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The Uses of History in Sociology: A ReplyAuthor(s): John H. GoldthorpeReviewed work(s):Source: The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 45, No. 1 (Mar., 1994), pp. 55-77Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The London School of Economics and Political ScienceStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/591525 .

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John H. Goldthorpe

The usesof history n sociology:a reply*

INTRODUCTION

The formof myreplyto the precedingfourpapers sconditionedbythe largevariation hatthey show in theircontent and quality.HartandMann orthemost partsimply ail toengagewiththe mainthrustof myoriginalarguments.The strategyof theirresponsesappears obe based, first, on the gross mis-statement f these argumentsand,secondly,on seeking to shift attentionfrom the issues I raised bylaunching argely rrelevant ttackson myownwork.I havethereforeto beginwith one sectionon 'Misrepresentations'ollowedbyanother

on 'Diversions'.Bryantalso starts from a misapprehensionof mypositionand devotes a good deal of his paperto establishing laims,thebearingof whichon myposition snotaltogetherapparent o me.Finally, hough,Mouzelis, n theshortestpieceof the four,does focusconsistently on the central questions that I addressed,and I amgratefulto him for some assurance hat I am stillcapableof writingcomprehensibleEnglish.I canthen,fortunately,have a thirdsection,mainlydevoted to Mouzelis'spaperand to the latterpart of Bryant's,which sheaded TheRealIssues'. mayadd that Iamfurthergrateful

to Mouzelis,and to Bryant, orconductingavigorousdebatewithout,however,allowingpersonalanimusto intrude.

MISREPRESENTATIONS

(i) Histoty,ociology,istoricalociologyndmacrosociology

The startingpointof my ( 1991)paper(Goldthorpe1991:from this

point on all page references to this paper will appear in squarebrackets)was with the claim Abrams(1980:x), followingGiddens(1979:230) thathistoryand sociology areand alwayshave been thesame thing' - that neither logicallynor methodologicallycan anymeaningfulline of division be drawnbetweenthem. This claim Isought to challenge. There was still force, I suggested, in the

BJS Volu7neno.45 Issueno. I March1994



56 JohnH. Goldthorpe

distinctionbetween diographicand nomotheticdisciplines, f under-stood as one of emphasis rather than of principle. But my main

concernwas to show that historyand sociologynecessarily iffered inthe nature of the evidence that they used or, more precisely, n theways n whichthis evidencecame into being.

For Mann, it then appears, my attempt to deny that history andsociologyare 'the same thing'can only implythat I seek to establish amassiveseparation'between them (51). For example, Mann assertsthat I accept the view 'thathistoryzsthe study of the particular' 40,emphasis n original); hat I wish to regardsociologyas being limitedto 'the studyof the present' 38; and cf. also Hart,21); and that I insist

that'only the professionalhistorianhas accessto the relics' 43). Allthis is nonsense-as anyone who goes back to my paper will find. Iemphasizethat historianscannot hope 'to produce descriptions hatare free of general ideas about social action, process and structure'[212]; I set out the circumstancesn which I believe that sociologistshave of necessity o resortto historical esearch 216];and I makenosuggestion whatever that relics should be the sole preserve of thehistorian. My argument concerning the differences in evidenceavailable to historians and sociologists is that the latter have the

possibility f engaging n research hat tself generatesevidence, overand above' [214], not as dzstinctrom,that of exploiting relics.Sociologists, quiteexplicitly tate, can,and often do, drawon relicsasevidence, in just the same way as historians' 214]. Furthermore,discuss at some length the work of MichaelAnderson (1971) andGordon Marshall 1980) Srreciselys instances where a recourse tohistoricalresearch by sociologistswas required - since what Mannwouldcall the 'analysis f origins'was nvolved.

I must also refer to this discussion n response to Bryant's onten-

tion that, although I raise 'severalserious objections o the currentrevivalof historicalmodes of analysis n our discipline' 3), 'the caseagainsthistorical ociology' s in the end not made (15). Of course t isnot made - because t was never my intentionto do so. Howcouldtbe, when I invoke the studies of Anderson and Marshall as leadingexamplesof how in fact historical ociologyshould be conceivedandexecuted' [217]?To be sure, I go on to criticizewhat I refer to as 'akind of historicalsociologyclearly different to that representedbythe work of Andersonand Marshall' 219] - that is, 'grandhistorical

sociology'.But to discriminatewithinhistorical ociology s scarcely o* .

reJect t.If Bryantelides the distinctionbetween grandhistorical ociology'

and historical ociology out ourt,Mann, t should be noted, makesayet more blatantattemptat argumentby pre-emptivedefinition: hatis, in claimingthat the traditionof grand historical ociology s what'Americans all'macrosociology39). Americans and not only they-do of course call various other things macrosociologyas well, and



Theusesof historyn sociology a reply57

with no lessjustification.But Mann thus paves the wayfor his finestmoment. Whilecontending- quitegroundlessly- that I advocate a

massive eparation' etweenhistoryand sociology,he then (46)refersto the several points in my paper where I am indeed concernedtopointout the necessarynterrelations etween hetwodisciplines, ndtriumphantly nnounces hat Goldthorpeoncedes heentirecaseformacro-sociology' Confronted with argument in this Malice-in-Blunderland tyle, it is difficultto conceiveof any rationalresponse.Perhaps tating heobviouswillsuffice.One candeny that historyandsociology are 'the same thing' but, even while underlining theirdifferences as intellectualenterprises,still appreciate he close con-

nections that must exist between them. And one can be less thanimpressed by the pretensionsof grand historicalsociology but stilladmire and support otherforms of historical sociology and ofmacrosociologylike.

(ii) Researchtrategiesndmethods

Havingobserved hatsociologists re ableto generatetheir owndata,ratherthan being relianton the evidenceof relics, I then went on to

claim that they are thus 'in a position f advantage hatshouldnotbedisregardedrlightlyhrown way' [214]emphasis n original): ociolo-gists should turn to history 'only with good reasons and in fullawareness f thelimitations hatthey willthereby ace.'The studiesofAnderson and Marshallserved to illustratehistoricalresearch bysociologistswhich,aswell as beingnecessary, iven the questions heywishedto treat,wasalsoof value on accountof 'theirsensitivity ojustwhat manner of inferences the relics availableto them can, andcannot,sustain'[226]. However,I took in contrastthe work of Kai

Erikson 1966) as an instanceof a recourseto historythatappearedmisguided.The hypothesesof interestto Eriksonwereones thathehimself regarded as having a high level of generality;and thus, itwould seem,they couldhavebeenexaminedasappropriately, ndatthe same time more rigourously, in the context of contemporaryratherthanseventeenth-centuryAmerican ociety.

In otherwords, my concernhere was to put forwardan argumentabout sociologists' esearchtrategies and one which, as I maintainfurtherbelow,none of my criticsappearsready to challengedirectly.

Instead, Hart and also Bryantchoose to impute to me a differentargument which I did not make and which indeed I sought -unavailingly- to disown: that is, the argument that the methods of'sociological' esearch,as compared to those of 'historical' esearch,areunproblematic ndpossessan 'inherent uperiority'Bryant: ).

Thus,Hart aunchesan attackon my'complacent resentation' 23)in which, she claims, n the course of a 'eulogy of tailor-madedata','problemsof validity nd reliability,he "disciplinaryatechisms" f



58 John H. Golulthorpe

a sociological training, are not even mentioned' (23, emphasis inoriginal).This is, however, ust more nonsense. I plainlystate [214]

that 'generatedevidence', n the samewayas that derivedfrom relics,'mustalwaysbe critically iewedas regards ts completenessas well asits reliabilityand validity';and I indeed add that 'in these latterrespects special problems result precisely from the processes ofgeneration.'

Bryant's omplaint 7) is that I attempt o drawup a 'balance heet'between historical and sociological forms of inquiry with 'allmethodological credits accruing on the sociological side of theledger'. (Note that it is Bryant,not I, who here introduces he adjec-

tives 'historical' nd 'sociological'o refer to past- and present-orien-ted research,respectively.)Again, though, I must reply that this is acharge that is not- and cannotbe - sustained. would,as it happens,mostlyaccept Bryant's bservations n the particular ppealof relicsas evidence; and, as indicated above, I do recognize the kinds ofproblem typically associated with data deriving from survey andother kindsof field research. ndeed, in view of Bryant's otal dispar-agement of 'standard ociologicaldata'(8 and ns. 8-12) - which s atleast two decades stalel - my own positionmight well be regardedas

more 'balanced' han his.However, the aim of my paper was not to evaluate differentmethods of research in abstracto.t was, to repeat, to argue thatsociologistsare n a position of advantage not superiority' whenthey are able to treat a research ssue on the basis of data collectedspecifically or the purpose (even though there may be attendantproblems)ratherthan havingto rely entirelyon the happenstance frelics(even though these mayhave some distinctivemerits).

DIVERSIONS

(i) Empiricismandsdataphilia'

Mann'smain diversionary trategy s to accuseme of 'empiricism' nd'dataphilia'.He gives only a sketchy ndicationof what he means byempiricism nd then addsto the uncertainty y admitting n. 7) thatheis not after all sure whether I am an empiricistor not. However,the

questionone must ask is: ust whatrelevancedoes all this have for mypaperand specifically, incethis is whatseemschiefly o disturbMann,for my chargethat n the workof grandhistorical ociologists he linksbetweenevidenceand argumentare both tenuous and arbitrary? heanswer s, so far as I can see, 'not a lot'. But, so as not to appearto beavoiding ssues,I might at leastsay the following.

If the distinguishing raitof an empiricist s the supposition hat thefacts are independent of our perceptions' Mann: 2-I assume he



Theusesof historynsociologya reply

really means 'conceptions'), hen I am not one. If, however, an 59

empiricist s one who believesthat data(factsfroma certainconcep-

tualstandpoint)are essentialboth to evaluating heoriesand also toestablishing he explananclao whichtheoriesare, presumably, o beaddressed, henI accept helabel.And in so faras this positionentailstakingmattersof dataqualityveryseriously, amhappyto be labelledas a 'dataphiliac' lso.SinceMannchoosesto bring my recentworkwithRobertErikson 1992)into the argument,I may elaboratewithreferenceto this.

If Mann had read this work at all seriously(readersshould bewarned thathis accountof it is garbledthroughout),he wouldhave

noted thatthere s in factan extensivediscussionch. 2)of the questionof the 'conceptualcontext'within which socialmobilityshould bestudied. Our decision to take up a class structural,ratherhanahierarchical,ontext- a decisionwethen implement hroughourclassschema- is basic o whatfollows.Ourdataon mobilityareconstitutedthroughthis schema,with particularattentionbeing given to ques-tionsof reliability, speciallynregard o cross-nationalomparability.The dataare then used, on the one hand, to test a range of extanttheoriesand,on theother,to bringoutnew regularitiesorwhichnew

explanations re required.Manncontends 48)thatallwe endup withis a patternof 'noresults';but,yet again,thisseemsto reflecthisbeliefthat f only hismisrepresentationsbigand barefaced nough,he mayget awaywith t.Patternsof absolutelassmobility ates, t istrue,showlittleregularity,whetherviewedovertimeor acrossnations,andhavethus, we suggest, to be accounted for more in historical thansociologicalerms.But, in contrast,patternsof relativeatesdisplayarather remarkabledegree of temporalconstancyand also tend toshowa largecommonalityacrossboth nationsand theirconstituent

subpopulations, s definedby region,ethnicityor gender(seeEriksonand Goldthorpe 1992: chs.3,5,6 and 7 esp.). That it allows suchregularitieso be revealed s,we believe,the best ustification or ourconceptualapproach;and the regularitiesare, incidentally,oneswhich, despite his protestations, all into questionmuch of Mann'sstandard hetoric e.g.4S5 1)- echoedbyHart (28-9) - on questionsof class,nationstates,genderrelationsetc.2

The point of Mann's lengthy 'warningsto empiricists' s, onepresumes, to suggest that macrosociologists uch as Eriksonand

myselfshould learnfrom grandhistoricalsociologists n mattersofconceptformation, he relatingof concepts odataand in turnof datato theories. If so, I must, for my own part, return thanksfor hisconsiderationand proceed regardless.I might, however,add thatwhilein myoriginalpapermyprimeconcernwaswith the qualityofdatain grandhistorical ociology,othercriticshavefocusedpreciselyon inadequacies n conceptualization nd in the linkingof data andtheory n explanatory trategies.See,for example, n the firstrespect,



60

John.olSthorpe

Lowenthal1968) on Moore'sconceptof 'bourgeoisrevolution'or

Cameron1981)and Stinchcombe1981)on Wallerstein'sreatment

ofmercantilism'nd'core' economies respectively;and, in the

second,ieberson(1991;cf. also Nichols 1986)on the unfortunate

combinationf deterministicheoriesandsmallnumbersof casesand

Kisernd Hechter (1991; cf. also Burawoy 1989) on excessive

inductivismndad hoccery, n particularn theworkof Skospoland

of annimself.

Groundedheotyndwomen'soting

Whileann attemptsto create a diversionthrough an attackon

'empiricism',art seeks the same effect through a celebrationof

'groundedheory'.In so far as this is of any relevanceto the issues

raisednmycritiqueof grandhistoricalociology,tisnot,I suspect, n

a wayhatHartenvisaged: hat s,it serves oundermine heresponse

madeyMann,andalsoBryant, o theeffectthat'theory' anhelpin

resolvingheproblemsof evidencewhichI soughttostress.Thispoint

Iwilleturnto later.

Here, wouldsimplyobservethatwhetheror not sociologistsare

proponentsf groundedtheorydoes littleto affect the positionof

advantagehich,I argued, they enjoy in being ableto createdata

ratherhanbeingrestrictedo theevidenceof relics.Indeed,in so far

asheory s developedby allowing'the sociological ntelligence' o

'roam'verawiderangeof data,asHartwouldhave t(26),thennoto

beependenton datathat sconditionedbymereaccidents f survival

wouldeem to be all the more important.Nor willit do for Hartto

claim23) the use of 'unobtrusiveor less obtrusivemethods of

gatheringvidence'ust forhersideof theargument cf.alsoBryant,

8-11).Whilet is truethatarchivalworkdoesnotobtrudegreatlyon

theead, all non-obtrusivemethodsof an observationalindcan, of

course,e appliedonlyin thepresent.

As well as urging 'the virtuesof groundingtheoryin data',Hart

seekslsotodemonstratehedangers hatmayarisewith tailor-made'

data:hat is, those collectedwith the specificaim of examininga

particularheory or related hypothesis.Where data collection is

focusednthisway,Hartclaims, nquiry endstobetoorestrictive nd

dataare 'all too often polluted by the theoreticalterms of the

investigation'

22). But, again, it is not apparentjust how Hart's

arguments intended to connectwith thatof my paper. It will of

coursealwaysbe possible,and I in no waysoughtto deny, thatwhat

one sociologistregardsas a data-setwell designed for its purpose,

anotherwill regardas defectivebecauseparticular ssuesare neg-

lected, variablesomitted etc. - just as, one might add, what one

sociologistbelievesis theorywell groundedin data, anothermight

considerquite fanciful. But such issues are the stuff of everyday



Theusesof hastorRn sociology a reply 61

sociologicaldebate; and if there is any implicationat all for presentconcerns, t can onlybe thatthese issueswillbe the moredecidublehen

data that bear specificallyon them can in fact be obtained. Let meillustratewith the case that Hartchoosesto raise.

Hart contends that the Af% uentorkertudies show the limitationsof tailor-madedata in that, as a consequenceof preconceived heoryand also of 'masculinist' ias, the wives of the workers interviewedwere not asked any question about their own politicalpartisanship.This, Hart believes,was a particularly rave omission in view of thefact that 'the female vote had determined the outcome of the threesuccessivegeneral elections' 25) that preceded the research.I would

reply as follows. That a higher proportion of women than of menvoted Conservativen the post-war lectionswas ndeed well knownatthe time when the Af0 uentWorkertudywasbeing designed. But whatwas also recognizedwas a ratherobviouspoint that Hart managestooverlook: hat from such a crude empirical act alone, a gerier effecton voting cannot e inferred. Nothing more maybe involved han theeffect on vote of otherndividualattributes, hemselvesassociatedwithsex, such as age (or generation)or class.In other words,more womenmight vote Conservative han men not becauseof their gender perse

but simply because more women than men belong to particularage-groups or classes. Decisions made in designing the interviewschedules for the Affi uentWorker tudy clearly reflected this latterinterpretation:Hartcompletelydisregards t. So who is right?

For generalelectionsprior to that of 1964, there are not, so far as Iam aware,any extant data that could supportthe kind of multivariateanalysisthat is here called for: the relics appear inadequateto ourpurposes. But the 1964 election, which is that closest in time to theAfyquentWorkernterviews (October, 1962 - February 1964), was

followed by the first-everBritish General Election Survey;and thisdoes providean appropriatedata-set.Analysis hen shows hat,at leastfor the period of the AffluentWorkeresearch,Hart'sentire argumentis without foundation. There is no tendency for women to be moreConservativehan men, once age and classare controlled.Thus, in thecase of working-classwomen aged 21 to 40 - the relevantgroup forcomparisonwiththe wivesof our Lutonrespondents it actually urnsout that ewerof those voting supported the Conservatives han didtheir male counterparts.3

The data of the 1964 surveyhave long been in the publicdomain.Why did Hart not use them? We might than have been spared therepetitionof a quite erroneoustiradealreadycontained n her paper'Genderand Class n Britain' 1989). However,the question I wouldregard as more important s the following. How often can data-setsthat are not in some large degree 'tailor-made',but are ratherconstituted rom the happenstance f relics,permit he testingof rivalhypotheses n the generalmanner llustrated bove,wherethe relative



62JohnH. Goldthorpe

influenceof severaldifferentfactorson socialactionacrossnationallyefinedpopulationssthecrucial ssue?

EXPLANATIONAND 'THE ONTOLOGYOF THE SOCIAL'

The second section of Bryant'spaper comprisesa discussionofroblemsf explanationand of theidiographic-nomotheticistinc-

ion although,ashe atone pointacknowledges,hesewereexplicitlyotneson whichmyattentioncentred.WhatBryanthastosay nthisespect,findfarfromcompelling. wouldcertainlybeready omakeheaseagainsta historical ociologywiththe kind

of philosophicalnderpinningsnd programmethat he would wish to lay down.owever,o faras the paperI actuallywroteis concerned,the onlyayn whichI canseethatBryant'sdiscussion ouldbearon it is if heishesochallengemyargumentaboutsociologists'hoiceof researchtrategy:hat s,if hewishes odenythatthechoiceof whether owork

nhe presentor in the pastdoes in factexist- sincethe 'ontologyofheocial' s such thatall sociologicalproblemsworthyof consider-tionreonesthatrequirehistoricaltreatment.Thus,methodsofdataollectionapplicableonly in the presentwould ipsoacto

be vitiated,ndsociologistswould have no option but to commit themselvesntirelyo researchof arelic-dependentkind.hether r not Bryantdoes want to make such a claim is notntirelylearto me. But sincethe relevanceof whathe writesto myaperust remainobscureunlesshe intends to reach some suchonclusion,maymakeone commenton the assumption hatthisis

hease.IfBryantis insistingthat socialphenomenacan be meaningfullytudiednly when takenas, so to speak,embeddedin their

specificistorical

ontexts,he isineffectrejecting distinctionhatI soughttoake216]betweenhzstortcalnd analyticalime. But considerwhathisusthen mean. It would, to begin with,precludesociologistsromtudyingsuchtemporaleffectsasthoseof life-cyclephaseor ofenerationalrcohortmembershipfconsiderednanydegreebstractly:eferenceould have alwaysto be made to particularlife-courses,enerationsrcohorts,withplacesanddatesattached. twouldnotberoper,ven in principle,to considerthese effectsperse;that is, asistinctromeffectsthatare indeed quite'period'or 'place' pecificndhisespitethe fact

thatsuchanalysishasbeenroutinely,butstillostilluminatingly,undertaken n regardto a rangeof phenomenauchspoliticalpartisanship,ocialmobility, abourmarketactivity,amilyformationandso on. Furthermore, nycomparativenalysisnheseespects ouldalsoberuledout,since,of course,allcomparison

ustntailabstraction tsomelevelorother.DoesBryantreallywishombracen'ontologyof thesocial'hatcarries heseimplications?f



Theusesof historynsociology a reply 63

so,a lackof explicitness n hispresentation s perhapsunderstandable.It was just such an ambivalentstance that I had in mind when I

referred in my paper [212] to a 'loss of nerve' over the very idea of* -

soaa saence.

THE REAL ISSUES

(i) History,ociologyndsociologzsts'esearchtrategtes

To repeat,the argumentwith whichmy paper began was that (i)pace

Abramsand Giddens,historyand sociologyare not the same thing';(ii)that one importantway n whichthey differ is in the natureof theevidence on which historians and sociologistsdraw; and (iii) thatsociologists, n being able to generate their own data in the present,ratherthan beingrestrtstedo the relicsof the past,are in a positionofadvantage hatshould be recognizedand not givenup withoutgoodreason.On the firstof these points,I wouldnote thatnone of mycriticsis ready explicitly o defend the view taken by Abramsand Giddens,and that Mouzelisindeed joins me (31) in rejecting it. C'estde'ja

quelquechose.gain, I do not find any basicobjectionto my secondpoint, which is perhaps scarcelysurprising since it is essentiallyafactualone thatwould be difficultto controvert.It would then seemthat it is on the third point that disagreement entres.

Here, the mainline of reply followedby my critics see e.g. Bryant7-10, Hart,22-3) is to accept hat nsome respectsdatacreatedon thebasisof field workwill ndeed offeradvantages ver evidencederivedfrom relics, while, however,insisting that in other respects ust thereversewillhold. In turn, then, I amaccusedof a lackof balance n my

evaluationof thesetwomethodologies.One difficultywiththis response,as I havealready oughtto show, sthat it is largelydirected against an argument that I did not in factadvance that 'sociological'esearchpossessessomekind of inherentsuperiorityover 'historical' esearch. But, further, in failing to getbeyondgeneralities,my criticsdo not engage withthe claims hat I didseek to pressregardingsociologists' esearchstrategies: hat where asubstantiveproblemcan be treatedthrough researchundertaken nthe present, t willusuallybepreferable o exploitthis possibility; nd,

correspondingly,hat where a recourse o history s made- and eventhough this maybe necessitatedbythe natureof the problem n hand- it must then be accepted that certain, and perhaps quite crucial,questionsmayhave to be leftwithoutany adequateanswer, implyonaccountof the limitations f the relicsavailable.

Preciselybecausemy concernwasnot withdifferent methodologiesconsidered in the abstract but with their application in specificinstances of sociological inquiry, I developed these claims with



64 John H. GolXthorpe

reference to several llustrative ases.And for my critics o take issuewith me directly, t would then be necessary or them to give some

attention o these cases. They would, for example, have to show thatErikson, in seeking to test his hypotheses on the functionalityofdeviance, was not, after all, ill-advised o engage in researchdepen-dent on relics that happened to have survived from seventeenth-century New England; or that Anderson and Marshall misledthemselves,as well as me, in supposing that there were importantaspectsof kinship n ninteenth-century ancashire r of economic ifein early modern Scotland hat were inaccessible o them. Or, at veryleast, my criticswould have to argue that the cases I consideredwere

unrepresentativeor in some other way unfairly chosen. However,what s remarkables that nothing at all of this kind is attempted.

One can indeed maintain hat evidenceconstituted rom relicshasits positive as well as negative features relative to evidence that isderived from fieldwork.As I have said, I broadlyagree with Bryant'sremarkson this matter.But what Bryantalong with my other criticswould appear to overlook,and what the cases I discussedwell bringout, is that no guaranteeexiststhat for any given sociologicalprobleminvestigated n the past- and especiallyfor any that turns on the

patternsof socialaction o be attributed o a relatively argecollectivity- relicsof the kind necessary o address his problemeffectivelywill nfact be ound. Whatever he advantagesof relics as evidence may be,these advantagescan of course only be realized in so far as relicsrelevant o a particular ssue are there o be examined.

(ii) Grand tstorzcalociologyndpositivist tstorzography

Grandhistorical ociologists, argued, proceed and must proceed

by supposing hat the resultsof primaryhistorical esearchconstitutea body of empirical indings in which it is then possiblefor them toground their own, more ambitious, projects. In Skocpol's words(1979:xiv), primaryhistorical esearch ervesas their 'basic ourceofevidence'. But, I went on to suggest, grand historicalsociologistsbecome n thiswaycommitted o a conceptionof historiographyhat sof an essentiallypositivistic ind. In a historiographyhat has escapedfrom positivistassumptions,historicalfacts may be understood assimply 'inferences from relics', which are made with very varying

degrees of securityand which, moreover,typicallyrepresent highlyinterdependentelementswithincomplex,and inevitably ontestable,interpretiveschemes. In principle, grand historical ociologistsmaythemselves favour such an understanding. But, in practice, theirmethodology requires that they must, willy-nilly,adopt a positiviststance: hat is, in treating he facts- or the concatenations f factsorentire 'accounts' that they find in the worksof historiansas if theywere an assemblage f relativelydiscreteand stableentities,bearinga




similarlywell-attested elationship o 'the past',fromwhich theycanthen,in 'scissors-and-paste'ashion,select temsto be combined,reor-

dered and marshalledn support of theirmacrosociologicalndeav-ours.In whatI uke tobe somekindof reply,Mannseeksto maintain 43)

that t is in fact 'common' or grandhistorical ociologistso engageinprimaryhistoricalresearchas wellas using secondarysources.In sofar as this mightbe the case, then of course my critiquewould notapply.But Mann s herebeing nota littledisingenuous.He knowsaswellas I do thatthecontributiono primary esearchof those whomIlabelledgrandhistorical ociologistss just about negligible.He him-

selfacknowledgeshatthe worksof Moore,Skocpoland HalltowhichI refer are ones founded entirelyupon secondarysources- and hecould have includedthoseof PerryAndersonand of Wallersteinaswell. It was, moreover, part of my definitionof 'grand historicalsociology' hatit wasessentially eliantupon "'history"n the senseofwhathistorianshavewritten'1991:220]- sinceI tookseriouslySkoc-pol's statementto this effect (as quoted again above)and also herfurther remark(1984:382) that it would indeed be 'disastrous' fprimarystudiesbyspecialists'ouldnotbe exploited n thisway.4

A more substantial esponsecomes from Mouzelis.The idea thatsociologistsmightproceedby takingthe resultsof historical esearchas theirmainempirical esourcewas,I observed,a nineteenth-centurycommonplace,the plainestexpression of which was provided byHerbertSpencer.Fromthe end of the nineteenthcentury,Spencer'sworkand its underlyingmethodologycameunder increasingattackfrom historiansand sociologists like,andbefore long waseffectivelydiscredited.But,I argued,thepracticeof the grandhistorical ociolo-gists of the present day raises again all the difficultiesthat were

revealedin Spencer'sprogramme.Mouzelisobjects (31-2) that thecomparisonhatI makehere is'unfairand misleading'.Grandhistori-cal sociologistsdiffer significantlyrom Spencerin that they are notconcernedwith propoundinggenerallawsof socialdevelopment-whichhistorical asesservemerelyto illustrate and in thattheiruseof historicalmaterials howsa far greatersensitivityo context.

I may note, to bevn with,that the posturingengaged in by Manndoes not do muchto help Monzelis's ase.Mann proudlyproclaims(41) thathe stands n line of sociologicaldescent fromSpencer- and

Comte andthathe is indeedready o gobeyondeventheir imperial-ism' nrenderinghistorians' ccounts ubordinateo his own theoreti-cal insights.His eagernessto attackhistoriansfor their intellectualdeficiencies 402), even while ivingoff them,couldscarcelybe moreSpencerian. I suspectthat sooneror later he will meet his Maitland.)Mouzelis, wouldthen suggest, s rather oo generous n attributingograndhistorical ociologists n generala degree of modesty and re-straint hatnot allin factpossess.



66John. Goldthorpe

Moreseriously, hough,I do not see thaton thecrucial ssueof the

usef secondaryhistorical ourcesasevidence,Mouzelis's ttempted

defencef grandhistoricalociologistsssuccessfullyarried hrcough.Evenf the latter do, in the main, differ from Spencer in their

theoreticalmbitions, t still remainsto be explainedjust why this

should,n itself, betterenable them to overcomethe methodological

problemsithwhichIwasconcernedsMouzelisherecontentshimself

withhe argumentthatbecausegrandhistorical ociologistsare not

workingithhighlyabstractheoreticalchemes, heycanbeattentive

tohespecificities f thehistoricalmaterialshattheyuse,rather han

simplylooting'the historicalrecord in order to fill up a series of

'empty oxes'.But this does not reallymeet the mainpoint of my

* u

crltlque.

Forexample,Mouzelis anrightlyobserve hatMoore(1966)seeks

toexplain different 'routesto modernity'not in terms of general

developmentalaws but of the strategies pursued by different

collectivectors n particularhistorical ircumstances.However,this

inno waycontrovertsmyclaimthat,in his use of secondary ources,

Moore hows little recognitionof the complex and inherentlyun-

certainprocesses of inference and interpretationthat historical

scholarshipntails,and in turnof the factthatthematerialon which

hedrawscannotbe treatedasevidence n the samewaythatprimary

historicalources(i.e.relics)areevidenceor, for thatmatter, hedata

thatare produced through sociological ieldwork.What is in this

regard specially evealing,asI soughtto show, s Moore'sattitude n

his reatmentof the EnglishCivilWar(or,I couldhaveadded,of the

FrenchRevolution)owardsrevisionist'writing- whichhasof course

tobeseenastheverystuffof anypost-positivististoriography.Moore

in fact takesup the samestanceas thatadoptedby Mannwhen the

latterasserts 41-2) that revisionism'anbemoreorlessignored f, in

thejudgmentof the theoreticallyophisticatedmacrosociologistwho

standsabovethe squabbles f the historians,t simplyreflectshidden

ideologiesor professionalrivalryor is in anyevent 'meredetail'.Or,

one mightalternativelywishtosay- if itappearsundulydisturbingo

the seemingly'solid'historicalevidencein whichthe macrosociolo-

gist's heoryhadpreviouslybeen'grounded'.

I would further add that Mouzelisfails to see that a concernto

propose and illustrateabstractdevelopmental aws is not the only

source of a positivisticattitude towardshistoricalfacts. Thus, as

Burawoy 1989:773-4) hasobserved,suchan attitude s alsopower-

fullypromotedbythestrategiesof'analytic nduction'whichSkocpol,

for example, has representedas a key resource for comparative

macrosociology(Skocpol 1979:3S7; 1984:37F81; Skocpol and

Somers1980:1834; cf. alsoRueschemeyer1991:324). Suchstrat-

egiesimply hat,asBurawoyputs t,'historical atternshavetheirown

voice',and there is then a reluctance o recognizethatthe factsthat




makeup thesepatternsare already nterpretationsnd, quite possibly,disputedones. ForSkocpol, thefacts have a certainobviousness hat

they don't for historians' nd she pays relatively ittleattention o thecontroversies hat rage around them. Nor is this accidental: She isforced nto thisblindness n ordertoget her inductionmachineoff theground.'

(iii) Evidencearulargument n grandhistorical ociology

The inadequate ppreciation hownby grandhistorical ociologists fthe difficulties that arise in their use of secondary sources then

resulted,I maintained 222], inseriousweaknesses ntheirwork n thelinkagebetweenevidence andargument: his was often tenuous andarbitrary o a quite unacceptabledegree. This charge was indeed atthe core of the critiqueof grand historical ociologywith which mypaper ended. Butwhile it seems that it is thiscritique hat has chieflyprompted the foregoing responses, only Mouzelisconcentratesonaddressing ts mainthrustdirectly.

As regards hetenuous natureof the linkagebetweenevidenceandargument,Mouzelisconcedes (33) that grand historical ociologists'

dependence on secondary sources 'is obviously a disadvantage'.However, he then goes on to contend that 'we live in an imperfectworld', hat allmethodologieshavetheir problemsand, further, thatthere are in any event 'a varietyof ways of minimising the risks'entailed in writinghistoricalsociology without the use of primaryhistorical vidence.In fact, n what ollows,Mouzelisndicatesjust nesuchway(334): that s, theencouragement f'a dialectical rocess'ofscholarly ommunication nddebatethroughwhich he argumentsofgrand historicalsociologistscan be constantlyreexamined and, if

necessary,refinedand qualified.Thus, Mouzelissuggests, my ownobjections o Moore's nterpretation f the EnglishCivilWar shouldbeseen as a 'moment' n such aprocessrather hanasan argument or'abandoning'the kind of historical sociology that Moore's workexemplifies.

In reply, I would first wish to emphasize and I address this re-markalso to Hart and Mann thatnowhere n mypaper did I claimthe right to say that grand historical ociologyshouldbe 'abandoned':only the right to criticize t, in as radicala way as I see fit, and even if

that should prove damaging to the amourpropreof some of its ex-ponents. Mouzelis s ready to grantme that rightand indeed to en-courage me to use it. But I have then to observethathe does not ap-pear to appreciatehow far, on the matter in question, my criticismactuallygoes.

As Mouzelis notes, I see the linkage between the arguments ofgrand historical ociologistsandtheir secondary,or yet more deriva-tive, evidence as being unduly tenuous because they are in effect



68 JohnH. Goldthorpe

engaged in interpretations f interpretations f, perhaps,interpre-tations.However,I alsostress hatthe init?alnterpretationsnvolved,that is, those of the

historiansusing primarysources,may well bethemselvesof a highlytentativef notspeculativenature andopenlypresentedas such-simply becausef the imitationsf these ources.nneglecting hisfurtherpoint,Mouzelis henmistakes he chief intentof my criticismof Moore- as alsodoes Mannwhen he accusesme(454) of only snipingat Mooreand of 'carefully tayingrightawayfromsubstantive rguments'.Myprimary oncernwasnotin factwiththe substantivessueof whetherMoore's hesisaboutthe socialbasesof politicaldivisions n the EnglishCivilWaris corrector not, butratherwiththe

methodologicalssueof thebasison which histhesis sadvanced.WhatI sought to emphasizewas the enormousgap thatexistsbetweenthe actualcontentof the secondaryworkson whichMoore relies - and even if one accepts here Bryant'sdistinctionbetween eportageandinterpretation andtheargument hatMooreseeks obuildupontheseworks.Moreover, wasnot(asMannseeks oimply) ngaging nsomevendettadirectedspecifically gainstMoore.Imake tclear[228,n.21] thatIwcouldeemycritiqueasbeingequallyapplicableo the treatmentof the EnglishCivilWarto be found inWallerstein1974)or in

Anderson(1974);and furtherstill[229-30,n.23], hatI wouldquestionwhetherany social hange' nterpretaticonof heCivilWar- even,letussay,one knownbytheRecordingAngeltobe valid- could in factbe adequately ustainedbythe relicsfromseventeenth-centuryngland hathavebeenleftavailableous(cf.myquotationn.23] fromHexter1961).

It is, incidentally,Mouzelis's ailure to recognizemy critiqueofMooreas being methodologicalrather than substantivethat liesbehindhe question he raisesof how I can claim,withoutmyselfhaving knowledgeof therelevant

primary ources, hatthethesisof'the ise of the gentry'wasalready osing groundat the time whenMoore rote.Asithappens,I oncedid havesomeknowledgeof thesesources,utthatisbesidethe point.Formyargument[223]referrednototheactualities f English ociety nthesixteenthandseventeenthcenturies ut to the state of opinion among historians in themid-twentieth.nd whatI askedwaswhy- on whatgrounds- didMooretillopt largely o acceptthe thesis n questionwhen'revision-ists' ere castingdoubt upon the evidencefor it and its supposed* *

* u

po tlca lmp lcatlons.

Here,then, the burdenof myreplyto Mouzelis s thatthe tenuousconnectionetween argument and evidence in grand historicalsociologyayoften notbe remediablebyanyamountof thecriticismandebatethathewouldpropose.Thatis,because hetenuityderivesnoto much from the fallibilityof particularauthorsas from theineluctableircumstance hat there are aspectsof the past- andincludingnes thatwe maysupposeto be of major mportance that



Theusesof histowyn sociology a reply 69

are, and will in all probability emain, largely beyond our cognitivegrasp. It is in this respect that my critique of grand historicalso-

ciology connects directly with my concern earlier in my paper tobringout the ultimatedependenceof whatcanbe achieved n histori-cal researchupon the mere happenstanceof relics. And this depen-dence is a fact that Mouzelis'sbland observation hat all methodolo-gies have theirproblemsdoes not adequately omprehend. Nor canits significance be diminished by his strictures (35) against amethodologicalperfectionism hat 'fetishisesrelics'. I do not knowwhat Mouzelismeansby this last phraseand suspect hat it maybe nomore than a rhetorical lourish;but, in any event, it in no way alters

the situation that it is relics, and only relics, that can provide ourknowledgeof the past.

I would again stress that I do not in any of the foregoing seekgrounds for proposingan end to grand historical ociology.It leadsme, rather, to suggest a way in which its practitioners ould greatlyimprove their credibility.That is, if they were to show themselvesmore ready to acknowledge he methodologicalpracticesdevelopedby historians,or indeed by sociologistswho do work with primarysources (cf. Scott 1990), in seeking to understand the limits to

historicalknowledgeand to recognizethem where they arise.Theymight then be less inclined to advance argumentswhich, in clearlyexceeding these limits, mayvery well not be right but, by the sametoken, have thedubiousattraction f being protected rom everbeingshownto be wrong.

As regards arbitrariness n grand historicalsociologists'use ofevidence,I sawthis as chieflyoccurringwherethesecondaryworksonwhichthey relyare in seriousconflict.If historiansdisagree(andmayperhaps have to remain in disagreementbecausethe kinds of relics

necessary to settle disputed issues do not exist), how do grandhistoricalsociologistsdecide which account they will accept-or, Icould haveadded,how theywill mediate' etweendifferentaccounts?Their actual practice, I argued, did not point to any satisfactoryanswerto thisquestion.Whatwas most apparentwas a tendency, nsome instancesquiteblatant, or authors imply o accept he authorityof those accounts most congenial to their own arguments,whileignoringor disparaging thers.5

Mouzelis gaindoes not seekto deny thatamethodological roblem

here exists.However,againtoo, he is readyto proposea solution,andof a quite simple kind: what is required is that, in drawing onsecondaryworksas evidence,grandhistorical ociologistshouldshowgreater self-discipline nd detachment' 34).With such an improve-ment in attitude,reinforcedby the processesof communication ndcriticismto which he has previously referred, there is no reason,Mouzelisbelieves,why the enterprise hould notcontinuewithsoundscholarly nd social-scientificredentials.



70 John H. Goldthorpe

But this will not do. Self-disciplineand detachment are indeedadmirablequalities,and I wouldobviouslyagree with Mouzelis hat t

is highly desirable hat grand historical ociologists along, no doubt,with everybody else) should display them more fully. However, Iwould have thought it by now well understood hat the methodologi-cal basisof scholarly r scientific nquiryof whateverkind is not to belooked for merely in the personal attributesof its practitionersbutmust rather ie in some normative tructure hat provides he context- the procedures, criteria etc. - that meaningful and progressiveargumentrequires.6

Mouzelis's osition s, in this respect,retrograde rom thattakenup

by Skocpol a decade ago. As I noted in my paper [225], Skocpol(1984:382) explicitlyrecognized he need for 'clear,consensualrulesand procedures or the validuse of secondary ourcesas evidence'andsaw that 'varyinghistoriographicalnterpretations' onstitutedoneobviousproblem o be addressed.A questionto which Mouzelis andmy other critics)mightwell then havedirected heir attention but infact disregard is that of why the methodologicaldevelopment hatSkospolcalledfor has not to anyappreciable xtentbeen realized.Thelack of progress confirms me in my view that grand historical

sociologists do here face a very severe difficulty: namely, that ofproviding grounds for the critical evaluation of secondary workswhichdo not demanda knowledgeof the primary ources rom out ofwhichthese worksare written.7

Mouzelisapart, my criticstake up the issues I raised of argumentand evidence n grandhistorical ociology n only a rather imitedway;and, so far as I can see, only one further responseemerges that callsfor seriouscomment.This is bestexpressedby Bryant- Mannoffers aless arguedthough more extravagant ersion and is to the effect that

the methodological roblems o whichI drewattentionare in factonesthatcan be overcomeby a resort o 'theory'.For Bryant(13), historicalworksare 'woven rom two distinguish-

able strands:what might be calledreportage, on the one hand, andinterpretation on the other.' Thus, it is possible for grand historicalsociologists, n using secondaryworksas evidence, to concentrateasfar as possibleon their elements of reportage the 'facts'of which,Bryant holds, possess 'stability' 14). However, where conflictinginterpretations f these factsdo arise,the questionof how the grand

historicalsociologist should decide between them has an 'obvious'answer: hat is, 'by means of theory and comparative vidence'(14).Mann, t seems,wouldgo further.Not only can theorybe used in suchadjudicationbetween interpretations ut, in addition,to modify the'facts' themselves. (What, one may ask, happens here to Bryant's'stability'?).Mann tells us (41) that 'if I am scepticalabout historians'facts, I have other sources of information (my theories based onbroaderknowledgeabouthow societiesoperate,and my knowledgeof



Theusesof historyn sociology a reply 71

historians' heories).' n usingsecondaryworks,he is thereforeready'to make judgments about sociologicalplausibilitybased on other

times and places' 41-2) whichmay overridethe authors'ownviews;and it is then such judgments that allow him to ignore or reject'revisionism'r indeed, one supposes,any otheraspectof historians'accounts.

These are remarkable laims,and the first question that has to beasked aboutthem is evident enough: ust whatis this theory- about'howsocietiesoperate' which s calledupon todo such crucialwork?Bryant and Mann are extraordinarily oy. They have, apparently,accessto the kind of theory for which sociologistshave been looking

since sociologybegan, and yet they are reluctant o tell us about t- orindeed to giveus even a singleillustration f it being used in thewaysthey propose. Since, for whateverreasons(Is it all a secret?,Could itjust be a lot of bluff?),we arenot providedwiththe illumination hatwe might expect, it is not easy to know how further to proceed.However, he followingat leastmightbe said.

First,an appeal o theory ohelp decidebetweenempirically-groun-ded, but still conflicting, interpretationsor indeed to questionparticular facts' ould be an acceptablemethodologicalmove. How-

ever, for thisto be so, the theorywould need tobe of a quite powerfulkind. It would have to permit the demonstration hat one interpre-tation followedrigourously rom it, while othersdid not; or, in thecase of dubious 'facts', that these were so contrary to otherwisewell-supported xpectations hatsome error of observation, ecord-ing etc. - mightreasonably e supposed.And,of course, n addition ohaving substantial onfirmation,he theorywould also need to be arathergeneral one, the applicability f whichto the circumstancesnquestioncouldsafelybe claimed.

Althoughwhat Bryant and Mann have in mind is, to repeat,leftobscure,one may indeed doubt if it is theorycapableof meetingsuchrequirements.Apart from there seeming to be rather ittle theoryofthis qualityaround in sociology,Bryantat leasthas indicated(1992)that he could not even support attempts o produceit. If, then, oneseeksto fill inwhatBryantand Mann ail to tellus, the only reasonableassumption o make is that the theory they invokeis of the kind thatKiser and Hechterhave shownto be chieflyfavoured among grandhistorical ociologists: hat is, 'theory'which,asKiserand Hechterput

it (1991:9), is actuallyno more than 'typologies,orienting conceptsand empiricalgeneralisations'r- to be somewhatmore charitablewhich is 'grounded theory' as advocatedby Hart (26-8) and whichMann(42-3) does indeed appearto endorse.

The distinctive eatures of such theory could be said to be three:first, it is developed more inductively han deductively it should'emerge from the data' (Hart,26); secondly, rather than aspiringtogenerality, t seeks to displaya particular elevance or the temporal




and spatialcontextswithinwhich t wasthus developed;and thirdly, tis so formulatedas to be as open not to critical mpirical estbut rather

to indefiniterefinement n a process n which theoryand data are, touse Mann'sword (45), blended'.Nowwhatmustbe pointedout is that,even if such featuresof groundedtheoryshouldbe found attractivenother respects, they are ones that make it especially ill-suited toresolvingmethodologicaldifficulties n grand historical ociology nthe waythat Bryantand Mannwould envisage.

Thus, in adjudicating etweenconflicting econdaryaccounts, usthow could groundedtheoryhelp- given that t is formed,so to speak,without any deductivebackbone?For how could it then be said that

one accountwasmore consistentwith- that s, was to a greaterextentimplied y a grounded theory than was another?And even if such ajudgment were made, what in the logic of grounded theory wouldprevent those who wished still to maintain a rival account fromarguingthat, insteadof this being rejected,existingtheoryshould bemodified so that it 'blended' ust as well with the content of theiraccountas with that of any other?Or again, one may ask, what forcecan groundedtheoryhave n determining he 'sociological lausibility'of historians'nterpretationswhen viewed n comparative erspective

- giventhat t emphasizes ts sensitivity nd specificity o context?Whyshouldwhat s known,on the basisof groundedtheory,aboutone timeand place be thought applicable o another?As Kiser and Hechter(1991: 12) aptly observe,the ultimate mplicationof the 'historicism'implicit in theorizing of this kind is that 'comparativehistory is anoxymoron'.8And finally, of course, the issue arises, and especiallywhen it is historians' facts as well as interpretations hat are inquestion,of the actualgrounds on which the superiorityof theory isclaimed.If a grandhistorical ociologist hooses o say,as Mannmight

be readyto do, that n the light of theorya historian's ccountmustbecorrected,why should it not be the other way around?If groundedtheory s so formulated hat t is not open to empirical efutation, henhow can it claim the degree of empiricalconfirmation hat would beneeded to underwrite ts use in the waythat Mannwouldwish?

In sum, if it is groundedtheory hat Bryantand Mannhave n mind(and if it is not, they will no doubt become more explicit), hen theirfaith that, in grand historicalsociology, theory can help overcomeproblems of linking argument to evidence would seem quite mis-

placed. I would ratherconclude from their arguments,and those ofHart, that the penchant for theory of this kind that grand historicalsociologistshave in fact displayed s one source f the difficulties ntheir workto which I drew attention.A resortto grounded theory, ngiving a general license for theory to be accommodated o evidenceand, equally, for the choice of (what is taken as) evidence to beaccommodated o theory,mustmilitateagainst he 'self-discipline'orwhich Mouzeliscalls and invite the tendentiousness hat I illustrated.



Theusesof historyn sociology a reply 73

And to encouragea yet greaterrelianceon suchtheory n the practiceof grand historical ociologycould then serve only to make thisless,

ratherthanmore rule-governed han it has beenhitherto.9

CONCLUSION

Mannstatesat one point (46) thathe is genuinelypuzzledby myattackon grand historical ociology:what, he wishesto know, is its 'generalsignificance'?He might of coursehave asked Hart, who could havetold him (28) that its 'real source' is to be found in my 'heavy

investments'n 'old sociological rthodoxies' hatare by now 'increas-ingly obsolete'and 'in constantneed of defenceand reassertion'.Butperhaps he knew all this anyway cf. 47). If, by way of conclusion,Ishould try to enlighten him further, I can only say that I took theemergence - or revival- of grand historicalsociology seriouslyasdevelopmentthat had attracteda good deal of favourableattentionand comment (though not least from among its own exponents).However,my own readingof thegenre led me tothe viewthat t was,atall events as it had so far progressed,a deeply flawed undertaking,

primarilybecause it lacked any well thought out and articulatedmethodology, and that in the attacks on the practices both of'mainstream' ociology and of'conventional'history in which grandhistorical ociologistsoften engaged, there wasno little strainingatgnats while camels were being readily swallowed.Followingfrom amore generaldiscussionof theuses of history n sociology, thereforesought to developa critiqueof grand historical ociologythatmightserve to redress matters somewhat- even if going against the'progressive'pinion of the day.

The responsethat my paperhas receivedencouragesme to believethat the effort was worthwhile, or three different reasons.First,myremarksdo seem to have hit a numberof sensitive argets the bestindicationof this comingwhere,as in the passage rom Hart referredto above,counterattacksavehad to be launchedagainst he supposedmotivation f the critiquerather han ts substance.Secondly, hough,the replies receivedfrom Bryantand Mouzelis tart from an accept-ance of the fact that I raisedserious questions that call for seriousanswers.As will have becomeapparent,I do not find the particular

answers hat these authorshaveto offer at allconvincing;but, at anyrate, in consequenceof our exchanges,the issuesa stakeshould havebecomea gooddeal clearer.Thirdly,since I firstdraftedmy paper (atthe end of 1985), I have beeninterested,and encouraged, o note theappearanceof a seriesof other- quite independent contributionsnwhich the methodologicalbasesof grand historical ociologyarealsoquestioned, n different, though complementary, espects rom thoseon which I concentrated.The most important of these further



74John. Goldthorpe

critiquesNichols,1986;Burawoy,1989; Kiserand Hechter, 1991;

Lieberson,991)I havereferredto in the foregoing.I cantherefore

haveomeassurance hatI amnotalonein continuing o believethat

grandistorical ociology,despite- or perhapsbecauseof- itslarge

pretensions,till restson very insecurefoundationsand thus often

providesswiththesemblance ather hansubstance f knowledgeof

ourast. Even if my own observations n this regard are clearly

unwelcomeo its supporters,I could perhapsend witha plea from

Francisacon,in the hope thatthe wordsof thisgreatprogenitorof

inductivismightcommandmorefavourableattention: Godforbid

thateshouldgiveouta dreamof ourownimaginationora pattern

ofheworld'.JohnH. Goldthorpe

(Dateccepted: une 1993)Nuff eldCollege

Oxford

NOTES

* I am indebtedto GordonMarshall

for elpful comments on anearlier

versionf thispaper.

1. Thus, Bryant follows Mills and

Cicoureln representingsurvey-based

researchstypically matter f collecting

informationn attitudes rotheraspects

of'respondents' subjective interpre-

tations'ia questionnairesusing 'pre-

selectedategories', fterwhichthe ma-

terialbtained is 'mechanically caled'

intouantitativeorm.Suchprocedures,

Bryanthenargues, eadto datathatareinherentlylawedbythe'artificiality'nd

'contamination'nvolved (v9 and

ns. -12). If Bryant'scharacterization

were t all an adequateone, I wouldbe

inclinedoagreewithhiscriticism.Butin

facthe shows scant awarenessof the

extent owhich,atthe present ime,data

collectedvia survey methods (i) are

concernednot with respondents'atti-

tudesoreventheirreportedacationsbut

with various of their (or of others')objective ttributes,elationshipstc.;(ii)

are collected,whetherviaquestionnaire

or interview,nunstructuredorm,after

extensive piloting, and are only sub-

sequently coded; (iii) are subject to

increasingly ophisticated esting to in-

dicate their degree of reliabilityand

validity;and (iv) can be analysedvia

powerfultatistical techniques Wit)lOUt

needingo be 'scaled' or treated at

anythingther than a nominal level ofmeasurement.An illustration of this

latteroint is, as it happens, provided in

notebelow.)

2. In this connection, two of Mann's

further izarre misrepresentations may

alsoe noted. First,he describes the class

schemawe use as comprising 'a single

hierarchicalcale'(48) when we explicitly

pointout that the schema 'is not con-

structed round any single hierarchical

principle' (Erikson and Goldthorpe

1992: 4) and emphasize how in this

respect it contrasts with occupational

status cales. Secondly, he claims that in

our work 'women were assigned the

occupational tatusof the leading male in

their household' (49) when in fact, in

additionto an analysisof'marital mobil-

ity', we further analyse the mobility of

women on the basis of the 'dominance'

method, according to which the class

positionof the conjugal familymayfollow

from the employment of either husband

or wife and on the basis of women's own

employment (Erikson and Goldthorpe

1992:242-53, 264-75).

3. The analysis entails constructing

from the BGES data a four-way table of

sex by age (21-40, 41-60, 61 plus) byclass




said n myoriginalpaper, hatsociologistsshould alwaysbe seeking to push their

theoriesas far in this respectas they willgo. And it is entirelyconsistent or me toagreewithKiserand Hechter hattheoryof a more general, deductivecharacterwould serve historicalsociology betterthan that now most often favoured.Asthey pertinently observe (1991:10)'Whendataare fragmentary nd hardtocome by - as often is the case incomparative-historicalesearch only atheory with high analyticalpower, and

thus low data nput requirements, an betested.'

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Moore, B. 1966 The Social Origins ofDictatorshipand Democracy,Harmonds-worth: Penguin.Nichols, E.1986 'Skocpol on Revolution:Comparative Analysis vs. Historical Con-juncture', Comparative Social Research9: 163-86.Rueschemeyer, D. 1991 'DifferentMethods - Contradictory Results? Re-search on Development and Democracy'in C. C. Ragin (ed.) Issuesand Alternatives

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