greater middle east initiative

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THE GREATER MDDLE EAST INITIATIVE:REGME C HANGE, NEOLIBERALISM AND US

GLOBAL HEGEMONY*

EDDIE J. GIRDNER

ABSTRACT

The George W. Bush Administration launched the Greater MiddleEast Initiative (GMEI) as "a forward strategyof freedom in the Middle East"in November 2003. The policy emerged as a central plank in the "vvar onterrorism" just as Operation Iraqi Freedom began to encounterstiff resistanceto the US occupationof Iraq. Marketed as a "brand nevv strategy" of "endingautocracy" in the region and bringing democracy to those deprived offreedom, officials clainned the policy vvas designed to "clean up the messyfart of the vvorld." This article argues that the GMEI is not about vvagingdemocracy in the Middle East, but rather neo-Wilsonian ideological cover forthe neoconservative agenda of controlling the entire vvorld by force. On thedravving board, the National Endovvment for Democracy (NED) and itsaffiliated organiza tions, vvorking clandestinely through US privatetransnational corporations, are to serve as conduits for the imperialist controlof local political parties and elections. This vvill allovv for the neoliberalcontrol of the region by US and Israeli capital, help to contain China andEurope through the control of oil, and bolster US capitalist accumulation.Ultimately , the US is certain to fail back on business as usual, supportinglocal autocracies vvhich serve "US national interests."

KEYVVORDSCivil society, democratization, imperialism, neoliberalism, neo-

Wilsonianism, terrorism, Turkey

"Presented at the First International Conference: "America in the MiddleEast, The M iddle East in America," American U niversity of Beirut. Beirut,Lebanon, Dec. 18-21, 2005.


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38 THE TURKSH YEARBOOK [VOL. XXXVI

".. .The United States has adopted a ew policy, a fonvard strategyo ffre ed om in th eMiddle East. " (George W. Bush, 6 November, 2003)

"We are always threatening the Middle East with Democracy... Butthere is another kind of reedom they would l ike, and that is freedomfrom us. " (Robert Fisk, 24 November, 2005)

"The Alternative to the old realpolitik is a brand new strategyoriented tovvard ending the entire apparatus of autocracy and

creating in its place the conditions for future political legitimacy andeconomic growth. "(Victor Davis Hanson, 21 October 2002)

".../ don 't thitk in any reasoable time frame the objective ofdemocratizing the Middle East can be successful.. . and in the processof trying to do it you can make theMiddle East a lot worse." (BrentScowcroft, National Security Advisor under GeorgeH. W. Bush)

"Where democracy appears to f it in well with US security andeconomic interests, the United States promotes democracy. Wheredemocracy clashes with other significant interests, it is downplayed oreven ignored." (Thomas Carotlers)

Introduction:

The Greater Middle East Initiative (GMEI) for"dem ocratization" is not about increasing freedom and democ racy forpeople in the region but about increasing freedom for W estern capitaland ensuring con tinued US political control of the region. Milita ryforce, along with other US foreign policy instruments underoccupation, c ontinues to be employed to secure the resources of Iraqfor US global hege mon y and corporate profits.1 Since maintainingeconomic and political control ver the entire Middle East throughmilitary force wo uld prove too costly, taking control throughclandestine polit ical and econom ic control, under the rubric of a"democracy initiative," is to be pursued in cooperation with the

'Eddie J. Girdner, "Operation Iraqi Freedom: Invasion, Occupation andConsolidationof US Hegemony in Iraq,"Punjab Journal of Politics 28 (2),July-Dec. 2004, pp. 1-31; "Pre-emptive War: The Case of Iraq,"Perceptions 9 (4), Winter 2004-2005, pp. 5-30.


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2005] THE GREATER MDDLE EAST INITIATIVE 39

European Union . The institutions for such control, through apartnership between US Government, private US capital, UScorporations operating in the region, and local comprador elites, havebeen in place for some time, as pioneered in US economic andpolitical control in Latin America.

With the neo-conservative perception that the US policy ofsupporting authoritarianism in the Middle East has outlived itshistorical usefulness, renovation of politics and consolidation of UShegemony is now to be carried out through a combination of forceand guile, namely incentives purporting to create a free anddemocratic society. As can be easily understood, at root,neoliberalism is neither free nor democratic. It is the prevailing formof corporate-capital-totalitarianism being locked upon countries andsocieties around the entire world today. It is not certain if the neo-conservatives believe their rhetoric that terrorism will be suppressedthrough Western corporate control of the region. The bottom line iscontrolof the politics and capitalof the Middle East region through acombination of military force and new institutions vvorking in leaguewith or under the cover of US corporations. The mechanism isexplained beIow. The GMEI is nothing other than the vehicle andblueprint for the extension and consolidation of neoliberalism in theMiddle East. In the neo-conservative vision, anything which presentsa barrier to this agenda must be ruthlessly rooted out and destroyed.

Since World War II, the United States has largely followed apolicy of realist politics around the world in the interests of servingthe interestsof its domestic ruling class and political constituency, theowners of corporate capital. The core of the US dom estic politicalconstituency is the corporate class. Under capitalist logic, it wasnecessary to secure the resources, raw products, labor and markets, ofthe entire globe as a source of capitalist accumulation. To someextent, benefits would filter down to other classes of the populationwithin the US domestic political economy.

Nevertheless, this agenda, under Cold War containment,counterinsurgency, and subversion of uncooperative regimes, wascarried out under the cover of various ideological devices, such as"preserving freedom and the American way of life," "freedom and


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40 THE TURKSH YEARBOOK [OL. XXXVI

democracy," and spreading "freedom.2 The well establishedWilsonian millenarianism, often with a crusading zeal, served as anappropriate ideological cover for the US enterprise of globalhegemony and pursuit of the interests of the domestic ruling classes,once the US took on the roleof global hegemon after World W ar II.

Consequently, under this rubric, the US carried out the coldwar, conducted counterinsurgency against potential social democraticgovernments, supported authoritarian governments in Latin Americanand elsewhere, or supported more democratic states as well,depending upon vvhether this was deemed to serve its interests.National interests were calculated primarily in termsof the needs andbenefits to the corporate class in the pursuit of global capitalistaccumulation.3

Within this framework, the US approach to the Middle Eastwas relatively simple and straight forward, having been essentiallysettled at the end of the Second W orld War. Democracy was notconsidered to be on the charts, under the rubric of Middle E asternexceptionalism, and the Unites States would support the autocraticand dictatorial regimes which were in place as long as the oil flowedthrough the US corporate structure. The US would be the regionalhegemon with ostensibly independent states. This arrangement wasreferred to as the "Arab faade." The US would sponsor local "copson the beat," Israel and Turkey, to help keep order in the region. Thiswas part of the deal which was struck at the end of World W ar II."Security" referred to the preservation of the system of capitalistaccumulation in the interests of the ruling classes of the US. T his"security" arrangement would be enforced by regional arrangements

2Will iam Blum,Kill ing Hope: U.S. Military and C.I.A. Interventions SinceWorld W ar II. Monroe, Maine: Common Courage Press, 2004; William

Blum,Rogue State: A Guide to theWorld's Only Superpower, London: ZedBooks, 2002; Richard J. Barnet,intervention and Revolution: America'sConfrontat ion with Insurgent Movements Around the W orld, N e w Yor k:Meridian Books, 1968. Lawrence S. Wittner has noted how the term"dem ocrac y" has been used as a marketing dev ice for policies, such as theTrum an D octrine that w ould otherwise be difficult to seli to the public.Lawrence S. Wittner, "The Abuse of Democracy," History News Network,Nov. 28,2005.

3Noam Chomsky,Deterring Democracy, New York, 1992.


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with Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and so on. This often precluded democracy,as with the overthrovv of Moham ad M ossadegh in Iran, and put theUS at odds vvith more democratic states, such as India.

Consequently, vvhile lip service vvas often paid to"democratization," in actual practice, democratic regimes vveresupported only in cases in vvhich it vvas clear that it vvould protectcapital and serve the US corporate class. In practice, US foreignpolicy vvas generally one of "deterring democracy," in vvhich scoresof regimes vvere overthrovvn by the CIA, vvhich held the prom ise ofthe emergence of local democratic autonomy, vvhich vvas deemed tomilitate against the needsof the US corporate ruling clas s.4

The history of US foreign policy since World War II has beenfairly consistent and significant shifts in the policy of support forauthoritarian regimes, such as in Latin America in the 1970s, havebeen consistent vvith the bottom neof a rational calculus about vvhatserved the domestic ruling class, rather than any abstract ideals aboutfreedom and democracy. There is no reason vvhy one should expectany radical shift in this historical approach in the near futuretrajectoryof US foreign policy.

Prior to the US invasion and occupationof Iraq in March 2003,and follovving the destructionof the Tvvin Tovvers in Nevv York, someof the neo-conservatives in the Bush Administration declared that theUS policyof appeasementof authoritarian regimes in the Middle Easthad failed and that the US must move quickly to remove theseregimes and establish democracy across the region.5 Regime changeemerged as a nevv buzz vvord.

Nevertheless, the Iraq vvar vvas not launched upon the rationaleof establishmentof democracy, but rather upon the rationale that Iraqpossessed vveaponsof mass destruction and that Saddam Hussein hadestablished links vvith al-Qaeda. When the Iraq War began to go badlyand encounterstiff resistance from indigenous forces, in the fail of2003, it became clear that the US vvas in for a long hard slog. The

4C h om s k y,Deterring Democracy; Blum,Killing Hope.5Victor Davis Hanson, "Democracy in the Middle East: It's the hardheadedSolution,"Weekly Standard, Vol. 8, Issue 6, 21 October 2002.


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Bush A dministration fell back upon the position of presenting"democratization" as the center plank in the "War on Terrorism."George W. Bush made his famous November 6, 2003 speech at theAmerican Enterprise Institute (AEI), where the National Endowmentfor Democracy (NED) is located, announcing a US "forward strategyof freedom." Bush called for $40 million for the NED budget to betargeted for the Middle East alone.6

The idea of G reater M iddle East Initiative (GM EI), developedby the US State Department was to be another tool of imperialistcontrol which could be used to secure the resources, labor andmarkets of the region to beef up US global hegemony and securecorporate profts in the region, while theoretically, ending anyincentives for terrorism. It is not clear if the neo-conservativeideologues took this argument seriously, but the rational of"democratization" went forward under the same rubric as the invasionof Iraq, that of the "War on Terrorism." In fact, as will be arguedbelow, both enterprises were of a piece with pushing forward thelogicof serving the US ruling class in consolidation the global rule ofneoliberalism and increasing global power and corporate profts.Under sleight of hand, the same m echanisms developed and used inLatin American would be brought in, opening the channels andfloodgates for a massive flow of new CIA money into the region onbehalf of US capital.

The Greater Middle East Initiative: Emergence and P rofile

One might reasonably expect that the GMEI would be takenwith a huge grainof salt, given the historyof US foreign policy sinceWorld War D. Nevertheless, it has largely been taken at face value bymost analysts and commentators.7 The original US State Department

6"In Pursuit of Arab Reforms: The Greater Middle East Initiative,"Aljazeera-net, 20 May 2004.

7"Greater Middle East Initiative Working Paper," al-Hayat, 13 Feb. 2004;Tamara Cofman, "The New U.S. Proposal for a Greater Middle EastInitiative: An Evaluation," Saban Center Middle East Memo #2, May 10,2004; Gunduz Aktan, "Latest developments on the Greater Middle EastInitiative,"Turkish Daily News, May 24, 2004; "G-8 Broader Middle Eastand North Africa Initiative," USINFO, 9 June 2004; Gary C. Gambill,


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document was leaked in February 2004 to the Arab nevvspaper, al-Hayat. It was to cover 22 Arab nations plus Turkey, Israel, Pakistan,and Afghanistan. The modified document actually promulgated at theSea Island, Georgia meeting of the G-8 in June 2004, was a greatlymodified version of what was leaked to the press. The G MEI was thethird initiative to be launched by the US since 9/11. In December2002, a US-Middle East Partnership initiative was launched and inFebruary 2003, the US-Middle East Free Trade Area.8

The Greater M iddle East initiative was first developed in theUS S tate Department, Bureau for Near East Affairs. The 2002-2003UN Arab Development report was used to provide demographic andeconom ic background data to underpin the thrust of the initiative.Also the Helsinki Agreementsof 1975, which were seen to encouragethe reforms in the governments of Eastern Europe, were seen toprovide a model for the process of political reform which wasenvisioned.

The 2002-2003 UN Arab Human Development Report (AHDP)highlighted "three deficits" in Middle Eastern soc ieties: Freedom,Knowledge, and Wom en's Empowerment. The logic forwarded wasthat these deficits contributed to a poolof disenfranchised individualsand led to an increase in extremism, terrorism, international erime,and illegal immigration to Europe and beyond. The thrust of theinitiative was that to address these deeper problems, which bredterrorism and other ills, political reform and demoeratization was apriority.

The AHDP presented a profileof the region in which the GDPof the 22 Middle Eastern countries had a combined GDP less than

"Jumpstarting Arab Reform: The Bush Adm inistration's Greater M iddle

East initiative,"Middle East Intel ligence Bullet in, Vol. 6, No. 6-7,June/July 2004; "In Pursuit of Arab Reform: The Greater M iddle Eastinitiative," Aljazeera_net, 20 May 2004; Gamal Essam El-Din, "Reformedand Reformulating,"Al-Ahram Weekly, No. 678, 19-24 Feb. 2004; RobinWright and Glenn Kessler, "Bush Aims For 'Greater Mideast' Plan,"Washington Post, Feb. 9, 2004, p. Al; Richard Youngs, "Europe and theGreater Middle East initiative,"Arab Reform Journal, April 2004.

8Nasim Zehra, "The Greater Middle East initiative,"Media MonitorsNetwork, March 15, 2004.


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thatof Spain, 40 percentof adult Arabs (61 million, 2/3 women) wereilliterate, six million new jobs needed to be created per year, only 1.6million had access to the Internet (the lowest proportion in the world),women held only 3.5 percent of seats in the parliaments of Arabcountries (compared to 8.4 percent in sub-Saharan Africa), and some51 percent of Arab youths vvanted to emigrate, mostly to the EU orAmerica.

There was also said to be a "freedom deficit," in which Israelwas the only country in the region rated "free" by the 2003 report ofFreedom House. Only four countries in the region were rated "partlyfree." Of the seven world regions, the Arab world had the lowestfreedom score in the late 1990s. Empowerment of women rankedonly above sub-Saharan Africa. On the other hand, it was reportedthat democracy was rated high among the peoplesof the Middle Eastas the most desirable formof government.

The launching of the GMEI was problematical, after theleaking of the initial document, and the negative image that the UShad suffered in the Middle East after the invasionof Iraq and the AbuGhraib prison torture scandals. The "sharp crisis of confidence" wasreflected in the image of the US as a neo-colonial pow er in theregion.9 Further, the US had failed to consult with the governments ofthe countries to be targeted and failed to mention the Arab-Israeliconflict in the docu me nt.10 It was recognized that Middle Easterngovernm ents vvould see such a "patronizing" initiative as a "new formof economic and cultural hegemony." They would understand thatWashington vvished to extend the programs of the NationalEndovvment for Democracy (NED) from Eastern Europe and theBalkans to the Middle East.11 The NED uses tax payer money to fundfavored political parties in elections around the vvorld, a practicewhich is illegal in the US. The US Office of Management and theBudget (OM B) had announced the allocation of $458 million for

9Richard W. Murphy, "The Greater Middle East initiative,"Arab Medianternet Network, April 19, 2004.

1 0Pamela and Robert Pelletreau, "Greater Middle East initiative: A Viewfrom Washington,"Arab News, 29 April 2004.

"Zeyno Baran, "Getting the Greater Middle East initiative Right,"Th eNational Interest, March 3, 2004.


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"democracy prom otion" in Iraq for the first six monthsof 2004 alonein Iraq. It vvas subsequently exposed that the US carried out a secretoperation to rig the January 30, 2005 elections in Iraq. Therefore itvvas realized that the launching of the program vvould need to becompromised by the vievvsof the Europeans and the Arab leaders.

The Americans vvould have to link the GMEI vvith the NATOMediterranean Dialogue and the European program knovvn as theBarcelona Process, launched in 1995. The first includes Israel, Egypt,Jordan, and four North African states in a "security partnership." TheBarcelona Process adds Syria and Lebanon to the other countries andis supposed to lay the foundation for an economic partnership and afree-trade area starting in 2010. The European program speaks of"modernization" rather than "democratization." Unlike the originalGMEI proposal, the European program agreed upon the need toaddress the Israel-Palestinian problem and the ongoing crisis in Iraq.The European program also put some emphasis upon addressingpoverty and underdevelopment.

The US vvould have to use a "clever" approach and get theregional leaders engaged, "gain local acceptance" by "providing themvvith the necessary safety net," and "put serious money into theregion."12 It vvas never pointed out that since the GMEI vvould bepatently illegal in the United States, perhaps the leadersof the MiddleEast had legitimate reasonsfor questioning the initiative.

In brief, the initiative vvas based upon five core components.First, the initiative vvould provide a venue for discussion of reformgoals and programs; encourage cooperation betvveen states; and bringbusiness and civil society leaders into the process. Secondly, therevvould be a Greater Middle East Democracy Assistance Group tocoordinate the American and European groups "promotingdemocracy." On the American side, this vvould include the NationalEndovvment for Democracy (NED), and its four majr organizations(discussed belovv). In Europe it vvould involve the affiliatedstiftungsassociated vvith German political parties and the WestministerFoundation in the UK. Thirdly, the initiative vvould establish amultilateral foundation modeled on the NED to focus on political

nIbid.


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change in the Middle East. Fourthly, there would be a Greater MiddleEast Literacy Corps. Fifthly, it would establish a G-8 microfinancepilot project, based upon an existing French proposal, fund new smallbusinesses, and contribute to building an Arab "middle class." Otherelements of the program included "civic education" programs,technical assistance with voter registration, parliamentary exchangesand training, women's leadership vvorkshops, legal aid, mediatraining, "anti-corruption" efforts, strengthening N GO 's (which mayactually only masquerade as NGOs), and support for certain laborunions.

One can get a better pictureof what is intended here by notingthe emphasis upon business initiatives, business education, civilsociety, human rights, and training political party leaders. Thedocument suggests that the Bahrain Instituteof Banking and Finance,with an American director and a partnership with several USuniversities, could serve as a model for other countries. The programwould prov ide an avenue for US universities to market theireducational programs, tailored to corporate needs, to the Middle Eastregion. It was said that the "key" to the program was "unleashing theregion's private po tential", under the auspices of W estern andAmerican capital,of course, which has ever been the formula for USrequirements for allowing a region of the world to develop. Theinitiative also emphasized the grovvthof an "entrepreneurial class" to"help democracy and freedom flourish." This also gives a clue as tothe type democracy that the program will foster. A neoliberalcapitalist framework that provides freedom for W estern capital anddefined as "democracy," is the desired final product. In fact, it iswidely recognized by serious political economists that in today'sglobal political economy, there is a sharp contradiction betvveencapitalism and democracy, betvveen corporate profit and dem ocracy,and betvveen corporate control and democracy. The GMEI is clearlyconcerned with freedom for capital, rather than freedom for humanindividuals.

The GMEI also calls for the establishmentof a Greater MiddleEast Development Bank (GMED Bank), a "partnership for financialexcellence," and an emphasis upon "removing barriers to cross-border financial transactions." In other words, neo liberal financialliberalization, which has been the cause of many financial crisesaround the world in recent years, is given a high priority. Financial


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2005] THE GREATER MDDLE EAST N T A T V E 47

services will be liberalized, to allow the marketing and control oflocal financial institutions by Western capital. There will bepromotion of intra-regional trade, a push for W TO accession forcountries, export processing zones, which are referred to as BusinessIncubation Zones (BZ), and special trade zones. This will increasethe process of the maquiladorization of the Middle East. Of coursewhen small business enterprises succeed through US taxpayer dollars,the big sharks, Western corporations will be there to buy them up andbroaden the foundation of firms for capital accumulation on a globalscale. From the above, we see that the GMEI is clearly the thin edgeof a wedge to transform the entire Middle East under the banner ofneoliberal global corporate control. The Arabs were not beingunrealistic when they charged that the program was designed forimperialist controlof the region. That is what it is for. But generally,analysts have been observed to dismiss such charges out of hand asthey are not considered to be in good taste in today's global businessenvironment.

At the same time, this is not to say that nothing is positiveabout the program. For example, literacy and vvomen's educationcould be a positive contribution. In a dialectical way, capitalism oftendevelops the tools for potential human liberation. On the other hand ,we are not to see the "invisible hand" of the CIA that is driving thisprogram in the interestsof the domestic ruling class in the interests ofUS and Western capital. This is to remain hidden.

One can readily discern that the elements laid out here are infact those already established in the NED model that have beenpioneered outside the Middle East region and vvhich serve asmechanisms of control by the US Government through concealedarrangements with private corporations. The mechanism andoperative principles of this regime, promulgated from the bovvels ofthe CIA in Washington, is laid out in some further detail below .

While the initial reaction in Arab countries was negative, it hasbeen argued that the document had some immediate positive results inforcing governm ents to take some reform initiatives, hovvever halting.In Egypt, the Legal Committee of the Government appointed aNational Council for Human Rights (NCHR). This committeeproceeded to recommend that the stateof emergency be rescinded. InLibya, Colonel Gaddafi pledged to cancel the Emergency Law . The


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Palestinian Authority announced that elections would be held. InSaudi Arabia, Crown Prince A bdullah hosted a series of "NationalDialogue Forums" and promised that municipal council electionswould be held. To some extent these were efforts to pre-emptpressures which these nations expected from the West. The feelingamong many was that the proposal vvould not be accepted as long asUS troops occupied Iraq.

More negative opinions were held in Syria by President Basharal-Asad and in Tunisia by President Sine El Abidine Ben Ali. PrimeMinister Sheikh Khalifa bin Salman al-Khalifaof Bahrain, where theUS Navy Fifth Fleet is home-ported, also rejected the initiative.Subsequently, the Arab League came forvvard with the "TunisDeclaration" on May 22, 2004, which expressed "commitment to thehumanitarian principlesof noble valuesof human rights... freedom ofexpression, thought, belief, and the independence of the judiciary."Twenty-two Arab governments pledged to pursue reform andmodernization; consolidate democratic practices; enlargeparticipation in political, economic, social, cultural and educationalfields; and reinforce the rights and status of the above in theirsocieties.13

In Egypt the "chronic indifference" to reform and movingtoward "democratization" was apparent. Members of the rulingNational Democratic Party defended the Governm ent and criticizedthe US initiative. Mohamed Abdellah, former head of Parliament'sForeign Affairs Comm ittee called the GMEI a "smokescreen." AbuZejd, Chairmanof the Parliamentary Arab-Affairs Comm ittee said theArab-Israeli conflict, which breeds terror, must first be solved.Foreign Minister Ahmed Maher said "reform must come from withinthe Arab world" and claimed that Egypt had already made democraticachievements, such as democratic reform, wom en's emancipation,human rights, and educational reforms. Gamel Mubarak, the son ofthe President and Chairman of the NDP Policy Secretariat, arguedthat the Party is truly open to reform. Others, such as SecretaryGeneral Hussein Abdel-Razeg of the leftist Tagammu Party, statedtruthfully what everyone knew, that the NDP was "dragging its feet"and vvould be sub ject to more pressure from the US. Egypt had yet to

13Gambill, "Jumpstarting Arab Reform."


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"appease" the US in the area of democratization because the rulingparty considered it so dangerous. The Secretary Generalof the NDP,Safwat El-Sharif had announced that amending the Constitution is noton the agenda of political reform in Egypt. Many other members ofthe opposition in Egypt were seen to be supporting the US pressurefor reform as the ruling party had refused to make any reforms ver a22 year period.14 In practice, hovvever, as Patrick Buchanan haspointed out, opening up the system has perils for Washington too, asit vvould likely bring the Islam ist fundamentalists to povver.

At the G-8 Summit in Sea Island Georgia, after considerab lemodifcation, tvvo documents vvere actually approved, designatedcollectively as the "Broader Middle East and North African initiative(BMENA I). Many leaders, including Mubarak, refused to attend theSea Island meeting. Leaders came from Afghanistan, Algeria,Bahrain, Jordan, Tunisia, Turkey, Yemen, and Iraq. Documentsapproved vvere a 12-point Partnership for Progress and a CommonFuture W ith the Region of the Broader Middle East and N orthAfrica" and the "G-8 Planof Support for Reform." Unlike the GM EI,the actually agreed upon BMENAI received little attention in thepress, after being vvatered dovvn to pass m uster vvith European andMiddle Eastern Nations. The original document vvas modified insignificant vvays. First, the BMENAI acknovvledged the Arab-Israelconflict and called for support for reform in the region to go "hand inhand" vvith "support for a just, com prehensive, and lasting settle tothe Arab-Israeli conflict. Secondly, the revised docum ent stressed thatreform should not be imposed from the outside but depend uponcountries in the region. Third, governments should not necessarily beexpected to change. Fourth, there vvould be no universally recognizedstandards. Diversity of countries should be respected. Fifth, eachcountry vvould decide upon the 'pace and scopeof change." Sixth, theidea of organizing an NGO to monitor reform progress vvas rejected.Seventh, government to government meetings vvould be held as a"Forum for the Future ." Conferences vvould be arranged forexchanges betvveen business and civil society leaders.15

Academics and analysts, rather than analyzing the roots of the

14Ga m al Essam El-Din, "Reformed and Reformulating."15Gambill, "Jumpstarting Arab Reform."


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nitiative, generally took the initiative at face value as one can seefrom a number of academic exchanges which have taken placeconcerning the initiative and the larger questionof democratization inthe Middle East.1 6

The ideological Neo-conservative Perspective:

The hard vision was laid out by Victor Davis Hanson in theWeekly Standard.17 This is a crusading vision which rejects boththose who argue that it will be difficult to establish dem ocracy in Iraqafter US invasion and occupation, and those who argue that the bestcourse w ill be for the US to fail back upon pro-US despotism. H ansonrejects the notion that lack of a democratic tradition and a middleclass militates decidedly against the establishment of democracy. Heextends this vision to the subsequent reconfiguration of the M iddleEast, across a wide region. He has little patience with thearrangement of supporting the pro-US despotism of General PervezMusharaf in Pakistan. He urges the US to decide upon a course of

16"Democratization in the Middle East: Solution or Mirage,"Middle EastReview of International Ajfairs (MERIA),Vol. 7, No. 1, Ma rch 2003;Richard Youngs, "Europe and the Greater Middle East initiative,"ArabReform Journal, April 2004; Daniel Neep, "Dilemmasof Democratizationin the Middle East; The 'Forward Strategy of Freedom ,"'Middle EastPolicy Council Journal , 11, (3), Fail 2004. Neep realistically points outthat the GMEI provides ideological cover for US "realpolitik" and is aboutdomestic po litics, rather than what is good for the region.

1 7Ha nso n, "Democracy in the Middle East." The idea of spreadingdemocracy by the svvord, by force and violence , has been challenged by awide rangeof comment, including former National Security Advisor B rentScowcroft. In the vvords of Michael Scheuer, it is "Pure Wilsonian

claptrap." In the case of Bush himself, it appears to be related to hisbelieve that he has been anointed to carry out a divine mission. SeeCharley Reese, "The Prospect for Democracy in Iraq," Antiwar.com, Dec.7, 2005; Steve Clemons, "Brent Scowcroft 'Breaks Ranks' with George W .Bush in Majr New Yorker Article," October 23, 2005, The WashingtonNote Archives; Larry Everest, "Lessonsof History: Nothing Good Can orWill come from U.S. Occupation," Sept. 21, 2005, ZNET; MichaelScheuer, "Deliberately Destroying America's Soul," April 22, 2005,Antiwar.com.


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action before the invasion and stick to it, regardlessof the cost.

Hanson argues that this is the "practica l" course of actionbecause legitimate governments have power ver dictatorships. Heargues that past US policy has failed, such as the "appeasement of[Yassir] Arafat" and the Palestinians, while pushing for democraticreform with no significant results. He sees this as a process, not theinstallation of "Jeffersonian Democracy" at once. The first step is to"remove the dictator," and this is most likely to have to be done witha war or at least considerable force. He is apparently not concernedabout the internationa l illegality of such use of military force. He isnot concerned that "regime change" by the US may create chaos.Even chaos is seen as better than what exists. What emerges will beflawed, to be sure, but this is not to deter the US. The emergenceof aflawed democracy is better than the status quo because eventually thepeople will realize that it is up to them to make things better. "Betterto deal with a subverted democracy: At least its people will soonrealize they, not the United States, are responsible for their disaste rs."The people are responsible. The model will be something likePanama, Grenada, Serbia, and Philippines. Regardless of the risks,the venture is necessary because it is not possible to leave the MiddleEast alone, after 9/11. It is "pathological" and will only get vvorse, sothe US really has no choice.

He says that Americans have been told that there are two typesof regimes in the Middle East, except Israel which is democratic. Thefirst type includes "sponsors of terrorism," such as Afghanistan(before the removal of the Taliban), Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syriaand Yemen. The second type includes the "moderate dictatorships,"such as Egypt, the Gulf states, lordan, M orocco, Saudi Arabia andTunisia. But on balance , after 9/11, there is not a lot of differencebetvveen these regimes for Hanson. They are ali sick societies,breeding terrorists. He argues that both kindsof governments "seek tosurvive through bribery, oppression, and censorship, and byscapegoating Israel and America." There is the absence of elections,no free speech, lack of any public audit of government finances, anduseof the "bogeymanof the Wes t" as an excuse for ali their ills.

Nevertheless, in the end, he believes the fact is that the Arabmasses hate their own governments more than they hate the US. Thelast two decades of ruined economics has "brought nothing but


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disaster." He sites the Arab Human Development Report 2002, as thebest evidence for this. There is a high population grovvth leading to38 percent of the population being under fourteen years of age. Theminimal GNP in the region means that 22 Arab countries have acombined GDP of less than that of Spain. On the other hand, thewealthiest 85 ,000 Saudi families have $700 billion in overseas assets.

Hanson neglects to explore how the US encouraged thissituation, selling useless arms, and recycling petrodollars through USbanks so that some seven percent of the US economy is now ovvnedby the Saudi Royal Family. It is also not explored how well globalcapitalism has done in developing the vvorld in general. And vvhatexactly does Western capital vvant to see happen in the region? Willthe profts stay in the countriesof the region or go to US, Israel, andEurope. These are larger questions that need to be addressed in acritique vvith a historically realistically vievv. Labor productivity inthe Middle East has actually fallen betvveen 1960 and 1990, Hansonnotes, and even Africa has outperformed the Middle East in economicgrovvth. Too fevv foreign books are being translated into Arab ic. Halfof the you ths vvish to emigrate, most often to the US and Europe.Rather facetiously, Hanson presents the US as a country that has triedeverything in the Middle East, and is now "exasperated" at the lack ofcooperation and progress.

In other vvords, vvith things so bad and getting vvorse, the USreally has nothing to lose in going after the Middle East vvith a meatcleaver. Whatever the result, it can't get vvorse. In any event, there isreally no choice. Supporting these regimes did not address theproblem of "Arab developm ent." It failed, but novv there is little tofear. Without the USSR, the US is free to do vvhat it vvants in theregion. Great progress has been made in Afghanistan, he believes. Hedismisses the critics. They vvere vvrong about Japan, Italy, andGermany after WW II. The US overcame ali the predicted difficulties,so there is no reason vvhy this should not happen in the Middle Eastas vvell. It is uncertain if Hanson vvould stili defend this pre-Iraqinvasion version of events after the chaos the US has encounteredthere, as predicted by the most knovvledgeable about the region.

And "democracy" is the only game in tovvn. For Hanson, it hasno rivals. He does not define vvhat he means by "dem ocracy" but it isobviously the US visionof "neoliberalism." It is Francis Fukuyama's


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liberal utopia of the "last man". What it seems is really beingforvvarded is the thesis that "there is no alternative." This is because"dem ocracy" has no rivals. The US need not fear competition from"French Marxism," "communist nostalgia," "Baathist nonsense," nor"Islamist fundamentalism." On the other hand, the US "has an ally inglobal popular culture." It becomes obvious that Hanson is talkingabout the type of "democracy" which exists in the United S tates, inwhich the actual constituency is the corporate ruling class. He doesnot recognize the possibility of a popular democracy in which theconstituency vvould be the masses or majority of the people. So thisties in nicely vvith the Fukuyamian thesis that liberalism, or ratherneo-liberalism, is the end of history and nothing else can challengethis paradigm. Neoliberalism has become the global totalitarianideology and vve can ali be happy that we live in such a totalitarianvvorld. Novv vve jus t have to m ake sure that the M iddle East goesalong vvith the program.

But there are dangers too, for Hanson. "Establish ing lavvfulrule in lavvless places entails costs and dangers," he quickly adds. Heargues that either vvar or the threat of force must be used. "Militarypovver must be decisive.' Another price the US must be ready to payis "the lengthy presence of Am erican troops." Not everyone vvill behappy. "W e must expect and not fear anti-Americanism." So forHanson , the old game of "propping up strong men in the name ofstability" is ver. It is to "flout the aspirations of long-suppressedpeoples and forget out national principles." The vvorld has changedsince the end of the Cold War, and "in our ovvn national interest, vvemust make sure that our policies evolve vvith it." The old option is nolonger there and "the Islamic vvorld lost the privilege of beingdifferent."18 They too are to be brought into the neo-liberaltotalitarian vvorld and serve their proper role of serving the needs ofglobal capitalist accumulation. Having committed the sin of defyingtheir masters, in 9/11, they vvill novv be taken to the vvoodshed andleam their proper place in the vvorld. This vision is indeed consistent

18Ib id . Juan Cole has pointed out the hypocrisy of Western intellectualsaccusing the Middle Eastof resisting democracy. The West has a history ofsuppressing democratic urges in the region. Juan Cole, "Bush's War andthe Egyptian Elections," Sept. 19, 2005, Salon.com Nevvs. Robert Fisk andJustin Podur, "The Great War for Civilization," rabble.ca, December 7,2005.


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with the prevailing racist and neocolonial world view of the neo-conservatives on the Potomac.

The Real key: The model, vvhich is the basis of the GM EI,and how it works

Philip Agee, a former CIA employee, has explained theevolution and functioning in practiceof the institutions vvhich the UShas set up to control the politics and econom ies of countries aroundthe vvorld. The GMEI seeks to extend this system to the vvholeof the"greater Middle East."1 9 Disguised as activities to "promotedemocracy," "resolve conflicts," and "strengthen civic life," theUnited States has spent some nine million US dollars in 2005 toremove President Hugo Chavez Frias from povver in Venezuela. T hisis up from tvvo million dollars in 2001, when a failed coup vvascarried out. The United States provides money, training, counsel, anddirection to a netvvorkof political parties, NGOs, mass media outlets,trade unions, and businessmen to end the democratic reforms beingcarried out by Chavez. One can readily see that this is the same modelvvhich is to be applied to the Middle East. In other vvords, to cali sucha program of regime change against the democratic vvishes of thelocal people "democratization" is, to say the least, the epitome ofOrvvellian doublespeak.

The coup being carried out from behind the scenes inVenezuela is directed by the US State Department, the architectof theGMEI, the Agency for International D evelopment (AID) and the CIA.The primary organization is the National Endovvment for Dem ocracy(NED ) and its four subsidiary organizations. These are the NationalDemocratic Institute (NDI)of the Democratic Party, the InternationalRepublican Institute (NRI) of the Republican Party, the Center forInternational Private Enterprise (CPE) of the US Chamber ofComm erce, and the American Center for International LaborSolidarity (AC ILS)of the American Federationof Labor-Congress ofIndustrial Organizations (AFL-CIO). The last organization vvasformerly called the American Institute for Free Labor Development

1 9Philip Agee, "Hovv United States Intervention Against Venezuela Works,"www.zmag.org., September 9, 2005
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neoliberalism, privatization, deregulation, control of trade unions,reduction of social vvelfare, elimination oftariffs, and free access tomarkets, In other words, these operations are very much an integralpartof US foreign policy operations.

While the NED is legally an NGO, this is not actually the case,and USAID and the CIA fully participate in these programs to"promote democracy." NED functions, for ali practical purposes, asan arm of the US State Department. In 1984, USAID established theOffice of Democratic Initiatives (ODI), renamed as the Office ofTransition Initiatives (OTI) in 1994. Along vvith NED, theseorganizations channel funds abroad through a network of USFoundations, consulting firms, and public relations firms, in order toconceal the US Government connection. While the official line is thatthese organizations work to "strengthen civil society," they merelysupport the groups that support US interests and oppose those vvhichdo not. This,of course, is again Orvvellian, as it promotes US control,not democracy. Undermining local democratization is promoted as"democratization."

These organizations vvere used to defeat the SandinistaGovernment in Nicaragua in the 1990 elections and similar operationsare novv being conducted against President Hugo Chavez inVenezuela. It is believed that the cost of the Nicaragua operation in1989 vvas some $20 million.22

Today, the consultingfirm, Development Alternatives, Inc., hascarried out development projects in some 150 countries including anumber of countries of the M iddle East. The Corporation isconsidered to be an ideal corporate structure for inserting CIAoffcers and agents. Contracts vvith USAID, operating in Venezuela,have been obtained and posted on the Internet. It is clear that theseoperations are designed to carry out the precise programs outlined inthe GMEI. They conduct "vvorkshops, seminars, conferences andtraining courses to develop political parties. They form political partycoalitions, run programs to register voters, and conduct programs to

2 2Ag ee , "The Natureof CIA Intervention in Venezuela."


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2005] THE GREATER MDDLE EAST NTATVE 57

get out the vote.2 3

Can Turkey be a Model For Democracy in the MiddleEast?

Some analysts have made the case that for the US andEuropean approach to democratizing the Middle East, the currentTurkish Government under Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoancan serve as an instructive example.24 The Justice and DevelopmentParty Government (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi or Ak Parti) showsthat "religious political movements in the Mslim world can take thelead in introducing greater social, political and economic freedom totheir societies." It is claimed that in Turkey's case "the evolutionof amodernizing Islamist political force was facilitated by externalpressures for reform." "Turkey has been cajoled, pressured andencouraged by the West in its journey toward full and m aturedemocracy." The conclusion is that"if Western governments hope tosee this evolution take place across the Middle East, they would dowell to study closely what is happening in Ankara."

2 3Ph il ip Agee, "Use of a Private U.S. Corporate Structure to Disguise aGovernment Program,"www.smag.org,September 10, 2005.

2 4Thomas Patrick Carroll, "Turkey's Justice and Development Party: AModel for Dem ocrat ic is lam?"Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, Vol. 6,No. 6-7, June/July 2004. The notion that the Ak Party could actually wantdemocracy to function is not even taken seriously. For example, allowingthe Turkish Parliament to democratically reject the bili for a US invasionof Iraq from Turkish soil is often explained as due to the "inexperience" ofthe leadersof the Ak Party. That is seen as a mistake, despite the fact thataround 90 percentof the Turkish people opposed the bili. The mainstreamUS sentiment is that once the leaders get the knack of ruling, the new

ruling party will fail into the groveof crushing democracy in the interestsof United States. See Alexander Cooley, "Base Politics,"Foreign Ajfairs,84 (6), Nov.-Dec., 2005, p. 84. For Cooley, this democratic decisionrevealed an "institutional weakness" typical of "young democrac ies." Inthis US view, the Turkish Prime Minister was mistaken that it was a'victory of democracy." Rather, "democracy," in US terms, would havemeant going against the willof 90 percentof the Turkish people. It wouldbe difficult to find a better example of how "democracy" for the US isdefined as that which serves US national interests.
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It is true that Turkey has taught the West, particularly theUnited States, something about democracy, in the recent past, but it isnot what is suggested by this argument. In fact, Turkey taught the USa lesson in democracy when in 2003, the Turkish Parliament voted torefuse permission for the US army to cross Turkish soil in its invasionof Iraq. This was met with an angry reactionfrom US authorities whoupbraided the Turkish military for not carrying out their duty andensuring that the bili would pass. The US threatened to cut aid toTurkey. In the Spring of 2005, the US Ambassador, KennethAdelman, requested that Prime Minister, Tayyip Erdoan, request theTurkish newspaper,Yeni afak, not to publish articles critical of theUS in Iraq. ver and ver, the US Embassy in Ankara has mademoves to counter the emerging spirit of democracy in Turkey,especially in relation to the unpopularity of the US invasion andoccupationof Iraq.

In the realmof civil society, the vveekendof 24 June, 2005, theworld tribunal on the Iraq war was being held in istanbul, which alsomilitates against the image of the US in the region. Th is is part ofdemocratization,of course, and was vvidely covered by TV in Turkey,while being boycotted by the supposedly "free press" Western pressoutlets like BBC and CNN. In other words, the United States hasexpressed hostility to democratization in Turkey in a numberof ways,as it is seen to militate against US interests.

The above argument made by Thomas Carroll about Turkeyunder the Ak Party as a model is misleading in a number of ways.Most significantly, it is not very convincing that the Turkishexperience is relevant to the Arab countries of the Middle East. Itdoes not seem very profound that Turkey shows that democracy canco-exist with islam, as this has been shovvn in a numberof countries,for example, India.

In the case of the Ak Party Government in Turkey, first, it isincorrect that Erdo an's program for further democratization andentry into the European Union has been driven by outside pressure. Inthe past, traditional Turkish leaders simply dug in their heels whenconfronted with outside pressure from Europe. Erdoan knew that thedesire to move forward on democratization and entry into theEuropean Union was broadly popular in the country and used this to


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gain votes in the November 2002 election. Secondly, politicalmodernization for the Ak Party sometimes means greater freedom forMoslems, for exam ple in terms of wearing headscarf in schools, andso is useful not in terms of moving in a secular direction, but ingiving more religious freedom from the state. While this could beseen as political modernization, it is generally seen by secularists asregression, rather than modernization, in the social arena.

Secondly, there is no other country in the Middle East vvherethe people are driven by the historical desire to be partof Europe andtoday see the possibility of actually joining the European Union.Thirdly, muchof the populationof Turkey does not see the Ak Partyagenda as a modernizing force at ali, but rather pursuing an agenda invvhich a religious party in secular clothing pursues a hiddensometimes religious agenda and is rolling back the modernizingsecular reforms of Atatrk. The secular elites feel threatened by thewide scale staffing of state institutions, including cu lture andeducation, with Islamists. Fourth, it is not clear that the Ak Party is,in fact, a modernizing regime. In the economic field, the agenda isone of neoliberalism and privatization. W hile this may be seen by

some as "freedom" it is not the case for vvorkers and trade un ions, northose who want Turkey to have some democratic economic autonomyfrom the IMF neo- liberal agenda. In the changing of the laws toconform to the European Union, this is not always seen asmodernization in the Turkish context as it opens the way for greaterfreedom for religious movements. It is not clear that ruling Turkeyfrom Brussels is exactly "democratic" as it surely strips the localpeople of any control ver their own lives. It seems that roads andshopping centers are being modernized but not necessarily cultureand society. Fifth, people voted for Erdoan not because he vvas a"modernizer" but mainly because they vvere fed up with every o therpolitical party in the country for failing to provide a stable economy

and government. The other parties vvere accurately seen as eithercorrupt or incompetent. Moreover, Erdoan had promised to largelykeep the state and government secular. People vvanted to throvv theold leaders out and get beyond the series of econom ic crises. Sixth,the extent of reforms vvhich have been achieved should not beexaggerated. The state security courts have been officially abolished,but states are c reative in finding nevv vvays to con tinue the same oldpractices in nevv vvays.


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Seventh, the United States is not happy with the Ak PartyGovernment as noted above. Erdoan's government does not fit themold of what the US vvould like. Moreover, the Government ispursuing many programs which depart significantly fromneoliberalism in giving opportunities to the downscale in the country.These include subsidized loans for low-income housing and so on.Erdoan has sometimes sharply criticized US policies in Iraq andforeign policy more generally a numberof times, which has not gonedown well vvith the United States. Further, the United States haspointedly let the Government knovv that it is not happy vvith the levelof anti-Americanism in Turkey after the invasionof Iraq. The UnitedStates has criticized the Government for not doing more to influencepublic opinion . This is surely a shocking and shameful attack uponTurkish democracy. Appealing to the Turkish Government to crushpublic opinion regarding US foreign policy in the region is not likelyto enhance the US as a country vvhich promotes democracy. TheTurkish public has enough examples to get the picture. It is not clearexactly vvhat the Turkish Government is supposed to do to controlpublic opin ion. Considering these facts, the Turkish model cou ld sinkUS hopes in the Middle East quite decidedly.

Finally, rather than enhance the image of the Westerndemocracy, European Union and American pressure on the countryhas actually caused a backlashof public opinion, vvith more and morepeople saying that they do not really careif Turkey enters or not. Soexternal pressure may in fact be doing more harm that g oo d.2 5

Given the operational plansof the US, the argument misses thepoint. The US has no desire to transfer the Turkish m odel, vvhich isdefective in many vvays from the US standpoint. It is not the Islamistelement that the US opposes, but the courage of those in theGovernment to refuse to toe the US party line. On the other hand, theUS has tried and true methods to create the sorts of US engineered"democratic" systems that will serve its purpose, as vve see above.This makes the argument quite irrelevant and shovvs that it misses thepointof vvhat is going on, rather badly.

25Ibid.


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What is D emocracy?

It appears that nowhere in the documents and discussionof theGMEI is there a vvorking definitionof democracy. There are at leasttwo different categoriesof defnitionsof democracy. One is the plainEnglish, generic, definition of democracy. Second is the doctrinaldefinition of democracy which might be used by a regime to define"democracy." In the US context, the doctrinal meaning has very littleto do with the generic meaning. Democracy may be defined as "agovernment by the people, especially rule of the majority. Agovernment in which the supreme power is vested in the people andexercised by them directly or indirectly through a system ofrepresentation usually involving periodically held elections."

On the other hand, there is the doctrinal definition ofdemocracy. This is what is used by the Bush Administration. In thissense, "democracy" is that which serves the US "national securityinterests." This can be further clarifed by noting that it is what servesto insure and protect capitalist accumulation and power. It serves bothUS global hegemony and capitalist accumulation. It vvill be seen thatvvithin this context, the rigged elections carried out under USoccupation in Iraq, as in January 30, 2005, are "democratic. On theother hands, the June 2005 elections in Iran are not "democratic."Elections in Venezuela, vvhich continue to keep Hugo Chavez inpovver, are not democratic since they do not serve the interestsof USand global capital.26 For the US, genuinely democratic elections

2 6George W. Bush has recently called President Hugo Chavez a "threat toDem ocracy" and a "demagogue." Venezuela has been identified by thePentagon as a "post-Iraq threat." In November in Brazil, Bush launched anattack on Chavez. Yet, Chavez got 56 percent of the vote in the 1998elections, some six percent more than Bush in Florida in 2000. Some 56 to

60 percent have supported Chavez in eight elections and referendums,including his reelecdon. The US recognized the short-lived coup in 2002,headed by Pedro Carmona, head of the Venezuelan B usiness Association.Chavez, unlike Bush, has used the nation's vvealth for social vvelfare, thatis, for the people. Som e 1.4 million have learned to read, three millionadults have enrolled in schooling projects, thousands of medical clinicshave been built, 20,000 doctors have been brought in from Cuba to providefree health care to 70 percent of the population and 60 percent get freefood. A chain of 14,000 stores have been created to seli at a 35 percent


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vvhich bring popular leaders to povver, but vvhich militate against theinterests of capital, are, by defnition, not democratic. Whatdemocratic elections are to protect is capital and not the people. Theyare to bring to the fore governments of cap ital, by capital and forcapital.

We can see that in the US context, democracy also involvesrigging the system. There are many vvays in vvhich this isaccom plished in the US. The frst past the post system, theredistricting and gerrymandering, elimination of sections of thepopulation vvho are not desirable voters, and so on, are actually vvaysto rig elections. A narrovv political spectrum exists, vvhich alsoeffectively precludes democracy. Neoliberalism, perhaps is the mostpointed m echanism today for the elimination of democracy on aglobal scale, as it precludes allovving people to make the democraticdecisions about m atters, such as jobs and benefits, that most affecttheir lives.

In Japan, after WW II, the US set up the desirable type ofsystem, from the point of vievv of capital, vvhere a conserva tive pro-business party vvas the only party vvhich could actually vvin theelections. This means that in such a "liberal system," a pro-capitalparty, such as the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) is goingto end up controlling the system in the interest of US capitalistaccumulation.

discount to the poor. This, in US terms, is not democratic and the US isvvorried that "other leaders like Chavez may emerge." The political partiesvvhich boycotted the national assembly election in early December 2005,may have been encouraged by the United States to do so. They vvereexpecting to do poorly at the polis. Roger Burbach, "Bush vs. Chavez,"

Nov. 11, 2005, ZNET; John Pilger, "The Riseof

America's Nevv Enemy,"Nov. 10, 2005, ZNET; Elisabeth Bumiller and Larry Rohter, "BushTargets Venezuela's Chavez in Tough Speech,"Ne w York Times, Nov. 6,2005; Chris Kraul, "Chavez: Ever a Bush Critic, Ever Popular,"Lo sAngeles Times,Nov. 6, 2005; Hovvard LaFranchi, "C lash of Visions forLatin America,"Christian ScienceMonitor, Nov. 3, 2005; Richard Gott,"Chavez Leads the Way,"The Guardian, June 4, 2005; Natalie ObikoPearson, "U.S. Criticizes Venezuelan Vote," AP, Dec. 6, 2005; MarkWeisbrot and Larry Birns, "Venezuelan Elections," ZNET, Dec. 3, 2005.


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The de facto systemof "democracy" in the US also means thatit eliminates any group or party that vvould serve to help the poor.Any voices that might militate against the agenda of cap italistaccumulation will be eliminated. This is also seen in the approach toVenezuela. W hen genuine democracy emerges, it must be denied thatit is democratic and destroyed. This is the historical pattern.Traditionally, when the masses raise their heads to participate,political scientists in the US have treated this as a "crisis ofdemocracy." It signifes the problem of too many dem ands on thesystem or "too much democracy." What this means is thatparticipation of the masses does not serve the agenda of acceleratingcapitalist accumulation.

Democracy in the Middle East and US National Interests:

As noted above, since WWII, the US has operated covertelection operations. These essentially subvert "free elections" aroundthe world. Th is started with Italy after WWII to prevent theComm unist Party from coming to power. This activity con tinuestoday. It is clear thatif the US vvas really interested in supporting freeand fair elections, there vvould be a sharp break from this standardoperating procedure. But it is simply not plausible that the neo-conservatives in Washington vvould be interested in opening upelectoral systems in the Middle East to genuine democracy.27 AsRobert Fisk has pointed out, the US has not tolerated undemocraticregimes, it has actively promoted them for more than 50 y ea rs.2 8Given the record and the objectives of the neo-conservatives tocontrol the entire vvorld as the global hegemon, it is simply notplausible that they vvould take their chances in an area so vital to USnational security interests. We can understand this by considering thepossible scenario in a numberof countries in the region.

Egypt: While the Bush Administration pays lip service todemocratic change in Egypt, there is no sign that the US government

2 7Ed wa rd Herman, The Farce of the Bush Pursuit of Democracy Abroad,vvhile undermining it at home,"www.smag.org,August 26, 2005.

2 8Robert Fisk, "How We Denied Democracy to the Middle East,"Th eIndependent, 8 November 2003.
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64 THE TURKSH YEARBOOK [ O L . XXXVI

is serious about opening up the system if it would bring Islamists topower. The US has praised M ubarak for changes, but these have sofar been only cosmetic. In the September 2005 Presiden tial elec tion,some 23 percent of eligible voters went to the polis. Bush calledMubarak and congratulated him on his victory, although the outcomewas never in doubt. The White House put out the statement: "Thiselection represents an important step toward holding fully free andfair com petitive multiparty elections and both supporters andopponents of the government have told us that it has occasioned avigorous national debate in Egypt on important issues."

There is not much evidence that the system is actuallybecoming democratic to a significant extent. The MslimBrotherhood and the new movement, Kifayah (Enough) continue tobe suppressed. Mslim Brotherhood protests have been stopped.Hundredsof members and leaders remain in prison, including 754 forpeaceful protests. Ayman Nour, leader of al-Ghad (Tomorrow) waskept in prison recently for 45 days on trumped up charges.

Nevertheless, it is hypocritical for the West to accuse thesestates of lack of democracy. The West never encouraged democracywhen they could have, such as during British control from 1882-1922.The regime engages in "goat barrel politics" and the ruling NationalDemocratic Party (NDP) m ight stili get a majority in fair elections.Even with many unhappy, Egyptians do not want Westerninterference in the elec tions.29

2 9T h e Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East is ElizabethCheney, who is Vice President Dick Cheney's Daughter. In a recent trip toEgypt, she stated to Gamal Mubarak (the President's son and leaderof theruling National Democratic Party) that the Bush Administration'scommitment to expanding democracy in the Arab vvorld is "Absolute and

very firm" and that the US national security is at stake. Novv let me get thisstraight. The sonof George Herbert Walker Bush sends the daughterof theUS Vice President to talk to the sonof Hosni Mubarak about democracy?We can, then, surely ali take the proposition that this is about democracyseriously! See Juan Cole, "Bush's War and the Egyptian Elections,"Salon.com, Sept. 19, 2005; Nadia Abou El-Magd, "U .S. Official UrgesEgypt on Democracy," AP, Sept. 30, 2005; "Egypt's Mslim BrotherhoodSeizes increased freedom ahead of polis,"The Daily Star, Agence FrancePresse, Nov. 8, 2005.


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Iran. In the early 1950s the US overthrevv MohammadMossadegh, restored Shah Reza Pehlavi to power, and kept the Shahin power until the Islamic Revolution in 1979. The US overthrovv wasa caseof ending a regime that had come to power democratically. Is itplausible that the US will support popular democracy today in Iran,given the levelof anti-Americanism?

In the electionsof 24 lune, 2005, the hard-line former mayor ofTehran, Amedinajad was elected President. Even though there wereclear irregularities, it can be seen that this was basically a democraticprocess, at least as democratic as that in Iraq on January 30, 2005.The US has recently called the Iranian elections "illegitimate." Theturn out was more than twice that in Egypt. If the candidates arecontrolled, then by the same token, there is a quite tight controlling ofthe candidates in the US elections as well. It is true that there weredirty tricks and that liberal candidates were disqualified. Sodemocracy is working to a significant extent. It vvas the result of apopulism vvhich mobilized the votesof the poor Mslim masses fromthe mosques, for better social vvelfare, some sops from the regime andto get them to support the more conservative clerics. The criticalremarks of George W . Bush about the Iranian election also seem tohave backfred. So here the result of democracy is the opposite ofwhat Bush and the neo-conservatives would like to see.3 0

Israel:The changing natureof the political regime in Israel hasbeen noted by some scholars who argue that it is difficult to refer tothis regime as a democracy for a number of reason s.31 The state of

30Stephen Zunes, "The U.S. and Iran: Democracy, Terrorism, and NuclearWeapons," ZNET, August 31, 2005; Kari Vick, "Political Lines Blurredfor Iran V ote,"Washington Post, June 16, 2005. Norman Soloman, "FromTehran to W ashington, an Axis of Demagogues lu st Got M oreDangerous," ZNET, Jan. 28, 2005; Nassar Karimi, "Iran's Leader Vows toAid Iraq Stability," AP, July 17, 2005. Stephen Zunes points out that thereare no real competitive elections in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, Oman,Kuvvait, Bahrain, atar, UAE, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan.Nevertheless, these regimes have received economic and military supportfrom the US.

3 lMichel Warshawski, "The Nevv Israel,"Monthly Review,56 (7) Dec. 2004,pp. 16-25.


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Israel has no constitution. It is democratic by defnition, but not whenone looks at the actual content and practices in how the systemoperates. The United States will not demand that democratic reformtake place in Israel, which is already rated as a free and democraticstate.

Iraq. The US sought to guide a process in vvhich genuinelyfree elections, vvhich vvere risky, vvere avoided . The US vvas actuallyvvas in favorof postponing elections until the situation vvould be lessvolatile and easier to control. But the US vvas compelled to go aheadvvith the elections because of Grand A yatolloh Ali al- Systani. Evenso, the US vvas pressed to control the results, staging a large-scaleelection rigging operation in the January 2005 elections so that theShiites vvould not get an absolute majority and control the vvriting ofthe nevv constitution. In the event, the elections could not be riggedvvell enough , and the situation vvas made more difficult for the US.Nevertheless, the US has attempted to capitalize on the resultsof theelection. The de facto situation after the elections has been muchvvorse, in terms of the "insurgency," that is the resistance tooccupa tion. It is unknovvn as to vvhat extent the referendum on theIraqi Constitution vvas manipulated in October 2000, but it is vvellknovvn that the US has pumped hundreds of millions of dollars intothe country for the "promotion of democracy." O ne cannot have agreat deal of faith that the elections vvere "free and fair' to say theleast. Elections held under military occupation are not generallyconsidered to be legitimate. It is possible that democratization vvilllead to the regime becoming a theocracy, and may break up into threecountries.32 The resultsof the December 2005 elections are yet to bedetermined but it is clear that the US has spend hundredsof millions

3 2Juan Cole, "Thoughts in the Middle East, History and Religion," InformedConsent, Sept. 2, 2005; Dafna Linzer, "U.S. Says it Did Not Carry Out

Plans to Back Iraqis in Election,"Washington Post, July 18, 2005. JuanCole points out that the Iraqi Constitution is a serious setback for vvomenand they could yet be subject to Islamic personal lavv. Linzer reports thatBush authorized covert plans to try to rig the Iraqi elections but that theplans vvere not carried out. This contradicts the report by Seymour Hershthat the US did carry out a large election operation using retired CIAofficers to try to cover their tracks. In any event, the US attempt to get IyadAllavvi elected vvas a hopeless failure. Perhaps it vvas a small victory fordemocracy in the collapseof the US plans.


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of dollars under occupation to promote its favored candidates, namelyIyad Allawi and Ahmed Chelabi.

Palestine:The US would not allow elections to be held in theterritories as long as Arafat was living, as he would have won. Nowthe US has the problemof the popularityof Hamas and the danger oftheir winn ing. It will be very problematic for the US to promotegenuine democracy here and it would be exceedingly foolish toimagine that this vvould happen.

Saudi Arabia.Would the US be willing to see the system hereopened up to genuine democracy? The Wahhabis could actually cometo powerif free and fair elections were to be held. Their base is in thepoor and Islamist communities, as well as stretching up into the rulingfamily. It is not likely that US interests would actually p revail in anelection, given the amountof Anti-American sentiment in the region.Elections could well militate against US interests.

According to Milan Rai, in some sense, the Wahhabis areactually in power in the Kingdom as the al-Saud family is the"guarantor and prom oter" of Wahabbism around the vvorld. It is the"state religion" and is enforced by "force and largesse." But it couldalso lead to the overthrovv of the House of Saud because ofcorruption. So according to this vievv, terrorism is not beingcontrolled. It vvould be too dangerous for the present rulers to open upand allovv vvomen to vote and drive.33

Pakistan.The U S is firmly behind the military dictatorship ofGeneral Pervez Musharif. Musharif says vvith a straight face thatPakistan is being ruled under a democracy. But political parties havemostly been banned, and it does not appear as a democracy. In fact,the country is one of the most violently anti-American countries,Osama bin Laden is a local folk hero among large masses of thepeople, and so democratic elections in the country are veryproblematical for the United S tates. Democratic elections vvould notbe likely to serve US national security interests.

Lebanon.It is not clear vvhat the resultof expelling the Syrians

3 3Milan Rai, "Saudi Arabia under the Spotlight," ZNET, Aug. 3, 2005.


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from the country w ill be. Democracy in the country has beendestroyed in the past, not just by the interference of Syria, but by theinvasionof Israel in 1982 that disrupted the country. There could be areturnof the violenceof the I970s.

Genuine democracy, and the likely results, is unthinkable andunacceptable to the US in most cases in the Middle East. Only adoctrinaire facade of democracy that allovvs the US to controlelections is likely to be acceptable in Washington. On the other hand,in Latin America, and particularly in Venezuela, where genuinedemocracy has taken place, the US has a massive program to destroythis democracy.

The Neoconservatives: Where is the Democracy?

Just how far the US has departed from those who founded theRepublic can be seen in a quote from John Quincy Adam s. "Americais not a nation meant to order others how to live and then push themat bayonet point into that lifestyle. The costof such a policy would bethe lossof America's Soul."3 4

Moreover, recent polis have shown that majorities neither inthe US not in the Middle East support the goalsof the US spreadingdemocracy to the region. This would question vvhether the Bushapproach , itself, has democratic backing. It simply does not. A poll bythe Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and the Program onInternational Policy A ttitudes of the University of Maryland (PIPA),showed that of 808 randomly selected respondents in the US, thefollowing results were obtained. Only 35 percent favor the use ofmilitary force to overthrovv d ictators; 74 percent said that the goal ofoverthrovving the Baathist Regime and installing democracy is not agood enough reason for war, with 60 percent of R epublicansagreeing; 66 percent said that threatening military intervention tobring about democratic change does more harm than good; only 26percent said that more democracies would make the world safer, only26 percent believed that Saudi Arabia would be more friendly to the

3 4Michael Scheuer, "Deliberately Destroying America's Soul," April 28,2005, Antiwar.com.


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US if it was a democracy; and only 42 percent said democracy, ingeneral would make countries more friendly to the US. While 80percent said that democracy is the best form of government, only 50percent believed that it was best for ali countries; 33 percent believedthat democracy and islam are incompatible, with 55 percent believingthat Islamic countries can be democratic; 54 percent said that the USshould not press for dem ocracy if it is likely it would lead to anIslamic fundamentalist government; only 27 percent said thatpromoting democracy is a very important foreign policy goal, with 49percent saying it vvas somevvhat important; 75 percent said the USshould not spend money to influence elections in its interests (69percentof Republicans and 83 percentof Democrats); and 68 percentof people favored vvorking through the UN. W hen asked hovvdemocratic the US is on a scale of 0 to 10, the mean response vvas6.2. When asked hovv much impact the vievvsof the majority have ondecisionsof elected officials, the mean vvas only 4.5, but at the sametime, the respondents said it should be 8.0.3 5

As another m easure of hovv vvell democracy is vvorking in theUS, 49 outof 57 communities in tovvn meetings in Vermont approvedresolutions to vvithdravv troops from Iraq. Some 53 percent ofAm ericans say the Iraq War vvas not vvorth fghting, 57 percentdisapproveof Bush's handlingof the War, and 70 percent say the UScasualties are too high a price to pay. Further, only 8 percentsupported a hegemonic role for the US in the vvorld, 70 percentopposed the ideaof the US as a vvorld policeman and 57 percent saidthe US should not have an absolute majority at the UN. Some 60percent approved of making the UN more povverful. A majorityapproved of the US joining the International Criminal Court, signingthe Kyoto Treaty on Global Warming, ratifying the Nuclear Test BanTreaty, and ratifying the convention on the banof land mines.36 Thissimply shovvs that the neoconservative agenda in the US is notsupported by a majority.

Moreover, Bush's claim to spread democracy is not popular inthe Middle East. A recent poll in six Middle East countries shovved

3 5Jim Lobe, "Public Skeptical About Bush's Democracy Crusade," IPS, Sept.29, 2005.

3 6Zia Mian, "American Domination is in Trouble," April 24, 2005, ZNET.


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that 69 percent say that democracy is not the real objectiveof the US(78 percent on Egypt and 77 percent in Morocco); only 6 percent saidthat spreading democracy was an important objective and wouldmake a difference; and some 16 percent said that spreadingdemocracy was an important objective but the US is doing it thewrong way.3 7

Conclusion: Neo-totalitarianism and Global CapitalistAccumulation

The G MEI for democratization in the Middle East cannot betaken seriously as democracy is incompatible with the central tenetsof the ideology of neoliberalism, vvhich is itself essentially atotalitarian system. The neo-conservatives hold that the US must bethe global hegemon vvith no possible rival and that there can be onlyone possible political and economic system, to vvhich there is noalternative. The recognition of this fact actually means that politics,that is democracy, is actually eliminated for ali practical purposes.There can be no democratic struggle ver the divisionof the spoils, asthis question has already been settled.If there is no alternative, therecan be no democracy.

Genuinely democratic states of the Middle East, on the otherhand, vvould demand to control their ovvn resources, particularly oil.They vvould dem and autonomy from US and Israeli capital vvithfreedom to run their ovvn economies. In genuinely dem ocratic states,people vvould be free to oppose political regimes and at the sametime, the agendas of Washington, including IMF austerity programs.The United States has shovvn that it is not comfortable vvith aspects ofdemocratization in Turkey, or elsevvhere, vvhich questions UShegemony.

That the US vvould tolerate a genuine democracy in the MiddleEast is actually preposterous and inconceivable. The US neo-conservative agenda is ali about controlling global resources andpovver. Democracy vvould quite clearly be a threat to this agenda. The

3 7"Middle East Not Svvayed by Bush's Democracy Pledge," Angus-reid.com,Dec. 7, 2005.


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GMEI is not about making the Middle East genuinely democratic,except in rare cases where it serves the national security interests.Rather, it is about engineering an alternative to past control throughthe autocratic ruling elites, which is seen by the US as havingoutlived their historical usefulness. Therefore we can expect thatrealism will prevail. Neoliberalism is to be clamped upon the area andthe established global institutions brought in to "govern" the region inthe interests of the domestic US ruling class. There is nothing theneo-conservatives fear more than genuine democracy.

It is ironic that the neoconservatives have already contributed

greatly to the democratization of the Middle East, but in a way thatwas unintended. By smashing the benign image of the United Stateswhich was established after WW II, resistance to Washington hasstrengthened. The aims of the global superpower have been laid bareas the pursuitof imperialism. This is likely to contribute to the largermovement for democratization around the world today. The GreaterMiddle East initiative is not about bringing "democracy" to theMiddle East, but precisely the opposite. It is a program to ensure thatthe only "democracy" to emerge in the region is that which serves theinterests of the US dom estic ruling class, the corporate or businessclass.