Federalist No. 47 by James MadisonStructure of the government and distribution of powerSeparate and distinct legislative, executive and judiciary branchesDistributed and blended powerThere can be no liberty where the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person or body of magistrates.Comparison to state constitutions in which departments of powers have not been kept absolutely separate and distinct shared power!

Federalist No. 70 by Alexander HamiltonEnergy in the executive!Protection of the community against foreign attacks, steady administration of the laws, security of liberty against the enterprises and assaults of ambition, faction, and anarchyA feeble executive = feeble execution of governmentIngredients for energy in the executive: unity, duration, adequate provision for its support, competent powersLegislation = deliberation and wisdom, but executive needs decision, activity, secrecy and dispatchA plurality in the executive would lessen the respectability, weaken the authority and lower accountabilityThe UNITY of the executive of this State was one of the best of the distinguishing features of our Constitution

The Constitution of the United StatesArticle IIOffice of the PresidentElection of the PresidentRequirements of the PresidentPay of the PresidentPowers of the President1. Commander in Chief 2. Grant pardons and reprieves for offenses against the United States3. Make treaties (with the advice and consent of the Senate)4. Nominate appointments for Ambassadors, Public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court, etc (with the advice and consent of the Senate)5. Give State of the Union to Congress6. Recommendations to Congress7. Receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers8. Take care that the laws be faithfully executedNote that Congress has the power to Declare War

Summary of Forrest McDonald: The American Presidency-An Intellectual History CHAPTER 7:

*Basically this chapter is an account of the 3 months of debate between the delegates about executive power at the Philadelphia Convention. There was a strong mixture of attitudes among the delegates between STRONG NATIONALISTS that wanted a strong executive and also (semi) FEDERALISTS who wanted the government to be an agency of the STATE GOVERNMENTS. There was a debate between FEAR OF LEGISLATIVE TYRANNY and FEAR OF EXECUTIVE TYRANNY. Ultimately Pierce Butler's proposal for an ELECTORAL COLLEGE solved many of the delegatesconcerns.*

THE CONVENTION-Delegates at Philadelphia convention had different views about executive power-2 Groups were in favor of a strong executive power: 1 - men who had served in the army (Washington, Hamilton etc) 2 - men who had served in Congress

*Overall - advocates of a strong executive were more prestigious and numerous than their opposing numbers, but they faced obstacles: 1 - state delegations voted on convention for executive power (only three were in favor of it) 2 - there were a large number of people taking a middle position on the issue of executive power that outnumbered both extremes

THE DIFFERENT PLANS PROPOSED BY THE DELEGATES: -at first discussion went in circles, and it seemed safer to give Congress executive power -delegates debated about number of presidents (Ben Franklin wanted 3!) -Paterson proposed "small states plan" of unicameral congress and plural executive -Hamilton proposed a powerful unitary executive chosen for life! -plan for SINGLE EXECUTIVE elected by NATIONAL LEGISLATURE for 7 YEAR TERM and NO REELECTION -decided President would have VETO power against only 2/3 majority in both houses -delegates wanted executive power FREE from dependence on CONGRESS -at first they proposed president's power to include: appointing executive officers, receiving ambassadors, and granting pardons -senate would appoint justices

BREAKTHROUGH FOR OPPOSING OPINIONS AMONG DELEGATES: -PIERCE BUTLER proposed the ELECTORAL COLLEGE SYSTEM: -President and vice-president -electors chosen in state by whatever method state leg wanted -each state had number of electors equal to its combined number of senators and representatives -electors to meet in respective states -electors voted for 2 candidates, whoever received the most won -president would appoint ambassadors, judges and make treaties with consent of 2/3 of senate -power to impeach shifted from supreme court to senate -10 states to 1 voted in favor of this electoral college

*Presidency evolved in the convention and did not end up being a "separation of powers," but rather a government with various branches that were SEPARATE and INDEPENDENT with their personnel, but the POWERS were INTERMINGLED Final Summary of powers: -Congress would have domestic powers and share in judicial powers through power to impeach

-Executive branch shared in lawmaking power through the VETO, the authority to recommend legislation, and the VP presiding over the senate -Courts would execute laws

Missing—steve marksForrest Chap 8

Twentieth Century PresidencyBy William Lechtenburg

Theme: The history of the presidency is one of aggrandizement.

Roosevelt- infused the pres with vigor did not merely preach but went after his objectives- imperialist: “speak softly and carry a big stick”- “I have used every ounce of power there was in the office and I have not cared a

rap for the criticisms of those who spoke of my ‘usurpation’”Taft much more circumscribed view of the presWilson

- viewed pres as representative of whole people- found presumptuous, righteous, and intellectual political crusade- first pres is over a century to appear in person before Congress rhetoric- New Freedom to liberate market forces- reluctant imperialist strove for peace WWI, League of Nations- “war socialism” from his government-driven economic mobilization

Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover declined pres powerFDR

- chief legislator many domestic social proposals formed FDR coalition of lower income groups (dominant in Dem party ever since)

- champion of executive and legislative over judiciary- master of media “fireside chats” made pres into guardian and friend- preeminence in foreign affairs: Pentagon, atomic bomb, United Nations- model of what a pres should be, but left uneasiness - limited terms

Truman- in shadow of FDR- committee on civil rights, Truman doctrine, Marshall Plan, Berlin airlift, NATO,

Korean War (without congressional approval), Dept of Defense, CIA, CEA- strongest assertion of civilian authority over military dismissing McArthur

Eisenhower- “what shall we refrain from doing today?”- interstate highway system, Dept of Health Ed and Welfare

Kennedy- civil rights, economic policy, commitment to space race, Peace Corps- first pres to make skillful use of television

Johnson- domestic accomplishments with Great Society- created alarm about too powerful and deceitful pres (esp with Vietnam)

Nixon- anxiety heightened Vietnam, Watergate pres appeared unstable

Ford, Carter, Reagan in time of imperial pres, downsized expectations, gov problem instead of solution

The Two Constitutional PresidenciesBy Jeffrey Tulis

Theme: There are two different conceptions of the presidency and its relation to the other branches of government. One is outlined by the Founders, the other by Woodrow Wilson. While both call for “energy” in the presidency, only Wilson calls for the use of rhetoric in today’s age of primaries and media. In general, the expectations of each presidency tend to exist in tension with one another, especially in this era’s higher expectations.

Founders: conservative

1) Synoptic character: goal- designed to form a whole

government made of parts and devoted to limited ends protect rights only

2) Demagoguery: threat- “demagogue” and “popular

leader” synonomous- relies on excess of popular

appeals- threat of tyranny of the majority- institutions designed to make

sure used only for good ends3) Representation: balance

- distrust of “pure” democracy- popular election as fundamental

basis but allow for indirect election of some (i.e. pres) through electoral college

- differing lengths of tenure due to various “proximities” to public

- formal power ultimately from people but immediately from Constitution

- insulate officials from sudden shifts in public opinion

- in appealing directly to public, passion rather than reason would triumph pres must be free enough to refine and serve

- representative but not wholly responsive to popular will

4) Independence of the Executive: impartialityWilson: rhetorical

2) Demagoguery: not large threat- distinguish from leader based on

nature of appeal and character of person transitory passion vs. durable sentiment and personal power vs. interest of community

- ethic passed on- public can judge character yet

judging often comes from oratory, not politics

- need for more energy greater than risk of demoagogue

3) Representation: greater weight- “interpretation” center of great

leadership understand and articulate people’s desires, even those currently unknown to them

- deliberation important- only major contestations of

opinion will gain interest of public, make them care

- government = publicity4) Independence of the Executive: respond to the public

- pres receives authority from national mandate from people

- rhetoric can transfer desires into public policy

5) Separation of Powers: weakness- central defect of American

politics- failed to promote true

deliberation in legislative and energy in executive

- “withstand delusion” of popular opinion

- Congress dominated by factions pres has broader view

5) Separation of Powers: effectiveness- common “checks and balances”

one branch cannot control another

- but also to equip each branch to perform different tasks

- three objectives of government (popular will, popular rights, self-preservation) divided amongst branches and within them

- particular circumstances determine which branch wins out

in specific conflicts usually successfully mitigated

- tension between “organic” and responsive system and “mechanical” and theoretical understanding and structure

- cooperation pres and Congress must be integrated and implicated in each other’s activities

- leadership and deliberation

10/29/2005 1:18:00 PM

Nesutadt

I. Preface to 1990 Edition

A. “Power” vs “Powers”

a) Power=ability to influence gov’t action

a) reputation and prestige=source of power

b) Powers=formally granted to President in Constitution (legal/customary)

B. Underlying Theme of 1960 Edition Remains True

a) President is very weak

i) Large gap between what is expected of Pres and the capabilities

he has to carry them out

ii) Separation of Institutions share powers

C. Use of Book

a) He hoped that advisors would use his book as a reference but he presupposed

that they would use it to supplement experience rather than replace it

II. Original Preface

A. What this book is NOT

1) Not an “hour by hour” account

2) Not a history

3) Not about getting into the White House

B. For this exercise, it’s best to assume the vantage point of the President

III. Chapter 1: Leader or Clerk

A. Part I

1) President as only one of several thousand personnel in Exec Branch

a)Nevertheless, his influence is pervasive

b)“His influence becomes the mark of his leadership”

B. Part II

1) Truman and Eisenhower are good models

a) high degree of continuity

b) issues from ’49-’59 remained the same

i) “emergency in policy with politics as usual”

C. Part III

1) Transformation: President as an “Invaluable Clerk”

a) What were once viewed as exceptional acts by a President have

come to be seen as routine and expected

b) He is expected to do something about everything

D. Part IV

1) President must work and attempt to satisfy demands of 5 constituencies

a) Executive Officialdom

b) Congress

c) Partisans

d) Citizens at large

e) Parties Abroad

2) No one else shares his direct vantage point and the burdens associated

3) President as a nexus for all political activity; referee for fights

IV. Chapter 2: Three Cases of Command

“...to persuade people to do the things they ought to have sense enough to do without my

persuading them...That’s all the powers of the President amount to”---Truman

A) Presidential Power as the Power to Persuade

B) Three Cases

1) 1951 Firing of Douglas MacArthur by Truman

a) MacArthur ignored White House policy on Korea to negotiate with

Korea. Instead, he demanded Chinese surrender, campaigned for military

action to be taken against the Chinese Communists, made public

statements in direct opposition to White House statements, and blamed

Truman and his policies for the defeat by Chinese Communists in

November, 1950.

b) Truman saw this as both an episode of policy interference and

insubordination

2) 1951 Steel Seizure by Truman

a) Collective bargaining reached stalemate leading United Steelworkers to

set a date to strike. After a failed attempt by the Wage Stabilization Board

to intervene, Truman seized the industry just before the scheduled

shutdown. Furthermore, he demanded that, under the direction of the

secretary of commerce, the steelworkers report to work as government

employees.

3) 1957 Integration in Little Rock by Eisenhower

a) In April, 1957 a Little Rock federal court of appeals ruled in favor of

implementing an integration plan for the local education system, reflecting

the Supreme Court’s decision to outlaw segregation three years earlier. A

local citizen filed a suit to prevent the plan from taking effect, but lost.

Nevertheless, Arkansas governor Orval Faubus sent the National Guard to

prohibit African Americans from gaining entry into Central High School.

Eisenhower, after meeting with Faubus, assumed control of the Arkansas

National Guard, removed them, and sent Army troops to restore order in

Little Rock.

C) All three cases share a common denominatior

1) The President’s own order was immediately and unquestioningly carried out.

Such a “self-executing” plan took advantage of five traits:

a. President’s involvement was unambiguous

b. His words were clear

c. His order was widely publicized

d. The people to whom it was directed had all necessary tools to carry out

the order

e. None of these people had any doubt about his right to make the

demand

2) This combination only occurs rarely

3) All were last resorts after exhaustion of other routes

4) Decisions often had unintended consequences down the road

a. Truman ultimately didn’t make up for 2 months without steel

production. Furthermore, the price controls he sought were never

realized.

b. Eisenhower’s use of troops did nothing to settle overall desegregation

issues.

5) Nevertheless, each situation demanded a hard-nosed stance

Thus, though command is a type of presidential persuasion, these three cases show that it is only

rarely employed and often has great consequences without guaranteeing any solution.

Richard Neustadt, Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents page 1-90

Intro

Neustadt defines power as personal influence that has an effect on governmental action

different from formal power

Theme of Presidential Power = presidential weakness: the gap between what is expected of the

president and the “assured capacity to carry through.”

Neustadt sees expectations and clerkly tasks rising while support weakens (foreign alliances

loosening and political parties decreasing). Moreover, the central weakness that Neustadt

identifies is:

President’s power is shared, and “to share is to limit” so the president’s power is dependent on the

consent from others, and he must use the power of his reputation and prestige to make policy.

Neustadt sees says that presidents must be forward-looking (“maximize prospective influence”)

and strategic about their power to be more effective. “The pursuit of presidential power, rightly

understood, constitutionally conditioned, looking ahead, serves purposes far broader than a

President’s satisfaction.”

CH 3

Constitutional convention of 1787 created a government of separated institutions sharing powers

(not separate powers). Executive power is shared/checked by Congress, Federalism, the Courts,

the Bill of Rights, the Press.

Persuasive power is more than charm and reasoned argument, it is reinforced by the status and

authority of the President’s office: those in government realize that their jobs and future

ambitions may depend on the President; this fact benefits the President in negotiations/decisions.

Meanwhile, his power is checked by theirs, because it is a relationship of mutual dependence.

Ex. Prez and congress: dependent on each other to get things accomplished: constant negotiation.

Know and understand this sentence: “Power to persuade is the power to bargain.”

Even within executive branch, relations with cabinet members, etc., there is give and take…

“Real power is reciprocal and varies markedly with organization, subject matter, personality, and

situation….The probabilities of power do not derive from the literary theory of the Constitution.”

People in government often act as if they are in business for themselves, not part of a team,

depending on what their responsibilities are [This somewhat contrasts Porter’s comments in

lecture about everyone being behind the President.]. Outside the executive, loyalty to the Prez

“may often matter less [emphasis his].” Congressmen act in accordance with what they think

they have to do to get reelected. Therefore, Prez must induce others to believe that what he

wants is what their interests and responsibilities require to do.

Even when politicians agree on the ends to achieve, they differ and negotiate on the means to

achieving it—how will it be done, who gets credit, etc. Ex. Truman and the Marshall plan:

“Truman, in effect, lent Marshall and the rest the perquisites and status of his office. In return

they lent him their prestige and their own influence.” The result: a massive 1948 European aid

program.

Presidents can maximize prospects for effectiveness and minimize chances that he will fail to

persuade others by guarding his power prospects in the course of making choices. Truman’s past

actions had led the way for his current bargaining: “his power was protected by his choices.” “A

President’s own choies are the only means in his own hands of guarding his own prospects for

effective influence. He can draw power from continuing relationships in the degree that he can

capitalize upon the needs of others for the Presidency’s status and authority.”

CH 4

President’s persuasiveness depends on the opinion that the men he aims to convince hold about

whether he has the skills and will to use his bargaining advantages (whether they expect him to be

able to and to have the tenacity to follow through).

“Reputation itself does not persuade, but it can make persuasion easier, harder, or impossible.”

Negative example: Eisenhower’s second term = way in which reputation should not be guarded.

Professional reputation of Prez is made by him—this an opportunity or risk. It is not made by

one move—it is changed through a pattern of action [example= Eisenhower]. A president’s

“general reputation will be shaped by signs of pattern in the things he says and does”—the

choices he makes every day.

CH 5: Public Prestige

Reputation (and therefore effective bargaining) also depends on President’s standing with the

public outside Washington: “Popular prestige.” Reputation and prestige both affect the Prez’s

power through the mechanism of anticipated reactions: for prestige, Congressmen will go along

with a plan more readily if they think that the public’s reaction to what the Prez proposes will be

positive. The Prez’s public standing sets a tone for what Washingtonians will do for him.

The president’s options are reduced, his opportunities diminished, his freedom for maneuver

checked in the degree that Washington conceives him unimpressive to the public.” If he is

unpopular, he will have to rely more on vetoes. In terms of both trying to gain votes and trying

to get “special publics” to follow a course of action that he wants, the president works within the

boundaries that his prestige sets for how much the public will respond to his appeals.

Nice quotation: “Presidential standing outside Washington is actually a jumble of imprecise

impressions held by relatively inattentive people.”

Neustadt only deals with the domestic angle of the Prez’ public prestige because “even though a

President’s position overseas affects all sorts of judgments made in Washington, his standing

with home publics is a matter of more moment to most Washingtonians.”

Personality factors into prestige, but is rather static—people form a public image of the Prez

when they first perceive him as President, and rarely change their image of him afterward. As

Neustadt writes, “an image of the office, not an image of the man, is the dynamic factor in a

President’s prestige.”

Neustadt talks about Gallup polls changing a lot early in 1951 and in the spring of 1958. In both

of these times it fell because government action was associated with large disturbances in the

private lives of Americans. This demonstrates that as private prospects are upset, men’s

expectations of the president increase, and their appraisal of his performance follows

accordingly. “The moving factor in prestige is what the people outside Washington see

happening to themselves.”

In this way, events in which the President plays no part can affect what his constituents think and

therefore affect his power (in a very meta kind of way).

Presidential teaching is a way for Presidents to avoid the negative effects that bad events can

have on his prestige. Presidential teaching 1) is aimed at students who are habitually

inattentive, 2) only gets attention when what he is teaching about is on the minds of his students

for reasons other than his talking about it, 3) he teaches by doing more than by telling, and 4)

his prior actions figure into how this doing is perceived.

Actions are always stronger than words, however, so Neustadt talks about how Truman’s efforts

to teach in 1950 were undermined by his own prior words and actions.

Key idea: the prestige of the President depends on what the public thinks it wants, and what they

think they got. Therefore, beyond his self-executing orders, the President’s influence is

regulated by his choices of objectives, of timing, and of instruments, plus by what he chooses to

avoid.

Eddie Lee

Stephen Skowronek “Presidential Leadership in Political Time” in Presidency and the

Political System

Abstract: “Some recent scholarship on the the presidency has emphasized the cyclical aspects of the office.

Skowronek explains one recurring sequence in presidential history-namely, the rise and fall of regimes, or governing

coalitions- in terms of the passage of “political time”. Each sequence begins when an established regime is defeated

soundly in a presidential election, bringing to power a new coalition led by a new president, such as Andrew Jackson

in 1828 and FDR in 1932. The challenges to the president who would create a regime are to undermine the

“institutional support for opposition interests,” to restructure “institutional relations between state and society,” and

to secure “the dominant position of the new political coalition.” As Skowronek argues, not all presidents succeed in

this endeavor, and the efforts of even those presidents who do succeed eventually crumble as the new regime

becomes old and vulnerable. Skowronek concludes by offering some thoughts about the place of the four most

recent presidents-Reagan, H.W. Bush, Clinton, and W. Bush-in the cyclical history of national regimes.”

-1.constitutional separation of powers ensures presidency remains unchanged to a degree 2.Post-WWII presidents’

duties increased in depth and breadth. *3. Presidents are linked (past and present) by “political time.” Pol. Time is to

be thought of in relation to regime sequences, or shifts from one party’s dominance to another, and in relation to

economic prosperity or degradation.

-The longer a party is in power (in office, congress, etc.), more its approach to national affairs becomes encumbered

and distorted, thus becoming less competent and energetic to deal with problems and demands of that time.

-Presidents who are viewed as successful came to power following the “abrupt break from a long-established

political-institutional regime.”p.113

- Examine political time parallels Andrew Jackson and FDR with respect to the problems of

constructing a new regime and leading others to support you and build it with you; examines

James Polk and John Kennedy as managers of an established regimein changing times. Interest

control and conflict manipulation in order to maintain coaltions and weaken divisions within the

ranks; examines Jimmy Carter and Franklin Pierce tried to establish leadership in a lethargic

regime with divided sects. Caught between established power and political legitimacy. Old

order affiliation in the new political age made their leadership bids awkward and superficial and

had to fight to make any changes.

Unilateral Action and Presidential Power: A theory

Terry M. Moe and William G. Howell

 

Synopsis: This article defines what is distinct about the modern presidency, which is the

president’s formal powers to act unilaterally and thus to make law on his own. The president’s

power is a force because they are not specified in the Constitution. They derive strength from the

ambiguity, and push this ambiguity to expand powers.

 

1. Neustadt’s argument that presidents are weak, and depend on skills, and bargaining

ability is on the decline. Out of sync with facts:

A. The presidential leadership was no longer in an “institutional presidency”, but changed

with the rise of a “new institutionalism”

B. Recognizes the president’s formal capcity for taking unilateral action and thus for

making law on his own – That is, the president can and do make law without the explicit

consent of Congress

C. The president always acted unilaterally to make law

D. They are able to do this precisely because they are not specified in the formal structure

of government (ambiguity of the formal structures, and president’s desire to expand

power)

1. Constitution as an Incomplete Contract

A. Constitution only created a framework of laws, to promote a rivalry conductive to the

public good.

1. Ambiguity and Presidential Imperialism

A. Presidents put great emphasis on legacies and being regarded as strong effective

leaders; for this they need power; they are primarily driven by the desire to expand power

B. The ambiguity in constitution – even in enumerated rights – give plenty of such

opportunities, for it does not specifically detail the extent of presidential authority.

C. The president is in an ideal position to take advantage of this authority, for he works

independently of Congress

D. the executive nature of job:

- Because presidents are executives, the operation of the gov’t is in their hands

- They have at their dispoal a tremendous reservoir of expertise, experience, and

information

- They are the first movers and reap the agenda powers that go along with it, other

branches are presented with fait accompli and has burden to respond This invites presidential imperialism, though there is the barrier of impairing

strategy in this.

1. A simple Spatial Model

A. Spatial Model - standard tool for exploring struggles among political actors over

policy and power.

A. The spatial model in this article concludes two major points: 1. unilateral action

can make a big difference in determining what presidents are able to achieve, 2.

even when they can act unilaterally, they are constrained to act strategically and

with moderation. They can not have everything they want.

1. Congress: delegation and Constraint

A. The congress can constrain presidential behavior through the statutes it writes

A. Yet, they can totally enforce this: a. congress may sometimes want the pres to

have all control, b. also, the president has ability to veto

A. Though, they can be overwhelmed by the sheer number of legislation, such a

proliferation creates substanital ambiguity, that can be used in pres' advantage

A. In conclusion, Congress cannot be expected to use statutory constraints with great

effectiveness in restricting the expansion of presidential power

1. Congress: the Capacity to act and resist

A. Congress is also limited to acting according to the beliefs of constituents, who

want to keep gov't from being centralized; they are also ebilitated by the fact that

it can not take coherent forceful action as there are many blocks in passing a law

A. When pres act unilaterally then legislative preferences are most likely to come

into play to the extent that presidential action has an adverse effect on consitutents

A. To summarize, presidents still hold substanital advantages over Congress, due

largely to the diabling effects of Congress's collective action problems and to the

relative ease with which presidents can block any congressional attempts to

reverse them.Still they will act moderately due to constraints in constituency,

legislative power of appropriations

1. The Courts

A. The Supreme court has every right to say what the Constitution means- and thus

resolve ambiguities - they can set boundries on president - if that is what is

required

A. They are independent, so president cant manipulate its collective action problems

as in Congress,

A. But courts are naturally inclined to support the imperialistic approach of the pres:

i. President appoint all members of the court - though one may suggest the

senate has ability to counter this, they are more interested in constituent

interest than pres power

ii. The basic design of separation of powers: Court not enforce own

decisions, but must rely on exec branch to enforce - pres can ignore the

Court's decision

A. In summary, the courts have a great power to limit the president, even more than

Congress. However, because of the apptment by presidents and their dependence

on the president the courts will ordinarily be supportive and refrain from imposing

seroius limits on presidential expansionism.

1. Conclusion: This article focused on the institution of the president - though not on the

formal powers. [Read conclusion of this article for a good overview]

Erin Mulkey

Hagen and Mayer, “The Modern Politics of Presidential Selection: How Changing the Rules

Really Did Change the Game” (pages 1-21)

THESIS: “Our argument, simply put, is that the delegate selection rules and campaign finance

regulations enacted in the early 1970s had a very significant impact on the nature of the

presidential nominating process: changing the rules really did change the game (3).”

-August 27th, 1968-Democratic National Convention approved a minority report that changed the

rules which govern national conventions and presidential nominations.

McGovern-Fraser Commission (Commission on Party Structure and Delegate

Selection)

Rules first used for 1972 convention

Asserted national party’s “authority to control its state and local

affiliates”

-1974 Amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971

passed by Congress in response to Watergate

changed how candidates raised and spent money when running for president

“The most significant change in campaign finance regulations in American

history (2).”

Affects?

-severely weakened political parties

-changed the kinds of candidates that were likely to be nominated and “their

subsequent ability to govern”

Set rules in place for delegates and conventions

Discussed on page 4; all states were in violation of at least 6 of the 18 rules

Many states thought rules so confusing that they just decided to hold a primary

(# of primaries began in 1972 a “sharp and sustained increase”)

Contribution limits:

-$1,000 for individuals and $5,000 for political action committees, in addition to

establishing spending limits and requiring accounting and full disclosure

-Supreme Court invalidated some of the rules, creating “loopholes”

Critiques? Turned conventions into an “empty ritual” done for benefit of TV

-Number of ballots to nominate a pres. candidate, % of uncommitted delegates, rise of

independent candidate organizations, how easily incumbents can be renominated, relationship

btwn party and pres. have all changed greatly in 20th century.

-How McGovern-Fraser Commission and 1974 Federal Election Campaign Act have changed

things:

1)plebiscitary system-nom. is given to candidate who is most successful at

winning; opened process up to anyone who wanted to take part in it. It also

became much more responsive to public opinion.

2)”led to contemporary presidential marathon”=longer campaigns

3)lots of power given to one or two early caucuses or primaries

-Many candidates, such as the “favorite son”, never make it to the national convention.

Michael F HAGEN AND William G Mayer, “The Modren Poltiics of Presidential Selection:

How Changing the Rules Really Did Change the Game,” …

PAGES 21-43

-By Kahtryn McKinley, mckinl2@fas.harvard.edu

The Advent of the Marathon: “another important effect of the rules changes has been a

dramatic lengthening of the presidential nomination race

1) ANNOUCNEMTNETS

a. 4 conclusions

1) Very large proportion of recent presidential contenders have announced

candidacy at least 400 days before the opening of their parties national

convention, 1.5 years before the novemebr election

2) Early announcers are not just long shots and also-rans, include democratic

and republic nominees, second place finishers

3) the first two trends do not of precedence in theyears 1952-1968

4) many candidates who delayed their announcement dates, claim that theiur

alte annoucnemtn dates hurt their cnadidiacies, denying opp to raise

money, build organization and line up support (ex: jerry brown, frank

church, Edward keendy)

b. Examples

1) past

a) It was confined to the election year itself (1952-1968, ex: Robert

Taft announced it the earliest in Mid October of 1951)

2) Now

a) Race stretches through most of the preceding year and infrequently

int he year before that (since 1968:, ex: Mcgovern announced

candidacy January 1971, 1.5 years before the Democratice national

convention)

c. Exceptions to early announcements

1) Incumbent presidents are generally spared the ordeal of announcing early,

even when they expect to face substantial opposition (ex: Jimmy carter in

1980)

2) Some candidates who have name recognition and national following (ex:

Reagan)

2) Problems with the marathon

a. Current officeholder—how can he attend to his governing responsibilities while

campaigning

1) Effects:

a) many qualified people decide not to run

b) public officials leave government because they are thinking about

running (EX: Mondale turned down senate seat because he was

thinking about running)

c) attempt to do both: run while continuiong one’s current office—

most cases this is a false choice, one responsibility r the other will

suffer (ex: senate votes for elected officals running decreases, up

through 1968, congressional voting participation rates were

affected onl during the election year itself, but in post-reform

nomination races big change from that)

Race to Judgement: Candidates get forced out of the race within just a few days or weeks

after the first primary

3) then

a. Pre 1972 presidential races: once candidates announced, they were able to remain

in race a reasonably long time, at least to the end of primary season and uaually to

the actual convention balloting

4) Now

a. post 1976: people who did poorly in early contests (new Hampshire, ioowa) were

withdraying days after race formally began—name for this is WINNOWING

1) many states responded to this by moving primaries to early dates, -- name

for this is FRONT LODAING, exacerbating the problem

5) problems with front loading

a. weeds oout long shot candidates, need name recognition early

b. early withdrawl not just fate of candidates who do not do well (*ex; Gephardt)

c. forced to withdraw before having a change to run in the kinds of primaries and

cuscuses in which their strength might have been most evident (locations of

primaries do not reflect voter constituencies of all candidates)

6) other causes fro early dropouts

a. lack of MONEY

1) candidates who do poorly I early primaries and caucuses are written off by

press, deprive media attention, and unable tot thus raise funds

7) PROBLEMS

a. COMBINATION OF EARLY WITHDRAWLS AND INCREASED FORNT

LODAING GREATLY ACCELERATE THE VOTERS’ DECISION PROCESS

AND THUS MAKE THE WHOLE SYSTEM LESS DELIBERATIVE,

RATIONAL, FLEXIBLE AND MORE CHAOTIC---- because of process voters

learn about the candidates too late

b. The presidetnail selection process places too much withg on the two early

delegate selection events: Iowa caucus and New Hampshire primary (neither state

represents national elecotorate

Conclusion: 6 ways the nominating process has changes since that in 1950s and 1960s

Midterm summaries:

Richard Pious, "The Presidency and the Nominating Process: Politics and

Power," in Michael Nelson, ed., The Presidency and the Political System, pp.

195-218.

Andrew Kohut, "The Long and Winding Road to the Presidential Election,"

Miller Center Report, vol. 20, no. 1 (Spring/Summer 2004), pp. 35-40.

Pious:

Richard Pious “The Presidency and the Nominating Process: Politics and Power” in

Presidency and the Political System

Abstract: “The Constitution defines the pool of possible presidents in any election as consisting of every “natural

born Citizen” who has “attained to the Age of thirty-five years, and been fourteen years a resident within

the U.S.” – more than one hundred million people. The Constitution also says that “the executive Power

shall be vested in a Pesident of the US”-one person. Historically, it has been the job of the major pol.

Parties to narrow the field of possible presidents to the two candidates from whom the voters make their

final choice. During the early 19th century, congressional caucuses did this job on behalf of their parties.

Caucuses were then replaced by nat’l party conventions dominated by state party bosses. The conventions

continue to meet every 4 years, but since the 1970’s they have been dominated by delegates chosen by the

voters in primaries. In this chapter, Pious reviews the history of the presidential nomination process and

analyzes the kinds of candidates whom diff. processes have tended to favor. He worries that in the current,

primaries-dominated process, “those who emerge with the nomination lack nat’l exec. Experience, a

situation that rarely occurs in other nations.” Pious suggests that “a nominating system that restores some

peer review and a greater role for party pros and members of Congress”-the same groups that dominated

earlier nominating processes-might yield more qualified presidential nominees.”

-“a costant in American politics is that no approach to candidate selection has been able to simultaneously maximize

participation of the voters and responsibility of the contenders’ peers to judge their qualifications.”

-King Caucus-nomination by congressional party-btw 1800-1824, electoral college votes were organized by party

members in Congress.Federalists and Republicans would each endorse a contender by plurality voted of

those present and send word of their endorsements to the state parties. Advantaged Washington insiders

who could lobby directly at the Capitol for nominations. Governors and state officials disadvantaged and

none ran for the presidency at this time. *Resulted in cabinet gov’t-President with cabinet secretaries with

their own constituencies in Congress. To get things done, president had to persuade these men. Led to

weakness and indecision.

-Nominating Conventions: Nomination by State Party Organizations

Jacksonian democracy brought down King Caucus and cabinet gov’t. Was not elected by congress, so felt no

obligation or accountability to a congressional party. Used veto and made his own policies. Established

principle that president could issue orders to cabinet secretaries and fire them if they didn’t follow policies.

-national conventions took place of caucus. State party boss dominated-necessary to have them bargain to get votes

of states to get presidency. Led to nominees with mediocre ability with little national government

experience but known by state party bosses. Influence peddling and corruption in administrations of

presidents handpicked by bosses.

-The Primary and Caucus System: Nomination by the Party in the Electorate

Erosion of Post-New Deal Democratic party in 1960s shifted power from bosses to voters bc of Primary Contest (a

vote within a party to determine the preferences of its members). Now, contenders had to win a majority of

the sixteen or so primaries to be nominated (not the case at all before). Means you don’t need state party

leader support and is “a contender loyalist who takes direction from the contender’s organization at the

convention.” But, now a matter of fundraising which can lead to obligations to major contributors.

Nominations: come from small group of career politicians with experience in public office, access to large sums of

cash, and experience in running a media campaign and influencing public opinion. But, often lack national

government (especially executive branch) experience. VP’s and Department Secretaries rarely win (Dept

secretaries hardly ever now but did in caucus system). Few connections with legislators they will be

working with. Governors have faired well in this system; anti-Washington mood in the electorate so they

portray themselves as outsiders who will change things and solve problems. Also can org. effective

campaigns and raise funds. Rarely military officers in pres. Nominations bc of media and fundraising skills

necessary to succeed.

Media coverage not enough about the candidates voting records and positions and too much about the fund-raising

and political strategy.

-Caucus-Convention and Primary Contests: Democratic?

1970s reforms designed to aid voters’ impact. Caucuses now open-particpation events rather than closed gatherings

of party leaders and supporters, but participation still very low with only hard-core out to support. Winners

in Iowa convention get more media coverage than other candidates and thus effectively weed out lower

performers. Critics see them as mass participation exercises in intraparty democracy. First primary is in

New Hampshire and enormous media coverage for winner gives him a great boost. But, primaries

demographic is mostly from high socioeconomic echelons (not representative). And, Iowa and NH are

predominately white-so not racially representative. *Primary voters more likely to be skewed to their

respective ends of the political spectrum than the rest of their voting party. Important for candidates to

swing to extremes during this part of the race. Must be well-funded and well-organized frm the beginning

to hang in the race and then be successful. Twofold strategy-eliminate similar candidates in early primaries,

and second, in “shakeout” period when states in specific region hold contests on the same day, they must

defeat the remaining opponents.

-National conventions

confirm results of primary and caucus contest. Delegates forced to agree on a platform and approve the candidate’s

choice of a running mate. For incumbent’s party, convention symbolizes a transfer of party leadership

from pres. To candidate. Most imp. Thing candidates do is win over national tv audience that has tuned in

for a coronation not a confrontation. Party unity key for success.

Candidates far more educated and econ. Better off than voters watching on tv. Must connect to them.

The Presidency and the Nominating Process: Politics and Power

By Richard Pious

This article explains the process of selecting a president. It is very similar to Prof. Porter’s

lectures on the subject except that Pious concludes that the system needs a greater role for party

professionals and elected officials so that we can increase the chances of electing candidates with

executive experience.

Brief summary of election processes: During the 19th century, congressional caucuses selected

their party’s candidate. This system was replaced by national party conventions dominated by

state party bosses. In the 1970’s this system was replaced by our current one, where the

candidates are selected by delegates who are chosen in primaries.

King Caucus and the early years: Originally, the electoral college was supposed to nominate 5

candidates for the Presidency and the House of Representatives would chose from among this

group. However, political parties began to develop (the Federalists behind Adams and the anti-

Federalists behind Jefferson). The parties chose their candidates from an exclusive group of

Washington insiders. Almost every President was a former Secretary of State, and none were

former governors. Presidents often gave away important cabinet positions in order to secure

votes, and cabinet officers had Congressional followings and a great deal of power.

Nomination by state party organizations: Andrew Jackson eliminated the King Caucus system

by declaring it corrupt and nominating himself for President. He campaigned directly to state

conventions and state legislators. His success and the advent of technology that made it safe for

people to travel across the eastern seaboard led to the creation of nominating conventions. State

party bosses controlled delegate selection and dominated these national conventions.

The Primary and Caucus system: This set of changes was a response to Hubert Humphrey

earning the Democratic nomination without entering a single primary. Humphrey was able to

secure the nomination with the help of party bosses who controlled 60% of the vote. The

McGovern-Fraser Commission was convened in response to this and created a system where

voters chose almost all of their state’s delegates. This system means that candidates are

accountable to voters, special interests, and campaign contributors rather than to party bosses.

The delegates are not representative of the average American; they are often more educated and

richer.

Primaries are ideologically skewed: Democratic primary voters tend to be more liberal than the

pool of all Democratic registered voters, while Republican primary voters are heavily skewed

toward the conservative end of the party’s spectrum.

Critics of the current system argue that it selects media-savvy people who have limited

Washington experience (and thus cannot be attacked as “a corrupt Washington insider.”)

Kohut: “The Long and Winding Road to the Presidential Election.”

In his article The Long and Winding Road to the Presidential Election, Andrew Kohut

gives a perspective on how voter attitudes were different in 2004 than they have been in previous

election seasons.

1. First, a few observations:

a) The voters decide who the candidates will be, not the press, pundits or pollsters

(i.e., Voters shot down Dean despite his support in the press and polls.)

b) The electorate is polarized more than ever in 2004.

i) Democrats disapproved of Bush in 2003 as strongly as republicans

disapproved of Clinton in 98.

c) The default position of the American Public is always to stay the course, not

to change horses.

i) this is especially the case with second term elections when people ask,

“Does the president deserve his job?” i.e., Bush.

d) The new concept of terrorism makes the 2004 election unique.

i) In terms of security issues, the incumbent always has a stature

advantage over the challenger.

ii) Voters always come to the side of the President when they see their

troops under attack (Iraq).

e) Deficit’s have become associated in the public’s mind wit deeper problems in

the economy.

i) Bush had an uphill battle in 2004.

f) Although people believe that legalizing gay marriage is unacceptable, they

draw the line at a constitutional amendment – Americans don’t like the constitution to be

changed!

g) At the time Kohut wrote the article, he viewed Bush as falling and Kerry as

rising; however, he notes that the election will hinge on perceptions of the conditions of

Iraq, the economy and social issues in the months closer to the election. He also

concludes by making the point that the American public has begun to view the media in

much more partisan terms. The public wants an independent media, not one that chooses

sides.

Assignment 8

John H. Aldrich, John D. Griffin, and Jill Ruckershauser, "The Presidency and the Election

Campaign: Altering Voters' Priorities in the 2004 Election, in Michael Nelson, ed., The

Presidency and the Political System, pp. 219-234.

The summary at the beginning of the chapter (which does a reasonably good job) reads:

“Presidential campaigns “are consequential,” argue John H. Aldrich, John D. Griffin, and Jill

Rickershauser. Most scholars agree that the campaigns the candidates wage help to shape the

policy agenda in Washington for the following four years. But some have expressed doubt that

what the candidates say and do has much effect on the outcome of the election itself. Instead,

these scholars argue, economic and political conditions prevailing before the campaign even

begins determines [the winner]. This chapter disputes this argument. The authors show that

prevailing conditions only have electoral meaning if the candidates discuss and debate

them. … [The authors] describe how each candidate tried, with considerable skill, to focus the

voters’ attention on the issues that were most favorable to him and his party.”

I will attempt to refrain from repeating facts above, but other important information includes:

Shaping Priorities

Although the candidates are unable to change the minds of voters, they are frequently

able to alter the public’s perception of what is important in the election. By choosing to focus on

specific issues, the candidates can “shape voter’s priorities” by forcing those issues to become

more prominent in the election.

Within issues, candidates frequently highlight those parts of the issues that are most

beneficial to their campaign. In the 2004 election, this was seen predominantly within the issues

of terrorism, the economy, and Iraq.

The candidates tend to be more successful when they highlight “party strengths” or

attributes which the public readily associates with a given party.

Issue Ownership

According to issues ownership theory, “the goal [of a campaign] is to achieve a strategic

advantage by making problems which reflect owned issues the programmatic meaning of the

election and the criteria by which voters make their choice.” Ie. Parties will tend to play to their

strengths within issues “owned” by particular voting blocks.

In this view, the a priori conditions of an election are not determinative—they merely

provide the raw materials the candidates must utilize.

This view also implies that campaign strategy is determined by the views of the voters

before the election, as candidates select issues that will speak (and largely to their base, though

perhaps also to targeted voting blocks and independents).

However, in the 2000 election, this situation rarely arose—in fact, 2/3 of the most

prominent issues belonged to independents (healthcare and education). The authors concede that

the 2000 election was unusual—both Bush and Gore were relatively unconstrained in the issues

they could select both because neither was a president seeking reelection, and there were no

“obvious issues.” The authors therefore turn to the 2004 election as a much more sensible test.

In 2004, there were obvious issues. Terrorism was on the radar screen, the economy hit a

severe downturn earlier in Bush’s administration, and the US was engaged in Iraq. Beyond this,

Bush was not popular enough to make the campaign completely asymmetric (as Reagan has done

in 1984).

Examining the Voters

Data reveals that voters make their minds up fairly early in the election—less than 1/5

make their decision within 2 weeks of the election. Partisans, as expected, tend to decide earlier

than independents. By collecting data from the 2000 and 2004 elections, we learned that there

were fewer undecided voters for Bush and Kerry to court than there were in 2000, but more of

those voters were independents than partisans.

Therefore, an “issue ownership” approach would suggest great incentives for Bush and

Kerry to target issues owned by Independents.

2004 Data

Early in the 2004 election, voter surveys established that the most important issues were

the economy (D), unemployment (D), terrorism (R), national security (R), and the war in Iraq

(D). These issues in turn were “owned” entirely by Republicans and Democrats (see letters next

to each issue).

Towards the end of the election, however, these priorities had shifted. The study was

repeated, and it showed that all three groups of voters were less concerned with the economy,

and more concerned with Iraq and Terrorism.

Coding Speeches

There are some neat graphs in the book (pp. 227-231) that reveal the individualized data

—if you’re interested, you can look there. I will only summarize the conclusions.

The authors looked at the candidates speeches and looked at 14 issues. Looking at the

percentage of the candidates’ rhetoric devoted to each issue, and comparing that to voter

priorities, the authors made two conclusions:

1. Candidates’ emphasizing particular issues strongly corresponded with those issues voters

identified as the most important issues.

2. As the candidates altered rhetoric and focused on different issues, the voters’ priorities

shifted. For example, in September, both candidates emphasized healthcare, when the

candidates turned away from the issue in October and November, however, so did the

voters. Similarly, Bush’s consistent rhetoric on the economy eased concern among

republicans that there was a problem. Kerry’s “more erratic attempts” were less

effective.

Conclusion

Even though the 2004 election was constrained by the pre-selection of particular issues,

and to a degree by the president’s tenure to that point, the candidates maintained room for

strategy through reshaping voters’ priority issues.

Thomas Patterson, Out of Order (Random House, 1994), chapter 1

This chapter proves to be somewhat repetitive; I’ll do my best to summarize the chapter

without repeating.

The role of the Press in the United States

The central premise of the argument is that the press in the United States has been asked

to perform two roles which it cannot simultaneously maintain.

In other nations, and until the 1960s in the United States, the press served only as a

critical watchdog, whose role was to watch government officials, and report objectively on

wrongdoing. Patterson argues that the press was given an additional role in the 1960s, however

—the role of ordering and giving direction to Presidential campaigns.

News and Truth

“News and truth are not the same thing.” Patterson points out that the news agencies, if

not directly misleading, frequently give the public only refracted versions of reality that

overemphasize particular aspects—those aspects that are sensational. Indeed, in a competition to

find riveting stories and attract viewers, the press devoted more coverage in the 1992 campaign

to issues such as Clinton’s draft record and Bush’s “wild charges (the Ozone-man, bozos)” than

to the economy.

The Nomination Process and the News

Through 1968, the nomination process was determined by party leaders. It was

Humphrey’s defeat that led to the McGovern-Fraser commission that instituted primaries to

determine the democratic nominee, and pressured states to impose similar systems on the

republic party. As a result, the nominating process quickly changed from a system where 2/3 the

states were “convention states” (determined by party leaders) to ¾ primary states.

This in turn place pressure on the voters to get to know the candidates in a way they had

not previously been asked to know them. Before, each candidate was attached to a readily

identifiable party, which implied the candidate had certain political positions. In primaries,

however, voters were confronted with a number of names, and oftentimes did not have the ability

to gather sufficient information on their own to make an informed choice.

The consequence is obvious—an increased reliance on the media to educate the public

about each of the candidates.

The intent of the McGovern-Fraser commission was to place the selection of the nominee

in the hands of voters. The commission’s recommendation, in the eyes of Patterson, was

therefore “naive.” The commission should have seen the newfound prominence and importance

of the media coming.

“The de facto premise of today’s nominating system is that the media will direct the

voters toward a clear understanding of what is at stake in choosing one candidate rather than

another.” Patterson goes on to state that even though the press can and does raise the public’s

consciousness, the news is unable to organize public opinion in a meaningful way (the way the

old party bosses used to).

Consistency

Of great importance to Patterson is the idea of consistency within the parties. Patterson

appreciates the attempt of old party bosses to select candidates who fell in line with the party’s

views, to maintain a consistent option for voters from election to election. The press, however, is

concerned with finding the new, the interesting, the sensational—and therefore will tend to

highlight those candidates who tend against consistency.

The Electoral College

Patterson then offers a defense of the electoral college to demonstrate his point. In

turning to the Federalist Papers, Patterson quotes #68 (Hamilton): “Hamilton said there was ‘a

moral certainty’ that the choice of a president would rest on the candidates’ ‘requisite

qualifications,’ and not on their ‘talents for low intrigue, and the little arts of popularity.’”

Patterson then proceeds to detail a number of examples from recent campaigns that

demonstrate the point that “low” issues tend to dominate the news, cutting against Hamilton’s

premise. Pages 66-69 offer these examples, which, though interesting, may not be important.

Conclusions

Patterson turns to the examples just mentioned and notes that the presidential election

system is essentially unpredictable. Patterson then offers a host of conclusive statements: “There

is no purpose behind an electoral system in which the vote is impulsive and can hinge on random

circumstance or minor issues.” “Disorder is a sure sign of a defective system.”

Indeed, Patterson returns to his point that voters “are not stupid, but have been saddled

with an impossible task.” Namely, knowing the candidates. Everyday life is too busy to remain

informed. “In reality, the voters act on the basis of little information and without the means to

select the optimal candidate in a crowded race.”

The candidates are similarly required to carry burdens they shouldn’t be expected to carry

—good men are discouraged from running, or prevented from running due to the requirement

that they fulfill other duties. Patterson adds that individuals might not run if they fear winning

the nomination but losing the general election—as such a move might brand them as “a loser”

and discount their chances in future elections.

Candidates are also forced to seek endorsements in primaries, in place of party brands.

Furthermore, the campaign trail puts pressures on candidates to make promises that they

feel compelled to make, but never should. Indeed, the campaign trail forces candidates to over-

promise.

As Patterson wraps up, he writes: “If we know now that the Framers were wrong in their

belief in the inevitability of a tyrannical majority, we also know that they were right in their

belief that an overemphasis on campaigning results in excessive appeals to self-interest and

momentary passions.”

Missing Jeffrey Wilf

Patterson

Stephen J. Wayne, “Reforming the Electoral System” Ch9 in The Road to the White House,

pp. 303 – 330

Nomination process reforms, problems, and potential solutions:

Choosing delegates

1. Democratic Party reforms of 1968 aimed at increasing democratic participation in

nominations. Reforms later forced on Republican Party.

2. Problems: campaigns more expensive, weakened state parties, longer campaigns,

calendar front-loading means most important part of campaign happens before

people are paying attention, conventions turned into coronations.

3. Potential solutions: compacting the calendar is resisted by individual states

seeking to maintain prominence (NH + IA), regional or population-based primary

grouping would favor regional candidates and promote sectionalism, national

primary day would be consistent with “one person one vote”, but would further

weaken parties and discourage lesser-known or less-well-financed candidates

from running.

Campaign finance

1. 1970s Reforms were intended to shed light on financing, provide funding equity,

and improve accountability.

2. Problems: 527 loophole and PAC soft money allow unlimited contributions,

spending caps apply only to candidates who accept public financing therefore puts

them at a disadvantage, public financing encourages fringe candidates to run at

public expense, FEC is ineffective because of even partisan divide.

3. Potential solutions: increasing the individual contribution limit would give the

rich more influence, increasing public donation matching would require exhaust

current public funding model, restricting media buys prohibits free speech and

reduces information the voter receives about a candidate, limiting PAC and 527

money is unconstitutional by Supreme Court ruling.

News media

1. The reforms of the 1970s enhanced media’s role in nominations process by

requiring candidates to seek popular votes through media advertisement and news

coverage.

2. Problems: candidates play the media in a “spin” game, journalists cover

personality and drama instead of issues, coverage focuses on two main parties and

excludes third party candidates, voters do not get enough information about the

candidates election night predictions are often wrong and can influence outcomes.

3. Potential Solutions: networks assign reporters to cover issues much like they

already assign reporters to cover campaign drama, candidates can use

nontraditional media like talk shows, candidates can engage in debates which fit

with media’s game schema, could stop predicting results while polls are still open.

Voter Turnout

1. Problems: In 1996, 51% of eligible Americans chose NOT to vote. Growing

disconnect between voters and the political system. Reduced legitimacy.

2. Potential Solutions: make registration easier or automatic, make election day a

national holiday (would cost employers millions of dollars in lost revenue),

extending voting period to multiple days, switch to mail or e-mail voting,

compulsory voting (has civil liberties drawbacks), introducing proportional

representation in congress (would make minority votes worthwhile), free media

time for candidates, increasing civic education, wider party policy appeals.

Electoral college and alternatives

1. The general election is for different slates of Electors in each state that will be

sent to the Electoral College. Potentially unrepresentative of popular vote, favors

smaller states, winner-takes-all discounts minority vote

2. Potential solutions:

Automatic Plan – give winner of popular vote in each state all of the

Electoral College votes, thus prohibiting an elector from voting against the

state’s popular vote. Unnecessary b/c electors rarely change their votes.

Proportional Plan – assign elector votes for each state by proportion of

popular vote in that state. Would increase minority and third party

participation in all states and encourage nationwide competition, but

would decrease winning margins in Electoral College, decreasing winner’s

claim to a sweeping mandate.

District Plan – 2 Electoral College votes in each state are determined by

state-wide election, the rest determined by votes within congressional

districts. Plan currently in use by ME and NE. Elector College votes

would resemble partisan divide in Congress, regional third parties might

benefit, large competitive states would lose.

Direct Election – president chose based on popular vote, with at least 40%

necessary to win. Run-off election if no candidate receives over 40%.

Would encourage 3rd party participation, may lead to multi-party coalition

government, could increase incentive to voter fraud, difficulty recounting,

plan supported by the public but opposed by career politicians.

Lecture 4: Presidential Selection: nominations 9/29/2005

Criteria for evaluating the nomination process: 1. Does the system motivate talented

people to run for office? 2. Does the system give adequate time and info for voters to

make informed decisions? 3. Does the system have legitimacy consistent with democratic

norms? 4. Does the system select for skill needed to govern effectively?

History of the nomination: Framers feared direct democracy. Compromised on Electoral

College scheme, with each state having 1 elector for each senator and representative in

Congress. Each elector casts 2 ballots, one of which must be for someone from a different

state. Majority of college vote goes to President, second most votes go to Vice President.

If no majority, then the House decides among the top 5 vote-getters. Did not foresee

campaigns or parties.

King caucus: 1800 – 1824. Congressional party leaders met in closed sessions to

nominate their party’s candidate after the Congressional session was over. Domination of

party and government insider candidates like Secretary of State. System fell apart after

1824 election of J. Q. Adams who had not received majority of popular votes.

National Conventions: 1831 Anti-Freemason Society held the first national party

convention to choose a presidential candidate. State parties send delegates who vote on

platforms and candidates. Favored party insiders, dark horse candidates, and back-room

dealing. Reflected power of political parties.

Unimportance of Primaries: TR beat Taft in most primaries in 1912, but only 42% of

convention delegates were chosen by primary, so Taft won anyway. Primaries became

less prevalent after WWI because people said they were too expensive.

1968: Humphrey won nomination at the Democratic Party convention in Chicago without

having entered a single primary. Protests and fights on the convention hall floor on

national television prompted the McGovern-Frasier reform commission to examine

reform options. By 1972 every state had to choose delegates by primary or open caucus

systems. New rules were also forced on Republican Party by Democratically controlled

state legislatures.

Today’s campaigns: all delegates except a few Democratic Super Delegates are chosen by

primary, and the winner is known well in advance of the convention, which has become a media-

orchestrated coronation. Today there are really 2 contests: who can raise enough funds to stay in

the game, and who can win enough votes. Candidates must endure a very long and expensive

process, appeal to a national audience, advocate a coherent set of ideas, and handle themselves

well in debates. Favors well-known and well-financed Washington outsiders with executive

Andrew Rudalevige

Main argument: Cabinet govt. is a fiction, but govt. can’t function without cabinet.

Washington relied on cabinet to help with enormous job.

Truman claimed cabinet was fundamental to policy formulation

While there are exceptions, cabinet mostly does not do too much.

Evolution of the cabinet

Cabinet anticipated, though not explicitly, in Constitution. In part, to put a check on

single executive.

State, War, Treasury, and AG in1789 by Congress. More through the years.

These form inner cabinet. The only ones that still have any real contact with the

President.

Cabinet Government

Some say cabinet not “institutionalized,” since role and power varies from President to

President.

Rudalevige says cabinet as institution has deep roots and broad scope.

Into mid 20th century, many cite cabinet as crucial for functioning government.

Every modern president claims he will get cabinet more involved.

o A promise rarely kept.

Reasons for cabinet weakness

o Cabinet is often selected as political favors.

o Nominees must secure Senate confirmation.

o Presidents cannot compel anyone to join their cabinets.

Once all of these accounted for, may not have President’s trust.

Even without all these problems, cabinet still has structural problems.

o Cabinet is too big for detailed conversation.

o Too diverse a group for productive debate.

Cabinet members don’t want others commenting on their problems.

o Presidents have to consider divided loyalties of secretaries.

Constituencies, Congress, courts, and “national interest.”

Much more attractive than cabinet is presidential and exec office staff.

o More loyal, fewer complications, less personal ambition.

Conclusion: Presidents like cabinet government in principle but not practice.

“Cabinet Government” in the Modern Presidency

Andrew Card: advise president and implement his decisions.

Cabinet members are either

o Specialists, substantive stuff.

o Generalists, managerial stuff.

o Liaisons, political attributes.

The Representative Executive.

o Cabinet used to please different constituencies.

Regional diversity.

Recently racial and gender diversity.

Cabinet symbolizes openness and inclusivity.

The Cabinet as Lightning Rod.

o Cabinet members rarely vocal. Not often good when they are.

o Can be used by presidents to give out bad news, deflect blame.

“presidential lightning rods.”

“Real Loyalty”: The Quest for Bureaucratic Control

Nixon valued loyalty so much that he put low profile people in positions, relying on their

loyalty and lack of personal ambition.

Some presidents have been more controlling than others in terms of appointing cabinet

assistants.

The President’s Program: Formulation, Passage, Implementation

President’s staff relatively small compared to rest of executive branch.

o Needs cabinet resources and manpower.

Departments play important role in forming ideas for policy.

o Have expertise.

Cabinet councils have been used to try to deal with overlapping issues.

o Effective when small.

o Gave depts. Real voice.

Conclusions: “Creative Confrontations” and Presidential Governance

Cabinet destined for failure as decision-making body.

Still, some write off cabinet as not being useful, which is not true.

o White House staff cannot replace cabinet’s implementation.

Cabinet meetings are generally not useful, but councils can be.

Keeping communication channels with cabinet open is important for President.

Cabinet crucial for creating constructive conflicts, and as a result, giving President good

advice

Presidential Decision Making: The Economic Policy Board, pp. 5-29: “Organizational

Challenges” 1980 – Roger Porter

←← Introduction

← The communications revolution has focused increased attention on the President as the

single most powerful figure.

←← A president’s capacity to meet the unrealistically high expectations that are placed upon

him is directly related to how organized he is to make decisions.

←← Why study economic policy? 1. Both foreign and domestic policy has become

increasingly important since FDR, and consumes large amounts of his time (read: organization is

key to success) and 2. Has received relatively little attention from scholars.

←← The Interrelatedness of Issues

← Three reasons for recent increased complexity and interrelatedness of policy making:

1. Expansion of Gov. activity (domestic spending: 9% in 1929, 17.5% in 1960, 1976:

28%)

o Result: increased demands on the president; fewer problems fall within a

single agency or department’s province.

o Result: President responsible for administering the increasing number of

problems, and also for resolving expanding conflicts between their objectives

and priorities.

2. Sheer growth in number of issues to understand and organize.

o i.e. environment, energy, consumer interests

3. Blurring of traditional distinction between domestic and foreign economic policy

since the 1950s.

o Businesses are increasingly multinational, and thus global.

Thus nat’l economies (incl. US) are more concerned with the

economies of their trading partners, which results in increased

openness of the US economy.

+ openness+interdependence+vulnerability

Thus, domestic economic policy must involve foreign economic

policy, and as such, they are now increasingly intertwined.

An example is agricultural policy: at once foreign (sanctions, imports)

and domestic (import activity affects farming, general food supply).

← Issue interrelatedness means that departments and agencies are less likely to be aware of

all of the overlapping elements of problems. Thus, OMB and WH staff are increasingly useful

for identifying interrelationships b/w issues and interests.

←← A Fragmented Executive Branch

“A many splintered thing” (Stephen Bailey)

Presents an organizational challenge: People who do not know each other across the

fragmented top layers of the branch are less likely to be able to coordinate operations,

information, planning, etc. Thus mutual understandings of issues are much more

difficult.

← Departmentalism

For efficiency purposes, decentralization is key. However, some aspects of

departments different than the Presidency:

o More parochial view, by definition of being departmentalized.

o Department staffers narrow-mindedly aim to protect and progress their

respective department, issues, etc.

o Relationships b/w interest groups and agencies/departments extend beyond a

single presidency.

Professionalism has maintained departmental influence.

o Bureaucratic core of departments are experts and professionals in particular

fields.

o Harold Seidman’s Iron Triangle of political power: these professionals,

interested legislators (i.e. subcommittees), and spokesmen for groups

benefiting from relevant gov’t programs.

Mutual dependence (constituency groups on departments) encourages mutual support

(departments supported by constituency to increase authority in the executive branch)

o Departments represent specialized constituencies rather than holistic

American ideology. Ex: Ag. for farmers.

Career bureaucracy: unlike UK, most servants remain in same department.

o Specialized expertise, but narrow perspectives

o Career civil servants depend on the health of their department, so they are

biased to preserve their institution, and expand its autonomy.

Unity across horizontal lines of leadership is hampered since each is loyal to their

department before the whole administrative team.

←← The Cabinet Secretary at the Crossroads

← New cabinet secretaries typically face career bureaucracies resistant to change, yet must

manage departments that contain multiple conflicting viewpoints.

Most secretaries have short tenures (average of 4 mos. from 1933-1965, 18 mos.

during Nixon)

← Three main pressures on secretaries:

1. Advocating their departments and programs

o Charles G. Dawe remarks that because of this, “the members of the Cabinet

are a President’s natural enemies.”

2. Having close ties with constituency. Ex: Ag must have ear and more to farm

community.

o This is most often the overriding attribute in selecting secretaries: the

likelihood of them meshing with their respective constituencies.

3. Having a good relationship with Congress.

o Congress confirms secretary, passes her legislation, oversees administrative

performance, appropriates funds, etc.

← Independence: while conflicting pressures present crossroads w/in Departments,

secretaries are afforded independence, which means that he can single-handedly influence

anything that applies to his Department.

← How secretaries spend time: largely administrative tasks, meetings to push programs and

policy, little time for reflection, and seldom confronted by peers.

←← The View from the White House

← Has a unique role in the American political system:

National constituency broader policy perspective than cabinet.

Congress and the nation expect initiative and direction from POTUS.

The national public status and following gives POTUS more leadership, bargaining,

and persuasion resources than anyone.

Because of the breadth of his role, 2 key organizational interests:

o 1. Integration of policy: with diffused power, a unified message is efficient but

difficult to achieve.

o 2. Balancing competing forces and interests in the major policy areas: results

in better informed policy advice

← Two prescriptions for overcoming or transcending departmentalism:

1. Consolidating departments

2. Cabinet government: held less for issue-oriented discussion, but for exchanging

information and getting direction from the President. Most secretaries lobby WH

staff because they know the President rarely seeks policy advice from the secretaries,

mostly because he knows their views, and knows them to be too narrow for his

broader responsibilities.

←← Organizational Alternatives

← 1. Adhocracy

President distributes assignments and selects who he listens to and when.

Involves few regularized channels

Frequently results in jurisdictional quarrelling, chaos.

Typically used in transitional periods, figuring out who will do what.

Still exists, though less random than in FDR’s time: now, OMB, NSC, and other WH

offices check and balance such tasks.

← 2. Centralized Management

Heavy reliance on WH staff and EOP, to filter ideas, proposals, and recommendations

before they reach the President.

Grounded in desire for advice from advocates.

← 3. Multiple Advocacy

Relies on an honest broker to ensure a full and balanced debate on issues.

Based on commitment to competition of ideas as best method of policy development.

Such honest brokers are supposed to insure

o Due process: everyone with an opinion gets a fair shot

o Quality control: the information fed to the President is high-quality, relevant,

and structured.

← Rarely are only one of these approaches implemented, usually it is a combination of two

or all three or simply variations.

← Porter supports multiple advocacy the most:

It’s theoretically promising, but largely unexamined in practice.

Theoretically, it provides all points of view, bridges the gap between policy

formulation and implementation, and allows the expansion of the President’s

influence: he can tap a plethora of individuals in the Executive Branch for advice.

Thus multiple advocacy is the most inclusive of the three.

However, it is difficult to implement because it depends on officials playing nice and

working together in groups. For example, the NSC.

o Such “fixed membership superstructures” have 5 operational problems

according to Francis Bator:

1. Substance is watered down because secretaries, etc. represent many

people. 2. Such groups never stop growing, reducing each member’s

share of facetime and productivity. 3. Subordinates tend to replace

heads in such meetings. 4. Leaks common 5. Most real bargaining gets

done outside the boardroom, in informal, interpersonal interactions.

Porter also adds that most often, a single personality dominates the

discussion although on paper everyone gets a fair shot.

The Economic Policy Board, according to Porter, circumvents all of these problems

because it actually achieves the theoretical goals of multiple advocacy.

10/29/2005 1:18:00 PM

←

Gov 1540: The American Presidency 10/29/2005 1:18:00 PM

←The White House Staff and Organization – James Pfiffner

White House staff system is one of defining characteristics of modern presidency

Argues that WH needs the firm control of a chief of staff, but too domineering approach

to job will result in trouble

Evolution of White House Staff

very small during early years of country, paid for by President.

Dramatic shift under FDR and birth of modern presidency

o Huge staff needed for New Deal

o Brownlow Committee proposed that president should be center of control in

the executive branch

o Seen as power grab by Congress, approved two of its proposals with provisions

creating positions for 6 administrative assistants to the president.

o Committee Report would have major repercussions over the years as it articulated

justification for an active staff to serve president and laid foundation for growth in

numbers and power of the WH staff in the modern presidency.

o WH staff has grown from relatively small staff of FDR to more than 500 in the

1990s.

How Presidents Managed their Staff

FDR

o Gave out assignments on an ad-hoc basis (adhocracy)

o Legendary for manipulation of his staffers, thrived on conflict in his staff and

used it be a more effective decision-maker.

Truman

o Uncomfortable with personal conflict

o Did not give out overlapping assignments or encourage conflict/disagreement on

his staff

o Truman WH began trend toward functional specialization that has come to

characterize modern presidency.

o Layering of WH staff began in Truman WH as a result of this specialization

Eisenhower

o Institutionalized the presidency

o Most important and lasting contributions to organization of presidency was the

office of chief of staff

JFK

o Took more active role than Ike, eliminated chief of staff

o Set up president at hub of the wheel for his WH

o JFK used loose organizational approach but increased centralization and WH

capacity.

LBJ

o Similar approach as JFK’s. Jealous of staff publicity, would cut them down to

size.

Nixon

o Wanted to give more power to cabinet/other agencies in executive branch because

he wanted them to focus on running the country while he could focus on domestic

issues.

o Changed strategy while president; brought the work of the deperatments and

agencies in the WH.

o Isolated himself and WH

Ford

o Started off with spokes-of-the-wheel approach

o Didn’t work, needed a strong chief of staff to filter out people/issues

Carter

o Did not want a chief of staff; thought he could do it himself.

o Eventually admitted that a chief of staff was necessary

Ford and Carter presidencies proved that the modern WH cannot function effectively

without a chief of staff

Reagan

o Passive, liked to delegated a lot of responsibility to his staff,

o Because of that, his staff was crucial to his presidency in a way that was not true

of FDR, JFK, or Bush I.

Bush

o Strong chief of staff but kept lines of communication open with cabinet, other

members of executive branch/administration

Conclusion

o WH staff and organization will faithfully reflect president, but should strive to

counter presidential weaknesses

o WH needs a chief of staff; someone short of the president must be in charge

o No president has successfully run WH without a chief of staff since 1969, and

since 1979 no president has tried.

o Chief of staffs must be honest broker and coordinator of administration policy.

Cannot be soft but nor can they be tyrannical, arbitrary, and egotistical.

o Ultimately, there is no salvation from staff. Buck stops with President.

Burke, John “The Institutional Presidency” from The Presidency and the Political System

Overview

John Burke argues that the size and complexity of the modern presidential staff have

caused the White House itself to take on the character of a bureaucratic organization. In

this chapter, he chronicles a number of strategies presidents have adopted to make good

use of their staffs.

Introduction

The White House staff is made up of around 2,000 employees in significant policy-

making positions and can serve as an organizational context that can set limits on what a

president can do and sometimes thwart even the best of presidential intentions

It is necessary to now recognize the American executive as an institution – a presidency,

not merely a president, and in doing this we can better understand the office, how it

operates, the challenges it faces, and how it affects our politics

The Institutional Presidency

The concern of this chapter is to understand the organizational character of the

presidency – its growth in size, the complexity of its work ways, and the general way in

which it resembles a large, well organized bureaucracy

Complex Institution:

The first aspect of the complexity of this institution is the increase in size which

can be seen by comparing the White House staff of FDR to that of Clinton’s or

Bush’s.

One of the primary causes of growth has been the addition of these units: Office

of Management and Budget (formed as Bureau of the Budget in 1921), the

Council of Economic Advisors (1946), the National Security Council (197), the

Office of the US Trade Representative (1963), the Office of Policy Development

(1970), the Council on Environmental Quality (1970), the Office of Science and

Technology Policy (1976), the Office of Administration (1977), and the Office of

National Drug Control Policy (1989).

In the institution of the presidency, there is the presence of a central authority that

coordinates the contributions of the institution’s functional parts – the Chief of

Staff.

Differentiation from Environment:

The complexity of the presidency and its reliance on expert advice have given the

institution a unique place in the policy process, differentiating it from its political

environment. One way this has occurred is through increased WH control of new

policy initiatives

Those seeking to influence national politics try to cultivate the people who have

the most to do with policy proposals: the White House

The second aspect of the presidency that differentiates it from the surrounding

political environment is the way parts of the staff are organized explicitly to

manage external relations with the media, Congress, and various constituencies.

The Effects of an Institutional Presidency

Do the presidency’s institutional characteristics, as opposed to the individual styles,

practices, and idiosyncrasies of each president matter? It is the personality, character, and

distinctive behavior of each of these presidents that have generally attracted the attention of press

and public

However, since the institutionalized daily workings of the presidency transcend the personal

ideologies, character, and idiosyncrasies of those who work within it (esp the president), it makes

sense to analyze the presidency from an institutional perspective.

External Centralization: Presidential Control of Policy Making:

The large presidential staff ahs centralized much policy-making power within the

presidency, and this has both positive and negative effects

Positive: centralized control can protect the programs that the president wishes to

foster new political initiatives usually not received well in DC

Negative: WH control of the policy process can cause the institution to diminish

or even exclude other sources of advice

Internal Centralization: Hierarchy, Gatekeeping, and Presidential Isolation

The centralization of policy-making power by the WH staff has been

accompanied by a centralization of power within the staff by one or two chief

aides, which also affects the way the institutional presidency operates, providing

both opportunities and risks for the president.

Positive: this can ensure clear lines of responsibility, well-demarcated duties, and

orderly work ways. FDR’s staff is an example of the problems that can arise from

lack of effective organization. It can also protect the president’s political standing

by giving the highly visible staff member a significant amount of authority which

acts as a lightning rod, handling politically tough assignments and deflecting

political controversy from the president to himself or herself (Eisenhower’s

presidency was like that)

Negative: Corruption and the abuse of power (when Sherman Adams under

Eisenhower was accused of accepting gifts from a New England textile

manufacturer). Also, a highly visible assistant with a large amount of authority

can act as a gatekeeper, controlling and filtering the flow in information to and

from the president (Jordan under Carter and Regan under Reagan were criticized

for limiting access to the president and selectively screening the info and advice

the president received). Another downside is that presidents can find themselves

isolated, relying on a small core group of advisers. If that occurs, the information

the president gets will already have been selectively filtered and interpreted, and

discussions and deliberations will be confined to an inner circle of like-minded

advisers (Pres. Bush has been criticized of this).

Bureaucratization:

As the top levels of the WH staff have gained authority and political visibility, the

rest of the staff has taken on the character of a bureaucratic organization.

What develops as a substitute for work satisfaction or personal proximity to the

president are typical patterns of organizational behavior: WH staff members often

compete for assignments and authority that serve as a measure of their standing

and prestige on the staff and ultimately with the president. They also care about

how they are perceived by outsiders, ie the press, Congress, lobbyists, and other

political influentials.

Politicization

In response to this bureaucratization, presidents are increasingly politicizing the

institutional presidency meaning they are attempting to make sure that staff

members heed their policy directives and serve the president’s political needs

rather than their own. To advance their goals, presidents need broad agreement

among their aides and assistants with their political programs and policy goals.

Excessive politicization can limit the range of opinions among the staff and can

weaken the objectivity of the policy analysis at the president’s disposal.

The Office of Management and Budget has been the most politicized part of the

president’s staff.

Putting the President Back In

Since its inception under FDR, the institutional presidency has undoubtedly offered

presidents some of the important resources they need to meet the complex policy task and

expectations of the office.

As we have seen, however, the by-products of an institutional presidency – centralization of

policy-making in the WH staff, hierarchy, bureaucratization, and politicization – have

detracted from as well as served the president’s policy goals.

Although the presidency is an institution, it is an intensely personal one, which can take on a

different character from administration to administration – presidents and their staff are by no

means hostages to the institutions.

The most obvious management task a president faces is to recognize on first being elected

that organizing and staffing the WH are matters of highest priority

Beyond striking a good balance between loyalty on the one hand and DC experience and

policy expertise on the other, the presidents must also be aware of strengths, and especially the

weaknesses of the various ways of organizing the staff members they have selected.

Presidents can also take steps to deal with the bureaucratic tendencies that crop up in their

staffs

All presidents also have the capacity to choose how they will act and react within a complex

political context populated by other powerful political institutions, processes, and participants.

Too much politicization weakens any special claims of expertise, experience, and institutional

primacy that the president might make in a particular policy area. Too much centralization

eclipses the role of other political actors in a system that is geared to share, rather than exclude,

domains of power; it may also set in motion a powerful reaction against the president.

Presidents need to know that the character and intended audience of persuasion must be

tailored not just to the requirements of legislative bargaining and enhancing popular support

but to the institutional character of the presidency itself.

The Institutional Presidency and the Unwritten Constitution

Don K Price

In Sum, the executive office of the President, the core of the intuitional Presidency, has turned

out to be much bigger than its inventors expected, but at the sacrifice of its basic principles.

- Before it was set up in 1939 Congress did not believe that the President’s duties as chief

executive justified the establishment of an official staff for policy planning and of

managerial control over the Exec Dept. and agencies.

- However, in 1939 the Brownlow Committees recommendation changed this and set the

Executive Office up by Reorganization Plan in 1939.

- Brownlow report was based on the following principles: 1) the exec. office agencies were

to help the President, but not to have any authority in their own right, nor to be in a chain

of command b/w the president and the heads of exec depts. 2) they were to deal only with

issues of such importance to the President that they could not be delegated 3) the dept.

heads, and not the members of the exec office were to be the principal political

lieutenants of the President, and accountable to Congress 4) the Exe office except for a

small number of political aides in the White House office and the heads of the

institutional staff agencies like the budge bureau was to be staffed on a career and merit

basis.

- Unfortunately in “all of these respects things have gone wrong” – personnel in the office

has doubled

- Price then asks on what basis and for what purpose should we devise a new set of

principles or reaffirm the old?

- Brownlow’s committees sales pitch depended on two ideas: 1) efficiency and economy in

govt. are important and should imitate private business 2) a desire to reorganize the

distinction between policy, the preserve of the legislature and administration, which

should be left to the executive .

- These two lines of argument – business efficiency and the separation of policy from

administration led to distortion of the original principles of the executive office in several

ways: 1) the purpose of govt. reorganization resulted in the elimination of overlapping

and duplication in an effort to achieve economy – yet the complexity of modern

economic and social systems has forced an interlocking and interdependence of govt.

agencies – we shouldn’t focus on separating their function rather making sure that there is

a ‘coherent meshing’ 2) the old Bureau of the budget was committed by these ideas to

tend, in most of its parts to a negative and restricted outlook. 3) the implicit distinction

b/w administration, as something to be left to career officers, and policy, which should be

the province of political appointees may well have discouraged the development of a

strong career staff w/a good institutional memory. 4) most conspicuous of all the

emphasis on business principles restricted the development of a career generalist staff

with an aptitude for broad policy development.

- After the original conception of the executive office as an institution it became clear that

the original principles of the brownlow and Hoover reports were progressively made

more obsolete by successive presidents. Why did this happen: 1)economies were not to

be effected by managerial efficiency 2) Exec Office staff agencies had no real power but

they had a great deal of influence – special interests in Congress used this to their

advantage. 3) As congress attempted to exert control over the internal structure of the

office the president compensated by increasing the number of political appointees.

- Price states “ I believe that the exec office could not be made to conform to its original

principles, not because they were wrong but because of fundamental contraction b/w the

principles – these ideas, in caricature, were the beliefs in legalism, scientism, and

nonpartisan reform.

- In conclusion, the “main problem is not with our written Constitution but our unwritten

constitutions, which Congress may change if it wishes – the first step in the right

direction will be to quit talking about Constitutional separation of powers and

acknowledge that in all major issues of management both Congress and the president are

involved in the direction and control of depts. and agencies.

- In order to determine the status and role of the executive office we have to ask our selves

a number of questions related to number of legislative checks, legal or political checks,

procedures for initiatives, distinction b/w discussion and determination of policy,

Political and Career staff, and the size of the executive office.

Lecture 8

Super Brief summary – Bold terms are possible ID’s

-In this lecture we discuss the Staff secretary – very important determines who gets to

see the president

- Goes into detail regarding the care and feeding offices related to the president.

- There is a third set of offices known as packaging and selling.

- The myth regarding WH staff is that it has grown too much – myth is far from reality.

- He then ends the lecture discussing vertical coordination w/in the offices and concludes

that horizontal coordination is far more difficult.

Roger B. Porter, "Presidents and Economists: The Council of Economic Advisers," American Economic Review, Vol. 87, No. 2 (May 1997), pp. 103-106.

- The Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) was created by congress in the Employment Act

of 1946.

- Four key reasons why the CEA has survived as an important part of the executive office

o It has maintained modest size comparable to other executive offices

o The CEA has maintained a professional, nonpartisan staff with a reputation for high-

quality analysis

o The CEA has avoided operational responsibilities (stayed advisory only) and has

thus concentrated on what they do best- the CEA has not tried to exceed its

responsibilities

o The CEA has concentrated its energies not on long-term studies or detailed reports,

but on the steady stream of day-to-day economic decisions

- One of the primary reasons why the CEA has remained important and relevant

throughout various administrations is the fact that the information they provide has

remained consistent over the years.

- Examples of positive functions the CEA has facilitated:

o Deregulation of industries

o the clear air act of 1990

o the collecting and disseminating of economic statistics

- Pretty much all presidential administrations have had positive relations with the CEA;

most chairman and top advisors in the CEA have had close working relationships with

the president as well

James P. Pfiffner, "OMB: Professionalism, Politicization, and the Presidency," in Colin Campbell and Margaret Jane Wyszomirski eds., Executive Leadership in Anglo-American Systems, (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991), pp. 195-217.

- The Bureau of the Budget was formerly the Treasury Dept. However, the BOB gained

importance and presence in becoming part of the Executive Office of the President in

1939.

- The Bureau of the Budget was renamed the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in

1970.

- The BOB’s official responsibility is offering nonpartisan service to the President in the

pursuit of economy and efficiency; they are also the most important political body in

terms of ensuring that the transition between changing administrations runs smoothly

- The OMB has undergone extensive criticism for the fact that they have been too

responsive to individual presidents and their personal political agendas

- The OMB’s primary power is its control over the budget of the executive branch.

- The OMB’s power is based on their familiarity with agency budgets and requirements

- The OMB (primarily in the 70’s and 80’s) became more concerned with saving money

than with effectiveness

- The OMB has become much more involved over the years in getting the president’s

budget pushed through congress

- The OMB is given “central legislative clearance” whereby all agency proposals for

legislation that may have a bearing on the treasury (or funds) has to be cleared by them.

- The OMB has been effective in maintainin its role in presidential management through its

regulatory review process, however has fallen short in the organizational planning and

help necessary to help other agencies. (pg. 243)

- There are three main ways in which the OMB has become more politicized over the

years, thus facilitating the president’s agenda;

o The transition from institutional to personal staff in the agency

o The creation of the positions of Program Associate Directors (PAD’s); these

presidential appointees are directly in charge of examining divisions in an attempt

to make the OMB more directly responsive to presidential political priorities

o The third element of OMB politicization is its increasing public advocacy and

visibility; the OMB has adjusted information in its attempt to support the

president, and has downsized its permanent “career” staff. It’s role in supporting

the president has basically become more blatant

- The OMB has continued to expand its role in adapting to the needs of the president;

furthermore, presidents have become more interested in centralized control of the

executive branch, than with governance (pg. 250)

← Summaries for Study Guide

←← Roger Porter, Presidential Decision Making, Appendix p.229-252

←← The Three Presidential Decision Making Styles:

←← Adhocracy

Not a formalized system

Relies heavily on delegation and prioritization by the President

President assigns responsibilities to advisers or “Experts”

Two types:

o Transition Adhocracy:

Typifies decision making during early monthes of

presidency

Characterized by newness

Relies on individuals over institutions

o Traditional Adhocracy:

Can occur at any time in an administration

Can involve competing assignments (Roosevelt)

Few regularized channels

Assignment can be given to interagency groups responsible only for

specific tasks

Open jurisdictional boundaries

More likely to settle issues bilaterally

o Can also turn into “multiple bilateralism”

President personally assigns the problems to someone

or the problems are raised by his advisers

Then creates multiple advocacy situation by seeking

advice from other interested parties

Leaves President final decision maker

o Image of President as “Commander in Chief”

Strengths:

o Flexibility

o Increased confidentiality

o Ability to respond quickly

o Image of President in command

Weaknesses:

o Heavy demand on president’s time

o Burden on president to integrate policies

o Fails to differentiate between major and minor issues

o Potentially excludes major interests

o Lacks provisions for comprehensive policy examination

o Scope for 1 on 1 pleading with the president

← Centralized Management

Heavy reliance on the White House Staff and Executive Office to

filter ideas, proposals and recommendations before they go to the

President

Indicates desire for advice and analysis from those who share the

president’s political views and know him best

Ordered and Rational

Driven by white house staff

Shields president from raw decisions over policy—distills the

information he receives

Concentrates power in 2 or 3 individuals who can become

advocates

Departments and agencies play secondary role

Strengths

o May have issues brought to his attention that would not

otherwise see

o Loyal and competent resource dedicated to him alone

o Increases likelihood of controlling timing and announcement

of new policies and initiatives

Weaknesses

o Alienates departments and agencies, reducing their morale

o Objectivity of staff can be an illusion

o Small resources

o Does not reflect diversity of concerns or opinions

o Enormous burden on Chief of Staff

o Decisions will be made before some things get to the

President

o Widens gulf between implementation and formulation

o Widens gulf between departments/agencies and white house

staff/President

← Multiple Advocacy

“Open system based on inclusion.”

Competing viewpoints presented to the president to expose him to

a wide variety of opinions by advocates and frequently hear them

argue in front of him

Relies on honest broker to make sure all sides are represented and

process runs smoothly

President hears all sides, asks questions and weighs options before

making decisions

Executive director and staff ensure “due process” and “quality

control”

Consistency amongst advisers

Strengths

o All points of view represented and considered

o Improves quality of alternatives and of supporting arguements

o Bridges gap between formulation and implementation

Decision less likely to be undermined if had say in

making the decision.

Quality of decisions improves with more info

Increases support for president in executive branch

o Mirrors forces in Washington

o Strengthens presidential influence

Give power to cabinet officials who can then influence

Sensitizes officials to broad range of interests

Weaknesses

o Difficult to operate

o Disparities in resources and talent may distort

o No guarantee all viable options will be represented

o Agencies can withhold info

o Group ideology may emerge

o Full participation takes lots of time

o Leaks likely

o Forces decisions to the top

o Weakens ability of senior executives to deliver on

commitments to constitutents

Models can be used together

Three fundamental differentiating characteristics

Continuity

Individual responsible for organizing information president receives

Participation pattern of white house staff, agencies and

departments

← Wide variations in execution of all styles, and wide room for flexibility

Summary of Chapter 4 on “Foreign Policy” from Presidents, The Presidency, and the Political Environment by John Kessel

Introduction Presidents tend to give more attention to international events in their second year

than in their first, and still more in their third The do shift back to domestic questions when running for reelection in the fourth

year; but if they win reelection, international events are more important in their second term than in their first.

The National Security Council Three Major Effects

o A committee of senior officials who meet to review foreign policy issues for the president

o Provides a focus for formal planning and decision-making processeso Has provided the institutional base for the emergence of a presidential

foreign policy staff Has four statutory members as mandated by National Security Act of 1947

o The President (chair), vice-president, secretary of stateo Also two statutory staffers: the director of CIA and chairman of the joint

chiefs of staffThe Department of State

The Department of State employs about 5,000 professional diplomats (Foreign Service Officers or FSOs) among its 20,000 to 30,000 employees

Dept. is responsible for the implementation of policy while NSC is charged with policy coordination

FSOs are less likely to care about the political popularity of a policy because they serve as career diplomats and are very removed from the President

FSOs are very useful in getting expertise on the political trends of other countriesThe Department of Defense

Created by the National Security Act of 1947 Cultivates very close relationships with members of congress In order to intervene meaningfully in these defense processes, one must first

master complex budgetary details, and then learn enough science and technology to be prepared to argue, for example that a new missile will or will not work for the following reasons

Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff became a very important player with passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986

o Acts as the principal military advisor to the defense secretary and the president and also responsible for unified theater commands

National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and National Security Agency (NSA) are part of the Defense Department not the CIA

Central Intelligence Also created by National Security Act of 1947 Much intelligence is now gathered technologically, especially using satellite

photography Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) is a statutory advisor to the National

Security Council

Because 80% of the total intelligence budget goes to the Dept. of Defense, the DCI can only coordinate intelligence with the cooperation of the Dept. of Defense.

Two most important units:o Intelligence Directorate, responsible for analysiso Operations Directorate, responsible for the case officers overseas

Foreign Policy Activities Custodian Framework

o The national security assistant should be a custodian who should scrupulously refrain from becoming an advocate himself and instead act as a neutral guardian of the decision-making process

o The custodian should balance actor resources, strengthen weaker advocates, bring in new advisors to argue for unpopular options, and protect the quality of information reaching the president.

o Critique of this Custodian framework: he is an expert so it wastes his potential to not have him involved in decision making

Policy Advocacyo If the recommendations coming from State, Defense, and other sources are

unwise, the national security assistant, familiar with the president’s thinking because of his proximity, may be in the best position to suggest alternatives.

Negotiationo For some time, presidents have sent national security assistants on

negotiating missions; e.g Henry Kissinero Should the NSA be engaged in diplomatic negotiation?

Pro: As a person of standing in the administration, he can speak more authoritatively than someone who can report to the secretary of state and president through bureaucratic channels only

Con: If the NSA travels freely in the name of the president, his availability can undercut the capacity of the foreign service officers on the scene to get the government leaders to speak frankly to them

Defending the President The fates of the NSA and president are bound together The lack of consensus on US foreign policy makes this task particularly important

in international affairsDecision Making in Foreign Policy

International decisions are often crisis situations where there is a severe threat to important values and there is a limited time for response

Policy frequently has a shifting nature because it is continuously modified as positions are taken vis-à-vis another nation

Once a decision has been made, it is imperative that all units within the executive branch actively support it

If a subject is worth the president’s personal attention, he can phone or meet with foreign leaders.

The limitations to American influence overseas are substantial since there are barriers to sovereignty and other nations will act in their own best interest even if the US is military and economically stronger

Summary Actors: The list begins with the national security assistant, supported by the

national security staff. It continues with the State Department, the Defense Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and central intelligence. Given his personal responsibilities in this area, the president and/or his national security assistant, oversees much of the coordination. Other foreign policy coordination is conducted through the National Security Council or other presidentially devised groups. The latter often have the effect of keeping foreign policy away from the National Security Council.

Foreign Policy Activities: Custodian view where the NSA gives full attention to maintaining the policy process. However, many assistants have become policy advocates and planners in their own right, as well as defenders of the president and his foreign policies. They have also taken part in the traditional diplomatic activities of negotiation and symbol manipulation. Foreign economic policy, increasingly important at the turn of the century, is usually handled by a different set of actors.

Common Activities in an International Environment: Information about international affairs is likely to be fragmentary, to present value conflicts, and to be shadowed by uncertainty. Consequently, a great deal of effort is devoted to extrapolating larger patterns from the bits of data that arrive from all over the world. Standing decisions about foreign policy are sometimes made, often at the beginning of an administration. More frequently, though, international decision making must be adapted, either in response to crises or because of changes in the international environment. The long-used metaphor of a static diplomatic chessboard is out of date. Perhaps the greatest difficulty with foreign affairs comes in persuading people to support a given policy. The domestic constituency is divided into militant internationalists, cooperative internationalists, and full internationalists. And these domestic problems are minor compared with the difficulties in eliciting cooperation overseas. Foreign governments are guided by their own interests, which are often quite different from American interests. Presidents, advisors, and diplomats all try to convince other governments that it is in their interest to cooperate with US policy, but if they don’t agree, nothing can be done.

The Neutral/Honest Broker Role in Foreign-Policy Decision

Making: A Reassessment (John Burke)

The case for the Broker Role

         George – 6 tasks required of managerial custodian:

o        Balancing actor resources within policymaking system

o        Strengthening weaker advocates

o        Bring in new advisers to argue unpopular options

o        Setting up new channels of information

o        Arranging independent evaluation of decisional premises and options

o        Monitoring the workings of the policymaking process

         What is Neutral/Honest Broker?  

o        At minimum encompasses narrow notion of policy administrator eg

o        NSA – briefing president, representing departmental proposals and viewpoints, scheduling matters for presidential decisions, monitoring NSC directives

o        Neutral =/= honest broker

o        Neutrality – ensuring quality and coherence of decision making process – quality control

o        Honesty – ensuring all relevant views represented – due process

o        1960s – policy advocacy came to fore from NSC adviser

         Why the Broker Role Matter

o        Positive contributions of the role to presidential decision making

o        How decision making process would suffer without it

o        Contrast

         Eisenhower's decision not to intervene in Indochina in 1954

         NSC assistant Cutler moved in positive direction, not a policy advocate, effective broker

         LBJ's decision to escalate forces in Vietnam in 1965

         Absent an affective broker, poor resultant decision                    

o        Janis – criteria for ranking decision making

         Correlations between quality of decision process and success of decision – suggests success where brokerage is present

         Brokerage Problems: Iran-Contra

o        Machinations of NSC staff and NSC advisers out of control

o        Tower – problem where NSC had operational control

o        Tower - NSA responsible for duties to all of NSC not just President

         Brokerage Problems: George W. Bush National Security process

o        Brokerage needed – GWB had little foreign policy experience and cabinet and advisers all old hands and powerful – no dominant leader or clear presidential direction

o        Rice

         Drives towards clarity, Bush decides on the consensus

         But she acted as advocate – counseled and advised GWB

         Interpersonal tensions between principals – her job to resolve these

o        Decision to go to war "slipped into" – not clear was well structured debate and whether, not how, to go to war

         Is the Broker Role Outdated?

o        Presidents find needs best served from within WH

o        Organization and structure of decision making has varied by President and appointments – individuals matter

o        Different roles for different NSC advisers

o        "where you stand depends on where you sit"

o        NSC adviser best to institute brokerage

Expanding the Broker Role

         George says should not be categories about to mention b/c of role conflict and overload

         Policy advocacy

o        Brokerage and advocacy difficult and combustible mix – personal advocacy may compromise adviser's neutrality among principals which is central to effective brokerage

o        The two can coexist, although honest brokerage is the more fundamental

o        Appropriate if      

         Effective brokerage generates trust and confidence in process

         Competing views fairly and fully represented

         Participants have right of appeal

         NSC adviser not perceived as pursuing wholesale policy agenda

         Advocacy is discreet

         Advocacy seen as representing President's unique, broader strategic interests

         Visibility

o        Differing opinions – passion for anonymity v spokesperson

o        Appropriate if

         Secs of state and defense are administrations principal spokesmen

         Other principals comfortable with NSC adviser's role

         Reality of media requires multiple spokespersons

         NSC adviser is effective public presence

         Public activities carefully orchestrated within broader communications strategy

         Political Watchdog

o        George – political calculations belong to others than the NSC adviser

o        Appropriate if

         NSC adviser uniquely positioned to offer certain forms of political counsel

         Issues dealing with political impact not presented by counsel of others

         More public activities directed at explaining/defending administration's positions

         Implementation and Operations

o        Tower – implementation strength and responsibility of agencies – cant be honest when implementer

o        May require some degree of involvement in oversight though

o        Could compromise claims to executive privilege and shield from congressional scrutiny

o        Limited activities feasible if

         Directed at monitoring and oversight

         Result from special circumstance such as foreign govt expectations rather than routine practice

         Avoid freelancing and principals are informed about and agree with actions

         Actions carefully weighed against brokerage role

Broader Contextual Fit

         Broker role and presidential needs and expectations

o        NSC staff must mould selves to personality and desires of president – need a good fit

o        Open leaders (thrive on advice and information) v closed leaders (more comfortable in restricted setting)

o        Broker role largely concerned with quality not quantity of information

         Broker Role and Types of Advisory Structures

o        Organizational structure largely up to president – formal hierarchical v informal collegial

o        Individuals matter greatly, as do institutions and structures

         Leverage, effectiveness and Presidential Responsibility

o        Super-custodian = largely powerless, ie pure broker will lack bureaucratic leverage

o        Needs presidents confidence

o        Leverage depends on will of President

Conclusions

         Significant expansion of broker's role since Ike

         Broker role might be expanded to a degree, but should remain bedrock of responsibilities

         Effective brokerage requires interpersonal trust and confidence in the integrity of decision making process that allow introduction of some policy advocacy, public visibility and other activities.

←←← I.M. Destler, "A Government Divided: The Security Complex and the Economic Complex," in David A. Deese, The New Politics of American Foreign Policy (St. Martin's Press, 1994), pp. 132-147.←← US Government institutions for foreign policy divided into two groups:

Security complexo Diplomatic and military issueso Priority to foreign policy goals and relationships

Economic complexo Trade, money and financeo Priority on domestic security and impact

Division has deepened Significant costs to the separation Creation of NEC could deepen divide Policy system that treats both separately can be damaging One sided decisions can have negative consequences

← Two major issues for presidents: peace and prosperity Economic and foreign policy tasks viewed as separate from

end of WWII Divided at end of WWII

← The Security Complex Dates from National Security Act of 1947

o Created National Security Councilo Created Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)o Coordinated military under Department of Defense

o Created Joint Chiefs of Staff These institutions plus Department of State main instruments

of postwar foreign policy making The assistant to the president for national security affairs

(head of the NSC) has come to rival and sometimes overtake the Secretary of State as principal foreign policy adviser

NSC increasing influence Congress possesses committees with counterparts in State,

Defense and CIA departments← The Economic Complex

The Employment Act of 1946o Made prosperity a government goalo New organizations:

Created the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) Joint Economics Committee of Congress (JEC)

CEA emphasized fiscal policyo No operational role

Bureau of the Budget o Moved into executive office in 1940o Responsible for overall spending

Troika: Head of CEA, Secretary of Treasury, Director of Bureau of the Budget

Quadriad: Head of CEA, Secretary of Treasury, Director of Bureau of the Budget, Fed Chair

Federal Reserve Board (the Fed): Control monetary policy Secretaries of Agriculture, Labor and Commerce form second

tier economic advisers Congressional economic organization mirrored executive

branch← The shifting focus of “foreign” economic policy

Immediate postwar years: US economy largely self sufficiento Agenda domestic

o Foreign economic policy handled by security complexo Foreign economic policy used to advance US political

interests 1970s: Special Representative for Trade Negotiation (STR)

(soon to become USTR) developedo Economic complex has primacy over foreign economic

policy issueso Internationalization of American economy

Trade became more important USTR made international negotiations possible

← Separate, Different and Unequal Little interplay between security complex and economic

complex Officials whose job is to link the two Certain policy choices do engage both His point is that both remain separate most of the time

—especially in day to day treatment of the issues Complex ties to Congress Security complex is much more centralized

o President pulls togethero Leeway with Congress allows closed process

Economic complex very broad, decentralized, fragmented, specialized

Coming from different intellectual traditions: strategy and economics

o Can’t communicate with one another Short term coping prioritized over long term policy National security usually takes precedence when two come

into conflictPolicy Making in Post-Cold War World

Economic position of the US has eroded Americans should give greater priority to long term economic

strength

o “This shift would require softening of the separation between security and economic institutions and the elimination or reversal of the security-over-economics hierarchy.”

Greater consciousness of need US global influence and prosperity will depend on strong

American economyo “competitive interdependence” between major world

economies indicates close tie between security and economic complex

Options to solve the problem:o Broaden NSC to cover foreign economic issueso Transform the NSC into a National Policy Council with

jurisdiction over all US economic and security policy Might still behave like old NSC (prioritize security)

Conclusion of Commission on Government Renewal

Recommended creation of separate Economic Council

o Created by Clinton as National Economic Council (NEC)

o Risks institutionalizing economics/security divide

Clinton can help keep this from happening

Enlarge number of top officials making security-economics decisions and meet with them regularly

Assign White House chief of Staff responsibility of coordinating coordinators

Modest substantive overlap in two staffs

Overlap staff joint-staff issues and give input on issues affecting both sides

John H. Kessel, Presidents, the Presidency, and the Political Environment.

Chapter 5: Economic PolicyI. The Major Players

a. The Treasury Department-part of the original cabinet-enormous department—first among equals w/ respect to economic policy-focus on tax collection, debt management, financial institutions/markets-seek low inflation rate

b. Office of Management and Budget-1921 Budgeting and Accounting Act created precursor to OMB-major job is to produce budget -to a lesser degree…legislative clearance, economic and domestic policy

c. Council of Economic Advisers-1946 Employment Act stipulated the gov’t be involved in economy and created CEA-very small: three council members and less than forty staff-has few defined responsibilities except to advise its client: the Pres.-write annual economic report; run analyses on economy-favor economic policies that reduce unemployment and stimulate growth

d. The Federal Reserve Board-created by Congress in 1913-independent from other Exec. branch actors: (governors terms don’t coincide with presidential terms, decisions made by Fed are put up to votes by governors, Fed is self-financing-Fed deals with monetary policy (controlling money supply) in 3 ways:-buys/sells government securities (open market transactions)-sets the discount rate (rate at which banks can borrow $)-sets reserve requirement (% of money banks must keep on reserve)-Fed focuses on controlling inflation

II. Coordinationa. Tensions and Amelioration

-tensions b/w CEA and Treasury b/c treasury people tend to favor low taxes and low interest rates… they are selected from business community whereas CEA favor economic growth and low unemployment and are from academia-OMB tends to be neutral-Fed independent but incentive to cooperate b/c effective monetary policies depend on effective fiscal policies

b. The Troika-started during Kennedy administration-made up of President’s three main economic advisors: secretary of treasury, the OMB director, and CEA chairman

c. Coordination and the Federal Reserve-adding the chairman of Fed. to the troika “quadriad” group

d. Troika-plus Groups

-troika and quadriad were principle groups used in Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations-in more recent administrations, other variations-e.g. Carter’s Economic Policy Group… troika + domestic staff head-e.g. Reagan’s Cabinet Council on Economic Affairs (I) and Economic Policy Council (II)

e. Councils-more complex arrangements for economic decision making-e.g. Economic Policy Board under Ford-e.g. National Economic Council under Clinton

III. Economic Activitiesa. Fiscal Policy – taxing and spending levels

i. Budgeting-very regular, very important process-budget requests reach OMB around Labor Day-by December, OMB director takes budget back to Pres. for review

ii. Taxation-not an annual routine, dates back to country’s inception-taken care of by Treasury dep.

iii. Limits on Fiscal Policy-both proposals pass through separate processes difficult to coordinate the two which is essential to their success-Congress involved in both processes-takes a long time to pass a tax bill (and appropriations bills)-Kessler concludes Pres. cannot use Fiscal Policy effectively

b. Monetary Policy-Fed controls money supply but has incentive to coordinate with Pres. and others b/c policies need to be coordinated to be successful-can be put into effect more quickly… only takes a vote of Fed. reserve board and/or Open Market Committee

IV. Miscellaneousa. Forecasting-Treasury Dep. provides revenue estimates-OMB provides expenditure estimates-CEA assesses economy + coordinates incoming info to Pres.b. Coping w. Business Cycles-main problem is that American public expects Pres. to be able to control economy-if economy is in poor condition, it is his fault-but there are economic and political business cycles-it is very difficult to control economy

Assignment 23

John Kessel Presidents, the Presidency, and the Politcal EnviornmentCoping with ComplexityDomestic policy is a very complex business, it must incorporate Agriculture, Interior, Energy, Commerce and Labor, Dept. of Healt and Human Services, Education, Justice, Veterans Affairs, Housing and Urban Development, and Transportation Dept. and all their resource needs. Kessel contrasts domestic policy with foreign and economic policy stating that there is a “core knowledge” that is shared by all economic policy experts, but the expertise needed for domestic policy is incredibly diverse, necessitating different kinds of expertise. The President doesn’t have as much time for the “outer cabinet” members (everyone except sec. of state, defence, treasury, attorney general, and senior white house staff). Also, outer depts can all of a sudden take center stage (e.g. Exxon Valdez crisis) making the president’s staff learn quickly about it.Kessel presents 3 questions regarding domestic policy:Should decisions be made in the White house or should they be left to the departments?What kind of expertixe is required of those who formulate domestic policy?Can the presidential staff maintain any control over such a complex area as domestic policy?The Locus of Decision MakingShould decisions be made in departments or in the White House?For departments: the white house staff does not have enough information to make informed decisions, have too many problems to deal with and therefore act too quickly.For white house: issues often involved more than one department, white house can coordinate them; president needs to review decisions himself—must be looked at from presidents view, can only be done in white house; Summary: “the greater experitse and larger staff in the departments is contrasted with the greater sensitivity to presidential wishes and political currents in the white house.”

The Evolution of Domestic StaffingThis section discusses how a distinct domestic advisor started in 1943 (under Roosevelt). This pattern of one or two domestic policy staff continued until LBJ who increased staff and had a policy making team in the white house. This brought domestic decision making into the White house. Under Nixon the Domestic Council was created which was supposed to be like the NSC for dometic affairs. Under Reagan, chaos erupted in domestic policy—he had too many players involved. When George Bush took office he used the idea of the “honest broker” and chose Roger Porter as his economic and domestic policy advisor. He was used to make sure everyone who should be involved was at the table, to make tentative decisions for the president, and to report views of involved parties to president.

Coordination through Decision ProcessesBecause presidential decisions are binding across all government, it is very important that right decision is made. Thus all the players involved must be able to express their view. This is sometimes achieved through task forces composed of members from the different agencies and a domestic council staff member in charge. (these tasks forces can also operate within the council itself). If president needs to make decision, domestic council

must try to narrow the decision and provide him with a lot of info (e.g. from OMB, economic advisors, legislative liason office etc), makes staff into gatekeepers.

Monitoring the DepartmentsBecause the white house controls domestic policy, they must know what is going on. This contact between white house and the departments is handled by assistant secretaries. The secretaries only involved in big issues. It is impossible for the domestic council staff to monitor everything, they focus mostly on issues the president is interested in. OMB monits overall government activity. OMB is much larger therefore easier to track more activities.

Information Gathering in Domestic PolicyImportant: “The domestic staffers form the junction between the president and all the domestic agencies.” They need to take all the info they get, decide what is important, and present it to the president in a clear concise form. A head of the domestic council whom the president trusts is essential to the system working properly (must trust they present accurate information).

Decision Making in Domestic PolicyPolicy making is like a pyramid. The base is a large number of people involved in the formulation. It narrows until just prior to the decision when president meets with cabinet. As it moves up, everyone is aware of pros and cons, so a decision is less likely to be challenged, more stability in decision making. Some policy is made without president, often if the players all agree, not necessary to involve president.

Exercising Influence in Domestic PolicyOnce the president makes a decision, it must be implemented. Inside white house, his decision is a command, but outside, must persuade agencies to support decision. “Several techniques are used to ensure agency support of an administration policy. The most important is to include the agency in the determination of the policy” Another strategy is bargaining…”if the policy has been modified so as to make it easier for the deparment to deal with its constituency, the dept is going to…[administer] the policy.” Sometimes have to start confronting people, insist on action. Dealing with congress is different. Top domestic assistants must be involved because they can discuss the detail of the legislation in relation to larger program.

Tom Wootentwooten@fas.harvard.eduAssignment 24

Economists and White House Decisions by Stuart Eizenstat

Context: Stuart Eizenstat served in the Carter administration as the Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs and Policy. While he himself is a lawyer, here he reflects back upon the role that economists played in the Carter White House. He asserts that government has not yet provided economists with a suitable niche, and that many of the Carter administration’s greatest mistakes could have been avoided had the role of administration economists been more clearly defined.

The Question: “What is the appropriate role for economists in the White House? What can they realistically be expected to do?”

The Answer:

The Council of Economic Advisors is perhaps the most valuable arrow in the President’s economic quiver, for the following reasons:

1.) It serves as a “counterweight for the competing, interest driven recommendations of the departments and agencies of the Executive Branch.

2.) It drives constantly for economic efficiency in government operations… something that individual departments aren’t inclined to do.

3.) It gives the President a realistic sense of where the economy is headed in the long-run, and how his policies will effect its course.

While the CEA is good, it is not the end-all solution to Presidential economic problems for the following reasons.

1.) Often, administrations set out to fulfill campaign promises before they attain a grasp of what it takes to manage the national economy.

2.) Economists have a set of “imperfect tools” that they must utilize to the best of their abilities, but these tools do not give them economic clairvoyance.

3.) The President’s economic decisions will invariably reflect his own personal political inclinations (duh)

The following lessons can be drawn from Carter’s economic mistakes:

1.) Administration economists must be “team players”2.) The White House needs a economic policy coordinator “to integrate economic

policy and politics for the President,” (p 69).3.) The President needs to REALLY REALLY like and trust his Secretary of the

Treasury, because (s)he is the President’s spokesperson for all things economic.

4.) Economists should concentrate less on tinkering with the economy, and more on identifying broad trends.

5.) Economists should be involved in every level and type of administration policy making.

6.) Economists cannot effectively “stand in” for a President who is not interested in economic affairs.

Economic Advice to the President: From Eisenhower to Reaganby our own beloved Roger Porter

Article Structure: First, the article reviews the creation of three entities which give the President economic advice. Second, the article discusses three broad issues that confront the President when he makes economic policy, and recommends ways in which these problems can be addressed.

Part I: History and Structure of Economic Advisory Entities:

The Council of Economic Advisors: This three-member panel was created by The Employment Act of 1946. Its members are typically academic economists who serve short (approx. 2 year) terms. It is served by a “highly qualified”12-20 person staff. The CEA is wonderful because its only constituency is the President, and it can thus give him sound economic advice without catering to anyone else’s agenda.

Interdepartmental Committees: Porter traces the history if interdepartmental economic committees from the Eisenhower White House to Reagan on pages 60-67 of Packet #3. These committees have ranged from structured, official bodies (under Eisenhower) to completely ad-hoc informal advisory groups (Kennedy). These committees tend to be problematic because they don’t survive from administration to administration, and because they often lack sufficient contact with the President himself. Porter points out that these problems reflect the need for an economic committee that would be equal in stature to the National Security Council. (Clinton created such a council, presumably after this article was written…).

A White House Assistant for Economic Policy: The first person to fill such a role was Arthur Burns in 1970 under Nixon. Republican Presidents have tended to opt for Assistants for Economic Policy, while Democrats have shied away from creating such a position. (See below for issues related to the merits of this position).

Part II: Issues in Economic Decision Making

Developing Coherent Economic Policies: Porter asserts that the CEA is awesome, but that it is too small to facilitate interdepartmental coordination and integration of economic policy. He proposes four potential ways that this integration could be brought about.

1.) Creating a Super-Department consisting of the current Departments of Labor, Commerce, Agriculture, and Transportation.

2.) The (perhaps unofficial) appointment of a “Czar of Economic Affairs” to oversee all economic policy in the executive branch. Nixon’s Secretary of the Treasury, John Connally, essentially played such a role.

3.) Creating a National Economic Council staff that would follow Porter’s “centralized management” model. This would consist of 40-50 individuals who would work in the White House specifically on economic policy- similar to the staff that served the Nixon/Kissinger National Security Council.

4.) Establishing a Cabinet-level economic policy group that would follow Porter’s “multiple advocacy” decision-making model.

Coordinating Foreign and Domestic Economic Policy: Foreign economic policy is becoming increasingly important, and there is mounting support for the creation of a separate advisory body for the President that would deal exclusively with foreign economic affairs. It might, however, be difficult to differentiate between “domestic” and “foreign” economic policy.

A White House Economic Policy Assistant: This role has existed mainly in Republican administrations, and there is still disagreement about its merit. Some critics point to the potential for tension between the chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors and an Economic Policy Assistant. Ultimately, the value of such a position depends upon the structure of each particular administration.

American PresidencyProf. PorterMid-term ReviewFor questions regarding this review, contact Zach Wyatt – wwyatt@fas

Presidential Decision MakingBy Roger PorterCh. 3, pgs. 57-100

The Economic Policy Board: Operation, Organization, and Functions--The EPB’s primary function was organizing the flow of information and advice to the President for his decisions on economic policy issues. The Executive Committee also

produced and cleared presidential speeches and messages exchanged information among the leading economic officials coordinated presentations to congressional committees resolved disputes served as place where major White House policy-making entities

met to coordinate their activities.

Meetings and Operations Daily (3-4 times a week) executive meeting held at 8:30 A.M. Far more active than the other four presidential councils (OMB, NSC, Domestic

Council, Energy Resources Council)Executive Committee meetings were restricted to members, allowed one staff person to assist you in meeting but no one else (to reduce leaks to press)

1. When issues affecting your department were in question, you could attend Exec. Comm. Meetings

Agendas released one week prior to the meeting, and the process was very smooth Minutes were later approved by Executive Director (ED) for public dissemination Purposes of Minutes:

1. Insure appropriate follow-up on Committee Decisions2. Acted as definitive record for disputes3. Primary information source for exec branch economic comm.4. Clarified outcome of certain decisions

Agenda items originated from a number of sources:1. Any member department or agency could request the EC to consider an

issue2. The EC had a dozen task forces, on various issues, submit issues3. Requests from the ED to a dept. to report on a subject4. Issues from Polling results from surveys taken every 3/6 months

Full Board Meetings Initially they were held monthly, but later moved to 3-4 times a year Served two functions: to inform and to explain Included a general discussion of likely major proposals, but was not a forum for

making decisionsEconomic Policy Reviews and Special Sessions

EC also organized two types of meeting to supplement the daily sessions: quarterly economic policy reviews and EC special sessions

Quarterly reviews: assessed overall economic outlook, last 2-3 days1. Brought in 10-12 non-governmental economists for their outlook on the

economy and possible mechanisms to enhance economic performance2. Troika II group presented a forecast of the economy, discussing

macroeconomic policy as well as considering problematic sectors3. Scrutinized particular problems, planning began 8-10 wks ahead of time4. Attended by Chairman of Fed

Special Sessions: focused on a single issue; allowed further discussionPresidential Meetings and Paper During 1974-1975, EPB met with the President more than once a week Briefing sent to President which contained:

1. Issues the EC had considered in the past week and action taken2. Activity summary of task forces that had reported3. Major upcoming agenda items4. – Succinctly summarized the most recent developments in prices,

employment, certain key economic sectors

EPB OrganizationConsisted of:

1. Quasi-informal subcabinet groups convened by ECa. Members selected by individual expertise to represent a dept.b. These people were close to dept. head, could mobilize people

2. EC established six permanent sub-cabinet level committees, each responsible for a policy area or range of issues

a. Troika IIb. EPB/NSC Commodities Policy Coordinating Committeec. EPB Subcommittee on Economic Statisticsd. EPB Task Force on Small Businesse. Food Deputies Group

3. EC formally created a large number of interagency committees and task forces to develop policy alternatives on specific issues. (Nearly 20 created, such as “task force for improving government regulation” or “task force for “Questionable Corporate payments abroad”

All committees or task forces represented a primary interest in the subject matter, not by the White House

Representatives of dept. were almost always assistant sec. or higher The permanent EPB committees reported biweekly or monthly Work plan was created by the EC for each committee or task force each quarter Helped generate an agreed upon data base and analysis of policy issues, shaping

alternatives

The Executive DirectorIn his dual capacity, William Siedman (1974-1975) performed ten basic roles:

1. Clerk – Responsible for day-to-day operation of EPB

2. Policy Manager – Perhaps the most important function – insured that all interested parties in the executive branch were included in discussing issues. Decided which issues went to President.

3. Catalyst – Initiated study on numerous topics. Since his interest in an issue was interpreted as a president’s interest, he was effective in getting a response

4. Implementor – Responsible for seeing presidential decisions implemented. 5. Mediator – Many disputes, although minor, were resolved through him6. Arbitrator – Reluctant role, when mediation did not work. Decision could be

appealed by the President, but rarely done7. Presidential Sentinel – Kept President informed on economic developments with

periodic memorandums assessing key economic indicators. Worked with Chairman of CEA to keep president informed.

8. Presidential Guardian – Protected the integrity of the work that went out under the President’s name. Checked all reports out from White House.

9. Presidential Representative – Addressed issues that the President had not gotten to

10. White House Link to the Outside World – Worked to enhance link with other government administrations and corporations

Did NOT act as an advocate or spokesman for any issue

Staff Remained small (10 people) despite numerous efforts to increase the size Why? For three reasons:

1. Concerned about influence on staff size and honest broker role2. Fear of large staff being viewed as competitor to other groups3. It would be easier to increase staff than decrease it, he thought

Supplemented by Council on International Economic Policy (CIEP), but not joined together

Staff worked very fluid and well together

Functions of the EPBThe EPB’s primary function was organizing the flow of information and advice to the President for his decisions on economic policy issues. The Executive Committee also

produced and cleared presidential speeches and messages exchanged information among the leading economic officials coordinated presentations to congressional committees resolved disputes served as place where major White House policy-making entities

met to coordinate their activities.

Scope of Activities Responsible for overseeing the formulation, coordination, and implementation of

all U.S. economic policy, foreign and domestic, was a quite broad mandate EPB was unique among economic policy entities in the level of its activity and the

breadth of its mandate:1. Devoted continuous attention to a wide range of policy areas2. Addressed special problems or crisis issues

3. Undertook long-term studies and projectsRegular Policy Areas

Not only considered domestic and foreign economic policy issues, but otherso Procedural issues, including organizational questions o Agricultural policy issueso Tax Policy Issueso Employment and Unemployment issueso Governmental Regulation issueso International Investment Issues

Special Problems and Crisis The EPB did not spend large amounts of crisis management, but was involved in

many special problems that had an economic impactLong-term Projects and Studies Organized several long-term projects, such as railroad reorganization, multilateral

trade negotiations

Met 520 times regarding 1,539 issues in 2 and one quarter years of existence. Met with the President nearly 100 times, had much access to him.Exercised responsibility for both domestic and international economic policy.

Missing Zachary Jones CarpenterNeustadt

Gerald R Ford: A Healing Presidency by Roger B. Porter

I.                     Intro

a.       Unelected as both VP and Pres

b.       Entered when country was in trouble

                                                               i.      Respect for institution diminished

                                                              ii.      Foreign relations in disarray

                                                            iii.      Stagflation, increasing unemployment

c.       Situation precluded him from planning admin

d.       This paper focuses on two aspected of Fords leadership that affect every Pres

                                                               i.      Handling of transition into Oval Office

                                                              ii.      Organization of admin’s internal policy development processes

II.                   Transition and Leadership

a.       Establishing a New Team

                                                               i.      Philip Buchen, Fords former lawyer, had given thought to a transition

1.        created 4 man transition team: Donald Rumsfeld, William Scranton, Rogers Morton, and Jack Marsh

2.        they met with cabinet department heads to figure out Ford’s organization

3.        formal report emphasized  need to elevate the roles of the department and agency officials and reduce dominant role of WH staff

4.        Must establish presidency distinctive from that of his predecessor and quickly

                                                              ii.      By November, a new WH team and cabinet were in place but did so in increments to continue with the healing

                                                            iii.      Had been conflicts between Nixon staff and Ford staff towards end

1.        when he became pres, sought to smooth relations

2.        failed, removed Haig (Nixon Chief of Staff) because of “Nixon image”

a.        moved him to UN, also moved others to nice places too.

3.        similar approach with the cabinet

                                                            iv.      Replacements came from several places

1.        academia

a.        professors, university presidents – weren’t considered partisan

2.        legal

a.        made choices on conviction of independence, and ability

b.       had not been public officials either

                                                                                                                                        i.      led to complaints of lack of expertise

                                                             v.      Qualities were chosen: competence and compatibility

1.        ford’s style = patient, deliberative, measured – influence by sense of comfortableness

a.        uncomfortable led to Halloween massacre – removal of Schlesinger as Sec of Defense

                                                                                                                                        i.      Ford questioned integrity

1.        Schlesinger had made up stories and told them to the press

2.        had gone behind back on Saigon removals

                                                                                                                                       ii.      2 factors leading to removal

1.        Schlessinger’s style in meetings

a.        Aloof

b.       Air of intellectual superiority

2.        too independent for Ford

b.       Accentuating the Positive

                                                               i.      Declared “accessibility and openness” to be hallmarks of administration

                                                              ii.      Less imperial President

1.        didn’t play Hail to the Chief, but the Michigan Fight Song

2.        size of staff decreased by 10%

3.        no bugs in office

                                                            iii.      cosmetic changes               

1.        paintings replaced

2.        living quarters called “residence” rather than “the Mansion”

3.        plane again called “AirForce One”

                                                            iv.      declared inflation as domestic enemy number one

1.        created summit on economics at various places around the country

2.        final 2-day conference in DC hosted by him

                                                             v.      demonstrate openness thru many meetings with governors, mayors, county officials, AFL-CIO, black leaders

                                                            vi.      symbolic actions

1.        created program to give amnesty to the draft dodgers

a.        wanted to put the recent past behind the country – worked

2.        granted Nixon Amnesty

a.        wanted to put Nixon behind him – didn’t work, country angry

b.       approval rating fell from 71 to 49

III.                 Organization and Style

a.       White House Organization (I don’t feel like doing intense outline anymore… will be less formal from here on)

-          ford wary of chief of staff because it might be a position used for bad as in Nixon admin.

-          There was no chief of staff at outset of admin, ford was determined to be own chief of staff, “spokes of the wheel” approach

-          This approach was shortlived.because the former VP Chief of staff moved in on Aug 9, this pissed off Haig

-          Haig tried to continue as Chief of Staff, by end of month Ford moved him on, Rumsfeld convinced to serve essentially as chief of staff, but nine people had direct reporting relationship to ford on staff chart

-          Book that influenced Ford presidency was George Reedy’s “The Twilight of the Presidency” from which he drew 2 main lessons of LBJs presidency: must take care to avoid being isolated and losing touch with rest of govt; 2. president must steer clear of aides whose principal interest lies in advancing their own positions, especially young and untested

-          This led to a pretty old staff of senior officials

-          Wanted a chief of staff who was efficient “expert manager”, but not alter ego or super confidant

b.       White House –Department Relations

-          realized there needed to be more power for the cabinet, in comparison to the Nixon admin.

-          Ford created and environment for the white house-deparmtement relations that kept cabinet officer more involved in policy

-          Viewd cabinet officers as able admins and advisers, who could operate in both roles, and chose based on this.

c.       Decision Making Style

-          place a high value on collecting and weighing the opinions and advice of experts

-          assembling experts what a characteristic of his leadership style

-          other formulative experience was leagal training which led to 1. no special confidants within cabinet 2. listen, don’t confide 3. donget get involved in any jurisdictional rivalries 4. have confidants outside the cabinet 5. don’t get mired down in detail 6. move toward resolution and decision 7. look at proposals as if you’re going to have to be the advocate to the public at large 8. encourage dissents before a final decision is made

-          constant on this approach, wouldn’t let a single person dominate discussion

-          combination of written report and meeting

-          didn’t constrain those who disagreed with dominant view

-          had a kitchen cabinet of candid, constructive, diverse old friends who had ben on transition team with whom he met every 6-8 weeks

IV.                 Executive Branch Policy Developments

a.       Policy Development Models

-          ford adopted different models of policy development (the 3 Porter Models) in national security, domestic policy and econ policy

-          for much of admin, national security was central management

-          domestic was mainly adhocracy

-          econ was mainly multiple advocacy

b.       National Security Policy

-          confident in his foreign policy abilities via his foreign operations appropriations experience on congress

-          white house and NSC played central role

-          kept Kissinger around for his intelligence, pragmatism, strategic approach to polcy and success as diplomat

-          met every day for half hour at least

-          would from time to time reject Kissinger advice. E.g. cut off of military aid to turkey

-          eventually reduced Kissinger’s role a bit to reduce concentration of power in single person and dominance of WH based views

c.       Domestic Policy

-          approach novel in both theory and practice. Delegates responsibility to the VP

-          idea came from transition team meeting in which idea that presidency too large for one man was discussed

-          also sprang from 3 factors: 1. own experience as vp which showed unrealized potential of office  2.thought Rockefeller deserved a large role due to expertise 3. felt own expertise was elsewhere

-          ran into 2 problems 1. Rockefeller wanted james cannon to be exec director of domestic council but rumsfelf felt this was confusing 2. fords decision to oppose any new federal domestic spending programs which made Rockefeller pointless and thus Cannon and domestic council pointless

-          made ad hoc development of domestic policy inevitable

d.       Econ Policy

-          most important institutional innovation of admin according to ford

-          created Economic Policy Board which would replace all existing cabinet level interagency machinery

-          non-statutory committtess were abolished, statutory ones would practice under aegis of EPB

-          formal vehicle for conveying econ policy advice to Pres

-          most sustained, comprehensive and successful collegial attempt to advise a president on econ policy matters

-          served as honest broker role

-          people working had impression that Ford’s style was broader and fairer than in any other admin they had worked

-          collective responsibility felt

-          created tax reduction of 1975

-          managed multiple advocacy characterized Fords econ policy making arrangements

-          emphasis on open and accessible

-          shaped policies in different ways

-          assumed office under most difficult circumstances, had no mandate, confronted a nation both frustrated and disillusioned

-          makes accomplishments all the more remarkable

-          healed wounds of Vietnam and Watergate

-          left legacy of remarkable skill in building morale within branch but also in adopting decision-making approaches in major areas that took account of strengths of team assembled

N.B.  Interesting piece because it really explains a lot about the way Porter is and the way he thinks because its where he was during his formative years.

Zuriel ChavezGov 1540 Study GroupRoger B. Porter, Presidential Decision Making

Chapter 8-Organizing the White House for Presidential Decision Making P. 213-228

I. Organizing the White House for Presidential Decision MakingA. Growth, Complexity of Government, interrelatedness of many important

issues, competing demands for scarce resources, and high expectations for presidential performance have contributed to renewed interest in organization, particularly in the White House.

1. This study concerned with organizational arrangements, procedures, and process.

2. There are two dangers with this emphasis.i. Concentrating on the process by which decisions are

made and advice is organized may overemphasize the importance of procedures and underemphasize the importance of people.

ii. Second is assuming that structure is decisive, that if one could just get things organized properly, then good decisions would automatically follow. Thus, good organization does not guarantee good decisions.

II. Structural Principles for Multiple AdvocacyA. Multiple Advocacy was the characterized by the Economic Policy Board’s

structure and operation. Multiple Advocacy in theory is a potentially successful arrangement for systematically advising the President if certain conditions are met.

B. What organizational principles can one distill from the EPB experience as guidelines in organizing multiple advocacy?

1. A White House policy council’s effectiveness depends on its having the President’s imprimatur. President must demonstrate by the way he makes decisions that he relies on the policy council.

2. The policy council must meet and operate at the cabinet level. Must operate at cabinet level so that the participants can speak authoritatively for their department or agency.

3. The honest broker should control the policy council’s operations. Whoever is in charge of the multiple advocacy entity must be seen as an honest broker. The honest broker should not have other responsibilities that would prevent him from devoting sufficient time to managing the policy development process. The honest broker must be free from any institutional tie that would compromise his position or represent a conflict of interest. He must be intelligent and capable enough to be accepted as a peer by the other members of the council. He must have all the skills of an effective advocate, yet consciously eschew that role and genuinely accept the role of honest broker. The honest broker’s

effectiveness also requires that he enjoy the President’s confidence. He must be perceived as close to the President. Finally, the successful broker must be willing to function as an advocate if the discussion is not sufficiently balanced and the President needs to hear an underrepresented point of view.

4. The policy council staff should be small and consist of generalists. Larger groups developed specialized areas and thus this would lead specialists to advocate one particular point of view. A small staff has the advantage as not being viewed as a competitor by member departments. Finally, a large, independent staff attached to the manager makes it possible for him to end run the system himself. On balance, then, the advantages of a small staff of generalists outweigh the benefits of a relatively large staff independent of member departments or agencies.

5. The policy council should have responsibility for advising the President over a broad policy area, such as economic policy or national security policy. This helps ensure coordinated policies. This also helps insure that the policies will be comprehensive. Fragmenting responsibility among several departments or groups weakens accountability.

6. The policy council’s deliberations should include all departments and agencies with a legitimate interest in an issue. Legitimacy of a process depends on it reputation for fairness.

7. The size of the core group or executive committee of the council should be kept reasonably small. Small groups are generally more flexible and efficient that large ones.

8. The policy council should be established by executive order and should function as a nonstatutory body.

III. White House Organization: The Quest for Integration.A. Several scholars have urged the establishment of cabinet level

interdepartmental entities-some new in scope and composition, some modifications of existing arrangements.

B. There is an interest in integrating international and domestic considerations by combining specialized councils and committees into a single entity.

C. Three questions underlie any proposal to organize the White House for presidential decision-making.

1. How many channels for policy advice should report to the President?

2. What policy areas should they cover and what should be their composition?

3. What relationship should they have with one another?IV. Organizing for Presidential Decision Making: A Proposal

A. One major consideration in organizing the White House is policy integration.

B. Second Structural consideration is what policy areas should policy councils cover?

1. One should avoid divisions that are likely to produce consistent overlaps and jurisdictional battles.

2. The more closely a policy council’s work is tied to a regular workflow, the more easily its members will develop a sense of collective responsibility.

C. Thus, Porter recommends a fourfold division-Budget, national security, economic, and social policy.