson’s opposition stated that the reliability of current engines made over-water operations too

hazardous; thus, making seaplanes a better alternative to mitigate the risk to personnel and

equipment.3

The Royal Navy (RN) might have taken Williamson’s approach had it looked beyond its

current situation and realized that aircraft engine performance and reliability would improve.

Furthermore, seaplanes were a limited use asset by location and mission set. Evidence seems to

suggest that British naval decision makers were struggling with the notion of when they would

see the expected benefits from aircraft carrier technology as opposed to whether they would see

those results.4 Even if the British policy makers had realized the advantages of naval airpower,

the differences in traditions, doctrine, and hierarchies further delayed the development of

England’s naval airpower.

Military organizations can become steeped in traditions to the point of crippling

inspirational leadership, and such was the case with the Royal Air Force (RAF) and RN.

England already possessed an independent air force with its own traditions, career paths, and

doctrine. The mere existence of a separate air force provided a solid base from which

disagreements in command and control, structure, and overall use of naval airpower and

capabilities could be leveraged to preserve the RAF’s position. The RN struggled to fully

integrate its airmen into its traditions, doctrine, and the mainstream of naval life, while the RAF 2 Geoffrey Till, Adopting the Aircraft Carrier; The British, American, and Japanese case studies, (Military Innovation in the Interwar Period , Murray and Millett 1996), 1923 Ibid., 1944 Ibid., 193

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was determined to restrict the freedom of maneuver of naval aviators to preserve its air force.5

Each service’s lack of vision and willingness to concede its power stance caused a severe

draught in leadership for naval air power.6

The struggle for naval airpower autonomy spilled over into the design, construction, and

implementation policies for naval air capabilities. They RN engaged in several campaigns to

recover all naval aviation aspects from the RAF Fleet Air Arm into one – the Royal Navy. Esprit

de corps was important to the navy; however, they did not want to create a separate service

within the navy. They wanted to create one navy with air assets integrated as a whole.7 Adding

to the struggles of autonomy, British naval aviators were even beginning to be viewed as traitors

to their own service – the RAF. Across the Atlantic, the U.S. Navy was able to secure benefits

and advocates for its naval air fleet, and continued to outpace the British development.

The U.S. Navy (USN) enjoyed the benefits and lack of constraints of an independent air

force but it endured similar doctrinal and policy challenges from the Army’s Air Corps. Rear

Admiral Bradley A. Fiske was the USN’s strongest advocate for establishing a separate bureau to

lobby for an independent naval air capability, and eventually enabled the creation of the Bureau

of Aeronautics (BuAer). BuAer provided the USN with a stronger voice than its British

counterpart, and witnessed a consolidation of powers for the design, construction, and funding of

aircraft production. Additionally, the BuAer enjoyed the freedom of maneuver in regard to the

assignment and training of naval aviators, and naval aviation was able to maintain complete

autonomy from other service influence.

Military leadership’s resistance to change and its inability to identify a threat are

additional reasons for a difference in application and adaptation of new technologies. Lieutenant 5 Geoffrey Till, Adopting the Aircraft Carrier; The British, American, and Japanese case studies, (Military Innovation in the Interwar Period , Murray and Millett 1996), 2056 Ibid., 2087 Ibid., 205

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Williamson’s proposition on aircraft carriers was partly dismissed on the basis of senior

leadership’s resistance to change. The RN operated within the constraints of a limited budget

and a lack of comprehensive doctrinal understanding of aircraft carrier technology. The latter

constraint was a main culprit in England’s slow development and adaptation of the aircraft

carrier. The British realized that Japan posed a threat to its empire’s sea lines of communication;

however, Japan did not warrant the immediate concerns that a re-emerging Germany posed to its

shipping routes and sea-based support of European allies. England remained unclear as to where

or with whom the RN would wage war, making it even more difficult to identify a strategic plan

for naval airpower.8

In contrast, the USN was able to clearly identify Japan as a threat to its interests in

Pacific. The U.S. decision makers realized that if the USN was going to have friendly air

support in a war with Japan, they were going to have to take it with them.9 This realization

forced the U.S. into a different strategic planning process than England. A large force would be

needed to provide the safety of the fleet as if crossed the Pacific beyond the range of friendly,

land-based air support. The USN would have to fight a combined enemy fleet and land-based air

forces. A clear identification of a single, most probable threat enabled the USN to create a sense

of urgency and obtain better funding, create clear doctrine, procure a large number of aircraft

carriers, and enjoy greater successes than England.10

Nations employ the same technologies in varying methods based upon differences in the

unrealized potential from the emerging technology, differences in existing hierarchies and

military cultures, and ideology differences among service leaders. England was not exempt from

these differences, and endured the hardships of implementing technology. A proposal for the 8 Geoffrey Till, Adopting the Aircraft Carrier; The British, American, and Japanese case studies, (Military Innovation in the Interwar Period , Murray and Millett 1996), 2019 Ibid., 20310 Ibid., 221

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advancement of aircraft carriers was rejected in 1912, and the Royal Navy opted for a safer

alternative for the present navy instead of for the navy of tomorrow. A military culture, steeped

in its traditions can lead to an alternate application of technology. And lastly, the inability to

clearly identify a threat can paralyze a nation, and prevent it from creating a strategic plan for

their navy. All nations experience similar challenges when adapting to new technologies and

England was no different. Ideology, tradition, lack of threat identification, and financial and

geographical constraints can alter the course of a nation’s implementation strategy for varying

technologies.

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Bibliography

Geoffrey Till, Adopting the Aircraft Carrier; The British, American, and Japanese case studies. In Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, Edited by Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet, 191 – 226. Cambridge University Press, 1996.