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The full text of this book is available on line via these links:

http://www.sourceoecd.org/scienceIT/9264035710http://www.sourceoecd.org/industry/9264035710http://www.sourceoecd.org/industrytrade/9264035710http://www.sourceoecd.org/governance/9264035710

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This book provides lessons from case studies in policy governance for the information society and sustainable development. It highlights important lessons from these policy areas for the governance of innovation policy, and illustrates mechanisms and practices for better co-ordination and integration across policy areas.

Companion volumes to this edition are:

Governance of Innovation Systems – Volume 1: Synthesis Report Governance of Innovation Systems – Volume 2: Case Studies in Innovation Policy

Governance of Innovation SystemsVOLUME 3: CASE STUDIES IN CROSS-SECTORAL POLICY

www.oecd.orgISBN 92-64-03571-0 92 2006 02 1 P-:HSTCQE=UXZ\VX:


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FOREWORD – 3

GOVERNANCE OF INNOVATION SYSTEMS: CASE STUDIES IN CROSS-SECTORAL POLICY – ISBN-92-64-03571-0 – © OECD 2006

Foreword

This publication constitutes Volume 3 of Governance of Innovation Policy, a three-volume compilation of the proceedings of collaborative work in the MONIT project (Monitoring and Implementing National Innovation Policies). This volume, Governance of Innovation Systems: Case Studies in Cross-sectoral Policy, provides an overview of analytical work on policy governance in OECD member countries participating in the project. The policy areas under scrutiny are the information society, sustainable develop-ment and transport policy. The aim of these studies is to draw lessons for innovation governance from policy areas with characteristics similar to those of the broader area of emerging innovation policy. The chapters also serve as empirical support for Volume 1 in the series: Governance of Innovation Systems: Synthesis Report.

The publication was prepared under the aegis of OECD’s Committee for Science and Technological Policy (CSTP) and its working party on Technology and Innovation Policy (TIP). The report was edited by Svend Otto Remøe who also co-ordinated the MONIT project together with Mari Hjelt, Pim den Hertog, Patries Boekholt and Wolfgang Polt.

5


TABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreword 3

Executive Summary 7

Part 1. Governance and the Information Society 11

Chapter 1. Governance in Austrian Information Society Policy: Progress without Strategy?

13

Chapter 2. Information Society Governance and Its Links to Innovation Policy in Finland

35

Chapter 3. Information Society Policy Co-ordination: A Mould for Innovation Policy Development in Norway?

65

Chapter 4. Innovation and the Information Society: Policy Coherence and Governance in Ireland

93

Chapter 5. Horizontal Co-ordination of Innovation Policies: Information Society Policies in the Netherlands

115

Chapter 6. Information Society Governance in Greece: “One Swallow Does Not Make a Summer”

145

Chapter 7. Towards the Information Society: The Case of Sweden

169

Part 2. Governance in Sustainable Development 171

Chapter 8. Policy Integration: The Case of Sustainable Development in Finland

191

Chapter 9. Environmental Policy Integration: How Will We Recognise It When We See It? The Case of Green Innovation Policy in Norway

221

Chapter 10. Linking Innovation Policy and Sustainable Development in Flanders

245

Chapter 11. Moving out of the Niche: Integrating Sustainable Development and Innovation Policy in Austria

271

Chapter 12. Patchwork Policy Making: Linking Innovation and Transport Policies in Austria

297

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY – 7


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Mari Hjelt, Wolfgang Polt and Svend Otto Remøe

Background: the MONIT project

The OECD’s project on National Innovation Systems (NIS) was initiated in 1995. Under the Working Party on Technology and Innovation Policy (TIP) it set out to explore the requirements for redirecting innovation policy in OECD countries, taking into account new insights into the innovation process that arose from the research on innovation at that time. While many accepted that the linear model of innovation did not capture the realities of the innovation process, it was acknowledged that public policy still relied upon the linear model and its implications for policy. Hence, the OECD NIS project became an important collaborative mechanism for generating new data based on the interactive model of innovation and for developing a set of recommendations for public policy.

Formally, the OECD NIS project was concluded in 2001. It generated several publications on industrial clusters, networks, human mobility, synthesis reports on the renewal of innovation policy, and it also fed into other OECD work. However, the concluding work (OECD, 2002) raised a critical question that was the starting point for the current MONIT project. If the developed economies are becoming more innovation-oriented and dynamic, can national governments and their policy-making modes remain largely unaffected? More precisely, given the changes needed in policy, how can or should governments change their structures and processes to better accommodate the dynamism in their environments?

To explore these issues, the OECD and its Working Party on Technology and Innovation Policy (TIP) endorsed in 2002 a new collaborative study called MONIT (monitoring and implementing national innovation policies). The project was organised in two work packages: one studied the main innovation governance issues in each country and the other studied selected policy areas with characteristics relevant to innovation policy. Volume 2 contains the results of the first of these packages and this volume contains the results of the second.

MONIT’s basic assumption was that innovation policy and its governance require significant changes. While the linear and systemic models of innovation can be seen as the first and second generations of innovation, MONIT set out to explore the foundations of the third generation which views policy making as a process, along with its institutional, structural and political characteristics. Seen from the point of view of a firm, this model represents a nexus in which policies interact and produce innovation outcomes. Achieving coherence of innovation policy across ministerial boundaries is therefore seen as key to successful governance.

8 – EXECUTIVE SUMMARY


Learning from horizontal policy areas

Innovation policy has typically been seen as an extension of R&D policy involving a number of instruments and policies that stimulate the innovation process, such as science-industry relationships, intellectual property rights, and industrial networks and clusters. However, as economic development has become more dependent on innovation and as growth patterns worldwide become more volatile and dynamic, innovation and growth may need broader stimulus from governments than has generally been the case. Hence, innovation policy may increasingly need to be redefined and expanded to encompass a wider set of policy domains.

This raises at least two key issues. First, governments will need to develop capa-bilities for broader or more horizontal governance spanning ministerial and other institutional boundaries. This requires learning from policy domains with such charac-teristics. The MONIT project therefore included the study of policies on the information society and sustainable development as well as transport and regional policy.

Second, it raises the issue of the relationship between innovation policy and other areas. These relationships may be supportive or unsupportive, creating challenges for balancing the links between them. Governments will also need to learn more about options and barriers to integrating diverse policy areas and thereby develop a policy environment that is coherent and conducive to innovation in the economy.

A guide to the volume

In the MONIT project, the study of policies for the information society was a core activity, as most countries have given priority to national initiatives to promote development with the support of information and communication technologies (ICT). Further, several countries studied linkages between innovation policy and policies for sustainable development, as the latter have been given importance as a principle under which to subsume other policy areas and priorities. These topics are therefore at the heart of this volume.

The chapters are typically shorter versions of the studies conducted. Lessons derived from the studies are treated in Volume 1, the synthesis report, which also contains summary analytical reports on the information society and sustainable development (OECD, 2005a).

Part 1: Governance and the information society

In Chapter 1, Wolfgang Polt and Julia Schindler describe how Austria has failed twice to produce an overall strategy for information society policy, but has nevertheless succeeded in promoting ICT diffusion and use in various fields, such as e-government. They also describe obstacles and failures in specific policy domains and provide examples of policy learning from successes and failures.

In Chapter 2, Juha Oksanen analyses Finnish policy for the information society and the vital links with innovation policy. He argues that a principal driving force for both the information society and innovation policy have been concerns about countries’ inter-national competitiveness and wealth creation in the global economy. Also, innovation policy and development of the information society have many features in common. Both policy domains are based on a strong commitment and protection of consensus among major stakeholders representing the public and private sector.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY – 9


In Chapter 3 Trond Einar Pedersen studies the Norwegian national plan for the information society and argues that the current governance situation represents a delicate policy dilemma. While overall economic policy takes a hands-off approach, with a lesser role for state involvement, the current organisation of eNorway (the term for the national policy) open possibilities for more hands-on implementation and co-ordination.

Chapter 4 contains an analysis by Paulina Ramirez, Murray Scott and Willie Golden of Ireland’s information society policy and the missing linkages with innovation policy. They argue that an important reason for the lack of coherence between the two policy areas is the “science-push” character of Ireland’s present STI policy which makes co-ordination with other policy domains difficult.

In Chapter 5 Pim den Hertog and Hilde de Groot present the Dutch information society, arguing that ICT has become an enabler of broad transformation processes in both industry and the public domain. However, most actors see ICT simply as an enabler in their primary processes and do not see a clear link to innovation. Thus, they do not develop an information society/ICT policy with a view to increasing innovation or developing a knowledge economy, and this impedes horizontal co-ordination.

In Chapter 6, Lena Tsipouri and Mona Papadakou study recent developments in Greece against a backdrop of inflexible hierarchies, low competitiveness and incomplete infrastructure. Innovation policy and information society policy had little in common, but Greece’s introduction of an information society initiative highlighted governance gaps, and new governance structures were implemented to overcome the inherent weaknesses in horizontal co-ordination. If successful, this initiative may help to modernise Greek governance.

Chapter 7 by Kristina Larsen, Patrick Sandgren and Jennie Granat-Thorslund is an analysis of the governance challenges in Sweden. It highlights the high degree of decentralisation in the Swedish model which results in a high level of efficiency but also illustrates a need to improve horizontal co-ordination in the context of handling more substantial changes in policy agendas.

Part 2: Governance in sustainable development

In Chapter 8 Mari Hjelt, Sanna Ahvenharju, Mikko Halonen and Mikko Syrjanen study the need for integration between science, technology and industry policies and policies for sustainable development, and conclude that despite the challenges related to expanding science and technology (S&T) policy to a broader innovation policy, there is both a need and an opportunity, from the point of view of sustainable development, to broaden the policy scope. However, there are also several challenges and barriers. This suggests that policy integration requires basic changes in policy formulation and implementation to generate effective interfaces.

The issue of policy integration is also at the heart of Chapter 9. William Lafferty, Audun Ruud and Olav Mosvold Larsen develop a benchmark for assessing the integration between innovation and sustainable development policy as “green innovation policy”. The findings indicate that Norway actively promotes vertical environmental policy integration, but that specific and direct efforts towards green innovation are practically non-existent.

10 – EXECUTIVE SUMMARY


Chapter 10 is a study by Ilse Dries, Peter van Humbeek and Jan Larosse of the linkages between policies for innovation and sustainable development. The focus is on the policy response to the industrial lock-in of the Flemish innovation system in material- and energy-intensive production systems. The way out in “system innovation” demands a long-term transition to a new, less resource-intensive and more knowledge-intensive economy.

In Chapter 11, Brigitte Ömer-Rieder and Katy Whitelegg illustrate the barriers to integration of innovation and sustainable development policies in Austria, and show that this partly hinges on the fact that sustainability policy is not an established policy field and that innovation policy is not recognised as an effective key driver for sustainable development.

In Chapter 12 Katy Whitelegg shows that even in cases where two policy areas are located in a single ministry, there are wide gaps between them. She highlights the importance for policy integration of lack of understanding of neighbouring policies and shows that perceived “missions” help to keep separate policies that might otherwise be more integrated.

References

OECD (2002), Dynamising National Innovation Systems, OECD, Paris.

OECD (2005a), Governance of Innovation Systems, Volume 1: Synthesis Report, OECD, Paris.

OECD (2005b), Governance of Innovation Systems, Volume 2: Case Studies in Innovation Policy, OECD, Paris.

11


Part 1

GOVERNANCE AND THE INFORMATION SOCIETY

GOVERNANCE IN AUSTRIAN INFORMATION SOCIETY POLICY: PROGRESS WITHOUT STRATEGY? – 13


Chapter 1

GOVERNANCE IN AUSTRIAN INFORMATION SOCIETY POLICY: PROGRESS WITHOUT STRATEGY?

Wolfgang Polt and Julia Schindler Institute for Technology and Regional Policy, Joanneum Research Ltd., Austria

Against the background of developments of the past decade, this chapter takes a skeptical view of the possibility of steering developments in sectors as divers as e-government, e-business, e-health, e-learning, etc., through a “grand design” and an overarching strategy. It describes how Austria has twice failed to produce a general information society strategy, but has nevertheless succeeded in promoting ICT diffusion and use in areas such as e-government. Obstacles and failures in specific policy domains are discussed and examples are provided for policy learning from both success and failures. Among various ways of achieving policy coherence, some have also been quite successful. The study suggests that with sufficiently strong communication channels, institutions and incentives for self-organised co-operation and mutual policy learning, effective Austrian information society policies can be achieved.

Introduction

Austrian information society policies in the past decade have been marked by a discrepancy between the size and structure of the ICT-producing sector and the diffusion and use of ICT in various sectors of economy and society (for an overview of recent Austrian performance, see Schneider et al., 2004). The former has been – according to most indicators – close to or even below the EU15 average. Investment in ICT is not very high and the Austrian pattern of industrial specialisation is not very geared towards ICT, although successful niche players in some fields have established themselves as highly competitive in their respective markets. As a result, unlike other small open economies such as Ireland or Finland, Austria did not profit from the new economy boom of the 1990s.

However, while Austria lagged in ICT diffusion in most fields in the 1980s, it later caught up rapidly and even approached top rankings in some fields, e.g. early up-take and high penetration rates of mobile telephony, broadband and wireless broadband access to the Internet, and e-government. Even taking these positive developments into account, however, the general perception is that there is still much room for better ICT use throughout the economy and society.

In Austrian information society policy, there is at most a weak link between horizontal science, technology and innovation (STI) policy and the relevant sectoral policy (e.g. health, business, transport). Thus, the current policy challenge for information

14 – GOVERNANCE IN AUSTRIAN INFORMATION SOCIETY POLICY: PROGRESS WITHOUT STRATEGY?


society policies in Austria is to further enhance ICT up-take by demand- and mission-oriented policies (especially in fields like e-government, e-education, e-health and transport) and to combine this with policies fostering R&D and innovation in the ICT-producing sector (Schneider et al., 2004).

Against this background, in 2001 the Austrian Council for Science and Technology Development asked the three ministries with the main responsibilities for science, technology and innovation policy (i.e. the Ministry of Transport, Innovation and Tech-nology, the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Labour, and the Ministry of Education, Science and Culture) to co-ordinate their information society/ICT programmes and to bring forth a common and coherent concept. For this purpose an inter-ministerial ICT working group was established, consisting of representatives from the three ministries and the Council. This inter-ministerial working group subsequently commissioned a study on the “Governance of Austrian Information Society Policy” in order to gain insight into the roles of the players, their interaction and co-ordination mechanisms. The study was produced in the context of the NIS MONIT project (Ohler et al., 2004), and the main results are presented here.

The study started off from the observation that past attempts to formulate a coherent strategy for information society policy were not successful. It was therefore necessary to analyse not only the current institutional setting and its policy co-ordination mechanisms, but also the reasons why previous attempts had not succeeded. A process-oriented historical approach was adopted.1 This allowed for analysing the actors’ incentives and motives, the barriers to communication and co-ordination, as well as path dependency and policy lock-in. As there is no, or very little, quantitative data available on information society policy processes, a qualitative approach was used, based on structured interviews with key players (a list of institutions covered can be found at the end of the chapter). Furthermore, important strategy documents and institutional mapping, i.e. a description of the formal relationships and distribution of competences, were examined.

The chapter briefly describes historical developments in the different sub-fields of information society policy, namely e-government, e-health, e-learning, e-business and science, technology and innovation policy for ICT along with the institutional settings and policy agendas specific to each field. Next, the different stages of the stylised policy process are addressed: agenda setting, policy formulation and co-ordination, imple-mentation, and policy learning. These stages of the policy cycle are analysed by applying key concepts of systems theory to the policy process. These concepts, such as context specificity, path dependency, localised learning and accumulated knowledge, can help explain the main characteristics of these processes. The final section draws conclusions about how the policy process might be (re)shaped to allow for the formulation of coherent policies under the constraints of multiple actors, divided competences and asynchronous policy agendas.

Historical development and formal organisation of information society/ICT policy

Historical development of Austrian information society policies

While some countries launched broad information society policy initiatives in the late 1980s and early 1990s, political awareness of the topic in Austria came only in the aftermath of the publication of the “Bangemann Report” (European Commission, 1994) and the US “Information Highway” initiative. The Alpbach Technology Forum in August 1994 marked the establishment of information society policy as an important policy field



in Austria. On this occasion, the Chancellor stated the need for political action and the government declaration of November 1994 took up the topic of the information society. Information society technologies and applications were “just around the corner”. Several technologies were mature enough to enter the market. The government initiative was declared to be of highest priority, and this created high expectations.

Subsequently, a first attempt was made to create a coherent strategic view on information society policy. A number of working groups were created, involving a large number of the most important stakeholders. These working groups produced recom-mendations for action and listed fields of potential policy challenges, which were made public in a final report (Federal Chancellery, 1996). In March 1997 the report was accepted. This was the first strategic document for information society policy in Austria, but it never had the status of a White Paper as similar documents did in other countries. No funding was specifically allocated for the strategy as a whole, and no central responsi-bility was defined to supervise and monitor the process. Mainly, it was left to the respective actors in the various policy fields to use the document as a (non-binding) guidepost. Ten years later, interviewees hardly remembered it as having led to increased policy co-ordination or coherence. As a point of comparison, the Bavarian initiative “Bavaria Online”, which was started at the same time, was allocated substantial financial resources and was put into practice within a couple of months.

A main reason for the reluctance of government to actually use the document as a means to formulate and implement an overarching strategy might have been that interests of stakeholders were diverging: while some were asking for rapid liberalisation of the telecommunications sector, powerful actors (public-sector trade unions) resisted change. As a result, the telecommunications sector was liberalised at the last moment in Austria, after all other EU countries. Moreover, the government did not pay enough attention at the time to the challenges arising for governance when dealing with such cross-cutting policy matters as the information society (whereas other countries had already established special responsibilities and structures within government to deal with information society matters in the form of information society “envoys” or “secretaries”).

On the other hand, while it failed to provide an umbrella for the coherent strategic orientation of actors, the information society initiative mobilised the most important players, some of which then started follow-up activities. A number of national and regional Internet initiatives were started in 1994-95 (e.g. the Austrian Platform for Tele-matics Applications – APTA), a specific programme, Technologies for the Information Society, was started by the Innovation and Technology Fund (ITF), and e-government initiatives were launched (e.g. the digitalisation of the public administration) or envisaged (e.g. the creation of an electronic social security “e-card”).

It was only in 2000 that another initiative to formulate an overarching strategy for information society matters emerged. The main impulse came from the EU in the form of the European Commission’s “e-Europe” initiative. The Austrian “e-Austria in e-Europe” initiative was started as a large-scale effort to formulate an information society strategy. Another important reason why the information society topic returned to the Austrian policy agenda was the change of government in 2000. The Ministry for Public Services and Sports – established in 2000 – led the e-Austria initiative and set up an information society task force, Taskforce e-Austria. Its purpose was to propose aims and action lines to strengthen Austria’s position in the e-technology environment.



The taskforce developed a concept paper, which again did not become an official document of the federal government. The reasons were twofold: first, there was insufficient involvement of major stakeholders and second, political responsibilities for information society matters were not clearly assigned from the start. As a result, the other ministries responsible for information society matters did not accept the Ministry for Public Services and Sports’ de facto responsibility for the information society. Some ministries also felt that their work was being held up because they had to wait for an overall information society strategy and were unable to implement already well-developed sectoral information society measures.

As was the case with its predecessor, although no overall, commonly accepted information society strategy was developed through the “e-Austria in e-Europe” initiative, it did motivate several information society activities in various sub-fields, giving rise to more coherent “sectoral” policy approaches, which are described below. For example, it led to the formulation of a strategy for the promotion of e-business activities by the Ministry for Economic Affairs and Labour and also paved the way for the creation of an e-government board and subsequently the creation of an e-government strategy.

In sum, two major attempts to formulate an overarching information society strategy failed. Some of the reasons can clearly be viewed as policy weaknesses (lack of allocation of funds, competences, process responsibility and process ownership, lack of awareness of the challenges for governing cross-cutting policy matters). Others are intrinsic to the complexity of the process (large number of actors, different incentives or disincentives to co-operate, time and effort needed for co-operation). If some of these barriers remain in place, there is little chance for future success. On the other hand, even in the absence of an overarching information society strategy, many policy initiatives in various information society sub-fields were successfully initiated. Institutional innovations were also triggered, as in the case of e-government. Where major projects failed, this was less because of a lack of co-ordination between the relevant information society policy sub-fields or with innovation policy, but because of reasons such as poor project management. Examples of successes and failures are given below.

Current setting: formal organisation of ICT policy at the central government level

To date, the main policy makers for information society policy are the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Labour (ICT innovations, e-business, e-content), the Ministry for Transport and Innovation (ICT innovations, R&D), the Ministry of Education, Science and Culture (e-learning, IT for schools, polytechnics and universities) (Figure 1.1). These ministries have formed an inter-ministerial working group on ICT, in which the Austrian Council for Research and Technology Development is also involved. Another important player is the Ministry of Finance (electronic documents and payments, e.g. of taxes). The Federal Chancellery is in charge of e-government. The dominant players are the Chief Information Office (co-ordination of horizontal e-government activities, development of strategies and solutions), the e-Government Platform (with political responsibility for e-government) and the e-Co-operation Board (with operational responsibility for e-government) (Figure 1.2).



Figure 1.1. Basic institutional setting of Austrian information society policies

E-government

E-government initiatives have been a significant driver of Austrian information society policies, and, in the absence of a generally agreed overarching information society strategy, act as a major driver for other policy fields. In this area, major institutional changes have taken place in order to cope with information society matters.

The major institutional innovation in this realm was the creation, motivated by government and the Austrian Federal Economic Chamber, of the Chief Information Office and chief information officer in August 2001. This was done partly to overcome the shortcomings of the existing working groups for e-government issues, which worked somewhat at cross-purposes, partly as a reaction to a controversial e-government bench-marking study.2 The expert group on benchmarking blamed the lack of an e-government strategy for Austria’s low ranking, and an e-Government Platform was created, along with the chief information officer. Furthermore there has been institutionalised co-operation between the ministries, the federal government, the Länder (federal states) and the municipalities. Co-ordination between the federal government and the Länder takes place regularly through two working groups: one for technical and the other for legal issues (see Figure 1.2).

Figure 1.2 shows the dual structure of the technical and organisational strategic units, which helps overcome the problems associated with allocation of e-government responsi-bility to IT representatives who emphasised the technical dimension and neglected the organisational and political aspects.

Ministry of Economics and Labour

Ministry of Transport,

Innovation and Technology

Ministry of Education, Science, and the

Arts

Council for Science and Technology Policy

Government

WG on ICT

E-government Co-ordination bodies

Ministry of Finance

Interministerial Working Group on ICT

Federal Chancellery



Figure 1.2. E-government institutions in Austria

The ICT board is responsible for co-ordinating horizontal e-government activities on the federal level, seeking e-government solutions and planning relevant strategies. The position of chief information officer was entrusted to a professor of information technology, who had previously worked on the e-health card and the electronic signature.

The e-Government Initiative 2003 led to the establishment of the e-Government Platform at the political level, assisted by the e-Co-operation Board on the operational level. The e-Government-Platform led by the Federal Chancellor put forth a roadmap, including a master plan for joint projects, financing models, an implementation framework and general objectives. An e-government strategy consisting of several modules was established. Both the chief information officer and the executive secretary are assisted by the administrative officials of the Chief Information Office.

According to interviewees, the ICT board (headed by the chief information officer), the e-Co-operation Platform (headed by its executive secretary) and the e-Government Platform have been fairly successful. During interviews, policy representatives stated that e-government is well co-ordinated, that the mechanisms are suitable for achieving consensus and that e-government in Austria is very modern, advanced and highly competitive in international comparisons (especially for the back office and the electronic file). A key factor leading to the perceived success of the Chief Information Office was the fact that it was equipped with adequate resources, including about 20 employees. Also, the units are integrated. The Chief Information Office tries to build consistent and transparent e-government structures. The commitment of the Federal Chancellor was an important success factor.

As a result, Austria’s performance in e-government has improved significantly over the past years, especially with respect to implementation and back-office applications. For example, Austria has a leading position in the category electronic file.

Among weaknesses can be noted the lack of integration of ministerial departments into e-government processes. Some interviewees stated that they did not know the Chief Information Office or the e-co-ordination representative of their own ministry. Likewise the Chief Information Office and e-co-ordination representatives of a ministry often did

- E-Government Platform

Head: Federal Chancellor

CIO Executive Secretary

E-Cooperation Board ICT Board

Technical level

Implementation level

Federal states (Länder)

Municipalities

Political level

Federal government

Cities



not know who was working on information society innovation issues in their ministry. Clearly, there is a lack of transparency concerning responsibilities for information society issues within ministries. The breadth and cross-sectoral properties of information society matters make this difficult, but it is essential to improve transparency and awareness within ministries.

E-health: ICT in the health sector

ICT is used in the health sector for diagnosis, therapy methods and instruments. The main focus of the discussion of ICT use in the health sector, however, is on ICT use in administration and inter-organisational data transfer (i.e. health certificates, transmission of diagnostic findings and medical records). Health telematics has become an important topic in information society policy discussions.

In contrast to the homogeneous and hierarchical structure of e-government, the health sector consists of highly heterogeneous players: resident doctors, hospital doctors, hospitals, hospital operators, health insurance providers, health ministry, social ministry and interest groups. Hospitals are also heterogeneous owing to the diverse ownership structure (there are public, private and religious hospitals). ICT use is affected by these complex organisational-institutional constellations. Co-ordination, introduction of de facto standards and guidelines, compatible incentives and acceptance are essential but difficult to achieve owing to the heterogeneity.

Health policy, social security and retirement pension insurance policy are interlinked, but are divided among two ministries. The Ministry for Health and Women has to share some of its competence in health matters with the Ministry for Social Security, Generations and Consumer Protection. This divided responsibility has advantages and disadvantages. With respect to e-health the division is seen as a disadvantage.

The Ministry for Health and Women has authority for ICT applications in the health sector, but does not use it for various reasons, such as the low level of attention to ICT within the ministry, as well as the strength of institutions such as hospital associations and the social security carriers. Furthermore, some issues are dealt by the Länder. The ministry is not allowed to order a reduction in hospital beds or the shutdown of a hospital, although it can make suggestions. The ministry might intervene in other ways, e.g. cutting back government aid for certain hospitals, which might lead to a reduction in hospital beds or the closure of hospitals. However, it generally does not use this method, owing to local interests and the power of policy players. It also does not make use of its legislative and co-ordination powers for policy design and implementation.

The “e-card” offers an example of the difficulties of implementing an e-health strategy. The “e-card project” is the e-health project that has received the most policy attention in the past years. In 1999 the main association of social security carriers was given the assignment to introduce a wide-reaching electronic administration system, in particular to introduce a chip card to replace paper health certificates. A call for tender was held in 1999. In April 2001 the task was commissioned to a general contractor consortium EDS/Orga.

Conflicts about contract requirements and specifically the extent of services to be rendered led to the early termination of the contract on the part of the main association of social security carriers. In spring 2003 a new call for tender was issued. Instead of seeking a general contractor, the project was now split into several sub-projects. Currently, the main function of the e-card is to replace the paper health certificate, but it



should be designed to enable future extensions. For example, the storage of patient records on the e-card is being discussed. Widespread use of the e-card is expected for 2005. The e-card will not comply with the strict security requirements of the Austrian Signature Law, which would have enabled it to be used as a citizen card for other e-government services. Although the federal government had wanted the e-card to meet the high security requirements of the “citizen card”, no one was willing to share with the social security carriers the high costs that would have been involved.

E-education and e-learning

The Ministry of Education, Science and Culture is responsible for the information society sub-fields of e-education and e-learning. As in other areas, impetus from the EU played an important role in policy formulation. The EU Council resolutions of Feira and Lisbon influenced the establishment of the “e-Fit Austria” programme, which promotes the broad and sustainable use of modern ICT in education, science and culture through numerous initiatives and projects.

The programme is an example of policy co-ordination by programme steering: e-Fit Austria integrates the activities of all units in a thematic programme. The decision to co-ordinate activities via a joint thematic programme was also used as a lever for internal institutional reforms. An IT steering committee was established to co-ordinate the programme. It co-ordinates the activities of ten ministry departments, related international activities, and strategic partnerships with industry and other national players. There are several working groups, ties with international co-ordination groups (the e-learning industry group) and strategic partnerships with industry. The concentration of activities helped overcome the diversity of activities, organisational barriers and the previously low degree of co-ordination.

The New Media in Teaching initiative is another successful sub-programme. It supports projects to develop software applications for teaching in universities and polytechnics. Its aims are quality improvements in teaching, easier access to education, interdisciplinary co-operation and networks, and systematic integration of the “funded innovations” into classes and teaching. Subsidies are an incentive for the continuous development of new media in teaching and the strengthening of the community. Detailed preparation involved stakeholders, and contacts were sought with polytechnics, uni-versities, students and industry (federal economics chamber, multimedia firms). The involvement of stakeholders in the preparation process and communication and net-working in the implementation process were important for enabling the very first example of co-operation between universities and polytechnics in development projects.

The programme builds on the “multimedia teaching material” programme of the 1990s. The early existence of ACOnet (the Austrian Academic Computer Network) is another important factor, as it made possible broadband data cable connection between universities as well as broadband Internet to European research and science networks. In the early 1990s, tertiary learning institutions were linked through medium-speed broad-band. More recent programmes and initiatives were able to focus on content and peda-gogy, because the infrastructure was already available.

The eFit programme and the New Media in Teaching programme serve as a basis for further programmes and reforms (within the ministry, schools and tertiary education). Awareness and acceptance will continue to be necessary, and diffusion is expected to become a more important topic. Among the important elements of a well-structured process are the following:



• Extensive research to define the target groups and the type of specific thematic priorities.

• Integration of existing institutions and initiatives.

• Selection of project carriers through a rigorous procedure involving a two-stage assessment.

• Existence of a person, generally with relevant know-how and competence, responsible for every thematic priority. Some priorities also received support from external project bureaus.

• High priority given to achieving sustainable results. Project participants are required to update their products.

• Feasibility and support studies to analyse and better co-ordinate demand, target groups and impact.

Within this policy field, as in e-government, an institutional setting seems to have been found that ensures a high degree of (internal and partly also external) policy coherence.

E-business

Explicit public measures to support ICT development and applications were taken as early as the late 1970s.3 In the 1980s and early 1990s use of ICT for intra- and inter-firm processes received little attention, except for electronic data exchange (EDI) between organisations, which focused work on i) the development of standards, and ii) the spread of underlying technologies, standards and applications. Data exchange, between firms (the automobile industry was the pioneer user) and between banks and between firms and public institutions, especially tax and customs authorities, constituted the dominant field of application.

Until the mid-1990s the Ministry for Science and Research and the Ministry for Public Economy and Transport had the main responsibilities for this area of information society policy. The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Labour did not have an important role. The only information society activity for which the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Labour was exclusively responsible was representation of Austria in standardisation institutes concerning EDI. It also had joint responsibility with the Ministry for Science and Research for the IMPACT programme.

The beginning of information society discussions in 1994/95 and the establishment of the information society working group led to the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Labour’s greater involvement in information society policy. The “Technologies for the Information Society” programme, carried out by the ITF, fell partly under the responsibility of the Ministry for Economic Affairs, which initiated two focus areas for the programme: EDI Business Austria and Multimedia Business Austria. The ministry decided to focus on areas in which it already had some expertise. This also ensured that the Ministry for Economic Affairs and Labour became a central player in information society matters.

In 2000 the Ministry for Economic Affairs and Labour widened its coverage of information society activities with the launching of the “E-business in a New Economy” initiative, also in the context of the EU’s e-Europe initiative. This was a full-fledged strategy process involving a large number of stakeholders. A steering committee and



seven parallel working groups, involving 300 persons, were established and led by representatives from business and science. The working groups made 35 proposals clustered around six action lines: Information and Awareness, Start-up and Growth Potential of Internet Firms, R&D, e-Content Austria, Technology Transfer and Location e-Austria, Gateway to the East.

This scheme not only developed new programmes and action lines, but also integrated existing measures, thus allowing for policy coherence over time. Furthermore a monitoring group was established and revision of strategies and measures was planned as a part of the process.

The scope was such as to include R&D and innovation policy, but went beyond the narrow confines of R&D. It addressed a number of broad information society topics (e.g. regulatory and legal aspects of e-business). It is a good example of strategy definition and of integration of information society policy and innovation policy in a narrow sense, but it did not extend outside the ministry.

R&D and innovation policy for ICT

The competence for ICT research and development and innovation policy mainly lies with the Ministry of Transport, Innovation and Technology and the Ministry for Economic Affairs and Labour. The former focuses on ICT R&D, whereas the latter focuses more on ICT applications and their diffusion.

Austria has a broad range of measures (indirect support via R&D tax breaks, direct support via thematic programmes, dedicated institutions, infrastructure build-up, etc.) to support R&D. These include non-targeted support for R&D, targeted support in the form of thematic programmes oriented towards ICT, and thematically oriented programmes which address ICT along with other targets.

In terms of non-targeted support, figures for indirect support are not available. For direct support for R&D projects that are defined as “bottom-up”, some 40% goes to ICT according to a recent evaluation of the major technology fund. Also, in the Competence Centre Programme, which funds the establishment of research organisations jointly run by academia and business, a considerable share of non-earmarked funding goes to ICT-related centres (between 30% and 40%).

In the cluster programmes, which are mostly carried out by the regions, some clusters are either entirely ICT or have a large ICT component. Since the mid-1990s most Austrian Länder have recognised the significance of technology and innovation policy and have allocated significant amounts of money. Regional technology policy and regional ICT activities were introduced essentially simultaneously in several Länder. Styria, Salzburg and Upper Austria developed specific information highways and tele-regions, often with EU support. These initiatives started in 1994.

Specific thematic programmes supporting R&D and diffusion of ICT have been in place since the early 1980s: e.g. the microelectronics/information-processing programme. This programme, even by today’s good-practice standards, was quite advanced: there was systematic co-operation, each of the ten action lines was under a lead scientific institute, supporting social science research was carried out and an extensive evaluation followed. In the mid-1980s, the establishment of the Innovation and Technology Fund led to several ICT-specific programmes, in computer-integrated manufacturing and software as well as the above-mentioned Technologies for the Information Society. With the fading out of these programmes, few thematic programmes now focus on generic ICT technology



development. Currently, there is only the FIT-IT programme, initiated by the Ministry for Transport, Innovation and Technology, which aims at stimulating longer-term, more advanced research in selected thematic areas (e.g. embedded systems).

Finally, ICT also figures prominently in other thematic technology programmes, particularly in the transport sector, where a large programme on intelligent transport systems and services comprises components on transport telematics, logistics, satellite navigation, etc.

Especially for the thematically oriented R&D and diffusion-oriented programmes, one could hope to find close co-ordination on the policy agenda of the information society and innovation policy. However, there seems to be hardly any link: while this is not surprising for the bottom-up projects, even dedicated programmes like the FIT-IT programme has not so far incorporated information society topics into its portfolio. The same is by and large true of the thematic programmes with other orientations, but with a high ICT component, such as the transport-oriented research programmes. There is no co-ordination between departments of the same ministry to bring together transport policy, information society policy and RTD policy. The main reason is that the transport policy department and the innovation policy department see themselves as culturally very different and with incompatible goals (e.g. securing/improving public transport vs. fostering risky innovation projects).

Thus, the field in which information society policies and innovation policies might be best linked is the one with the least developed institutional setting to do.

Agenda setting

This section focuses on agenda setting in information society innovation policy. How do discussions, topics, measures, programmes and policy areas arise? Why are broad strategic concepts developed from time to time? Are some methods less successful than others? Does best practice exist? This study’s findings on agenda setting processes in Austrian information society innovation policy are presented below.

Issues arrive on the political agenda through a variety of channels. Many arise quite spontaneously without going through a formal process. Therefore, the way in which a topic appears is often not observed by the external observer.

Agenda setting is influenced by many factors: the distribution of formal responsi-bility, successful previous programmes, existing networks, dedicated persons, dominant organisations, internal distribution of tasks and changes in the organisational structure, general administrative reforms, (benchmarking) reports, presence in EU programmes and policies.

In Austrian information society policy, the EU is an especially important factor in strategic policy formulation. Both recent attempts to arrive at an overarching information society strategy were based on EU initiatives. EU policies thus strongly affect Austrian information society agendas. The EU’s influence is not only due to political documents (such as the Bangemann Report, the e-Europe Initiative), but also to thematic priorities in the framework programmes, e.g. the e-Europe initiative and the IST programme. The EU agenda is filtered through the local operational logic; for example, the IST is “translated” into the Austrian FIT-IT programme. The importance of the EU in shaping national politics is likely to increase further, especially with respect to infrastructure and standards.



Historic development paths are another important factor affecting the emergence of agendas. The development of an agenda, its contextual design and its implementation are often based on previous activities, responsibilities or experiences, e.g. on previous programmes, responsibilities for particular agendas (especially EU), current or previously established networks, and previously successful approval procedures. As a result, estab-lished competences are enhanced and strengthened, but this also leads to gaps and blind spots. This must be taken into account when trying to understand the difficulties the administrative system had (and has) in coping with the challenges of horizontal policy matters like the information society.

During the study, it was observed that players seek to minimise the expected co-ordination effort and show a clear preference for local autonomy in agenda setting. The localised nature of such efforts seems to be a relatively stable pattern and was found in all policy sub-fields, because of: i) the local nature of knowledge and experience; ii) the local nature of networks and memberships; and iii) the low incentive for crossing borders. Localised behaviour does not necessarily cause activities to be narrowly defined, as illustrated by e-Business in a New Economy and e-government activities.

The above remarks support the hypothesis that the process of agenda setting is predominantly context-specific, contingent and local. The question is the extent to which more rational approaches to policy formulation are possible, i.e. policies that are i) pro-active, ii) horizontal/global in nature and iii) avoid contextual randomness.

New – and sometimes radically new – agendas arise with the advent of so-called “change agents”. Windows of opportunity for change agents are especially large when changes in government occur, especially when a new government comes into power. New governments tend to be more active in setting new directions, overcoming barriers and interrupting or putting off current information society policy processes. It was observed that the new government that came into power in 2000 in Austria meant new directions, new people and the formation of new networks. This helped overcome lock-in situations, but the changes in personnel also led to the disappearance of accumulated know-how and (partly) destroyed old networks. Strong change agents can act as points of orientation or centres of gravitation for other players and implement changes that would not occur otherwise.

Over the ten years of discussion about an information society in Austria, there were two attempts to develop a global concept. The first document, in 1996, received little notice as a lead document, but the preparation work was a starting point for several initiatives. The second initiative in 2000 likewise did not produce a global strategy document that was accepted by the government, but it also sparked several smaller initiatives. Where stakeholder groups were involved, the mobilisation effect was suc-cessful. Moreover, owing to the complexity of the topic, it is increasingly difficult to develop concepts requiring a high degree of experience and contextual knowledge. It is therefore unlikely that another global ICT or information society strategy initiative would succeed.

An alternative to the construction of global concepts is the systematic detection of gaps (bottleneck analysis). The search for explicit “needs for action” has many advan-tages. It is not necessary to screen the whole system, but only to identify development-hindering factors and, on that basis, to design appropriate measures. Moreover, “the clock can be repaired while ticking”. and some contextual constraints can be overcome. This study did not find this kind of agenda-setting, but it would appear to be quite attractive. As an example, in the Ministry for Transport, Innovation and Technology, the IT



innovation department designed an IT research programme in an area where the department saw a funding gap, i.e. a “bottleneck”, in the structural context.

Just as most firms formulate a vision and goals, it is useful for a public body to formulate its aims and instruments. This is helpful in creating internal and external clarity. It defines a framework for agenda setting and makes it easier to determine whether ideas match the general goals of the organisation and to justify them. If explicit guidelines, in the form of meaningful mission statements and strategies, do not exist, there is more room for determining the agenda through personal relationships. However, informal agenda setting runs a higher risk that some players will not be heard.

Even if public bodies do not explicitly discuss which topics reach the agenda and how, there is one formal mechanism that is very influential in agenda setting. The (annual) budget planning is the point at which agendas are defined and agenda priorities are newly formulated. In ministries with few formal agenda-setting mechanisms, interviewees complained about “not being heard”. The interview partners did not explicitly blame this on the lack of formal mechanisms, but felt that their ministry lacked interest in information society matters, that their superiors did not attach importance to information society matters or that they were not “well-connected” within the ministry. This can occur in any policy area, but it is a greater problem for a horizontal policy area when the people responsible are ignored or given little prominence in the vertical power chain. The existence of formal co-ordination and interaction channels within ministries is important for articulating a horizontal policy area within the ministry.

Policy formulation and co-ordination

Policy formulation

Austrian information society policy formulation largely occurs in a local setting. Each ministry formulates its activities and programmes and does not necessarily take into account what is happening in other departments and institutions. Policy formulation generally focuses on department plans for near-term activities. In this sense, policies are rather small-scale and short-term and can lead to duplication and to a lack of vision or missing the “big picture”. The strongly local orientation is due to the fact that gathering and co-ordinating information about other public institutions is perceived as costly. This is discussed below in further detail.

As compared to the many examples of local policy formulation, two attempts to formulate a global information society strategy stand out. In both cases, a lot of resources were devoted to the strategy formulation. A large number of people were mobilised for brainstorming in working groups and the processes were quite time-consuming. The content of the first global strategy was viewed as acceptable by most relevant policy players at the time, while the content of the second strategy was heavily criticised. The two processes differed in that the first involved many stakeholders and policy players, whereas the second was “outsourced” to external experts and did not involve a number of important policy players from the ministries.

Both cases of the global information society strategies focused strongly on the content of the strategies, but did not focus enough attention on the process to implement the policies. This led to the fact that neither of the two attempts to formulate an information society strategy were implemented.



Co-ordination

Policy co-ordination is important for the effective use of public resources, for example to avoid policy duplication. A horizontal policy area such as the information society, which is spread over a multitude of public bodies, requires horizontal co-ordination to connect the information society sub-areas and vertical co-ordination to embed the information society areas into specific ministries’ policies. Co-ordination is a common means of addressing coherence.

In general co-ordination appeared to have an ambivalent status among actors in Austrian information society policy. In theory it is seen as extremely important, but it is also difficult for the players to appropriate the returns on their investment in the co-operation. Co-ordination and co-operation are often seen as an additional burden, as an increase in complexity and as leading to additional uncertainty. This is because more information has to be processed and co-ordination is not free from hidden strategic motivations among the players involved. Recently, a third reason has emerged: co-ordination and co-operation require additional resources without necessarily creating a compensating gain. Current constraints on budget and personnel resources act as disincentives to engage in co-operation and co-ordination.4 This constitutes a relatively stable pattern of behaviour, one that is observed not only for information society policy.

The degree of co-ordination needed varies among the different information society policy areas. E-government for example is an area in which broad co-ordination is necessary as it affects all ministries. Furthermore, e-government instruments such as the “electronic file” are to be implemented by all ministries in a similar way. The rather homogenous structure of the players involved and the general relevance of the measure make it an area that is potentially easy to co-ordinate, when the area is given thought and when resources are set aside for the programme.

Other information society areas such as e-learning and e-education affect only one ministry, thus requiring very little inter-ministerial co-ordination (inter-ministerial information exchange can still be useful, however). In this case the players involved in information society-related education policy (e-learning, e-teaching) are identical to the players involved in education policy in general. Co-ordination might still be difficult, but no additional co-ordination is necessary. Horizontal information exchange with IT research units could be useful, for example to start joint measures for the development of modern e-learning tools.

The information society area e-health consists of a large diversity of players. Co-ordination is extremely difficult but involves the same players as health policy in general. Co-ordination problems that arise are not due to the horizontal property of information society policy but to the complex structure of the health sector in general.

Co-ordination in the area of information society technology research is difficult, because research and technology policy is cross-sectoral. IT research is an area of information society policy which requires co-ordination and currently involves too little. The difficulty of co-ordination here is not specific to information society policy, but is due to the fact that technology policy is a horizontal policy area that affects a heterogeneous group of players. An added difficulty is the fact that successful IT research and innovation depend on many factors, including a well-functioning education and science system, the presence of IT researchers and IT firms and a healthy business (creation) environment.



The amount of co-ordination needed depends on the number and heterogeneity of the players involved. Sometimes formal co-ordination is unnecessary and information exchange is sufficient to avoid duplication and to create awareness. Co-ordination boards can be decision-making bodies or can serve for information exchange purposes only.

Experience has shown that the establishment of a co-ordination board does not ensure successful co-ordination. It is very important that co-ordination boards consist of representatives with the knowledge and decision power to fulfil the aims of the board. Co-ordination boards do not necessarily require high-ranking officials, but the members need to be adequate for the purpose. Successful co-ordination requires adequate financial, personal and managerial resources. Some co-ordination boards aim only to exchange information; they are useful as long as the participants gain insight from attending the meetings. This will be the case when the representatives are capable and willing to share information that is relevant for the others. Co-ordination boards that do not fulfil their purpose should be dissolved or their aims should be adapted to their capabilities. In order to ensure the effectiveness of co-ordination boards, it is good to be open to changes in the participants and to allow fresh insight to enter.

Stakeholders are often involved in co-ordination activities. Successful co-ordination and co-operation require differentiating between stakeholders who are participants and supporters of interests and those who are carriers of knowledge. This is more easily achieved when the core competency has been described and there is a clear definition of roles.

On the programme level, examples of successful co-operation and co-ordination were found. This is facilitated when there is a clear definition of roles and the necessary knowledge is available. The integration of different support channels under the e-Fit and New Media for Teaching programmes are cases in which the combination of steering committees, forums and external counsellors led to stability and good information exchange.

Implementation

Much that has been said about co-ordination and coherence efforts is also true for the implementation of measures, because coherence efforts are themselves part of imple-mentation. A second observation is that the status of implementation has greatly changed within the last ten years. Implementation has become a separate issue and numerous new public management concepts have entered policy actions.

The strategy formulation exercises showed that concepts, lead documents and (global) strategies that were not planned with a view to implementation risk ending with the production of the final document, leaving open whether or not they will be implemented. This is definitely not ideal, because good ideas may be wasted and because those who took part do not see any returns to their efforts and lose interest or become frustrated.

Personnel and financial resources need to be allocated to implementation to achieve good results. This is true for strategy concepts, and was also the case for the e-card. The failure of the first attempt to introduce an e-card (for the health system) depended significantly on the underestimation of the resources needed by the social security carrier to carry out the desired plans.



In many cases, implementation is a process based on division of labour, involving ministerial departments, agencies and private firms. This is very prominent in the programmes of the Ministry of Transport, Innovation and Technology and in parts of the Ministry for Economic Affairs and Labour. There has been some criticism that the division of labour has reached a level that makes governance difficult to sustain because of the lack of process ownership. This is not a problem only in the information society context.

On the programme level there are numerous cases in which the quality and originality of concepts and programmes were not determined by the content but by the method of implementation. Many of the case studies (Chief Information Office, e-FIT, New Media for Teaching, e-Business) can be seen as supporting examples.

Policy learning

The analysis of learning processes and effects gives very ambiguous results, as in the case of the two information society strategy formulation exercises. Although the first exercise made clear that it is not sufficient to create a strategy document, but that efforts must be made to implement the new ideas, the second information society strategy made the same mistake. A final document was produced, but was not even circulated within the department. Positive effects resulted from the exercise in that some of the brainstorming activities led to new initiatives, but it is not possible to conclude that the second information society strategy initiative had “learned” how to conduct a strategy exercise.

Examples of successful learning do however exist. Integrated learning processes were used in a number of government support programmes, especially in IT research and development support programmes. Explicit justification for measures, monitoring throughout the duration of the measures and evaluation (which has nearly become a standard measure) are clear evidence of this. This does not exclude the possibility that the justification was carried out unsatisfactorily or that monitoring and evaluation results were not utilised to create improvements. Learning processes, such as the evaluation of particular measures and the establishment of information channels, still need to be established or improved in all areas of information society policy. This is especially true for the health sector.

Main findings and suggestions for policy

This chapter analyses Austrian information society innovation policy, looking at historical development, current status and degree of coherence of information society innovation policy. Interviews with important policy players gave insight in the different stages of the policy cycle (agenda setting, policy formulation, implementation, co-ordination and learning).

Information society policy is no longer a new cross-sectoral policy topic. In the 1980s and 1990s information society innovation policy had some difficulty positioning itself in the departmental structure of the federal ministries, but information society topics are now quite well established. Owing to the relative maturity of the policy area, depart-mental units have had time to build up competence and establish their responsibilities for specific information society innovation policy matters. This has led to clearer definitions of information society policy responsibilities. With respect to transparency and allocation of responsibilities, the coherence of Austrian information society policy has certainly increased.



Another important development affecting Austrian information society innovation policy is the growing influence of European-level information society innovation policy. EU initiatives and aims affect Austrian agenda setting and lead to a significant degree of synchronisation of the agenda, especially in information society R&D policy. EU initiatives and guidelines lead to greater coherence among European nations, but also in Austrian information society policy itself.

The maturity of the policy area is also reflected in the fact that large-scale information society innovation strategy concepts are no longer developed; current information society innovation policy now consists of many small initiatives. Owing to the fact that many institutions are involved in information society innovation policy and all are working on their own, there is a strong need for co-ordination. Although total policy coherence is an ideal which cannot be achieved in the real world, working towards coherence is definitely desirable. Austrian information society innovation policy lacks coherence in some aspects, e.g. when a duplication of initiatives occurs (in ICT research and development) or when players do not co-ordinate well (e-health).

Information society policy measures have proliferated in various domains in recent years. Many departmental units have created their own programmes, in some of which their aims or instruments overlap with other measures. The costs of checking whether any one else is already conducting a similar initiative and discussing possible alterations seem too high compared to possible benefits. Some pressure to co-ordinate does exist within departments, but depends on the structures. Generally there is less motivation to co-ordinate with more distant policy bodies, e.g. other ministries and other agencies. Co-ordination is sometimes enforced from above by the Council for Research and Tech-nology Development (as for the ICT programmes of the three ministries) .

A study by Dachs et al. (2003) on the factors of success and failure in Austrian IST development5 concludes that Austrian political institutions showed little concerted effort to actively push information society policy. Instead they stress the importance of EU stimuli through White Papers and regulation as well as the interest of the private sector (Dachs et al., 2003, p. 17). They also believe that “Austria would be doing even better in some indicators if there had been a stronger public policy push towards the information society”.

Possible policy conclusions for the different phases of the policy cycle are noted below.

Agenda setting

Agenda setting can take place as a formalised process or can be continuously adapted. Agendas can be determined top down by high-ranking bodies or can arise through suggestions and ideas, e.g. from interest groups. An important factor in shaping the national agenda has been EU policies, which represent an orientation point for national agendas and serve as a natural mechanism to align policies and provide ideas.

“Localised” information society policy strategies are useful for orientation and as guidelines both for the organisation itself and for indicating how its activities differ from those of other organisations. “Global” or “overarching” information society strategies are theoretically useful for creating more coherence among policies, but face a much more difficult task. Apart from the difficulty of devising and designing such a strategy, it faces the risk of not being accepted by all stakeholders.



The systematic detection of ways to improve the current strategy (bottleneck analysis) is an alternative to the construction of overarching strategies. It consists of identifying development-hindering factors and then designing helpful measures. This approach has the advantage of being more realistic about what can be achieved and thus has a better chance of acceptance and implementation.

Significant revolutionary changes rarely occur in agenda setting. One point in time when agendas are strongly modified is when new governments come into power and create new change agents. They often set new directions and lead to the creation of new networks (however, they may also destroy old agendas and old networks).

Level of policy co-ordination

Policy co-ordination is important for the effective use of public resources, especially in a cross-sectoral policy matter that needs to be embedded both in the departmental structures and linked between departments. The degree of co-ordination needed varies among information society policy areas, depending on the area’s structure. Whereas e-government policy often deals with a large number of homogenous players, e-health consists of a large number of heterogeneous and influential players, making it very difficult to achieve consensus and to plan measures without formal co-ordination. Sometimes information exchange is sufficient, at other times formal co-ordination boards are needed.

When co-ordination boards are needed, it is very important that they consist of representatives with the knowledge and decision power to fulfil the aims of the board. Boards do not necessarily need high-ranking officials, but the members need to have the necessary qualifications and power.

Policy implementation

In order for concepts to become a reality, it is very important to carefully plan and carry out the implementation. The quality and originality of concepts and programmes are greatly affected not only by the content but also by the method of implementation. For the implementation to be successful, adequate resources are necessary for:

• Ex ante activities, e.g. detailed content planning and maybe foresight.

• Co-ordinating activities, e.g. the involvement of stakeholders in all phases of the programme.

• Outward communication, awareness-building activities.

• Use of analytical tools such as evaluation, monitoring (project supervision), benchmarking.

Concepts, lead documents and (global) strategies that were not planned with respect to their implementation have a great danger of remaining ineffective or having unplanned (and undesired) effects. In the past, policy makers have tried to outsource the imple-mentation of initiatives; however, public organisations need to retain some process ownership. In order to formulate the outsourced duties, the contracting authority needs some managerial and hierarchical competence. This is imperative for achieving the intended results of an initiative.



Policy learning

Integrated learning processes, such as policy evaluation and the establishment of information and feedback channels, are necessary for successful policy learning. A combination of local and higher-ranking policy learning must exist in a complex policy area such as the information society. The establishment and provision of strategic intel-ligence, i.e. organised information provision, can be done through various instruments (market studies, technology assessment, technology foresight, monitoring, evaluation).

To sum up, there is considerable room for increasing policy coherence in the field of information society policy in Austria. At present, there appears to be at most a weak link between information society policy and technology and innovation policy. On the other hand, even in the absence of an overarching information society strategy, policy has reacted to the challenges of the information society. This was often done in a localised way, that is, with the borders of the respective administrative competences. In the various sub-fields of information society policy, failures were found, but also different ways to achieve policy coherence, some of which have succeeded quite well. It also emerged that there might be limited need to co-ordinate everything and everybody in the form of a “grand strategy”. The reasons why attempts have failed twice in the past are still in place. If there were communication channels, institutions and incentives for co-operation that are sufficiently strong to allow for self-organised co-operation and mutual policy learning, Austrian information society policy would be successful.

Interview partners

Interviewees held responsibilities for information society matters in the following institutions:

• Federal Ministry for Transport, Innovation and Technology

• Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs and Labour

• Federal Ministry of Education, Science and Culture

• Federal Ministry for Health and Women

• Federal Ministry of Finance

• Federal Ministry of Justice

• Federal Chancellery

• Chief Information Office

• E-Co-operation Board

• City of Vienna – Chief Executive Office – ICT Strategy and Management

• Vienna Science and Technology Fund

• Council for Research and Technology Development

• Main Association of Austrian Social Security Institutions

• Austrian Regulatory Authority for Broadcasting and Telecommunications

• Austrian Federal Economic Chamber



• Public Employment Service

• Austrian Medical Association

• Competence Centre FTW (Research-Centre Telecommunication Vienna)

• Imagination (industry partner in the competence centre Virtual Reality and Visualisation (VRVis)

• Telekom Austria AG

• Mobilkom Austria AG & Co KG

• Siemens AG

• Infineon Technologies AG

• Education Highway – Innovation Centre for Schools and New Technology GmbH (Educational Server Upper Austria)

Notes

1. For details of the approach, including the interview guidelines, see Ohler et al., 2004.

2. Databank Consulting, “eEurope 2005 Key Figures for Benchmarking EU 15”, SIBIS, April 2003.

3. ICT was already being funded earlier, but under different names.

4. In some departments there have been reductions in personnel along with increased generosity regarding resource transfers to third parties. Outsourcing of services requires search, communication, acceptance of the service, appropriation on the part of the outsourcing side and specific resources. In an increasing number of cases, not only the provision of a service is outsourced but also the tender, the choice of outsourcing partners and the acceptance of the service.

5. The Austrian case study forms part of a study by ESTO (2003) on “Identifying factors of success and failure in European IST-related national/regional developments”.



References

Austrian Council for Science and Technology Development (2002), “Nationaler Forschungs- und Innovationsplan”, Vienna.

Austrian Federal Chancellory – Bundeskanzleramt, Bundespressedienst (ed.) (1996), “Informationsgesellschaft. Endbericht der Arbeitsgruppe der österreichischen Bundesregierung”, Vienna.

Austrian Federal Chancellery (1996), Informationsgesellschaft, Final Report of the Working Group of the Austrian Federal Government, issued by Federal Chancellery, Federal Press Service, Editor: E. Grossendorfer, Scientific Editor: N.G. Knoll, Vienna, December.

BMWA (Ministry of Economic Affairs and Labour) (2001), “Final Report of the ‘E-business in a New Economy’ Initiative”, Vienna.

Boekholt, P. (2002), “Towards Policy Integration” in P. Boekholt (ed.), “Innovation Policy and Sustainable Development: Can Innovation Incentives Make a Difference?”, Contributions to a Six-Country Programme, Conference, Brussels, 28 February- 1 March 2002, pp. 141-146.

Boekholt, P. (ed.) (2002), “Innovation Policy and Sustainable Development: Can Innovation Incentives Make a Difference?”, Contributions to a Six-Country Programme, Conference, Brussels, 28 February-1 March.

Dachs B. et al. (2003), “Identifying Factors of Success and Failure in European IST-related National/Regional Developments: Austrian Case Study”, ESTO/arcs.

Databank Consulting (2003), eEurope 2005 Key Figures for Benchmarking, EU 15, SIBIS.

e-Austria Taskforce (2001), e-Austria: “Strategische Ziele und Aktionslinien für die österreichische Bundesregierung, Empfehlungen an die Bundesregierung”, Vienna.

European Commission (1994), “Bangemann Report Europe and the Global Information Society: Recommendations to the European Council”, Brussels.

European Commission (2001), “European Governance – A White Paper”, Brussels.

European Commission (2002), “eEurope 2005: Eine Informationsgesellschaft für alle”, Brussels.

European Commission (2004), “Europa und die globale Informationsgesellschaft – Empfehlungen an den Europäischen Rat”, Brussels.

Ministry for Science and Transport – Bundesministerium für Wissenschaft und Verkehr (1999), “Grünbuch zur österreichischen Forschungspolitik”, Vienna, http://www.bmbwk.gv.at/medienpool/3746/gruenbuch.pdf.

Ohler, F., W. Polt, A. Rammer, and J. Schindler (2003), “Governance in der österreichischen Politik im Politikfeld Informationsgesellschaft – Interviewleitfaden”, Vienna.



Ohler, F., W. Polt, A. Rammer, and J. Schindler (2003), “Governance in der österreichischen Politik im Politikfeld Informationsgesellschaft – Hypothesen zum Thema IKT Governance”, Working Paper, Vienna.

Ohler, F., W. Polt, A. Rammer, and J. Schindler (2004), “Governance in Austrian Information Society Policy”.

Posch, R. (2003), “e-Government – Entwicklung in Österreich, Bericht Juni 2003”, Chief Information Office (Stabstelle IKT-Strategie des Bundes), June.

Schindler, J. (2003), “OECD Information Technology Outlook 2004 -- Country Report: Austria”, Joanneum Research, Vienna.

Schneider, H., W. Polt, H. Gassler, W. Lueghammer, J. Schindler et al. (2004), “IKT in Österreich”, study on behalf of the Austrian Council for Science and Technology Development, Vienna.

INFORMATION SOCIETY GOVERNANCE AND ITS LINKS TO INNOVATION POLICY IN FINLAND – 35


Chapter 2

INFORMATION SOCIETY GOVERNANCE AND ITS LINKS TO INNOVATION POLICY IN FINLAND

Juha Oksanen VTT Technology Studies

Development of the information society and science, technology and innovation (STI) policy making are closely intertwined in Finland. Concerns about international competitiveness and wealth creation in the global economy have been a driving force for both. They also share decision-making and policy features and are based on a strong commitment to and protection of consensus among major public and private stakeholders. They sometimes differ in terms of the administrations and actors involved in policy making.

The information society has been on the policy agenda since the mid-1990s and a number of strategies and action plans have been drafted at the national, regional and local levels. Their preparation has often involved actors from various administrative sectors as well as stakeholders representing private companies and civic associations. However, leadership and co-ordination in implementing information society activities have been lacking. In particular, it has been argued that co-ordination of information society policies horizontally across sectors and vertically between local, regional and state authorities is insufficient. Improving co-ordination is one of the main goals of the new Information Society Policy Programme and Information Society Council launched by the government in autumn 2003.

Overall, Finland’s STI policy making has been more concrete and more coherent than policies promoting the development of the information society. Interestingly, the success of STI policy making is partly based on a well-established division of labour in the central government. In these areas, the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Trade and Industry, with agencies in their respective fields, have been the principal policy-making actors. Horizontal innovation policy, which crosses administrative boundaries, poses new challenges to current STI policy making, which is still largely sectoral. The question arises whether truly horizontal innovation policy can rely solely on values and goals inherent in science and technology policy making or whether it must take into account broader societal issues, goals and values.

36 – INFORMATION SOCIETY GOVERNANCE AND ITS LINKS TO INNOVATION POLICY IN FINLAND


Introduction

This chapter focuses on governance in the development of the information society in Finland and the dialogue with innovation policy. It brings out both challenges and opportunities relating to horizontal policy making and governance. In the policy debate the notion of the “information society“ is linked to the development of information and communication technologies (ICT) and the prospects for industry and the economy. At the same time, the term has also been closely associated with a broader range of societal issues, such as education, e-democracy and sustainable information society development.

The need to reconsider the governance modes of the politico-administrative system has various sources, some of which are endogenous while others arise from changes in the political and operational environment. The challenges to be faced show the need for horizontal and vertical co-ordination of public policy activities as well as for coherence and policy learning:

• The current political administration is highly departmentalised and this adversely affects interdepartmental exchange and co-operation (Edler et al., 2003).

• Shifting of decision-making power from the national level to sub-national (regional and local) and supranational (EU) authorities.

• The nature of the issues on policy agenda is changing and there are an increasing number of “cross-cutting issues“ structured around client groups rather than around functional policy areas (Peters, 1998).

In the face of such challenges, governments are looking for new, more collaborative governance models that entail working through networks rather than hierarchies. This requires a variety of co-operative arrangements involving actors from the public sector, the private sector and civil society associations. Greater collaboration is needed not only between government and its non-governmental partners, but also among ministries which are managing policies in a more horizontal manner and are working with each other in more co-ordinated ways.

This study has three major goals: i) to describe policies that support development of the information society; ii) to map information society links with STI policies; and iii) to analyse the opportunities and challenges of horizontal innovation policy from the view-point of the information society. To this end, the focus is on the paths followed in the development of the information society, with special attention to (potential) links to STI policies, on how the information society policy agenda is set in practice, on the degree to which information society activities are co-ordinated horizontally across administrative fields, and on the kinds of policy learning processes, if any, that can be identified in Finnish information society policy.

The major focus is on policy making at the central government level. However, reference is also made to policies and initiatives on regional and local levels, even though they have not been reviewed as systematically as the central government. The case study on the eTampere programme comes under the umbrella of the information society study, but is reported separately. The decision to focus on the central government is due to the number of information society projects and actions on local and regional levels: it is estimated that in 2002 there were several hundred ongoing national projects on the information society, but closer to 1 000 at the regional and local levels.1



This chapter covers a wide range of empirical material and includes both primary and secondary sources. The studies cover information society and STI policy issues. In order to go beyond the surface of official descriptions of strategies provided in formal policy documents and to get a better grasp of questions relevant to the MONIT project, three case studies were selected for closer review, with the idea that they could illuminate different aspects of potential connections between information society and innovation policy. They are presented in Annex 2.A.

The next section discusses briefly the emergence of the notion of the information society and outlines some major features. Attention then turns to the evolution of the information society in Finland through a concise overview of its development since the 1970s. The following section presents the key actors, before describing, in the subsequent section, the links between the development of the information society and STI policy. The balance of the chapter gives a more detailed review of the different phases of the information society policy-making cycle, from agenda setting to policy formulation and co-ordination and then to evaluation.2 Within this heuristic framework, it is possible to deal with specific aspects of policy making, such as policy coherence, vertical and especially horizontal co-ordination across administrative sectors, and policy learning.

The information society as a complex policy domain

Studies on the information society can be understood as an attempt to grasp the changes taking place in industrial societies over the last decades. Researchers have high-lighted various societal aspects in order to describe how this evolving society differs from that of the past. Depending on viewpoint and theoretical lenses, different reasons for the transformation have been identified and stressed; they may be technological, economic, occupational, cultural or spatial. This has led to a plethora of definitions and fashionable labels: post-industrial society, service society, post-modern society, risk society, network society, knowledge-based society and information society, to name a few.

The definitions are not mutually exclusive, and the notion of the information society incorporates various aspects of apparent changes in different areas of social life, from the economy to culture. Even so, technologically oriented interpretations have been parti-cularly evident in policy discourse. Rapid advances in ICT and the growth of information networks are commonly perceived as a defining feature of the information society. From a policy viewpoint, the development of ICT presents challenges but also opens up oppor-tunities for governments, companies and citizens. From the early 1990s, the European Union, national governments and regional and local authorities have adopted information society strategies and programmes to smooth and advance the expected structural changes. According to Schienstock et al. (1999), four key themes have dominated the policy state-ments: “the ‘information society’ would supposedly guarantee economic competitiveness and employment; bring ecological advantages; intensify democracy; revolutionise our ways of living and working with the help of new communications technologies”.

By its nature, the information society raises genuinely horizontal policy issues that cross various societal boundaries. The all-encompassing character of the information society – it is everywhere and nowhere – blurs the limits and content of the phenomena that the term attempts to capture. In addition, there are signs that the pervasive and rapid diffusion of ICT throughout society is weakening the information society as an organising notion for policy making. When the use of ICT becomes a natural part of everyday life, it seems increasingly hard to define what makes the information society a distinct policy issue.3



Therefore, it would appear that the success of ICT to which the concept of the information society has been firmly anchored may be crowding out the latter’s potential to deliver a politically compelling vision for the future. Of course, it is the narrow definition of the information society which focuses on the development, diffusion and use of ICT that may have become somewhat outmoded. However, the potential social impacts of the information society for issues such as e-democracy have largely still to materialise.

It is worth recalling that ambiguity in terms of concepts and symbols is part and parcel of politics and policy making. The capacity of concepts and symbols to have multiple meanings is not a negative feature of policy making as it is of science because it enables coalition building and compromise. Stone (1997, p. 161) even states that ambi-guity can be considered as “the glue of politics which allows people to agree on policies because they can read different meanings into the words”. According to Stone, ambi-guous words provide “the vehicle through which diverse motivations, expectations and values are synchronised to make collective action possible” (p. 157).

This applies not only to the information society but also to innovation policy. As Kuhlmann (2000, p. 30, referring to Jasanoff, 1997) points out, “there is a lingering uncertainty about the boundaries of research and innovation policies which could with little imagination be stretched to encompass virtually every aspect of purposive state activity: health, education, welfare, defence, energy, environment”. Pelkonen (2005) pays attention to the ambiguousness of Finnish innovation policy and argues that “innovation policy does not officially exist in Finland, as it is not politically defined or opera-tionalised”. In policy debates, innovation policy is (still) predominantly perceived as sector-based science and technology (S&T) policy. At the same time the notion of the national innovation system has achieved almost a paradigmatic position among Finnish politicians and policy makers as an organising schema for S&T policy making. The vagueness surrounding innovation policy has increased with the proliferation of terms such as innovation environment, innovativeness, and social innovation, all of which have gained ground in policy discourse over the recent years.

To summarise, information society is understood here as a political rather than as a theoretical term that would try to define the character of current societal development. It is more the visionary aspects implicit in the information society that arguably are attractive in politics and policy making. In this vein, Schienstock et al. (1999, p. 4) have noted that the information society “is present as a strategic aim, in order to overcome the current social stagnation”. What is important is the weight given to intentional action and future orientation which are essential parts of politics and decision making.

The e-democracy case study brought out the opportunities for defining the information society in different ways. According to Kuitunen (2004), development of the Finnish information society has been mostly motivated by business sector interests and targets, with competitiveness as the main rationale and driving force. At the same time there is strong reliance on the public sector, and governance is conceived in terms of the principal players organising and implementing information society strategies. By contrast, e-democracy has adopted a somewhat different approach. Local actors and authorities have taken the initiative to develop information society practices and procedures. Furthermore, researchers have participated actively in the e-democracy debate, bringing more critical viewpoints to the discussion. Some of the most significant differences between the information society and e-democracy strategies/doctrines are summarised in Table 2.1.



Table 2.1. Characteristics of conventional information society development and e-democracy

Information society e-democracy

Approach Top-down Bottom up

Actors Business sector actors Public sector actors

Local actors: public authorities and ordinary citizens Researchers

Nature of communication

Vertical, one-directional Horizontal, multi-directional

Focus and targets of the activity

Development of business opportunities for firms Digitalisation of public services

Enhancement of civic participation strengthening the links between citizens and public authorities and political elites Deliberation Empowerment

Source: Kuitunen (2004).

Information society as a formal policy domain

Development of the information society in Finland

The development of the Finnish information society and related public debate has largely followed international trends. Phenomena that are perceived as distinctive for the information society have been around for some time, even if the term only became fashionable in the policy-making forum in the 1990s. In the 1970s and the early 1980s, the impact of evolving information technologies and electronics on industrial structure, content of work and employment raised interest among policy makers and the research community alike.

Emerging challenges and opportunities led to a rethinking of national strategies in Finland at the end of the 1970s and in the 1980s (e.g. Lemola, 2001). In 1979 the government appointed the Technology Committee to assess technical developments and their impact and propose ways to increase the beneficial effects of new technologies, decrease the harmful aspects and strengthen technical know-how. In its report, the Committee highlighted the role of automation and micro-electronics, which were expected to change radically the industrial structure of industrialised countries in the 1980s. The government was urged to take initiatives that would secure the competi-tiveness of Finland’s industry and service sectors. A step in this direction was taken in 1980 when an information technology action programme for Finland was launched. Development of ICTs was boosted further by the establishment of a new funding agency, Tekes, the Technology Development Centre, in 1983.4

During the 1980s a number of decisions were taken which have proven particularly successful from the perspective of development of the Finnish information society. One often-mentioned factor was the deregulation and liberalisation of the telecommunication market which took place gradually from 1987. Finland had a unique starting point for liberalisation and development in this area (Paija and Rouvinen, 2004), because telephony was never a state monopoly as in other countries. Instead it had a dual market structure. A state-owned telephony operator had a stronghold in long-distance and international telecommunication, whereas a multitude of private companies, with local monopoly positions, operated local telephony networks. This market structure prepared the way for a rapid take-off of competition in the wake of deregulation and liberalisation. With hindsight it can be argued that the open-source approach to technological development



adopted in Finland accelerated the mushrooming of new technology-based businesses and the quick take-up of new communication devices in the population.

The 1990s: a decade of national information society strategies

In the early 1990s, discussion of the information society increased sharply in both the United States and Europe. The political upheavals in eastern Europe, rapid changes in global trade and ICT and Internet breakthroughs caused major changes in Finland’s operational and political environment. A deep recession and soaring unemployment during preparation for EU accession gave a special colour to the national policy debate of the time. Beliefs and practices that had been taken for granted were strongly challenged and cleared the way for a profound reconsideration of national priorities and policies. The situation opened a “policy window“ which made it easier to set a vision for Finland’s future that various societal groups and interest organisations could share. Around that time, the terms “national innovation system”, “cluster approach” to industrial policy and development of the “information society” appeared on national policy agenda.

In this new mental landscape, promoting the development of the information society became an integral part of national policy. The first explicit national strategy for the information society was formulated in 1994. The OECD review of information and communications policies in Finland (1992) was an impetus for drafting the strategy. According to the review, Finland had a high level of information technologies and telecommunications penetration and expertise but lacked a clear strategy in these areas (OECD, 2004). A resolution of the Council of Ministers relating to measures to reform Finland’s central and regional administration provided a framework for developing a national information society strategy.

The Ministry of Finance, which was given the responsibility of preparing a national information management strategy, appointed a working group (TIKAS group) to draw up the strategy. Paralleling international trends, the group adopted a wide perspective. Its report, Finland’s Way to the Information Society – The National Strategy and Its Imple-mentation, emphasised the Finnish economy and society and international co-operation. A main argument of this first strategy document was that, in the longer run, ICT and its utilisation in the networking of economic and societal activities were the key to solving the problems facing Finland. On this basis, a vision for the’s near future was established. Furthermore, it was envisaged that Finland would be a leading global figure in ICT and information industry applications.

Recommendations were targeted both to the public administration and to industry and commerce. The central government was to frame more detailed strategies and plans were to be prepared for sectors. In January 1995 Prime Minister Aho’s government adopted a decision in principle on measures for developing the Finnish information society. This document expressed the government’s commitment to the strategy’s guidelines. State departments and agencies were obliged to include measures needed for the strategy’s operational implementation into their annual budget plans. Also the new coalition govern-ment, which came to power in the same year following the general election, committed itself to the information society strategy. Prime Minister Lipponen’s government (1995-99) included a number of references to the development of the information society in its programme setting out priorities for the coming cabinet period.5



Late 1990s onwards

During the latter part of the 1990s, the centre of public information society activities gradually shifted from the central government to the regional and local levels. Consequently, regional and local projects relating to the information society flourished around the country. The central government took a less active role during the period around 2000, although e-governance issues were visible in legislation and in ministry agendas. Around the same time, the content of public information society strategies and initiatives were going through small but noticeable qualitative chances. Well into the latter part of 1990s, the focus of policies promoting the information society was dominated by issues of ICT development and infrastructure as well as international competitiveness, but gradually, more attention was paid to broader social aspects of development, such as sustainable, regional and civic dimensions of the information society. This led to a revision of the first national information society strategy in the late 1990s.

The original strategy of 1994 was criticised for its exclusive focus on technology and international competitiveness and its lack of attention to civil society issues. The National Research and Development Fund, Sitra, was assigned the task of preparing a new information society strategy for Finland. The updated national strategy (Quality of Life, Knowledge and Competitiveness: Premises and objectives for the strategic development of the Finnish information society) was published at the end of 1998. The renewed strategy led to a series of spearhead projects which were acknowledged by Prime Minister Lipponen’s government, which was returned to power after the general elections in spring 1999, although the updated version was never officially adopted at government level.

In autumn 2003, Prime Minister Vanhanen’s government launched a new Information Society Policy Programme in conjunction with three other policy programmes covering the most important aspects of the government’s programme. The Information Society Policy Programme is led by the Prime Minister and co-ordinated from the Prime Minister’s Office. The other policy programmes are the Employment Policy Programme co-ordinated by the Minister of Labour, the Entrepreneurship Policy Programme co-ordinated by the Minister of Trade and Industry, and the Civil Participation Policy Programme co-ordinated by the Minister of Justice. With the launch of the new programme a new high-level Information Society Council was established. This new arrangement is discussed in greater detail below.

Actors in the information society policy domain

As a cross-cutting policy theme rather than a well-defined and delineated policy field, the information society does not lend itself to a mapping exercise. It can be approached through a broadly defined concept of a policy domain defined as “a component of the political system organised around substantive issues” (Burstein, 1991, p. 328). The information society qualifies as a substantive issue around which a constellation of public and private actors has evolved into a policy field comprised of the many public actors and other stakeholders that participated in the formulation of an agenda, first for ICT-centred development and later for the information society in a broader sense. In the 1980s the university sector, private firms and individual experts and visionaries were especially active promoters of the information society.



In the course of 1990s, the state, municipalities and non-governmental organisations took on a more pronounced role and related themes entered the broader public debate. For instance, growing concerns were voiced about the capabilities of citizens to employ new information technologies. Questions about equal access to new ICT solutions (the “digital divide”) were discussed and received attention from policy makers. Individual organi-sations with a noticeable role at this stage were TIEKE, the Information Technology Development Centre, which was involved in drafting the first national information society strategy, and Sitra, which played a prominent role in the new strategy.

A distinctive feature of the development of the Finnish information society has been active collaboration between private- and public-sector actors. The business sector has been a driving force, while the government and the public administration have mostly reacted to ongoing developments. However, while technological development companies and those in the ICT sector have certainly played a role, it would be an oversimplification to assume that the state did not leave an imprint in terms of societal development through the ICT/information society policy making of the last decades.

Organisation of information society policies at the level of central government

Although national information society strategies have existed since the mid-1990s, ministries and administrative fields have in practice had substantial autonomy to decide how to react to the guidelines in their own administrative sectors. It can be argued that formal co-ordination of the implementation of national information society strategies has been quite weak if not absent. It is still too early to assess whether the new Information Society Policy Programme launched by Prime Minister Vanhanen’s government in autumn 2003 and the new Information Society Council will change this situation. Co-ordination of information society activities across ministries and sectors is a main goal of the programme and the Council.

Within the public administration certain ministries have played a relatively strong part in the formulation of information society strategies and visions. For instance, the Ministry of Transport and Communications has had an important influence on legislation concerning development of telecommunications and the communications infrastructure. The Ministry of Finance has played a visible role by introducing ICT solutions in the public sector and co-ordinating the development and promotion of e-government in Finland. As mentioned, the Ministry of Finance was also tasked in the early 1990s with preparing the first national information society strategy.

The Ministry of Education, one of the key ministries in national STI policy making, has actively worked for the development of the information society. In early 1995, it drew up a strategy for information and communication policy for education, training and research into the 21st century (Ministry of Education, 1995), which contained the Expert Committee’s proposals on how to raise the level of education and research by applying information technology, thus promoting national competitiveness and employment, and on how to promote the availability and use of information and to assess the needs and identify the means for giving citizens basic skills in using ICT. In order to implement the strategy, the Ministry of Education implemented its Information Society Programme (1995-99). In early 1999 a new information society strategy for education, training and research was devised by the Ministry of Education for 2000-04 (Ministry of Education, 1999). This was followed by a national strategy on education, training and research in the information society for 2004-06 (Ministry of Education, 2004).



In comparison, the other central actor in the STI policy arena, the Ministry of Trade and Industry, has had a minor role in information society issues, especially if one looks beyond innovation policy narrowly defined in terms of S&T policies alone. Within the framework of the current government’s Information Society Policy Programme, the Ministry of Trade and Industry focuses its actions on developing electronic business and electronic services for companies. In addition it seeks to promote content production and strengthen resources for training, research and product development with these companies (Ministry of Trade and Industry, 2003). In the field of technology policy, the Ministry of Trade and Industry and particularly Tekes are the principal sources of public funding and advice for technology development and innovation, including in the ICT field. Tekes has actively participated in and promoted the development and application of ICT-based solutions in different sectors of society. A notable example is its technology programmes in the field of health care.6

In other state departments, the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health have been responsible for prominent information society projects at different stages. The Ministry of the Interior was already involved in early telecottage pilot projects in the 1980s and early 1990s which aimed to lower the threshold for the use of new information technologies (computers, etc.) in geographically peripheral locations but later also in less favoured urban areas. More recently, it has been in charge of promoting e-government at regional and municipal levels. The Ministry of the Interior has responsibility for developing electronic services, network services and citizen services to ensure their availability. In addition it promotes co-operation between the state and municipalities for information management and helps to build up co-operation in information management in regional administration.

The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health and the agencies within its administration have centred their activities on the Finnish welfare cluster and the application of ICT in social and welfare services and their provision, e.g. e-health solutions. In 1995, after the publication of the first national information society strategy, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health assigned a broad-based working group to draft a national strategy regarding the application of information technology in health care and welfare. The original strategy was reviewed and updated over 2000-02.

The Regional Satakunta Macropilot Project (1999-2001) is one of the largest and best-known attempts to apply information technology to develop social welfare and health-care services. Its aim was to support seamless linking of social and health-care services provided by various organisations, with implementation based on a new type of co-operation model which included both the municipalities responsible for the services but also state administration and the private sector actors. The broader framework was provided by the IT strategy of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health as well as the national welfare cluster programme (see for example, Hänninen et al., 2001).

Figure 2.1 presents the ministries that have been most directly involved with information society development in Finland over the time.



Figure 2.1. Ministries with main responsibility for the information society

Development of the information society and innovation policy

Questions related to STI policy have been closely examined in official information society strategies and guidelines, as well as in the literature reviewing the development of the Finnish information society. The evolution of the information society shares issues, actors and advances with the development of national science and technology policy: the Technology Committee in 1979, the founding of Tekes in 1983, continuous public promotion of R&D and innovation activities, increasing intake in higher educational institutions and the take-off of the Finnish ICT industries to name a few (Nevalainen, 1999; Huuhtanen, 2001).

As a policy domain, the information society also has considerable similarities with the targets and values of science, technology and innovation policy. Overall, development of the information society appears as a technology-driven process which gives strong weight to ICT. In both policy spheres, there is also a firm commitment to growth and inter-national competitiveness through technological advances. As a result, it is not surprising that the development of the information society is commonly assessed through mainly

VM Ministry of

Social Affairs and Health

(STM)

SM Ministry of Education

(OPM)

OM Ministry of Transport

and Communi-

cations (LVM)

KTM Ministry of

Finance (VM)

Ministry of the Interior

(SM)

Ministry of Justice

(OM)

Ministry of Trade and Industry

(KTM)

e-Government at regional and local level

e-Government, ICT in public sector

Telecom and infrastructure

e-Learning, ICT skills for

citizens

e-Health

Legislation

ICT R&D e-Business



quantitative indicators of the penetration of technical devices such as numbers of mobile handsets, computers and Internet connections in the population and access to and use of ICT. A lot of attention is also paid to indicators on R&D, ICT infrastructure and ICT sector in general.

Information society and innovation themes have entered policy and strategy documents and are taken by policy makers from different sectors and policy domains. The Science and Technology Policy Council has frequently referred to development of the information and knowledge-based society in its tri-annual reviews, which are considered as main strategy documents outlining national S&T policy strategies.7 For instance, the Council’s 1996 Review contains an appendix delineating the Science and Technology Policy Council’s view on “Development of Finnish Information Society”. Overall, the review pays a lot of attention to connections between the national innovation system and the development of the information society and education policy (1996, p. 52).8 Likewise, information society documents clearly draw attention to ICT and continued investments in R&D and education as major requisites for the development of the information society.9

In terms of links between innovation policy and the development of the information society some interviewees noted that the policy-making level in the two policy domains does not always coincide, mainly owing to differences in the sectors involved in policy making. However, the two domains seem to be moving closer together. Their intertwining interests are well illustrated in the composition of the new Information Society Council, which has a sub-group focusing specifically on education and R&D issues. Among external interest groups present in the group are representatives of the key public funding agencies in the field of science and technology policy (the Academy of Finland and Tekes), Sitra, the National Board of Education, Nokia Group, and a few other stake-holders. From the central government side, the section has representatives from the Ministry of Trade and Industry and the Ministry of Education, the ministries responsible for S&T policy.

There are, however, also areas in which linkages between the information society and science, technology and innovation policy are less pronounced. In particular, e-democracy and civil society participation are issues which appear regularly in the information society debate, but seldom in STI policy discourse. For instance, democracy issues and values are built into the EU-level information society debate and frameworks. ICT and especially the Internet are assumed to increase democracy by giving citizens new possibilities to connect with one another and with their representatives. At the same time, there are concerns about the digital divide and equal access to the use of new information and communication technologies in all social groups. Although democracy issues have been part of Finnish information society discussions and activities, competitiveness and changes in the economy have been the main rationale and driving force in official strategies and guidelines (Kuitunen, 2004).

At the level of aims and means there are significant differences between e-democracy, on the one hand, and ”conventional” information society and STI policy rationales, on the other. STI policy aims first of all at fostering competitiveness and growth. For e-democracy, the major target is to support debate and strengthen civil society by increasing ordinary citizens’ opportunities for active participation and dialogue through technological and other means. It is the citizens, not the authorities or the private firms, who are the main actors and the main impetus for e-democracy, rather than policy makers and the authorities. It is nevertheless clear that in Finland, the public authorities have



been active in promoting “digidemocracy” (especially locally) and in digitalising public services (the latter qualifies more as e-governance which aims to improve the efficiency of the delivery of public services and has nothing to do with democratic participation per se). Table 2.2 illustrates characteristics of the focus and targets, values and target groups of the information society, e-democracy and innovation policy.

Table 2.2. Some characteristics of innovation policy, the information society and e-democracy

Feature Innovation policy Information society e-democracy

Focus and targets

Growth, competitiveness and prosperity Enhancing the growth and competitiveness by supporting innovation activities Supporting economic life

Growth, competitiveness, overall well-being Enhancing growth and overall well-being by developing new communication technologies Supporting economic life, developing the governance

Quality of life, deliberation Expanding the opportunities for participation, communication and dialogue between various groups and individuals in the society Supporting civic society, deliberation

Values Efficiency Efficiency, qualitative aspects of life, human values

Qualitative aspects of life, human values

Style of decision making (policy) Consensus-based Consensus-based ?

Major actors in the implementation process

Innovation policy elite Private firms

Policy-makers Researchers Private firms – if they see some profit-making opportunities

Ordinary citizens Policy makers, especially local authorities Researchers

Target group(s) Firms/economic life Firms/economic life Civil society

Ordinary citizens Governance

Role of ordinary citizens No role/very marginal role Marginal Significant (major driving force)

Source: Kuitunen (2004).

Taking into account that there are significant differences in the composition of players and different and even contradictory targets and values, it is not surprising that the dialogue between innovation policy and e-democracy is less well established and organised and one may even ask if it should be.

It can be maintained that in Finland STI policy making have been more concrete and more coherent than policies promoting the development of the information society. The cluster approach was mentioned in interviews as a good example of an innovation policy initiative with strong links to horizontal thinking: there are distinct advantages to linking and matching resources and know-how from different parts of society. In the S&T policy arena, there has been systematic dialogue between private- and public-sector actors for a long time. The division of labour within the central government closely follows sector boundaries and the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Trade and Industry, with agencies in their respective fields, have been the principal actors in S&T policy making. The S&T Policy Council, chaired by the prime minister, has had an important role in bringing together major stakeholders, even if it is a limited and conventional group, from the domain of STI policies.



Agenda setting

Aspects of Finnish information society agenda setting process

From the policy cycle perspective the agenda-setting stage is one of the most important aspects of the policy-making process. During this stage, issues, questions or problems succeed or fail to reach the policy agenda. Those that reach policy agenda are socially and politically constructed in interaction between people representing interested parties and stakeholders from society as whole. Interaction in the agenda-setting phase has a significant effect on how problems and opportunities requiring common action are defined and what kind of meanings and values are attached to the issues.

According to Kingdon (1984), political streams have the main influence in the agenda-setting process. The concept refers to the wider political environment, including issues of changes of government and public opinion. Characteristic features of the agenda-setting process are the coupling of problems and definitions, policies defined as solutions to problems, and politics which refer to the political receptivity and accept-ability of issues among interested parties and citizens at large. At the highest political level, general elections and changes in the cabinet have a definite impact on the agenda-setting process. In Finland, the political priorities for the coming cabinet period are set in the government programme document between the parties of the coalition government. Tiili (2004) notes that the government programme is based on many conflicting goals and expectations, and this in practice tends to lead to a mix of strategic goals and operational details.

Information society issues have explicitly been on the Finnish political and policy agenda since the mid-1990s when the first national information society strategy was outlined and published. The appearance of the information society on the political agenda coincided with a number of substantial occurrences and transformations in Finnish society as well as in the international political, economic and technological environment. These events included, among others, the end of the cold-war period in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the breakthrough of new communication tech-nologies and the Internet. The latter, with their global repercussions, combined with a severe recession in the Finnish economy and Finland’s accession to European Union in 1995, can with hindsight be understood as a focusing event which opened a momentary policy window for a major rethinking of national priorities and policies. This kind of major agenda change may occur when policy streams converge simultaneously with the opening of a policy window (Figure 2.2). Finland’s experience demonstrates that in agenda setting, timing and sheer chance are critical factors. As Lindquist (2001, p. 18) notes: “problems may worsen objectively, but without saleable solutions or leaders and a public willing to embrace the cause, the problems are unlikely to receive more than passing attention”.



Figure 2.2. Agenda setting and a policy window

Over the years many actors and organisations have taken part in the formulation of the information society agenda. However, no principal, leading body to carry the process and to take main responsibility for this policy domain has emerged. Also, the policy-making structures have stayed more or less constant over the last couple of decades. The development of an information society policy space and of institutional arrangements has taken place incrementally.

International trends and examples of information society activities have had an impact on the agenda-setting process at national, regional and local levels. However, there is no unanimous view about the significance of EU decisions and guidelines in this respect. In critical comments EU directives and guidelines are seen as a hindrance that delays the development of the information society, because they lag behind what has been already done at the national level. On the other hand, common practices are seen as an advantage for the member states, and the EU is a pivotal player which cannot be neglected in national policy making in any policy domain. EU directives and legislation bind the member states and it is not easy to tell where EU policies end and national policies start. So far, Finland’s position as a forerunner in ICT has made it more influential in international ICT/information society agenda setting than what might be expected given the country’s size.

The current Information Society Programme provides an interesting case from the agenda-setting perspective. The ongoing public management reform which started in the early 1990s was the main catalyst for the launch of four new policy programmes (including the Information Society Policy Programme) following the general election in 2003. The new policy programme approach is part of the Programme Management Reform which was the outcome of extensive analysis and reform work undertaken during Prime Minister Lipponen’s second government (1999-2003).10 The government decided to focus the main efforts of central government reform on the identified lack of horizontality. According to a background review, a sector-driven administration tends to

Problem definitions

Alternative solutions

Problem definitions


Problem definitions


Political climate

“A window of opportunity”

Connections across streams

Converging Diverging



define problems and related cures and policy measures from the single-sector perspective rather than to meet the actual needs of the citizens. The problem is less overlaps or “turf wars” between ministries but an inherent feature of administration: many relevant issues do not fit in a single sector’s territory but instead fall in a sort of no-man’s land. The reform has had clear political backing from the beginning which has made it possible to implement reforms largely as intended (Harrinvirta and Kekkonen, 2004).

The agenda-setting and preparation phase for the Information Society Policy Programme was not, however, a purely consensual or conflict-free process. Internal competition in the public administration materialised during the programme preparation process. Ministries could not agree on where the main responsibility should lie for the implementation of the new programme. In the end the Prime Minister’s Office became the base. It is also important to note that the programme did not come into existence only because of the government’s will. Interviewees pointed out that the need for a new arrangement was also raised by stakeholders outside the public administration. The Ministerial Group is considered to have a good chance to co-ordinate the activities of the public administration in terms of information society issues.

Reflections

It is not clear whether a separate, well-structured information society policy exists in Finland. Nevertheless, the information society has without a doubt appeared as an issue on the political agenda. Overall, on the basis of policy documents and interviews it is reasonable to argue that policies promoting the development of a Finnish information society have been incremental, which is well in line with the findings of policy analysis literature. For instance, Howlett (2002, p. 7) concludes, based on a study of four federal policy sectors in Canada, that “most policies made by governments are, for the most part and most of the time, in some way a continuation of past policies and practices”. In Finnish information society strategies, continuity and temporal coherence are evident in the focus of attention and even the identification of drivers for the development of the information society over the last ten years.

In spite of the fact that information society issues have greater visibility on the political agenda, it would be misleading to maintain that the information society evokes or has evoked strong convictions among Finnish politicians. Indeed, the issue seems to be peculiarly apolitical in the sense that no strong political controversies have emerged in public debate about such issues as the goals, content or means of developing the information society. In this sense, information society policy like innovation policy apparently enjoys a broad consensus in Finland’s major political parties.


Formulation of policies targeting development of the information society

This section discusses the formulation of policies and initiatives covering information society issues in Finland, highlighting different aspects of their formulation and the co-ordination of activities.

When looking back, it is evident that there has been much effort to develop strategies and programmes for the information society at the national, regional and local levels. Preparation of strategies and action plans has often involved actors from various administrative sectors as well as stakeholders representing the views of the business sector and civic associations. It is quite generally felt that implementation has not always



gone smoothly. It is argued that co-ordination of activities horizontally across sectors and vertically between local, regional and state authorities has been insufficient. To simplify, horizontal implementation of extensive strategies has been left to individual sector ministries or agencies, and the results have differed widely, depending on their commitment and understanding. The picture becomes even more unclear when sources of funding of information society initiatives and projects are taken into account (EU, national, regional, local).

Broad-based forums in policy formulation and co-ordination

From the policy formulation point of view, broad-based co-operation among public and private stakeholders has been an integral part of the development of the information society as of STI policy. An explanation often given is the so-called “small country phenomenon”; it is commonly thought that in specific fields, people tend to know each other and that this lowers the threshold for co-operation.11

Another characteristic feature is the role played by committees, working groups and advisory bodies on the central government level. Many of these bodies are created for a fixed term. They are usually comprised of representatives of public administration, private-sector companies, research organisations and civic organisations. These inter-mediary bodies have played an important role in enabling active collaboration and communication between the private and public sectors.

Taken as a whole, co-operation by the key actors in developing the Finnish information society can be characterised as dominated by active individuals and dense networks enabling swift dissemination of knowledge and information between sectors and organisational actors without excessive bureaucracy. At the same time, because these networks rely on fairly informal contacts among informed insiders, they may be a less effective tool for co-ordination than is commonly believed. Otherwise it is difficult to understand why the orchestration of information society policies is time and again identified as an Achilles’ heel by public authorities and stakeholders alike.

Structural constraints on policy formulation and co-ordination

Decision makers and other actors that influence policy formulation and imple-mentation operate within an institutional and structural landscape involving constraints, some of which are organisational and administrative, others economic and socio-political. For instance, resource constraints have always had a strong role in policy making: “votes count, resources decide” as it is sometimes expressed.

The general framework for policy formulation and implementation is set by the existing state structure and institutionally embedded public administration practices. Finland’s administrative structure has been variously described as being unitary, decentralised and fairly fragmented. At the national level, power lies with the central government and the ministries, which have a strong impact on decision making for their respective sectors. Ministries have traditionally had a significant amount of indepen-dence, and each minister is individually responsible to parliament. Recent constitutional reforms have increased the power of the prime minister and the Prime Minister’s Office, but ministries still have considerable freedom of action within the frames set by the government programme and the annual budget.



It has been maintained that the position of ministry staff has strengthened over time in comparison to the status of the sector’s minister. In particular, the highest ranking officials in the departmental hierarchy have a significant role alongside the minister in steering and monitoring activities within the administration. This “trickle of power“ to civil servants is sometimes seen as arising from the constantly increasing workload of ministries and concomitant increase in staff. The cabinet period and the fortunes of the government, of course, set limits on an individual minister’s ability to exercise power. As in every profession there is always a certain learning time before one masters the means available. In this situation, the highest civil servants and ministry staff represent continuity. In the context of the recent central administration reforms there have been efforts to strengthen the role of individual ministers as strategists and opinion leaders in their administrative sector. Critics of the reform have worried that strengthening the strategic political leadership of ministries leads to short-termism and politicisation of administration.

The recent adoption of a strategic management approach to government work has, in Tiili’s words (2004, p. 5), aimed to “strengthen political leadership by focusing the goals of government, and making sure that those are pursued consistently throughout the administration”. So-called frame budgeting has been one of the main tools for the government to achieve the goals it sets in the government programme. There are however concerns that the way that frame budgeting is implemented, at least so far, does not support strategic management and cross-sector horizontal policy making. Budget frames were originally intended to address “socio-politically and economically important policy fields but soon frames became a means to cut expenses” and in practice this has led to a situation in which “frames are given to sectors, that is ministries, instead of policy fields” (Tiili, 2004, p. 8).

Another characteristic feature of Finland’s institutional set-up that affects policy formulation and co-ordination is the degree of autonomy of municipalities. At the sub-regional level, Finnish municipalities have substantial independence with regard to the central government. The municipalities with extensive autonomy and the right to levy taxes are in a position to decide on many issues. In contrast to many European countries, Finland’s regions have played a minor role politically, administratively and legally. There has not been much opportunity for the regions to develop an autonomous political role, because of the power of national and local bodies (Mennola, 1999). However, several important changes affecting regional development and governance have taken place during the past decade. Legislative changes have increased the importance of local government in regional policy by delegating power from the central government to the regions. Another key effect was the establishment of new regional governance structures. Moreover, a programme-based regional policy has been introduced to co-ordinate the actions of diverse regional organisations and players.

In some interviews the extent of self-government combined with the large number of municipalities was cautiously criticised as hampering the development of the information society. Also the current fragmentation of regional administration was thought to have a negative effect on the government’s Information Society Policy Programme: the co-ordination of information society initiatives requires identification and networking of local and regional information society projects.



Examples of interdepartmental co-ordination and steering

Several attempts have been made at the central government level to formulate and co-ordinate policies affecting the development of the information society. In May 1996, the Ministry of Finance, on behalf of the Cabinet, established two bodies to provide an arena for debate and to co-ordinate the activities of different societal actors, the Information Society Forum and the Information Society Advisory Board, respectively. The latter was chaired by the minister of Interior Affairs, and the minister of Education acted as vice-chairman. Members of the Information Society Advisory Board were nominated for three years and represented the public and private sectors as well as the research community. The Information Society Forum was a broadly based loose group of 55 experts. It has been argued that the main initiative of these two bodies was to suggest updating the national information society strategy published in 1994.

The new Information Society Advisory Board was appointed in 1999. Like its predecessor, it was to promote implementation of the national information society strategy and increase co-operation among industry, trade and administration. The members of the Advisory Board represented the public administration, businesses and civic organisations. The Board was chaired by the minister for Transport and Communi-cations. In addition, three other ministers were members of the Board for a term that ended in March 2003. The Information Society Advisory Boards were, as the name suggests, advisory bodies without decision-making power. Several changes in the group of ministers negatively affected the later Board. However, it reported to the government on the development of the information society a couple of times over its mandate period. In essence the reports were reviews summing up past developments rather than future-oriented documents guiding policies on information society issues.

The most recent effort to co-ordinate information society issues at the level of the central government is the launch in autumn 2003 of the Information Society Policy Programme and the assignment of the Information Society Council by the government of Prime Minister Vanhanen. One of the programme’s major aims is to increase the co-ordination of information society activities and actors. The programme is horizontal in nature and seeks to orchestrate and articulate the interests and demands of various groups and organisations. The programme has a specific institutional position within the central government. It is chaired by the prime minister and the programme director, whose office is administratively located in the Prime Minister’s Office. This arrangement helps, at least in principle, to place information society issues high on political agenda and diminishes sector and ministry disputes.

The Information Society Council is composed of a ministerial group, representatives of stakeholder organisations, associations and companies, permanent experts, the pro-gramme director and the secretariat. It has seven sub-sections covering the thematic areas of the Information Society Policy Programme. Members of these sub-sections represent both external interest groups and ministries. The broad base of the Council is thought to support the co-ordination of the information society programme. Compared to another body led by the prime minister, the Science and Technology Policy Council, the Information Society Council has a wider spectrum of stakeholders.

Horizontal issues, promotion of inter-sectoral co-operation and development of interaction between business life and the administration in information society develop-ment projects are important parts of the Council’s mission. There is also a certain continuity with the tasks of the former Information Society Advisory Boards, as the Council is tasked, among other things, with anticipating, monitoring and assessing the



development of the information society and related impacts, possibilities and threats; following international information society developments and putting forward proposals on Finland’s policies; and assessing the Information Society Policy Programme and its progress and reporting to the government on the state of the development of Finland’s information society.

At the time of its appointment in autumn 2003 there were strong expectations among interested parties concerning the new Information Society Council. It was supposed to provide guidelines for developing the information society, improve co-ordination of information society activities, and help administrative sectors to take information society issues into consideration in their policies. The Council is seen as a forum where different sectors of the administration as well as Finnish businesses and other stakeholders meet. On the other hand, its broad membership base means that it cannot be an operative body.

There seems to be some uncertainty about the prospects of success of the Information Society Policy Programme. Some interviewees expressed concern that the programme is under-resourced, which adversely affects its ability to support horizontal activities. It is also asked whether the new programme is more than a repackaging exercise drawing together, and in some cases renaming, existing information society projects of different administrative sectors. The latter criticism may, of course, be levelled against most of the so-called “umbrella programmes” that encompass a large number of (often ongoing) projects.

Policy formulation and co-ordination in the HST project12

The electronic identification project (HST case study) offers an enlightening view on policy formulation, implementation and co-ordination in practice. The project is a textbook example – for good and for bad – of the challenges of co-operation and collaboration between administrative branches in implementation of a policy. From a purely bureaucratic perspective, the HST project followed well-established administrative procedures in the sense that a number of participants representing ministries and other interested parties were involved in the working group assigned to prepare and implement the project in 1996. After the initial phase, however, substantial disagreements between the key ministries surfaced. The ministries’ widely diverging perspectives on electronic identification reflected sector-based rationales and the actors’ frames of reference. Creation of a common vision became extremely difficult and this was reflected in the implementation.

In spite of the highest political backing – since the mid-1990s successive govern-ments had committed themselves to develop both e-government services and an elec-tronic identification infrastructure for which the electronic ID card became more or less synonymous in policy debate –some ministries and state agencies with a large customer base were never really convinced of the feasibility or rationale of the so-called single card policy. These actors supported a more flexible user identification policy for e-government transactions that would allow demanding strong identification through the use of solutions in addition to the Certificate Authority solution (FINEID) developed during the HST project.13

Co-ordination was made even more difficult because the rules determining ministries’ mandate to issue orders concerning the adoption of electronic transactions and e-governance within the public administration were imprecise. The main rivalry, between the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of the Interior, was about which ministry has



competent authority to issue guidelines for the development of electronic transaction in e-government services.

The HST project also provides an interesting example of co-operation between public and private stakeholders. At the turn of the millennium, it had become evident that the diffusion of electronic services and identification services was taking place much more slowly than anticipated a few years previously. In this situation, the Population Register Centre (PRC) started actively searching for partners interested in the FINEID electronic identification service. In the aftermath of the bursting of ICT bubble, a small group of committed individuals (the director general of PRC and a couple of high-ranking representatives of the insurance and banking sector) saw an opportunity for promoting electronic services and the diffusion of the PRC’s FINEID certificate in Finland. Thus, the Pro-HST group was founded in 2001, composed of the central authorities and service providers from the public and private sectors. In this way industry and trade became a main driver of the diffusion and promotion of the electronic identification solution, after earlier co-operation by state authorities had failed. All in all, the activity of the Pro-HST Group and its successor HST Group has demonstrated that successful co-operation demands commitment at the executive level of organisations, personal contacts and mutual trust among partners. This creates good conditions for tackling emerging problems and challenges and finding compromises for the sake of common good.

Use of benchmarking, experiments and evaluation in the policy cycle

International influences have had a visible impact on the path taken by the information society in Finland. For instance, the OECD has carried out a number of reviews of national policies affecting the information society. Without a doubt, some of these reviews have been influential, like the OECD review of Finland’s information and communications policies, published in 1992, which pointed out Finland’s lack of a clear ICT strategy, an area in which it had achieved a high level of competence.

Since the mid-1990s, the Finnish government has paid a lot of attention to monitoring and evaluation of activities aiming to further the information society. For instance, an evaluation scheme is an integral part of the current government’s Information Society Policy Programme, which is part of the new system of programme management tailored essentially for implementation and evaluation of horizontal policies.14 The main principles include the need for better steering and management and closer networking between ministries (by extension implying better horizontal integration of different policy sectors), as well as closer co-operation between ministries and organisations and actors from the broader society (“stakeholders”), better adaptation capability, and more structured and organised monitoring and evaluation of policies. Partly for this reason, the role of the Prime Minister’s Office has been strengthened to make resources available for follow-up of the horizontal policy objectives such as the implementation and impact of the Information Society Policy Programme.

For the highly contested HST (electronic identification) project no official evaluation has been carried out. It has however attracted a lot of interest and short reviews on its progress and failures have been produced during the last few years. The Information Society Advisory Board reviewed the HST in its reports to the Finnish government in 2001 and 2002. In the latter report the Board found that the HST project and particularly the electronic ID card has not progressed as expected. Also in their Annual Report for 2001 the Parliamentary State Auditors reviewed the state of e-government services and transactions. The HST project and the electronic ID card were highlighted in the review.



A recently published OECD study (2003) on e-government in Finland includes a case study on the electronic citizen identification card.

Reflections and conclusions

The development of the information society and science, technology and innovation policy making are closely related in Finland. Both policy fields stress common issues, mainly the move towards the knowledge-based society, the growth and competitiveness of Finnish industries and the national economy, and the development and utilisation of ICT. Also the information society is usually discussed in a manner that underlines the significance of decisions, policies and measures that are usually understood as the core of science, technology and innovation policy.

Regarding the features of decision making and policy in general, both innovation policy and the information society are based on a strong commitment to and protection of consensus. A great deal of effort has gone into developing strategies and programmes for the information society at the national, regional and local levels. The preparation of strategies and action plans has often involved a number of actors from various admini-strative sectors as well as stakeholders representing the views of the enterprise sector and civil society. However, there has been an apparent lack of leadership and co-ordination in the implementation of information society activities. The horizontal co-ordination of information society policies across sectors and the vertical integration of local, regional and state authorities has been seen as insufficient. Improving co-ordination is a main goal of the new Information Society Policy Programme launched by Prime Minister Vanhanen’s government in autumn 2003 and the new Information Society Council.

Co-ordinated and coherent policy making does not occur in a vacuum. Decision makers and other actors in policy formulation and implementation operate in an insti-tutional and structural landscape that involves constraints, some of them organisational and administrative, others economic and socio-political. The implementation of frame budgeting has not so far supported strategic management and cross-sector horizontal policy making. It was intended to target strategic issues with socio-political and economic importance but in practice the frames are based on sectors instead of cross-sector policy fields. The traditionally strong autonomy of municipalities is also a challenge for co-ordination of policies across public administration.

A principal driving force both for the information society and innovation policy in Finland has been concerns about international competitiveness and wealth creation in the global economy. This is particularly visible for innovation policy but is also part and parcel of conventional information society policy discourse. The picture is complicated when information society issues are viewed from a perspective that includes e-democracy issues. A view of the information society as technology-driven and largely determined by economic and technological perspectives does not emphasise the capacity of citizens to actively participate and engage in discussions of the information society, which inevitably affects their daily lives. It is plausible to argue that the reason for the neglect has little to do with lack of awareness of the importance of e-democracy issues in S&T and innovation policy. Rather, it appears to be a consequence of the choice of definition of the major target and the values behind the policy.



Overall, it seems doubtful that a new innovation-centred paradigm as a guide for policy making would succeed without taking into account a broader set of societal issues, goals and values than has been the case in innovation policy discourse. To be truly horizontal, innovation policy cannot rely simply on values and goals inherited from sector-based science and technology policy making.



Annex 2.A

THE THREE CASE STUDIES OF THE FINNISH MONIT INFORMATION SOCIETY STUDY

Case study 1: Finnish Information Society Policy Programme and Information Society Council (2003- )

Following the general elections in March 2003, a new programme management approach was introduced at the highest political level in order to improve co-ordination of implementation of the government programme. Preparation of this “administrative innovation” began during the previous cabinet period in order to create a tool that would help the government to set and manage priorities, particularly in the case of horizontal policies crossing established administrative fields.

The cabinet of Prime Minister Vanhanen decided to launch four cross-sector policy programmes, which cover the most important horizontal policy issues in the government programme. One is the Information Society Policy Programme, which is chaired by the Prime Minister. The programme management includes the director, whose office is administratively located in the Prime Minister’s Office. In principle, this arrangement places information society issues high on the political agenda.

In tandem with the launch of the Information Society Policy Programme a new body, the Information Society Council, was set up to provide a platform for “steering the development of the information society and for co-ordinating co-operation between administration, organisations and business life”. The Council is composed of a ministerial group, representatives of stakeholder associations and companies, permanent experts, the programme director and the secretariat. In addition, representatives from external interest groups and ministries are appointed to the seven sub-sections covering the programme’s themes. In mid-February 2005, the Information Society Council published its first report, which analyses the current state of the Finnish information society and its challenges.

The Information Society Policy Programme aims to orchestrate and articulate the interests and demands of various groups and organisations. The broadly based Information Society Council is thought to support the co-ordination function. The programme and the council also aim at making information society questions more visible in Finnish society.



Case study 2: e-democracy

The case study focusing on e-democracy was selected to shed light on those aspects of the development of the information society which are presumably more sporadically addressed in the science, technology and innovation policy debate and policy making: broader societal effects and the impact of the diffusion of ICT on everyday life including opportunities and threats, as well as the new paths it opens for political participation and communication.

The concept of e-democracy in the context of the information society is defined in various ways. Most of the definitions encompass two dimensions or factors, the first of which is the use of modern ICTs and the second is participation. ICTs are perceived as a means for participating in the political arena, not as an end in themselves. The alleged enlargement of possibilities to participate in politics with the new communication technologies points to the emergence or strengthening of two dimensions. First, there are horizontal linkages between citizens in civil society as a result of the emergence of e-democracy. Second, vertical linkages are being formed between civil society debates and policy makers.

The case study does not focus on a specific policy or an instrument tailored for promotion of e-democracy. Instead, questions concerning potential links and (emerging) challenges between innovation policy and the development of the information society were approached through more generic e-democracy trends and topics. Attention has been paid to more practical issues and challenges faced by actors and involved in the launch and implementation of information society and e-democracy. In addition, the study analyses how compatible and conflicting are the values and goals of policies promoting the information society, innovation policy and e-democracy in Finland.

Case study 3: HST (electronic identification of persons)

The HST project illuminates the challenges of co-ordination, co-operation and coalition building both among ministries and public agencies and between policy makers and private-sector actors. The history of the HST project can be traced back to the mid-1990s when the first national information society strategy was prepared in Finland and issues related to data protection and information security were identified as a critical factor for the diffusion of information and communication technologies.

In 1996, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Transport and Communications and the Ministry of the Interior established a working group (HST Group) to carry out a study to prepare a proposal for implementation of an electronic identification system based on the smart card. Recommendations were compiled in a report, ”Electronic Identification and the Electronic ID Card” published in the same year. The report included a pre-liminary specification for the use of smart card technology for identification, electronic signature and the encryption of documents. At that time, there was a strong belief that diffusion of electronic services is best promoted by developing an electronic identifi-cation infrastructure that would clear the path for services. Another goal was to raise the status of electronic transactions to the level of other service transactions: electronic transactions have to have the same indisputableness and legal validity as traditional transactions.



The Council of Ministers’ resolution of 5 February 1998 on electronic transactions, development of services and reduction of data gathering was important for the creation of a national electronic identification solution and the relevant infrastructure. In the resolution, the Population Register Centre, which belongs to administrative field of the Ministry of the Interior, was appointed to work as the Certification Authority responsible for issuing and maintaining FINEID certificates and electronic ID cards. PRC was also tasked to promote the preparation of legislative amendments and to require and encourage ministries and agencies to provide electronic services. The resolution set also a time frame for the introduction of electronic citizen ID cards.

The implementation proceeded briskly and the electronic citizen ID card was introduced in the presence of the prime minister in December 1999. However, it soon became evident that diffusion of electronic services and identification services takes place much more slowly than had been anticipated. The number of electronic ID cards issued stayed low until the amendment of the Identity Card Act (299/2003) in autumn 2003.

In order to promote diffusion and use of the newly created electronic identification infrastructure and the PRC’s FINEID certification, a Pro-HST Group was established in 2001 by interested stakeholders. The group drew together high-ranking representatives from the public and private sectors, from central authorities and service providers alike. The Pro-HST Group was dissolved in late 2002 when a group, known simply as the HST Group, was established to continue its work. The new group comprises telecommuni-cations operators, banks, a credit card service company and the PRC. These parties issue smart cards that enhance the use of qualified certificates, especially the one given by Population Register Centre.



Notes

1. The Report of the Information Society Advisory Board to the Finnish Government, 11 December 2002 (only in Finnish).

2. Arguably, describing the policy cycle by dividing it into four neat phases provides an excessively linear view of policy making. In the policy cycle framework, policy-making problems are defined as “essentially problems of co-ordination, or, in other terms, of collective action. In line with the rational choice institutionalism, politics is conceived as the process of selecting optimal solutions to collective problems” (Frankel and Højbjerg, 2004). In the real world, policy making tends to be a much messier process. Nonetheless, the model provides a useful outline for analysis, so long as its restrictions are kept in mind.

3. In a recent column a civil servant of the Ministry of Communication and Transportation argued that information society policy does not really exist. As he put it “there are only good and bad societal policies: good policy takes into account the opportunities and threats of information technology, a bad one overlooks them” (Harri Pursiainen: Tietoyhteiskuntapolitiikkaa lukutaidottomille, published in Tietoviikko, 22 April 2004). Another interesting notion was advanced by the Director of the Information Society Policy Programme in her column, “The Year of Attitude Changes”, in which she comments on the public debate about the information society. She suggests that the debate has recently taken a new form and information society terminology is being called into question. She welcomes this development and notes that when the programme was launched, the staff of the Office of the Information Society Policy Programme set as a goal that at the end of programme there would no longer be any need to speak about the information society as a separate (policy) concept (Katrina Harjuhahto-Madetoja: Asenne-muutosten vuosi).

4. Since 2000 Tekes is known as Tekes, the National Technology Agency.

5. The government’s programme is a strategy document in which the new government defines the focus areas for the coming mandate period. The official definition to be found at the Finnish government’s Web site states that “the Government Programme is an Action Plan agreed by the parties represented in the government. The government must without delay submit its programme to Parliament in the form of a statement. The Prime Minister co-ordinates the implementation of the Government Programme”.

6. Tekes has been involved in development of health-care technologies since the 1990s. It currently runs a FinnWell technology programme (2004-09) the objective of which is “to improve the quality and profitability of health care, and to promote business activities and export in the field”. FinnWell was preceded by the iWell technology programme (2000-03).

7. Titles of the latest tri-annual reviews of the Science and Technology Policy Council are revealing in this respect: “Finland: A Knowledge-based Society” (1996); “The Challenge of Knowledge and Know-how” (2000); and “Knowledge, Innovation and Internationalisation” (2003).

8. According to the document “in many respects, the construction of the information society relates to the development of the national innovation system and thereby also to the terms of reference of the Science and Technology Policy Council. The Council’s subcommittees have dealt with relevant issues. In



publishing this opinion, the Council wishes to support the development of the information society and to draw attention to questions which it thinks essential in this development work.”

9. See for example “Report of the Information Society Advisory Board to the Finnish Government on 20 June 2001”.

10. The Finnish government commissioned three international experts to assess which areas most urgently required reforms. The report submitted by Geert Bouckaert, Derry Ormond and Guy Peters (A Potential Governance Agenda for Finland, 2000) formed the basis for the subsequent programmes.

11. However, the validity of this “Finnish model” as a basis for co-operation has recently been questioned. In the Information Society Council’s first report, published in February 2005, the sub-section on working life notes that, contrary to popular belief, Finnish actors in business, research, development and educa-tion tend to work independently and genuine cross-boundary collaborative working habits are rare. The sub-section recommends the establishment of cross-sector forums that would draw together people from different backgrounds and branches in order to facilitate creation of new knowledge and know-how.

12. In publications in English the term FINEID rather than HST is used to refer to a project on electronic identification of a person. Here, the Finnish acronym is used for the project and the term FINEID is reserved for the certificate issued by the Population Register Centre.

13. For instance, the Finnish Bank Association’s identification service for authentication of online transactions which is based on user code and password lists. In 2003 Kela (the National Social Security Institution) together with the Finnish Tax Administration and the Labour Administration signed a mutual agreement on co-operation on electronic services and on a common approach for identification when using these services. In practice, the consortium relies on two methods through which the customer can identify him/herself in a service transaction either by using the Population Register Centre’s identification service developed in the context of the HST project or the Finnish banks’ Tupas service.

14. A number of key documents were commissioned by the Ministry of Finance within which the Public Management Department has responsibility for public management reforms in central government. New models for the reforming central government was outlined in a report published 2001 (Sirpa Kekkonen: Hallituksen yhteisen poliittisen johtamisen vahvistaminen - keinona ohjelmajohtaminen. Valtiovarain-ministeriön selvityksiä 2001). Later in the same year the Ministry of Finance launched a Council of State’s simulation project for programme management. The results of the simulation project were pub-lished in autumn 2002 (Ohjelmajohtaminen valtioneuvostossa. Uusi menettely ja uudet asiakirjat. Valtiovarainministeriö, työryhmän muistio 2002).



References

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INFORMATION SOCIETY POLICY CO-ORDINATION: A MOULD FOR INNOVATION POLICY DEVELOPMENT IN NORWAY? – 65


Chapter 3

INFORMATION SOCIETY POLICY CO-ORDINATION: A MOULD FOR INNOVATION POLICY DEVELOPMENT IN NORWAY?

Trond Einar Pedersen NIFU STEP, Oslo, Norway

Competition policy and framework conditions are central components of Norwegian economic policy and prescribe a hands-off approach to information society policy imple-mentation. But core challenges of Norwegian information society policy (eNorway), e.g. an electronic identification standard and boosting e-commerce, probably call for more hands-on policy making. This situation represents a delicate policy dilemma. While the overall economic policy is hands-off, the current organisation and competence of eNorway suggest more hands-on implementation and co-ordination. The co-ordinating body, located in the Ministry of Modernisation, has a good overview of the information society policy area, and the conditions for proactive co-ordination and implementation are good. However, personnel and competence resources within the co-ordinating body may prove scarce. Co-ordination requires on the one hand large, comprehensive and finan-cially independent policy measures, and, on the other hand, more specific policy initia-tives, processes and schemes. The former type of measures has often subcontracted implementing organisations with the relevant sectoral ministry as a co-ordinating actor. In the case of policy learning it is an option for the co-ordinating body to operate stronger co-ordination and exert influence on large outsourced policy schemes in relation to overall but concrete aims in the eNorway framework. The latter type of policy measures is typically operated and hands-on co-ordinated by the co-ordinating body. Existing well-managed processes can prove more efficient if the co-ordinating body can take stronger decisions that can become important milestones, in particular on issues of technology standardisation.

Introduction

The interrelation between information society policy, innovation policy and economic policy receives attention in horizontal policy-making initiatives, at the European as well as the national level. The aim of this study of Norwegian information society policy is to contribute to the policy learning process between policy domains by exploring some of the central conditions under which information society policy evolves. The main lesson from this study is that Norwegian information society policy making may prove to be a relevant example of good practice for the development of a comprehensive Norwegian innovation policy. Norwegian information society policy documents are up to date in terms of vision, strategy and targets. The policy mix and policy co-ordination, operated

66 – INFORMATION SOCIETY POLICY CO-ORDINATION: A MOULD FOR INNOVATION POLICY DEVELOPMENT IN NORWAY?


by the centrally located co-ordinating body, is a good example of how to organise policy making, implementation and co-ordination for an extremely wide-ranging policy domain.

Information society policy often faces a dilemma. The bureaucratic capability to co-ordinate information society policy may be present, and the ministries in charge of sector-oriented policy measures are often willing to make consensus-based, co-ordinated, cross-ministerial policy, but the overall political signals prescribe a hands-off approach. In other words, high quality policy implementation and co-ordination require hands-on policy processes. Such policy implementation calls for an overview and requires general and specialised competence in the staff of the co-ordinating body.

This chapter builds on a study of Norwegian information society policy and aims at addressing the issues introduced above. It studies the dilemmas arising out of the interface between horizontal policy, co-ordination and institutional factors, on the one hand, and a macroeconomic context and market-orientated policy stance, on the other.

The study combines information about the co-ordination of the implementation of a specific policy area with general information about how the co-ordinating body operates. Both parts are based on information from interviews with policy actors and from studies of policy documents. Particular use is made of an evaluation of the Norwegian broadband roll-out scheme, HØYKOM, in 1999-2003.1 HØYKOM is one of the main instruments for ensuring that widespread broadband roll-out meets national targets concerning infrastructure and Internet access.

The following section describes Norwegian information society policy today and its historical development. Next, the policy reference points and links between other policy domains and information technology (IT) policy are presented. The final two sections address co-ordination and present conclusions and implications for innovation policy development.

Norwegian ICT policy and its history

During the 1980s and the early 1990s Norwegian information and communication technology (ICT) policy was shaped as a policy area with broad effects on societal change. Despite divergent perceptions based on sector-specific interests, a comprehensive national plan that took account of the broad effects of ICT was created based on a climate of consensus among the key actors in industry, research and public life. Norwegian ICT policy has over the last 20 years been made against a background of relatively high scores on indicators benchmarking ICT performance. In 2004/2005, Norway can still refer to positive technology penetration indicators, but the picture is perhaps a bit more disturbing for Norwegian policy makers. Patterns of private use are stronger than patterns of business use. ICT-based public service supply, public sector modernisation, e-commerce and e-government represent areas in which it is possible to excel in the near future, but results seem to be long in coming. The most recent peer review of ICT diffusion to business in Norway identifies the need for increased policy attention particularly in advanced business applications and business organisation (OECD, 2004).

The Norwegian e-society policy, “eNorway2005”, is an action plan that establishes a framework for how Norwegian authorities shall orchestrate (prepare, organise, arrange) the emergence of the e-society. The department of IT policy in the Ministry of Moderni-sation is the co-ordinating body of this comprehensive policy framework covering most areas of importance concerning societal production, exploitation and use of ICT. The core documents present a coherent hierarchy of targets and operative objectives within each



policy area and there are dedicated co-ordinators responsible for each area, in addition to the top co-ordinating body. Each policy area is operated by means of overall targets. Concrete policy making for each area involves a package of measures, in which flagship (prioritised) projects are defined. Below the nicely designed surface and fluency of eNorway’s visions, strategies and targets, there exists a multitude (more than 100) of policy initiatives, programmes and schemes. The portfolio of policy tools is a hetero-geneous mix of large, comprehensive and financially independent policy programmes and smaller, more specific policy initiatives, processes and schemes. The large programmes have often subcontracted operative and co-ordinating organisations, with the relevant sectoral ministry as co-ordinating actor. The co-ordinating body of eNorway does not have hands-on managerial or governing functions, but represents an additional co-ordinating level that currently seems to fulfil objectives relating to strategic coherence. The co-ordinating body has relatively little influence on agenda setting, prioritisation, implementation and policy learning in the large policy schemes. The smaller policy initiatives, processes and schemes are typically operated and co-ordinated hands-on by the co-ordinating body. Co-ordination implies a multitude of types of interaction and a multitude of forms of communication (for example, interdepartmental processes, processes of legal change and standardisation, forums and arenas for dialogue and collaboration between industry and stakeholders, etc.). The paper-based co-ordination and marketing activities of eNorway represent a relatively large part of the work of the co-ordinating body. Box 3.1 presents the action plan in more detail.

How and why horizontal ICT policy became possible in Norway

There is a relatively clear tendency in Norway’s recent history of ICT policy for policy making to repeat itself. During the 1980s a cross-ministerial consensus was achieved concerning the importance of ICT in society. Two national strategic efforts have been replaced by a range of less centralised, targeted sector efforts. The eNorway2005 national strategic effort follows this historical line. It is largely an overall framework listing the variety of policy measures and policy actions that have been introduced over the last years. What is new in the eNorway framework is a dedicated authority that co-ordinates the policy efforts. The eNorway action plan and the workings of the established co-ordinating body are described below.

In the first years of the 1980s industrial policy thinking changed in Norway. The transformation is particularly important when one looks back at the initial stages of Norwegian information society thinking. It implied the establishment of innovation policy as a relevant concept at the macro level (traditional political actors and channels). And it led to the definition of research as a central industrial policy instrument. In concrete terms the result was the definition of the main policy priorities for Norwegian research. The macro political level was necessary but not sufficient to influence what was to become the most important milestone on the way to the adoption of the information society, namely the big concerted IT plan that was launched in the second half of the 1980s.



Box 3.1. The Action Plan: eNorway2005

The prevailing Norwegian IT policy action plan is called eNorway. It contains qualitative objectives rather than quantified targets. It includes a hierarchy of overall priorities, areas of effort, sub-areas priorities, and a range of different policy programmes, policy instruments and policy actions with more or less specific aims. Following advice from the European policy level, the Norwegian government responded to the eNorway 2005 action plan. The Norwegian plan sets three main priorities and objectives:

• Creating value in industry.

• Efficiency and quality in the public sector.

• Involvement and identity.

Involvement to achieve the main goals is divided into five areas:

• A good framework for eNorway.

• Accessibility and security.

• Skills for change.

• Attractive contents.

• A modern public sector.

In the main policy document, each of the five areas is described in detail, including sub-areas of priority connected to concrete targets. A so-called “flagship project” is assigned to each sub-area, the responsible institution(s) is defined, and a deadline for target achievement is defined.

Two types of policy instruments

The plan has currently more than 100 projects and different types of actions, and 14 of the 17 Norwegian ministries are engaged in projects and actions. Use of flagship projects seems to be a way to present the most important effort in each policy area. A flagship project is synonymous with a prioritised task. The portfolio of projects can be arranged in two types. On the one hand, there are the large and comprehensive policy programmes with a specified budget, external (external to the co-ordinating body) administrative, operative staff and often a co-ordinating panel. On the other hand, there is a smaller and more heterogeneous range of policy initiatives and policy processes.

Large, comprehensive policy programmes

eNorway consists of a few large, complex policy programmes that concern specific ICT policy domains. In addition to the “ICT in Norwegian education” scheme, which has been running since 1997, the HØYKOM scheme is also a typical example of a large-scale policy effort. Both schemes have outsourced administrative and operative organisations (outside the co-ordinating body in the Ministry of Modernisation).

“ICT in Norwegian education” is organised by highly competent professionals who take care of the array of nation-wide projects, schemes and network-building processes. The project portfolio represents examples of good policy practice across the nation and is supposed to function as a policy guide for potential participants. The aim is to establish, develop and contribute to national and international, multidisciplinary and network-building research and competence development. “ICT in Norwegian education” has an intermediate co-ordinating level in the Ministry of Education and Research.

HØYKOM, the scheme for stimulating broadband demand in Norway, is a comprehensive, complex and outsourced policy scheme and the same type of policy effort as “ICT in Norwegian education”. It is a policy instrument aimed at stimulating public and semi-public enterprises to invest in and employ broadband infrastructure and applications. In the main eNorway publication, the target is formulated as follows: “Good offers for broadband shall be available on the market in all regions of Norway. During 2005 primary schools, public libraries and local authority administrative services shall be given the option of broadband connection at a competitive price.”

Grants are approved for public enterprises, under the condition that at least 50% of the total investment is self-financed.



Box 3.1. The Action Plan: eNorway2005 (continued)

Smaller schemes, liaison committees, policy processes and initiatives

The eNorway project and activity portfolio clearly indicates that day-to-day tasks and activities of the staff of the co-ordinating body are dominated by network-building processes and the operation of measures with relatively concrete aims. Across the five policy areas (A good framework for eNorway, Accessibility and security, Skills for change, Attractive content, and A modern public sector) eNorway operates and is involved in an array of activities aimed at establishing good conditions for the emergence of the information society. The main types of measures include co-ordination of and participation in network building on specific issues such as common sector-specific interfaces, e-commerce, electronic signatures, IT security and IT research; formal initiatives and activities in relation to themes, and processes such as changes in the law, other juridical issues, re-regulation and standardisation, establishment of framework conditions (strategies, action plans building common perceptions and objectives), studies and analyses of specific issues such as how e-commerce can affect transport and the localisation of trade of goods and environment.

Macro policy dynamics of the 1980s

The policy debate in the early 1980s was dominated by arguments about the future role of the telecommunication monopolist Televerket. The majority of the Norwegian parliament voted for extended use of tenders in industrial demand and supply, a resolution that de facto started the process of splitting up the state-owned telecommuni-cation monopoly. This decision marks the start of the trend towards liberalisation and re-regulation or deregulation in telecommunications. It can be seen as a paradox that while maintaining and developing a strong will to make the best information technology policy for the nation, politicians arguably started the process of decreasing ownership and control over their best IT research policy tool, the national telecommunication monopolist Televerket and its huge research facilities. Historically, it is plausible to argue that the policy of liberalisation in telecommunications moulded national policy conditions so that it became more and more difficult to govern and exploit publicly funded research – in other words, to politically build and exploit Televerket as a driver for Norwegian industrial development of an information society.

The IT plan 1987-90

The IT plan ran from 1987 to 1990. It was a comprehensive public initiative aimed at growth in the production and application and use of IT in most areas of the Norwegian economy and society. The plan had a very broad scope. It included education at all levels, public application of IT, basic research, strategic and applied research in product development and application of IT, regional policy measures and telecommunications. Looking back, the plan was the predecessor of the current Norwegian policy plan, eNorway 2005.

The 1980s and inter-ministerial collaboration: the foundation for horizontal policy making

co-operation and co-ordination between actors in the bureaucracy is an aspect of the foundation for horizontal policy processes in the area of information technology. However, the transformation of policy thinking at the macro level and the IT plan could not have been realised without unifying initiatives from the micro level. The unifying initiatives that fed into a concrete innovation policy in the shape of an IT plan came from peripheral actors and individuals and units in research and education more than from the ministries. Based on initiatives from these peripheral actors and experts, several



independent initiatives emerged at the ministerial level, pointing in the direction of an IT plan. The initiatives were quite different, but may be seen as an emerging network of ministerial interests in IT. The network was dominated by the professional experts and individuals with specific interests in technology, often at a peripheral location. It was above all the view that information technology was a key technology that was similar across ministries. Initiatives and contributions from each ministry were naturally specified as themes corresponding to their area of responsibility, but a 1983 green paper about “telematics” reflects the tendency towards horizontal policy thinking by suggesting concrete policy initiatives across several ministries.

The committee behind the green paper put strong emphasis on the role of the Norwegian telecommunication monopolist Televerket. It suggested strengthening its internal research activity and boosting collaboration between Televerket, industrial actors and other research institutes. Moreover, it emphasised rapid expansion of infrastructure and investment in services that could improve the competitiveness of Norwegian indus-try. Televerket was to play the role of driver. Worth mentioning is the committee’s recommendation that investment in and acquisition of technological solutions should not necessarily take a cost-based view. The committee suggested that (more expensive) solutions could be preferred if the socio-economic effects were expected to be higher. Education policy related to information technology was also strongly emphasised. On the one hand, modern information technology tools and solutions were to be used to improve the efficiency of education. On the other hand, education was seen as crucial in order to exploit the opportunities afforded by R&D in the field.

In the period between the 1983 green paper on telematics and the launch of the IT plan in 1986-87, two different political directions were visible in the inter-ministerial processes that led to consensus about the plan. Strong political forces pulled in the direction of emphasising IT policy as (a tool for) industrial development. This policy interest was brought forward by representatives of industry, technology and technological research and backed by the Ministry of Industry. Exploitation and acquisition of IT in existing industries was a topic for this side, but the development of a new and emerging IT industry was emphasised even more as the solution to Norwegian industrial chal-lenges. In the mid-1980s this kind of political interest, involving industry modernisation, had as its counterpart a notion of IT as a more comprehensive driving force in the information society. The interest in modernisation of industry took concrete form as a committee proposal (a proposal from the so-called Kuvås committee) that was to give input into work on a national IT plan. The political interests that supported a broader view of diffusion and exploitation of IT existed above all in other ministries. The message from this side came from an advisory board consisting of senior public servants, which was established by the government with a mandate to protect objectives and values other than those related to industry and commercial life. In compliance with the board’s mandate, called “Datapolitisk Råd”, it commented in particular that the proposal from the Kuvås committee could be characterised more as a programme for Norwegian industry and commerce than a comprehensive national IT programme. Rather than national objectives within economic variables and productivity, Datapolitisk Råd was of the opinion that several issues were missing, in particular:

• Competence accumulation, research and investigation of the interface between IT and social science.

• Cultural and social implications of IT, in particular humanistic and social scientific areas.



• Competence accumulation in broader spheres of education and research, not only IT, such as law, medicine, and agricultural science.

• Competence accumulation and exploitation of IT in the public sector.

• A special effort in rural Norway, in particular education and industry in the northern part of the country.

In other words, the variety of ministerial suggestions, which were reflected in the committee’s statement, included education at lower levels, use of IT in the public sector/administration, and IT and regional policy measures. Despite the differing views, the Ministry of Industry saw it as its responsibility to gather together the different interests in an effort to propose a national IT plan that could build on consensus with the government’s political signals and objectives. In practice, this meant that the Ministry of Industry understood that all interests expressed by ministries and other stakeholders had to be taken into consideration in the proposal for a national IT plan. A couple of important points can be made from this brief description of Norwegian IT policy in the making during the 1980s:

• The constructive process of balancing power between different political interests and objectives prior to the big IT action plan 1987-90 resulted in a plan that was comprehensive, nation-wide and not limited to industrial and commercial interests.

• The understanding of the broader significance of how IT could be exploited and diffused in society had reached both the government and the most important actors in IT policy making at that point in time: representatives from the most important ministries and the expert committees with a mandate to develop IT policy.

The result was that all actors could agree on five main areas for an IT action plan:

1. Education, vocational training, universities and colleges, in-service training.

2. Equipment for education and research.

3. Knowledge production and accumulation: research (basic and applied) in central and specialised areas.

4. Product development: measures supporting industry, grants for R&D and inno-vation.

5. Technology acquisition and diffusion: demonstration projects, productivity pro-grammes, IT in the public sector.

The proposal was built on the consensus achieved and common understanding at the ministerial level that IT has societal effects and implications (an information society perspective) that go beyond potential industrial development. However, observers have pointed out that policy making at the ministerial level made the mistake of including both the information society perspective and the industrial development perspective. Looking to the 1990s, IT policy went in the direction of detailed and comprehensive policy implementation based on inclusion of both aspects. Even though the lessons from this extremely wide-ranging and comprehensive policy making are mixed, it seems reasonable to see the consensus-making efforts at the ministerial level in the 1980s as a prerequisite for the fact that hardly any interests or policy domains were excluded.



The role of the Finance Ministry

In the balance of power of the 1980s the Finance Ministry clearly played a consolidating role in relation to existing sectoral budget allocations. Having less interest in the policy dimensions of IT in terms of the societal effects, and more interest in keeping the overall national budget in balance, the Finance Ministry demanded that every new proposed policy initiative should be financed by the existing budgetary limits of the relevant ministry. In the consensus-seeking processes, the Finance Ministry can be characterised as a hindrance to be overcome in order to realise the plans that were made. The historical dynamics between ministerial consensus and departmentalisation in strong ministries with specialised sector interests are discussed below.

The 1990s: detailed and comprehensive policy planning

Buland (1996) emphasises that negotiations between ministries involved in IT policy efforts resulted in a sufficient degree of consensus to achieve the IT plan 1987-90. The framework of policy efforts and the five main areas of attention defined in the action plan seem to have traced the paths of policy efforts in the 1990s. These paths were much less collaborative and much more sector-specific. The national plan 1987-90 was succeeded by other, more sector-specific plans. Although the activities defined in the most highly profiled policy documents of the last 15 years seem to add up to a coherent whole, in fact each area of implementation was subject to ownership and control by the responsible ministry. The fact that consensus had been established did not mean that opinions about the plan did not differ. And it did not imply that every policy area was developed with strong reference to a common and co-ordinated development path.

From the opposite perspective, it can be emphasised that the inter-ministerial consensus and collaboration that led to the big action plan succeeded despite the fact that sectoral interests in each ministry were and still are particularly strong in Norway compared to many other countries. There is no doubt that the patterns of strong sector interests and departmentalisation in the Norwegian bureaucracy did not change in its nature just because the ministerial level managed to agree to the overall IT plan. The big IT action plan included ministries’ specific activities and plans.

In sum, during the 1990s, the IT plan of 1987-90 was followed by a period of far less centralised activity. Different ministries contended to be the central “IT ministry”, and the various IT policy work was carried out in relative calm as part of several smaller “sectoral” plans. In some of these areas, for example education and infrastructure, good results were achieved, a strong indication that big national efforts are not necessarily crucial. It is possible to achieve good results with determined work.

During the last part of the 1990s, the national dimension again came to the fore. In 1996, a report by a panel of deputy ministers formulated a new national strategy.2 In isolation, this was of course a positive effort and had significance for the whole nation. There was an evident need for an IT policy. The problem was that, once again, the strategy by and large took form as statements of intent instead of measures and action. The report represented a range of good ideas without any concrete plans pointing to how to reach the targets. It noted that the “revolution we live in the middle of” implies possibilities and perspectives to be taken care of, and that it is necessary to exploit information technology for the sake of:

• Growth and value creation.



• Reduced proximity.

• Culture and the media.

• The global school.

• A simpler life for all.

• Protection of privacy and vulnerability.

• The public sector and the future.

• Improved organisation and collaboration in the health care system.

In this way, the top policy level presented its views. An inter-ministerial consensus was presented, and the formulation (and implementation) of concrete action was handed over to those who knew how to do it. However, one could argue that it was disappointing that such a comprehensive policy document contained little more than general overall aims. To the extent that the document had a strategic method, it seemed to be the principle of addition. The report was mainly a summary of everything that had to do with IT in the mid-1990s. Difficult choices, decisions about direction, prioritisation and content, were basically lacking. And, above all, no co-ordinating body with concrete responsibility was set up.

Relevant policy contexts

European policy as reference point

The Norwegian e-society policy is organised within a framework that follows in the footsteps of European initiatives and action plans.3 The European plans and core docu-ments emphasise infrastructure, skills, access and exploitation of ICT. Moreover, they include strong statements about the continuous need to evaluate, benchmark and develop policy. It is stated that eEurope will facilitate the exchange of experience, good practice and demonstration projects, but will also share lessons to be learned from failures. Policy measures are to be monitored by benchmarking progress made in achieving the objectives and the policies in support of the objectives. To understand governance, it is highly relevant to study how nations implement and co-ordinate information society policy within the EU context.

In the context of the MONIT project, the paragraph in the eEurope 2005 document on co-ordination is particularly important. It emphasises that overall co-ordination of existing policies can create synergies among the proposed actions. It also states that there is urgent need for political commitment to this central initiative at the national level. Targets and objectives at the European level can only be reached if nations are able to set new priorities, to provide adequate funding and to remove obstacles to achieving the targets. In Norway, the information society policy initiative is formally included in the eNorway action plan.

Norwegian politics and information society policy

Most of the parties represented in the Norwegian parliament are engaged in ICT policy and information society policy matters. As in the Norwegian political context in general, the information society policy debate has been consensus-oriented and not subject to much interference or disagreement. The reason is, among other things, the fact that the Labour Party has been in power most of the last 25 years, and only occasionally



replaced by a conservative government coalition. Moreover, the same period of time has been characterised by minority governments, and this too encourages the orientation towards consensus. Although commentators argue that a policy change towards market-based policy thinking and policy making certainly involved the last social-democratic governments because of the trend towards globalisation and deregulation that started in the 1980s and 1990s, the conservative-dominated government (2001) undertook radical policy change more explicitly than the preceding social-democratic governments. It is increasingly evident that the current Norwegian government is strongly in favour of letting the market rule.

Current Norwegian politics and eNorway 2005: conservative political principles

The “Bondevik” government reveals through its legislative proposals, budgets, policy priorities and guiding principles a strong desire to shift policy towards a market orientation. Based on the comparison of new competition law proposals in the EU and Norway, commentators argue that the Norwegian government is more liberal – more willing to let the market rule – than the European Union currently is. The Norwegian government proposes that competition should be a central policy aim and principle in all public as well as private domains of society. The EU is proposing exceptions from competition laws in the health and social sector, in education, in collective transport and in culture. In Norway, the market orientation is increasingly visible in policy making in general and in the eNorway initiative but perhaps even more so at the level of implementation. Market orientation and belief in what competition can accomplish are very noticeable in certain policy solutions for broadband roll-out and are somewhat clear in ICT and innovation/modernisation processes in the public sector.

European information society policy and the Norwegian version are formulated at the qualitative, general and main policy levels. The policy sets objectives in terms of universal concepts about access to and exploitation of ICT by human beings and society at large, independent of the stage of technological development or maturity and of the policy instruments to achieve the objectives. This kind of formulation of key concepts and aims in central policy is crucial in the sense that it arranges for a policy process that is flexible and adjustable. It is open to changes in technology and to changes in people’s preferences and it can be adjusted in response to different types of political regimes and different types of policy measures. eNorway 2005 seems strong in terms of covering an extremely wide array of relevant policy areas and it can exhaustively cover different types of implementation measures, programmes and instruments. Looking ahead, the policy framework should therefore not embody obstacles to meaningful and co-ordinated policy innovation (policy learning) in the field. Policy innovation certainly depends on political insight and vigour, and on human preferences and properties of the political system.

After more than three years in office, the Norwegian centre-conservative coalition government increasingly demonstrates that its policy represents a clear-cut alternative to what used to be known as Norwegian social democratic policy thinking. This is evident across policy fields, it is not limited to the tax policy and general economic policy. The belief in competition and individual choice is obvious in education policy for example. Evidence of the government’s intentions also became clearer in the overall innovation policy plan launched late in 2003. This policy tendency can be described as market orientation, with a strong belief that shaping framework conditions is one of the most important policy mechanisms. This latter point has had a bearing on social democratic thinking as well, but social democrats in opposition criticise the government’s lack of will to intervene actively to develop knowledge-based policy measures. The conservative



government is generally more sceptical (than opposition parties in parliament) of a policy that implies allocation of money to specific measures and policy programmes. In broader economic policy the government asserts that the best policy making is to shape good external conditions without allocating money directly. There can be no doubt that market orientation and a focus on external conditions is a strong policy mechanism in eNorway 2005 but not the only mechanism in this comprehensive area of policy making.

Norwegian information society policy and its link to innovation policy

Reflecting the perceived relation between IT policy and policy areas such as innovation policy and education policy, the department of IT policy in the Norwegian Ministry of Trade and Industry4 stated in its initial document on IT policy:

“Today’s modern, knowledge-based information society is at the hub of the IT policy. The [IT policy] department’s drive is to create a practical framework to promote reform and modernisation, as well as boost value creation through effective deployment of information and communication technologies.”

and

“The IT revolution entails innate social and economic changes; social and cultural patterns are being altered, national legislation and regulations are being contested and new products are being taken into use. The burgeoning growth of the digital society – eNorway – heralds tremendous opportunities, which command targeted work for realisation. A pro-active policy is crucial here. eNorway is the Norwegian Government's IST/ICT policy.”5

Without addressing explicitly the concept of innovation policy, the eNorway policy nevertheless captures the general objective of boosting value creation. The new innovation policy plan that was launched by the government in October 2003 has value creation as its main target, in addition to targets concerning knowledge, technology and innovation. Moreover the innovation policy plan includes in its formulation of overall objectives exploitation of ICT in a broad sense. The link between the plans of eNorway and Norwegian innovation policy is clear.

The text referred to above emphasises that the IT policy department’s core tasks are in the areas of e-commerce, IT deployment and broadband roll-out, as well as policies for electronic content and IT security. The overall objective is for Norway to be at the forefront of the knowledge-based information society through the promotion of advanced IT development and deployment. The government’s eNorway 2005 action plan,6 launched in May 2002, provides more in-depth information on the primary objectives of the government’s IT policy.

Co-ordination of eNorway

The characteristics of eNorway 2005 as a policy action plan

The eNorway action plan and its co-ordinating body is an innovative organisational operation aimed at making ICT policy co-ordinated and coherent. Compared to the history of ICT policy in the Norwegian context, which indicated a lack of credible visionary perspectives and aims, the eNorway action plan provides a hierarchy of targets and objectives related to five policy areas and a corresponding set of policy schemes and initiatives. It is visionary as well as concrete in its formulation of policy tools. The policy cycle contains large, comprehensive, complex policy schemes that are outsourced (from



the eNorway co-ordinating body), and it contains an array of policy initiatives, processes and smaller schemes that are operated by the co-ordinating body itself.

The eNorway co-ordinating body has as its aim to motivate and orchestrate information society policy as a whole. With the exception of legal competence and knowledge and skills related to the functioning of the political and bureaucratic system, it does not have specialised competence to handle sector-specific policy domains, and the large and comprehensive schemes seem to live a life of their own without specific influence or co-ordination from eNorway. The responsible co-ordinating authority for the large and complex schemes, which often is the relevant sector-specific ministry, is responsible for operation, implementation and policy learning related to these large schemes.

Policy initiatives and smaller schemes are by and large co-ordinated by the co-ordinating body, even though there are cases in which sector-specific ministries are the most important co-ordinators. Co-ordination implies the establishment of communication platforms, physical and electronic interfaces and routines between stakeholders and the co-ordinating body. From the side of the co-ordinating body it requires the design of measures for interaction between stakeholders that affect existing, traditional systems, technologies and solutions. It implies a pedagogic effort that engages stakeholders and participants in the opening of doors to digital solutions and corresponding network requirements. The emergence of the information society encounters a range of impediments in the existing structures and solutions of society. It is eNorway’s role is to co-ordinate the necessary changes in conditions. In many ways one can argue that the portfolio of policy initiatives and the smaller policy schemes that depend on network-building activities, taken together, are similar to one of the larger policy schemes that are outsourced.

The eNorway2005 action plan was until mid-2004 managed by the department of IT policy in the Ministry of Trade and Industry. From mid-2004 the department of IT policy (the co-ordinating body of eNorway) and responsibility for and management of eNorway is under the new Ministry of Modernisation. This places the co-ordination of the Norwegian government’s IT policy or information society policy7 within the Ministry of Modernisation and in close liaison with other government ministries with different areas of responsibility. The close liaison between eNorway and the ministries and com-munication between them take a variety of forms depending on the policy domain and the type of policy scheme in question. In other words, the intensity of communication and collaboration between the eNorway co-ordinating body and the sector-specific ministry as co-ordinating body, depends on the kind of policy scheme being operated. The following discussion identifies two general types of collaboration pattern, roughly corresponding to the two types of policy schemes described above.

In policy domains dominated by large complex schemes with separate budgets (e.g. HØYKOM and ICT in Norwegian education), which are mainly supervised and co-ordinated by sector-specific ministries, eNorway plays a defensive, relatively marginal role, at least concerning the activities under the scheme. This does not mean that the co-ordinating body does not participate in liaison committees between the actors (eNorway, sector-specific ministries, implementing actors and stakeholders). On the contrary, for policy schemes and domains that are outsourced and co-ordinated by sector-specific ministries, networking functions and the exercise of influence by the co-ordinating body are by and large done through participation in liaison committees that deal with overall



relevant policy making (governance, management, reporting, evaluation, policy learning and planning of activities).

In the policy domain that is characterised by networking activities, liaison com-mittees, and more specialised policy processes and schemes (e.g. e-commerce networks, standardisation processes, re-regulation, juridical processes), the co-ordinating body plays a more central role, leading the processes as chairman with responsibility for the variety of liaison committees, collaboration forums and policy processes. This implies keeping an up-to-date view of network participants, communication with core actors and stake-holders as well as agenda setting, responsibility for progress, for reporting and for evalu-ation and policy learning.

Patterns of interaction between co-ordinating body and stakeholders

The co-ordinating body operates a multitude of arenas and forums for co-ordinating policy initiatives, processes and schemes. Some processes are dominated by meetings and dialogue between the co-ordinating body and relevant ministries (for example interaction leading to propositions for changes in legislation). Some forums work on political and bureaucratic processes and include only higher level bureaucrats (for example, the IT panel of deputy ministers and the interdepartmental panel on e-commerce). In the case of e-commerce, there is a Web site (www.ehandel.no) which serves as a market and a gateway for the initiatives in eNorway’s “scheme for electronic commerce” for projects and activities that promote the development of electronic commerce in and with the public sector. Other forums are arenas for dialogue and collaboration between industry and stakeholders, such as the Forum for IT security and the national public key infrastructure (PKI) forum (e-signatures).

The many of arenas for interaction require many types of communication between the staff of the co-ordinating body and its contact points. They require communication across ministries and ministerial hierarchies and communication with a range of people with different status in society. This work is done more easily by telephone calls, e-mails and face-to-face contact than the typical bureaucratic mode of formal letters. In order to manage all the arenas between different actors, the department of IT policy (the formal label of the organisation that includes the eNorway co-ordinating body) works as a rather flat organisation. Although a hierarchy exists, formally speaking, this is a department that is different from many other ministerial departments in the bureaucracy.

Sectorisation and departmentalisation

Although the co-ordinating body certainly plays a central role in working towards the overall coherence of the eNorway action plan, responsibility for implementation of the five policy areas is partly distributed to relevant sector ministries or to constellations of ministries.8 The concept of departmentalisation – strong ministries and government agencies promoting sector interests – has strong roots in Norwegian politics and bureaucracy and is an important observation in the context of the MONIT project. The drive towards more horizontal policy may encounter impediments due to sectorisation.

The following discussion will refer to the above-mentioned description of the co-ordinating body’s activity: on the one hand as relatively peripheral co-ordinator of outsourced schemes that are strongly influenced by sector-specific interests and co-ordinated by sector-specific ministries; on the other hand as a central actor in policy initiatives, policy processes, smaller schemes and the strategic level of eNorway.



Downstream and upstream co-ordination in the policy cycle

The mandate of the co-ordinating body is limited to political and bureaucratic processes in Norway and in relation to the EU system. Its main task is to implement, follow up and develop the action plan. As pointed out above, for the variety of policy schemes and initiatives that include comprehensive areas, the co-ordinating body can only fulfil its objectives by running different types of co-ordinating activities.

In the context of the MONIT project, the study of the information society explores the subtleties in the distribution of responsibility among actors for the formulation, co-ordination and implementation of policy, and for evaluation, policy learning and re-formulation of policy. For the policy schemes and initiatives that have to be co-ordinated, two types of co-ordination tasks can be identified. On the one hand, there is the co-ordination of implementing activities. This requires what can be called a “downstream” policy exercise or policy execution. On the other hand, there are development and evaluation activities that require what can be called “upstream” policy learning capa-bilities. Both types of activities are necessary components of a policy system that aims at development, at staying attuned to political preferences, and at maintaining a long-term perspective and a flexible but continuous drive towards the overall objectives.

A stylised table of co-ordination in the policy cycle

This chapter has presented two stylised types of policy schemes or policy activities in eNorway: on the one hand large, complex outsourced policy schemes, and on the other hand specialised policy initiatives, actions and smaller schemes that are implemented with stronger internal control and co-ordinated as network processes. It has also presented two stylised types of co-ordination tasks: on the one hand the downstream co-ordination that concerns policy agenda setting, prioritisation and implementation, and on the other hand upstream co-ordination that concerns policy learning capabilities, policy analysis and evaluation. To assess the degree of influence and therefore the role of the co-ordinating body, Table 3.1 presents these stylised policy activities and co-ordination.

For agenda setting, prioritisation and implementation (downstream co-ordination), the co-ordinating body appears to have a low degree of influence on the large complex, outsourced policy schemes. Its influence and co-ordination appear stronger for the internally based schemes and policy processes.

Table 3.1. A stylised perspective on the influence of the eNorway co-ordinating body in the information society policy cycle

Type of policy scheme

Co-ordination type Type 1: large complex, outsourced policy schemes

Type 2: policy initiatives, actions, smaller schemes

“Downstream” co-ordination in the policy cycle 1. Agenda setting and prioritisation 2. Implementation

1. Low degree of influence 2. Low degree of influence

1. High degree of influence 2. Medium degree of influence

“Upstream” co-ordination in the policy cycle 3. Policy analysis and evaluation

3. Strong marketing function Low degree of influence, but potentially stronger influence

3. Strong marketing function, strong influence



For upstream co-ordination, i.e. the influence on the dimensions of policy analysis and evaluation, the co-ordinating body appears to be an important marketing tool for large, outsourced schemes. eNorway places large-scale Norwegian policy measures within the wider aims of information society policy. Moreover it has a currently low but potentially strong influence on policy learning. Documentation of the co-ordinating body’s ability to co-ordinate and influence policy analysis and evaluate the large out-sourced schemes is weak, because it is recently established and has undergone only a couple of evaluations. There is no information available on eNorway’s policy learning since the evaluation of one part of “ICT in Norwegian education” and the evaluation of HØYKOM, the broadband roll-out scheme.

For agenda setting, prioritisation and implementation and the co-ordinating body’s influence on type 2 policy schemes, it appears to be relatively strong, because the co-ordinating body actively runs most of these policy processes. Its influence on the marketing function and policy learning for type 2 schemes is strong, as it can follow these policy processes and schemes closely.

A multitude of actors in eNorway 2005

The Norwegian government and the Norwegian parliament obviously play important roles as overall driving forces in the development of the information society policy. From the perspective of policy making, there is no doubt that the key actors in the information society policy area are the co-ordinating body and the involved ministries. The links to the political level are strong. The co-ordinating body and the ministries are strongly influenced by and carriers of policy signals, policy guidance, governance and control from the government and parliament. Above, the current Norwegian government’s conservative political principles were viewed as the most fundamental policy signal. Links to the policy cycle and the level of implementation are relatively strong, although not as strong as to the political level. Figure 3.1 sketches eNorway’s key players in a hierarchical perspective.

Figure 3.1. Key players in the eNorway policy system

The key player at the policy level is the co-ordinating body in the Ministry of Modernisation. The responsibility for eNorway 2005 was transferred from the Ministry of Trade and Industry to the Ministry of Modernisation, and the Ministry of Trade and Industry now co-ordinates e-commerce. The other key players include the ministries involved as responsible participants and/or co-ordinating actors in specific areas of implementation of the action plan. In a few cases other public institutions play key roles

Norwegian Government

The co-ordinating body of eNorway in the Ministry of Modernisation

Implementation level Ministries, government agencies, outsourced agencies, commercial and public actors and stakeholders

Norwegian Parliament

Ministerial level The ministries as co-ordinating and implementing bodies



(the Norwegian Research Council is an important stakeholder in certain policy domains for example). In addition to the Ministry of Modernisation, which is active in most areas because of its overall responsibility as co-ordinator, the involved actors include the following ministries with designated co-ordination tasks:

• The Ministry of Labour and Government Administration has designated tasks for regulation, electronic signatures, skills, and public sector policy.

• The Ministry of Justice and the Police has designated tasks for regulation policy.

• The Ministry of Education and Research and the Research Council have desig-nated tasks for research, security and education policy.

• The Ministry of Transport and Communications has designated tasks for elec-tronic communication policy.

• The Ministry of Finance has designated tasks for tax incentives.

• The Ministry of Culture and Church Affairs and the Ministry of Children and Family Affairs have designated tasks for content policy.

• The Ministry of the Environment has designated tasks concerning content, i.e. spatial information policy.

Implementing institutions below the ministerial level also play an important role in this policy system. Implementation of policy is the most important task. At the end of the day the co-ordinating body depends crucially on the implementing institutions’ ability to reach the defined eNorway objectives.

The Norwegian IT committee of deputy ministers

In the past, the committee of deputy ministers in the domain of IT has played an important role. The committee was established in 1995 and was the result of political pressure arguing that IT policy needed political vision and concrete co-ordination. Accordingly, there were high expectations at the political level about what the deputy ministers could contribute to IT policy. After political arguments among different ministries that wanted to take part, the six participants9 concentrated on producing a report, which drew together existing IT policy schemes and initiatives, arranged ac-cording to a number of visionary statements and reflections.10 The report introduced a public debate about Norwegian IT policy. Between 2000 and 2002 the committee of deputy ministers was actively involved in work to prepare the launch of the eNorway action plan in 2002. The Ministry of Trade and Industry has headed the committee since 1995.

The committee is currently involved in different aspects of IT policy and issues relevant to eNorway. It convenes annually for a lengthy meeting, in which themes and schemes relevant to the inter-ministerial level of governance are presented and discussed. HØYKOM, the scheme for broadband rollout, was a main theme around 2000 and was immediately included in the eNorway action plan. The committee also holds shorter workshops. It is supported by a forum, the e-contact group (eKontaktgruppen), which has senior official representatives from the same ministries as the committee. The e-contact group prepares the work of the committee, as well as tasks that it is natural to keep within the ministry, such as policy evaluations. A forthcoming theme and task for the committee and the e-contact group relates to implementation of EU directives with relevance to IT policy.



The work of the IT committee of deputy ministers has various functions for eNorway and different levels of utility for the different ministries. The participating deputy ministers’ engagement in the work of the committee partly reflects their individual engagement, and partly reflects the tasks, schemes and status of each ministry’s role in and contribution to IT policy and eNorway as a whole. This means that some deputy ministers may use the committee work to actively influence issues and processes that are important for their ministries’ interests. Other deputy ministers may use the committee work to stay up-to-date on issues of importance for their ministry’s share of eNorway.

The co-ordinating body’s work: sector interests versus co-ordination

The questions that are opportune to ask are related to mechanisms of interaction and organisation in the system described above, which is meant to establish and ensure coherence between the policy-making and the policy-implementing level. The interaction between the policy-making level, the policy-co-ordinating level and the policy cycle (the implementing level) have been explored above. An attempt has been made to see how interaction between key players sets the conditions for agenda setting at the policy level and how priorities are set. What are the dynamics of influence and information flow? To what extent do the policy level and the co-ordinating body influence and control the extent to which the policy cycle delivers results in accordance with the objectives? How do the ministry and its co-ordinating body fulfil their role as the co-ordinator of eNorway?

This chapter will argue that co-ordination efforts encounter impediments owing to the way political power is structured and the way sectoral interests are protected. Policy coherence at a strategic level seems possible, but once one goes into the more specific context of implementation there are indications that policy coherence in eNorway is impeded by sectoral interests and lack of information flows between large policy domains and the co-ordinating body. This is not necessarily visible from the outside and may not be negative at an aggregate policy level. A central part of the co-ordinating body’s mandate is to stay up to date vis-à-vis the information society policy processes in Norway, Europe and globally. At this level eNorway seems to be a success.

However, when approaching the policy cycle and the day-to-day work of eNorway as co-ordinator, it becomes evident that the large policy areas and programmes that eNorway is supposed to co-ordinate are generally controlled by programme-level co-ordinating actors, which in turn are strongly influenced by the sector interests that once established the policy instruments. Moreover, even though there are different degrees of co-ordination intensity – in some policy areas the co-ordinating body is very actively involved, in other areas it is not – sector interests in general and the financial structure of policy implementation in particular seem to represent important impediments to co-ordination.

Mandate and target formulation

A discussion of co-ordination in this policy domain necessarily addresses how co-ordination affects target formulation and fulfilment. A main objective of the Norwegian authorities is to organise and drive eNorway-2005 and reach its targets. This intention is formulated in the eNorway action plan. It is stated that the development of eNorway is supposed to be driven by individuals’ and enterprises’ creative application of ICT, with active participation by the authorities (www.enorge.org). Moreover, and addressing the more concrete executive role of the co-ordinating body, the authorities express the



intention for it to be orchestrator, organiser and driving force. These terms refer directly to the targets in each of the sub-areas within the five main areas of effort described above.

An interesting question related to the defined targets and the possibility of successfully fulfilling them has to do with wording and formulation. The wording of the overall targets as well as the sub-targets in each area is relatively general. The positive aspect is that this type of formulation is more visionary than precise target formulations. Moreover, it is easy to make rough estimates of whether or not the targets are reached. The negative side is that the relative lack of precision may make it difficult to use such targets as they may imply more varied policy solutions. Consequently, estimates of fulfilment are difficult to quantify and may become politicised. A foreseeable result is political disagreement about whether or not targets are reached.11

With relatively vague target formulations, co-ordination implies activities that range from no influence to strong influence (by the co-ordinating body). Rephrased, the co-ordinating body may fulfil its objectives by any type of co-ordination. It can be argued that this may be necessary. The information society policy system involves very different areas of effort, policy instruments and schemes, which consequently imply very different implementation settings in which actors and stakeholders take different positions and have dissimilar bargaining power and possibilities to influence the processes.

While broad target formulations may be acceptable at the overall eNorway level, one would expect more specific formulations at the level of particular policy schemes. It is not the case for HØYKOM. The evaluation report states that the formal and overall targets in HØYKOM are complex and not stringently operationalised. In the light of the different types of policy guidance, commands and control that have had effect during the process (for example annual political signals about priority areas from the government and ministries), targets have changed and been prioritised differently. In the case of broadband implementation, the ambition of the political level has been to enable and obtain development in public enterprises and institutions, a stronger focus on user needs, and a stronger focus on efficiency and productivity gains in administration and services through the use of applications and services based on broadband technology. Thus, if public enterprises did not have a broadband connection, HØYKOM was to contribute to such a connection. If there was no access to (no supply of) infrastructure to which the enterprises could attach, demand from enterprises should stimulate investment in broadband infrastructure. The supply of broadband solutions and the development of applications is supposed to be ensured by commercial actors. Moreover, it has been an important intention to support ICT competence and industrial development related to broadband services and broadband-based services across the country, in particular in the periphery.

Given its complex mandate and overall targets, HØYKOM is an instrument with much wider implications than what is intuitively captured by the notion “broadband roll-out”. HØYKOM can be seen as a scheme for the modernisation of the Norwegian public sector, for industrial development, for regional development and for upgrading compe-tence related to broadband applications in the knowledge society. HØYKOM grew out of concrete target formulations about Internet access and applications and IT policy at the turn of the century, but, as with ICT policy in general, the scheme has developed into a multi-sector policy instrument with targets that correspond to national targets for hori-zontal innovation policy.



The evaluation of the HØYKOM scheme concludes that it has functioned well in some cases and less well in others. The scheme has addressed a range of aspects linked to broadband acquisition and application: infrastructure investments, competence flow, acquisition and application, development in and between institutions, production of content, stimulation of demand, competition and planning. Although to have national penetration rates among the best in the world is a declared objective of the overall eNorway framework, the main idea in the HØYKOM scheme has been to stimulate institutions that mainly want to work on their own development. As a scheme for boosting broadband penetration across the nation, it seems to be lacking mechanisms that ensure access in the periphery. HØYKOM has worked well at one end of the market, but has not been able to operate efficiently where the market has not already invested in infrastructure. With a stronger influence from regional authorities (channelled through eNorway as co-ordinating body) HØYKOM could probably have developed into a programme that strongly supported broadband investments and access in peripheral areas that lack possibilities for connection.

In fact, HØYKOM has focused on positive results from planned and ongoing development processes in the institutions that took part. It would appear that the political signals from the government and the ministries that finance HØYKOM limit the use of public money and engagement. This implies that it is appropriate to release public money when market mechanisms have ensured access to the technology. On the contrary, it is not politically acceptable to let policy schemes fiddle with the market through public investment in infrastructure.

There is much more to the story of broadband implementation in the Norwegian context. The evaluation of HØYKOM indicates that the policy of letting the market, i.e. the actors with ownership and control of infrastructure investment and co-ordination in the municipalities, take care of fulfilling broadband penetration targets in rural areas implies at least an acceptance that Norway will not be among the best broadband nations by 2005. If this is so, what role does the co-ordinating body play? It remains to be seen in the process of policy learning.

Dimensions of interaction

Competence

Competence in the co-ordinating body certainly sets the conditions for interaction with other co-ordinating actors and with actors with operative responsibility and tasks in implementation processes. It is a task of the co-ordinating body to give other ministries support for their sectoral IT policy areas. Considering the broad scope and open-ended nature of eNorway there is evidently a need for a broad competence base in the co-ordinating body to be able to co-ordinate the different parts. The question is the extent to which the co-ordinating body should have in-depth competence for each implementation area or each policy instrument. It is easy to say that its staff should have specialised competence in all of the professions and technology areas covered in eNorway’s programmes and schemes. Realistically it is impossible.

An orchestra conductor, for example, needs to have a minimum of insight into the properties of the different instruments and how they work together, but need not be able to play all instruments. In the same manner, the co-ordinating body has to have a mini-mum of knowledge and competence about the different policy areas, corresponding implementation instruments and underlying technologies, and their current and potential



interaction. However, it largely lacks the deep competence base on each implementation area and on specific technologies for the concrete and detailed management of a specific policy instrument. This does not mean that the co-ordinating body cannot be competent enough to control specific technology or policy areas in order to identify a misfit between the political principles that underpin policy instruments and the concrete possibility of reaching declared targets. Moreover it does not mean that the co-ordinating body cannot become competent to make decisions that can set a standard. This last point implies for example choosing one technology platform or solution in a technology area that is in urgent need of standardisation in order to become a public good. It can in fact be argued that centralised administration of specific policy instruments is not useful in an organisation that is focused on maintaining an overview and co-ordinating different policy areas into a coherent whole.

The most important tasks of the co-ordinating body include keeping an up-to-date view of the overall “policy portfolio” of eNorway, and identifying, following up and co-ordinating measures across areas with sector-specific characteristics. This means that the co-ordinating body intervenes in and co-ordinates the different policy areas and instruments. Moreover, it has a particular responsibility to intercept political signals and is responsible for co-ordinating and influencing legislative changes in relation to changes made necessary by eNorway. Intercepting political signals requires a considerable effort to stay up to date on political processes at different levels, because of the need to adapt eNorway to continuous changes in technology, society and political priorities. With the department of IT policy’s scarce resources and relatively small staff of fewer than 20 persons, this is a demanding task in view of the comprehensive scope of eNorway and the number of activity areas and tasks.

The co-ordinating body operates more or less like an orchestra conductor, with at least one exception. Specialised legal competence can be considered as a type of competence that is needed across many of the policy areas operated by eNorway. This area is covered by the two or three employees with a law degree. In general they take care the need for changes in the law or regulations in order to implement policy. They work as legal advisors both in general and on specific issues, and they interact with regulatory and juridical units in other parts of the Norwegian political system. This includes for example taking the initiative and following up the process of making a new law that takes into account new formal and legal aspects of e-mail, e-signatures and e-commerce. In concrete terms it implies collaboration between the co-ordinating body and the relevant ministries, in this case the Ministry of Culture and Church Affairs, responsible for content policy, and the Ministry of Justice.

Management, co-ordination and intercepting guiding political principles

Several interesting issues related to management and co-ordination of eNorway emerge when one looks at details of the co-ordinating body’s interaction with specific policy areas, their schemes and instruments. At the overall level, guiding principles from the political authorities strongly influence the co-ordinating body. The current main guiding principle is that policy making shall keep away from the selection mechanism that is supposed to work in a well-functioning market. It may well be that political signals may prevent the co-ordinating body from intervening actively, selecting a technology platform or a path-breaking and standardising technological solution, for example in the case of electronic commerce and electronic signatures. Even though the co-ordinating body probably has the competence to reach a conclusion regarding electronic signatures, and to set a standard that could boost electronic commerce, the political ideology that



considers the market the best selection mechanism appears to work against this. In addition, the same ideology generally influences policy domains affected by standardi-sation.

Co-ordination in a context of strong sector interests and sector-based financial resources

The consensus about ICT reached over the years makes it appropriate to ask whether ICT has gradually become depoliticised in Norway. The question is not easy to answer. The co-ordinating body’s ability to govern eNorway depends on the specialised interests that characterise a parliamentary political system and its stakeholders. It is a common perception among political analysts that strong sectoral interests are a dominant feature of the Norwegian system of ministries and the government agencies. The interests of ministries and government agencies, their strategies and patterns of action, reflect the strong influence of their specialised stakeholders, but, above all, this system of strong sectoral interests is interwoven in a rigid system of financial allocations from the Ministry of Finance. The allocation of financial resources to ministry budgets normally does not encourage or arrange for collaboration. On the contrary, ministries’ budgets reproduce the sectoral interests of each ministry. The possibility for co-ordinated action across mini-sterial borders is therefore not high. There appears to be a lack of financial resources, for example in earmarked cross-sectoral policy domains such as ICT, that encourage compromise across ministerial and sectoral interests. When it comes to the eNorway co-ordination body, the available resources cover its operation and its main activities, which include helping stakeholders and different sectoral interests to meet and discuss the possibilities for co-ordinated action. However, the budget of the co-ordinating body does not include funds earmarked for concrete co-ordinated implementation of policy. Conse-quently, the actors have to consider their specific budgetary constraints when considering a common solution. Co-ordination in this context implies making the different sectoral interests meet but it does not imply giving them money to implement common solutions.

Information from the co-ordinating body and from other ministries that try to co-ordinate specific areas of implementation indicate that it is hard work to bring together actors from government agencies and other institutions that at least theoretically should have a common interest in co-ordinated policy implementation. Seminars and meetings aimed at achieving co-ordinated policy implementation require specialised competence in order to be able to convince each of the actors that they will profit from joint processes and should spend money from their budget on projects that offer additional value. In the effort to modernise the public sector through ICT, it is not easy to influence strong government agencies to release scarce resources from their budgets. Another example is investments by local authorities in Web-based services for inhabitants and customers. Such decentralised solutions, which depend on constrained budgets and strict priorities, may lead to differences in local service levels that may not be politically desirable.

These aspects of sector-specific interests and departmentalised financial allocations point to the problem as due to the Ministry of Finance. It has not been possible to study how strongly its influence shapes processes of common, co-ordinated thinking and action, and how strongly sector-specific financial allocation is in the hands of the ministry. The general impression from conversations with bureaucrats in the ministries is that the ministry is in fact powerful.



Co-ordination and policy schemes of different complexity

Activities towards the end of the 1980s ensured that ICT policy was seen as a broad policy area that included basically what is contained in eNorway today: a policy domain for creating value in industry, efficiency and quality in the public sector, and involvement and identity. The IT committee of deputy ministers may be seen as the current political institutionalisation of high-level cross-ministerial consensus and collaboration. However, the culture that makes it possible to reach consensus on the overall ICT policy has not hindered the parallel existence of strong sector-specific interests that have shaped sub-areas of ICT policy. The 1990s have seen the flourishing of ICT policy schemes, some of which are very complex, some of them less so. This section looks at how co-ordination routines seem to relate to different levels of complexity in policy schemes.

A complex scheme is here defined as large enough to necessitate separate administration (it cannot be run and managed by the co-ordinating agency, for example) and it needs its own steering committee. A complex programme has a mandate and targets that cross sector-specific interests and policy areas. Examples are HØYKOM, the scheme for broadband roll-out, and ICT in education. Such programmes by and large take on lives of their own, in the sense that the co-ordinating agency has no specific influence on their operation. This often relates to the establishment of the programme, which often predates eNorway and its co-ordinating body. As described above, the portfolio of ICT policy schemes and programmes was initially drawn together by the co-ordinating body into a coherent whole. eNorway is by and large not the force behind the large ICT policy programmes. Instead, a number of large existing policy programmes gave substance and a flying start to the eNorway framework. The co-ordinating body has not been actively involved in policy programmes established before eNorway was launched.

For example, co-ordination of HØYKOM by the co-ordinating agency has not implied making use of the technical competence and technical understanding of broadband infrastructure or broadband applications. The operation of HØYKOM has been subcontracted to the Norwegian Research Council, which has experience, routines and administrative resources to grant money based on external applications.

Results from these large policy programmes are reported back to the co-ordinating body. Realising that the co-ordinating body cannot take on a role in the operation and concrete co-ordination of this type of programme, the co-ordinating agency should nonetheless be able to monitor and influence the overall effect of a programme, with reference to how it meets targets under the umbrella of eNorway.

In contrast to the lack of interaction between the co-ordinating agency and large policy programmes, the agency often plays operative roles in more specific eNorway initiatives and policy processes. In the portfolio of policy initiatives, the co-ordinating agency is the leading actor in a range of cases. Typical activities in this category include sector-specific or technology-specific efforts such as the diffusion and application of geographical data and information, challenges related to changes in legislation and standardisation, adjustment of Norwegian regulations to EU directives, and a range of network processes, e.g. related to changes of attitude with respect to e-commerce, e-security, e-content, etc.



Concluding discussion and implications for innovation policy

It is one of the main aims of the MONIT project to uncover good policy practice and derive lessons from specific policy domains such as IT policy for the formulation and implementation of a third-generation innovation policy. This concluding section con-siders the above study with a view to how horizontal innovation policy can be developed.

It is the aim of the Norwegian authorities to motivate and orchestrate the compre-hensive portfolio of ICT policy initiatives, schemes and programmes. ICT policy and eNorway are a means to obtain the following political objectives: value creation in industry, efficiency and quality in the public sector, and involvement and identity. The overall objectives of eNorway and its policy instruments include policy domains such as economic policy, research and education policy, regional policy, welfare policy, etc. Finally, eNorway is a part of the newly launched horizontal innovation policy plan. The comprehensive portfolio of policy making for the information society is thereby intimately linked to third-generation innovation policy thinking, i.e. horizontal and co-ordinated innovation policy. It is in a sense a part of the innovation policy plan. It is therefore a paradox that the innovation policy plan does not have an operative co-ordinating body. This is perhaps the most important good practice lesson for innovation policy makers, given the observation that the eNorway co-ordinating body is successful.

Influence on the implementation of larger, outsourced policy schemes

The findings indicate that the co-ordinating body for eNorway generally has little influence on the downstream co-ordination of large, complex, outsourced policy schemes. This should be taken into consideration if innovation policy is equipped with such a co-ordinating body. Co-ordination is attained far more easily if new financial resources are allocated or responsibilities and power are advantageously redistributed. This makes it easier to formulate demands and provides strong incentives for changing behaviour. This chapter has explored what eNorway consists of, and whether and how the co-ordinating body intervenes in components of eNorway to ensure fulfilling overall targets, but the answers are anything but straightforward. First, because the aims of eNorway imply identification and follow-up of issues that cross sector borders, the co-ordinating body initiates and co-ordinates cross-sectoral measures and brings different sector interests together (ministries, government agencies, important stakeholders in research and tech-nology, market actors, programme level co-ordinating agencies, etc.) to make them aware of and collaborate on issues involving common interests related to eNorway targets. Impediments to collaborative action due to sectoral interests and the fact that specific actors’ choice of action is strongly controlled by budget constraints have been discussed. Within eNorway there is a way to bring such actors together, but generally no financial means are available to implement specific projects and processes for collaborative action.

It is noted that the degree of co-ordination of specific policy schemes and pro-grammes in eNorway varies with the characteristics of different policy schemes and pro-grammes. Comprehensive policy programmes by and large often depend on programme-specific co-ordination agencies and interaction of often strongly sectoral interests. The co-ordinating body of eNorway generally plays an insignificant or less important role for the day-to-day operation of the large, outsourced schemes.



Influence on policy learning in outsourced policy schemes

However, eNorway may have greater influence on policy learning in large, complex, outsourced policy schemes, for which it works as a marketing tool. Moreover, it is the co-ordinating body’s task to communicate with the operative units of programmes about issues of cross-sectoral importance. It is more important for the co-ordinating body to monitor and revise eNorway through evaluations and changes in programmes than to co-ordinate implementation concretely. Because the co-ordinating body does not have the qualifications to exercise concrete co-ordination of implementation, it can exercise its influence with reference to how well large outsourced schemes work towards the overall targets of eNorway. More than any other national actor dealing with IT policy, the co-ordinating body is in a position to capture political signals, evaluation results and important stakeholders’ needs. It can work towards policy analysis by considering care-fully and accurately the specific national targets related to each policy scheme and relate the results to political processes in the EU and globally. It can influence and adjust the effects and target area of the policy schemes.

Influence on implementation and policy learning in policy initiatives and smaller schemes

In addition to large complex policy programmes, eNorway represents and runs a range of more specific policy initiatives and policy schemes. While some are outsourced, many are not only co-ordinated but governed and controlled by the co-ordinating body. This includes specific policy areas linked to regulatory, juridical, technological and market-related ICT issues, relating, for example, to digital content, standardisation and property rights. In particular, the co-ordinating body has a mandate to co-ordinate broad-band policy, ICT security, electronic signatures, etc. For such schemes, the co-ordinating body has a high degree of influence on downstream co-ordination; agenda setting and prioritisation, and a medium degree of influence on implementation. The co-ordinating body has the power to set and control agenda priorities, but it is more difficult to control the implementation process because of the uncertainty related to actions by stakeholders in strong sectors.

With both ownership and control of agenda setting and prioritisation in many policy processes, initiatives and smaller schemes, the co-ordinating body can influence policy learning strongly as well. Standardisation has been mentioned as a policy area that is very difficult to deal with under the current market-oriented political principles. For example, IT policy commentators argue that the co-ordinating body should be able to adjust to the need for setting a standard for e-signatures, which probably would boost e-commerce.

eNorway as a co-ordination body: role and potential for improvement

In both the large complex policy programmes and the smaller, more specific and more specialised policy domains, there seem to be good processes of co-ordination that link important stakeholders together with interests across sector domains. However, given the recent establishment of the co-ordinating body, there has not been much time for policy analysis, evaluation and policy learning. This study suggests that the current eNorway organisation might exercise more co-ordinating influence if its focus is on policy learning and the overall eNorway targets. However, this probably requires explicit political acceptance. While the co-ordinating body cannot have its “hands on the wheel” in the large programmes and make independent decisions about technological standardi-sation in specific policy domains, it should be able to organise its work so as to ensure



that the different policy initiatives, schemes and programmes address and attempt to reach the overall targets of eNorway. For example, co-ordination of broadband diffusion could have included signals that HØYKOM did not sufficiently address broadband infra-structure in rural areas. In this case fundamental policy principles from the centre-conservative government made this impossible, although policy learning processes are likely to show that rural areas have to be favoured in one way or another if broadband access targets are to be reached. Again, in working towards standardisation of an electronic signature, there has been space for a relatively early statement about preferred solution from the co-ordinating body.

Grande (2001) argues that the tendency towards increased complexity has a negative impact on states’ capacity to implement policies successfully and that such capacity is being eroded. In that perspective the the eNorway policy system would appear to have such features. Moreover, the assumption would be that not only eNorway but also horizontal innovation policy, if it is developed, are complex and comprehensive policy systems that have weaknesses but also potential strengths in their co-ordination mechanisms. How do the observations and findings in this chapter shed light on these assumptions?

The Norwegian information society policy certainly has the comprehensiveness and complexity that Grande refers to. The strategic level and wording of the eNorway action plan have been emphasised, and the plan is certainly broad enough to be included in the recently launched Norwegian horizontal innovation policy. Even at the level of specific policy schemes, target formulations correspond to innovation policy targets as they appear in the national innovation policy. Moreover, the co-ordinating body exercises co-ordination by means of a multitude of processes and arenas of dialogue and collaboration for the two types of policy schemes.

Given this complexity and the challenge of fine-tuning the degree of influence and adjusting the co-ordination process to the different policy schemes and processes, the Norwegian information society policy is certainly experiencing the strategic policy dilemma that Grande (2001, p. 916) describes:

“Policy strategies which have been feasible within the existing institutional structures turned out to be under-complex and, hence, inadequate to improve industrial competitiveness in the IT sector; however, more adequate comprehensive innovation policy strategies tended to be over-complex and overstrained the state’s institutional capability, in particular its capacity for horizontal and vertical policy co-ordination.”

Looking ahead, and in relation to the three options Grande presents for providing a way out of the policy dilemma, how can co-ordination of Norwegian information society policy improve its performance? The first option is to concentrate and centralise the competencies and resources in the institutional setting of co-ordination. The Norwegian co-ordinating body has juridical, political and bureaucratic competence and skills, and is probably more concentrated and centralised than in other OECD countries. An even more concentrated and centralised co-ordinating body would have to be far larger and would require restructuring the specialised competence that is currently located in the sector-specific ministries. It would probably also require moving competence that is currently located in powerful government agencies and in subcontracted organisations that operate specific policy schemes to the co-ordinating body.



The second option, to decentralise policy, goes in the opposite direction and may be more promising. Norwegian information society policy is not currently very decentralised. The large, complex policy schemes are outsourced from the co-ordinating body, but local and regional governments are probably not as involved and influential as co-ordinating actors as they might be. Nevertheless, local governments have a good deal of freedom for their technology investments, as seen in HØYKOM. However, the local and regional levels in Norway are relatively small compared to regions in larger European countries. They are arguably far from being able to be core actors in implementation, because of lack of resources and competence.

The third option is to adopt a policy strategy that is better suited to the country’s institutional framework. This may be what has happened for Norwegian information society policy. Discussing this option, Grande distinguishes between “deliberate strategies”, i.e. plans intentionally designed and implemented, and emergent strategies, i.e. an “unintended order” emerging from activities of individual actors or organisations, referred to here as stakeholders. Deliberate strategies emphasise the implementation of pre-set goals. Emergent strategies emphasise results as the product of a process. The two types of schemes described in this chapter as typical of eNorway roughly correspond to the deliberate strategy (the large complex schemes) and to the emergent strategy (the smaller ones).

The potential for improvement would appear to require a policy learning process by the Norwegian government and the co-ordinating body and consideration of a reallocation and reorganisation of the policy tasks in the current policy cycle (policy portfolio) into one of the two types of strategies. Certain policy tasks (for example standardisation) that currently are run and managed as a policy process/emergent strategy by the co-ordinating agency could be improved if defined as deliberate strategy. This requires stricter decision making and co-ordination according to the defined aim. Another example implies greater awareness that schemes defined as deliberate strategies, i.e. with clearly specified aims, need to be implemented in accordance with their aims. The example emphasised in this chapter is the broadband roll-out scheme and the lack of effect in peripheral areas, whereas it is the overall objective of the government to ensure broadband infrastructure in all parts of Norway. In this case, and perhaps across policy making in generic technology domains, the political principle of the conservative government, which can be sum-marised as a market orientation and no desire to disturb the market by means of direct public investment, represents a counteracting principle and a challenge to co-ordination.



Notes

1. SINTEF STEP Report 02-2004, “Bredt band i tynn tråd? Evaluering av HØYKOM”, by Håkon Finne, Anders Ekeland and Yngve Seierstad Stokke.

2. “Den norske IT-veien. Bit for bit”, Rapport fra Statssekretærutvalget for IT, January 1996.

3. http://europa.eu.int/information_society/eeurope/2005/all_about/action_plan/index_en.htm

4. The Ministry of Trade and Industry was in charge of eNorway until summer 2004.

5. Ministry of Trade and Industry, Department of IT policy, December 2003, http://odin.dep.no/nhd/engelsk/

6. The eNorway Web site is www.enorge.org and the eNorway 2005 strategy document can be found at http://odin.dep.no/archive/nhdvedlegg/01/03/eNorw040.pdf

7. This text uses the terms IT policy, ICT policy and information society policy. The concepts are roughly equivalent, even though information society policy is certainly broader and IT policy may be more specific.

8. In some schemes two or more ministries collaborate as responsible co-ordinators.

9. The Ministries of Trade and Industry, Administration, Transport, Church Affairs, Education and Re-search, Culture and Finance.

10. Den norske IT-veien. Bit for bit, Rapport fra Statssekretærutvalget for IT, 1996

11. The evaluation of the HØYKOM scheme contains a discussion of the wording in relation to targets in broadband roll-out in Norway. The authors make a point of the fact that “access to” is used instead of “connection to” broadband infrastructure and services. It is an example that indicates the problem with vague or inaccurate targets.



References

Buland, T. (1996), Den Store IT-planen, Norges Satsing på Informasjonsteknologi 1987-1990, Report 27, Senter for Teknologi og Samfunn, NTNU.

Finne, H., A. Ekeland and Y. Seierstad Stokke (2004), “Bredt band i tynn tråd? Evaluering av HØYKOM”, SINTEF STEP report 02-2004.

Grande, E. (2001), “The Erosion of State Capacity and the European Innovation Policy Dilemma: A Comparison of German and EU Information Technology Policies”, Research Policy, 30.

Ministry of Trade and Industry (2002), The eNorway Action Plan.

OECD (2004), “ICT Diffusion to Business Peer Review, Country Report: Norway”, internal working document.


Statssekretærutvalget for IT (1996), “Den norske IT-veien: Bit for bit”, January.

Technopolis Group (2002), The Governance of Research and Innovation: An International Comparative Study, December.

INNOVATION AND THE INFORMATION SOCIETY: POLICY COHERENCE AND GOVERNANCE IN IRELAND – 93


Chapter 4

INNOVATION AND THE INFORMATION SOCIETY: POLICY COHERENCE AND GOVERNANCE IN IRELAND

Paulina Ramirez, Murray Scott and Willie Golden Centre for Innovation and Structural Change (CISC)

National University of Ireland, Galway

Recent discussions on the need for a new generation of innovation policy point to the need for greater integration between innovation and other policy domains. The challenge is how to establish national systems of policy governance which lead to greater horizontal co-ordination and coherence between innovation and other policy fields. To improve understanding of the issues raised by cross-departmental policy governance, this chapter presents the results of a study on the policy-making process for the information society, a policy area that requires co-ordination across many government departments and agencies. It also looks at the linkages and coherence between the information society and science, technology and innovation (STI) policy. It is found that though the information society agenda crosses departmental boundaries, Ireland’s information society policy is mainly developed and implemented along traditional departmental lines. While inter-departmental co-operation takes place on concrete issues it does not occur when a longer-term, continuous commitment is required. No evidence was found of horizontal policy co-ordination between the areas of the information society and STI. An important reason for the lack of coherence between the two policy areas is the science-push character of Ireland’s present STI policy which makes co-ordination with other policy domains difficult. A broader innovation policy is needed before effective linkages can be made between STI and other policy fields. The link between innovation and other policy areas might better be made by “innovation champions” within the policy system whose task would be to identify synergies between policy areas and with the authority and resources to implement cross-departmental initiatives.

Introduction

This chapter reports the findings of a study on policy governance in the area of the information society and the extent of horizontal linkages and coherence between the information society and science, technology and innovation (STI) policy. The research was undertaken in the context of recent discussions on the need for a new generation – a third generation – of innovation policy that would integrate STI with other policy domains (EU, 2003; OECD, 2002). The challenge is how to establish national systems of policy governance which lead to greater horizontal co-ordination and coherence between innovation and other policy fields.

94 – INNOVATION AND THE INFORMATION SOCIETY: POLICY COHERENCE AND GOVERNANCE IN IRELAND


The premise for the present study is that the development of a third generation of innovation policy would gain from greater understanding of how the policy-making process is governed in an area that requires co-ordination across many government departments and agencies. One such policy area is the information society. At the same time the study made it possible to identify characteristics of the policy governance system that supported or hindered the development of horizontal linkages and policy coherence between the information society and STI. The study focuses on the governance of the policy cycle defined in three broad stages, namely: i) agenda setting, policy formulation and prioritisation; ii) policy implementation and co-ordination; and iii) policy evaluation and learning.

National systems of policy governance are contingent on countries’ history, traditions and culture as well as the formal mechanisms of the policy-making process. Ireland’s history of industrialisation and the recent decade of exceptional economic growth have been major influences behind perceptions of the main policy challenges for the information society and STI and have played an important role in shaping the governance system in both policy areas. The next section presents the context of Ireland’s recent development, the background to the two policy areas and the main STI policy bodies. The following section sets out the information society policy structures before turning to the governance of the information society policy cycle. Then, the links between the information society and STI policy are discussed. A final section draws the main con-clusions of the study.

Background to Ireland’s national system of innovation

Ireland is a small, open economy, situated in a peripheral location with respect to the main European and world markets. The country’s history of industrial development dates from the 1960s when it adopted a development strategy centred on foreign direct investment (FDI) and export-led growth. This strategy for industrial development succeeded in attracting various waves of manufacturing and services FDI, above all from US multinational corporations (MNCs) looking for a low-cost location from which to enter the European market. At this stage, innovation was not seen as an important part of Ireland’s industrialisation strategy. One of the areas in which Ireland proved particularly successful in attracting FDI was information and communication technologies (ICT), a sector which has become central to the country’s development.

Until the end of the 1980s the FDI-led model of industrial development had a mixed history in terms of investment, employment and economic growth. While the 1970s were characterised by years of FDI inflows, the international economic crisis of the 1980s resulted in a fall in US investment, high levels of unemployment, emigration and brain drain. Increasing concerns were voiced about the lack of sophistication of much of the foreign investment and the absence of mechanisms that would allow Ireland to move towards higher-value businesses (Trauth, 2000). The crisis of the 1980s brought home the vulnerability of a FDI-dependent economy with weakly embedded MNCs, a concern that still prevails in many Irish policy circles.

From the late 1980s, Ireland once again experienced major flows of inward FDI. The 1990s was a period of unprecedented economic expansion, the decade during which Ireland became known as the Celtic Tiger. US multinationals in the ICT sector provided much of the new investment, employment and exports that underpinned the Celtic Tiger. By the mid-1990s Ireland had become the favourite location for US electronic hardware overseas investment and was the main location for the production of software products



for the European market (Sweeney, 1999). The 1990s also saw important FDI growth in ICT-intensive internationally traded services with the establishment of pan-European call centres in a number of services areas. It was the success of the internationally traded service industries which led Fórfas, the policy advisory body of the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment, to identify ICT-intensive services as a key sector for future economic growth, and it was also central to the singling out of the information society as a distinct policy area from the mid-1990s (Fórfas, 1996). Another major development of the 1990s was the emergence of a number of indigenous software firms built around product innovation.

In spite of the recent successes in terms of employment and export growth, policy circles have consistently voiced concerns about two aspects of Ireland’s pattern of development over the years. The first is the failure to build an internationally competitive indigenous sector (Fórfas, 1996; Culliton Report, 1992; Telesis Consultancy Group, 1982). In fact, outside the recent successes of the Irish software sector, one feature of Ireland’s FDI-led economic development model has been the emergence of a dual economy characterised by a very productive but weakly embedded foreign-owned sector and an underperforming and uncompetitive Irish-owned sector.

The second, and related, feature of Ireland’s economic development has been the weakness of the country’s national innovation system (NIS) (see Box 4.1). A recent report by the Inter-departmental Committee on Science, Technology and Innovation acknowledged that R&D activity in Ireland (both the public and the business sectors) lagged behind that of leading countries (IDC Steering Group, 2004). Of special concern was the fact that, in the business sector, performance lagged in terms of number of firms with sufficient minimum scale of R&D activities and with sustainable absorptive capacity for scientific and technological advances. This reflects the fact that, while innovative activities of MNCs are central to Ireland’s NIS, most of these firms undertake the bulk of their R&D investment elsewhere. At the same time indigenous industry does little in the way of innovation. Another factor to note is the highly concentrated nature of R&D in terms of industrial sectors. As Box 4.1 shows, the weight of the ICT industry in the country’s NIS has made this sector an influential stakeholder in the country’s STI policy.

Box 4.1. Some characteristics of Ireland’s NIS

• In 2001, business expenditure on R&D in Ireland was 0.9% of GNP compared to an EU average of 1.25%.

• Approximately two-thirds of R&D carried out in Ireland is performed by MNCs. The majority of is accounted for by 19 firms.

• One-third of Irish-owned industry (about 1 000 firms) have some expenditure on R&D. Most of this investment is very small.

• Approximately 70% of MNC R&D investment in Ireland is in computers, electronics and software.

• Approximately 50% of R&D-performing indigenous firms are in the software industry.

Source: IDC (2004).



Policy background: the shift towards an information and knowledge economy

The rise of the information society as a distinct area of policy and recent develop-ments in the field of STI date from the late 1990s. The origins of both policy initiatives are rooted in increasing concerns in Irish policy circles about the sustainability of the economic model that underpinned the success of the Celtic Tiger. The need to make a transition towards a higher-value information or knowledge economy as an alternative to the previous low-cost-location model of international competition began to gather momentum from the mid- to late 1990s and underlies recent information society and STI policy initiatives.

Information society policy

Initiatives in the area of information society policy were the result of discussions within the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment (DETE) in the mid-1990s on the need to develop a long-term framework for enterprise development (ISSC, 1996). The policy document that summarises these discussions identified the coming together of a number of factors that posed a challenge to Ireland’s future economic development (Fórfas, 1996). The factors identified included changes in the organisation of international production as a result of developments in ICT, increasing trade liberalisation, and the entrance into the world economy of a number of low-cost locations. It was argued that, together, these factors would result in the intensification of international competition for FDI, a serious predicament considering the role of these investments in Ireland’s eco-nomic development.

Policy discussions also acknowledge however that ICT could open new opportunities for Ireland, above all because the new technologies diminished the constraints of distance and time. This was seen as particularly important given the country’s peripheral location with respect to the main world markets and its high dependence on exports. Among key elements for a future long-term strategy for enterprise development, the document identified the central role of ICT (with a big emphasis on telecommunications policy). One result of these discussions was the establishment of an Information Society Steering Committee (ISSC) with a mandate to propose a strategy for the development of an information society in Ireland (ISSC, 1996). Later sections will discuss the development and governance of information society policy in more detail.

Science, technology and innovation policy

STI policy, as distinct from industrial policy, only really began in Ireland in the late 1980s; in fact some would say that the Irish NIS only emerged in the 1990s (Cogan, 2003). During the 1980s and 1990s, Ireland introduced a number of measures to enhance the technological sophistication and innovative performance of Irish-owned industry; these measures were not perceived to have been particularly successful (Cogan and McDevitt, 2002). The most dramatic change in the Irish NIS has occurred since the late 1990s, with a powerful drive to build the country’s academic scientific and research capability. The five-fold increase in resources for STI in the National Development Plan 2000-20061 underpins this major policy initiative. The motivation behind this policy shift is the need to prompt a move towards a knowledge-based economy; this is seen as Ireland’s only possible response to increasing international competition for FDI. The main objective of the new STI policy is to attract R&D investment from the MNC sector by creating advanced academic scientific research. A related goal is to stimulate the



creation of an innovative indigenous sector through the emergence of clusters of inter-nationally competitive high-technology Irish-owned firms.

The major commitment of resources for science and technology spending in the National Development Plan 2000-2006 represents a new departure towards strengthening the innovative capabilities of Irish society. It is important to note, however, that the recent STI policy model is far closer to first-generation science-push models than to the second-generation innovation policies associated with the NIS concept of the 1990s. One consequence is that the present emphasis on science and technology has gone hand in hand with a scaling back of non-R&D innovation measures (Cogan, 2002). This could have serious implications for the majority of Irish-owned industry that still requires assistance to monitor, adopt and adapt technology. Moreover there seems to be little awareness among policy makers of the role of demand-led innovation policies based on interaction between users and producers. As will be argued later in this chapter, the science-push character of present STI policy makes it difficult to develop horizontal linkages or create policy coherence with other policy fields.

STI policy-making bodies

In Ireland, the original impetus for both information society and STI policy came from the government department associated with industrial policy, the Department of Enterprise Trade and Employment. Within the DETE, Fórfas is responsible for providing advice to government on enterprise, trade, science, technology and innovation policy. Under Fórfas, three state agencies are responsible for enterprise development and STI. They are: the Industrial Development Agency (IDA), responsible for initiatives relevant to the MNC sector; Enterprise Ireland (EI), focused on the development of indigenous industry; and the recently founded Science Foundation Ireland (SFI), responsible for managing new STI funds under the National Development Plan 2000-2006.

While there are numerous government departments and agencies with some involvement in STI, the two government departments most closely associated with STI policy are the Department of Education and Science (DES) through the Higher Education Authority (HEA) and the DETE. Of the two, it is the DETE that is identified as the champion of the shift towards a knowledge economy and the source of recent initiatives in the area of STI policy. As a result of the major increase in resources allocated to STI, a number of new bodies have been established to manage these funds. These include the Irish Research Council for Science Engineering and Technology (IRCSET) and the Irish Council for Humanities and Social Science (IRCHSS) at the DES and Science Foundation Ireland (SFI) at the DETE.

Figure 4.1 gives a simplified picture of government bodies involved in STI policy. The policy structures for the information society are discussed in the next section.



Figure 4.1. Departments and agencies involved in STI policy

Government of Ireland

Department of Enterprise, Tradeand Employment (DETE)

Department of Education and Science (DES) Other government departments

Agriculture & FoodCommunications

Marine & Natural ResourcesHealth & Children

Office of Science and Technology

Fórfas

Higher Education Authority

IRCSET IRCHSS

Science Foundation

Ireland (SFI)

EnterpriseIreland (EI)

Industrial Development Agency (IDA)

Government of Ireland

Department of Enterprise, Tradeand Employment (DETE)

Department of Education and Science (DES) Other government departments

Agriculture & FoodCommunications

Marine & Natural ResourcesHealth & Children

Office of Science and Technology

Fórfas

Higher Education Authority

IRCSET IRCHSS

Science Foundation

Ireland (SFI)

EnterpriseIreland (EI)

Industrial Development Agency (IDA)

Policy structures for the information society

Public policy engagement with the information society, as a distinct policy area, began in the mid-1990s (see Table 4.1 for a chronology of the main events). Following the recommendation of the Information Society Steering Committee, set up by Fórfas to come up with proposals for the development of the information society in Ireland, political responsibility for the implementation of information society policy was taken on by the Department of An Taoiseach, a powerful government department with responsi-bility for providing an overall vision and strategy for government policy. The task of designing an implementation strategy for the information society was taken on by a high-level Inter-departmental Implementation Group on the Information Society convened by the Department of An Taoiseach.

Towards the end of the 1990s, the Inter-departmental Implementation Group recommended a plan of action which identified key areas for government policy. This plan of action, published by the Department of An Taoiseach in early 1999 under the name ”Implementing the Information Society in Ireland: An Action Plan”, became the main information society policy document until 2002 when a revised version, “New Connections”, was published (Department of An Taoiseach, 2002). The action plans not only identified the major areas of policy but, as will be seen, provided the basic imple-mentation and co-ordination framework for the information society. As a consequence, the policy structures for the information society developed around the execution of the action plans. At the same time, in order to facilitate progress of the initiatives set out in the action plans, an Information Society Fund, managed by the Department of An Taoiseach along with the Department of Finance, was created.2



Table 4.1. Chronology of main events in information society policy

Date Government department/agency Main event Document

1996 Fórfas Establishes Information Society Steering Committee (ISSC) to propose a strategy for development of the information society in Ireland.

Shaping Our Future: A Strategy for Enterprise in Ireland in the 21st Century, Fórfas.

Information Society Steering Committee Publishes information society strategy. Information Society Ireland: Strategy for Action.

Department of An Taoiseach Political responsibility for information society policy taken on by Department of An Taoiseach.

1997 Department of An Taoiseach convenes Interdepartmental Implementation Group on the Information Society

An Interdepartmental Implementation Group on the Information Society established to propose implementation strategy for the information society.

1997 Independent Establishment of Information Society Commission.

1998 An Interdepartmental Implementation Group on the information society

Interdepartmental Implementation Group proposes Plan of Action.

1999 Department of An Taoiseach Department of An Taoiseach publishes Action Plan recommended by the Interdepartmental Implementation Group. Plan of Action becomes main information society policy document.

Implementing the Information Society in Ireland: An Action Plan, Department of An Taoiseach.

1999 Department of An Taoiseach Establishment of information society policy implementation structure.

1999 Department of An Taoiseach & Department of Finance

Information Society Fund

2001 Department of An Taoiseach

New set of structures created to improve interdepartmental co-operation. ISPU main government body responsible for information society policy.

2001 Independent Establishment of Second Information Society Commission.

2002 Department of An Taoiseach ISPU

Second Information Society Action Plan, New Connections.

New Connections: Government Action Plan on the Information Society.

2005 ISPU Dissolution of ISPU.

New policy structures to increase policy coherence

In the initial period, horizontal co-ordination across government departments and agencies for the design and implementation of information society policy was in the hands of the Interdepartmental Group. Departments and agencies also co-operated on an ad hoc basis. There was however no single agency responsible for the overall imple-mentation of the government strategy and it was increasingly felt that this affected the coherence of the information society agenda. To strengthen the implementation of the 1999 Action Plan, new structures based at the Department of An Taoiseach were put in place in 2001 to improve interdepartmental co-operation and develop a more coherent policy approach. These high-level structures were still in place at the time of this research and consist of:



• The Minister of State. The minister has responsibility for the co-ordination of the information society agenda across all government departments.

• The Cabinet Committee on the Information Society. This is the main political body driving implementation of the information society agenda. Its role is to take a high-level political view of information society policy. It brings together ministers with responsibility for policy areas set out in the revised government action plan, New Connection (2002). The Committee is chaired by An Taoiseach and is convened by the Minister of State.

• The eStrategy Group of Secretaries General. This group addresses national strategy issues and is responsible for high-level administrative decisions. It is made up of the Secretary General, the highest civil servant, of each of the ten departments with responsibility for information society policy.

• The Assistant Secretaries eGovernment Implementing Group. The objective of this group is to ensure that information society policy is implemented in a co-ordinated manner across all government departments and agencies. It is made up of senior civil servants from ten departments.

• The Information Society Policy Unit (ISPU). This unit, based at the Department of An Taoiseach, has overall responsibility for developing, monitoring, co-ordinating and driving the implementation of the information society agenda. The ISPU also has functional responsibilities for e-government and the eCabinet Initiative. The ISPU, in conjunction with the Department of Finance, also has the task of evaluating submissions to the Information Society Fund.

Figure 4.2 shows the high-level information society policy structure, the role of the committees and the frequency of meetings. According to the government the new arrangements were:

“designed to deliver a more coherent overall approach, at the highest levels of government, to formulation and implementation of policy on a wide range of issues that increasingly cut across traditional departmental boundaries between departments and agencies and between central and local government” (New Connections, 2002).



Figure 4.2. High-level structure of the information society

Department of An Taoiseach

ISPU

Cabinet Committee on theInformation Society

10 Departments

EStrategiesSecretaries General

10 Departments

Assistant Secretaries

Implementation Group

Ad hoc groups

Taoiseach

Minister of IS (convenor)

Meets every three months

Central eGovernment Group

Depts. of Finance & An Taoiseach

Meets every month


Department of Taoiseach

High Level

Political

High Level

Administration

Detail implementation issues

“Conflict resolution”

Department of An Taoiseach

ISPU

Cabinet Committee on theInformation Society

10 Departments

EStrategiesSecretaries General

10 Departments

Assistant Secretaries

Implementation Group

Ad hoc groups

Taoiseach

Minister of IS (convenor)


Central eGovernment Group

Depts. of Finance & An Taoiseach

Meets every month


Department of Taoiseach

High Level

Political

High Level

Administration

Detail implementation issues

“Conflict resolution”

Governance of the information society policy cycle

Agenda setting

The government department with political responsibility for information society policy is the Department of An Taoiseach. Since 2001, the Information Society Policy Unit, within that department, has been the main government body responsible for managing the information society policy cycle of agenda setting, implementation and learning (see Table 4.2 for the main characteristics of the information society policy cycle in Ireland). Contrary to other countries, Ireland has had no White Paper or policy document outlining the government’s general strategy or vision with respect to the information society. While the general implementation outline developed by the Interdepartmental Implementation Group and the ISPU (in the case of the 2002 action plan) has been effectively conveyed in the two action plans, there has been no general strategy or roadmap underpinning and unifying the various strands of information society policy.

In 2002, a new action plan, “New Connections”, produced under the leadership of the ISPU, replaced the 1999 action plan as the main information society policy document. The main areas of policy prioritised by the two action plans are set out in Table 4.2. In the case of both action plans, however, the actual development of the policy agenda in each of the prioritised areas was delegated to the departments with jurisdiction over those policy fields. Along with its responsibility as overall policy co-ordinator, the Department of An Taoiseach and the ISPU also took responsibility for the development and imple-mentation of the e-government agenda, a complex policy area that crosses all government departments.



One result of this agenda-setting structure is that the different strands of information society policy have, in essence, been developed and implemented by individual government departments and agencies along traditional departmental lines. Though all departments report to the ISPU the progress being made in their respective areas of responsibility, interviews indicate that the ISPU engages little in the formulation of information society policies outside the area of e-government. This departmentalisation of the information society agenda, with measures conceived, designed and implemented following the established rationale of existing departments, limits the possibility for developing a more integrated approach to information society policy. The lack of a general roadmap providing a unifying framework for the constituent elements of the information society adds to the fragmented nature of the policy-making process.

A second important issue related to this agenda-setting structure arises from the dual role of the Department of An Taoiseach and the ISPU as both overall co-ordinators of information society policy and bodies with responsibility for e-government. Along with the information society, the Department of An Taoiseach also has political responsibility for the modernisation of the public sector. E-government fits very well with the agenda for transforming the public sector and both agendas cross all government departments. It is clear from interviews that the e-government agenda, in conjunction with the modernisation of public services, had become the primary focus of attention of the ISPU. While this has given the ISPU leverage to push the e-government agenda forward, it has also meant that both the ISPU and the high-level information society policy structures (Figure 4.2) are mainly identified with e-government rather than overall information society policy co-ordination.

How policies for the information society are conceived, developed and prioritised within departments is not clear. In the interviews undertaken for this study policy makers played down the role of the European Union (EU) in the formulation of information society policy. However, because of membership in the EU, at least some areas of Irish information society policy (for example e-business) are guided by policy decisions made at the European level. Within departments and agencies, much of the initiative for specific information society policy measures is left to the heads of e-units (e.g. the e-business units within the DETE and Enterprise Ireland) who have responsibility for developing concrete policies. At this level, the process of designing policy and setting priorities seems to be relatively haphazard and contingent, subject to a number of immediate pressures. Important factors that influence the formulation of information society policy here include: the availability of funds for specific policy initiatives, the amount of resources in terms of people and time dedicated to that policy area, the pressures from well organised stakeholders as well as the particular motivations of the individuals in charge of that policy area.



Table 4.2. Summary of main characteristics of the governance of the information society policy cycle

An arrow indicates that the initiative was carried through to the next period

Important features of policy governance

Agenda setting

Policy document 1999 information society Action Plan 2002 New Connections, 2nd information society Action Plan

Body responsible:

Government level Interdepartmental Implementation Group on the Information Society identifies main policy areas.

ISPU identifies main policy areas.

Departmental level Each department takes responsibility for the formulation of information society policy in their specific areas of jurisdiction.

A number of departments and agencies create dedicated e-units to develop and implement information society policy. ISPU takes responsibility for overall information society policy co-ordination and for e-government.

Information society policies are designed and implemented along traditional departmental lines. Within departments and agencies the process of policy formulation and prioritisation is contingent on numerous immediate pressures

Stakeholder level 1st ISC 2nd ISC

Main Policies 1999 Action Plan focused on five policy strands:

• Telecommunications infrastructure

• Legal and regulatory environment

• e-business • e-government

• Enabling measures

New Connections focused on seven policy strands:

• Telecommunications infrastructure

• Legal and regulatory environment

• e-business • e-government

• R&D

• Lifelong learning

• e-inclusion

Policy implementation and co-ordination

Government level Action Plan provides co-ordination framework for implementation of information society policy. Ad hoc interdepartmental groups formed around specific policy issues. Information Society Fund catalyst for interdepartmental projects.

ISPU develops as mediator when there is conflict between departments and agencies.

ISPU and high-level information society structures fail to develop as co-ordinators and integrators of overarching information society policy agenda. Interdepartmental co-ordination takes place over specific issues but fails when longer term commitment is required. Informal social networks are important mechanism for information exchange between and within departments.

Departmental level Units within departments.



Table 4.2. Summary of main characteristics of the governance of the information society policy cycle (continued)

An arrow indicates that the initiative was carried through to the next period

Important features of policy governance

Policy evaluation and learning

Government level Department of An Taoiseach monitors and appraises progress on specific actions set out in Action Plan Learning from participation in international forums

ISPU within Department of An Taoiseach

Main evaluation criteria are the target dates for the completion of projects set out in Action Plans. International benchmarking and participation in international forums can lead to learning by comparing.

Departmental level Dedicated e-units within departments monitor and appraise measures leading to the successful meeting of the Action Plan targets. Learning from participation in international forums and international networks.

Targets and international benchmarking can lead to policy learning but it depends how these tools are used. There are important differences in the use of targets and international benchmarking across the information society policy making system.

Link between information society and Innovation policy

Government level Importance of innovation referred to in Action Plan. No link between information society and Innovation Policy.

In New Connections R&D is one of the seven information society policy strands. STI policy left to DETE and DES. No link between information society and innovation policy.

STI policy is recent in Ireland. A number of new institutions have been created to implement STI policy but as yet these are not operating in a coherent fashion. STI policy agenda has still not been fully understood or accepted by important sections of government. Science-push nature of present STI policy hinders horizontal policy co-ordination between STI and other policy areas.

Departmental level No link between information society and innovation policy.

No link between information society and innovation policy.

The influence of stakeholders in the setting of the policy agenda

The official forum for stakeholders outside government to influence the formulation of information society policy is the Information Society Commission (ISC). The ISC is made up of representatives from some of the large MNCs operating in Ireland, industry associations, chambers of commerce, trade unions, county councils, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and numerous regional bodies. Up to now there have been two ISCs, both of them nominated by the Department of An Taoiseach. The first ISC established a number of working groups on issues relating to the implementation of the information society; however, as an advisory body, the ISC found it difficult to make a clear contribution in this area. The second ISC has focused on topics such as the development of better understanding, and establishing a broader consensus, around the



meaning of the information society. One of the issues the ISC was discussing at the time of this study was the role of the information society in Ireland’s transition towards a knowledge-based society (see for example ISC, 2002).

The ISC has produced a number of reports for consideration by the Assistant Secretaries Implementation Group. It is unclear to what extent the deliberations of the ISC influence policy. Some members of the ISC interviewed for this project indicated that the ISC was not a powerful stakeholder in the information society policy-making process. It is also clear that some interest groups represented in the ISC are more influential than others. For example, the large MNCs operating in Ireland have a far more powerful voice than the smaller indigenous firms and certainly more influence than consumer groups.

Since much of the information society agenda is being developed and implemented at the level of individual government departments, agencies or units, a less official way for stakeholders to influence the development of information society policy is through their contacts and relationships (both formal and informal) with relevant government bodies. It is clear from the interviews that powerful interest groups, such as MNCs with large investments in Ireland, have access to ministers and senior civil servants and have exerted their influence to shape particular aspects of the information society policy agenda.

The evolution of the information society agenda

In its initial stages, the information society policy agenda was strongly influenced by the development of the Internet. At that stage the dominant notion was that the Internet was the information society and the expectation that as long as there was widespread engagement with this medium a successful information society would inevitably follow. Central to this thinking was the notion that improvements in productivity and value would occur automatically with the introduction of these new technologies. The collapse of the dotcom bubble and the slowdown of economic growth rates (resulting in a slowing down of the move towards Internet adoption), as well as difficult experiences with e-government and e-business in the indigenous sectors of the economy, have led to further discussions about the meaning of the information society and the priority that should be given to this policy area.

According to a number of policy makers interviewed for this project, one of the issues that is increasingly being discussed at the highest level of information society policy making is the link between ICT (including the Internet) and productivity. Discussions about the relationship between the new technologies, organisational and managerial innovation, and investment in human capital and between all these factors and productivity have only crystallised in the recent period. A number of interviewees identified a lack of a shared understanding or consensus in the policy-making system on a number of these issues.

E-government is an area in which the relationship between the introduction of ICT and organisational change has increasingly dominated discussions (see Box 4.2). The objective of the 1999 Action Plan was the online delivery of integrated public services. However, since the publication of “New Connections” in 2002 there have been increasing attempts to shift the emphasis away from a focus simply on adoption of the Internet to one in which the introduction of ICT is linked to the programme of modernisation of public services. At the time of this research, the ISPU leads efforts to focus attention on the reorganisation of business processes in government. The ISPU (to be dissolved in 2005) is now calling for the establishment of two separate offices: first a government



central information officer (CIO) with responsibility for developing the technology strategy within the public sector and second, the establishment of a new body – the Office of Innovative Government – to oversee the introduction of process change in government departments.3

Box 4.2. The developing agenda in e-government One of the central developments in agenda setting for the information society was the introduction of strategies for the implementation of e-government. The initial objective of this agenda was to provide integrated public services on line, facilitated by the introduction of centralised, Internet-enabled technology. The initial policy focus, contained in the 1999 action plan, encouraged the development of front-end online access to services, but gave little emphasis to re-organising back-end processes.

The first action plan spearheaded the drive to make better use of the Internet for information dissemination and introduced the concept of a portal as the possible architecture of a public service access interface. Towards the end of 2000 the Reach agency was officially established to implement e-government strategy. The Reach agency adopted the concept of a portal-based public service broker (PSB) as a technical solution to providing a front-end interface for services.

Two main problems emerged in the implementation process however: technical issues in providing services through the PSB and organisational obstacles hampering the necessary managerial and work-process changes. As a result of a lack of technical development and compatibility, very few local authorities are technically able to receive and fully process forms submitted electronically by citizens. Furthermore, local authority IT managers acknowledge that local authority managers were resistant to initiatives that required changes to existing power structures and displayed aversion to committing funds to experimental projects.

As a result of these barriers to implementation, policy focus has recently shifted from a reliance on the Internet to provide a mechanism of co-ordination, to prioritise the reorganisation of business processes in government. The focus of previous modernisation policies had encouraged individual departments to use IT to gain process improvements; the e-government agenda differed in that it further demanded interdepartmental integration, thus creating a need for a more comprehensive approach to process change. The ISPU and the Department of An Taoiseach have indicated that the development of e-government policy will highlight the need for innovative improvements to government processes and better co-ordination between government departments and agencies. Information technology will play an enabling but not central role in this strategy.

Horizontal policy co-ordination and implementation

Though large parts of the information society agenda have been developed and implemented on a departmental basis, there are important areas of information society policy that have required horizontal co-ordination between departments and agencies. As mentioned, the co-ordinating framework for the implementation of the information society was largely given by the two action plans, which not only identified the main policy areas but also designated the departments and agencies that would take responsibility for developing each strand of information society policy. Where policy action crossed traditional departmental boundaries, the action plan nominated a lead department with responsibility for taking the initiative in that policy field as well as the supporting departments. At the same time, since policy bodies had to report regularly on progress in their respective areas of responsibility, a reporting system developed around the action plans.



As discussed earlier, the high-level interdepartmental structures created in 2001 are mainly associated with e-government but are not perceived as effective as overall co-ordinators of information society policy. Instead, the main mechanism for cross-departmental co-ordination has been the numerous interdepartmental working groups and committees formed around specific policy issues in areas such as telecommunications, skills needs, e-business and e-inclusion. These interdepartmental committees have been formed on an ad hoc basis as the need for co-ordination arose and are seen to have been the most effective vehicles for cross-departmental collaboration. The Information Society Fund has also acted as an important catalyst for many information society projects that crossed departmental boundaries.

The role of the ISPU in co-ordinating the implementation of the information society agenda across government departments is complex. While the ISPU and the high-level information society structures have formal responsibility for the co-ordination and integration of the overarching information society policy agenda, in fact these bodies have not developed into that role but have increasingly focused on e-government. Nevertheless, the fact that the ISPU is located within the Department of An Taoiseach has given it the authority to act as mediator between departments when there is conflict over the implementation of information society policy. There are in fact no formal processes of arbitration when disagreements arise departments; the procedures are entirely informal. In this context the ISPU has often played an important role in oiling the wheels on interface issues.

Although there are numerous examples of co-ordination problems and difficulties in the development and implementation of information society policy, the interviews conducted give a mixed picture of the extent to which departmentalisation impedes horizontal policy co-ordination. Some interviewees expressed the view that there were no major structural or organisational barriers to policy co-ordination across departments. The many interdepartmental working groups and committees formed around the information society action plans were given as examples. It was argued that access to the various levels of decision making was relatively easy and that the system was quite flexible from the point of view of interdepartmental interactions. Other interviewees in senior positions in the policy making system, however, pointed to difficulties in getting departments to work together on a continuous basis. It was argued that, in part, a history of weak strategic decision making at top government levels and a political system that was short-termist in outlook created difficulties for policy cohesion. It was suggested that groups of ministers would have to work together for significant periods of time for a culture of co-operation and consensus to build up and filter down the policy system. The study suggests that while interdepartmental co-operation takes place on specific issues it fails when it requires a longer-term, continuous commitment.

Information society policies have also required horizontal co-ordination and collaboration within government departments. In a number of departments the role of co-ordinating intra-departmental initiatives across the various divisions and groupings has been taken on by dedicated information society policy units specially created to drive the development of this policy area. At the DES, for example, the ICT Policy Unit manages the formulation and implementation of information society policy for that department. Within the DETE and affiliated agencies, e-business units have been created and work closely together. In this respect the information society agenda has created a number of collaborative initiatives within as well as across government departments.



The difficulties of horizontal policy co-ordination even within the same government departments should not be underestimated. One example is the DETE and the work of the two industrial development agencies (the IDA and EI) under the aegis of Fórfas. A close working relationship exists between these three bodies, and strategy is shared at the senior level. However, at the operational level, the extent of policy coherence and co-ordination often depends on the specific project. Recently for example, the three agencies took the decision to focus attention on the development of policies for the digital content industry. However, from this shared overall strategy, the IDA and EI picked “different flavours”. The result is that the two agencies are focusing their efforts on different sectors of the content industry, with an ensuing loss of opportunities for synergies. In this case the lack of policy coherence is not a product of the lack of horizontal co-ordination between agencies but a reflection of different needs in the two (foreign-owned and indigenous) sectors of industry. This example indicates that in some instances a lack of policy coherence reflects different stages of development, different needs and/or time horizons. In such situations, the achievement of policy coherence across or even within government departments may not only not be possible but may not even be desirable.

The organisational arrangements discussed above represent the more or less formal co-ordination structures of the policy system. Informal networks, however, are just as important. Ireland is a small country in which social networks are often the mechanisms for information exchange and contact both inside and outside government. Interviews carried out for this study confirm that much of the contact between departments and agencies and between the policy making system and stakeholders is in fact informal.

Policy evaluation and learning

The modernisation of the public sector and the adoption of concepts such as evidence-based policy making has been part of Ireland’s policy agenda for the past ten years. Interviews indicate that over this period a number of reforms have been introduced in the civil service that have made the policy-making process more professional, more flexible and more agile. It is probably the case, however, that important differences exist in the governance of the policy-making process between government departments and even within different units of the same departments.

With respect to policy evaluation and learning in the information society field, the Department of An Taoiseach, and specifically the ISPU, constantly monitors and appraises progress on the implementation of information society measures. The main mechanisms for these appraisals are the progress reports structured around the specific actions set out in the two action plans. The main evaluation criteria are the target dates for the completion of projects set out in the action plans. Within the various departments, agencies and units responsible for information society policies, the main evaluation criteria are the implementation of measures leading to the successful meeting of the action plan targets.

The key issue that arises from these methods of evaluation therefore is how targets are set. Some of the interviews indicate that targets are often set without real discussion about their meaning and relevance or how they are to be achieved. In these cases, targets are not used as a mechanism for policy evaluation and learning but have more of the characteristics of an accounting exercise. This would tend to happen when managers responsible for information society policy are under-resourced and/or when this particular policy area is not their main concern. In other cases, however, the development of targets



is a serious exercise related to expectations from particular policy initiatives. In these cases meeting or not meeting targets does lead to policy learning.

International benchmarking is also used as a mechanism for policy evaluation and learning. Again, some interviews indicate that international benchmarking exercises are often not coupled with policy learning but are mainly used as basic indicators to rank Ireland’s performance in relation to other countries. In other cases, however, international benchmarking has led to more in-depth discussions about the reasons for international differences in performance. In these cases learning by comparing does take place. What the interviews indicate is that target setting and international benchmarking can open up discussions about performance and lead to policy learning; however, much depends how these tools are used. It is also clear that there are important differences in the use of targets and benchmarking exercises across the Irish information society policy making structure.

The exchange of experiences with policy makers from other countries facing similar challenges, through participation in international, and above all EU forums, was another important mechanism for policy learning. This refers not only to official meetings but also to numerous unofficial international networks resulting from participation in international forums. In order to monitor international developments in their fields, a number of government departments and agencies have opened offices in the United States and Asia; their task is to inform about developments outside Europe. The Department of Communications, Marine and Natural Resources, for example, has offices in the United States and Singapore; the same is true for EI and the IDA.

The lack of co-ordination and coherence between information society and innovation policy

As discussed earlier in this chapter, policy engagement with the information society agenda started at a time when the idea of developing Ireland into a knowledge-based economy began to crystallise in influential policy circles. The late 1990s saw the opening of a period of important policy initiatives in the Irish science and research system. The emerging concern with STI policy was reflected in the two information society action plans, above all in “New Connections” which explicitly singled out R&D as a major information society policy area. However, though the action plans acknowledged the importance of STI, there has been no attempt to co-ordinate or integrate these two policy areas.

No doubt, the very recent nature of Ireland’s initiatives in the area of STI policy is one reason for the current lack of horizontal co-ordination and coherence between information society and innovation policy. Since 2000, a number of organisations have been created within the DETE and the DES to manage the new funds allocated to STI. Most of these bodies have only recently been established and are still in the process of clarifying their fields of operation. Moreover, the organisational overload (Hilliard and Green, 2005) associated with the new STI policy initiatives raises questions about the extent of coherence of the STI system itself, let alone coherence with other policy areas.

More important, however, from the point of view of coherence between the two policy areas, is the fact that the STI policy agenda has still not been fully understood, accepted or adopted by important sections of government. Debates are still taking place about the pertinence for Ireland of the present strategic shift towards the knowledge economy and the priority that should be given to STI policy. Among policy makers



responsible for the development of indigenous industry, for example, there is widespread questioning of the relevance of STI for this part of the economy. It can be argued that the basis for their scepticism is the science-push character of Ireland’s present STI initiatives which have mainly focused on the university research system. This focus has made it difficult for policy makers outside this system to see the relevance of innovation policy to their fields of operation. At the same time, the adoption of a science-push model has meant that there is little awareness in policy circles of the importance of demand-led innovation policies (see Box 4.3).

There are however important areas for which the concerns of the information society fit well with those of enterprise development and innovation policy. For example, one of the priority areas of Fórfas and Enterprise Ireland is the development of an indigenous digital content industry (see the ITS 2007 of Enterprise Ireland, 2000). Today, this policy area is being developed with no involvement from, or link with, the policy bodies developing the information society agenda. This has meant that in at least the area of government procurement, where policies for the information society could have had a powerful impact on innovation, opportunities have been lost (see Box 4.3).

At present, the only formal link between the ISPU and the departments responsible for innovation policy (mainly the DETE and DES) is high-level policy-making bodies such as the Cabinet Committee on the Information Society and the e-Strategies and Assistant Secretaries groups. Interviews for this study indicate that possible synergies between information society and STI policy have not been discussed at this level. It is also the case, however, that even government departments and agencies that do have a clear mandate in the areas of both innovation and the information society (for example the DETE and EI) seldom link these two fields in the design and development of policies. The e-business units at the DETE and EI, for example, have not included innovation as part of their e-business best-practice recommendations for indigenous SMEs on the grounds that such firms do not have the capability to innovate. The point to stress here is that even when there are no institutional obstacles for horizontal policy co-ordination, the integration of the two policy areas is hindered by the character of Ireland’s present STI policy.

In discussing horizontal co-ordination and coherence between policy fields, one should not underestimate the complexity of the various agendas that are simultaneously pursued by individual government departments and agencies. These agendas frequently require difficult trade-offs and there are often synergies with other policy fields. In these circumstances linkages with innovation policy will only develop to the extent that policy makers understand where innovation presents a way forward for the challenges they face. This issue relates to the understanding of the role of innovation rather than the existence of co-ordinating mechanisms. In Ireland, creating awareness of the role that innovation can play in different policy areas is a precondition for the development of horizontal policy co-ordinating mechanisms. Rather than formal co-ordinating structures, the link between innovation and other policy areas can better be made by individuals well placed within the system who can see where synergies between policy areas exist. This argues in favour of the creation of an innovation champion, that is, an individual, or group of individuals, within the policy system whose task is to identify synergies between innovation and other policy areas and with the authority and resources to get departments to work together on a longer-term basis.



Box 4.3. The development of a knowledge-intensive indigenous industry

and government procurement Public technological procurement1 is an important demand-side instrument which improves the technological competencies of firms through their interactions with a sophisticated user. There are at least two areas, the digital content industry and e-health, in which government technology procurement activities, as part of the information society policy agenda, could have a major impact on the innovative capabilities of Ireland’s indigenous software industry.

In its report on the information society, the Information Society Steering Group (ISSC, 1996) singled out the digital content industry as an area of potential development for Irish software firms. One of the difficulties has been Ireland’s relative distance from large sophisticated markets. In a recent study on the digital content industry, Fórfas (2002) singled out the role of government sponsorship of specific projects as an important tool for the development of this industry. Among examples of the government’s potential role were contracts by public libraries (as part of the information society agenda in the public sector) to indigenous firms with digital content capability. Though the potential for such initiatives has been recognised by Fórfas and Enterprise Ireland, no concrete steps have been taken to develop this area of policy.

E-health and the development of innovative products for remote diagnosis have also been identified as an area of potential growth for indigenous software firms. However, neither the ISPU nor the DETE considered co-ordinating with the Department of Health or local health boards to explore possibilities for developing e-health software by indigenous firms. According to policy makers with responsibility for the information society, the main reason for the lack of government procurement policies to stimulate the innovative capabilities of indigenous software firms is that these measures would come into conflict with EU competition policy.2

It is clear however that in general, public sector organisations outside the STI field are not aware of the links between their activities and innovation. Though the difficulties associated with departmentalisation and weak organisational co-ordination for policy coherence should not be underestimated, the problem runs deeper and has much to do with the nature of Ireland’s present STI policy which does not create awareness of the importance of demand-led innovation policy. The lack of coherence between information society and STI policies means that Ireland is not taking advantage of a possibility to strengthen its national innovative capabilities.

________________ 1. The placing of an order for a product or services which do not exist but could be developed within a reasonable time period.

2. One of the issues being pursued by the Irish Software Association (ISA) is that the government e-procurement programme should mandate that 25% of purchases be made from SMEs. This would give Ireland’s indigenous software SMEs a chance to compete for government contracts and would not violate EU competition policy.

Conclusion

The purpose of studying the policy governance processes in the area of the information society was to see what lessons could be learned for the development of horizontal linkages and policy coherence in the area of STI. The first point to note is that, even in the case of the information society, a policy area that crosses all government departments, the establishment of horizontal linkages between departments and agencies represents a major challenge to traditional ways of organising the policy making-process. While the Department of An Taoiseach, has taken overall responsibility for the information society agenda, the development of information society policies has taken place along traditional departmental lines with little interdepartmental co-ordination. The departmentalisation of the information society agenda, with policies conceived and implemented following the established rationale of existing departments, has placed



limits on the potential for the development of a more integrated approach even within this one policy area.

The second point relates to the difficulties in getting government departments to work together on a longer-term or continuous basis. In the case of the information society, the high-level interdepartmental policy structures established to push forward the implementation of the Action Plans could have become catalysts for initiatives requiring longer-term (or continuous) horizontal policy co-ordination. These bodies, however, have played a more limited role, becoming associated mainly with the area of e-government. It is likely that giving the small ISPU responsibility for e-government as well as the co-ordination of the information society agenda detracted from its role as overall policy co-ordinator. As a result, where policy co-ordination between departments and agencies has been needed, the main mechanism for cross-departmental collaboration has been ad hoc interdepartmental groups and working committees. While these committees seem to have been effective in co-ordinating cross-departmental collaboration on specific issues, they cannot ensure overall long-term policy cohesion.

The study shows that policies for the information society and STI are conceived and implemented totally independently. Yet, important benefits could be gained by linking these two policy areas. The fact that STI has only really begun to crystallise as a major policy area since the late 1990s is a factor explaining the lack of horizontal co-ordination between the two policy fields. Moreover, the importance of STI policy for Ireland’s future development has as yet not been fully understood or accepted within Irish policy circles. More importantly, however, obstacles for policy coherence arise from the nature of present STI policies. One of the difficulties for creating linkages and coherence between policies for the information society and innovation is the fact that Ireland’s present STI agenda is more akin to first-generation science-push models than to the broader innovation system approach identified with second-generation innovation policy. One implication is that for many in the policy-making system, the relevance of innovation policy to the information society is not at all clear. This is true even for the departments most closely associated with the innovation agenda. In the case of Ireland, therefore, a broader innovation policy is needed before coherence and effective linkages can be achieved between the two policy fields. Moreover given the complexity of the two policy fields, the creation of an innovation champion within the policy system with the authority and resources to encourage cross-departmental initiatives could play an important role in establishing horizontal co-ordination and policy coherence between the information society and STI.



Annex 4.A

Research methodology

This study was based on a detailed review of policy documents in the areas of the information society and STI over the last ten years, as well as semi-structured interviews with representatives from a number of policy-making bodies in the areas both of the information society and STI. The interviews were conducted in the early months of 2004 and included people at various levels of seniority in both policy-making areas. For both the information society and STI, however, policy makers from the most senior levels were interviewed.

Organisations interviewed

• Information Society Policy Unit (ISPU)

• Information Society Commission (ISC)

• Enterprise Ireland (EI)

• Department of Enterprise Trade and Employment (DETE)

• Department of Communications, Marine and Natural Resources

• Fórfas

• Science Foundation Ireland (SFI)

• Irish Council for Science, Technology and Innovation (ICSTI)

• Irish Council for Science, Engineering and Technology (IRCSET)

• Higher Education Authority (HEA)

• Irish Software Association (ISA)

Notes

1. Government investment in STI increased from EUR 0.5 billion during the period of the previous National Development Plan (1994-99) to EUR 2.5 billion in the current National Development Plan.

2. Up to the end of 2001, EUR 109 million had been made available to support approximately 150 projects across government departments and agencies.

3. At the time of interview the ISPU was still formulating the roles and locations of both the CIO and the Office of Innovative Government.



References

Cogan, J. (2003), “Building a System of Innovation: Reflections on the Irish Experience”, mimeo, Science Policy Research Centre, UCD.

Cogan, J. and J. McDevitt (2002), “Review of Irish Industry-oriented R&D and Innovation Policies: The Link between Low R&D Performance and Poor Technology Absorptive Capacity”, report to Fórfas for ICSTI Commission on RTD Policy Framework.

Culliton Report (1992), “A Time for Change”, The Industrial Policy Review Group.

Department of the Taoiseach (1999), “Implementing the Information Society in Ireland: An Action Plan”.

Department of the Taoiseach (2002), “New Connections: A Strategy to Realise the Potential of the Information Society”, Government Action Plan.

Enterprise Ireland (2000), “ITS 2007: Opportunities for Ireland’s High-Technology Internationally Traded Services (ITS) Sector to 2007”.

European Union (2003), Innovation Tomorrow.

Fórfas (1996), “Shaping Our Future: A Strategy for Enterprise in Ireland in the 21st Century”.

Fórfas (2002), “A Strategy for the Digital Content Industry in Ireland”.

Hilliard, R. and R. Green (2005), “Governance and Institutional Change in Ireland”, in OECD (2005), Governance of Innovation Systems, Volume 2: Case Studies in Innovation Policy.

IDC Steering Group (2004), “Building Ireland’s Knowledge Economy: The Irish Action Plan for Promoting Investment in R&D to 2010”, Report to the Inter Departmental Committee on Science, Technology and Innovation.

Information Society Commission (2002), “Building a Knowledge Society: Report to Government”.

Information Society Steering Committee (ISSC) (1996), “Information Society Ireland: Strategy for Action”.

Lundvall, B.A. and S. Borras, (1997), ‘The Globalising Learning Economy: Implications for Innovation Policy”, Directorate-General Science, Research and Development, EU.


Sweeney, P. (1999), The Celtic Tiger: Ireland’s Continuing Economic Miracle, Oak Tree Press, Dublin.

Telesis Consultancy Group (1982), “A Review of Irish Industrial Policy”.

Trauth, E. (2000), The Culture of an Information Economy: Influences and Impacts in the Republic of Ireland, Kluwer Academic Publishers.

HORIZONTAL CO-ORDINATION OF INNOVATION POLICIES: INFORMATION SOCIETY POLICIES IN THE NETHERLANDS – 115


Chapter 5

HORIZONTAL CO-ORDINATION OF INNOVATION POLICIES: INFORMATION SOCIETY POLICIES IN THE NETHERLANDS1

Pim den Hertog and Hilde de Groot Dialogic, the Netherlands

This chapter analyses Dutch policies relating to the information society and information and communications technologies (ICT) at the central government level. It addresses processes of agenda setting, policy co-ordination and evaluation. As in most other countries, information society/ICT policies in the Netherlands have gradually become broader in scope. ICT has enabled broad transformation of processes in both industry and public domains. However, not all actors develop an information society/ICT policy agenda to increase innovation or develop the knowledge economy. Most see ICT as an enabler in their primary processes without any clear link to innovation. Although much energy is invested in formulating an integrated ICT/information society strategy, the ministries most involved have a good deal of autonomy in shaping and implementing their information society/ICT policy. This leads to the question of whether it would be too complex to formulate an overall ICT/information society strategy. This chapter concludes that interdepartmental practices do not as yet allow for a further broadening of infor-mation society/ICT policy making. However, new co-ordination and governance mecha-nisms are under discussion and experiments with some new governance mechanisms are under way.

Introduction

A broad and complex policy area2

In the Netherlands as in most developed countries the past two decades have seen the introduction first of ICT policies and then, from the early 1990s, information society policies. Over time these policies have increased in both scope and complexity, making it sometimes difficult to see where specific information society/ICT policy ends and more sectoral policies begin. The most recent (central) government-wide ICT White Paper makes the central goal of ICT policy to address major economic and societal issues with the help of ICT. It notes that ICT not only can improve productivity levels, but also facilitate new forms of co-operation and increase the quality of (public) services (Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2004). It states that in both private and public domains there is a need for new combinations of actors and services, new organisational concepts and new business models.

116 – HORIZONTAL CO-ORDINATION OF INNOVATION POLICIES: INFORMATION SOCIETY POLICIES IN THE NETHERLANDS


There have been a variety of policies, schemes and initiatives over the years. While there have been isolated successes, the complexity of the task has made it difficult to facilitate the development and use of the potential of ICT throughout the economy and society. The complexity is associated with the following factors:

• ICT is a pervasive technology3 which has triggered quite complex technological and organisational transformation processes in almost all technological, eco-nomic, societal and policy domains. In addition to technological innovation, application of ICT requires massive investments in non-technological changes and innovations. Implementing ICT generally requires more time than anticipated and steering these developments is a complex process.

• ICT policy is not an isolated policy area, but an aspect of a great many policy areas. This raises questions regarding the design of ICT policies. How does innovation policy relate to ICT policy? To what extent can there be separate ICT and broadband policies? How do policies for public government envisage ICT? As a result, ICT policies most likely involve considerable inter- (and intra-) departmental co-ordination. This requires a clear overall ICT policy strategy and the ability to “use” other policy areas to achieve policy goals.

• Dutch information society/ICT policies are increasingly defined by European information society/ICT policies.4 Likewise, attempts to influence the EU ICT agenda are increasingly important.5 Nonetheless, important parts of the more sectoral or ministry-specific information society/ICT policies seem to develop more or less autonomously and their development and implementation differ considerably.6

• Both politicians and ICT policy makers experience this complexity on a daily basis. They are involved in changing existing regulations, in developing and applying broad and more focused policy plans, and in taking stock of best practices and benchmarking initiatives. In most countries (and indeed at the EU and other levels) attempts are made to derive an overall information society/ICT policy agenda or action plan, by selecting new priorities and revising existing policies. Increasingly, information society/ICT dossiers require the co-operation of various ministries, as emphasis shifts to using ICT and facilitating innovation in all domains. Beyond interdepartmental co-ordination and coherence in STI policies, new interdepartmental coalitions seem needed in specific sectors. Some countries have in fact chosen to co-ordinate information society/ICT policies at the highest political levels.

Focus, approach adopted and structure

This chapter on Dutch information society/ICT policies is aimed at illustrating pro-cesses of innovation governance. It focuses on the way in which three basic phases of a policy cycle (i.e. agenda setting, policy formulation and policy evaluation, see Figure 5.1) develop in practice. The discussion will show how policy co-ordination, policy learning and horizontalisation of innovation policies take place both formally and informally and result in more or less coherent policies. The following questions are addressed:



• As a prerequisite for answering subsequent questions, how has information society/ICT policy, as initiated from an innovation perspective, evolved over the years?

• How is information society/ICT policy organised (formally)?

• How is the information society/ICT agenda set in practice?

• How can the process of information society/ICT policy formulation be charac-terised?

• How does information society/ICT policy seek to raise innovativeness and to what degree does horizontal, i.e. interdepartmental, co-ordination take place?

• Are there processes of policy learning and evaluation that can be identified in information society/ICT policy aimed at furthering innovation government-wide?

The case study reported here was restricted in scale and scope. One limitation is restriction of the coverage to information society/ICT policy initiated at the central government level. Another is that the principal focus is on the link between information society/ICT policy and innovation in an attempt to see how the former has worked to raise the innovativeness of the Dutch economy and society. The discussion is therefore biased towards policy initiatives in which the Ministry of Economic Affairs plays a dominant role. Finally, attention is given to processes of agenda setting and policy formulation, emphasising horizontalisation, policy learning and interdepartmental co-ordination.

Figure 5.1. Phases in a simple policy cycle and aspects addressed in this contribution

The chapter is organised as follows. First, there is a brief historical overview of how

information society/ICT policy has developed since 1970 and the main characteristics of the formal organisation of information society/ICT policy are described. The discussion then turns to the setting of the information society/ICT policy agenda and some insight is provided into the policy formulation process, the co-ordination mechanisms used and how horizontal co-ordination takes place in practice. Then, the policy evaluation phase is discussed and some observations regarding policy learning are made. Finally, some

Policy formulation and

implementation

Agenda setting

Evaluation

Aspects: Co-ordination

Policy coherence Horizontalisation Policy learning



concluding remarks are made and some of the findings are linked to the overall inno-vation governance discussion.

Historical overview of Dutch information society/ICT policy

This section provides a brief overview of how information society/ICT policy has developed and broadened over the years from an innovation perspective. Although any periodisation is a simplification of what are more gradual processes, four periods can be distinguished. They largely coincide with new governments and White Papers that high-light the government’s overall views on the role of the information society and ICT in the economy and society.

1970-94: the development of ICT policy as a separate policy area

Information technology (IT) policy initially started through science policy (e.g. computer centres at universities) and specific technology policy. As in most developed countries, policy initiatives were aimed at the creation of (scientific) knowledge, technology development and the development of an ICT infrastructure. The Information Technology Promotion Plan, a EUR 770 million (interdepartmental) IT support scheme that ran from 1984 to 1988, was typical of the technology schemes in most European countries. In the 1980s a shift towards more diffusion-oriented and even demand-oriented programmes was already visible. The 1980s and early 1990s were further characterised by privatisation of telecom incumbents and liberalisation of telecom markets. In addition to initiatives aimed at establishing an ICT infrastructure, policies to support the develop-ment of new services were initiated. There was growing attention to ICT in education and knowledge transfer programmes (den Hertog and Fahrenkrog, 1993, pp. 28-34).

1994-99: the broadening of ICT policies into information society policies

In the mid-1990s the wider societal implications of what was called the information society or information superhighway entered the policy agenda, not least through the publication of the European action plan on the information society (the Bangemann Report) in 1994. In the Netherlands it led to the publication of a White Paper, Information Superhighways, and the subsequent launching of a National Action Programme on Information Superhighways. It was one of the first programmes designed as an inter-departmental, integrated ICT policy programme to be implemented jointly by the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science and the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management. Each ministry looked after its own interests in this more widely defined ICT policy. The Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations emphasised the creation of “information government”. The Ministry of Economic Affairs was mainly concerned with the role of the market in ICT (while also addressing knowledge creation and knowledge diffusion in ICT in industry). The Ministry of Justice examined whether a new regulatory framework was needed to facilitate ICT uptake and dissemination, while the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science addressed the issue of the access of schools to the information superhighway. Finally, the Ministry of Transport focused on the (deployment) of telecom infrastructures and its regulation.



In 1998 the National Action Programme (NAP) was rebalanced. The position of the Netherlands vis-à-vis the other EU member states was evaluated and new priorities were set. In the second half of the 1990s a multitude of government initiatives were taken. At that point in time, sectoral action programmes defining sectoral ICT policies were pub-lished. The impact of ICT in all sorts of domains was increasingly under consideration.

1999-2003: attempts to further co-ordinate and integrate information society/ ICT policies

At the end of the 1990s, the number of individual initiatives increased rapidly (see Box 5.1), not least because of general political pressure to support and facilitate ICT uptake in various domains. Gradually the lack of an overall view of ICT policy was felt – at least among outsiders, including parliament – and consequently the need for more integration and co-ordination. This resulted in 1999 in a White Paper, “The Dutch Digital Delta”. This was the follow-up to the National Action Programme on Information Super-highways (1994) and its successor, the Review of the National Action Programme on Information Superhighways (1998). The Dutch Digital Delta is a framework for the government’s initiatives and activities to improve the Dutch ICT base. The report was organised around five themes7 that were used as labels to structure measures and plans that were already described in more topical action plans or for which additional action plans were announced. Over this period a clear shift to addressing (once again) ICT knowledge and innovation and ICT skills and ICT use was observed. For most sectoral ministries, ICT is an important enabling technology that is increasingly part of their core policies. However, their frame of reference is linked more to their respective domains and less to furthering innovation through ICT. Attempts to co-ordinate and integrate ICT policies increasingly have to compete with sectoral policies that integrate sector-specific ICT policies.

Box 5.1. Some ICT/information society policy initiatives taken in 1999-2003 The Ministry of the Interior focused on electronic government. Under the previous government (i.e. Kok II, the “purple coalition”) a minister was made responsible for big cities and integration policy. This minister was based in the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations and was responsible for co-ordinating government-wide ICT policies, promoting ICT policies within the individual departments (internal ICT policies) and improving relations between government and citizens through the use of ICT. ICT was presented both as an instrument to renew politics and democracy and to improve electronic service provision to citizens. This position was not continued under the Balkenede I and II administrations. Instead, under Balkenende II a new minister (Minister de Graaf) was entrusted with modernising public sector governance and was responsible for co-ordinating government-wide e-government. The minister launched a new White Paper, Andere overheid (Modernising Government), which illustrates how ICT has developed into a helpful tool for accomplishing the wider goals of governance.

At the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sciences, the further development of Kennisnet was emphasised. Kennisnet is the Internet portal or electronic learning environment for primary, secondary and professional education in the Netherlands. Kennisnet became an independent foundation in 2001 funded by the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science (OCW). In fact it is a massive investment in increasing access to and use of ICT in education. It is an important way of innovating in education, but is not steered by an innovation policy logic. This again shows that over the years ICT policies have moved from the science and technology policy domains to other domains that follow a logic that is not necessarily an STI logic.



Box 5.1. Some ICT/information society policy initiatives taken in 1999-2003 (continued)

The Ministry of Economic Affairs (actually a department within the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management that was soon merged with the Ministry of Economic Affairs) initiated a smartcity, Kenniswijk, in the Eindhoven region. Started in 2001 Kenniswijk has developed into a national test bed for consumers in the area of computers, (mobile) communications and the Internet. For the experiment – organised as a public-private venture – the government reserved EUR 45 million in funds over a five-year period, equally divided between infrastructure and development of innovative services. At the end of 2003/early 2004 the initiative was evaluated and major changes were made, including opening up the scheme for developing innovative services to applicants from all over the country and focusing the services to be developed much more on societal areas such as health, education, mobility and security. As of March 2005 almost 100 services are under development in Kenniswijk and 48 services have been completed.

2004 onwards: using ICT and the development of a government-wide ICT agenda

The ICT White Paper, “A Government-wide ICT Agenda: Better Performance with ICT” (February 2004) possibly marks a new phase in government ICT policies. It adapts the eEurope 2005 action plan to the Dutch context. Two action lines are discerned: further improving the ICT base and better exploiting available ICT knowledge. For the first line, the government mainly aims at maintaining and improving (new) networks and creating the right framework conditions (such as safety, legal security, standards, etc.). Further, the government aims at improving the possibilities for partnering in international R&D co-operation and promoting the Netherlands as a site for international firms. To improve the Netherlands’ position in ICT knowledge, it created a new governance mechanism, the regieorgaan (co-ordination platform) for ICT research (discussed in more detail below). For the second action line (better exploitation of the current ICT base), the government aims at better use of ICT by firms to increase productivity and efficiency, with a focus on e-business and SMEs. It seeks to improve the application and use of ICT in government services provided to firms, organisations and citizens and in sectoral domains such as health, education and traffic and transport. Additionally some studies to see how wider societal issues can be addressed using ICT have been announced and clearly point towards more horizontalised ICT policies and the use of the innovative potential of ICT to help solve societal issues. The resulting agenda is to be reviewed and reassessed mid-2005. In the realm of e-government a new, more implementation-oriented White Paper, Towards an Electronic Government, was presented mid-2004. Actions in seven domains were mentioned and it was emphasised that improving service provision to firms and citizens was key. E-government was positioned as a tool, not as an aim in itself.

Table 5.1 summarises the four phases in Dutch ICT policies discerned here, and Box 5.2 sketches how information society/ICT policies in general have broadened over the years.



Table 5.1. Main characteristics of Dutch ICT policies, 1970-2004

Phase Characteristics Integrated White Papers1

1970- 94: Development of ICT policy as a separate policy area

ICT policy largely part of and originating from science and technology policy. Focus merely on ICT research and ICT infrastructures and at the end increasingly

on regulatory framework, normalisation and certification. Gradual shift from predominantly supply-oriented towards diffusion and demand-

oriented ICT policies. Privatisation and liberalisation of telecoms feature high on the policy agenda at the

end of this phase.

IT Policies in the 1990s (1993)

1994-99: Broadening of ICT policies into information society policies

Bangemann Report draws attention to the information superhighway/society and a gradual shift from pure ICT policies towards broader information society/ICT policies.

Broader economic and societal impact of ICT is apparent. Broader perspective on ICT implies multiple sectoral approaches towards

information society/ICT policies. Numerous initiatives in multiple domains. Relatively more attention to access and skills, innovation and ICT in the public

domain.

National Action Programme Information Superhighways (NAP, 1994) Beyond the National Action Plan: A Recalibration of the Existing Programme (1998)

1999-2003: Integrated and co-ordinated information society/ICT policies

Need for a more integrated and co-ordinated approach in information society/ICT policy.

DDD framework is mostly a cosmetic integration as sectoral ICT policies develop in practice mostly independently.

Proliferation of more focused action plans. Continued attention to ICT skills, ICT use and (again) ICT knowledge position.

The Dutch Digital Delta (DDD): The Netherlands Online (1999)

2004 onwards: Using ICT and the development of a government-wide ICT agenda

Further Europeanisation of Dutch ICT policies. Increased attention to the social and economic return on ICT investments. Introduction of a new form of governance (regieorgaan ICT). Beginning of more horizontalised ICT policies aimed at solving societal issues.

A Government-wide ICT Agenda: Better Performance with ICT (2004)

1. Only the major (government-wide) White Papers.

Box 5.2. Four basic policy goals in information society/ICT policies The four general policy goals in information society/ICT policy making are:

1. Policies aimed at signalling key ICT technologies (strategic intelligence) and policies aimed at excelling in a certain selection of key ICT technologies. These are ICT policies with a technological perspective and pos-sibly the longest history (especially in the larger countries).

2. Policies aimed at strengthening innovation by and competitiveness of ICT core industries1 (ICT manu-facturing, ICT networks, ICT services) as well as the efficient use and diffusion of ICT in all economic industries. These are ICT policies with a more economic perspective and are well established in almost all countries.

3. Policies aimed at increasing access to ICT as well as addressing framework conditions to facilitate the intro-duction and use of ICT.

4. Policies aimed at effective and efficient use of ICT in all societal domains and embedding ICT society-wide.

One may observe that in the Netherlands as in most other countries information society/ICT policy agendas have gradually become broader in scope, developing from a focus on the ICT-producing industry and innovation and competitiveness issues towards framework conditions and diffusion and use to a broad range of societal domains. ICT has become an enabler of broad transformation processes. Not all actors develop an information society/ICT policy exclusively to increase innovation or move towards a knowledge-based economy. Most see ICT simply as an enabler in their primary processes without a clear link to innovation. _______________ 1. For a definition of the narrowly defined ICT core industries, see OECD (2002), which defines the ICT core industries as “a combi-nation of manufacturing and services industries that capture, transmit and display data and information electronically” (pp. 81-83). In a recently published study comparing UK and Dutch ICT policies, a similar broad definition of ICT policies was provided. “ICT policies concern the development and generation of new information and communication technologies, and their diffusion and appli-cation across all types of activity, from manufacturing, public services to leisure and education” (Molas-Gallart et al., 2003, p. 18).

Source: den Hertog et al. (2005).



Formal organisation of central government ICT/information society policy

In the Netherlands no single ministry is responsible for ICT policy. The major White Papers are signed by various ministers and various ministries may lead depending on the theme (Figure 5.2). However, the Ministry of Economic Affairs is primarily responsible for co-ordinating ICT policy at the central governmental level. This is evident in the government-wide ICT agenda published in 2004.

Over the years the lead or most proactive ministries have varied, and the broadening of issues is reflected in the actors involved at the central government level. In the first phase the leaders were the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science (OCW, science policy) and the Ministry of Economic Affairs (EZ, firm-oriented policies). The Ministry of Traffic, Public Works and Water Management (V&W) played a role in the whole process of the privatisation and regulation of telecoms. However, the department responsible for this matter was recently merged with the Ministry of Economic Affairs. Since the early 1990s the Ministry of Justice (JUS) has played an important role in setting the legal framework for ICT, but never a dominant role. With the increased importance of ICT for government operations, the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (BZK) successfully claimed and actually played a more dominant role. The role of OCW has increased since the mid-1990s, less in terms of co-ordination than in terms of spending on ICT skills and ICT use in education. In practice, the three core ministries are the OCW, EZ and BZK. Not coincidently, these are the only ministries with separate ICT directorates. The simplified version of the distribution of responsibilities among these ministries for the various themes is given in Figure 5.2.

Figure 5.2. Distribution of some ICT themes over the five ministries (most) involved in information society/ICT policy

V&W EZ OCW BZK JUS

Telecom and infrastructure

Knowledge and innovation

e-learning

e-government/ ICT in public

sector

Legislation

Access and capabilities



The recent ICT White Paper, A Government-wide ICT Agenda, does not fully answer the question of how to deal jointly with ICT challenges in various domains. It notes that institutional reforms and redesign of work procedures are needed to make better use of ICT. This implies that the distribution of tasks and responsibilities for ICT within the central government needs to be reconsidered. The new White Paper notes that to attack societal issues, the BZK and the EZ will attempt jointly to see what possibilities exist to improve efficiency and efficacy through the application of ICT (through “chance” or “opportunity cards”). However, it is also mentioned that the responsibility for solving societal issues, as mentioned in the coalition agreement or working programme of the current coalition, resides with the sectoral ministry in charge and its partners in society (2004, p. 19). When it concerns others, government may suggest coalitions to learn to appreciate better use of ICT. How this will be realised and the appropriate governance structures are not mentioned (see below for further discussion of this issue).

The pattern is similar for policy implementation, i.e. it is typically a responsibility of individual ministries. The policy plans in the White Papers are translated into more specific action programmes, plans and projects. The Ministry of Economic Affairs has launched an action plan on broadband, BZK published a programme on how to organise government, Modernising Government (2003), in which ICT is only an enabler. In some case an individual ad hoc advisory commission is set up to propose a practical strategy on how to deal with certain topics. For some overarching policy programmes, co-ordinating platforms (interdepartmental working groups) are created in which the ministries most involved are represented. There are co-ordinating platforms or committees for ICT and administrative costs, streamlining of base data, and public key infrastructure (PKI). Finally it should be remarked that the various ministries operate through various services. The Ministry of Economic Affairs uses its innovation centres (Syntens) to implement its ICT policies aimed at SMEs, and the telecoms regulator (Opta) supervises the operation of the various players in the telecom market. BZK has created a separate body that co-ordinates and manages large programmes in the area of e-government and has a position between pure implementation and policy design (ICTU). OCW has created Kennisnet to implement its ICT policies in education. Thus, at the level of policy design and policy implementation, various departmental approaches and practices dominate a more co-ordinated approach.

Agenda setting

Some characteristics of the information society/ICT agenda setting process

In public administration studies a distinction is made between a policy agenda, a political agenda and a public agenda. The agenda-setting process concerns the ways in which a certain topic is put on the policy agenda. Some topics are triggered mostly by external parties (i.e. the public agenda leads), others are initiated internally i.e. by politicians and policy makers (the policy agenda leads) (van de Graaf and Hoppe, 1996, p. 182) In the case of the information society/ICT agenda, the agenda-setting process is not very clear-cut for various reasons:



• The information society/ICT agenda involves a collection of various agenda items. The ICT research agenda is built differently from the e-business agenda, the ICT in education agenda, or the e-government agenda. It is hard to speak of an overall information society/ICT agenda. It is at most is a sum of various ICT agendas.

• Over time attention to the information society/ICT theme varies considerably. Around 2000 there was intense attention to all ICT-related matters and politicians were eager to show their willingness to invest in the topic, but today the political market for information society/ICT initiatives is less crowded. The ability of actors involved in the agenda-setting process to point at real or perceived flaws in the information society/ICT landscape partly defines their power in the process of agenda setting.

• Sometimes coincidence plays a more important role than some actors would like to admit. A study tour or visit of officials of the responsible minister may for example play a role in setting the agenda.

Some of characteristics of the internal and external processes of agenda setting that can be observed in the Netherlands are described in more detail below.

As coalition governments are the norm in the Netherlands, the coalition agreement is an important element of the agenda-setting process. All sorts of interested parties try to influence those in charge of forming a new cabinet, and the agreement in fact defines the political priorities. These priorities set in motion a new policy cycle in which a new budget reflects the new priorities, and a policy White Paper is generally produced that either reaffirms existing policies with some new emphasis (mostly the case) or announces new policies or initiatives. Although the length of the policy cycle may differ, a four-year rhythm is the norm. The White Paper is generally followed by more detailed policy programmes and actions plans or practical projects.

An important part of the wheeling and dealing takes place between policy makers of the various ministries that jointly compose and write the White Papers. The ministries bring their respective building blocks, and along as these are recognised as belonging to one ministry and one jurisdiction, they are integrated quite easily (the individual ministries can use their separate budgets). Discussion mostly focuses on new policy initiatives (that have not been “assigned” to a specific ministry) or on interdepartmental programmes. In the latest ICT White Paper, it is stated that funds are put aside on the departmental budgets for internal application of ICT and for ICT activities in the sector under the ministry’s responsibility. NAP funds (a relatively small interdepartmental programme) are available for “new ventures” or new themes as long as there is no “regular budget” available. The formulation leaves room for interpretation and further negotiations among ministries. Encouraging such actions may contribute to better use of ICT for the most urgent societal problems. NAP seems to be less important as a mechanism for interdepartmental co-ordination. Not only is the budget limited, but ministries have some sort of drawing rights and propose projects that cannot be funded through the regular budget. So far, ministries intervene little in other ministries’ selection of projects.

A new ICT White Paper – replicated in the more detailed programmes and actions plans that are, in some case, formulated by more than one ministry – takes on a more formal character when the final drafts are discussed in the committee in which high-level officials approve (or refuse) the results of the work of the interdepartmental writing



groups or committees. There is a separate official Commission on Science, Technology and Information policy (CWTI8) in which decisions are officially prepared and co-ordinated (the secretariat of CWTI resides with the Ministry of Economic Affairs) before they go to the ministerial Sub-council for Science, Technology and Information policy (RWTI). This council is formally chaired by the prime minister but the ICT policy part is run by the minister of Economic Affairs, the minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, and the minister of Education, Culture and Science. The ministers try to prepare a joint decision before the dossier is handed to the general meeting or Council of Ministers that decides on dossiers every week. Members of the RWTI are, apart from the obvious candidates (OCW, EZ and BZK), the ministers of Defence, Finance and Justice.

The Ministry of Finance is an internal actor, sometimes perceived as an external actor as well, which emphasises over and over again that, especially regarding technology policy, market failure is the only rationale for government intervention. As the Ministry of Finance is powerful in terms of how budgets are spent and where budget cuts are needed, the market failure paradigm is partly incorporated in much of the policy thinking beforehand. Some policy actions, instruments or experiments are not considered seriously because of the potential threat of opposition by the Ministry of Finance.

Various external actors try to influence the political and policy ICT agenda, sometimes indirectly through the public agenda, sometimes more directly by interacting with politicians and policy makers. It is hard to assess how effective these efforts are. It depends on the timing, the coalition of actors (for example, of industries or of knowledge institutions and related associations) that may unite to request similar changes, and the sort of channels used. Government officials have regular face-to-face meetings with certain groups of actors that may play a role, but an active discussion in leading newspapers in combination with questions in parliament may be effective as well. Sometimes government actively seeks input and advice for example through an ad hoc advisory committee. In the information society/ICT domain, many such committees were formed and some were influential and put themes and possible solutions on the agenda, while others were soon forgotten after giving their advice. It is this mixture of actors and channels that sometimes makes the agenda-setting process rather hazy.

Industry’s influence depends on its ability to formulate a coherent message or request. The ICT industry is still relatively young and therefore does not have a long-standing tradition of strong industry associations that represent the interests of all ICT players. In practice the larger industrial firms and more general employers associations such as MKB-Nederland and VNO/NCW influence the policy agenda to certain extent. In 2003 Philips remarked that it considered relocating its R&D abroad and this (at least temporarily) made an impact on the discussion of innovation. It is not surprising that big industry is quite well represented on the new innovation platform.9

The influence of research and consultancy firms on the ICT agenda should not be overlooked. They are active in all phases of the policy cycle, including agenda setting. They may perform feasibility studies, perform benchmarking studies, provide examples from abroad and act as secretaries for ad hoc advisory commissions and so influence policy. By helping to implement and by evaluating existing schemes and policies and subsequently making suggestions for improvement, these organisations may influence the ICT agenda.



Academia and related organisations are important external actors, and are relatively well organised (NOW, VSNU, TNO). They mostly influence the ICT research agenda. Recently, academia, organisations active in applied research and the ICT industry have teamed up in the ICT forum to advise on the ICT research agenda; in the near future they will bear responsibility in the regieorgaan ICT for organising the ICT research function.

Some reflections regarding the process of agenda setting and prioritisation

The process of agenda setting and prioritisation is not steered top-down, but is more an implicit process in which policy makers, politicians and various external actors interact, make proposals or provide (by request or on their own initiative, paid or unpaid) advice, send warnings, point at foreign experience, discuss ICT matters on various occasions, ask for new initiatives, provide input to draft White Papers, etc.

At the same time, the overall ICT agenda is the sum of plans and strategies of individual ministries. Co-ordination mostly takes place at the top and except for budgets that are administered on an interdepartmental basis, they are administered by individual ministries. Respecting traditional boundaries and not interfering in each other’s domains appears to be the norm. As budgets cannot be changed overnight (not only is there a multi-annual planning regime, most programmes are multi-annual as well), new initia-tives mostly have to be accommodated within current budgets. A few interdepartmental programmes offer room for new policy actions as well as political decision making which may lead to an additional budget (incidentally or on a more structural basis). However, most of the time, budgets and programmes are fixed and respected, so that changes in the ICT policy agenda are evolutionary rather than revolutionary.

The financing of the ICT policy agenda is complicated as well. It is the sum of various departmental budgets, some interdepartmental schemes (mostly integrated in the budget of one of the core ministries) and small budgets that can be used for various projects. If for example a new overall strategy or action plan is presented, the budget is mostly a repackaging of existing budgets (that are allocated differently or more specifically) and some “new money”.

In the public administration literature various theories exist on how topics reach the policy agenda and how the process of agenda setting develops. The “garbage can model” elaborated by Kingdon (1995)10 seems to reflect the process quite neatly. Kingdon attempts to understand why people pay attention to one subject rather than another, how their agendas change from one time to another, and how they narrow their choices from a large set of alternatives to a few. Public policy making is considered to be a set of processes, including the setting of the agenda, the specification of alternatives from which a choice is to be made, a choice among those specified alternatives and the imple-mentation of the decision. Kingdon concentrates on the first two of these processes and argues that, in general, two categories of factors might affect agenda setting and the specification of alternatives: the participants who are active (inside and outside the government), and the processes by which agenda items and alternatives come into promi-nence. Regarding the latter processes a distinction is made between problems, policies and politics. Each of the three processes can serve as an impetus or as a constraint. They are largely independent of one another, and each develops according to its own dynamics and rules. But at some critical junctures the three streams are joined, and the greatest policy changes grow out of that coupling of problems, policy proposals and politics. This coupling is most likely when policy windows (opportunities) are open (Kingdon, 1995, pp. 1-4) (see Figure 5.3).



Figure 5.3. Kingdon garbage can model of agenda setting in public policy

Source: van de Graaf and Hoppe (1996), p. 198.

This model seems to reflect the Dutch situation. At few moments in the life of a policy dossier can radical changes be made, as it is the exception rather than the rule to find a set of problems (the public agenda), politics (the political agenda) and policy (the policy agenda) aligned so that the agenda can be radically redefined. In practice the political momentum is generally decisive. When there is a new government and a new budget and leading politicians are prepared to make a change that is supported by various external actors (who make practical proposals that are more or less aligned) more radical changes can be made. Benchmarking exercises increasingly play a role. Both politicians and policy makers are sensitive to bad ratings in international comparisons and this may increase their readiness to change an agenda. In the mid-1990s, for example, it was clear that something should be done about the slow rate of ICT start-ups and the initiative to establish ICT twinning centres materialised quite easily. In 1999/2000, in the wake of excitement over the Internet and ICT, extra money was made available for facilitating ICT/Internet development; ICT policy directed at SMEs still benefits, as detailed plans on how to spend the money were drawn up in subsequent years. In the period between such “windows of opportunity” the overall budget remains quite stable. Currently, as budget-cutting is the norm and ICT has lost some of its political appeal it is harder to put ICT high on the political agenda, let alone increase the budget for ICT policy.


Characteristics of information society/ICT policy formulation11

This section focuses on how policies are actually constructed and formulated. In the policy science literature a distinction is made between top-down and bottom-up or centralised and decentralised approaches to policy formulation. The general theory was formulated by Molas-Gallart et al. (2003, p. 14) as follows: “The main advantage of a top down centralised style is that it permits greater and more effective co-ordination of the



government’s policy agenda. Its main disadvantages is that it tends to diminish the importance of the local environment, which is generally closer to user needs, and it faces difficulties at the implementation stage when the agencies and departments in charge may resist the perceived imposition of policy practices.….. The adequacy of a centralising or decentralising approach will depend on the policy area and the stage of policy formulation. In general, policy definition is likely to benefit from central co-ordination and the clear definition of policy objectives. The pursuit of policy consensus is likely, at best, to slow down the policy-making process and, at worst result in muddled policy objectives. Yet to force a centralising top-down process on policy-making implementa-tion is likely to encounter resistance from those in charge of implementing the policy, and may run counter to the political traditions and practices of countries with a diffuse distribution of political power. Bottom-up approaches will usually be better suited to the implementation stages of an ICT policy.”

Dutch information society/ICT policies can possibly be best characterised as follows:

• Bottom-up approach to policy formulation and a relatively large autonomy for individual ministries, making a co-ordinated ICT approach hard to accomplish.

• Processes of policy making and translating these into practical programmes are rather slow.

• Continued discussion on new co-ordination and governance mechanisms.

The development of information society/ICT policy in the Netherlands mostly has a bottom-up character. Although quite a lot of energy is invested in formulating an integrated strategy, the individual ministries most involved in realising information society/ICT policy dispose of a good deal of autonomy for actually shaping and subsequently implementing information society/ICT policy. Responsibility for the ICT agenda is divided in practice among the various ministries and their territories are well fenced, limiting possibilities for creating more integrated information society/ICT policy. In fact, many smaller schemes, initiatives and experiments have developed and there has been some duplication. Even if clear responsibility is given to one ministry it does not mean that the ministry can steer the policy government-wide. Cross-departmental steering is limited while advisory roles are quite common.12

Above, better and faster implementation was mentioned as one of the advantages of a bottom-up approach. Is this true in the case of information society/ICT policy as well? In practice, policy making is rather slow. In the first place, strategy formulation (and consensus seeking) is a lengthy process of consultation and discussions in which many actors participate (without ensuring a really integrated approach). Second, when it comes to practical co-ordination and co-operation, this is mostly considered when it is more or less compulsory because other ministries have a clear mandate or responsibility in a particular area. It is less perceived as a way of organising matters more conveniently or of speeding up policy implementation. Illustrative in this context is the issue of electronic identification. An electronic identification system is seen as a prerequisite to help solve various problems in different societal areas (such as health, public services, safety). Various ministries in fact work on their own system and co-ordination is mostly ad hoc in later stages. The lack of co-ordination slows policy implementation. This is a wider innovation governance problem in the Netherlands. The main problem is the emphasis on policy formulation and development of a shared vision, instead of the implementation strategy.



The ITPS report notes a related trait that is possibly as harmful: hesitancy and loss of policy coherence. They observe that “in seeking as broad a consensus as possible, policy making and implementation often became hesitant. This is clearly visible in the half-hearted attempts to liberalise the market, steering between maintaining a favourable position for the incumbent while ensuring non-discriminatory access for new entrants. The result was an ambiguous policy that in the end satisfied no one. Significantly, the excessive emphasis on the allocation of responsibilities to the appropriate decision-making level has resulted in the loss of policy coherence.” (Molas-Gallart et al., 2003, p. 26)

It seems as if government is well aware of the fact that new co-ordination and governance mechanisms are needed. More vision, steering and clear-cut choices may be what is needed most. This could also imply giving up autonomy. Molas-Gallart et al. remark that “the Netherlands recognise that policies have to be co-ordinated horizontally across different ministries and departments. Yet, they are facing difficulties to put in place effective horizontal structures as ministries and departments have resisted attempts to remove their control over ICT policy” (2003, p. 12). The 2004 ICT White Paper, A government-wide ICT agenda: Performing better with ICT, already signals the need for a more integrated approach. At the same time it notes that better performance using ICT coincides quite often with institutional adaptations and redesigned working processes (see Box 5.3). Within government, government leads, whereas in areas where other parties lead, government may facilitate the forming of coalitions to show organisations and firms the advantages of better use of ICT. At the same time the White Paper does not propose many institutional adaptations. It announces that the advisory ICT forum will become a platform (regieorgaan ICT) that disposes of discretionary power regarding Dutch ICT research. It also promises that the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Ministry of the Interior will jointly screen a number of areas that might benefit from more targeted use of ICT (2004, p. 19). It does not spell out how this can be organised and to what degree it might contribute to a new sort of interdepartmental coalition to work on the ICT issue in various societal areas.

Another example showing that government is struggling with how co-ordination and governance regarding ICT needs to be shaped is the ad hoc advisory committee on ICT and government that published the report, Citizen and Government in the Information Society: The need for institutional innovation (2001). In this report, the committee presents its vision of the information society and the relationship between the government and citizens. “The Committee argued that in order to strengthen the role of government in the information society, government had to find new ways of working. Non-hierarchical approaches should be promoted especially in the field of ICT with its high level of complexity, its socio-economic pervasiveness and the impossibility to ‘lead’ the information revolution. The changing role of government should therefore be based on the principles of mediation, facilitation and process management.” (Molas-Gallart et al., 2003, p. 138)



Box 5.3. Rethinking governance in the ICT innovation system

In a recently published discussion paper on the future development of ICT policies in the Netherlands the need for rethinking ICT governance structures was signalled as one of the key challenges. It was observed that the steering of the overall ICT innovation system could be improved. Some of the key problems mentioned in this context are:

• A well-established culture of knowledge transfers between knowledge institutes and firms is lacking. This cannot be attributed automatically to the knowledge institutes, as both ICT-producing and ICT-using firms need to articulate their knowledge needs more precisely. The regieorgaan ICT might play a role in bringing these two worlds closer together.

• The proliferation of intermediary organisations such as research schools, top institutes, major research programmes, platforms, institutionalised meeting and lobbies. A considerable reduction in the number of these would help speed up both development and implementation of ICT in societal sectors.

• So far an overall ICT policy strategy is missing. It currently is too much an accretion of the needs and wishes of individual ministries and the associated budgets. In fact ICT policy and later information society/ICT policy were never managed top-down in an integrated way. At the level of policy programmes and White Papers, a layer of interdepartmental co-ordination exists, but it overlays various departmental bodies and programmes of quite autonomous ICT/information society policies that are still articulated to a limited degree in the form of concrete, measurable goals.1 There are some positive signs, such as the recent foundation of a interdepartmental working group on electronic services and identification (CEDI).

• In the ICT realm, a number of external ad hoc committees have been used over the years. Some made a real impact, others just caused a temporary ripple. One can question the extensive use made of this instrument and the resulting committee culture.2

• A real evaluation culture with swift adaptation of policy if needed and more policy learning is not yet widely accepted. The last integral or meta-evaluation of ICT policy appears to have been performed at the end of the 1980s. There are a number of changes under way such as the overall move towards more accountability, reformulation of the overall ICT policy plan, and the overall trend towards monitoring and evaluation.

The same position paper discusses the balance between policy strategy and policy imple-mentation. It is questioned whether a complete and inclusive ICT strategy can be formulated. A plea is made for more pragmatic, faster and hence “lighter” forms of strategy formulation with clear policy goals and a clear focus on removing the major barriers to large-scale imple-mentation of ICT in industry and, from a public policy perspective, in societal sectors. In policy implementation, the demand side needs to put forward its needs more strongly. This requires policy makers to use a more varied arsenal of policy tools in addition to financing, and act as regulator, owner and supplier, governor, facilitator of learning environments and experiments, knowledge broker and system director. ___________

1. One could also argue that ICT seems to be gradually more integrated into the various sectoral policies because it has become too important to be shared completely with other ministries. Possibly the momentum for more co-ordination in information society/ICT policy is already behind us.

2. Without judging the quality of the advice given, quite a number of ad hoc committees were established in the last few years. In the e-government realm, they include the Commission Cerfontaine (on ICT and the City), Commission Snellen (on modernising the local administration), Commission Docters van Leeuwen (on ICT and government). There were several temporary advisory commissions on ICT and innovation/research, for example: the Commission Risseeuw (on the social and economic return on ICT investments), Commission Le Pair (on ICT research) and the Broadband Expert Group (public broadband strategy) among others.

Source: den Hertog et al. (2005), pp. 18-20.



Two examples of interdepartmental co-ordination and steering

The 1990s produced two major interdepartmental information society/ICT policy initiatives that can be viewed as attempts to formulate a co-ordinated policy approach. Just recently, a third was published. The following discussion concentrates on the first, more limited programme (NAP), which still exists but has changed considerably, and a second much broader attempt to achieve interdepartmental co-ordination, the Dutch Digital Delta (DDD).

National Action Programme: Information Superhighways (NAP)

This integrated interdepartmental action programme, launched in 1994, was triggered by the EU’s so-called Bangemann Report (1994). It provided for a number of years the framework for information society/ICT policies. It is an overarching programme with a budget, co-ordinated by the Ministry of Economic Affairs (the NAP budget is part of the EZ budget).13 Over the years the available annual budget – mostly decided when a new government comes into power – has varied. During the Kok I government (1994-98) it was EUR 9 million on an annual basis and increased under Kok II (1998-2002) to approximately EUR 33 million. Under Balkenende I (2002-03) – the Internet bubble had burst in the meantime – the amount was reduced to EUR 22 million and under Balkenende II (from 2003) to the current EUR 20 million. Typical projects financed through NAP include the public counter 2000, digitisation of libraries, opening up the cultural heritage, advanced telecommuncations infrastructure for academia (Surfnet), the research programme IT and Justice, a research programme Society and Information Superhighways (run by NOW, the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research).

Decisions regarding projects to be aided by NAP reside with its interdepartmental steering group, which is co-ordinated by the Ministry of Economic Affairs, with representation from six ministries. NAP is among the first policy programmes that are interdepartmental by design. All members may make project proposals. Although the criteria have not been made explicit, they must be innovative, address clear societal issues, lack direct support for individual firms, be anchored in the ministry that runs the project and in general fit within the relevant framework (that is, DDD from 1999 and recently the new government-wide ICT agenda). Through NAP 50% of the project costs are financed as a rule, the other 50% to be financed from the regular budget of the ministry that runs the project. In practice, after a certain time lag and after the project is rooted in the host organisation, the funding is taken over by the responsible ministry. In this way NAP functions as a catalyst. Some projects surpass the means of individual ministries and are then partly financed through NAP.

It is difficult to assess precisely the importance and effectiveness of NAP as an interdepartmental steering mechanism. One could argue that although NAP is limited in size and scope it is one of the few possibilities for interdepartmental coordination of ICT. Moreover, an increasing number of ministries are involved in NAP14 and projects funded through NAP increasingly have a more strategic character. Finally, because of its catalyst function and co-funding principle, the effect of NAP funds is greater than the size of the NAP budget suggests.

Over the years the interdepartmental working group has not only co-ordinated NAP and NAP projects, but other ICT policies as well. To some extent NAP is the glue for interdepartmental co-ordination.



However, there are also developments that work against NAP as an effective co-ordination mechanism. As indicated, most information society/ICT budgets are still run by the individual ministries that are responsible for certain dossiers. Only a small fraction of programmes and projects is funded through NAP. Further, the interdepartmental character of a programme or project is not one of the selection critera. In fact, the various ministries have some sort of drawing rights regarding the NAP budget. They are relatively free to put forward proposals and are not very critical of other ministries’ proposals. Thus, departmentalisation continues even in an interdepartmental programme. Therefore NAP can be perceived, more cynically, as a fall-back option if policy makers or politicians fail to fund initiatives completely through regular departmental budgets. Finally, interdepartmental co-ordination through NAP is sometimes overruled by a higher level, i.e. CWTI (see above).

The Dutch Digital Delta (DDD)

The 1999 White Paper on the Digital Delta was an attempt, in response to parlia-ment’s request for an overview of information society/ICT policy, to provide a comprehensive and structured overview of the topic (i.e. the static element) and to define new strategic goals (i.e. the dynamic element). Whereas NAP is fairly limited in scale and scope, DDD is much broader (like the development of information society/ICT policy). NAP and DDD differed also on a number of other points, e.g. no separate budget was attached to DDD and it had no separate (interdepartmental) steering group. Further, DDD was clearly (as was NAP) triggered by EU policies, but it contained an important element of benchmarking as well. In 2000 and in 2002, international benchmark studies were performed on all five pillars and summarised in a central policy benchmarking docu-ment.15

It is difficult to assess how important and effective the DDD exercise has been. According to some interviewees DDD was a broad, integrated policy plan which was much needed at the time. It provided more steering than NAP. For the first time it became apparent how substantial information society/ICT policies had become. It further – through its overview character – helped to point at gaps and overlaps and possibilities for merging programmes.

However, more sceptical opinions were voiced as well. In a way, the DDD can be perceived as a reallocation exercise, as no specific budget was available, or, more cynically, as a ribbon wrapped around a collection of activities already under way. Further, the five pillars mostly reflect the departmentalisation of information society/ICT policies rather than their integration as most can be linked to an individual ministry. So the vision presented in the White Paper is still dependent on the willingness of individual ministries, but there is no money to enforce co-operation and co-ordination. Co-ordination is still mostly left to the political will and readiness of policy makers to initiate joint programmes and projects.

Use of external commissions to co-ordinate and steer

A typical Dutch custom in innovation governance is the use of external advisory commissions.16 In fact the use of a “group of outsiders” can be seen both as a willingness to bring in fresh ideas or as compensation for weak internal governance mechanisms. In practice the effect may differ considerably, as the advice can be used to push specific solutions or, if the advice is found not useful, it can be disregarded. External advisory committees are used in the field of Dutch information society/ICT policy making as well.



Over the years various ad hoc advisory commissions headed by mostly reputable persons have studied and advised on various ICT-related topics.

These commissions may help in the process of agenda setting and policy formulation. As they are official commissions, the government is obliged to react officially on the advice they provide. This may lead to a parliamentary debate on the results. However, such commissions may also delay decision making, can result in advice that sets no obligations on government and can on some occasions be a way to shift to another body the task of formulating policy options or to get rid of ideas that appear threatening.

A new development in innovation governance gives external advisors more permanent tasks or some discretionary power to actually do something. The establishment of the innovation platform chaired by the prime minister is an example. In addition to the prime minister and the ministers of OCW and EZ, 15 representatives of the knowledge infrastructure and industry provide advice on all knowledge economy topics. To some degree, the agenda of these high-level platforms steers the political and policy process. While the government has no obligation other than to take the advice seriously, the advisors are gradually almost getting discretionary power.

This development can be seen in information society/ICT policy as well. The recently announced establishment of a public-private broadband expertise centre is one example. The announcement in the recent government-wide ICT agenda (2004) that not only will the ICT forum advise on the organisation of ICT research, but will also partly steer it is very interesting. For this purpose, the ICT forum is reshaped into an ICT co-ordination platform (regieorgaan ICT) that is still composed mostly of independent outsiders but will decide on the organisation of ICT research in the Netherlands.

The transformation of the ICT forum into regieorgaan ICT was announced in 2004, and reference was made to experience gained in the Action Programme Genomics in which this new governance model was introduced for the first time (Boekholt and Mckibbin, 2004). The regieorgaan ICT was established jointly by the Ministry of EZ and the Ministry of OCW. There is no overall regieorgaan for the whole information society/ICT domain; the regieorgaan ICT is restricted to ICT research. It will have formal responsibility for co-ordinating ICT research (e.g. by establishing programmes), which should increase the efficacy and efficiency of ICT research.17 This will most likely involve a streamlining of existing instruments used to finance ICT research. Another possibility is the creation of (virtual) network institutes with built-in incentives to prevent overlap and achieve the necessary co-operation. It is not likely that the regieorgaan ICT will distribute funding on the basis of the criteria it formulates. It is more likely to bring together actors to define a joint long-term work plan and make the coalition responsible for the funds and execution of their plan.

The regieorgaan ICT cannot be compared with the NAP steering group as it operates at some distance from the ministries, includes members from industry and academia, and has a specific focus (ICT research). As in the case of the innovation platform, it means greater involvement of industry and academia in policy formulation and funding. How this will take shape and to what degree insiders who are neither politicians nor policy makers will be allowed to decide and take responsibility for spending public funds remains to be seen.



Some observations regarding the use of benchmarking, experiments and evaluation

There is a general society-wide trend towards evaluation and accountability, not least in industry where recent administrative scandals have further strengthened the trend towards corporate governance. In the public domain a similar trend towards new forms of management (new public management) and related forms of accountability have surfaced. Politicians and policy makers have greater interest in benchmarking, policy experiments, monitoring and evaluation. In an EU setting an ”open method of co-ordination” is in vogue, and the combination of ambitious goals and benchmarking should gradually lead to more coherence and mutual policy learning. In the Netherlands, the elements of new public management have been introduced as well. An operation named VBTB led to the formulation of clearly stated policy goals and the formulation of quantifiable indicators, a trend that is visible in science and innovation policies as well. In innovation policy the evaluation function was restructured and there is a trend towards mid-term and ex ante evaluation as well as more quantitative evaluation.18 In science policy government tries to steer in a less detailed manner.

As noted in the latest international ICT benchmark (2002), the use of monitoring and benchmarking in ICT has increased. At the European level, eEurope, Eurostat, EITO and many individual studies undertake much comparative analysis. At the global level, such studies are provided by the OECD, universities, market research and consultancy firms. In the Netherlands there is a separate ICT in education monitor (progress report twice a year) and the Social and Cultural Planning Office presents international comparative research on the role of ICT in society. The Ministry of Economic Affairs has, as part of the Dutch Digital Delta initiative, invested in international benchmarking studies and funds benchmarking publications like Networks in Figures (2004) (mostly for telecoms) and The Digital Economy (2001), published by Statistics Netherlands.19 The most recent ICT White Paper stresses the importance of measuring performance in ICT and verifying improved performance (2004, p. 2).

Monitoring and benchmarking have developed quickly. However, these documents are at the same time seen as “policy-poor”, as benchmarking and monitoring are poorly linked to policy and the results of policy making, i.e. monitoring and benchmarking are not coupled with policy evaluation.20 Benchmarking and monitoring are mostly used not for evaluation purposes or to analyse the impact of information society/ICT policies – which would require more advanced evaluation – but to analyse the position vis-à-vis competing countries and to motivate adaptations to or intensify policy efforts that are presented in separate policy documents. Processes of policy design, monitoring and benchmarking and, where available, policy evaluation are taking place separately. Molas-Gallert et al. remark that: “In the Netherlands general monitoring revolves around a structured international benchmarking exercise. The degree to which measurable benchmark indicators that could be attributed to specific policy initiatives is far from clear and has not been formally explored. Yet, a good benchmark performance is still taken as an indicator of robust and adequate policy outcomes. (Evaluation must often deal with difficult problems like the attribution of impacts to a specific initiative, the ways to identify the additionality of a policy [i.e. identify the effects that would not have taken place in the absence of a policy), and the timing of the evaluation. There are different methods and techniques to deal with these issues).” (2003, p. 27)



Learning not only occurs through monitoring, benchmarking and policy evaluation, but may also be the result of experiments. For the information society and ICT, the importance of (learning from) experiments has been stressed. However, there is no culture of systematically evaluating experiments and evaluating them in real time so as to make changes when needed. If experiments are used, it must be possible for them to succeed. Otherwise, positive aspects are stressed more than the points for which learning is possible. Further, there is not yet a culture of real-time evaluation and swift adaptation that would speed up learning processes. It was pointed out in several interviews that experiments are not always treated as continuous and interactive learning trajectories. If problems arise during the experiments, adaptations are only made after the formal evaluation or mid-term review. Finally, if an experiment or a new approach is successful, it may be copied quite easily, without always questioning whether it is the best solution or effective in terms of investing in learning.21

More general integrated or meta-evaluation of Dutch information society/ICT policy is lacking, for example at the level of NAP or DDD. Evaluations take place at the level of individual measures and programmes and most ministries have their own approaches to evaluation. This implies that policy learning also mostly takes place at this level. In general much more energy is invested in agenda setting, consultation and policy formulation than in evaluation. Molas-Gallart et al. (2003) mention that “neither the Netherlands nor the UK has been found to follow a systematic approach to ICT policy evaluation. In both countries there was an element of centrally co-ordinated monitoring, and, in addition ministries and agencies carried out their own evaluations, mostly on an ad hoc basis…. More often evaluation and policy assessment will be conducted on an ad hoc, ‘as needed’ basis. In the Netherlands a strong emphasis on policy analysis can be seen as part of the consensus-driven approach to policy formation. The Dutch study has shown that exhaustive policy consultation results in comprehensive documentation on policy definition. These documents will often include different forms of policy evaluation, whether implicitly or explicitly” (2003, pp. 27, 28).

When evaluations are performed, cost-benefit analyses or quantitative indicators dominate, and wider societal effects or process-like evaluations receive relatively less attention.22 It was remarked for example that individual policy programmes were evaluated, but not the whole policy process (and hence possibilities for policy learning were missed). It is mostly when a small project group of officials starts working on a new White Paper that reflection on current policies and the policy package as a whole takes place.

There is still quite some ground to cover in terms of policy evaluation in information society/ICT policy. The possibilities for policy learning are not fully utilised. Of course the various stages at which information society/ICT policy was broadened can be perceived as the result of subsequent (mostly implicit) processes of policy learning, but these changes are to an important degree also defined by political developments, not least the EU information society/ICT policies that increasingly set the scene.



Concluding remarks

This section links the various aspects of governance in Dutch ICT/information society policy examined above to the wider innovation governance discussion through some general concluding remarks. These focus on the need to link various policy levels more explicitly in terms of temporal coherence, vertical coherence, horizontal coherence, the issue of “policy laboratories” and policy learning between policy fields, and the new role of “outsiders” in policy formulation and policy implementation.

Linking the various policy levels

A first, rather obvious but still important, observation concerns the fact that Dutch information society/ICT policies as well as many other policy domains are increasingly affected (rather than defined) by European information society/ICT policies. The 1994 Bangemann Report and more recently the eEurope action plans have contributed to the Europeanisation of Dutch information society/ICT policies. Gradually an information society/ICT policy is emerging that is more and more comparable in terms of its scopeto those in other countries. At the same time regional and local ICT policies (e.g. for broadband) have emerged. Having said this, important parts of more sectoral or ministry-specific information society/ICT policies seem to develop more or less autonomously. In innovation policies, there is a similar development which draws attention to the need to make sure policies at the various levels are co-ordinated and coherent.

Temporal coherence

One may argue that policy coherence is one of the results of governance. Temporal coherence is concerned with co-ordination over time. In Dutch information society/ICT policy, although there may be quite some policy turbulence over time, budgets and programmes are generally fixed and responsibilities are respected, so that policy changes are evolutionary rather than revolutionary.23 If a new overall strategy or action plan is presented, the budget mostly is a repackaging of existing budgets (which are now allocated differently or more specifically) plus some “new money”. This seems to be in line with the “garbage can” model elaborated by Kingdon (see above). There are few moments in the lifetime of a policy dossier at which radical changes can be made. It is the exception rather than the rule that problems (or the public agenda), politics (political agenda) and policy (policy agenda) are aligned and offer a window of opportunity to radically redefine the agenda. This observation seems to hold for Dutch innovation policy as well. In general, one can dispute how much adaptation and change is beneficial. Sometimes long-term stability, predictability, simplicity (and less so adaptation) may be preferable to short-term adaptability, constant changes and new forms of governance and instrumentation.

Vertical coherence

Vertical coherence is about co-ordination of policy formulation and policy implementation. In the Netherlands, policy-making processes are extremely important but relatively slow. Strategy formulation (and consensus seeking) involves a lengthy process of consultation and discussion in which many actors participate (without ensuring a truly integrated approach). Co-ordination and co-operation are mostly considered when it is more or less compulsory because other ministries have clear responsibility in a particular area. It is less perceived as a way of organising matters more conveniently or as a way to



speed up policy implementation. At the same time, the practical day-to-day knowledge derived from implementing all sorts of policy schemes is not always used optimally because of the gap between policy design or developing policy strategies and policy implementation. Increasing the quality of innovation governance in the Dutch situation may require the introduction of “lighter” (hence faster) ways of strategy building that leave more leeway for sectoral ICT strategies combined with empowered sectoral ICT (implementing) organisations.

Even more fundamentally, one might wonder if some topics are simply too big and too complex to formulate an integrated, coherent policy strategy. This consumes a lot of energy and time, while not necessarily guaranteeing a superior approach. If departmentalisation is endemic, it might be more productive to accept the fact that an integrated information society/ICT strategy does not exist and to invest in more decentralised experiments and hence start processes of policy learning as quickly as possible. Put differently, some topics may be too important to many policy actors and the co-ordination costs may outweigh the cost of choosing other strategies. In such cases the momentum for heavier forms of (vertical) co-ordination is already lost.

Horizontal coherence

Horizontal coherence is about the co-ordination of various policy strands. In innovation policy this is traditionally about the co-ordination of science, technology and industry policies. But for third-generation innovation policies it is increasingly about co-ordinating mainstream STI policies with sectoral policies. Ultimately, horizontal innovation policies mean that policy initiatives and instruments deriving from various domains (in practice from ministries) are co-ordinated, strengthen each other and address wider societal issues through well-co-ordinated policies deriving from various policy domains. The need is evident in information society/ICT policies as well as in innovation policy.

A (horizontally) coherent policy requires a basic understanding of who does what (transparency) and a clear distribution of responsibilities. Over the years transparency in Dutch information society/ICT policy has increased, mainly owing to the mapping and streamlining of activities since the late 1990s. As observed above, responsibilities are spread over many actors and possibilities for enforcing policy are limited, and this negatively affects policy coherence. Ministries optimise information society/ICT policies mainly at the level of individual ministries, as cross-departmental initiatives are laborious and require the sort of exchanges that most policy makers are not used to (or willing to enter into). Interdepartmental co-ordination takes place when a new overall information society/ICT White Paper is being formulated, an important window of opportunity for change. An important part of the wheeling and dealing takes place between policy makers in the various ministries that compose and write the White Papers. The ministries mostly bring their own interests, and interdepartmental co-ordination takes place when issues obviously exceed the responsibility of one ministry (and co-ordination is almost compulsory). In practice there is only a small layer of interdepartmental information society/ICT policy on top of a broad base of mainly departmentalised information society/ICT policies. At the same time, the information society/ICT policy agenda has broadened from a science-technology agenda to an agenda that addresses societal and governmental transformation, and horizontalisation of content is accomplished almost along the way. However, horizontalisation in organisational terms is much slower. In the processes of agenda setting, policy formulation and evaluation, individual ministries rather than integrated programmes dominate.



To achieve the needed horizontal coherence requires putting a premium on interdepartmental projects where these are needed most. Old-style hierarchies are not designed for horizontal communication and more mechanisms are needed to deal with these, not through interdepartmental programmes with departmental ”drawing rights”, but through interdepartmental budgets that can enforce breakthroughs on key dossiers. This might even take the form of interdepartmental project teams and dedicated project directors with power to act. What is important is that interdepartmental vehicles have enough responsibility or room to manoeuvre to function and execute their tasks well. Another option might be to designate ICT project ministers or state secretaries for example for ICT in health or e-government. In Dutch information society/ICT policies, the need for institutional adaptation and redesign has been noted. In the 2004 ICT White Paper the need for “institutional reforms and redesign of working procedures” was noted as a prerequisite for better use of ICT. Although the regieorgaan ICT is a good example of renewal in innovation governance, other new forms of governance are needed.

More generally, the goal of increasing the quality of innovation governance requires new forms of horizontal and mostly interdepartmental co-ordination. In this context, the government policy to rotate top officials over the ministries (on average a new position every five years) might have been one of the best decisions to facilitate future interdepartmental governance.

Role of policy laboratories and policy learning

Innovation governance may also benefit from information society/ICT policies through the latter’s policy laboratory. What will happen in innovation policies in general – if the trend towards broadening and horizontalised innovation policies proceeds – can already be observed in the information society/ICT policy domain. In that respect ICT policy is, like environmental policy, a forerunner of types of policy issues that will increasingly require interdepartmental approaches or at least other types of governance.

Unfortunately, policy learning in Dutch information society/ICT policy is not yet optimal. Although the use of monitoring, benchmarking and evaluation are on the increase, policy learning is still mainly piecemeal. There is not yet a culture of real-time evaluation and swift adaptation of experiments to speed up learning processes. Thus far, integrated or meta-evaluations of Dutch information society/ICT policies are lacking. Evaluation take place at the level of individual measures and programmes and most ministries have their own approaches to dealing with evaluation. This implies that policy learning also mostly takes place at this level.

Policy learning might also mean that approaches and governance mechanisms that work in one area can be transferred – with due care and in an intelligent way – to another. This seems the case with regard to regieorgaan ICT. It is therefore important to invest sufficiently in processes of policy learning.

Role of outsiders in innovation governance

Finally there is a need in innovation governance to discuss the use and role of outsiders in policy advice and policy implementation. Certainly in the Dutch case, external actors (i.e. not policy makers) increasingly play a role in policy processes, e.g. through the frequent use of ad hoc advisory commissions and ”external actors” (who are quite often “insiders”) who are increasingly a part of the policy implementation as well. The transformation of the ICT forum into regieorgaan ICT – jointly established by



the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sciences –to steer and streamline research in ICT is a remarkable innovation in governance of ICT. It will be interesting to see how this new form of governance takes shape and to what degree insiders who are neither politicians nor policy makers will be allowed to decide and take responsibility for spending public money. In mainstream innovation policy the creation of the innovation platform is another example of the new way of involving ousiders in the policy process. Are these signs that traditional forms of policy co-ordination have failed and that coherent policy strategies or new forms of governance need to be welcomed?



Notes

1. This is an abridged and partly updated version of H. de Groot and P. den Hertog (2004), Innovation Governance in the Netherlands as illustrated by Information Society/ICT Policies, case study carried out within the framework of the Dutch OECD MONIT studies on innovation governance, Dialogic, Utrecht.

2. This section partly draws on den Hertog et al. (2005).

3. The phrase “pervasive technology” was introduced by Freeman in the early 1980s. In the economic literature, Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995) further developed the notion as “general purpose technology”.

4. The Bangemann Report on the Information Superhighway in the early 1990s triggered the publication of the Action Plan Information Superhighways in the Netherlands (and similar initiatives in other EU countries). The more recent eEurope 2002 and eEurope 2005 action plans have certainly led to a further Europeanisation of Dutch information society/ICT policies. R&D policies regarding ICT cannot be made without taking into account developments such as the 7th Framework Programme, the European Technology Platforms (ETPs) and discussions on an European Research Council. Many ICT applications and standards require at least European scale, and EU regulation, action programmes and best practices in fact steer national agendas.

5. As during the Dutch EU presidency. The Ministry of Economic Affairs presented a major study by PricewaterhouseCoopers (2004) entitled Rethinking the European ICT Agenda. Ten ICT breakthroughs for reaching Lisbon goals. In the EU Telecom Council in December 2004 six new elements were placed on the European ICT agenda, namely: an excellent ICT sector and innovative businesses; ICT for Citizens and ICT skills; ICT for public services; content and development of products and services; development of networks; and trust and security. The fight against spam was tabled.

6. Similar conclusions are drawn in Molas-Gallart et al. (2003) who performed a highly interesting review of ICT policy in both the Netherlands and the United Kingdom when evaluating the Swedish national IT-policy for the Swedish Institute for Growth Policy Studies (ITPS). They observe for example that “an increasing number of countries are adopting similar national ICT policies. This trend towards ICT policy convergence has been given impetus by the promotion of free trade and competition in global ICT markets. However, there are a number of countervailing pressures working against convergence, which may lead countries to follow their own distinctive national ICT policy paths. National policies are constrained or facilitated by a range of national conditions, such as social and legal norms, the size of the ICT sector and the pool of ICT knowledge.” (p. 22)

7. These are (tele)communications infrastructure; know-how and innovation; access and skills; regulatory issues; and ICT in the public sector.

8. In CWTI and hence in RWTI the separate policy areas of science policy, technology policy and information policy were merged.

9. Philips is represented through its CEO, Mr. Kleisterlee.

10. Kingdon’s model is actually a revised version of the Garbage Can Model originally developed by Cohen et al. (1972).

11. This section partly draws on Molas-Gallart et al. (2003).

12. Molas-Gallart et al. (2003, p. 155) mention for example that: “attempts have been made to organise the public procurement is such a way that its procedures could be monitored from a central direction unit.



Until now, their efforts have been blocked by the individual claims from several ministries about independent policy making in this area. Among the various ministries involved in ICT matters, there is no central co-ordinator of standardisation policies and practices in the public sector. In theory, the Ministry of Interior is responsible, but in practice it has been so far unable to execute leadership in the adoption of XML and open source software.”

13. The Ministry of Economic Affairs, the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science and the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management started this initiative (1994). In 1996 the Ministry of Justice and in 1997 the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment were also active in this interdepartmental programme.

14. The Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport and possibly the Ministry of Spatial Planning, Housing, and the Environment will take part in NAP in addition to the ministries mentioned earlier.

15. Some meso-tests were part of these benchmarking exercises in which a number of industries or societal themes were internationally benchmarked. In fact these studies can be seen as forerunners of a further broadening of information society/ICT policy towards more government-wide information society/ICT policy.

16. See the innovation governance study on the TNO (den Hertog, 2004).

17. Substantial ICES/KIS or BSIK funding has been allocated and although it would have been logical to have the various information society/ICT-related projects co-ordinated by the regieorgaan ICT this has not been done.

18. The Ministry of Economic Affairs performed the MAIT study (Monitoring and Assessing the Impact of the Economic Affairs Technology Instruments) in which the benefits of individual technology schemes were assessed.

19. Not surprisingly, one of the action points in the most recent information society/ICT White Paper is to structure the various quantitative publications on networks and communication sectors and to aim at a more unambiguous benchmarking of the Dutch ICT position and what this implies for the economy and society (2004, p. 42).

20. There is of course a real measurement problem regarding information society/ICT as no proper set of statistical indicators is available. Those that are available have a considerable time lag, making them less useful in a rapidly evolving area.

21. It is not always questioned whether a similar set-up or tool would succeed in a different environment. This may be phrased as the danger of a tool-push approach, which is as real in ICT as in innovation policy.

22. Molas-Gallart et al. observe that “in both countries [the United Kingdom and the Netherlands] policy evaluation remains a challenge. There is no broadly accepted methodology, and the focus on the collection of measurable indicators appears to be made at the expense of tackling the thornier issues of impact assessment, like the attribution of observed changes to specific policy actions, and the identification of the additional effect of such actions“ (2003, p. 29).

23. This may also lead to a broad array of policy goals and instruments if the “dead wood” in the policy portfolio is not cut. A recently published position paper related to the next ICT government-wide White Paper (in 2005) includes a reflection on governance and temporal coherence in the ICT innovation system. One suggestion for improving governance in ICT was to critically review policy initiatives (and associated organisations) in existence for more than three years. The idea was that policy interventions should in principal be temporary and policy efforts should concentrate on the issues that are perceived as most urgent by (potential) ICT users. It was argued that the usefulness and necessity of standing ICT policies should be reviewed systematically (den Hertog et al., 2005, pp. 34-35).



References

Advisory Commission, Belgendoenhetbeter.nl (2003), “Een kwestie van uitvoering. Vernieuwingsagenda voor de presterende overheid”, The Hague.

Advisory Commission on Citizens and Government in the Information Society (2001), “Citizens and Government in the Information Society: The Need for Institutional Innovation”, The Hague.

Boekholt, P. and S. McKibbin (2004), “The Netherlands Genomics Initiative”, mini-case study as part of the Dutch contribution to the OECD MONIT study, Technopolis, Amsterdam.

Bresnahan, T.F. and M. Trajtenberg (1995), “General Purpose Technologies: ‘Engines of Growth’?”, Journal of Econometrics (65), 1, 83-108.

Broadband Expert Group (2002), “Nederland Breedbandland. Aanbevelingen aan het Kabinet van de nationale breedband expert groep”, Broadband Expert Group, The Hague.

Brynjolfsson, E. and L. Hitt (2000), “Beyond Computation: Information Technology, Organizational Transformation and Business Performance”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol 14, no. 4, p. 23-48.

Cohen, M., J. March and J. Olsen (1972), “A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice”, Administrative Science Quarterly 17, 1-25.

EITO (2003), European Information Technology Observatory 2003, EITO, Frankfurt.

van de Graaf, H. and R. Hoppe (1996), “Beleid en politiek. Een inleiding tot de beleidswetenschap en de beleidskunde”, Coutinho, Bussum, derde druk.

de Groot, H. and P. den Hertog (2004), “Innovation Governance in the Netherlands as illustrated by Information Society/ICT-policies”, case study within the framework of the Dutch OECD MONIT studies on innovation governance, Dialogic, Utrecht.

den Hertog, P. (2004), “Innovation Governance and TNO”, case study within the framework of the Dutch OECD MONIT studies on innovation governance, Dialogic, Utrecht.

den Hertog, P., C. Holland and S. Maltha (2005), Naar een vernieuwde, probleemgerichte en vraaggestuurde ICT-agenda, Dialogic, Utrecht.

den Hertog, P. and G. Fahrenkrog (1993), “IT Adoption: Can Policy Help? Experiences and Trends in Five EC Member States”, discussion paper, TNO-STB, Apeldoorn.

ICT Forum (2003), “Innovation through ICT”, ICT Forum, The Hague.

Kingdon, J.W. (1995), Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies, 2nd edition, Longman.

Molas-Gallart, J., P. Tang, S. Flowers, W. Hulsink, A. Davies, W. Gooijer and J. Spaapen (2003), “A Review of the ICT Policy in the Netherlands and the UK. A Study for the Evaluation of the Swedish National IT Policy”, ITPS, Swedish Institute for Growth Policy Studies, Östersund.



Ministry of Economic Affairs (1993), IT Policies in the Nineties, The Hague.

Ministry of Economic Affairs, the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science and the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management (1994), “Action Programme: Information Superhighway, From Metaphor to Action”, The Hague.

Ministry of Economic Affairs, the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science and the Ministry of Transport, Public works and Water Management (1998), “Beyond the National Action Plan: A Recalibration of the Existing Programme”, The Hague.

Ministry of Economic Affairs, the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science, the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment (1999), “The Dutch Digital Delta. The Netherlands On Line”, The Hague.

Ministry of Economic Affairs, Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Education, Culture and Science and the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management (2000), “The Dutch Digital Delta: Beyond e-Europe”, The Hague.

Ministry of Economic Affairs, Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Education, Culture and Science and the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management (2000), “International ICT Benchmark 2000”, The Hague.

Ministry of Economic Affairs, Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Education, Culture and Science and the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management (2002), “International ICT Benchmark 2002”, The Hague.

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INFORMATION SOCIETY GOVERNANCE IN GREECE – 145


Chapter 6

INFORMATION SOCIETY GOVERNANCE IN GREECE: “ONE SWALLOW DOES NOT MAKE A SUMMER”

Lena Tsipouri Associate Professor, University of Athens, Centre of Financial Studies

Mona Papadakou

Research Fellow, University of Athens, Centre of Financial Studies

In Greece, information society policy started in the 1970s. The first two decades focused on the development of information and communication technology (ICT) infrastructures and preparation for the liberalisation of the telecommunications market. Only in the mid-1990s did the information society concept enter the policy agenda and in the early 2000s the first integrated strategy was implemented in the form of an Operational Programme (OPIS) co-financed by the EU. A wide gap with other OECD countries made intervention an urgent matter, with a target not directly related to innovation policy. The two policies are not linked in any phases of the policy cycle and the policy making responsibility belongs to different ministries. Moreover, the Greek governance system does not provide for horizontal co-ordination of policies, except in the case of formal co-ordination for the allocation of funds in order to avoid overlaps.

For the information society it is necessary to involve all government agencies and society as a whole, and the Greek public governance system was quite unprepared for such a demanding task. New governance structures had to be invented to overcome the lack of horizontal co-ordination mechanisms and modern governance tools. Information society governance in Greece is thus a special case for indicating how good governance practices can be introduced in a public sector dominated by inflexible hierarchies. The information society experiment, if successful, could trigger changes throughout the public governance system. Yet the results of this effort are still unclear. Delays in promoting actions and in absorption of the dedicated budget show that, besides strong political will and the intro-duction of innovative governance tools, the system cannot move faster than its internal potential will allow.

146 – INFORMATION SOCIETY GOVERNANCE IN GREECE


Introduction

Greece is one of the European cohesion countries1; it ranks low in terms of competitiveness and suffers from incomplete development of infrastructure. The latter issue has been systematically addressed by the regional development aid provided by the European Community Support Frameworks (CSFs). The first (1988-93) and second (1994-99) CSFs were mainly designed to build up physical infrastructure and the few isolated efforts to address intangibles had limited success. As a consequence, Greece was ill-prepared to face the challenges of information and communication technologies (ICT).

At the same time, governance in Greece was only gradually adapting to modern principles. Hierarchies play a crucial role. Interaction and co-ordination among govern-ment departments remain limited, fragmented and often imposed by obligations external to the system. Stakeholder participation was introduced but has made no significant difference and remains largely formal in nature. Industry and professional associations are little involved in the development dialogue.

Thus, when funding increased considerably during the third CSF (2000-06) and the European Union tried to encourage all recipients to focus on the prioritisation of intangibles, a new mechanism was needed. In the past, no radical changes had been made to accompany the substantially increased funding. The central agency scheme with no powerful co-ordination was never particularly effective, yet it was never changed and replaced by horizontal or higher-level thematic co-ordination.

Information society policy was thus independent and never directly linked with the innovation policy. In the effort to catch up and achieve good co-ordination it was positioned under the most powerful ministry and followed its own pace in of the main phases of the policy cycle (agenda setting, policy formulation and policy evaluation and learning). Initially the focus was on the development of infrastructure and then, during the last five years, infrastructure, applications and content were developed simultaneously.

The nature of the information society and the need to involve all government agencies and society as a whole thus called for a new governance structure that would be both effective and embedded in the general governance system. This chapter presents a description, analysis and appraisal of the effort to create such a structure.

The next section presents an overview and describes the formal organisation of the information society and policy design. It indicates that Greece may be considered a market with serious lags but benefiting from latecomer advantages (i.e. accessing a mature market that presents few risks relating to standards or high degree of uncertainty). In that sense, the timing for accelerating the information society is very appropriate. There is overall rapid growth in many ICT indicators, and the challenge is to identify to what extent this is sustainable and sufficient for catching up.

The chapter next deals with the agenda-setting processes that emerged to meet the needs of the Operational Programme for the Information Society (OPIS) in the context of the third CSF. Following a brief description, the effectiveness of the design and implementation of the policy are examined.

There follows an in-depth analysis of policy formulation and co-ordination of invest-ment in the information society during the last five years. The chapter concludes with comments on the connection between information society and innovation policy and the lessons to be learned from information society governance in Greece.



Historical setting and formal organisation

Development of ICT policies

ICT development in Greece started in the 1970s with the acquisition of big computer systems by large public and private companies. The first policy intervention aimed at faster diffusion of hardware and applications took place in 1984 with IMP-Informatics. The IMPs (Integrated Mediterranean Programmes) were the predecessors of the CSFs and the first form of integrated transnational regional development planning in Europe: in view of the accession of Spain and Portugal, Mediterranean countries were given structural funding for 1984-88 to face the emerging competition. Each member state organised this support in the way considered most appropriate for its needs. The Greek government of the time decided to promote IMP-Informatics, an integrated programme to enhance diffusion and application of computing.

IMP-Informatics was initially designed to cover the needs of the public sector only. Design, monitoring and management were shared by the European Commission,2 the powerful Ministry of National Economy and a consultant. This “closed-door” set-up, combined with a lack of experience in development planning, meant that any type of consultation and co-ordination could only be ad hoc and limited. As a consequence, there was no awareness raising and this led to under-subscription of the programme and insufficient absorption of the European funding. A decision was therefore taken to expand the programme to allow private sector investments. This improved absorption per-formance although not greatly.

The experience was useful for the first CSF, which provided for funding of projects left over from IMP-Informatics. Again design and management were centralised. An encompassing operational programme called Kleisthenis was adopted, offering oppor-tunities for purchase of equipment and training by all public and semi-public authorities, but it had the lowest absorption and efficiency of the whole first CSF. Organisational matters and inefficiency of the public service were considered the key causes. Beyond the improvement of the telecommunications infrastructure, the first CSF viewed the informa-tion society simply as a means to improve the computerisation and automation of public services. Hardware, which was sometimes under-utilised, and some isolated success stories were the only tangible results of this period. Overall, compared to the rest of Europe, Greece lagged further behind in the information society. By 1992 preparations for the next CSF started taking into consideration Kleisthenis’ problems and failures.

In 1995 the first strategic document on the information society was presented, with the title “Greek Strategy on Information Society: Instrument for the Promotion of Employment, Development and Quality of Life”. The document set four major milestones or objectives, taking into account that Greek society and markets lagged in the areas of ICT infrastructure, applications and use. These objectives were:

• Reducing the gap between Greece and EU partners in the use of advanced information technology infrastructure within the next ten years.

• Access to information technology infrastructures for the majority of Greek enterprises within the next 15 years.



• Access to information technology infrastructures for the majority of Greek households within the next 15 years.

• Promotion of electronic transactions with the public sector so that the majority of services could be ensured remotely within the next 15 years.

To achieve these goals, the document suggested a series of actions such as develop-ment of core national infrastructure, establishment of “information cells” that offer citi-zens easy access to information, creation of an independent information society authority to supervise and guarantee constitutional rights in the information era, the creation of a permanent Information Society Committee in the Greek Parliament, the creation of information networks for enterprises, opening of the public sector to electronic communi-cation with citizens, and pilot applications with a social welfare orientation. The docu-ment offered the basic guidelines for the national information society strategy as a response to the Bangeman Report and international developments in ICT. Many of these actions are more or less completed, while others are being implemented or reviewed on the basis of current needs and developments.

The document influenced the introduction of information society actions in the second CFS for enhancing ICT infrastructure that would at a later stage support appli-cations. The design was included in the sectoral operational programmes and was viewed as a means to improve ministerial performance rather than as an overall policy. In that sense the strategic document did not meet its target. Three relevant operational pro-grammes explicitly adopted information society improvement actions as indicated in Table 6.1.

Table 6.1. Selected information society actions in the second CSF

Operational programme Ministry Selected project

Sectoral budget (EUR millions)

Telecommunications Transport and Communications

Infrastructure development for global services provision Development of advanced services

378.6

Industry Development Electronic commerce centres E-commerce standards development Sectoral EDI Clearing house Investment support to ICT enterprises

346.3

Modernisation of public service

Public Administration

Kleisthenis (Modernisation of public administration: integrated information systems and training)

261.2

Research and technology

National Defence High accuracy models – weather forecasting technologies

146.7

Source: Working Group on the Information Society (1999).

Co-ordination was neither desired nor imposed, and the result was duplication, over-lapping and gaps. Yet, despite the failure of co-ordinated implementation in the 1994-99 programming period, telecommunications infrastructure improved considerably and reached satisfactory levels for the first time, while mobile telephony grew rapidly. Under the second CSF, the most important programmes again mainly addressed hardware and software in telecommunications and government: Communication Post, which included telecommunications infrastructure, and Modernisation of the Public Service, a series of information society applications for all ministries and public or publicly supervised



agencies. The former had higher absorption and was considered more successful overall than the latter. In addition, most sectoral programmes included elements of information society applications in: transport infrastructure (automation); human resources (compu-ters in schools and universities); manufacturing services (EDS, support of professional organisations); energy-natural gas (automation); health (infrastructure in hospitals and telemedicine); and R&D (grants for research and promotion of the academic data transmission network).

In spite of the absence of co-ordination, some ministries undertook ambitious projects, while others stuck to the purchasing of hardware. Results were mixed. The most successful broad application under the second CSF was TAXISnet, which offered the possibility of electronic submission and clearance, first of access to certification, then VAT and finally tax revenue declarations (see Box 6.1). The service was reviewed and accepted as a European best practice model in 60 out of 282 proposals submitted in the framework of the monitoring of the eEurope actions.

Limited absorption, Greece’s continuing last-place ranking in all information society indicators and increasingly perceived needs, combined with an active commitment at the prime minister’s level to reverse the situation urged a reorganisation of the planning and implementation processes in view of the third CSF.

Box 6.1. TAXISnet The TAXISnet electronic services offered by the General Secretariat for Information Systems were launched in May 2000 and aim at raising the quality of dealings between taxpayers and the tax authorities. The purpose in developing them was to create suitable infrastructure and gradually introduce new electronic services for taxpayers. Today, the complete Taxation Information System (TAXIS) covers all taxpayers and all financial transactions, and was honoured by the European Union with the “best practice” award at the e-government conference held in Brussels in November 2001 under the title “From Policy to Practice”. In March 2004 the service was presented to the general public enriched with further functions relating to filling in and printing the basic income tax declaration form.

The response of the market to the new services was unexpectedly good. To date more than one million users have registered to use online services offered by the system, and the Web site is continuously expanding in order to meet increased needs for presentation and operability of the new applications.

Overview of the current information society governance system

The relatively limited success of the previous programming periods in terms of applications led the Greek government to decide to bring together all the elements of previous national programmes that either needed or envisaged enhancement of the information society, into one new sectoral programme called the Operational Programme for the Information Society. This programme includes practically all the information society elements of the previous programmes along with new ones and tries to co-ordinate them within the e-Europe framework.3 The idea is that as the information society becomes a key priority for the competitiveness of the Greek economy and its social cohesion, it should have a vision and a common tool for co-ordinating, monitoring and supporting individual activities with synergetic effects.



In this context a broad and financially ambitious programme was conceived, new organisations were created and old ones were put into a new perspective, emphasising new processes and the need for co-ordination and synergies. Three organisations and a variety of groups and committees have been set up in an effort to manage funds effectively, initiate a broad dialogue and lay the foundations for training and awareness raising.

The most innovative step was the creation of a Special Secretariat for the Information Society, under the Ministry of Economy and Finance, to supervise the process. The Secretariat has tried to introduce modern governance principles by applying an understanding of the international challenges and lessons learned to an ambitious philosophy for the Greek programme. New actors were needed to implement the new philosophy. Some of them emerged from the general CSF governance system, others were specific to the organisation of the OPIS.

The Managing Authority of the OPIS is designed to play the central role in funding, speed, conformity to the rules and implementation. Because of the general problems of inefficiency in the Greek administration and the performance problems in the second CSF, the Commission and the Greek government agreed on the need for more efficient management of EU funds. The result was the creation of a special service in each ministry/operational programme, a managing authority, which is composed of skilled civil servants and is responsible for the legal and financial aspects of programme implementation. In that sense the Managing Authority of the OPIS has responsibility for informing potential applicants about launching calls for proposals, evaluating them and organising the financing procedure. Information, ex ante evaluation, legal provisions, management, monitoring and control are under its responsibility.

Another organisation for the modernisation of the public service is a company, Information Society SA (Koinonia tis Pliroforias AE), which is expected to offer support services to the public sector. The idea for this company arose from the observation that many delays in public-sector adoption of the information society were due to the inability of individual units (within ministries or regional authorities) to design and implement the changes necessary for replacing conventional with electronic governance. Administrative capabilities are often insufficient to deal with the complex system of public tendering and procurement, and outsourcing is not always a good solution. Thus the government decided to create a fully subsidised non-profit company to act as an intermediary. Its responsibility is to deal with procedures including technical specifications and tendering (not the selection of proposals which remains a responsibility of the Ministry of the Economy) in co-operation with the final beneficiary. The assumption in the company’s business plan is that 25-30% of all OPIS calls addressing the public sector will receive the assistance of the company. The concept has a good rationale, but the public character and governmental support raise some doubts concerning the potential efficiency and effectiveness of such a company. Its quantitative targets were very ambitious:

• Reduction of time to market (from the adoption of the idea until the procurement and service received), which is now over a year. The present target is 6-8 months. Comparisons with other member states on the speed of public procurement are necessary to create reasonable benchmarks.

• Reduction of the number of public calls for tender, which too often delay the process and sometimes altogether cancel it or make it obsolete.



• Training of the “client” public services so that at the end of the period the company’s services are no longer needed and it becomes a provider of more specialised services.

A broad number of other actors or committees were formed to assist in the imple-mentation of the new philosophy:

• The sectoral e-business forum and the health forum, which encourage debate and information.

• Working groups, like the one for disabled persons to improve access to e-government, and a working group on broadband, to assure full exploitation of current technical knowledge and compatibility among regional initiatives.

• The IT Observatory.

• A horizontal inter-regional group including representatives from all regions for discussion and good practice transfer and 13 regional co-ordinating committees to ensure monitoring and follow up of the adopted actions.

Markets, milestones and policies of the past

The above historic overview started with Greece lagging behind in the imple-mentation of the information society with the gap increasing initially and decreasing thereafter. The crucial question is the extent to which the closing of the gap in certain indicators is attributable to policy or simply to market maturity. Figure 6.1 clarifies the co-evolution of the information society gap between Greece and the EU, government policy and market conditions.

Until 1984, only bigger businesses acquired computer equipment and automated their processes. The first milestone was the opportunity offered by IMP-Informatics in 1984. This policy was apparently not effective because, in a period of intense personal computer (PC) acquisition, the gap between the EU and Greece increased. In the early 1990s, market opportunities in mobile telephony helped Greece rapidly close the gap in this particular sector. Gradually improving the design of programmes in the first and second CSFs was insufficient to meet the challenges created by the global expansion and growth of the Internet.

The second milestone of the first strategic document did not achieve any change and policies remained locked in the same frame. Greece remained characterised by low levels of penetration of ICTs, low uptake in households and business, an “immature” ICT industry, no critical mass of “advanced” users in industry and services, and an important “digital divide” in terms of age and geography. The information society was still not a central policy issue.The full reorganisation, which started in 1999, and its mode of governance, which tried to exploit increased funding, and the concomitant experiments in organisation are described below in an attempt to shed some light on policy effectiveness.



Figure 6.1. Co-evolution of ICT sector and information society policy in Greece

IS activity

IS policy

1984

IMP

1989

1st CSF

1994

2nd CSF

2000

3rd CSF

• No policy • IMP-Informatics • Development of basic infrastructures

• Development of telecom infrastructure

• Sectoral ICT actions

1995

First document on IS

(no follow-up) 1999

First white paper on IS

(follow-up in OPIS)

• OPIS

• IS actions in sectoral and regional O.P.s

1992

Mobile telephony

1998

Partial liberalisationof telephony

2001

Full liberalisationof telephony

1984

• Telecoms: public monopoly, pure infrastructure

• Big computers in big public & private organisations

• Hardware in the public sector

• PCs in the private business

• Digitisation of public telecom network

• Rapid growth in mobile (three providers)

• Pure ICTs diffusion

• Rapid growth in ICT sector

• Liberalisation in progress

• Slowdown in IT sector

• Expansion in telecom services

• Catching up in ICTs diffusion

Agenda setting and prioritisation

The basic features

A major distinguishing feature of current information society policy compared both to previous information society endeavours and to other national programmes is a very carefully designed planning process. The strategic framework for improved coherence started with a central information society strategy document, which was prepared after consultation and was adopted at Cabinet level. The document covered all aspects of the information society (funding as well as institutional/regulatory), distributed clear responsibilities across government, and was intended to mobilise all relevant actors and society as a whole.

All activities required by ministries and regions related to the information society had to be planned and agreed in co-operation with the Special Secretariat. This involved checking the current situation in detail, helping the competent national or regional agency learn how to plan adequately, linking the plan to both the overall CSF priorities and OPIS, and suggesting concrete actions, which were discussed both in private and in open consultations with the relevant authorities.



In terms of timing, it required over a year to raise awareness and explain the principles and processes to the ministries concerned as well as to the regional authorities. This was not a smooth process, partly because during this period many gaps were identified in the original strategies and partly because of serious conflicts of power and interest. Several organisations tried to ensure the necessary funds to manage autonomously (both at the national and regional level), while others did not dispose of the necessary planning skills. The OPIS Secretariat was very firm in its central role of co-ordination in order to assure quality and avoid past mistakes. Despite a limited track record of co-ordination among Greek authorities after the first year, the co-ordination process was smoothed out and started functioning.

At the same time, it was clear that most of the programmes lacked the necessary in-depth knowledge and did not adequately reflect either their choices or their plan of implementation. Thus a decision was taken to launch a call for business plans (which would include a snapshot of the current situation, strategic priorities and action plans for each sector and region). Central funds from the Secretariat’s Technical Assistance were used to make up for the lack of planning skills in the public administration through the use of external consultants. A special committee was appointed in each case to monitor and formally approve the plan. The 31 business plans were launched in summer 2001 and were expected to be finished by December 2001 but very few met the deadline and the quality varied considerably.

Following approval of the business plans, their evaluation and a public consultation process, the co-ordinated policy took final form. Budgets were earmarked and the priority areas were broken down according to four themes rather than on the basis of ministerial autonomy.

The broader financial provisions and priority axes

OPIS has a total budget of approximately EUR 3 billion (7% of the total development effort) with both sectoral and regional missions. Management and implementation were the co-responsibility of the Ministry of the Economy and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Public Administration and Decentralisation (with a special secretariat in each). OPIS is thus a unique funding instrument for two main reasons:

• First, it is co-ordinated by two ministries, namely the Ministry of Economy and Finance and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Public Administration and Decentralisation, and the implementation agencies are the General Secretariat of Information Society of the former and the General Secretariat of Public Administration of the latter.

• Second, it adopts a cross-governmental and cross-regional approach that required a significant co-ordination effort during both the design and the implementation phases.

The systematic planning process helped the information society to absorb a higher share of funds than initially imagined (Table 6.2).



Table 6.2. Information society financial planning

EUR millions

Total cost 2 839.1

Public funding 2 269.6

EU funding 1 702.2

ERDF 1 266.0

ESF 436.2

National public funding 567.4

Private funding 569.5

The strategic priorities are is four areas: education and culture, citizens and quality of life, development and employment, and communications. A fifth area is technical assist-ance. The thematic priorities constitute a unique organisational structure that envisaged inter-ministerial thematic co-ordination:

• Education and culture address equipment and training in the educational sector and the enhancement of digital content in an effort to modernise the Greek educational system, and to use new technologies for the promotion of cultural heritage. The ministries involved are Education, Labour and Culture.

• Citizens and quality of life is a critical area for the use of ICT in order to improve public services, which are notoriously inefficient. It includes all public service sectors, including health, transport and the environment. This priority area is primarily a responsibility of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Public Administration, but all levels of public service are included.

• Development and employment addresses the creation of favourable conditions for the transition to the new economy, supporting e-commerce, entrepreneurship, R&D, training and e-learning. The Ministries of National Economy and Development are the main responsible bodies.

• Finally, communications is a topic related to market liberalisation, telecommuni-cations infrastructure in peripheral regions and universal access for citizens. From the administrative point of view, the Ministry of Transport and Communications supervises the area.

Within the context of these broad areas of 21 measures one can distinguish three types, plus three measures addressing technical assistance: two are very big and ambitious (over EUR 350 million), ten have funding between EUR 100 million and EUR 200 mil-lion, and the remaining nine are smaller. The technical assistance measures are designed like all corresponding measures in the CSF.

The initial utilisation of specific governance tools

In hopes of achieving radical change, OPIS agenda setting has used an extensive set of modern tools for the first time in Greece. Unfortunately these tools were poorly adapted to the current institutional set-up.

The consultation process for adoption of the information society strategy involved all the ministries, but there was little preparation and discussion of substance on the influence of technologies over the five-year horizon. Further, adoption of the document at



the Cabinet level did not imbue it with the power originally hoped for. However, the consultation process at least succeeded in achieving broad coverage of all institutional and regulatory aspects in a single document.

The business plan milestones combined with their formal evaluation and a ministerial/regional level consultation process could also have triggered an effective, high-impact implementation process. The extensive public consultation process was an important step to ensure that the process would not become a technocratic exercise but would combine technical skills with public awareness and political responsibility. Although the process was well designed, consultants often failed to deliver the required quality (which they were paid for). Lessons learned from more advanced countries were not exploited in the business plans. Besides, the public consultation that followed the formal presentation of the business plans turned out to be less interactive and value adding than originally hoped.

The idea of co-responsibility proved that two decision-making centres were one too many. While it helped during the first steps it created too many tensions and delays afterwards.

The sound process design thus triggered considerable delays that led to complaints. Figure 6.2 shows how time-consuming the good planning process was, not because a good planning process is necessarily time-consuming but because it risks being so in a system that does not tolerate change. The planning delays led to politically unacceptable absorption delays.4

The lesson to be drawn is that in a notoriously slow and inefficient administration, one can be ambitious and try to change behaviour. Yet, to succeed, it is important to use very tight, hands-on management and decide, from the beginning, when and how to apply sanctions.

Co-ordination of implementation and policy learning

The formal co-ordination structure for implementation

After a political decision was taken to start implementation in order to avoid further delays, the organisational set-up of the CSF was applied, with specific innovations. The formal co-ordination structure involves the following public actors:5

• The CSF Managing Authority, which co-ordinates, guides, gives opinion if necessary and controls projects with financial inflows.

• The Information Society Monitoring Committee, which is broadly repre-sentative of Greek and EU actors and carries responsibility for design and programme strategy.

• The Payments Authority, which provides matching funds and controls the legality of payments decided by the OPIS Managing Authority, which has full financial responsibility and executive power and is responsible for the pro-gramming and evaluation of any action in the OPIS.

The flow of actions and responsibilities is the typical process followed for the entire CSF. So at least financial co-ordination is effective.



A consequence of the multidimensional character of the OPIS was the need for a high level of co-ordination during the implementation phase, both horizontally across different sectoral ministries that manage other sectoral programmes and vertically between OPIS and regional programmes. In neither case were ex ante formal procedures established, because of the fragmented character of the public administration and the lack of formal communication channels in ministries’ middle management. However, it was an impediment for co-ordinating funds to avoid overlaps. Thus hybrid mechanisms had to be invented, while general secretaries in different policy areas often had to expend their personal energies and use their relations in long negotiations with their peers. Therefore, the following instruments were foreseen or imposed in order to improve absorption later on:

• Co-ordination mechanisms proposed during the planning process, notably the Information Society SA and the various observatories and forums.

• Crash and Mini Crash Programmes to cope with the rigid procedures and lack of skills that led to significant delays compared to the rest of the CSF.

By the term implementation is meant the detailed description of the nature, the aims and the content of actions to be financed in the chosen areas and measures of the OPIS, the publication of calls, the evaluation of the proposals and the supervision and acceptance of the final outcome, including the budgetary flows between central managing authorities and final beneficiaries.

The rules for project implementation were clear but rigid and time-consuming. An effort by top politicians to simplify them was unsuccessful. At the same time the lack of incentives for the timely execution of projects resulted in more emphasis on processes rather than on attaining substantial objectives. Needless to say, no sanctions were foreseen for long and unjustified delays. Furthermore, there was a lack of links between funding and institutional policy initiatives. Last but not least, the delays attributed to the long design phase led to very little focus on evaluation and learning in the implementation phase, which is described in detail below.

Role of stakeholders

Awareness raising aimed at greater involvement of a large number of stakeholders as well as society as a whole was among the imperatives of the third CSF. Special funding was provided for technical assistance under the category “Publicity Actions”. In this context, a number of forums and working groups were established to bring together experts and actors specialised in the different areas of action foreseen in OPIS. The E-business Forum is one of the most active in the area of diffusion of ICTs in the business sector, mainly to SMEs. The forum has included representatives from academia and business federations. For the promotion of broadband applications, there is a working group on broadband technologies, mainly as an advisory group to the Managing Authority, which assists in designing actions based on these services. Other groups, more specific in scope, have emerged (Geographic Integrated Systems, Task-Force Hellas Grid, Task-Force on e-accessibility) but they have limited influence.

The main stakeholder that needs to be involved is the business sector, which lags considerably behind the OECD average in terms of investment and performance. The Greek ICT sector is dominated by the telecommunications sub-sector (EITO, 2005), which accounts for 65% of the turnover in this sector and 5.2% of GDP. Per capita expenditure on telecommunication services remains below the EU average (EUR 433 in



2004, based on data from Eurostat, 2005). The telecommunication business consists of about 250 enterprises with general licences, while 48 enterprises have special telecommunications licences. Mobile telephony is by far the most competent of the ICTs. The four providers share a market that serves more than 80% of the Greek population, and competition is relatively strong with a market almost equally shared among the three providers with the longest history in the sector. As far as third-generation mobile telephony is concerned, three licences have been granted. Because the telecommunications sector and mobile telephony are market-led, policy intervention is limited to regulation and companies from this segment are not very interested in shaping policy.

Information technology’s share of GDP is low, and annual per capita expenditure on information technologies in 2004 was about EUR 149. On the supply side, the Greek information technology market is still, with few exemptions, driven by ad hoc participation in international projects and public procurement. There are very few non-SMEs and none plays an international role, the biggest expand only into the Balkan market. A temporary dynamic performance, which spilled over from international developments and Greek stock market conditions, ended after the financial crisis of 2000. The dominant activity of the sector is commercial (imports of hardware), which is responsible for 40% of the sector’s turnover, while the market for software and other information technology services is relatively limited.

The sector is represented by the Federation of Hellenic Information Technology and Communications Enterprises (SEPE) and the Association of Information Technology Companies of Northern Greece (SEPVE). The structure of the sector explains why the interests expressed by the federations are limited to interventions to increase and speed up the implementation of support schemes. While they are invited to participate in monitoring committees and various forums their interest is almost exclusively funding, not investing resources to create a coherent strategy to promote the sector. In general public-private consultation and partnership mainly involve formalities rather than in-depth prioritisation consistent with the real needs of the market and the society. The business sector as user exerts even less influence. The programme envisages sensitising SMEs and microfirms to Internet-related technologies and applications; this type of company does not have collective representation.

The academic community plays a crucial role both formally and informally, the latter because of the role of academics in politics and the administration.6 Formally, universities are involved in project implementation, R&D funding and consulting processes (in the context of technical assistance) at both the national and the regional levels. University teams play an isolated role and do not express the common interests of the academic sector. Academics as individual experts are often found in implementation committees, defining new projects and opening up new areas, but with some confusion about the limits of their role.

The effort to involve the broader community through open consultations has not shown any sign of significantly increased participation. Actions have focused on publications (leaflets, brochures, etc.), limited Web surveys and press announcements, but there is no evidence on the success of these efforts. At the regional level, the participation of the social actors has varied.



Horizontal co-ordination

Implementation of OPIS was very demanding in terms of co-ordination owing to its multi-sectoral character and the involvement of a large number of policy centres, which felt that as either intermediaries or final beneficiaries they should have a right to interfere in the decision process. The boundaries between stakeholder involvement and decision authority blurred and neither role was clear or well performed. Implementation was under the joint political responsibility of the Ministry of the Economy and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Public Administration and Decentralisation, the executive power was in the hands of the OPIS Managing Authority, and the overwhelming majority of measures were applied in areas under the responsibility of more than one ministries (see Annex 6.A). Therefore, during implementation, the actions announced had first of all to be consistent with the overall policy objectives of each ministry. For this reason bilateral negotiations and agreements were needed at the level of general secretaries. Each of the ministries mentioned under “responsible actors” intervened, sometimes only technically, sometimes trying to influence broader choices and more often than not the timeframe was not respected and the necessary quality standards were not met. However, the horizontal co-ordinators were all understaffed compared to the needs of the endeavour.

Many of the benefiting ministries manage their own sectoral programmes, which led to complementary information society actions in addition to the information society projects planned together with the horizontal co-ordinator. While this was beyond the original aim of co-ordination, it was inevitable: specific needs arose that could be solved with information society solutions or a specific demand was expressed. As a result, internal funding was used for activities which theoretically should have come under the horizontal co-ordination. In a rough estimate by the Secretariat in 2003, the amount of funds that were found ex post to be dealing with the information society without being included in the original planning process added about 50% to the original budget. The horizontal co-ordinator had no role for them, so co-ordination was clearly limited to form and not essence.

Moreover, the recognition that the sectoral managing authorities had better expertise on specialised issues, as in health and education, led to the direct involvement of their managing authorities in elaborating calls and guidelines in the areas of culture and trans-port. In many cases the OPIS Managing Authority dedicated its own human resources to prepare calls and to supervise the implementation of actions with assistance from by external consultants.

An instrument initially proposed to help overall co-ordination of the implementation of OPIS was the creation of the Information Society S.A. It was designed to operate as a repository of knowledge regarding design, implementation and evaluation of information society projects and as an executive agency capable of undertaking project design and implementation. Its success is, however, questionable, owing to a slow start, problems in defining its mission and problems of co-operation with the hard core of the public administration. The milestones of its business plan described above were not met.

The implementation of large infrastructure projects, mainly the modernisation of the public sector and the transport infrastructure, is a special case. Responsibility for their implementation is allocated to the relevant government or public agency. However, less horizontal co-ordination is needed because of the large number of agencies and services involved. This form of co-ordination is quite difficult in Greece, since there are no established processes or mechanisms for communication in middle-level public admini-stration. While these activities were expected to be easier to accomplish, they are among



the most delayed. Internal co-ordination in the competent ministries was not more efficient than horizontal co-ordination.

As in the past, certain actors who were in a position to promote their own projects did so, while others were left behind. However, an overall impetus has been given, which is reflected in the opportunity for more active actors to submit specific pilots. For instance, there is a pilot project of one municipality (Voula) that tries to address the many layers of government. The municipality has to be linked and receive input and standards from the public administration in terms of forms, guidelines and standards. At the same time, the mayor supervises municipal services (operating and accountable at the local level, such as municipal libraries, polls, local social services) or national services operating locally (tax service, police, health, public education) but also offers access to information and other services to the local constituencies (professionals, shops, clubs and associations). The need to design a local system that meets (currently emerging) national standards and financial instruments, and at the same time covers local needs and enhances public awareness and participation, is a multi-level task, that is not easy to design and imple-ment. The pilot took place ahead of a big, very ambitious, much delayed similar project, aimed at modernising the whole of the public sector.

Education and skills represent a particularly challenging and complicated case, in which horizontal co-ordination was limited to bilateral agreements on individual programmes despite an effort to put everything under the same umbrella. The Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs was among the first to use EU regional development resources in the early 1990s. The development of network infrastructures in tertiary and secondary education is one such initiative. In terms of curriculum development, the introduction of technology-oriented courses in secondary education was a large step towards increasing the computer literacy of Greek youth. Moreover, the ministry tried to respond to the market pull with the creation of new university departments on informatics and telecommunications. With an established long-term strategy, experience on information society policies and a precise action plan, the Ministry of Education had better response during the co-ordination of actions in the context of OPIS and the best absorption rates for dedicated funds.

When the third CSF started, there were marked weaknesses in primary schools, and less so in secondary schools, but the university system was well endowed not only with computers but also with high-speed Internet access. The target was to achieve computeri-sation and 100% access plus implementation of a massive programme of training (of teachers and pupils) plus the infrastructure for e-learning (mainly in institutions of higher education). A major problem for the purchase of equipment was the central tendering process, which was systematically opposed by the excluded bidders, who delayed the process. A decision was taken to decentralise the public procurement process and schools now tender individually. Although there is the issue of the potential economies of a central call for tenders compared to smaller decentralised calls, the efficiency of the new process gains in speed. In this trade-off between speed and cost, the decision to increase efficiency at higher cost seems absolutely reasonable, even brave, after all these years of stagnation. An additional benefit of this decision also facilitates local economic support. At the same time a programme of massive training for 75 000 primary and secondary school teachers was prepared for 2002-03, which included the use of information technology in the learning process. A good balance has been achieved as there is a special measure addressing content and educational tools. E-learning and digital software are the major targets of this measure. School equipment had the highest absorption and it was on this criterion that the effort was considered a major success. However, a variety of critical



leaps forward that could have been made through co-ordination were conceived but not implemented: the idea to use school computer labs in the afternoon for teleworking, community learning or other purposes did not materialise because joint use would require joint cost carrying and responsibilities and this could not be resolved technically.

R&D development presents a similar case. The key policy actor is the General Secretariat of Research and Technology (GSRT), which plays an active role in the promotion of research in ICTs and has several programmes that promote the diffusion of new technologies in the business sector. The GSRT has also undertaken two initiatives to promote e-learning and implementation of information systems in Greek SMEs under the general title e-business. Except for ensuring that there was no duplication of funding, there was no co-ordination between the GSRT and the corresponding secretariats in the Ministries of Education or Industry.

This means that, overall, in the implementation phase, broader horizontal co-ordination was degraded into a bilateral agreement between the benefiting agency and the co-ordinator to ensure that spending corresponded to the funds earmarked. There were no bilateral or multilateral discussions on content and its potential amendment. Only in the context of the mid-term review of the programme were all actors gathered together, but again in a formal meeting to make sure that funding would not be lost owing to the delays.

While these were the constraints at the national level, the problem had an additional dimension, notably regarding the funding earmarked by the regional authorities. The funds themselves were limited but the co-ordination even more complicated:

Articulation between the national and the regional level

In the third CSF the issue of direct co-operation and co-ordination between the central sectoral Managing Authority and regional authorities was raised for the first time. During the CSF planning phase, regions were instructed to include electronic applications in their respective regional operational programmes (for which they had sole responsibility). All regions had to respect these central guidelines and earmark part of their limited regional funds for information society applications, to be determined by a local SWOT analysis. Quality assurance and co-ordination for the implementation of these plans were entrusted to the OPIS Secretariat and Managing Authority.

Until the current programming period, three types of information society policies followed by the Greek regions can be distinguished:

• EU-induced policies. The only regions that made an attempt to adopt a policy framework were those receiving specific grants from the EU. The region of Central Macedonia was the only one with a thorough regional plan for the information society.

• Project-based developments. In some regions research or other groups under-took specific projects, reacting to ad hoc opportunities rather than as part of a regional strategy. The common denominator in these regions is one or two key programmes and smaller projects at the initiative of specific teams. These projects attracted national or EU funding, created skills, and promoted awareness raising in certain populations but were not part of a regional strategy.



• National follower strategies. Some regions made no attempt at either the individual or the collective level. They followed the guidelines and adaptations through launches of national calls (digitisation of libraries, computers in schools, adoption of e-government initiatives imposed by the centre, etc.), when pre-scribed by the national authorities under the second CSF and thus received a small share of the national funds for projects decided by the national ministries.

The divergences are considerable. In this context the sectoral and regional distribution of funds during implementation was a major challenge. The market mechanism drives resources towards income-generating activities and market failure helps to increase rather than eliminate the digital divide. In addition government failure is very likely to occur, since regional administrations lack the skills that would allow them to plan and implement effectively technologies they do not master. The Greek national authorities had to make major strategic choices, and this resulted in a mixed approach: the centre decided on the platforms and launched calls for common elements to avoid duplication of efforts and broader calls were then launched, which included both national and regional funding to serve local needs. The quality of the regional business plans proved utterly insufficient to support this phase and new consultants had to be hired.

A special measure (2.4) was used to mobilise regional actors and to create new ICTs, and there was a generalised measure for regional geographical information systems (GIS) and innovative actions. For these two targets, funds had to be distributed to seven areas: education, culture and tourism, public governance and information, health, environment, transport and SMEs. The selection of the areas was based on eEurope, which also gave the directions for the regional business plans. The national authorities finally promised matching funds of EUR 7 million (approximately EUR 1 million for each action under measure 2.4) per region (independently of the size or maturity of the region), while the rest were to be provided by the OPIS.

Since the basic guidelines had been set, the next step was the prioritisation and specification of the actions according to regional needs and co-ordination so as to proceed to the publication of calls. In order to overcome or to avoid delays, the Special Secretariat for the Information Society decided to adopt a more flexible and effective co-ordination process between OPIS and the regional managing authorities and undertook the following actions.

It set up a Co-ordination and Consulting Committee (SESY) in each of the 13 Greek regions. Their main task was to act as an informal intermediary between regional and national managing authorities, increase awareness and thus the participation of regional actors, as well as to provide advice to both sides on issues related to regional information society actions and on actions with strong regional orientation (e.g. broadband networks).

The second step was the co-ordination of regional and regionally distributed national funds in the context of the Mini-Crash 2003 programme. The main aim of this pro-gramme was to speed up the adoption of information society programmes and projects, as well as to eliminate double or over- or under-funding of certain regional actions. For the elaboration of this programme the co-operation of the following actors was necessary: the regional managing authorities, which elaborate and submit requests to the OPIS Managing Authority regarding their proposals, the OPIS Managing Authority, which assesses the regional proposals, and finally the SESYs, in their advisory function.



The co-ordination process revealed that despite the efforts to have well-defined regional information society strategies and raise interest among regional actors through the regional information society business plans, there were significant variations in terms of maturity among the 13 regions. While not unexpected, this caused significant difficulties and delays in reaching a final agreement on distribution of funding and actions; these were finally overcome with some pressure and commitments at the level of the general secretaries, since much of the effort was based on the general government commitment to promote regional information society actions.

After lengthy discussions and agreements with all directly and indirectly involved managing authorities in April 2003, the Minister of the Economy, in agreement with the regional secretaries, approved the Information Society Mini-Crash 2003, which was then formally launched. The concrete results of the co-ordination and planning process are summarised in Table 6.3.

Table 6.3. Public financing (OPIS and ROPs) per region and per area of action

Education Culture E-Gov’t Health GIS* SMEs** Total

Eastern Macedonia and Thrace 1 200 000 1 450 000 4 150 000 2 000 000 2 400 000 2 125 000 13 325 000

Attica 1 000 000 2 800 000 1 900 000 0 1 300 000 4 000 000 11 000 000

North Aegean 1 430 000 1 800 000 3 570 000 1 700 000 1 500 000 1 000 000 11 000 000

Western Greece 1 430 000 1 560 000 2 520 000 1 096 000 1 104 000 3 280 000 10 990 000

Western Macedonia 1 310 000 690 000 4 204 400 665 000 4 000 000 1 000 000 11 869 400

Ionian Islands 940 000 3 630 000 3 270 000 780 000 400 000 900 000 9 920 000

Ipeiros 2 200 000 1 500 000 1 900 000 1 500 000 2 500 000 2 500 000 12 100 000

Central Macedonia 1 400 000 800 000 7 400 000 0 400 000 5 900 000 15 900 000

Crete 1 400 000 800 000 4 200 000 1 000 000 3 000 000 1 200 000 11 600 000

South Aegean 4 450 000 1 850 000 4 100 000 2 200 000 2 200 000 1 700 000 16 500 000

Peloponnese 1 600 000 1 300 000 3 350 000 1 450 000 300 000 3 000 000 11 000 000

Continental Greece 2 000 000 1 718 500 2 750 000 1 200 000 1 583 000 1 748 500 11 000 000

Thessaly 1 500 000 1 000 000 1 000 000 1 300 000 3 400 000 3 730 000 11 930 000

TOTAL 21 860 000 20 898 500 44 314 400 14 891 000 24 087 000 32 083 500 158 134 400

* This category finally included applications of GIS in transport and environment so the two areas were merged.

** In the actions concerning SMEs there is provision for additional private funding according to the De minimis rule.

The implementation of the programme raised the need for a second round of co-ordination actions, this time to increase interest among potential beneficiaries and financing organisations, as well as to avoid duplication of support work. The OPIS Managing Authority assigned this role to the SESYs, while centrally arranging aware-ness-raising activities for all regions. Initially, it was planned to publish calls only for regions with the necessary level of maturity. At first, education was the only area of action characterised as nationally mature. However, the scheme was abandoned as further delays were detected in the implementation process and all areas followed suit, with the necessary technical support from the centre.



Another important aspect which the managing authorities tried to address was the exploitation of economies of scale in implementation by promoting horizontal actions where necessary. These actions included the development of integrated Internet platforms and software for regional projects with common elements or rationale. This model was applied for culture, tourism, e-government and GIS applications.

The initial target was mobilisation (publication of calls) for all actions foreseen in the Information Society Mini-Crash 2003 by the end of 2003. This target proved to be quite ambitious. The implementation process achieved a publication of calls for 44.5% of the Mini-Crash by the end of 2003; 52% from OPIS, and 38% from regional programmes. The speed of mobilisation varies significantly among regions as well as among actions. The main reason is the lack of experience, the rigorous decision making between centre and regions, the difficulties in co-ordination between ministries, and the trade-off between speed and exploitation of economies of scale and scope for the implementation of certain actions.

In terms of policy learning one may suggest that while the regional level matters enormously for the creation of external economies, the lack of economic and governance maturity can become prohibitive in terms of the effectiveness of regional planning. To support the regions, national authorities need to take the political decision to make a special effort to mobilise limited resources. In terms of immediate opportunity costs, this creates administrative bottlenecks, but it is likely to pay off in the longer term. The current provisions and institutional set-up hamper rapid implementation, even when political agreement has been reached. Effective external support (in the form of SESYs or otherwise) is necessary. The more skilled the people involved and the more informal their role, the better the result.

Conclusion

Information society and innovation policy

Designing a catching-up information society strategy in Greece became particularly urgent and difficult as the digital divide increased. Innovation governance was inefficient and all efforts to modernise were hampered by an inefficient administration, lack of co-ordination and reluctant stakeholders. Since innovation policy was not particularly successful and because of the urgency of the matter for the information society, it was decided to create an autonomous structure totally distinct from innovation governance.

Innovation and information society policies were placed under different ministries without established links or provisions for horizontal co-ordination between them. The information society policy agenda makes no direct reference to the needs of the national innovation system and its priorities were inspired mainly by the EU information society action plans (eEurope 2002 and 2005) rather than by an internal policy debate. The two policies meet only on the implementation level as a few actions financed by OPIS are directly related to the objectives of the Ministry of Development and are implemented by its secretariat.7 At this level there is only a form of financial co-ordination between the two managing authorities.



The connection of the two policies has been formally asserted for the first time in a discussion document produced and published by the General Secretariat of Research and Technology (GSRT, 2003). The aim of the document was to form the basis for the elaboration of the national strategy in view of the Barcelona and Lisbon targets, describing the roles of all actors whose actions can facilitate the promotion of a “knowledge-based economy”, and making a direct proposal for the establishment of a horizontal co-ordination mechanism among sectoral policies. However, the follow-up of the document was practically nil, since there was no response by stakeholders to the GSRT’s call for discussion. The overall policy context is not expected to change until the next programming period.

The lack of horizontal co-ordination, the absence of modern governance structures in the public sector, and the low level of skills in the public administration means that the actors involved in the promotion of modern policies need to re-invent themselves and establish ad hoc structures and mechanisms in order to be effective.

Lessons from information society governance in Greece

Public policy for the enhancement of the information society in Greece has a long but not particularly successful history, which is co-determined by the low competitiveness of the economy and a traditional, not particularly effective, governance structure. The initial steps were introduced late, compared to the rest of the EU, policies were fragmented, focus was on hardware investment without emphasis on utilisation, and the first attempt at co-ordination only took place in 1995 with an encompassing strategy document; however, there was no systematic follow-up and the document influenced design at the individual project level only.

A market drive and European regional funding instruments have gradually exercised some pressure to use modern techniques and improve co-ordination both at the design and implementation stages. With political backing and hard work (in view of the design of the 2000-06 development policy), a unique preparation process adapted to the Greek circumstances was started: stepwise consultation, mandatory business plans, evaluation tools and the provision for transnational policy learning were initiated and systematically pursued. This ambitious top-down, modern approach was seen as an effort that could be a model, which, if successful, could trigger change into the development tools of the country.

However, good policy design faltered owing to the informal rules of Greek governance: hardly any of the actors involved responded to the challenge and complied with the quality required to make a change. Ministries and regional authorities lacked both skills and vision. Stakeholders called for consultation either had no strategies or chose to fight for their short-term interests, consultants involved in the process prepared less imaginative and documented reports than originally hoped for, local authorities did not have the skills to exercise any influence. Moreover, all these actors, feeling vulnerable because of their own weaknesses, were reluctant to co-operate and preferred the security of their individual realms. Co-ordination encountered suspicion, sometimes even hostility. There were no enforcement tools designed for the planning period. But as sanctions for low quality were not foreseen and time constraints were the real bottleneck (because the EU regional development funds would be lost if not used on time), a political decision was taken to abandon the ambitious new model and hasten imple-mentation to save the funding.



Hence, in the implementation phase, good governance and high ambitions ran out of steam. New actors, created to respond to the modern governance approach, replicated the traditional attitudes of the public sector. Delays could not be made up for, possibly because the political backing was not strong enough to overcome resistance, and there was neither a single, undisputed decision-making centre nor clear cross-ministerial authorities. The boundaries between stakeholder involvement and the decision authority blurred and neither role was clear or well performed. Management, implementation and assessment (the three pillars) were never really integrated. So, while individual projects succeeded in the implementation phase, the same had been true in the past, before the good planning process.

The Greek case raises some crucial questions: does a good but failed planning process leave the system better or worse off than no good planning process? Does learning occur and pave the way for better future governance or does an isolated, excellent experiment lead to the conclusion that such endeavours should be avoided? What would be necessary to allow the good start to achieve better tangible results at the end of the process?

The answers to these questions are difficult and cannot be generalised since good practices applied elsewhere did not lead to the same good results. Possibly a good process is one that makes the system move as fast as it can afford to; if faster it can create more harm than good. The crucial issue is whether or not an ambitious design is able to transform the internal potential, increasing the system’s responsiveness to modern needs. Changing the potential may be translated into changing the culture in the public governance system. The case of the information society showed that the political vision failed to diffuse throughout the political system. Thus, human capital considerations also need to be taken into account. Better skills and a deeper knowledge of the policy objectives, along with the establishment of enforcement mechanisms, could increase the commitment of the actors involved in the policy making process to achieve better results.

Besides, political determination for change needs time and support all the way, in particular through the difficult phases of resistance to change. In order to change governance structures and make a difference in the long term, it is important to decide from the very beginning how long politicians are prepared to wait for results. They will not be immediate, as the Greek experience clearly shows. Quality should be given priority over absorption. Redesign at each stage is important and has to accompany learning and co-evolution. Otherwise the system slides back to its informal rules.

The lesson learned from this ambitious experiment is that design of the information society took a first-mover’s risk and that the Greek system did not tolerate change. One swallow did not make a summer. But learning by doing is an arduous process. The next swallow will (hopefully) have an easier task.



Annex 6.A

The operational programme for the information society

“Information society” Operational programme

Policy actors Budget (EUR)

1. Education and culture 421 033 333

1.1 Network and educational equipment for all educational levels Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs 119 000 000

1.2 Introduction of new technology applications in education Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs 182 158 519

1.3 Documentation and promotion of Greek culture Ministry of Culture 119 874 814

2. Services for citizens and improvement of the quality of life 879 324 000

2.1 “E-government” for citizens: business plans, studies Ministry of Interior, Public Administration and Decentralisation

40 869 406

2.2 “E-government” for citizens Ministry of Interior, Public Administration and Decentralisation

362 000 000

2.3 Management support for the structural funds Ministry of Interior, Public Administration and Decentralisation

Ministry of Economy and Finance

60 000 000

2.4 Regional geographical information systems (GIS) and innovative actions Ministry of Interior, Public Administration and Decentralisation

Ministry of Environment, Urban Planning and Public Works

112 925 801

2.5 Training for public administration employees, modernisation support studies

Ministry of Interior, Public Administration and Decentralisation

96 000 000

2.6 Information and communication technologies (ICTs) for health and care Ministry of Health and Social Solidarity 107 402 054

2.7 Training and structural measures for health and care Ministry of Health and Social Solidarity 9 257 333

2.8 “Smart” transports Ministry of Transport and Communications Ministry of Mercantile Marine

Ministry of Environment, Urban Planning and Public Works

90 869 406

2.9 Data infrastructure and information technology for a modern cadastre Ministry of Environment, Urban Planning and Public Works

3. Development and employment 901 700 000

3.1 Development of a propitious “digital” environment for economic activity Ministry of Development Ministry of Tourism

Ministry of Agriculture Development and Food

97 347 028

3.2 Support of enterprises in order to enter the “digital economy” Ministry of Development Ministry of Agriculture Development and

Food

403 509 149

3.3 Research and technological development for information society Ministry of Development 81 347 028

3.4 Human resources skill upgrade Ministry of Employment and Social Security Ministry of Development

Ministry of Culture

186 281 731

3.5 Promotion of employment in information society Ministry of Employment and Social Security 133 215 064



The operational programme for the information society (continued)

“Information society” Operational programme

Policy actors Budget (EUR)

4. Communications 569 233 333

4.1 Development of mechanisms for the implementation of the institutional framework and the competitiveness enforcement

Ministry of Transport and Communications National Telecommunications and Post

Commission

193 477 623

4.2 Development of local access networks infrastructure Ministry of Transport and Communication – General Secretariat of Communications

153 866 664

4.3 Advanced telecommunication services for citizens Ministry of Transport and Communications 128 419 639

4.4 Development and modernization of post infrastructure Ministry of Transport and Communication Greek Postal Services

85 869 406

4.5 Human resources training in communications Ministry of Transport and Communication 7 600 000

5. Technical assistance 67 787 728

5.1 Management, implementation ad monitoring 25 333 333

5.2 Technical assistance ESF 21 742 399

5.3 Technical assistance ERDF 20 711 996

Total 2 839 078 394

Notes

1. GDP per capita under 75% of the EU average.

2. At that stage the subsidiarity principle had not been adopted, and the Commission played a more hands-on role.

3. eEurope is the EU initiative to enhance the information society in Europe, using an open method of co-ordination through benchmarking in ten main areas of action: European youth into the digital age, faster Internet for researchers/students, awareness raising, participation in the knowledge-based economy, government on line, health on line, European digital content, working in the knowledge-based economy, accelerating e-commerce, cheaper faster Internet, secure networks and smart cards, intelligent transport systems and infrastructure.

4. The third CSF rules stipulate that delays in funding of more than two years compared to their original plan are lost.

5. See also Tsipouri and Papadakou (2005), section 4.4.

6. All secretaries and many political appointments in the various agencies mentioned above were people who were directly or indirectly employed in universities before/after their involvement in information society governance.

7. Measures under area 3, see Annex 6.A.



References

European Information Technology Observatory (EITO) (2005), ICT Markets 2005.

Eurostat (2005), Structural Indicators, http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int.

GSRT (2003), “Towards a Knowledge-Based Economy: Prospects and Roles”, discussion document, Ministry of Development, General Secretariat for Research and Technology, November.

Tsipouri, L. and M. Papadakou (2005), “Profiling and Assessing Innovation Governance in Greece: Do Increased Funding and the Modernization of Governance Co-evolve?”, in OECD (2005), Governance of Innovation Systems, Volume 2: Case Studies in Innovation Policy, OECD, Paris.

Papakonstantinou, G. (2004) “Innovation in Greece, the Information Society Case”, 5th MONIT Workshop, “Innovation Governance: Towards a Synthesis”, Athens, 4-5 October.Working Group on the Information Society (1999), “Regional Development Plan on Information Society”, discussion document (in Greek), May.

TOWARDS THE INFORMATION SOCIETY: THE CASE OF SWEDEN – 169


Chapter 7

TOWARDS THE INFORMATION SOCIETY: THE CASE OF SWEDEN

Kristina Larsen, Patrik Sandgren and Jennie Granat-Thorslund VINNOVA

Sweden has had an explicit information technology (IT) policy for about 40 years. The development of Swedish IT policy has been closely connected to the search for internal efficiency in the public sector, as well as the promotion of innovation and economic development. Responsibility for the implementation of IT policy is currently divided among several actors, including a nationally appointed strategy group. This wide distribution of responsibility has resulted in insufficient horizontal co-ordination and sub-optimisation, as much of the real co-ordination of IT policy has taken place through informal networks. To achieve better co-ordination of Swedish IT policy, there is a need for more incentives for actors as well as a clearer demand for active co-ordination from the government level. Another important feature of better co-ordination would be the establishment of a common language, as current semantic differences have proven to be an obstacle.

Introduction

This chapter focuses on co-ordination in the sector of information technology (IT) and how IT policy is co-ordinated in Sweden. It is based upon a case study and the object has been to use this study in order to search for critical issues in horizontal co-ordination.

The case study is based on interviews within the government administration, interviews at the Swedish Agency for Innovation Systems (VINNOVA) and written material. Of particular interest is a recently completed evaluation of the Swedish IT policy.

IT and IT policy

IT policy making is to a large extent about the use of IT, and rules and regulations related to usage. Although IT policy is a recognised policy area in Sweden, there is no clear definition of what the area includes or excludes. There is also an ongoing discussion concerning whether IT policy is a policy area in its own right, or simply a limited issue embedded in various other areas. However, this chapter is based on the assumption that it is possible to define Swedish IT policy in terms of a policy area with certain processes, actors and objectives.

170 – TOWARDS THE INFORMATION SOCIETY: THE CASE OF SWEDEN


The Swedish government, when defining the policy area, uses the terminology “IT” and “the IT sector”. In this chapter the term IT is used in a broad sense and IT policy includes both policy regarding the use of IT in the public administration (internal IT policy) as well as IT policy directed towards society as a whole (external IT policy).

The policy processes monitored in this chapter mainly focus on policy ambitions and decisions at the government level, although they involve all implementation levels.

The following discussion first provides a short historical background on IT policy in Sweden before turning to an overview of current actors and policy entrepreneurs within the Swedish IT policy system. Some examples of policy making are then presented, followed by an evaluation of the IT policy. Next, co-ordination within Swedish IT policy is described, and the link between IT policy and innovation policy is explored. A final section summarises the results.

IT policy from a historical perspective

Swedish IT policy 1963-941

The beginning of a Swedish IT policy can be roughly dated to 1963 when the first government bill on computers was presented. The bill, signed by the Minister of Finance, suggested that machinery for automatic data processing should be introduced to help on national registration and work on taxation and accounting of direct taxes.

According to the bill, computer technology was extraordinarily well suited for rationalising office work because of its ability to execute long chains of processes. Other typical characteristics of this technology were that it was fast, safe and involved no more than an insignificant risk of miscalculation and other errors, often referred to as “the human factor”.

The bill also addressed an important technological controversy concerning the choice of computer system for county administrations. Two options existed: the international market leader IBM or the Swedish-owned DataSaab. The computers developed by the Swedish company were considered to be of substantial value from a policy perspective. To settle the controversy, the government decided to build parallel infrastructures using both systems.

1963: Bill addressing internal IT policy (Prop. 1963:85)

1985: Computer policy (Prop. 1984/85:220)

1994: Education and research (Prop. 1993/94:177)

1996: Measures to broaden and develop the utilization of IT (Prop. 1995/96:125)

1998: Public administration in the service of the citizens (Prop. 1997/98:136)

2000: An information society for all (Prop. 1999/2000:86)

2001: Research and renewal (Prop. 2000/2001:3)

2002: R&D within the innovation system (Prop. 2001/02:2)

2003: Law on electronic communication (Prop. 2002/03:110)

2005: Bill on IT to be released summer 2005



In the 1960s, there was a political consensus about the ambition to modernise society by utilising computers. Computerisation was seen as a general value-enhancing tool. In 1969 a new organisation for the national register and taxation system and county computer centres was suggested and established.

During the 1970s and 1980s, Swedish IT policy shifted focus to some extent, as attention turned to matters of industrial policy (innovation policy) and how public authorities should handle the growing information loads.2 At the same time the risks of IT surveillance also became a matter of political concern. Especially during the 1970s, as personal registers were digitised, public discussion centred around the issue of privacy. The debate faded in the 1980s as the fear of “big brother” seemed to have been exaggerated. Instead, the innovation policy issue of fostering a domestic electronic industry became an important issue along with an initiative to computerise schools.

In the middle of the 1980s, a new government bill presented an overall vision of IT in the near future based mainly on software (machine code) and integrated and merged into everything (ubiquitous computing). This foreseen development renewed concerns about privacy. In addition plans to support the development of a domestic microelectronic and IT industry drew a great deal of attention.

Since the beginning of the 1990s, Swedish IT policy has been very much influenced by the international IT agenda, mainly the American National Information Infrastructure initiative (NII) and the European “Bangemann Report”.3 This has also affected public debate.

The Swedish IT policy 1994-2004

In 1994, a new phase of Swedish IT policy began as the Swedish government appointed a national IT Commission to review the new information and communication technology (ICT). The commission was organised in accordance with a network approach that connected experts and important stakeholders with relevance to IT. The prime minister chaired and co-ordinated the work.

The IT Commission developed scenarios that showed how Sweden could become a leading “information society”, primarily in seven areas: education, the legal system, public administration, health care, communications networks, manufacturing, trade and IT research. The IT Commission had a substantial impact on Swedish discussion of IT policy. Two similar IT commissions followed in the wake of the first, but were not chaired by the prime minister. This substantially reduced their impact.4 Some 30 different committees dealt with IT policy during the period 1994-2003, and the IT commissions published nearly 130 documents.5

An IT policy bill6 with proposals on how to broaden and develop the utilisation of information technology in most areas of public life was delivered to the Swedish parliament in spring 1996. Three years later, work began on a new IT bill entitled ”An Information Society for All”.7 The bill dealt with several different policy areas and how IT policy was to relate to them. It was submitted to the Swedish parliament in March 2000 and opened the door to a new IT policy approach in Sweden.

The bill was influenced by the mood of the time. During the IT boom, conditions were exceptionally good in Sweden, but there was a gap between what happened in the market and the issues on the policy agenda. There was also an ongoing (critical) discussion about which issues could be seen as a public responsibility and which could be left to the market to solve, as well as a general discussion about the need for broadband



connectivity. In order to solve the dispute – in particular the issue of public financing of a national broadband infrastructure in Sweden – several government investigations were initiated.8

The boom of the period was followed by an economic recession during the second half of 2001. This resulted in a free fall for the Swedish IT sector and layoffs of nearly 12 000 employees by the Swedish IT firm Ericsson. This change in the economy had a strong impact on external demand for policy actions and forced a rapid change of focus. The result was a mix of long-term strategic policy actions and short-term quick fixes, so called “rescue actions”.

Among others, VINNOVA, the Swedish Agency for Innovation Systems, was commissioned to investigate the situation and propose a strategy. The agency chose to present an ambitious EUR 380 million rescue plan for the Swedish IT sector called “VinniTel”.9 However, because of a general lack of public money, the government chose only to implement a minor part of the plan and allocated about EUR 9 million for the “rescue plan”.

The failure to implement VinniTel is a good indicator of Sweden’s post-boom political environment. The global economic recession that followed the downturn in the IT sector erased much of the enthusiasm for IT among policy makers. In the aftermath of the bursting of the “dotcom bubble” several visionary initiatives were either postponed or abandoned. IT was no longer the obvious solution in search of a problem.

In spite of the backlash, a few long-term projects remained. For instance, two national technology foresight exercises were carried out in order to trace the technology tracks of the future. IT and the application of IT played an essential part in these exercises.10

Institutional mapping of institutions and actors

Organisation of Swedish IT policy

The organisation of the Swedish administration with regard to different phases of the policy processes is briefly described below. There are three different layers of power, each with its own political and administrative organisation. There are also regional and local administrations, with a high degree of self-government. The only possibility for centralised management at these levels is by legislation or financial means. The different levels of responsibility are:11

• Parliament decides on legislation and bills, evaluates government work in dif-ferent policy areas and commissions the government to do research on selected topics.

• The government prepares proposals, is responsible for producing bills com-missioned by the parliament, commissions studies on selected topics, formulates goals, gives commissions to government agencies and formulates instructions for government agencies.

• Government agencies are constituted by non-politically appointed civil servants and implement policy decisions taken by the ministries or the parliament.

• County councils are governed by elected clerks, have the main responsibility for medical services and have their own budgets based on income taxes and state funding.



• Municipalities are governed by elected clerks, are responsible for delivering various services at the local level and have (like the county councils) their own budgets based on income taxes and state funding.

IT policy actors

The government

In accordance with bill 1999/2000:86, “An Information Society for All”, the Ministry of Industry, Employment and Communication (MIEC) is responsible for co-ordination of general issues within IT policy. However, IT issues that directly concern specific areas such as health care, environment, education, defence, government administration, etc., are handled by separate ministries and their national agencies. IT policy in government administration and agencies is for instance the responsibility of the Ministry of Finance while the Ministry of Education and Science handles scientific development in Sweden. This includes responsibility for such things as computerisation of public schools and R&D investments in IT. Another example is the Ministry of Defence, which invests a substantial amount of money in the development of IT surveillance systems and appli-cations.

A rather large amount of IT policy work is performed by agencies and other actors on behalf of the government. This is especially the case in the agenda-setting phase (the process of choosing the issues to be included on the agenda) and the evaluation phase of the policy process.

Government agencies

Agency responsibilities are regulated at different levels. There is a general description of the long-term agency mission. These assignments are presented in special letters with directives that are revised annually (by the government). Agencies with long-term missions relevant to IT policies are the Swedish Agency for Public Management (Stats-kontoret) and the Swedish National Post and Telecom Agency (PTS), but VINNOVA, ITPS, ISA and NUTEK also play important roles.

The Swedish Agency for Public Management12 provides support to the government and government offices. One of its tasks is to modernise the public administration with the use of IT. The Ministry of Finance is responsible for the agency and the policy, which may be described as internal IT policy.

A number of agencies under the Ministry of Industry, Employment and Communi-cations have duties in the IT field:

• Invest in Sweden Agency (ISA)13 is the government agency assisting and informing foreign investors about business opportunities in Sweden. It provides tailor-made information and relevant contacts for setting up a business in Sweden. ISA has been a strong promoter of the Swedish IT sector and has, among other things, mapped the Swedish IT clusters and published several reports about the current status of the Swedish IT sector.

• The National Post and Telecom Agency (PTS)14 is the supervisory authority for electronic communications, and carries out several tasks in the IT field.



• The Swedish Business Development Agency (NUTEK)15 has the task of pro-moting sustainable growth nationwide by providing funding, information and guidance. Among other things NUTEK provides support for IT implementation in small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).

• The Swedish Institute for Growth Policy Studies (ITPS)16 is responsible for policy intelligence, evaluations and IT statistics. The institute conducts policy intelligence studies to help policymakers develop viable growth policies and was recently commissioned by the government to publish a comprehensive evaluation of Swedish IT policy (also available in English).

• The Swedish Agency for Innovation System17, VINNOVA, integrates research and development in technology, transport and working life. VINNOVA’s mission is to promote sustainable growth by financing R&D and developing effective innovation systems. Some 30% of VINNOVA’s total funding is allocated to IT-related projects.

Special committees

In June 2003 the Delegation on Public E-services for the development of electronic services in the public sector was formed. The task of the delegation is to create a base for increased co-operation between the state, county councils and municipalities regarding electronic services. Another ambition is to establish new methods of collaboration among the three parties.18

In addition, a strategy group was established in the summer of 2003.19 It belongs organisationally to the government offices. A decision has also been taken to establish an e-agency with the task to work on standardisation and norms for information exchange between public agencies.

Industrial research institutes and universities

Industrial research institutes and universities influence policy making in the sense that they provide information, conduct research and take an active role in Sweden’s IT policy debate. ACREO, St. Anna, SICS, SITI, Framkom and the Viktoria Institute are all examples of industrial institutes with a clear focus on IT. Representatives from uni-versities with an IT focus are frequently invited to take part in hearings and investigations in the policy area.

Foundations and research councils

A number of foundations and research councils fund IT-related R&D. Some of the most influential are: the Knowledge Foundation, the Swedish Foundation for Strategic Research, the Swedish Research Council and the Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation. The foundations have considerable freedom and can, by directing funding, both facilitate and hinder the implementation of government policy.

Other organisations with an influence on policy making

The Federation of County Councils and Swedish Association of Local Authorities20 has the task of co-ordinating and representing the member organisations in discussions with the government. The organisation has been given the responsibility to follow IT development from a regional and local perspective.



The Association of Swedish Engineering Industries21 has some 3 000 member companies, and includes many of Sweden’s IT companies. The objective of the association is to reinforce its member companies’ international competitiveness and long-term profitability, for instance by conducting R&D and business intelligence.

The Association of IT enterprises22 is an industry organisation specific to the IT sector and serves as a forum and lobbyist. The association promotes greater use of IT in Sweden and provides support for the development of individual member companies by promoting business opportunities, removing barriers and providing member services. This is mainly done by influencing decision makers and those that mould public opinion.

The Royal Swedish Academy of Engineering Sciences (IVA)23 is an independent arena for the exchange of knowledge. By initiating and stimulating contacts between experts from different disciplines and countries, IVA promotes cross-fertilisation between industry, academia, public administration and various interest groups in order to generate new ideas and knowledge. IVA is divided into twelve divisions, which hold regular meetings and organise their own special activities. Division XII focuses on IT.

The Swedish Association of Graduate Engineers (CF) protects the interests of its members in three different ways: as a professional association, in labour negotiations and as an advisory body to its members. As the major union for employees in the IT sector, CF has an important role in setting the Swedish IT agenda. CF influences the debate through direct contacts with decision makers in trade and industry and society in general (lobbyist). The association is also a recognised official reference body.

IT companies

Large Swedish IT companies influence policy making more directly than the industry associations. Government clerks regularly meet with representatives from these companies. Occasionally industry representatives are invited to take part in work groups, but many times they approach the government clerks in order to discuss pressing issues.

Media

Newspapers and other media channels are extremely receptive to news about IT, largely because of the economic importance of Ericsson. There are currently a handful of newspapers, such as Computer Sweden and Ny Teknik, with a particular focus on the IT sector, and most of the big influential newspapers, such as Svenska Dagbladet and Dagens Industri, have special sections devoted to the development of the IT sector.24

Informal personal networks

Sweden is a small country with a limited number of persons active in different parts of the IT sector and the policy system. A general observation is that Sweden has something of a tradition to limit and control the number of representatives and organisations that tend to be invited into policy-relevant discussions. Representatives of these organised interests often know each other and are frequently part of strong networks of influence (Öberg, 1997; Rothstein, 1999; SOU, 1999:121; Hall and Löfgren, 2004).

The persons in the networks are often called “policy entrepreneurs”25 and they influence the system by aggressively marketing their “pet ideas” (favourite solutions). Their strength lies in their ability to “soften up” policies and make issues attractive to policy makers.



The policy entrepreneurs whose “pet idea” is IT have made (and still make) a substantial difference to Swedish IT policy. They work by providing and confirming all sorts of information through various informal networks on all policy levels. Even if these networks can distribute information efficiently, they might be an obstacle when it comes to introducing new persons and ideas into influential policy spheres. The degree of path dependency and private agendas in these networks is, in other words, quite high.

Strategy and evaluation of IT policy

The IT policy strategy group26

As noted above, an IT policy strategy group was established in the summer of 2003, and during the first year it created four internal teams that focus on education and learning, health care, growth and availability and trust. Compared to the IT Commission27 the IT policy strategy group is more tightly bound by government instructions. In some ways the IT Commission was more of a lobby organisation with a high degree of freedom and its own independent agenda. The IT policy strategy group has, in a broad sense, two aims:

• To improve co-ordination – this includes improving co-ordination within IT policy and trying out new work models.

• To generate opinion and create a debate about the future of IT – this includes conveying to the public that IT can be a catalyst for innovation and growth.

The group is expected to contribute a holistic perspective and formulate goals that can be evaluated. Another issue is to raise awareness of the need for IT statistics in order to follow and evaluate development in different policy sectors. Its task also includes:

• Dialogues with state secretaries. The strategy group is to keep state secretaries in different ministries continuously informed about IT projects and activities.

• Establishment of an inter-ministerial group. The strategy group, together with the Minister for Infrastructure, brings together political advisors from different ministries. The aim is to create an active forum with participants/delegates from all ministries so that national IT policy can be co-ordinated.

• Contribution to co-ordination within the public sector by assisting the Commission for Public E-services achieve smooth co-operation among government authorities, local authorities and other parts of the public sector.

Since a new national IT bill will be presented in 2005, the main issue for the IT policy strategy group in the short run is to collect and present proposals and recommendations that can be used as input in the formulation of the new bill. All IT policy projects, related actions and information released by the group will be available on a Web site. A collection of examples will also be used to highlight and stimulate the diffusion of “best practice”.

Evaluation of Swedish IT policy

An evaluation of Swedish IT policy 2001-03 was commissioned by the Swedish government and completed in November 2003.28 The evaluation, conducted by ITPS (the Swedish Institute for Growth Policy Studies), had several purposes: to help prioritise the different areas of IT policy; to help clarify boundaries of responsibilities among the actors



in the IT sector;29 and to contribute to government management principles (management by rules, management by result), as well as principles of financing, evaluation and control. The evaluation is of interest both because of the content and because it provides an example of policy co-ordination.

Methodology and co-ordination of work

Even though the evaluation was conducted by consultants, the process involved several representatives from ministries and government agencies. There were also reference groups with participants from the government, agencies and experts as well as several hearings with stakeholders. In all, 13 thematic reports were commissioned and submitted30 and these reports (in addition to the hearings and discussions) formed the basis for the main report.

Recommendations from the evaluation

According to the ITPS evaluation, horizontal communication and co-ordination between political areas and activities is insufficient in Sweden on all political levels. As a result, the work on how IT can be of support in specific policy areas has been delayed and involuntarily limited to a few aspects of the policy spectrum. The lack of incentives for co-ordination has in other words probably considerably slowed the implementation of IT policy.

The main results concern the requirements for a future IT policy that can be used to prioritise policy areas. These requirements focus on general aspects; they include for instance the notion that a new IT policy should have a long-term perspective, centre on strategic problem areas in society, be durable and consistent (i.e. a learning policy) and focus on users, rather than producers.

References to innovation and innovation policy are basically of two kinds. First, IT is considered an important instrument to achieve the renewal of trade and industry, and second, IT is seen as a force to release resources that can increase core activities in the public sector. Innovation policy has in other words, according to the evaluation, a direct connection to IT policy.

There are limited recommendations on government principles and boundaries of responsibilities. In general, a horizontal policy is needed in order to: avoid sub-optimisation, create synergy effects and obtain a holistic picture of IT and its effects on society. The evaluation makes it clear that each policy area has full responsibility to implement IT. The suggestion is therefore to give concerned ministries an assignment to draw up a strategy for ways in which activities should be designed in order to take full advantage of the potential of IT. These strategies are then to be revised every two years. A prerequisite is that the objectives should be formulated in a way that enables evalu-ation.

The recommendations from the evaluation have so far been used within the admini-stration as input in discussions about policy formulation, and concerned ministries and government agencies have been invited to react to the evaluation.



Co-ordination within the IT policy area

Mechanisms for horizontal co-ordination

Government work in Sweden is carried out both within the government and within the more or less independent government agencies. The result of this division of labour is a need for co-ordination at several levels.

Co-ordination among policy areas is often labelled horizontal co-ordination. This type of co-ordination involves both high-level co-ordination (members of government) and co-ordination among agencies. Horizontal co-ordination can also relate to different stages of the policy process: agenda setting, prioritisation, learning and adapting to change, and policy implementation. In particular the early stages (agenda setting and prioritisation) require good co-ordination.

The Swedish government model involves extensive use of investigations, studies, bills, hearings and focus-group discussions at different levels of the public administration. This provides the opportunity to gain approval for actions and suggestions, and it is an efficient way of gathering information and developing knowledge. Second, it provides arenas in which the different actors and stakeholders meet. Representatives from organi-sations and agencies get the same messages and contributions to their frames of references and meet to discuss common issues. Such co-ordination activities provide information especially for the processes of prioritisation, but they are also a way of preparing for the implementation phase of the policy process.

Another mechanism for co-ordination is a yearly survey by the Ministry of Finance. Among other things, suggestions of formulations to be used to govern the agencies are proposed and distributed for opinions within the government. These formulations can facilitate the process of writing yearly directives to government agencies and are a tool to facilitate coherence and co-ordination in policy implementation.

In addition temporary working groups and committees are set up by different ministries and can be used for co-ordination although this may not be their main purpose. The groups can have assignments related to all stages of the policy process, although agenda setting and implementation are probably the most frequent. The IT policy strategy group is a good example (see the discussion above).

High-level co-ordination

High-level co-ordination in Sweden is in this context defined as co-ordination between ministers, and concerns first and foremost agenda setting. Co-ordination between ministers is influenced and complicated by the fact that it involves the distribution of financial resources. In reality this means that co-ordination per se is seldom an option, if there are no clear incentives, such as the potential loss of control over resources. Co-ordination within the government is crucial to all parts of the policy process, although agenda setting and adjustments of the agenda are the most time-consuming.

Co-ordination among government clerks is facilitated by a formal system called “delning” (sharing), which invites all concerned divisions (in different ministries) to give their opinion or to provide information on specific issues. In IT policy, this is a well-functioning mechanism as long as financial issues can be resolved. Implementation of IT policy has a tendency to involve large investments and extensive consumption of resources, a problem when resources are scarce.



In 1999, a structured attempt was made to create ministerial co-ordination of IT policy. A number of ministers/state secretaries were to meet regularly to discuss IT policy. The attempt failed since the group only met infrequently and was never very active. There may be several reasons, but one critical factor was the lack of incentives to achieve functional co-ordination. It is worth stressing that this initiative was taken during a period when IT was on everyone’s agenda. The issue was therefore prioritised, but not the co-ordination of actions. According to interviews with a stakeholder who took part in the initiative, the failure can partly be explained by the fact that co-ordination between ministers must be supported (or demanded) by the prime minister in order to be effective.

Co-ordination between government agencies

Co-ordination between government agencies mostly involves agenda setting, but there seems to be a need to put more effort into co-ordination of the implementation of IT policy.

The Swedish government structure, with its far-reaching decentralisation and freestanding agencies, delegates responsibility and implementation efficiently but offers few possibilities for formal co-ordination on different levels. There are no, or very few, incentives to co-ordinate government agencies today. This has been pointed out as one of the factors that have slowed implementation of IT policy.

The possibility to have an impact on policy making and to add questions to the agenda is considered a strong incentive for government agencies to co-ordinate with other actors (i.e. not other agencies). Note for instance that, when it comes to voluntary co-ordination and “partnership”, interest groups and lobby organisations seem to be more frequent partners than government agencies. From a governance perspective, it would be useful if such co-ordination and liaison took place between government agencies.

Critical issues related to co-ordination

Even if the system works well in a general sense, some serious flaws can still be identified. For instance, the ITPS evaluation of IT policy shows that insufficient co-ordination has negatively affected the implementation of IT policy. With improved co-ordination, more actions could have been implemented. To make this co-ordination possible there is a need for better incentives to co-ordinate.

The wish to introduce the 24/7 Agency (e-governance) has, according to some concerned stakeholders, suffered from the fact that responsibility for implementation is delegated to the authorities but not co-ordinated by the government. More specifically, there has not been sufficient pressure from the government level, and there is a lack of incentives to co-operate in developing the needed information systems. One effect of this is the risk of insufficient compatibility and usability between systems.

There are also indications that it has become more difficult to co-ordinate IT policy. In 1999, when the IT bill “An information society for all” was produced, IT was still on everyone’s agenda and it was quite easy to motivate several ministries to contribute to the process. Since realisation of IT policy nowadays includes both high costs and large investments, few ministries are willing to be involved. Having an explicit overall strategy with common visions and responsibilities might however both reduce the risk of conflict and facilitate a creative dialogue.



Concluding remarks

The overall impression from interviews and discussions with policy makers is a strong awareness of the difficult balance between co-ordination and sector responsibility. On the one hand, the Ministry of Industry, Employment and Communication has no formal authority to co-ordinate IT policy except for issues that are not part of a specific ministry’s responsibility. On the other hand, the IT policy strategy group (commissioned by the MIEC) has declared that it will focus on finding ways to facilitate co-ordination both inside and outside the government and the agencies. In addition, the Minister for Communication and Regional Policy has the ambition to systematically meet ministers to discuss IT questions (within their areas of responsibility). There are, in fact several signs of more horizontalisation in the current IT policy.

It may be important to stress that not all issues are to be co-ordinated. The goal is that every minister should take full responsibility for IT issues within his or her ministry. The MIEC must therefore also be careful in its co-ordination attempts and focus on issues that are not the responsibility of a single ministry.

Links between IT policy and innovation policy

IT policy and innovation policy have some common denominators: their horizontal character (they embrace several policy areas), the need for engagement from several ministers, and the need for co-ordination. This is also why it is interesting to study and compare these two policy areas from a structural perspective. Another implication of these similarities is that several policy activities can be looked upon both as a part of IT policy and as a part of innovation policy. Many policy initiatives that are relevant as examples of connections between the two policy areas would actually be presented as IT policy by IT policy makers and as innovation policy by innovation policy makers. One example is the so-called “Employee Computer Reform” (“Personaldatorreformen”) which started in 1998.

The case of Employee Computer Reform

The Employee Computer Reform was originally based on a proposal from the IT Commission. Constructed as a tax deduction scheme, the objective was simply to achieve an increase in the Swedish population’s computer literacy by making personal computers available at low cost. From a democratic point of view, this was a clear action in the field of IT policy, with the mission to counteract the unequal distribution of access to IT.31

Computer literacy also has a bearing on innovation policy. The number of personal computers is frequently used as an indicator of innovation in the European Commission’s “European Innovation Scoreboard” (EIS) (European Commission, 2003). The EIS measures the percentage of households with Internet access since use of IT is considered an important driver of economic renewal and growth. As the Employee Computer Reform has increased the number of computers, it has also increased the share of the population with Internet access. In other words, the initiative can also be motivated from an innovation policy perspective.

The Employee Computer Reform is not unique in its characteristics and provides a good example of the many connections between IT and innovation policy



The case of MIEC and VINNOVA

At MIEC, government clerks with responsibility for IT policy and those responsible for innovation policy belong to the same department.32 However, until now there seem to have been few common tasks between clerks working with IT policy and clerks working with innovation policy. Though they share the heading of department, they respond to different state secretaries. As a result, they seem to learn very little from each other’s work. The difference in state secretary is one explanation for the weak connections between these two groups; another is the relatively slim government organisation.33 Despite potential benefits, there seems to be very little time to make use of the other’s work and search for synergies.

Much of the responsibility for co-ordinating the two policy fields has been placed on VINNOVA. VINNOVA works with R&D funding and commercialisation from an innovation systems perspective but also has the task to co-ordinate activities and actors within the national innovation system. VINNOVA’s funding is currently organised according to 18 growth areas. Growth areas with relevance to IT policy are e-services in the public administration,34 IT in home health care, telecom systems, micro- and nanoelectronics, and software products.35

These growth areas have been analysed from an innovation system perspective and are a foundation for programmes of action addressing the whole innovation system. Several of VINNOVA’s programmes focus on IT development and usage. This provides opportunities to integrate innovation policy and IT policy.

Synergies and conflicts between IT policy and innovation policy

Both IT policy and innovation policy have roots in industrial policy and research policy. Today IT policy in Sweden does not primarily focus on innovation aspects, but on general issues such as infrastructure, information and network security, e-inclusion and competence. However, public investments in the IT sector can still more or less be associated with innovation policy.

The strength of the relation between the two policy areas (innovation policy and IT policy) has varied over time. In the late 1990s, Swedish innovation policy focused strongly on the IT sector. More recently, IT has become of much wider interest and complexity, including societal aspects such as democracy, equality and freedom. The current innovation policy is, therefore, only concerned with a few aspects of IT policy.

There seems to be no obvious conflict between innovation policy and IT policy, but the temporal perspective of the two policy areas differs. Innovation policy is described as more long-term than IT policy. Another interesting difference is the surrounding rhetoric. Innovation policy is considered as surrounded by rhetoric, while IT policy is seen as being based on facts. The terminology used in innovation policy is sometimes perceived as unnecessarily complex and ambiguous. These semantic differences are obstacles to integration between innovation policy and other policy areas.

Take IT policy. A common feature of the debate about IT in Sweden is the futuristic, visionary nature of the language used in the media as well as in official documents and proposals.36 IT is frequently described as a revolutionary technology that will shape the future. In the world of tomorrow, it is IT that has solved today’s challenges.



This optimistic view of IT policy can be compared to the rhetoric in documents con-cerning innovation policy. Concepts such as “innovation systems” and “clusters” are seen by some policy makers as diffuse and fuzzy, while innovation-related labels such as “mission-oriented research” are looked upon with suspicion (in comparison with “curiosity-driven scientific research”). While IT policy can be materialised in backbones and fibre optics, it is a lot more difficult to find quantitative indicators for innovation policy in the short run.

Concluding remarks

While a national evaluation has been conducted in the area of IT policy, where both stated improvements and goals have been critically analysed and examined, no such thing exist in the area of innovation policy. When it comes to innovation policy, evaluations are primarily conducted at the agency level. In the long run, this might hamper the learning mechanisms at the national level, since important knowledge may be prevented from achieving wider distribution and an impact on national policy. The two policy areas are still kept separated and lessons from IT policy are not transmitted to the innovation policy field on a systematic basis. From a policy perspective, this is an obstacle to integration between innovation policy and other policy.

In Swedish innovation strategy, IT is treated as one of several focus areas. IT is important for innovation, but an innovation perspective can also spur IT. When it comes to IT policy, policy makers need to be aware of the fact that the innovation system perspective is a good analytical framework in the search for weaknesses and obstacles. The use of the innovation systems perspective within IT policy could radically catalyse the discovery of important new aspects and possibilities.

Conclusions

Coherence in policy making

Effectiveness

As operational decisions in Sweden are taken at a comparatively low organisational level, there is a general need for a broader and better understanding of policy issues. Decisions that require understanding and awareness from more than one political agenda, which is the case when trying to achieve synergies between innovation policy and IT policy, can be a serious source of conflict. In order to avoid such problems, the need for co-ordinated information is high.

Efficiency

The current decentralised Swedish model can be considered as quite efficient in individual sectors, at least when it comes to agenda setting and implementation. However, decentralisation requires awareness and knowledge of the political agendas on many levels. A question to be raised is whether the system is able to handle changes in these various agendas efficiently. This is likely to depend very much on the specific policy maker and the culture in which he or she operates. This makes the system vulnerable as it might create serious delays in the ability to take united action.



The ITPS evaluation of Swedish IT policy proposes prioritising horizontal policy making. The main reasons are to avoid sub-optimisation, create synergies and facilitate keeping or developing a holistic view of IT among both politicians and citizens. How-ever, to succeed, it is considered necessary to formalise responsibilities for integrating and make use of IT in other policy areas within ministries.

Critical issues in horizontal co-ordination

Incentives for co-ordination are crucial at all stages of the policy process. Rather than altruistic reasons (such as a desire “to do what is good for Sweden”), the overall incentive for co-ordination often related to possibilities of obtaining more resources and having substantial impact.

Obstacles to and facilitators of co-ordination are of different kinds at different organisational levels, depending on the level of freedom to act. Formal demands for co-ordination have a certain importance on all policy levels, but are considered a rather weak means of creating smooth co-ordination. Informal communication and personal contacts are crucial to co-ordination, but they are not enough. To have an impact a real commitment is needed at the highest policy levels, preferably from the prime minister. It can be somewhat of a pedagogical challenge to show why co-ordination has the ability to create a win-win situation.

Another critical issue is the existence of organisational barriers. Barriers to co-ordination between innovation policy and IT policy in Sweden have, to some extent, been eliminated in the sense that government clerks who are currently responsible for these policy areas work in the same administrative department. This can facilitate co-ordination, but the fact that different state secretaries are responsible for the two policy areas keeps them apart. Except for “delning” (sharing), co-ordination at the ministry level depends significantly on the enthusiasm of the head of department and the involved government clerks. Some attempts to increase co-ordination within ministries have been detected, but they are at this point not strong enough.

There is also a difference in time perspective. Innovation policy is considered to have a longer time perspective than IT policy, partly owing to its systems approach. (This might sometimes be used as an excuse not to co-ordinate.) To be able to co-ordinate policy actions, an overall strategy with a common timeframe may be of crucial importance.

Another important obstacle to co-ordination is rhetorical barriers between the policy areas of IT policy and innovation policy. Innovation policy is considered abstract and surrounded by relatively inaccessible theoretical concepts. In a slim organisation such as the government, this can be a major obstacle when trying to take advantage of the other’s work and policy initiatives. Accessible concepts and a common language are crucial to co-ordination as well as to communication. Semantic differences must be taken seriously as they can prevent mutual learning and the search for synergies.



Notes

1. Contribution partly by Erik Hörnell. The section is based on Johansson (2004).

2. The discussion was influenced by futuristic visions presented in Japan and France which focused on the consequences of a more technological society, and how structures and relations would be altered as a result of new computers (Hall and Löfgren, 2004).

3. The central theme of the reports was that better communication networks would give people access to valuable information, a prerequisite for economic growth and prosperity.

4. For more information on the IT Commission and an analysis of IT policy focus during this period, see Santesson-Wilson (2003) (in Swedish).

5. There were also a number of committees with regional responsibility for IT policy (Hall and Löfgren, 2004).

6. “Åtgärder för att bredda och utveckla användningen av informationsteknik” (Prop. 1995/96:125).

7. “Ett informationssamhälle för alla” (Prop. 1999/2000:86).

8. The first committee report, “Broadband for Nationwide Growth” was presented 1999. Several investi-gations and evaluations have been carried out since and a new one has recently been commissioned to the National Post and Telecom Agency (PTS).

9. “VinniTel” was originally initiated by the county administrative board of Stockholm under the title: “Development programme for the IT/telecom sector viewed in the light of the given notice from Ericsson” “(Utvecklingsprogram för IT/Telekomsektorn mot bakgrund av Ericsson-varsel”) (Ericsson, 2002).

10. The first project was implemented during 1998-2001 under the responsibility of the Royal Swedish Academy of Engineering Sciences (IVA), the Swedish National Board for Industrial and Technical Development (NUTEK) (now superseded by VINNOVA), the Swedish Foundation for Strategic Research and the Federation of Swedish Industries and had an overall budget of some EUR 3.7 million. The second project was implemented during 2003-04, and was partly an update of the first technology foresight project with an overall budget of some EUR 1.5 million. Both projects were conducted in close co-operation with the government, companies, public agencies and other interested parties. For more information, see Teknisk framsyn (2004).

11. Based on the ITPS report, “IT-politikens ansvarsfördelning och styrning”.

12. Statskontoret, “Vad är 24-timmarsmyndigheten?” www.24-timmarsmyndigheten.se/DynPage.aspx?id=901&mn1=453 Regeringskansliet, “Förvaltningsutveckling”, www.regeringen.se/sb/d/2005

13. ISA: www.isa.se

14. PTS: www.pts.se

15. NUTEK: www.nutek.se

16. PTS: www.itps.se

17. VINNOVA: www.vinnova.se



18. Regeringskansliet, “Exempel på statliga samordningsinitiativ på IT-området” www.regeringen.se/sb/d/2373/a/16358

19. Regeringskansliet “IT-politisk strategigrupp”, www.regeringen.se/sb/d/2495

20. Svenska Kommun och Landstingsförbundet, www.lf.svekom.se

21. Teknikföretagen: www.teknikforetagen.se

22. Svenska IT-företagens organisation: www.itforetagen.se

23. IVA: www.iva.se

24. Computer Sweden: www.idg.se/cs Dagens industri: www.di.se Ny Teknik: www.nyteknik.se Svenska Dagbladet: www.svd.se

25. Kingdon (1984) defines policy entrepreneurs as “people willing to invest resources in return for future policies in their favour”.

26. Regeringskansliet, “Regeringens IT-politiska strategigrupp”, status report, June 2004. Official Web site: www.regeringen.se/sb/d/2495/m/wai

27. For information about the IT Commission, see IT-kommissionen, “Välkommen till IT-kommissionen”, www.itkommissionen.se/index-2.html

28. ITPS, “En lärande IT-politik för tillväxt och välfärd” (A Learning ICT Policy for Growth and Welfare”, ITPS final report on its assignment of evaluating Swedish ICT policy), www.itps.se/pdf/A2003_015_en.pdf

29. This concerns for example the magnitude/level and focus of public (state) engagement and the distribution of responsibility between government, government agencies and between county councils and the state.

30. The reports are not available in English. ITPS, “Underlag till IT –utvärdering”, www.itps.se/publikationer/Publ_IT_utvardering.htm

31. Of 4.3 million Swedish households, nearly 1.6 million have taken advantage of the offer. This can also be seen in the statistics showing the increase in the number of personal computers per capita in Sweden. In 2003, more than 80% of the Swedish population had access to a computer at home (SIKA, 2004).

32. The Ministry for Research and Education is responsible for the Swedish research policy, which is related to innovation policy. Communication and co-ordination between the MIEC and the Ministry for Research and Education is an important issue, but is not discussed in this chapter.

33. The Swedish model is based on small ministries and, in terms of employees, larger agencies.

34. The Director General of VINNOVA is part of the government group that treats these questions.

35. For more information see www.vinnova.se

36. For example: “A Future IT Infrastructure for Sweden”, “An Information Society for All” and “Information Technology – Wings to Human Ability”. [Swedish titles: “Informationsteknologin – Vingar åt människans förmåga” (SOU 1994:18); “Framtidssäker IT-infrastruktur för Sverige” (SOU 1999:134); “Ett informationssamhälle för alla” (Prop. 1999/2000:86)].

For more information and further reports, see the IT Commission’s official Web page: www.itkommissionen.se.



References

Government bills (Propositions)

1963: Computer bill addressing internal IT policy (Proposition 1963:85)

1985: Computer policy (Proposition 1984/85:220)

1994: Education and research (1993/94:177)

1996: Measures to broaden and develop the utilisation of IT (Prop. 1995/96:125)

1998: Public administration in the service of the citizens (Prop 1997/98:136)

2000: An information society for all (Prop. 1999/2000:86)

2001: Research and renewal (Prop. 2000/2001:3).

2002: R&D within the innovation system (Prop. 2001/02:2)

2003: Law on electronic communication (prop. 2002/03:110).

Interviews

We have conducted interviews with three senior clerks at the Ministry for Industry, Employment and Communication, and two at VINNOVA.

General references

Ericsson, P. et al. (2002), “VinniTel”, VINNOVA, Stockholm.

European Commission, European Scoreboard of Innovation 2003, http://trendchart.cordis.lu/scoreboard2003/index.html

Hall, P. and K. Löfgren (2004), “The Rise and Decline of a Visionary Policy: An Analysis of Swedish ICT Policy”, unpublished paper, Malmö University, School of Technology and Society.

ITPS, “A Learning ICT Policy for Growth and Welfare”, www.itps.se/pdf/A2003_015_en.pdf

ITPS, “IT-politikens ansvarsfördelning och styrning”, www.itps.se/publikationer/Publ_IT_utvardering.htm

ITPS, “Underlag till IT-utvärdering”, www.itps.se/publikationer/Publ_IT_utvardering.htm

Johansson, M., “Smart, Fast and Beautiful: On Rhetoric of Technology and Computing Discourse in Sweden, 1955-1995”, www.ep.liu.se/diss/arts_science/1997/164/index.html

Kingdon, J. (1984), Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies, Little Brown, Boston.



Rergeringskansliet, “Ett informationssamhälle för alla – en skrift om svensk IT- politik”, www.regeringen.se/sb/d/257/a/2204

Regeringskansliet, “Exempel på statliga samordningsinitiativ på IT-området”, www.regeringen.se/sb/d/2373/a/16358

Regeringskansliet, “Forskning”, www.regeringen.se/sb/d/2470

Regeringskansliet, “Förvaltningsutveckling”, www.regeringen.se/sb/d/2005

Regeringskansliet, “Informationssamhället”, www.regeringen.se/sb/d/2373

Regeringskansliet, “IT-politisk strategigrupp”, www.regeringen.se/sb/d/2495

Regeringskansliet, “Mål”, www.regeringen.se/sb/d/1468/a/14570

Regeringskansliet, “Plan of Activities”, www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/01/64/03/ead0730c.pdf

Regeringskansliet, “Regeringens IT-politiska strategigrupp”, status report, June 2004

Rothstein, B. (1999), Den korporativa staten, Norstedts, Stockholm.

Santesson-Wilson, P. (2003), Studier i symbolpolitik, Lund.

SIKA (2004), Facts about ICT in Sweden 2004, SIKA, Stockholm.

Statskontoret, “Vad är 24-timmarsmyndigheten?” www.24-timmarsmyndigheten.se/DynPage.aspx?id=901&mn1=453

SOU, Bredband för tillväxt i hela landet (SOU 1999:85)

SOU, ”Avkorporatisering och Lobbyism”, (SOU 1999:121)

Teknisk framsyn, “Teknisk framsyn för Sverige”, www.tekniskframsyn.nu

Öberg, P.O. (1997), “Medborgarnas inflytande och särintressenas makt”, Uppsala University.

Agencies, institutes and organisations homepages

The Association of Swedish Engineering Industries: www.teknikforetagen.se

The Association of IT Enterprises: www.itforetagen.se

The IT commission: www.itkommissionen.se

The Institute for Growth Policy: www.itps.se

The Invest in Sweden Agency: www.isa.se

The National Post and Telecom Agency: www.pts.se

The Swedish Agency for Innovation Systems: www.vinnova.se

The Swedish Association of Graduate Engineers: www.cf.se

The Swedish Business Development Agency: www.nutek.se

The Royal Swedish Academy of Engineering Sciences: www.iva.se

The Swedish Association of Local Authorities (SALA) and the Federation of Swedish County Councils (FCC): www.lf.svekom.se



Newspaper homepages

Computer Sweden: www.idg.se/cs

Dagens Industri: www.di.se

Ny Teknik: www.nyteknik.se

Svenska Dagbladet: www.svd.se

189


Part 2

GOVERNANCE IN SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

POLICY INTEGRATION: THE CASE OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN FINLAND – 191


Chapter 8

POLICY INTEGRATION: THE CASE OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN FINLAND

Mari Hjelt, Sanna Ahvenharju, Mikko Halonen and Mikko Syrjänen

This chapter describes a study of Finnish sustainable development that took place in two stages. First a broad review of the national sustainable development strategy was per-formed, and several sectoral policy domains were analysed to identify processes for integrating – or discussing the integration of – sustainable development issues in sectoral policies. The second stage consisted of three case studies with a strong environmental policy focus as a way to analyse the interaction of innovation policy and sustainable development policy. In both stages, a similar framework was used to describe policy processes related to agenda setting, design and implementation of policy measures and policy learning.

In spite of the challenges for expanding science and technology policy to a broader innovation policy, such broadening is necessary from the sustainable development point of view. The biggest challenges are at the level of agenda setting. There is a need to strengthen mechanisms for setting priorities and for anticipating and handling conflicts. There is also a need to increase the participation of different stakeholders in the priority setting processes. Special attention should be paid to long-term foresight work to explore future opportunities. At the level of design and implementation, such expansion requires new types of policy measures. To produce them, the knowledge base and the multi-disciplinarity of innovation policy actors should be increased. Innovation policy needs to design and test new types of actions. Generally, the roles of policy learning and policy advice will increase. In this area the study revealed relatively few strong and formal co-ordination and co-operation efforts. There is a need to strengthen critical, evaluative, objective, forward-looking and cross-cutting policy-oriented research that addresses sustainable development themes.

Introduction

The term sustainable development has entered common language to describe a general guiding principle for promoting societal development without increasing the environmental burden.1 To achieve sustainable development requires a holistic, future-oriented approach to development, taking into account the interdependence of various environmental, economic and societal issues. However, despite the broad definition and the aim to integrate all three pillars of sustainable development into policy discussion, policy interaction and integration remain a major challenge. For example, in the environ-mental policy domain, often seen as spearheading the sustainable development debate, the focus is still largely on the ecological dimension.

192 – POLICY INTEGRATION: THE CASE OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN FINLAND


This chapter focuses on the sustainable development challenge from the innovation policy perspective. The key challenge is that both innovation policy and sustainable development policy concepts are dynamic and continuously evolving. In Finland, inno-vation policy has largely been defined as science and technology (S&T) policy. However, the definition has moved beyond “pure” S&T issues towards a more holistic concept.2 In sustainable development policy, there has been for a decade an emphasis on the broadening of the traditional environmental/ecological focus to incorporate societal and economic dimensions in a more balanced manner. However, it is hard to identify a clear sustainable development policy domain.3 In Finland, sustainable development policy is viewed in terms of environmental policy and related policy processes. Thus, this chapter mainly focuses on interactions between two recognised sectoral policy domains – S&T policy and environmental policy. However, to develop initial guidelines for expanding innovation policy to take account of sustainable development, the present study aimed to analyse the evolution and status of sustainable development policy, evaluating both whether such a policy domain can be identified and in what directions it is likely to develop in the future.

The Finnish sustainable development study took place in two stages. First a broad review of the national sustainable development strategy was performed, and several sectoral policy domains were analysed to identify processes for integrating – or discussing the integration of – sustainable development issues in sectoral policies. The second stage consisted of three case studies with a strong environmental policy focus as a way to analyse the interaction of innovation policy and sustainable development policy.4 In both stages, a similar methodology was used to describe policy processes (see below).

This chapter first presents an overview of the definitions and scope of the study and a description of the methodology used to describe the policy processes. Next, the development and status of sustainable development policy in Finland are summarised, followed by a presentation of the main observations and analysis results. The chapter ends with the main conclusions and recommendations.

The Finnish case study methodology

Overview of policy domains, their integration and other definitions

The overall aim of the MONIT work is to analyse needs for and future directions of innovation policy. It is widely recognised that there is a move from traditionally narrow S&T policy towards a broader concept of innovation policy, covering “all public initiatives regarding science, education, research, technological development, industrial modernisation, overlapping also with industrial, environmental, labour and social policies” (Edler et al., 2003). New directions are clearly needed, and one driver behind the need to broaden the scope of innovation policy is that today’s “innovations”, no longer focused on purely technological innovations, also encompass the broader context of organisational, institutional, design-related or any other significant changes that provide added value to users. Although this broader concept is not new, it is time to take it concretely into account to reshape national S&T policy.5

The challenge for studying the status and role of the interaction between sustainable development and innovation policy is that both policy domains are evolving in a com-plex, dynamic environment. Figure 8.1 illustrates the position of the different policy domains of interest for studying sustainable development. First, sustainable development and innovation policies are largely horizontal issues that are not necessarily clearly



defined policy domains. Second, the case studies focus on two sectoral policy domains, S&T and environmental policy, both of which are traditionally vertically organised.

Figure 8.1. Horizontal and vertical dimensions of different policy domains

Source: Adapted from Ruud and Larsen (2004).

For this study, four main interactions were of primary interest:

• First, processes related to the formulation of horizontal sustainable development policy (existence of a horizontal sustainable development policy).

• Second, whether horizontal innovation policy encompassing sustainable develop-ment principles exists (existence of horizontal innovation policy).

• Third, how horizontal sustainable development or environmental principles are taken into account in the S&T policy domain (absorption of horizontal principles within a sectoral domain).

• Fourth, existing policy processes aimed at increasing the interaction between S&T and environmental policies (horizontal interaction among sectoral policies).

There are several complementary approaches to analysing these interactions. First, the role of innovation – both technologies and other sources of change – in providing solutions to the sustainable development challenges can be analysed. For example, one might examine the role of technologies in providing solutions to climate change challenges or the negative role of new innovations in increasing energy demand. R&D processes in companies and research institutes have been the subject of several studies aimed at understanding the processes needed to find such solutions. Second, the drivers of these innovations can be analysed in order to understand the role of different policy measures in innovation. For example, energy taxation has a big role in creating new markets for technologies that do not affect climate. Third, the means taken by innovation policy – S&T policy – to solve sustainable development challenges can be analysed. For example, one might look at the extent to which technology policy makers have participated in the drafting of the national climate change strategy. For all three areas much research material is available (e.g. Technopolis, 2004; Boekholt, 2002; Hilden et al., 2002; Markusson, 2001; Loikkanen and Hongisto, 2000). MONIT has particularly focused on the third research area, studying interaction, horizontal co-ordination and

Innovation policy

Science and technology policy Environmental policy

Sustainable development

policy

Horizontal dimension Governmental responsibility for sustainable development

Verticaldimension Verticaldimension



governance between separate policy domains (see Figure 8.2) and this focus is also adopted here.

Figure 8.2. Overview of innovations, sustainable development challenges, policy measures and policy domains

In examining different horizontal interactions, evaluation criteria have to be defined. The MONIT work is generally concerned with developing practices and mechanisms that ensure coherence, defined as referring to horizontal, vertical and temporal coherence. Horizontal coherence ensures that individual – or sectoral – policies complement and build on each other, minimising inconsistencies such as (seemingly) conflicting goals. Vertical coherence ensures that public outputs are consistent with the original intentions of policy makers. Temporal coherence ensures that today’s policies continue to be effective in the future by limiting potential incoherence and providing guidance for change. This concept of coherence is close to the concept of policy integration which requires that “all significant consequences of policy decisions are recognised as decision premises, where policy options are evaluated on the basis of the effects on some aggregate measures of utility, and where the different policy elements are in accordance with each other” (Underdal, 1980). A special case of this general principle is the requirement of environmental policy integration (EPI) that focuses on mechanisms for integrating environmental concerns into other policy domains (e.g. Lafferty, 2004; Mickwitz and Kivimaa, 2005). For example, the Norwegian sustainable development case study explicitly focused on developing tools for the monitoring of EPI (Lafferty et al., Chapter 9 in this volume; Ruud and Larsen, 2004). The same types of integration principles and rules could be developed for integrating social aspects of sustainable development (e.g. poverty reduction, equity, gender balance) into other policy domains along with tools for monitoring and ensuring compliance.

Actions of policy makers

Actions of companies, NGOs, citizens, research community...

Other policies

Science and technology policy

Sustainable development challenges

Environmental

Other policies

Environmental

policy

Innovations Economic

Social

Provide solutions

Horizontal co-ordination

Policy measures Stimulation Regulation, stimulation

Create new problems



It is clear from the Finnish study that the concept of coherence is multifaceted and that analysis of the interaction among policies starts from a variety of positions. Furthermore, it was a question whether there is only one way to ensure policy coherence. There are instances in which the internal coherence of innovation policy may suffer from strong integration with other policies. To analyse the different dimensions of integration, three case studies were chosen; they are described in more detail below. Furthermore, no explicit criteria were used to evaluate the policy processes. Instead, a structured framework for monitoring the policy processes was used.

Learning from the policy processes – the policy cycle framework

The Finnish sustainable development case study used the policy cycle framework to structure observations and recommendations.6 The decision to focus on policy processes reflects the aim of MONIT to collect evidence of horizontal practices without evaluating their success in detail. An overview of the policy cycle is presented in Figure 8.3.

Figure 8.3. The different parts of the policy cycle

The overall process consists of eight interactive stages (inner circle in Figure 8.3) which can be distributed among five overall phases:7 agenda setting, design, imple-mentation, evaluation and policy learning (pictured counter-clockwise in the figure):

• Agenda setting covers the processes needed to define the policy objectives. This includes both national strategy and sectoral strategies. This part of the policy cycle is strongly influenced by different interest groups and is based on the results of policy needs analysis. It also includes understanding why certain issues are on the political agenda and how they got there. This part also includes processes involved and decisions made to set up national organisational structures.

• Design covers the part of the policy cycle in which the issues on the policy agenda are formulated into concrete initiatives, programmes or policies. This involves an assessment of the situation and of the needs and development of concrete actions.

Policy learning Agenda

setting

Implementation

National strategy National strategy

Strategic intelligence Strategic

intelligence

Policy evaluation

Policy evaluation

Performance evaluation

Performance evaluation

Impact evaluation

Impact evaluation

Sector polic ies Sector policies

Implementation strateg ies

Implementation strategies

Instrument set - up

Instrument set - up

Design

Evaluation



• The implementation part of the policy cycle refers to the implementation of the policy measures developed in the previous phase. It is important to see this as a separate phase as the experience of implementation is often very different from that of designing initiatives, owing to contextual changes and practical trade-offs.

• Evaluation is an important part of the policy cycle. Formulated and implemented policies are assessed, often through ex post evaluations but increasingly also ex ante. Evaluation activities are often systematic and formal, with a clear focus on providing recommendations for further development of policy actions.

• Policy learning covers all the research, analysis and interaction processes that together enable strategic understanding of the development requirements of the policy system. Policy learning is defined as all those processes by which policy systems generate and incorporate knowledge and understanding about: i) the underlying causes and conditions of policies and initiatives; and ii) the effects of policy and initiatives. This knowledge is derived throughout the policy cycle and policy learning provides feed-back to all stages.

This policy cycle framework does not provide a tool either to evaluate the processes or suggest actions. However, by focusing on governance issues – in particular on the status of policy co-ordination and integration – it allows for deriving recommendations for developing the systemic coherence and capabilities needed to advance integration. Some generic observations can also be made on the conditions for successful integration of innovation and sustainable development. By structuring observations in this manner, the approach is generic and applicable to any policy domain.

Finnish case study material

In the first stage, information was collected and collated to get an overview of Finnish national sustainable development policy. The main aims were to establish whether such a policy domain can be defined and determine the processes and actors related to its implementation. This stage also explored the linkages between sustainable development and national innovation policy.

In the second stage, three case studies were selected for detailed analysis of individual policy issues. A short overview of the case studies is given in Box 8.1. Each was selected with a view to presenting a clear, logical link with technology, under the assumption that horizontal co-ordination with S&T policy would be justified. At the same time, they did not represent the core area of S&T policy and thus were not part of the normal S&T policy processes.8 They also reflect different types of needs for building interaction among policy domains:

• Need to handle political and societal issues that are high on the political agenda. Such issues are prone to political conflict but cannot be solved in a single sectoral policy domain. Often the objectives of different policy domains may be in conflict. To look more closely at one such issue, case study 1 looks at the process of formulating Finland’s national climate strategy.

• Need to create new business opportunities that enhance sustainable develop-ment. The most obvious and the most often highlighted reason for the need for co-ordination between innovation policy and sustainable development policy is that innovations that promote sustainable development can help new businesses to emerge. Interaction in this area is a clear win-win opportunity for the policy



domains as their objectives are aligned. Innovation policy is seen as a stimulator of new knowledge and new solutions that can be used to solve the problems in other policy domains. The environmental cluster programme that was meant to enhance business opportunities in the environmental sector was selected as case study 2.

• Need to understand policy actions that affect the innovation framework but are not high on the political agenda. Certain policy issues that affect innovation and are relevant to innovation policy are not high on the political agenda of any policy domain. The regulatory framework is an example, and it often attracts little attention. The revision of the Finnish Environmental Protection Act was taken as case study 3 to represent regulatory change.

These three situations are examined separately, as optimising the outcome may require different tools. From the innovation policy point of view, one of the challenges is to recognise when innovation policy should be more proactive, although it is also a challenge to recognise whether this may be undesirable (and why) in some contexts. It should be recognised that the three case studies and the conclusions drawn do not constitute a comprehensive view of all of the types of situations that policy domains confront.

Box 8.1. Finland’s three case studies on sustainable development

Case study 1: The National Climate Strategy (NCS) This case study concentrated on the formation of the Finnish climate strategy and the elaboration of the national climate change programme in the wake of the Kyoto Protocol. The first international commitments on climate change date back to the early 1990s, and the foundation for international and national responses was formulated in the Kyoto Protocol. The case study covers the preparation of the Finnish climate strategy from 1999 until its adoption in 2001. Hence, the impact of climate change and the implementation of the Finnish strategy were not studied.

As part of the burden-sharing package among EU member states, Finland committed itself in 1999 to stabilise its emissions to the 1990 level of approximately 76.5 million CO2 tons during the first commitment period of the Protocol. To comply with this commitment, the Finnish government appointed in spring 1999 an inter-ministerial working group, the Kyoto Group, to prepare a national action plan.

The National Climate Strategy (NCS) was elaborated and based on sectoral programmes put together by the Ministries of Trade and Industry (MTI), Environment (MoE), Agriculture and Forestry and Transport and Communications which indicated how their sectors might contribute to the required greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reductions. The ministries of Finance and Foreign Affairs were also involved but did not produce sector-specific climate programmes.

The ministries offered several studies in support of their work on the sectoral programmes. Based on the sectoral programmes and available research, a common background report for the NCS was elaborated by a network of administrative representatives from the above six ministries (the so-called “Kyoto Network”). The MTI was responsible for integrating the sectoral programmes into the background report, in co-operation with the other ministries. The Kyoto Group, consisting of the respective ministers and chaired by the MTI, was responsible for preparing the NCS, which was approved by the government in 2001.

(continued)



Box 8.1. Finland’s three case studies on sustainable development (continued)

Case study 2: Cluster programmes The Finnish cluster programme concept originated in the S&T policy domain. On the recommendation of the Finnish Science and Technology Policy Council (STPC) (STPC, 1996), the government decided to provide additional funding totalling FIM 3.2 billion (about EUR 538 million) for R&D in 1996. Most of this sum was allocated as an additional appropriation to universities and funding organisations. However, over EUR 23 million were used for cluster programmes co-ordinated by five sectoral ministries. These programmes were designed and executed over the period 1997-99.

In principle, each of the cluster programmes was carried out in the same way. A given amount of money was allocated to each programme and one ministry was assigned as co-ordinator. The ministries and agencies involved set up a co-ordination group to design the details of each programme. The co-ordination groups were given considerable freedom to define their programme’s objectives, processes and working methods. However, the main overall objectives of the programmes were to secure employment, boost competitiveness, increase networking and improve public services (e.g. in health care).

Many of the programmes were linked to sustainable development issues. The case study focused on the environmental cluster programme, co-ordinated by the MoE and in which the MTI also had an important role. The programme aimed to enhance eco-efficiency, thereby improving the state of environment and promoting innovation, to create new opportunities in environmental entrepreneurship, and to promote co-operation among researchers, the business sector, public authorities and funding organisations in order to integrate environmental issues more closely into the Finnish system of innovation (Honkasalo, 2000).

The environmental cluster programme was conducted in three phases, as described in detail by Honkasalo and Alasaarela (2003). From the start, the environmental cluster programme was intended to be a research programme and provide funding for research and development projects through open competition. The first phase (1997-99) immediately followed the initiation of the cluster programmes. Separate rounds of calls for proposals were implemented, allowing for a great variety of projects. Most had a strong research focus and were proposed by research organisations; industry showed rather little interest. The second phase (2000-02) was preceded by more detailed studies than the first in order to give greater focus to the programme. Two themes were selected: infrastructure in a sustainable community and information society and sustainable development; the same procedures were followed as in the first round. During the second phase, the programme received additional funding from the MoE. Most of the other cluster programmes did not continue past the first period. Prior to the ongoing third phase (2003-05) an extensive study took place (Heinonen et al., 2003). This phase has the more ambitious aim of initiating research projects based on more extensive networking.

Case study 3: New Finnish Environmental Protection Act (EPA) The revised Finnish law on environmental protection and water legislation entered into force in 2000. The reform was a response both to international developments, specifically the European Union Directive on Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control (IPPC), and to national discussions that had started in the 1970s. However, the main initiating force was the IPPC directive obliging EU member states to integrate the control of emissions, i.e. environmental permits must take into account the entire environmental performance of the plant: emissions to air, water and land, generation of waste, use of raw materials, etc. Apart from administrative issues, the goals of the EPA were largely those of the IPPC. All environmental emissions are now considered simultaneously, and the use of best available techniques (BAT) to control and minimise emissions was strengthened. However, in Finland these principles apply to a wider group of plants and actors than required by the directive. The BAT information exchange was organised independently from the preparation of the law; it follows the European model and contacts with industry and companies play a key role.

The EPA replaced sectoral acts and permission systems and led to a major reform of the environmental administration and the permit system. The EPA also affected a number of other acts. The reform can be seen as a continuation of a longer national process. The new act was prepared between 1994 and 1999 by the Ministries of Environment and Justice. The preparatory work engaged a number of stakeholders, such as industry and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Organisational questions formed an important part of the discussion, and connections with other environmental policy instruments were thoroughly examined.



An overview of the Finnish sustainable development policy domain

Sustainable development policy development in Finland

Finnish authorities have actively participated in international forums on sustainable development and environmental issues. Immediately after the “Brundtland Report” in 1987, the minister of Environment set up a committee to discuss the Finnish response. The committee brought together representatives of government, research, and public and other stakeholders. The participatory structure of the committee later worked as a basis for the creation of the Finnish National Commission on Sustainable Development (FNCSD), which was formed in 1993 to co-ordinate national work on sustainable development (see Box 8.2). The first Finnish statement on sustainable development was published in 1989 and a year later, the Council of State published Sustainable Development and Finland (Council of State, 1990). The Rio environmental conference in 1992 had a strong impact on national sustainable development processes and led to measures in various policy domains. Evaluation of the implementation of the national programme was started as part of Finnish preparations for the second summit – Rio+10 – in Johannesburg. In light of the Johannesburg results and the assessment of the Finnish National Programme for Sustainable Development (Ministry of Environment, 2003), target setting and priorities for Finnish sustainable development work have been the subject of active discussions. As a follow-up to the Johannesburg meeting, a new national advisory Committee for Sustainable Production and Consumption was established in 2004.

In addition to FNCSD, there are many sectoral and thematic working groups or committees for policy formation related to sustainable development. Some are long-term, and others are more ad hoc, with a temporary or informal status. Examples are working groups on sustainable forestry and international forest matters, trade and the environment, biological diversity, climate change and development co-operation. The working groups include members from different ministries and stakeholder groups. For example, the Finnish Council for Environment and Natural Resources was established in 1995. The Council promotes the protection and management of the environment, the use of natural resources, and land use and community planning according to sustainable development principles. The Council also has an advisory status. The chairman and vice-chairman, as well as most of the members, are members of parliament. The Finnish parliament also has two permanent specialised committees, the Environment Committee and the Committee for the Future, which widely discuss environmental issues.

In addition, sustainable development has played a central role in government programmes. Sustainable development was first mentioned in a Finnish government programme under Prime Minister Esko Aho in April 1991. The programme had a considerable impact and initiated the general incorporation of sustainable development considerations in government thinking that continues today. The government of 2003 established new horizontal governmental programmes to tackle important policy issues that cannot be dealt with in any of the sectoral policy areas. Sustainable development was not one of the themes included. This may be intepretated as a sign of successful integration and the lack of need for a new programme. However, it may also suggest that the political priority of sustainable development or environmental issues is declining.



Box 8.2. The Finnish National Commission on Sustainable Development (FNCSD) The FNCSD is chaired by the prime minister, and its members include three or four ministers, four members of parliament, 16 representatives from ministries and 19 from other stakeholder organisations as well as seven permanent specialists. Its work is mainly organised by task groups and committees. Originally there were two permanent committees (Communications and Education & Awareness Raising) and seven temporary committees (Production & Consumption, Forests, Finances & Developing Countries, International Trade & Technology Transfer, Com-munities, Health & Water, Chemicals & Hazardous Waste) (FNCSD, 1995). Over the past years, four committees have focused on local sustainable development, production and consumption, socially sustainable development, and sustainable development programmes.

Since its foundation in 1993, the FNCSD has had an important role in providing a common vision for Finnish sustainable development policy. It has had a lot of “trend-setting power”. For example, socially sustainable development, capital concepts such as human, social, natural and man-made capital, eco-efficiency, ecological accounting and indicator development have found their way onto the agenda and into public discussion largely due to the work of FNCSD. Overall case study interviews showed that the FNCSD has been a very important forum for discussion. In particular, the involvement of a broad set of stakeholders is seen to have been beneficial.

Although the FNCSD provides a common vision, it does not have actual decision or enforcement power for the implementation of the strategy. It has had the necessary high profile (chaired by the prime minister), but has very little resources for concrete actions. One step towards more concrete co-ordination was taken in 2002, when, as part of the evaluation of sustainable development in Finland, all ministries stated how they have followed the common strategy and what had been done in their sectors to promote sustainable development. In the interviews, this evaluation process was viewed positively and was regarded as a good incentive as well as a means of assessing sectoral activities. However, in the sectors most actively engaged in sustainable development, the evaluation was felt to be unnecessary, too superficial and not leading to concrete follow-up actions.

Is there a sustainable development policy domain in Finland?

Finland has a relatively good international reputation with respect to sustainable development issues. Finnish sustainable development policy and specifically Finnish environmental policy are, in general, internationally appreciated. However, Finnish sustainable development policy cannot be defined as a separate policy domain with clear resources and processes. The policy objectives and relevant actors can be identified, but very few elements indicate strong political and decision power. Although policy discussion around the sustainable development concept is dynamic and the direction is towards a more holistic, broad sustainable development policy, environmental aspects are still the dominant dimension and are much more evident than the social and economic dimensions. Concrete policy processes and discussion are currently best achieved when the discussion is limited to environmental policy.

In the interviews conducted for the study, three main arguments emerged for why sustainable development should not be a distinct policy domain (including goals, governance structures, decision-making power, enforcement power, etc.):



• The ultimate goal is to integrate sustainable development thinking in all govern-ment actions across all policy domains. Isolation of sustainable development issues in a separate, clearly defined policy would hamper integration and remove individual actors’ and organisations’ responsibility to take sustainable develop-ment as a guiding principle.

• The tradition is to trust a voluntary, bottom-up approach. A clear policy for sustainable development would mean that some “top-down” co-ordination and control mechanisms would be introduced, which could potentially destroy some of the existing good work.

• The whole concept of sustainable development is still evolving and it would be impossible to define it as a policy domain.

However, views that true attempts should be made to make sustainable development a more clearly defined policy domain were expressed using the following arguments:

• Sustainable development is not concrete enough. A more concrete policy domain would be a way to introduce clear targets and actions for sustainable develop-ment. Implementation would become more effective and efficient.

• At the moment, interpretations of sustainable development vary and each actor defines it according to its own needs. An attempt to make sustainable develop-ment a clear policy would reduce conflicting interpretations and the tendency to use sustainable development as a general phrase to justify almost anything.

Thus, there appears to be a consensus that sustainable development as such does not require any clear structures for policy co-ordination but that more attention should be paid to achieve integration across existing policy domains and to strengthen the co-ordination mechanisms.

Implementing sustainable development in different sectors

As outlined above, sustainable development in its broad sense is clearly recognised as a governmental responsibility. The national strategy is implemented through actions in various sectoral policy domains. However, the division and recognition of responsibilities are not evenly distributed across the relevant sectors. Few policy domains have a clear central role in policy processes related to sustainable development. As part of the study, the interviewees were asked to identify the key actors for defining and implementing sustainable development in Finland. The Ministry of Finance, which controls the government budget, was often mentioned first. However, it was emphasised that its role is indirect and that the ministry has been a passive participant in strategic discussion on sustainable development. Following the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Environ-ment (MoE) was mentioned as the leader and main co-ordinator for sustainable develop-ment issues (to the extent that sustainable development is co-ordinated). The other most relevant sectoral domains were considered to be the Ministry of Forestry and Agriculture (responsibility for issues related to natural resources, water, forests), the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI) (energy, industrial and technology policies) and the Ministry of Transport and Communications. Reflecting the low emphasis on the social dimension, the ministries of Education, Social Affairs and Health and the Interior are seen to have had a relatively passive role in sustainable development.



As noted in Box 8.2, the FNCSD does not strongly co-ordinate inter-ministerial co-operation. The main co-ordination and alignment of policy processes takes place in the working groups that prepare policy assignments. These working groups are often informal and nomination to these groups is based on personal networks. Ministries differ in terms of their involvement of other ministries in their work. From the interviews, it was evident that the MoE is seen as one of the most active promoters of cross-ministerial collaboration. The most important drivers for initiating inter-ministerial co-ordination are the EU and other international policy work that requires formulation of national strategies.

In the strategy setting and implementation of sustainable development policy in sectoral policy domains, there is wide variation among ministries owing to: i) difference in the focus on sustainable development depending on sectoral interests and objectives; and ii) different internal working and management cultures. Success in integrating sus-tainable development into a ministry’s operations is dependent on influential key individuals who take a leading role in co-ordination. This reflects the fact that the integration of sustainable development is still very much dependent on voluntary, bottom-up approaches.

In most ministries, intra-ministerial processes for defining goals to reach sustainable development objectives are not very transparent. Also, there are too few ways to transfer learning experiences across sectors. Different ministries (in different policy domains) or even different departments within a ministry appear to be dealing with similar problems while not effectively utilising the practical lessons learned by others (e.g. with respect to reporting and monitoring). The FNCSD is not seen as an appropriate place for such practical information sharing, and the problem can largely be traced to the lack of resources for sustainable development co-ordination. Another observation was the small number of processes within ministries that involve broader stakeholder groups. However, experience in cases where the involvement of other parties has generally been higher was considered very good, although the actual processes were seen as more cumbersome and requiring more effort.

Reflecting the specific objectives of the MONIT project, processes in the admini-strative sectors of MoE and MTI may be of interest. A summary of the key aspects relevant for the MONIT work is found in Box 8.3.

Box 8.3. Administrative processes in key ministries

The Ministry of the Environment (MoE) aims to ensure a good, safe living environment and biological diversity, to prevent environmental damage and to improve housing conditions. It has a unit on sustainable development, which does preparatory work for FNCSD and also deals with policy integration questions. The preparation of different programmes (such as the National Programme for Sustainable Development) has been the main tool for cross-sectoral co-operation. The MoE has represented Finland in international climate change negotiations (case study 1) and acted as the co-ordinator of the environmental cluster programme (case study 2). The MoE also co-ordinates the work of the Finnish Environment Institute (SYKE), the main research institute in the sustainable development field. The work of the ministry is also linked to various research programmes. Policy instruments controlled by the ministry include the land-use and construction act, the environmental protection act (case study 3), environmental labelling, voluntary environmental management systems and waste management law.

(continued)



Box 8.3. Administrative processes in key ministries (continued)

The Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI) is responsible for industrial, energy and tech-nology policies and influences and participates in decision making related to economic policy. Its main function is to improve the competitiveness and operation of Finnish industry. Numerous research and development programmes and projects have been implemented under the ministry. Most notable of these are the technology programmes run by the National Technology Agency (Tekes), the main implementation agency responsible for innovation policy. Other examples of policy instruments to promote sustainable development controlled by MTI are investment subsidies for renewable or less environmentally harmful energy production and voluntary energy saving agreements. From a MONIT perspective, the MTI has a significant role as the sectoral ministry responsible for technology policy. One of the main activities of MTI related to the government programme on sustainable development is the co-ordination of the work on the national climate strategy (case study 1).

Innovation and sustainable development policy interaction

This section presents observations and results relating to the interaction of innovation policy and sustainable development policy. These are structured according to the different parts of the policy cycle and cover the issues described above: i) whether there is a horizontal innovation policy; ii) how horizontal sustainable development or environ-mental principles are taken into account in the sectoral S&T policy domain (absorption of horizontal principles); and iii) how the interaction between S&T and environmental policies takes place (horizontal interaction).

Agenda setting

During the first phase of the study, interviewees at different ministries were asked about their perception of the connections between sustainable development and innovation policies. Almost all immediately pointed to the practical technological solutions and the measures used, for example by Tekes, to promote R&D. Technologies were seen as potential and positive solutions to sustainable development problems. In general, technology policy measures and aims were felt “not to hamper” sustainable development objectives and were a positive contribution. However, interviewees (persons responsible for sustainable development issues in different sectoral domains across government) consistently felt was that there is no connection between innovation and sustainable development discussions at the level of setting policy objectives and developing common guidelines. Overall, Finnish S&T policy was seen as very passive towards sustainable development challenges at the agenda-setting level. Thus, from the sustainable development point of view, there appears to be no active horizontal inno-vation policy.

In terms of observations on “vertical coherence” in incorporating sustainable develop-ment issues in the S&T policy domain, there is an internal and external consensus that innovation policy performs correctly. Particularly at the implementation level, measures and activities are seen as sufficient. There are some signs of over-optimism or even complacency, as environmental or broader sustainable development issues have been referred to less frequently in strategic S&T policy documents in the last years (Kivimaa and Mickwitz, 2005). Many of the positive remarks were directed towards actions by Tekes, an agency with a special role in the Finnish innovation system. Tekes is relatively strong and independent and has a role in both designing and implementing many



technology policy measures. Thus, Tekes can work independently to promote sustainable development. However, this situation is not due to strong top-down co-ordination. Consequently, innovation policy is not seen as a strong, influential process, but rather as a policy for individual technologies that help to solve practical problems at the operational level. When using the strong criteria developed in the Norwegian case study to assess whether Finland has a clearly defined and operational “green innovation policy”, one has to conclude that this is not the case (Kivimaa and Mickwitz, 2005).

In summary, Finnish innovation policy has interiorised sustainable development policies relatively well, on the basis of bottom-up processes. However, innovation policy is neither outward-oriented nor an active player in the horizontal sustainable development policy field at the agenda-setting level. This overall assessment of the current role of innovation policy for sustainable development and of the reasons that have led to this passivity in horizontal co-ordination between the sectoral policy domains can be looked at more closely from the following points of view:

• The level of priority for sustainable development objectives within innovation policy.

• The stakeholders of innovation policy.

• The organisational structure of the policy domain.

The level of priority of sustainable development objectives in innovation policy

The view of innovation policy as rather passive in the sustainable development dis-cussion was seen partly as a consequence of the low priority of sustainable development objectives in the innovation policy domain. The main innovation policy objectives have been economic growth, an increased knowledge base, increased viability of business and support for emerging business opportunities. Sustainable development (or more speci-fically environmental) objectives of innovation policy can be identified, but these have not had high priority. For example, in the 2003 strategy statement of the Finnish Science and Technology Policy Council (FSTPC), the role of sustainable development or environ-mental objectives has diminished. FSTPC is the main strategic body that combines policy views across sectoral domains to provide strategic guidelines for innovation policy. It should be noted that environmental policy representatives are present in the FSTPC and might help to incorporate sustainable development in innovation policy discussion. If innovation policy is broadening in a direction that would incorporate more sustainable development views in policy objectives, a challenge is to create mechanisms for defining such objectives and for assessing the relative weights and priorities of the various objectives.

The stakeholders of innovation policy

Traditionally, industry and the research community have been the main stakeholders in S&T policy. Broader innovation policy may require extending the stakeholder basis. In the past, industry representatives have often been the most active in expressing views and concerns on technologies or innovations outside the S&T policy domain to activate the discussion of horizontal policy. The involvement of S&T policy has been modest com-pared to that of industry. This is demonstrated by the modest involvement of S&T policy during the early phases in the case of climate change strategy and the Environmental Protection Act. In both cases, the role of technology and research was acknowledged, but S&T policy actors were not the main players in agenda setting. To describe the logic of



S&T policy actions, some observations from the climate change case study are presented in Box 8.4.

Box 8.4. Technology and the preparation of the national climate strategy (case study 1) During the preparation of the national climate strategy, the role of technology and innovation was recognised as central. The strategy states that: “Technology is the central measure, with which greenhouse gas emissions can be reduced or even achieve the removal of already emitted gases, and technological solutions can be used to achieve long-term, permanent changes” (NCS, 2001). Furthermore, the strategy emphasises the role of R&D investments in all areas of the NCS. However, at the level of concrete actions, the role of S&T policy measures remained limited. This is in part explained by the framework conditions set for the process. The strategy focus was strictly limited to the first Kyoto commitment period 2008-12 and led to the following, jointly agreed practical limitations:

• During the first commitment period, market expansion of existing GHG mitigation technologies were to take place through existing market mechanisms. The basic assumption was that the market situation would not change markedly.

• During the first commitment period, no major technological breakthroughs were predicted. The develop-ment of energy technologies was seen as a long-term process, and no new major changes were expected in the short term.

Thus, the role of R&D resources was generally acknowledged but considered more relevant during the implementation phase and to be incorporated into the actions of Tekes, for example. The inclusion of more comprehensive innovation policies, covering issues related to the demand side, new ways of consumption, sustainable transport, IT, etc., could have expanded the strategy framework from a primarily energy-production focus. These measures were seen to require international, Europe-wide measures and actions to promote market development beyond the national strategy. While the inclusion of these issues would have given innovation policy a more significant role and expanded the measures available to prepare an optimal national strategy, it would also have extended the focus to cover more societal and longer-term questions.

In 2004, in connection with the updating of the national climate strategy, more active policy discussion on preparation for the post-Kyoto period started and S&T policy actors showed interest in including new technology perspectives and mitigation approaches. One key driver is that new market opportunities related to climate change mitigation are currently better acknowledged.

The interviews indicated that S&T policy actors remained rather passive. The technology policy domain could have taken a stronger role in activating discussion of alternative futures and policy scenarios beyond the first commitment period as part of the NCS process. The opening of the time horizon beyond 2010 by an independent innovation policy actor could have led to fruitful debate on possible, realistic innovation-related policy measures. Focusing S&T policy on the implementation phase may mean that some win-win opportunities are lost. However, there were practical reasons to limit the complicated process to the urgent needs of the first implementation period. An expansion of the NCS process would have led to problems in reaching the internationally agreed deadline. Follow-up actions have shown a more forward-looking attitude and stronger technology policy involvement.

Differences in the drivers of policy development should also be recognised. Climate change strategy is closely linked to international agreements whereas the main driver for national technology policy is national interest. At the implementation level, however, the measures and actions of technology policy and national climate policy point in the same direction. A concrete example is Tekes’ long-term work to promote technologies that do not harm the climate (Tekes, 2003). The framework for fruitful joint co-operation exists and one cannot see any potential conflict.

It is clear that the NCS process created important networks, bringing together different administrative sectors and other stakeholders. A basis for more active co-operation between environmental policy and innovation policy domains was also created and may lead to true joint actions. During the implementation of identified GHG mitigation measures and when identifying additional measures for reaching the required further emission reductions, successful policies are likely to require better integration of the environmental and innovation policy domains. Even if the main focus has moved towards implementation, co-operation and co-ordination at the agenda-setting and strategy level (including strategy revisions and updates) should be strengthened.



The organisational structure of the policy domain

In general, allocation of R&D resources to develop new innovations is recognised as significant. However, the prioritisation of resource allocation is not actively considered at the policy agenda-setting level in the S&T policy domain or in other policy domains. Prioritisation of R&D allocations is often left to the implementing agencies (Tekes and the Academy of Finland). The top-down steering of S&T prioritisation is weak. One view brought forward in the interviews was that innovations are generally positive with respect to sustainable development and there is no need for strong prioritisation. Thus, inno-vations are seen to develop mostly on their own (through industry actions) and no strong innovation policy actions are needed or possible. However, the opinion more generally expressed in the interviews was that stronger involvement of innovation policy could promote sustainable development. Interviewees at ministries shared the view that better co-ordination at the policy agenda-setting level is needed.

Technology policy reveals a challenge raised by the organisational structure of the policy domain. As described earlier, Tekes allocates R&D resources quite independently, and very little priority setting is co-ordinated by the MTI. While Tekes’ impact in the sustainable development field is considered positive, the agency operates at the level of designing and implementing strategies rather as a participant in the objective-setting processes within and between ministries. This is particularly a problem for legislative reforms as the implementing agency has neither the knowledge nor the mandate to draft new laws. While there is a strong agency implementing technology policy, there are no national implementation agencies in the environmental policy field. The implementation of environmental policy is distributed to regional environmental centres with less political power than a national agency. Thus, there are no appropriate counterparts for agenda-setting discussion at the implementation level.

Design and implementation

Although “horizontal” connections between the environmental – or, more broadly, sustainable development – and S&T policy domains appear rather weak at the agenda-setting level, there is a clearly recognised connection at the level of designing and imple-menting policy measures. First, particularly in Tekes’ strategy and actions, one can see a clear movement towards a broader horizontal innovation policy that would also deal with sustainable development issues. This evolution seems to be taking place more rapidly at the implementation level than at the agenda-setting level. Second, there is clear vertical coherence and absorption of sustainable development principles in S&T policy actions. Third, interaction among the implementation-level policy actors between S&T and environmental policy domains works relatively well. In practice, discussions on the co-ordination of implementation often takes place through direct personal contacts and somewhat informal networks.

As described earlier, the interviewees mentioned technologies and innovations as a first, natural and logical linkage between innovation policy and sustainable development policy. This makes it very natural to focus horizontal interaction at the level of designing and implementing measures for promoting technology development. There is also a particular need for the environmental policy domain to be active, as it is well recognised that environmental policy instruments alone are not sufficient to foster eco-innovations. Stronger S&T policy involvement in designing environmental regulation is also justified in order to promote the spread of innovations. There is a win-win opportunity for streamlining policy implementation, as innovation policy aims to stimulate inventions



whereas environmental policy aims to spread innovations. Thus, both “technology push” and “technology pull” can be catalysed through policy measures. The increasing need to shape and change demand in order to achieve sustainable development and to create “systemic” and “social” innovations requires more active design of joint actions.

However, the tools used by different policy domains differ, and this creates a major bottleneck that still prevents the most efficient co-operation. Environmental policy focuses particularly on legislation and regulation, whereas the main tool for S&T policy is allocation of resources for R&D. The challenge is to take the approaches of both policy domains into account in a balanced manner when designing the measures. Research supports the view that regulation works best and reaches its objectives when operating in combination with other forces, such as customer demand (see Hilden et al., 2002). When these forces work together, changes in technology can be transferred rapidly for practical use. This implies that innovation policy makers need to be aware of the regulatory framework and to be involved in the process of preparing the legislation.

Based on the case study results, the following themes requiring further attention to improve horizontal co-ordination are discussed in more detail:

• S&T policy measures and their implications for environmental policy measures.

• S&T policy participation in designing environmental policy measures (legislative measures).

• The capabilities of other policy domains to use the expertise and strengths of the S&T policy domain.

• Stakeholder involvement in the processes.

S&T policy measures and their implications for environmental policy measures

As noted earlier, S&T policy focuses on creating a favourable environment for the emergence of innovations and new businesses. There is a wealth of studies on the impact of public R&D funding on industrial competitiveness.9 There is also evidence from different countries that competitiveness and promotion of sustainable development are positively correlated. Finland has for years been at the top of international benchmarking exercises measuring competitiveness and sustainable development. However, there are very few studies on the precise environmental impacts of S&T policy measures. Furthermore, there is some evidence that new, environmentally friendly innovations do not get to the market without supporting measures in other policy fields that help open up new markets. However, allocation of R&D resources contributes significantly to promoting sustainable development. Over the years, Tekes has estimated that around 15% of its R&D funding has been targeted to applications that directly promote environmental sustainability. In addition, other public R&D funding sources promote research and other activities that promote sustainable development. The conclusion from the case studies was that the implications and results of these S&T policy activities are only taken into account in other policy domains to a very small degree. The priority setting achieved through the allocation of R&D resources can have far-reaching, long-term consequences. However, as discussed earlier, this prioritisation takes place at the implementation level by the funding organisations instead of as a result of high-level top-down policy control.



From an innovation policy perspective, resource allocation may have less impact on sustainable development in the absence of an active search for synergy opportunities with other policy domains and their measures. During this study, too few examples were found of active and concrete linkages, with knowledge gained from R&D allocation and long-term investments taken into account in designing measures for other policy domains.

S&T policy participation in designing environmental policy measures (legislative measures)

There is a low level of commitment to using R&D investment as a catalyst in other policy domains. Equally, actors in the S&T policy field make little effort to engage in designing policy measures in other fields. This is particularly true for legislative changes (see Box 8.5). Issues that prevent an innovation perspective when designing other policy measures are:

• Actors designing S&T policy measures do not have sufficient knowledge of regulatory issues (most often they have a background in industry or research and have limited experience of legislative and administrative issues). Consequently, there is a need to broaden the knowledge base (multidisciplinary basis) of innovation policy actors and a need for a more active monitoring of legislative changes.

• There is insufficient knowledge of impacts and synergies among policy measures. There is no basis or guidelines for what should be done and thus no valid arguments for being closely involved in the process. Historically, there have been situations in which tighter environmental regulations have boosted innovation but others in which markets and business opportunities have diminished or dis-appeared due to regulatory changes. In Finland, there are some good studies of the impact of regulations on innovations (Hilden et al., 2002), but more sys-tematic efforts are needed.

• The agencies responsible for designing S&T measures (Tekes, Academy of Finland) are not the right partners for the design of legislative and regulatory measures drafted at ministry level. There are no existing channels for effectively engaging S&T policy actors to the process.

The ability of other policy domains to use the expertise and strengths of the S&T policy domain

One observation from the case studies is that the proximity of S&T policy actors to industry and their understanding of industry needs is an asset that could be better utilised in implementing measures in other policy domains. Ministry-level actions in the environmental policy domain are not at the right level to stimulate and catalyse environmental R&D in the industry sector, as was apparent in the cluster programme case study. The environmental cluster programme started from the assumption that the MoE is as able as agencies at the implementation level to design and execute an R&D programme. In practice, the resources and the time necessary to develop communication channels to industry and establish steering mechanisms were underestimated. A reason for low industry interest in the environmental cluster programme might also have been that the environmental policy authorities were not seen as a “neutral” source of funds. Industry sees S&T policy as neutral and co-operation is based on well-founded mutual trust. Greater priority for societal objectives may in the long run lead to a similar problem



in the innovation policy domain. If the “neutral, objective and trustworthy” status of innovation policy is lost, industry’s interest in participating and using public R&D resources may diminish.

Box 8.5. Innovation policy participation in the Environmental Protection Act and best available techniques (case study 3)

In the preparation of the EPA, technological or innovation questions did not generally receive attention and participation of S&T policy actors was low. The main connection to technology issues took place in defining and interpreting BAT at both the European and the national levels. At both levels, the conclusion was that the BAT defined in the European process provides information for local decisions, but does not provide guidance on actual technological choices or direct emission limits. Hence, the authorities define emission limits but not the technological choice based on BAT. Clearly this makes great demands on local application of BAT.

All interviewees felt that BAT is a good basis for regulation. It takes into account environ-mental, technological and economic aspects and is thus in line with the different dimensions of sustainable development. Furthermore, the preparation of BAT is based on information exchange, not on regulation. In practice, industry representatives have actively participated and made a major contribution to the Finnish BAT preparation work. According to some interviewees, the role of industry has been much more significant in Finland than in most other EU countries. Industry representatives have brought knowledge and resources that the authorities and civil servants lack. The National Technical Working Groups have operated openly and allowed parties to gain a deeper common understanding of how BAT principles can be applied.

A number of studies were commissioned to support Finnish arguments and views in the preparation of the BAT reference documents (BREFs). The comments addressed to the European level had to be sufficiently motivated and supported by empirical evidence. It is acknowledged that participation in the preparation has had an impact on the competitiveness of Finnish industry. It is also considered that sufficient resources have been allocated for the work; typically industry has covered half of the cost. The resources have also made it possible to distribute BAT information widely. The financing of these activities was organised through the environmental cluster programme, which also involved the MTI and technology policy actors. Tekes financed some of the early studies, but later withdrew, as the projects were considered information gathering exercises rather than R&D.

Although the innovation policy actors – MTI and Tekes – have had representatives in the different working groups and are interested in the BAT work, they have only played a minor role. Industry outperforms policy on technological issues and the role of promoting technological knowledge, and this role was effectively left to industry. On the other hand, innovation policy makers might have taken a bigger role, acting as a neutral partner in seeking the best technological knowledge.

Stakeholder involvement

A critical remark made during the interviews was that, aside from industry, there is little stakeholder participation in S&T policy design processes. Improvement in this area is crucial if innovation policy objectives expand and there is a need to design measures to reach objectives with broader societal impacts. In addition to R&D actors, industry and research organisations, NGOs, other public sectors actors, community and city repre-sentatives as well as the general public could contribute.



All the above-mentioned issues highlight the need for further work to develop horizontal co-operation in designing and implementing the policy measures. This is a considerable challenge, as no clear guidance on best practices exists. The cluster pro-gramme concept was an attempt to address this challenge. Some of the programme objectives and results are summarised in Box 8.6.

Box 8.6. The Finnish cluster programmes: an attempt to encourage horizontal governance practices (case study 1)

One of the main objectives of these programmes was horizontal co-operation across the sectoral boundaries of different ministries. Horizontal co-operation in the programmes covered at least three areas.

• First, the programmes aimed to support knowledge creation and enhancement of industrial clusters across traditional boundaries (Hernesniemi, 1995; STPC, 1996). Thus, the object-ive of the environmental cluster programme was to support the creation of an “environ-mental cluster”. During the programme period, there was a clear move towards such a cluster. Although industry participation was low, the programme and its nature as a hori-zontal co-operative measure raised awareness and general knowledge of opportunities. The high level of visibility in the business and research communities would not have been achieved without horizontal co-operation and S&T policy involvement.

• Second, the cluster programmes were seen as tools to test and develop new horizontal governance practices. An example is the allocation of research funding via co-funding and joint decision making in the environmental cluster programme. All decisions were made based on consensus and long discussions involving both environmental and S&T policy actors. Through practical work, practices were improved and better joint co-ordination was named as one of the biggest impacts of the programme.

• Third, strengthening the national knowledge base also requires truly multidisciplinary research. The programme’s funding and projects were seen as a means of strengthening this cross-cutting knowledge. The programme’s multidisciplinary research in cross-cutting areas was one of the programme’s main strengths.

Evaluation and policy learning

Among the areas studied, processes related to evaluation and policy learning proved the most difficult. In all areas examined, there is a lack of co-ordination and clear processes in policy learning. In particular, there are few co-ordinated policy learning activities at the level of broad horizontal policy domains. Between the S&T and environmental policy domains there are some good examples of active policy learning processes; learning mostly takes place through policy makers’ actions and co-ordination is mainly informal. As a result, efficient exchange of experience and information between S&T and environmental policy occurs mainly via small and stable personal networks. Networks linking innovation and sustainable development have been active for a long period and are considered to be functioning well. In comparison to the other countries for which MONIT sustainable development case studies were completed, a high level of information exchange and communication across policy domains has been actively promoted over a long period in Finland. On the other hand, tradition and stable personal networks mean that it is very difficult to change the processes and there is a high risk of losing essential knowledge when key individuals leave.



The following themes in the area of evaluation and policy learning emerged during the study:

• Efficiency and resources for research.

• Organisational structures hampering policy learning.

• Role of evaluation and foresight.

Efficiency and resources for research

The common view emerging from the interviews was that research efforts are not used to their full potential. To support informal information exchange and networks, considerable research is undertaken, but the results are often not utilised. Researchers seem to be insufficiently integrated in the preparation of policy. A frequent comment was that researchers do not present their results in a manner that policy makers can use. Neither do policy makers appear to be able to clearly communicate their requirements to researchers. Although there appeared to be sufficient resources for research, these may not be optimally allocated from the policy makers’ point of view.

There is an imbalance in the resources available for policy-relevant research. In the S&T policy field this is not considered a large problem, as the policy domain controls and has access to research funds. However, in the sustainable development field, and particularly in the environmental policy domain, there is a lack of resources for research that could enhance policy learning. This was one of the main reasons behind the decision to organise the environmental cluster programme as a research programme rather than concentrating on other means of promoting eco-efficiency and innovation. Within the MoE in particular, an acute need to enhance policy research was evident, as sufficient resources for targeted research work had not been available. The environmental cluster programme was an example of an effort to enhance the use of resources for policy-relevant research by means of horizontal collaboration across policy domains.

Organisational structures hampering policy learning

A structural and organisational weakness which hampers the use of research in policy learning was the sectoral, and thus vertical, organisation of research. The research traditions of separate areas are quite distinct and researchers have difficulties in finding a “common language” across sectoral boundaries. This is particularly a problem for sec-toral and ministerial research institutes. Universities do not follow the sectoral division of policy domains, but in academic research the objectives largely relate to fulfilling criteria of academic excellence, rather than meeting policy makers’ needs.

The Finnish Environment Institute was considered the main research institute pro-viding useful results for policy makers in the cross-cutting area between sustainable development and innovation policies. However, it was highlighted that SYKE’s work is largely focused on environmental issues and there are generally too few research bodies working in the other sustainable development dimensions (social, economic) and linking them with innovation research.



When looking at the role of SYKE as a provider of policy-relevant research results, its historical development provides an interesting view on organisational structures related to policy learning. The environmental administration was restructured in the 1990s, when the National Board of Waters and Environment was divided so that policy agenda setting, implementation functions and research activities were more clearly assigned to different organisations. Agenda-setting activities were divided between the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and the MoE, implementation was assigned to new regional environmental centres and research (including some monitoring, testing, etc.) activities were assigned to the new SYKE. However, according to interviews, some valuable policy learning and co-ordination was lost as a result. In order to enhance policy learning and the role of research in policy making, the interviewees considered the proximity and presence of all functions – agenda setting, implementation and research – within one organisation as an asset. This view was reinforced by opinions claiming that, compared to environmental policy, Tekes makes much more active and successful use of research results for policy making. Tekes is very close to agenda setting, design and implementation of policy measures and also commissions and funds research related to innovation policy.10

Role of evaluation and foresight

Evaluation of the impact of individual measures, organisations and larger govern-mental strategies and programmes provides one tool for policy learning. Generally, the tradition and practice of evaluation are strong across Finnish policy domains. However, compared to S&T policy, sustainable development policy actors are less active; evalu-ations have been somewhat ad hoc and have had little impact. From the sustainable development perspective, the ministries studied took a rather critical view of evaluation. Wishes for better integration of evaluation into operations were expressed, as were some doubts about their quality. A wish was clearly expressed for evaluations combining self-evaluation and some external expertise, with an emphasis on strategy formulation and action plans rather than on evaluations that are forgotten once the reports are written.11

There was an overall wish to increase the role of advisory councils and academic criticism in order to provide more critical, future-oriented and provocative views that would catalyse discussion. It was recognised that there are long-term developments in the sustainable development field that also affect innovation policy. A broader consideration of these is needed in order to support informed long-term decisions on R&D resource allocations.

Conclusions and recommendations for innovation policy

The following conclusions are divided in two parts. First, in the light of the results of the case studies, there is a discussion of whether future innovation policy should incorporate issues beyond traditional S&T policy boundaries. Second, the main recom-mendations at different levels of the policy cycle are summarised for the innovation policy domain (vertical dimension) and for innovation and sustainable development policies (horizontal dimension). In looking at these results, one should note that the MONIT work has focused on policy processes and that certain dimensions of creating and using innovations are not addressed.



Expansion of innovation policy – a right response to the sustainable development challenge?

In Finland, innovation policy processes have relatively well adapted the sustainable development principles vertically, based on “bottom-up” processes, but innovation policy is neither outward-orientated nor an active player in the horizontal sustainable develop-ment policy field. Finnish innovation policy is generally seen as a leading international example of successful policy formulation. However, the innovation policy domain has made little effort to reach across sectoral borders. Based on the case study observations, one has to conclude that there does not exist an active or aggressive horizontal innovation policy. One may even question whether clear sectoral status and vertical coherence have been among the strengths of the national innovation policy.

In spite of the current status, there is a need to move from traditional S&T policy towards a broader innovation policy covering more societal objectives. The question of how this should be done and what future innovation policy should look like remains. From the perspective of sustainable development, the case study offers no clear answer. The results indicate several pros and cons for expanding the concept of the Finnish innovation policy.

As the discussion of sustainable development shows, broad concepts and overarching principles are difficult to implement concretely. It could be concluded that sustainable development as a broad concept has not succeeded in gaining political power. More successful in this respect is the environmental thinking that has been integrated into many policy domains and resulted in concrete implementation. An analogy can be seen in S&T policy, where the potential expansion of the policy domain towards broader innovation objectives may lead to a more ambiguous situation. The core objectives and the division of responsibilities may be blurred. The strengths and the concreteness of the innovation policy domain might be at the optimal level if the policy domain focuses on science and technology.

S&T policy objectives have been quite clear and Finnish S&T policy discussion has, for the last decades, been relatively free of complicated or heated discussion about its objectives. However, if broader sustainable development objectives are more clearly included in innovation policy, the prioritisation of policy objectives becomes more critical. Different societal “sub-objectives” need to be set in a clear order and different objectives within innovation policy and between innovation policy and other policy domains may more often conflict with one another. There will be an increasing need to develop mechanisms for handling and anticipating potential conflicts between policy objectives and stronger priority-setting mechanisms. There will also be an increased need for internal analytical attitudes to acknowledge that clear trade-offs must be made (and potential compensation schemes elaborated), with a view to operationalising the win-win opportunities.

However, despite these challenges, the view that consistently emerges from the Finnish study is that to truly promote sustainable development, there is a need and an opportunity for S&T policy to broaden its scope beyond traditional technology and science promotion. There is a risk that the role of the sectoral S&T policy domain will diminish. Also, win-win opportunities will be lost if the scope of innovation policy is not broadened. Stronger involvement in and influence on sustainable development issues will in the end create more opportunities for a competitive and sustainable economy.



Improving vertical and horizontal innovation policy coherence

If it is accepted that future innovation policy should be broader and aim to reach wider objectives related to sustainable development, several challenges must be acknow-ledged. The policy issues become more multifaceted and there are no universal solutions for improving co-ordination and synergy between the policy domains. The different types of policy issues require different approaches and innovation policy should be able to recognise these differences. Table 8.1 summarises some of the general recommendations and challenges related to vertical and horizontal co-ordination in different parts of the policy cycle. Some of the key recommendations are further elaborated below.

The biggest challenges in policy processes take place at the level of agenda setting. First, discussion of the role of innovation policy in relation to the challenges of sustainable development needs to be strengthened. Discussion should take place both within the policy domain and across policy domains. Second, as described, the incor-poration of a wide set of societal issues into the discussion of policy objectives will lead to greater potential for conflict. This is the case both within the innovation policy domain and in horizontal interaction with other policy domains. There is an increased need to strengthen mechanisms for prioritisation, for handling conflicts and for anticipating potential conflicts.

However, another challenge is to bring into the discussion issues that either appear to be outside the innovation policy domain, or are not considered at the agenda-setting level setting in other policy domains. Debate and discussion of those topics should be en-couraged. There is a need to increase the participation of various stakeholders in priority-setting processes for innovation policy. Special attention should be paid to initiate long-term foresight work to explore future opportunities. Innovation policy has a natural opportunity to take a stronger role than other policy domains in activating discussion of the future. Technology and science-related issues by nature require long-term planning.

At the level of designing and implementing policy measures, the expansion of innovation policy requires new types of policy measures. To produce these, innovation policy actors need a broader knowledge base and multidisciplinarity. Innovation policy needs to be very innovative in designing new types of actions and in testing them. With respect to horizontal co-operation between S&T and environmental policy in designing common measures, the sustainable development case studies in the MONIT project have highlighted that various common barriers still exist. They include differences in the drivers of policy development (national vs. international commitments), differences in primary stakeholders (industry vs. broad stakeholder processes), and differences in resources available and in measures used (R&D allocation vs. regulatory measures). All these barriers need to be overcome in order to accomplish joint work in designing and implementing policy measures with synergies. A special challenge in the innovation policy area is to increase understanding of long-term developments in legislation and build capabilities to anticipate the consequences of the future changes.



Table 8.1. Summary of the main recommendations for future innovation policy

Vertical coherence (absorption of horizontal sustainable development

principles within a sectoral domain)

Horizontal coherence (interaction and co-ordination among

sectoral policies)

Agenda setting • Increased need for innovation policy to participate in setting of objectives and discussing national priorities.

• Need to strengthen mechanisms for prioritisation and for handling potential conflicts.

• Innovation policy needs to be more influential in the areas of other policy domains and promote the innovation view.

• Need to raise awareness and bring to the agenda issues that are seemingly beyond the scope of innovation policy.

Design and implementation of policy measures

• Need to propose more optional and new (innovative) possibilities to reach policy objectives.

• More attention to joint design of policy measures across policy domains.

• Need to increase overall knowledge on long-term developments in legislation and other areas.

Policy learning • Need to strengthen policy-oriented research and create research bodies that provide critical and objective views.

• Need to strengthen forward-looking, long-term foresight thinking.

• Further enhance the multidisciplinarity of research and restructure the organisation of policy-oriented research in a less sector-focused manner.

• Need for further research to understand the processes of innovation and their dependence on factors outside the innovation environment.

• Need to strengthen forward-looking, long-term foresight thinking.

Generally, the role of policy learning and the role of policy advice will increase. In this area, the study demonstrated relatively few strong, formal co-ordination and co-operation efforts. There are well-functioning informal mechanisms for exchanging information and experience, but more formal mechanisms are needed to strengthen learning across policy domains. A potential bottleneck is that research close to the needs of the policy makers is, in most cases, organised according to the sectoral division of policy domains and receives part of its budgetary funds directly from individual ministries. This leads to a situation in which research results may not be considered neutral or objective. Sectoral organisation of research may also hamper opportunities to increase knowledge about synergies among policy measures in different sectors. There is a need to strengthen policy-oriented research that would be critical, evaluative, objective, forward-looking and would cut across different policy domains and sustainable develop-ment themes.



Notes

1. The concept in its current form emerged from a series of meetings and reports during the 1970s and 1980s. In 1987, the UN-sponsored Brundtland Commission released a report, Our Common Future, which emphasised that economic development cannot stop, but must change to fit within the planet’s ecological limits. It also popularised the term sustainable development, defining it as ‘development that meets present needs without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’. This study does not attempt to give a final definition for the concept, but aims to show the interpretations that different policy domains have used in order to follow the general principle.

2. The case study does not include the analysis of Finnish S&T policy. As a part of the MONIT work, a separate case study was carried out on Finnish innovation policy.

3. “Policy domain” refers to a general policy pertaining to overall national strategic goals and/or all sectoral policies including policy objectives, related organisations and their actions and processes.

4. The discussion of sustainable development can be very easily expanded to cover issues such as information society, health care and others. This would have expanded the Finnish case study beyond comparability with other MONIT sustainable development case studies. Thus, the study focuses on environmental policy more than on a very broad sustainable development discussion.

5. For example, in the last review of the Finnish National Science and Technology Policy Council, the dominant new strategic demand was to stimulate “social innovations”, see STPC (2003).

6. A similar approach is used in many other MONIT case studies as well as used in the literature (e.g. Mickwitz and Kivimaa, 2005). Different types of policy cycle frameworks reflect in principle the same processes. The key feature is the need to acknowledge that the process is complex, with multiple interactions between the different parts, rather than a linear process.

7. Naturally, the boundaries between the parts are often vague. Also, different organisations may cover different parts of the cycle depending on the policy issue to be dealt with.

8. For example, Tekes technology programmes would have offered good material for case studies on S&T policy implementation but were purposely left out. Kivimaa and Mickwitz (2005) have used the technology programmes as case study material to study the environmental policy integration in Finnish technology policies.

9. For example, in 2002, Tekes published an extensive report summarising research assessing the impact of public R&D funding on society.

10. For example, Tekes and MTI jointly fund the Research Programme for Advanced Technology Policy (ProACT) which focuses on research that can be used for the needs of technology policy (see http://proact.ktm.fi).

11. A recent example of a broad evaluation that more clearly focused on development of actions and programmes was that of the environmental programme of the Ministry of Transport and Telecom-munications which covered all transport-related organisations within the transport policy domain (Hjelt et al., 2005).



References

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Council of State (1990), “Kestävä kehitys ja Suomi” (Sustainable Development and Finland), Valtioneuvoston selonteko eduskunnalle.

Edler, J., S. Kuhlmann and R. Smits (2003), “New Governance for Innovation: The Need for Horizontal and Systemic Policy Co-ordination. Report of a Workshop”, Fraunhofer ISI Discussion Papers, Innovation System and Policy Analysis, No. 2/2003, Karlsruhe, June.

Finnish Committee for Environment and Development (1989), Committee statement (“Ympäristön ja kehityksen Suomen toimikunnan mietintö”), Komiteanmietintö 1989:9, Helsinki.

FNCSD (1995), Finnish Action for Sustainable Development. Finnish National Commission on Sustainable Development, Forssa.

FNCSD (2001), Finland: National Report for Rio+10. Finnish National Commission on Sustainable Development.

Hakala, H. and J. Välimäki (2003), “Ympäristön Tila ja Suojelu Suomessa” (State of Environment and Environment Protection in Finland). Suomen ympäristökeskus/ Gaudeamus, Helsinki.

Hilden, M., J. Lepola, P. Mickwitz, A. Mulders, M. Palosaari, J. Similä, S. Sjöblom and E. Vedung (2002), “Evaluation of Environmental Policy Instruments: A Case Study of the Finnish Pulp & Paper and Chemical Industries”, Monographs of the Boreal Environment Research, No. 21.

Hjelt, M., V. Valovirta, Y. Gilbert and A. Pathan (2005), “Evaluation of Environmental Management Systems within the Administrative Sector of the Finnish Ministry of Transport and Communications – English Summary”, Ministry of Transport and Telecommunications Publications.

Heinonen, S., P. Kasanen and M. Walls (2002), “Ekotehokas yhteiskunta – Ympäristöklusterin kolmannen ohjelmakaudne esiselvitysraportti” (Ecoefficient Society: Preliminary Study of the Third Phase of the Environmental Cluster Programme, in Finnish), Ministry of Environment, 598, Helsinki.

Hernesniemi, H., M. Lammi and P. Ylä-Anttila (1995), “Kansallinen kilpailukyky ja teollinen tulevaisuus” (The Competitive Advantage and the Future of Finnish Industry, in Finnish), ETLA and Sitra, Helsinki.

Honkasalo, A. (2000), “Eco-efficiency, Entrepreneurship and Co-operaton: The Finnish Envrionmental Cluster Programme”, in Innovation and the Environment, OECD, Paris.



Honkasalo, A. and E. Alasaarela (2003), “On the Cluster Approach to Environmental Research and Development”, Ministry of Environment, 653, Helsinki.

Honkasalo, A. (2003), “Ympäristöklusterin tutkimusohjelma” (Research Programme of the Environmental Cluster, in Finnish), Ministry of Environment, 652, Helsinki.

Huimasalo, T. (2002), Johannesburg Summit: Mid-term Check, Endpoint or New Start? (in Finnish) in Ulkopolitiikka 3/02.

Kivimaa, P. and P. Mickwitz (2005), “Can We Get Greener Technologies through Greener Policies? – Environmental Policy Integration in Finnish Technology Policies”, manuscript, Finnish Environment Institute.

Lafferty, W. and E. Hovden (2003), “Environmental Policy Integration: Towards an Analytical Framework”, Environmental Politics, Vol. 12, No. 3, Autumn.

Lafferty, W.M. (2004): “From Environmental Protection to Sustainable Development: The Challenge of Decoupling through Sectoral Integration”, in W.M. Lafferty (ed.), Governance for Sustainable Development: The Challenge of Adapting Form to Function, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, UK.

Lafferty, W.M., A. Ruud and O.M. Larsen (2005), “Environmental Policy Integration: How Will We Recognize It When We See It? – The Case of Green Innovation Policy in Norway”, in OECD (2005), Governance of Innovation Systems, Volume 3: Case Studies in Cross-Sectoral Policy, OECD, Paris.

Loikkanen, T. and M. Hongisto (2000), “Kestävän kehityksen ja innovaatiotoiminnan integraatio” (Integration of sustainable development and innovation activities, in Finnish), VTT Kemiantekniikka, IEE Reports: 05/2000, Espoo, Finland.

Markusson, N. (2001), “Drivers of Environmental Innovation, VINNOVA Innovation i fokus VF 2001:1.

Mickwitz, P. and P. Kivimaa (2005), “Evaluating Policy Integration – The Case of Policies for Environmentally Friendlier Technological Innovations”, manuscript, Finnish Environment Institute, SYKE.

Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (2003), “Sustainable Use of Renewable Natural Resources”.

Ministry of Environment (2000), Environment Report.

Ministry of Environment (1998), “Finnish Government Programme for Sustainable Development: Council of State Decision-in-Principle on the Promotion of Ecological Sustainability”, The Finnish Environment, 254.

Ministry of Environment (2003), Assessment of the National Programme for Sustainable Development (in Finnish).

Ministry of Trade and Industry (1995), “Suomen ekoviennin mahdollisuudet” (The Opportunities for Finnish Eco-export, in Finnish), Committee Report 1995/3.

Ministry of Transport and Communications (2000), “Intelligent Transport Strategy”.

National Climate Strategy (2001) “Kansallinen Ilmastostrategia. Valtioneuvoston selonteko eduskunnalle”, in Finnish, 27 March.

NCSD Network (1999), “The NCSD Sustainable Development Report: Finland”.



Rouhinen, S. (2002), Finnish Sustainable Development: Long Line – Shortly (in Finnish), in Maailmanpyörä 2/2002.

Ruud, A. and O.M. Larsen (2004), “Coherence of Environmental and Innovation Policies: A Green Innovation Policy in Norway?”, ProSus Report 05/04, ProSus, University of Oslo.

Science and Technology Policy Council of Finland (STPC) (1996), “Finland: A Knowledge-based Society”, Science and Technology Policy Council of Finland Review, Helsinki.

Science and Technology Policy Council of Finland (STPC) (2003), “Knowledge, Innovation and Internationalisation”, Science and Technology Policy Council of Finland Review, Helsinki.

Technopolis (2004), “Policy Instruments for Sustainable Innovation”, report prepared for the Informal Environmental Council, 16-18 July.

Tekes (2003), Technology Programmes and Climate Change – The Role of Tekes Technology Programmes in Reaching the Climate Objectives in Light of Selected Technology Programmes and Technology Areas (in Finnish), Tekes publication.

UNCSD (2002), Johannesburg Summit 2002: Finland Country Profile.

Underdal, A. (1980), “Integrated Marine Policy: What? Why? How?”, Marine Policy.

THE CASE OF GREEN INNOVATION POLICY IN NORWAY – 221


Chapter 9

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY INTEGRATION: HOW WILL WE RECOGNISE IT WHEN WE SEE IT?

THE CASE OF GREEN INNOVATION POLICY IN NORWAY1

William M. Lafferty, Audun Ruud and Olav Mosvold Larsen Programme for Research and Documentation for a Sustainable Society (ProSus),

Centre for Development and the Environment, University of Oslo, Norway

Taking the definition of environmental policy integration (EPI) and benchmarks proposed by Lafferty (2004) as a point of departure, this chapter outlines an approach that allows for an evaluation of EPI with respect to green innovation policies in Norway. EPI has both a horizontal and a vertical dimension. The horizontal dimension refers to cross-sectoral strategies for environmental protection, and the vertical dimension to a “greening” of sectoral policies. A constitutional mandate, an overarching strategy for the sectoral domain, a national action plan and a responsible executive body are proposed as baseline requirements for achieving (and assessing) horizontal, cross-sectoral integration of environmental goals. With regard to the vertical dimension, the combination of a sec-toral strategy for change and an action plan are the proposed key initiatives.

Using the benchmarks as evaluation criteria, the chapter discusses the degree of inte-gration of Norwegian innovation policy and environmental policy. The discussion is illustrated with efforts undertaken by the government, the Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of Trade and Industry.

The paper presents a fourfold perspective on stylized modes of combining environmental concerns and innovation. The modes are delineated along two dimensions: i) whether the integration is steered by “processual/instrumental” or “substantive” norms and values; and ii) whether the goal of integration is related to a simple decoupling of economic and social drivers from environmental degradation, or is also related to an active “recoupling” of drivers to ensure more sustainable production and consumption. The findings indicate that vertical environmental policy integration is actively promoted in Norway, but that specific and direct efforts in the direction of green innovation are practically non-existent. The same holds true for the horizontal dimension. This does not necessarily mean that green innovations are not being promoted in Norway. But the integration effects that are being made are not the result of an active and goal-directed policy. There is, therefore, a clear potential for achieving a more effective implementation of green innovation in Norway.

222 – THE CASE OF GREEN INNOVATION POLICY IN NORWAY


Introduction

The 2004 Dutch presidency of the European Union highlighted “eco-efficient innovation” as a key aspect of EU environmental strategy.2 The Presidency’s focus is pri-marily on strengthening the environmental component of the Lisbon process (“environ-ment as opportunity” for greater economic competitiveness in Europe). The focus mirrors, however, a more general preoccupation with the relevance of environmental con-cerns for national policies and actions plans for promoting innovation. The relationship between innovation and environmental concerns is both conceptually and normatively diffuse. What is being “integrated” into what? And how will we know a successful (“cohesive”) national plan for either innovation or sustainable development when we see it? In terms of EU strategies, is the goal one of integrating environmental concerns into innovation policy: “environment as opportunity” for the Lisbon process? Or is it rather one of integrating innovation into sustainable development: “innovation as eco-efficiency” within the Gothenburg process? Or is the idea purposely left vague to accommodate the “happy” (and highly elusive) medium of “win-win”: innovation that simultaneously pro-motes economic competitiveness and sustainable development?

Answers to these questions are difficult. While there is considerable discussion of the issue of environmental policy integration (EPI) (Collier, 1994; Liberatore, 1997; Lenschow, 2002; Lafferty and Hovden, 2003; Nilsson and Persson, 2003), most treatments focus on the integration dynamics between traditional environmental policy and the driving forces of leading economic sectors (industry, energy, transport, agriculture). Neither the broader agenda of sustainable development (integrating the “social dimension”), or a concern with innovation is prominent in the EPI literature. As for the discourse on innovation, it has only recently taken on the challenge of policy integration in general, and only very recently reflected an interest in the integration of innovation and the environment.

The Norwegian study on sustainable development in the MONIT project illuminates linkages, or the lack thereof, between innovation policy and policy for sustainable development. For specific empirical findings which also include two relevant business cases, see Ruud and Larsen (2004). The present chapter concentrates on policy integration, a key issue in the MONIT agenda, and contains an in-depth discussion and analysis of integration issues.

The chapter begins by briefly reviewing the particular policy mandates of promoting policy integration with the areas of sustainable development and innovation. It then addresses the challenge of decoupling. Decoupling signifies that environmental protective measures should be pursued regardless of economic growth patterns, business cycles and innovation policy priorities. The issue of decoupling has been identified by the OECD as the key challenge of sustainable development. However a decoupling to alter practices into more sustainable practices requires “recoupling” environmental protective measures and economic growth patterns. This requires policy integration of the dual goals of environmental policy for sustainable development and innovation policies.

The integration of environmental concerns and innovation can be presented in four normative modes. These modes can be distinguished with respect to whether integration is steered by processual/instrumental or substantive norms and values. Further, the modes can be distinguished with respect to whether the goal of integration is related to decoupling unsustainable patterns of economic growth and environmental protection or recoupling sustainable patterns of environmental protection and economic growth. Normative standards for evaluating both horizontal and vertical policy integration are



presented and illustrated with efforts undertaken by the government, the Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of Trade and Industry.

The findings indicate that vertical environmental policy integration is promoted, but specific and direct efforts to promote green innovation are very limited, if they exist at all. On the horizontal dimension little can be documented. This does not necessarily indicate that green innovations are not promoted. However, efforts undertaken by the public sector, the Norwegian government and particularly the two ministries studied confirm that there is a large potential for strengthening public policy integration for the promotion of green innovation in Norway.

Mapping the policy mandates

Achieving change for sustainable development requires a strong consensus on the nature and seriousness of environmental degradation. Agreement as to causal relations and political legitimacy are vital prerequisites for effective action. One need only mention the extensive efforts of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to achieve a consensus on the causes and effects of greenhouse gases to indicate the scope of the problem. Discussions as to the validity of the panel’s findings still continue at the margins of scientific discourse; and politicians continue to play traditional party-politics “games” with climate policy, despite the enormous resources that have gone into docu-mentation and dissemination of the causal framework. The pursuit of innovation has for many years been synonymous with the pursuit of economic growth without reference to environmental protection or sustainable development. Is this still the case in terms of the particular policy mandate for a green innovation policy?

The mandate for policy integration for sustainable development

With respect to sustainable development, the goal of policy integration can be traced to the “Brundtland Report”. In Chapter 12 of Our Common Future – appropriately titled “Towards Common Action: Proposals for Institutional and Legal Change” – can be found the following:

The ability to choose policy paths that are sustainable requires that the ecological dimensions of policy be considered at the same time as the economic, trade, energy, agricultural, industrial, and other dimensions – on the same agendas and in the same national and international institutions. That is the chief institutional challenge of the 1990s. (WCED, 1987, p. 313)

The very specific recognition of sectoral integration is also considered a highly relevant challenge by the European Union. Article 6 of the Treaty of the European Community explicitly states that:

Environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and implementation of the Community policies and activities referred to in Article 3 [listing the full range of Community activities] in particular with a view to promoting sustainable development.

Further there is the so-called “Cardiff Process”, initiated by the Luxembourg European Council in December 1997, and elevated to a full-scale EU programme at the Council meeting in Cardiff, June 1998. The strong nature of the mandate here is reflected in a policy evaluation from 2001, where the report concludes that:



In summary . . . the Cardiff Process can be characterised as binding and committing. Legally, the binding nature is rather weak, but the political commitment is strong. There was a clearly expressed will at the start, which was reinforced at various levels throughout the whole process. Of significant importance are the various self-commitments of the Council configurations to further refine or revise the strategies, and the work packages delegated to the European Commission or specific working groups.” (Kraemer, 2001, p. 33)

Finally there is the EU “Strategy for Sustainable Development”. Authored directly by the Office of the President of the EU Commission and presented to the European Council in Gothenburg in June 2001, the strategy stated that:

The process of integration of environmental concerns in sectoral policies, launched by the European Council in Cardiff, must continue and provide an environmental input to the EU Sustainable Development strategy, similar to that given for the economic and social dimensions by the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines and the Employment Guidelines. The sectoral environmental integration strategies should be consistent with the specific objectives of EU Sustainable Development Strategy. (CEC, 2001, p. 14).

In spite of a relatively specific focus and broad-based support, however, the notion of policy integration for sustainable development has clearly not been adequately developed or systematically evaluated. Though the situation is clearly changing for the better (as demonstrated by the activities referred to below), the conclusion of the International Institute of Environmental Policy from 2001 still stands:

Despite a progressive commitment to environmental integration, relatively little attention has been given to defining the concept. There is a confusing variety of methods for taking more account of environmental factors in the development of sectoral policies. (IEEP, 2001)

As will be seen below, a major reason is that the concept of policy integration for sustainable development implies a relatively strong revision of the traditional hierarchy of policy objectives. In such a hierarchy, environmental concerns are normally ranked below issues of national security, economics, finance, labour relations, education and welfare. This indicates an apparent failure of the discussion of integration to appreciate the extent to which the concept forms part of a broader political process, with the portrayal of environmental objectives as central, if not principal. This discussion will be resumed below, following a presentation of the “case” for integrating innovation into national policy.

The mandate for innovation and policy integration: a European perspective

Objectives and regulations for environmental policies and sustainable development are to a great extent embedded in international or supranational governance processes. In the Norwegian context, an assessment of European policy development is critical. This section therefore highlights the international context for national policy integration giving specific weight to the European Union.

The goal of increasing levels of “innovation” in the European Union has been a key dimension of “competition policy” since (at least) the introduction of the Single Europe Act (SEA) in 1987. It was not until 1995, however, with the issuance of the “Green Paper on Innovation”(CEC, 1995) that the policy was given distinct status as a key feature of the new “knowledge society and economy” which would keep Europe at the cutting edge



of international market competition. The first “Action Plan for Innovation in Europe” was adopted in 1996 (CEC, 1996); and the second – “Innovate for a Competitive Europe” – was, as of November 2004, being circulated by the Commission for comments and amendments (CEC, 2004a). The current review and revision of the action plan takes place within the context of the “Lisbon Strategy”.4

The major thrust of the OECD work has been promotion and monitoring of innovation as an aspect of research and development, but the OECD has also focused strongly on innovation in the context of innovation systems (documented notably in OECD, 2002). Most importantly for the present discussion, however, is the work done by the OECD on “innovation and the environment” and “technology and environment”.5

Despite efforts at conceptual clarification and monitoring, it is safe to say that there currently exists considerable confusion and disagreement as to what “innovation” is all about. And – as with all such “essentially contested concepts” (Gallie, 1956; Lafferty and Langhelle, 1999, Chapter 1) – the only way one can gain semantic “closure” is to either aim for a consensus among all users, or stipulate specific instrumental criteria for applying and interpreting the idea. Relying on the latter approach, the notion of “innovation” employed here refers primarily to change that enhances competitive advantage within and among firms. Such advantage can be measured in terms of increased market shares, gross earnings, profit margins, number of patents, etc. It will be argued, moreover, that this is the ultimate test of whether or not innovation actually is achieved

The relationship between innovation and the environment has recently received very specific treatment by the EU Commission, not only with respect to environmental protection, but more pointedly in connection with the promotion of sustainable develop-ment. On the first point, there has gradually emerged – as an instrumental complement to the expansion and generalisation of the innovation mandate – an emphasis on the need for greater “coherence” and “integration” within and across sectors. This is clearly expressed in the most recent “communication” on innovation by the EU Commission (CEC, 2003). This line is then followed up in the second-generation draft action plan currently circulating (CEC, 2004a). The draft expresses a need for institutional mechanisms to integrate innovation policy at both the national and regional levels.

As for the goal of integrating innovation and the environment, the policy signals are much more perfunctory and diffuse. The issue was given very little attention in the initial phases of innovation policy development. Neither the “Green Paper on Innovation” nor the First Action Plan (“Innovation for Growth and Employment”) had anything significant to say on the relationship.6 More important, however, is the fact that the second-generation draft plan currently circulating says even less. There are only two hints of what the environment could mean for innovation policy: i) environmental regulation can be either a hinder or a help for innovation; and ii) there are positive market opportunities for greater innovation in the environmental technology and services sector.7

The reticence of the Commission on the innovation-environment link may, however, be partially explained by a direct reference in the draft action plan to the recently adopted separate action plan on environmental technology. Entitled “Stimulating Technologies for Sustainable Development: An Environmental Technologies Action Plan for the European Union” (ETAP), this plan – adopted in January 2004 (CEC, 2004b) – moves the innovation-environment discourse in a totally different direction. Just as the innovation action plan seems to be exclusively drafted to accommodate the Lisbon process, the ETAP is solidly anchored in the Gothenburg process. Still, an effort to promote an integration of innovation and environmental policy is explicitly stated:



This Environmental Technologies Action Plan (ETAP) … aims to harness their full potential to reduce pressures on our natural resources, improve the quality of life of European citizens and stimulate economic growth. As such it is an important means to implement the EU Sustainable Development Strategy and to pursue the Lisbon Strategy. (CEC, 2004b, p. 2)

To summarise the implications of the policy documents, the EU is solidly committed to a major policy effort to improve European economic competitiveness through inno-vation. There is also a growing awareness that innovation policy must be integrated within and across sectoral directorates and ministries and at the regional, national and local levels of government. Finally, the ETAP shows a more recent commitment to joining innovation efforts with environmental concerns. However, the commitment is very ambivalent as to how a balance between the two tasks should be achieved. This ambivalence is most crucially manifest in the political challenge to reconcile an in-creasingly obvious conflict of priorities within and between the Lisbon and Gothenburg strategies for European development.

Assessment of decoupling and recoupling: from policy mandates to substantive standards for evaluation

The challenge of integrating innovation and environmental policies for sustainable development is related to an issue that the OECD has identified as a “key challenge” of sustainable development: decoupling. Decoupling signifies that the necessary environ-mental protective measures should be pursued regardless of economic growth patterns and business cycles (OECD, 2001a). With decoupling as a major goal for sustainable development, the specific task for adapting government practice to sustainable develop-ment becomes one of developing more consequential steering mechanisms for relieving pressures on natural life-support systems.

The authors have earlier made several attempts to clarify the nature of decoupling as a goal of policy integration for sustainable development (Lafferty, 2002, 2004; Lafferty and Hovden, 2003; Ruud, 2002, 2004). Building on this work, the discussion is expanded to differentiate explicitly between “decoupling” and “recoupling”. This is necessary to highlight the particular challenge of integrating the dual goals of sustainable development and innovation. Economic growth and business development must be promoted, but they must be promoted more in line with ecological considerations. This is particularly demanding for policy integration, since the respective policy mandates for the environ-ment and innovation may lead to very different consequences for governance for sustainable development.

Though many treatments of decoupling presume that continued economic growth is inherent in the idea itself, the presumption should be more closely explored. The entire debate about “zero growth” implies that “recoupling” need not be either a conscious effort or functional prerequisite for change. Reductions in impacts between industrial-business drivers and environmental-ecological resources can be compensated by “drivers” that do not presume continuous economic growth. That such change involves “inno-vation” also seems obvious – since “innovation” is conventionally understood to imply any kind of change – though it may not necessarily be change that increases value creation in a competitive market context. The fact that such a position does not correspond to that of the Brundtland Report (and presumed as a basis for both the UN and EU strategies for sustainable development) does not mean that it cannot be, or is not, maintained as an alternative to continued growth. The crucial premise of the Brundtland



Report is that continued economic growth is necessary, but that the quality or nature of growth can be changed. This is most succinctly expressed in the second so-called “key concept” of the WCED definition of sustainable development: “the idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and social organisation on the environment’s ability to meet present and future needs” (WCED, 1987, p. 43).8 The decoupling of non-sustainable patterns of social change in this context necessarily implies a search for recoupling for sustainable development. Environmental protective measures must be promoted in a way that triggers modified and even new value-added activities and economic growth patterns. This can be achieved through incremental changes in existing patterns of consumption and production, but can also involve a need for more radical discontinuous change. Moving from a decoupling orientation towards recoupling for sustainable development requires highly creative architectural innovations in both technical and non-technical governance systems.

The content of economic growth in production and consumption must be altered in such a way that it is recoupled with environmental concerns and imperatives. This implies (for example) technical efforts in the field of dematerialisation and decarbonisation. Services can increasingly be substituted for the production of material goods, and renewable energy sources can be substituted for fossil fuels. Such efforts must, however, be actively pursued and supported by appropriate governing structures, and it is within this “policy space” that the relationship between innovation and sustainable development concerns becomes crucial. Within the normative-functional framework of sustainable development, innovation must be green – and greening must be innovative.

This perspective provides a rationale for assessing the relationship between sus-tainable development and innovation with respect to instrumental standards of governance – what are here referred to as processual norms. How can policy integration between the two goals be achieved as a governing process? This chapter argues that a need for instrumental standards of policy integration must be supplemented by sub-stantive standards. It is not enough, in this view, to evaluate the mechanisms of sustainable development governance as process alone. Integration must also be evaluated in terms of “outputs” (policies) and “outcomes” (products).9

While the distinction between “process” and “outputs”/”outcomes” is relatively straightforward, the difference between the latter two requires some elaboration. Vedung (1997) identifies “outputs” with specific initiatives (policy instruments) designed to achieve sub-goals of an overall programme; “outcomes” are seen as the actual effects of policy on target groups. The difference can be well illustrated for the present discussion by looking at another key notion of the sustainable development discourse: eco-efficiency. Both the OECD and the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) have identified eco-efficiency as a principal standard for decoupling. It is also a standard which succinctly reflects the second key concept of the Brundtland definition, indicating the prescription of the WCED to change the “quality” (nature, mode) of economic growth.

Ruud (2004) has demonstrated, however, that eco-efficiency must be viewed in a more complex light. As generally understood (and increasingly practised), the idea emerges as a necessary – but not sufficient – criterion for achieving sustainable development. An emphasis on relative gains through isolated technological improvements does not, for example, always result in absolute gains for the environment and develop-ment. A distinction between eco-efficiency and eco-effectiveness is thus advisable. Whereas the former focuses on technological improvements within a relatively narrow



scope of production and consumption, the latter aims to reflect actual impacts and ulti-mate change within a broader framework of both eco-systems and potential “rebound effects” (Ruud, 2004). Increased eco-efficiency may appear as a positive “output” of the policy implementation process; but clear substantive standards are needed to assess the overall eco-effectiveness as an “outcome”.

The implications of these preliminary perspectives can be summarised in terms of four “normative modes” for the integration of environmental concerns and innovation policy (Table 9.1). The modes serve as a simple frame of reference for highlighting different standards for prescribing and assessing the implications of different degrees and types of environment-innovation integration.

Table 9.1. Normative modes for the integration of environmental concerns and innovation

Integration steered by*

Processual norms Substantive norms

Decoupling Environmental protection: Major emphasis on end-of-pipe regulation and prevention of pollution.

Ecological communalism: Major emphasis on limiting growth. Reliance on self-sustaining life-styles and communal values.

Goa

l of i

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ratio

n

Recoupling Ecological modernisation: Major emphasis on improving eco-efficiency of existing sectoral practices through “win-win” solutions. Plays down zero-sum conflicts of interests and trade-offs.

Sustainable development: Major emphasis on achieving overall eco-effectiveness in a global context. Assigns “principled priority” to maintaining and enhancing natural life-support systems.

* In the present context, “steering” is done by government actors. While the overall effectiveness of implementation will depend on “governance”, the ultimate responsibility for achieving EPI as a “first-order principle to implement and institutionalise the idea of sustainable development” (Lenschow, 2002. pp. 6-7) is the responsibility of “governments”. It is national governments that are bound by the international and regional agreements promoting both sustainable development and innovation.

By cross-classifying a need for processual versus substantive norms, differentiating between “decoupling” and “recoupling”, one arrives at the four types of environment-innovation constellations identified in Table 9.1:

• Environmental protection. This normative mode places major emphasis on end-of-pipe regulation and prevention of pollution. In this mode innovation may be perceived as ameliorative environmental technology.

• Ecological communalism. This normative mode places major emphasis on limiting growth. Reliance on self-sustaining life styles and communal values is highlighted. In this mode innovation may be perceived as sustainable life styles in self-sustained communities.

• Ecological modernisation. This mode emphasises eco-efficiency of existing sectoral practices through “win-win” solutions. It plays down zero-sum conflicts of interests and trade-offs. In this mode innovation may be perceived as a “greening” of existing production-market relationships.

• Sustainable development. This mode places major emphasis on achieving over-all eco-effectiveness in a global context. It assigns “principled priority” to maintaining and enhancing natural life-support systems. In this mode innovation may be perceived as a radical transformation of the quality of economic growth.

The logic of the fourfold categorisation leads to a number of preliminary observations about the normative framework being developed.



First, the two dimensions capture significant aspects of the latent trade-offs implicit in the parallel developments of sustainable development policy and innovation policy in Europe. Both policy tracks attribute great importance to the values and goals pursued by each, and both declare a clear need for better policy integration. As it now stands, however, there has been virtually no open discussion as to the relative importance of the two tracks. Differentiation along the principal axis – from “environmental protection” to “sustainable development” – provides a value hierarchy that is in line with the constitutional situation in the EU. In other words, the goal of sustainable development has a stronger principled status than the goal of innovation. This is manifest in two ways: i) both sustainable development in general and environmental policy integration in particular have stronger legal status in the EU treaties; and ii) whereas sustainable development is the overarching value/goal of the Gothenburg strategy, innovation is only one aspect of the Lisbon strategy, and it is an aspect on a par with “sustainability” in the Lisbon process.10

Second, the framework clearly reflects – through the differentiation between “processual” and “substantive” norms – a fundamental aspect of policy implementation research. Equally important is the fact that the same distinction is manifest in EU policy discourses themselves, where (particularly in the different action plans), goals and initiatives reflecting “means” and “ends” are indiscriminately mixed. What the framework clearly indicates, however, is that changes in process do not necessarily result in changes in substantive outcomes; and that positive changes in substantive outcomes can be achieved without pursuing the processes designated.

Third, there exists an implied, but inadequately expressed, presumption that decoupling involves recoupling. It is important to explain the implications of not only disconnecting drivers from pressures on natural resources and eco-systems, but also of finding ways (or not) to achieve surplus-generating development. The importance of such a distinction is particularly clear with respect to ETAP, where it is, on the one hand, often assumed that end-of-pipe initiatives require no compensatory growth-maintaining initiatives; or, on the other, that achieving eco-efficiency is the same as achieving eco-effectiveness.

Finally, there are interesting implications in the framework for relativising the meaning and value of innovation. Most importantly, an understanding of the potential of innovation provides a very different context for understanding and promoting innovation as a policy goal. Instead of viewing any kind of innovation as potentially positive for value-creating competition, the framework points out that innovation can serve ends other than increased economic growth through increased market/profit shares.

Innovation in the mode of “environmental protection” referred to in Table 9.1 can contribute significantly to decoupling, without being commercially competitive. Innova-tion can also contribute to apparent “ecological modernisation”, without contributing to “sustainable development” (owing to reduced eco-effectiveness and “rebound effects”); and innovation can contribute to “ecological communalism” by developing life styles, learning mechanisms and organisational forms that seem to point backwards rather than forwards in terms of economic growth and development. Ecological communalism and ecological modernisation are perceived by various stakeholders as the most “progressive” way to promote sustainable development. Apparently there are different approaches and perspectives on how to integrate environmental concerns and innovation. Some primarily see the goal of integration as recoupling economic patterns in more eco-efficient ways, while other are more concerned with substantive norms and limitation of growth patterns.



The variety of perspectives is important for assessing the overall costs and benefits of innovation in a much broader normative context. However, to assess the degree of policy integration in the direction of green innovation, these differences must be reconciled and integrated in such a way that substantive standards can be stipulated.

Stipulating normative standards for policy integration

Integrating new policy demands into existing policy areas requires some sort of substantive norm or principle. Given that the political system essentially involves “the authoritative allocation of values” (Easton, 1965), some means must be at hand for authorities to determine “who gets what, where, when and how”. Such means can only be provided (in a democracy) by transparent norms for specific allocations and the resolution of policy trade-offs. Win-win solutions in the pursuit of sustainable development are a blessing when achieved, but such solutions are in general very difficult to realise, and, when realised vis-à-vis the environment, usually achieved as a sub-optimal solution to the problem of long-term environmental degradation.

Previous studies have identified benchmarks for governing mechanisms to achieve environmental policy integration (Lafferty, 2002; Lafferty and Hovden, 2003; Lafferty, 2004). These benchmarks involve the horizontal (HEPI) and vertical (VEPI) dimensions of governments’ integration initiatives. The focus is, in other words, on the responsi-bilities and activities of governing institutions: ministries, agencies, intra-governmental committees, and other bodies deriving their authority from national, regional or local constitutional mandates. In addition to these institutional-procedural benchmarks, a definition of EPI is also proposed which directly addresses the issue of “substantive norms”. The most recent formulation of this definition (with slight changes introduced in the course of debating and developing the idea), is as follows:

Environmental policy integration implies:

“…the incorporation of environmental objectives into all stages of policymaking in non-environmental policy sectors, with a specific recognition of this goal as a guiding principle for the planning and execution of policy;

“…accompanied by an attempt to aggregate presumed environmental consequences into an overall evaluation of policy, and a commitment to minimise contradictions between environmental and sectoral policies by giving principled priority to the former over the latter.” (Lafferty, 2004, p. 201)

With respect to the first part of the definition, VEPI is elaborated on as follows: vertical environmental policy integration indicates the extent to which a particular governmental sector has taken on board and implemented environmental objectives as central in the portfolio of objectives that the sector continuously pursues. VEPI involves the degree to which a sector has been “greened”; the extent to which it has merged envi-ronmental objectives with its characteristic sectoral objectives to form an environmentally prudent decision-making premise in its work. This “greening” does not presuppose the overarching primacy of environmental goals at the Cabinet level. Each sector is left free to develop its own understanding of the concept and its implications. The dimension thus focuses on the degree of EPI within the steering domain of the individual department or ministry. This may lead to significant EPI in the sector, depending on the level of ministerial commitment and the ability of sectoral officials to balance internally derived environmental priorities with external demands for “normal” sectoral policy outputs, and to discover, employ or foster effective means of governance.



As an initial indication of what VEPI entails, Lafferty (2004) mention the following interdependent check-list of operational mechanisms:11

• A scoping report providing an initial mapping and specification of sectoral activity which identifies major environmental/ecological impacts associated with key actors and processes, including the governmental unit itself.

• A forum for structured dialogue and consultation with designated principal stakeholders and citizens.

• A sectoral strategy for change, putting forth the basic principles and goals for the sector.

• An action plan to implement the strategy, with stipulated priorities, targets, time-tables, policy instruments and designated responsible actors.

• A green budget for the integration and funding of the action plan.

• A monitoring programme for overseeing the implementation process, its impacts and target results, including specified cycles for monitoring reports and revisions of the sectoral strategy and action plan.

These steering mechanisms identify institutions and procedures deemed necessary to achieve a minimum of processual integration of environmental concerns in sectoral governance. It is important to stress that the term “vertical” is here used in the functional sense of governing responsibility for a given sector (transport, energy, agriculture, etc). This should not be confused with the notion of “vertical governance” across different domains of constitutional responsibility (regional, national, local).

The importance of this distinction becomes clear when one considers the second dimension of EPI: horizontal environmental policy integration (HEPI). In its most essential form, HEPI involves the integration of environmental concerns within governments: that is, across sectoral policy and responsibility. If determining “who gets what, where, when and how” is the essence of a political system, the relevance for HEPI is to substitute ”environmental interests” for ”who”; and to insist on at least equal treatment for the environment vis-à-vis competing interests. This entails, of course, the negotiation of con-flicts between environmental objectives and other societal objectives; between different sectors pursuing alternative environmental objectives; and between alternative possible consequences of specific environmental initiatives. Assessing the degree of HEPI is a question of assessing both the basic mandate for environmental privilege – when and where it is to be regarded as “trump” – as well as the detailed specifics for realising the mandate in and through the workings of public administration.

A list of HEPI benchmarks has been proposed as follows (Lafferty, 2004):

• A “constitutional” mandate providing provisions for the special status of envi-ronmental/sustainable-development rights and goals.

• An overarching strategy for the sectoral domain, with clearly enunciated goals and operational principles, and a political mandate with direct backing from the chief executive authority.

• A national action plan with both overarching and sectoral targets, indicators and time-tables.



• A responsible executive body with designated responsibility (and powers) for the overall co-ordination, implementation and supervision of the integration process.

• A communications plan stipulating sectoral responsibility for achieving over-arching goals, and outlining how intra-sectoral communications are to be struc-tured and made transparent.

• An independent auditor with responsibility for monitoring and assessing imple-mentation at both governmental and sectoral levels, and for proposing revisions in subsequent generations of strategies and action plans.

• A board of petition and redress for resolving conflicts of interest between environmental and other societal objectives, interests and actors.

These benchmarks should also be seen as indicating “baseline” requirements for achieving (and evaluating) horizontal, cross-sectoral integration of environmental/ecolo-gical goals. They cover institutional and procedural aspects of implementation and reflect both processual and substantive norms. Further, each set of benchmarks constitutes a sequential implementation strategy and is cumulative as to potential outcome. The degree to which the outcome is substantial for sustainable development is a question of the degree of political and administrative commitment to the substantive norms.

Focusing more specifically on this particular issue, one is confronted with one of the most difficult issues of democratic governance: the actual achievement of change. Policy in a democracy is about the determination and pursuit of collective-choice goals. The implementation of policy is a “game” consisting of interdependent initiatives and ploys to get specific “target groups” (individuals and collective actors within culturally deter-mined constellations of institutions and procedures) to change their behaviour in specific directions. The effectiveness of the initiatives and ploys (policy instruments) chosen for reaching goals will depend on the interaction between general characteristics of operational effectiveness (the “medium”); and the degree of will, commitment, drive and general moral force pushing key actors towards successful realisation of the goals (the “message”). Why and how they acquire impetus and direction has to do with the quality of the norms and authority that permeate the transactions, negotiations, intimidations and bargains that effect change.

Such norms and authority have been identified with the idea of “trump” in card games (Lafferty and Hovden, 2003, pp. 9-11). Some values must be accorded “principled priority” when confronted with other values that do not serve the policy goals if change is to be effected in one rather than alternative directions. The governing mechanisms of policy implementation are in this view regulated by priority principles and application guidelines – a “canon of judgement” – that serves to regulate decisions among imple-menters as to alternative paths of action. At any one time any single policy process (in a democracy at least) will be confronted with alternative “trump” principles. These can, for example, be to the ultimate advantage of free-market competition (the capitalist state); social welfare (the social-democratic state) or the environment (the ecological state). The goal of sustainable development is often expressed as a “balance” between all three. But as argued elsewhere (Lafferty, 2002; Lafferty and Hovden, 2003; Lafferty, 2004) the normative message of sustainable development discourse clearly implies that the eco-logical dimension – understood as the preservation of vital life-support systems for present and future generations – must be given “principled priority”. How this priority is expressed in the legal-political structure of a political system, and how it is applied in



specific decision-making situations, are crucial issues in the design and execution of governance for sustainable development.12

Green innovation policy in Norway: where, when and how?

This analysis does not go into detail on whether or not environmental issues are actually considered as “trump” in innovation policies. As the conclusion will show, that is clearly not the case. Rather, findings from environmental and innovation documents published by the Ministry of Environment (MoE) and Ministry of Trade and Industry (MoTI) (responsible for innovation policy) will be used to assess the degree to which Norwegian environmental and innovation policies are coherent.

Given the complexity and difficulty of taking EPI from rhetoric to actual politics, substantial academic and political efforts have been devoted to developing EPI as concept and to studying EPI as a policy process (Collier, 1994; Liberatore, 1997; Lenschow, 2002; Lafferty and Hovden, 2003; Nilsson and Persson, 2003; Lafferty, 2004, Persson, 2004; Lafferty et al., 2004a). EPI may also be studied as output in terms of policy initiatives, statements, objectives and so forth. The study of EPI as an outcome is a third option that would imply evaluation of real-life results of the integration of environmental concerns into other policy fields.

This exercise is both a form of evaluation of Norwegian governing mechanisms for green innovation – process – and actual policy outputs, that is, programmes and other efforts to promote green innovation. It evaluates neither actual outputs of the policy process nor the processes and outputs of green innovation in the private sector. Further, the chapter presents relevant horizontal and vertical contributions only from MoE and MoTI. There are also relevant green innovation initiatives within the sectoral domains of the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy and the Ministry of Communication, for example. They were not, however, included in the empirical background analysis (Ruud and Larsen, 2004).

The findings presented below are discussed in accordance with the HEPI/VEPI benchmarks presented earlier (Lafferty, 2004), but slightly modified to accommodate innovation policy. However, as the HEPI/VEPI benchmarks are developed to assess a policy implementation process, they do not capture initiatives not connected to a “policy plan”. A third section on “other initiatives” is therefore added to paint a bigger picture of the actual status of green innovation policy in Norway.

A green innovation policy in Norway: the horizontal dimension

The horizontal dimension of EPI (HEPI) refers to the overall governmental responsi-bility for sustainable development. By horizontal initiatives are to be understood policy documents or efforts especially aimed at co-ordinating policies across sectoral domains. The assessment is based on a number of policy documents.

With regard to sustainable development, both a national strategy and an action plan for sustainable development were studied. The separate notion of innovation policies is relatively new in Norway. MoTI is responsible for innovation policy, it has so far only published two policy documents on innovation policy. The assessment is based on both: Parliamentary Bill 51 (2002-03) on the establishing of a new state innovation agency; “Innovation Norway”, and “The Government’s Plan for a Comprehensive Innovation Policy” (HIP) (MoTI, 2003).



The Ministry of Environment is responsible for the overall formulation of environ-mental policy in Norway. White Papers 46 (1988-89) and 58 (1996-97) are, together with the three bi-annual “State of the Environment” reports (White Papers 8 [1999-2000]; 24 [2000-01] and 25 [2002-03]), the most important and influential environmental policy documents. The MoE documents include a wide variety of issues, but ay attention focuses here on how they treat innovation.

Below, and in line with the benchmarks proposed by Lafferty (2004), a brief sum-mary is presented of the findings to enable a better understanding of the current status.

• A “constitutive” mandate providing provisions for the special status of green innovation policy. Since the launch of the Brundtland report (WCED, 1987), Norwegian governments of both the “right” and the “left” have published White Papers, long-term plans, a National Strategy and a National Action Plan (NA21), all proclaiming “sustainable development” as an overarching goal for Norwegian society. Strong environmental prescriptions are also included in the Norwegian constitution (Lafferty et al., 2004a). Except for White Paper 46 (1988-89), however, there has been no special mandate for green innovation in Norway and the issue has hardly been debated in parliament.

• An overarching strategy for the sectoral domain, with clearly enunciated goals and operational principles, and a political mandate with direct backing from the chief executive authority. Norway has never adopted a national overarching strategy for green innovation. In 2002, however, Norway adopted a relatively short, relatively vague and highly controversial “National Strategy for Sustainable Development”. The strategy was hastily prepared for the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg (Lafferty et al., 2004a). It actually mentions innovation a couple of times, but never systematically. Further, the strategy makes mention of environmental technologies and technological innovation and states that “Norway will play an active role in developing environmentally friendlier technology through research” (MoFA, 2002, p. 35). However, this is not further specified and no goals are mentioned.

• A national action plan with both overarching and sectoral targets, indicators and timetables. There is no document or plan especially dedicated to green inno-vation. Innovation is hardly mentioned in environmental policy documents and environmental issues are hardly mentioned in innovation policy documents. The Action Plan for a Comprehensive Innovation Policy (HIP) published in autumn 2004 does not consider environmental issues at all. This is interesting because in the National Action Plan for Sustainable Development (NA21), published two weeks earlier, it is stated that the HIP “is consistent with NA21” (White Paper 1 (2003-04), p. 195). In NA21 the challenge of decoupling is explicitly emphasised, but in the HIP there are no references to either decoupling or recoupling. Within the field of environmental politics, eight policy priority areas with strategic objectives and operational national targets are agreed upon. In NA21 seven “central policy areas”13 are identified. None is related to innovation, however. Consequently, a national action plan with targets, indicators and timetables for green innovation does not exist in Norway.

• A responsible executive body with designated responsibility (and powers) for the overall co-ordination, implementation and supervision of the integration pro-cess. As there is no strategy or plan for green innovation, there is no executive



body responsible for green innovation. However, a committee consisting of deputy ministers14 from nine out of 18 ministries was established to follow up the innovation policy plan, but MoE is not represented. Further, an expert group has been asked to develop national indicators to facilitate the realisation of the objectives stated in NA21, but innovation is not part of its mandate. In general no efforts are made to supervise, co-ordinate or implement a green innovation policy in Norway.

• A communications plan stipulating sectoral responsibility for achieving over-arching goals, and outlining how intra-sectoral communications are to be struc-tured and made transparent. No communications plan exists.

• An independent auditor with responsibility for monitoring and assessing imple-mentation at both governmental and sectoral levels, and for proposing revisions in subsequent generations of strategies and action plans. No independent auditor exists.

• A board of petition and redress for resolving conflicts of interest between environmental and other societal objectives, interests and actors. No board of petition and redress exists.

The HIP is not very innovative; in terms of being an action plan, it is not very comprehensive. This is the case, at least, for green innovation. Ruud and Larsen (2004) document that the HIP contains virtually no references to environmental concerns and does not take ecological thresholds or the Earth’s carrying capacity into account. NA21 indirectly emphasises that sustainable economic development must include a green innovation policy. It is stated that the HIP “is consistent with NA21”, but as mentioned above, the HIP does not refer to environmental issues. In conclusion, horizontal co-ordination of environmental and innovation policies is virtually nonexistent. There is no such thing as a national green innovation policy in Norway, but perhaps the situation is more promising in specific sectoral domains.

The vertical dimension

A summary of the results from Ruud and Larsen (2004) is again used to assess to what extent innovation and environmental policies are integrated. It is of course possible to pursue green innovation policy within a sector without an overarching horizontal policy. However, recalling that there is little emphasis on green innovation in the horizontal steering documents referred to above, it is not surprising that the findings on the vertical dimension are limited.

The Sectoral Environmental Action Plan (SEAP) and the Environmental Profile of the State Budget (EPSB) for the 2004 budget for both ministries were used to assess sector-specific green innovation initiatives. The SEAP is part of the National Environmental Monitoring System (NEMS). The SEAP describes the ministry’s environmental chal-lenges and instruments available to meet the challenges within its domain as well as sectoral targets and objectives. The EPSB is a separate chapter in each ministry’s Annual Parliamentary Bill on the State Budget. In the EPSB ministries are required to document the levels and types of “environmentally motivated expenditures”. Both the SEAP and the EPSB are parts of the Norwegian government’s overall efforts for environmental policy integration.15 In addition to the SEAPs and EPSBs all policy outputs potentially relevant for green innovation were assessed. Within MoE’s sectoral domain, the Norwegian Foundation for Sustainable Production and Consumption16 (GRIP) and the Pollution



Control Authority (SFT)17 were studied. Within MoTI’s sectoral domain, Innovation Norway,18 the government-owned investment company Argentum,19 the Industrial Development Corporation of Norway (SIVA)20 and the Norwegian Board of Tech-nology21 were studied.

• A scoping report provides an initial mapping and specification of sectoral activity which identifies major environmental/ecological impacts associated with key actors and processes, including the governmental unit itself. There do not appear to be any such mappings or specifications from either MoE or MoTI. Inspired by the EU Plan on Environmental Technologies (ETAP), however, MoE has commissioned a report on current and previous Norwegian efforts on environmental technologies from the Pollution Control Authority (SFT). SFT’s report is pending at the ministry, but it is highly unlikely that a scoping report will be produced.

• A forum on green innovation for structured dialogue and consultation with designated principal stakeholders and citizens. There is currently no green inno-vation forum within either MoE or MoTI.

• A sectoral strategy for green innovation, putting forth the sector’s basic princi-ples and goals. Neither MoE nor MoTI has published a sectoral strategy for green innovation, but environmental technology is mentioned as one of three central aims of MoTI’s environmental policy in the EPSB for 2004: “To contribute to the development and use of environmentally friendly technology, products and services” (MoTI Parliamentary Bill 1 (2003-04), pp. 41-42). However, except for research initiatives financed by the Research Council of Norway (RCN), no specific efforts to realise this aim are presented.

• An action plan to implement the strategy, with stipulated priorities, targets, time-tables, policy instruments, and designated responsible actors. A sectoral green innovation action plan is not in place in MoE or MoTI. Except for the references to RCN in MoTI’s EPSB no efforts on green innovation are proposed or referred to in MoE’s SEAP and EPSB or in MoTi’s SEAP.

• A budget for the integration and funding of the green innovation action plan. There is no action plan, hence there is no budget.

• A monitoring programme for overseeing the implementation process, its im-pacts and target results, including specified cycles for monitoring reports and revisions of the sectoral strategy and action plan. No monitoring programme exists (and there is not much to report on).

There is little vertical policy integration of environmental and innovation policies in Norway. There are no strategic actions or plans for green innovation in place. This said, research on related issues such as renewable energy and environmental technologies is taking place. It is financed by the Research Council of Norway. Technical research is, however, only the start of a long innovation journey. Development and diffusion with a view to commercialisation are also needed. Few policy instruments relevant to green innovation are in place.



Other initiatives that may promote a green innovation policy

Results from the evaluation of MoE’s and MoTI’s initiatives with respect to the HEPI/VEPI benchmarks indicate clearly that environmental concerns are not integrated into innovation policy in Norway. However, there are some relevant initiatives. These are not visible when reviewing the HEPI/VEPI benchmarks because they are not an inte-grated part of any policy or plan for green innovation. Examples of such efforts are found within entities like Innovation Norway, SFT and GRIP, but they are all insignificant in both relative and absolute terms. Further, the limited public initiatives documented are not related either to each other or to any overall strategy for green innovations.

The most interesting finding, however, is related to the fact that out of all the policy instruments available to the “innovation ministry”, hardly any are related to green innovation. The simple fact that Innovation Norway, established to spearhead Norwegian innovation policy, has hardly any activities specifically dedicated to green innovation, is remarkable. It is intriguing that despite its more than 700 employees and an annual budget of almost NOK 1 billion22 there was only one small programme of NOK 18 million related to green innovation23 in 2004, and environmental concerns are hardly mentioned in the preliminary version of Innovation Norway’s strategy plan (Innovation Norway, 2004). According to MoTI’s EPSB for 2004, NOK 312 million were allocated to SND/Innovation Norway projects that contribute to greater eco-efficiency. The extent to which the eco-efficient projects are related to innovation is not reported. It has also been difficult to identify such projects as the document refers to projects which have taken environmental concerns into account. The findings from Innovation Norway are clear evidence that the focus on green innovation is virtually non-existent at MoTI, the ministry responsible for innovation policy.

In the 1990s, MoE was responsible for several substantial green innovation initiatives, such as the programme for environmental technology. MoE also financed the Environ-mental Fund, administered by MoTI and SND. It has not been possible to identify any current initiatives, except for a grant of NOK 900 000 allocated in 2004 to the environ-mental NGO Bellona to support information activities related to environmental tech-nologies. MoE’s focus on environmental technology has certainly been declining.

Conclusion

Taking the definition of environmental policy integration and the benchmarks proposed by Lafferty (2004) as a point of departure, this chapter has discussed green innovation policies in Norway. The general conclusion is that the integration of environmental and innovation policies is very weak. The implementation of both the Action Plan for Sustainable Development and the Action Plan for a Comprehensive Innovation Policy is poorly reflected in the EPI benchmarks.

There are, however, some green innovation policy initiatives in Norway. The possi-bility of pursuing change in terms of strengthened public governance for green innovation without the formal structure of a strategic plan is of course possible. Though such ad hoc approaches are very fragile in the sectoral departments – where they must continuously compete with the dominant interests of more traditional sectoral policy making – they constitute a point of departure. And green innovation – both technical and non-technical – is being promoted by a variety of actors within the business community.



It should also be noted that the government’s commitment to green innovation has been steadily declining since the late 1980s. Whereas White Paper 46 (1988-89, Chapter 10.5) explicitly mentioned that the transition from research and development to diffusion and the “widely adopted use of environmental technology has proved to be difficult and that this problem will be addressed”, White Paper 58 (1996-97) focused on such policy instruments as fiscal measures and voluntary agreements. Industry was asked to be more pro-active, and encouraged to extend the lifetime of their products and focus on their products’ life cycle.24 However, the government proposed few concrete measures. In terms of policies recommended in White Paper 58, the greening of industry is to a large extent left to market forces; the associated risks are to be borne by the firms. This still seems to be the case, at least for innovation initiatives.

While commitment to sustainable development has been repeatedly endorsed through international agreements and commitments, the commitment to innovation derives pri-marily either from policy declarations by the European Union, or from more general intellectual and interest-based arguments as to why innovation is increasingly necessary for market competition and economic growth. Furthermore, as indicated above, even within the EU context, it is clear that the goal of sustainable development rests on a stronger normative mandate than innovation. As noted above, Article 6 of the Treaty of the European Union explicitly declares that “environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and implementation” of Community policies, and that this should be done “in particular with a view to promoting sustainable development”. As there is nothing similar with respect to innovation, it is clear that the integration of environmental concerns has greater immediacy and “lexicographic” (ranked) normative status than innovation.

The case for “principled priority” for environmental concerns is perhaps even stronger for Norway, which has consistently been a key actor in promoting the sustainable development agenda at the international level. Though the follow-up at home has been considerably less impressive (Lafferty et al., 1997, 2002), the strong international profile adds considerable normative weight to sustainable development as a national task of “overarching” importance. The international commitments are, moreover, reflected in the relative weightings of the two policy domains in domestic politics. While there is a National Strategy for Sustainable Development, there is no national strategy for innovation. Both issues have their own national action plans, but whereas the National Action Plan for Sustainable Development (NA21) clearly enlists innovation in the service of sustainable development, the Action Plan for a Comprehensive Innovation Policy (HIP) has nothing of substance to say about the role of innovation in promoting sustainable development.25

By relating the results of the foregoing evaluation to the categories identified in Table 9.1, it should be possible to map degrees of integration with respect to “environmental protection”, “ecological modernisation” and “sustainable development”. It should also be possible to highlight the normative differences (and practical implications) of contrasting existing EU innovation policies with the prospect of “ecological communalism”. Such a mapping can then be used as a point of departure for identifying barriers and prospects for change in relation to each type of integration, thereby adding greater substance to the discussion of “decoupling” and “recoupling”. A more substantiated discourse devoted to the dimensions put forth in Table 9.1 could provide a more effective approach to govern-ance for sustainable development through a strengthening of green innovation policies.



Notes

1. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2004 Berlin Conference on the Human Dimensions of Global Environmental Change: “Greening of Policies – Interlinkages and Policy Integration”.

2. The “Presidency’s Priorities” are available on the Web site of the Dutch EU Presidency: www.eu2004.nl (accessed 12 November 2004). The relevant section is “Environment”, pp. 16-17.

3. This section builds on work presented in Lafferty 2002 and 2004.

4. There are several EU Web sites devoted to different aspects of innovation, but the concept has its own “portal”, so that it can be navigated from www.cordis.lu/innovation/ (accessed 8 February 2005). The site is well co-ordinated and highly informative.

5. OECD (2001b, Chapter 6) is a key source for the position adopted here.

6. The Green Paper makes sporadic references to the environment, touching, for example, on environmental regulations as reasons for innovation, or, more obliquely, the potential for innovation within the environmental protection sector. Mention is made of a pilot project (“Growth and Environment”) set up at the request of the European Parliament which provided loan guarantees for “projects with beneficial effects for the environment” (CEC, 1995, p. 30).

The “First Action Plan for Innovation in Europe” had even less to say on the issue. Here there is only a single mention of a possible innovation-environment link – but it is a mention that points towards things to come. In a brief concluding reference to a need for “fleshing out” the plan in relation to “various priority sectors or fields”, it is stated that: “Situations vary widely according to the country, the sector and the technology. The action plan will therefore need to be adapted to certain fields or sectors designated as priorities. These might include environmental protection and sustainable development, the services sector, rural development, aspects related to demand and consumers, the audio-visual sector and better exploitation of space and dual-use technology”. (CEC, 1996. p. 9) It is this “signal” that is strongly reflected in the current draft action plan, and, most specifically, in the separate “Environmental Technologies Action Plan” (ETAP) of 2004 (CEC, 2004b).

7. It should also be mentioned here that the draft action plan now circulating makes it absolutely clear that the major purpose of innovation in the European Union is to “close the gap” between the United States and Europe in levels and rates of economic performance. Anyone looking for less commercial signals as to the purpose of innovation will look in vain.

8. “Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. It contains within it two key concepts: the concept of “needs”, in particular the essential needs of the world’s poor, to which overriding priority should be given; and the idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and social organisation on the environment’s ability to meet present and future needs” (WCED, 1987, p. 43).

9. For the distinction between “outputs” and “outcomes”, see Vedung (1997); and for the differentiation between “process”, “policy” and “products”, see Lafferty (2001, pp. 268-301). Nilsson and Persson (2003) have adopted a similar approach to that proposed here.



10. It must be underlined, however, that this refers to the principled status and not necessarily the actual political interpretation.

11. The list reflects general models of policy implementation (see, for example, Sabatier, 1999; Parsons, 1995; and Hill 1997), as well as more recent publications on policy integration and de-coupling (OECD, 2001a, Chapter 3; and OECD, 2001b, Chapter 4; Wilkinson, 1998; IEEP, 2001, Chapter 4; EEA 2001, Chapter 4; Lafferty and Meadowcroft, 2000). It also reflects more specific evaluations and project reports (such as Hertin et al., 2001, Fergusson et al., 2001, and Kraemer, 2001). See also the comprehensive state-of-the-art overviews of EPI by Persson (2004) and the European Environment Agency (EEA, 2004), and the “stocktaking” of the Cardiff process by the European Commission (CEC, 2004c).

12. The conceptual imagery and terminology are inspired by Immanuel Kant’s work on “pure” and “practical” reason (Kemp, 1968, Chapter 1). Within a context of “procedural democracy” (Dahl, 1997), it is presumed that a “trump” regulatory principle would be judiciously applied in accord with the conditions and guidelines of a “canon of judgment” for sustainable development decision making. The “precautionary principle” (as elaborated, for example, by O’Riordan et al., 2001) would be a necessary part of the canon.

13. The Norwegian term is sentrale politikkområder.

14. The Norwegian term is Regjeringens innovasjonsutvalg.

15. More information on the NEMS/SEAP and the EPSB is available in Lafferty et al. (2004a).

16. For further details see www.grip.no/ (accessed 5 January 2005)

17. For further details see: www.sft.no/english/ (accessed 8 January 2005).

18. For further details see www.invanor.no/ (accessed Jan 8, 2005).

19. For further details see www.argentum.no/ (accessed 8 January 2005).

20. For further details see www.siva.no/ (accessed 8 January 2005).

21. The Norwegian term is Teknologirådet. For further details see www.teknologiradet.no/ (accessed 8 Janu-ary 2005).

22. NOK 973.25 million in 2004 and NOK 997.2 million in 2005 (MoTI Parliamentary Bill 1 (2004-05), p. 150).

23. The program provides grants to develop small bio-fuel plants and machinery to make chips for the plants.

24. This can be interpreted as an expression of the environmental policy paradigm of ecological moderni-sation. See e.g. Mol (1996) and Reitan (2001).

25. An English version of the sustainable development action plan is available on line at www.odin.dep.no/filarkiv/206401/nat_action.pdf. An English version of the Innovation Policy Plan is available at http://odin.dep.no/archive/nhdvedlegg/01/10/fromi033.pdf. In the sustainable development action plan it is stated that: “Business has a crucial role in working to achieve sustainable development. The ability of business to innovate in the direction of more sustainable production processes and a willingness to take social responsibility will ultimately be decisive for reaching key political goals.” (National Action Plan for Sustainable Development 2003: 40-41, authors’ translation).



References

Commission of the European Communities (CEC) (1995), “Green Paper on Innovation”, Brussels.

Commission of the European Communities (CEC) (1996), “The First Action Plan for Innovation in Europe: Innovation for Growth and Employment”, Brussels.

Commission of the European Communities (CEC) (2001), “A Sustainable Europe for a Better World: A European Union Strategy for Sustainable Development”, Commission’s Proposal to the Gothenburg European Council, COM(2001)264 final, Brussels.

Commission of the European Communities (CEC) (2003), “Innovation Policy: Updating the Union’s Approach in the Context of the Lisbon Strategy”, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM(2003) 112, Brussels, 11 March.

Commission of the European Communities (CEC) (2004a), “Innovate for a Competitive Europe: A New Action Plan for Innovation”, Brussels, 2 April.

Commission of the European Communities (CEC) (2004b), “Stimulating Technologies for Sustainable Development: An Environmental Technologies Action Plan for the European Union”, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM(2004) 38, Brussels 28 January.

Commission of the European Communities (CEC) (2004c), “Integrating Environmental Consideratons into Other Policy Areas: A Stocktaking of the Cardiff Process”, COM(2004)394 final, Brussels, 1 June.

Collier, U. (1994), Energy and Environment in the European Union, Aldershot, Ashgate.

Dahl, R.A. (1997), “Procedural Democracy”, in R.E. Goodin and P. Pettit (eds.), Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology, Oxford, Blackwell, pp. 109-27.

Easton, D. (1965), A Framework for Political Analysis, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice Hall.

European Environment Agency (EEA) (2001), “Environment in the European Union at the Turn of the Century”, Copenhagen.

European Environment Agency (EEA) (2004), “Environmental Policy Integration: Looking Back, Thinking Ahead”, draft paper authored by C. Coffey, A. Ladefoged, D. Wilkinson and A. Farmer. Project manager: A. Dom, Copenhagen.

Fergusson, M., C. Coffey, D. Wilkinson and D. Baldock (2001), The Effectiveness of EU Council Integration Strategies and Options for Carrying Forward the “Cardiff” Process, Vols. 1 and 2 (Annexes), London, Institute for European Environmental Policy.



Gallie, W.B. (1956), “Essentially Contested Concepts”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. 56: 167-198.

Hertin, J., F. Berkhout, S. Moll and P. Schepelmann (2001), “Indicators for Monitoring Integration of Environment and Sustainable Development in Expertise Policy”, Final Report, Brighton, SPRU, University of Sussex.

Hill, M. (1997), The Policy Process in the Modern State, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall.

Innovation Norway (2004), “Strategisk retning for Innovasjon Norge” (Strategic Direction for Innovation Norway), unpublished preliminary strategic plan, received from Statistics Norway official, 21 December 2004.

International Institute of European Environmental Policy (IEEP) (2001), Manual of Environmental Policy, London.

Kemp, J. (1968): The Philosophy of Kant, Oxford University Press, London.

Kraemer, R.A. (2001): “Results of the ‘Cardiff Processes’: Assessing the State of Development and Charting the Way Ahead”, Report to the German Federal Environmental Agency and the German Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, Research Report Number 299 19 120 (UFOPLAN), Berlin, Ecologic.

Lafferty, W.M. (ed.) (2001): Sustainable Communities in Europe, London, Earthscan Publications.

Lafferty, W.M. (2002), “Adapting Government Practice to the Goals of Sustainable Development”, ProSus Working Paper 1/02, Oslo, ProSus, University of Oslo (Paper presented to the OECD/PUMA expert seminar on “Improving Governance for Sustainable Development”, Paris, 22-23 November 2001).

Lafferty, W.M. (2004), “From Environmental Protection to Sustainable Development: The Challenge of Decoupling through Sectoral Integration”, in W.M. Lafferty (ed.), Governance for Sustainable Development: The Challenge of Adapting Form to Function, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK.

Lafferty, W.M. and E. Hovden (2003), “Environmental Policy Integration: Towards an Analytical Framework”, Environmental Politics, Vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 1-22.

Lafferty, W.M. and O. Langhelle (1999), Towards Sustainable Development, Macmillan Press Ltd., London.

Lafferty, W.M., O. Langhelle, P. Mugaas, and M.H. Ruge (eds) (1997), Rio + 5. Norges oppfølging av FN-konferansen om miljø og utvikling, Tano Aschehoug, Oslo.

Lafferty, W.M., O.M. Larsen and A. Ruud (2004), “Institutional Provisions for Environmental Policy Integration: An Analysis of the ‘Environmental Profile of the State Budget’ and the ‘National Environmental Monitoring System’ in Norway”, Working Paper no. 2/04, University of Oslo, ProSus.

Lafferty, W.M. and J. Meadowcroft (eds) (2000), Implementing Sustainable Development: Strategies and Initiatives in High Consumption Societies, Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press.

Lane, R.E. (1991), The Market Experience, New York and Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.



Lane, R.E. (2000), The Loss of Happiness in Market Democracies, New Haven, Yale University Press.

Lenschow, A. (2002), Environmental Policy Integration: Greening Sectoral Policies in Europe, London, Earthscan Ltd.

Liberatore, A. (1997), “The Integration of Sustainable Development Objectives into EU Policy Making: Barriers and Prospects”, in S. Baker et al., The Politics of Sustainable Development, London, Routledge, pp. 108-126.

Mol, A.P.J. (1996), “Ecological Modernisation and Institutional Reflexivity: Environmental Reform in late Modern Age”. Environmental Politics, Vol. 5, No. 2.

Ministry of Environment (MoE) White Papers: see “White Papers” below.

Ministry of Finance White Paper: see “White Papers” below.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) (2002), National Strategy for Sustainable Development, MoFA, Oslo.

Ministry of Trade and Industry (MoTI) (2003-2004), Parliamentary Bill 1 on the Sate Budget, Oslo.

Nilsson, M. and Å. Persson (2003): “Framework for Analysing Environmental Policy Integration”, Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning, Vol. 5, No. 4, pp. 333-359.

OECD (2001a), Policies to Enhance Sustainable Development, OECD, Paris.

OECD (2001b), Sustainable Development: Critical Issues, OECD, Paris.


O’Riordan, T., J. Cameron and A. Jordan (2001), Reinterpreting the Precautionary Principle, Cameron-May, London.

Parsons, W. (1995), Public Policy, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.

Persson, Å. (2004), “Environmental Policy Integration: An Introduction”, background paper for the PINTS Project (“Policy Integration for Sustainability”), Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI), Stockholm.

Reitan, M. (2001), “Ecological Modernization and ‘Realpolitik’: Ideas, Interests and Institutions”, Environmental Politics, Vol. 17, No. 2: 1-16.

Remøe, S. (2002): “MONIT: Joint Conceptual Paper”, STEP Centre for Innovation Research, Oslo.

Ruud, A. (2002), “Industry and Environmental Responsibility: From Proactive to Reactive Public Policies”, in W.M. Lafferty, M. Nordskag and H.-A. Aakre (eds), Realizing Rio in Norway: Evaluative Studies of Sustainable Development, Oslo, ProSus.

Ruud, A. (2004), “Partners for Progress? The Role of Business in Transcending Business As Usual”, in W.M. Lafferty (ed.), Governance for Sustainable Development: The Challenge of Adapting Form to Function, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK.

Ruud, A. and O.M. Larsen (2004), “Coherence of Environmental and Innovation Policies: A Green Innovation Policy in Norway?”, ProSus Report 05/04, University of Oslo, ProSus.



Sabatier, P. (ed.) (1999), Theories of the Policy Process, Westview Press, Boulder.

United Nations (1994), Agenda 21: Programme of Action from Rio, United Nations Department of Public Information, New York.

Vedung, E. (1997), Public Policy and Program Evaluation, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, New Jersey.

WCED (1987): Our Common Future, Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York.

White Paper 1 (Ministry of Finance) (2003-2004), “Nasjonalbudsjettet 2004” [2004 National Budget], Ministry of Finance, Oslo.

White Paper 46 (Ministry of the Environment) (MoE) (1988-89), “Miljø og utvikling. Norges oppfølging av Verdenskommisjonens rapport” [Environment and Development: Norway’s Follow-up of the World Commission’s Report], Ministry of the Environment, Oslo.

White Paper 58 (Ministry of the Environment) (MoE) (1996-97): “Miljøvernpolitikk for en bærekraftig utvikling. Dugnad for framtida” [Environmental Policy for Sustainable Development], Ministry of the Environment, Oslo.

Wilkinson, D. (1998), “Steps Towards Integrating the Environment into Other EU Policy Sectors”, in T. O’Riordan and H. Voisey (eds), The Transition to Sustainability: The Politics of Agenda 21 in Europe, London, Earthscan Publications, pp. 113-129.

LINKING INNOVATION POLICY AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN FLANDERS – 245


Chapter 10

LINKING INNOVATION POLICY AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN FLANDERS

Ilse Dries, Jan Larosse and Peter Van Humbeeck

This chapter describes the policy response to the Flemish innovation system’s excessive dependence on material- and energy-intensive production systems. The solution would require a long-term transition to a less resource-intensive and more knowledge-intensive economy. However, the governance of both sustainable development and innovation policy is still dominated by a sectoral logic in institutional behaviour and policy development that is a bottleneck for integrated policy development. There is not yet an integrated governance structure to implement a framework for sustainable development. Moreover, innovation is not at the top of policy agendas elsewhere in the system. Until recently in fact there has been little interaction between sustainable development and innovation. The Environmental Technology Platform (MIP), established by the Flemish government, can be a decisive institutional lever for changing the governance structure in order to manage the transition more effectively, in particular by achieving greater co-herence between supply (stimulating excellence in research and innovation) and demand (procurement policies, etc.). MIP has the potential to foster the development of visions and co-operation among different actors in the innovation system. Whether this will happen depends on conditions that remain to be fulfilled.

Introduction

Context

Innovation policy and sustainable development policy are relatively new policy domains. They share characteristics such as complex subject matter, heterogeneous actors, a horizontal approach and weak institutionalisation. They exemplify many of the challenges for managing complexity in modern societies in general, as well as a changed context for policy efforts to build for the future.

Innovation policy evolved from a linear technology-push strategy, which assumes that economic performance follows research performance, into a system approach which recognises the innovation process as an interactive process in which interconnected actors and institutions engage in the production, diffusion and use of knowledge. At national level, this interactive innovation process provides the elements and relationships that constitute a country’s national innovation system (NIS).

246 – LINKING INNOVATION POLICY AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN FLANDERS


The system approach, which focuses on the relationships between actors and the knowledge flows in the system, is well suited to help policy makers deal with dynamic, complex processes such as innovation. However, it is still very new. The challenge is to derive operational guidelines from the NIS approach in order to conduct successful innovation policy. In fact, policy practice is often in advance of theory in developing new ways to capitalise on the interactive nature of innovation processes. The OECD Working Party on Technology and Innovation Policy, which had an important stake in the elaboration and diffusion of the new policy framework, has sought to give the approach more operability and focus, in particular in terms of institutional preconditions for enhancing the performance of innovation processes. Because the institutional setting of its national innovation system largely determines a country’s adaptive capacity and competitive advantage, the governance issue is of strategic importance and has become more of a focal point in policy development.

At the same time, innovation policy is evolving towards third-generation innovation policy, stressing the need for integration with sectoral policies. This means that sectoral policies have to make innovation a distinct objective and that innovation policy has to expand its scope from economic goals to other types of policy goals. New types of horizontal policies and governance structures are needed to develop a multi-sector, multi-goal innovation policy. Innovation policy combines with sustainable development policy to balance economic, social and ecological goals to preserve the well-being of future generations.

The general issue of governance

The key stages of a policy cycle, as depicted below, are a well-known reference for policy making. The policy cycle, from agenda setting to evaluation of the effectiveness of policies, is a formal linear model that is not generally followed in practice. The processes are in fact interlinked and should be understood as elements of an interactive model in which policies are the result of many complementary inputs and conditions and outcomes are determined by many interacting players. In addition, policies affect each other. Therefore, the consistency of policy cycles in different policy domains and between policy levels is an important issue as well. This leads to a broader view of policy as an institutionalised multi-actor and multi-dimensional process. Governments can hardly be viewed as a single (rational) actor, pursuing clear objectives with full information and clear and consistent preferences. Rather, governments, and their policy systems, act under great uncertainty often with less than optimal information and in-built contradictions and tensions.

Public governance concerns the ways in which the policy cycle is managed and influenced, both formally and informally. It typically concerns the systems and practices that governments use to set agendas, co-ordinate policies, co-operate with stakeholders and build up collective capabilities for policy learning (Figure 10.1). The objective is to develop the capacities, instruments and institutional mechanisms that are required for effective and coherent policies. Coherence is defined here as the degree of correspondence between goals and instruments and between policy formulation and policy implementa-tion in a particular policy domain (vertical coherence), the consistency between policies in different policy domains and the potential for integration (horizontal coherence) and the modulation over time of short-term and long-term objectives or the mutual fit of current policies and perceived challenges (temporal coherence). By institutional capa-cities are meant the ability of a country to mobilise and/or adapt its institutions to perform functions, solve problems and set and achieve objectives. Institutions are broadly defined



here as sets of rules, processes and practices. They not only include organisations, which are often called institutions, but also all formal or informal rules, processes and practices that exist within society.

Figure 10.1. The policy cycle and the issue of public governance

A country’s governance structure determines to a large extent its performance, including its ability to adopt new societal objectives. Improving governance means dealing with the mismatches between perceived policy challenges and the policy mixes adopted, often owing to weak political leadership, lack of decision-support systems, fragmented policy formulation, inefficient interdepartmental co-ordination, competing rationales and ideologies, short-termism in resource allocation, poor transparency and accountability. Political leadership and commitment, institutional mechanisms for policy co-ordination, transparency, stakeholder participation and knowledge management are components of good governance.

The following discussion first analyses the policy space and the policy processes related to sustainable development policy. It next examines the links between sustainable development and innovation policies and the role of the innovation policy in enhancing sustainable development and vice versa. Then, possible ways to improve the synergy between these policies are described. A brief conclusion follows.

Sustainable development policy in Flanders and Belgium

The Belgian/Flemish context

Belgium is a small and densely populated country (10.3 million inhabitants and 32 545 km2). Flanders is the more densely populated, Dutch-speaking part of Belgium (almost 6 million inhabitants and 13 522 km2). Flanders is one of Europe’s key economic regions. It lies at the heart of the large industrial area of western Europe and has a well-educated workforce. A good transport network provides direct links to all major European markets and – through the harbour network – to the world. Owing to its small scale, high population density, central location and transit economy, Flanders has to deal with problems of congestion, road safety, high emission levels, environmental degradation and

Agenda setting

Policy preparation

Policy formulation Policy implementation

Policy evaluation

Institutions

Policy cycle

Networks

Capabilities

Interactions

Knowledge

Information

Incentives Regulations

Procedures

Instruments

Ideologies

Values



lack of space. A decoupling of economic growth and pressure on the environment has not yet taken place.

The institutional context in Belgium is complicated by the division of competencies among different governments. Apart from the federal government there are three community governments (Flemish, French and German) and three regional governments (Flemish, Walloon and Brussels). Important issues such as taxation and social security are decided at the federal level, but many policy issues have been regionalised (e.g. culture, education, environment, public works and transport, science and research policy, etc.). There is no hierarchy of federal laws and regional decrees. Because of its wide scope, sustainable development policy is distributed among various federal and regional policy domains.

This complex institutional organisation is an obvious barrier to a coherent and integrated sustainable development strategy. On the other hand, its advantages include more possibilities for mutual learning and for institutional competition.

Public governance for sustainable development policy at the federal level

Good governance and sound public management are preconditions for implementa-tion of sustainable development policies. These preconditions include political leadership and commitment, institutional mechanisms for policy co-ordination, transparency and stakeholder participation and knowledge management. Political leadership is particularly challenging in this context, given the potential for conflict among various interests in both the public and private sectors. Institutional mechanisms are the source of the capacity to adapt or construct new institutions for sustainable development, to bring together capable personnel and mechanisms for solving problems, and to set, achieve and evaluate sustainable development objectives. Policy coherence is a key element owing to its wide scope. Transparency implies that decision making is sufficiently open and helps ensure broad support. Conflicting interests are often at stake in discussions of sustainable development, and trade-offs are a major feature of policy making. Governments have an important role to play in addressing the major conflicts of interests among stakeholders, in particular by involving them in constructive discussions of these issues, but also in forging compromises, advancing solutions and networking. Knowledge management is extremely important in the context of the long-term thinking required for sustainable development. The complexity and unpredictability of the long-term effects of most issues related to sustainable development imply that, for most policy decisions, conclusive scientific evidence may not be available. Managing knowledge for sustainable develop-ment is therefore extremely important. This section analyses how these four aspects of good governance are present at the federal level.

Political leadership and institutional mechanisms

The federal government is ahead of the regions in developing a more formal strategy on sustainable development. It has created a governance framework with a law, a council, different institutions and a planning and reporting system.

As a follow-up to the Rio agreement on sustainable development, a 1997 federal law describes a set of policy instruments for building sustainable development policy. Two important elements are the four-year Federal Plan for Sustainable Development and the bi-annual Federal Report on Sustainable Development. The first plan dates from 2000 and covers 2000-04. The second plan was recently launched and follows the structure of the



European strategy for sustainable development. It covers climate change, transport, health, natural resources, poverty and social exclusion, and population ageing.

The Interdepartmental Commission for Sustainable Development (ICDO) is res-ponsible for preparing the four-year plan and an annual follow-up report. It is composed of federal officials, each of whom represents a member of the federal government. Almost all policy domains that are the competence of the federal government are repre-sented. Until recently the officials who attended the monthly meetings of the ICDO were not high-ranking.

Although there is a legal framework, it is clearly insufficient (and probably not the most important issue in building sustainable development policy). Since sustainable development has not been a political priority, it has proven very difficult to implement the plan. There has also been a lack of human and financial resources. As a result, many actions have been delayed.

Because the federal government is the competent authority for only a limited number of policy issues and instruments, it has difficulty developing a truly integrated policy plan for sustainable development. For example, it can introduce certain labels or product standards, i.e. for recycled materials, but the regional governments are the competent authorities for instruments such as subsidies for recycling centres, agreements with industrial sectors, information campaigns, etc. For water, the federal government legally has almost no policy competence. A truly integrated sustainable development plan would need the consent of the regions and the elaboration of a common national strategy on sustainable development as agreed in the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation (JPOI).

An important challenge is to achieve true policy integration and implement sus-tainable development through a horizontal approach rather than a set of scattered initiatives in separate policy domains. Today’s federal plan looks like a list of actions to tackle specific problems in particular policy domains, rather than an integrated approach to horizontal challenges in the overall context of sustainable development. This frag-mentation is also reflected in the functioning of the ICDO. For example, for the annual follow-up report, every member prepares a document for his or her policy domain. Little interaction takes place. Although the content of the Federal Plan for Sustainable Develop-ment is still highly fragmented, progress has been made in certain areas.

Recently, the federal government has responded to some of the drawbacks by founding a new horizontal central administration (PODDO: Programmatic Public Service on Sustainable Development) to support sustainable development policy. Its mission is to help other institutions to prepare and implement sustainable development policy.

Following the policy agreement of the new federal government (July 2003), units for sustainable development in the different ministries have been approved. Their main task is to analyse the effect of all governmental decisions on sustainable development (sustainable development impact analysis). The government has also announced that it will pay more attention to the annual follow-up report of the ICDO, as well as to the reports of the Planning Bureau. Every year it will ask the advice of the Federal Council, and all these documents will be delivered to parliament.



Stakeholder participation on the federal level

Stakeholder participation is considered very important. An important actor in this context is the Federal Council for Sustainable Development (FRDO), an advisory body composed of a large number of experts, representatives of socio-economic, cultural and environmental protection organisations, as well as of the federal and regional govern-ments. The federal government can ask advice on its proposed policy, but the Council can also initiate advisory procedures. It has several thematic working groups, in which interaction and discussion take place. It can also take initiatives to communicate with the public on sustainable development. For example, for the preparation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, the Council organised several conferences.

There is also a public inquiry on every new Federal Sustainable Development Plan. All citizens can give their opinion during a two-month period (three months in future). But there are no rules on how this inquiry should be organised, on the instruments to be used, the way to approach the public, appropriate timing, etc., or how the results of inquiries should be taken into account.

Figure 10.2. Sustainable development policy governance at the federal level and in Flanders

… Energy Policy Decree (in preparation)

Mobility Decree (in preparation) 1999 Land Use Planning Decree

Env reports 1 - 2 - 5 years

GMO (Departmental Commission)

Federal government

MIRA (Flemish Environmental Agency)

MiNa - Raad (Env Council) (and Social - Economic Council)

Public inquiry

1999 Innovation Decree

Draft Env program (1 year)

Draft Env plan (5 years)

Env program (1 year)

Env plan (5 years)

Federal level Flanders

Legal framework for SD Explicit SD strategy and plan

Formal governance bodies for SD

But Little polictical commitment

Highly fragmented

No legal framework for SD No explicit SD strategy and plan

No formal governance bodies for SD

But Broad Environmental Policy Plan

Important (isolated) efforts Informal SD strategy (‘Pact van Vilvoorde’)

Stakeholders

Public Public inquiry

Draft follow up report (1 year)

Follow up report (1 year)

Env plan (5 years)

Draft Federal plan for SD (4 years)

Federal plan for SD (5 years)

Federal report on SD (2 years)

ICDO (Interdepartmental Commission)

Federal government

Federal planning bureau

FRDO (Federal Council for SD)

Government Administration

(ministries)

Federal government

‘Scientists’

1997 Federal Law on SD

Env reports 1 - 2 - 5 years

GMO (Departmental Commission)

Flemish government

MIRA (Flemish Environmental Agency)

MiNa - Raad (Env Council) (and Social - Economic Council)

Government Administration

Flemish government

‘Scientists’

Stakeholders

Public Public inquiry

1995 Environmental Decree

Draft Env program (1 year)

Draft Env plan (5 years)

Env program (1 year)

Env plan (5 years)



Knowledge management at the federal level

Political commitment and policy integration can only come together in a framework for long-term strategic convergence. At the federal level, the Research Programme for Sustainable Development and the Planning Bureau in particular provide important sup-port in this respect.

The Task Force on Sustainable Development of the Planning Bureau prepares the Federal Report on Sustainable Development every two years. The report analyses the current situation and evaluates sustainable development policy. It is used as an input for both the follow-up of the present plan and the elaboration of a new plan. Figure 10.2 compares sustainable development policy governance at the federal level and in Flanders.

Public governance for sustainable development policy at the Flemish regional level

Flanders does not have an overall sustainable development policy and there is no legal framework for co-ordination of such a policy. Environmental policy clearly takes the lead in promoting sustainable development through a legal and institutional frame-work similar to that for sustainable development on the federal level, laid down in a 1995 decree. In fact, the federal framework was inspired to a large extent by the Flemish environmental policy. The Flemish government approves an environmental policy plan every five years and an environmental programme annually. The Flemish environmental agency is responsible for a series of environmental reports that describe the quality of the environment, forecast the state of the environment under different scenarios and evaluate environmental policy. Based on the 1995 decree, there is a public inquiry on every new plan. The Environmental Council and the Social-Economic Council act as advisory bodies. Some other policy domains in Flanders have a more or less comparable policy cycle framework. For example, the 1999 decree on innovation introduced among other things a four-year innovation policy plan for which the Council for Scientific Policy and the Social-Economic Council act as advisors. In spite of the lack of an overall strategy or framework, important efforts have been made recently.

Political leadership and institutional mechanisms

In the last decade sustainable development was part of policy declarations in 1995, in 1999 and less explicitly in 2004. In 1999 the policy agreement stated more explicitly the importance of sustainable development: “We must provide for the needs of this genera-tion without limiting the possibilities of future generations. Sustainable development has to take place within the borders of the ecological system and pay attention to the less favoured members of society.” The new 2005-09 government declaration makes a less explicit reference to sustainable development but affirms a continuation of policies to integrate economic, social and ecological concerns. The new policy agreement states that one of the core tasks of Flanders is “to evolve towards a competitive and responsible region, with an economy that fosters simultaneously economic, social and ecological development”. On the other hand, responsibility for sustainable development policy was for the first time formally assigned to the Minister-President of the Flemish government. His cabinet prepared a first policy note for sustainable development for the coming five years.



While Flanders did not have a defined, overall sustainable development policy at the end of 2004, many issues relating to sustainable development were included in the policy letters of different ministers between 1999 and 2004 and there have been some interesting projects related to sustainable development: sustainable entrepreneurship and employ-ment in the environmental sector, sustainable mobility, rational energy consumption and renewable energy supply, sustainable agriculture, sustainable technology development, etc.

In 2001 the government launched a policy vision project, called Colourful Flanders, to establish a platform involving all social actors for longer-term societal development. It can be considered as a first move towards an integrated strategic policy that finds its inspiration in the sustainable development agenda, because of its horizontal goals and themes and its longer-term thinking (2010). Six working groups, composed of experts, members of the Cabinet, officials of the ministries, and representatives of socio-economic organisations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), drafted long-term vision texts on entrepreneurship, education, work, culture, care and the environment. These were translated into “21 objectives for the 21st century” and signed during a high-level con-ference by all ministers and by representatives of the social partners and environmental organisations. Afterwards, a set of indicators was agreed to follow up the Pact of Vil-voorde (named after the town where the conference was held). The Pact of Vilvoorde can be considered as a valuable effort to formulate policies with a longer-term horizon, combining ecological, social and economic objectives for sustainable growth. On the other hand, the Pact of Vilvoorde cannot be more than a first step. The process was characterised by a lack of integrated thinking. The six vision groups worked indepen-dently without much interaction. As a consequence, the horizontal aspect is absent and certain dimensions that are important for sustainable development are lacking, i.e. the international dimension (international solidarity, technology transfer to the developing countries) and a balanced approach to the three pillars of sustainable development. The pact is a political message that long-term thinking is important. Furthermore, governance by conferences, a common thread in political decision making in Belgium, has limited impact if it is not combined with efforts to translate objectives into coherent policies.

The recent policy letter on sustainable development explicitly states that the govern-ment will formulate a sustainable development strategy for Flanders. To enhance this scenario, a study was carried out in 2004 to examine tools and conditions for structuring the future dialogue and policy framework for sustainable development.

Institutional mechanisms at Flemish level

Flemish public servants will have to deal with cross-department issues relating to sustainable development, and an interdepartmental working group on sustainable develop-ment was established in 2003. One of its tasks was to prepare in common papers for international meetings on sustainable development, such as the Commission for Sustain-able Development of the United Nations. Other tasks were to prepare co-ordinated advice on preparatory texts of the Federal Plan for Sustainable Development and to prepare a Flemish strategy on sustainable development, which the group felt was a priority. In this context, they have made an inventory of the different approaches, visions and actions related to sustainable development in the different policy domains.



An important tool for the integration of sustainable development thinking in policies and regulations is the recently introduced regulatory impact analysis. Its aim is to improve the quality of regulation and policies by carrying out a systematic analysis of the social, economic and environmental effects of existing and proposed regulations.

Stakeholder participation and transparency

At present, there have been several exercises with focus groups, test panels, etc., and there is increasing use of different forms of interactive policy making developed by government administrations, universities, NGOs, etc. However, these are often separate, small-scale initiatives.

There are several well-established advisory boards such as the Environmental Council (MiNa), the Social-Economic Council (SERV), the Council for Innovation Science, and the Council for Education.

MiNa and SERV recently decided to collaborate on sustainable development. They have published a call, directed to the whole Flemish government, to prepare a Flemish Strategy for Sustainable Development.

Knowledge management

Flanders has no framework for long-term strategic convergence. There is an emerging use of scenario analysis and foresight in Flanders (administration of planning and statistics, ViwTA, VRWB, universities), scientific policy support points have been estab-lished at universities and departmental policy units are under way (BBB), and advisory councils like SERV and MiNa sometimes fulfil a think-tank function. New innovation projects like transition management (sustainable building and living) and foresight (rural areas) are initiated by the environmental policy domain. Also, instruments like MIRA (environmental reporting and foresight) play an important role. But generally, instruments for strategic intelligence to support decision processes are not well developed. Initiatives involving foresight, back-casting and other explorative techniques for policy development are scattered and not well linked to the policy cycle. Forums for sharing experience and knowledge are nearly inexistent.

Co-ordination and integration of environmental and innovation policies in sustainable development

The case for integration

Discovery of a path to sustainable development is a main policy challenge. Leaving aside disaster scenarios, the evolutionary strategies societies currently pursue depend heavily on rebalancing the economic system on which our welfare is based. Techno-logical progress carries high hopes for ecological modernisation and is bringing innovation and environmental policies closer together.

In fact, combining economic, social and environmental goals requires the decoupling of economic growth and environmental pressures. The inadequacy of present policies to achieve the necessary improvement in eco-efficiency puts radical, systemic change and technological, economic and social innovation at the centre of sustainable development policy. Close collaboration between environmental policy and innovation policy is urgently needed.



Instrumental integration and co-ordination of policies

In environmental policy, interest in the potential role of technological innovation for attaining environmental goals is very limited. And, vice versa, the consideration given in the innovation policy field to the promotion of environmental quality is also very limited. There has been little contact between innovation policy and environmental policy and a total lack of integration. Not only the two policies, but also their entire policy communi-ties, including policy research, are largely separate worlds.

Approaches to better integration or co-ordination of environmental and innovation policy can take either the perspective of single policy instruments focused on changing (economic) behaviour, or that of transition programmes for system changes. They can also be complementary (Figure 10.3).

Figure 10.3. Emerging collaboration between innovation and environmental policy in Flanders

Innovation Policy

Environmental Policy

Innovation Policy

Environmental Policy

Transition Management

Integration of each other’s objectives

Environmental policy, e.g. more flexible and innovation-friendly standards and permits

Innovation policy, e.g. ‘sustainable

technological development (DTO) scheme

Separate worlds

Little effect on environmental technological development

Typically diffusion, not innovation

due to uncertainty and lack of consistency

and isolated measures in the ‘innovation chain’

Need for system innovation

Decoupling – Factor 10

Interactive policy making

Networking

Transition management

Evaluation of innovation impacts of environmental policy instruments

Strengthening existing

innovation support schemes

Development of environmental regulations favouring innovation

’Innovation chain’ management and

development of new instruments (public procurement,

third-party financing, etc.)

‘Third-generation’ innovation policy

Technology forecasting and backcasting

Networking and clustering with private sector and research

MIP Governance for linking environmental and innovation policies

Time

Institutional underpinning

Integration agenda

Not surprisingly, traditional environmental and innovation policy instruments have had little effect on environmental technology development. Environmental policy typic-ally focuses on diffusion of existing technologies, not innovation, and it is often accused of being a barrier to technological innovation. This can be said for instruments such as regulation based on the best available technology, some types of covenants and even economic instruments (subsidies, taxes, tradable certificates) that are used in Flanders.



The basic reason is that innovation tends to be incremental under conditions of uncertainty or when the long-term framework is lacking; Flanders has generally lacked clear goal setting, consistent goal keeping and practical and consistent environmental policies. The calculation of the wastewater charge, for example, was revised in five successive years in the early 1990s; the system for renewable energy certificates has been modified as much as seven times since its introduction in 2002. In a survey of the Flemish environmental industry, business leaders mentioned this uncertainty as the most troubling barrier for technological innovation (Bollen and Van Humbeeck, 2000). It is also one explanation for the success of minimum compliance technology and end-of-pipe solutions in the Flemish environmental industry. This confirms that the effect of environmental instruments on technological innovation perhaps depends more on the role of political leadership in setting clear targets that are reflected in the design and implementation of instruments than on technical characteristics.

Second, traditional policy instruments cannot hope to achieve much more if they are isolated measures. The innovation chain has to be reflected in the design of mutually reinforcing policy mixes. This is the main reason why instruments such as technology impulse programmes, R&D subsidies and demonstration projects have often failed.

Nevertheless, there are some promising examples of integration of the objectives of environmental and innovation policies. The Flemish government recently made explicit efforts to make regulatory policies more flexible and innovation friendly. A decree adopted in 2004 stipulates that, whenever possible, environmental standards and permits should formulate the environmental results to be attained rather than how they comply (“ends, not means”). If it is necessary to use technology standards, firms can always use an alternative with the same environmental effectiveness. On the side of innovation policy, the Innovation Agency introduced a new subsidy mechanism in 2002 called sustainable technological development (DTO). It is not conceived as a particular support programme (a “ghetto”) for environmental and energy technologies, but is integrated in all existing technological research and innovation support schemes as a bonus for R&D projects that have a significant impact on resource savings and environmental quality.

Tools like the Benchmarking Covenant and the SO2 and NOX Covenant with the electricity sector take a long-term perspective involving a long-term commitment to seek new frontiers. Although they only stimulate the diffusion of world-class technologies and do not intervene directly in the innovation process, they could provide a platform for organising the transition from one technological regime to another.

Governance for system changes

In environmental policy as well as in innovation policy, there is an evolution towards a system approach. System approaches take a broader view of policy as an institu-tionalised multi-actor and a multi-dimensional process. In this perspective, policy inte-gration problems are problems of co-ordination in the governance structure that reveal systemic failures.



The system approach in innovation policy

Flemish innovation policy has evolved from a traditional first-generation innovation policy towards an explorative third-generation innovation policy (European Commission, 2002).

In the 1980s, after the establishment of the first Flemish regional government – still with limited competencies – the Flemish Minister-President launched the DIRV campaign (Third Industrial Revolution in Flanders), which emphasised basic research of international level in the new generic technologies and the creation of university spin-offs. This linear, technology-push strategy assumed that economic performance follows research performance and coincided with the emergence of the first generation innovation policy.

In the 1990s, a full-fledged Flemish innovation system started to become institu-tionalised with the establishment of a technology agency (IWT – Institute for the Promotion of Science and Technology in Industry) to support bottom-up technology development. Interest in environmental technological innovation was weak. Early Flemish pioneering results in wind energy or hydrogen energy were not pursued when time-to-market was revealed to be much longer than hoped. The introduction of cluster policy as a new economic development policy for Flanders failed because the co-operative mood was not yet strong enough. However, R&D policy evolved towards broader innovation policy with the 1999 decree that provided the legal framework to extend support as well as institutional leverage to stimulate collective innovation. This embodied a second-generation innovation policy. Instead of relying entirely on technology push, it puts the economic outcome as the objective and supports an interactive model of organisation to bring together the requirements for success. IWT evolved from a purely technology-push subsidy agency to the stimulator of innovation with different roles. In addition to being a distributor of subsidies and financier of near-risk capital, it became the co-ordinator of intermediary innovation agents under the influence of the new conceptual framework of national innovation systems which acknowledges the central role of interaction among innovation actors. The name of the IWT was changed and became the Institute for the Promotion of Innovation by Science and Technology.

There has recently been a phase of consolidation and maturation in the Flemish innovation system. The signature in 2003 of the Innovation Pact by the social actors, which is a commitment to the Lisbon targets, has put innovation high on the political agenda. With the appearance of third-generation innovation policy the focus is shifting from pure science and technology objectives to sustainable growth as a programme of broad societal goals. This involves a holistic view and a system-wide approach and stresses the need for an “integrated innovation policy”, that integrates innovation with sectoral policies. This requires sectoral policies to make innovation a distinct objective. Innovation policy also has to expand its scope from economic goals to other types of policy goals, not as constraints but as a part of a coherent mission. A sustainable development policy combines these economic, social and ecological goals.



The system approach in environmental policy

The new ecological approach in environmental policy shares a holistic paradigm with third-generation innovation policy and reflects a general shift from a mechanical to a biological worldview in science.

Roughly until the mid-1990s, environmental policy, institutions and legislation were built around traditional environmental sectors (water, air, waste, soil), and environmental problems were tackled by issuing environmental standards and permits and by building large-scale waste and wastewater treatment facilities.

From the mid-1990s, it has become clear that this approach is not entirely effective, and other policy concepts have been added. First, the set of policy instruments was broadened. Because of the high cost and low level of effectiveness of traditional com-mand and control regulation, other types of instruments, such as covenants and economic instruments, were increasingly used. Second, government clearly wanted to steer more at arm’s length and looked to greater co-operation with target groups to achieve environ-mental objectives. With the recognition that society cannot be steered by government and that government is only one of many actors influencing the behaviour of citizens and firms, the relationship between the state, the market and civil society began to change and a multi-actor policy approach appeared. Third, environmental policy is placing greater stress on the strong linkage between environmental problems and socio-economic activities and thus the need for an integrated approach. This implies that environmental objectives should be internalised and pursued by policies for agriculture, economy, energy, transport, etc. More attention is also given to multi-level governance.

Recently, the concepts of system innovation and transition management have entered Flemish environmental policy. The transition to a new, sustainable evolutionary trajectory makes a set of strategies to change behaviour necessary. Policy makers are now conscious of this challenge. The Environmental Policy Plan 2003-07 presents a framework for transition management and for stimulating system innovation. From mid-2004, a project on transition management in sustainable building is being carried out to learn to make this a reality. Also, the 2004 environmental programme announced several initiatives to promote the idea of system innovation (forecasting studies, development of a knowledge infrastructure in co-operation with the innovation and technology policy field, creation of a multi-actor network). The challenge is to concretise and implement these initiatives.

Transition management follows from the system approach and may be what is missing to put the Flemish economy and society on the route towards structural renewal and a coherent and sustainable model of production, consumption and innovation. Environmentally oriented technological innovation will be at the heart of this transformation.

Transition management is used to tackle very persistent problems. In transition management the policy maker conducts the setting of a transition agenda and establishes a communication platform to promote strategic convergence. The transition agenda mobilises society for long-term goals on sustainable development and offers radical innovators an opportunity to interact with complementary actors. One of the main tasks of transformation concerns government itself, because an integrative horizontal policy approach is needed to overcome vertical departmentalism.



The innovation platform for environmental technologies1

A new impetus for integration of environmental policy and innovation policy comes from their mutual evolution towards a system approach in the context of a broader policy perspective founded on structural change and interactive policy making. Environmental policy and innovation policy are developing into generic policy areas that affect a great number of ministries. In a complex society the interaction of many players determines outcomes. New technologies are also the result of many complementary inputs and conditions. Management of such complexity is bound to fail if it is unable to adapt to an ever-changing policy environment and unpredictable effects of interaction. Therefore, the management of system innovation requires transition strategies to continuously adapt agendas in the light of shifting long-term objectives in order to maintain progress towards the societal goals on which a strategic consensus has been forged. Policy makers in Flanders are starting to realise this and are experimenting with concepts such as interactive policy making, multi-actor governance and transition management. Transition management may serve to bring together innovation policy and environmental policy in the coming years. The translation of such principles into practice is a lengthy process that requires further institutional innovation. However, strategic initiatives to establish new kinds of social contracts (Pact of Vilvoorde, Innovation Pact) need specific institutional underpinnings.

In this regard, at the end of 2003 an Enterprise Conference took place, involving Flemish public authorities, business organisations and labour unions. All parties agreed that social and economic welfare has to be ensured through a strategy of enhancing creativity and innovation. As a consequence, the Flemish government created the Innovation Platform for Environmental Technologies (MIP) as a new form of institutional co-operation based on innovation systems and third-generation innovation policy (Figure 10.4). The platform integrates the policy instruments of three ministries (Innovation, Environment and Energy Policy), and has the potential to become an example of integrated innovation policy. Its success will depend on the will of the parties involved to co-operate on the lines that were put forward. The aim of the Innovation Platform is to bring together all relevant private and public actors in order to boost the innovation potential of environmental technologies in Flanders for internal and export purposes.

The mission of the Innovation Platform is to encourage synergies using the “pooled” policy instruments of the three ministerial domains to meet the common goal. It is “non hierarchical” and based on networking of ministries and administrations. The platform is structured to work closely with (semi) public companies and relevant firms and stakeholders and to encompass and co-ordinate supply-driven (DTO scheme, user groups, Excellence Pole on Environmental Technologies) as well as demand-driven instruments (technology procurement, regulations favouring innovation, and new financial instru-ments). A central Steering Committee co-ordinates all activities and will draw up an action plan containing the key objectives and pointing to synergies.

1. The authors gratefully acknowledge the contribution of Paul Zeeuwts to this section.



Figure 10.4. Structure of the Innovation Platform for Environmental Technologies (MIP)

Along with these general policy objectives, a new Pole of Excellence on Environ-mental Technologies was created, located in VITO but involving university and other research capabilities. This pole of excellence will deal with two kinds of projects: first, projects bringing existing knowledge to the commercialisation stage and second, projects developing new basic knowledge. Priorities will be “demand-driven”, based on techno-logical and commercial potential and taking into account the need for publicly supported knowledge development. The Steering Committee of the Innovation Platform will decide on priorities, acting as a “board”.

Thematic working groups will deal with these issues. They will mainly be composed of members of the relevant administration, (semi) public companies and relevant firms.

Assessment of MIP

To assess Flemish experience and developments requires once again attention to the same factors of good governance as for sustainable development – political leadership, institutional mechanisms, transparency, and strategic intelligence.

Political support and leadership

Sustainability requires policy integration or co-ordination, improved interaction between government and society and a long-term policy view. This cannot happen in a bottom-up manner. It requires political commitment at the highest level and willingness to deal with trade-offs and conflicts of interests.

Action Plan

Innovation policy Energy policy Environmental policy

European Union

Federal level

Other policies Steering Committee

Advisory Group

Demand-driven policies Supply-driven policies

Working Group 1: Public procurement

WG 2: regulations Favouring innovation

WG 3: New financial instruments

Pole of Execllence VITO (+ universities, technical high schools) Bringing existing technology to a

commercial stage

New knowledge

development Knowledge diffusion, Prodem,

BBT/EMIS

Existing Innovation Support schemes: R&D companies SME - programme

Strategic Basic Research Technical

High schools Cluster support … +

Ecoscan

User Group 1

User Group 2

User Group x



Political support and leadership in setting up and implementing the MIP is vital. The decision to create an Innovation Platform was taken by the Flemish government fol-lowing a commitment by Flemish public authorities, enterprise organisations and labour unions in the Enterprise Conference. It is possible, and even probable, that the parties agreed to an environmental innovation platform without a clear picture of its role and relevance. The platform’s success will depend a lot on the understanding, support and political will of the new government to implement its goals and working principles.

Institutional mechanisms

At the outset, the only tools for co-ordinating environmental and innovation policies in the MIP are the action plan and the participation of different ministries in the Steering Committee and in working groups. Clear procedures for decision making are lacking, and there is no clear political commitment concerning budget support, personnel and capacity building.

There is not a single best instrument or programme for promoting environmental technological innovation. A mix of strategies is needed to develop an eco-efficient market economy with good conditions for eco-innovations. Good governance requires a wide portfolio of policies. Economic instruments are important but not sufficient. One also needs innovation- and knowledge-oriented policies. Such a policy mix is very time- and context-dependent and should be attuned to the demands of specific clusters in co-operation with the innovation actors. The portfolio of policy instruments should cover the whole trajectory of the innovation and diffusion process and focus on a combined push and pull approach. Market- or demand-side programmes can promote the application of new technologies and stimulate wider application of proven technologies, all within a strategic context of well-defined specialisation.

The basic propositions of MIP are sound and innovative. Its efforts will concentrate on well-defined target areas. There is a clear commitment, not only to strengthen the classical policy instruments of research and innovation policy for the purpose of environmental innovation, but also to complement them with new instruments targeting the demand side of environmental technologies and to work across the traditional borders of environmental and innovation policy. However, one should be cautious to limit the scope of MIP’s work to the three potential instruments put forward (smart technology procurement, modification of regulations for innovation and introduction of new financial instruments).

Interactive policy making and transparency

Government, business, investors, consumers, researchers, NGOs and educators all have important roles to play in redesigning the innovation system. This is important in the globalising economy because assessment of markets and new technologies is key to companies’ long-term survival. Also, companies themselves are challenged to attend to a broader set of objectives and integrate social, environmental and ethical considerations in their business (socially responsible corporate governance).

At the level of MIP, interaction is the task of the Steering Committee. There is an important opportunity to introduce and experiment with horizontal integration of policies for innovation purposes, with a more pro-active role for different policies aimed at innovation and for networking and clustering. However, it is unclear whether the compo-sition of the Steering Group and a relationship with an advisory group is the best solution. The Steering Group is a hybrid body composed of representatives of government and of a



few business organisations. Involvement of other stakeholders will be organised through an advisory group, but its composition and functions are unclear. At the moment, trans-parency seems to be lacking, although it is essential to establish a credible policy that is supported by a wide range of actors.

Strategic intelligence

To reach the ambitious goals of MIP requires strategic intelligence. This involves analytical instruments such as foresight, scenario analysis, benchmarking, cost-benefit analysis, monitoring, technology assessment, etc., and competencies in process manage-ment, participative methods for consultation and co-ordination, policy instruments and policy mix, system innovation and transition management, etc., in order to create a common mindset, provide a common framework of reference, rationalise the decision processes and help to implement the important choices that will have to be made. Little attention has been given to these new types of instruments for strategic intelligence.

Conclusions and recommendations

Sustainability: the need for a new approach to public sector management

Public management for sustainable development

Public-sector management is in need of new methods to deal with present urgencies and long-term vision. On the one hand, there are challenges such as the ageing of the population, immigration flows, the financing of the social security system, prevention of infrastructure congestion and environmental degradation that require long-term visions and strategies. On the other hand, the pressure of day-to-day decisions and the management of conflicting claims on limited resources is becoming more difficult in an open society where short-term success parameters tend to dictate the agenda. The art of governing is to combine the conflicting agendas of long-term and short-term decision making into new styles of political leadership and new methods of political and administrative management.

The discovery of a transition path to a sustainable development along the economic, social and ecological dimensions may be the main current challenge for policy development. Technological progress carries high hopes for ecological modernisation and is bringing innovation policies and environmental policies closer together.

The important political choices that need to be made are seldom made by single players, whether in the market place or in the political arena. In a complex society, out-comes are determined by interaction among the players and new technologies are the result of complementary inputs and conditions.

Sustainable development requires initiatives to better integrate economic, environ-mental and social goals within the mandate of each policy sector. This requires measures to build and strengthen a sound policy cycle in every policy sector (vertical coherence), measures to improve the co-ordination of sectoral policies (horizontal coherence) and measures to allow for the modulation of short-term and long-term objectives (temporal coherence). Good governance and sound public management seem more important for the implementation of sustainable development policies than new institutions and regulations. The most important aspects are political leadership, institutional mechanisms for policy co-ordination, transparency and knowledge management (Table 10.1).



Table 10.1. The current situation for sustainable development in Flanders

Preconditions Current situation Recent developments Recommendations for Flanders

Political leadership

Federal: low, not a priority. Flanders: low, not a priority.

Federal: rising, new minister-secretary of state for sustainable development. Flanders: Pact of Vilvoorde; Minister-president formally responsible for co-ordinating sustainable development policy in Flanders.

Strengthen political leadership and vision. Better include sustainable development in social contracts and pacts.

Institutional mechanisms

Federal: ICDO and the sustainable development Plan are weak and are not working properly. Flanders: lack of mechanisms for co-ordination of policies (BBB).

Federal: programmatic public service on sustainable development and sustainable development impact analysis. Flanders: interdepartmental working group for sustainable development; promising regulatory management instruments (e.g. RIA).

Set up a central sustainable development unit to act as a catalyst. Install evaluation and reporting mechanisms to support sustainability appraisal. Develop longer-term budgeting and sound regulatory management instruments.

Transparency Federal: public enquiries; Federal Council for Sustainable Development (FRDO). Flanders: public enquiries; Environmental Council, Social-Economic Council.

Federal/ Flanders: a lot of separate and often small scale initiatives and experiments such as focus groups, test panels and forms of interactive policy making, developed by government administrations, at universities, by NGOs, etc.

Ensure a more efficient and effective participation of citizens, stakeholders and advisory bodies. Use new and more flexible consultation methods. Introduce "white papers" for earlier consultation. Introduce a regulatory agenda and “notice and comment”. Develop clear guidelines and minimum standards for consultation.

Knowledge management

Federal: Federal Planning Bureau. Flanders: Advisory Councils, MIRA, NARA, etc.

Federal: PODO Flanders: emerging use of scenario analysis and foresight at APS, ViwTA, VRWB; establishment of university policy support points, departmental policy units in BBB, transition management .

Build strategic intelligence capabilities. Strengthen analytical instruments such as foresight, scenario analysis, etc. and integrate them in the policy cycle. Build competences on process management, participative methods for co-ordination, policy instruments and policy mix, etc. Develop forums for sharing experience and knowledge.

• Political interest in sustainable development policy is still high on the agenda at federal level and in Flanders. A particular promising development is that, following the regional elections of June 2004, the responsibility for co-ordinating sustainable development policy in Flanders was for the first time assigned formally to a minister, the Minister-President of the Flemish government. It remains to be seen whether this will lead to stronger political leadership for sustainable develop-ment.

• New institutional mechanisms that have been very recently introduced in Flanders, such as the Programmatic Public Service on Sustainable Development, sustainable development impact analysis at federal level, and the new regulatory management instruments (e.g. regulatory impact analysis), are promising tools. They should be developed further to act as catalysts for improvement. Also the new Flemish interdepartmental working group on sustainable development is a first step into the direction of integration of policies.



• The Flemish and federal governments have a strong tradition of working with advisory councils and public enquiries. These are necessary but insufficient com-ponents of a full-fledged open policy development process. More effort to enhance the transparency of the policy process is necessary to allow more inter-action between administrations and more stakeholder involvement. At present, there are several experiments with participatory approaches, but these are often separate, small-scale initiatives. For Flanders, the priority is probably not to install a Flemish Council for Sustainable Development, not because there are several well-established advisory boards/councils, and the space and resources for yet an additional council is limited, but because such a council would again institu-tionalise consultation practices, tend to monopolise stakeholder involvement and hinder new participants and innovative consultation methods. The priority should therefore be to integrate sustainable development thinking in each and every advisory council, and more importantly, to ensure more efficient and effective participation of citizens, stakeholders and advisory councils in important policy decisions. Here progress is slow both in Flanders and at federal level.

• Political commitment and policy integration can only go together if there is a framework for long-term strategic convergence. At the federal level the Research Programme for Sustainable Development (PODO) and the Planning Bureau provide important support. Flanders does not have such an institution. Generally, instruments for strategic intelligence to support decision processes are not well developed, either at the federal level or in Flanders. Initiatives with foresight, back-casting and other explorative techniques for policy development are scattered and poorly linked to the policy cycle. Forums for sharing experience and knowledge are nearly inexistent.

Combining positive points of the federal and Flemish situations, and giving more attention to integration, it should be possible to develop and carry out strong and coherent national and regional strategies for sustainable development. The different elements of governance need mutually reinforcing dynamics between government levels in Belgium and between administrative levels in Flanders. The recent collaboration between environmental policy and innovation policy in Flanders indicates a possible way to advance the integration agenda.

From government to governance

The present management of innovation systems tends not to produce the necessary breakthroughs for sustainable growth. The industrial system still normally chooses rationalisation and end-of-pipe solutions to react to pressures arising from ecological problems.

Moreover, in the current transitional phase, market signals for eco-innovations are weak and unclear. Markets can be efficient (to a certain extent) but favour short-sightedness because of the difficulties of coping with uncertainty and pricing. Therefore an economy in which government corrects such market failures has proven better able to handle socio-economic shifts. Environmental policies are crucial for developing new markets on both the supply and the demand side. Innovation policy is also about market creation, as governments can play a role by actively supporting breakthroughs (basic research, product standards, public procurement).



Insufficient production of environmental technological innovations is not just a problem of prices that do not reflect societal costs. The innovation strategies of companies depend on their appraisal of market potential and risk, but companies are also part of networks and national systems of innovation on which their ability and willingness to innovate also depends. The cumulative and embedded nature of technical change means that companies are locked into non-eco-efficient systems and products. Internal-ising the environmental costs is therefore a necessary but insufficient condition for escaping lock-in.

The system model of innovation shows that environmentally friendly innovation requires conditions other than price incentives. Regulation is usually mentioned as the most important, but the institutional settings of the innovation system have a much broader scope. Making companies behave more pro-actively requires changes at many levels of the innovation system: the government-business relationship has to change, producers and consumers must develop new competencies and the economic framework conditions have to change to make the innovation system perform better from a sustainability point of view. This is a political challenge as much as a challenge for business. There is thus a strong case for active policies to stimulate environmental innovation for sustainability.

Assessment and recommendations

To carry out an ambitious programme of structural transformation requires a com-bination of instruments that influence behaviour of individuals (consumers and pro-ducers) and institutional engineering in the form of transition management. The co-ordination of policy design and policy implementation, especially between environmental policy and related domains (such as energy, agriculture, transport) and innovation policy, is of utmost importance.

Progress is rather slow. Flanders still finds it difficult to capitalise on the synergy between environment, research and competition policies. Investing in the future has no urgency in the actual political business cycle and self-imposed targets (Kyoto targets, the 3% target for R&D) risk being delayed. Other types of governance are necessary to create societal consensus and direction in complex issues of this kind.

To improve the co-ordination of innovation policy and environmental policy under the umbrella of sustainable development, some common goals and strategies can easily be defined:

• Promote environmental technological innovations explicitly rather than impli-citly.

• Develop an integrated horizontal strategy towards environmental innovation with other policy fields such as energy, transport, housing, agriculture, etc.

• Create a network with all relevant partners; develop integration and interaction models to stimulate innovation as a common learning process.

• Promote system innovation and new management styles such as transition management.

• Develop joint measures and projects that take advantage of synergies between environmental and innovative strategies.



• Use public technology procurement as a major driver for strategic innovation policies for sustainable development.

In environmental (and related) policy the following actions can be recommended:

• Keep trying to get prices right.

• Create a more innovation friendly regulatory and policy framework; consistency and predictability is more important than financial incentives.

• Set distinctive innovation objectives (together with the innovation policy domain) in transition programmes.

• Integrate technology foresight models into policy design.

• Better integrate and co-ordinate the different instruments and estimate their impact on innovation.

• Use a mix of instruments, favouring those with a stronger impact on system innovation (with long-term goals) over those for system improvements, and analyse the impact on innovation.

• Take existing platforms, e.g. for covenants, as a starting point to build trust in more far-reaching changes.

• Promote an integrated approach to the value chain (life cycle analysis, eco-design).

• Promote and evaluate support for demonstration projects.

• Extend the policy toolbox with new, promising environmental instruments such as innovation waivers and environmental technology verification programmes.

In innovation policy, the following actions can be taken:

• Strengthen traditional mechanisms – R&D funding, diffusion, technology transfer – through better synchronised policies along the innovation chain for environmental technologies.

• Increase the use of environmental criteria in policies and programmes that support technology development. Sustainable development or global responsibility has to be an explicit selection criterion on the same level as the technical and financial aspects of project evaluation by IWT.

• Improve the convergence of supply and demand in environmental innovation in Flanders by promoting platforms of strategic actors, supported by foresight capabilities.

• Support the development of new competitive economic clusters in environmental and energy technologies, on both the supply side (technology providers) and the user side (sectors that improve their competitiveness through increased eco-efficiency).

• Target a much greater share of resources explicitly to environmental sustain-ability in experiments of transition to new technology trajectories in which Flanders has comparative advantages (e.g. in energy technology as announced in the Policy Agreement).



• Promote the development of new instruments and measures such as demand-side research, innovative public procurement, technology forecasting and technology roadmaps that ensure that technology meets the societal and environmental needs for sustainability.

• Develop joint measures and projects with the relevant policy domains (environ-ment, energy).

• Pay explicit attention to new policy development for third-generation innovation policy by attention to (international) policy learning and strategic intelligence, with a focus on integration with sustainable development.

The new Innovation Platform for Environmental Technology can bring together several aspects of these recommendations. It could become a powerful instrument for assessing where societal needs and technological capacities might be brought together to achieve breakthroughs in sustainability. It can also bring together strategic actors to develop new innovation chains. It can become an instrument for fostering the develop-ment of visions and co-operation among different actors in relevant innovation systems. However, several key aspects of governance need to be improved during implementation of the MIP (Table 10.2):

Table 10.2. Summary of recommendations for improving the governance of MIP

Governance component Importance Assessment of MIP Recommendations

Political support and leadership

Policy co-ordination and improved interaction between government and society in the context of a long-term policy view requires political will at the highest level.

Outcome of the Enterprise Conference, so in principle broad support.

Provide a clear picture of role and relevance of MIP.

Institutional mechanisms: Policy portfolio and policy mix

There is not a single best instrument or programme for promoting environmental technological innovation.

The basic propositions of MIP are sound and innovative.

Do not limit the scope to the three potential instruments put forward, provide additional focus on programmes for system innovation; create interfaces for developing tailor-made policy mixes such as cluster platforms.

Integration Key issues in integrating environmental and innovation policy are policy style and governance arrangements for policy integration.

Action plan; participation of different ministries in the Steering Committee and in working groups.

Create governance tools and arrangements for policy co-ordination, such as an innovation impact assessment tool; provide clear responsibilities and mandates, clear procedures for decision making.

Interactive policymaking and transparency

Decisions on the future shape of society imply interactions with different actors to build consensus through adequate institutional arrangements.

Steering Committee, advisory group, user groups.

Tackle the hybrid and unbalanced composition of the Steering Committee; clarify the role and composition of the advisory group and user groups; provide adequate mechanisms for transparency.

Strategic intelligence

Without strategic intelligence, there is a real danger that MIP will be captured by particular interests and lobbies to create another one-stop shop for R&D subsidies and business support.

No analytical instruments such as foresight, scenario analysis, technology assessment, etc., and no competence on process management, participative methods, policy instruments and policy mix, system innovation and transition management, etc.

Underpin MIP with a strong and intelligent secretariat or task force and institutionalise learning.



• Although there is some political commitment, the rollout of the MIP will depend a lot on the understanding, support and political will of the new government to implement its goals and working principles.

• Concerning institutional mechanisms, clear procedures for decision making should be elaborated for the Steering Committee, the action plan and working groups, and a clear political commitment is needed concerning budget support, personnel and capacity building. Also the set of mechanisms for policy inte-gration could be much broader (Verhoest et al., 2003). Policy integration also requires competencies, capabilities, communication and mutual learning, for example, through exchanges of civil servants between the ministries responsible for environment and innovation, establishment of mixed task forces, extended consultation and dialogue on sectoral policies and projects, sectoral capacity building, information tools and indicators.

• Interactive policy making is taking place through the Steering Committee but only a few business organisations are participating. Involvement of other stake-holders will be organised through an advisory group whose composition and functions are unclear. At the moment, transparency seems to be lacking. The MIP does not seem to be using new models of interaction such as networking.

• In terms of strategic intelligence little attention is paid to promising policy instruments that merit consideration, such as the use of environmental manage-ment systems, measuring and benchmarking, long-term covenants, eco-labels and product declarations, innovation waivers and environmental technology verifi-cation programmes (Van Humbeeck, 2002). Making environmental regulation more innovation-oriented can also stimulate innovation. It is clear that forming thematic working groups, composed of members of the administration, (semi-) public companies and relevant firms, to deal with policy instruments and policy mix will not suffice. This requires some strategic intelligence.

• Before choosing programmes, MIP needs to explore the relevant domains in greater depth. The best strategy is to build upon strengths and develop regional clusters of specialisation in sectors and disciplines in which Flemish actors are leaders or have the potential to become international leaders. When there is no established technological base, market support alone will not easily lead to a strong industry. However, to make the necessary management decisions requires an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of Flemish industry, based on strategic environmental and technology forecasting, balancing long-term goals and short-term results, and integrating an international perspective to avoid duplication and to use knowledge that is available at international level.

• It would merit consideration to underpin the MIP with a strong secretariat or task force, to tap into available information, knowledge and competence and create an institutional memory by pooling experience in an organised information network. The government should institutionalise learning by requiring assessment, evaluation and adaptation as a regular feature of the policy process. A knowledge centre or expert group within the government administration should be created to give methodological advice and to assist departments and agencies on a strategic level with integration of policies, implementation of governance tools and building of strategic intelligence. It should also promote initiatives to strengthen



institutional capacities at all levels: individual, organisational, network, govern-ment, society.

• Finally, MIP seems to be missing a clear focus on programmes for system inno-vation. This is also a necessary and important dimension of strategic intelligence concerned with transition management. Also, learning should be an important objective in its own right. MIP should stimulate experiments and support high-risk projects with high social/environmental benefit. The balance of support to incremental innovation in mature technologies and innovation for new break-throughs can only be found in a concrete analysis of the technology trajectories from the point of view of their overall contribution to sustainable development.

MIP: A showcase for horizontal innovation policy?

This chapter has analysed the links between innovation policy and sustainable develop-ment. Traditional government procedures for addressing cross-sectoral and intergenera-tional issues, two important aspects of sustainable development and horizontal innovation policy, are often insufficiently effective.

A lack of effective co-ordination among sectors and across the various levels of governments is a major challenge. Good governance and sound public management are preconditions for the implementation of sustainable development policies. These pre-conditions include political leadership and commitment, institutional mechanisms for policy co-ordination, transparency and stakeholder participation and knowledge manage-ment. The same kinds of problems appear when analysing sustainable development and innovation. Political commitment is often very short-term, institutional mechanisms are often very weak, integration is often lacking, especially between environmental and innovation issues, new instruments to enhance transparency have not yet been put into practice (innovation policy) or are small-scale initiatives and experiments, and especially knowledge management is still lacking: there is almost no experience with foresight, scenario analysis, technology assessment, system innovation and transition management. The MIP initiative offers the possibility for learning and can function as an experiment in innovation governance. The conditions are in place to make of MIP a showcase of policy co-ordination and integration.



References

Bollen, A. and P. Van Humbeeck (2000), “Sociaal-economische analyse van de Vlaamse milieu-industrie”, Sociaal-Economische Raad van Vlaanderen, Brussels.

De Jonge, W. (2003), “Voorraadbeheer binnen de milieugebruiksruimten duurzame ontwikkeling en systeeminnovatie”, RUG, CDO, Ghent.

Dries, I. (2003), “Duurzame ontwikkeling in Vlaanderen en België”, mimeo.

European Commission Directorate-General for Enterprise (2002) “Innovation Tomorrow. Innovation Policy and the Regulatory Framework: Making Innovation an Integral Part of the Broader Structural Agenda”, Innovation Papers No. 28, Brussels.

European Commission (2004), “Stimulating Technologies for Sustainable Development: An Environmental Technologies Action Plan (ETAP) for the European Union”, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, COM(2004) 38 final.

Jansen, J.L.A. (1994), The Environment: Towards a Sustainable Future, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht.

Kemp, R. (2002), “An Integrated Policy for Innovation for the Environment”, in P. Boekholt (ed.) “Innovation Policy and Sustainable Development: Can Public Innovation Incentives Make a Difference?” Contributions to a Six-Country Programme, IWT Studies No. 40, Brussels.

Kemp, R., M. Munch Andersen and M. Butter (2004), “Strategies for Eco-innovation”, VROM, zaaknummer 5060.04.0041.

Larosse, J. (2002), “Transition Management as an Instrument for Leadership and Coaching in Systemic Transformations”, mimeo.

Larosse, J. (2004), “Towards a ‘Third-Generation’ Innovation Policy in Flanders, Policy Profile of the Fleminsh Innovation System”, in OECD (2005), Governance of Innovation Systems, Volume 2: Case Studies in Innovation Policy.

OECD (2004), “Improving Policy Coherence and Integration for Sustainable Development: A Checklist”.

OECD (2004), “Institutional Capacity and Climate Actions”, Summary Paper.

Rennings, K., R. Kemp, M. Bartolomeo, J. Hemmelskamp and D. Hitchens (2003), “Blueprints for an Integration of Science, Technology and Environmental Policy”, STRATA Project (Strategic Analysis of Specific Political Issues).

Rotmans, J., R. Kemp and M.B.A. van Asselt (2001), “Transition Management: A Promising Perspective”, in M. Decker (ed.), Interdisciplinarity in Technology Assessment: Implementation and its Chances and Limits, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 165-197.



Van Giessel, J.F., G. van der Veen and P. Larrue (eds) (2004), Policy Instruments for Sustainable Innovation, Technopolis BV, Amsterdam.

Van Humbeeck, P. and A. Bollen (2003), “Klimaatbeleid en CO2 regelgeving in België en Vlaanderen: status questionis anno 2003”, SERV sociaal-economische raad van Vlaanderen, Brussels.

Van Humbeeck, P. (2002), “Naar een industrieel beleid voor het milieu. Technologie en innovatie al sleutels voor een duurzame welvaart. Discussienota”. Brussels; SERV sociaal-economische raad van Vlaanderen/Academia Press, Ghent.

Verhoest, K., A. Legrain and G. Bouckaert (2003), Over samenwerking en afstemming. Instrumenten voor een optimale beleids- en beheerscoördinatie in de publieke sector, Academia Press, Ghent.

Verhoest, K., B. Verschuere and G. Bouckaert (2004), “Pressure, Legitimacy and Innovative Behaviour by Public Organisations”, Public Management Institute, Catholic University of Leuven.

MOVING OUT OF THE NICHE: INTEGRATING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND INNOVATION POLICY IN AUSTRIA – 271


Chapter 11

MOVING OUT OF THE NICHE: INTEGRATING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND

INNOVATION POLICY IN AUSTRIA

Brigitte Ömer-Rieder Department of Regional Studies, ARC Systems Research GmbH, Seibersdorf, Austria

Katy Whitelegg

Department of Technology Policy, ARC Systems Research GmbH, Seibersdorf, Austria

This chapter discusses links between sustainable development and innovation policy in Austria. It looks at the way in which the two policy areas interact and the kind of mechanisms that facilitate communication between them. Following an overview of sustainability policy and the actors involved in its implementation, the chapter focuses on two case studies that play an important role in policy co-ordination between the two areas, based on an assessment of key documents and a series of interviews with policy makers and experts. The first case study concentrates on the research, technology and development (RTD) programmes in the area of sustainable technologies and the second focuses on the Austrian Sustainability Strategy as a policy co-ordination mechanism. The two case studies are assessed as part of the attempt to understand better the way in which innovation policy and sustainability policy interact. Although the two case studies are very different, they give useful insight into barriers and problems at the interface of the two policy areas.

Introduction

Over the last decade, policy makers in many European countries have concluded that the current segregated approach to policy making is no longer adequate to address the complexity of the issues they face. Segregated policy areas cause a number of problems for policy making. Not only do policies from neighbouring policy areas overlap, unco-ordinated policies may even pursue contradictory aims. Another problem occurs when cross-cutting areas that do not traditionally belong to a single policy area are not adequately addressed by any ministry and no responsibility is taken for them.

The trend towards increasing coherence and co-ordination in the policy-making process has been most pronounced in areas of policy making that are inherently cross-cutting. In areas such as sustainable development or science and technology policy there has been strong pressure to develop more appropriate co-ordination measures. A number of recent studies and workshops have supported the search for coherence in the area of innovation policy (Edler et al., 2003; Boekholt and Arnold, 2002; Arnold and Boekholt, 2003; Smits and Kuhlmann, 2002). Although there is no such thing as a model of optimal

272 – MOVING OUT OF THE NICHE: INTEGRATING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND INNOVATION POLICY IN AUSTRIA


policy coherence, the authors agree that there are ways of conceptualising policy making for innovation policy that can improve the overall functioning of the system.

The problems inherent in politico-administrative systems in general and innovation in particular in most OECD countries are characterised by Edler et al. (2003, p. 5) as:

• A high degree of departmentalisation, sectoralisation of the political administra-tion, and low inter-departmental exchange and co-operation.

• Heterogeneous, unlinked arenas: often corporatist negotiation deadlocks.

• Failure to restructure responsibilities in government because of institutional inertia.

• Dominance of the “linear model” of innovation policy approaches (and of related economists as consultants).

• Innovation policy focused on introduction of new technologies in small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), IPR (intellectual property rights) or VC (venture capital) issues, etc.

• Emerging multi-level governance in the context of European integration makes launching of “bridging/systemic” policy approaches more difficult.

A high level of segregation not only creates closed policy arenas in ministries and departments. The same way of thinking is often transposed to institutions such as uni-versities and consultants that work closely for and with departments. Policy fields create their own arenas which leave little space for input from sources other than those that are close to them. Integration is made more difficult by the narrowness of the policy areas. This phenomenon has also been observed in innovation policy, especially when it is designed and implemented by different ministries and/or agencies.

Coherence and co-ordination are not goals in themselves, but tools. Depending on the policy field and the constellation of actors, different mechanisms can be used to increase the ability of the system to think in terms of the whole. These are based on the increased need to manage interfaces, to embed innovation policies in the broader socio-economic context and to increase learning and experimenting. The role of the state becomes that of moderator and enabler, allowing different parts of the system to communicate more effectively. This in turn supports collective decision making and implementation of poli-cies and encourages learning within the system (Smits and Kuhlmann, 2002, p. 48).

To reduce overlaps and gaps between policy areas, an increasing number of governance mechanisms have emerged to fill the co-ordination gap (Glynn et al., 2003, p. 5). Many of these new mechanisms take the form of councils, commissions or platforms that bring policy makers from different ministries together with non-policy specialists to discuss issues and formulate common policies and procedures. These bodies provide a useful basis for discussion and also improve the chances that initiatives in one policy area do not conflict with goals in another and that policies are co-ordinated. They do not, however, replace the policy process; policy decisions still remain with the ministries. The extent to which decisions taken in such forums must be implemented or taken into account by individual ministries differs from country to country and according to the subject matter. Although these bodies are increasingly seen as one of the best mechanisms for integrating policy fields, this greatly depends on how they are set up and the powers they are given. Not all such councils support policy integration attempts and some contribute to the further fragmentation of policy-making structures (Edler et al., 2003, p. 19).



Specifically designed external mechanisms in horizontal areas of policy making are only a small part of the complex network of bilateral interactions that exists between individual policy areas. Recently, attention has turned to the way individual policy areas interact. Special focus has been given to innovation policy, not just as a horizontal policy area in itself, but as a policy area with specific and individual relationships with other policy areas. As in the case of innovation policy as a horizontal policy area, there is no one best-practice model defining what co-ordination and coherence of policy areas should look like. Countries and policy areas differ and require co-ordination mechanisms tailored to suit their specific needs.

Policy coherence between sustainable development and innovation

The most often used definition of sustainable development can be found in the Brundtland Report (World Commission for Environment and Development, 1987). According to it, sustainable development is a “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”. It requires equal consideration of economic productivity, social balance and environ-mental protection. None of the three sustainability dimensions – economy, society and ecology – should develop at the expense of the others.

Innovation in the context of sustainable development is innovation that enables the social system to develop new ideas to support sustainability and to implement them. In the minds of the persons interviewed for this study, sustainable innovation refers more to new human behaviour than to new products and services. In the same manner, sustainable innovation policy is interpreted more broadly than financial support for specific technologies. Policy should enable people to try new behaviour and to develop innovations but should not define what sustainable innovations are. It should leave the search process to the relevant actors and enable them to search for ideas and implement them. According to the interview results, sustainable innovation policy is the design of a public framework that allows innovation processes. However, the interviewees described the current sustainability policy situation as a niche policy that hardly affects other policy fields.

Sustainable development policy in Austria is still strongly linked to environmental policy, the policy field from which it derives. This is clear from the fact that sustainability policy is mainly under the responsibility of the environment minister. Most interviewees view this situation critically and want to see this policy field as the one that spans all other policy fields. They say that sustainability policy should have a special position and strive for the integration of the idea of sustainability into all policy fields. However, this requires more awareness of sustainable development than is currently the case, given the little attention to the sustainability concept in policy, among the public and in the media.

National profile: sustainable development policy

Two important documents have marked Austrian sustainability policy in the last ten years. They are the national environmental plan and the national sustainability strategy. The following paragraphs give insight in their development and contents.

Austria was the second country after the Netherlands to develop a national environmental plan (NUP). The development of this document took about four years and involved more than 300 persons from science, the administration, the economy and experts from different organisations in seven working groups. The co-ordination of the



development process was under the responsibility of the Federal Ministry for Environment, Youth and Family Affairs. In 1995, the NUP was published and adopted by the federal government. The aim was to integrate environmental policy into all levels of policy making. For that purpose, goals and about 470 measures for seven sectors were worked out. The sectors were: energy, industry and trade; traffic and transport; agriculture, forestry and water resources; tourism and recreation industry; resource management; and consumption and consumer behaviour.

The NUP was an important step in Austrian sustainability policy, since it contained quality and environmental protection goals to reduce emissions of harmful substances and to treat natural resources with care. They are based on the perception that the carrying capacity of the Earth is limited and that global circular flows of matter must not be influenced irreversibly. Thus, the NUP corresponds to the concept of sustainable develop-ment. The NUP became quite popular in Austria owing to accompanying activities such as an exhibition called the “sustainability nature trail” which was shown not only in Vienna but also in the provinces, the preparation of a CD-Rom which constituted a virtual visit of the exhibition, and the publication of a so-called “Youth Environmental Plan (JUP)” which was set up as a complementary initiative to allow Austria’s youth to participate in national environmental policy.

A further development of the NUP is the Austrian national sustainability strategy which was published in April 2002. Its international roots go back to Agenda 211 which was adopted by the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio in 1992; a paragraph in Chapter 8 requires the preparation of sustainability strategies to adjust national economic, social and environmental policies. At the Rio+5 Conference in New York in 1997, the demand was more insistent, and 2002 was decided as the time horizon. Finally, the European Council in Gothenburg 2001 was an important initiating event, as the draft of the European sustainability strategy was discussed. Several member states of the European Union then started to develop national sustainability strategies.

The Austrian national sustainability strategy was prepared under the responsibility of the Federal Ministry for Environment, renamed the Federal Ministry for Agriculture, Forestry, Environment and Water Management (BMLFUW). It is a commitment by the federal government to sustainable development. It contains four comprehensive fields of action which are composed of five key objectives for sustainable development. Each key objective consists of a description of the challenge, goals and first steps. At the end of each field of action five to eight indicators are described.2.

The strategy document mainly describes intentions; quantifiable targets with a date of implementation are not very concrete. Nevertheless, many experts think that, in general, the value of strategic political documents lies less in the documents than in the activation of discussion and implementation processes based on the documents. This is confirmed in the strategy document, which announced the intention to design the strategy as a “learning strategy” (Austrian Strategy for Sustainable Development, p. 109f.). This means that the structure and the process will be further developed according to needs that appear during the implementation process. This process and its assessment by several interviewees are described below.



Institutional mapping of actors, institutions and flows

An overview of all the actors that play a role in both sustainable development and innovation policy in Austria could involve all policy fields, as these are by nature horizontal and have links to all policy areas. However, this only holds if the two policy areas are interpreted in the broadest possible way. In most countries, and here Austria is no exception, innovation and sustainable development policy are not well-defined policies but are more often represented as strategies for co-ordination. Policies, and more importantly actors, in these areas tend to belong to more conventional policy areas such as science policy, technology policy and environmental policy. For this reason, the list of actors below falls into these areas.

Innovation policy

Innovation policy is comprised of a large number of actors on both the strategic and the implementation level whose responsibilities are not clearly defined and often overlapping. Evaluations have frequently referred to fragmentation as one of the barriers to the design and implementation of a coherent innovation policy in Austria. A recent evaluation (Arnold and Boekholt, 2003) of the two main research funds in Austria, the Austrian Industrial Research Fund (FFF) and the Austria Science Fund (FWF) concluded that:

• Overly fragmented policy delivery limits opportunities for building scale and for learning about policy delivery and about policies themselves.

• The funding system is hard to understand and is therefore a problem both for those who have to live with it and in terms of connecting it to developments in European R&D funding and performance.

• With many small agencies, it is hard to build critical mass and especially hard to afford the needed investment in capabilities for analysis and strategy development (strategic intelligence).

• There is a wide diversity of governance practice and therefore unclear interfaces between ministries (as principals) and agencies (their agents). In some cases, a ministry simultaneously maintains different governance styles in its relationship with a single agency about different activities. This incoherence helps prevent ministries and agencies alike from building the right amount of strategic intelligence to maintain a coherent division of labour.

• Differences in governance styles limit possibilities for individual agencies to serve multiple ministries.

Furthermore, to increase the confusion, the responsibilities and the organisation of actors within the policy field also change frequently, often within one legislative period. The current minister, Hubert Gorbach, is the fifth minister in the Federal Ministry of Transport, Innovation and Technology to take office during the coalition which began early in 2000 between the Austrian Freedom Party and the Austrian People’s Party.

A mapping of actors and responsibilities directly involved in the design and implementation of innovation policy can be divided into ministries, research funds and programme management organisations. Four ministries are involved in innovation policy issues: the Ministry for Economics and Labour (BMWA), the Ministry for Transport,



Innovation and Technology (BMVIT), the Ministry for Education, Science and Culture (BMBWK) and the Ministry of Finance (BMF).

The main research funding agencies in Austria are, as mentioned above, the FFF and the FWF; the FFF concentrates on the private sector and the FWF on basic research. The funds support “bottom-up” or non-programme research activities. Although funding through strategic thematic programmes has increased in recent years, there are still few thematic programmes and the “bottom-up” approach is preferred. Having said this, some recently established programmes have been less of a strategic nature and more a bundling of individual research projects contracted by a ministry in a particular field. These often do not have the same quality criteria that the funds require (Arnold and Boekholt, 2003).

Other agencies include the Austria Wirtschaftsservice, the Division for Science-Industry Co-operation within the Austrian Research Promotion Agency (FFG), the Christian Doppler Gesellschaft, the Austrian Space Agency, the Ludwig Boltzmann Gesellschaft and the Anniversary Fund of the Austrian National Bank. Each has a budget to pursue its own goals, whether these are the Kplus centres (science-industry co-operation) or an individual area or type of research such as space (ASA).

In addition to the agencies with their own budgets, other organisations manage thema-tic programmes on behalf of the ministries. Some of these organisations specialise in programme management and have less competence on the content side while others have expertise in a particular field. The management consultant Trust Consult is an example of the first type of organisation and has provided the BMVIT with the management for the programme line Factory of Tomorrow. An example of the second type is provided by the ÖGUT (the Austrian Society for Environment and Technology), a well-known player on the Austrian sustainability scene. It manages the programme line Building of Tomorrow for the BMVIT. The contracts for programme management are given for the duration of the programme and are put out to tender again if the programme is continued. There is little exchange of experience between the management of the individual programmes and many different actors are involved in one programme period. This practice mirrors the general fragmentation in innovation policy discussed above.

Sustainable development policy

At the national level, the most important actor in Austrian sustainability policy is the Federal Ministry for Agriculture, Forestry, Environment and Water Management, under the responsibility of which the national environmental plan and the national sustainability strategy were prepared and co-ordinated. In addition, the chancellor gave the minister responsibility for co-ordinating the implementation of the national sustainability strategy. The ministry is divided into four departments, one of which, “sustainability and rural areas”, might be viewed as the competence centre for sustainability. Since 2002, the ministry has co-ordinated sustainability-oriented activities horizontally but also vertically (between the national and regional levels).

The Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Initiative Austria3 is a co-operative initiative started in late 2002 by the Federal Ministry of Economics and Labour, the Austrian Federal Economic Chamber and the Federation of Austrian Industry. It aims to achieve two goals: first, to show how Austrian businesses work for the state and society and second, to motivate entrepreneurs to intensify their efforts to that end and to encourage them to communicate these efforts to a broader public. CSR is based on the conviction that economic gains and responsible actions are not mutually exclusive and may give Austrian companies an advantage in terms of location. One of the CSR’s most



important activities is the yearly award show “Trigos”, which is designed to give com-panies an incentive to include CSR in their business strategy and to support public awareness for CSR.

Apart from these two initiatives at national level, many important actors work on sustainability-oriented activities at the regional level. It is a characteristic of the Austrian sustainability policy-making structure that the regional level plays an even more active role than the national level. Some of the nine provinces strongly support sustainable development by giving responsibility to relevant institutions in their administration structure or by establishing sustainability consulting organisations outside the admini-stration and giving them financial support. These organisations and institutions have been initiating activities in the field of sustainable economy (e.g. Economy Initiative in Styria or the EcoBusinessPlan in Vienna), in the field of sustainable social development (e.g. Social Capital in Vorarlberg) or in supporting and facilitating local Agenda 21 processes in their municipalities. The federal commitment to sustainability is also evident in the fact that three provinces – Upper Austria, Lower Austria and Styria – are preparing or have already published their regional sustainability strategies.

The main actors in the provinces are well connected through the sustainability co-ordinators conference which supports exchange of experience among the provinces.4 It is based on a declaration for the further development of environmental policy in Austria that was adopted by the speakers for environmental affairs of the provinces and the Minister for Environment in 1999. This declaration agreed upon an alignment of the future environmental policy with the concept of sustainability. At the annual conference of the speakers for environmental affairs in 2000, the establishment of an expert’s conference between the sustainability co-ordinators of the provinces and the national level was decided. Since then, sustainability co-ordinators meet twice a year to exchange experience and to develop and implement common strategies.

At the local level, there are some 200 local Agenda 21 processes. The local authority enters into a dialogue with its citizens, local organisations and enterprises to discuss how to obtain or improve quality of life in their living space. It is a new form of participatory work to develop and implement ideas and projects for a better future. It is important that all three dimensions of the sustainability concept are considered and that none is neglected in favour of the others. Local Agenda 21 processes usually follow several phases: development of a common guiding vision, guiding targets, measures and implementation. In many cases, the provincial administration provides financial support to the municipalities and connects it to quality assurance. The municipality has to commit itself to engage only well-educated and experienced process facilitators.

Policy co-ordination bodies

In addition to the ministries and regional actors, a number of inter-ministerial and intra-ministerial bodies support the integration of policy areas. Especially in the areas of innovation policy and sustainable development policy, these bodies play an important role in linking different policy areas. Most are either in innovation policy (Council for Science and Technology Development) and focus on the relationship between science, technology and innovation policy or in sustainable development policy (Business Unit Sustainable Development and the Committee for a Sustainable Austria) and concentrate on co-ordinating sustainable development policy with the BMLFUW and between all ministries.



The most important new addition to the innovation policy scene has been the Council for Science and Technology Development. It was established in August 2000 to advise the government, ministries and federal states on all matters concerning Austrian technology policy. The Council consists of eight members, four chosen by the BMVIT and four by the BMBWK. As well as advising on ad hoc issues, the Council is charged with developing long-term strategic plans for Austrian technology policy. Most recently it was responsible for reviewing the special funds (a total of EUR 508 million). These were not part of the normal science and technology funding and different ministries applied for funding of their initiatives. The Council reviewed and ratified each application according to a set of criteria focused mainly on the leverage effect for private-sector involvement. In addition, the Council tried to build a picture of all of the proposed initiatives and to look for overlaps and cases in which clearer definitions would be useful.

The involvement of the Council in distributing the special funds should not be underestimated. Previously, the ministries distributed such funding on their own without any external checks and balances. The Council brought a higher degree of transparency and standards to the formulation of individual programmes and initiatives, not simply by increasing the need for evaluation. On another level, the Council has begun to encourage interaction between the ministries and the programmes involved in sustainable development research. The FORNE initiative is an example and is described below.

However, these recent developments also have negative aspects. Competition among programmes has increased, as the Council decides among them. Its decisions are not based on long-term strategic planning but on which programmes most impress the Council members. It is questionable whether increased competition among ministries will also lead to increased co-operation.

Policy co-ordination in the field of sustainable development is mainly informal, and there are few formal institutions. Two interesting examples are described below. The first, the Business Unit Sustainable Development, co-ordinates the tasks of all depart-ments within a ministry. The second, the Committee for a Sustainable Austria, co-ordinates the contributions of all ministries to the national sustainability strategy.

The Business Unit Sustainable Development was established as a unit covering all departments of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Environment and Water Management (BMLFUW). It is composed of representatives from all departments, the chairman and the bureau of the minister. Its main tasks are integration of sustainability in all of the ministry’s policy fields through common planning and co-ordination of upcoming activities and thematic aims. This assures the coherence of the ministry’s work. It functions as an in-house “think tank” and as a communication and co-ordination plat-form for sustainable development, and it develops a common strategy for the ministry’s sustainability issues which is agreed with all departments. A special task of the business unit is to harmonise all sustainability-related fields in the ministry in order to implement the national sustainability strategy.

The Business Unit Sustainable Development is one of three business units in the BMLFUW. It aims to develop a planning culture for a time horizon longer than one year, so that specific topics can be worked on strategically. The visionary, identity-founding aspect is important. This business unit gives consideration to the fact that sustainable development is not a single discipline but an umbrella. The integration of sustainable development in all environmental policy fields may be a first step towards its integration in other ministries and policy fields like economics or transport. So far, no similar units



exist in other ministries. One interviewee suggested that it might be a good institution to copy, but that that sustainability is not a core concern in other ministries.

The “Committee for a Sustainable Austria” was established in 2002 as the main driving force to implement the national sustainability strategy. It consists of two to four delegates of each ministry, of representatives from social partners and of five sustain-ability experts from the provinces. Its main task is the preparation of work programmes to implement the national sustainability strategy. These programmes are published every two years. The committee members collect projects and measures that are under the responsibility of their organisations and assign them to the 20 guiding targets of the strategy. These projects and measures are consolidated in a draft of the work programme that is presented to the Council of Ministers and then published. As the work programmes for 2003 and 2004 show, they serve to inventory projects and measures according to the strategy’s 20 guiding targets. The second main task of the committee is to inform the federal government about the implementation of the strategy by preparing and publishing progress reports. The first progress report was published in June 2004; the next is planned for 2006. The committee may be the most important horizontal policy co-ordination body in the Austrian sustainability policy field and is described in detail below.

Co-ordination initiatives

This section describes individual initiatives and actions that play a role in supporting co-ordination of innovation and sustainable development policy. Two different types of initiatives should be mentioned in this context. First, there are initiatives that aim to increase co-ordination either within one policy area or between different policy areas. These are especially common in the area of sustainable development or in specific sectoral policy areas that cover more than one ministry or division. An example is the Austrian Forestry Dialog which aims to bring together all actors in the forestry sector. Second, there are initiatives at the interface between two policy areas, but not designed primarily with co-ordination in mind, such as the RTD programme Sustainable Technologies.

Participation in sustainability initiatives

As sustainable development requires consideration of economic, societal and eco-logical aspects at the same time, the issues are complex. Sustainability-related discussions therefore often involve conflicts of interests. Solutions to complex problems that are acceptable to as many interests as possible have to be found. Participation has always been a principle in sustainable development. It serves to include different opinions and interests and to find “socially robust” solutions that are accepted by most parties.

Although participation is an important criterion in sustainable development activities, few examples of successful participation in sustainability initiatives exist. The following example describes public participation during the preparation and development of the national sustainability strategy and brings out the difficulties involved.

Strategy development began with preparation of the Green Paper between March and May 2001 and continued with the elaboration of the strategy document. About 50 representatives from the ministries, social partners and non-governmental organisations worked on guidelines, fields of action and concrete measures that could be part of the strategy. Actors that worked throughout the strategy development process were: a steering group that led and managed the process (employees of the BMLFUW); a



commissioned moderator who supported the search for consensus and decisions; and a scientific editorial staff that wrote intermediate results and the document itself.

Between August and October 2001, a written survey was sent to 200 scientists to explore the necessary aspects of the strategy. The very low return of 20 answers can be interpreted as little interest in the strategy. The answers could be divided in three groups (Martinuzzi and Kopp, 2002, p. 10):

• Criticism of the preparation process of the strategy (doubt about the sense and gravity of the strategy; too little time for responding; insufficient involvement of science).

• Unspecific praise (for single statements in the Green Paper or for the initiative to develop a strategy in general).

• Representation of own scientific fields or interests (especially integration of the respondent’s field of competence).

An Internet discussion platform was equally disappointing. A section of the Web site www.nachhaltigkeit.at provided information about the strategy development process and invited visitors to post comments. Although statistics show that about 1 000 persons visited the Web site, only 20 contributions were posted. It is difficult to know why this initiative was not more successful. Possibilities are a belief that responses would not be taken into account, fear of documenting one’s position, or lack of interest in active participation.

The third participation initiative was the so-called plenum. It consisted of about 50 representatives from ministries, social partners, federal governments and non-govern-mental organisations who were nominated by their organisations. The plenum met four times and discussed the aim, course of action and quality criteria of the strategy, the contents and fields of action, suggestions for the guiding targets of the strategy, and the proposed text of the final version of the strategy. Unlike the other two initiatives, the plenum was relatively successful and efficient with a well-structured working process. The main reasons for its success were a good atmosphere and the expertise and possibilities for negotiation among the plenum members.

Research programmes in support of sustainable development

Research programmes are one of the main interfaces between innovation policy and other policy areas. Here innovation policy aims have to be reconciled with the aims of the sectoral or horizontal policy area. Austria has a long history of developing RTD programmes in the area of the sustainable development. The first, the Austrian Landscape Research Programme, was established in 1992. Since then, environmental and sustainable development research has grown and diversified. Currently, several RTD programmes aim to support sustainable development. The two main programmes in this area are “Technologies for Sustainable Development” of the BMVIT and “Provision” of the BMBWK. The BMLFUW has a programme called “PFEIL 05” that also supports the aims of sustainable development.

The main aims of the Austrian Landscape Research Programme were to reduce anthropogenic stock flows, to optimise the relationship between biodiversity and quality of life, and to support development options in landscape dynamics. The programme aimed to achieve these goals through research that secured the long-term economic and socio-cultural development of regions, research for ecological and societal stability, and



support for a dialogue between science and practical experience. The programme, which ran for ten years, ended in mid-2003.

A follow up programme called EcoForesightAustria was presented to the Council for Science and Technology Development in autumn 2001 for ratification. At the Council meeting of 9 April 2002, the Council decided not to fund the programme and recommended that the programme be integrated in appropriate activities of the BMLFUW (Council for Research and Technological Development, 2002). However, this turned out not to be feasible as a considerable proportion of the BMLFUW research funds are allocated to its own research and the testing institutes it is required by law to maintain. In addition, the contents of the EcoForesightAustria were quite different from BMLFUW activities.

For a few years, research on sustainable development, apart from the BMVIT’s technology programmes (see below), was not funded. Only when the Council realised that it needed to put this type of research back on the agenda did sustainable development research stand another chance of receiving funding. This the Council did by organising a strategy process to create a new programme. It organised workshops and working groups to design a new programme. The final result was “Provision” which started in late 2004 and is scheduled to run for ten years. The programme will be divided into three phases, two programme phases and a synthesis phase. The first call for proposals was announced in September/October 2004. The programme has seven main areas of focus: risk assessment, sustainable living, integrated welfare, environmental balance, adaptable space, global responsibility and sustainable mediation.

In addition to the content-specific focus areas, the programme also aims to address a number of horizontal research goals including increasing international co-operation, improving co-operation between science and industry, increasing the participation of women in science, improving career prospects for young scientists, establishing continu-ous co-operation between research and education.

The BMVIT’s Technologies for Sustainable Development is the main programme supporting sustainable technologies in Austria. It was established in 1999 and has three sub-programmes: Building of Tomorrow, Energy Systems of Tomorrow, and Factory of Tomorrow. Its main aims are to create new economic opportunities, increase the economical use of natural resources, consolidate Austria’s position in the field of tech-nology and create positive effects on the economy and on employment. According to the programme documents, this can be achieved by strengthening R&D competencies, en-couraging interdisciplinarity and networking, and increasing the diffusion and application of R&D results. This programme is the subject of one of the case studies and will be dealt with further below.

A Research Strategy for Sustainable Development (FORNE)

In June 2004, the Council for Science and Technological Development ratified a research strategy for sustainable development that aims to co-ordinate the programmes described above. This process was initiated in reaction to new specifications introduced by the Council as part of its remit to try and increase the coherence of RTD funding in Austria. In 2004, the FORNE process led to the development of the Framework Strategy 2004 Plus (Paula et al., 2004) which sets out the initiative’s aims and objectives. The main aim of FORNE is to strengthen the field of research for sustainable development in Austria, to define common aims for sustainable development research in Austria, and to set future priorities. It brings together activities in the BMLFUW, BMBWK and the



BMVIT and aims to increase coherence between their RTD programmes. In addition, FORNE seeks further coherence of the activities of the ministries with the Austrian Sustainable Development Strategy. The framework programme produced in 2004 sets out methodological and strategic fundamentals and details the working practices. In one part it sets out the different types of research needed to answer the questions raised by the transition to sustainable development. In another part of the framework programme Austria’s strengths in the area of research for sustainable development are portrayed both on a national and international level.

The establishment of FORNE has led to increased co-operation between programmes, better co-ordination of programmes, and discussions on new research methods for sustainable development. The ministries have also been able to exchange experience and co-ordinate co-operation with other national programmes and with the EU Framework Programme. In addition, the FORNE initiative not only gave the ministries the oppor-tunity to exchange experience, but also to make this type of research more visible. It is no longer possible to obtain special funds without a clear strategy of how the programmes of the different ministries fit together. However, environmental research has not been one of the Council’s top priorities and it took the Council a while to recognise its importance. One reason for the neglect was the Council’s composition. None of its members came from this area of research so that there was little understanding of the area and no one to further its aims.

Co-ordination arrangements typical for the policy area

Policy areas interact. Whether they do so as part of a co-ordinated process or on a more ad hoc basis depends on structures and on the need for interaction. Integration between sustainable development policy and innovation policy in Austria provides an example of close physical proximity but little co-ordination on the formal level. Higher levels of interaction are found on the informal level where personal connections play an important role. There are few typical arrangements for interaction, and new constellations of actors, with varying degrees of integration, take form around each new issue. The extent of informal interaction among actors is difficult to determine and beyond the scope of this study. However, some general barriers and challenges to co-operation and collaboration can be observed when looking at specific activities that require interaction between the two areas.

Selected cases

This section looks at two activities in which concrete interaction between sustainable development and innovation policy can be observed. These activities have been selected for three reasons. First, they represent arguably the most important interfaces between these two policy areas in Austria. Second, both are activities with a concrete need for interaction. Third, the two case studies represent very different types of co-ordination mechanisms. The Austrian Sustainable Development Strategy was designed to co-ordinate different sectoral policies under a horizontal sustainable development strategy. The Programme Technologies for Sustainable Development was established and is managed by the innovation division of the BMVIT. It is not a specific co-ordination mechanism, but a policy initiative that requires the interaction of the two different policy areas.



The National Sustainable Development Strategy

European background and document preparation

At the request of the Helsinki European Council in December 1999, the European Commission developed a proposal for a European Sustainable Development Strategy for the Gothenburg European Council, called “A Sustainable Europe for a Better World: A European Union Strategy for Sustainable Development”.5 Instead of adopting this document, the European Council formulated 14 paragraphs under the heading “Strategy for a sustainable development” in the presidency’s conclusions.6 They contain a call to member states of the European Union to develop national sustainable development strategies. These paragraphs are said to be the European Sustainability Strategy.

In Austria, a group of about 15 experts – delegates from ministries, social partners and external consultants – prepared a Green Paper under the co-ordination of the environmental minister which was completed in May 2001. It was viewed as a basis for the National Sustainable Development Strategy and contained three fields of action which were incorporated in the later final version: quality of life in Austria, Austria as a dynamic business location and living spaces in Austria. The Green Paper was presented for the first time at the European Council in Gothenburg 2001 and then revised to produce the final document. This phase included about 40 representatives from ministries, provincial governments, social partners, lobbying groups and non-governmental organisations. Finally, the strategy draft was adopted by the Council of Ministers in April 2002.

The Sustainable Development Strategy contains four fields of action: Quality of life in Austria; Austria as a dynamic business location; Living spaces in Austria; and Austria’s responsibility. Each of these fields of action contains five key objectives which are prerequisites for sustainable development. They include a description of the current problems and their background and a list of concrete targets and approaches for achieving them. Several indicators are assigned to each of the four fields of action to measure progress. The target definitions in the strategy are more declarations of intent than clear quantifiable goals with a precise time horizon for implementation. For this reason, the European Commission, which analysed the different national sustainability strategies, categorised the Austrian one as a framing strategy and not as an action programme (European Commission, 2004).

Implementation process and structure

Since sustainable development is a cross-sectoral issue, many actors are involved in the implementation process:

• Federal government. The strategy is an initiative of the federal government. The implementation process is under the responsibility of the Federal Minister of Agriculture, Forestry, Environment and Water Management. All documents referring to the strategy are prepared by the administration and adopted or recognised by the Council of Ministers.

• Steering group. The group takes responsibility for both the preparation of the strategy document and its implementation. It consists of four delegates from the Federal Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Environment and Water Management. It designs the setting of strategic points in the implementation process, supports



the committee and forum in their work, and creates the framework conditions for preparing the strategy documents in time.

• Committee for a Sustainable Austria. Established in 2002, it is one of the most important actors in the strategy implementation process. Its main task is the preparation of the annual or bi-annual work programmes and progress reports for the federal government. It consists of representatives from all ministries (one or two persons per ministry), from different interest groups and four delegates from the Expert Conference of Sustainability Co-ordinators, an institution that supports the exchange of experience between sustainability actors in the provinces.

• Forum for a Sustainable Austria. Established in 2002, it consists of 45 experts from scientific organisations and non-governmental organisations in the environ-mental and social fields. It supports and advises the committee, e.g. by com-menting on the committee’s work programme drafts. The forum is a critical but constructive panel that introduces experts’ know-how and identifies societal themes to be discussed as part of the strategy implementation process.

The implementation process has been in place for two years. There is criticism related for example to the fact that the Federal Minister of Agriculture, Forestry, Environment and Water Management – not the Federal Chancellor – is responsible for co-ordination. This is assessed differently by those involved. Some, especially those from environment-related fields, favour this assignment and argue that progress in implementation depends more on the personal dedication of the responsible minister or individuals in the ministries than on formal jurisdiction. Others say that the assignment inhibits equitable dialogue between the three dimensions of sustainability because the environmental dimension is overemphasised. Another consequence of the assignment is that the Ministry of Environment remains in its role as an institution which adds environmental aspects retrospectively to concepts and proposals instead of supporting the integration of the environmental dimension from the outset.

Nevertheless, the work processes are viewed as transparent and clearly structured by those involved. The implementation process is seen as a highly useful effort that brings together different actors. By defining it as a learning strategy, the necessary flexibility for adaptation during the implementation process – for example, corrections concerning the focus of future tasks – is ensured.

In June 2002, the Committee for a Sustainable Austria was constituted. It consists of delegates from all ministries, from lobbying institutions and four representatives from the Sustainability Co-ordinators Conference. It therefore ensures the linkage of institutions that are important for implementation of the strategy as well as the exchange of information on the fields of action defined in the strategy document. The committee ensures that sustainability issues are institutionalised as a priority in the administration and that the idea of an integrated view of ecological, economical and societal challenges is widely recognised (BMLFUW, 2003, p. 7).

Assessing the committee as a horizontal policy co-ordinating institution

The committee’s work is assessed differently by the interviewees. Criticism relates to unbalanced handling of the different topics and slow progress. Discussions and decisions about whether specific topics are included or not in the documents take a long time. Some argue that the committee could be a good institution if it were not dominated by particular interests. Committee members’ lack of formal authority leads to long feedback loops with



their organisations, the results of which have made some committee members cautious. Other interviewees, however, praise the implementation process as well-structured and democratic, offering an opportunity for ministries that do not focus on sustainability to become familiar with it or to look at their activities in this light. The committee’s value lies especially in a more formal awareness building for sustainability than previously existed in Austria.

As mentioned, co-ordination sometimes take a long time because decisions have to be postponed while members collect their ministry’s official opinion. Another difficulty is due to the complexity of the sustainability concept. Some topics to be agreed on are new both to some committee members and to their ministries. This puts an additional burden on the committee, its members and the ministries concerned.

During the committee’s first period, in which committee members collected the sustainability-oriented projects and measures of all ministries, resulted in a good overview of initiatives on the national level. The result, a list of 200 measures or projects, was also criticised as a conglomeration of any and all initiatives that could be viewed as concerned with sustainability. About a quarter had been defined before the sustainability strategy was published. The value of the list was that the individual measures had not been considered in light of sustainability and that the list had not been regarded as a whole. Thus, this work can be viewed essentially as a learning and awareness-building process.

In the committee’s second period, ten working groups were established to examine the contents of the projects and measures in depth. The groups consisted not only of committee members but also of members of the Forum for a Sustainable Austria. Each group focused on a specific topic, developed a common understanding of it, and suggested two or three concrete ideas for projects which had to concern at least two ministries; suggestions relevant to the competence of a single ministry were not accepted. At the end of this phase, 20 to 30 project ideas were developed. Some were chosen for implementation and are now at different stages of advancement.

A problem for implementation is the lack of any budget for projects and measures agreed on by the committee members. Most interviewed committee members find this a significant barrier. Projects that fall within the scope of the strategy can only be initiated if expenses can be covered from other budgets. Some committee members would like to see all ministries dedicate a specific percentage of their budgets to implementation activities. The budget could be used to initiate projects on which the committee members agree.

The quality of the committee’s work depends on various factors. First of all, the dedication of the committee members plays an important role. Since the strategy goals are not binding and no clear political instructions exist, progress depends on individual goodwill and on the conviction of those involved. At the same time, the strategy process is an opportunity for delegates who are very interested in sustainable development but do not have the authority to set priorities in this field in their organisations. Strategy implementation activities provide them the opportunity to engage more actively in these issues.

The attitude of committee members also plays a decisive role. Members are nominated not by the co-ordinator of the sustainability strategy, the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry, Environment and Water Management, but by their organisations. As a result, they represent their ministries and not simply their own expertise. Some



interviewees criticised this method of choosing the committee members because it does not (sufficiently) take the individual conviction of the committee members into account.

A great deficiency of Austria’s sustainability policy is the lack of debate in political forums. One interviewee noted the discrepancy between the diversity of sustainability activities and the lack of debate in parliament, for example. Moreover, the activities of the committee and sustainability activities as a whole are a relatively closed policy field within the environmental policy field and have little effect on other policy fields. The effectiveness of sustainability policy is therefore limited. This is a real weakness in Austria, in particular compared with countries like Germany, the Netherlands or Scandinavia where sustainability issues have already entered political forums.

There is little horizontal policy co-ordination through the work of the Committee for a Sustainable Austria because the administration works on the basis of bureaucratic logic and interests. As one of the interviewees explained, the administrative structure can be compared to many relatively autonomous little “boxes”. This structure, which has developed over decades, leads to an efficient day-to-day routine but does not encourage strategic renewal. This presents a structural problem for dealing with horizontal issues. Moreover, from the view of ministry delegates, co-operation not only offers oppor-tunities, there is also the danger of losing responsibility in a particular field and becoming redundant. For this reason, horizontal co-ordination requires high-level commitment as well as strong will to implementation.

After two years of work, some committee members have seen signs of fatigue in the group. For example, more and more of the nominated members no longer participate in the meetings but send a colleague. In addition, the work on concrete project ideas requires patience and persistence. It is a challenge for the steering group to cope with this situation and to find how to ensure the group’s dynamism over time.

Conclusions

The major difficulty discovered during the study of links between innovation and sustainability policy is a lack of commitment to sustainability by politicians and by individuals in the ministries. This is not only due to individual conviction, but also to the political system and the way it works. Whereas the horizon for policy goals, measures and their implementation is an election period (four years in Austria), sustainability goals are more long-term. Politicians do not have incentives to work on more long-term visions and measures because they will not be rewarded for it. Some interviewees argue that the political system itself needs innovation to deal with sustainability.

Another general difficulty emerging from the case study is that there is not yet a clearly defined objective for a sustainable innovation policy. There is no common understanding of what sustainable innovation is or should be. In Austrian sustainability circles, it is widely thought that sustainability needs not only technological innovations and changes in the economic system, but also and especially institutional, social and system innovations. Interviewees considered that sustainability requires society as a whole to recognise this in view of current and forthcoming challenges and to act accordingly when decisions are to be taken in enterprises, in political institutions and in households. To limit the scope of this broad approach would mean limiting the scope of the search for sustainable solutions.



A further consequence of the problem of definition is the difficulty, even the impos-sibility, of defining clear, quantitative political targets for sustainable innovation. But policy making requires target definition, the development of appropriate measures and commitment to reaching the targets. While it was easy to define targets for end-of-pipe environmental technologies, which could be expressed in reductions of harmful sub-stances per time scale, this is not possible for sustainable innovation policy. Since the goals and objectives of sustainable innovation policy are open, ways to achieve these goals need also to be open. The main problem is that every sustainable innovation can only be a single solution in a specific context. Policy in the sense of something that is generally valid is therefore difficult. Policy formulation for sustainable innovation strongly depends on the special context and framework.

Policy formulation and implementation of the Austrian Sustainability Strategy require activities that largely result from the initiative of those involved since the strategy goals are not binding. One interviewee stated that the strategy is a good basis and reference for engaging in sustainability issues but the success of the strategy depends on the will of the actors. Furthermore, it needs not only the engagement of the ministries, but also that of all institutions and societal groups. Within the Committee for a Sustainable Austria, members’ institutional background is a deciding factor. Some committee members have more scope than others to bring the strategy into their organisation.

The approximation to what sustainable innovation could be requires a search process that involves people from all societal systems. The role of policy in this process is more to facilitate than to provide knowledge content. In the words of one interviewee, policy should mainly undertake to enable a participatory search process for sustainable innovations and provide the necessary preconditions. In this way, sustainable innovation policy means the organisation of the public framework so that renewal processes become possible.

The Technologies for Sustainable Development programme

Technologies for Sustainable Development is an Austrian RTD programme at the interface between innovation and sustainability policy. It attempts, by supporting innovation, to pursue economic growth without negative effects on the environment. The first programme line began in 1999, followed shortly by two others. The programme focuses mostly on technological development, leaving another Austrian R&D programme (Provision) to focus on the social and ecological aspects of sustainable development.

Programme overview

The main aim of the programme is to support research and development of future technologies and solutions in order to create new opportunities for an eco-efficient economy and to ensure quality of life for future generations. The programme builds on three pillars: the integration of ecological and social systems, securing the presence of businesses in the long term and increasing the quality of R&D. Figure 11.1 shows how the different pillars are to be integrated focusing on R&D as the interface. The programme seeks to ensure Austria’s position in specific fields of technology, to create positive effects on the economy and on employment, while focusing on the economical use of natural resources.



Figure 11.1. Technologies for sustainable development: programme aims

Source: Modified from BMVIT, 2004.

The programme has three programme lines: Building of Tomorrow, Factory of Tomorrow and Energy Systems of Tomorrow. It began in 1999 with the programme line Building of Tomorrow, followed by Factory of Tomorrow in 2000 and Energy Systems of Tomorrow in 2003.

Factory of Tomorrow focuses on technological development in companies. It con-centrates on areas such as production processes, renewable resources and new product concepts. In many cases the creation of new partnerships, co-operation initiatives and internal qualification processes are important prerequisites for innovation. The pro-gramme aims at demonstration projects and has so far financed projects for EUR 10.6 million.

The programme line Building of Tomorrow is based on developments in the area of solar energy and energy-efficient buildings and also aims to establish demonstration projects through research and development projects. These will be concentrated in the area of energy efficiency, use of renewable energy and ecological building materials in order to ensure high quality of life at acceptable cost. The projects will also focus on service and use aspects of urban structures. So far the programme has financed projects for EUR 17.8 million.

Technologies for sustainable development: Programme aims

Increasing quality of life

Increasing competitiveness

Integration in ecological and social systems

Securing business location in the long-term

Increasing the quality of R&D

Increasing resource efficiency

Increased use of

renewable resources

Use-oriented systems solutions

Taking ecological and

social systems into account

Increasing cost efficiency

Creating safe and high-quality employment

Increasing innovation

potential

Sustainable regional and location development

Increasing scientific competencies

Improving the diffusion

process and implementation

Strengthening

international position

Supporting methodo-logical innovation



Energy Systems of Tomorrow is the most recent programme to be established and focuses on energy efficiency, use of renewable energy, questions relating to the functioning of the system and implementation strategies. Research and development strategies should provide the basis for model systems which can then be put into operation at the regional level. So far the programme has financed projects for EUR 5.9 million.

Background and development of the programme

The programme was initiated as a result of a 1998/99 government initiative which increased the budget available for R&D activities. The origin of Technologies for Sustainable Development can be found in a concept paper of February 1999 which outlined the relevance, the political framework, the experience to date, the current status and the future procedure for developing the programme. The programme was able to draw upon experience from previous actions of the ITF (Innovation and Technology Fund) Energy Technologies and Environmental Technologies. It was able to draw on the evaluation of these actions (Bruck and Gasser, 1996) and the recommendations made. The evaluation suggested that the subject area “Innovation for Sustainable Development” had “a high innovation potential and would be a follow-on theme able to deliver a significant contribution to resource efficiency” (Lang et al., 1999, p. 9). Other suggestions put forward by the evaluation and taken up by the programme included taking the different phases of innovation into account. Development of the programme was also supported by the at:sd network (the Austrian Network on Technologies for Sustainable Development) which included all relevant actors from the economic side of research for sustainable development. They were very important in working out the basic principles and the thematic directions of the programme.

The concept paper drew on the above-mentioned inputs and put forward a first sketch of the programme detailing its understanding of the guiding principles of sustainable development and outlining concrete thematic areas for the programme. The areas initially chosen were: efficient use of energy and renewable energy sources; renewable resources, processes, products and services; sustainable regional economic development; imple-mentation strategies; and institutional and structural innovation. Following the outcome of an initial call for ideas from the Austrian science community, six key actions were chosen for further development: solar energy; energy from biomass; sustainable building; renewable resources, processes, products and services; and sustainable regional economic development; and implementation strategies.

The ex ante evaluation of the key actions from the Sustainable Technologies Programme

The ex ante evaluation of the Technologies for Sustainable Development programme (Ohler and Knoflacher, 2000) reviewed the six key actions. Each was evaluated independently based on suggestions made for the action and its contribution to the whole programme. The evaluation considered content, organisation and economic aspects. It was based on criteria such as efficiency and transparency in programme implementation, clarity in development of aims and ability to test whether aims have been reached, inclusion of interdisciplinarity and the relationship between technological and socio-economic factors, the relevance of expected results for the overall aims of the pro-gramme, ability to implement the action and expected results, and the use of synergies with other key actions and other programmes.



The evaluation was very critical of the six key action lines and suggested that many aspects should be reconsidered. The evaluation asked why, although other types of innovation are referred to, technological innovation is stressed. It did not see a justification for the technological emphasis. Many of the criticisms were still referred to in interviews related to this project, in particular the links to other policy areas and the technological focus of the programme.

Co-ordination and co-operation

Links to policy initiatives

The only explicit link to concrete policy strategies or initiatives is the reference to the Austrian Strategy for Sustainable Development. The programme line Factory of Tomorrow is closely related to two of the 20 key objectives of the strategy, namely “Successful Management through Eco-efficiency” and “Strengthening Sustainable Products and Services”. Unlike the programme line Factory of Tomorrow, which does not define quantitative goals for improving resource efficiency, the Austrian Strategy for Sustainable Development requires increasing the productivity of resources by a factor of four. There are no specific plans for how this goal should be reached.

Links and co-operation with other programmes and initiatives

Formal links to other programmes in the area of sustainable development are provided for through the newly established FORNE framework initiative (described above). FORNE has greatly increased the visibility of research for sustainable develop-ment, an area that did not previously receive much attention from the Council. However, it remains to be seen whether it can also provide the ministries with a platform for increased co-operation within the programmes.

Most of the exchanges between the programmes in this initiative are informal. The civil servants responsible for initiating and running the programmes in the ministries know each other and meet regularly. They are therefore quite well informed about activities in the other ministries. However, few initiatives cross the borders of the individual ministries. Each has its own focus and its boundaries are clearly defined. This behaviour is slowly beginning to break down despite efforts by the Council that tend to decrease willingness to co-operate. The BMBWK will run an initiative designed to link with the start-up initiative in the Technologies for Sustainable Development Programme. Another such co-operation, still in its initial phase, is with the Seed Financing Pro-gramme, a programme that supports start-ups. The programme managers have begun to see if the two programmes can work together.

Other efforts at co-operation are more informal and take place at the level of the individuals who sit on programme panels of other programmes. Although such co-operation is informal it is a useful method of exchanging information and of ensuring that overlaps are avoided. One example is K-net,7 which focuses on bioenergy, a subject area close to Factory of Tomorrow. The BMVIT has a member on the panel that observes the work of the competence network. Another such centre, the Austria Bioenergy K-plus Centre, is also of interest to the BMVIT programmes. However, the centre focuses less on applied research.



The European ERA-Net initiative on linking RTD programmes in different countries is giving people who work with the programme a chance to exchange methods, views and practices. There are few links to other programmes that do not focus on sustainable development. The Division of Energy and Sustainable Technologies pursues its own agenda and interferes little with the other technology programmes in the ministry.

Addressing different policy goals

One of the issues that arose during this study was the complexity of issues surrounding the design and development of the programmes. Several criticisms were linked to the fact that institutes and organisations are funded without questioning whether they are moving in the right direction. The interviewees criticised the programme for focusing on individual technologies and not assessing their chances of success. They pointed out that agricultural agendas were taken into account when designing and developing new technologies but that industrial agendas were barely considered. The fact that there was an abundance of renewable resources available was acknowledged but there were few if any industrial partners willing or able to use the products. Value added was always theoretically possible but not always thought through. Technical and agricultural agendas set the direction.

Conclusions

The programme Technologies for Sustainable Development is the only initiative in Austria that focuses solely on the integration of innovation and sustainability. It is perceived as successful by the BMVIT which runs the programme and by many of the actors involved in sustainable technologies. However, the programme remains a niche programme and concrete links to other initiatives are not apparent. It is also heavily focused on technology development. This is a product of the Austrian separation of responsibilities between ministries. The BMBWK runs the programme on the more societal and behavioural aspects which are not addressed by the BMVIT. There have been very few co-ordinated activities in the past and only a few very specific ones are planned for the future.

There have been recent attempts to co-ordinate research for sustainable development, and all ministries pursuing research in this area have joined forces to design a framework for research activities. However, although a very useful exercise, the framework does not strengthen links with policies or strategies in other areas. The programme does not support concrete policies in innovation or sustainable development.

The way in which the programme was designed and established underlines this point. It was designed through a bottom-up process and with considerable contact with researchers. This led to a programme that was very much in tune with the research agendas of people in the field, but with little strategic input concerning the future direction of the programme in terms of supporting other policy initiatives.

The way in which the programme was set up and the narrowness of the focus is not only due to the specificities of this policy area. Many other programmes in Austria follow this pattern and co-operation is generally difficult on an aggregate level. Co-operation is also not encouraged by the system and recent activities of the Council for Science and Technological Development have done more to increase competition than to further co-operation.



Assessment

This section looks at the extent to which there is horizontal policy integration between innovation and sustainability policy in Austria. It is based on an analysis of the two case studies according to the following stages in the policy cycle:

• Setting directions (agenda setting/prioritisation, stakeholder involvement, using strategic intelligence).

• Horizontal co-ordination in policy formulation (interdepartmental collaboration, policy co-ordination at strategic level).

• Horizontal co-ordination in policy implementation (multi-principle approach, cross-agency initiatives).

• Policy learning (accountability).

Setting directions (agenda setting/prioritisation, stakeholder involvement, using strategic intelligence)

Individual policy areas in Austria are quite independent. They have considerable contact with stakeholders in these fields. However, the links between the policy areas are weak. There is little discussion between experts and on the political level about the interfaces. For example, there are few ideas about what sustainable innovation policy is or what it should look like. Therefore, the first step for any form of integration of the policy areas would be a common strategy. For instance, sustainable innovation policy would benefit if sustainable innovation were recognised as a necessity and an opportunity for future economic and societal development. It would need to become part of agenda setting across the policy fields. This is not presently the case.

Among the reasons for the lack of integrated agenda setting between the sustainability and innovation policy fields are barriers caused by the bureaucratic structure. As one of the interviewees explained, the administrative structure allows for an efficient day-to-day routine but does not encourage strategic renewal. This presents a structural problem for dealing with horizontal issues. Moreover, from the view of ministry delegates, co-operation not only offers opportunities, there is also the danger of losing responsibility in a particular field and becoming redundant. For this reason, horizontal co-ordination requires high-level commitment as well as strong will to implementation.

Horizontal co-ordination in policy formulation (interdepartmental collaboration, policy co-ordination at the strategic level)

Current links between departments of different ministries were in most cases estab-lished on the initiative of individuals in the ministries and are informal. Especially in the field of research for sustainable development, good mutual information exchange exists, e.g. between the BMLFUW and the BMVIT. One example of formal co-operation in sustainable development policy stands out: the Committee for a Sustainable Austria, which supports the implementation of the national sustainability strategy. It is valuable for spreading the idea of sustainability and for looking at the different activities of the ministries from the view of sustainability. However, the quality of co-operation among the committee members differs, depending on the level of their knowledge about sus-tainability issues and their ability to make their organisations aware of these issues.



The case study of the RTD programmes clearly shows that policy initiatives are developed on their own and are the responsibility of individual ministries, with few connections to other policy areas. In a similar way, the Austrian sustainability strategy was prepared under the responsibility of a single ministry, the BMLFUW. Repre-sentatives of other ministries participated through the so-called plenum but it met only four times and some interviewees doubted the seriousness of the offer to discuss the issues.

Horizontal co-ordination in policy implementation (multi-principle approach, cross-agency initiatives)

Implementation of policy initiatives in Austria usually takes place in individual policy areas. Because policy making takes place in small policy niches, there is little cross-policy implementation. Most sustainability activities take place in the provinces. The provincial governments are smaller units that implement activities relatively auto-nomously. Provinces such as Styria and Vorarlberg are especially active in implementing sustainable innovations, but the initiatives come mostly from the administration, not from the political level. At the local level, there are about 200 Agenda 21 processes. Lower government and administration levels seem to be more successful in implementing sus-tainable development than the higher ones.

Policy learning (accountability)

Evaluations are an indication that learning plays a role in policy formulation and policy implementation. There have been several evaluations of the RTD programme Technologies for Sustainable Development and there is also an evaluation tender planned for the Sustainable Development Strategy. Although these evaluations effectively take place, the question of how the results are used remains, and there is evidence to show that they are not always used.

In the area of sustainable research, the FORNE exercise shows that there is willing-ness to learn and to discuss and integrate different viewpoints. The ministries involved in sustainability research have developed a framework for their activities.

On another level, the Austrian Sustainable Development Strategy is conceptualised as a learning process. The fact that, with the establishment of the Committee for a Sustain-able Austria ,the different ministries have been brought to the same table to discuss sustainable development should not be underestimated. However, care needs to be take to ensure that it does not end up being an umbrella under which ministries continue to carry on their own activities.

Conclusions

Investigation of the links between the sustainable development and innovation policy revealed three main constraints which seem to be pivotal points for strategies to improve policy co-ordination:



• Lack of common understanding about “sustainable innovation” and “sustain-able innovation policy”. There is a need is to initiate a broad discussion about the question of what sustainable innovation is, why it is important and what a sustainable innovation policy needs. In the minds of interviewees, sustainable innovation is broader than new products and services and the main challenge for all groups in society is to develop and implement new ideas to support sustainable development. Interviewees also interpret sustainable innovation policy more broadly than, for example, financial support for specific technologies like solar energy. If policy is understood as the solution of common, public and general problems, sustainable innovation policy has to set conditions under which people will be innovative independently of where they act. According to the interviews, sustainable innovation policy is the design of a public framework that allows innovation processes. Until discussion of the meaning of sustainable innovation and sustainable innovation policy takes place, the question of how to organise co-operation will be secondary.

• Differences in the acceptance and embedding of innovation and sustain-ability in the political system. Innovation and sustainable development are embedded differently in ministries. While innovation is an explicit part of the BMVIT and well accepted, sustainable development today is not an explicit policy area but part of environmental policy and located within the BMLFUW. Sustainability is not taken as seriously as innovation as a political task. It lacks attractiveness owing to its prescriptive character (you should do…) on the one hand and its abstractness and complexity on the other. Politicians have little incentive to work on sustainable development and to give financial support to sustainability-oriented projects. A sustainable innovation policy requires ac-cepting sustainability as an important and trend-setting policy issue and making this manifest in political structures.

• Lack of authority in policy co-ordination boards. All interviewees were of the opinion that establishing more boards or panels will not make policy co-operation happen. The more important question is how existing boards could improve their work and design it more efficiently. The Committee for a Sustainable Austria lacks power of authority (like other sustainability boards, e.g. the sustainability co-ordinators conference). This derives also from the fact that sustainability is still strongly bound to environment policy and is mainly under the responsibility of the environment minister. To intensify policy co-ordination in existing boards requires separating them from the environment policy sector, giving them access to higher policy levels (e.g. federal chancellor) and a clear political commitment.

Sustainability policy in Austria is a policy niche that is positioned in the bureaucracy rather than in politics and is driven by a few people dedicated to the sustainability idea. This policy niche has proved quite successful, not because it is very effective but in comparison to sustainability policies in other European countries and the possibilities of this complex and abstract policy field. Innovation policy has many similarities to sustainable development policy. It also has certain niche characteristics and has developed its own way of thinking, its own programmes and initiatives. At the same time, and again like sustainable development policy, it has many interfaces with other policy areas and cannot fully play its role without recognising and encouraging interaction. These links are not as established as they could be and innovation policy is only starting to see itself as a horizontal policy area and to move out of its niche. Given this type of



behaviour in the two policy fields, it is hardly surprising that the links between the two are few and far between. Apart from very specific initiatives, there is little recognition of the importance of linking the two policy fields. However, as both policy areas move out of their niches and see their role as more interactive, there is the potential for greater co-operation. Innovation can become more important as a key driver for developing sustain-ability policy and sustainability policy can gain more acceptance in innovation policy.

Notes

1. www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/agenda21/english/agenda21toc.htm.

2. www.nachhaltigkeit.at/strategie/pdf/strategie020709_en.pdf.

3. http://csr.m3plus.net/website/output.php.

4. www.nachhaltigkeit.at/netzwerke.php3?koord_netz.html.

5. www.nachhaltigkeit.at/strategie/pdf/EU_nachstrat_en.pdf.

6. http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/de/ec/00200-r1.d1.pdf.

7. K-net are competence networks that aim to support industrial research and technology transfer. They have a strong focus on SMEs.

References

Arnold, E. and P. Boekholt (2003), “Evaluation of the Austrian Industrial Research Promotion Fund (FFF) and the Austrian Science Fund (FWF): Synthesis Report”, Technopolis, Brighton.

Boekholt, P. and E. Arnold (2002), “The Governance of Research and Innovation. An International Comparative Study”, Country Reports. Technopolis, Amsterdam.

Bruck, M. and S. Gasser (1996), ITF Programmanagement Energietechnik – Evaluierungsgutachten, Vienna.

Bundesministerium für Land- und Forstwirtschaft, Umwelt und Wasserwirtschaft (2003), “200 Maßnahmen für ein nachhaltiges Österreich. Das Arbeitsprogramm 2003 zur Umsetzung der Österreichischen Nachhaltigkeitsstrategie”, Vienna.

Bundesministerium für Verkehr, Innovation und Technologie (2004), “Zwischenbilanz 2004”, Impulsprogramm Nachhaltig Wirtschaften, Vienna.



Council for Research and Technological Development (2001), Recommendation of 27 June 2001, http://www.rat-fte.at/files/empf_020409_sondermittel5.pdf

Edler, J., S. Kuhlmann and R. Smits (2003), “New Governance for Innovation. The Need for Horizontal and Systemic Policy Co-ordination”, Fraunhofer ISI Discussion Papers, Innovation System and Policy Analysis, No. 2/2003, Institute Systems and Innovation Research, Karlsruhe.

European Commission (2004), “National Sustainable Development Strategies in the European Union: A First Analysis by the European Commission”, Commission staff working document, Brussels.

Federal Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Environment and Water Management (2002), “A Sustainable Future for Austria”, The Austrian Strategy for Sustainable Development, Vienna.

Glynn, S., P. Cunningham and K. Flanagan (2003), “Typifying Scientific Advisory Structures and Scientific Advice Production Methodologies (TSAS)”, PREST, Manchester.

Lang, R.W., T. Jud and M. Paula (1999), “Konzept Impulsprogramm Nachhaltig Wirtschaften”, BMWV, Vienna.

Martinuzzi, A. and U. Kopp (2002), “Die Erstellung der Österreichischen Nachhaltigkeitsstrategie. Process Review and Lessons Learnt”, Diskussionspapier 02/2002 der Schriftenreihe des Forschungsschwerpunkts Nachhaltigkeit und Umweltmanagement, Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien. http://www.nachhaltigkeit.at/bibliothek/pdf/nstrat_review.pdf

Ohler, F. and M. Knoflacher (2000), “Evaluierung des Impulsprogramms ‘Nachhaltig Wirtschaften’”, OEFZS-Bericht-S-0059, Seibersdorf.

Paula, M., C. Smoliner and B. Tiefenthaler (2004), “FORschung für Nachhaltige Entwicklung. FORNE Rahmenstrategie 2004 plus”, BMBWK, BMLFUW, BMVIT, Vienna.

Smits, R. and S. Kuhlmann (2002), “Strengthening Interfaces in Innovation Systems: Rationale, Concepts and (New) Instruments”, report for the EC STRATA Workshop “New Challenges and New Responses for S&T Policies in Europe”, Brussels, 22-23 April.

World Commission on Environment and Development (1987), Our Common Future, Oxford University Press.

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Chapter 12

PATCHWORK POLICY MAKING: LINKING INNOVATION AND TRANSPORT POLICY IN AUSTRIA

Katy Whitelegg

This chapter examines the links between transport and innovation policy in Austria. It is based on key documents in the two areas and a series of interviews with policy makers and experts. It looks at the way in which the two policy areas interact in Austria and the kinds of mechanisms that exist to facilitate communication between them.

Following an overview of the main documents in the field of transport policy and an assessment of their approach to innovation, two case studies are described in detail. They help to understand how innovation policy and transport policy interact. The first case study concentrates on RTD programmes on transport technologies and the second on the transport telematics framework programme. Although the two case studies are very different, it is possible to gain a good overview of the barriers and problems that exist at the interface of the two policy areas.

Introduction

Over the last decade policy makers in many European countries have reached the conclusion that the current segregated approach to policy making is no longer adequate to address the complexity of the issues they face. The segregation of policy areas causes a number of problems for policy making. It not only leads to overlapping policies, it may even lead to policies that pursue contradictory aims. In addition, cross-cutting areas, which do not traditionally belong to a defined policy area, may not be adequately addressed by any ministry so that no responsibility is taken for the issues.

The trend towards greater coherence and co-ordination in the policy making process has been most pronounced in areas that are inherently cross-cutting. In areas such as sustainable development and science and technology the pressure to develop more appropriate co-ordination measures has been greater. A number of recent studies and workshops have supported the search for better coherence in the area of innovation policy (Edler et al., 2003, Boekholt et al., 2002, Arnold and Boekholt, 2003, Smits and Kuhl-mann, 2002). Although there is no such thing as a model of optimal policy coherence, it is possible to conceptualise policy making for innovation policy so as to increase the overall functioning of the system.

298 – PATCHWORK POLICY MAKING: LINKING INNOVATION AND TRANSPORT POLICY IN AUSTRIA


The problems inherent in politico-administrative systems in general and innovation in particular in most OECD countries are characterised by Edler et al. (2003) as:

• A high degree of departmentalisation, sectoralisation of the political admini-stration, and little interdepartmental exchange and co-operation.

• Heterogeneous, un-linked arenas, often with corporatist negotiation deadlocks.

• Failure to restructure responsibilities in government because of institutional inertia.

• Dominance of the “linear model” of innovation policy (and use of economists as consultants).

• An “innovation policy” focus on the introduction of new technologies in small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), intellectual property rights (IPR) or ven-ture capital issues, etc.

• Emerging multi-level governance in the context of the European integration makes the launching of “bridging/systemic” policy approaches more difficult.

The high degree of segregation leads not only to closed policy arenas in ministries and departments but also in universities and among consultants. There is little opportunity for input from other sources and integration is made more difficult by the narrowness of the policy areas. This phenomenon is observed in innovation policy, especially when designed and implemented by different ministries and/or agencies. Innovation policies should be more focused around knowledge and less around the narrowly focused priorities of individual ministries.

Coherence and co-ordination are not goals in themselves but tools. Depending on the policy field and the actors involved, various mechanisms can be used to increase the ability of the system to think in terms of the whole. They are based on the increased need to manage interfaces, to embed innovation policies in the broader socio-economic context and to increase learning and experimentation. The state becomes a moderator and enabler that helps different parts of the system to communicate more effectively. This in turn supports collective decision making and implementation of policies and encourages learning within the system (Smits and Kuhlmann, 2002).

To alleviate overlaps and gaps between policy areas, an increasing number of govern-ance mechanisms have emerged (Glynn et al., 2002). Many of these take the form of councils, commissions or platforms which bring together individual policy makers from various ministries and non-policy specialists to discuss issues and formulate common policies and procedures. These bodies provide a useful basis for discussion and also improve the chances that initiatives in one policy area do not conflict with those in another and that policies are co-ordinated. They do not, however, replace the policy process. Policy decisions still remain within the ministries. The extent to which decisions taken in such forums have to be implemented or taken into account by ministries differs from country to country and according to the subject matter. Although these bodies are increasingly seen as one of the best mechanisms for integrating policy fields, this greatly depends on how they are set up and the powers they are given. Not all such councils support policy integration and some contribute to the further fragmentation of policy-making structures (Edler et al., 2003).



Mechanisms specifically designed for horizontal areas of policy making are only one small aspect of the complex bilateral interactions that exist between individual policy areas. Recently, attention has turned to the way individual policy areas interact. Special focus has been given to innovation policy, not just as a horizontal policy area, but as a policy area with specific relationships with other policy areas. There is no single best-practice model for defining what co-ordination and coherence between policy areas should look like. Countries and policy areas differ and require co-ordination mechanisms tailored to suit their specific needs.

Policy coherence between transport and innovation

Transport is by its nature a policy area that requires a high level of interaction with other policy areas. A wide range of issues influence the direction and implementation of transport policy, including infrastructure, spatial planning and environmental policy. In transport policy, many different logics and policy levels converge. Although incremental change is the rule in this policy area, it is often confronted with very different logics in other policy areas. This is increasingly the case as transport moves centre stage in the transition towards sustainable development. Many countries have started to implement strategies for sustainable mobility and to create initiatives to link transport policy to other policy goals such as regional development and environmental policy. The benefits of “joined-up government” are perceived to outweigh the barriers.

In the joined-up approach, there are high hopes that new technologies can solve transport problems. As one high level policy maker interviewed remarked, there is no such thing as transport policy that does not take the development of new technologies into account and the more involvement between innovation and transport policy there is, the easier it is to benefit from development in the other policy area. However, technology should not be seen as the sole solution. Politicians should not be able to hide behind technological fixes to avoid tackling larger behavioural problems in transport policy. The development of technologies in transport should be linked to pursuing overall societal goals.

This report looks at the interaction of innovation and transport policy. This focus artificially narrows some extent the scope of policy aims addressed by transport policy, which normally include areas such as industrial policy and environmental policy. However, the two policy areas can shed light on the way interaction takes place in general and can also touch on the direction of policy making and on which other policy areas play a role.

Austrian transport policy

Strategic planning documents are an important starting point for assessing any policy area. Although they should not be taken as sole evidence of the existence of strategic policy making, the existence, or the lack, of policy documents gives an indication of how policy is made. In Austria, two important documents provide the framework for transport policy: the General Transport Plan (1991) and the Austrian Federal Transport Infra-structure Plan (2002). Neither defines an integrated transport policy. The General Trans-port Plan was written long before Austria joined the European Union. The Federal Trans-port Infrastructure Plan focuses on a single area of transport policy.



Austrian Federal Transport Infrastructure Plan

The Austrian Federal Transport Infrastructure Plan (BMVIT, 2002)1 aims to develop a strategy for how the road and railway network should evolve by 2015. Its main focus is on the structure of the network. In addition to the road infrastructure, it also includes a strategy for developing other modes of transport, including rail and waterway transport on the Danube. It is the first successful attempt to create an Austrian federal transport infrastructure plan. The design process began in March 2002 and lasted nine months. It was based on a new approach to decision making and consensus building. It concentrated on building a consensus on the infrastructure projects to be financed among the main actors involved in planning and providing transport infrastructure. Non-infrastructure aspects of transport planning were not addressed. Safety, soft policies, legal aspects and financial support are mentioned, but not detailed as they are dealt with through other activities. The process involved the BMVIT, the Austrian federal states, representatives of the main transport carriers and other individual stakeholders. The academic community, the media and other stakeholders were informed about the process through a “general transport plan platform”.

According to Rosinak and Snizek (2003) the key strategic aims of the plan are:

• To strengthen Austria as a business location: transport networks make or break the quality of a location.

• To ensure efficient and appropriate extension of the existing network. step-by-step modernisation.

• To increase safety (in the light of several tunnel accidents)

• To ensure the financing of projects, that is to co-ordinate short-term investments with long-term financial planning.

• To simplify implementation. to create dynamic project management between the conceptual and the project level.

The process was organised in a series of stages. All of the stakeholders (see above) defined their individual priorities. The BMVIT then organised the suggestions according to federal priorities and the states replied with comments. In parallel, the financial requirements were calculated according to the time horizon.

The federal priorities are based on infrastructure networks of national and inter-national importance. They aim to link important Austrian nodes with each other and with other European nodes of importance for Austria. The Austrian nodes and the corridors were ranked according to their importance on a number of criteria. These included criteria for nodes: relevance for freight, for passenger transport and evidence of bottlenecks; and criteria for corridors: spatial integration of nodes, capacity, potential contribution to network, and efficiency (investment compared to use). The process consolidated 270 projects costing EUR 45 000 million into a series of infrastructure investment packages to be implemented in the near future worth EUR 17 100 million.

1. For more information, see www.bmvit.gv.at/sixcms_upload/media/131/gvk.pdf.



General Transport Plan

The General Transport Plan was finalised in 1991 and sets out the basic features of transport policy in Austria. It aimed to meet the country’s transport needs and make it possible to switch to more environmentally friendly modes of transport. It drew up the following guidelines for Austrian transport policy:

• Reduce transport: this should take place through balanced spatial development and increasing the quality of life in cities to reduce urban sprawl, through more efficient use of transport and reduction of empty journeys by employing new technologies and through use of producer pays principle in pricing.

• Support for environmentally friendly modes of transport: establishing fair competition between transport modes, support for rail projects and other public transport initiatives including local accessibility, integrating pedestrian and cycle networks with rail networks, integration of public transport accessibility in planning regulations. In addition, increasing waterway transport on the Danube.

• Earliest possible implementation of new technologies: introduction of legis-lation to support innovation in areas such as noise and pollution prevention, support for the introduction of electric vehicles, implementation of technologies to increase road safety and traffic monitoring.

• Involvement of stakeholders in transport policy: inclusion of a wide range of stakeholders in the formulation and implementation of transport initiatives to give the authorities access to different opinions and evaluate the pros and cons of proposed initiatives; including a wide range of views can increase transparency and the acceptance of such processes.

• True costs in transport: the internalisation of external costs and the introduction of the producer pays principle. True costs in transport include: measuring the external costs of accidents, environmental degradation, etc., taking external costs into account in taxes, charging and pricing and employing the polluter pays principle, whereby regional and social differences should be taken into account.

• Increased co-operation between modes of transport: Increasing co-operation between modes of transport concerns both freight and passenger transport. In freight it means improving the logistics of freight transport and intensifying the use of information and communication systems for optimisation. It also entails creating freight centres for transferring from one mode to another and further developing technical systems for combined freight transport. In passenger transport it means connecting different modes of transport to build an integrated network including cycle networks, park and ride systems and taxi-buses.

• Development of new transport legislation: This entails including the latest developments in road safety and monitoring road safety, better protection for non-motorised road users and putting public transport first. It also includes intro-ducing new technological standards to reduce the negative effects of transport.

• Reducing the impact of transit traffic: This includes a review of the relevance of transport activity on the international level and the implementation of the polluter pays principle. More extensive international rail and waterway networks and a long-term transit agreement with the EU based on environmental protection and acceptance by the local population.



• Environmentally and socially acceptable organisation of transport in con-urbations: Use of planning tools to decrease traffic in urban areas, create incentives to use public transport including traffic calming and restrictive parking initiatives, road pricing and prioritising trams and buses over private transport.

• Opening up the borders to eastern neighbours: Opening the borders increases traffic and requires a co-ordinated transport policy with eastern neighbours that includes extending the rail and waterway networks and decreasing the impact of transport on people and on the environment.

Although the ten guidelines outlined above are relatively broad and can be said to form the basis of an integrated transport policy, they were never translated into practice. The plan set out impressive aims and is often referred to, but it was not implemented in a clear and structured manner.

These two documents are the only official documents that outline transport policy in Austria. As one is entirely devoted to infrastructure planning and the other is quite old, it would appear that transport policy is not presented in documents in Austria. In fact, policy making takes place more informally in smaller policy arenas. Overall, this approach has worked very well, whence the lack of other attempts to define an integrated transport policy.

There are few explicit links to innovation policy in the two documents. The Austrian General Transport Plan mentions the need to develop and implement new technologies at several points (logistics, transfer of freight from road to rail, public transport, etc.), but goes into no detail. The Austrian Federal Transport Infrastructure Plan explicitly states that other documents deal with transport policy and that it only addresses infrastructure planning.

Institutional mapping of actors, institutions and flows

The interaction between innovation and transport policy in Austria is easier to understand when one looks at the institutional setting. As the barriers to coherent and co-ordinated policy making are often inherent in the structures rather than in individual policies, a mapping of the main actors and their interactions forms the basis for looking at individual policies. The Austrian institutional set-up in innovation and transport policy goes a long way towards explaining the problems.

Innovation policy

Innovation policy is comprised of a large number of actors on both the strategic and the implementation level whose responsibilities are not clearly defined and often overlapping. Evaluations have frequently referred to fragmentation as one of the barriers to the design and implementation of a coherent innovation policy in Austria. A recent evaluation (Arnold et al., 2004) of the two main research funds in Austria, the Austrian Industrial Research Fund (FFF) and the Austria Science Fund (FWF) concluded that fragmented policy delivery limits the opportunities for building scale and for learning both about policy delivery and about policies themselves. It makes the funding system hard to understand, and this is a problem both for those who have to live in it and for connecting it to developments in European R&D funding and performance. Moreover, as there are many small agencies, it is hard to build critical mass and especially hard to afford the needed investment in capabilities for analysis and strategy development (strategic intelligence). Finally, there is a wide diversity of governance practice and



therefore unclear interfaces between the ministries (as principals) and the agencies (as agents). In some cases, ministries maintain different governance styles for different activities in their relationship with a single agency. Furthermore, the responsibilities and the organisation of actors within the policy field also change frequently, often within a single legislative period. The current minister of the BMVIT, Hubert Gorbach, is the fifth to take office during the coalition between the Austrian Freedom Party and the Austrian People’s Party which began early in 2000.

A mapping of actors and responsibilities directly involved in the design and implementation of innovation policy can be divided into ministries, research funds and programme management organisations. Four ministries are involved in innovation policy issues: the Ministry for Economic Affairs and Employment (BMWA), the Ministry for Transport Innovation and Technology (BMVIT), the Ministry for Education, Research and Culture (BMBWK) and the Ministry of Finance (BMF).

The main research funding agencies in Austria are the FFF which concentrates on the private sector and the FWF which concentrates on basic research. The funds support “bottom-up” or non-programmed research. Although funding through strategic thematic programmes has increased in recent years, there are few thematic programmes and the “bottom-up” approach is preferred. Other agencies include the Austrian Wirtschaft Service, the Technologie Impulse Gesellschaft (TIG), the Christian Doppler Gesellschaft, the Austrian Space Agency, the Ludwig Boltzmann Gesellschaft and the Anniversary Fund of the Austrian National Bank. In addition to the agencies’ budgets, other organi-sations manage and administer the thematic programmes on behalf of the ministries. Some of these organisations specialise in programme management and have less competence on the content side while others have expertise in a particular field.

The most important new addition to the innovation policy scene has been the Council for Science and Technology Development. The Council was established in August 2000 to advise the government, ministries and federal states on all matters concerning Austrian technology policy. The Council consists of eight members, four chosen by the BMVIT and four by the BMBWK. Most recently the Council was responsible for reviewing the special funds worth a total of EUR 508 million. The special funds were not part of the normal science and technology funding and ministries applied for their own initiatives. The Council reviewed and ratified each application according to a set of criteria that focused mainly on the leverage effect for private sector involvement. In addition, the Council also tried to build up a picture of all initiatives and to look for overlaps and cases where clearer definition would be useful.

Transport policy

Austrian transport policy is the responsibility of the BMVIT. The ministry remit covers all modes of transport and the overall coherence of transport policy. Within the ministry two separate departments deal with the transport agenda, the department for infrastructure and the department for co-ordination. The department for infrastructure covers the individual transport modes and has groups for the individual modes: roads, railways, air and waterways, and the transport inspectorate. Each group is further divided into units that focus on legal, technical or sectoral issues. The co-ordination department is responsible for co-ordinating and integrating transport policy across the different modes and has three divisions: Co-ordination of Infrastructure Policy, International Networks and the General Transport Plan and Combined Transport. This is a relatively new



structure. Before a coalition was formed between the People’s Party and the Freedom Party in 2000, transport policy was spread across different ministries.

Institutional linkages

On an institutional level there are potentially strong links between innovation and transport policy. Both policy areas are under the responsibility of the BMVIT. Figure 12.1 shows the relevant departments and units within the BMVIT.

Figure 12.1. Departments within the BMVIT with direct responsibility for innovation and transport policy

Source: Simplified version of the BMVIT’s organisational structure.

However, according to most interviewees, the links stop here. Although both policy areas are covered by the same ministry, co-operation between the two has not increased very much and physical proximity has not significantly contributed to integrated policy making. A variety of reasons were given for the difficulties perceived in co-ordinating the two policy areas. They included:

• Confusion over which unit is responsible for which policies.

• Difficulty in understanding the division of labour between the transport divisions and the co-ordination division.

• Need to defend own area of responsibility in the light of changing organisational structures.

• Differences in thinking and in disciplinary backgrounds that influence the approach to change and to the concept of innovation within the departments.

Department I: Co-ordination

Co-ordination EU Affairs

Corporate services

Department II: Infrastructure

Roads

Rail

Air-Water

Department III: Innovation and Telecommunications

Telecom-Post Innovation Division

I2: Science and technology

support

I3: Science and technology

infrastructure

I7: Mobility and transport

technologies

K3: Co-ordination

innovation policy

K5: General transport management, logistics

and telematics



• Misperceptions (which often have greater weight than the reality) about the way in which the other department approaches change and innovation.

• Lack of strategic guidelines.

• Lack of clear responsibilities as a basis for co-operation.

• Lack of trust and fear of responsibilities being taken away if co-operation takes place and other units build up competencies in the area.

It is well recognised that more co-ordination is needed but there is little knowledge about how this should take place. Sometimes the organisation’s internal logic is not conducive to co-ordination. It is not known what co-ordination will imply and whether it will entail more in terms of loss of competence than gain in terms of co-operation. The current situation is a complex network of ad hoc and personal co-ordination and co-operation activities.

Co-ordination arrangements

Policy areas interact, whether as part of a co-ordinated process or on a more ad hoc basis depends on the structures and the need for interaction. The integration of transport policy and innovation policy in Austria provides an example of close physical proximity but little co-ordination on the formal level. Higher levels of interaction are found on the informal level where personal connections play an important role. There are few typical arrangements for interaction in the policy area; actors are rearranged for each new issue with a greater or lesser degree of integration.

This section looks at two activities that involve concrete interaction between transport policy and innovation policy. The activities were selected for two reasons. First, they represent arguably the most important interfaces between these two policy areas; second, both activities require interaction. RTD activities in the area of transport technologies have a long, but not entirely friction-free, tradition of interaction between the two policy areas. The Telematics Framework Programme is a more recent initiative to overcome some of the shortcomings in the interaction between different policy areas.

R&D activities in the area of transport

Research and development programmes that focus specifically on issues that are the responsibility of sectoral policy are an important interface between innovation and sectoral policies in any country. Although expertise on funding mechanisms and options is often located in the innovation and research ministry, contact with other forms of expertise is necessary to define the specific content of such programmes. Often the input comes from actors involved in research; however, during the design and development of programmes with a sectoral focus, ministries and agencies with responsibility for inno-vation and research often communicate with other sectoral ministries about their needs in terms of the focus and outcomes of RTD programmes.

Austrian transport-focused RTD activities are the responsibility of the BMVIT. Research activities are commissioned and designed by the Rail and Road Divisions under the Directorate for Infrastructure and the Innovation Division. The focus of the divisions differs. The Road and Rail Divisions commission research relevant to the development of their transport mode. The Rail Division has its own publications series and the road safety authority also commission research activities. The Innovation Division has a designated



unit that focuses on transport technologies and designs and develops transport technology programmes. The focus in this division is on innovative (both technological and organisational) solutions to transport problems.

It is more difficult to gain an overview of other transport-related RTD funding activities. Transport-focused research and development initiatives are also funded by other ministries and agencies, but on a smaller scale and often on an individual project level. In many cases, the focus on transport is often a consideration that is secondary either to the type of funding mechanism or the focal issue of the individual ministry. Other funding mechanisms that also encompass transport issues include the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) which funds basic research projects based on their academic merit. Such projects can cover transport issues as the FWF does not set funding targets. Another is the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment which supports networking activities between academia and business in competence centres. One centre concentrates on vehicle acoustics.

Transport technology programmes

Targeted funding of research and development activities in the transport area can be traced back to the early 1990s and the establishment of the Transport Technologies Programme (1992-97). There had been individual projects in the area of transport earlier, but there was no focused RTD programme. The subsequent development of the transport technology programmes can be divided into two periods: the Transport Technologies Programme MOVE: Mobility and Transport Technologies (1999-2003) and IV2S: Intelligent transport systems and services (2003-06).

Early transport technology programmes

The first transport technology programme was also one of Austria’s first thematically oriented research programmes. It represented quite a new approach to R&D funding and a break with the previous response mode of project funding. The programme focused on the organisation of large-scale projects and umbrella projects. It therefore had to focus not only on developing thematic content but also on organising appropriate programme management structures.

The original idea and the motivation behind the development of the programme were to increase internal co-operation in R&D in Austrian Industries (AI) AG, a holding company. The first thematic focus of the programme, the Low Noise Rail Umbrella, was based on a theme common to a large number of firms within the AI company. Three other umbrella programmes or projects followed: Low Noise Road Project, Logistics Austria Umbrella (Logistics Control Systems and City Logistics) and LOFT (feasibility study for a logistics research terminal).

The overall goals of the programme were to raise the technological capabilities of the Austrian transport equipment industry, develop supplier consortia of integrated systems, create centres of competence on a national level and reduce the environmental impact of transport in accordance with the general transport policy. The programme was established and run by the Innovation and Technology Fund. However, as the ITF is a “virtual” organisation, day-to-day management took place through funding instruments of the operative funds that subsidise company R&D in Austria, the FFF and the ERP.



MOVE

The MOVE Programme: Impulse Programme for Mobility and Transport Tech-nologies (1999-2003) (www.movenet.at) was established by the BMVIT (previously BMWV) to address “the strategic goals of Austrian transport policy on the one hand and the innovation potential of the Austrian economy on the other hand” (Grassegger, 1998). The programme intended to support innovation in the transport sector that would lead to a more efficient, environmentally friendly and intermodal transport system. Following an analysis of the challenges and barriers, it was decided to focus on increasing the attractiveness of public transport and optimising intermodal public and freight transport. The programme aimed to act as a moderator to stimulate interaction between different transport modes and to provide strategic impulses to decrease barriers to system innovations. The programme consisted of three programmes that addressed the individual thematic lines of the programme’s aims: Take ÖV, Logistics Austria Plus and Innovative Mobility Services.

Thematic overview of current programmes

The Intelligent Transport Systems and Services Programme (IV2S)

This is a more recent programme that has been financed through the research special funds for research activities. It concentrates on three key areas: automotive suppliers, rail technologies and transport telematics.

Austrian Advanced Automotive Technology (A3)

The Austrian Advanced Automotive Technology A3 programme focuses on the auto-mobile supply industry. Increasing pressure is being put on suppliers to change existing practices in light of new trends and challenges that can be described as “cleaner, lighter, quieter, more intelligent and more flexible”. The programme covers six key areas: new propulsion systems, energy-efficient auxiliary vehicle systems, alternative lubricants and fuels, low-noise road vehicles, new vehicle concepts and intelligent vehicles.

Innovative Rail System (ISB)

The aim of the ISB programme is to support the realisation of the latest technologies in passenger and freight transport. It concentrates on long-term solutions in the area of interoperability of the European rail system, the relocation of freight transport to rail, increased customer acceptance in passenger transport and optimisation of the vehicle/ track. On the basis of other European initiatives (A Joint Strategy for European Rail Research 2020: Towards a Single European Railway System), the programme aims to develop long-term solutions to technological challenges

Intelligent Infrastructure (I2)

Intelligent Infrastructure is a research and development programme that supports integrated systems approaches to telematics applications and use in the transport sector. The programme was designed to increase innovative capacity in the transport telematics field, to support high levels of co-operation and co-ordination between suppliers, cus-tomers and different transport modes, and to increase the user transparency in telematics.



Programme actors and their responsibilities

Programme design and development

The BMVIT has overall responsibility for the development and implementation of the transport technology programmes. The Unit for Mobility and Transport Technologies, which is part of the Innovation Division in the Directorate for Innovation and Telecom-munication, is directly responsible for the programmes and for the strategic development of transport technologies. The Innovation Division has responsibility for science and technology funding and science and technology infrastructure. It includes units that oversee research initiatives in the areas of air and space, information and communication technologies, nanotechnology, transport technologies, and energy and environmental technologies.

Programme management

The day-to-day management of the programmes is not performed by the ministry, but is carried out by an external programme management agency. In the case of the transport technology programmes, each programme line is managed by a different programme management organisation. These are selected through a competitive tendering process based on criteria such as previous programme management expertise and knowledge of RTD actors. In some cases, project management is chosen in part on the basis of its competence in the field of transport technologies; in others, programme management is carried out by an organisation specialised in programme management. Recent pro-grammes have involved an additional actor, as administrative management has been separated from financial management. Financial control is carried out by the Austrian Industrial Research Promotion Fund (FFF).

The design process

The transport technology programmes provide an in-depth look at the way in which themes are determined and the content of programmes decided. This section focuses on interaction between transport and innovation policy. This narrows to some extent the focus of aims and objectives that are addressed in the programmes, as environmental and industrial development goals play an equally important role in their development. However, it would be extremely difficult to focus on the interaction of all policy areas.

Bottom-up programme development

Within the general framework in which the transport technology programmes are developed, two independent sets of actors influence design and composition. First, actors from industry and the research sector play an important part in the bottom-up definition of the content of specific programme lines. Second, actors in the research funding frame-work play an increasingly important role in influencing the direction of programmes. However, although the research policy framework has changed significantly over the course of the three programmes, the basic mechanisms for designing programmes have not changed. The design process for the programmes is characterised by policy-level definition of a need followed by translation into concrete programmes through a participatory process at the bottom level. It is sometimes unclear whether this process is underpinned by a strategic planning process.



The design model described above can be observed in the development of all three transport technology programmes. It was first used during the development of the Transport Technologies Programme which was initially conceived to develop the state-owned industrial sector. It aimed to enhance internal R&D co-operation in Austrian Industries AG (AI). Once this need had been defined on the policy level, the definition of individual programme lines and topics took place through a bottom-up process involving sector-relevant participants. This happened first within AI, then with AI and the ÖBB, and then with private sector companies, mostly in the construction sector. The outcome of the process was a focus on noise reduction as an area with a high degree of synergy among the partners (Ohler and Jörg, 1998). The 1998 evaluation of the ITF Transport Technologies Programme (1992-97) (Ohler et al., 1998) further details the development of the individual umbrellas within the programme. These were also developed through a bottom-up process in which industrial companies proposed projects. The authors of the evaluation concluded that strategic priorities were not given first priority but that “Early involvement of potential participants in the envisaged programme worked to some extent as a substitute for a more systematic and broader analysis of problems and needs. Programme goals had not been defined beforehand in order to use them as a guideline for approaching the most appropriate stakeholders but evolved during the first brainstorming session.” The evaluation further concluded, in its analysis of the low-noise rail programme, that “these considerations suggest that there was in fact a much larger problem of innovation deficit in the Austrian railways cluster than could be addressed by focusing on noise reduction. In the ideal case, this would have been revealed by analysis.” (Ohler et al., 1998)

The development of the two subsequent programmes, MOVE and IV2S, proceeded along similar lines. The policy need was defined at the top and individual programme lines were developed with the help of stakeholders from industry and the research field from the bottom up. These were then developed into strategy concepts that summarised the content of the programmes (Geyer, 2001).

IV2S: The Council’s attempts at co-ordination

The IVS2 programme underwent a slightly different ratification process from the MOVE and ITF transport technologies programmes which was significant in terms of interaction. Since the earlier programmes, the research funding structure had changed and the Council for Research and Technology Development had been established to co-ordinate and develop research activities. In 2001 this meant that all research and technology development programmes submitted by ministries for funding under the special funds for research had to be submitted to the Council for approval. The Council assessed each submission and made a recommendation as to funding. The Finance Ministry released resources only on the Council’s positive recommendation.

The Council took its role seriously and when it considered the transport programmes it initially refused to give a positive recommendation. The reasons were detailed in the Council’s Recommendation of 27 June 2001 (Rat für Forschung und Technologie-entwicklung, 2001a):

The Council initially postpones a recommendation on the programme Intelligent Transport Systems. Regarding the announced comprehensive transport plan in which this programme will be integrated, an alternative financing concept should be developed. This concept should be financed from sources other than the Research and Development Special Funds for the parts of the programme that are not directly



research-related or very applied (e.g. infrastructure installations, demonstration activities, etc.) owing to their high relevance for transport policy. Other sources could be resources from the transport divisions.”

The Council was also unsure about the areas of competence for transport policy and innovation policy within the BMVIT and did not want to fund activities that were not research-related. In the Council’s Recommendation of 20 November 2001 (Rat für Forschung und Technologieentwicklung, 2001b), however, the Council agreed to fund the proposed programme. It came to two conclusions: first, that the comprehensive transport plan would not be completed for some time and that the decision on the programmes could not wait; second, that the co-ordination of transport policy and transport tech-nologies could not be achieved in such a short space of time and that the programme would be financed out of the special funds or would not be carried out.

Involvement of research, industrial and policy actors

The involvement of actors from research, industry and policy in the development of the programme can, if used appropriately, ensure the relevancy of the programme to policy needs, advanced research and industry. A wide range of stakeholders can also ensure that the goals of the programme are not tailored to a small group of players but include a variety of goals.

Actors from industry and the research sector were very involved in the development of all of the programmes and the individual programme lines were developed with the help of key stakeholders from relevant sectors. In addition, the programmes held brainstorming and ratifying workshops in order to gauge the reactions of the research and industrial sectors.

The involvement of policy makers from other policy areas has been more complicated. During the development of the recent IV2S programme attempts were made to include the transport divisions of the BMVIT in the design process. However, this was not entirely successful for reasons both of structural inconsistencies and of the divisions’ perceptions of each other.

The transport divisions tend towards the view that the Innovation Division is responsible for innovation in the transport sector and that this does not concern broader transport policy issues. They see clearly demarcated boundaries between transport policy and transport technologies. The Innovation Division does not limit its remit to the development of transport technologies and interprets its agenda as also encompassing organisational aspects related to the implementation of new technologies. This causes two potential conflicts with the transport divisions.

One potential conflict between the innovation and transport policy areas is based on the fact that there are no clear areas of competence concerning responsibility for R&D in transport (as a whole). The more the Innovation Division concerns itself with issues of transport policy and not just transport technologies, the better they master transport policy issues and the greater the threat they present to transport policy. However, the Innovation Division is well aware that many interfaces between transport technologies and transport policy need to be addressed. This was one of the main reasons for including the transport divisions in the programme development process.



Another potential conflict is more subtle but no less important. It is the policy areas’ perceptions of each other and how this affects their willingness to co-operate and learn from each other. The two policy areas have fundamentally different attitudes to innovation and its benefits. The transport divisions, such as rail, which deal with large and complex systems, are more sceptical of the benefits. They are suspicious of the Innovation Division’s motives for pursuing new technologies and caricature it as jumping onto every new bandwagon with no thought for the impact on large systems. In the other direction, the transport divisions are depicted as being anti-innovation, traditional and set in their ways.

Addressing different policy goals

R&D programmes can address a variety of goals or focus on a single objective. In the transport area, many European programmes try to address more than one policy objective. An assessment of the three programmes reveals that the programme documents all state that, although their main focus is on innovation, they also aim to pursue transport and environmental policy goals. However, a closer look at the programmes reveals that their primary aim is to support Austrian industry through R&D collaboration. Following closely behind are other transport and environmental policy aims, such as increasing intermodal transport in order to reduce the environmental impact.

The programmes all refer to the transport policy documents. However, given that the General Transport Plan dates from 1991 and was never implemented and the Austrian Federal Transport Infrastructure Plan (2002) only concerns infrastructure, there is no transport policy document that defines the role transport technologies should play in an integrated transport strategy. It is up to the unit and the programmes to define their legitimacy and position and their links to transport policy.

Telematics Framework Programme

When looking at the interaction of innovation policy and transport policy, the issues quickly become complex, as the Austrian Telematics Framework Programme illustrates. Telematics is a horizontal policy issue that affects transport and innovation, among other policy areas. The development and testing of new technologies is the responsibility of innovation policy whereas their interaction with real situations and implementation is that of transport policy. This is not a linear process, however, and the costs and benefits of technological developments need to be communicated with the expectations from the transport side.

The Telematics Framework Plan provides a platform for a variety of actors to define jointly the future framework conditions for the development and implementation of tele-matics applications. It provides a common framework in which actors from specialised areas of policy making can express their requirements, interests and questions without having to understand the entire concept. The process is managed by an external organi-sation.

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Structure of the Telematics Framework Programme

Transport problems have led to a need to find ways to optimise existing structures, link transport modes and use transport system more efficiently. Transport telematics have the potential to bring considerable benefits, but require a common approach. For this reason ITS Austria (Intelligent Transport Systems) was initiated to ensure that Austria’s implementation of transport telematics is coherent and in line with European standards in terms of the definition of interfaces, user demands and the implementation of new tech-nologies. A coherent strategy can provide stability for companies that want to invest in the area.

The basis of ITS Austria is the Telematics Framework Programme TTS-A (Transport Telematics Systems Austria). The framework programme’s aim is to provide compre-hensive guidelines for the implementation of telematics in transport. Four other elements (lead projects, technology programmes, investment programmes and further education and training programmes) contribute to the overall aims.

The five parts of the process

The highly structured Telematics Framework Programme aims to include many of the actors involved in the formulation and implementation of transport telematics. In order to structure their involvement, the process is divided into five clear stages: guiding framework, assessment and evaluation, functions and interfaces, technology portfolio and general telematics plan.

• Guiding framework. This part focuses on the definition of a guiding framework in which the development of the framework programme should take place. It is based on an assessment of user requirements. The guiding framework is based on four overarching themes: efficiency, safety, quality and usability.

• Assessment and evaluation. This part involves an assessment of the current and expected use of telematic applications in Austria. The data will be assessed according to the overarching themes and user requirements. Data collection includes analysing different systems and areas of application.

• Functions and interfaces. To develop an ITS system architecture for Austria. The aim is the interoperability and the inclusion of user requirements in existing and future telematics implementations. There are three parts: functional archi-tecture, physical architecture and communication architecture.

• Technology portfolio. This part establishes recommendations for the implementation of telematics technologies in all areas of transport and traffic in Austria with a time frame to 2015. It develops a method for categorising existing technologies according to technical and economic factors and on the basis of the overarching themes. It aims to develop a priority list for the implementation of telematics technologies on the basis of the technology assessment.

• Implementation plan. This part aims to develop a unified country-wide basis for planning in the area of telematics implementation in order to ensure a common approach across all modes of transport and areas of implementation in Austria. It deals with broader organisational and legal framework conditions.



Design process

The transport telematics framework programme is an attempt to design a compre-hensive strategy across all transport modes and areas of implementation. The process should not just produce a strategy on paper, but should include the commitment of all stakeholders from both the public and private sectors. They will then be responsible for implementing the strategy. For this reason the process involves a wide range of actors from senior policy makers through to field specialists.

Co-ordination through stakeholder involvement

The TTS-A Advisory Board, which has 16 members, including the heads of the transport and innovation divisions in the ministry and representatives from the transport operators (Asfinag, SCHIG, ÖBB), ensures high-level commitment for the work in defining the framework programme. Without this commitment the plan would remain a theoretical exercise.

Working groups include representatives from the departments involved and from the operators. They concentrate on different transport modes and the implementation of tele-matics in the various areas. The process also benefits from external expertise (European experts and civil servants from countries with expertise in designing and implementing telematics framework programmes).

Process management by agency

The responsibility of organising and co-ordinating the process of designing the framework programme lies with via donau, an agency belonging to the BMVIT which manages several RTD programmes.

Assessment

It should be stressed that the development of this plan is not a simple process and that it has required the commitment of a wide range of actors, including high-level policy makers, the heads of the transport operators and highly motivated individuals who have continued to contribute to the process. The results so far look positive and the process seems to be working. However, the plan can only be called successful if it is also implemented.

Assessment

This section looks at the extent to which horizontal policy integration of between innovation and transport policy in Austria exists. This assessment is based on an analysis of the two case studies based on the following stages in the policy cycle:

• Setting directions (agenda setting/prioritisation, stakeholder involvement, using strategic intelligence).

• Horizontal co-ordination in policy formulation (interdepartmental collaboration, policy co-ordination at strategic level).

• Horizontal co-ordination in policy implementation (multi-principle approach, cross-agency initiatives).

• Policy learning (accountability).



Setting directions

There are no strategic policy documents in the area of transport policy. The infra-structure plan cannot be considered an overall strategic policy document, as it only deals with one small, if albeit significant, area of transport policy. This is often considered due to strong localised policy areas with their own agendas. As a result, more top-down strategic planning documents are difficult to establish and even more difficult to implement. Co-ordination of the various areas of transport policy making is mainly informal and based on relationships between individual policy makers with a certain profile in the policy area. The lack of a strategic transport planning document means that each policy area in transport policy is free to pursue its own goals.

Direction setting at the highest level is not often done in collaboration with different policy areas. The initial impetus for a strategy or an instrument usually comes from one policy field. This was the case for both case studies in the transport field. This is also a result of the fact that the process through which initiatives evolve is ad hoc and not very structured. Initiatives often depend on an opening for a specific issue and not on strategic need for a certain policy instrument.

Horizontal co-ordination in policy formulation

The transport technology RTD programmes have had limited success in co-ordinating policy formulation. Co-operation between the transport and innovation divisions proves difficult owing to a number of factors, including differences in approaches and time scales, the potential threat of takeovers and the lack of clear process ownership.

The Telematics Framework Programme is a good example of co-ordination at the policy formulation stage. It involves a wide range of actors from the ministries and from the private sector. External management of complex political and technical processes is increasingly common.2 This helps to move the process out of one policy area and also allows for a broader perspective. Individual policy areas often do not look beyond the next budget or the next large technology programme. External actors are not tied to such time horizons and are able to take a longer-term perspective.

Horizontal co-ordination in policy implementation

Implementation of the transport technology RTD programmes concerns the Inno-vation Division and the programme management. The transport division is not involved in this stage. Implementation of programmes is perhaps best left to the division with the most experience in programme management. For the Telematics Framework Programme it is probably too early to say how the implementation of the co-ordination mechanism will take place.

Policy learning

The establishment of the Telematics Framework Programme is a signal that learning is taking place in the policy system. This programme has addressed several of the main problems and barriers that exist between transport and innovation policy. First, it addressed the issue of process ownership and moved the process out of the ministry. By doing this, it decreased the threat of losing responsibility to another division, which is perceived as one of the main obstacles to policy co-ordination. Second, it has developed

2. The General Transport Infrastructure Plan was also developed with the help of an external moderator.



long-term strategic aims for a policy area that has the potential not to remain a theoretical exercise. However, it is still too early to assess the programme, as it is still in the conception phase. Its effectiveness will be tested when it can be seen whether individual actors use the programme as a basis for decision making.

On another level, the Council for Science and Technological Development is forcing parts of the innovation policy system to step back and consider gaps and overlaps within the system. It is able to take a wider perspective and to pinpoint weaknesses. It was able to do this when it examined all of the RTD programmes submitted for funding by the special funds. Many of the programmes were rejected at first because they were not co-ordinated with similar programmes in the same area. However, although the Council was able to pinpoint system failures, individual actors had little time to remedy the situation and it is not clear whether there is a long-term effect on the system.

Having looked at the level of coherence and co-ordination between the two policy areas in the different phases of the policy making process, the following section summarises the main barriers to policy integration. It shows that although the cases vary considerably depending on their success in attempting to co-ordinate policy areas, the barriers in both cases are remarkably similar.

Barriers to policy integration

There are many barriers to the co-ordination of policy areas. As mentioned above, there are structural, organisational and psychological barriers to co-operation between innovation and transport policy in the development of transport technology programmes. They include:

• The lack of clear structures and competencies increases mistrust and encourages each part of the system to try and strengthen its own area. There is too little openness and interest in what others are doing.

• Unstable structures, changing competencies and resources lead to an atmosphere of mistrust. Co-operation needs to be based on a degree of stability.

• A lack of strategic planning documents. The fact that there are no policy docu-ments outlining the role of transport technologies in an integrated transport strategy inhibits the integration of policy areas.

• Transport goals are formulated implicitly and not explicitly.

• Lack of understanding of differences in thinking between the two policy areas. Policy areas do not make allowances for differences in thinking and believe the other should change.

• Lack of time to increase co-operation which is a time-consuming process.

• Lack of formal processes. Although informal processes function well then cannot always replace formal ones.



Success factors

• The external management of the Telematics Framework Programme by an organisation separate from the ministry that has a mediation function can be seen as learning within the system and therefore as a success factor.

• Policy niches are well informed about their specific area and connected to the actors in the area.

• There is a high level of informal networking and information flows that keep one part of the system informed about the other.

• Policy makers are in touch with what is going on in their area and able to make informed decisions.

Conclusions

This report has touched on a wide range of issues concerning overall policy making in Austria, on the organisation of transport and innovation policy and on interaction between the two policy areas. It has thrown up a number of questions that would warrant further investigation.

The pros and cons of long-term strategic policy documents that provide a framework in which individual policy areas and units can work are difficult to judge. It is not clear whether a strategic transport policy document which contains a clear link to innovation and the role innovation should play in supporting overall transport goals would help. First, it is not clear whether it would be possible to develop such a document in such a way that all actors are involved and feel that they own the process. Second, it is not at all clear that if such a document were produced it would be followed. Several attempts in ICT policy to create such documents have failed to have the intended impact.

In addition to a belief in strategic policy documents, there is a tendency to think that coherence in policy making means integration and that combining ministries or agencies is a way of ensuring they work more efficiently and effectively. The experience of the past four years in the BMVIT, where transport and innovation have been under the same roof, has shown that mere organisational proximity is not enough to overcome the barriers. There is no right amount of integration and coherence in a system. It is a case of finding out what does not work and where the system fails and finding appropriate mechanisms to fix it. Looking further into what policy coherence and co-ordination mean in the Austrian context would be an interesting study that would benefit both from a deeper understanding of the country’s patchwork style of policy making and from looking at how other countries deal with the transport/innovation interface.



References

Arnold, E. and P. Boekholt (2003), “Research and Innovation Governance in Eight Countries: A Meta-Analysis of Work Funded by EZ (Netherlands) and RCN (Norway)”, Technopolis, Brighton.

Arnold et al. (2004), “Evaluation of the Austrian Industrial Research Promotion Fund (FFF) and the Austrian Science Fund (FWF): Synthesis Report”, Technopolis, Brighton.

Boekholt, P. et al. (2002), “The Governance of Research and Innovation: An International Comparative Study”, country reports, Technopolis, Amsterdam, 2002.

BMVIT (2002), “Generalverkehrsplan Österreich 2002 - Verkehrspolitische Grundsätze und Infrastrukturprogramm”, BMVIT, Vienna.

Edler, J., S. Kuhlmann and R. Smits (2003), “New Governance for Innovation: The Need for Horizontal and Systemic Policy Co-ordination”, Fraunhofer ISI Discussion Papers on Innovation System and Policy Analysis, No. 2/2003, Institute Systems and Innovation Research, Karlsruhe, 2003.

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Geyer, A. (2001), “Strategiekonzept ‘Intellegente Verkehrssysteme und Services’”, Endbericht, ARCS, Seibersdorf.

Glynn, S. et al. (2002), “Typifying Scientific Advisory Structures and Scientific Advice Production Methodologies (TSAS)”, PREST, Manchester.

Grassegger, E., A. Frötscher, R. Pichler, T. Glöckel, M. Seitz and L. Jörg (1998), ”Das Impulsprogramm Mobilität & Verkehrstechnologien MOVE 1999-2003”, Seibersdorf Research Report OEFZS A-4546, Seibersdorf.

Hertin, J. and F. Berkhout (2002), “Practical Experiences on Policy Integration and Recommendations for Future Initiatives on EU and National Level”, paper for the 3rd Blueprint Workshop: Instruments for Integrating Environmental and Innovation Policy, Brussels, 26-27 September.

Ohler, F., E. Arnold, L. Jörg and D. Corsten (1998a), “Evaluation of the ITF-Transport Technology Programme”, ARCS, Seibersdorf.

Ohler, F. and L. Jörg (1998b), “Public Procurement as Collective Action: The Case of the Austrian Low-Noise Rail Programme”, ARCS, Seibersdorf.

Rat für Forschung und Technologieentwicklung (2001a), Empfehlung vom 27 Juni 2001, Verteilung von F&E Sondermittel, www.rat-fte.at/files/empf_010627_sondermittel3.pdf

Rat für Forschung und Technologieentwicklung (2001b) Empfehlung vom 20 Novermber 2001, www.rat-fte.at/files/empf_011120_sondermittel4.pdf



Rosinak, W. and S. Snizek (2003), “Der General Verkehrsplan Österreich 2002, Verfahren und Methoden”, Internationales Verkehrswesen (55) 3/2003, 76-81.

Smits, R. and S. Kuhlmann (2002), “Strengthening Interfaces in Innovation Systems: Rationale, Concepts and (New) Instruments”, report for the EC STRATA Workshop on “New Challenges and New Responses for S&T Policies in Europe”, Brussels, 22-23 April.

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The full text of this book is available on line via these links:

http://www.sourceoecd.org/scienceIT/9264035710http://www.sourceoecd.org/industry/9264035710http://www.sourceoecd.org/industrytrade/9264035710http://www.sourceoecd.org/governance/9264035710

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This book provides lessons from case studies in policy governance for the information society and sustainable development. It highlights important lessons from these policy areas for the governance of innovation policy, and illustrates mechanisms and practices for better co-ordination and integration across policy areas.

Companion volumes to this edition are:

Governance of Innovation Systems – Volume 1: Synthesis Report Governance of Innovation Systems – Volume 2: Case Studies in Innovation Policy


www.oecd.orgISBN 92-64-03571-0 92 2006 02 1 P-:HSTCQE=UXZ\VX:






























GOVERNANCE SCIENCE INNOVATION GOVERNANCE SCIENCE INNOVATION GOVERNANCE

SCIENCE GOVERNANCE INNOVATION SCIENCE GOVERNANCE INNOVATION SCIENCE GOVERNANCE

SCIENCE INNOVATION GOVERNANCE SCIENCE INNOVATION GOVER

GOVERNANCE INNOVATION SCIENCE GOVERNANCE INNOVATION

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