global warming: the state of play - canada

8/7/2019 Global Warming: The State of Play - Canada

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Canada Institute

CanadaInstItute

OctOber 2006

Cimat Chang

Poitics in Noth

Amica:

Th Stat of Pay

Henrik Selin

and Stacy d. VandeVeereos

Occasiona Pap Sis

tHIs RepoRt Contains papers rom a two-day con-erence on Climate Change Politics in North America, organized at the Woodrow

Wilson International Center or Scholars, May 18-19, 2006. The conerence pa-

pers and participants endeavored to critically examine key aspects and issues o

North American politics and policymaking related to climate change.

In 1992, 172 o the worlds governments gathered at the Earth Summit in Rio

de Janeiro, Brazil. There they adopted the United Nations Framework Convention

on Climate Change, which set the goal o the stabilization o greenhouse gas con-

centrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenicintererence with the climate system. Five years later, in 1997, the much-debated

Kyoto Protocol was negotiated among national representatives rom around the

world, setting mandatory greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reductions or industri-

alized countries and countries with economies in transition, but not or develop-

ing countries. The Kyoto Protocol entered into orce in 2005, and countries with

emission reduction requirements that have ratied the agreement are required to

reach their targets no later than 2012. By mid 2006, 164 countries had ratied

the agreement. Currently, climate change related policy initiatives are developing

in many countries based

on an acceptance o the

science demonstratingimportant changes to

the global climate sys-

tem and a warming trend

largely caused by human

release o GHG emissions

(Fisher, 2004; Harrison,

2004; Schreurs, 2002;

Weart, 2003; Houghton,

et al., 2001).

In cnt yas, cimat chang

poitics an poicymaking

hav xpan an gown

incasingy mtifact

in Noth Amica.


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ClIMate CHanGe polItICs In noRtH aMeRICa

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octob2006

In recent years, climate change politics and policymak-

ing have expanded and grown increasingly multiaceted in

North America. O the three North American countries,

Canada and Mexico have ratied the Kyoto Protocol,

while the United States has elected to stay outside the

agreement. Under the Kyoto Protocol, Canada has taken

on a legally binding emission reduction commitment o

six percent below its 1990 emission levels. Mexico, classi-

ed as a developing country, is not required to reduce its

GHG emissions under the Protocol. Partially as a result o

dierent attitudes toward the Kyoto Protocol, Canada, the

United States and Mexico have developed dierent ed-

eral climate change policies. In addition, the complexi-

ties and divergences o climate change policies in North

America are even greater at the sub-national level than

among the ederal governments, as climate change policy

initiatives are discussed and developed in a multitude o

rms, municipalities, states, and provinces.Canadian public support or the Kyoto Protocol and

Canadian ratication o the agreement is widely known.

Only recently have Canadian government ocials

acknowledged that Canada is unlikely to meet its Kyoto

commitments (Stoett, this volume). Opposition by the Bush

administration and many members o the U.S. Congress

to the Kyoto Protocol and to mandatory ederal standards

on GHG emission reductions is also well documented

and much debated. Less well known, however, is that a

growing number o U.S. states, Canadian provinces, and

municipalities across North America are adopting climatechange policies that exceed national standards and goals.

Likewise, a growing number o large North American-

based private sector entities have launched GHG reduc-

tion eorts, oten going beyond ederal mandates.

Much (i not most) action at the oreront o climate

change mitigation in North America is developing out-

side the realm o the ederal governments in Ottawa,

Washington, and Mexico City. Firms, non-govern-mental organizations, municipalities, states and prov-

inces are all playing critical roles in North American

climate politics. In this respect, North American cli-

mate change politics and ongoing eorts to curb GHG

emissions are largely driven rom below.

This collection o papers analyzes issues critical to

our understanding o the politics and developing poli-

cymaking on climate change in North America. Many

o these initiatives are infuenced by Kyoto Protocol

debates, while others seek to get beyond Kyoto.

Rather than ocusing on actions or inactions o thethree ederal governments, the papers examine a multi-

tude o policy developments at international, national,

regional, and local governance levels in the public sec-

tor, in the private sector, and in civil society.

Peter Stoetts paper examines climate change politics and

policymaking in Canada with a specic ocus on chal-

lenges aced by the new Conservative government electedin 2005. Barry Rabes piece details the rapidly expanding

policymaking eorts related to climate change in many

U.S. states that are developing in response to various envi-

ronmental, economic, and energy concerns among state

ocials and publics, as well as the policy vacuum cre-

ated by a generally inactive U.S. ederal government. The

contributions by Alex Farrell and Michael Hanemann,

and Henrik Selin and Stacy VanDeveer, respectively, build

on Rabes analysis o the importance o state action and

examine signicant state-level initiatives in more detail.

Farrell and Hanemann ocus attention on recent devel-opments in climate policy in Caliornia, while Selin and

VanDeveer discuss regional and local-level policy devel-

opments in Northeast North America.

Ian Rowlands paper analyzes issues associated with

renewable energy production, trade and use in a Canadian-

U.S. context. Simone Pulver examines climate change and

energy issues in Mexico, with a particular ocus on the

role o PEMEX, the Mexican state-owned oil company.

Most action at th fofont of

cimat chang mitigation in

Noth Amica is voping

otsi th am of th

fa govnmnts.

tHe papeRs


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Addressing the challenges posed by human-induced cli-

mate change is seen by many policy advocates as a long-

term process o multi-level and multi-sector governance.

The issues examined in these papers are important or

North American citizens and policymakers, and or

many around the globe interested in long-term solutions

to global climate change. I GHG emissions are to be

reduced to levels needed to stabilize carbon dioxide con-

centrations in the atmosphere, then numerous changes

in policy and behavior rom the global to the local levels

will be required around the world. North America is a

major emitter o GHG emissions in both absolute and per

capita terms, and bringing these emissions down will be

necessary to tackle global emissions. Thus, policymakers,

analysts, and advocates everywhere would do well to pay

attention to the plethora o eorts associated with climate

change mitigation across North America, and critically

assess the potential and limitations o these eorts.

The papers collected here illustrate that much more

is happening on climate change mitigation in North

America than may be apparent at rst glance. A grow-

ing number o public- and private-sector actors in North

America are preparing or a uture where the costs o car-

bon emissions (and the activities that produce them) will

increase and where policies will be aimed at limiting GHG

emissions. At the same time, only minimal environmental

progress can be noted so ar. Total carbon dioxide emis-

sions are much higher today in all three North Americancountries than they were in 1990 or 2000. Yet, a ounda-

tion or more active and ambitious climate change action

in North America appears to be emerging. I public and

political support or more proactive action across public

and private sectors continues to grow, this could acilitate

much more rapid climate change policy developments in

North America over the next ve to ten years.

Noth Amica is a majo

mitt of GHG missions

in both absot an p

capita tms, an binging

ths missions own wi

b ncssay to tack

goba missions.

WHo CaRes?

This publication and the preceding conerence at the

Woodrow Wilson International Center or Scholars

were supported by g rants rom the Canadian Embassy

in Washington, D.C., the Energy Foundation, and both

the Canada Institute and the Environmental Change

and Security Program at the Wilson Center. Thanks

also to all those who attended the conerence, and in

particular those who contributed much to our dis-

cussions: Tim Kennedy (Global Public Aairs), Julie

Anderson (Union o Concerned Scientists), Truman

Semans (Pew Climate Center), Andrew Aulisi (World

Resources Institute), and Joseph Dukert (Independent

Energy Analyst). We are particularly grateul to the sta

o the Canada Institute and the Environmental Change

and Security Projectespecially David Biette, Geo

Dabelko, Katherine Ostrye and Christophe Leroy

or their hard work and invaluable input or the coner-

ence and this report.

Michele Betsill scrutinizes the possible creation o a GHG

trading mechanism under the North American Free

Trade Agreement. David Levy and Charles Jones analyze

reactions and strategies o private sector actors to the cli-

mate change issue and expanding climate policy. Virginia

Haufers paper also looks at the private sector but more

specically ocuses on the insurance and re-insurance sec-

tor. In the nal two contributions, Dovev Levine details

the expansion o climate change action on university

campuses, and Susanne Moser discusses the role o com-

munication in motivating citizen action and support or

more aggressive climate change policy.

aCknoWledGMents


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octob2006

Henrik Sein is an assistant proessor in the Department o International Relations at Boston University, where he

conducts research and teaches classes on global and regional politics and policymaking on environment and sustainable

development. His paper, co-authored with Stacy D. VanDeveer, presents results rom an ongoing research project onNorth American climate change policymaking and action at national, regional, and local levels. Prior to his current

aculty position, he spent three years as a Wallenberg Post-doctoral Fellow in Environment and Sustainability at the

Massachusetts Institute o Technology. He can be contacted at [email protected].

Stac D. VanDeveer is an associate proessor o political science at the University o New Hampshire. His

research interests include international environmental policymaking and its domestic impacts, the connections

between environmental and security issues, and the role o expertise in policymaking. Beore taking a aculty posi-

tion, he spent two years as a post-doctoral research ellow in the Beler Center or Science and International Aairs

at Harvard Universitys John F. Kennedy School o Government. He has received research unding rom the (U.S.)

National Science Foundation and the Swedish Foundation or Strategic Environmental Research (MISTRA),

among others. In addition to authoring and co-authoring numerous articles, book chapters, working papers, and

reports, he co-edited EU Enlargement and the Environment: Institutional Change and Environmental Policy in Central

and Eastern Europe(Routledge, 2005), Saving The Seas: Values, Science And International Governance (Maryland Sea

Grant Press, 1997) and Protecting Regional Seas: Developing Capacity and Fostering Environmental Cooperation In Europe

(Woodrow Wilson International Center or Scholars, 1999). He can be contacted at [email protected].

Fisher, Dana R. 2004. National Governance and theGlobal Climate Change Regime. New York: Rowman andLittleeld Publishers.

Harrison, Neil E. 2004. Political Responses toChanging Uncertainty in Climate Science in Neil E.Harrison and Gary C. Bryner (eds.) Science and Politicsin the International Environment. New York: Rowman andLittleeld Publishers.

Houghton, J. T. et al. (eds.). 2001. Climate Change2001: The Scientic Basis. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press.

Schreurs, Miranda. 2002. Environmental Politics in Japan,Germany and the United States. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press.

Weart, Spencer R. 2003. The Discovery o GlobalWarming. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

ReFeRenCes


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PeTerSTOeTToctob2006

Canaa, Kyoto, an

th Consvativs:

Thinking/Moving

Aha

Peter StOett1

CanadIan ClIMate CHanGe polICy

In 1987 Canadian Pr ime Minister Br ian Mulroney, during a multi-

lateral conerence in Toronto, called the threat rom climate change

second only to a global nuclear war, and called or 20 percent

cuts in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2005. Thus would begina airly consistent pattern o rhetoric outweighing policy implemen-

tation on this issue. Canada had promised to stabilize GHGs at 1990

levels prior to the 1992 United Nations Conerence on Environment

and Development (UNCED), at which the embryonic, but target-less,

UN Framework on Climate Change (UNFCC) was signed. The subse-

quent Liberal government went urther, promising a 20 percent reduc-

tion and introducing the rst National Action Program on Climate

Change. As it became apparent this was rather unrealistic, the target

slipped at the Kyoto negotiations in 1997 to six percent below 1990

levels by the ve-year commitment period o 2008 to 2012. Though

Canada signed the Kyoto Protocol on April 29, 1998, it did not ratiy

the agreement until December 17, 2002.

Actual policy initiatives on emissions reduction have been slow in

coming, but many environmentalists were somewhat heartened by the

steps later taken by the Liberal governments o Jean Chrtien and

Paul Martin. These included the Action Plan 2000 on Climate Change

which committed $500 million to the eort; and, in November o 2000,

the release o the Climate Change Plan or Canada, promising (but all-

ing ar rom delivering) annual cuts o 240 megatonnes o emissions.

Total spending on Kyoto neared $4 billion by 2003. In 2004 the One

Tonne Challenge was released; it sought voluntary eorts by citizens to

reduce their own emissions but came with energy conservation initia-

tives and other incentives. Later the same year, Environment Canadareleased its 2002 greenhouse gas inventory, indicating that Canada had

emitted 731 megatonnes o greenhouse gases that year, up 2.1 percent

over 2001, and 28 percent above the Kyoto target o 572 megatonnes it

had promised to reach by 2012. In March o 2005 the ederal govern-

ment reached an agreement with Canadian automakers that contained

voluntary commitments to GHG reductions. Later that year a plan was

released which both increased government spending and decreased

the obligation o large emitters to reduce emissions. The Province o

Alberta made it very clear it had no intention o enorcing Kyoto provi-

sions in its jur isdiction, and proceeded to intensiy the highly polluting

process o extracting oil rom tar sands.2

Indeed, provincial disharmonyhas been a constant actor in Canadian climate change policy, since

the provinces are constitutionally responsible or the governance o

natural resources (though the ederal government retains much room

or jurisdiction on pollution issues), and since the provinces dier in

terms o their resource and energy production bases.

Canadas Kyoto commitments demanded total national emissions

o 571 megatonnes (Mt) per year during the period o 2008-2012.

With current emissions well over 725 Mt, reaching this target would


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indeed be a colossal achievement within the time span

permitted. More action plan than action, Canadas

national eorts ell so ar rom the mark that the Liberal

governments steadast public commitment to Kyoto

became dicult to take seriously by late 2005. In

January o 2006, Stephen Harpers Conservative party

won a minority government, and with it came a shit

rom a Kyoto-oriented policy platorm to an essentially

anti-Kyoto platorm. This brie paper discusses related

contextual and implicational issues.

It would be premature to declare the Canadian imple-

mentation o Kyoto dead, but it is certainly apparent

that the new Harper government is making audible

uneral arrangements. Indeed, it has moved with rather

remarkable speed toward dismantling whatever scaold-

ing previous Liberal governments had managedin their

own procrastinate mannerto erect. Public comments

by Environment Minister Rona Ambrose and Natural

Resources Minister Gary Lunn have made it clear that

less Kyoto, more Washington, is the preer red approach.

A made in Canada solution has emerged as the man-

tra or the development o a new set o policies, which

includes an overhaul o the Canadian Environmental

Protection Act (CEPA) and a ocus on air and Great

Lakes pollution; some critics are already labeling it a

made in Washington approach.3 This is unair, but it

is clear that a Canadian approach as conceived by the

Harper government diers signicantly rom the seem-

ingly alse promises made by the Chrtien and Martin

governments, and that the current government will

be even less willing to direct onerous responsibilities

toward the large nal emitters (LFEs) that contribute

just under hal o all Canadian emissions.4 Cuts have

included the much-publicized One Tonne Challenge,

40 public inormation oces across the country, several

scientic and research programs on climate change, and

a home conservation rebate plan.

O course, the death o Kyoto has long been pre-

dicted by many observers, especially once George W.

Bush and his team assumed the helm in Washington

(see Soroos, 2001). Kyoto has several embedded prob-

lems that suggest a premature demise, such as the lack

o participation by key states with rapidly expanding

economies, a lack o U.S. leadership, and a reliance on

market mechanisms to control emissions with insu-

cient inrastructure to avoid corruption. It has certainlybeen common knowledge that, without a Herculean

eort and the complete participation o every provincial

and municipal government, Canadas commitment o

six percent below 1990 levels will be an embarrassing

ailure; even Liberal ocials said as much prior to rati-

cation.5 Even i we assume a genuine (i incontestably

delayed) eort on the part o the Liberals, an expanding

economy and population have put the initial commit-

ment out o reach.6 The Harper government has argued

that it aces the stark choice o admitting deeat in terms

o the specic goals, or o pretending Canada can meetthe targets and acing certain embarrassment at a later

date. In this context they should at least be commended

or an honest assessment and statement o their capabili-

ties, even i their intentions remain rather unclear at the

time o this writing (May 2006).

While Canadian ocials insist that Canada main-

tains a long-term commitment to Kyoto, and indeed

Ambrose (because o a prior Liberal commitment)

neW dIReCtIons?

Canaas Kyoto commitmnts

man a tota nationa

mission of 571 Mgatonns

(Mt) p ya ing th

pio of 2008-2012. With

cnt missions w ov

725 Mt, aching this tagt

wo in b a coossa

achivmnt within th

tim span pmitt.


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Many casual observers have been hampered by the erro-

neous belie that ederal or national leadership is just a

matter o time on climate issues. The belie here is that vis-

ible extreme weather events will orce politicians to lead.

Yet political logic suggests that politicians will not cut o

the main branches on which they sit; in the Conservatives

case, this includes the oil wealth and tar sands develop-

ment in Alberta and an ideological platorm encouraging

deregulation. Some might argue that the Harper govern-ment, with its clearly right-leaning platorm, is the only

party that can actually apply serious pressure to LFEs, since

the latter will have no urther-right party to support in

retaliation. I nd this somewhat anciul, but perhaps this

will play out over the next year.7 Short-term and relatively

minor inusions o cash into research and development

aside, we will not see major leadership initiatives by either

Ottawa or Washington on climate change. In the Canadian

case, even in a minority government where the opposition

is in avor o Kyoto, this is already evident. I am tempted

to view the lack o serious leadership at the national level

as a permanent eature that will outlive the next national

elections in both Canada and the United States. In short,

the lack o national leadership on climate change issues is

a sae assumption we can make when looking orward.

Given the leadership lacuna at the national level, a

decentralized vision o strategy has begun to emerge.This remains one o the most sensitive political issues

in a ederalist state. For example, i much o the action

on climate change will take place at the city level, the

ederal government needs to nd innovative ways to

support local initiatives without soliciting provincial

territor ialism. This is easier said than done. Nonetheless

it is evident that mayoral leadership in the United

States is impressive: some 231 mayors representing

recently presided over the 24th session o the Subsidiary

Body or Scientic and Technological Advice (SBTA)

and the Subsidiary Body or Implementation (SBI) o

the UNFCCC in Bonn, it is sel-evident that eorts

to curb expectations o urther Canadian commitments

have already been made. Cutbacks to Kyoto-inspired

Liberal programs have proceeded at breakneck speed,

ostensibly to make budgetary room or a tax subsidy

or citizens willing to take public transit on a regular

basis. Nearly every statement rom Ambrose and Lunn

about Kyoto has at least mentioned the sheer utility, and

implied olly, o trying to meet the original goals.

This does not amount to abandoning Kyoto, but to

demanding a renegotiation o a commitment that was,

according to the new regime, made under alse pretenses

in the rst place. Should the eort to re-open commit-

ments ail, which it probably will, Canada has another

option, which is simply to ail to meet the targets, andthen get serious about a renegotiated post-2012 sce-

nario. The more drastic option o pulling out o the

Protocol, which could be done legally in a matter o two

or three years, seems less likely at this point, when the

Conservatives hold a minority in Parliament. Indeed,

some o the policy advisors I approached insisted that

even with a majority government there is no long-term

plan to pull out o Kyoto, though that will be proven in

time. At present, however, public discourse over Kyoto

seems hampered by the emergence o bipolarity on

Kyoto, ranging rom near-religious support to outright

dismissal. This is unortunate. Indeed, one could argue

that ideological blinkers have been limiting the policy

spectrum or some time. Given the realities o petro-

leum-riendly governments in both Washington and

Ottawa, some ideas are best discarded, i only or a bet-

ter view o the policy option landscape.

leadeRsHIp QuestIons and QuestIonaBle leadeRsHIp

It wo b pmat

to ca th Canaian

impmntation of Kyoto

a, bt it is ctainy

appant that th nw Hap

govnmnt is making aib

fna aangmnts.


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10

more than 45 million Americans have signed the U.S.

Mayors Climate Protection Agreement; 20 Canadian

counties, towns, and cities (including Calgary and

Edmonton) belong to the International Council or

Local Environmental Initiatives. Transgovernmental

approaches will similarly hold greater promise than

multilateral ones at this stage. For example, in 2001

the New England Governors and Eastern Canadian

Premiers adopted a joint Climate Change Action Plan,

committing to reduce GHG emission to 1990 levels

by 2010, and 10 percent below 1990 levels by 2020

(see Selin and VanDeveer, 2006). This commitment was

renewed as recently as May 2006. It is time to recog-

nize that most leadership on this issue is not national

but regional and municipal. Canadians would be ool-

ish to rely upon the inevitability o national leadership.

Nonetheless, i the latter is to proceed, it will be within

the realm o consultative relations with the provinces.

tHe need FoR FedeRal-pRoVInCIal Co-oRdInatIon

The lead-in to Kyoto is oten reerred to as a textbook

example o how notto conduct the complex interplay

between oreign aairs commitments and ederal-pro-

vincial relations. Arguably, it was a squandered opportu-

nity or serious cooperation. There are o course several

interpretations o this, with some suggesting the prov-

inces recalcitrance as the main culprit and others insisting

Ottawa made all the wrong moves in its lackluster eort

to achieve provincial harmony. From an outsiders view-

point, it is rather obvious that both the ederal government

and several provincial governments are to blame or the

essential disconnect. The 1995 National Action Program

on Climate Change, resulting rom ederal-provincial

ministerial dialogue, did nothing to decrease emissions,

which were almost 10 percent above 1990 levels in 1999.

A 1997 agreement, sans Quebec, to stabilize emissions by2010 had some promise, but the ederal government uni-

laterally declared its intention to agree to a three percent

reduction instead o stabilization at Kyoto. Once there, it

went a step urther, eectively doubling that commitment

to six percent. No doubt this description misses much o

the nuance behind the process, but it remains an event

that most provincial historians note as a ederal betrayal

(MacDonald and Smith, 2000).

As always, relations between Canada and the United

States and their public optics are interesting acets o the

story. Much o the Canadian ederal oscillation pr ior toand during the Third Conerence o the Parties (COP3)

to the UN Framework Agreement on Climate Change

seemed to be predicated on shits within the Clinton

administration. Likewise, Harper will be sensitive to the

popular suspicion that his approach is based largely on

the Bush/Cheney approach to energy policy. Also con-

stant are concerns that a majority government will be

impossible to achieve i the rest o Canada perceives

the government as excessively Albertan. But open con-

sultation and, on some key issues, negotiation with the

provinces will be as essential as it will be strained. The

recent rapprochement between Ottawa and Quebec (the

ederal government has made several initiatives to court

the avor o Qubcois concerned with their cultural

identity) will be put to an interesting test in this regard;

Quebecs moral high ground on this issue (aorded by

its immense hydropower development) is particularly

irksome to westerners.

There is more than mere political territoriality

involved here. When it comes to GHG reductions,

common terminology may be ound, but common

understandings will be a much more painul and

W n to stat taking

opny abot aaptation

to cimat chang, a topic

th Init wi no obt

bcom vy famiia with

as thi way of if is fth

at by cimat shifts.


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11

localized process. For example, Manitoba has claimed it

is well on the path to exceed Kyoto commitments, but

there remains ample controversy over the exact level o

GHG contributions made by hydropower. Indeed, it is

oten simply assumed that we have commonly agreed-

upon methodologies or measuring emissions, and

even this is alse (especially on a global scale, but across

a large state such as Canada as well). Similarly, debates

over carbon sequestration sinks leave much room or

both innovation and compromise. Canada should

push its expertise in this vital scientic eld, through

the SBTA and through the promotion o educational

development in Canadian universities. Technological

solutions will never, in themselves, provide sustainable

development, but they can certainly point towards

sustainability. However, provincial interests will almost

certainly distort their utility.

One ray o hope here is that a national emissions capand trading regime can be established that will unite

provincial jurisdictions. This should be taken cautiously,

however. Doubtlessly, the promise o a robust interna-

tional emissions trading regime has generated an entirely

new eld o economics, based almost entirely on deriva-

tives and utures. The idea is borrowed rom U.S. eorts to

cap air pollution, but in its Kyoto variation it has spawned

a virtual eeding renzy o potential investors, chartered

accountants, nancial advisers, and lawyers. It has, in short,

already taken o at astronomical speed toward becoming

a major industry in itseli it ever actually works, out-side o a domestic or European Union context. However,

it would be imprudent to put too much stock in carbon

emissions trading as either a protable activity or a sin-

cere eort to reduce global warming. This was a market-

based incentive compromise8 (Cass, 2005) that is oten

lambasted by the right (who eel it gives undue credit

to overpopulated developing states and de-industrialized

Cold War losers) and the let (who view this as yet another

way to escape the demands o emissions reductions at

home and carry on business as usual). Even possible Clean

Development Mechanism (CDM) contributions have

raised serious concerns amongst environmentalists that

the CDM could be used to avoid Kyoto action while

contributing to projects in the southern hemisphere with

dubious ecological (i.e., in terms o orest carbon sinks)

and human rights implications, such as the Plantar euca-

lyptus tree plantation in Brazil.9

Meanwhile at the national level, Canada is ar rom

implementing an eective trading system. Beyond

Albertas media campaigning and Ontarios hesitance,

Quebecs insistence that it be rewarded or hydro

resources has also curtailed any eort to establish a

national emissions trading regime. One thing is certain:

the Harper government will not indulge the end-result

o the multilateral trading system as agreed to, sans the

United States, which would see companies and/or

provinces and/or the ederal government buy hot air

credits rom de-industrialized states such as Russia. This

should not be dicult policy to sell. Hopeully the

Harper government will move toward a national system,

but this will require compromise and commitments by

provincial governments.

Ultimately, it is senseless to prolong the debate over

the most appropriate political level o environmental

governance in Canada. It is quite clear that all levels

are heavily involved and none has sucient leadership

capacity to rmly take the helm. Local initiatives, whichare fourishing, oer the best hope or an eective GHG

reduction program. Ronnie Lipshultz oered ve essen-

tial arguments in avor o local approaches that ocus

on the bioregional level o implementation. They allow

or the scale and practices o ecosystems; more eec-

tively assign property rights to local users o resources;

locate local and indigenous knowledge; increase par-

ticipation o stakeholders; and display greater sensitiv-

ity to eedback (Lipshultz, 1994). But there is no doubt

that some orm o national or ederal level leadership is

instrumental, since pollution lies substantially withinederal jurisdiction. Pollution and the protection o

habitat are very much a part o providing peace, order,

and good government (Paehlke, 2001). Edward Parson

concluded a major research project on environmental

governance with the thought that [a] promising direc-

tion or resolving competing claims o environmental

authority at multiple scales would be to construct cross-

scale networks o shared authority and negotiated joint

decisions that mirror the complex cross-scale structure

o environmental issues. Canadas loose ederal struc-

ture may acilitate such an approach, or indeed com-

pel it i redrawing the lines o ormal environmental

authority is out o the questions (Parson, 2001). He

adds that the Canadian Council o Ministers o the

Environment held such promise in the 1980s and early

1990s, as it helped build technical capacity in smaller

jurisdictions; it invested provincial and territorial o-

cials with a national perspective when they held the

rotating chair; and it provided key research and analysis


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to address technically challenging problems shared by

multiple jurisdictions (ibid.).

Though it still meets today, this Council could cer-

tainly be rejuvenated with political will. This entails ed-

eral, provincial, municipal, and aboriginal participation,

and in the case o an issue so obviously global in scope,

the participation o the oreign policy community is

essential as well; in total this has been reerred to as

the microederalism o environmental policy (Gillroy,

1999). Given the lack o national leadership, this is not

necessarily a bad thing; some combination o unwieldi-

ness and pragmatic co-operation is the hallmark o

democracy, and ew o us are convinced o the need or

radical centralization at this stage. Public opinion is airly

strong on this issue, and non-governmental organiza-

tions can keep genuine pressure on politicians at the ed-

eral, provincial, and municipal levels to engage in serious

discussions. It is perhaps shameul that Canada needs to

reinvent this process at this late stage; yet the alternative

at the governmental level is doing nothing.

We need to start talking openly about adaptation to cli-

mate change, a topic the Inuit will no doubt become very

amiliar with as their way o lie is urther altered by cli-

mate shits. Several scholars have been doing this or some

time (see Pielke, 1998), as have the UNFCCC COPs,

but generally it has been taboo amongst environmentalists

to seriously discuss adaptation, since it implies resigna-

tion to the ate o global warming and might discourage

more active prevention programs. The norm o stopping

global warming is pitted against the relatively mild, even

acquiescent need to limit human damage, and naturally

the ormer appears more robust.10 However, given the

serial lack o leadership on this issue, the immensity o

the problems associated with mitigation, and the con-

tinued drive or industrialization, it is only reasonable to

assume adaptation will become one o the more pressing

policy concerns we will ace in coming decades (I will

return to this theme below). More importantly, however,

openly discussing adaptationmost notably in Canadas

case, possible policy responses to northern challenges,

and the subsequent demands this will place on uture

budget projectionswill rame the issue as a mainstream

concern, and provoke more reasonable demands on the

Conservative government to begin thinking aloud. Finally,

admitting that adaptation is both necessary and inevitable

conrms the science behind climate change. It wouldseem that Canadians ace a much thinner wall o discon-

nect in that area than do Americans at this stage, though

this is changing as public awareness in the United States

increases and even some o the largest ossil uel compa-

nies publicize their eorts to combat global warming.

Again, the Canadian north will ace serious adapta-

tion policy issues. Rather quickly, the Arctic has become

what is perhaps the most visible related issue-area or

Canadians; this was reinorced by a recent TIMEmaga-

zine cover depicting a lonesome and, perhaps, doomed

polar bear. Recent studies indicate that Arctic ecosystems

are in peril, and that is a disturbing scenario not just or

northerners but or the image o Canada as a whole. A

recently completed Arctic climate impact assessment

concluded that air temperatures in Alaska and western

Canada have increased as much as three to our degrees

Celsius in the past 50 years, leading to an estimated eight

percent increase o precipitation across the Arctic; when

this alls as rain it increases snow melting and the dan-

ger o fash fooding. Melting glaciers, reduction in the

thickness o sea ice, and thawing o permarost are also

possibilities. Should the Arctic Ocean become ice-ree

in summer, it is likely that polar bears and other north-

ern species would be driven toward extinction (Canada,

2005). Arctic disturbance has also raised various security

dimensions. This will be a convergence point o public-

ity eorts made by opponents and proponents o Kyoto.

Oil and gas companies (Canadian and Alaskan) will strive

to demonstrate their ecological consciousness by way o

tender television commercials; environmental NGOs will

use the Artic as a platorm to raise broader awareness o

their concerns; the military will request additional und-

ing or proper ice-ree surveillance. What might get lost

in all this, however, is the actual condition and eects oglobal warming upon northern peoples. Here we have

both a constituency, albeit a small one, and a global human

rights concern that could prove to be a great embarrass-

ment or an ostensibly progressive state such as Canada.

I would suggest also that Canada is not doing enough

to sell renewable energy abroad, despite the economic

opportunities this entails. Though undoubtedly improv-

ing, Canadian commitment to solar power, wind power,

lookInG FuRtHeR aHead


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1

geothermal activities, and hydrogen uel cell develop-

ment has been limited. While wind technologies are

beginning to penetrate utility markets and catch the

eye o domestic policymakers, and companies such as

Ballard have emerged as world leaders in the develop-

ment and employment o uel cell technologies, theCanadian International Development Agency (CIDA)

remains actively engaged in developing the oil and gas

sector abroad, rom Bolivia to Kazakhstan.11

Given the immense potential or solar power and

biomass development in Arica and elsewhere, it might

be wise at this juncture to investigate more seriously

the option o redirecting resources into these emerg-

ing elds. The assumption that developing states must

pass through a ossil-uel dependent stage in their paths

toward modernity discourages more creative eorts to

acilitate development. Given the potential contributionCanada can make with technology transers, and the act

that any global agreement based on emissions reductions

will indeed prove utile in the ace o expanding indus-

trialization in Asia and Latin America, it would appear

obvious that Canadians can best pursue their long-term

interests by encouraging states to either limit or rapidly

bypass the oil-based technological culture that charac-

terized North American and European development.

Meanwhile, the symbioses between globalization and

global warming are increasing the likelihood o bio-

invasions at both the microbial and species levels, caus-

ing shits in pathogenic virulence (Price-Smith, 2002).

There is evidence that warming trends will induce spe-

cies migration northward, and this raises concerns about

disease and threats to native species (see Hughes, 2000).

However, such unassisted migration will prove di-

cult or rare species o plants and trees, and adaptation

or extinction is as likely (see Iverson, et. al., 2004). Not

so or insects: warming patterns have vastly extended

the range o the mountain pine beetle, ravaging Yoho

National Park in British Columbia and threatening or-

ests in the State o Washington; ocials in Alberta are

setting res and traps and elling thousands o trees in

an attempt to keep the beetle at bay.12 (One ormer

government ocial involved in the negotiations over

sotwood lumber taris mentioned the possibility thatthe agreement reached in 2006, which was certainly not

in tune with the Canadian governments initial demands,

was provoked at least partly by the pine beetleor, rather,

the urgent need to clear orests and, as a result, the need to

resume large-scale exports.) In the inamous case o zebra

mussels, which have clogged entire swaths o the Great

Lakes, we might see northward migration as appropriate

reproduction temperatures are more common. Flooding

could expand zebra mussel territory even urther. It is

believed that climate change will aect the incidence

o episodic recruitment events o invasive species, byaltering the requency, intensity, and duration o food-

ing by allowing aggressive species to escape rom local,

constrained reugia. (Sutherst, 2000; Kolar and Lodge,

2000). In general, we may be in or some nasty surprises,

but this uncertainty is also an opportunity to promote the

cause or climate change policy as well, directly appealing

to threats-to-livelihood issues on which various levels o

governance should be compelled to act.

ConClusIon

Givn th aship acna

at th nationa v, a

cntaiz vision of statgy

has bgn to mg.

I have only touched on the range o actors necessary

or a serious, post-Kyoto Canadian eort to combat

global warming to take shape. It is certainly necessary to

involve the business community and the NGO commu-

nity (neither o which oten appreciate the ner quali-

ties o the other) as well as aboriginal groups. Indeed,

these sectors will involve themselves without invitation

through courting public opinion. The big question may

well be whether the Conservative government has

either the legitimacy or instinctive openness (beyond

repeated bromides to the values o decentralization)

to pursue such a broad agenda when it is related to a

topic they do not nd particularly galvanizing in the

rst place. Meanwhile, the Kyoto machine chugs on,


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with hundreds o government employees carrying on

as though the Kyoto protocol is an assumed contextual

variable in international aairs; busy with COP prepa-

rations, and sub-COP preparations, and the Ad Hoc

Working Group or Further Commitments or Annex

1 Parties Under the Kyoto Protocol preparations, and

the intricacies o providing security or participants at

COP12/MOP2 in Nairobi next year, and the many

other acets and minutiae o these global governance

eorts. They are joined by citizens who have adapted

a Kyoto-based litmus test or environmental concern,

and still await national leadership to get us there. It

may be time to look elsewhere or both leadership and

co-operative possibilities; indeed this is happening with

unprecedented requency at the level o civil society

and even, to a limited extent, in the pr ivate sector.

Thankully, we have more than Kyoto with

which to approach global warming, both in termso mitigation and adaptation. Trans-governmental

and community-level programs can both set regula-

tory examples and reduce emissions. Internationally,

there are extant technology agreements such as the

Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum, Methane to

Markets, the Renewable Energy and Energy Eciency

Partnership, and the Asia-Pacic Partnership on Clean

Development and Climate.13There are also many other

international agreements that have a direct or indirect

impact on shaping climate change related policies, and

we would be remiss to mourn the ailure o Kyotowithout some optimistic reerral to the opportunities

they oer. Indeed it would take a very long policy

paper to outline them all; Meinhard Doelle has listed

several in a recently published book on climate change

and international law, including world trade, human

rights, law o the sea, and biodiversity conservation

(2006). In some cases, there is a blatant advocacy role;

the Coalition o Small Island States has thrust global

warming onto the human rights agenda, and Canadian

Inuit and other northern dwellers have begun a similar

process. There is some room to work within the con-

text o regional economic agreements such as NAFTA

to pursue climate change-related policies. In other

cases there are incidental benets; or example, eorts

to curtail the loss o biodiversity must be explicitly tied

to habitat preservation, which protects carbon sinks.

I Canada is reluctant to urther embrace Kyoto, it

can nevertheless improve the odds o climate change

mitigation and adaptation by pursuing a sustainable-

development agenda that is both broad and multilaterally

oriented. Most Canadians, still convinced that Canada

is or could be a world leader in environmental policy,

would support this. The hard work o serious consulta-

tion with the provinces and local groups lies ahead; the

need to keep public pressure on the Conservatives issel-evident. But it might be a blessing in disguise to re-

open the debate over Kyoto commitments and to rame

a dialogue in which Canada admits the impossibility o

meeting infated targets but renews eorts to achieve

realistic targets instead, while looking urther down the

road at adaptation measures and even more demanding

targets than originally envisioned. One o the inherent

dangers with such a sweeping agenda as that presented

by the UNFCC and Kyoto, beyond the temptation to

sign on without commensurate and consensual under-

standings o the consequences, is that the public might

assume a that job is done attitude. This job has just

begun, with or without Kyoto, and every Canadian (and

American) should be made aware o this.

Manwhi, th Kyoto machin

chgs on, with hns

of govnmnt mpoys

caying on as thogh

th Kyoto potoco is an

assm contxta vaiab

in intnationa affais


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1

Bell, Ruth. 2006. What to do About ClimateChange. Foreign Aairs (May/June): 105-113.

Canada, Government o. 2005.Action on Climate

Change: Considerations or an Eective International

Approach. Discussion paper or the preparatory meetingo ministers or Montreal 2005: UN Climate ChangeConerence. Environment Canada and Foreign AairsCanada.

Cass, Loren. 2005. Norm Entrapment and PreerenceChange: The Evolution o the European Union Position

on International Emissions Trading. Global EnvironmentalPolitics 5(2): 38-60.

Doelle, Meinhard. 2006. From Hot Air to Action?Climate Change, Compliance and the Future o International

Environmental Law. New York: Carswell.

Gillroy, John. 1999. American and CanadianEnvironmental Federalism: A Game-Theoretic Analysis.Policy Studies Journal27: 360-388.

1. Thanks to Stacy VanDeveer and Henrik Selin orcomments on an initial drat o this paper; and to DavidBiette and Geo Dabelko or support rom the WoodrowWilson International Center or Scholars.

2. See http://www.cbc.ca or a timeline on majorCanadian policy initiatives on climate change. Governmentwebsites have been stripped o much o their contentollowing the changes introduced by the Harpergovernment.

3. Note that the CEPA overhaul is not a Conservativeinitiative, as it is up or review regardless o thegovernment in power. There is concern also that therevamping o CEPA might eliminate the move inlate 2005 to add the Kyoto six greenhouse gases(namely: carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide,hydrofuorocarbons, perfuorocarbons, and sulurhexafuoride). While in opposition the, Tories wereopposed to their inclusion, especially with regard to the

rst two GHG sources.4. LFEs are ound in the primary energy production,

electricity production, mining, and manuacturing sectors.This covers about 700 companies operating in Canada;80-90 o these companies account or approximately 85percent o GHG emissions by LFEs. Even the Liberalshad exempted automobile manuacturers, however(though a voluntary reductions agreement had beenreached, as mentioned above).

5. Herb Dhaliwal, Minister o Natural Resources,September 5, 2002: Canada has no intention o meetingthe conditions o the Kyoto Protocol on greenhousegases even though the government hopes to ratiy it this

all. Quoted in Bruce Cheadle, Canada to Sign Kyoto,but Wont Abide by it, Toronto Star, September 5, 2002,online, available at http://www.theStar.com.

6. Note that per-capita emissions rates have not grownat the same rate as overall national emissions; thereorepopulation growth itsel is an obstacle to meeting the

Kyoto commitments as they are presently ramed. SeeKettner et al., 2006.

7. This scenario was stressed by co-panelist Tim Kennedy.8. It was only ater the United States rejected

the Kyoto Protocol that the EU was able to promoteemissions trading as a legitimate strategy to meet theKyoto target. Emissions trading was reramed rom anillegitimate attempt to shirk responsibilities to reducedomestic emissions into the best option to salvage theKyoto Protocol without American participation. (Cass,2005).

9. See Suzuki Foundation, Risky Business: How Canadais Avoiding Kyoto Action with Controversial Projects in

Developing Countries (Vancouver, October, 2003).10. This is reerred to as norm entrapment in the

regime literature (Risse, 2000). On the need to movetoward serious discussions o adaptation, see Bell (2006).

11. See the relevant website at CIDA, available at

http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cida_in. Subsequent statisticsin this paragraph were taken rom this source.

12. The pine beetle has swept across BritishColumbia and scientists ear it will cross the RockyMountains and sweep across the northern continentinto areas where it used to be killed by severe cold U.S. Forest Service ocials say they are watchingwarily as the outbreak has spread. The United Statesis less vulnerable because it lacks the seamless oresto lodgepole pines that are a highway or the beetle inCanada. By the time we hear more about the beetlehighway, it may be too late to recover. Quotes romDoug Struck in an article written or the Washington

Postand reprinted in The Montreal Gazette, Our ForestsAre a Feast, March 5, 2006, p. A10.

13. The latter involves the United States, Australia,India, Japan, China, and South Korea, and seeks waysto develop innovative technologies to reduce emissionsrather than to set str ict targets or emission reductions.

notes

ReFeRenCes


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Hughes, Lesley. 2000. Biological Consequences oGlobal Warming: Is the Signal Apparent Already? Trendsin Ecology and Evolution 15:56-61.

Iverson, Louis, et. al. 2004. How Fast and Far MightTree Species Migrate in the Eastern U.S. Due to ClimateChange? Global Ecology and Biogeography 13:209-219.

Kettner, C., A. Tuerk, and B. Schlamadinger. 2006.Reaching Kyoto Targets: Does Population ChangeMatter? Joanneum Research, Graz, Austria. Accessedonline at http://www.joanneum.at/climate.

Kolar, Christopher, and David Lodge. 2000.Freshwater Nonindigenous Species: Interactions withOther Global Changes. In H. Mooney and R. Hobbs,Invasive Species in a Changing World. Washington, D.C.:Island Press: 3-30.

Lipschutz, Ronnie. 1994. Bioregional Politics and

Local Organization in Policy Responses to GlobalClimate Change. In Global Climate Change and PublicPolicy, D. Feldman, (ed.). Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 102-122.

Macdonald, Douglas, and Heather A. Smith. 1999-2000. Promises Made, Promise Broken: QuestioningCanadas Commitments to Climate Change, InternationalJournalLV, 1, (Winter). 55:1, 107-124.

Paehlke, Robert. 2001. Spatial Proportionality: Right-Sizing Environmental Decision-Making. In Governingthe Environment: Persistent Challenges, Uncertain Innovations.Toronto: University o Toronto Press), 73-124.

Parson, Edward. 2001. Persistent Challenges, UncertainInnovations: A Synthesis. In Governing the Environment:

Persistent Challenges, Uncertain Innovations. E. Parson, ed.Toronto: University o Toronto Press), 345-380.

Paterson, Matthew. 2001. Climate Change asAccumulation Strategy: The Failure o COP6and Emerging Trends in Climate Politics. GlobalEnvironmental Politics 1(2): 10-17.

Pielke, Roger. 1998. Rethinking the Role oAdaptation in Climate Policy. Global EnvironmentalChange8(2): 159-70.

Price-Smith, Andrew. 2002. The Health o Nations:Inectious Disease, Environmental Change, and Their Eects on

National Security and Development. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Risse, Thomas. 2000. Lets Argue! CommunicativeAction in World Politics. International Organization54(1):1-39.

Selin, Henrik, and Stacy VanDeveer. 2006. Canadian-U.S. Cooperation: Regional Climate Change Actionin the Northeast. Forthcoming in Bilateral Ecopolitics:Continuity and Change in Canadian-American Environmental

Relations. P. LePrestre and P. Stoett (eds.). London:Ashgate.

Soroos, Marv. 2001. Global Climate Change andthe Futility o the Kyoto Process. Global EnvironmentalPolitics 1(2):1-9.

Sutherst, Robert. 2000. Climate Change and InvasiveSpecies: A Conceptual Framework. In Invasive Species

in a Changing World. A. Mooney and R. Hobbs (eds.)Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 211-240.

Peter Stett (Ph.D., Queens, 1994) is associate proessor and chair o the Department o Political Science at

Concordia University in Montreal, Canada. He specializes in global environmental and human security issues, including

Canadian environmental governance. Recent publications include (ed.) International Ecopolitical Theory: Critical Refections

(UBC Press, orthcoming), (ed.) Bilateral Ecopolitics: Canadian-American Environmental Relations (Ashgate, orthcoming),

Canada and Sustainable Development: National and International Perspectives (Broadview, 2001), and Human and Global

Security: An Exploration o Themes (University o Toronto Press, 2000). He is currently writing a book on global biosecu-

rity issues. He can be contacted at [email protected].


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1

Scon Gnation

Cimat Poicis in

th unit Stats:

Poifation,

diffsion, anrgionaization

barry G. rabe

More than teen years ater signing the Rio Declaration on

Environment and Development and nearly a decade ater

its signing o the Kyoto Protocol, the U.S. ederal govern-

ment has maintained its posture o disengagement rom climate policy.

Congress rejected a series o legislative proposals in 2005 that would

have established modest targets or containing the growth o green-

house gas emissions rom major sources. Even Congressional passage o

one o these bills would likely have been blocked by a presidential veto.

At about the same time, President George Bush rejected strong pres-

sures to accept some new greenhouse gas initiatives as the G-8 group

o developed nations gave new attention to climate change.

This amiliar tale, however, ails to provide a complete picture

o the evolving U.S. engagement in climate policy. Indeed, at the

very time ederal institutions continued to thrash about on this issue,

major new initiatives were launched, with bipartisan support, in such

diverse state capitals as Sacramento (Cali.), Carson City (Nev.), Santa

Fe (N.M.), Austin (Tex.), Harrisburg (Penn.), Albany (N.Y.), and

Hartord (Conn.). By the middle o the current decade, more thanhal o the U.S. states could be airly character ized as actively involved

in climate change policy, with one or more policies that promised

to signicantly reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. Virtually all

states were beginning to at least study the issue and explore very

modest remedies. A growing number o thesesuch as Caliornia,

Connecticut, New Jersey, and New Yorkwere every bit as engaged

on multiple policy ronts as counterparts in European capitals and

ar more active than all Canadian provinces except Manitoba. These

programs are beginning to have some eect on stabilizing emissions

rom their jurisdictions. Indeed, many states are major sources o

greenhouse gas emissions, and thus state programs oer considerablepotential or reducing emissions. I the ty states were to secede and

become sovereign nations, thirteen would rank among the worlds

top orty nations in emissions, led by Texas in seventh place ahead o

the United Kingdom (Rabe, 2004).

There are, o course, proound limitations on what states, acting indi-

vidually or collectively, can do to reverse the steady growth o American

greenhouse gas releases o recent decades. States ace enormous consti-

tutional constraints, including prohibitions against the negotiation o

international treaties and restrictions on commercial transactions that

cross state boundaries. This paper will consider the historic role o U.S.

states in national policy development and particular drivers that seem

pivotal in the case o climate change. It will also examine the evolution

o state climate policy, with particular attention to new trends that have

emerged in the past ew years. Finally, we will consider possible limita-

tions acing state-driven policy and opportunities or these state-level

developments to continue to expand and ultimately dene a unique

U.S. response to this enormous policy challenge.


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Many accounts o U.S. public policy are written as i

the United States operated as a unitary system, whereby

all innovations and initiatives emanate rom the ederal

government. A more nuanced view o U.S. ederal-

ism indicates that states have oten served a ar more

expansive and visionary role. The potential or early and

active state engagement on policy issues has intensied

in recent decades, as the capacity o most state govern-

ments has grown markedly. This has led in many instances

to dramatic increases in state revenue and expansion o

state agencies with considerable oversight in all areas

relevant to greenhouse gases, including environmental

protection, energy, transportation, and natural resources.

Even in areas with signicant ederal policy oversight,

states have become increasingly active and, in some

cases, airly autonomous in interpretation, implementa-tion, and innovation.

Extending such resources and powers into the realm

o climate change is a airly incremental step in some

instances, such as electricity regulation, where state gov-

ernments have been dominant or decades. But the bur-

geoning state role must be seen as not merely an exten-

sion o existing authority but rather a new movement

o sorts driven by a set o actors distinct to the issue o

climate change. These actors have proven increasingly

infuential in a wide range o jurisdictions, overcoming

inherent opposition and building generally broad andbipartisan coalitions or action. In some jurisdictions,

this dynamic has advanced so ar that one o the great-

est conficts in climate policy innovation is determining

which political leaders get to claim credit or taking

early steps. The ollowing actors appear to be pivotal

drivers behind action in numerous states.

Ciate Ipact

Contrary to the rather acrimonious interpretations o

climate science in national policy circles, individual states

have begun to eel the impact o climate change in more

immediate ways. These impacts dier by jurisdiction but

are oten buttressed by state-based researchers working

cooperatively with state regulatory agencies in attempt-

ing to discern localized indicators o climate impact.

Among coastal states, or example, concern is oten

concentrated on the impact o rising sea level, particu-

larly given the substantial economic development along

many shores at relatively low sea level in the United

States. This dynamic has infuenced state governments

rom Honolulu (Hawaii) to Trenton (N.J.). No two

states have aced identical experiences, but a common

theme suggests that individual states and regions have

begun to ace direct impacts, thereby taking the climate

change policy debate rom an acrimonious battle over

graphs and charts toward something that touches real

lie experience and legitimizes a policy response.

Ecnic Devepent

Virtually all states that have responded to the challenge

o climate change have done so through methods that

they deem likely to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and

simultaneously oster economic development. Active

state promotion o renewable energy, through a combi-

nation o mandates and nancial incentive programs, has

ocused upon development o home grown sources

o electricity that promise to both stabilize local energy

supply and promote signicant new job opportunities

or state residents. Many states with active economic

development programs have concluded that investment

in the technologies and skills needed in a less-carbonized

society in coming decades is a sound bet. In response,

they have advanced many policy initiatives in large part

in anticipation o economic benets. Even some states

with substantial sectors that generate massive amounts

o greenhouse gases, such as coal-intensive Pennsylvania,

Vitay a stats that hav

spon to th chang

of cimat chang hav on

so thogh mthos that

thy m iky to c

gnhos gas missions

bt simtanosy fost

conomic vopmnt.

BottoM-up polICy


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1

have begun to shit their thinking toward the opportu-

nities or longer-term economic development presented

by investment in renewable energy.

Agenc Advcac

Many states worked intensively in recent decades to

build in-house capacity on the environment, energy,

and other areas that now have direct relevance to cli-

mate change. Consequently, state agencies have proven

increasingly ertile areas or policy entrepreneurs to

develop ideas that are tailored to their states needs and

opportunities. These ideas can then be translated into

legislation, executive orders, and pilot programs. State

ocials also have proven eective in orming coalitions,

oten cutting across partisan lines in the legislature and

engaging supportive interest groups where easible

(Rabe, 2004; Mintrom, 2000). No two states have assem-

bled identical climate policy constituencies, nor have

any devised identical policies. But state agencies have

been signicant drivers behind innovation, whether in

the stages o developing policy ideas or seeing them

through to policy ormation. In more recent years, state-

based environmental advocacy groups and private rms

that might benet nancially rom climate policy have

become increasingly visible and active in bringing about

ar-reaching initiatives. This has created broader sup-

portive coalitions or new policy development, although

some schisms have begun to emerge, such as between

competing providers o renewable energy (Rabe and

Mundo, 2007).

enteRInG tHe seCond GeneRatIon oF state ClIMate polICIes

The sheer volume and variety o state climate initia-

tives is staggering, hard to measure with precision, and

subject to expansion. Much policy analysis has been so

heavily ocused on ederal or international-level actions

that state or other sub-national policies have received

markedly less attention. This paper draws rom ongoing

renement o climate policy proles or all 50 states,

representing a confuence o interviews, government

documents and reports, and legislative histories, as well

as sector-specic data acquired rom state-based pro-essional associations. These sources help distill current

developments and highlight emerging trends in a sec-

ond generation o state climate policy.

Cntining Prieratin

Perhaps the most evident trend in state policy engage-

ment on climate change is that the number o states

involved as well as aggregate number and range o poli-

cies continues to expand on a monthly basis. As o mid-

2006, this trend showed no signs o slowing; it may in act

be accelerating. More than hal o the states have enactedat least one piece o climate legislation or passed at least

one executive order that sets ormal requirements or

reducing greenhouse gases; 18 states have passed mul-

tiple laws designed to achieve such reductions. Forty-

seven have completed greenhouse gas inventories and

22 have set orth action plans to guide uture policy. In

six cases, states have ormally established statewide com-

mitments to reduce production o greenhouse gases over

uture years and decades, linked to policies designed to

attain these reduction pledges. Renewable energy, dis-

cussed urther below, has been a particularly popular

area o engagement, with 22 states enacting so-called

renewable portolio standards (RPS) that mandate a

ormal increase in the amount o electricity distributed

in a state that must be generated rom renewable sources.

Fiteen states have established their own version o car-

bon taxes, through so-called social benet charges that

allocate their revenues to renewable energy develop-ment or energy eciency projects. In transportation, 10

states have agreed to ollow Caliornia in establishing

the worlds rst carbon dioxide emissions standards or

vehicles and 12 states are engaged in some orm o cap-

ping carbon emissions rom electrical utilities.

Alongside the sheer magnitude o state policies, these

eorts are generally becoming more rigorous in terms

o the levels o emission reductions that they are seeking.

There has been a gradual shit in state policy over the

past decade, with voluntary initiatives increasingly sup-

planted with regulatory eorts. Most o these policiesretain considerable fexibility in terms o compliance,

consistent with the credit-trading mechanisms popular

among most nations that have ratied Kyoto. But their

rigor is steadily increasing, along with the likely impact

on greenhouse gases i aithully implemented. In turn,

states continue to have multiple motivations or pursuing

these respective policies but are becoming increasingly

explicit and orceul in articulating the climate benets,


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0

among others. This runs somewhat contrary to earlier

practice, whereby many states were aware o potential

climate impact but said little i anything about this ele-

ment o a proposed policy. This newer pattern is particu-

larly evident among current and recent state governors

with prominent national proles, some with aspirations

or higher oce, such as Arnold Schwarzenegger o

Caliornia, other Republicans such as George Pataki o

New York and Mitt Romney o Massachusetts and such

Democrats as Bill Richardson o New Mexico and Tom

Vilsack o Iowa. Indeed, it is possible to envision presi-

dential primaries, in 2008 or 2012, where multiple can-

didates may emanate rom statehouses rom which they

can claim more constructive climate policy engagement

than any o their recent presidential predecessors.

Disin acrss the States

Much o the existing inrastructure o state climate pro-grams has been individually tailored to the needs o a

particular state. However, there is increasing evidence

that some policies enacted in one state ultimately are

being replicated in one or more additional states. There

is, in act, precedent in other policy arenas or such pol-

icy diusion to spread across the nation and become, in

eect,de acto national policy. Under such circumstances,

it may be possible or the states to simply negotiate inter-

state dierences and implement these inter-related pro-

grams. There may also be some tipping point at which

diusion reaches sucient numbers o states that the

ederal government concludes that it should respond by

drawing rom these state models and establishing some

version o this on a national basis.

There are several areas in which climate policy enact-

ment in one jurisdiction has already been duplicated

elsewhere. The policy tool that appears to be diusing

most rapidly is the RPS, which was operational in 22

states as o mid-2006. The rst RPS was enacted in 1991

in Iowa, with little i any attention to greenhouse gas

impacts. Subsequently, the pace o adoption has intensi-

ed, with our new RPS programs approved in 2005 and

three existing ones signicantly expanded during that

period. Collectively, these policies are projected to add

26,000 megawatts o renewable electricity by 2015.Particular RPS eatures vary by state but all such

programs mandate a certain increase over time in the

level o renewable energy that must be provided by all

electricity providers in a state. For example, the State o

Nevada passed legislation in June 2005 that will require

that states utilities to gradually increase their supply

o renewable energy, ultimately reaching 20 percent

by 2015. This legislation passed with unanimous sup-

port in both legislative chambers and was endorsed by

Republican Governor Kenny Guinn. It built on a set

o earlier laws, each expanding the states promotion orenewable energy. Nevada, like virtually every other state

that has enacted an RPS, provides regulated utilities con-

siderable fexibility in nding ways to meet renewable

mandates through so-called renewable energy credit

programs that unction much like other market-based

programs and promise to reduce compliance costs.

RPS programs appear likely to continue to diuse

in coming years, refecting recent legislative enactments

and the continuing exploration o this approach as a

policy option in a number o other state legislatures. In

turn, several states with established RPSs, such as Texas,

have ound them so successul in terms o their ability

to add renewable energy at reasonable costs, that they

are looking actively to increase the bar, building on the

exponential rate o renewable energy growth o recent

years with a substantial increase in uture mandate lev-

els (Texas PUC 2005). Ironically, this U.S. state pattern

coincides closely with the experience o the European

Union, where a growing number o nationsincluding

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Denmark, Sweden, and the United Kingdomhave

adopted their own RPSs as central components o their

plans or meeting greenhouse gas reduction obligations

(Rowlands, 2004). One growing challenge as RPSs pro-

lierate will be dierential state requirements, ranging

rom varied denitions o what constitutes renewable

energy to state eorts to maximize generation o in-

state renewable sources or economic development rea-

sons. The ormer issue poses challenges or renewable

energy market development in areas where generators

serve multiple states whereas the latter raises questions

o state adherence to the Commerce Clause o the U.S.

Constitution (Rabe, 2006).

Reginais: Between Natin and State

There is also ample precedent in U.S. ederalism or states

to work cooperatively on common concerns and, in

some instances, ormalize regional approaches involvingtwo or more states (Zimmerman, 2002). Some regional

strategies take a permanent structure, such as interstate

compacts, which involve a ormal agreement ratied by

participating states and ultimately Congress. These have

been used extensively among states that share respon-

sibility or an ecosystem or common boundary. Other

strategies may entail establishing multi-state organiza-

tions or commissions to acilitate ongoing negotiation

over particular issues or less ormal agreements outlining

reciprocal policy commitments.

As state climate policies prolierate and diuse, itis entirely possible that certain clusters o states may

become regions in practice even in the absence o ormal

agreements. All southwestern states between Caliornia

and Texas, or example, have an RPS. It is increasingly

possible to envision inter-state trading o renewable

energy credits and other orms o cooperation that link

these state programs. But more ormal regional arrange-

ments are also under consideration, perhaps most nota-

ble among northeastern states, where relatively small

physical size and heavy population oster considerable

economic and environmental interdependence. States in

this region have a strong tradition o working together,

whether campaigning or ederal air emission standards

to deter acid rain or common regional standards negoti-

ated with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agencys

New England oce.

For more than three decades, New Englands gover-

nors have urther ormalized this partnership through

an organization that links them in cooperative ventures

with the ve eastern provinces o Canada. The respec-

tive premiers and governors meet annually, with envi-

ronmental and energy concerns oten paramount. In

2001, the leaders o these jurisdictions, representing ve

dierent political parties, agreed to common green-

house gas reduction goals, reaching at least 10 percent

below 1990 levels by 2020, ollowed by more signicant

reductions thereater (Selin and VanDeveer, this volume).

These goals are not ormally binding, even in Canada,

which has been bound by Kyoto ater its 2002 ratica-

tion o the Protocol. But they have triggered exploration

o common strategies and prodded some jurisdictions,

particularly participating states, to take more aggressive

steps on climate policy than ever beore.

Perhaps the most vibrant regional initiative that

involves U.S. states is the so-called Regional Greenhouse

Gas Initiative. RGGI was launched in 2003, when New

York Governor Pataki invited his counterparts rom10 neighboring states and Washington, D.C.s mayor to

explore the possibilities o establishing a regional cap-

and-trade program or reducing carbon dioxide emissions

rom all ossil uel-burning power plants located within

the region. At this point, states such as Massachusetts and

New Hampshire had already taken ormal action to cap

greenhouse gas emissions rom their own coal-burn-

ing plants and similar steps were under consideration

elsewhere. New York completed a multi-year review

to conront climate change, which included a number

o renewable energy initiatives and a pledge to reduceemissions ve percent below 1990 levels by 2010 and

10 percent below 1990 levels by 2020. But state policy

analysts concluded that a regional approach to cap-and-

trade would be more cost-eective given the strong

inter-state linkages in regional electricity distribution.

New York reached agreement in December 2005

with six other states (Connecticut, Delaware, Maine,

New Hampshire, New Jersey, andVermont) on a regional

cap-and-trade program. Maryland joined RGGI in

2006, Massachusetts and Rhode Island were active in

negotiations but have decided or now not to join, and

Pennsylvania, Washington, D.C., and the province o

New Brunswick continue as ormal observers and may

ultimately decide to join the initiative. Development

o a model rule addressing all key provisions continues

through 2006, with the goal o ormally launching the

cap-and-trade program in January 2009. RGGI would

cap regional emissions at 2009 levels through 2014, and

then reduce these 10 percent below that level by 2018.


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The RGGI process emulates some o the ramework

or interstate coordination in reducing nitrogen oxides

emissions in the northeastern Ozone Transport Region,

but entails exclusively a negotiation among states with-

out any input rom ederal ocials. Consequently,

a major RGGI goal is to establish and implement a

regional carbon emissions cap while accommodat-

ing, to the extent easible, the diversity in policies and

programs in individual states (RGGI, 2005). In that

regard, RGGI bears a rather signicant resemblance

to Europes Emissions Trading System (ETS) that was

launched in February 2005 and has triggered inormal

contacts between state ocials and representatives o the

European Commission and European member states

(Kruger and Pizer, 2005).

Yet another variant o a multi-state approach involves

an extension o regionalism to include states that are

not necessarily contiguous with one another. Underederal air pollution legislation, or example, Caliornia

enjoys unique status that it can parlay to establish a net-

work o states with regulatory standards more stringent

than those o the ederal government. Congress con-

cluded in the 1970s that Caliornia was so ar ahead

o the ederal government in conronting air emissions

that it could take any emerging ederal air standard as a

minimum rom which it could establish its own regula-

tions. The remaining states would then be ree to adhere

to ederal standards or join orces with Caliornia, oten

unleashing upward bidding in air policy.Caliornia chose in 2002 to revisit those powers,

becoming the rst Western government to mandate car-

bon dioxide caps or motor vehicles. This took the orm o

legislation, signed by ormer Democratic Governor Gray

Davis that went to considerable lengths to characterize

carbon dioxide as an air pollutant and thereore a natural

extension o its regulatory powers. The state has contin-

ued to assert that this does not encroach on uel economy

standards, which clearly remain under ederal control.

Since enactment, the Caliornia Air Resources Board has

moved toward implementation, which is scheduled to go

into eect later in the current decade and could achieve

reductions o up to 30 percent in vehicle emissions in

uture feets. This legislation has been a cornerstone o

a larger Caliornia eort on climate change, which has

resulted in some o the lowest per capita emission rates

o any state and relatively modest emission growth since

1990 (Brown, 2005). In act, under Republican Governor

Schwarzenegger, the state has only intensied its eorts

on climate, leading to his June 2005 executive order that

vowed to return Caliornia to 2000 emission levels by

2010, ollowed by a return to 1990 levels by 2020 and

reductions that are 80 percent below current levels by

2050 (Farrell, this volume).

These steps have already had eects beyond state

boundaries. Within two weeks o the Schwarzenegger

executive order, New Mexicos Richardson proposed

comparable reductions through his own executive

order authority. Perhaps more important, 10 states have

ormally approved the Caliornia vehicle standards

or carbon. These include the States o Oregon and

Washington and eight Northeastern states, with deci-

sions pending in additional states. This creates the very

real possibility o two separate regional standards or

vehicular emissions, including the coastal strategy

(involving Caliornia and collaborating East and West

Coast states) alongside the central states. Litigationrom automobile manuacturers and the Bush admin-

istration will ensue, based on alleged state encroach-

ment on ederal terrain. Nonetheless, this additional

re-denition o regionalism illustrates the array o pos-

sibilities whereby multiple states might begin to pool

their eorts and work collaboratively.

Direct Decrac: Taking It t the Pepe

Direct democracy has been an alternative route or

policymaking in more than 30 states or nearly a cen-

tury, refecting its origins in the populist and progressivemovements. But its use in the state context has grown

at an exponential rate over the past two decades, par-

ticularly in the controversial arenas o environmental

and energy policy (Guber, 2003). Indeed, state consti-

tutions impose ew i any restrictions on the kinds o

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policy questions that can be addressed through direct

democracy and a number o states, such as Caliornia

and Oregon, make extensive use o this provision.

In November 2004, state climate policy moved rom

the exclusive realm o representative institutions into the

arena o ballot propositions. Colorado voters, by a 54-to-

46 margin, approved Proposition 37, which established

an RPS or that state. This initiative set orth an ambi-

tious target or steadily increasing the level o electricity

in the state derived rom renewable sources rom its cur-

rent level o approximately two percent to 10 percent

by 2015.

global warming: the state of play - canada

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