gm smith the dangers of a political friendship

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The dangers of a political friendship: Nietzsche contra Schmitt

Please do not cite without the authors permission. 1

The Dangers of the Political Friendship:

Nietzsche Contra Schmitt

Graham M SmithDepartment of Politics and IR

Lancaster University, UK

[email protected]

This paper represents a work-in-progress. It is intended to sketch-out the main strands of what is to be a more detailed argument.Please do not cite this paper without the authors permission;correspondence and comments are welcomed.

ABSTRACT: This paper critically assesses the accounts of the relationship

between friendship and the political offered by Friedrich Nietzsche and Carl

Schmitt. Schmitts objective is to make the friend-enemy pairing foundational

to the concept of the political. Key to this are three main assumptions: (1) that

because pairs of opposites can be identified in relation to other spheres (such as

aesthetics and economics), then we can assume that the political must also follow

this pattern; (2) that friendship and enmity are not only the foundational pairing

of the political, but that they are also opposites; and that (3) friendship entails a

basic solidarity. There are serious difficulties with these assumptions which call

Schmitts enterprise into question. These difficulties can be exposed if we

contrast Schmitts account to that of Nietzsche, who also links friendship and thepolitical. What Nietzsche stresses, and what Schmitt overlooks, is the dangerous

nature of friendship. Whilst Schmitt assumes a basic unity or solidarity in

friendship, and further opposes the relationship to enmity, Nietzsche stresses the

close, contradictory, and even fluid nature of friendship in which he identifies

elements of hostility, volatility, and even danger. Thus, for Nietzsche, the friend

and enemy are not opposites, but closely related and even synonymous with each

other. The article concludes that whilst Schmitts attempt to found the political on

the idea of friendship is clearly not nonsensical, his underdevelopment of the idea

of friendship, coupled with dubious conceptual assumptions which ultimately link

friendship to sovereignty, undermine his enterprise. In contrast, Nietzsches

unsettling and elitist account of friendship exposes the complexities of the

relationship itself, and its link to enmity. However, we also find that Nietzsches

concept of friendship also falls foul of the concept of sovereignty located in the

powerful individual, and so Nietzsche abandons the idea. Thus, it is suggested

that if there is to be a political understanding of friendship, then it is necessary not

only to rethink the idea of friendship itself, but also to do so outside of the

framework of sovereignty.


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It is suggested here that we cannot simply ignore Schmitts thought. However, we can

do more to show its limitations and to overcome them. Of course, this approach is

negative insofar as it flags-up potential problems for the theorist of friendship and the

political. However, it is the view adopted here that these problems can be overcome,

and that in thinking about Schmitt we can learn from him without having to endorse

Schmitt or his political conclusions. Indeed, it is suggested here that Schmitts

arguments concerning the centrality of the friend-enemy distinction as the foundationof the political are flawed. In doing so we can begin to consider (and possibly

endorse) the very value that Schmitt was so concerned to avoid: pluralism.

In order to begin to think through the limitations of Schmitts position we can draw on

the thought of Nietzsche. At first sight it might seem rather strange to attempt to

undermine Schmitt via Nietzsche after all, although it is true that Nietzsches

thought does not necessarily endorse right-wing authoritarianism it is undoubtedly

true that the attempts to rehabilitate Nietzsche have gone too far in the opposite

direction. It is hard to escape the harsher conclusions of Nietzsches philosophy and

spiriting them away as metaphor or spiritualising them seems merely to be wishful

thinking. In any event, this also undermines what is distinctive and interesting about

Nietzsche. Postmodern garb cannot transform or disguise Nietzsches distinctivefigure. Ultimately we must see Nietzsche in the words that he himself endorsed as

the shrewdest remark that I have read about myself until now: the view of the

Danish critic (Georg Brandes) that he was an aristocratic radical (Nietzsche and

Middleton, 1969, 278-280). This aristocracy is not just spiritual or aesthetic, is also

entails social and political discipline, hierarchy, and pathos of suffering.

Why then use Nietzsche? The answer is two-fold. It is not that Nietzsches politics are

any more desirable than those of Schmitt. Indeed, whilst it is clear that Schmitt works

within the realm of the state and even gives endorsement to certain political states-of-

affairs it is not entirely clear what kind of political settlement Nietzsche would (or

could) endorse. Instead Nietzsche becomes useful for our purposes because (as recent

scholarship has ablely demonstrated) Nietzsche addresses the question of friendship

directly in his work (in the middle period at least) and Nietzsche, like Schmitt, treats

this concept in relation of enmity. So, there is an initial point of comparison in the

accounts of the two thinkers. However, the second reason is that in the thought of

Nietzsche we can see an alternative configuration of the friend-enemy relationship

and the political itself. Indeed, whereas Schmitt is at pains to separate the political

from the pursuit of specific values, for Nietzsche the political and friendship are the

characterised by precisely this. Thus, although Nietzsche does not offer us a political

programme as such, his analysis of friendship can be usefully contrasted to that of

Schmitts in order to assist us in identifying what is deficient about his friend-enemy

pairing and his subsequent account of the political.

Schmitt: Friendsor Enemies

Although Schmitts friend-enemy pairing lies at the heart of his account of the

political there it is very rarely analysed as such. Indeed, many are prepared to simply

accept the concepts are being without need of further elaboration or clarification.

Partly, it seems, that this is because often the concepts are overshadowed by Schmitts

claims about sovereignty, and especially Schmitts claim that sovereign is he who


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decides the exception. Additionally, currently Schmitts claims about the exception

have gained ascendancy as scholars have attempted to develop the ideas in order to

account for the war on terror and the legal exceptionalism that this is said to entail.

This scholarship often fuses Schmitts ideas with those of Foucault to explore the

ideas of bio-politics (e.g. Agamben and Heller-Roazen, 1998)

However, there would appear to be another reason why Schmitts friend-enemypairing is not examined not only because scholars have chosen to focus on other

aspects of Schmitts thought, but because the friend-enemy distinction has a certain

rhetorical value. That is to say, on a basic initiative level the friend-enemy pairing

appears both natural and self-explanatory. So too do the concepts of friendship and

enmity themselves; but this is not quite true. In the words of Tracy B. Strong what

needs attention in Schmitts theory is not the attack on universalism but the overly

simplistic notion of friend. There is a way in which Schmitt allowed his notion of

enemy to generate his idea of friend. (Schmitt, 1996, xxiii-xxiv). We read in Concept

of the Political (henceforth simply Concept) of the various characteristics and features

of enmity. Indeed, it is clear that Schmitt thought that enmity was necessary for

politics. However what recent scholarship on friendship has revealed is that far from

being a simple and self-evident category friendship is in fact both complex termwhich differentiates a whole range of possible relations or affinities. Indeed, it is not

even clear that the terms friend and enemy are opposites or that one generates the

other.

What is needed then is a reconstruction of the usages and linkages that Schmitt makes

when employing the concepts of the friend-enemy and the political. Whilst it will be

shown that it is possible to reconstruct an account of friendship from Schmitts

Concept the reconstructed notion is far from satisfactory. What the reconstruction

does reveal, however, is not only some of the possible features of the friend-enemy

pairing and its complications, but also the work that friendship might be able to do in

order to understand the political.

The first thing to note is that for Schmitt friendship (and enmity) are political

concepts. It is true that there can be private manifestations of these relationships (i.e.

friendship and enmity between individuals) but Schmitt is not concerned with these

relationships but the relationships of friend-enemy which define or demarcate political

entities. In order to show the pedigree of such an understanding of the friend-enemy

pairing, and to highlight what modern political vocabulary has obscured, Schmitt

draws attention to the Greek understanding of the public enemy (hostis) and the loss

of this in modern languages (Schmitt, 1996, 28-29, see also 46). Here Schmitt

emphasises the claim that the distinction rests not upon shared ideas or normative

meaning as such (Schmitt, 1996, 28, 48-49), but the fact that the enemy poses an

existential threat to the friend. In other words, the friend-enemy distinction isunderscored by conflict and the real possibility of physical killing (Schmitt, 1996,

33).

However, before we can get to this claim we must consider two moves which Schmitt

makes prior to this. The first is that the friend-enemy distinction is identified as the

central basis for the political as a result of Schmitts consideration of what he takes to

be the defining oppositions in other spheres. Schmitts method is to identify what is

central and unique to various other spheres of human endeavour or experience, and


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then to ask what is unique about the political. For example, the defining opposition in

the economic sphere is the idea of profit and unprofitability, in aesthetics the beautiful

and the ugly, in morality the good and the evil (Schmitt, 1996, 23, 25, 26). Schmitt

moves from these claims to go on to claim that the distinctive opposition and

characterisation of the political sphere is the friend-enemy distinction (Schmitt, 1996,

26). Schmitt writes that:

The political must therefore rest on its own ultimate distinctions, to which

all action with a specifically political meaning can be traced The

specific political distinction to which political actions and motives can be

reduced is that between friend and enemy.

However, it is important to pause here to consider this initial move. Schmitt wishes to

separate the areas of our experience into distinct spheres. As an initialproposition this

claim is fine but Schmitt does very little to actually establish that these spheres are

distinct. Of course, in the thrust ofConcepthe does go on to argue (plausibly) that

there are undesirable results for the confusion of these spheres (Schmitt, 1996, 54,

69ff, and esp. 77-79); but the objectionable results that might occur through failing to

treat the spheres as separate does not support the claim that the spheres actually aredistinct. Thus, right from the start of his account Schmitt makes an assertion which (if

true) us unsupported. In-and-of-itself this would not be overly damaging to his

account as a whole. After all, it could be argued that regardless of whether the other

aspects of human experience or activity can be identified by a focus on central

oppositional paring , it could still be the case that the friend-enemy pairing remains

the central distinction that identifies and animates the political realm. However, this

concession cannot be granted to Schmitt precisely because his account of the friend-

enemy as being the exclusive feature at the centre of the political foes on to trade so

heavily in his attacks on the dangers in blurring these categories which he levels at

liberals, pluralists, humanitarians and others.

The second slippage that occurs here is directly a result of Schmitts concentration of

the characterisation of the enemy. Whilst Schmitt spends considerable time in saying

exactly what the enemy is (and is not), and by-and-large he leaves the friend as the

mere surplus of the enemy. This should raise questions in our minds. Why does

Schmitt offer no substantial account of the friend? What would such an account look

like? Indeed, how would the substantiating Schmitts notion of the friend affect his

overall account of the political in Concept? Of course, it could be that for Schmitt the

notion of friendship was obvious and that he assumed that it was also obvious to his

readers. However, we might suspect that Schmitt was either unwilling or unable to

substantiate the concept of the friend. To begin to see why this might be the case we

can attempt this task for ourselves. Schmitt has already made it clear that the enemy is

not a moral enemy. Indeed, it is even possible to trade with the enemy (Schmitt, 1996,27). Nor is the enemy opposed on religious, aesthetical, or ideological grounds. The

sole criteria for the identification of the enemy is that they pose an existential threat.

However, when we begin to think about this it raises further questions. For one, what

motivates this existential threat? Is it an objective fact about the enemy, or is it merely

in the perception of the friend? In other words: what divides Us and Them; or what do

We share with each other, but not with Them?


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Schmitts account. That is doesnt is surely a result of his failure to analyse this term

in detail.

However, despite these observations it would still be suggested that, for Schmitt, the

nation is not somehow prior to the political. Indeed, it could be suggested that it is the

political act of identifying the enemy creates the nation (consider, for example,

Hobbes arguments about the foundation of Commonwealth in Leviathan). Thiswould allow some leverage as it could then be other forces (such as religion,

economics, history etc.) which become decisive providing the motivation for the

political; it would then be that the political decision cements the groups as a nation.

This is certainly plausible (and perhaps there is historical precedent for this), but it

would then create further problems for Schmitts analysis of the friend-enemy. In

recognising that non-political forces can transform into the political and create the

friend-enemy distinction Schmitt does little to show that (a) the political thereby does

or even can lose the distinctive nature of these motivational forces and is thus wedded

(or perhaps even subservient) to religion, morality, etc.; or that (b) therefore there is

anything which is truly distinctively political other than the claim that some forces

come to dominate other considerations. In terms of a nation these forces form part of

the identity, but for Schmitt this concrete identity (insofar as the identity of a nationcan ever be considered concrete) cannot be the basis of the political.

This all raises one further question: in what practical way is the enemy identified?

Schmitts answer is ambivalent. At times (and in a Hegelian mode) he writes as if the

state were the vehicle of the nation, and that the enemy of the state is the enemy of the

nation. But if this is the case then why isnt nationhood the central category of the

political? Furthermore, what defines a nation? The immediate answer is that there are

two clear candidates either the identification of race, or the identification of culture (a

shared history, connection to a region, religion, language etc.). Clearly if Schmitt

considers the friend enemy distinction to produce existential threats then they must be

motivated by something, and the identification with others as a people would seem to

provide stimulus to this. However, this is precisely the move that Schmitt cannot

make if he wishes to keep his concept of the political distinct from the other

categories (and especially moral categories). Thus, in Conceptnot only is the notion

of the friend underdeveloped but Schmitt also oscillates between the nation and the

state as being the primary location of friendship.

What Schmitts account does, then, is to update the notion of friendship and

reintroduce it to an analysis of the political. However, as has been suggested here, it is

far from certain that this attempt is successful. For one, Schmitt seems to make some

basic assumptions that he never really goes on to defend; moreover Schmitt tends to

treat the notion of the friend as a kind of residual category of the enemy: it is this lack

of attention that enables Schmitt to make his rhetorical moves, but at the cost of somerigorous philosophical analysis.

Nietzsche: FriendsandEnemies

Thus far we have drawn-out certain limitations of Schmitts account of friendship by

considering the internal coherence of Schmitts argument in Concept. In this section

we will compare and contrast Schmitts position to the account of friendship and the


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political that is developed by Nietzsche. This comparison will be useful as whilst

Nietzsches account further highlights some of the deficiencies of Schmitts account,

it also offers a challenge to some of our conventional understandings of friendship.

Thus, although Nietzsches account it useful in transcending Schmitt, it is also

necessary to find a way to respond to both accounts if the project of friendship is to be

useful and desirable to a contemporary analysis of the political.

What this exposes in regards to Schmitt is that for the jurist friendship is not only

underdeveloped, but remains a fatally empty category. For Schmitt there is a

resistance to theorising identity/difference both between the friend-enemy and within

the friendship grouping itself. Moreover, as the pairing of the friend-enemy is central

to Schmitts account of the political we can come to see that this category is empty as

well. Schmitts under-theorisation of the friendship grouping is actually an under-

theorisation of the political itself. Content is needed to flesh out the friend-enemy

distinction, and this content challenges to particularity and sovereignty of a discrete

account of the political.

In order to understand the role that friendship plays in Nietzsches thought (and why it

has a political dimension) we need to make a few very general remarks aboutNietzsches project as a whole. The first thing to recognise is that Nietzsches oeuvre

does nor represent a monolithic whole: in fact it represents the constant working and

reworking of the central themes of Nietzsches thought. Thus, we are not presented

with a system, but a series of positions which often modify or refute earlier positions.

Second, Nietzsches overall aim is connected to the idea that European life has

become nihilistic; as such his thought represents a way of both thinking through that

nihilism and finding a way to overcome it. However, what is also clear from

Nietzsches thought is that he did not place his hope in European nihilism working

itself to a positive conclusion. Instead, Nietzsche asserted that there would have to be

intervention in order to create a greater sense of European culture. This intervention

would be enacted by those who had so disciplined their own characters that they could

face the nihilism head-on and create values. In order for this to be achieved a new

kind of politics would have to be created, one that overcame the levelling affects of

liberalism and democracy. Thus, at the heart of Nietzsches thought there is a

hierarchical or aristocratic prejudice.

Of course, this is a brief (all-too-brief) summary of the central themes of Nietzsches

thought. Despite this it perhaps provides sufficient indication of the general thrust of

Nietzsches thinking to begin to connect up his thought on friendship and enmity (on

the one hand) and his political aspirations for sovereign-individuals higher types, and

hierarchy on the other. Let us turn first to his account of friendship.

In recent years there have been several attempts to draw attention to the role thatfriendship plays in Nietzsches thought (Abbey, 1999; Appel, 1999; Berkowitz, 1995;

Derrida, 1997). In what follows we will outline the basic contours of a Nietzschean

account of friendship. From these accounts we will draw-out four features which will

be particularly relevant to the discussion of the f-e pairing in Schmitts Concept. We

can use these accounts to draw some preliminary remarks about Nietzsche account of

friendship (especially the accounts of Appel and Abbey).


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Appel warns that we should not be overhasty concerning Nietzsches views on

sociality (Appel, 1999, 83) and that we are mistaken to adopt the consensus view of

Nietzsche as a radical individualist(Appel, 1999, 81 note 81). For Appeal Nietzsches

account focuses us away from the rabble which represents a degenerate form of

sociality, and characters such as Zarathustra identify the possibility of a sociability

based on an equal footing(Appel, 1999, 86). Such a companion is a mirror image

of the self (Appel, 1999, 91-92). This companionship is devoid of the debilitatingpity that characterises the rabble and lower types. The companions on an equal

footing show no pity for each other as they attempt to become masters of themselves

and their destinies (Appel, 1999, 93).

Abbey agrees with the contours of this account, but focuses on Nietzsches middle

period. Here it is argued that friendship takes higher and lower forms (1999:50).

Crucially Abbey claims that in this period Nietzsche connects friendship to the notion

of identity and the self (Abbey, 1999, 51). Abbey stresses the role that difference

plays in the Nietzschean account of friendship (Abbey, 1999, 59-60) but seems to

disagree with Appeal concerning the role of pity. Focusing on Daybreak and Assorted

Opinions and Maxims Abbey finds a role for pity amongst the higher types as an

intimate, individualised response to suffering (Abbey, 1999, 61). In friendshipsuffering and pity do not act as a debilitating force if they are used to craft a unique

response to the others plight and to aid them back towards mastering their fate.

However, for Abbey there is a clear shift away from these ideas in the post-

Zarathustra works (Abbey, 1999, 64-66) and increasingly the focus is on the praise

of solitude that exclude[s] all others (Abbey, 1999, 66).

What is suggested here is that Nietzsches thought provides a consideration not only

of friendship, but also its link to enmity. In particular, we can discern in Nietzsches

thought a movement from the middle to the (so-called) mature period (with Thus

Spoke Zarathustra as being the pivotal point) which reflects a wider change in

Nietzsches thinking and not just a change of attitude towards friendship. What we see

in NietzschesZarathustra and post-Zarathustra works is a refocusing away from the

central (Enlightenment) task of self-discovery to the task of self-creation. In the

former friendship could play a role. Indeed, friendship seems to be a necessary

condition for self-discovery. However, the task of self-creation requires no such

intimacy, and friendship is replaced with talk of enmity and warlike rhetoric. Now the

hardness of others is used to fashion the self.

What Nietzsche offers us, then, is an elitist view of friendship. True friendship, as

opposed to the simple herding or neighbourliness of the mass, is something rare,

precious, and reserved for the few. What Nietzsches thought achieves is to combine

within his notion of friendship both intimacy and publicity. The friendship remains

intimate as it is a particular response and relationship between the individual friends.However, in aiding each other to self-knowledge, this particular relationship has

political import. Put bluntly: the development of the characters of the higher-types is

crucial to Nietzsches response to European nihilism.

What is also important about Nietzsches account is that we see from the start the

connection between friendship and enmity. Whereas for Schmitt the concepts are

diametrically opposed, for Nietzsche they have the potential to blur into one another.

Friendship contains danger from the start. Friendship (as opposed to neighbourliness)


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creates danger. For Nietzsche we should consider the friend to be the greatest enemy.

It is this blurring of the boundaries of the friend-enemy distinction that Derrida has

done so much to identify in Nietzsche and in the idea of friendship itself (Derrida,

1997). What seems to be at issue here for Nietzsche is that friendship is not simply a

static state or a given identify, but a process in the formation and transformation of

identity, whether this be in terms of the self-knowledge necessary for the friends of

the middle period, or the self-creation of the sovereign-individuals of the post-Zarathustra writings. In part this also helps us to understand how it is possible for

Nietzsche to move from talk of friendship to a focus on enmity afterZarathustra. The

categories of the friend and enemy are not distinct: in terms of the task of the

individual and the task of the higher types in overcoming European nihilism they are

two sides of the same coin.

We have already indicated that Nietzsches account of friendship combines both

intimacy and publicity: indeed, that it has a political dimension. It is now clearer why

this is the case. For Nietzsche friendship and enmity are not simply private relations,

but a mode of becoming which is connected to the transformation of character and

values. In Nietzsches middle period this was connected to self-discovery; however,

in the post-Zarathustra works we see a greater stress on enmity and the isolationneeded if the individual is to have the strength to become creative. In the later work it

is this sovereign individual who is alone is capable of reshaping Europe and the

affinities of friendship which were so crucial to the middle period fade away.

For Nietzsche, then, both enmity and friendship are potentially creative forces. They

are not merely states of being, but ways of becoming. In Nietzsches thought the

political itself is a realm of the creation and imposition of values; indeed, from

Nietzsches standpoint Schmitts attempt to separate the political from other spheres

might be judged as negatively as Schmitts own view that liberalism usurps the place

of the political.

The Dangers of a Political Friendship

In this final section it is possible to draw together these surveys of Schmitt and

Nietzsche, and to refocus on the wider task of relocating friendship in the political. It

is clear that whilst both Nietzsche and Schmitt reconsider friendship and its political

implications neither account is complete. Moreover, neither account is especially

attractive to the contemporary theorist of friendship and the political. In order to see

what we could learn from Nietzsche and Schmitt, and what we must negotiate, it is

worth restating the central points of contrast between the thinkers, and in particular

where Nietzsches thought challenges that of Schmitt whose account of the friend-

enemy paring in Conceptis becoming the groundwork for some who would now seekto theorise friendship and the political. Whereas Schmitt finds the friend-enemy

distinction antithetical, for Nietzsche they are closely related, slip into each other, and

might be considered two faces of he same coin. Whereas Schmitts objective (contra

liberalism and pluralism) is to create a realm of action which is distinctively and

uniquely political, Nietzsches objective is to use the political in his revaluation of all

values necessary to the overcoming of European nihilism. Finally, whereas Schmitt

achieves his goal by creating an impersonal and strictly public conception of the

friend-enemy, Nietzsche achieves his by placing the future of politics in the hands of


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a small number of individuals who share in the friend-enemy relationship and are

isolated from others.

These two approaches show some of the dangers of a political friendship. Schmitts

account suffers from internal weaknesses, not least in the way that he develops his

initial premises. Additionally (and more importantly perhaps), Schmitts account of

the radical antithesis and hostility between the friend and enemy begins to break-down when we consider it against not only its own silences, but the spaces expose by

the backdrop of Nietzsches account. It is not clear that his valueless politics is

either desirable or realistic (even as a tool of analysis). What, if anything, motivates

the political decision. Furthermore, what binds those who populate the category of the

friend?

On the other hand, Nietzsches account fills in the contours of the friend-enemy

relationship but only at the price of making the relationship so rare as to be almost

impossible. For Nietzsche friendship is political and politics is about identity and

values but friendship and politics are the preserve of a few (isolated) individuals.

This clearly does not appeal to contemporary sensibilities and many would intuitively

resist this conclusion. However, what Nietzsche usefully brings to our attention is hidea of the pluralism which exists within the self and friendship. Does this mean that

Nietzsche would endorse an aristocratic but plural politics? At times, his talk of

hierarchy and pathos would seem to suggest this but it is not clear. In any event, we

should not lose sight of the fact that for Nietzsche friendship is a means of

transformation for both self and others, and it is directed at a wider task or goal which

involves community. Thus, unlike the state of friendship for Schmitt, Nietzsche

views friendship as a process.

Finally, although we can travel with both thinkers for a short while as they develop

their accounts of friendship and the political we must conclude that their paths are

dangerous dead-ends. The dangers presented in both thinkers are similar despite their

differences. What both thinkers succumb to is the identification (at least in some way)

of the friend with the enemy. This identification presupposes a certain hostility to

otherness (even if Nietzsche goes some of the way to dissolving this complex

entanglement). What both thinkers fail to do is to move away from the association

that friendliness is an enclosed circle, or encampment, that must resist or overcome

those outside its confines. In the final analysis both Schmitt and Nietzsche tend to

view friendship and enmity against the modern backdrop of sovereign relations of

power, be these public (in Schmitts case) or personal-public (as in Nietzsches case).

What is potentially both enlightening in a theorisation of friendship and the political is

precisely the challenge to these vertical relations of sovereign power that a fully

developed notion of friendship might seek to offer. Whilst Schmitt and Nietzsche are

useful to such a purpose, their thought must be identified as being mired in the politicsof modernity. As such it fails to recognise friendship as being independent of enmity,

and promoting pluralism rather than agonism or antagonism. Such a notion of

friendship would stress the horizontal relations bound together by moral

considerations, multiple affinities, and solidarity. Both Schmitt and Nietzsche guide

us some of the way, but in doing so they also show us the dangers of a political

friendship.


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gm smith the dangers of a political friendship

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