government and public sector the dead generalist reforming the civil service & public services...
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Government and Public Sector
The Dead Generalist Reforming the Civil Service & Public Services
Ed Straw
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Problem, What Problem?
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What does the state offer this woman?
‘Criminalisation of my partner’
‘Criminalisation of the father of my children’
‘Imprisonment of the father of my children’
‘Take my children away from me (into care)’
Domestic Violence
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The state service provided to victims of domestic violence has changed very little in 30 years.
The new Act will make some difference
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Why such an absent performance by the government machine?
The window on the world is
partial, obscured
Wrong skills and motivation
Very little stimuli to improve
No mechanism to translate
strategy into action
Endemic under-achieving
public services
• Civil servants areimpartial,impassionate andpassing through
• Research isacademic, statisticalaccuracy observed,unaware of tangibleoutcome
• Policy not change
• Producer dominated, not customer driven
• Office bound, notservice sampling
• Lack of transparency
• Institutional consultation
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Traditional Civil Service Approach
• A generalist is assigned to it
• Staff assigned to the job from the civil service
• Largely office bound
• ‘Passing-through’-orientated
• Issue guidance and wait for the world to change
• Future careers dependent on serving inside
• Analyse the problem academically and as a policy matter
• Impartial
• Dominated by departmental silos
• Basic assumption is to carry on as before
• Change has to be justified
Rough Sleeping Approach
• Led by a deep specialist/practitioner
• Staff hand-picked for the job from a range of backgrounds (including civil service)
• ‘Service sampling’ approach
• Goal-orientated and time-limited
• Committed, well led, motivated group
• Future careers depending on success of with this objective
• Analyse the problem from the ground and from the customer and redesign the services accordingly
• Passionate
• Joining up services
• Explicit about the need for change
• Challenging assumptions and working practices, and do things differently
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Why such an absent performance by the government machine?
The window on the world is
partial, obscured
Wrong skills and motivation
Very little stimuli to improve
No mechanism to translate
strategy into action
Endemic under-achieving
public services
• Civil servants are impartial, impassionate and passing through
• Civil servants areoften unskilled
• High personalautonomy, limitedperformancemanagement, little accountability
• Research isacademic, statisticalaccuracy observed,unaware of tangibleoutcome
• Policy not change
• Producer dominated, not customer driven
• Office bound, notservice sampling
• Lack of transparency
• Institutional consultation
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The British Civil Service 2004
“So hard to find a point of responsibility and ownership and someone who will make it happen. Management by
committee, decision by committee, good people up to their ears. Dead wood lying all around”
Source: Client-side project manager for financial systems upgrade
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Why such an absent performance by the government machine?
The window on the world is
partial, obscured
Wrong skills and motivation
Very little stimuli to improve
No mechanism to translate
strategy into action
Endemic under-achieving
public services
• Civil servants are impartial, impassionate and passing through
• Civil servants are often unskilled
• High personal autonomy, limited performance management, little accountability
• Civil Service valuesare inward lookingvalues
• Research isacademic, statisticalaccuracy observed,unaware of tangibleoutcome
• Policy not change
• Producer dominated, not customer driven
• Office bound, notservice sampling
• Lack of transparency
• Institutional consultation
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Civil Service Values
Incorruptibility
Impartiality
Integrity
Independence
Adaptability
“Enduring Values”:
Who chose these values?
Achievement
Outcomes
Delivery
Customer driven
Public service
Accountability
What about these values:
Who should choose these values?
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Why such an absent performance by the government machine?
The window on the world is
partial, obscured
Wrong skills and motivation
Very little stimuli to improve
No mechanism to translate
strategy into action
Endemic under-achieving
public services
• Civil servants are impartial, impassionate and passing through
• Civil servants are often unskilled
• High personal autonomy, limited performance management, little accountability
• Civil Service values are inward looking values
• Role Confusion
• Knowledge shedding– no institutionalmemory
• Refuge taken inlanguage and process – alternative diplomatic immunity?
• Research isacademic, statisticalaccuracy observed,unaware of tangibleoutcome
• Policy not change
• Producer dominated, not customer driven
• Office bound, notservice sampling
• Lack of transparency
• Institutional consultation
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Role confusion is widespreadWhy do we have a civil service?
• To administer Government?
• To run the country?
• To serve ministers?
• To protect ministers? From themselves?
• To regulate ministers?
• To put political objectives into practice?
• To shock absorb?
• To prevent or limit bad ideas going into practice?
• To educate parliament?
• To prepare legislation?
• To develop policy?
• To deliver services?
• To reform public services?
• To survive?
• To look after its own?
• To ‘mind the shop’ and provide continuity as ministers come and go?
When a civil servant gets up in the morning, what is she responsible for? What does he go to work for?
Organisations without a clear role perform below their potential.
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Why such an absent performance by the government machine?
The window on the world is
partial, obscured
Wrong skills and motivation
Very little stimuli to improve
No mechanism to translate
strategy into action
Endemic under-achieving
public services
• Civil servants are impartial, impassionate and passing through
• Civil servants are often unskilled
• High personal autonomy, limited performance management, little accountability
• Civil Service values are inward looking values
• Role Confusion
• Fixed resourceallocation – no socialinvestment bankers
• No internationalrankings, no processcomparisons
• Little performancemeasurement ofservice costs andoutcomes
• Innovation nearlyimpossible
• Change must bejustified, not retainingstatus quo
• Knowledge shedding– no institutionalmemory
• Refuge taken inlanguage and process – alternative diplomatic immunity?
• Un-joined upgovernmentdepartments andpublic services
• It takes forever: 3 months versus 5 days
• Research isacademic, statisticalaccuracy observed,unaware of tangibleoutcome
• Policy not change
• Producer dominated, not customer driven
• Office bound, notservice sampling
• Lack of transparency
• Institutional consultation
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Timetable for Resource Accounting and Budgeting
IMPLEMENTATION
PLANNING
1993 1998 2003 2008
Spec
Systems
People
Reporting
Training
Law
Reporting
Planning - Spending Reviews
Control
Source: Head of Government Accounting
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Why such an absent performance by the government machine?
The window on the world is
partial, obscured
Wrong skills and motivation
Very little stimuli to improve
No mechanism to translate
strategy into action
Endemic under-achieving
public services
• Civil servants are impartial, impassionate and passing through
• Civil servants are often unskilled
• High personal autonomy, limited performance management, little accountability
• Civil Service values are inward looking values
• Role Confusion
• Fixed resource allocation – no social investment bankers
• No international rankings, no process comparisons
• Little performance measurement of service costs and outcomes
• Innovation nearly impossible
• Change must be justified, not retaining status quo
• Knowledge shedding – no institutional memory
• Refuge taken in language and process – alternative diplomatic immunity?
• Un-joined up government departments and public services
• It takes forever: 3 months versus 5 days
• Voluntary sector keptweak and off balance
• Client-side ITmanagement isabsent
• Project procurement:no such thing as badofficers only bad soldiers
• Research isacademic, statisticalaccuracy observed,unaware of tangibleoutcome
• Policy not change
• Producer dominated, not customer driven
• Office bound, notservice sampling
• Lack of transparency
• Institutional consultation
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So the issue is…
What can he Do for her?
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Finding Answers
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Finding Answers
Monetary Policy Committee Other Countries DVD Player Wider organisational theory
1980 2000Performance
Pric
e
• Finland• New Zealand• Australia• France• US• Singapore
ExternalEnvironment
Leadership
Mission,Strategy,Direction
Culture
ManagementPractices
StructureSystems, Procedures,
Reward Process
Work UnitClimate
Motivation
Task Requirements /Skills / Abilities
Individual Needs& Values
Individual &OrganisationalPerformance
What Works Here
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Finding Answers: Monetary Policy Committee
• Clear role: Optimise Interest Rates
• Independent of both government and civil service
• Specialists, appointed for expertise and reputation among peers
• Transparent deliberations and decisions
• Politicians set decision-making framework
• Depoliticise decision making
• Make it a specialism
• Create public accountability through transparency
• It’s a Learning Organisation
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Finding Answers: Other Countries
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Finding Answers: Industry Learning
1970’S US, invasion of high quality, high value Japanese automotive and consumer electronic products and industries
Led to ‘knowledge acquisition engines’ e.g. business schools & organisational gurus
Who asked…
• What were the Japanese doing that made such a difference?
• How did they do it?
• What were the underlying organisational principles?
• Could these be replicated in different national cultures?
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Finding Answers: Learning Engines
A National Industry
International Industry
To learn is to change
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Local Government: Learning Engines
Free movement of Staff
University
Local Government Information Unit
Conferences
Local Government Chronicle
Service Journals
SOLACE CIPFA
LGA
PwCDeloitte
E&YKPMG
Professional Institute
Professional Standards
IDEA Knowledge Transfer
Ranking: CPA
Best Practice Identification
Motivator / Intervention
Knowledge acquisition, cross-sector
Practice and Implementation
Audit Commission
A Local Authority
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Learning organisations are stimulated by the right leadership:
Vanity
Ability
Termination
Sustainable Excellence
Unsustainably high
performance
Low Performance
High
Low High
NIH
No culture
Nothing to learn
Self-importance
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Leadership and responsibility
Armed Services: No such thing as bad soldiers only bad officer
IT, Defence & All bad projects start with bad clientsOther Projects:
Leading the Learning
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Solutions
System One: The Essential Drivers of Performance
System Two: Structure of Government
System Three: Organising to Deliver
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The Dead Generalist Reforming the Civil Service & Public Services – Proposals
System One: The Essential Drivers of Performance
Government OrganisationsRegulation
Ministerial Behaviours
Product and Service
StandardsNational
Scorekeeping
• CPA equivalent, international ranking• Programme & initiative evaluation• Audit Commission equivalent, best
practice• Service specific professional institutes,
conferences and journals• Powerful educational institutes• Values
More Learning• Free movement of staff• Specialist staff• Leadership for learning
Fully independent Office of National Statistics
Stimuli to improve
• Independent of government & of the civil service• Public confidence in control of delivery resources• Clear roles for civil service
• Borrowing• Expenditure• Unemployment• Crime• Schools• Waiting Lists
• Etc
RankingLearning
Transparency
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The Dead GeneralistReforming the Civil Service & Public Services – Proposals
System Two: Structure of Government
Foreign Affairs / Europe
Economic management
Departments
NationalStrategy, Planning, Budgeting
Problem solving
Regulation of private sector
Indirect delivery of
public services
Direct delivery of
public services
Prime Minister’s Office
Ministry of Finance
Political, parliamentary &
legislative management
• Priorities• Objectives• Financial modelling
for citizens
• Project groups• Time limited• Structure around
consumer
• Best practice,international
• Effectiveframeworks
• Efficiency Review
• Complexpartiallyautonomoussystems
• Direct ministerialappointment
• Independence frommonolithic civil service
• Clarity of outcomes• Freedom to manage• Strong accountability• New scorekeeping• Knowledge & learning• Governance
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The Dead Generalist Reforming the Civil Service & Public Services – Proposals
System Three: Organising to Deliver
DepartmentAgency / NDPB
AccountabilityPeopleFree Movement of StaffSpecialisation & professionalisation
Electorate
Parliament
Government
Minister
Management
• Direct Ministerial appointment• Change some of the people• End graduate recruitment public
service recruitment• End job for life• Centre ground for terms & conditions• Recruit flexibility for the task, not service• End job churn• End grown-your-own• Join the corporate services gene pools• Preserve political, parliamentary &
legislative expertise• Remove innovation obstacles and add
stimuli• Change not policies• Special public services capacities• Organising principles
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The Dead GeneralistReforming the Civil Service & Public Services – Proposals
Getting There
• Self-reform? No history of success
• By-pass reform? Existing
• Imposed reform? Choice
• Abolition? Sanction
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The Dead GeneralistReforming the Civil Service & Public Services – Proposals
But, we can’t have this conversation…
• Politicians are in the delivery–reform Stoner dilemma
• Reform is scared off, self-preservation becomes the priority
• “Politicisation” creates paralysis
• Keep playing the “corruption” card and the “constitution” card
• No external market, governance, or media pressure – who owns the civil service?
Create open discussion
Create pressure and desire for reform
Crate a sense of responsibility for reform
Day 1 issue
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Reforming the Civil Service
“This will take a political act of bravery comparable to the transfer of interest-rate setting powers to the
Bank of England and the establishment of the Monetary Policy Committee”
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©2005 PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP. All rights reserved. PricewaterhouseCoopers refers to the United Kingdom firm of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (a limited liability partnership) and other member firms of PricewaterhouseCoopers International Limited, each of which is a separate and independent legal entity.