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Environmental Development

Environmental Development 2 (2012) 73–85

2211-46

doi:10.1

E-m

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/envdev

Governance for sustainable reconstruction afterdisasters: Lessons from Nias, Indonesia

Ugo Guarnacci

University of Reading, Reading, United Kingdom

a r t i c l e i n f o

Keywords:

Governance

Reconstruction

Sustainability

Disaster

Indonesia

45/$ - see front matter & 2012 Elsevier B.

016/j.envdev.2012.03.010

ail address: u.guarnacci@pgr.reading.ac.uk

a b s t r a c t

Disasters create enormous pressure to provide survivors with

permanent housing and normally lead to large-scale reconstruc-

tion programmes. In this respect, the concept of sustainable

reconstruction has surfaced in the international arena as a

successful strategy to deal with disasters, since it addresses the

issue of sustainability during the recovery process. This paper

focuses on Nias, an Indonesian island hit by the December 2004

tsunami and the March 2005 earthquake, and shows why and to

what extent governance is key to achieving sustainable recon-

struction. In analyzing these issues, the article uses evidence from

field research and relies on primary data collected through

questionnaires, semi-structured elite interviews and in-depth

interviews. Finally, the paper draws conclusions regarding some

major governance gaps that might have prevented the recon-

struction process in Nias from being sustainable.

& 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

On Sunday 26 December 2004 the Indian Ocean tsunami struck the region of Aceh and Nias Island,Indonesia. Within minutes, over 800 km of coast was flattened. No warning systems were in place, andlocal populations were caught completely unprepared (Clarke et al., 2010). Three months later, onMonday 28 March 2005 an earthquake of Mw 8.7 on the Richter scale hit Nias and the coast of WesternSumatra. According to UNDP figures (2007), of the two disasters, the March 2005 earthquake had agreater impact in Nias in terms of damage and deaths. In fact, after the December 2004 tsunami a total of122 deaths and 2300 people directly affected were recorded. However, the March 2005 earthquakecaused the death of 839 people and made 70,000 people homeless (UNDP, 2007).

V. All rights reserved.

U. Guarnacci / Environmental Development 2 (2012) 73–8574

Nias ranks as the world’s sixth most quake prone region and it is one of the poorest and mostisolated areas in the province of North Sumatra. Moreover, the island suffers from inefficient land useplanning, coastline degradation and increased population in hazard areas. Therefore, Nias clearlyshows how disasters are a symptom of unsustainable development as they represent the result ofthe complex interaction between potentially destructive events, such as an earthquake and atsunami, poor environmental management and the vulnerability of a society (Albala-Bertrand, 1993;Alexander, 2000; Cutter et al., 2003; Weichselgartner, 2001).

The magnitude of the two catastrophic events that severely affected Nias drew internationalattention and brought in many humanitarian organizations interested in taking part in thereconstruction process. In such a context, it has been evident that even if disasters cause extremedevastation in terms of loss of life and property, they can also provide a unique window ofopportunity for local governments and NGOs to take on new roles and to rebuild in more sustainableways. However, sustainable reconstruction can only be achieved under certain conditions andprimary governance issues need to be taken into account.

This paper shows that sustainable reconstruction and environmental governance are closelyconnected in terms of addressing sustainability in a post-disaster scenario. It also presents the mainattributes that characterize sustainable reconstruction. Moreover, it examines why it is crucial toconsider governance issues in sustaining sustainability during the reconstruction process. By usingNias as a specific case study, the paper also provides a critical reflection on those governance gapsthat have limited the implementation of sustainable reconstruction on the ground. Consequently,this article is an attempt to bring governance concerns into post-disaster reconstruction as a way toreplace inappropriate catastrophe management and promote an alternative and more sustainablefuture.

2. Defining sustainable reconstruction

A vast array of literature positions shelter and housing at center stage in post-disaster interventions(Barakat, 2003; Davidson et al., 2007; Hamdi, 1990; Zetter and Boano, 2007). It is usually found that theurgent need for housing normally leads to large-scale reconstruction programmes, with huge demand forconstruction materials and limited considerations for environmental impact and poor living conditionsfor future residents (Peacock et al., 2007).

While sustainable reconstruction is quite a new topic, it has been analyzed in several academicpapers (i.e. Aide, 2003; Alexander et al., 2006; Ferradas, 2006; Lizarralde et al., 2010; Passerini, 2001)and in different field reports of international and non-governmental organizations (i.e. UNEP andSKAT, 2007; World Bank, 2010; WWF, 2006). In this respect, the UNEP and SKAT’s report presents aninteresting definition of sustainable reconstruction, describing it as ‘‘an integrated approach toreconstruction. Environmental, technical, economic, social and institutional concerns are consideredin each stage and activity of reconstruction to ensure the best long-term result, not only in housingdesign and construction activities, but also in the provision of related infrastructure such as watersupply and sanitation systems’’ (UNEP and SKAT, 2007: 9).

Although this definition is broad, it draws our attention to two main aspects which characterizesustainable reconstruction:

1.

It is a multidimensional phenomenon, which considers sustainability under different butinterrelated criteria.

2.

It is a long-term strategy.

These two characteristics link the concept of sustainable reconstruction to the notion ofsustainable development, as it was defined in the Brundtland Report ‘‘development that meets theneeds of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their ownneeds’’ (WCED, 1987: 43). An implicit idea behind this explanation is that achieving the goal ofsustainable development requires balancing at the same time the interests of environment, socialequity and the economy (Rydin, 2003). Moreover, Neumayer’s analysis (2003) is instrumental in

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stressing that time perspective is crucial in addressing sustainability, since future generations are‘‘downstream in time’’ and thus vulnerable to the choices made ‘‘upstream in time’’.

The concept of sustainable reconstruction seems to acknowledge the necessity of a dualisticapproach: one that faces the challenges of a disaster response in the present while, in parallel,it promotes a culture of prevention for the future (Ingram et al., 2006; Smith and Wenger, 2007).Therefore, sustainable reconstruction is centered on the idea of ‘building back better’ which impliesthe need to link humanitarian relief with longer term disaster risk reduction efforts (Kennedy et al.,2008). In fact, sustainable reconstruction should aim at rebuilding in a safe and adequate way,supporting equity and fairness and strengthening cooperation between international and nationalinstitutions, NGOs and local communities.

The sustainable reconstruction approach indicates that the environment is not external to society; infact, it represents a dynamic and evolving setting in which boundaries between ecological systems andsocial systems are dissolving (Berkes et al., 2003; Holling et al., 2002; Meadowcroft, 1999.). This aspectsymbolizes a break with the single disciplinary view which focuses mainly on disasters ‘naturalness’ (as inthe phrase ‘natural disaster’), with little or no reference to human induced actions (Weichselgartner, 2001).

3. Why governance is key to sustainable reconstruction?

Governance is a controversial and complex topic because its meaning is context-dependent and therecan be competing stakeholder interests involved. Not surprisingly several definitions of the term can befound in the literature (i.e. Kjær, 2004; Rhodes, 1996; Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden, 2004).

In line with Kemp and Parto’s analysis (2005) this paper defines governance as the formal andinformal arrangements through which decisions are taken and implemented in order to advancesocietal aims. To concretize this definition and reduce its vagueness, the term governance is linkedhere to the sustainable reconstruction approach, where societal aims are identified in reducing socialvulnerability, giving consideration to environmental aspects and promoting long-term resilienceafter disasters (World Bank, 2010).

Moreover, in applying this definition to the post-disaster reconstruction context, twoobservations should be made. First, governance is not government (Kooiman, 1993). In this regard,the governance literature is centered on the idea that the conventional ‘‘command and control’’approach, structured around a centralized leadership and contraction of power, is by no means asufficient strategy to support sustainable development after disasters (Underdal, 2010). In fact,hierarchical and overly bureaucratic arrangements tend to limit the types of knowledge and thenumber of players involved in decision making. Furthermore, the rigid structure of this kind ofarrangement is generally ineffective to deal with surprise and discontinuity (Levin, 1999). On thecontrary, governance, as a concept, recognizes that power exists inside and outside the formalauthority and institutions of government. Governance is framed by the idea that human–environment systems are characterized by uncertainty and thus emphasizes adaptiveness andflexibility as two crucial requisites to deal with hazards (i.e. Armitage et al., 2008; Biermann andPattberg, 2008; Folke et al., 2002). Even though government is a major player, it is not the only oneinfluencing decisions and how they are implemented. Other players, such as NGOs, internationalorganizations, community leaders and religious institutions, have to be taken into consideration forseveral reasons, for example because of the resources and local knowledge which they bring to thereconstruction work in Nias.

Second, governance emphasizes ‘process’. It recognizes that decisions are made based on complexrelationships between many stakeholders with different priorities. The way these competingpriorities are reconciled can be identified as the essence of the concept of governance (Rhodes, 1997).This second aspect of governance is also stressed in the ‘‘Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015:Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters’’, adopted in the World Conferenceon Disaster Reduction (WCDR) held in Kobe, Hyogo, Japan in January 2005. In particular, the HyogoFramework for Action highlights the need to involve both communities and local authorities inimplementing actions for disaster risk reduction (United Nations International Strategy for DisasterReduction—UNISDR, 2005: 5).

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The post-disaster reconstruction is commonly a process requiring intense decision-making basedon limited information about complex issues with long term impacts. Moreover, a large influx ofresources need to be coordinated and allocated by different players (international, national andlocal) under time pressure and with the urgency to show tangible progress. In this respect, theconcept of ‘‘earth system governance’’ (Biermann, 2007; Dellas et al., 2011) may be useful to pointout that the promotion of sustainability after disasters implies taking into consideration the sum ofthe formal and informal rule systems and actor-networks that are set up to prevent, mitigateand adapt to risks, environmental change and earth system transformation (Biermann, 2007: 329).In such a context, certain concerns prominent in the ‘‘earth system governance’’ literature becomeparticular relevant in supporting the implementation of sustainable reconstruction:

�

Accountability. It implies clearly defined roles and responsibility; the presence of performancechecks according to these predefined roles and responsibilities; responsiveness to other players inorder to ensure transparency (Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden, 2004). According to Biermanand Gupta (2011) accountability is based on four pivotal elements: a normative element, that is,an agreed way of behaving; a relational element, that is, a link between those held accountableand those who hold to account; a decision element, that is, a judgment about whether theexpected standard of behavior is being met; and a sanctioning element, that is, an ability tosanction deviant behavior. � Legitimacy. The concept has both a normative and a sociological meaning. To say that an

institution is legitimate in the normative sense is to emphasize that it has the right ‘‘to rule even ifit does not act in accordance with the rational self-interest of everyone who is subject to its rule’’(Buchanan and Keohane, 2006: 410). An institution is legitimate in the sociological sense when itis widely believed to have the right to rule (Ibidem).

� Coordination. In the case of post-disaster reconstruction, accountability and legitimacy are

dispersed among a variety of stakeholders (international, national, regional and local). In such acontext, coordination is key and it requires more than just achieving the goals of individualorganizations (Papadopoulos, 2000). Consequently, addressing complex issues such as sustain-able reconstruction demands multilateral coordination and involves ‘‘network governance’’(O’Toole, 1997). Provan and Kenis’ analysis (2007) allows us to point out that networks are a set ofactors or nodes with different configuration, since relationship between these nodes can be eitherpresent or absent. Pluralist forms of accountability and coordination are stressed that providegreater legitimacy through acceptance of new players and the formation of horizontal andvertical linkages (Agranoff and McGuire, 2001).

� Effective evaluation. This is a crucial governance aspect and is suggestive of the need to take into

account the complexity of the situation under assessment. In this respect, a holistic approach isrequired in order to include ecological, social and economic parameters in the evaluation(Plummer and Armitage, 2007).

� Knowledge. This element is linked to the previous one and it refers to the fact that no single player,

state or non-state, can have the full range of knowledge required to support effective governance.As a result, multiple sources of knowledge should be welcomed (Jasanoff, 2004). For instance,social anthropological research stresses the importance of indigenous knowledge for disasterreduction. In fact, this kind of knowledge is passed down from generations and is internalized bythe communities through a process of socialization (United Nations International Strategy forDisaster Reduction—UNISDR, 2008).

� Community engagement. Community members should have equal access to decision-making,

priority-setting and resource allocation processes. Community participation also requires a moreevaluative and analytical approach in terms of what it means and how to engage communitiesmeaningfully (Head, 2007; Taylor, 2007). In particular, in line with Kumar’s investigation (2005),this article challenges the notion that ‘community’ is intrinsically good. In fact, cooperation andparticipation within communities may assume a negative sense if they are used to cut somemembers off and favor some others. In this respect, it is crucial to highlight that vulnerable andmarginalized groups are often excluded from making decisions on the communitarian and publicmanagement of disaster risks (Paton and Johnston, 2001).

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These governance concerns will be discussed further on in this paper in order to understandbetter the limits of the reconstruction process in Nias.

4. Case study and methodology

4.1. Background

With a population of 756,762 inhabitants and an area of 5449 km2, Nias is the largest of the chainof islands off the west coast of Sumatra, Indonesia (BPS, Census, 2010). From an administrativeperspective Nias is divided in four main regencies: Nias Utara (North Nias), Nias, Nias Barat (WestNias) and Nias Selatan (South Nias) while Gunung Sitoli is the capital city of the Nias regency. GunungSitoli is the center of administration and business affairs and is independent of the four regencies.

Source: Syafruddin et al. (2007).

Nias’ history is rooted in slavery. In fact, by the time the Dutch East India Company (VOC) began totake an interest in Nias in 1660s, Aceh in North Sumatra was regularly importing slaves on a large scale.Nias remained marginal to colonial interest until the change in Dutch policy towards the Outer Islands,which led to its complete conquest in 1906. After 1949, post-independence Nias has seen an increasingcentralization of power away from the villages (Beatty, 1992). From a religious perspective, the majorityof Niasans are Protestant, while the remainders are either Muslim or Catholic (BPS, Census, 2010).

Nias is one of the poorest regions in the province of North Sumatra. The local economy ispredominantly based on rice-farming, pig-farming, fishing and cultivation of cash crops such as rubber,cocoa and coconuts. Per capita income was estimated at US $340 per annum in 2004 and the share of thepopulation living below the poverty line in 2002 was 31 percent, roughly twice North Sumatra’s level of16 percent, or the Indonesia-wide range of 18 percent (Nazara and Resosudarmo, 2007: 4). Furthermore,poor infrastructure remains a binding constraint to the economic development of the island.

Last but not least, Nias is particularly subject to natural hazards. In fact, it is classified in thehighest seismic risk zone in Indonesia (zone 6) and earthquakes occur monthly, with an averagemagnitude of Mw 6 Richter out of 10 (Beetham and Sinclair, 2008: 8). Furthermore, floods happenregularly in the coastal lowlands and the risk of landslides is considerably high.

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Nias therefore represents an interesting case from a research perspective with a fragile context,where social, economic and environmental aspects of vulnerability interact with a high exposure tonatural hazard risks. Moreover, after the December 2004 tsunami and the March 2005 earthquake theisland was taken over by a massive reconstruction process and received an unprecedented amount offinancial resources from the Government of Indonesia, donors and NGOs. The reconstruction budgetfor 2006 was estimated at about Rp 1.1 trillion, four times the size of the normal local governmentbudget (Reliefweb, 2007). Furthermore, from 2005 to 2008 a total number of 29,898 houses werereconstructed and rehabilitated in Nias by national and international organizations (Badan Rehabilitasidan Rekonstruksi—BRR NAD-NIAS, 2009: 82).

4.2. Field research

The purpose of the field research in Nias has been to conduct an ‘‘exploratory study’’, which is avaluable means of finding out ‘‘what is happening; to ask questions and assess phenomena in a newlight’’ (Robson, 2002: 59). Integrating the research on sustainable reconstruction with that ongovernance in a post-disaster environment represents the ‘‘new light’’ of this investigation.

This paper relies on primary data collected during two different periods of fieldwork conducted inNias, Indonesia, in 2009 and 2011. A four-week period of field research started at the beginning ofJuly 2009 was instrumental in carrying out thirty in-depth interviews with the representatives ofthose organizations involved in post-disaster reconstruction. Interviewees comprised officials of theWorld Bank, European Commission, Asian Development Bank and several UN agencies (UNDP,UN-HABITAT, UNICEF and UNOPS) as well as international and local NGO practitioners.

During a second fieldtrip, carried out from June to July 2011, three hundred and fifteen beneficiariesof reconstructed houses were interviewed in different districts of Nias. A twenty-page questionnaire wasused in order to investigate people’s resilience after disaster. At this time, the reconstruction process hadalmost been completed, and all international organizations with the exception of UNDP, UNILO andCaritas, had left the island. The questionnaire included a specific section dedicated to the evaluation ofrebuilt houses in terms of provision of basic infrastructures and general living conditions.

Thirty semi-structured elite interviews were also conducted in 2011 with people in key villageroles: kepala desa (head of village), kepala dusun (head of sub-village) and religious leaders. By virtueof their status as ‘insiders’, elite respondents acted as experts and well-informed commentators onpost-disaster reconstruction.

The article will present data in a narrative form. Therefore, information will be organized intothemes and categories, by selecting what is significant and meaningful in the data.

5. Discussion

This section will evaluate what the key governance gaps were which might have hampered theprocess of sustainable reconstruction in Nias. By doing so, the main governance concerns presentedin Section 3 will be used as guidelines for the analysis.

5.1. A fragile architecture: low coordination, weak accountability and lack of legitimacy

Following the twin disasters that affected Nias in 2004 and 2005, there was an urgent need tofocus national and international resources on the enormous task of the reconstruction. According tothe figures from the Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi-BRR NAD-NIAS (2009: 7–8) 16,161 houseswere destroyed, 29,184 severely damaged and 34,009 slightly damaged. Additionally, 723 out of 879schools were damaged or destroyed. Infrastructure was also ruined and 90 percent of livelihoodaffected, particularly farmers and fishermen.

In response to the Government of Indonesia’s request, the World Bank and several other fundingagencies agreed to establish a multi-donor trust fund for Aceh and Nias (MDF), pooling US $704.06million to support the post-earthquake and tsunami emergency rehabilitation and reconstruction

U. Guarnacci / Environmental Development 2 (2012) 73–85 79

program (World Bank, 2006). The MDF, which will end its mission at the end of 2012, is co-chaired bythe European Commission as the largest donor, the World Bank as the Trustee and, until recently, by theIndonesian Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency—BRR. The BRR was created by the IndonesianGovernment on 16th April 2005, with a four-year mandate, in order to coordinate the large number ofstakeholders involved in reconstruction and development programs both in Aceh and in Nias.

Therefore, during the reconstruction process in Nias, accountability has been spread overdifferent players namely MDF, BRR, international, national and local NGOs, with BRR beingresponsible for coordinating network members. This is what Provan and Kenis, 2008 define as‘‘shared network governance’’ at the mid-range, where a single organization takes one or more keygovernance activities while leaving others to network members. However, BRR’s mandate wasextended by the Indonesian government to rebuilding activities in order to speed up reconstruction.‘‘This situation generated a clear coordination problem since each stakeholder failed to inform the others

in a timely and regular manner of ongoing impact assessment work’’.1 Targeting eligible beneficiaries forhouses was the most evident sign of lack of coordination in Nias. In fact, within the same communitysome people received more than one house from different organizations. ‘‘This creates a paradoxical

situation where one household got two or three houses while others were not considered eligible’’.2

Moreover, by becoming an implementing agency BRR extensively used contractors and its mainconcern turned out to be the number of rebuilt houses rather than the quality of living conditions. Asthe head of Miga, a village near to Gunung Sitoli, clearly stated: ‘‘BRR houses are small, built with low

quality-materials and without basic infrastructure. The agency ended its activities on April, 16th, 2009

and therefore nobody is responsible anymore for this kind of mistake’’.3 This accountability gap was alsopointed out by other interviewed village heads and representatives of local and international NGOs.

The way reconstruction activities have been managed also had crucial implications in terms oflegitimacy both internally and externally. Inside the network, legitimacy was obstructed by the lackof trust and coordination among involved stakeholders. In this respect, BRR, internationalorganizations, local and international NGOs became competitors for funds, without consideringany potential benefit from interaction and coordinated efforts. Externally, an increasing lack oflegitimacy affected both national authorities and the international donor community sincebeneficiaries generally felt their expectations were betrayed. In fact, ninety percent of thebeneficiaries interviewed agreed that more attention needed to be paid to how decisions aboutthe allocation of houses were taken; to who participated; and in what capacity.

5.2. Rebuilding almost without a master plan: underestimating the importance of evaluation

for sustainability

Evaluation is key to effective governance for sustainable reconstruction since it may helphumanitarian organizations in identifying whether the service and material assistance they areproviding in response to a disaster have the least socio-environmental impact possible (i.e. Ostrom,2007; Plummer and Armitage, 2007). In Nias the main evaluation document used to guidereconstruction activities was represented in the ‘‘Master Plan for the Rehabilitation and ReconstructionAceh-Nias’’. This was compiled by the National Development Planning Agency (Badan Perencanaan

Pembangunan Nasional, Bappenas) and it became legislation in June 2005 by Presidential RegulationNumber 30 (Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi—BRR NAD-NIAS, 2009: 50). This document, whichwas valid for four years, focused on short-term actions without a comprehensive assessment ofreconstruction needs. The lack of a stable and shared master plan among different stakeholderscontributed to compromising the general effort to ‘build back better’. In this regard, this paper will focuson four main bottlenecks of the evaluation process: location, standards, provision of basic infrastructureand environmental considerations.

1 Interview, Facilitator Officer, UNORC, Gunung Sitoli, Nias, July 14, 2009.2 Interview, Executive Director, LPAM (Local NGO), Gunung Sitoli, Nias Island, July 13, 2009.3 Interview, Head of Village, Miga, Nias, June 27, 2011.

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5.2.1. Location

Mapping the most risky areas before starting the reconstruction is considered to be a vital action,especially in disaster-prone regions like Nias (Davis, 2004). From interviews with the representativesof international agencies it emerges that finding a safe location where to rebuild houses and schoolswas a critical issue in Nias. In addition, local NGO practitioners interviewed pointed out that BRR andinternational organizations have simply reconstructed buildings in their previous positions, makingthem particularly vulnerable to future hazard. ‘‘On location there was a division between local NGOs,such as Forniha, and international organizations. In fact, local NGOs stressed the necessity of conducting a

survey inside the most affected villages, proceeding with the estimation of on-site damage and identifying

vulnerable areas. However, since this type of action requires time, BRR and international partners

preferred to rebuild in the same locations. Success has been increasingly measured in terms of number of

reconstructed houses, with no or insufficient considerations for the safety issue’’.4

Concerning schools, the location was changed only when previous site quality was extremely low. Inthis respect, officials from UNICEF and UNOPS emphasized that relocation was suggested when the schoolsdestroyed by the tsunami or earthquake were located on unstable slopes or close to steep cliffs. Thisposition taken by officials from UNICEF and UNOPS is in line with Minke’s analysis (2001) which providesevidence for the need to assess soil strengths before reconstructing new buildings after an earthquake.

5.2.2. Standards

Interviewees from international and local humanitarian organizations emphasized that theirmajor concern for houses and schools was to assure seismic-resistant protection. However, it wasalso pointed out that in order to both achieve this aim and to contain building costs, BRR andhumanitarian organizations did not apply the highest anti-seismic standards. Instead, the focus wason building according to anti-seismic standards which would prevent buildings from collapsingimmediately thereby giving people the opportunity to evacuate. In addition, there was no agreementbetween interviewees on which international standards should be considered when rebuildingsecure houses and schools. The answers of the ACTED’s official explains this aspect: ‘‘For people like

me that work in the field, it would be useful to know what the international standards are that we should

follow during the reconstruction. Some organizations refer to the Sphere Project, others to the UNHCR

Emergency Handbook or to the more recent Hyogo Framework for Action’’.5

In terms of housing standards, Viaro’s analysis (2007) allows us to stress that in Nias differentorganizations have also used diverse house shapes, space size (from 16 to 40 m2) and layout, withouttaking into consideration climatic, social and cultural aspects. Elite interviews are instrumental inpointing out that, on the one hand, some international organizations such as the Canadian Red Crossimported timber to rebuild wooden houses; in fact, according to their assessment, not only are timberhouses earthquake resistant but they are also suitable for Nias tropical climate. On the other hand, otherorganizations such as BRR and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) preferred to rebuild concrete housessince they can be among the safest and most durable types of structures during an earthquake.

Consequently, an agreement on international safety and adequacy standards seems to be abinding condition in order to promote sustainable reconstruction. In this respect, Kennedy et al.(2008) argue that clear international safety standards may also represent a guideline for countries,such as Indonesia, that make an effort to improve national legislation.

5.2.3. Provision of basic infrastructure

Provision of basic infrastructure is a vital element to achieve sustainable reconstruction, since itrepresents a precondition for adequate and well-functioning buildings (UNEP and SKAT, 2007;

4 Interview, Executive Director, FORNIHA (Local NGO), Gunug Sitoli, Nias, July 15, 2009. For more details on these

standards and how they differ from each other please refer to The Sphere Project. Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards

in Disaster Response, 2004, Oxford: Oxfam Publishing; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR Emergency

Handbook, 2007, 3rd edition; United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, Hyogo Framework for Action

2005–2015: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters. World Conference on Disaster Reduction

(WCDR), 2005.5 Interview, Country Director, ACTED, Gunung Sitoli, Nias, July 13, 2009.

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Minke, 2001; Twigg, 2002). According to elite interviews the main problems identified in Nias arepoor water and electricity supply, insufficient sanitation provision and lack of secondary roads whichlink residential buildings and schools with each other and with the main road system. In fact, afterthe first emergency phase, several organizations concentrated just on transition from temporary topermanent shelter, without considering infrastructure. Infrastructure was rather seen as a costlyissue under the responsibility of the Indonesian government.

Ninety-five percent of beneficiaries interviewed highlighted a lack of water as their major concern.The majority of them cannot rely on running water and use a private well or, in more remote areas, isobliged to spend at least 1 h/d to fetch water. With regard to UNICEF schools, village heads interviewedpointed to a paradoxical situation where buildings have separate sanitation facilities for boys and girls,but due to the lack of running water remain closed and are used as utility rooms instead.

5.2.4. Environmental considerations

According to Turner et al. (2003) ‘building back better’ after disasters implies not only consideringthe social aspects of reconstruction but also the environment, on which human conditions depend.The interviews conducted among humanitarian organizations show that environmental protectionhas not been a priority in Nias during the reconstruction process. In this regard, a representative ofthe United Nations Office for Project Services stressed that ‘‘BRR and other humanitarian organizations

working in Nias should make a self-criticism because the housing anxiety has led us to underestimate

important aspects of the reconstruction, such as environmental protection. This is also due to a lack of

assessment and control on environmental impact of the reconstruction process. In fact, while the

Indonesian Ministry of the Environment is trying to make environmental impact assessment (AMDAL)actual implementation of such rules and procedures has been poor’’.6

In particular, waste management is still a critical issue on the island. As stressed by Pilapitiya et al.(2006) this represents one of the most challenging environmental concerns in disaster affected areas likeNias. Elite interviews show that prior to the tsunami and earthquake, disposal practices on the islandwere poor and waste was collected in open dumpsites, often located in close proximity to residentialareas or the coast, with little or no environmental controls. Although UNDP has implemented a tsunamirecovery waste management program in Nias, waste collection and treatment are still limited only tourban areas. Furthermore, the majority of beneficiaries interviewed highlighted that domestic burning ofwaste is still widespread and it was often quoted as one of the main problems reducing the quality oftheir living environments.

5.3. Local knowledge and community engagement: two missing pieces of the reconstruction puzzle

Multilevel institutional arrangements require vertical and horizontal linkages among multipleplayers involved in the reconstruction process in order to facilitate an effective transmission ofknowledge in general and local knowledge in particular (Provan and Kenis, 2007). In Nias theinformation flow was blocked by a lack of cooperation among different stakeholders and especiallyamong international humanitarian organizations, local NGOs and community representatives. In thisregard, village heads interviewed pointed out that it was easier for them to communicate and beunderstood by local NGOs because they speak the same language and were familiar with local cultureand institutions. ‘‘Since the beginning, international organizations seemed not to be interested

in sharing their reconstruction plans with local players in order to get some feedback based on our

knowledge and experience’’.7 This problem was evident especially for building materials. In fact, duringthe reconstruction process different materials were used in Nias: timber, aluminum, zinc, cement andconcrete (Viaro, 2007). BRR and international agencies used contractors for the construction ofmasonry buildings. This had an important socio-environmental impact as the local communitiesprovided those companies with local sources of building materials such as sand and gravel. Not onlywere these materials unsuitable, but mining activities were also unsustainable since they were

6 Interview, Field Office Manager, UNOPS, Gunug Sitoli, Nias, July 14, 2009.7 Interview, Head of Village, Lagundi, Nias, July 20, 2011.

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conducted near reconstructed roads and bridges, making this infrastructure collapse or unstable.In addition, when carried out near a hillside, mining activities increased the risk of floods and landslide.Interviewed households in Lagundi and Sorake, South of Nias, highlighted that mining activities wereessential for their subsistence. Even if they realized that this type of action was deteriorating theirenvironment, they felt they had no alternative due to the lack of other opportunities.

In general, households encountered during the field research in 2011 complained about the lackof involvement in the reconstruction process from the beginning. They indicated that as beneficiariesthey were not consulted about their needs and not informed about the type of houses they weregoing to receive. Women’s opinions were particularly meaningful in this respect; for instance theyemphasized that although they represent the main users of housing (working at home, taking care ofchildren, etc.) they felt totally excluded from the reconstruction process.

Local communities have not been trained by BRR and humanitarian organizations on how to keephouses and schools in good condition. Consequently, in case of defects people are not preparedto repair buildings and often are not able to identify the type of materials that should be used,especially when these are not locally available. Elite interviewees suggest that maintenance is acrucial question inside communities and need to be answered in order to address sustainability inthe long-term. However, now that BRR and international organizations have completed their workand left Nias, maintenance remains an unsolved problem.

6. Conclusions

The December 2004 tsunami and the March 2005 earthquake created an unprecedented challengefor the Indonesian government, the United Nations and the international donor community at large.Considering the high number of houses and schools rebuilt in Nias, BRR, international agenciesand NGOs have achieved a significant result in terms of ‘physical’ reconstruction. However, whatdistinguishes sustainable reconstruction from conventional is a focus on long-term communityresilience, in order to ‘build back better’ and promote a culture of prevention. In this respect,humanitarian response has had a modest impact, both in reducing social vulnerability through safeand adequate building and in taking into account environmental considerations.

The argument of this paper can be reiterated: addressing sustainability during post-disasterreconstruction is a complex task since it involves interconnectedness of different issues and scales, aswell as long-term effects of present actions. Consequently, concerns prominent in the ‘‘earth systemgovernance’’ literature such as accountability, legitimacy and cooperation have been presented ascrucial elements in ensuring that reconstruction trajectories are indeed sustainable.

Firstly, increasing accountability, coordination and legitimacy is fundamental. In fact, the Niascase study shows how hierarchical arrangements based on a top-down control may be inadequate tocapture the complexity of distributed roles among a variety of stakeholders (Stephenson, 2005).Moreover, the example of BRR suggests that ambiguity of roles creates weak governance systemscharacterized by poorly delineated responsibilities. Therefore, even though multiple actors wereinvolved in the reconstruction process on the island, the formation of horizontal and vertical linkagesamong them to ensure the sharing of resources, information and outcomes was not encouraged.In this respect, ‘network governance’ may provide the basis for ‘‘illuminating the structure ofcollective action’’ after disasters (Powell et al., 2005: 1133) and suggests the need for a multi-dimensional model of accountability, coordination and legitimacy.

Secondly, effective evaluation is a relevant governance aspect necessary to guide reconstructiontowards sustainable paths. In this regard, a map of vulnerable places was needed in Nias from thebeginning of the reconstruction process to avoid geologically risky locations. In addition, the lack ofagreement among stakeholders on which standards to adhere to for safe and adequate buildingreconstruction has led to fragmentation in their intervention. Furthermore, the quality of life fordisaster-affected populations depends on the provision of basic infrastructures and the protection ofthe environment. However, not enough importance has been placed on these factors in Nias.

Last but not least, community engagement and knowledge sharing are two other importantgovernance concerns that emphasize the need to use multiple sources of knowledge to build an

U. Guarnacci / Environmental Development 2 (2012) 73–85 83

integrated and holistic understanding of the local context. In this respect, complementary forms ofknowledge and different capabilities of actors have been denied during the reconstruction process inNias, with the result that valuable bridges and connections between international and local playerswere not built. This had an evident impact especially in terms of maintenance.

Addressing the governance issues presented in this article may represent an appropriate way topromote an alternative future where post-disaster reconstruction is managed by following moresustainable paths. In this regard, the challenge to researchers will be to broaden their focus,examining in greater depth governance models suitable to support multi-level arrangements indisaster management. For instance, the next step may be focusing on network governance andinvestigating in a more detailed way to what extent network activities and behavior may promotereconstruction processes that meet certain sustainability criteria. Hopefully, this paper willencourage this kind of research.

Acknowledgments

Discussions with Alain Viaro, Arlette Ziegler and Petra Gruber have helped clarify my ownthinking about this topic. Thanks also to Marina Della Giusta and Gaye Iris Wilkinson for suggestionsand language editing.

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