german submarine activities on the atlantic coast of the united states and canada

8/14/2019 GERMAN SUBMARINE ACTIVITIES ON THE ATLANTIC COAST OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA

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NAVY DEPARTMENTOFFICE OF NAVAL RECORDS AND LIBRARY

HISTORICAL SECTION

Publication Number 1

GERMAN SUBMARINE ACTIVITIES ON

THE ATLANTIC COAST OF THE

UNITED STATES AND CANADA

Published under the direction of

The Hon. JOSEPHUS DANIELS, Secretary of the Navy



ERRATA

P ago 5 0 , " C r p is o of U -1 56 " 1 s t p a r a g ra p h .,iico o u t von 01don"burg a n d s u b s t i t u t e R i c h

ard P o l d t ePage 3 8 1 p a r a g r a p h 2 , l i n o 5 : c h an g e J . A .

F cs jso t t * r o a d Thomas D . P a c k a r d .iPago 1 0 4 , p a r a g r a p h 5 , l i n o 9 : change t o

raa'cL ono man w a s m o r t a l l y w o un do d.



&?

GERMAN SUBMARINE ACTIVITIES ON THE ATLANTIC COASTOF THE UNITEP STATES AND CANAJ3A

Publication No. 1, Historical Section, Navy Department

ERRATA

Page7, ia ta bleb otto m of page, in f if th column, l ines6artd 7, 'str ike out wbrds"a bo ut Nov. 1 5 " and-. inser t Sept. 22. I n l ine 12, str ik e o u t " 1 5 "and insert a.£.

Page 22, line 39 , s t rike ou t "S t r a thm ore " and inse r t " Strathdene."Page 23 ,l ine 10,s t r ike out " Ka pi tanVan No st i t izund Janekendorf ' ' and inser t

Korvettenkapitdn (Lieutenant. Com mander) von Nostitz und Jaenckendorf.

Page24,afterline15,insert Note: The British steam ship " Crenella *' was formerlythe Canadian steamship " Mbn tcalm." The'two names were confused in the dispatches and consequently the discrepancy.

0,after line14,insert Note: While it would have been possible for" U^-151"to have been in the vicinity of the battleships o n June 1, it is impro bable that theattack of the battleships was on that submarine. The prisoners from the u HattieDunn,1' ".Hauppauge," and "Edna-' were not released ffom "U+ 151 ' < until June2, and they do not make any mention of the encounter and would most likely haveknown of it.

Page34,line37,strikeout 1"Un i t ed Sh ipp ing 'S tat es Board " a n d i n se rt United

States Shipping Board.' Page36,af ter l ine 5 inser t a newpa ragraph , v iz :•Thi loss of the "Texel" had a direct bearing upon the plan of operations for the

"United States Naval Railway Batteries in France." That ship was one of thosechosen to transport a cargo of material for that remarkable enterprise> and her'lossnecessitated the selection of another vessel.' P a g e 38, s t rike ou t l ines 11 to 26 (bo th inclus ive) and inse rt i n lieu the reofafter line''10j The oMd al list, made later, shows that 272 survivors, were landM atNew York, vi&:

Crew— 1 stewardess and 91 men; total 92.Passengers— 58 females, 118 males, and 4 infants; total 180.Other survivors from the "S. S. Carolina" were accounted for on June 4- At

} .45 p: m. lifeboat No. 5, containing 8 w omen akd 21 men , landed through the surfat the foot of South C arolina Avenue, A tlantic City, N. J. The same day the Britishsteamship " Appleby" picked up from lifeboat No. 1,9 mem bers of the crew a nd'10passengers and carried them to Lewes, Del. The first loss of life charged to enemysubmarine activity off the Am erican Atlantic eoast was recorded when the survivorsfrom lifeboat No. 1 were picked up by the steamship *' Appleby," and reported thatwhile trying to weather the rough sea that arose during the night their boat had capsized about 12.15 a. m., June 8, and it was later found that 7 passengers, the purser;and 5 mem bers of the crew were missing and were lost.



Page44,line22,after the word "w hale r" strikeout "Nicholson" and insert"A. M. Nicholson."

6, strike out footnote 14and insert The joint attack by the battleship"Sp0kCaroling" and, U..S* " $ ,C'. 23%'•' occyvKgl in hat. 08? 26' N., hong. 740

rlV. aria was tqo fa r north and west to have been on TJ—151'/' 'Besides Capta

Ballestad says in Ms'tistifmbny,'that from 6^20p.>m;,on!Tune 8, to 6.20 a. m., June9, his ship followed the submarine at a slow.,speed, without stopping, on a coureast, southeast, easterly, and they did not encounter the battleship.

Page50,afterline'29Insert Nofe: 12 lives Were lost on'the " Tttftuguero."Page55,line18,strikeout"Naus^|t"' a n d insert Nauset.Page 56,line 24,strike out "Gran d Island " and insert Grand MananIsland.Page56,line29,strikeout"GrandIsland"andinsert? Gfand ManahIsland.Page59,infootnote 29,.strikeou t "E liz ab eth V on Bi lgi e''aridinsert Elizabeth

Van Belgie.'Page71,lime 8;strikeOut'<Melitia"and insert Melita.Page 88,after line 6insert-Note: There wa» no loss>vf'life on the, two?fishin

vessels, "Cruiser" and "Old Time." All reached shdre in safety-.Page 91,line23,strikeout^tampion"andinsert tompion.Page94,line13,strikeout "Brazilian"andinsert American.Page95,line4,strikeoutwords"T he dayaft er" and!Msert Two days after.Page 96,line 44,after the word '^longitude" (line 43) strikeout ' ' 5 8 ° " and

insert 68°.Page..101,after:line40insert newparagraph, viz: On September 7; 1918, at

•8.80 a. m.., the Portuguese sailing vessel "Sophia" was sunk with bombs by "U-15in latitude 42° 51' N., longitude 45° 58' W.

Page105,line38,strikeout"October19"andinsert October 18.

Page106,line3,after thewordN ovemberstrikeoutthewords"1 5four" andinsert 14 three, line 11,after the word "Oonstanza" insert Note: The BritishAdmiralty give the name as "Constance," 199 gross tons. The vessel'wassalvageline33,strikeout"237"andinsert 239.

Page118,line 33,strikeout"August'.'andinsertOctober.Page124,line34,strikeout"August"andinsert September,Page 127, after line 13,insert Note:, The exact location] of the sinking of the

U.8.S. "San Diego" was latitude.40° 38' 15" N., longitude 78° 0V 20" W.Page 133,line 14,after the words Norwegian S. S.strike out "Bre iford" and

insertBreifond;alsoinline16,samecorrection.

Page133,afterparagraph 6insertnewparagraph,viz:Besides the three rescued by the"Breifond" five other men, including one deadwere picked up by the American steamship," Lake Felicity" and taken to Newport,R. I. Thefivemen clung to pieces of the pilot house, on which they remained for 1hours., One died after 9 hours of exposure. A total of SO liDes waslost, includithis man.

Page134,line9,strikeoutthewords •"The crewof 11mencameinthe inletwith the captain in one of their ownboats ; ,the balanceof the crewlanded onNorthBeach,CoastGuardStation 112,''andinsertinlieu thereof: Of the crew,consisting of 29 men, the captain and 11 men came in the inlet in one of their ownboats and landed at Coast Guard Station 112. Another boat with 11 men landed



Page140, inTable No. 1,column 1,after ".Gamp (Portuguese)" ^insert new-line,vis?: "Sophia" (Portuguese)...^.do 16S,B^^-.-^Sept. 7. 42°51'N,,48?58'W.

Page157,line27,secondcolumn,strike out"Brieford" andinsertBrelfond.Page>160,line51,.strike out"Brazilian.'' and insert Am erican* , (

Page162, infirstcolumn,afterline33,insert: "Sophia" Portuguese S.V.101.

CORRECTIONS CHART NO, 1

CHART TRACK OF; " u - l S l "

• M&.y, Ig (S. S. Nyanza), ,Insertsignshowingvesselattacked but notsunk inla|itude38621' N.,longitude70° 05' W.

IStay 21(S.S. trenella). Changesigntoindicatevesselattacked but notsunk.f June 13, (Llanstephen Castle). Latitu de 38° 02' N.,longitude 72° 47' W.

Changesign toindicatevesselattackedDut notsunk.'June 18 (S. S. Dwinsk). L atitude 38° 30' N.,longitude 61° 15' W. Should

havesignindicatingvesselsunk.CHART TRACK OF "XJ-156"

"July23"(schooner Robert and Riphard). 60 Inilessoutheast of.CapePorpoise.ShWdbeJuly 22.' ;

August 8 (S. S. Sydland). Insert signshowingvesselsunk inlatitude41° 30'N.,longitude65° 22' W.

NOTE.—Signindicatingvesselsunk onAugust 8, oncharttrack of "U-117"should be ontrack of U-156.

August 20 (Triumph and fishing fleet). 52milessouthwest of Cape Canso,

NovaScotia,approximatelylatitude 44°31'N.,longitude 60°30'W. Changesigntoindicatevesselssunk."August 22" (Notre Dame dela Garde). Latitude 45° 32' N.,longitude 58°

57' W. Should be August21.August27(nearCapeCanso,NovaScotia). Strike outsig»indicating vessel

sunk.CHART TRACK OP " tX-140"

"July 19" (U. S. S. Harrisburg). Latitude 45° 33' N.,longitude 41° W.Should be July14.

"July 19" (S. S. Joseph Cudahy). L atitude 41° 15' N.,longitude 52° 18' W.

Should be July18.July 26 (S. S. British M ajor). Approximately latitude 38° 42' N.,longitude60° 58' W. Changesign toindicatevesselattacked but notsunk.

July 30 (S. S. Kermanshah). Latitude 38° 24' N.,longitude 68° 41' W.Changesign toindicatevesselattacked but notsunk.

August 10 (U. S. S. Stringham). L atitude 35° 51' N.,longitude 73° 21' W.Changesign to indicatevesselattacked but notsunk.

August 13 (U. S. S. Pastores). Lati tude 35° 30' N.,longitude 69° 43' W.Changesign toindicatevesselattacked but notsunk.

"September 7" (S. S.War Ranee), la ti tu de 51° 27' N.,longitude 33° 24'W. Should be September 5 , andsignchanged toindicatevesselattacked but not



August 15 (rhdtfcr'v esse l ' Madrugaifa,') .•'< Latitude<87® 50 ' N;, longi tude1 74°

56 W. Change s i$n to i nd ica t eVessel sunk* ' "*•> ••<- " '••'•>

" Au g u s t 2 2 " (S. S. Algeria). L a t i tu d e 40° 30' N., l on g it ud e 6 8 * 3 5 ' W,S h o u l d b e A u g u s t s * . .• <•/••-• .• : i : - - . - • . •

:- . ' . .;: ' . ? . . . , - » » . . T V - ; i ^ M - . -.-^

"August 2 5" (schooner Bianco). Latitu de 43° 13' N:.fongitude61° 0 5" W .Should be'August 4.

CHART *RACi: Of U -I S S '

"August 28" (S. S. Montoso). Lat itude 40° 19' N.,longitude 32° 18' W.Shoujdbe August | 7 , . , , •

"September 1 1 "(S. S. Leixoes). Latitude 42° 45/ N., lopgitude 57° 37' W.Shouldbe September 12,?indsignindicating.vesselsunkshouldhemovedeast"tolatitude42°45'N.,longitude51°37' '$,•'•

October 17(S. S. Lucia). ...Insert sign indicating vesselsunk inlatitude 38°05 N, ,longitude50° ,5tQ W,

CHART TRACK OF u - I 5 2

October 16. S trike outsigh indicating vessel sunk, approximately latitude38° 05' N.,JioQg tudse5p° 50' W,

"October 18" (S. S. Briarleaf). L atitude 36° 05'N.,'longitude 49°. i ^ W«Should be October17.

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THE UNITED STATESNAVY'SFIRST U-BOAT CAPTURE.

German U-58capturedbytheUnitedStatesdestroyersU.S.S.FanningandU.S.S.Nicholson.



NAVY DEPARTMENTOFFICE OF NAVALRECORDSAND LIBRARY

HISTORICAL SECTION

Publication Number

GERMAN SUBMARINE ACTIVITIES ON

THE ATLANTIC COAST OF THE

UNITED STATES AND CANADA

Published under thedirection of

The Hon.JOSEPHUS DANIELS,Secretary ofthe Navy



LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.

TheUnited StatesNav y's f irst U-boat capture, GermanU-58captured by theUnited StatesdestroyersU. S. S.Fanningand U. S.S.Nic holso n. . . Frontispiece.

Facingpage—

The Deutschland "M ercantile Subm arine" 16

Theinterior ofaGermansubmarine showingits instrume nts and high-powered

Photographiccopyofthe receiptgiven tothe master ofthe Americanschooner

AGerman submarine lying near a ship which has just been boarded by the

Receipt given to them aster of the Norwegian S. S. SanJoseby J. Knoeckel,

Receipt g iven to the master of the Swedish S . S . Sydland, by J . Knoeckel ,

German U-117 anchored a t Wash ington, D . C , after the war. Used in the

German U-155 (ex-Deutschland) after surrender anchored within the shadow

Motorboatarrivingalongsidethe U. S.S. Fairfax with aloadofsurvivors from

The Deutschland a t Baltimore, Md. (Twoprints) 16The Deutschland a t Baltimore, Md 16The Deutschland a t New London, Conn 16The Deutschland leaving forGermany 16OvermanU -5 3 at N ew port R . I . U . S . S. B irm ingham in t he background 16GermanU-151at sea. Takenfromthedeckof theAmericanS.S.PinardelRi o. 16GermanU-151at sea , from the Spanishpassenger s teamer I sabelde Bourbon. . 16

engines 32

H auppauge by K orvettenkapitan v . Nostitz 32Time fuse used on the American schooner E dna by U-151 32D epth charge exploding 32German submarine a t sea 48

subm arine'smen 48Smoke-screen defense 48

Waronhospital ships 48

O berleutnant U-156 60

O berleutnant U-156 61American steam ship O. B . Jennings after her fire 80

Victory loan campaign 80German U-boat showing saw-teeth on the bow used for cutting nets 80Sinking ofAmerican S. S. Frederick R . Kellogg 80

German U-155 (ex-Deutschland) asawar ship 96Largegunmounted onU-155 (ex-Deutschland) 96

ofthe famous Tower Bridge, London 96U-155 (ex-Deutschland) after the war in the Thamesnear London 96Survivors of the U . S. A. 0 . T . Lucia leaving the ship 112

t h e U . S. A. C. T . Lucia 112U . S. S. Ticonderoga 112Type ofU-boat w hich operated in American waters 112Explosion of450pounds ofT . N .T 128



PREFACE.

Thepreparat ion of the data for this ar ticle has occupied the t ime

ofalargepa rt ofthepersonnel of theH istorical Section of the Na vyDep artment for several mo nths.I t has been a tt ended wi th great difficulties. The report s of the

s ightings of submarines have been wi thout number , and great care has been exercised to try to.corroborate or validate the reports, andall have been re jected which do no t answer such conditions as toaccuracy. I t is believed tobes tr ict ly accuratewith the information

•availableatthepresentt ime.T he two char ts accompanying t he repo rt, which were p repa red

through the kindness of the United States Hydrographic Office, arein tended to show as c learly as possib le the opera tions of the submar ines. OnChart No. 1 are printed the t racks of a ll the operatingvessels . OnChart No. 2 is shown the location of all the minefieldswiththenum berofminesintheareacovered andwhenandhowthe ywereremoved or destroyed.

The information received as to the number of mines in each areaand the reports of their destruction leave l i t tle or no doubt tha t theAtlantic coastisfree from any danger asto mines.

C. C. M A E SH ,

Captain, V. S. Navy (retired),Officer in Charge, Historical Section, Navy Department.

December 12, 1919.



GERM AN SUBM ARINE ACTIVITIES O N TH E ATLANTIC COAST

OF TH E UNITED STATES AN D CANADA.

FOREWORD.

In defining in this articlewh at should be considered asthe American A tla ntic coast, th e m erid ian 40° w est lo ngitud e is ad opteda rb itra rily to s epara te the submarine activ itie s on the E uropean coastfrom those ontheA merican coast.

I t is no t believed necessary to go into the discussion based onopinions or surmises during the early years of the war in Europe as

tow hether or not an a t tack by the Germans would bem ade on theAmericancoast. Therefore, theoperationshereindescribedarethosewhich actually tookplacein the year 1918,with adescription of thepreliminary cruises made by the DeutscMandand the TJ-53 in th eyear 1916.

Of course, i t must remain am atter , more or less , of conjecture asto what was actually the object of the cruises m ade by the Deutschlandin1916. Ap paren tlytheywerebothpu relycommercialvoyages.

The voyage of the TJ-53 assumesmore acharacter of a path-findingexpedition. T his vessel w as a strictly com bative vessel. I t isinteresting tonote th at onthe arrivaljof thisvessel at Newport, thecommanding officer s ta ted to the American submarine that he did no t need or want a p ilo t to ente r Newport, and tha t he wanted nosuppliesorprovisionsormaterialsofanykind.

I n o rder tokeep clear in the mind of the reader the date s andtracksof the several vessels , there is given here a condensed tableof arrivals and departures.

Table showing arrivals and departures of German submarines off United States Atlanticcoast or west of longitude 40°.

Arrivedof l At lant icNameor number . Left Germany. coast or longitude Left Atlant ic coast . Arr ived Germany.

W.40°.

D eutschland (1 s t ) . . Ju n e 14,1916 Ju l y 9,1916.. A ug. 1,1916.. A ug. 23 1916.U-53 A bout Sep t.20,1916 O ct. 7,1916.. Oct . 7 1916. Nov.1,1916.D e ut sc hl an d ( 2 d ) . . O ct . 10,1916 N o v . 1,1916. Nov.21,1916. Dec. 10 1916.U-151 A p r . 14,1918 May15,1918. July 1,1918.. . Aug.1,1918.U-156 AboutJune15,1918. July5,1918. . Sept . 1,1918.. S tru ck m in e i n

Nor t h Sea a bou t



8 GERMAN SUBMARINE ACTIVITIES ON ATLANTIC COAST.

The appended Chart No. 1 gives in deta il the cruises of a ll these vessels. T hese tr acks and all t he da ta accompanying them are in accordance wi th all the da ta ava ilable a t thi s t ime . I t is possib letha tfurther data in thefuture will possiblyrequire some corrections,

bu t them ainfacts are correct.There is , therefore , g iven in the following pages a brief account

of the commerc ia l cruises of the DeutscJdand and the pre liminary cruiseofthe TJ-53,andsomewhatatlength,thecruisesofallthesubmar ines that operated off theA merican coast . The cruise of TJ-189is shown on the char t, but not referred to in the text , as she nevergot west of longitude 30-50 and therefore doesno t properly belongin the opera tions of the submarines off the United S tates At lan ti ccoast.

STEPS TAKEN BY THE NAVY DEPARTMENT TO PROTECTSHIPPING ALONG ATLANTIC SEABOARD.

Anticipating such attack sfrom (German subm arines,the Nav yDepartm ent onFebruary 1,1918, appointed aspecialb oard tomakerecomm endations as to the me thodstobetaken to provide for "defenseagainst submarines in homewaters ." The repor t of the board, wi th certain a ltera tions, was approved by the Chief of Naval OperationsonM arch 6, 1918. (Note: Repor t in full of the specia l board, wi th a lt erat ions, will be found in the Appendix , page 143.) In accordance wi th the r ecommendations of th is board, the following s tepswere taken:

1. Submarines placed and ready to operate as soon as information received of enemy:Colon. New York.St. Thom as. LongIsland area.K ey W est. Boston.Galveston.1 Halifax.1

Chesapeake.

2. Shipping:(a ) Shipping should bekep t going with the least possible delay, at the same

time taking allpossibleoffensive measurestorem ovet he danger.(6) Approachroutesadopted forAtlantic seaboardforwestboundships.

NowinforceforNewY ork, Delaware, Chesapeake,and beingextended towholeseaboard,includingCaribbeanand Gulf.

(c) Convoy lanes adopted and in force for all eastbound shipping. Aircraft escort convoys to 50-fathom curve and as far as possible beyond unt i ldark. Thisescortisinadd ition tosubmarinechasersand destroyers.

(d ) Coasting t rade to hug the coast, keeping wi th in 5-fathom cu rve . Only



9TEPS TAKEN TO PROTECT SHIPPING.

S. War warnings:Vestedin Navy Departm ent exceptsuchasrequireimmediateactionandare

authentic. Warwarningsnot tobegiven unlesspresumedtobeauthentic. 4. District defense:

(a )Netsanddefensiveminefields;nooffensivemines.

(&)Airpatrol.(c) Listeningstationsonlightshipsand elsewhere. Submarine bellsstopped.(d ) Sweepingserviceatshippingpoints. (e) Lim ited escortoffshore bychasersandn ine destroyersretained forpurpose.(/) Patrol craft atfocal pointstoanswerrescuecalls.

5. Intelligence Section:Coastpatrolshave been organized and system ofcomm unicationsperfected to

obtain information ofe nem y.Secretservice has been expanded, particularly in Gulf and Caribbeanareas,

and Secret Serviceis intouch withB ritishservice.

6. W ireless:Allroute-givingofficersinEuropehavebeeninstructedtowarnallshippingapproachingAtlanticseaboardnottousewirelessforcommunicatinginstructions.

DISPATCHES FROM FORCE COMMANDER IN EUROPE.

The following dispatches from the force commander in Europe,a rranged ch ronologically , gave t he Navy Depar tmen t necessary information to preparefor andm eet the attacksw hich followed:

April 28, 1917.—W ithregard tosubmarines entering and leaving their bases, andtheir approximate whereabouts while operating, the Admiralty is able to maintain

information tha tisfairly exact.Ofth e thirty-four mine U-boats twofor somedays werenot located, and the Ad

miralty wasonthe poin tofinforming usofth ep robab ility ofthe irbe ingen routetothe Uni ted Sta tes when their whereabouts were discovered. I t is the Admiral ty 'sbelief now that atpresent nonearelikely tobesent overand that the present effortofthesubm arineswhichissuccessful willbek ep tup offth e Channelen trance.

April 11, 1918 (No.6352)(quoted inpart).— TheD epartm entwillbekep tsuppliedwith allinformation obta inab lehereastoth epro bab ility.ofhostileoperationsonhomecoast.

May 1, 1918 (7289).—Admiralty informs me that information fromreliable agents

states tha t asubmarine of Deutchland

type left Germany about nineteenth April toattack either Americantroop transports orships carryingm aterial from the States.Sofarasknownthe Germansformed conclusionstha t: Nantuc ke tShoalsand Sable

Islanddirect toEurope.Second: Material t ransports gofrom Newport News to a point south of Bermuda

and then toAzoresand thence to destination.It is thought that thesubm arineis takinganorthernrouteacrossAtlantic, average

speedfiveknots.Noneofnewclassofcruisingsubmarinesreadyforservice.Admiralty experience with Deutchlandclassestab lishes following conclusions:Theygenerallyoperatealongdistancefromshoreandseldominlessthanonehun



1 0 GEKMAN SUBM AKINE ACTIVITIES ON ATLANTIC COAST.

May 15,1918(7289).— Information contained in thiscableisgivenmebytheB ritishAdmira lty and i s necessar ily somewhat paragraphed for t ransmission , bu t I haveeveryreasontobelievei t is authent ic . Thereappears to bea reasonableprobabi li ty that the submarinesin quest ionm ay arrive off the United States coastat anyt imeafter May twentiethand that the ywil l carrymines.

English experience indicates the favorite spot for laying mines to bethe posit ionin whichmerchant shipsstopto pick uppi lots. For instance, forDelawareBay thep ilo ts for la rge sh ips a re p icked up south of the Five Fa thom Bank Light Vesse l.Thisinouropinion isoneofthe mostl ikelyspotsforasubm arinetolaymines.

As regards information possessed byG ermany on subject ofantisubmarine patrol.They have from variousn eutral sources information that a patrol is maintained offmostof theharborsand especial ly off Chesapeake Bay. Aneutral hasreported that thepatrolextendsasfarasCapeSkerry.

I t should be noted tha t except for mine laying , submarines of th i s c lass a lways work in deep water and tha t the Germans have la id m ines in water in depths up to

seventy fathoms . So far a s is known there is no reason why they should not layminesin depthsup toninety fathoms.

The foregoing comple te s t he in fo rma tion furnished by Br it ish Admi ra lty. Thefollowingisaddedbyme.

There are circumstances which render i t highly important that nothing whatevershould begiven out whichwouldlead the enemy even tosurmisetha t wehave hadanyadvanceinformation concerningthissubmarine, evenin the eventofoursinkingher, and that such measures asare taken by the department betaken assecret ly aspossibleandwithoutpublicdisclosureofthespecificreasons.

I ven tu re t o remind the depar tmen t i n t h is connection tha t t he employment ofsurfacevesselstopatrolagainstthissubm arinewouldpro bablyresultatbestinmerelydrivinghe rfrom onearea toanother, whereas the employm ent ofsubmarines againsther might lead to her dest ruc tion. I t is suggested tha t having est imated her mostprobable areas ofoperation submarines be employed in apatrol asnearly stationaryasmaybe,someofthemcoveringthepointsouthofFiveFathomsBankLightVessel,remain ing submerged dur ing the day wi th per iscopes only showing. Of f ive submarinescertainlydestroyed infour daysthreeweretorpedoed byBritishsubmarines.

June 4, 1918—(9029).—It i s pract ical ly certain that there isb ut onesubmarineonAtlanticcoast,whichisprobably U-151.

June 7, 1918—(9120).—Militarycharacteristics of U-151 from l at es t Admiral ty information asfollows:

Leng th 213feet 3inches bre adth 29feet 2inches surface draft 14feet 9inches displacement surface 1700tonssubmerged 2100tons Engine 1200horsepower speed 11knots and a half surface speed 8knots submerged fuel stowage 250tons includingstowageinballasttank,endurancesurface17,000milesat6knotssubmerged50milesat 7knotsarm ament 2-5-9gunstwo 22pounders onem achinegun sixtorpedo tubes4 bow 2 s te rn complement 8 officers 65 men: U-151 i s converted mercanti le submarine Deutschland type commander p robab ly L ieu tenan t Commander Kophamelformerlyincom mandofPolasubm arine flotilla. Incruisinglastfrom September 10thto December 20th approximately U-151was out over 100days during this period9steamersand 5sailingvesselstotal45,000tonssunk by gunfire, about400ammunition



STEPS TAKEN TO PROTECT SH IPPIN G . H

July 24, 1918.— Admiraltyhasreceived reliable information indicating tha t U-1S6is in tended to operate in Gulf of Maine but if foggy there to shif t opera tions off Delaware.

July 26, 1918.—A dmiraltyreport on reliable authority tha t harbor works, cranes,etc., at W ilmington areconsidered by Germansasfavorable objectives for bombard

ment . Thisand othersimilar information is t ransmitted forsuch useas the departmentcanmakeofi t althoughapparentlyofnotverygreatvalue.

August 1, 1918.—Itis considered probable by Admiral ty that a new mine-layingtype submarine is on i ts way to American coast, and tha t possib ly she i s the one engagedbyS.S. Baron NapieronJuly 26thin lat . 45-26N .long.32-56W.at0838.It isestimatedthissubmarinecanreachlongitudeNantucketLightshipAugust2nd.I t is said tha t th is type i sa great improvement over U-71-80, larger than ordinaryU-boats and carries following armament: One six-inch gun, one four-inch gun, twoanti-aircraft guns,forty-fives. Alsocarriestorpedoes but numb er oftubes unknown.

August 6, 1918.—Followingcable rece ived by Brit ish commander in chief "As

submarinesreported western Atlant ic are at present between New York and Chesapeake Bay area, vessels from U K below speed 13knots are being routed northofareaifbound NewYork, southifbound ChesapeakeBay and north orsouthif boundDelaware Bay lat ter beingsent by X orZroutesrespectively if necessary and thenhugcoast* Latter casewillbespecified inreportsentinaccordancewithparagraph8approachingroutes." Astheagreementw ith Navy Department is that after generalplans meet with joint approval, wewill handle the diversion routes at this end forwestbound ships , thi s cab le does no t accord. I t happens in th is par ticular case toroute shipsdirect through area of operat ions of the only two submarines at presenton this coast. Bri t ish C.-in-C. concurs in general scheme that westbound diversionbetterbehandledfromthisend.

August 7, 1918.—We feel so certain tha t n fine- laying submarine will opera te inVineyard Sound and Nantucket Sound August 10that counter measures in miningarerecommended.

August 9, 1918.—Admiraltyinformsthattwoconvertedmercantiletypesubmarineswi ll p robably leave Germany middle of August for American coast. One of themwillprobablylaym ineseastofAtlanticCityandC urrituck. TheotheroffS t.Johns,Newfoundland , Western Bay, Newfoundland and Hali fax. These submarines esti mated toreach American watersaboutsecondw eek of September.

August 10, 1918.—Returnroutes ofsubmarine now on American coastexpected tobe somewhat as fo llows: Submarine off Cape Hat te ras a t p resent by same re turn

routeas TJ-151. Submarine off Halifax at present approximately along parallel 44north from longitude Halifax toabout50degreesw est. Mine-layingsubmarine afterlaying her mines expected to operate between Cape Race and Halifax.

September 2, 1918.—Returnrouteofmine-layingsubmarinenowoffAmericancoastexpected somewhatasfollows: Vicinity CapeR acethrough anapproximate position54degreesnorth 27degreeswest.

September 9, 1918.—S.S. Monmouthreportsthat onSeptember 7thshe waschasedin about 43.00north 45.50west. Should thisreport provereliablesubm arine wouldbeoneoftwoconverted mercantiletype which were expected tosailfrom Germanyabo utth em iddle ofAugustandshecouldreachthe AmericancoastaboutSeptember



1 2 GERMAN SUBMARINE ACTIVITIES ON ATLANTIC COAST.

longitude Nantucket before about October 12 th . . Evident ly U-1S9 wassubmarinewhich,sunk twoships bygunfire in about 45.30n orth 11.00west October 1st and is

therefore notproceedingAmerica atpresent. Hercomm andingofficer Arnau ld de la

Periere isfirmbeliever ina t tack bygunfire.

In addi tion to theabovedispatches thefollowing lett er from, theforce comm ander inEurope wasreceived.

U. S. N AV AL F O R CE S O PE RA T IN G IN E U RO P EA N W A T E R S,

U. S. S. " M E L V I L L E , " F L AG S HI P,

SO Grosvenor Gardens, London, S. W., April SO , 1918.

Reference No.01. 16416.From: Commander, U. S.NavalForces inEuropeanWaters. To : Secretary of theNavy (Operations).Subject : Areas ofOperations ofEnemySubmarines. Reference: (a) Mycable#6352 of11April.

1. Submarines along Atlantic seaboard.—Since thebeginning ofsubm arine warfarei t hasbeen possible for theenemy tosend asubmarine to theA tlantic seaboard to

operateagainstalliedshipping. Thedanger to beanticipated- insuch adiversion is

not in thenumber ofshipsthatwould besunk, but in theinterruption anddelays of

shipping due to thepresence of a submarine unless p lans are ready inadvance to

meet such acontingency.Amoreseriousfeature is that thedepartment might be led toreconsider itspolicy

ofsendingantisubmarinecraftabroad. It isquitepossible for theenemy tosend one

ormoresubmarines to theA tlant ic seaboard at any t ime. Themost l ikelytype of

submarine to beused forsuchoperationswould be thecruiser submarine.2. Cruiser submarine.— At thepresentt imethere areonly 7cruisersubmarinescom

pleted. All of these are of the ex-Deutschlandtype, designed originally as cargocruisers and nowused toassist in the submarine campaign. Tenothers ofgreaterspeedhavebeenprojected, butnonehavebeencompleted, and thelatestinformationindicates that thework onthese vessels is not b ein g p us he d. T his is ra ther to be

expected owing to thesmallamount ofdamagedonethus far bycruisersubmarines.Thesesubmarinessinkonly30,000 to40,000tons ofshipping in afour-months'cruise.

3. Cruiser submarines now in service make only about 11£knots on the surface,with perhaps amaximum of 7knots submerged. They handle poorly under waterand probably can notsubmerge to any considerable depth . Onaccount of thei r

large size they arepart icularly vulnerable toa t tack by enemy submarines. It isprobably forthisreasonthat thecruisersubmarine hasalwaysoperated inareaswellclear ofantisubmarinecraft . Ifthistype ofvesselproceeded to theAtlanticseaboarditwouldundoubtedlyoperatewelloffshoreandshiftitsareas ofoperations freque ntly.Thus far,wi th oneexception, which occurred a fewdaysago, thecruiser submarinehasnever at tacked convoys and hasneverfiredtorpedoes in theopen sea,althoughvessels of th i s type have been operat ing for 10months. Alla t tacks have been by

gunfire, and as these cruiser submarines areslow,they canattackwithsuccessonlysmall,slow,poorlyarmedships.

4. If cruiser submarines aresent to the North Atlant ic seaboard nogreat damage



1 3TEPS TAKEN TO PROTECT SHIPPING .

5. As there a re on ly 7 c ru iser submarines bu i lt , we are able to keep very close track oftheseships. Atth eprese nttime oneofthesevesselsisoperatingoffth ewestcoastof Spain, en route home,two arein the vicinity ofthe Canaries, oneisin theNorth Sea bound out, and three a re in Germanyoverhauling . I have the positions of all ofthese cruiser submarines checked regularly, with the ideaof anticipating a

cruise of any of these vessels to America. These vessels are frequently in wirelesscommunication wi th one another, as well as wi th the smal l submarines, and theyreceive messages regularly from Nauen. Their at tacks against ships furnish an additionalmethodofcheckingtheirpositions,andIhopethatwewill beabletokeepanaccuratec hartofallthe cruisersubmarines,soastobeabletowarn thed epartm entconsiderab ly in advance of any probable c ru ise of these vessels out of Europeanwaters. Atthem omenttheo nlyonetha tmightcrosstheoceanistheonenowcomingout ofthe NorthSea, asthe other threehave beenout toolongtomakealongcruiselikely.

6. Small submarines.—There i s g reater danger to be an ticipated from the smallsubmarine—that is , submarines of a surface displacement not exceeding about 800

tons. Thesevesselscanapproachfocal areaswithafairdegreeofimm unity,and canat tack convoysorsingleshipsunder most circumstances. The number of torpedoescarried by these vessels is small, however, not exceeding 10or 12,and the damageby gunfire would not be serious except to slow, poorly armed ships.

7. There seemslittle likelihood,however, tha tsmallsubmarinesw illbe senttotheAtlantic seaboard. Thesevesselswould havetosteam nearly 6,000milesadditionalJbefore a rr iv ing a t t he ir hun ting g round. Th is would mean a s train on the crew,difficulty of supplies and fuel (although their cruising radius is sufficient), absencefromwirelessinformation, liabilitytoenginebreakdown, unfamiliarity w ithAm ericancoast, and soforth, all forasm allresu ltonarrivingon the Atlan tic seaboard.

8 . The small submar ines a t p re sent ope ra ting a round the Un it ed Kingdom can dischargethe irtorpedoesands tarthomeafter abou t10day s'operations. In onecase,U-58, whichisconsidered aremarkably efficient submarine, exhausted all torpedoes

after 4days'operationsin theE nglish Channel.9 . I t iscertain that if theenemy transfers hissubmarineat tackin anystrengthto

America the submarine campaign wi ll be qu ick ly defea ted. The enemy i s having d ifficulty in main ta in ing in opera tion under present condit ions any considerab le number of small submarines. The average number a round the Uni ted Kingdom a tany t ime does no t exceed about 10. The number i s no t constant bu t seems to begreaterd uringperiodsoffull moon.

10. Declared zones.—Ifsubmarines a re to operate regularly on the At lan tic seaboard, i t is qui te probable that theenemy will makeapublic declaration extendingthe present barred zones. Public declarations werem ade January 31,1917,set tinglimitstothe barred zoneandthesewereextended by proclamation on November22,1917;Jan uar y 8, 1918;Jan uary 11, 1918.

The barred zonearound the Azoreswasdeclared in November, 1917,bu t a cruisersubmarineoperatedinthev icinityduringJune,Ju ly, andAugust,1917. The barredzone around the Cape deV erde Islands wasdeclared January 8, 1918,but a cruisersubmarine wasoperatingoff Dakar andin the Capede Verde Islandsin October andNovember,1917.

It isevidentthattheenemymightatanytime,withoutwarning,sendasubmarine



1 4 GERMAN SU BM ARINE ACTIVITIES ON ATLANTIC COAST.

11. Future submarine operations.—Theenemy isworkingonanew type of cruiser submarine wi th a speed of about 17knots and the samebat tery as the Deutschlandtype . I t isdoubtfulif thistypeofvesselwillbehand yun derwaterandit isassumedtha tth eb ulk ofherworkwillb edoneb y gunfire.

Convoysescortedb y cruiserswould have littletofear from thistyp eofsubm arine;

but slow vessels poorly armed would be a t a d isadvantage. There is some doubt ,however, astowhetheraconvoyofvessels, evenwithoutacruiserescort, wouldnotmakeit interestingforthesubmarine. Altogetherthetypeisnotgreatlytobe feared;butit isrealizedthat thistypeofvesselwouldhaveconsiderableadvantageoverthepresent Deutschland typeofcruisersubmarine.

12. Around the United Kingdom the small submarineseems tobe committed, for the present, at least, toinshoreoperations.

InFebruaryof1917thereweresome30sinkingstothewestwardofthe10thmeridian,extend ingasfarasthe 16thm eridian; bu tinF ebruary ofthisyeartherewerenosinkings west of the 8th meridian. In March, 1917, there were 40sinkingswestof

the 10th meridian, extending as far as the 18th meridian, bu t in March, 1918, therewere nosinkings west of the"8th meridian. In Apri l, 1917, there were 82 sinkingswest of the 10th mer idian, extending to the 19th mer idian, while in Apri l,1918,practically all ofth e sinkings have been east oft he 8thmeridian, therebeingonly4sinkingswest of thism eridian, operationsnot extending beyond the 12th meridian.Sofarascanbeascertainedtheenemyareconcentratingeffortsonbuildingsubmarinesofabo ut 550tonssurface displacem ent.

13. The changes of a reas in which submar ines opera te have undoubted ly been ,broughtaboutby th e introductionof the convoysystem. Submarinesoperat ingwell toth e westward have smallchan ce of finding convoys and have the disadvantageofhaving to a t tack convoys under escort if found. By confining thei r operations to areas near shore submarines enjoy the advantage of a lways having a considerable qua ntity ofshippingin sight, aswellasoffinding man y opportunities either by dayornighttoattackshipsthatarenotunder escortorinconvoy. Thisisnecessarilyso,as there is a considerable coasting trade, cross-channel t rade, and numbers of shipsproceeding to assembly ports, al l of which sail ings are ei ther unescorted or poorlyescorted, and the submarine f inds many opportunities for at tack without subjectinghimself tothe dangert ha the would encounterin attacking escorted convoys.

14. I t ishoped during summer weather to makea wider useof aircraf t and small surface craft toprotect coastalwaters. W hether resultswillbe successful enough todrivethe submarinefarther offshore remainstobeseen. Eve ryindicationa tpresent

seemstopointtoth e submarines continuingth eir operationsnearth e coast.15. The convoysystem hasgivenusadouble advantage:(a) I t has brought the submarine closer in shore, where morem eansare available

forattackingit.(6) Ithasgivenprotectionandconfidencetoshippingatseaandma deth esub ma rine

exposehimselftoconsiderableriskofdestructionincaseheelectstoattackaconvoy.Therearemanyindicationsth at th esubm arine doesnotrelishtheideaofattacking

convoys unless the escort is a weak one or a favorable opportunity presents itself through stragglingshipsorotherwise. About90percent ofthe attacksdelivered bysubmarinesaredelivered againstshipsthat arenotin convoy.



1 5HE DEUTSCHLAND.

17. There isalwaysthe l ikelihood that a submarine mayappear oft the Americancoast. Inthesamemanner,andthiswouldbefullyasembarrassing,submarinesmaybeginoperationsw estofthe 20thm eridian. The lossesfrom allsuch operations mustbeaccepted. Weare certainth atth ey will besmall,and will not,forman yreasons,beregularlycarriedon.

18. I seenothingin the submarine situat ion to-day to warrant any changein thepresent policyof the departm ent. Thesituationisnotasseriousasi t wasayearagoa t thi s t ime. The Allies a re ge tt ing be t te r defensive measures and are increasingoffensive measures against the submarine, many of which are meeting with success.Thehelpofthe U . S .Nav yhasmateriallyaidedin defeatingthesubm arinecam paign.Presentinformation indicatesth at weareatleastholdingourownwiththesubm arine,and that submarine construct ion is slowing down rather than speedingu p. Duringthefirstqua rterof1918wesank21enem y submarines,and the bestinformation indicatesthat notmorethan 17newboatsarecommissioned. Withth e comingofbetterweatheri t ishopedth at the situation will further improve.

19. There seems no sound reason for assuming that the enemy will transfer oper

ationstotheAtlanticseaboard,exceptpossiblyinthecaseofthecruisersubmarines.These vessels have thus far done li t tle damage to shipping, and it mightprovegoodstrategytosendthem toourcoast. In anyevent nogreatdangeristobean ticipatedfrom the present type ofcruiser submarine, and adequate stepscanbe taken to dealwiththesevesselsiftheyarriveontheAtlanticseaboard.

20. Thislette r wasprepared priortoth e dispatchofm y cableN o.7289ofMay1.

THE DEUTSCHLAND.

TheGermansubmarine Deutschland, the first cargo-carry ing U-

boat,left Bremenw ithacargoofchemicals and dyestuffs onJune 14,1916, andshaped her course for Heligoland, where she remained fornine days for the purpose, so her captain , Paul Koenig, s ta ted, ofth rowing the enemy off the scen t if by any means he should havelearnedw hatw asbeing attem pted.

The D eutschlandwasm anned by acrew of 8officers and 26m en—the captain, 3 deck officers, 4engineer officers, 6 quartermasters, 4electricians, 14engineers, 1steward and 1cook.

Because of the danger by way of the English Channel, which was

heavily ne tt ed , Capt. Koenig la id h is course a round the north ofSco tland, and i t was while he was in t he North Sea t ha t most ofthesubmergenceofthe D eutschland(about90milesinall)tookplace.Usually t he U-boa t trave led on the surface, bu t on sighting anysuspicious ship she would imm ediately submerge, occasionally usingher periscopes. According to Capt. Koenig's account, she was submerged to the bottom and remained for several hours .

The D eutschlandresembled the typicalG ermanU-boat, but carriedno to rpedo tubes or guns. Her hull was c igar-shaped , cylindrical



1 6 GEBMAN STJBMAKINE ACTIVITIES ON ATLANTIC COAST.

beam, inner hull , about 17feet; beam, outer hull , 29 feet 2 inches ;depth, about 24 feet; depth to top of conning tower, about 35 feet;draft Goaded), 16 to 17 feet; d isplacement, l ight, 1,800 tons—submerged,2,200tons. Speed on the surface, 12 to 14knots per hour—

submerged, 1\ knots ; fuel oil capacity, 150 tons normal, and maximum240tons. A t 1\ knots per hour she could remain submerged for 8 hours ; a t

3^ knots per hour , 40hours ; a t 1^ knots per hour , 96hours . Cargocapac ity , about 750 t ons. T he DeutscMand was equipped wi th twovertical inverted , four-cycle, single-acting, nonreversible, air-startingengines of 600 horsepower each ; Deise l, Krupp type ; d iameter ofcylinders, about 17inches; shaft, about 6inches.

She had two periscopes of the housing type , one in the conning

tower and one offset, fo rward of t he conning tower. Her electricbatteries consis ted of 280 cells in two bat ter ies of 140 cells each.There were two motors on each shaft, each motor being 300horsepower. Shewas fully equipped wi th radio apparatus , ins ta lled in asound-proof room. The radio set was in forward t rimming s ta tion.Two hollow masts were used, height about 43 feet above the deck;length of an tenna, about 160 fee t. Masts were h inged and housed inrecesses ins tarboa rd superstructure. They wereraised by meansof aspecial motor and drum.

The interior of the cylindrical hull was divided by four transversebulkheads into five separa te water -t igh t compartments . Compartm e nt N o. 1 a t th e bow c on ta in ed th e anchor cables a nd electricwinchesforha ndlingthe ancho r; alsogeneralshipstoresan dacertainam ount of cargo. C om partm en t N o. 2 w as given u p en tirely tocargo. Compartment No.3,whichwasconsiderably larger tha n anyof the others, contained the living qua rters of the officers and crew.At t he after end of th is compartmen t and communicating with it

was the conning tower. Compartment No. 4 was g iven up en tire ly to cargo. Compar tment No. 5 contained the propelling machinery,the twoheavyoilengines, andthe twoelectric motors. The storageba tt er ies were carried in the bo ttom of the boat , below the living compartmen t. For purposes of communication, a gangway 2 feet6 incheswideb y 6feet high was built through each cargo compartment, thus rendering i t possible for the crew to pass enti re ly fromone end of the boat to the o ther. The freeboard to the main deck ran the full length of the boat and was about 5^ to 6feet wide.



THE DEUTSCHLAND "MERCANTILE SUBMARINE.

(Page15.)



THE DEUTSCHLAND ATNEW LONDON,CONN.

(Page17.)



THE DEUTSCHLAND LEAVING FOR GERMANY.

(Page17.)



GERMAN U-53ATNEW PORT, R.I . U.S. S. BIRMINGHAM INTH E BACKGROUND.

(Page18)



GERMANU-151ATSEA.

Takenfrom thedeckoftheAmericanS.S.PinardelRio.



GERMAN U-151AT SEA.

Takenfromthe SpanishpassengersteamerIsabeldeBourbon.



1 8 GERMAN SUBM ARINE ACTIVITIES ON ATLANTIC COAST.

Some t ime after her re turn to Germany she was converted intc warsh ip and fu rn ished wi th to rpedo t ubes and two 5.9-inch guHerwaractivitieswerecontinuedas TJ-155.

The Deutschland a s the TJ-155 left Germany about May 24, 19

and operated principally off the west coast of Spa in , nor th of \Azores,and between theAzores and theM adeira Islands; thenunithe command ofL ieut. Comm ander Meusel, on a cruise which lasi103 days, during which she sank 11s teamers and 8 sai ling vess<withatotaltonnageof53,267grosstons.

Sheat tacked bygunfire theAmerican Steamship / L. Luckenha4,920 gross tons,on June 13,1917, at 7.15 p. m., in lat i tude 44° '.longitude 18°05 'W ., bu t theship escaped.

Among the sailing vessels sunk was the American schooner Jc

Twoliy, 1,019 tons gross , which was sunk by bombs placed aboaa fter her cap ture about 120 miles south of Ponta Delgada and sproximately in lat i tude35°55' N. , longitude23°20' W., onJuly1917,a t 6 a. m.

Also the American bark CJiristiane,964 tons gross ,was sunkbo mb s placed on b oa rd after h er c ap tu re off th e A zores and ip rox ima te ly in l at it ude 37° 40 ' N ., and long itude 20° 40 ' W .,A ug ust 7, 1917, a t 6 p . m . She r etu rn ed t o G erm an y a bo ut Si

tember4,1917.The Deutscliland again left G e rm a ny a b ou t J an u a ry 16, 19U Commander Eckelmann apparen tly having succeeded L ieu t. Co mander Meusel—on a c ru ise which lasted about 108 days, duriwhich t ime she sank 10s teamers and 7 sailing vessels , wi th a to gross tonnage of 50,926 tons , v iz, 2 B ritis h steamers (armed)Ita lia n steam ers (arm ed ), 2 N orw egian and 1 Spanish steari(unarmed), 4 Br it ish , 2 Portuguese, and 1 Spanish sa iling vessFrom the Norwegian Steamship Wagadesic, which was captured a

afterwards sunk, she took 45tons of brass , which she took backGermany. During the c ru ise she operated between the Azoresa CapeVincent off thecoast of Spain, and the entrance to the Straof Gibraltar.

Shereturned to Germany about May4,1918.In August, 1918, she began her famous c ru ise on the Americ

coast.

VISIT OF THE GERMAN SUBMARINE U-53 TO NEWPOF



VISIT OF GERMAN SUBMARINE U - 5 3 . 1 9

At 2p. m. October 7a code message was received from the U. S.submarine D-2, s ta ting tha t a German man-of-war submarine wass tanding in . A few minutes la ter a German submarine was s ightedente ring the harbor of Newport. The submarine was first sighted

3miles east of Point Judith, s tanding toward Newport, and the D-2approachedandparalleledhercoursetoconvoytheGermansubmarinewhile ins ight of land. Upon arrival at Brenton Reef Lightship, thecaptain of the German submarine requested permission from D-2to enter port , which permission was granted by the D-2. The Germancaptain s ta ted that he did notneeda pilot. The D-2 convoyedthe submarine in to Newport Harbor. She was flying t he Germanman-of-war ensign and the commission pennant and carry ing twogunsin a conspicuous position.

Upon approaching the anchorage the U-58, th rough the cap ta in of the U. S. D-2, signaled the U. S. S. Birmingham, R ear AdmiralAlbert Gleaves commanding, reques ting to be assigned to a ber th .Shewas assigned to Berth No. 1, where she anchored at 2.15 p. m.

The commandant of the nava l s ta tion , Nar raganse tt Bay , R . I .,sent his aidealongside tom ake the usual inquiries, bu t with instructionsnot togoonboard, asnocomm unication hady et beenhad withthe hea lth authoritie s. A t 3 p . m . the commanding officer of theV-58, Lieut. Hans Rose, went ashore in a boat which he requested

andwhichwasfurnishedbytheU.S.S. Birmingham. He called on thecommandant of the Narraganset t BayNavalSta t ion. Hewas in theuniform of alieutenant in theG erman Nav y,w earing theiron cross;andhestated, with apparent pride, tha t hisvesselw as a man-of-wararmed wi th guns and torpedoes . Hes ta ted that he hadnoobject in en terin g th e p ort ex cept to p ay his re sp ec ts; t h at he needed nosuppliesor assistance, and th at heproposed togoto sea at 6 o'clock.He s tated also that he left Wilhelmshaven 17daysbefore, touching

at Heligoland.The collector of customs located at Providence, R. L, telephonedand asked for information as to the vis it of the German submarine,andwhentoldthatsheintendedtosailat 6p.m.,hestated tha t underthecircumstancesit n otbepracticable for eitherhimora quaran tineofficer to visit the ship.

Following the vis it of the captain, the comm andant sent his aideto return the call of the captain of the U-58 and to reques t that nousebemade of theradio apparatus of the vessel in port.




proposed to sa il about sundown on the same day; that the t rip hadbeen made wi thout incident , on the surface, and had passed to then orth wa rd of th e S hetlan d Islan ds and along th e coast of Newfoundland.

Th efollowingofinterestw asno ted : Le ngth aboveth ewater, about212 feet; two Deisel Ni iraberg engines, each of 1,200 horsepower;each engine h ad six c ylin de rs; m a xim u m speed*, 15 k n ot s; submerged speed, 9 to 11knots .

The captain s tated with pr ide that the engineswere almost noiseless and made absolute ly no smoke except when first s tart ing. Shehadfour 18-inch torpedo tubes, twointhe bow and twoin the stern;the tubeswerecharged and four spare torpedoeswerevis ible. Eachpair of tubes was in a horizontal p lane. They could carry 10 torpe

does, bu t pa r t of t he to rpedo stowage space was u tilized to carryextraprovisions. Thetorpedoeswereshort andtheysaid theirrangewas 2,000yards . The gunswerem ounted on the deck, one forwardand one aft. T he forward gun looked to be abou t 4-inch and theafter one about 3-inch—short and l ight. The muzzles were coveredandwater-tight. Theyhadvertical slidingwedge breechblocks,witha gasket covering cartridge chamber wa te r- tigh t. T hey carried ap erm a ne nt sig ht w ith peephole an d cross w ires, a nd on it was areceptacle evidently to take a s ighting te lescope. The s teel deflec

tion and elevation scales, cap squares, etc.,wereconsiderably rusted.The guns were permanently mounted on the deck and d id no t folddown. A gyro compass with r epea te rs was in sta lled. T he controlseemed to be ,similar to t ha t of the American submarines. Therewere th ree periscopes, which could be ra ised or lowered, and theplatform onwhichth econ trol officer stood moved with the periscope;onewas abou t 15feet high above the deck and the othersseveralfeetlower. Oneof theperiscopes led to the compartment forward of the

engine room for the use of the chief engineer and the thi rd was aperiscopefor aeroplanes. Therewasstowagespacefor threemonths 'supplies of all kinds. The complement consis ted of the captain, theexecu tive and navigating officer, ordna nce officer, engineer, electricalandradio officer, and crewof33men. The officers werein the*regulation uniform, new and na t ty in appearance. Thecrewworeheavyblue woolen kn it swea te rs , coa ts and trousers of soft, thin blackleather lined with thin cloth, topboo ts and theregular blue flat cap.They werefreshly shaved orwithn eatly close-trimm ed beard orhair,



VISIT OF GERMAN SUBMARINE U -5 3 . 2 1

Theradiosendingandreceivingapparatuswasin.asmallseparateroom on the sta rboa rd side. T he radio genera to r was on the po rtsideintheengineroom.

There were two antennae—one consisted of twowires,oneon each

side about three-eighths of an inch in diameter , extending from thedeck a t the bow to the deck a t the s te rn and up over supportingstanchions above the conning tower, with heavy porcelain insulatorsabout 4 or 5 feet from deck at each end and from each side of thesupport ing s tanchions. The other was an ordinary three-wire spansuspended between the masts and was about 3feet highonthe s tarboard s ide. Thesemas ts were about 25 feet h igh andm ounted outboard over the whaleback; were tapered, of smooth surface, hingedattheheel, eachwithatrussbuilt outabout3feetneartheheelfor

leverage,tow hichsecured, andfrom whichledthrou ghguidesheavesalong the s ide, a galvanized one-half inchwire rope for raising andlowering. The mas ts were h inged to lie along the top of the oute rsurface along s tarboard close to thevert ical s ide plateof the supers t ructure . Theycla imed to have a receiving range of 2,000 miles.

A flush wood deck, about 10 feet wide amidships, extended theentire length. This was built of sections about 2 inches thick, eachabout30inchessquareandsecuredtothesupportingsteelframework

bybolts. Eachsectionhadseveralholesabout 2\ inchesby 4inchescut through to allow passage of thew ater. The sides of the superstruc tureframework wereinclosedby thin steelplatesreachingnearlyto the hull . The inner body of the hull was divided into s ix watert ight compar tments . Theyhad very l i tt le beam andsuggested that a large amount of available space was devoted to oil s torage.

There were three main hatchways—-'onefrom the conning tower tothe central s tation, one into the forward livingspace, and the otherinto the after l ivingspace.

P at en t anchorswerehoused infitted recessesinth ehulljust abovethe to rpedo tubes. E lectric motor-driven anchor cha in winch ou tside thehullunder thebowsuperstructure. Therewasagalvanized-wiretowinghawserabout \\ inchesin diameter, shackled to thenoseleading aft along thep ort sideof the hull, stoppered onw ith asmallwire, to the port side of the conning tower, so tha t the heaving linefastened to its end could be hove from the conning tower. T heyhad a small e lectric galley with coppers, e tc . Small room for thecommanding officer amidships forward of the central; officers' room



2 2 GERMAN SUBM ARIN E ACTIVITIES ON ATLANTIC COAST.

T he vessel appea red very o rderly and clean th roughout. I t wasespecially noticeable th at no repair work whatever was in progress .Allhan ds,except officers and men showing visitorsthro ug h theboat,were on deck, where the crew were operating a small phonograph.

The engineer officer said th at TJ-53 wasbuilt th at year, 1916.The cap ta in s ta ted tha t he would be p leased to have any officer

visithisshipandw ouldshowthem around. Thisprivilegewastakenadvantage of by a number of officers from the destroyer force, andthe aid to t he commandant. A ll the officers who v isited the shipwere much impressed by the youthfu lness of the personnel, theirperfect physical condition, and their care-free at t i tude. Oneor twoobservers tho ught th at thecaptain seemed serious andrather weary,but a ll agreed that the other officers and the crewseemed entire ly happy and gave no indication tha t they considered themselves engaged in any undertak ing involv ing hazard or responsib ility . Thefreedom with which the officers and crew conversedw ith visitors andtheir willingness to show all par ts of the ship wassurprising. Theys ta ted that they were wi lling to te ll a ll that they knew and to showall they had, this to officers and civilians alike.

The officers spoke our tongue with careful correctness, though notfluently, and answered all questions except when asked their names,

whichth ey courteouslydeclined togive. W hen oneofficer wasaskedby one of the visiting officers whether he spoke English, he replied," N o ; I speak American ." All hands were verym i li ta ry in deportment , and whenever a man moved on duty he went wi th a run1. Astheb oat entered andleft the harbor , the crewwas l ined up ondeck,a t a t tent ion, facing vessels they passed. Upon leaving, they facedabout and after pass ing and"saluting the dest royer tender MelviUe,the officers and crew waved their caps to the las t destroyer as theypassed. T he U-53gotunderwayat5.30p.m.andstoodouttosea.

It waslearned th at aletter totheGermanAm bassador atWashingtonwasentrusted to anewspaper representative and by him was posted.

On O cto ber 8, 1916, th e d ay after leav ing N ew port, th e U-58captured and sunk the following vessels off the coast of the UnitedStates,viz:

The Br it ish S. S . Stepham, 3,449 tons gross, 2£ miles E. byNE.of Nantucket L igh t Vessel. The StepTiano ha d Am erican passengersaboard.



2 3HE CRUISE OF THE U-151.

I t was thought possible th at the TJ-53wasaccompaniedbyoneortwo other U-boats , as other U-boats marked Z7-45and TJ-61 were reported. I t is , however, likely tha t the report of three submarineswas due to C ap t. R ose's hav ing h is number " U - 5 3 " painted o utandsubst ituting other numbers. He did this onfour separate occasions and finally came into Germany about November 1 under the number " U - 6 1 ."

THE CRUISE OF THE U-151.

The U-151 2, aconvertedmercantilesubmarineofthe Deutscfilandtype, commanded byK apitan VanN osti tiz und Janckendorf , sailedfrom Kiel on April 14, 1918. Al though her route to the AmericanAtlanticcoastisnotdefinitelyknown,itisprobablethatshefollowed

them ore or lessrecognized pa th later taken by other enemy cruisersubmarines to and from America.3 The U-151 was first locatedearlyinMay,when theoffice ofNa valOperations,W ashington,D .C.,received the following messagefrom Kingston, Jam aica :

U. S.steamerengaged enemysubm arine 2May, 1918,lat . 46° N ., long.28°W.4

Thepositionindicatedbythismessagewasapointabout400milesnorthoftheAzores.

On May 15, 1918, the Brit ish s teamer Huntress, 4,997 gross tons,

boundfor Ham pton Roads, reported that shehad escaped a torpedoattack mad ebyan enemysubmarineinlatitude34°28 'N., longitude56°09' W.5

These reports were considered authentic. All section bases wereordered to be on thealert,andt hefollowingmessagewasb roadcastedby theN avyD epartment onMay 16,1918:

Most secret.—Frominformation gainedb y contactwithenem ysubm arine,onemaybe encountered anywhere west of 40 degrees west. No l igh ts should be carried ,except as may be necessary to avoid collis ion and paravanes should be used when

pract icable and feasible . Acknowledge, Commanderin Chief Atlantic Fleet, Commander Cruiser Force, Commander Patrol Squadron, Flag San Domingo, GovernorV irgin Is la nd s, C om m an da nts 1st to 8 th, in clu siv e, a nd 15th Nav al D is tr ic ts .13016.OPNAV.

The first definite information of the activity of theG erman raideroff theAm erican coastwasreceivedb yradioonMay 19at 12.14p.m.The At lan ti c C ity radio in te rcep ted an S O S f rom the Americansteamship Nyanza, 6,213 gross tons, adv ising tha t she was being gunned and givingh er position aslatitude 38° 2 1 'N., longitude 70°

8




W., or about 300milesoff the Maryland coast. Tha t the submarinewasproceeding westward into thewaters of thefourth naval dis tr ictwasindicated byinformation received on May 20from them asterofthe J. C. Donnell,w ho, upon his arrival at Lewes,D el., on tha t day,

r eported tha t h is ship's radio had intercep ted a message from the American s teamship Jonancy, 3,289 gross tons , on May 19, sayingtha t shewasbeinggunned and giving her posi tion as 150miles eastof W inter Qu arter Shoals. OnMay21, at 11.15a.m ., the Canadiansteamer Montcalm relayed amessagetoCapeMayradiostation fromthe Bri tish s teamship Crenella,7,082 gross tons, s tating that asubmarineh ad been sighted inla titud e37°50' N ., longitude 73°50' W.,a point about 80miles off the Maryland coas t. Six shots were fireda t th e Crenellaby t he submarine, bu t no h it s were registe red . A t

1p. m.onthesamedaythe Montcalm repor ted that the Crenellahadescaped.

T he in fo rma tion t ha t mer chant vessels had repo rted a Germansubmarineproceedingtowardthecoastwasimmediatelydisseminatedtothesectionbases,totheforcesafloat, and tothecom man dersofthecoast defenses. In addition to the r egula r pa trol s, detachmentsofsub-chasers were established and ordered, whenever practicable, toproceed to thepositionsgiven in SOSmessages.

Subsequentinformationindicatedth at asthesubm arine approachedthe American coast she picked as her prey sai ling vessels n ot likelytohavemeans of comm unication byradio, andin at tempting further to conceal her presence in thev icinity took as prisoners the crewsofthefirst threevesselsshe attacked , the Hattie Dunn, the Hauppauge,and the Edna.

OnMay26,1918,the Edna, anun arme d Am erican schooner of325grosstons, ownedbyC.A.Sm all,M achias,M e.,wasfound abandonedn ea r W in te r Q u arte r Shoals L ig htsh ip . She w as t ak en in tow by

theClyde'Linesteamer Mohawk. Theschooner 's towingbi tts carriedaway and she was abandoned by the Mohawk; later she was pickedup by the tug Arabian and towed to Philadelphia, arriving May29.An investigation mad e by the aidefor information, fourth naval district, disclosed the presence of twoholes, 20to30inchesin diameter,in the vessel's hold jus t above the turn of the bilge, evidencing anexternal explosion.6 A tim e fuse was found, the extrem e end ofwhich had been shattered by an explosion. Thus, the naval authoritiesreceived the first visual evidence of the work of an enemy raider




been sunk earlier on th e sam e day, M ay 25. A t the sam e tim edefinite information was gained concerning the identity and militarycharacteristics ofthe submersible. Although there wereno identifyingmarks,letters,ornumbersonthehull,M.H.Sanders,mateofthe

Hauppauge, s tatedthathesawtheletterandfigures " U - 1 5 1 " a t the foot of severa l bunks and on the b lanke ts aboard the submarine ;T. L. Winsborg saw the letter and f igures on the hammocks and onthe machine guns; other survivors noticed that tools , furniture, andequipm ent w ere sim ilarly m ark ed . These facts, to ge th er w ith acomparison of the photograph of thesubm arine known tohave sunkthe first sh ips, w ith pho tographs and silhouette s of submarinesobtained from official sources , proved conclusively that the raideroperating off the American coast was the U-151 of the DeutscMand

type. The description of the submarine as given by Capt . Gilmoreof the Edna and Mate Sanders of the schooner Hauppauge, an d byothersurvivors,wasm ost complete. This description, together withthe information gained from official sources, furnished the basis forthe dissemination, onJune 7,to allnaval forces of the following dataconcerningthe U-151:

Ident i ty , U-151, DeutscMand type ofconverted mercantilesubmarine, complement;8officers and 65enlisted me n; length, 213feet3inches;brea dth, 29feet 2inches;sur

face draft, 14feet 9 inches; displacement (surface), 1,700 tons; displacement (submerged),2,100tons; engine, 1,200H .P .;speed(surface),11*knots;speed(submerged),8knots;fuel storage, 250tons, including storage of ballast tank ; endurance (surface),17,000milesat 6knots; endurance (submerged), 50 milesat 7knots; armament, two6-inch guns, two 22-pounders, one machine gun, six torpedo tubes—four in bow andtwo in s te rn ; ammuni ti on capac ity , 400 rounds per each gun ; maximum numbertorpedoes, 12; m any t ime fuse bombs; equipped to carry and lay 40mines; a two-kilowatt wirelessset, and apo rtable setw hich could berigged upin afewhours onacap tured merchant vesse l to be used as a decoy or as a mother sh ip . Submarines "TJ-converted mercant ile ty p e" are especial ly fitted with submarine cable-cut tingdevices.

That the U-151 carried a cable-cutting device is apparently borneout by the s ta tements of Capt. Sweeney, of the Hauppauge, and ofCapt. Holbrook, of the Hattie Dunn, describing a mysterious deviceon the deck of the submar ine. Along the cen te r line of the ship 'sdeck, fore and aft, there were two s tanchions about 70 feet apart ,around each ofwhich acoilof48turns off-inch wireropew astak en.Ononeendofthisrope,whichwascoveredonlywithacoatofheavygrease,therewas aneyesplice, and at theo ther endtherewasacable



2 6 GERMAN SUBM ARIN E ACTIV ITIES ON ATLANTIC COAST.

off New York Harbor. I t is possible that this lurchm ay havebeencaused by the submarine 's grappling with or cut t ing cables leadingfrom New York . As a mat te r of fact, one cab le to Europe and oneto Central America were cut 60miles southeast of Sandy Hook, on

May28,1918. This devicehad disappeared whentheprisonerscameondeckonthemorningofMay30.

The s tatements of survivors also furnished details concerning theprocedure and the methods employed by the TJ—151 in h er a tta cku po n vessels. T he first sinking b y th e U-151 off the Americancoastoccurredwhenthe Hattie Dunn, anuna rme dA mericanschoonerof 435 gross tons, was at tacked off W inter Quarter Shoals a t 10.10a.m. onMay25. Capt. C.E. Holbrook, mas ter of the Hattie Dunn,tells the following sto ry:

The Hattie Dunn sailed from New York onMay 23,1918,en route for Charleston,S.C , in ballast. OnS aturday, May25,about 10.10a. m.,w henabout 15to25milesoff Winter Quarter Lightship, I heard a cannon gooff; I looked andsaw aboat, butthought i t was an A merican. That boa t fired once ; I s ta rted my ship full speed to thewestward. He fired again, and final ly camealongsideand said:

"Do you w ant me to k i ll yo u?" I toldhimI thought his wasanAmericanboat. He toldm etogivehimthepapers,

and get some foodstuff. He t he n wa nte d m e to g et in to h is sm all bo at, b u t I wasanxiousto getashore, soI imm ediately gotinto oneofm y ownboatsand shoved off.Hehal ted mebecausehedid notwant metogetashore. Hethenpu t a manintomyboatsothat I would comebacktothe submarine. Anofficer andotherm enfromtheGerman submarine then boarded the schooner and after p lacing bombs about her ordered the crew of the Hattie Dunn to row to t he submar ine, wh ich we d id . The schoonerwassenttothebottombytheexplosionofthebombsinlatitude37°24'N.,longitude 75°05'W. The secondofficer in command aboardth e submarinegavemeareceiptformyship.

Therewerenocasualit ies. Theweatherwasfineandclear, theseawascalm.Wekeptaboardthesubmarineuntil th emorningofJune2. Whilewewereaboard,

the secondofficer and othersofth e subm arine creww rotesomelettersand gavethemtometomail. Itoldthem Iwouldnotmailthe lettersiftherewasanythinginthem

detr imental tom y country . I handed them to the f irst naval officer I came to .

A few minutes la ter the U-151 made another a t tack in the samevicinity, which culminated in the s inkingof the Hauppauge, an unarmedA mericanschooner of 1,446 grosstons,ownedand operatedbyR . Law rence Sm ith, New Y ork. C apt. Sweeney, m aster of theHauppauge, gavethe following information:

We left Por tland , Me., on Fr iday , May 17, 1918, en route for Norfo lk, Va., inbal last. Thevoyagewasuneventful unt i l them orningofSaturday, May25,whenat



THE CEUISE OF THE U -1 51 . 2 7

The shots were fired in sequence of about four or five minutes. We stopped the

schooner in latitude 37° 27' N., longitude 75° 09' W. and shortly after the submarine

came cloBe to us. An officer aboard the submarine called to us:

"Leave your ship immediately."

The submarine then pulled away from the ship, 50 feet or more, and ordered us to

come alongside. We obeyed and went aboard. The commanding officer asked me

for the ship's papers, and when I told him they were on the ship he replied:

"Well, we have to have the papers."

A copy of the receipt for theHattieDunn and photostatic copy of

that for the Hauppauge are on file and are practically the same in

effect. The receipt for theHauppauge reads as follows:

PKOTOKOLL.

Am 25 ten Mai 1918, 11 Uhr 10 Min. Vormittags ist auf 37° 27' N. und 75° 09' W.

der amerikanische 4 Mast Schooner Hauppauge L T Q H von S. M. Unterseeboot

vernichtel worden.

Aug See, den 25 ten Mai 1918.

Der Kommandant,

v. NOSTTTZ,

Korvettenkapitdn.

Then they took me back to the schooner for the papers; they also took three bombs

with them which they placed aboard the Hauppauge. We had just returned to the

submarine wheD the bombs exploded and the Hauppauge sank at 11.30 a. m.7

There were no casualties. The weather was fine and clear; the sea was calm.

Upon boarding the submarine we found the crew of the HattieDunn sunk a short

while before. We were retained as prisoners until the morning of June 2, when we

were placed in boats with the survivors of two sunken vessels—the IsabelWiley and

Winneconne.

The sea had scarcely closed over the sinking hull of theHaupphuge,

before the submarine cast about for new prey, and early in the after

noon she made the attack upon the schoonerEdna, in latitude 37° .30'

N. and longitude 74° 52' W. In describing the attack on his vessel,

Capt. C. W. Gilmore, master of theEdna, said:

We cleared Philadelphia on the 17th of May and sailed from Delaware Breakwater

on May 24 en route to Santiago, Cuba, with a cargo of case oil. About half past 1 on

May 25 we heard a gun fired and a little later a shell struck in the water about a half a

mile from us. We had heard firing inshore about an hour or so before. About a

minute after the first shot there came another shot which fell about 50 feet away. I

then ran up the American ensign; he had run up a German flag. He was standing

about 4 or 5 miles northwest. I hauled down the jibs and hove to. The submarine

then came toward us towing a yawl boat belonging to one of the schooners he had sunk

before; finally he came alongside. Two German officers and four men came over the

Edna's railing; they shook hands with us and greeted us just the same as they would




"Now, don't get excited; if you want to change your clothes and get everything of

value to you, we are going to be around here aD hour."

He took possession of all my official papers, which I had encased in one envelope.

When I came from below I noticed that they had placed some little black tubes about

10 inches long and one-half inch in diameter, which looked like sticks of dynamite

and which were tied to ropes extended over the side of the vessel abreast of the mainhatch.

Twenty minutes after the German officer and his crew had boarded the schooner,

and after I had had time to have everything of value placed in the lifeboat, he ordered

us to proceed over to the submarine, and laughingly said:

"You will find some of your friends over there."

Upon being ordered below I found Capt. Sweeney of the Hquppauge and Capt.

Holbrook of theHattieDunn, who said they and their crews had just been taken aboard

the submarine.

The explosion of the bombs aboard the Edna occurred at 2 p. m. in latitude 37° 3(/

N., longitude 74° 52' W. The submarine immediately quit the spot, leaving theEdna in apparently a sinking condition. She did not sink, I understand, but was

towed into Philadelphia.

There were no casualties. The weather was fine and clear; the sea was calm.

Upon the arrival of the crew of the Edna there was a total of 23

prisoners aboard the submarine. The description of what occurred

on the submarine as given byM. H.Saunders, mate of the Haw ppauge,is as follows:

Shortly after the sinking of theHauppauge we were ordered below. We then heard

two shots fired, but nothing else to indicate that another vessel was being attacked.The next we knew was when the captain and crew of the schooner Edna appeared

below decks about 2.20 p. m.

About 2.30 p. m. the submarine started on a course to the eastward, moving at a

speed of about 7 or 8 knots an hour. She remained on the surface until about 4.30

p. m., when a steamer was sighted and the submarine submerged. She remained

submerged for about one hour and a half, moving all the time at about 4 knots an hour.

Coming to the surface about 6 p. m., the submarine maintained a speed about the same

as earlier in the afternoon. At this time all the prisoners were allowed on deck for

about an hour.

During the night the submarine submerged several times but again came to thesurface. On the morning of Sunday, May 26, we were again allowed on deck, and it

appeared that the submarine was heading westward, as indicated by the bearing of the

sun. At 11 a. m. a steamer was sighted and the submarine immediately submerged,

allowing the steamer to pass over her. Upon being questioned, the crew said that the

vessel sighted was a Norwegian steamer bound inshore. After remaining submerged

about two hours the submarine rose again, but the prisoners were not allowed on deck

until later in the afternoon, when they were given liberty for an hour or more. During

the night the submarine spent part of her time running submerged.

Upon coming to the surface on Monday morning, May 27, some of the crew, in refer

ring to the sub chasers they had seen, asked:



29HE CRUISE OF THE U -1 51 .

"This seems like Nantucket here."

Kohler, a sublieutenant, replied:

"You ain't far from there." •

During the night the submarine remained submerged most of the time and appar

ently was headed back to the westward. On Tuesday, May28, there was a fog all day

and the U-boat ran on the top of the water at about her usual speed, blowing her

whistle all the time.8

On Tuesday evening at 8 o'clock a light was sighted and the submarine went down

all night. That evening the commanding officer said he thought he would put ua

ashore next morning.

On Wednesday, May 29, the submarine came to the surface and we were allowed

on deck, but were not permitted to approach the apparatus that resembled a cable-

cutting device. At 2.30 p. m. we sighted another steamer and immediately sub

merged, allowing the vessel—they said it was a Norwegian steamer, inbound—to

pass over us.

When we came on deck the following morning, the coils of wire had disappeared.

During the day they had torpedoes up, overhauling them and trying the pins, wheels,and other machinery of the torpedoes. They even had the crew of theHauppauge

to help get the torpedoes up and to put them back below again. Thursday night was

rough and foggy; the submarine stayed below all night.

The next morning, May31, the submarine came up, but the day was foggy. Another

inbound Norwegian steamer was sighted and the submarine submerged as usual. In

the afternoon the submarine rose to the surface again; the prisoners were kept below

deck. At this time the commanding officer remarked:

"If I run across a small vessel, I will sacrifice it to put you on board it ."

During the afternoon the submarine was on the surface from time to time, but every

time she sighted anything she would submerge. At one time a steamer came so closeto us that the vibration of the propellers could be heard distinctly.

On Saturday, June 1, the submarine cruised all day, watching for a suitable vessel;

during the evening several ships were sighted but no attacks were made

It was on this day that the United States battleships Ohio,NewHampshire, and Louisiana reported the sighting of a submarine.

The three vessels had been at target practice off Hampton Roads

and had reassembled previous to returning to their base when the

periscope of a submarine appeared. The war diary of the New

Hampshire gives the following in regard to the encounter:All ships being stopped, this ship forced ahead and around bow of the leading ship

(Louisiana). At this moment, 11.10 a. m., Ohio signaled submarine alarm, and all

ships went ahead at full speed, separated, and acted in accordance with doctrine.

The commanding officer and a number of others sighted a periscope showing twice,

bearing to the northward and westward and apparently standing toward this ship

and between Louisiana and Ohio. A few moments later numerous observers, includ

ing the commanding officer, sighted a torpedo wake coming down from the northward

and eastward across the bow of theLouisiana and toward the port quarter of this ship.

A few moments later a number of observers saw a periscope to the southward and



3 0 GERMAN SUBM ARINE A CTIV ITIES ON ATLANTIC COAST.

This report is supported by the war diary of the Ohio:

Adisturba nce in the water, bearingfrom thiss hip 270°,distan ta bou t 1,200 yarda,wasobserved,and oncareful examination it appeared tobea wakeofa submarine.Three observers, twoofthem officers, reported positively that the y observeda periscope in this wake. The signals indicat ing submarine werem ade to ships present, the targetwascut adrift, fire wasopenedwfth torpedoba ttery, and maxim um speedwasobtained assoonaspossible. The shipwasgradually brought around toaheading toward Buoy 2CB,distant about 12miles, and we returned to port zigzagging. Inalltwen ty-one 6-inchserviceprojectileswere fired. Firingwasheardfromthe NewHampshireand possibly from oneothervessel. Thelowvisibilitypreventedanaccura te determinat ion of th ispoint. The tugwasdi rected top ick up the target . Twosubmarine chasers invest igated the locali tyaboutwhere the Ohio'sfirst6-inchprojecti les fe ll,which was near the locali ty in which the wake appeared. After consideringthesefacts,th ecom mander inchief wasinformed by radioofthe occurrence.

In speaking of life and conditions aboard the submarine, Saunderssaid:

Thefoodwasgood. In th emorningwehadrollsandfreshbutter . Thebutter wasfine. The bread was black and came in loaves about 3 feet long. Wehadcognacnearlyall thetime.

They had three graphophones onboard. The members of the crewwere cheerfuland joked wi th us, e spec ia lly after indulg ing in cognac. They were apparently young fellows and f requently talked of their mothers . Thecrewexpressed greatsurprise when Capt. Sweeney told them wehad shipped 2,000,000menoverseasandhad 10,000,000moreasreserves.

NoneoftheGermansw ouldgiveusanyinformation astothenu mb erofsubmarinesoverhere. Wewere told that the U-151leftKielonApril 14,1918;thebreadwrappersbore the stamp of April 9. The commanding officer saidh e expected toremainoutabouteightweeks.

At5.30a. m., June2,9wordw aspassed toprisonersb y an officer, who said:"G et ready, there's asailing vessel alongside wearegoingtopu t youaboard of."All the 21menwereorderedupond eck. Alittlelatertheschooner Isabel B. Wiley

and the steamship Winneconneweresighted. Instead of putt ing usaboard ei therof those vessels , they sank them and transferred us to the four boats—one from the Wiley andthreefromthe Winneconne—withthesurvivors.10

In describing the incidents in connection wi th the s inking of theIsabel B. Wiley, an unarmed American schooner of 776 gross tonsowned by the At las Shipping Corporation, which occurred off theJersey coast, Capt.Thorn I. Thomassen, master, stated the followingfacts:

We sailed from PrincessBay anchoragea t 3o'clock p .m .onJu ne 1,passedoutbySandyHookat4p.m.enrouteforNewportNews,Va.,toloadcoalforMontevideo.

1Thetug Anson M . Bangssentanallofrom 1 mileeastofFiveFathomBantlightat 10.30a. m. onthisdate. Thepresence ofthe U-161 intha t placeat tha t timeisimpossible,but it isnotunlikelytha tan



T H E CEU ISE OF T H E U -1 51 . 3 1

At7.50a. m., June 2, I cameon deck and noticed off the port quarter asuspicious-looking object about 1,200 yards away. The craft washeading toward my ship, andasi t approached I not iced i t had twoflagsandasmall Germannaval ensign. Whenabout 1,000 yards offth esubm arinefiredashotandth eshotfellabout100yardsofft hevessel. Ithe nwe ntbelowand gotanAmericanensign,cameondeck,andhoistedit . Then I hovemy vessel toandhauleddownthe j ibs. Theweatherwashazy and theseacalm. Asthe submarine approached us, another shipappeared ahead ofusandthesubmarinefiredashotather.

In them eantimeI orderedth esteward togetsomeprovisionstopu tinthe lifeboatand directed the engineer to get some oil and gasfor the engine. W ithout waitingordersfromth eGermancom manderth eentirecrewgotintothelifeboatandwepulledoff about 100yards, waiting for the submarine to return from the steamship Winneconne. The Winneconnewasstoppedandthecrewgotintothreeboats;thesubmarinethencametowardusandorderedm ylifeboat alongside. Iaskedhimw hathew anted,and he said t ha t he des ired to pu t some men in my lifeboat whom he had on thesubmarine . He put 11men from the submarine on my boat; tha t made 19 men on

board my lifeboat. He o rdered the boa ts from the Winneconneto come alongsideanddistributed 12men from thesub marineonthethreelifeboats. Allfourlifeboats—onefrommyvesselandthreefromthe Winneconne—weretold toshove off.

Thesubmarine commander launched aboat from the submarine and sent three orfourm enwithbombstothe S. S. Winneconne. Shortly after these menre turned to th e su bm arin e, a nd after t he y a rr iv ed t he b om bs on t he Winneconneexploded.In t he meant ime the Wileyhad dri fted somed istance away. The submarine thenheadedtowardthe Wiley. When theygotnear t he Wileytheyputasmallboatover- .board wi th some men in he r. They wen t aboard and hau led down the Amer ican ensign.

Weobserved in the meantime several t r ipsbetween the Wileyand the submarineby the sa ilo rs in the small boat from the submarine ; apparent ly they were tak ingprovisionsfrom th e Wiley.

Before shoving off from the submarine I informed the captain that I did not havesufficient watertotake careofthe extram en,an dhe gavemealargekegofw ater.

I did notseethe Wileyblownu p, bu tabout onehour afterwards Iheard threedist inc t exp losions . When bombed the Wileywas i n 39° 107 nor th l at it ude and 73° 7"westlongitude.

I consulted with thoseinthe otherthreelifeboats and concluded that, as1had theonlypowerlifeboat, it would beb est formetom ake forshoreassoonaspossible, with

aview ofhailing someship and have them advisethelocation ofth e otherthree lifeboatsandtosend them help. I instructed theother threel ifeboats to remain wheretheywere. At5.30myboatsightedthe WardL inesteamer Mexico. Theyp icked usup andsentawirelesstoWashington that threelifeboats, holding50men , werein theposition I indicated. At about 7.30 Monday morning, the S. S. Mexico,which washeading south, stopped the Santiagobound north, and all who werein my lifeboatweretransferred totheS.S. SantiagoandtakentoNewYork,wherewearrivedTuesday,June4,at12o'clock.

Capt. Waldemar Knudsen, maste r of the Winneconne,describedhow his vessel, an unarmed Am erican steamship of 1,869 gross tons,




thought was an American patrol» boat lying alongside the schooner. At 8.10 a shot

was fired and we tried to make ior shore. At 8.12 they fired another shot and a shell

burst about 200 or 300 yards ahead; the Winneconne hoved to in latitude 39° 26' N.,

longitude 72° 50' W. The submarine came closer ready for action and then launched

a small boat. An officer and two men came on board and gave orders to leave the ship

immediately, as they were going to sink her. I asked him how long they were going to

give us, and he said he would give us one-half an hour. He asked me where the

chronometer was, and 1 told him it was my private property, and he said I could take

it . He took the ship's log, ship 's register, and ship 's papers. We launched the two

boats and the crew got in . The chief mate and I were still on board and were under

the impression that we were to go aboard the schooner, but he told us to launch the

small boat and go alongside the submarine, which we did . He placed four bombs on

our ship, one on the fore deck, one on the aft deck, one in No. I hatch, ana one in No. 3

hatch.

1 asked him what was the reason he came over and sank our vessel, and he said he

was sorry to do it, but war was war and that England was to blame. He said that he

had been in that game for four years and had been over here 10 days and this was the

first steamer he had sunk, but he had sunk three or four schooners.

When he went off to the submarine we went alongside and some sailors from blown-

up schooners came off the submarine into our boats. I asked the officer to give us a

tow and he said:

"What do think this is, a passenger boat? "

About 15 minutes after we left the ship we heard three explosions, and the ship sank

about 9.12.

Then we pulled for dear life to the westward. We were rowing all day and all night

unti l 7.40 in the morning, when we were picked up by the S. S. San Sabo, about 25

miles southeast of Barnegat.The submarine was about 230 feet long and 30 or 40 feet wide. She was armed with

two 6-inch guns, one forward and one aft. I saw the figures on the stern, which were

covered with rust and paint which read, "151."

The chief officer, H. Wasch, of the S. S. Winneconne,gave the

following in formation concern ing certa in inciden ts tha t occurred while theGerman officer was onboard:

When the submarine officer boarded the bridge, the captain, the third mate, and

myseil were on the bridge, and the German officer said:

"Good morning, fine weather to-day. You men take to your boats, you had betterget your boats ready."

The captain asked, "What are you going to do?"

"Well ,/' replied the officer, " I got to sink you. War is war, and I can not help it. '

We got the boats ready, and the officer ordered me to the wheel, and said "Star

board " to me. He then looked on the wheel teller and asked: " Is this ship set for

starboard?"

"Yes," I replied. He said "All right ,' ' and gave half speed ahead for about twoor

three minutes or so; stopped again, then slow speed for a little while; then he signaled

to his own commander and ordered the engines of my ship reversed, then he stopped



INTERIOR OFA GERMAN SUBMARINE.

Showingitsinstrumentsandhigh-poweredengines.



PHOTOGRAPHIC COPYOFTHE RECEIPT GIVENTOTHE MASTER OFTHE AMERICANSCHOONER HAUPPAUGE BYKORVETTENKAPITAN V.NOSTITZ.

(Page27.)



TIME FUSE USEDON THE AMERICAN SCHOONER EDNA BY U-151.

(Page27.)



DEPTH CHARGE EXPLODING.



THE CEUISE OF THE U -1 51 . 33

seconds; at 7 o'clock five shots were heard; at 7.12 two shots were fired; at 7 16 woshots were heard.

At 7.40 the next morning we were picked up by the S. S. San Saba.

The first shots heard by the survivors of the Winneconne were

those fired across the bows of the Jacob M. HaskeU, an unarmedAmerican schooner of 1,778 gross tons. Capt. W. H. Davis, masterof the Jacob M. HaskeU, made the following statement concerningthe destruction of his vessel:

On Sunday, June 2, about noon, in a calm sea, the schooner Jacob M. HaskeU,with a cargo of coal, proceeding under sail from Norfolk, Va., to Boston, Mass., atabout 3 miles an hour, and about 50 miles east by south of Barnegat Light, was firedupon by having a solid shot sent across her bows. A few minutes later a second shotwas fired across the ship's bows and the approaching submarine displayed the international signal "Abandon Ship." We made arrangements to abandon, and droppingthe boats into the water prepared to take the crew off. While we were doing this, arowboat containing one officer and six heavily armed seamen rowed alongside. Themen came aboard the schooner and the officer demanded the ship's papers, log book,and crew list, which were delivered. The captain then directed men to hurry andget the crew off. During this time, the bombing party had placed four bombs overthe ship's side—two forward, one on each side, and two aft, one on either side. Thebombs were about 6 inches in diameter and 14 inches in length. They were hungs* that the bombs themselves rested about 2 feet under the surface of the water andalongside of the schooner's hull. The men went about their work in a business-likemanner; the officer was so polite that he almost got on our nerves. Each seaman was

armed with two automatic revolvers and a long vicious-looking knife.

According to Gustave Nelson, a seaman aboard the Jacob M.HaskeU, after the officer had posted his men they stood grinningwhile he demanded the ship's papers. The officer then hauled downthe American flag and wrapped it in paper. Just before the shipwas abandoned, the cook remarked:

"You had better take the food we have on board before you sink the ihip."The officer snapped back: "We don't want your food; we have plenty food of our

own. We don't want your lives either; we want your 3hips. Now get away fromhere; you have three minutes before the ship goes down."Upon leaving the ship,

the statement of Capt. Davis continues,

we were allowed to take our valuables, the chronometer, the sextant, and some sailingcharts. As we were shoving off, an officer on the deck of the iubmarine hailed usand demanded the ship's papers. When told that the papers had been turned over tothe boarding officer, and he ordered us to proceed on our way. A few minutes later theHaskeU was blown up and disappeared with all sails set. As we were starting on ourway, the boarding officer called out:




the Edward H. Cole,an unarmed American schooner of 1,791 grosstons, owned byEdw ard H .ColeCo., Boston. Thefollowing accountsummarizesthestatementofH.G.Newcombe,masteroftheschooner,concerning the sinking of his vessel:

We sailed from Norfolk, Va., on May 30,for Portland, Me.,w ith acargoof 2,516tonsofcoal. I mig htnothavebeenontheregular steamshipcourse,asI hadtofollowGod'sgoodw inds. At 3.10inth e afternoon ofJu ne 2,when about 50milessoutheastofBarnegat Light, wesighted aboat onthe starboard bow about 2,000yardsaway.She c i rc led around and cameaft on the por t quarte r. When she came pre ttyclose I put theglassesonher and sawi t wasa Germanflagshewas flying. Shecameupthen about 150 feet off us and told us to clearawayth e boats,as they weregoingto sink us,which wedid. An officer and someof the men lowered aboatfrom thesubmarine and came on board and demanded the ship 's papers and took them,andwhile in the cabinhetoldmewehad sevenand one-half minutes toclear Hismen

had already placed bombs on the ship, two on each side, and I bel ieve therewereothers. He told me toget some clothes and supplies, but weweretoo busygettingtheboatscleared todoit ;wehadnowaterorcompassinthe boat. Iw entdownintothecabinandgotafewpapers,licenses,barometer,etc.,andshowedthemtotheofficerand askedif i t wasal lr ight . He said, " Sure,goahead." Wegot intothe boatandpul led away, and about 16minutes after weleft, the ship sank.

About anhour after this wewere about 4 miles away from the submarine, whichhad not moved, whenthe steamer hove in sight . The submarine opened fire, firingfiveshots. Thesteamerturned aroundandheaded intheopposite wayandstopped.About15minuteslaterweheardanexplosion,suchaswebeardonthe Cole. I suppose they d id the same th ing to tha t as they d id to ours.

Then werowedaw ay, hearingseveral reports later from thissubm arine. Wewerepickedup bythe Americansteamship Bristolabout8p.m. While wewereboardingth e Bristolweheardthissubmarinestillfiringofftothesouth, Tjudgeabout12milesdistant.

Afewminutesafterwegotonboard,anothersubmarineappearedunderthe Bristol'sstarboard quarter about 500yards away. 1 did not see much of the submarineandd id n ot p ay m u ch a tte nt io n to i t. We saw m uc h driftwood. We a rriv ed in NewYorkat5.37a.m.,June3.

Thesteamerthatthesurvivorsofthe Edward H. Colesawattacked

by the submarine just after their own vessel had been sunk,wastheTexel,an unarmed American s teamship of 3,210 gross tons, ownedand operated by the Uni ted Shipping States Board. In te llinghowhis vessel was at tacked by gunfire and sunk by bombs, Capt. K.B.Lowry, gave the following information:

WesailedfromPonce,P.R.,onMay27enroutetoNewYorkwithacargoofsugar.On Sunday June 2,at 4.21p. m., the first intimation wehad ofsubmarinesoper

atingin the vicinity wasw hen asolid shotwas fired,passing over the vesselforwardof the funnel and r icoehett ing about 200 yards to por t. I immedia te ly went up to



THE CRUISE OF THE TJ-151. 35

on the water to the starboard of the vessel. The first and second shots were fired at

a range of approximately 2,000 yards. After the secoDd shot I discovered another

submarine directly ahead who "was coming to the surface with his- conning tower

clear; a hatch opened and an ofiicer stepped out.

After I stopped he submerged and disappeared. He was afloat about 10 or 15

minutes. He tried to intercept me after I changed my course. As far as I couldsee, it was the same kind of conning tower and had three periscopes.

In this predicament with one submarine astern who had my range to a degree of

disconcerting nicety and another ahead at a distance of about 1,500 yards, further

attempt to escape or to disconcert the enemy seemed not only useless but an act un

necessarily exposing the crew to injury or loss of life. At this time I stopped the en

gines and hove to; soon after this the submarine that had fired the previous shots

opened fire again, firing two shots in quick succession, the first hitting the working

boat on the starboard side under the bridge, carrying it away and shattering the

starboard wing of the upper bridge; the next shot passed over the bridge at a height

of about 10 feet and struck.the water about 100 yards forward of the bow and

exploded.

During this time the first firing submarine drew steadily nearer, encircling the

vessel twice, and shaping a course so as to come up under our stern; he arrived along

side at 4.46 p. m. An officer boarded the vessel with three seamen and an under-

lieutenant. He asked me for any and all papers that the vessel might have. I told

him that being in the coastwise trade that we carried no Navy Instructions or codes,

and that in view of che fact that the vessel had been formerly of Dutch nationality

we carried no register—the Navy Instructions had been thrown overboard previous

to this time. After leaving the ship all the vessel's papers were in my boat in charge

of the second officer. I destroyed the register, manifest, and articles as he headed

toward our boat, rather than let them fall into his hands.After I had concluded my business with the German, I watched (with the permission

of the lieutenant) the placing of the bombs. Lieut. Kohler said: " I know how to do

this, I have been in the business four years."

I asked him where his home was and he replied:

"My home is in Germany, that's all I can tell you."

Three bombs were set at the base of each mast; bombs were also set in the engine

and fireroom, but as to the numbers I can not say. When all the bombs were set, the

lieutenant ordered me to leave as they would explode in 10 minutes. As he pro

ceeded to leave, 1 did as ordered.

The submarine, the one that sank the vessel, came to within 20 feet of the ship.I had a good chance to see the commanding officer. He was about 5 feet 8 inches;

probably weighed about 200 pounds, stocky build; he had light hair, wore a mustache

and Van Dyke beard; he was about 40 years of age and wore a Navy uniform with

long overcoat. His rank was indicated by two gold stripes on his sleeve, slightly

above his wrist. He spoke English.

One of our boats was jammed between the submarine and the ship, and the captain

of the submarine, shouted down:

"You dunder head, why don't you get out of there? I'l l break your boat up!"

I asked Kohler, "What are you going to do when we get in the boats? Are you going

to shell us? "




had encoun tered another victim , and again, at 7.20p .m., arepetition oftheshootingwasheardfrom thistimeun tilwereached thecoast. Wesawnovessel. WereachedAbseconLight andbeached ourboatsatAtlantic CityonJun e 3,whereweweremetby the CoastG uardsofStation 123,and arrangements weremade for accommodationsfor thenight. All the crewof 36men weresaved.

The repor ted s ighting of a second submar ine, off the bow of the Texel,was the first indication th at possibly two enemy raiders werepresent in A merican w aters and w ere acting in com pany. Thebelief was materially heightened for the t ime by the report of Capt.Wal ter M. Ha r t of the American s teamship Bristol, in which hetoldhow he picked u p th e survivors of th e Edward H. Cole and laters ighted a submarine on the afternoon of June 2:

The Bristol left BostononJune 1,enroutetoNorfolk, Va., in ballast. OnJune2,

about 8p .m.wesightedalifeboatwith 11men,crewofAmericanschooner Edward H.Cole,schoonerhavingbeensunkbysubmarineat3.30p.m.about50milessoutheastofBarnegat Light. The crew of the Edward H. Cole waspicked up .

Ata bout 8.20p.m ., when about 38milessoutheast ofBarnegat Buoy, bearing120°true, we s ighted a submar ine about 5,000 yards off the starboard quarter, headingdirectlytowardtheship. Bytravelingatmaximumspeedof 12kno ts,we managedtooutdistancehima ndarriveda tNewYorkat5.37a.m.,J un e3.

The subm arine appeared tobe about 200feet longand tobearmed with tworifles,whichappeared tobeeither 5or6inch.

Taking into consideration the possible mission of the enemy submar inecampaign in American waters, the N avy Depar tment a t thist ime expressed i ts views as follows:

From the chara cteroftheseenem yoperations,thee ne m y'smissionisestimatedtobeprimarily political, with the object ofcausingustoinaug urate suchan offensivecampaignastopreventusplacingournavalforceswheretheywilloperatetobestmilitaryadvan tage. Ifthisestimate oftheene m y'sprim arym issioniscorrect,itisreasonabletoexpect the enemy submarines toshift their baseof operations frequently, bothtogainadded victims and alsotocreateth eimpressionth at moresubmarinesareonthiscoastthanarereallyhere.

Later developments failed to disclose the presence of more thanone su bm arin e o pera tin g off th e coast a t th is tim e, and provedbey on d a reason able d ou bt t h at th e TJ-151continued to operatealone.

The firing heard about 6p. m. by survivors of vesselssunkearlierin the day was tha t employed by the TJ-151 in a tta ck in g th e Carolina, an u na rm e d A m erican steam sh ip of 5,093 gross tons cwned and operated bytheNewYork &PortoRicoSteamship Co. T he fol



THE CRUISE OF THE U -1 51 . 37

chief engineer to open her up all he possibly could and steered, due west by the compass. My position at 6 o'clock by dead reckoning was 38° 57' N., 73° 06/ W., so thatI figured that I was about 13 miles south of where theIsabel B. Wiley was.

I just got my vessel steadied on the new course and scanned the horizon to findthe submarine, when I saw the conning tower and two guns on my starboard quarter

distant 2 miles. Although the weather was quite hazy at the time, I could make outthe outline plainly. She seemed to be rising in the water.Shortly after, about 6 p. m., she fired, the shell falling astern of my ship about 100

yards. The second shot went overhead and landed straight ahead about one-halfship's length, the third shot landing quite close to amidships on the starboard side.

I had already ordered the chief wireless operator to send out a wireless S O Sthat we were being attacked by gunfire from a German submarine. After the secondshot I stopped my ship, ported my helm, and brought her broadside onto the submarine. I hoisted the signals " I am all stopped," and the American ensign.

Realizing the uselessness of trying to escape, not having the necessary speed, I atthe time gave the wireless operator orders to send the foregoing dead reckoning position broadcast, but thinking that if I sent it out he would possibly shell the ship, andhaving many women and children aboard the ship, 1 recalled the order. Later thechief wireless operator informed me that the submarine had wirelessed under lowpower the message: "If you don't use wireless I won't shoot." Our ceasing to usethe wireless, I presume, was the reason for his stopping firing.

After the third shot was fired, the submarine bore down on my starboard bow andwhen he got nearer I saw he was flying the signal "A. B.," abandon ship as quicklyas possible. I had already ordered a boat full out and now I ordered all hands toleave the ship. The women and children were put into the boats first and the menentered after the boats were lowered. After I had seen everyone off the ship into the

boats, and after I had destroyed all the secret and confidential papers, I, myself, gotinto the chief officer's boat, this being the only boat left alongside. Upon clearingthe ship's side, about 6.30 p. m., I was ordered by the submarine commander, both inEnglish and by signals with the hand, to make for shore.

I collected all the boats near me and moored them head and stern one to the other.Being eventually joined by all the boats except the motor lifeboat and lifeboat No.5, we pulled to the westward and out of the line of gunfire as much as we possiblycould.

When the boats were clear, the submarine then ranged alongside the ship on theport side at what seemed a short distance off and at 7.15 fired one shell into No. 2

hold, lower port, as near as I could judge. She then fired another shell into thewireless room and another into the vicinity of my own room behind the pilot house.The submarine proceeded around the ship's bow and seemed to watch her sink fromthere. The Germans did not board the steamer as far as I could see.

The ship remained steady about 20 minutes then listed to port, gradually sinkingon her port side, and finally sank at 7.55 p. m. with the ensign and signals flying.Great clouds of fire and steam arose as she went down.

By this time I had eight made fast in line. The boat I was in was in the lead; Isteered a course to the best of my ability somewhere near west. During the night Iheard other firing and presumed that the submarine was attacking some other ship.




Douglas. Capt. G. Launo, master of the schooner, and his wife and daughter receivedus with fine courtesy and placed all their supplies and stores at our disposal.

After struggling with light and variable winds, the schooner finally anchored offBarnegat Inlet, about 11 a. m., Tuesday, June 3. I sent my chief officer ashore witha message to the owners of my vessel telling them where we were and requiring assist

ance. In the meantime the U. S. S. P. 507 appeared from the south and her captain,Ensign J. A. Fasset, U. S. N. R. F. offered his services to help out in any way wesaw fit. S. P. 507 stood by and towed us to New York, arriving at 4 a. m., June 4.

There were about 160 passengers, as near as I could judge, and 94 of the crew on board

the Eva B. Douglas.

Other survivors from the Carolina were accounted for on June 4.The first naval district reported that 19 people had been picked upand brought to Vineyard Haven; at 1.45 p. m., lifeboat No. 5 containing 5 women and 25 men, landed through the surf at Atlantic

City, N. J., and the same day, the British steamship Appleby pickedup 18 survivors at sea and carried them to Lewes, Del.

All the men and women aboard the Carolina, however, did notreach safety. The first loss of life charged to enemy submarineactivity off the American Atlantic coast was recorded when one ofthe lifeboats containing 8 passengers and 5 members of the crew ofthe Carolina was capsized about 12.15 a. m., June 3, while attemptingto weather the rough seas that arose during the night. At 4 p. m.the same day, when about 60 miles east of Cape May, N. J., theDanish steamship Bryssel picked up a lone motor dory swamped andabandoned, belonging to the S. S. Carolina, which told the mutestory of how its occupants had perished.11

When th6 day of June 2 was done, the TJ-151 had registered ninesuccessful attacks upon unarmed vessels within 75 miles of the coast andbefore the dawn of June 3, had been charged with the loss of 13 lives.

It thus became apparent that the enemy raider was intent uponwreaking her harvest, if possible, from the unarmed and unpro

tected vessels in close proximity to the coast. In anticipation ofthis fact, Admiral W. S. Benson, the chief of Naval operations, onFebruary 6, 1918, had appointed a special Planning Board to studythe situation and to formulate a plan for the defense of the coastand the control and protection of merchant shipping. The planprepared by the board was approved March 6, 1918. (See Appendix,page 143.)

Following the approval of this plan the department forwarded onMarch 28, 1918, to the commandants of Atlantic coast naval districts




seawardands harp ly definedand thelocation ofthe officeha vingjurisdictionovereachareawasgiven.

This was followed on May 4by a circular letter to all shipownersandmasters containing the general plan itself and giving instructions

astothe procedure to befollowed incaseit becamenecessaryfor theNavy to assume control of shipping. (SeeAppendix,page 153.) Aletter wasalsosent on May 8 to commandants informing them that upon thereceipt of the dispatch "Assume control of coastwise shipp ing," they were immedia te ly to pu t in to effect the general p lansprevious ly prepared. Theywere further ins tructed that prior to the receipt of th is d ispatch theyshould assure themselves that a ll theroutingpreliminaries and requirements of coastwiseshipping and themilitary and commercial requirements onshore were fully developed

andwell understood by the various parties interested. (SeeAppendix,page 155.)

On M ay 12, 1918, a no th er le tte r w as issued to co mm an dan tsadvising th at war warningsfor coastwiseshipping would besent outonlyfrom the office ofN aval Operations upon receipt of informationfrom the naval districts and other sources.

Onthem orning ofJu ne 3,therefore, the office ofN aval Operationssent thefollowing dispatch tod istrict com ma ndants:

Assumecontrolofcoastwiseshippingandhandletrafficinaccordancetherewith.Alit tle later in the morning of June 3Naval Operations sent out

thefollowing message:

Unmistakable evidence enemy submarine immediately off coast between CapeHatteras and Block Island. Vessels not properly convoyed advised to make portuntilfurther directed.

Onthesameday,June3,aCoastwiseRoutingOfficewasorganizeda t W ashing ton, D . C , an d b ecam e a p a rt of th e office of N av alOperations.

Thereafter, Navy control of coastwise shipping became an actualfact, and through the Ro uting Office the work ofprotecting shippingbecame centralized and proceeded along the following general plan:

1. Inallcasesthe controlofshippingwithinadistrict willbein the handsofthedistrict commandant. In orderthat the proper coordination maybeobtainedalongthewhole coast, this controlwill follow ageneral doctrine, and the commandantofeaehdistrictwillbeinformed ofthe controlofthose districtsadjacent tohisown.

2.Thebest practiceistohavecoastwiseshipping to proceed by dayhugging theshore and keeping within,the 5-fathom curve or as near it aspracticable. Also,




General instructions were also laid down to cover the routingofsh ipping with in the d istric ts and of coastwise sh ipp ing passingthrough the district.

I n t he case of p rovid ing escorts for convoys passing through

successive d is tr ic ts , the commandant of the d is tric t in which the convoy was made up routed i t and provided an escort for i t throughhis district and arranged with the adjacent district for relief of theescort upon the convoy's a rrival w ith in t he l at te r's jurisdiction,and each successive d is tr ic t in turn a rranged for the relief of itsescort. Thus, convoys proceeding south in the thi rd naval d istrictwere escorted by vessels of tha t district to the vicinity of BarnegatL ight, where the e scorting craft were relieved by vessels of thefo urth n av al d istric t, w hich acted as escort to th e convoy until

reaching the vic inity of Winter Quar ter Shoals, where in turn the escort du ty was assumed by craft attached tothe fifthnav al district, andsoonalongthecoast.

This same pract ice prevailed in the case of northbound convoys.All arrangements were made through the Communication Service,the details of the convoy, the facts relat ing to the rendezvous, andother m atters of a confidential natu re being transm itted in code.

R ou tin g offices w ere e stab lish ed la te r in every A tla ntic portwherein coastwise shipping was likely to or iginate , a t Halifax, in W est I nd ian po rt s, and on the s ta ti on sh ip a t T ampico , Mexico.These offices were controlled from the D istrict Ro utin g Office at thedis tr ict headquarters . They werekep t wellsupplied with the latestin formation as to rou tes to be issued , and dangers to be avoided.Masters of coastwise vessels were required tocall a t these officesbefore leaving port and to receive wri t ten instruct ions which werecarefully explained to them. Theseinstructions specified theroutesto be followed, and areas to be avoided; they also included la test

warwarnings,w ar-warning schedules, and thelocation ofthespeakings tat ionsw ith thes ignals tha t would be displayed at each. Masterswereinstructedtoturnintheirroutinginstructionsattheportofarrivalandsubmittotheroutingofficerareportofdelaysatspeakingstations.

In order tha t no vessel should leave port without proper instructions, guard sh ips a t harbor en trances were r equired to tu rn back anyshipnotpossessingthem.

I t soon developed that mas ters were willing to repor t to routing



T H E CRU ISE OF T H E U -1 51 . 4 1

Routing officers in each port were able to communicate with theshipping in te re sts th ro ug h th e custo ms officials, th e M aritim eExchange, and th e pilot associations. This close cooperationmu tuallybenefited allorganizations concerned.

Thespeakingstatio ns were established at points alongthe coastinorder toexpedite theflowof coastwise shipping from oned istrict toanother, to p rovide a means for communicating with vessels no tequipped with radio, to call vesselsinto harbor if necessary, and todivert vessels w hich m ig ht be proceeding in to danger. Theses ta tionswere manned by Navy personnel and were equipped wi th gearfordayandnigh tsignalingaccordingto asimplecodeof distancesignals.

Vessels were instructed to speak to all s tations along their route,

but they were no t to be delayed . Sand Key and J up it er S ta tionswere called report ing s tat ions. All vessels passing out of the Gulfcoastwisebound were required to speak to Sand Key; all vesselsnorthbound through Old Bahama Passagewererequired tospeak toJ up ite r. T hese s ta ti ons p roved valuab le in d iverting vessels fortheir owners when i t was desired to change a vessel's dest inationaftershehadsailed.

The successful consummation of convoying act ivity according tothe general scheme la id down necessita ted a considerable fleet ofescorting vessels, usually subchasers , of fair speed and armament,andm eant th at thew ork ofthesesmallshipswasto beoneofincessant activity.

T he fact t ha t no convoy was a ttacked off the American coastindicated clearly th at the presence of these smallmen-of-war me antsecuri ty to the very essential cargoes, both of men and the mater ialtransported up and down the coast.

On the morning of June 3 , the day that p lans for the protection

ofcoastwiseshippingwerebeingevolved,theU.S.S. Preblereportedthat she was engaging an enemy submarine in la ti tude 39° 31 'N., longitude 73° 3 1 ' W . T he U . S. S. Henley was immed ia te ly d ispatched to theposit ion indicated, and a t 1 p . m. reported that shehadsearched thevicinityinwhich theU .S.S. Preblehadmadecontact, buthad found nothing.

Though the American tanker Herbert L. Pratt, 7,145 gross tons,wasminedandsunkat3.35p.m.,June3, 2\ milesoff Overfalls Ligh tship,astheresultofthem iningac tivityofthe U-151inthatvicinity,




John W. Wilkins, the first officer "of the Mengel s ta ted t ha t heoverheard a conversa tion between the board ing officer and Capt.Hans T . Hans en in which t he officer said h is name was Kohler;t ha t the submarine had been ou t six weeks and had sunk 17,000

tons, three schooners and three s teamers , off the coast. AccordingtoW ilkins,when thecrewofth eschoonerleft theirshipth e boardingofficer shook hands with them and said, "Sen d Wilson out hereandwewill f inish himin 10minntes. Wilson is the only one prolongingthe war ."

Early next morning thesubmarine at tacked bygunfire andfinallysankwithbombsthe Edward R. Baird, jr., an una rmed Americanschooner of 279gross tons, owned byD .J . Fooks,Laurel , Del. Herlocation was off the coast of Maryland. Approximately 37° 35 'N.,

74°W.They placed bombsonthe schooner, one oneachside, suspended from therigging.

It wasabout 7.30a. m. suntime (8.30a. m. Navy time)w henwe shoved off fromtheschooner. They shovedoff and wen tafter and fired at asteamer which appearedonthe scene. When they shoved off after t he s teamer t hey were towing their dory astern the submarine. The bombsw ent off five minutes after weleft the schooner. Theweatherwasfine and clear; the seawascalm.

While the submar ine was chasing the s teamer mentioned abovethe U . S. S. Hull, a coast to rpedo vessel, hove in s ight; the sub

m arin e im m ediately abandon ed the chase and subm erged. TheHull then picked up the survivors of the Edward R. Baird a t about8.20 a. m., three quarters of anhour after their ship had been sunk.

The dest royer had intercepted an a t tack upon the French tankerRadioleineandlatersentinthefollowingmessagewhichwasreceivedat Norfolk at 11.30 a. m.From: U. S. S . Hull.

To: Commandant Fi fth Naval Dis tr ict .

Rush int ercep ted a tt ack enemy submarine on s teamer Radioleine lat.37°38'N.long. 73°42 'W. 9.30a. m. Took onboard crewof Schooner Edward Bairdbombedandsinking11304.

The commanding officer, R. S. Haggar t , U. S . S. Hull, made the following report concerning the attac k upon the Radioleine:

At8.30a. m ., Jun e4,1918,while thi svesselwasproceedingtostationinaccordancewithradioordersfromth e comm andant,fifthna valdistrict , making 15 knotsspeed,course61°true,latitude37°15'N.,longitude74°W.,soundoffiringwasheardnearlya he ad . F u l l s peed was p u t on a t on ce a n d s ho rtly a fter S O S signal wasreceivedfromthesteamship Radioleineand the steamer whichappeared tobe firingwasseen



THE CRUISE OF THE TJ-151. 4 3

the direction of the sailing vessel dead ahead about 3 miles distant. We sighted an

object in water and headed for same; it proved to be a dory containing crew of Ameri

can schoonerEdivardR. Baird,Jr. They reported their ship fired upon and bombed

by German submarine and boarding officer had forced them to abandon ship.

We searched the vicinity for submarine, but found nothing. We went close aport

the schooner, which was still afloat, to determine if she could be saved. The executiveofficer of this vessel (U'. S. S.Hull) went on board with crew of schooner and found

decks awash and holds full of water from bomb holes inside; the vessel was floating,

due to the cargo of lumber. A device believed to be a German percussion fuse igniter

was found on board and is forwarded herewith. We took the crew of the schooner on

board once more and circled in the vicinity searching for the enemy. We sighted

full-rigged ship Boon and warned her out of the danger area. We remained in the

vicinity until 1 p. m., when we proceeded toward station."

The master of the French tanker Radioleine in reporting the at

tack on his vessel said that on June 4, at 7.10 a. m., in latitude 37°

10' N., longitude 74° W., they were attacked by a German submarine which chased them for an hour, at the end of which time the

American torpedo boat Hull appeared in answer to S O S calls of

the Radioleine, and the submarine gave up the chase. A number

of shots were fired by the submarine and the Radioleine returned

the fire. The Radioleine finally exhausted her supply of ammunition.

After abandoning the chase of the Radioleine about 8.30 a. m.,

the submarine continued her route southward and about 4.15 p. m.

when in latitude 37° 12' N., longitude 73° 55' W., made an attackupon and subsequently sank the Norwegian steamship Eidsvold,

an unarmed vessel of 1,570 tons , chartered by the United Fruit Co.

Capt. J. Johnson, master of the Eidsvold, told how his vessel was

overhauled and sunk by the submarine:

On June the 4th, at 4.15 p. m. in latitude 37° 12' N. and longitude 73° 55' W., a

submarine appeared off the starboard bow about 500 yards. She fired one shot over

the steamer; we then stopped our engines. He signaled me to send a boat over to

the submarine; one of the mates, three seamen, and I took the ship's papers over to

the submarine and boarded her. I told him we were bound from Guantanamo, Cuba,to New York with a cargo of sugar. When he heard that it was sugar for New York

he said that he was sorry that he had to sink the ship.

I then asked him for a reasonable length of time to get into the lifeboats, as I had

my wife on board. He stated that he would give me as much time as it would take

to get into the boats. I then returned to my ship and at 5 p. m. the boats got clear of

the ship.12

They then fired three shots into the starboard side, then turned around and fired

three shots into the port side, all shots taking effect at the water line. My ship dis

appeared at 5.20 p. m.

The submarine remained in view till dusk. She seemed to follow us slowly wait



4 4 GEEMAIST SUBMAKINE ACTIVITIES OJST ATLANTIC COAST.

when she torpedoed, wi thout warning, the HarpatMan an unarmedBritish steamship of4,588 tons gross, enrou te from London toNewp ort N ew s in b alla st. T he m a ste r of th e HarpatMan supplied thefollowing information to the commander, Newport News, Division

Transport Force:The HarpatManwassunk without warningb y atorpedo from an enemy submarine

at 9.30a. m .Ju ne 5, Cape He nry bearing N. 70W. (t rue) 90miles.13 The ship was torpedoed in la ti tude 36° 30 ' N . , 75° W.; sank in about seven minutes . Allhands were saved. One member of t he c rew, a Ch inaman, was s t ruck between the eyesbyapieceofthetorpedothat sunkth eship. Thecaptain did notseethe submarinetillaftert he shipwashit, and onlyafew ofthe crew sawth e torpedobefore itstruck.

T h e crew got away i n t he b oa ts . T h e s ub m ar in e c om m an de r called t he boatsalongsideandaskedifall weresaved and if any were sick; he alsoasked if theyhadfoodand water. The Chinamanwasgiven t reatment aboard the submarine andwas

t hen returned aboard the lifeboat. The submarine commander gave each boat a bucket ofwater and asked the captain of the vessel if he had senta wirelessandonbeingtoldth atthere had beennotime,gavethe boatsthe coursetothenearestland.

The crew of the HarpatMan was picked up by the Brit ish steamerPotomaconJune 6, at 10.30p .m .

At 3 p . m ., June 5 , the American schooner Ella Swift s ighted thesubmarine in latitude 36°30 ' N. and longitude 73°40' W.;less thananhour later the American whaler Nicholsonwash alted at thesamespot. T he maste r of the whale r, u rged the submarine officers to

spare his ship saying tha t i t would ruin him financially if the vesselw as d estro yed . A fter a brief conference th e su bm arin e officersinformed h im tha t he might p roceed and o rdered h im away fromthe vicinity.

T he sam e d ay th e JJ-151 sank the Norwegian s teamer Viriland,1,143 gross tons, in lat i tude 36°32' N. and longitude 73°58' W.

The Vinland sa iled from Guan tanamo for New York wi th a cargo of suga r. On June 5 a t 6 p . m. a German submarine sen t a shot over the sh ip which landed 300 yards on the o ther s ide. The submar ine was abou t 3 mile s away and one point

abaft theportbeam. I w entaboardth esubmarineandthey toldm etoget theboatsready asquickly aspossible . I went back tom y shipand told every man toget asmany clothesashe could. About thesametun e oneGerman officer andfouror f ivemencameaboard. They tooktwobagsofsugar. After that th ey placed abombontheoutsideabout2feetbelowthewaterl ine. It wascylindricalinshapeandpointeda t both ends and they d ropped i t down wi th a p i ece of rope. The a t ti tude of theGermans while aboard wasvery nice; the y said they were goingtogiveusasmucht ime as they could and i t was20minutes after they came aboard before weleft theship.

One of the men s truck a match and l igh ted the fuse i t be ing a fuse bomband i t



THE CRUISE OF THE TJ-151. 4 5

On June 6, at 10 a. m., the British S. S. ManteUa reported a sub

marine in latitude 36° 2' N., longitude 73° 41' W.

On the same day at 2 p. m. the American steamshipCacique

reported sighting a submarine in latitude 31° 5' N., longtitude 75° 35

W. This position, however, was too far south and too far west atthe time to have been that of an enemy submarine.

On June 7, Coast Guard Station No. 115 reported that a submarine

had been sighted in latitude 39° 41'N., longitude 74° 5 'W. On

the same date the British S. S. Huntsend reported an oil patch in

latitude 39° 45' N., longitude 73° 42' W. These positions were also

too far north to have had any connection with the enemy submarine,

which, even on this date, was still operating further south as shown

by the fact that on June 8, at 5.30 a. m., in latitude 36° 25' N., longti

tude 74° 20' W., the submarine captured the Norwegian S. S. Vindeggen, a vessel of 3,179 gross tons owned by Jens Folkmans hailing

fromSkien, Norway, and after transferring part of her cargo of copper

to the submarine, sank the steamship on June 10, at 11.07 a. m., in

latitude 36° 25' N., longtitude 73° 20' W.

The statement of Edward Ballestad, master of the Vindeggen,

covers the story of his experience with the submarine:

The steamship Vindeggen left Chile May 31 bound for New York to discharge a

cargo of wool, copper, and salted skins. Everything went all right until June 8,*5.30 a.m. in 36° 25

/ N., 74° 20' W., when a submarine immediately came to the

surface in easterly direction about three-quarters mile off. The submarine fired

two shots and hoisted signals to stop immediately. We lowered the port-side boat

and it went over to the submarine with the ships papers. During the work of lowering

the starboard boat some Chinamen jumped into it and it capsized and one of the

Chinamen was drowned. At 7.30 a. m. we sighted another steamer and the submarine

proceeded down to the eastward and ordered us to follow. At 11.30 the submarine

came back to us. It was the intention of the submarine to sink the ship right away

but when they found out we had copper they decided to bring it over to the submarine.

At 9 a. m. on the 9th they commenced bringing copper to the submarine and they

continued until 8 p. m. Next day they began work again at 5 in the morning and

continued until 11. Then the submarine commander gave orders that the ship

should be sunk and said he would tow us to port. They planted bombs and in seven

minutes the ship disappeared. The submarine then proceeded westward with the

boats in tow. At 6.30 p. m. another steamer was sighted and the captain of the sub

marine gave us orders to cast off the ropes and sail in a westerly direction. He went

for the steamer and sank her; he was back in half an hour. The submarine picked

us up again and towed us till 8.30 p. m., when they sighted another steamer and cast

us off again and submerged.

They did not say how many tons of copper they took from my ship, I should say




American s teamship of 2,504 tons gross, en rou te to Boston fromCubawith acargoof 25,000bags of sugar. Thecrew of thes teamertook to thebo ats at once and the submarine comingwithin 100feetof the ship sank her wi th gunfire in la t itude 36° 16 ' W., longitude

73° 50' W., at 8.15 a. m.,J un e 8, 1918.Early in themorningof June9 theU.S. S. Batt leship South Caro

lina^ with theU.S.S.C. No. 284,sighted and fired upon aperiscope,S. C. No. 234 dropping depth bombs in the neighborhood of GapeHenry , and on the a fternoon of t he nex t day t he Henrick Lund,a Norwegian vessel, of 4,322 gross tons, was overhauled and sunk bythe TJ-161, 1Sin lat i tud e 36°30 ' N. , longitude 71° 29' W .

OnJune10,at6.40p.m.,theCoastGuardStationNo.82reporteds ighting aperiscope bound east. At 7.22p. m.on thesamedate theU.S. S. L-5 repor ted a submar ine running awash 2 miles dis tant in lat i tude37°3 2' N. , longitude 73°49' W . At 9.22 p. m. theU.S.S.L-5 r eported tha t the submarine fired a to rpedo which crossed the bow of the U. S. S. L-5 a t 10 yards d i s tan t . On J^une 10 when in l at it ude 39° 15' N ., long itude"74° 15' W ., t he steamsh ip Sodralsighted a submarine and at the same t ime saw anAm erican shiponthes tarboard bow turn her guns on the object and f ired threeshots,oneof which fell close to the object. Theobject disappeared;seven

minutes later the same steamerfiredfive,moreshots . A submarinewasreported by a fishing boat and an aeroplane onJu ne 10,9miles'no rtheas t of W inte r Quart er Shoals. On t he same da te the CoastGuard S ta tion No. 83 s ighted what appeared to be a periscope 2\miles southeast of F i re I sl and . I t will be seen tha t all these positions indicated a re a t po in ts too fa r nor th to have any connection wi th the TJ-151, which was s ti ll operating farther south in la titudeabout 36°30' N.

Thewhereabouts of the TJ-151 during the two days tha t followed

the sinking of the Hendrik Lund m u st re ma in an open question.Therew erenum erous reports of s ightings, but none of these canbeaccepted as authentic.16 On the morn ing of J une 13, however, theBritishsteamer LlanstepTian Castle encountered theraide rwhichgaveup the chase of t ha t vessel to a tt ack the Keemun, another Britishshipwhich appeared nearer at hand. Capt .Chopeof the LlanstepMnCastle reported his escape to the aid for information at New Yorkasfollows:

/



THE CRUISE OF THE U -1 51 . 4 7

about 10 miles off, closing in on the ship. When it was noted that the submarine was

closing in my vessel turned away, so as to keep the submarine astern. He did not

follow us, however, for about five minutes, and changed his course to the westward.

He again started for us after another five minutes, and then he changed his course to

the eastward. I noted two big guns on the submarine, one forward and one aft. She

had a rounded stern and a raised bow, and two periscopes which looked like a funnelat that distance. My gunner reported to me, after looking at her through his sight,

that she had removed two clows from her fore deck since we had first sighted her.

When we had the submarine astern of us the S. S.Keemun appeared on our port bow.

I hoisted the " B " flag, with a ball underneath and the proper signal, "North."

TheKeemun apparently did not see our signal, as she did not answer it . Therefore

I sent out an "a llo" message, giving the ship's position. The Keemun at that time

was astern of us, about 5 miles distant. The Marconi officer on the ship at this time

reported that he had picked up a message that theKeemun was being shelled. I noted

three shots fall near the Keemun. The Keemun returned the submarine's fire. The

submarine was about 300 feet long.

The report of the Master of the Keemun, Thomas Collister, supple

ments that of Capt. Chope, and tells of the final escape of hisship:

On the evening of June 13th at 6.50 p. m. after receiving a wireless message from the

steamship Llanstephan Castle stating that a submarine was in latitude 38° 02/ N.

longitude 72° 47' W., we sighted a submarine while in latitude 37° 51 ' N. and longi

tude 70° 50/ W. The submarine was about 7 miles from my vessel. It was not sub

merged and was making about 12 knots, about the same speed my vessel was running.

Ten shells were fired by the submarine. My vessel opened fire at 7,000 yards and at

11,000 yards the last shot was fired. After our last shot was fired the submarine

apparently came to a standstill.

On the next day the Norwegian bark Samoa, of 1,138 tonsgross,owned by Jacobsen & Thon, Norway, bound from Walfich Bay,

South Africa, for Perth Amboy, N. J., with a cargo of wool and

copper ore, was overhauled in latitude 37° 30' N., 72° 10' W. by an

enemy submarine and subsequently sunk by gunfire at 8 a. m.

The following gives the summary of a statement made by Harold

Grostock concerning the sinking of theSamoa:

I do not know the exact latitude, but the captain of the German submarine told uswe were 200 miles off the Virginia coast. We sighted her about 5 a. m. while she

was cruising around us on the surface until about 6 a. m., when she came within 100

yards of us.

She gave us 15 minutes to leave the ship. She fired a shot across our bow to stop;

then she gave us the signal to get into lifeboats.

After we had gotten into the lifeboats she went around on the west side and put

three shots into our vessel; theSamoa sank on the third shot.

The captain of the Samoa asked the commander of the submarine what latitude

and longitude we were in and the submarine gave him a paper which stated that the




Paul Jones and subsequently landed at Norfolk by boat. Theweather was fine and clear. There were no casualties .

Onthe afternoon of June 14, at 5o 'clock,when in lat itude 38°02'N., 71°40' W., the enemy submarine accounted for her next vessel

when she a tt acked and sank by gunfire the Kringsjaa, aNorwegianbark of 1,750 gross tons, owned by Knudsen &Christ iansund, Norway, which left Buenos Aires on April 25, 1918, en route to NewYorkw ith acargo of flaxseed.

The captain of the^ Kringsjaa requested the submarine officers togivehis boats a towtowardland. TothisLieut . Kohler replied thatt h a t w as im possible; t h a t th ey h ad o th er b usin ess, and th at thesubmarinewasboundnorth. H ethen toldCapt.GunwaldMagnusdelthat he was 150miles from the coast and to s teer a course westby

north in order to reach the coast as soon aspossible. He thensaid,"I will repor t tha t you have been sunk, by wireless, in order thatyou may be rescued." Capt . Magnusdel of the bark then heard the wireless of the submarine cracking.17

OnJune 15at 7.30p.m.theB ritish S.S. City of Calcuttasentinan" a l l o " advis ingt ha t shehad s ighted asubmarine in lat i tude 39°08'N., longitude66°18' W.

After the s inking of tne Kringsjaa on J u ne 14, th e TJ-151 began

h er ho mew ard jo urn ey . T he fact t h a t th e City of Calcutta sighteda submarine in lat i tude 39° 08' N . , longitude 66° 18' W. onJune15indicates th at onth atd atesub marinewaswellonherhomewardwayandwasnot s ightedbytheBri t ishs teamship Aras onJune 15,orbythe Princess MatoikaonJune16, or theU.S. S. MexicanonJune17,aswasreported atthe time. Theassumptionisfurther substantiatedby t he fact t ha t on J une 18, a t 9.20 a. m ., t he B ritis h steamshipDwinsk, 8,173 gross to ns, com m anded b y L ie ut. Com mander H.Nelson, R. N .R. , was torpedoed, and subsequently sunk by gunfire

about two hours later in lat i tude 38° 30' N. , longitude 61° 15'W.About two and one-half hours after the Dwinsk had been aband

oned th e U . S. S. Von Steuben a pp eare d on th e scene and boredown on the lifeboats . She suddenly s topped, however, avoidinga torpedo and openedfire on aperiscope, firing 19shots and droppingdepth charges.

OnJun e 19theAm erican steamship Advance repo rted the sightingofw hat appeared to be asubm arine at 4.15 p.m . in latitude 38°32'



GERMAN SUBMARINE ATSEA.



AGERMAN SUBMARINELYINGNEAR ASHIPWHICH HASJUST BEEN BOARDED BT THE SUBMARINE'SMEN.



SMOKE-SCREENDEFENSE.



WAR ONHOSPITAL SHIPS.




sinceonJune 22,when inlatitud e 39°30' N., longitude 53°4 0' W.,the U-151 atta ck ed and sank th e Belgian tra nsp ort Chillier a t12.30p.m.

The Chillier,avesselof2,966grosstons,wasboundforNewYork

inballas t. Shewas armed with " an oldFrench 90-mm. gun, whichcouldbeloadedwithpowderand cartridges," andwiththis antiqu atedpiece she fired several ineffective shots at the submarine before shesurrendered. T he d ay after th e Chillier had been abandoned oneofher lifeboats with six mem bers of the crew aboard foundered andallwerelost.

On the morning of June 23 the raider scored another success, thevictim being the Norwegian steamer Augvald, a vessel of 3,406 grosstons. Thefollowingaccoun toftheattac kisgivenbyAlfred Pedersen

the chief engineer of the merchant ship:On Sunday morning about 9 o 'clock in lat itude 38° 30/ N., longitude 53°42 ' W.,

thesubmarinem adeitsattack by gunfire. Whenwefirstsawthe submarineshewasabout4 miles away. Westopped the engines . She cameabeamof usand began to fire again . No th in g s tr uc k us till ab ou t 11 o'clo ck. We a ba nd on ed s hip a bo ut9.30before the shots began to st rike the vessel. At about 11o 'clock the submarinefired25or30shotsinto the vessel. Wehadonlytwolifeboats. Wehad grub, water,andeverythingintheboat I wasin,bu twelostit alland them ate,too,whenth e boatcapsized . The f irst t ime she capsized we lost our compass. There were 14 men in theboatwhensheleft the ship;after shehad capsized thethird timetherewereonly

11 left. Wesawmany s teamers , bu t none of them would p ick us up . Wewere notpickedupuntil July4. Theonlythingwehad toeatafter the boatcapsizedonJune25wassmallbitsofseaweedandli t t lefishwecaughtinthe seaweed. Wehad plentyofrainw aterfor awhile, but later wehad to usesalt water.

The Augvald was the l as t v ic tim of the imemorable cruise of theU-151. The raider did not ceaseher efforts to add to the l ist of hervictims, however, and the la st pa r t of her homeward cruise wasm arked by unsuccessful a tta ck s and ru nn in g engagem ents w ithAmerican and British vessels.

OnJune25at7a.m.theBritishsteamship Glenlee,4,915tonsgross,wasshelled by submarine in lat itude 40°N., longitude 49°W. TheGlenlee was saved by her own guns. There were no casualties.On t he same day a t 7p . m . the U . S. S. Dochra,4,309 gross tons,reportedbeingshelledbyasubmarineinlatitude40°25'N.,longitude47° 2 9' W . T he Dochra also escaped.

TwodayslatertheU.S.S. Lake Forest, 4,100tons displacement, aNaval Overseas Transportat ion Serv ice vessel, a t 6 a. m. sightedthe U-151 in latitude 41° 12' N., and longitude 44°0 3' W., and was




marine was also repor ted a t 8 a . m. by U. S. S . Minneapolis,givingthe posi tion 42° 17' N. , 41°22' W.

OnJuly2U.S.S. Lake Erie-sighted the subm arine inlatitude40°12' N ., long itude 33° 55 ' W . T hree days la te r a t 1.50 a. m. the

radio station at Bar Ha rbor intercepted an SOSfrom ashipwhosename is not g iven, advis ing that she was being chased in latitude45° 4 0' N ., longitude 25° 3 0 ' W . O n th e n ex t day the Britishsteamship Nevassa, 9,071 tons gross , repor ted that she was beingchased by an enemy submarine in l a ti tude 49° 06 ' N., longitude 26°51' W.

After the a t tack on the Nevasa the TJ-151 passed from thesceneof submarine activit ies and no more is heard of her unti l thesurrender at Harwich after the s igning of the armistice. Accordingto

the repor ts to the Br it ish Admiral ty she reached her base early in August andremained thereunti l thewarcametoan end.

Al though the cruise of the TJ-151 was not successful in drawinghome any of the naval vessels of the United S ta tes operating in foreign wa te rs, i t must be admitted t ha t the ra ider fulfilled theexpectations ofth eG erman highcom mand inherroleasacommercedest royer , s inking 22 vessels, the aggregate tonnage of whichexceeded52,000grosstons.

THE CRUISE OF U-156.

The U-156, another subm arine of the converted mercantilecruisertype left her base a t Kie l for American waters on or about June 15, 1918 under the command of Kapi tan leu tnant von Oldenburg.After makingherw ayacross theN orth Sea and around theShetlandI slands she engaged in her first offensive on the 26th , when she torpedoed and sank theBri tish s teamer Tortuguero, 4,175grosstons,in latitude 55°5 0' N., longitude 15°30 ' W.

The next encounter l8 of her voyage took place late in the afternoon of J u ly 5 when she a tt acked t he U . S. S. Lake Bridge, 1,984gross tons, bound from Lamlash , Scotland , for Hampton Roads,in l at it ude 43° 35' N ., long itude 43° 50 ' W . T he submarinehaddisguised herself as a s teamer and i t was not unti l she housedher false funnel, headed directly for the Am erican vessel at highspeedand openedfirea t 10,000y ards th a th er enemy charac ter wasrecognized. The Lake Bridge a t once returned the fire and a running



5 1HE U-156.

Two days .l ater the U-156 sank the .Norwegian bark Marosa,1,987 gross tons, in lat i tude 40° N., and longitude 50°3 5' W. Thevessel, which was proceeding from Newport News to Montevideowith a cargo of 3,171 tons of coal, received her first warning of the

presence of the submar ine when a sho t was fired across her bow.She hove to ; the crew took to the l ifeboats and rowed to the submarine where the sh ip 's papers were examined and the officersquestioned regarding the precautions taken to protect the Americancoast, the location of Am erican war vessels, and the feelings of theAmericanpeopleinregard to the war.

From the report of Andreas A. Nyhus, captain of the Marosa,totheA merican Na val Intelligence officers, at Halifax:

Thehourandda yofattac kwas4.30p .m.,7Ju ly, 1918. The positionwaslatitud e

40northlongitude50.35west,the MarosabeingonatrueNE.course,closehauledonthestarboard tack, agood lat i tude having been observed at noonand agood p. m. l ine of posi tion obtained at 2. She carr ied a coal cargo of bi tuminous, 3,171 tons.Thefirstintimationthatasubmarinewasinthevicinitywasashrapnelshotstrikingthewaterclosetothe Marosa. Thesubmarine wasseen on the surface dead in thewater,threepointsonthe portbowofthevesselab out3milesoff. The Marosa thenbacked herm ainand mizzen yards. Thismovement madethesubmarinebearbroadon thevessel'sstarboard bow. Thesubmarine then f ired another shot , which wentoverthe ship, and struck the water closeto, splinters from the shrapnel shell flyingbackonboard. The Marosa thenloweredhertwolifeboats. All theship'scompany,

including the captain, left the ship and rowed toward the submar ine . The smallscullingboat wastheonly other boat left onboard. It tookthe boatsan hour orsotopull up to thesubmarine. Themate 'sboatgot alongside f irst . When the captainofthe Marosagotalongsidein the boathe wasin, hewasordered on board thesub marineand told to bring the ship 's papers and logbook. Thesecond officer of thesubmarine interrogated him as to the present and previous voyages of his vessel .Thecaptain of the submarine wasnot seenondeck during the entire t ime thesubmarine was in sight. The second officer and one sailor did all the interrogating inbroken English. The ship 's papers and logbook were kept by the submarine, andthecrewlistand all the passports ofthe crew and the captain's pocketbook, whichcontained about $40 in American currency, was re turned to h im. The submarine

then tookthe boatsin tow backto the shipand ordered the Marosa's crew to lowerthe remaining scull ing boat and bring i t back to the submar ine . The submar ine 's crewthenm adeseveraltripsinthisboatcarryingabagwhichthey handled carefullyinthefirst trip, andw hich I tooktobebombs. They searchedth e vessel sendingamanaloftonthe mizz enwithap airofbinoculars asalookoutandtookoff thehatch es.Theythenleft theship. Mymenwerethenperm itted togoonboardandtakeeveryth ing they wanted . We took p rovis ions, o ilskins, and p len ty of wa te r. We leftour ship thesecond t ime about 6p. m . and pulled off and stoodb y. They did notsinktheshipaslongaswecouldseenorwereany explosionsheard. The ywerestillusingoursmallboattotransfer whatI believed wereprovisions. At7p.m. having



5 2 GERMAN SUBM ARINE A CTIVITIES ON ATLANTIC COAST.

boatsfrom this vesselwereseen, and aswecouldobta innoassistancefromthissinkingvessel weheaded on a course NW. by W.m agnet ic . The condition of theweatheronJuly 7waslightsoutheasterly breeze, clear, and it blew up duringthenightwithheavy rain squal ls . There wasnolossof life or injury toany one. Thevessel wasnotarmed. Notoneofthesurvivorssawm yvesselactuallysink,nordid weseethe

full rigged vesselIsightedth ene xtday actuallysink. The exactpositionofthesecondvessel, I am unable togive. All my efforts werebe nt ongettingawayfromthevicinity.

The following is a s ta tement of S. E . Hol te, chief officer of the Norwegian bark Marosa, as received from theU nited States NavalIntelligence officer of Halifax, Nov a Scotia:

Wehad alat itudeat dinner t ime of39°54 / N. and longitude 50°56 'W. About 5p .m ., localappa rent time ,after sailing25milesE N E . (true) from thenoonposition,Iwaslyingin bedw henI heard a shot . I immediately came out and wentuponthe

poopdeckand sawa subm arine lyingabout 3milesto ourwindward onthestarboardside. I o rdered a ll hands on deck r igh t away. We lowered down the top-gallant^ sails,brailedup themainsail,braced back them ainand mizzen yards,and Iorderedone-ha lf the c rew to ho is t out the li feboats . They were swung out. The steward and cookgotprovisionsin to the boatsa bout five m inutes after thefirstshots. Whenwewerenot quite finished they fireda nother shot, which landed about 15yardsfromthe starboard lifeboat, and pieces ofshrapnel flew closeto the vessel.

Thesubmarinethenboredownonourvesseluntiltheywereone-halfmileoff,whenthey letusgo,andfiveG erman sailorsarmed with revolvers came onboardmyboat.Ongoingalongside,th ey toldusth at the y wouldgiveus 20m inu tes togetouroilskins.

Weput more provisions into ourboat and our oilskins. Then they asked meif thegigup forward wasany good, and I told them yes; they then ordered metoputherintothe water, which I d id. Aswehad all wecouldget , wepulled away, laying offhalf a m i le from our vesse l in our boats un t i l darkness set in . All we could see ofwhatthesubmarine'screwwasdoingwashoistingarticlesinthegigbythestarboarddav it. The lastwesawofthem waswhenthe yp ulled from ourshiptothesubmarineand they werest il l usingthegig. The kind ofstores they took, I donot know,but they werecarrying bombsw ith them orsomeapparatus with longwhite lanyards onthem. TheGermansailors,whoboarded theshipw ent through the cabin, andtherest of theship. They stationed aman onthe mizzenroyal yard asa lookout withlargepowerful binoculars, and the y alsotoreall the hatche s off.

Description of the submarine.— About200feet long,one conn ing tower, twomastsforwireless (smallstumps), largeguns, about 8-inch, white square withred cross onitabout 4 inches square on conning tower , exact ly l ike the Red Cross. Twopatentanchors forward, a ll rus ty . Two per iscopes, one of them telescopic . Amidships,fore and aft, were life rai ls . Hul l pa in ted gray and b lack . Guns and everything e lse pa in ted in the same way. Deck about + inch th ick . Had b ig holes about1J feet in diameter around thestern. Aswecame up to the submarine they askedusiftherewasanyone elseonboard,and wetold them no. They unloaded theirguns,usingawoodenrammerabout10feetlongtoejecttheshellsfromtheguns. Twomen,having longwires leading below deck with ear pieces on their heads, walkedabout



THE TJ-156. 53

About 9 p. m., after dark, we proceeded on our course NW. by W. and lost sight ofthe vessel. They gave us no course, but told my captain to steer to westward andeorne one on board the submarine shouted, "Good trip and God bless you, you are800 miles from land." We then steered NW. by W. to gain north of the Gulf Stream.

About 4 p. m. the next day we sighted a full-rigged sailing ship with only the lower

topsails on her. Everything else was lowered down. The mainsail was brailed up,foresail and cross jack were furled. We bore down on it to within 2\ miles. Shelooked suspicious, so we waited a while to see what it was. We waited there for awhile and then started, keeping on our course for about a quarter of an hour. Suddenlythe ship disappeared and we could not have been more than 3 miles off at the timewhen we saw the same submarined. Just as we were looking they saw us and steeredNW. by W. magnetic. At night we saw some lights, whether they were the lightsfrom the submarine or the lights flashing from the boats of the full-rigged ship, I donot know. The lights were not flare-ups, they were flashes, caused either by signalor motions of the seaway. Heavy rain, squalls, a very rough sea, and a westerly wind

had set in by this time.The next day we saw nothing, and the day after that we saw nothing. The nextmorning there was a light southwesterly breeze, and we sighted the barque Sorkness,home port, Farhsund, Norway, and we pulled up to that ship. They picked us up,took our boats on board, and carried us 200 miles toward the Nova Scotia shore. Onthe same day w"e sighted the schooner Linda, from Liverpool, and the captain of myvessel went over and asked them if they would take us to Nova Scotia. He said hecould take the captain and a couple of men, but not all. The captain then came backand Capt. Daniels of the barque Sorkness said he would take us closer to the NovaScotia shore.

We shoved off again in our two boats, loading up with provisions again, and duringthe next two days we saw several fishing vessels from Newfoundland. We held ourcourse and kept the boats together so that they would not get lost in the fog. A largeBritish man-of-war came up to within 10 yards of us and nearly ran us down. Theysaw us and altered their course. She was using her siren constantly. Our boats gotmixed up with the propeller wash. They never answered our signals and at the timeone could not see more than 200 feet ahead on account of the fog. We landed on thenight of the 16th, at 11 p. m., at Cranberry Island.

The second officer of the submarine told me that they had to sink the ship, as shewas chartered by an American firm.

The vessel which the captain and first officer of the Marosa sawsunk on July 8 was the Norwegian schooner Manx King, 1,729 grosstons, bound from New York to Rio de Janeiro with general cargo,and was sunk in approximately latitude 40° north, longitude 52°west. The captain of the Manx King protested against the seizureof his vessel, pointing out that she was of neutral register, but thesubmarine officer insisted that the type of cargo carried (oil, cotton,barbed wire, sheet iron, and shoes) was contraband and that thevessel must be destroyed. As in the case of the Marosa the crew of



5 4 . GERMAN SU BM ARIN E A CTIV ITIES ON ATLANTIC COAST.

in a westerly direction, saying that he would be sure to bepickedup by a pass ing ship ," ordered the l ifeboats to get underway. Thecrew of the Manx King did not see their vessel s ink, as shedisappeared in the fog a fte r they had gone 2 mi les.

After the sinking of the Manx King nothing was learned of thewhereabouts of the TJ-156

20 unt i l an allo was sent out on the17thb y th e U . S. S. Harrisburg, giving her posi tion as lati tude 40°10'N., longitude 68° 55 ' W. The submarine , which was lying on thesurface, made no effort to a t tack, and after remaining in viewfor10minutes submerged at a distance of abou t 10,000ya rdsfromtheHarrisburg.21

F ou r day s after she w as sighted b y th e Harrisburg the raiderra ised a s torm of exci tement a long the seaboard by a ttacking the tug Perth Amboy, 435gross tons, and her tow of four bargesinsightof the Massachusetts coast and within a few miles of the Chathamnaval a ir s ta tion. The war diary of the first naval d is tr ic t givesa graphic account of the a t tack:

AGerman submarine a t tacked the tug Perth Amboy of th e Lehigh Valley R.E., and her four barges, 3 miles off Orleans, on the southeastern elbow of CapeCod,Mass., a t 10.30 a . m. t o-day. The one -s ided ba t tl e l as ted one hou r and one-half,

The tug wasburned toth ew ater 's edge by shel l f ire, while thebarges LansfordandNo. 766, No. 403, and No. 740were sunkb y gunfire. The bargesw ereboundfrom

Gloucester, Mass. , for New York, N. Y., and only one was loaded, her cargocons is ting of s tone . Of the 41persons, including 3 women and 5 ch ildren on board,3menwerewounded.

Th ea ttack waswitnessed by largecrowdsofnativ es and summer visitors,who hadflockedtothe capeforth eweekend ,seekingrelief from theh otwave. Allaccountsagreed that the submarine'sshootingwasverybad . Her torpedoworkwasnobetter.According to Capt. Ainsleigh of the Lansford, the U-boat launched three torpedoesa t the tug and a llw ent wi ld . This i s no t be lieved tobe t rue .

Theattack occurredonlyafew milesfrom thenav alair stationat Chatham. Fourhydroplanes a ttacked the ra ider wi th bombs. The depth bombs dropped did not

e xp lo de . T h e fire was r et ur ne d, k ee pin g t he p la ne s h ig h. F in al ly , th e U-boatsubmergedandwaslastobservedheadingsouth.

To-nightth etugwasstillafloat, and itisthough tshecanbe saved. Thenetresultoftheraidwasthe sinkingofbargesvalued inthe aggregateat $90,000and the seriouadamagingofatug valued at $100,000,and the expe nditu re of some amm unition.

The appearance of the raider sonear the t reacherous shoals and t ide rips of thecapeandhersubsequentactionscausedamazementtothethousandsofeyewitnessesra ther than consterna tion . The na tives of the cape could not unders tand whyshe should wastetorpedoesand shells onbarges running toa coal port.

A fog bank lying 4miles offshore hid the U-boat from her approaching victims.



5 5HE TJ-156.

Before herealized that i t wasa torpedo, two other missiles sped by, wide of theirmark. He shouted awarning. At the same t ime there wasaflashfrom the fogandashell crashed through the wheelhouse. Afragment ofthe flying steel took off thehand ofasailor ashegrasped the spokesofthe steering wheel. In quick successioncameother shots, some of which went wide and,some ofw hich struck home.

Capt.J. P. Tapley, ofthe Perth Amboy, whowasin his cabin at the t ime, ran outonthedeck justasthe submarine loomed outof the fogbank, her deck gunflashingout i ts s torm of s teel . The bombardment set the tug on f ire, and the German thenturned his at tent ion to the helpless barges.

Shrapnel burstingoverthe Lansford, second in the tow, struck down CharlesAinsleigh, master of t he barge. The shoo ting of t he enemy was amaz ingly bad . Formorethan anhour the blazing tugand the drifting barges were underfirebefore theenemysucceeded inget ting enough shots tosink them. In themeantime, the submarine c rept nearer un ti l her range was only a few hundred yards . This a t length proved sufficient, and the barges disappeared beneath the surface one by one unt il onlythesternofthe Lansfordwasvisible . Thetugwasaburning hulk.

The crews, with t he t hree women, t he five child ren who were aboard and the wounded, rowed ashore, landing in Nauseet Harbor, Cape Cod, Mass. (Coast GuardStation No.40),whilenaval hydroairplanes cameout, located the U-boatinthe haze,and engaged her.

Someof the summer residents grew uneasy when they saw how wild the Germangunners were shooting and feared s tray she lls would h i t the ir cottages. Many of theseresidents went to cottages which had substantial cellars and watched thefiringthere, readytoseek shelter should the Germantr y hismarkm anship onshore targets.Someresidents reported shells fatting on shore.22

OnJuly22,1918,the dayfollowing the atta ck onthe Perth Amboy,the TJ-156 sank the American fish ing schooner Robert and Richard60milessouthea st ofCapePorpoise,in latitude 42°4 2'N ., longitude68°23' W. Thesubmarinefiredher first and onlyshot at a distanceof 2 miles. The schooner hove to and the submarine approached.A German officer ordered one of the fishermen's dories alongside,and with two sailors, boarded the schooner. On the vway to th eRobert and Richard the German officer seemed willing to ta lk: "H esaid he h ad a big house in th e S ta te s. I asked him w h at h e w as

going to do wi th us, and he said he was not going to do anything,andwhenwegot ashorehe wanted us to tell the authorit ies that we

22Athri ll ingstory ofhow the Boston fishing boat Rose,ona seining t rip, wasfi reduponseveral t imesbya German submarine off Orleans , Cape Cod, Mass. , be ing missed by only 10 feet, together wi th her ,( lightforsafety, was told to-night upon herarriv al in Provincetown byC apt . Marsi Sehuil l . The captainandhiscrewofsevenwitnessedtheattackonthetug Perth Amboy a nd t he four ba rge s . The c a p t a in s a id :

"W ewere iibout 5 mi lesoff Orleansa t 10.30thi s morning, and th e sea was as ra lm as am i rror . About 2milesaheadofus the tu gan d her tow offour bargeswassteamin glazi lyalong. Suddenly weheard thereport of abiggun. We looked toward the t ug and her towand were s ta r t led to see a subm arine breakwater.

"She looked l ikea bigwhale , wi th the wate r sparkl ing in th e sunl ight as i t rolled off her s ides . Then



5 6 GERMAN" SU BM AR IN E A CTIV ITIES ON ATLA NTIC COAST.

donot do anything to those on the vessels we sink. He said 'Youth ink too much of wha t W ilson tells you .' T hey acted as thoughthey had plenty of t ime. They onlybrought onebomb aboardandthey carried this in a canvas bag. This theyswung underneath the

sh ip by the use of a sounding lead . They s ta r ted on the stern end of the ship and pulled i t up to about midships ." 23

In this ins tance the submar ine crew removed nothing from theirvictim other than the f lag and theship 's papers .

On the 23d and the 27th sightings wererepo rted by theAmericanS. S. Temple E. Dorr an d b y th e B ritish S. S. Gymeric. The Dorrwas 8miles east of Fire Is land at the t ime, while the Gymericwasinl at itude 38° 27 ' N. and longitude 70° 42 ' W. In the l at te r caseitwas reported that two submarines were seen and in the former the object was far away when sighted; i t is doubtful, therefore, thattheTJ-156 was seen in either case, although it is possible tha t Americansubmarines, which Wereoperating in the vicinity at the time,mighthave been sighted.24

T he n ex t victim of th e TJ-156 was the B ir itsh motor schoonerDornfontein, which was sunk August 2 in l at it ude 44° 17' N . and longitude67°W.

The war diary of the first naval district furnishes a good account

ofthesinking:The little cloud ofsmokerisingto-day from the hu lk ofth e British schooner Dorn

fontein. 7miles south of Grand Island,at the entrance ofth e Bay of Fundy,markedthesceneofthemostrecent Germansubm arine attack onthe Atlantic coast.

The schooner, lumber laden, from St. Johns, New Brunswick, for a port south,wasovertaken jiist before noonyesterday by a German submarine, her crewdriveninto their dories, and the vessel robbed and burned. After rowing three hours themenreached Grand Island.

The fact that the submarine ventured so close to the shoals and shallowsof theBay of Fundy, as did the one which sank four coal barges in the dangerouswaters

close to Orleans, on Cape Cod, Mass., two weeks ago, led shipping men to believethat i t was the same German craft. This belief was substantiated by the fact thatthe second officer of the submarine which sank the Robert and Richard told Capt.Whartonofth at schooner th at heha d ma intained asummer homeonth e Mainecoastfor25yearspriortoth e war. It isbelieved th at nonavigating officer ofasubmarinewould venture so close inshore unless he was very familiar with the details of thecoastline.

The schoonerwasjust gettinginto open sea; 25milesoff Briar Island, thewestern-,most point of Nova Scotia, when the submarine rose from the water andf ired twoshots across her bow. The schooner quickly came to and a few minutes laterwas



THE U-156. 57

provisions, was taken off by the German raiding party. The officer? and crew of the

schooner made the best of their time while in contact with the Germans and brought

in the best account of the vessel and her crew that had been obtained up to date.

Part of their report is as follows: "The submarine was the U-156, and the crew num

bered 73. Their ages would run from 20 to 35. They were well clad and appeared

to be in good health and condition. The men stated that the only thing they suffered

from was a lack of vegetables. The captain of the submarine was a stout man, appar

ently about 32 years of age and about 5feet 7 inches tall, and the crew were pretty

much the same type of men. The captain spoke only broken English, while the

second lieutenant spoke English fluently. Nearly all the crew spoke English."

Many false statements were made to the Englishmen by the sub

marine crew, but these were mixed with truths that aided the navy

men in tracing the activities of the vessel.25

Following the destruction of the Dornfontein, the U-boat turned

its attention to the fishing fleet operating in the vicinity of SealIsland, Nova Scotia. On August 3 the American schooners Muriel,

120 gross tons, SydneyB. Atwood, 100 gross tons, Annie Perry, 116

gross tons, and the American motor schooner RobRoy, 112 gross

tons, were destroyed by bombs. The affidavit of the master of the

Muriel before the American consul at Yarmouth, Nova Scotia, is as,

follows:

The affiant, Eldridge Nickerson, states that he is a n aturalized American citizen

living at Everett, Mass.; that he was the master of the fishing schoonerMuriel, belonging to the Atlantic Maritime Co., of Boston, Mass.; that the said schooner's gross

tonnage is 120 and net tonnage 83; that the said schooner sailed from Gloucester on

August 2, 1918, bound for Browns Bank, intending to call at Pubnico, Nova Scotia;

that about 11 o'clock of August 3, 1918, when the said schooner was about 45 miles

W. by N. of Seal Island, Nova Scotia, a submarine was sighted about 4 miles to the

south; that the said schooner's position was about the same when abandoned and

sunk; that the said schooner's course at the time was due east, sailing at a speed of

10 knots, and that no flag was flying; that the submarine was steaming on the surface

at about 10 miles an hour, headed NE. and flying three German flags; that he

attempted to escape and was drawing slightly away from the submarine when the latter

fired two shots, one across said schooner's bow and one across said stern; that heimmediately hove to and waited for the submarine's approach; that the commander

of the submarine ordered the crew of the said schooner into their four boats and to

come alongside of the submarine; thatsthe submarine's commander then went aboard

the said schooner with some of his own seamen and took away the said schooner's'

American flag, the ship's papers, and some of her provisions, such as eggs, and then

tied a bomb to said schooner's sounding lead, placing it under said schooner's stern,

and that about a quarter of an hour after noon he fired off said bomb by means of a

time fuse; that the said schooner sank in about two minutes, going down by the

head; that the submarine remained on the surface and steamed away to SE. at a



THE TJ-156. 5 9

a to rpedo or a mine. She pu t about w ith the in tent ion of re tu rn ing to Halifax to r epair the damage caused by the explosion. A t2 o'clock in the afternoon the TJ-156appea red between 4 and 5miles off her por t quar ter and opened fire . The Luz Blanca carried

one 12-pounder aft, and alth ou gh th e explosion in th e m orninghad t i lted the gun deck,making i t imposs ible to use the gun to thebestadvantage, it s crew returned the fire of the enemy. The submarine quickly found tha t she outranged the Luz Blanca and therefore kep t a t a safe d is tance , f iring in all 30 sho ts . Meanwhile thetanker , whichat the beginning of the engagement had been making12 kno ts an hour in s pite of her in ju rie s, sudden ly stopped . T hemaster was of the opinion tha t oneof theshells from the submarinewhichs truck jus t astern of the vessel dest royed the propeller. The

shells of the submarine now began to s tr ike home, two men werekilled and severa l o ther s wounded aboard the t anker , and a t 3.15 the vessel, afire in seve ra l p laces, was abandoned by her crew.The submarine con tinued to shell the burn ing hulk which, when las t seen byher crew,was sett ling rapidly, in la ti tude 43°48 ' N.,longitude63°40'W.28

On August 8 29 t he TJ-156 overhauled the Swedish S. S. SydUnd,a vessel of 3,031 gross tons , in la t itude 41° 30 ' N. , longitude 65°

22' W. This vessel,which had before the present t r ipbeenengagedin Norwegian-American t rade, had been cha rte red by the AlliedGovernments for use as a Belg ian relief sh ip and was proceedingfrom Bagen, Norway, to Ham pton Roads to receive her orders andher cargo. T he s ta temen t of C ap t. A lexandre N . L arson, maste rof the Sydland, was summarized as follows by the a id for information at New York:

OnAugust 8,at2.30p.nf., the captain and chiefofficer werestandingonthedeck,andfirstknewofthepresenceofthesubmarinewhentheyheardthereportofagun

andsawthesplashofashellabout20fathoms in front oftheSydland.Thecaptainthenstopped his vessel, although he did not seethe submarine. About2.33p.m.another shot washeard and a shell landed about 10 fathoms amidships. Ashorttimeafterwards the submarine appeared apparently 6or 7milesastern ofthe ship,aboutESE.fromthevesselandwasatthetimeheadingSW.byW.3^W.

The submarine was next observed signaling, International Code "A F ," whichmeant "Bring your papers onboard." Orders were at oncegivenby the captaintoputoutasmallboat tothe submarine. The captain himself, with three of hiscrew,first mate,boatswain, and onesailor,put off for the submarine, whichat thattimeappearedwithin 2milesofthe Sydland. Thecaptaingavehispaperstoamemberofthe crew, whoin turn gavethem tothe prize officer ofthe submarine. The




When the captain came alongside of the submarine there appeared to be about 40

men of the crew standing on deck. They appeared to be men between 30 and 40years of age. The prize officer was the only officer seen by the captain. He was ashort man, brown eyes, and dark hair, clean shaven, and had about three or fourdays' growth of beard. He looked like a Spaniard, and had on a brown leather coat

with a blue cap. The captain talked to the prize officer, first in German, which hespoke slightly, and afterwards in English.

The prize officer and six men of the submarine got into the boat and rowed backto the Sydland with the captain, and asked if he had any license from the GermanGovernment to show that the Sydland was a Belgian relief ship. As the captaincould not produce the necessary German papers, the prize officer returned to thesubmarine and at 4.10 p. m. came back to the Sydland with papers from the commanding officer of the submarine stating that the Sydland must be sunk. OrderBwere given to the crew of the Sydland to man the boats, and at 4.25 p. m. they abandoned the ship. Between 2.30 p. m. and 4 p. m. the submarine had moved, and

at the time the ship was abandoned she was lying about a ship's length on the starboard side of the Sydland. Capt. Larson protested against leaving his ship, anddemanded a paper from the prize officer showing for what reason he was about* to

sink the vessel. After a little conversation he gave the captain a document, copy of

which was obtained by this office.

After the vessel was abandoned the boats rowed about five or six ship's lengthsfrom the submarine and one of the boats went alongside of the submarine to obtainthe proper course to steer for land. The course was furnished to the man in the boat,and the crew of the submarine were very insolent. The boats started to row away,

Bteering on a course due west. As they were rowing away, the captain noticed thata number of the men from the submarine were making for the Sydland. The lastseen of the submarine was about 5 p. m., as the weather grew foggy and it was impossible to see after that tim^. When last seen the submarine was alongside theSydland.

At 8 o'clock p. m., August 8, while the crew of the Sydland was still rowing, threeor four explosions were heard, three loud and one very slight, which it was thoughtto be explosions of bombs on theSydland. At the time that the prize officer returnedto the Sydland, about 4.10 p. m., he brought three bombs on board the Sydland.These bombs were round and appeared to be about 12-inch and were painted gray.

One of the members of the crew of the submarine told the second officer of theSydland that he had been chief officer on board one of the" Hamburg-American Linevessels, that he was married in New York, and that although he was qualified to'be

an officer in the German Naval Reserve he had to take the place of a seaman on asubmarine because he was married in New York and had a brother in the UnitedStates Navy.

The sinking of the S. S. Sydland has previously been charged toU-117, but a comparison of the receipt given to Capt. Larsen forhis ship and that given to Capt. Hans Thorbyonsen for his ship (theSan Jose, which is known to have been sunk by the TJ-156) provesconclusively that the loss of the Sydland should be charged to theaccount of the TJ-156. Further evidence develops in the fact that



Isu^ fa ri -

';

RE CEI PT GIVEN TO T HE MAST ER OF T HE NORWE GI AN S . S . SAN JOSE BY J . KNOE CKEL ,OBERLEUTNA NT, U-156

(Page61.)



R ED ER t :

IIEL BmsTRii i SnOOTEBORQ .

RECEIPT GIVEN TO THE MASTER OFTH E SWEDISH S.S .SYDLANDBYJ. KNOECKEL, OBERLEUTNA NT,U-156.



T H E U - 15 6. 6 1

17. A U GU ST , 1918.

Der norwegische Dampfer San Josewurde von e inem Deutschen Unterseebootangehalten ttnd versenkt : da keiner le i Cha rte r pa rty an Bord , auf Grund e ines Schreibens vom 2.Juli 1918aber anzunehmen war,dass derDampfer inCharter der

BritischenFirmaFurness-Wihty &Co.(FurnessWithy&Co.)fuhr. Ein Schreiben

vom 31.Ju li 1918konnte dieseAnnahm e nicht wiederlegen.J. KNOECKEL, Obit.z.S. d. R.

AUGUST 17, 1918.

The Norwegian steamerSan Jose wasstopped by aG erman submarine andsunk,asthere was nocharter party onboard, bu t it was to beconcluded onaccount of a

communication ofJuly 2,1918,that thesteamer ran under thecharter of theBritishfirm Furness-Withy & Co. Acommunication ofJul y 31,1918,could notcontradictthisassumption.

J. KNOECKEL, Lieutenant.

Rederi: S. S. " SY D L AN D ,"

AxelBrostrom & Co. den 19..Goteborg.

Ich bescheinige dass der Dampfer Syd land von e inem Deutschen Unterseebootam 8.August 1918angehalten worden ist. AufGrund der Charter party und des

ganzlichen Fehlens jeder Deutschen Bescheinigung, dass dasSchiff fur denDienstderCommissionofBelgianR elief bestim m t, istdasSchiffaufgebracht,daderVerdachtderfeindlichen Bestimm ung alsbewiesengilt.

J. KNOECKEL, Obit.z. S.

Shipowners: S. S. " S YD L A ND ,"

AxelBrostrom&Co. the 19..

Goteborg.I certify t ha t the s teamer Sydland was s topped by a German submarine on

August 8, 1918. Theship iscaptured as thesuspicion of thehostile intentions isconsideredproved byreason ofthecharterpartyand thecompletelack ofanyGermancertificatethattheshipisintended fortheservice oftheCommissionofBelgian Relief.

x J. KNOECKEL, Lieutenant.

OnAugust 11 theBritish S. S. Pennistone, 4,139gross tons, was

torpedoed andsunkabout 1mileastern of latitude 39° 50'N.,longitude 67° 25' W.; and on thesame day the Herman Winter,30 2 ;625

grosstons, anAmericansteamship, wasattacked in latitude 40° 45'N.andlongitude67° 10' W.

DavidEvans, themaster of the Pennistone, wastaken aboard the

submarine when hisvessel wasdestroyed andremained a prisonerfor sixdays. Hetells aninterestingstory of theloss ofhisship and

of his subsequent capt ivi ty . I

The Pennistoneleft NewYork on the 9th ofAugust inconvoy. There were 18 all

told in theconvoy at thetime Iwastorpedoed and wewere thelastship in therightwing of thecolumn. Ourescort was at thehead of theformation with onecruiser.

of in/



6 2 GEKMAK" SU BM AKINE A CTIV ITIES ON ATLA NTIC COAST.

boats. Wesen t out an S OS after wehad beenh i t . Our speed was 8 kno ts . The speed of the convoy was 8£ or 9 . Wehad fa llen behind during the n ight from4 o 'clock t i ll morning (up to t imewewerehi t ) . Weweredrivingalongashardaswecouldto get uptothem. Thecruiser came back about 8 o 'clock and warned usforkeepingbehind. We werenot zigzagging.

It tookusfiveortenminu testogetawayinthe smallboats. Therewere 41in ourcrew. Oneofourengineerswaskilledanda fireman. Therewereonly 39intheboatswhenIcountedthem. Werowed awayfromtheship. The submarine did notcometo the surface . The sh ip w ent downa lmost to her decks and then she hung. The wirelessofficer, third engineer, and three gunners,signalman,and onefiremanwereinour boat when I saw shewashanging. I w asgoingtogoaboard her, but whenwewereabout20yardsfrom shipth esubm arinecameu p alongsideofus. Shecameupb roadside. She came toward us , we wen t a longside, and I wen t on boa rd . They asked for the captain and I said I wasth e captain, a l though I was not in uniform.When I wasin thesubm arine, they kep tthe boatalongsideand the boarding officerandtwomenwentonboardandwentontheboat . Theywen t to my room andtook

someclothingandshoes. I wassentdownbelow immediately when I went onthesubmar ine, bu t was no t cove red by guns . They took bombs on boa rd our boat.It tooktheboardingofficer aboutten minutes tobomb ourboatand sink her. Ididnotseehersinkorheartheexplosion;theyjusttoldmethatshehadsunk. Ididnotdestroytheconfidential publ icat ions before they got on board. I did not havemyplansonboard. I had Instru ctions for Ship Masters, Ocean Code,M arconi Code,andRadio Code. I don ' t knowwhether the rad io operator des troyed them. Theywere eft ontheshipasfar as I know.

I wasaboard the submarinefrom noonon Sunday tonoon onSaturday—six days.1 was rescued by a Norwegian s teamer. Assoon as the c rewof the submarine saw

smokeonthe horizon I wassent below. Iwasaboutan hourandahalf belowwhenthecommander sent for metocomeondeck. Hesaid hewasgoingtosink theNorwegian boat and tha t I wasentit led togow iththecrew ofthe Norwegiansteamerint h e lifeb oats or s ta y on t he s ub m ar in e. I chose t h e lifeb oa ts. T he boats camealongsideofthe submarinewith Norwegian crewinit and I went on board theboat.The crew ofthe submarine gave me provisions for three orfourdays. Theytoldushowtom ake thebeach and told uswewere84 milesfrom Cape Sable. The Derbyshirep icked usup a t half pas t 2 , August 18 . Wehad been in the open boats fromhalfpast1tillhalfpast2—25hours.

Thecrewofthesubm arinetold meit was200feet long. Thebrea dthwasabout 25

or 30feet, I shouldsay. I t had twogu ns,oneforward and oneaft; theforwardgunwasabout20feet from conningtower, theafter gun25to30feet. Bothgunswere ofsamesizeandcaliber, 15centimetersor5.9. Thebarrelwasabout 10feetlong. Theammunit ion wask ept under deck almost amidships, just aft of the conningtower. Therewasatu befrom the deck downtoth elockerw hereth e amm unition waskeptandasmallderrick fit ted under the conningtowertogoover thesetubes. Theyhadcasestop ut the shel ls in and heaVethem up . They hoisted thesupply upthroughthetube to the gun. I t was fixedam munit ion in big brasscases, somewhereabout

2 feet long. Judging by the looks of the shel ls , they would weigh about 50or60pounds. The she llwasabout 6inchesandhad abrasscapontheendof it. I saw them



THE U-156. 6 3

from conning tower right in the middle. She had two periscopes—one on starboard

side of conning tower, the other in the conning tower. She had two wires running

from conning tower aft, fastened to a stanchion on the conning tower on the starboard

side. They ran aft to same place. These wires were for wireless (radio wires); she

had no wire from forward to conning tower. She had two masts for wireless that she

could raise up. They were about 30 feet high. She used to put them up sometimes.There were two wires on these. There was about 120 feet space between these poles.

They lay right on deck and were made of thin steels. The poles were 6 or 8 inches in

diameter. The wires were always fastened to poles. It took three men to raise the

poles up. They had guide wires for them and the guide wires fastened on the after

pole. The poles braced each other. The two of them came up forward. They were

lying down aft. There was a guiding wire from the forward one of the deck. All they

did was to connect the wires on them onto the other wireless. They made the connection

on the conning tower. The deck was sloped. About three feet from the curve up to

the top of the rail there was a platform. There were three holes in the curve-like

steps. I, when boarding submarine, jumped right from boat to curve. The sub

marine was painted gray (old paint). They told me she had been out for two months.There was no name or number on submarine, neither were the names on caps the

same. One of the caps had the name "Porsen," another the German words meaning

"Under the sea boat."

While on the submarine, I was quartered along with the sailors and firemen. There

were about 40 men in the one room. We slept on wooden lockers. They gave me a

kit the same as a man-of-war is given, with a hammock and a thin mattress. There

were 77 men on board. There were five on watch always. Some of the crew were

active service men, others were Reserves. The skipper was an active service man,

but I could not say as to his rank. I do not know the names of any of the officers.

The discipline on board was very lax. There was disagreement between officers andsailors and firemen. Captain did not mix much with crew, except to pass time of day.

I noticed her torpedo tubes back of forward end. She had just one tube on port side

and the only time I saw that, they were just finishing putting a torpedo in after the one

they used on me. Then the place was closed up. I don't know whether the sub

marine carried mines. There were iron doors at the torpedo locker.

There was no machinery in the crew's quarters. There were some stores underneath

the deck. There were iron shutters and underneath were lit tle compartments. I

saw them getting stores up one day. The second compartment was about 35 to 40

feet long. I was not in the first compartment. After crew's quarters there was an

alleyway to the right forward hatch. There were some rooms there on the right

where some of the petty officers used to live. After that came the officers' mess rooms

and the officers' and commanders' rooms. On the left of the alleyway there was nothing.

Alleyway ran along the left side of craft, not amidship. 1 was not in the officers' mess

rooms. The officers had separate staterooms. There were three or four on each side,,

occupying a space of about 50 or 60 feet to a place called the "Central," where the con

trolling valves were. The conning tower rose right above the central quarters. There

were two decks—one into lower part of conning tower and the second in the top of the

conning tower. We went on deck through forward hatch by way of an iron ladder.

There was just one flight to main deck. The air in the submarine was very foul;

they did not seem to have many ventilators. There was one ventilator on forward



64 GERMAN SUBMARINE ACTIVITIES ON ATLANTIC

side and engines on the other side and engines in the middle. There seemed to be no

longitudinal in engine room. There was a horizontal wheel controlling the periscope.The glass of the periscope was not more than an inch in diameter, so far as I could see.There were some figures on the line of vision in periscope. These figures were onhorizontal line.

The captain of the submarine was a man about 5 feet 7 inches. He was about 30

years, German appearing, and weighed about 170 pounds. He was fair, had a freshcomplexion and blue eyes, light eyebrows, medium nose. He was of very militaryappearance. He spoke English, but not very well. The man next in command wasthinner than the captain. He was about 35 years old, weighed about 150 pounds, andwas about the same height as the captain. They looked healthy and were tan. Thesecond commander had a little mustache. He also was fair. I would recognize thesemen if I were to see them again. The first officer was the best English-speaking man.The boarding officer had whiskers, weighed about 140 pounds, was about 5 feet 6inches. He spoke very little English. Boarding officer was about 30 or 35 years old.

The officers wore American dungarees and had on their caps, indicating commis

sioned officers. The ages of the crew ranged between 20 and 30 years. All were youngmen. The crew was very contented. We had tea and coffee, bread and butter andmarmalade, all tin stuff. There was a little sugar, but not much. Crew got verylittle sugar, and butter was not very good. Everything was canned, even the bread.The bread was dark and was made up in tins.

Several of the crew spoke English and some of them had been sailing on the Hamburg-American Line and on the North German Lloyd Line. The war was nevermentioned. We did not discuss the sinking of ships and they never asked me for anyinformation whatsoever. They treated me fairly well, and never jeered or insultedm e. The submarine had been out two months and was supposed to stay another

month. The submarine ran on the surface all the time and they did not submerge fromSunday till Thursday afternoon. We just ran along slowly, and two or three nights we

just lay to. We never sighted anything from Sunday till Thursday afternoon. Wewere probably somewhere around the entrance of New York. After that we startednorth, then south again. We did not sight land at all. I spent most of my time ondeck. The speed on the surface was about 12. They fired about 40 shots after anAmerican oil tanker from the forward gun, as I stated above, but she got away. Thefirst I knew of the oil tanker was when I was ordered below, then I felt the vibrationof the shots. The guns appeared to be far too heavy for the ship. The oil tankermade smoke like a fog and got away. That was Friday afternoon. The next thingattacked was the Norwegian San Jose, which they sank. They sank her with bombs,but did not torpedo her. We saw one explosion from out lifeboat about 5 o'clock,and we had left at half past 1. At about 6 we could see nothing.

From the 11th until the 16th, when the British steamer Lackawannawas gunned, the movements of the U-156 are not definitely known.At 3.20 that afternoon when the Lackawanna was in latitude 40° 45'N ., longitude 64° 40' W., the officer on watch sighted a periscopeabout 2,000 yards away. Shortly after two torpedoes were fired fromthe submarine, the first passing about 20 feet astern and the second



THE U-156. 6 5

marine, which submerged very soon afterwards, while the s teamermadethebest ofthe oppo rtunity to escape.

OnthefollowingdaytheNorwegiansteamer, San Jose, 1,586 grosstons,inballastfromBergentoNewYork,sightedthe TJ-156emerging

from the wa te r in l at itude 42° 10' N ., long itude 64° 42' W . T hesubmarineopenedfireassoonasshewasonthesurfaceandthesteamera t oncehove to and s topped her engines. Actiug uponorders fromtheraider the m aste r of the San Joserowedtothesubmarine,tookaprize officer and crew into his small boat , and returned to his ship.Theprizeofficer examined thep apers of thesteamer and despite theprotests ofher captain decided tha t shemust besunk. Capt. DavidEvans, of the Penistone, was p laced in boa t with the master of the San Jose,who was given arece ipt for his vesselsignedby"K noeckel,Oberleutnant zur See," informed thebest direction tom akesail, andordered to leave the v ic in ity . The crew of the San Jose saw theirship set tling in the water as they pulled away but did not hear theexplosion of the bombs which sank her. Theboats of the San Josewere picked up a lmost immediate ly by the Br it ish S. S . Derbyshirewhichwassonearatthetimeofthesinkingofthe San Josethat theyheardtheexplosionofthebombsaboardher.

After this s inking the submarine made her way to the northward,"

where,onAug ust20,shema deanewa ttack onthe fishing fleet. Theresultsof thisfresh ou tbu rst of "schrecTcKchlceit"wasthesinkingof11fishingvessels,only oneofwhich registered above 160grosston s.

The method used in th is a t tack was entire ly new, the first s tepbeing the capture of the 239-ton Canadian s team trawler Triumphand the arming of the prize as araider. The s tory of theseizure astoldby the crew ofth e trawlerisasfollows:

At12.10p .m., August 20,1918,ship'stim e,a pproxim ately 60 miles S. by W.offCJanso,Nova Scotia,th e captain and crew of the Triumph sighted the conning tower

ofasubmarine,comingoutofthewaterastern,1£to2milesaway.Fiveminuteslaterashotwasfired,landinginthewateroverportsideaboutamid

ships. Engines werestopped, l ifeboats manned, andhasty preparationswere madetoshoveoff, takin gp ractic ally nobelongingsexc ept abox ofbiscu itsfor each boat.

Afterpu tting off, th esu bm arine cameup towith in 50yardsofthe trawlerand Cap t.G.Myhreproceededforthesideofthesubmarineinadingywiththeship'spapersandart icles, while the other boats laid by. The commander of the submarine took thepapers from the captain and ordered him aboard. He then ordered another oneof thelifeboatstocomealongside. The 11meninthisboatwereorderedaboardthesub .

TheGermansthen pu tarmam entintoth e lifeboat and proceeded withtwoofthe



To face page67.]

TABLE V.-WEIGHTS OF FULL CHARGES AND PROJECTILES FO R B .L . A ND Q .F. ORDNANCE.

ull charges.B.L. Ordnance. Mark.

Powder. Cordite.

Guns. lbs. Size. lbs.

12-pr.(6cwt.)15-pr30-pr

.. LLI.

55

10

4-inch(jointed). . L4-inch II .toVI. 12S.P.

5-inch II .toV. 15£S.P.80-pr I. 25S.P.

6-iuch III. to VI. 48E.X.E. 20 14

«

„ ..8-inch

»j

»»

9-2-inch

..

..

..

..

III.V.

III.IV., VI.

VII.,VILA.I., II.

III.to VII.

36E.X.E.45Prism

1black

104Prism1brown118Prism 1brown90Prism1black

140Prism 1brown164Prism 1brown

20

20

20

30

30

2832224253

VIII. 40 63IX.

10-inoh I.toIV. 252Prism1brown 30 76

12-inch I.to VII. 295Prism1brown 30 88VIII. 50 167

13-5-inch I.toIV. 630S.B.C

16-25-inch I. 960S.B.C.

Howitzers:

5-inch 3 5-4-inch 3f6-inch (25 cwt)6-inch(30 cwt)

3 5

Q.F. Guns:

3-pr. Nordenfelt andHotchkiss 1£Q-F.1- 56-pr. „ „ H Q.F.i 5

12-pr. (8 cwt) I. 10„ (12 cwt ) I. 15 1

4-inch I.toIII. 15 34-7-inch I.toIV. 12S.P. 20 56-inch I.toIII. 2 9 |E.X.E. 30 13

15f6

12

1210

112

6*7 |

13f15974

Weight ofProjecti le.

lb s .

302525

5080

100100100210210180380380380

500714850

1250

1800

5060

118*

12*2545

100

Nature of Projectiles used with B L. and Q.F

Armour-Piercing Shot,of s teel, are uwith 6-inch B.L. guns and upwards, with4-inchQ.F.andabove.

Palliser Shotare usedupwith4to16

inchB.L.guns,andwith4and6-inchQ.

Case Shot,with 12-pr. to 13-5-incli Band the5-inchB.L. howitzer.

Palliser Shellareuaedwith4to 16'25B.L. guns, except the 80-pr., a basebeingused.

Pointed Common Shell, with4to16-25B.L.guns, exceptthe 80-pr.,and with 12Q.F.gunsandabove. Theyareofcaststmadewithapoint,and haveabasefuzeh

Common Shell,ofcast iron and of caforgedsteel andf illed with powder,areuwith all B.L. gunsand howitzers,and w

Q.F.guns.

Common Shell, filled with lyddite,offsteel,areusedwith 6and 9-2-inchB .L.gand with howitzers, a lso with 4 to 6-iQ.F.guns.

Shrapnel Shell,of castiron,castand fonteel,areusedwith all B.L.and Q.F.guandB.L.howitzers.

Double Shell,with80-pr.B.L.guns.

Star Shell,with 12 and 15-pr.B.L. guandwithhowitzers.

Bing Shell,with4-inchB.L.guns.



THE U-156. 67

On getting nearer, I made out that the vessel was the schooner A. Piatt Andrew of

Gloucester, and I was going up alongside her to speak to the captain when the beam

trawler approached us under full steam. I could see that it was the trawler Triumph

of Halifax, as we had fished alongside of him on our last trip and I knew the captain

of her quite well. I did not mistrust anything out of the way until they got within

150 yards of us, when they stopped their vessel and the captain, through a megaphone,ordered us to heave our vessel to. I thought the captain was joking with us and kept

on toward the A. Piatt Andrew, and the first thing we knew four shots were fired

across our bow from rifles. We brought our vessel up in the wind and the beam trawler

came up alongside of us and I then saw that she was manned b \ a G erman crew and had

a German flag at her masthead. The captain ordered me to come aboard of his vessel

with our papers, so I took one of my dories and with one of the < rew rowed alongside

of him and the German gave me quite a calling down for not stopping my vessel sooner

and said that if we expected him to do the right thing, we would have to do the right

thing by him. He then ordered three of his men to come in the dory with me and

they brought a bomb along. The bomb was a small round thing and they had it in abag and hung it under the stern with a line. They took one of our other dories and

after touching off the fuse, returned to the beam trawler. The bomb exploded shortly

after they left and the vessel went down stern first, the topmast being the last thing to

disappear. In the meantime, we had forgotten all about the A. PiatiAndrew, but

shortly before they blew up my vessel, we heard a muffled explosion and saw the

A. PiattAndrew go down. All of this happened in about one half or three quarters

of an hour and the vessel went down about 3.30 in the afternoon. We were then about

55 miles south half east from Canso so the crew and myself started in our dories and

rowed toward land. A small fishing boat picked us up off Canso and took us into

Matthews & Scott's wharf, arriving there at about 9 o'clock in the morning of August

21. I telegraphed home the loss of my vessel and got in communication with theAmerican consul who sent us home to Gloucester. I arrived home Sunday, August25.

Only one of the schooners, the TJdaA. Saunders, was sunk by the

submarine.

The submarine came up on our bow and came right alongside, her decks awash.

She was about 280 feet long, with guns fore and aft. I was practically alone on the

vessel, all but three of the crew being out in the boats from half mile to a mile away.

The Huns hailed us and ordered a dory alongside. I sent two men out to her in a

dory and three of the raider's crew came aboard. "Don't be afraid," said the one

who appeared to be in command. "We are going to sink your vessel. I will give

you 10 minutes to gather up food and water enough to last you until you get ashore."

One of the Boches set about storing bombs below and soon after we left the TJdaA., I

heard a muffled explosion, the two masts broke off short, she seemed to crumple in

the center and immediately went under. We had enough food and water, but the

men in the other dories had only their working clothes and we who were on board had

only the barest necessities. The Hun commander took all my papers and the flag.

We set out for the nearest shore and rowed 18 hours before landing. We had 700

quintals of fish and 7 casks of oil.31

••



6 8 GEKMAN SUBM ARIN E A CTIV ITIES ON ATLANTIC COAST.

After sinking the Notre Dame di la Garde the submarine againd isappeared for th ree days , resuming her activ ities on August 25 by the s inking of the small Bri tish S. S. Eric, 583 gross tons. The following account of the sinking of this ship istak en from thereport

mad eby British com mu nication officers to the A dm iralty.The unarmed Brit ish s teamer Eric, 610 tons gross, carrying a crew of 18alltold,

owned by James Speir , Ltd. , of St . Johns, Newfoundland, and under charter oftheGovernmentofN ewfoundland, wassunkby aGermansubm arine onAugust25, 1918.

The Eric, 610 gross tons, left St . Johns, Newfoundland, on August 23, 1918,forSydney, Nova Scotia;shewasin bal last and was to make the voyage without anyin te rm e dia te stops. T he m aster of th e Eric was Capt. W. Lane, of 43 LongsailStreet, St.Johns, Newfoundland.

About1.30a.m.,onAugust25,1918,the Ericwasabout70milesNW.byW.fromGa lantry L ight, S t. P i er re . She was p roceed ing s traight on her course ; was not

z igzagging. The Eric was en ti re ly da rkened , bu t t he re was a nea rly full moon,giving a fair degree of visibi li ty . There was no land in sight, St . Pierre , about 70milesdistant, beingthenearest land.

Thefi rst int imation that the crew of th e Erich ad ofth e presence of asubmarinewas a shot which h i t the s teamer, about 1.30 a . m. This shot was followed bysix othershotsin rapid succession, four moreofthem hitting the steamer. Thesteamerwasbadly damaged, her wireless apparatus beingp ut out ofcommissionby the firstshot, her smokestack being knocked down by the second one. Fivem en, includingthe captain, mate,andchief engineer,w ere wounded by piecesofshell and by flyingdeb ris . The captain of t he Eric judges that the shots were fired from adistanceofa bo ut 2 m ile s. T h e Erics topped immediately after thefi ringbegan. Notorpedoeswereused.

A few minutes after thefi ringhad ceased the submarine wasseen by the crew ofthe Eric r ight alongside the steamer by the stern. Someoneaboard thesubmarinehailedthe Ericandaskedifanyonehadbeen-killedbytheshellsfired;onbeingtoldtha t no one was k i lled , the man aboard the submarine said tha t he wasglad,ashewasafter shipsandnot l ives. Thesubmarinecrewdidnot boardthe Ericwhentheycame a longside but ordered the c rew of the Eric to come on board the submarine. Therewasbutoneboatofthe Eric's com plem ent oflifeboatsleft, asmallonecapableofcarryingonlyfourpersons. In thisboat the Eric'screwrowedovertothesubmarine,fouratat ime.

Whenthecaptainofthe Ericgotonboardthesubmarine,thesubmarinecommanderinformed him that in view of the fact that there werenot sufficient boats in whichtoput him and his crew, hew ould keep them aboard the submarine unt i l hefounda vesselwithsufficientboatstoaccommodate the m .

The captain of the Eric went below when he boarded the submarine; someofhiscrew, however, remained on deck. These men saw men from the submarineboardthe Ericandsinkherbyplacingbombsaboard her.

On going below aboard the submarine the wounded men from the Erichadtheirwoundsdressed by adoctor, a youngman about 25yearsold. Thecrewof the Ericwere'given coffee aboard the submarine and the officers were given coffee, brandy,



69HE U-158.

Eric and the crew of the WillieG. and that therefore he would send the Eric's crew

aboard the WillieG. and would not sink her, as he had intended doing. This was

done, and theWillieG. brought the crew of theEric to St. Pierre, arriving there about

10 a. m. on August 26. The WillieG. was only about 25 miles from St. Pierre when

the submarine overtook her and put theEric's crew aboard.

Three hours after the survivors of the steamer had been placed

aboard the WillieG. the submarine was again in the midst of the

little schooners and by noon had sent to the bottom theE.B.Walters,

126tons, the C.M. Walters, 107tons, the VernaD.Adams, 132tons,and the J. J• Flaherty, 162 tons. The last mentioned vessel was an

American, the other three of Canadian register.

The position of the vessels above mentioned at the time the submarine was first

sighted was latitude 46° 33' N., longitude 57° 33/ W. This was also their position

when sunk, as they were all at anchor and did not move. The date of the sinking

was August 25, 1918, the time about 10.30 or 11 o'clock a. m. At the time the sub

marine appeared the vessels were at anchor within about one-half to 1 mile apart.

The crews of the first three were aboard the vessels, as the Canadian fishermen do

not fish on Sunday.

The submarine was first sighted by the crew of the E. B. Walters. When first

sighted, the submarine was about 2 miles NW. of theE.B. Walters. The crew of the

E. B. Walters were not alarmed when they sighted the submarine, as they mistook

it for a Canadian patrol boat. The submarine approached theE.B. Walters, traveling

slowly on the surface. When the submarine was within about 50 yards of theE. B.

Walters, the crew of the schooner saw the German flag on a small flagstaff just behind

the small deck house or conning tower of the submarine. At this juncture a largeman in uniform hailed theE.B. Walters from the deck of the submarine. He ordered

the captain to come alongside the submarine in a dory, and ordered the crew of the

schooner to leave the vessel as quickly as possible. Capt. Cyrus Walters rowed

alongside the submarine in one of the schooner's dories. As he got alongside he said,

"You are not going to sink my schooner, are you?" Some one from the submarine's

deck answered, "That 's just exactly what we are going to do." Four men from the

submarine deck then jumped into the dory with Capt. Cyrus Walters and rowed to

theE. B. Walters. These men boarded the schooner and Capt. Walters gave them

the ship's papers. Capt. Walters reports that the^nen from the submarine ransacked

the ship, even going through the chests of the crew in the forecastle. He saw thempile up a large quantity of canned goods from the vessel's stores nearthe dory in which

they had come aboard. Capt. Walters and his crew hastily packed up a few personal

belongings and got into the dories and pulled away from the vessel. About 10 minutes

after they had left the vessel they heard an explosion aboard the schooner and in

about five minutes they saw the schooner sink.

The four men from the submarine who had boarded theE.B. Walters and sunk her,

rowed back to the submarine in the dory which they had taken from the vessel just

sunk. The submarine towed the dory alongside the C.M. Walters which was lying

about one-half mile distant. When the submarine was within about 25 yards of the

C.M. Walters the four men rowed to the schooner in the dory and demanded the



7 0 GERMAN SU BM AEIN E A CTIV ITIES ON ATLANTIC COAST.

The submar ine, wi th t he do ry of t he E. B. Waltersin tow,th en approachedtheVerna D. Adams. The master and'crewofthis schoonerhad left the vesselbeforethesubmarine approached them. The four men whohad sunk the two.otherschoonersrowedovertothe Verna D. Adams and boarded her . The men from the submarine stayedaboardthe Adams longer than aboard any ofth e other vessels. Capt.Mosher

of the Adams says that he had a large supply of stores aboard, especially ofcannedfoods, and believes man y articlesw ereremoved from the schooner and takenaboardt he s ub m ar in e. T h e Verna D. Adamswassunkb y abomb placed aboardinthesamemanneraswasdonewiththeothertwovessels.

After disposingofthe three Canad ianvesselsthe submarineturnedi ts at tent ionto the J. J. Flaherty, which wasbo arded and destroyedinthesamewayastheothers.

On the morn ing of August 26 the ra ider cap tu red and sankbybombs the Canadian fishing schooner Gloaming, 130 gross tons,in

latitude46°02' N., longitude57°35' W.After the a t tack on the Gloamingthe JJ-156 began her homeward

voyage. OnAugus t 31 the U. S.S . West Haven, 5,699grosstons,aNavalOverseasTransportationship,wasattackedandshelledinlatitude 44° 20 ' N. , longitude 51° 09 ' W .; but succeeded in escaping.The West Haven sent a radio message from the abovelocation:"8.25a.m . Attacked by an enemysubmarine which openedf ireuponus.Immediately brought guns into action. At 8.46 a.m.enemysubmarineceasedfiring^andturnedbroadsideto."

The TJ-156wastheonlyoneoftheenemysubmarinesdispatchedtotheAm ericancoast tha t failed toreturn toher base insafety. AfterremainingintheN orth Seaduringthe conce ntration there,thisvesselwhichhadworkedsuchhavocwiththefishingindustryoftheAtlanticcoast a tt empted to r un the no rthern mine barr age. She struck a mineandwassodamaged tha tshesankinashort t ime. Twenty-onesurvivorswerelanded ontheN orwegiancoastshortly after thesigningofthe armistice; thefate of tfierestofthecrewisunknown.


W ithin aweek (June22,1918) after the TJ-156hadcommenced.hervoyage to the American Atlantic coast the U-140,a cruiser submarine m o un tin g tw o guns and com m an ded b y K orvettenX arutanKophamel, left Kiel for the same destination. Sheproceeded northof the Shetland Islands and had her first encounter of thevoyageonJu ly 14, when an allo was rece ived from the U.S .S . Harrisburg^givingher position aslatitude 45°3 3'N .,longitude 41° W.



TH E TT-140. 7 1

reporting her position from aconfidential referencep oint. In viewofthe vessel's speed, which was known to be 9knots, and of the facttha t her a rmament consisted of 3-inch guns, it was believed tha tthis message was a decoy; that the Cudahyhad been captured and

that her confidential publications werein thehan ds of the Germans.Themessage,however,provedtobegenuine,themerchantshiphavingescaped withou t damage.

On the 26th the British s teamer Melitia, 13,967 gross tons, wasgunned in la ti tude 38° 42 ' N. , longi tude 60° 58 ' W., and later thesame day the British Major, 4,147 tons gross, was a ttacked by the submarineinthesamelocality; both vessels escaped.33

The following day the TJ-IJ+O regis tered her f irs t sinking when inlat itude 38°25 ' 3 6 " N., longitude 61°46' 30 " W., she captured the

Portuguese bark Porto, 1,079 gross tons, bound from Savannah to Oporto . Capt. Jose Tude d 'Oliveisa da Velha made the following statement totheAmericannaval authorities:

The Portosailed under the Portuguese flag. Includingmyself therewere18inthecrew. EverymemberofthecrewwasPortuguese. Onthe11thofJulywe«ailedfromSavannah,Ga.,boundforOportowithacargoof600balesofcottonandbarrelstaves.Wehadonboardprovisionsforsixmon ths. Theship 'sstoreswereofageneraln ature.The Portowasnotarmed. Thesubm arinewasfirstseenJuly 27,about 11a.m. I twas thenabout2milesoff the starboard bow. Shewas onthe surface andgraduallyap

proachedus. Whenthesubm arinewasabout 2milesoffshefiredthreeshots,afterwhichwehoveto. Thesubmarine then came alongsidethebark,w hilewewerestillaboard,and t ied up. The commander"of the submarine and one officer and aseaman whospokeSpanish asked for the ship 's papers. I gave the commander of the submarinealltheship'spapers,including them anifest, bill oflading, andeverything. Noneofthenauticalinstruments weretaken by the Germansbecausewemanaged to concealthem. Oneofthefirstthingstheyinquired aboutwaswhetherornot wehadonboardanyporkorchickens. W hen Irepliedyes,the yproceeded toremovealltheporkandchickenswehad onboard. W hilewew eretiedalongside,the Germansforfivehourstookthesuppliesfromour shipand put them onthe submarine by the useofplanks.Inadditiontotheporkandchickensthecrewtookpracticallyalloftheship'sstores.

Noneofthecrewofthe Portohelped inremoving thesupplies from ourship to thesubmarine,i t wasdoneby the crewofthesubmarine. NomemberofthecrewofthePortoa tany t imeboarded thesubmarine . The crewof the Portod id notwait unt i lallthesupplieswereremoved tothesu bm arin e,butshovedoffinthe twolargelifeboatsfromthe Portoafterab outhalf anhour. Aftershovingoffinthelifeboatsweremainedinsight ofthebarkandthesubmarineunt i l thebarkwassunk. The Portowassunkatabout5.30p.m .with bombsandshell fire. Noshipswereseenatanytime whilethesubmarinewasinoursight.

Thecommanderwastalland slim, withashortm ustache,dressedinbrown. I didnotnoticewhetherornothehadonanystripes. The commander was about 35years




and the bow gun about 12 feet long. She had one conning tower located in the center.

The number "U-19' ' was painted in white on the bow. The submarine had noflag or

ensign. The German commander did not give me a receipt for my ship. Some of the

crew of thePorto engaged in conversation with the submarine crew in Spanish, but it

only concerned the provisions. Neither I nor any member of the crew ascertained how

long the submarine had been out or what their plans were. The commander conversed with me through an interpreter who was a member of the crew of the submarine

and who carried binoculars and did not wear a hat. The interpreter through whom

the submarine commander spoke, spoke a very pure Spanish, and I believe he was not

a German.

On July 30 the American S. S. Kermanshah, 4,947 grosstons, was

attacked by the submarine in latitude 38° 24' N., longitude 68°41' W.

In an interview with Robert H. Smith, master of theship, with the

United States naval authorities, he says:

TheKermanshah, owned by the Kerr Steamship Corporation, arrived at New YorkJuly 30, 1918, from Havre via Plymouth, in water ballast. She carried three naval

radio operators and an American-armed guard crew of 21 men under the command

of M. Coffey, C. G. M., U. S. N. Her armament consisted of one 4-inch gun astern

and a 2-pounder forward.

. On July^30, at 11.45 a. m. (ship's time), while in latitude 38° 24/ N., longitude

68°41' W., the captain was standing in the chart-room doorway and sighted the wake

of a torpedo headed toward the after part of the port side of theKermanshah. He ran

on deck, let the ship run off about four points to starboard, and the torpedo missed the

stern by 10 or 15 feet. The helm was eased a trifle so that the ship would not be

swinging too quickly to starboard in the event another torpedo was sighted. Theship had no sooner steadied a li tt le when the wake of another torpedo was seen

approaching amidships on the starboard side. The captain immediately put the

helm hard to starboard with the idea of throwing the ship in a course parallel to that

of the torpedo. In this he was successful, the torpedo passing the starboard bow about

5 feet away.

As soon as the second wake was sighted the commander of the armed guard fired

one round from the 4-inch gun astern, the shot being directed at the spot the wake

started from. The explosion that followed sounded like the bursting of the shell

against a hard object, which gave the.captain the impression that a hit had been made.

After following a northerly course at full speed of 9.5 knots for about 15 or 20 minutes,the submarine was sighted on the horizon about 4 miles distant, the gun crew imme

diately opening fire. After a few rounds it was seen that the submarine was out of

range and fire was stopped. As the submarine made no attempt to chase orfire on the

ship, the captain believes there is some basis for assuming that the first shot had some

effect.

Allo and S O S messages were sent out immediately after the first torpedo missed,

giving position and stating that theKermanshah was being attacked and pursued.

At the time of the attack there was fine, clear weather, the sea fairly smooth, with

moderate south winds. The regular watch was on the aft gun platform; there were

lookouts in the crow's nests on the fore and main masts, but no periscope was sighted.



THE TJ-140. 73

Earlier in the day one of the gun crew reported* to the watch officer the sighting of asmall two-masted vessel. Capt. Smith is of the opinion that it was a disguised submarine, but could furnish no further details or reason for his belief.

The next victim of the TJ-IZ+O was the Japanese steamship Tokuyama

Maru, 7,029 gross tons, which was torpedoed 200 miles southeast ofNew York, in approximately latitude 39° 12' N., longitude 70° 23' W.r

on August 1 at about 8 o'clock in the evening. The ship struck "washit on the starboard side under the bridge with a torpedo," remainedafloat long enough to send an allo, but the submarine which launchedthe torpedo was never sighted.

Another large ship was successfully attacked by the raider threedays later, when the tanker 0. B. Jennings, a vessel of 10,289 grosstons, after successfully avoiding a torpedo attack, was sunk by

gunfire after a battle lasting over two hours, in latitude 36° 40' N.,longitude 73° 58' W. In his preliminary report to the naval authorities, Capt. George W. Nordstrom said:

While on a voyage from Plymouth, England, to Newport News, Va., in ballast, onAugust 4, 1918, in position 36° 30/ N., 73° 20' W., a torpedo was sighted about 1,000yards, four points on port bow; by maneuvering ship, torpedo missed and passed 3 to4 feet astern. At 9.30 a. m. the submarine opened fire from a distance of about 8miles, and we immediately hoisted our flag and opened fire, after we broke our smokeboxes out and made a, smoke screen, changing course often to hide ship behind smokescreen. At this time the submarine was observed five points abaft port beam. Thesubmarine followed us and kept shelling until 11.40 a. m., having our range finely allthe time, several shells bursting so close to ship that ship's side was punctured inseveral places. At 11.40 a. m. a direct shot hit the engine room through the counter,smashing port engine and wrecking main steam line. Several men were wounded.At the same time another shell hit magazine and exploded, destroying all ammunition. Previous to this one man was killed by gunfire and some minor wounded ondeck. I pulled my colors down and sent out wireless calls. I surrendered at 11.45a. m., ordered all hands in theboats, and abandoned ship. Pulling away from the ship,the submarine came up and interrogated boat crews, took second officer prisoner,asking the boat crew where the captain was, and the crew answered, that the captain

was killed. Then the submarine returned to ship and commenced to shell her. Wepulled away to northward until out of sight, and then hauled around to westward. At3 p. m. all boats together, sails set, course given by captain, compass regulated, andcommenced to sail for land. During the night the first officer's boat and chiefengineer's boat dropped out of sight. At 8.30 a. m. we were picked up by Italiansteamship Umbria and given food and relief. This ship took us down off Currituckbeach, put the boat into water, and we sailed for shore. We landed 3.30 p. m. August5, 1918.

At 9.30 a. m. sent out allo call and at 9.50 approximately sent out S O S at irregularintervals thereafter. The surrender call was sent out on emergency set, as dynamo




description of the raider, and' the account of the rescue of survivorsbytheU.S.S. Hull, isgivenin the report of the aid for information,first naval district, to the Bureau of Operations.

At9a. m. (ATS ),August 4,1918,while procee ding at aspeedof10knots,atorpedo

•wakewassighted four pointsoff portbow. Helm wasput hardastarboardandquarterswassounded and full speed ahead ordered. Jennings had been zigzaggingandcont inued to do so, holding the same course. About 9.30 a. m. several shotswerefired by the submarine , wh ich was t hen s ight ed . The Jenningsopenedfireonthesubmarine,w hichwasthenapparent ly 7milesaway. Shotsfrom Jenningsfellshort.Jennings continued a t fu lkspeed , z igzagging and using smoke boxes . Submarine continued firing, discharging about 40or50shotsat two-minute intervals. At11.40a. m. shot from submarine exploded in the engine room of the ship, disablingtheengineand wreckingthe mainsteamline. Afew minutes later another shell hi t themagazine, exploding and des troying a ll the ammuni tion remain ing . Prior to this t imethe Jenningshadfiredabout60roundsatirregularintervals,causingsubmarine-to submerge twice. During the engagement submarine fired 150roundsat approxi mately two-minute intervals. At 11.45ship'sflagwasstruck and wirelesscall sentout that the Jenningshadbeen captured. In thisconnect ioni t hadbeentheinten

"t iontousetheword surrendered insteadof captured.

Preparations were imm ediately made for abandoning the ship, and at 12.20p.m.all survivorshadleft the shipinthree smallboats. Positionof Jenningsatthistimewas la t itude 36° 40 'N. , 74° W. Submarine then approached the Jenningsandcont inued she lling her. The boats drew awayfrom the v ic in i ty and a t 2.20 p . m. the Jennings turned on port s ide and sank slowly, disappearing from view 15minutesla te r . At th is t ime the lifeboat in charge of the f irst officer, W. J . Manning, was

about half am ile awayfrom the Jennings. The lifeboat in chargeofthe chiefengineer, Albert Lacy, was2milesahead ofth efirstofficer's boat and the boatinchargeof the captain wasahead of the chief,engineer's boat, thu s the actua l sinkingoftheJennings was observed only by the first officer's boat. After the crew abandonedthe ship and before they were permit ted to leave the vicinity the three boatswerecalled toth e sideof the subm arine, and aconversation betwe en the secondofficer ofthe submarine and the men in charge of the three l ifeboats took place asfollows:The officer of the submarine sa id : "We got you a t l as t; I knew wewould . Whatdamage did theshell in the engineroomdo? " Reply: "P ut the engineout ofcommiss ion." Ques tion: "Where is t he cap t ain?" Answer : "H e is dead ." Question:

"Where is the chief wirelessoperator?" Answer: "I don ' t know; hemust bedead,too." Theaboveconversationwascarriedonbyoneofthe meninthe captain'sboat,duringwhichtimethecaptainandthechiefwirelessoperatorwerebothpresent,butthe captain 's clothes had been placed on the body of the second steward, whohadbeenkilledandleft onthedeckofthe Jennings.

Thechiefengineerwasinchargeofoneofthelifeboats,andinthislifeboatwasalsoone Rene Bast in , second officer onthe 0. B. Jennings,whohadjoinedtheshipatSouthampton, England. Bast in in sis ted t ha t he be pe rmi tt ed to speak with the officer onth e submarine and, despite the fact tha th e wasslightlyw ounded, jumpedfrom the lifeboat tothe deckofth esubmarineandbeganspeakingrapidly inGerman^to the officer and men on the deck, f inally shaking hands with them and without



75HE U-140.

The submarine was about 300 to 325 feet in length, and the top of the conning towerwas about 20 feet from the surface of the water, very rusty looking, with a guardaround the propeller. It was armed with two gifns, 6-inch caliber, barrel 20 feet long.They were placed fore and aft and about 6 feet from the conning tower. There weretwo periscopes about 5 inches in diameter on the conning tower. No masts or wirelessi

visible. Three officers and 30 men were observed on the deck of the submarine, alldressed in regulation blue uniforms. The hat of the men had the inscription: " Under-see Boat Deutchland Undersee Hamburg."

At 2.20 a. m., August 5, two boats in charge of the first officer and chief engineerwere picked up by the U. S. S. Hull. About 30 minutes before this occurred a submarine was sighted moving slowly alongHhe surface. Submarine passed about 50yards from first officer's boat and about 300 yards from the captain's boat. Submarinewas about 300 feet long, conning tower about 20 feet from the surface of the water.

The U. S. S. Hull searched the vicinity for 30 minutes, endeavoring to locate thecaptain's boat, but without success, as the captain refused to show any lights or

answer any signals, believing, as he stated later, that the U. S. S. Hull was the supposed submarine sighted about 30 minutes earlier. The only fatality was that of thesecond steward. Several of the crew sustained minor injuries from shrapnel.

The reference to Rene B as tin made in the account of the rescueof the survivors of the O. B. Jennings is explained and amplified bythe following letter from the American Consulate at Havre, France:

I have the honor to report that, on January 4,19191, Mr. Rene Henry Bastin, formerlysecond officer of the American S. S. O. B. Jennings, of New York, came to this consulate and asked for relief and transportation to the United States, giving the following

explanation of his situation:The American S. S. O. B. Jennings (gross tonnage 10,289 and net tonnage 7,890),owned by the Standard Oil Co., Capt. Nordstrom, sailed from Plymouth, England,for Newport News, Va., on July 20, 1918. On August 4, 1918, when about 60 mileseast of Newport News, it was attacked by a German submarine and sunk by gunfire.Mr. Bastin was taken aboard the submarine as a prisoner of war, remaining on thesubmarine for nearly three months, until its arrival at Kiel on October 25, 1918, whenhe was transferred to a prisoners' camp.

The enemy submarine was U K.140, being an armored cruiser submarine, 375 feetlong, drawing 23 feet, with freeboard 3 feet above the water line, armed with four6-inch guns, carrying 35 torpedoes and having eight torpedo tubes and seven sets of

engines. Mr. Bastin says that the submarine carried a crew of no less than 102 men,including the captain, seven officers, and a special prize crew.

During Mr. Bastin's enforced stay aboard the submarine he had many excitingexperiences. On August 5, 1918, the submarine sank the American S. S. StanleySeaman (?), of Boston. On August 17 it sank the Eiamond Shoal Lightship and foursteamers, whose names are unknown to Mr. Bastin. On August 22, 1918, the submarine torpedoed and sank a large British passenger steamer called the Diomed,of Liverpool (gross tonnage 4,672). On September 20, 1918, the submarine attackeda British tanker, the S. S.Lackawanna, of Liverpool (4,125 tons), which, being armed,succeeded in shooting away the conning tower of the submarine. (Note: It might be




with terror and he himself and the four or five other prisoners from differentsunk by the submarine awaited momentarily their end. The effect of this long continued mental strain may well be imagined. Only those of robust physique andwell-balanced mentality could stand the strain.

Mr. Bastin said that the prisoners received the same food as the crew, this beine

in rotation, boiled barley one day, boiled rice the rfext day, and boiled macaroni thethird day, with roasted barley as a substitute for coffee. The prisoners were permittedon deck only one and one-half hours "each day, of which one hour was in the morningand one-half hour in the afternoon. The remainder of the time was passed in the close

and noisome atmosphere of the engine rooms in the depths of the submarine. Whilethe ventilation was as good as can be attained on a submarine, the air was so heavy

with odors that the men were in a drowsy condition and slept most of the time. Onthe whole, Mr. Bastin said that the treatment of the prisoners aboard was bad and thesupply of food inadequate. He felt sure that the German crew had been forcedaboard in Germany and everything was done according to the strictest military disci

pline. As above stated, the submarine arrived in Kiel on October 25, 1918. Forsome days previously there had been great discontent among the crew and plans weremade to attack their officers and join with other submarine crews as soon as theylanded.

On October 29 the crew received an order to put to sea to fight the British fleet.They refused to obey the order and, joining with other submarine crews under theleadership of a sailor from the Seidlitz, who had been for two years in a submarine,they began the revolt, the signal for which was a bombardment of the main street ofKiel by a German cruiser in port. The prisoners of war were released for the dayonly with orders to return aboard at night.

On November 5, Bastin, with his comrades, was transferred to Wilhelmshayen andwas then interned on the German cruiser Hamburg.

On November 9 the prisoners were told that the armistice had been signed andthat a revolution had broken out in the British, as well as the German navy; thatMarshal Foch had been shot and that the peace conditions would be favorable forGermany. In confirmation of these statements the Germans showed the prisoners anarticle in a local newspaper.

On November 10 there was a great illumination of the German fleet and a celebration in the city of Wilhelmshaven. On November 11 the real terms of the armisticebeing known, everybody was depressed and everything was quiet.

On November 21 the prisoners were escorted from Wilhelmshaven to the American

officers' camp at Karlsruhe, where, according to Mr. Bastin, there were about 20American officer prisoners from the Flying^Corps.

Mr. -Bastin was released and left the camp at Karlsruhe on November 29 and proceeded to Villingen, about 20 miles from the Swiss frontier, where he was cared forby the American Red Cross. On December 1 he arrived at American Base HospitalNo. 26, AP. 0 . 785, and it was from that point that he came by rail to Havre andpresented himself as a destitute American seaman, entitled, under our laws, to reliefand transportation.

Naturally, Mr. Bastin had none of his original papers, all having been lost or takenfrom him by the Germans. He showed me, however, Special Order No. 445, of the



7 7H E U -1 40 .

aboard tha t vessel to theUnited States. The U. S. S. Newtonsailed from Havre for

NewportNews, Va., viaPlymouth, England, onJanuary 11, 1919.

On August 5 the Stanley M. Seaman, a four-masted schooner of

1,060 gross tons, bound from Newport News to P orto P la ta , San

Domingo,with a cargo of coal, washal ted in la ti tude 34° 59' N.,longitude 73° 18' W. by a shot from the V-lIfi. Thecrew of the

schoonertook theboats atonce androwed to thesubmarine,wherethey delivered their papers. They informed the German officersthat they "hadleft theschooner in ahurry andw ere w ithout sufficientfood andw ater," whereupon" thesubmarine took their boats intow and re turned them to the schooner, where they were permittedtoprovision. Theywere ordered to run alinefrom thestern of the

schooner to the bow of the submar ine and after so doing were

permitted toleave thevicinity.The dayfollowing thesinking of the Stanley M. Seaman the TJ-Ufi

sanktheAmericansteamship Merdk(formerlyDutch),3,024tonsgross,4mileswest ofDiamondShoalsLightship. The Merakwasproceeding atabout 8knots anhour,when at 1.40 p. m. ashotfrom the sub

marinecrossed her bows. Theweatherwas sohazythat thesubmarine,whichwas4miles off theportbow, wasinvisible, but the flashesof hergunscould beseen. The Merdk putabout atonce andmadeforshore,steering a zigzag course. The'subma rinepursued, firing at

intervals ofabout aminute. The M erak,which was notarmed, ran

agroundafter thesubmarine hadfired herthirtiethshot and thecrewtook tothe boats . TheGermansdrew up to thesteamer,boarded her

from thedeck of thesubmarine, placed their bombs, and assoon as

these hadexploded, called thelifeboats alongside andquestioned the

captain of the Merak. A fter checking up the captain 's answers in

Lloyds, thesubmarine officer gave him the d is tance to shore and

turned hisattention toothervesselswhichwere insight at the t ime:

The Diamond ShoalsLightship, 590grosstons, theBritish steamer,Bencleuch, and the American S. S. Mariners Harbor. Of thesevessels thefirst wassunk bygunfire, thesecond escaped after beingchased andgunned for some t ime, and the thi rd escaped at tack of

anykind. The Mariners Harbor was,however, close enough to the

lightship to observe the a tta ck upon her, and a summary of her

captain's story as submitted to the naval authorities tells of the

afternoon'swork of the V-lJfi:

MarinersHarbor, of by the New and




Thefiringwasoffthestarboardbowofthe MarinersHarbor. Thecourse wasalteredtoNW.forabout 15minutes. Throughtheglasses thecaptain couldseethelightshipand oneship on ei ther sideofher. One of the shipsappeared to beofaboutfiveorsixthousandtons,andtheotheronewasm uch smaller. Thelargershipseemed to beinsidethelightshipandthesmalleroneappearedtobeoutsideofthelightship.

Shellswereobserved tobe droppingabout the shipsinto thewater/causing aconsiderablespraytoarise. Thefiringwasnotregular. Usu allytwoshotswerereportedwith an interval ofa few secondsbetween them. Then anintervaloffrom threeto fiveminutes and sometimes longer would follow. The captain estimated thatabout,eightshellswerefiredduringthefirst10m inutesofthe atta ck.

At 2.12p. m . (Saturday) the Mariners Harbor inte rce pte d the following radiomessage: "KMSL S. 0 . S . Unknown vesse l being she lled off Diamond ShoalL ightVessel No.71. Lat i tude35°05 ' , longitude 75°10 ' ."

Thecourseofthe Mariners Harborwasthe n changed toN .and .itwasobservedthattherepo rtofthefiringbecamemoredistinc t. Subs equen tlythecoursewaschangedto

NW .and the ntodueW.forashorttim e,and th erepo rtofthefiringbecamequitefaint.Finallythecourseofthe Mariner.s HarborwassteeredN.andtheengineswerestoppedwhentheshipreachedapointabout10milesWSW.ofCapeHatteras,in8fathoms ofwater. I t wasthen about5 o 'clock.

The fifingseemed toceasefor about ahalf hour, when it commenced again,SSW.oftheship'sposition,andco ntinued un tilshortlyafter 6o'clock.

At 5.50 (Sa tu rday ) t he Mariners Harbor received the following radio message:"Gu nned , steeringS. 55E. Bencleuch."

At6p.m.ashipwassightedasternofthe Mariners Harborproceedingatalowrateof speed on abou t an ENE . cou rse. She came a longside t he Mariners Harbor an d

Capt . Hansen hailed her captain through am egaphone. The nameof theshipwastheAmerican S. S. Cretan,ofab out li)00 tons, engaged in passenger service.

T he c ap ta in of t he Cretan inquired about the f ir ing and asked Capt.Hansen ifhewasgoingout. Capt. Hansen informed him of what he saw, and stated that heintended toproceedafter dark.

At 6.25 (Saturday) the Mariners Harbor received the following message: "Ceasedfiringafter 37shots, 23.25,steeringtoward Loo kout."

The Cretan an d th e Mariners Harbor stood together unt i l 6.30 p. m., whentheMariners Harborproceeded alongth e beach, followed by the Cretan. After about ahalf hou r t he Cretans topped , bu t the Mariners Harbor continued onher E. byN.courseuntil CapeH atteras wasreached.

Atdusk (7.15p. m.)t he Cretancameuptothe Mariners Harborand the course wasresumed. When offshore about 7milesthe captain observedth at the DiamondShoalLightshipwasnotinsight, although the shipwasin rangeofi ts visibility.

At 8.30 p. m., w hat appeared to be a small steamer wasobserved off the starboardbow coming from the southwest and steering northeast for the position ofDiamondShoal Lightship. She wasshowing a masthead l ight , and a red side l ight couldbeseenthrough the glasses. The lights were verylowin the water and proceedingat ah ig h ra te of sp ee d. T he Mariners Harborand the Cretanwere run ning completelydarkened. Thenightwasdark, withnomoontobe observed.

Thecaptainbelievesthisvesseltobeasubmarine,andthe Mariners Harbor'shelm



7 9H E U - 14 0.

thisaccounts for the fact that the submarine did not shell him , although his positionwasabout the same distance away from the submarine as the l ightship—the threepositions forming a triangle.

Duringthe entire attack the captain estimated that between 50and 60shellswerefired.

At 10p. m. a message wasreceived that the Diamond Shoal Lightship had beensunk.34

On the morning of Augus t 10, the following radio message wasintercepted b y several ships and s ta tio ns : " S O S 36 N . 73 W .Help. W e are ru nn in g extrem e danger. W e are being a ttac ked .Lat. 36 N., long. 73 W . S. D . Z ." The U. S. S. Stringhamhurried to the assis tance of the endangered vessel, which proved tobe the Brazilian steamer Uberaba. The result of her mission is evidenced by the following message received by the Bureau of Opera

tions: "Enem y submar ine s ighted la t. 35° 51 'N. , long. 73° 2 1 ' W.Dropped 15 depth charges. Searching v ic in ity Brazilian steamer.Call letters S.D. Z. Escaped undamaged."35

ThreedayslatertheU.S.S. Pastoresengagedthe TJ-llfi. Thestoryof this action is ta ke n from th e w ar d iary of th e Pastores datedAugust13:

At5.32p.m., G.M.T., thisdate,in latitude 35°30'N.,longitude 69°43 /W.,thisvesselchanged course from 269°true to330° true in order tocrossarestricted area inapproach route before moonset. Zigzag combined p lans Nos. 1 and 2 had been carriedonallday. At 5.43p.m., G.M.T.,th eofficer ofthe decknoted asplash about2,500yardsdistant, al i t t le on the starboard quarter, and heard the report ofa gun.With his glasses he discovered a large enemy submarine lying athwart our course6or 7milesdistant, alittle onthestarboard quarter, andfiringatthisship, apparentlywithtwoguns. From sizeofsplashitappeared tha tthesegunswereofabout 6inchesin caliber. Went to bat tle stations and commenced fir ing at submarine at extremerangewith armor-piercing shell a t 5.46 p. m., G. M. T. The enemy fired about 15shots, no,ne of which came closer than 1,500 yards, after which she headed aroundtoward usoraway from usand ceased firing. Thisshipfirednine roundsat extremerangefrom after 5-inch 40-caliber guns, all of which fell more than 3,000 yards short.

Ceasedfiringat5.50p.m ., G.M.T ., after enem y had ceased, and proceededon courseatfull speed. Submarine disappeared about 5minutes later.

Foraweekfollowingtheengagementwiththe Pastoresnothingwasheardof the TJ-1/f.O, and when, onA ugust 21,sheresumed her activitiesshewasfar to the northward of the scene of her former operations. A t t ha t time she a ttacked and, after a brief fight, sank theBritish steamer Diomed, 7,523 gross tons, bound from Liverpool toNewYork.

84



AMEEICAN S.S.O.B.JENNINGS AFTER HER FIRE .

(Page 73.)



1

' • i t -. nnn In

G E RM A N U -1 17 A N C H O RE D A T W A S H I N G T O N , D . C , A F T E R T H E W A R .Usedin theVictory loancampaign.



GERMAN U-BOAT SHOWING SAW-TEETH ONTHE BOW USED FORCUTTINGN ETS.



SINKING OF AMERICAN S. S. FREDERIC K R. KELLOG G.

Page 92.)



TH E TJ-140. 8 1

actionand offered the suggestion, in order toprevent unnecessary wasteoflife, thatthe ship be abandoned . The cap ta in agreed to thi s suggestion and the ship was abandoned ingood shape .

The captain 's boat, in which I left the ship, washeld alongside the ship aslongas we thought i t proper to hold her there . By the t ime we jo ined the o therboats ,

which werelying about aq uarter ofam ileoff the ship waitingforus,th e submarinehad steamed to aposi tion quite close to the other boats. I wasnever lessthan 250yards from the submarine, bu t I tried toobserve all I could ofher construction andgeneral appearance. The submarine passed our boa ts as she went to t ake up herpositiontosink the ship, which shedid by firingthree salvosoftworoundseachfroma distance of about 300yards, and the ship immediately commenced tol ist to port andfinally sankonher portsideab out ]5minu tes after thefirstsalvohad beenfired.Whenthe ship sank wewere about 600yardsfrom her. The position at the t imeof sinkingwaslatitude40°43

/N.,longitude65°15'W.

30

The day after the s inking of the Diomed t h e U-140 a ttacked the

American cargo vesse Pleiades, 3,753 gross tons,bound from HavretoNewYork. Thesubmarine,whichwaslyingawashandnotunderway,wassighted at 7.10 p.m. from the crow'snest ofthe shipbyamember of the armed guard crew.

The I Leiadcs, of3,700grosstons,owned by the Luck enbac h Co.,left Hav reAugust4, 1918, "for New York. On August 22, a t about 7 p . m. ( ship 's t ime) , in la ti tude39°43 'N. , longitude 63° IV W., a member of the armed guard in the crow's nestreported a suspicious object two points off the starboard bow, distant 5or 6miles.The weather was c lear , but the firs t officer on the bridge could not make out the

object and ascended to the crow's nest . By th is t ime the object wasdead ahead.Thef irst officer recognized that what the lookout had taken to be a funnel wastheconningtowerofthe subm arine.

Thesubmarinewasawash,notunderway,andintheslightswelloftheseathefirstofficer could make out the bow and stern alternately exposed below the water line.Henoticed agun forward and aft, bu t could not distinguish otherdetailsatthatdistancebeyond the fact that she wasa bigsu bmarine, atleast 300feet long,and thatherconningtowerwasamidships.

At7.10p.m.thecourseofthe Pleiadeswaschanged from S.(true)toSW.byW.JW.,atherregular speed of 9 i knots. Afew minutes later thelookout reported that thesubmarine had submerged.

At8p. m. the flashof agun wasseen off the portbeam and ashellfell 1,000 yardsshortofthe Pleiades. Asubmarinewassighted, lyingawash,distantbetween3and4miles. The posit ion of the shipwas39°34'N ., 6

D 25 'W. There wasa full moon,

in the rays of which the submar ine lay , making an excellent target. The Pleiadesswunghersterntothe subm arine and worked up aspeed of 12knots.

Alltold the submarine fired four shots, the interval between the firstand secondbeing three of four minutes and between the o ther two about two minu tes. Thesecondshotfell off the shi p's port qu arte r from 500to1,000 yardssho rt; the third andfourth shotsstruck astern from 700to1,000 yard s short.

The Pleuidesf ired13shots from her after gun, a4- inch 40. Beginning with the



8 2 GEEMAN SUBM ARINE ACTIVITIES ON ATLANTIC COAST.

two or three points off the port quarter . The firs t officer believes the submarine firedonly four shells, because the armed gua rd's shots were so wellaimed astoleadthesubm arine todecidetosubmerge quickly.

Th e first officer explains the failure of the submarine ei ther to pursuethe Pleiadesor tomaneuver around her toget herin the path ofth e moon's rayson thegrounds

that shewasnotofaspeedy type .Two radio messages were sent out by the Pleiades. The firstwasanALLO,sentat7.15 p. m . Theother wasa n S O S S S S S message,sentat8.15,approximately. It wasacknowledged byashorestation,b u tth efirstofficerw asun abl etostatewhichone.

The Pleiadesarrived at NewYorkA ugust25.37

After the a tt ack on the Pleiades t h e TJ-lJfibeg an her homewardvoyage and on S ep tember 5 made an unsuccessful a ttack on theBrit ish tanker War Ranee, 5,559 gross tons, en route from Grangemouth, England, to Halifax, Nova Scotia, inbal las t. At 11.30a.m.

inlati tude51°27' N., longitude33°24' W.,the War Raneesightedaperiscope and then the t rack of a torpedo close alongside, which,passed immediately under the engine room, but did not hit theship.The ship had been s topped for minor engine repairs and when the submarine was sighted o rders were g iven for " fu ll speed ahead."After a delay of five minutes she s teamed ahead, zigzagging, untilthe submarine was well as tern. The submarine came to the surfaceand gave chase. L ater th e subm arine opened fire. Two roundswere fired a t three-minute intervals between shots . The last seen

ofthesubmarine,shewasheadingsouthandthe War Raneeescaped.The TJ-lJfihaving sus ta ined some damage resulting in a slight

leakage, delayed her passage and she was jo ined-on September 9 by the TJ-117w hich cam e to her assistan ce. T he tw o then proceeded incompanyfor a t ime toward Germanyby way of theSkawandAlbachB ay . T he V-l/fi arrived at Kielon the25th ofOctober,1918.


The TJ-117,™commandedbyKapitanleutnantDroscher,lefther baseearly inJu ly, 1918. This vessel was one of the cruiser, mine-layingtype of German submarines , and . combined the e rrand of sowing mines on the American coast with tha t of destroying tonnage by d irect a t tack . Her approach to the American coast was heralded by an a t tack on the Br it ish s teamer Baron Napier, Jul y 26,wheninlati tude 45°26' N. , longitude 32°50' W.

On August 10 she a tt acked the fish ing flee t in the vicinity of



8 3HEU-117.

34tons; the Reliance, 19 tons ; the Earl and N ettie,24tons;and theCruiser, 28 tons. The Albert W. Black, 54 tons , was fired on bu tsucceededinescaping,andthe Gleaner, 45tons,after seeingoneof thevictimsdisappear und er the waves,fledwithou t mo lestation.

Allof the fishermen witnessed the sinking of at least one schoonerbesides their own; some had conversation with the officers and crewofthesubmarine, while others,w howeretak en aboard the submersiblewere able tofurnish fairly good nontechnical descriptions of theraider.

I amaFrench Canadian,

saidFredDoucette,engineerofthe Aleda May,

and 32 y ears o ld . H a ve b ee n i n t he fishing b usin ess 15 y ea rs . W e sighted t hesubmarine whenwe were SE . of Georges Banks. I t hink tha t t he wate r the re is about70fa thoms. Wes ighted the submarine between 9 a . m. and 10a .m. Iwasengineer, and the fir st I knew about i t waswhen Iwas to ld to s tart themotors .Just a t th at tim e I h ea rd t he first shot, w h ich jarred th e b oa t. I opened th eenginewideopen,th en weheard another shot. The submarine wasthen aboutone-fourthmilefrom us,comingtowardus. Ashellstruck and cutourmainsailoff. Thesmokefrom theshellwasblack . Th enwegotintoourdories. They tookthe skipper,ayoungfellow,and myself and told ustogoaboard the submarine. They took our dory and then three Germans, two of whom were sailors, got on board with AledaMay. Theofficer had ajerseysweateron,withblue sergepants. Haddevices onhat.HespokeEnglish. They took our picture from the bridge, as we came alongside,

withasmallcamera.Theywereaboardthe Aleda Mayand tookallourfood. They tookonions,candles,

watermelon, bananas,and mea t,and cleaned outallourprovisions. TheytookahosewhichIhad there, alsoacanofgasolineand acan ofcylinder oil. Tookrubberbootsandshoes. Alsotookth ebowlineand dum pedi tinthe dory.

Thebomb waspainted red , about the s ize of a b ig tomato can. They screwed a fuseintothem etal on the top of the bomb. They then lowered i t down thesideof thevessel. They tied thefusew ithpieceofropewhenthey lowereditdownthe side.Theythentookascrewdriverand shoved it into the endofthefuse andit snapped.Then they said , "Row off quickly . Wehavesevenm inutes ." About every minute

thereseemedtobeasnap. I t seemedmorethansevenminutesto me. I should sayi t wasnearer 10minutes. The officer began to look anxious, and then i t exploded,without much noise. The boat set tled s lowly, and the officer said "There she i s;that i swar ." There wasa handle on the s ide of the bomb to carry i t wi th . There wasasecondbom bin the dory and thisgavemeagood chancetogetadescriptionofi t. I twas7 or 8 inches h igh; 6 inches around; nose was 3 inches long and about1^inchesindiameter . Thehandle wasjust large enough totake hold of. Wewereon the deck of the submarine for a whole hour. The bow slanted; top was round;Bternwentrightdown tothe water. Thereweretwotightwiresstretched from forwardaft,overconningtower.




The forward gun looked to be larger than the aft gun. The forward gun was about12 feet long. The after gun was about 10 feet. The recoil cylinder was conspicuouson after gun.

There was a wire handrail the entire length of the submarine held up by iron.When the crew got on deck they were covered by four men. They took an empty

shell from the gun, which shell was about 5 inches, with a brass nose fuse, about1\ inches. They loaded the empty gun again. They took up a wooden gratingfrom floor where shells were kept. There was an iron bar holding wooden gratingdown. There seemed to be about 200 shells. They picked up the shell, turned itup, nose down, and unlocked case which- held shell (brass case). They put theshell into gun and took the empty shell and put it with the other shells and covered it over again with iron bar.

No wireless or periscope was noticed. There was a pipe on each side of conningtower, about 6 feet above conning tower.

The smallest gun was aft. There was no flare on the submarine. She ran straight.

There was a small German fla,g on after end of conning tower, red, white-black.The deck of the submarine was perfectly smooth except for the grating. Theconning tower was about 12 feet. She was battleship-gray color. She set up inwater pretty well forward, and went down low aft.

The men stayed on deck about one hour. She was steaming up to sink the Progress,

and made a sign to the captain to push away. They got into the dory, and they toldus to come down the conning tower. We went down the hatchway through theconning tower, and when we got down we walked a few steps to another manholeabout the same size, and then to another manhole, which made the third, andwe hadto stoop down to get through it. It was a little aft.

On the first level nothing was noticed. Nothing was noticed on the second level.On the third level, we went through manhole, and there were two big motors there,one on either side, probably dieselators. They were about 2 feet apart. They werevery noiseless in running, and kept going all the time. The engine was started fromup above by a turning wheel, and went very smooth. There was no vibration whatever. It was a reversible engine. When she ran on reversible she was just as noiseless. The engine room was short distance from conning tower.

The men sat on tool chest and there was a small dynamo running all the time. Abell would ring, and the switch was thrown, which would result in a loud noise.This would happen quite often. There were a number of men handling the motors.When bell would ring there would be indications above (lettered) and a certain

man would throw lever on. There were five or six men handling the switches. Theywere kept busy all the time.

There were no crosspieces or wire running from bow. The men stood back of conning tower for about one hour. The beam was about 30 feet wide amidships. Conning tower was about 12-15 feet wide. Did" not have double flare.

When they were sitting on the tool chest there was a manhole opposite, and itseemed as if the crew of the submarine did not want them to see into it. They werevery careful about closing the door every time they went in, and when the doorwas left open, they hollered to close it. You wouldfhave to stoop to get into manhole.

The door on manhole opened inside port side. The crew of the submarine, went



THE TJ-117. 85

when the men went down in submarine, and 3.15when they came out. Quitea

fewmenshookhandswith them andwished them luck.

All the supplies of the crew of the Lena Maywere taken away. Also all their

clothes.

Thismanonboardthesubmarine,whoappeared tobeanofficer, stated thathehad

beeninNewYorkand Providence. Hestated thathewasmarried. Hesaid, "Doyouthink the people ofAmerica think they are going towin thewar?" He said,

"I suppose you people think the same." He said that nobody would win. He

saidthatGermanyhadagoodchancetowin,astheyhad plenty ofmen. Heasked

aboutthedraft. He askedDoucettehowoldhewas, towhichDoucette replied33.

He said that the draft agein Americawasbetween 20-30. He alsoasked if there

wasmany training. He asked Doucette howmany men there were in France, to

whichDoucette replied that therewasthreemillion inFrance, and one-half million

inItaly. Hewanted toknowifwehad any charts. Theyseemedtobeverymuch

afraid ofmines,andwanted toknowif therewereany that weknewof.

Theygotsomeketchup from the Lena Mayandwerequitepleasedwithit. They

said, "Oh look, Sniders." They threw openthe hatch onthe Lena Mayand found

fresh goods.

They looked like a crowd of pirates, and were very yellow.

Itwas#veryhot in the submarine, the airwasvery foul from crudeoil.

At about 9.50 a.m. on Saturday,August 10,according to R. A.Sanchez,ownerof the William H. Starbuck,

the man on the lookout on the Starbuck first sighted the submarine. At that

timethe Starbuckwasabout220milesSE.by,S. from GravesLight. It isbelieved

thatthe Starbuck wasthe firstoneofthefishingfleettosight the submarine,which

wascomingfrom E. by SE.and about 5milesoff; itwasrecognizedat onceasasubmarine. She showed agreat deal of foam and appeared to be comingfast. When

atadistanceofabout3milesfromthe Starbuck,shestartedtoshellthatvessel,which

wasattempting to escape. The Progress, Reliance, Aleda May,and oneothervessel

werein the fleet. After several shells fell very close tothe Starbuck,shehove to.

Thiswasafter fragments of shellhad fallen on the deck of the Starbuck. Thiswas

probablyabout 10o'clock a.m. Threedorieswereprepared toabandonedtheship,

andatabout10.30the Starbuckwasabandoned. Thedorieswereclosebyand after

wardsapproached the submarine, and during this timewitnessed the sinkingofthe

Aleda May,the Progress, andpossiblythe Reliance,sunk inprobablytheaboveorder.

Atabout 2p. m. the submarine sank the Starbuckwith abomb. Nosound oftheexplosionwasheard, but the concussionwasdistinctly felt in the dories.

Mr.Sanchezstates that he thinks the submarinewassomewhere

between 200and300feet long,and he thinksthat shewascertainlynotover250feet. Her after gunwasconsiderablysmaller thanher

forwardgun. Theafter gunappearedtobeverylargeatthebridge,andwhat appeared to be the barrel itself wasnolonger than 5or6feet, and the larger part toward the bridge appeared to be even

longer than th is . The caliber of the gun appeared to be about 3



8 6 GEKMAN SUBM AEINE ACTIVITIES ON ATLANTIC COAST.

tobeteethlikeaknifefastened toit. Tfrissta y appearedtobeabout3 inches in d iamete r, made of wire. Her bow was sha rp , slopingforward from the water linelike the bowof aschooner, andherdeckran downfrom amidships aft.

As many as 20 of the crew were s tanding in the conning towerlaughingasthe Starhuckwasbeing rifled of allhe r provisionsbysomeof their mates.

Abou t 20 feet from the bow of the submarine appeared a contrivance, which looked like the davit on board a vessel for hoistingpurposes. No b oa ts w ere visible on deck. - T h e subm arine waspaintedlead color, aswere alsoher guns. Attached totliestayrunning fore an d aft was wh at a pp ea re d to be a w ireless apparatusleadingtotheconning tower. Mr. Sanchezisabsolutely positivethat

the after gun was muchsmaller than the forward gun and appearedto be ab ou t half th e caliber. A bo ut 10 feet from th e bow thereappeared to be a spa r, which lay on deck, and which apparentlycould beforced forward to an upright position. This spar appearedto be about 20 or 25feet long and appeared to be fitted to a hingeondeck.

At about 2 p .m. , short ly afte r leaving the submarine and whenabout 4 miles d istan t, the submarine opened fire on the doriesofthe Starbuck. T here is no q uestion in C ap t. S anchez's m ind butwhat they fired on the dories, the shells landing in the ir vicinity,an d th e su bmarin e afterwards coming to ward th em and lookingthem over.

About 6.30p .m., Sunday, August 11,after sailing since Saturdayafternoon about 2 p. m., the trawler Acushla was met and thecrewof the Starbuck went on board of her and were brought to Boston,arriving at 9a. m., Tuesday, Augu st 13,1918.

JamesNickerson,themasterofthefishingschooner Reliance,gives

thefollowing account of the att ack :Itwasabout10o'clockSaturdaymorningandIwaslyingdown,andoneofthecrew

camedownandsaidtherewas ashotfiredalongsideof us. Therewerefourboatsclosetogether, all f ishingboats. SoI came ondeck, and just asI cameup ashell struckalongside and I saw them lowersailsoff ofher. Then heshelled oneoutsideofusal i tt le, and westar ted our power and swung away from her, and then he threwtwoshellsatus; onestruck about 50feetfromusandtheotherabout150feet.

Shewasnotamileawayfrom uswhenwesightedher,and,ofcourse,then westoppedourmachineand lether lay. There wasnousein tryingtogetaway,andweputourdoriesoverandtooksomeprovisionsandwaterandgotallreadytoleave,andthen we



8 7H E U -1 17 .

getting over the s ide of the submar ine with a bag. I t hink he was an offce". Hehad a white capand oilskins; a ll of them had. I t wasan officer's cap . They were perhaps 20m inutes aboard her before they left her , and they just got aboard the submarine and did not move very far before she went up . There wasn 't much ofanexplosion; shewentdownstern fifst. Wesawthreemoreschoonersjustaboutthe

time we left; the Starbuck w as a bo ut n orth b y w est from u s. After h e sunk th eStarbuckhesteamedinthat way. Therewereabout 10or11shotsfired there at thoseotherthree.

v

Thewind wasabout EN E. Shewasn 't goingvery fast. Shehad the dory astern .Therewasverylittlenoise; justemoke. Shefired perhaps10or11 shots . Justaboutnoonthe Starbuckwent down and we got aboard the Katie Palmer abou t 5.30. Ten minutesbefore weboarded herweheard four moreshots. Wegotaboard and startedpowerand star ted about west by south. Wedidn 't go40minuteswhen wesawhercomingbehind us,and, ofcourse,w hen shewasabout 2milesfrom uswesighted her.Her bow wasabout 12or 14feet out of water and her stern wasawash. The centerwasabout 6or7feet out ofw ater. So,ofcourse,hepaysthere isnouseofustrying toget away. He stopped his engine and wegot into our dories again and started out. The Katie Palmer is owned, I th ink, in Boston. Themaster i sEdward Russell. Hehad nodory out that time and had noboat ofany kind because thefirst,ofhis doriescamealongwith us,and the submarine wasperhaps 300yardsfrom usand therewasa fellowsignalingto oneofth e last doriesth at left her and that dorywen t alongside.Itwasgett ingdarkthen. Weheardthis slight explosion. Ofcourse we started thenforland. Weneversawanythingafter welefther until Sunday nightabout8o'clockwje heard—I suppose there was a f ishing vessel coming up. About noon Mondaywewerepickedupbytheschooner Corinthianabout 14milesaround South Channel.Theownerofmy boatisJohn Nelson,ofGloucester. The crewofthe Katie Palmerall

left h er. T he Palmer looked likeadory alongsidethesubmarine. Hewasabout17milesabout west from wherewewere. Her bow wasround, justlikeaschooner bow.1waswithin 200feet ofherwhen shecamedownalongside ofour boat. They allhadsomekind of coats on . Shehad twogunsaft. Oneheavygun on thebow. I t wascovered. It wasaslongasone ofthose 6-inch guns. Musthave been50men onherforward deck. There wasn 't over 12men in s ight when shewasalongside us. Shewastwiceaslongasthe Starbuck,andthe StarbuckIshould judgetobeabout90 feet.Shewas250feet at least. She wasclose to the Slarbuck. She was newly painted .The Starbucklookedlikeajollyboatalongsideher. Therewerenoroughspotsonher.Shelooked new.

The following is t he s ta temen t of M anael D ias, c ap ta in of theschooner Mary E. Sennett:

Thecrew consisted ofseven, allb eing saved.Saturday,August10,1918,between3and4p.m.,SE.partofGeorgesBank,known

aslatitude 41°,160milesSE. Island Light;weather verygood. Fridaynight, August9,1918,weather wasstormy, raining, and rough.

The Cruiser from Boston, afishingboat, told me that they heard someshotseastofthem and that they thought wehad bet ter gotoport , but owingtothe fact that thecaptainhad heard tflese reportsfrom otherfisherman from time totime, did not pay




All boatst ried torun awaytoward theNW . Then speed wasput on;whenabout a mile off three shots were fired at same time, one at each one ofthefishingboats.Then we faced vessel SE. and then twomore shots were fired, one at stern andoneat bow. Then wetook to doriesand went WNW. and the vessel SE.joggingalongby itself. Only sawoneshoth i t water and went under keel . Cruiser wassunkand

Old Timewasalsosunk;none ofmen believed saved.Germans^ ere not seengoingonboard any of thess vessels. After Cruiserand Old

Time were sunk, i t went toward the Mary E. Sennett. Lost sight of vessel anddidnot pay much attention aswe wereusingour best efforts toget away.

Around 5.30 or 6p. m. nine shots were heard in direction where submarinewasseen. Sailed NW. forhome. Sai led unt i l Sunday 2 p . m. Goodspeed, aknockabouttrawleronClarkesBank ,broug ht ustofishingground s. Wethen gotonboard aUnitedStateschaserandwerebroughttotheS.S. Rijndijk,whichwasatIslandLight,anditbrought ustoharbor, whereweweretaken tothe immigration office.

The submarine wasabout 200feetlong,no thing less,and looked gray. Wesawtwo

brassguns, one on stern and one on bow. The gun on the stern wasof solidshell. Fire camefrom forward gun and smokefrom the sterngun when fired. Believethereweremoregunsonit.

Therewasnowirelessseen. No flag. Conningtower quite high, about8or9feet.Lost sight of vessel and therefore do not know whether or not they boardedmy

vessel.

Statement of Edw ard Russel l, captain of the Katie L. Palmer:

The Kate L. Palmerwasa fishingschooner formerly owned by William andW.»S.Jerdenand taken overby Mr.Jack O'Hara, Boston,Mass. ShepliedbetweenBostonandthefishingbanks.

It left Boston, August 6,w ith acrew ofseven men, including the captain,boundforGeorgesBank s, abou t 200milesoff the coastof Massach usetts.

On Saturday three g\in shots were heard about 10a . m. The weather wasclear and the wind was NE. During the day several shots were heard , but nothingwasseen t il l about 3.30p .m., whena submarine wasseen about 8milesaway. I tcont inued comingnearer un ti l i t arr ived alongside the ship. The submarinewasabout 300feet longand wasawar-gray color. It had twoguns, fore and aft. Theforegunwas6to8inch and about 15feetlongand looked tobe about 3feetin diameter. Nooverhead wires were seen. The conning tower was about 25 feet h igh. On the outs ide of the submarine were about 20or 25 men. Later I boarded her andsaw

several menonboard. I wasquestioned astowhether ornot I wasarmed. Four ofmy menboarded thesubm arine,b ut theotherthreedid not. I wastold togobelow.The crewweresociableand said, "D on 't hu rry ," and asked if wehad waterandprovisions. I replied that wehad. The submarine crew then took our stuff out of thedory. I had adrink withsomeofthem embersofthe crew and wasgiven abottle ofcheap rum, unsealed. An officer ofthe crew asked about the minesand tried togetus to talk. Wesaid we were not permit ted to know anything about thesematters. He then asked if wewould l ike tohave peace. I answered,"Yes." Henextaskedif our people wanted peace, and I said that I thought they did . He asked whenIthought the war would be over and I answered that I d id no t tn ow . He thensaid,



THE TJ-117. 89

that America knew nothing. He said, "You have about 100 men in Europe, haven'tyou?" 1 said that we have more than 1,000,000. He evidently did not believe it,and shrugged his shoulders. He told me not togo ashore and tell anylies. I answeredthat I would not.

Before leaving, the crew of the submarine returned all of my goods to my dory.

We left the German sub about 8. We exchanged greetings and headed west. Thesubmarine headed south. I was asked by the crew of the submarine about how manyfishermen were about and I answered 25 or 30 eastward. I said that for the purposeof going west ourselves, in the hopes of finding a boat to help us. The officer saidthat they were going to give us a boat but later said they had changed their minds.We were aboard the dory until about 11 p. m.

When we were sunk, we were about 200 miles SE. of Highland Light in 50 fathomsof water. We went west toward the South Shore Lightship for the purpose of meetingsome vessel to take us up. We were picked up about10 o'clock by iheHclenE. Murleyand landed at New Bedford, Mass., about 3 a. m. The officer I talked to looked likethe second mate. I don't think he was the captain. The men were dressed in leather

jackets and wore regular German hats.The officers wore slate-colored clothes and caps. The machinery looked as if it

were operated by electricity. All the bells and lights were electric. They had twoengines running lengthwise in the vessel. There were three passageways. 1 headedthrough the conning tower, then through another deck and then another and thenanother deck into the submarine. It was divided into compartments, with rounddoors that closed so that the compartments could be shut off. The engines were aftof the submarine. The galley was aft of the sub. I saw no anchors, ammunition,torpedo tubes, or numbers. There was a life rail about3 or 4 feet in height.

Evidence that the German plan of break-ing the morale of theAmerican people and leading to a demand for the recall of the destroyer division was not badly calculated is shown by the fact thatJames J. Phelan, assistant States administrator of Massachusetts,at the instance of the* mayor of Gloucester, reported to Washingtonthat the fishermen and their families were greatly alarmed by theU-boat activities and desired additional naval protection on thefishing grounds.

The statement of Louis Amirault, a member of the crew of the

schooner Katie L. Palmer:On August10 at about10 a. m. gunfire was heard to the eastward which was repeated

several times during the day up until about2 o'clock, when it was distinctively recognized as being gunfire.

About3 p. m. the man at the masthead reported three dories which came from theeastward. These dories proved later to belongto the Americanfishing schooner Reliance,

a swordfish vessel from Gloucester. There were two men in each dory.The crew of the Reliance stated that the Starbuck, Progress, and Lida May were

sunk about 7 or 8 miles to the eastward of the position of Katie L. Palmer. TheReliance was sunk some time between 12 m. and 2 p. m. All of these vessels were




When the submarine came to about 100 yards of the Palmer, the Palmer was abandoned by its crew and that of the Reliance. After they had got into the dories, thesubmarine crew beckoned to one of the dories of the Palmer to come alongside. Inthis dory were Capt. Edward Russell of the Palmer, Fred Quinlan, Forman Belliveau,and the subject, Louis Amirault.

The submarine appeared to be about 300 feet long. Her deck appeared to be about

9 feet above the sea level. Conning tower was about 13 feet long, 6 feet wide. Shehad two guns, the one forward appearing to be 12 feet long and the caliber is estimatedas being about 6 inch. The after gun was very much smaller, and appeared to be notmore than 4 or 5 feet long. The forward gun appeared to be mounted about30 feetforward of the conning tower. The other gun appeared to be about 20 feet aftofthe conning tower.

She had a hand rail which began about the forward gun and ran aft slightly behindthe conning tower. She appeared to have two hulls, and had square holes outofwhich the water was running.

The four men of the crew of the Palmer remained on the deck of the submarine

about one-half hour, standing between the conning tower and the forward gun, chattingwith the crew of the submarine of which there were about 30 or 40, and three ofwhomspoke English. The majority of the crew were dressed in khaki trousers and undershirt, some barefooted, and only one appeared in white uniform.

One of the three men who could speak English asked the subject, Amirault, from-what port he hailed, to which he replied, "Boston." He told them that they were150 miles from the nearest land, and that they would be picked up Saturday.

One of the officers of the submarine later asked the captain of the Palmer if he hadany information in regard to mine field off the United States coast, to which he wasgiven the answer that such information was secret, and that they knew nothing

about it.After standing for about one-half hour on deck, the four men were ordered below,where they went, going down a manhole in the conning tower, by climbing a ladderon the starboard side. The manhole appeared to be about 3£ feet in diameter.

They went through three manholes to get to deck below.. At the foot of the manhole he found himself in an alleyway about 3£ feet wide, with a steel floor.

The men then went aft down the passageway through three or four bulkheads,which had round manholes about 2 feet from the floor. These manholes had steeldoors. When they reached this compartment they were told to sit down on somesmall boxes. On either side of this passageway was machinery which they were toldwas electric on one side and motor power on the other side.

A member of the crew of the submarine, who stated that he was mate on the submarine, conversed with the crew of the Palmer, and asked them how long the warwasgoing to last. They stated that they did not know, and the mate answered thatWilson knew anyway. At this time a member of the crew in white uniform broughtin a bottle of liquor and were told to drink it as it was not poison.

This man asked if the United States had 100,000 soldiers over there, and we toldthem that they had 1,000,000. He said, " I saw an American paper, and the Americans captured 24 Germans, and the next day the Germans captured twice as many."He said, "You have got a lot to eat in this country anyway." He also said, "I hearyou have got a lot of aeroplanes in this country. I would like to get a couple of them."



TH E JJ-U1. 9 1

The crew of the Palmer r emained in the compar tment about one hour. All t he timethat they werebelow the engines wererunning and after about onehour theystopped and the men went on deck. Amirau lt does not know whether they submergedornotd uring this hour.

Thecrewofthe Palmerwerethenputintotheirdoryandweretoldbythemanonthesubmarinetotellthetruthaboutthewaytheyhadbeentreatedonthesubmarine,andhewished them good luck.

Whileonboardthesubmarinethecookofthe Palmerwasquestioned astow hethertherewereany potatoes onboard thevessel. Atthet ime they cameondeck of thesubmarinetherewasnovesselvisible, andit wasthoughtth at the Palmerwassunk.Whenthecrewofthe Palmerwent below deck ofth esu bmarine, someofthe crewofthesubmarine went over to the Palmer car ry ing wi th them what appeared to be a bomb. This wasred in color, f la t on both ends, somewhat l ike a tomato can andabout thesamesize. I t appeared tohave afuse 1inch long coming out of oneof theends.

Noboats were seen on the deck of the submarine , but the crew of the Reliance

statedthat therewasadory on the submarine.Thesubmarinewaspainted alightgray and appeared tohave beenfreshly painte d.

Whatcould beseen ofthe bottom appeared clean.

Shehadtwoheavy wiresabout1inch thick strungfrom the bowover the conningtowertothestern. Noanchororotherdevices were noticed.

Thegunsappeared to be darker in color then the hull of the submarine, and theforwardgunhad atampion onthe muzzle. Noplugwasvisible,and the cookofthePalmer toldsubject that henoticed aperiscope about 25feet long. I t wasvery hotintheholdofthesubmarine.

At11.20p.m.onAugust10thedoryofthe Katie L. Palmerwaspickedu pby the

Eelen E. Murley,ofNewBedford,andimmediatelysetsailforshorewateronGeorge3bankandfrom therehead ed forNewBedford, arrivingth erea bou t12p .m.A ugust11.

Theman whosaid he wasm ate on the submarinestated that he was38years andthathe was the oldest man aboard. Themateof thesubmarinewasquest ionedaa 'ohowmanyvesselshe had sunk, and hereplied that the Palmerwasthe nin th vesselsunkonAugust10.

Theyhad aboutthree orfour weeks'growth ofbeard. About 75men inthecrew.Stated that they had been herefor six months. The crewof the submarine seemedto be tired of the war, and onesaid that he wished i t would end shor tly. He said thatthesubmarine businesswasahardjoband that hedid notlike it .

Mate onsubmar ine s ta ted to Amiraul t, "D on ' t put any guns aboard any fishingvessel because if you do we will consider yon p ir at es and cu t your th roa t. " He statedthattheFrenchhadplacedgunsaboardtheirfishingvessels.

After sinking the fishingfleet off Georges Banks thenext activityofthe TJ-117 was two days later , when onA ugust 12she torpedoedandsunk (about 25 miles SE. of Fire I sland) the Norwegian S.S .Sommersladt, 3,875gross tons , in lat itude 40° 10' N. , longitude 72°45'W. The officers and crew of the ship declared that the torpedofired bythesubmarinem adeacircle and returned, exploding against




the glasses and then saw a torpedo coming along a little aft from abeam of the shipabout 150 fathoms away.

As soon as I saw the torpedo I stopped the vessel and ordered the engines reversedand full speed astern. The torpedo went under the vessel, barely missing it, a littleon the fore part of the bridge, and came up on the other side.

I walked across to the other side and I then gave the orders for full speed ahead.The torpedo went about 1,300 fathoms on the starboard side; then it started toturn to the left. When I saw the torpedo start to swerve around I gave orders for fullspeed ahead. After it passed the bow it made two turns, making a complete circleand then struck our vessel aft on the port side exactly between the third and fourthhold, right at the bulkhead.

The submarine didn't come to the surface, but after we got into the boats Ieaw astick, and somebody said, "There's the periscope." I wa? expecting the submarineto come to the surface.

My ship was drawing about 7 feet, and when the torpedo passed under the shipshe only missed it by about a foot. At first she was traveling at a depth of about8feet, but gradually started to come to the surface, and when she finally struck usshe was about 5 feet under.

At 6.25 the next morning the British steamer Pyrrhus, when 1mile north of Fire Island Lightship, sighted a periscope abeam. Alittle over an hour later the periscope was again sighted, this timeastern. The Pyrrhus opened fire at a range of 2,600 yards, and theenemy submerged. Late in the afternoon of the same day theFrederick R. Kellogg was torpedoed and sunk 30 miles south of

Ambrose Channel Lightship. The statement of Capt. C. H. Whiteis as follows:

My ship, the Frederick R. Kellogg, was torpedoed at 5.10 p. m. August 13, 1918,12 miles north of Barnegat and 5 miles off shore. Latitude and longitude is not givenfor the reason that the ship was sunk in 15 seconds.

I was steering at the time of the attack north by east magnetic. The ship is ownedby the Pan-American Petroleum & Transportation Co., and was carrying a cargoofoil for the United States Government. It was coming from Tampico, Mexico, boundfor Boston. The Kellogg had a gross tonnage of 7,127 tons, net tonnage of 4,418 tons.The port of registry is Los Angeles,Calif., where the ship was registered when built.

Immediately she was taken around to the east coast.At the time of the accident there were moderate southerly winds, water smooth.

No sign of a submarine, no periscope, nothing suspicious before the attack was seen.Nothing was seen until after the torpedo exploded, and then for about 150 yards thewake of the torpedo was seen by me. No warning was given, and for about an hourafter the attack I looked for some trace of the submarine, expecting that the bowwould be shelled, and absolutely nothing was seen. The ship went down in lessthan 15 seconds in shallow water, stern first, and it looked as though the stern wereresting on the bottom. It is my opinion that this ship might possibly be salvagedif immediate action were taken.39



THE U-117. 9 3

The torpedo must have been close to the water for the reason that it blew up twosteel decks and a wooden deck and a lifeboat on the port quarter clean into the air.There was one engineer, the third assistant, one fireman, and one oiler on watch,and all three were killed. Four others were killed or drowned. These men werein the vicinity of the engine room. They were the second engineer, one mess boy,

and two cadets.The ship was unarmed. However, she was measured last trip for gun platforms.

It was impossible to do anything for the defense of the ship, for she was torpedoedwithout warning and the sinking was instantaneous. Even if the ship had beenarmed nothing could have been done.

On the 14th the U-117 halted the American schooner Dorothy B.Barrett, 2,088 gross tons, about 6 miles from Five Fathom BankLightship. The crew of the Barrett took to their boats and the submarine after following them for .a time returned to the prize and de

stroyed her. William Merritt, master of the schooner, tells the following story of his escape from his ship, his rescue by the U. S. S.Kingfisher, and the action of the latter vessel in warning an unknowntanker of the presence of the raider:

The schooner Dorothy Barrett was at9 o'clock about 6 miles NE. of Five FathomBank Lightship, heading NNE., when from the WNW. a submarine on the surfaceabout 4 miles away ESE. fired one shot. The Dorothy Barrett hove to and loweredher jib sail and abandoned 3hip. The submarine came within 2 miles and submerged. I started my boat NW. to try and get some assistance. After getting within

\\ miles of the submarine I stopped the boat for awhile and then thought I had bettertry to secure some help.Iwas to the north and west of the submarine. Then he made a short circle and then

I had to go on the outside. I then had him on a line between me and the ship. NowI was between him and the shore. He waited a while to see what I would do. Ithought if he wanted that vessel he would take it, and in the meantime I would tryto get some help. I then gave our boat a NW. course, then headed WNW. and ranin on that until I found the Kingfisher. The submarine followed me for a while andthen stopped and showed his conning tower. I kept going and bye and bye I gotaway. He was going to the ship again, and worked on to a line between me and theship with his conning tower still up. Then for about 10 minutes after that I saw theKingfisher coming from the northward. I laid my course to the Kingfisher to see ifhe could not give us some assistance. He swung around as soon as I signaled himand I went aboard.

I asked the captain what he had to fight with. He said he had three-inch guns,and I told him that the submarine was too big for him to tackle with that kind ofgun. I then went up on the bridge and asked him what he svas going to do. Hesaid he was going to run for shoal water. We had been running about west only ashort time when we sighted the oil tanker. I said to the captain, " He is going to getthat fellow, also, and to shift our course to warn the tanker." The submarine wason our starboard quarter and we commenced firing. We were then heading about




Then the submarine cameupandwent rightahead ofusandwefiredaboutthree

shots. From the timeweabandoned.our ship to the time these shotswerefiredI

judgeitwasaboutthree-quartersofan hour.

Someofthem cameprettynear. Justbeforeweshotthelast fewtimesabigblack

smokecloud came upout of the water. It wascomingup just like steam. Then,

aboutfiveminuteslater,anotherbigblack steamcloud seemedtorisefromthewaterfrom near the vicinity of the submarine and kept comingup forabout 10minutes.

I called thecaptain'sattention toit,buthe saidhecouldnottellwhatitwas. Idonotbelieve itwasover5fathomsdeepwhere that submarinewas. ThelastthingI

didbefore I left myvesselwastoheave the lead and it showed 15fathoms. Ifwe

had only had one ofyour fast submarine-chasing boats therewe couldhavegotten

that fellowbecausehewasin shallowwaterand couldnot turn very fast.

Capt. Frederick Rouse, master of the Brazilian motorschooner

Madrugada,whichwas the next victim of the TJ-117, made thefol

lowingreportof thelossofhisvessel':

The Madrugadahad agrosstonnageof1,613,and anettonnageof1,288. Herhome

portwasNewYork, and she left onAugust 13atabout 11a.m.,bound forSantos,

Brazil,withageneralcargo.

OnAugust 15at 7.15a.m., in latitude 37°50'N., longitude74°55'W.,the first

mate sighted avessel about 2miles off. This vessel wasentirely outofthewater,

anddidnot look likeasubmarinewhenwefirstsawher. Thefirstmatecalledme

and said, "I don't knowwhat to make ofher; she looks like adestroyer tome."

She then opened fire onus, her first shot falling about 100feet over thestarboard

bow, and the next shot falling about 20 feet ahead. She then fired athird shot,

which fell slightly over her port bow. By that time wehad stopped ourengines,puttingthewheelharddown. Afourth shotwasthenfired,whichstrucktheengine

room. They thenfireda fifth shotright on thewater line, and seeing therewasno

chancetosave the vessel, I ordered the crew totake totheboats,whichwealldid

withoutmishap. Whilewewerepulling awaythey firedtwomoreshots,stayingat

the same distance from the ship all the time. They did not fire at the lifeboats.

Afterwegotwellawayfrom the shipthesubmarinesteamedrightupunderherstern

andput twoshotsin her stern, at adistance ofabout 20feet, and thenputanother

shot through the cabin, setting fire to the oil tank. Shewasburningasshewent

down,and the lastwesawofher thewholebowspritwasstickingoutofthewater.

Shehad 1,000 tons of cement onboard at the time, and I think when thiscement

settlesto thebottomitwill causethebowsprit toremainabovethewater,makingit

amenace tonavigation. The submarine did not signal usat any time,nordidshe

offer torenderusanyassistance. Theseawascalmduringthe attack.

After they hadfired the firstshotat us,my wirelessoperator, F.L.Cook,whois

stationed at the City Port Barracks, Armed Guard, Brooklyn, N.Y., sent outan

SO S call,butwehadnot timetowaitforany response. Myvesselwasnotarmed.

Atthe timemy shipwassunk theweatherwasa littlehazy, and asthesubmarine

wasabout 2milesoff, I could not get agood look at her; I could barelymakeout

theformsoftwoorthreemenattheeuns.

The submarine was the ordinary type, about 400 feet in length. This Ijudge



THE U-117. 9 5

disappeared. We were picked up by the Taunton at about 11.30 a. m. 10miles

southwest of Winter Quarters Shoals. Nobody from the submarine boarded the

Madrugada.

The day after the sinkingof the MadrugadatheNorwegianbark

Nordhav, 2,846 gross tons , bound from BuenosAires to NewYorkwithacargooflinseed,washaltedbyshellfireinlatitude35°42'N.,longitude 74° 05' W. The statement of Capt. Sven Marcussen of

the Nordhavmaybesummarizedasfollows:

OnAugust17at 6.30a.m., whenhis vesselwas120mileseast southeastof Cape

Henry, heading north northwest, a submarine was sighted 1£miles astern coming

slowly. The submarine proceeded until it wasabreast of the ship on the port side

still1£milesdistant.

At7a.m. the submarinefiredashotoverthe shipfollowed quicklyby twomore

shots. The Norhdavwas hove to and the lifeboats made ready. The submarine

signaled forpapers tobebrought aboard. The captain took 12>men in the ship'sboatandwasrowed tothe submarine. He delivered the papers to the submarine

andwasasked where ship came from and where bound and what cargo she had.

Thesequestionswere answered.

Capt.Marcussenwith hismen togetherwith four Germans, one ofwhomwasan

officerreturned tothe ship. TheGermanofficer spokeexcellent English. Hesaid

thathehadbeenfirstofficeronvesselstradingbetweenHamburg andSouthAmerica.

Heaskedthecaptainifhehad anypotatoesonboard.

When the ship was reached the crew were allowed 20minutesin which toget

togethertheir effects. During this time the Germansplaced hang bombsover the

portsideofthevessel, oneforward andoneaft andoneamidships.Thecaptain and his crew then returned to the submarine and were all ordered

belowexceptfoursailors,whowereleftintheboats. Themenwerekeptaboardthe

submarinefourhours;whenthey cameondeck, their shipwaslaidoverat anangle

about45°. Shesankinhalf anhour. Themenremainedin openboatsfor29hours

andwerepicked up onAugust 18about 6p.m. by theU. S. S. Kearsarge. They

arrivedatBostononAugust20about3.30p.m.

Thefollowing is adescription of the submarinewhich attacked the Nordhav: 250

to300feet long, 25feet beam. Shewaspainted dark gray. In places the paint

appeared to have been chipped which made some spots onher hull darker than

others,which the captain said somewhat resembled camouflage. The hull of thesubmarinewas fairly clean and in good condition except in placeswhere chipped

aspreviouslydescribed. The captain did not seeanynameornumber onthe sub

marine, but states that his steward claims to have seen U-117on the hull. The

bowwaanearlystraightbeingbut slightlycurved and alittle slantingfrom thepeak

tothewaterline. Thecaptaindidnotgetagoodview ofthe stern anddeclinedto

describeit.

Themaindeckwasabout4feet abovethewater. Theconningtowerwaslocated

amidships,andwas8or9feethigh fromthedeckforward, andabout afootlower aft.

Themetalplatearoundtheforwardpartoftheconningtowerwascarried aboutthree

feetabovethedeck ofthe tower, servingasaprotectiontothe menstationed there.



96 GEKMAN SUBMAKINE ACTIVITIES ON ATLANTIC COAST.

Capt. Marcussen stated that he had not seen any torpedo tubes or cables on boardthe submarine. She had no boat so far as he knew.

At the bow she had a sawtooth arrangement running fore and aft for a distance ofabout 4 to 6 feet. It started low over the bow and was higher at the other end beingabout 4 feet above the deck at the point where the wireless was attached. Therewas

a railing running around the whole main deck.The captain entered the submarine through a hatchway, just aft of the forward gun.He passed through the chart room. (He declined to give any description of the chartroom, stating that he only passed through it and did not notice, anything about thefurnishings or navigating instruments, etc.) He next passed into a room about 6feet by9 feet, having two bunks on one side and a sofa on the other. He thought thatthis made sleeping accommodations for four men. This room had no other furnishingsso far as he could tell. None of the remainder of the interior of the submarine wasvisited by the captain. He saw 20 to 25 men on deck. The commander of the submarine informed him that he had a crew of 40. The men looked well fed, but hada ^ale yellow color and appeared dirty. He thought the officers were from 25 to 40years of age, and the men were mostly younger. All the officers had uniformsofmaterial similar to khaki, with some sort of a mark on the shoulder. Tlrey wore capswith visors, having an insignia over the visor. The crew were mostly dressed indungaree and khaki. Some of the men said that they sunk a ship nearly every day.When asked how long thay had been away from Hamburg, one of the men said fourweeks, and others laughed at this remark and said it was nearer six months.

On August 20 the Italian S. S. Ansaldo the Third encountered theU-117 in latitude 38° 57' N., longitude 70° 48' W. The submarine

was first sighted at 7 o'clock in the morning. She attempted to cross

the bow of the steamer and was prevented from so doing by gunfire.Thwarted in this she drew up abeam the Ansaldo at a distance of2{ miles and began a gun duel which lasted for almost three hoursduring which 200 shots were exchanged. The steamer having exhausted her supply of ammunition, put on all possible speed and succeeded in making her escape. Several shells from the submarinetook effect; the afterpart of the Ansaldo was damaged, one gun putout of commission, and three members of the crew wounded.

At 9 a. m. the following morning the British S. S. Thespis sightedthe periscope of the U-117 in latitude 39° 54' N., longitude 69° 25W.The Thespis turned stern to and made off at full speed. The submarine then dove and it was believed she had been shaken off. At10.40, however, the wake of a torpedo was observed. The steamerhaving succeeded in avoiding injury by the narrow margin of 20 feet,the submarine rose to the surface and opened fire. The Thespisreplied and after a running fight lasting half an hour outdistancedher enemy.



GERMANU-155(EX-DEUTSCHLAND) ASAWAR SHIP.

(Page100.)



LARGE GUN MOUNTED ONU-155(EX-DEUTSCHLAND).

(Page 100.)



GERMAN U-155(EX-DEUTSCHLAND),AFTER SURR ENDER ,ANCHORED WITHIN THE SHADOWOF THE

FAMOUSTOWER BRIDGE.LONDON.



U-155(EX-DEUTSCHLAND) AFTER THE WAR, INTHE THAMES NEAR LONDON.



THE XT-Ill. 97

blastsof the whistle to indicate that there wasno headway ofhis ship. Thesub

marinethenhoisted the international code letters "T .A. R.," and the captainof

the Algeriareplied, " I canseeyour lettersbut cannotmakeoutthemeaning."

Thesubmarinethenfiredthesecondshot,whichfellontheportsideverycloseto

theship. After thesecondshotthe captainordered theboatloweredand proceeded

toboard thesubmarine. The submarine inthe meantime swungunder astarboard

helmandcameasternofthe Algeria,layingstarboardsidetothesternofthe Algeria's,

distantaboutone-quarterofamile. Whileinthispositionthecaptainpulledalong

sideandboarded the submarinefrom the starboardside.

Whenheapproaced the submarine, hewastoldtogouponthe conningtower,and

whenhegotontheconningtowerthecommanderfirstsaidtohim,"Whydidyounot

loweraboatatoncewhen you sawthe submarine;your actionswerenotthoseofa

neutral." The captain answered, "Youwereshowingnoflag,and it not being the

first submarine I have seen and beingsoclose toAmericanwaters, I assumed it to

bean American submarine." He then asked where the captain wasbound. He

repliedGothenburgto SandyHookfororders.

Hethentookthe Algeria'slogand examined it, andwhenhefound that shehadbeenoperatingontheUnited Statescoasthesaidthatwasthe "end." The captain

replied, "You should notbeguided bywhat I havebeen doingin thepastbut by

what I am doing in the present." The chief officer of the submarine said to the

captainof the submarine that the captain of the Algeriawascorrect;that they had

nothingtodowithwhathehadbeendoingbefore. Atthispointseveralofthe officers

ofthe submarine joined in the conversation, all ofwhichwasin German, and took

thesideofthe chief officer, statingamongother thingsthat if they sankthe Algeria

theGermanGovernmentwouldhave topay for it.

Thediscussion lasted about 45minutes toan hour. The commander of thesub

marinethenturnedtothecaptainofthe Algeriaandstatedhewassorry,buthewouldhaveto lethim go;but the next timehe caught him, he would sink him without

warning. He asked the captain if he would give him his word of honor that the

Algeriawasnotunder charter oftheUnited StatesShippingBoard, and the captain

said"Yes,"but added that all heknewwasthathewasunder sailingdirections to

report toNewYork for orders. The other officers on the submarine addressed the

commander,whowasthe manthe captain of the Algeriaspoke to,as(Herr Kapitan-

Leutnant.) Thecaptain ofthe submarinewasnotover 5feet 4inchestall, thickset,

roundface, blackhair, dark eyes, clean shaven, and about 35yearsold. The first

officerofthesubmarinewasabout5feet8inches,andhad lighthair. Thesubmarine

wasabout300feetlong,highbow,butsternwasnotawash. Theconning towerwas

about10to12feet, ontopofwhichwasawirelessleading from the bowtotheconningtower and to the stern, insulated at places with glass. The captain saw no

periscope,and noidentification marks;shehad twoguns,the forward oneappeared

tobe6-inchand theafter gunwas75-mm.; therewerenotorpedotubes. Therewas

ahatchmidway between the conning tower and the after gun, which appeared to

beanammunitionhatch. Thesubmarinewasofthedoublehulltype,withnumerous

portholesonher outer shell. According tothe marks, shewasat the time drawing

about4.2meters ofwater. Capt. Risberg sawnonet-cutting device. Therewasa

liferailaround themidshipportionofthesubmarine,butwhether it extended clear

forwardandaft, thecaptain isunable totell.40



99HE U-117.

Wepulledawayfrom the submarine about9andat 11a.m.wesighted the John J.

Fallow,, whopickedusupand landedusatCanso.

Theseawascalmandtherewasathickfog. Thevesselwa§unarmedandnobody

wasinjured.

Thedayfollowingthesinkingof thefishingvessel,theNorwegiansteamer B ergsdalen,2,550grosstons,wassunkbyatorpedoinlatitude45°10'N., longitude 55° 10'W., about 110 miles SW. true from

Cape Race. The attack wasmadewithout warning and the sub

marinewasnot sightedby the crewof thesteamer. The Bergsdalensank sorapidly that therewasnot sufficient time to launch all theboats. Manyof themenhad toleapoverboardandonewaslostin

sodoing.Thelast operation of the U-117on this side of theAtlanticwas

the sinking of two Canadian fishing schooners on August 30, inlatitude 50° 30' N., longitude 47° W. The two vessels, the Elsie

Porterand the Potentate,wereoverhauledwhilein companyandwereboth sunkbybombs. Someof thedetailsof theencounterasgiven

byW.M.Rheinhard,masterof the Elsie Porter,areasfollows:

Submarinefirstsighted approachingthe schoonerfrom the eastwardandfiredrifle

shotstostopthe schooner. The submarine showed no colorsat any time. All the

provisionswere taken off the schooner and the captain of the submarine asked the

master of the Porterthe course that steamers usually took from Newfoundland to

Canada. Masterreplied that hedidnotknow. Submarine commanderthen threatenedtotakethemastertoGermanyormakehimdopilotwork. Hetooktheship's

papers.

Submarine had no number, appeared to be from 300 to 400feet long. Had the

whaleback deck forward and steel slats in front of conning tower. Conning tower

was15to18feet high. Had largegun forward, but could notseewhethertherewas

agunonthe bow to conning tower and from conning tower to stern. Nowireless

gearseen. Submarine waspainted adark steel colorand paint looked tobe about

twomonths old. Nomarks of damage were seen on the submarine. Officers and

crewworeleatheruniformsand naval caps. Commandingofficer wasabout35years

old,mediumheight, thin face, sharp nose,dark complexion, blackhair,andappear

ancedirty. Themaster and crewwere treated humanely andwereoffered tobacco,

matches, and compass on leaving submarine.

Submarine crewstated that they were tired ofwar and were only beingmade to

fightbytheirofficers. Thesubmarineclaimed tohavesunktheschooner Bianca,and

fromchartsseensubmarinehad comefromCapeRace.

The steamship Solbergpickeduppartofcrewofthe Elsie Porterinlatitude47°40'

N., longitude 51°08/W.at 1.15 p.m. on September 1. Thesameshippicked up

crewof Potentatewhichwassunkbysubmarineat 8p.m.onAugust30.

The sinking of the two schooners evidently took placewhile the



1 0 0 GEKMAN SUBM ARINE A CTIV ITIES ON ATLANTIC COAST.

TJ-117 passed the Skaw and Albach Bay safely, but apparently ranshort of fuel oil later, for in October as she approached theGermancoast, torpedo-boat destroyersweresent out to towherintoKiel.


The U-155w as the original German submarine of the convertedmercantile type having been, before her conversion into a commercedestroyer, the famous submersib le cargo ca rrie r, the Deutschland.After t he e nt ry of t he Un ite d S ta te s i nto t he war this vessel together with others built for m erchant servicew ere refitted and soonafter mad e th eir a pp ea ra nc e as r aid ers . I t seemed fitting to theGermans that this vessel, which had in her peaceful character madetwo trips to A merican p orts, now to be dispatched to western

Atlanticwaters to attack the commerceof theUnited States.I t was early in A ugust of 1918 tha t the ex-DeutscMandunder the

command of Ka p it an l eu tn a n t E ric k Eck elma nn left K iel on hererrand of destruction. She was sighted off Udsire ( la t. 59° 19'N.,long.4P 50 ' E.) on August 16,going north.

T he first a tta ck m ad e b y the U-155 was d irected against theAmericansteamship Montoso,of 3,129gross tons ,onA ugust27,1918,in l at itude 40° 19 ' N . , long itude 32° 18 ' W. The following is the

statement ofA.O.Forsyth, ma ster of thesteamer Montoso:Onthe evening ofAugust 27,6p. m. (A. T. S.), in latitude 40°24'N., longitude

31°4 1'W.,itwasreported tomet ha tasuspiciouslookingwakehad beenseenonourport beam,resembling that thrown up by asmallsteamboat. I wasatdinner at thet ime,andi t haddisappearedbythet imeI hadreachedthebridge.

Igaveordersforanespeciallygoodlookouttobekept,andremainedonthebridgemyself. S ignaled to U. S .S . RondoandtheU.S.S. Ticonderoga,whichwereincompany wi th us , and asked the Rondo (whowas acting as commander by mutualconsent) if he did not think i t advisable to make a radical change in our course after dark, inordertopreve nt ourbeing followedsuccessfully. H echangedthecourse20°

andtostarboard.At9p.m . (A.T. S.), latitu de 40°19'N .,longitude32°18

/W.,Idistinctly saw the

outline ofa long,lowdark object onour port beam abou t 2,000yardsaway, showingabout 4 feet. I called the a t tent ion of the chief boatswain mate , commanding theArmed Guard, toi t . Heimm ediatelywent to the after gun and openedfire, in themeantimeI ordered course to s tarboard to bring the object on our por t quarter, leaving it alittle opensothat forwardgun wouldbear onit. Wefiredsixshotsfromaftand four from forward, and the Ticonderogaf iredtwo, the Rondowas unarmed.Submarinemakingabout 10knots,weaboutth esame.

Ju stafter weopenedfire,twoshotsfella few hun dred yardsasternofus,evidently



1 0 2 GERMAN SU BM AR IN E A CTIV ITIES ON ATLANTIC COAST.

T he o ther submarine spoken of was the U-139,which left Kielabout theend of the first weekin September, 1918.

At 6.10a.m .onthem orningofSeptem ber 12the U-155torpedoedandsankthePortuguesesteamer Leixoes,3,345tonsgross,inballast,

from Hul l to Boston, in la ti tude 42° 45 ' N. , longitude 51° 37'W.The captain of the Leixoes, Joaquim F. Sucena, gave the followingaccount of the loss of hiss hip :

The torpedostruck onthestarboardsideofNo.4ha tch ; submarine wasnotvisible.AssoonastheshipwashitIsawshewasgoingtosink,andIorderedallhandstotaketothe lifeboats, and all ofm y confidential bookswere sunk. The ship washeadingeastbysouthtrue . Fifteen min utesafterth eshipwasstruck thesubmarineappearedon thestarboard beam about one-quarter mile distant. Our vessel sankinabout 15minutes and before wegotalongsideofthe subm arine.

The submarine wasabout 500feet long; four guns, twoaft and twoforward, about6-inch; straightflat deck, sharp bow,norailing; wirelessrunnin g fromconningtoweraft; oneverysmallperiscope; painted black andit lookedlikebrandnewpaint; wasnot f lyingany colors, nor did shehave any number. The captain of the submarinewas of l ight complexion, dark mustache, wore no uniform, but had on a cap;washeavy set and he spoke splendid English, very much l ike an American. Heaskedwhat ship i t was,and we said i t wasa Portuguese ship, and then heasked if therewereany Englishmen on board, and I said no, and then he ordered all handsupondeck. Therewereabout50men inthe crewofthesxibmarine. Whenheorderedustoshoveoffhed idnotgiveusanycourse,neithe rdidh egiveusanyprovisions. The

submarine wenttotheeastward, steamingonthe surface.Onemanlosthislifeonthesh ip. He wasprobablyasleepwhentheship wasstruckand didnotwakeu p. Twoother men lost theirlivesfrom exposure andcold.

OnSeptember 13the U-155wasworstedinanotherrunningbattlewith an armed Bri tish merchant ship, the Newby Hall, of 4,391tonsgross. Thefollowingis astatem ent ofF .O.Seaborne, master oftheNewby Hall, to theU nited States naval authorit ies :

The Ntwby HallleftB arry onAugust 30,1918,and left Milford Ha ven onSeptember1,1918,inconvoy,bound forNewY ork. OnSeptem ber 3at 6p.m .wewereordered

to detach convoy and proceed to destinat ion according to secret orders. All went well unti l Fr iday, September 13,at 9.52a. m., in lat itude 42°18

/N.,longitude58°

22' W. Wesighted atorpedo coming toward us from three points ontheportbow.We immedia te ly pu t he lm hard s ta rboard . The to rpedo missed by about 6 feet,passingourbowsfrom an angle overto the starboard side. I then steered paralleltot rack of the torpedo, and a t 9.56 a . m. (approximate) I a ltered to SSW., therebybringing position ofth e submarine astern and instructing engineersto giveallspeedpossible.

At 10a. m. wesighted submarine coming to surface bearing north; I then kept himasternsteeringanirregularzigzagcourse(about3,000yards).



103HE GERMAN SUBMARINE TJ-155.

tobeseen. Soonafter wescoredanotherhit onhisforward end,the forepartofthe

forwardguncausinganexplosionandavolumeofsmoke. Afterthatwescoredanother

hitonhisafter end,about 20feetaft the after gun. Hethen reducedhisspeedand

seemedtobeunder difficulties, but continued firingwithhisafter and smallergun.

Atabout13,000yardsweoutrangedhimandheceased firing. He headed toward

usandappearedasifhewaschasingus, butin a fewminutes he wasbroadsideontousagainand stopped andsuddenly disappeared. Action lasted from 10a.m. to

11.20a.m., whenfiringceased. Enemy commencedand ceasedfiringfirst.

During the action the enemy used shrapnel and high explosive shells, but none

hittheshipexceptshrapnel. Noneofthecrewwasinjured. Twoboatsontheport

sidewereriddledand oneplate amidshipon the portside dented and badly cutin

numerousplacesbyshrapnelorburstshell. Allthecrewbehavedsplendidlythrough

outtheaction,andspecialpraiseisduetothegunlayerfor his coolnessand themas

terful wayhe handled the gun, and also the gun's crew whoworked very hard;

alsotheofficers and engineerswhoassistedinpassingup the ammunition.

Distresssignalsweresent outbywirelessforassistanceand answered immediatelybyUnitedStatespatrol,whoendeavoredtocometoourassistancebutastheweather

becamethick and rainy we sawnothing ofhim. All secret books and codeswere

thrownoverboardduringtheaction.

Thesubmarine wasabout 250to 300feet long; black in color; cutter bow;flush

deck;gradually slopinginto thewater at the stern. Therewasa platform about3

feethighamidshipsand 40to50feetin length; in the centeroftheplatformwasthe

conningtowerabout10feetlongat thebase and4or5feethigh. Theafter vertical

portionoftheconningtowerwasnotparallelwith the forwardportionastheconning

towerwassmaller at the top thanat thebottom. Theforward gunwasabout20to

30feetfromtheforward partoftheplatform. Amastorperiscopeextended from the

forward portion of the platform and another was situated on the after portion.

Theywerethesameheightasthe conningtower.

Duringtheensuingsevendaystheinactivityofthe TJ-155 againstshipsmaybe attributed to the fact that itwasreported inadvancethat oneofherpurposeswas tolayminesoffHalifax and theNovaScotia coast. The sighting of an enemy submarine there and the

discoveryofminesoffHalifax confirmthecorrectnessof that report.TheAmerican steam trawler Kingfisher,353 gross tons, was the

next victim of the x-Deutschland. Thefishingvesselwas stoppedonSeptember20whenin latitude43°31'N.,longtitude61°53'W.

After the trawlerwas abandoned, her crewwere ordered alongsidethe submarine where they were questioned and then ordered toproceed. Theyheardwhat they took to be the explosionofbombs

after they were out of sight of their vessel but could not be surethat their sh ip , the Kingfisher, had been destroyed. The officers

and crewof the submarinewere described as follows, by the crewofthe Kingfisher:



1 0 4 GERM AN SU BM AR IN E A CTIV ITIES ON ATLANTIC COAST.

I tw asmore th an aweekbefore the subm arinew as again definitelylocated, although th e allo of an unknow n vessel w as reportedSeptember26fromlatitude43°15'N.,longtitude65°W.,theapproximatewhereabouts of thesubmarine.

Onthe twenty-ninth, the Bri tish S. S. Reginolite,2,246tonsgross,wasattacked at 12.25p .m . by gunfire, inla ti tude 40° 5 1' N., longitude 66°40 ' W. The submar ine opened fire a t a d is tance of about5,000 y a rd s and con tinued firing for 45 minute s w ithou t result.The Reginolite r eturned the fire while steering a zigzag course ath er b est speed. T he su bm arin e b eing o utd istan ced gave up thechase and submerged.

OnOctober2theBritishsteamer Nevasa,9,071tonsgross,sightedthe submarine in la ti tude 38° 31 ' N ., long itude 68° 23 ' W. Thesubmarine which was about 8miles away when first seen attemptedto overtake the s teamer without success; then swung broadside to,fired one shot which fell far shor t and abandoned the chase .

OnOctober 3and 4 the TJ-155 scored two successess; thefirsttheto rpedoing of the I ta l ian S . S . Alberto Treves, 3,838 gross tons,inlati tude 38°2 0' N., longitude 67° 10' W .; the second the destructionbybombsoftheBritishschooner Industrial,330grosstons,inlatitude37° 57'N ., longitude 66° 4 1 'W., abo ut 250milesS EJ S. (true) from

Nantucket Is land.On October 12, the American S. S. Amphion, 7,409 tons gross,

formerly the German S. S. Koln, and belonging to the United StatesShippingB oard, inballastfrom Bord eaux toNewY ork,wasattackedinlatitude 36°06' N., longitude62°59' W . Thesubmarineappearedat 10a. m. and at once opened fire on the s teamer, the secondshotcarry ing away the wire less. A ba t tl e lasting over an hour ensued duringwhichtimethe Amphion gradu allydrewawayfromherpursuer.Thesubmarine fired almost 200 sho ts,anum ber ofwhichtook effect.Twomenweremorta llywounded and anum berofotherswereseriouslyinjured by shrapnel; f ive of the steamer's l ifeboats wereriddled andher supers truc tu re was badly damaged. The Amphionfired72shotsinreturn, the las t of which appeared to be ahi t . Immediatelyafter th is the submarine, by this t ime well as tern , abandoned the chase and submerged.

F ive days after the a t tack on the Amphion the TJ-155scoredthefinal success of her cruise , by s inking the U. S . A. C.T . Lucia, of



1 5HE GERMAN SUBMARINE TJ-155.

There was no sign of any submarine to be sjeen. I had just finished my supper andwas going on the bridge. The commander of the armed guard, who was on top ofthe chart house several minutes before I got on the bridge, said he saw the wake ofthe torpedo about 100 yards off, and had guns trained in that direction. There wasan efficient lookout kept at all times. Our speed at that time was 10J knots. The

S. S. Hawaiian, our guide ship, was about two or three points on our port bow, about1,000 yards distant. We immediately sent out S O S calls and our position, andsemaphored the guide ship Hawaiian, to broadcast same. We sent out S O S callsfrom time to time on auxiliary set, until five minutes before leaving ship.

As we fully expected the U-boat to return and send another torpedo into us orshell us, I decided after a consultation with the commander of the armed guard andofficers, to lower three boats and put civilian crew afloat and hold on to bow and sternof the ship. As our No. 4 lifeboat was destroyed by the explosion, and hercomplement was 22 persons, four of whom were killed in the engine room, 18persons were left to divide up in the remaining boats. There three boats hung by

ropes from the stern of the ship all night until morning of the 18th of October. I hadcivilian crew come on board and get some food and return to their boats. Our afterdecks were awash at this time (1 a. m.). Our engine room and fireroom and No. 4andNo.5 hold were full of water, No.6 was one-half full and gradually filling and deckload breaking loose. The wind and sea was increasing, and seas breaking over ourafter decks. About 10 a. m. we put No. 2 boat afloat, bringing her on lee with threemen and stood by, as ship was slowly settling down.

About this time I heard a noise below, which I believed was the carrying away ofthe bulkhead between the fireroom and No. 3 hold as the ship settled more by thehead after this, which I believed was due to the flooding of No. 3 hold. At 1.30 p. m.we launched No. 5 boat, which was on starboard quarter, and hung her off to leeward,

standing by. We also launched after life raft and forward life raft. The after guncrew had to abandon their gun as the sea was breaking over gun platform and theywere ordered to their boats immediately. At 2.20 p. m. I left for ship in No. 2 boatwith the commander of the armed guard and forward gun crew and three others ofthe civilian crew. No. 6 hatch was broken in by deck load and filled. Stern settleddown, with after decks under water. All boats hung at leeward of ship until 3.15p. m. when her stern sank until ship was perpendicular with her upper bridge justunderneath and sank in that position. At 3.20 p. m. she disappeared beneath thewaves. After the ship sank, all boats hauled away clear of floating wreckage andlaid to sea anchors. A very heavy sea was running now and our boats were taking

considerable water on board and we had to keep bailing continually. At 9.26 p. m.October 19, we sighted the U. S. S. Fairfax coming to our rescue. At 10 p. m. we inNo. 2 boat were all landed safely on the destroyer, and at about 12.05 a. m. the lastboat was landed on board the destroyer without any mishaps.

If the Fairfax had not arrived at the time it did, I do not think our boats wouldhave weathered the heavy seas, as they were all overloaded. I and my officers andcrew think that great credit is due to the commanding officer and crew of the Fairfaxin the skillful way he handled his ship, in the heavy seas, and effecting the rescue ofour crew without any mishaps.

All confidential books, codes, and papers were dropped overboard immediately



3 .0 6 GEKMAN SU BM ARIN E A CT IV IT IE S ON ATLANTIC COAST.

Arthur of 7,382 gross tons on Octobe r 25 in la titude 41° 20' N.,longitude32°30'W . This washer lastrecorded activity;sheis nextheard of as arriving in Kiel Novem ber 15,four days after thesigningof the armistice.


The TJ-152 w as a su bm arin e of th e co nv erted m ercantile orDeutschland type. In the la t ter par t of Augus t, 1918, she left Kielunder command of Kapi tanleutnant Franz and made her waynorth of the Shetland Islands onher cruise toA mericanA tlanticwaters.

ThefirstattackofthevoyageresultedinthesinkingoftheDanishsailing vessel Constanza on S ep tember 11 in la titude 62° 30' N .,

longitude 35' W. Herne xt at tem pt was directed against theBritishsteamer Alban, 5,223grosstons,whichwasfireduponSeptember24,when in la ti tude 44° 22 ' N. , longitude 29° 45 ' W. Five days lateranother unsuccessful at tack was made in lat itude 43° 40' N., longitude37°42' W.upontheU.S. S. George 0. Henry, 6,936grosstons.Thesubmarine wass ighted at 8.50 a. m. and the Henry opened fire.T he su bm arin e fired in r et ur n. A t 9.05 a sh ot stru ck th e Henry,causing anexplosion in the magazine in the ship,causinga fire. At9.50 a. m. thef ire was under control. After ahot runningfight thesubmarine ceasedfiringand submerged at 10.40a. m. Thefollowingday , S ep tember 30, the U . S. S. Ticonderoga(ex-German CamillaRickmers) a vessel of 5,130 gross tons , which because of enginet rouble had fallen behind her convoy during the night was attackedat5.20a.m.bythe TJ-152inlatitude43°05'N.,longitude38°43'W.The Ticonderogam anned by anavy crewm ade agallant defense andthe account of their action and thesinking of then

1shipform astory

ofheart interest, no texceededby anyepisodeofthewar. I t wasnot

unti l the end of a two-hour bat tle , when both the ship's guns hadbeen disabled and many of the men aboard killed or wounded thatthe submarine dared to approach near enough to fire the torpedo that endedtheengagement.

Of the 237 men aboard the Ticonderoga only 24, the majority ofthem wounded, were rescued, including the two officers, whoweretaken prisoners by the submarine and taken to Germany.

A par t of the story of Ensign Gustav Bingelman, who was officer



THE GERMAN SUBMARINE TJ-152. 107

andpractically putting thenavigation of the shipoutof commission, crippling the

steeringgearandsettingtheamidshipssectionablaze.

Lieut.CommanderJ. J.Madison,U.S.N.R. F., captain ofthe Ticonderoga, was

severelywoundedbyapieceofthisshell.

ThisalltookplaceinjustasshortatimeasIamtellingyouthis. Iwasgoingback—

Ihadchargeofthe6-inchgun aft.Thesubmarine firedwith the aft gun at our 3-inch forward gun, killing the gun

crew. They fired sixshotsputting the gunout of commission. She then steamed

aroundourstarboard sideandopenedupherdistancealittlebit, openingfireagain.

Werepliedwithour6-inchgun.

I amnot exactly sure, but I should say the distancewasnowabout4,000yards.

Thatwasmyrange, I believe, and the submarinegraduallyopened up the distance

betweenustoabout4miles. Meanwhilethesubmarinewasshellingusandwewere

answeringhershots. Duringthis timemosteverybodyonboardourshipwaseither

killedorwoundedtosuchanextentthat theywerepracticallyhelplessfromshrapnel.

Thelifeboatshangingonthedavitswereshelledandfullofholes,otherscarriedaway.

However,wekept the submarineoff until ourfirewasput outand ourboatsswung

outonthedavits,readytoabandontheshipwiththefewmenleftonboard. Possibly

50wereleftby that time—therestweredead. Well,at7o'clockupcomesthesub

marineagain,off thestarboard quarter.

Meanwhilewehadalsoseveralboatswhichwereswampedimmediately,duetothe.

falls carrying away—the submarine had shot them away before—and holes in the

boats,and therewasnot another boatgotaway that I could see. Every boat that

attempted to get away was either swamped, or something happended to it. The

submarinefiredat usagainfor the second time at arangeof 10,000to12,000yards,

andtherewereonlythreeleftonour6-inchgunasaguncrew—achiefboatswainmate,

agunner'smate, and myself. Wemanned that gununtil ashell struck us underneaththegunandput thegunoutofcommission,aswellasourselves,disablingus.

Thesubmarinestill continued toshellus,and then camealongsideoffourstarboard

beamand fired a torpedo which struck amidships in the engine room. The ship

thereafter slowlysettled.

Therewasalife raft left on the topofthedeckhouse. Wegotourwoundedmen

together,lashed them to the life raft—that is, thosewhowere able todo this—and

shovedthe life raft off from theship. Possibly threeorfourminutesafter that she

tookthefinalplunge. After the Ticonderogahadsunkthesubmarinecamealongside

andhad alreadypicked up the executive officer outof the water and made him a

captive. Theytookthefirstassistantengineerofftheliferaftandmadehimacaptivealso.

Theyaskedusseveralquestions; wantedthecaptainandthegunner; wherebound

for,andwherefrom; threatening us. After getting noinformation they shoved off.

Now,beforeshecametousshehadbeen tothisonly lifeboat that hadstayed afloat,

and thecaptainwasin that, but they did not seehim. The captain wasseverely

woundedandwaslyingonthebottomoftheboat. OneoftheGermansailorswent

intothe lifeboat andmade a line fast by whichshe towed the lifeboat afewyards,

butthelineparted when they speeded up. After that thesubmarinemade off but

stayed in the vicinity. Several shellsbefore thishad fallen rather close tothe life



1 0 8 GERMAN SU BM AR IN E A CTIV IT IES ON ATLANTIC COAST.

backtotherafti n ordertotowit, asthey had nofood onit . Thewindandseagrewin violence and after many fut ile at tempts to come alongside of the raft wehadtogiveupt heideaofgettin galinetoit. Wemade sailinth esmallboattogetawayfromthe submarine ,and in case another ship or a rescue ship should come alongwewouldbe away from thesub marine . Wesailed dayan d night forfour daysandthree

nights,and onThursday morning at 8o'clock wesighted asteamer heading westata distance of 5miles. She,however, ignoredus .

At2o'clockin the afternoon wesighteda nother steamerdead ahead. Thesteamerbore down on us . When she came a longside she p icked us up . The name of the steamerwasthe Moorish Prince, British, bound for New York in command ofGapt.Bi rch . Wereceived a ll the comforts and a t tent ion they could g ive us . Theyhadnomedicalofficer aboard, b u t the stewa rd,whok new hisb usinessvery well,attendedthe men to the bes t ofh i s ab i li ty . While on board the Moorish PrinceonSunday,October 6, this steamer, the Grampian, came alongside and seven ofus weretransferred tothisship. There were22in the l ifeboat altogether . We were transferred

tothisshipbecausebettermedicalattentionandbetterfacilitiescouldbehadaboardofherforthewoun ded. B uttwomen,th ecom mandingofficerand asoldier, whoweretoo severely wounded to be transfer red and moved, were kept aboard the MoorishPrince,with threeother men ,soldiers,toattend them—and herewearenow.

Ensign Clifford T. Sanghove, U. S. R. N . F., third engineer oftheTiconderoga, gave the following version of the attack, to the aidforinformation at New York, N. Y.:

On September 30at 5.30a. m., in lat i tude 43°0 5' N., longitude 38°43' W., thevessel s ighteda submar ine . At the t ime I was in myroom; an 8-inch shell which

crashed through the room woke meu p. From that t ime on I wasbusy. This firstshellstruckthebridge,settingitafireanddestroyingthewirelessandpreventingtheBendingoutofanywirelessmessages.

The Ticonderoga wasarmed witha 6-inch gun astern and a3-inch gunforward. I do not know, however, how many shots were f ired from the vessel . The after gunfired some shots; also the forward gun,b ut shortlyafterwards both gun crewswereshot away.

Theseawasfair ly rough at the t ime. The ship wasdarkened, but I donotknowwhether shewaszigzagging or what her coursewas.

WhenIsawthesubmarineshewasabeamofthe Ticonderogaandacoupleofhundred

yardsaway. Shewasofftheportbowandonthesurfacewelloutofthewater. Thesubmarineremained inthe vicinityal lday unti l af ter dark that night .

I went downtothe engineroomand organized gangstofightthe fire. Someofthemen would beshot away and I would have to organize anewgang. I wasthelast man to leave the engine room, and I t ried to get fresh water star ted torelievethewoundedmenondeck.

WhileIwasdownintheengineroomatorpedostrucktheshipandIwaspinnedupagainstthebu lkhead and thegratingby theb ulgeofthe bulkhead from theexplosionof the torpedo. Thistorpedowasnearly the last thing f iredb y the submarine,andit struckrightaft oftheengine-roombu lkhead onthe starboard side. I wascrushed



THE GEEMAN SUBMARINE U-152. 109

After the torpedowasfiredwegotsomeofthewounded togetherandgotsomewate

andblankets together, and then placed a few of the wounded on the raft, which I

helpedtolaunchfrom thedeckhouse,whichwas20feetabovethewaterat thetime.

Theraftwentinto thewaterwith twoorthreewoundedmenonit,whostillclungto

it. Thisraftwasthelastthingtoleave theship. Therewere13lifeboatsaltogether

aboard.Theboatthecaptainwasinwasfiredatby thesubmarinewhileitwasinthewater.

Thetwoshotswhichwerefiredatitmissed; Iwasontheraftatthetimeofthisfiring

andIknowthatacoupleofshotswerefired,andthemenintheboatclaimthatthese

shotscamepastthem. Therewereeight orninemenonthe raftwithme; thiswas

thesameraft onwhich thewoundedmenwere launched. Wehad tied aline to it

beforelaunchingand then drewit in toward therailingand jumped onit ourselves

afterlaunchingit. Iwasthenexttothelastmanofftheship. Thecaptainhad been

placedinalifeboat,whichwastheonlyonewhichwassafely launchedtomyknowl

edge. Hehadbeenplaced in thisboatafterhehadbeenwounded intheleg.

Therewereanumber ofpotatoesandboxesonthe afterdeck, whichfloatedoff the

vesselastheafter partsank, and the submarine picked upanumber oftheseboxes,

cruisingaroundmeanwhile. When I first saw the submarine the Ticonderoga fired

threeorfourshotsfromtheaftergun. Thisgunbecametotallydisabled,havingbeen

struckbyashellfromthesubmarine.

Weremained onthe raft until 2o'clock in the afternoon, whenwedrifted toward

thecaptain'slifeboatandfivemenleft theraft andgotintothe lifeboat, aswhen the

raftcameclosetothe lifeboat theyshoutedthattherewasnooneintheboatwhowas

abletomansame,allofthemhavingbeenwounded. Thefivementransferred were

Turner,the carpenter(EdwardJ.Willoughby),thequartermaster(GeorgeS.Tapley),

Mr.Ringleman,and myself. Thisboat containedallthesurvivors.

Ididnotseemanyofthelifeboatslaunched,asIwasbelowmostofthetime,riggingfiremains,gettingwater,etc. Ididseetwoboatslaunched, ononeofwhichthe for

wardfallburnedawayandshecapsizedasshewasbeing launched. Shehad at least

eightmeninher.

Thesubmarinecamealongsidetheraftandspoketous. Sheaskedwhoitwastried

toramthemandwherewasthecaptainandwherewasthegunner;howmany soldiers

wereaboard; where we left and where we were going. Mr.Ringlemananswered a

coupleofthemandthe chiefmachinist'smate,whoIbelievewaslost,alsoanswered

somequestions. The chief machinist'smatewastaken aboard the submarine fora

timeandthenfinallyreturned tothe raft, andwasprobablylost, astheseawashigh

andweneversawtheraft again.

Thefirstassistantengineerwasalsotakenaboardthesubmarineandkeptaprisoner.HisnameisFulcher. Hewasalieutenant (j.g.). I believe the executive officer,

Mr.Muller,hadbeenpicked up from thewaterandalsotakenaboardthe submarine

andkept a prisoner. I believe the executive officer, Mr. Muller, speaks a little

German,but I knowMr.Fulcher couldnotspeakawordofGerman,ashewanted to

answerthembut couldnot. Theywere the onlymenofthe survivorswhowerein

uniform. Oneortwoofthemenaskedforfirst-aidpackages,butreceivedaverygruff

answer. IheldaGermansecondassistant engineer's licensein the Adriaticservice

oftheHamburg-American Lineand the NorthGermanLloydCo.



1 1 0 GERMAN SU BM AR IN E A CTIV IT IE S ON A TLAN TIC COAST.

master bringhim aft and sith im in achair. The executive officer wasloweringtheforward boatonthe portsideofthe bridgealone, BOIwentoverandhelpedhimloweri t . I alsohelped lowerthe twoboatsonthe portside. Thesteeringgearwasout ofcommission, and I went aft in to the after s teering quarters and disconnected the steamfromthehand-steeringgear,andtriedtosteertheshipbyhand;but findinghe

steeringgearjamm ed, it wasnecessaryto connect back again, soI went downtothesteering enginetoseewhat could be done. Ourwirelesshad beencarried awaythefirstthin g,soweco uld n't sendouta ny messages. Wew erefiringourgunsallthetime,but apparent ly d idn ' t make a h i t. When the submarine hadfirs tbeensighted shewasabout 200yards off our port bow. The firsttwo shotshit our bridge, setting itafire,andth ethird shot carriedaw ayth e 3-inchgu na ndkilledalltheguncrew. Ourspeed atth etim ewasabout 10knots,and the captain boredirec tlydowninthesubmarine's pathand tried torami t , bu t missed by about 25feet. Thesubmarinewasfiringa l l t ime, and our deck wascovered wi th dead and wounded men. Thesubmarine then submerged for about 20m inutes, bu t reappeared about 2miles offourstarboardquarter and thenstartedshellinguswithshrapnel. Shenextfired atorpedowhichstruckusdirectlyamidships,breakingthesteampipesandcausingconsiderablesteamtocomefrom theengineroom. Theshipthe nstartedtosettle. TheGermans'markm anship wasexcellent, and the yseemed tohitallpartsoftheship . Mostofthelifeboats werefull ofholesfrom shrapnel. At about 7.15th e captain wasputinthelast boat on the vessel, together with 14soldiers, and the boat waslowered away.That wastheonlyboattha tgotawayclear. Atthattim etherewereabout 35 or 40 menstillleft onboard the ship,alive. I reported tothe executive officer thatour6-inchgunhadbeendisabledbyshellfire,andthevesselcouldnotbesteeredfromthesteering engine room. By his ordersItiedawhiteblanketontheaftermast, nearthetopmast, bu tthe submarine paidnoattentiontoit ,andcontinuedshellingus,killingfour

orfiveoftheremainingmen. I pickedupapiece of plank near where the executiveofficera ndfiveothermen werestand ing, b utforsomereasonIth oug htb etterofit,andlookingaround I sawaraft ontopofthe boatdeck. I madem ywayuptothat,andthere found twelvem en, three of whom were very badly wounded, lyingontopof this small house alongside the raf t. I asked them why they were lyingthere, and"d am n" soonfound out, forjust the n ashell struck about twofeet under me,goingdirectly through the small house. Wethen put the three badly wounded menontheraft, andpushed it intothe water, about 20feet below;bu tthe raft capsizedandthethree menwerethrownintoth ew ater. Then the rest ofusgotdownontheraft,15inal l. I t wasthen 7.30and byth at t imethe submarinehadstopped f ir ing. Shehad fired inall about 200shots. Afew minutes after getting onthe raft the vesselwent down, s tern firs t, s inking completely in about 10 seconds. Wethen drifted offontheraft. Isawthesubm arinefiretwoshotsatth eonlyopen boatleft.

Thesu bmarine then went alongsideth e lifeboat and inqu ired forthe captain,chiefengineer, and gunner. On being to ld that the captain was not aboard , they tookaboard the submarine two seamen, t ie ing the boat to the s tern of the submarine.The last I saw, the two seamen were on the submarine. The submarine thenwentovertothe driftwood, and picked up considerablepotato crates, etc.,from thewater,alsopickingup the executive officer and takinghim prisoner. In about 15minutesthe submarine cameovertothe raft onwhichwew ere,tied up alongside,andtookon



T H E GERMAN SUBMARINE U -152. HI

request. Thenth esubmarine letgoofourline,andwedrifted away. Theonlyboatthat gotawaywasabout 1mile tow indward ofus, but all the time drifting nearer.Whenitcame alongsidefiveofusfrom the raft gotin the boat,inte nding totiealinetotheraft, bu tthe wind wassostrongthat wecouldn 'tdoso. Wetried forfour hourstoget back toth e raft to giveher a l ine, but thewind prevented us from doingso.

Wethenhoistedasmallsailonthebowoftheboat,inordertokeephersterntothewind,andthiswaywespent thenight . Then ext morningwetookaninventoryof thesupplies,and found wehad8gallonsofwater, 2cansofhard tack , 1caseofapricots,and 1caseofpineapples. Therewere22menin all ,includingth ecaptain, whowasvery badly wounded. Weat fir st decided to t ry and make Newfoundland, but thecaptainsaidnorthwestwindsstartedblowingaboutthistimeoftheyear,soweabandonedtheideaandcomm encedtosteereast-southeastforSpain. Badweatherhadsetinandwethoughtwesawtwoshipsonthe horizon, but werenot sure. Each man'srationsconsistedofoneapricotand twospoonsful ofjuicetw iceaday. Wecontinuedpulling onourcoursealltha tday. Thatnighttheseastartedtorun veryhigh, and wehadgreat difficulty in keeping the boat from swamping. On the third day the sea

becamemoremoderate,and wemadeperhaps60milestotheeastward. The captainwasfeverishand deliriousattimes,and itwasnecessarytogivehim waterat frequentintervalstokeephisfever down. Them enintheboatwerebehavingaswellas couldbeexpected, exceptt hat the y were constantly complaining aboutnot having water.Onthefourth daythe weathercalmed down, and the seawasmoderate.

Atabout 7a.m. wesighted ashipaway off onthehorizonheading west, bu t apparentlyshedidnotseeus. Atabout 1o'clocksmokewassighteddeadahead, andinth ecourseofan hour's time the S. S. Moorish Princecame alongside and pickedusup .Everybody was very weak , and the cap ta in was in an ext remely bad condition.Threykept usonboard forthre e daysand the n transferred ustothe Grampian.

Theexecutiveofficer F .L.Muller, lieut. (j.g.),U.S.N.K. F., andthe first a ssista nt engineer, J . H . F ulc he r, lie ut. (j. g .), U . S.K.R. F., of the Ticonderoga,were the two officers taken prisonersbythe TJ-152. L ie ut. M uller collected m a ny of th e w ounded onaraft secured to the deck house and cu t the lash ings as the sh ip sank. Muller took to the wherry which was badly holed and soonfilled . Both he and Fu lcher were in the wate r about 40 minu tes.Fulcher finally go t to the l as t ra ft. The following is a r eport of

Lieuts.Muller's and Fulc her's experience:MullerandFulcher weretaken separately, sentbelowandisolated. Neither knew

oftheother'spresence onboard forfour days. Muller, whom Capt.Franz ofthesubmarine,supposedtobethecaptainofthe Ticonderoga,waspickedupat9.20. Franz,standing amidsh ips, demanded : "Where 's t he chief gunner? Where 's t he chiefgunner'smate?"

"Dea d," replied Muller.Franz wasunder the impression that the Ticonderoga's a fter gun had continued

firing after theshe ethad been hoisted.Alicke, a machinis t' s mate of German descent, a lready hauled aboard the sub



1 1 2 GERMAN SU BM ARIN E A CTIV IT IES ON ATLA NTIC COAST.

Fulc her wastak entoChief En gine er H ein e's room,whe resh rapne lwascutfromhisleg, and he was given brandy and overal ls by the ship 's surgeon, whosename,bycoincidence was Fuylcher . He wask indly t reated , and the pair conjectured upontheir relationship. MeanwhileH einek ept saying, "W hy doyou call usHuns? Weare nomore cruelth an yo u." Thissoreness, testifying tothe effect ofAlliedpropa

ganda, prevailed insistently among the subma rine's officers. Their tuneat firstwas"W hy didthe United Statesenterthe war? Seewhatyougetnowforcomingin."

Fulcher wasquestioned aboutt he speed, cargo, and number ofshipsinthe Ticonderoga's convoy, but in re turn "gave the hand of Esau, speaking wi th the voice ofJacob."

The captaincamein andsaidto Montau, aC.P . O., "T ak e the prisoner andshowhimw herehew illsle ep." Fulcher went toth e forecastle, whereabout35menwerequartered in permanent bunks. He wasgiven a lower one, which he occupiedfor the res t of the voyage. The surgeon came each day and dressed his wounds. Hemessed with the warrant officers, asdid Lieut. Schwarz, radioofficer. Mulleratein

thewardroom,butthefoodinbothmesseswasthesame,wBitebreadtwiceaweek,plenty of wurst and butter , canned brown bread, etc. Muller alsowas continuallyasked why we camein to the war: "W hy do you call us barbarians? Weare only doingourd u ty ," wasrepeated overand over. The rewasacopyofHearst'smagazineon board. Anar t icle in i t on Harry Lauder 's visit to France showed aHunsoldier standingwithabayonetoverawounded Frenchsoldier. "T ha t isnot true! That isnottrue !" exclaimed the officers.

U-152had left Kiel September 5on an outbound voyage to the Americancoast. It wasonlyher secondtrip. All the timetha t they were aboard, the twoAmericanswere allowed on deck, except during the various actions with merchant shipsthatensued. They wereth en sent below, bu tm anaged tosecureinformation ofhappeningsther e. They alsolearned, chieflyfromth ecrew,manyoftheorders that camebyradio. T h ey w ere a lw ay s w ell t re a te d . T he U-152rem ained on th e surface exceptwhenforcedbythepresenceofAlliedcrafttodive.

Between September 30 and October 11, the submarine's course was SW.( true), speed 4knots; but as shewascontinually in the Gulf Stream, her position didnot varymu ch. Shewasonthe lookoutforAlliedshipping. Uptothelatterdate,whenthefirstintima tion ofthe armisticenegotiations werereceived, noattacksweremade.Thesubm arine's engines werein bad condition, and it wasstated that shecouldnotmake more than 10knots on the surface. Her proper speed was 12knots, but shenever m ade more than 11onher f irst voyage. The engines wereoverhauled every

day,andappearedtolackcopperandothermetals.On October 11thismessage camein code—asdid all others: "Engage menofwar

o nly . T h e m e rc ha nt w ar h as e n d e d. " T h e A m eric an s w ere to ld t ha t thiswas,"T hefirstactofournewgove rnm ent." CoursewasnowchangedtoSE.

On October 12, the Norwegian bark Stifinder was sighted about 4p. m.andtwoshotssent acrossher bows. The crewtook tothe boats. Lieut. Willewentover toher with aboarding party, and returned with man y provisions, onions,cannedfish-balls, etc. , from the United States, besides three l ive pigs. The Norwegianswereg iven compasses and food, then told to set sail for the nearest land, whichwasNewfoundland, some 1,000 miles away. I t was impossible to protest against this



SURVIVORSOFTH E U.S.A.C.T. LUCIA LEAVING THE SHIP.

(Page104.)



MOTORBOATARRIVINGALONGISDET HE U.S. S.FAIRFAX WITHA LOADOF SURVIVORSFROMTHE U.S. A.C. T.LUCIA.

(Page104.)



U.S.S.TICONDEROGA.

(Page106.)



TYPE OFU-BOAT WHICHOPERATED INAMERICAN WATERS.



THE GERMAN SUBMARINE TJ-152. U 3

worryaboutthat." Acruiser and a destroyer were reported. Five minutes later,

ninedepthchargesexploded. Theboatshook,butnolightswentout,andtheAmeri

cansweretoldthatnoone"worried"unlessthathappened.

Variouscoursesonthesurfacewerenowsteeredforafewdays. Atorpedowas fired

ataBritishsteameronthe 17th,but asitwasnotheard toexplode,probablymissed.

Thesubmarine dived, but tenminures later came to the surface and engaged the

steamerinagunduel. The latterfired40shots, noneofwhich hit TJ-152, and the

submarine83;range and effect not learned by the prisoners. This wasin the late

afternoon, and had continued for twohours. The steamerwasmaking morespeed

thanthesubmarine, and nowescaped.

October20cametheradio"All submarines return toKiel." TJ-152setcourseNE.,

tillshehad rounded the Faroe Islands. Sheentered the northernmine barrageat

4p .m.,November11. Sheproceededatfull speedonthesurface,throughitscenter,

andtheAmericansweretold that themineshadbeenpassedat4a.m.,onthe 12th.

Theywoketolearnthattheofficershadheardofthesigningofthearmistice. Allhands

seemedpleased that "thewarwasover." Lieut. Schwartzadmitted thatformonthsGermanyhadbeenwagingalosingfight,becausetheUnitedStateshadintervened.

TheSkagerack was entered on the night of the 12th. TJ-152 encountered TJ-58

(HansRose'sfamoussub),andtied uptoherfrom 9to11p.m. VonSchraderhad

replacedRosein command. >Hestated that about sixweekspreviously TJ-58had

torpedoedaUnited Statesescortshipat the entrance tothe BristolChannel. TJ-58

wasnotcertainofhername,butitsoundedlike Tampa. (Note:Timeandlocation

oftheunexplainedlossofU.S.S. Tampawouldconfirmthis. Itisknown,however,

thataboutthatdate TJ-58firedatorpedoatU.S.S. Chester.The Chesterwasnothit,

butasshedropped depth chargesthe submarinemay havebeen deceivedby their

explosion.)

TJ-58statedthat after shehad torpedoedU.S.S. Jacob Jones(Dec.6,1917),she

'hadrecognizedinthelatter'sdoryLieut. CommanderD.W.Bagley, "Whohadbeen

aboard an American destroyer off'Newport when we torpedoed enemy merchant

menin 1916." Shealsodeclared that shehad sent out aradiomessagewhen the

Jacob Joneswassinking,andthat thiswastheonlycallforhelpthatany submarine

hadevergiveninthecaseofatorpedoedship. (Note: Aradiomessagewhose origin

hasneverbeenaccountedfor,signalingthesinkingofthe Jacob Jones,wasintercepted

atQueenstownonthe afternoon ofDec. 6,1917.)

TJ-58alsodeclaredthat shehad left Kielowingtotherevolution; that her officers

andmenwereloyaltothe Kaiser, andthatshewasboundforSweden. Apparently

uncertain about this step, however, she proceeded back toward the Baltic on the

morningofNovember 13,leading TJ-152 through the mine fields. The latter con

tinuedintotheSound,afterthe TJ-58wentaheadat15knotsforKiel,andsheanchored

nearCopenhagenontheeveningofthe14th. Heretworadiomessageswerereceived:

Onefrom TJ-58,sayingthatallwascalmatKiel,butthatshewasleavingto intern in

Sweden (which she hassupposedly done). Another from the Commandant at Kiel

ordering TJ-152toreturntoport.

Capt.Franznowheldameetingofthe officers and crew,andtooktheir voteasto

whether thesub should gotoSweden ortoGermany. Ofthe crewof80,about10

favoredinterning,and70Kiel. Asthesubmarinegotunderway,FranzsaidtoMuller



1 1 4 GEKMAN SU BM AK INE A CT IV ITIE S ON ATLANTIC COAST.

a t the Bat tle of Ju t land. But during the years s ince , I have been in submarines.Andth esubmarineshav ebeen doingalltheN av y'sworkinthewar. Thebattleshipsand cruisers ofthe High SeasF leet have been doingne xt tonothing." Thisfeelingofchagrinandangerwasfromnowonconstantlyphrasedbothaboard U-152andtheshipsvisitedb y the prisonersat Kiel.

Kiel wasreachedat 5p. m., November 15. The Americanswerequarteredonthesubmar ine mother ship Kronprinz Heinrich, where they got hot baths androoms.Buttheycontfnuedtomesson U-152,w hich wasthe outboa rdsub ma rine ofthesevenU-boatsalongside. The executive officer of the Heinrichformally released themasprisoners. "Naval officers havenomorepower over you ," hesaid. Heblamedthecollapseof Germany upon theUnited States entry intotheW ar. "Youhaveruinedour country ," he added. "Seewhatyouhavedone." He to ld themthat they were freetogoashore,butadvisedagainstit.

Onthe 16th, they were told that they wouldleave for Copenhagen at 10a. m.thenext day. Nothingwasdonetocarry thisout , and the executive of themothership

asked apologet ical ly whether h is guests minded wai ting unt i l thefollowingday.Th atafternoon (Saturday)they we ntashorewith achiefboatswain'smateofthe U-152.

They weretold there that the mu tiny in the High SeasFleet star ted onOctober28,the day fixedforittogotoseatomee tth e Grand Fle et. Th eblackganginacertainship star ted the revolt. Between 250and 300of th e crew were put in thelockup,bu tacrowdof10,000ratingssu rround edt heship (ap pare ntly alongsidedock),releasedthem ,andhoistedthered flag. Ashorein Kiel,theAm ericansvisitedfiverestaurants.The rewaslittletobuy exce ptbad beer. ManyB ritish,B elgian,andRussiansoldierswere encountered, but no Americans. Conditions d id not appear abnormal.

The execut ive of the mothership on the 17th s ta ted that he no longer hadany

authori ty to deal with hisguests, in any way. He said that to arrange for reachingCopenhagenorelsewhere,theymusttreatwiththesoldiers'andworkingmen'srepresentat ives aboard . He referred to them as "soldaten ," a lthough one wasa chief boatswain's mate, and the otherstwoable seamen. Theyalsohadchargeofthesubmarinesalongside.

"The submarines a re go ing to England wi th t ranspor ts , " t hey said . "Wewillarrange accommodations for you on one of the transports." But when the crew of U-152 heard thisthey protested. They held avote, and elected totakeMullerand

Fulcher wi th them. "We wish to insure your safety ," they said , amongotherevidences that the Americans were popular aboard . They had no relat ions with the officers of the ship, bu t the divided authorities were not antagonistic, andshipdisc ip line was main ta ined by the l at te r. Mulle r and Fu lcher s tayed on the Heinrichuntil November20,andweregivencleanunderwearandshoes.

On the morning of that day, they went aboard U-152again, and at 2p. m. left th rough the Kie l Canal, a rr iv ing a t Brunsbut te l t he following afternoon. They reachedHeligoland 11p.m .th esameday, andleft forH arwich at7.30,November22.The 24submarines enroute, preceded by atransport, were in two columns, oneledby U-152and the o ther by U-155 (Dey,tschland). Harwich wasreached onSunday,the24th.

Preceding the departure from Germany, half ofth e U-152'''s crew had goneashore,somehome,otherstomanm erchantshipsatHamburg. Therehadbeennoobjection



T H E GERMAN SUBMARINE TJ-152. H5

of politenessMuller and Fulcher fel t tha t they had to do so. They stepped ashorewithpackagesofcheese, andflour, and wurst. "W ehav emorethan weneed totakebacktoGerm any," said the crew.

EveryGermanthe y had seenexpressedhimself asbeinggladth att hew arwasover.I twasdeclared that surrender had been necessary to save the l ives of women and

children; tha t except for this the f ight would have continued. All officers statedthatGermany months ago would have won if the Uni ted Sta tes had not come in .Thiswasthe opinion even of thosest i l l loyal to the Kaiser . All were enthusiasticoverthenewG overnmen t, wh ich wastobe arep ublic.

"Takeall our submarines, and bat t leships, and bat t le cruisers," thesoldation onthe Kronprinz Heinrichhad said. "S ink them in them id-Atlan ti c. Wedon' t wan tthemanymore. W hat wedo wantfrom now onareploughsand picks and shovels,togetbacktoworkagain."

After the s inking of the Ticonderogathere was no definite reportofthewh ereabouts of th e TJ-152un til October 13,when shesank theNorwegian three-masted ba rk Stijlnder, 1,746 grosstons,bound fromNewYork to Freemo nt,Australia,Tarwald Frehe,chief m ate of thesailingvessel, made the following report of the loss of the ship tothe American naval authorities:

Ourpositionwas37°22'northl at itu de ,a nd 53°30'westlong itude. Wefirstsightedthesubmarine at 1.45 p. m., when three shots weref iredat us, none of which hi t . I ,personally, only heard the last shot, as I wasbelow deckw henth efirst two shotswerefiredandhadgoneupabovewhenIheardshoutingbythemembersofthecrew.Well,after I heard the shot I went up ondeck andsawthesubmarine, whichwasonthesurface in awesterly position from us, off our stern about 3milesaway. We atoncehoisted the Norwegian f lagand drew in our sai ls. Wethen lowered our boat, andat the request of the captain I took eight men with me and sai led over to thesubmarinein the small boat with the ship'spapers, it being the idea ofour captainthattheywouldwanttoseethemasthathadbeenourunderstandingoftheirpracticeinthepast. Onarrivingalongsidethe submarineI asked ifthe y wanted metocomeonboard, and on being told todosoby oneofth e officers onthe submarine, I wentaboard. I gavean officer the ship 's papers. They immediately asked the nameof theship,where bound from, where to, and for information as t^ the nature of thecargo. Iansweredhim t ha twewereboun dfrom NewYorktoAustralia,w ithacargo

ofoil. Hewaslookingovert hepapers,standingjustoutsideth e conningtower,andsaid,"Youhaveturpe ntine alsoonboard, haveyounot?" "Whereisthisstowed?""Where are your p l ans?" I to ld h im tha t wehad tu rpen tine on board , bu t tha t Ididnot have the ship 's plans, asthese were kept by the Standard Oil Co., of NewYork. Iunderstand alittl eofGerman,and Iheardh imsaytoanotherGerman officerth at th is b oa t h ad t ur pe n ti ne a nd " w e h av e n on e in G e rm a ny ." H is a tt en ti onseemedtobe centered on the turpentine, and was-apparantly not interested in thekeroseneand ben zine .

Thecommanderofthe submarine would nottalktomein English, bu the did talkto oneoftheofficersin German,w ho,inturn ,talked tomeinEnglish. Afterfinishing



1 1 6 GERMAN SU BM AR IN E A CT IV IT IE S ON ATLANTIC COAST.

the chief said then, "W e will towtheboatup to the ship; goaboard, and seewhat wecanuse ." They then made arope fast to our l ifeboat in tow,madeabout ahalf circlearoundthe Stifinder,and camealongside. Iunderstood thecomm ander'sorderstobe full speed ahead, and I imaginehe was makingabout 10to11milesperhour.

I wason board the submar ine a ll t h is t ime . They t ied up alongside the Stifinder,

and I asked if they would re turn the ship 's papers to me. The officer said "No,"and at that moment a sailor on board the submarine pushed me from thebackandinto the lifeboat. Tha t was the only rough a tt ack made aga inst me . They were very businessl ike and had three or four cameras with which they were takingpictures, bu t I d id not not ice any moving-p ic tu re mach ine . A German officer then took charge of10or 12ofth e crew from the submarine and ordered usall onboardourboat. Thisofficer then pu t one man in the crow'snestand placedguardsatthedifferent hatches. Oneof themen brought onabagof bombs. I didnotgetaverygoodlookatthese,butoneofthemseemedtobeaboutthesizeofaball,paintedblack,andbrassriveted. Th eGerman officer the n wentu p toourcaptain andbegantalking

tohimb utins tructingm etothrowsomefood and clothesintoourlifeboatandbeatit.I askedhim if I could get the ship 's instruments, andonbeing allowed wenttomyroom,bu tbefore Igotall I wanted they lookedm eup and told metogetout. I didgeta few ofm y personal things and food and water enough for 11men forabout20days, the ship 's sextant, and the lifeboat compass. After put t ing these in the.lifeboat I again approached the German officer, whowasstilltalking tothe captain,andasked him for a chart , as we had two lifeboats and only one chart . He instructedwhat I took tobe the navigating officer of the submarine togivem eachart. Theylet us take al l the provisions wewanted andm adeno complaint about the quantitywetook, andh e gave orderstohis men tha t nothing wastobe touched untilweleft

t he ship and then they would t ake what they wanted a fte r. No specia l remarks weremade that I canth ink ofwhich would be ofinterest toyou, and I didnotheartheconversationbetween the officer and ourcap tain. Wethen loweredourcaptain'sboat,whichhad been fully provisioned, andb oth ourboatssailedawayafewhundredyardsand cametogether totalk overour position, wheretoland, andwedecidedtot ry and reach Nova Sco tia . There were 11 men , inc lud ing myself,in my lifeboat,and8men, including the captain,inthe captain's lifeboat. Myboat wassailingthefastest, sowegavethe captain'sboataline andtried totowit. It wasabout4p.m.when weleft ourship,and at 5p .m .we lostsightofourship onaccountofdarkness.Wehadm adeabout»5milesinawesterly direction. The lastwesawof the Stifinder

the submarine wasst i ll alongside, and we saw the German crew sti ll onboardandbreakingopenthehatches,withonemanu pin theriggingtokeepawatchout. Thecaptainhad all ofthe confidential papersin the chartroom, and I donotknowwhatd isposition he made of them. The stowage chart was one which wasmadebymeformyinformation, and Ihad previously destroyed it .

I wasonthe submarine forab out oneho ur'stim e, b ut only ondeck, asI wasnotallowedins ide. Shewasbetween 280feetan d 300 feet long;had oneconningtower;two5or6inch guns,onefore and-one aft; and eachgun had twomen in charge;thebarrels ofthe guns appeared tobe 25or30feet long. I did notnoticeanymachinegunson the deck. There wasone 2-inch pipe immediately forward of the conning



THE GERMAN SUBMARINE TJ-152. 1 1 7

sheepskincollar,and aheavy whitesweaterinside. H elookedtobebetween 32and35years old and was about 5feet 10incheshigh, rather skinny; reddish face andamustachebetween ablondeand red, with aratherbignose; I didnothearhisnamecalled. The general run of the men was as follows: Their clothes were very dir ty, oily, andragged; their clotheswerea sortofkhak idungaree. They allappeared tobehappy and well fed, and all weresmokingcigars. Threeorfour ofthem enwore

small arms, and all of the officers had revolversin bel ts on their side. The officer whogavemeth ec hart, and whoI assumewasthena vigatingofficer, woreadungareesuitandasailor 'scap. WhenhegavemethechartI askedhim tomarkour positiononit andhedid,butI thinkhislatitudewaswrongbypossibly10degrees.

The l ifeboat containing the capta in and seven of the crewof theStifinder landed a t T u rks Is land November 5, hav ing been a t seaforover threeweeks. Thesecond boat, containing them ate and 10men, waspicked up by TJ.S. S. C. No. 294on October 28, after 15daysa t sea.

On th e 1 5th of O cto ber th e TJ-152a tt acked t he B ritis h S. S.Messina,4,271tonsgross,inlatitude37°20'N.,longitude53°30'W.The Messina was a rmed with one 4 .7-inch J apanese gun and wasattackedb y gunfire at 18.28G.M.T., while enroute from Plym outhto Baltimore in bal las t. When the submar ine was s ighted the ship wassteering S.82 W. ( true) a t 7 knots . There was a s trong WSW.wind, heavy sea , and fa ir v is ib il ity . Speed of submarine about 14knots,steeringW . by N.(true),and wassighted onthepo rt quarter.

Ons ighting, the ship brought thesubmarine as tern, and put on fullspeed andzigzagged in accordance with thefall of the enemyshots. The submarine opened fire a t 18.32 with r ange of approximate ly 8,000 y ard s and fired about 100 s ho ts of two rounds per m inute .Theshipwashi tonceonthepor tsideabaft thebridge andtwoplateswere f ractured in the s ide. The ship opened fire a t 18.35 a t about7,000yardsrang eand fired15roun ds,bu t thesubm arinewasnot hit.After twoho urs ' running fight thechase was abandoned in approximately lat itude37°37 ' N. andlongitude52°48 'W . Them asterof

the Messina r eported tha t the submarine was about 10 to 15 feetoutof the water . Two 6-inch guns wereseen, oneforward and oneaft of theconning tower. Shewaspainted dark gray.

Thelastactionofthe TJ-152washerattackontheBritishsteamerBriarleaf,October17,inlatitude36°05'N.,longitude49°12'W.

TheBritishS.S. Briarleaf arrived at Sabine,T ex., onOctober 2£,and the fo llowing information was obta ined from Capt. G. E . Pat tersonregarding the encounter withG ermansubm arine:

Cap t. Pa t te r son s ta ted tha t on October 17, 1918, a t 4.10 p . m.,



1 1 8 GEEM AN SU BM AK INE A CTIV ITIES ON ATLANTIC COAST.

oneshot, which also missed. Thesubmarinesubmerged, comingupastern and again openedf ireon thevessel, which replied. Thesubmarine f ired in all about 150shots , making no hi ts , althoughsomefragments of shells d ropped on deck. The Briarleaf fired 39shots,

and then ceased firing, as thesubm arine was out ofrange; however,thesubm arinecontinedfiringfora bo ut30minu tes,asitwasequippedwithheaviercaliberguns. A t5.55 p.m .thesubmarineceased firingand dropped as tern . Capt. Pat terson, while not positive, believesth at hem ust have scored ah it w hichcaused someslight damage,asotherwise the submarine would not have given up the engagement,as i tseemedfairly ableto m aintain anevenspeedwith the Briarleaf'.

The submarine is described as fo llows: Length about 300 feet,with superstructure entire length, said superdeck being about 5feet

aboveconning tower; pain ted lightgra y, with periscopebeingeitherb rass or pa in ted yellow. Capt. Pa t t er son was of the op in ion thissubmarine is one of the l at es t t ype . No guns or gun crewswerevisible, the guns being situated under the superstructure, as all thatcouldbeseenwerethe flashesasth eguns were fired. Thesubmarineused two guns while in action, both of which were either 5-inchor la rger, as they had much longer r ange than the guns on the Briar-

leaf,whichis4.7.

Capt Pa tters on advised alsot h a tw hile th e subm arinewasshellinghis vessel, awireless message wasreceived from the S.S. Luciacalling for help . T he Lucia said inher message tha t shehad beentorpedoed and was s inking, and gaveher posi tion as about 100miles northofthepositionoftheS.S. Briarleaf.*

I t was fo rmerly believed tha t the TJ-152was responsible for thes inking of the Lucia on t he same day t ha t t he a tt ack on the Briar-

leaf took place. B oth the TJ-152 and the TJ-155wereinthevicinityat the time, and i t is the tes timony of Capt . Pat terson and theWar

DiaryoftheU.S.S. Princess Matoika th at leadsto the decisionthateachwas engagedinaseparate atta ck :

Atabout4p.m.,August17,thesignalfromthe Briarleafcamein. Plottedonthechartthe Briarleafborefrom the Princess Matoikaand the Pastores 219 true distanceabout 15miles. By inspection of the chart would pass within 6miles of theallo. About 4.40p. m. gunfire washeard ahead—sometimes topo rtan d sometimestostarboard. At 4.52 s ighted object ahead on hor izon resembling heavy smoke. Firing could be heard and gunflashes visible. Transports changed coursetobring objectsabeam where they were las t seen. F i ring no longer heard . Briarleafescapedandheaded forB ermuda . Shortlyafterth e changeofcoursewasmadeat5p.m.theallo



CABLE CUTTING OP THE TJ-151. 1 1 9

entering the northern minebarrage areaon the day of the armistice.She passed through the fie ld running a t full speed on the surface,completing the passage in sa fe ty on the morn ing of the 12th and arriving at Kiel three dayslater, November 15,1918.

CABLE CUTTING BY THE U-151.

Thepossibility and probability of the interruption of transatlanticcableservicebytheenemywasasubjectofseriousconsiderationevenbefore the Uni ted Sta tes entered the war. The conclusion of thosemost familiar wi th t ransa tlant ic cable traffic was tha t the reasonthe G erm ans did n ot in te rru pt these cables w as n ot t ha t it wasimpracticableforth em todosobu tbecauseitwasprobable th at theywereusing themfor German messages and did not desire to do so.

There seemed to b e good reasons to suspect t h at either th ro ug hfriendly diplomatic channels or through apparently harmless messages,bywhichtheBritishcensorshipwasevaded,theGermansweremakinguse of the cablesfor the transmission of their ownmessages.

Allofthese m att ers werediscussed and carefully consideredby theUnited States authorit ies and seemed to offer the most reasonableinterpretation of the situation.

When the Uni ted Sta tes entered the war i t was thought tha t theattitudeofthe enemym ight beentirely changed toward the cuttingof the cables and tha t the time might come when the advan tagesto th e Germans of c ut tin g t he cables m ig ht outweigh th e disadvantages. TheadvantageswhichtheGermansmightgainby cuttingthe cables were increasing rap id ly as the United S ta tes forces inEurope were increas ing. At the same time, the chances of the useof the cables by the Germans to carry the ir messages, were beingeliminated because of the v igorous methods tha t were adopted bythe Office of Naval Inte lligence through naval censorship . These

factors alltended tointroduce anewenemym otiveinto the situationandgave the United States authori ties both at home and in Francemuch concern because they considered that our transatlantic electrical communications presented a vulnerable point of attack whichhe might be tempted to explo it whenever the advantages of doingsolooked sufficiently promising; orw hen, in the finalstruggle, in hisvarious measures of desperation, he might include cable cutting andinterferenceineverypossiblewaywiththeradiosystem.

OnApril 29,1918,the Office of Naval Operations sent a mem oran



1 2 0 GERMAN SU BM AR IN E A CT IV IT IE S ON ATLANTIC COAST.

produced add itional act iv ity and a le rtness so as to be sure to ber eady in case the cab les shou ld be cu t, which was then regarded asbeing something that might occur a t any t ime.

The service on the Commercial CableC o.'sN o.4Canso-NewYorkcablewasinterrup ted at 12.35p .m.,May28,1918. Onthesameday

the Central and South American Cable Co.'s New York-Colon cablebegan to fail at 3.30 p. m. and went out of service entirely at 9.30p. m . T he cable ship Belay made the repairs to the lat ter onJune25. At thebreak there was l i t tle sign of chafing or dragging onthesurface ofthe cable. The armoredstran ds were,however,somewhatdistorted and showed indications of having withstood considerablepressure andwrenching. Thes trandsof the armor appeared tohavebeen cut approximately half through, either with a saw or possibly

some rough-cutting tool, and the other half of each strand wrenchedorbro ken off.

The Commercial Cable Co.'sN o.4 wasrepaired at 4p .m. onJuly4. T his cut was an excep tiona lly clean*shea r, t he cable sheathwi thin half inch of each side of the break being in almost normalcondit ion, very l it tle distorted and showing no signs of chafing or anchorrubbingonthesurface. In thiscasealsothearmoredstrandswere cut approximately half through and broken off the res t of theway . T he C ommercial cable was cu t a t 12.35, th ree hours prior

to the first indication of trouble on the Central and South Americancable, at a dis tance of approximately 28 miles north of the Centraland South American cab le fa ilu re . The wate r a t bo th poin ts wasapproximately 25 fathoms.

A study of the causes of the failure of these two cables wasmadeby various cable experts including Mr. Loriot, cable engineer oftheCentral and South American Cable Co., Mr. Pierce, cable engineer of the Commercial Cable Co., and Capt. Oldham, the commanderofth e cable ship. I t is^their opinion tha t the cables were cut on thebot tom or near thebo t tom and were not raised to the surface tobecut . They believe the cables were cut maliciously by someonewhocame to the spot w ith the in tention of cu tti ng the cables. Theydonot think theywerecutby ashipinclearingits anchor. Thedaywas calm with a s light wester ly wind. Normally therewouldbenooccasion to anchor in this locality except during a s torm with extremely adverse wind conditions. Neither of the breaksoccurredina normal route of sh ip tr avel. B o th b reaks were w ithin sight of



RADIO SERVICE ADEQUATE. 1 2 1

While these facts are not conclusive, the evidence indicates that the two cables were cut by part ies wi th malic ious in tent , possibly by an enemy subm arine. The latter supposition seems quiteprobable.

On May 25, 1918, the JJ-151 a ttacked and sunk the American

schooner Hattie Dunn, The Hauppauge and Edna off the Virginia coast. Nothing more is positively known of the activi ty of JJ-151untilJune2, 1918,when shesank the Isabel B. Wiley, Winneconne andJacob M. Haskell off Barnega t L igh t, N. J . During these seven oreight days i t is supposed tha t she was laying mines, and it is no timprobable tha t during tha t time she may have cu t the cables on May 28, and as will be p la in ly seen by reference to the chart , she wasinalocationonMay25fromwhichshecouldeasilyhavereachedtheposition of thecablecutting on the28th, and afterwards reached

thepositionofhersinkingsonJune2.

UNITED STATES AND ALLIED RADIO SERVICE ADEQUATEFOR THE TRANSACTION OF IMPORTANT OFFICIALBUSINESS IN CASE OF THE DESTRUCTION OF TRANSATLANTIC CABLES.

When the United S ta tes ente red the war i t was considered very necessary to provide a system of transoceanic radio communication,

which would be capable of handling all official messages betweentheU nited States andEurope, in case the enemy should cut any orallofourcab les;orincasetheenem ym ade itdifficult for ustorepairsuch cables as were put out of commission e ither by the enemy orfromnaturalcauses.

In October, 1917, an Inter-Allied Radio Conference, consisting ofrepresenta tives from the Uni ted States, Great Br itain , France andI taly,m et at NewLondon, Conn. At this conference i twasdecided

that the Un ited S ta te s would make provisions for t he use of itss tations at Marion, Mass , ( then under construction); Sayvil le, L. I .(taken over from its German owners); New Brunswick, N . J . (underconstruction by the M arconi C o .); T ucke rton, N . J . (taken overfrom theGermancons tructor ); and Annapolis , Md. (a naval h igh-power s ta tion just comple ted). The Allies were to o rgan ize theirstations a t C arnarvon , E ng land; L yons, F rance ; Nante s, F ranceandRome,Italy.

In the spring of 1918 the Navy Department , hav ing been g iven



1 2 2 GEEMAN SUBM AKINE A CTIVITIES ON ATLANTIC COAST.

both the United States s ta tions and those in Europe were capable of tra nsm ittin g and receiving sim ultaneo usly , this indicates acapacity of 55,000 words per day in t ransa t lan t ic communication.T his capacity w as a deq ua te to han dle th e im p orta nt messagesbetween the "V ar and Navy Dep artmen ts and theforces inEurope.

Inasmuch as the cablesweren ot all cut, or pu t out of commission,th e t ra nsat la nt ic ra dio sy ste m h an dled only a small amount'ofthe to ta l traffic between the Uni ted States and Europe. I t is estimated th at thegre atest am oun t oftraffic hand led byradiowas50,000wordsper day. However, this comparatively small amountrelievedthe cables to acertain extent and was not only ameans of facilitating communication but served as an insurance for effective commu nic ation ; and g ave assu ran ce t h a t th e enemy could n ot com

pletely in te rr up t t ra ns atl an ti c com m unication. H ad the enemycut all the t ransa tlan tic cables i t would have been impossible forhim to h av e sto pp ed effective c ommun ic atio n between the Warand NavyD epartments and ourforces in E urope.

MINE-LAYING OPERATIONS.

As all destruction of vessels by mines on the Atlantic coast wasby mines p lanted by the Germans , i t is of interes t to know what

submarinescarriedontheseoperationsandhow.Aswehave noreports from them the procedure islargelyamatterofconjecture. Any conclusion as to the respective dates andplacesof p lant ing mines by the submar ines can be, a t thi s time , onlya logical deduc tion, taking into considera tion the genera l Germanpolicy regarding mine laying, the character of the cruises of thosesubmarines , the speed, longes t per iod of apparent inactivi ty , thelapse of time between s ightings of or a t tacks by the submarines,and the da tes and locat ions of reported s ight ings or des truc tion of

enemymines.This procedure has been followed: A careful analysis of the track

of the submarine with dates of her presence in certain localitiesandthe corresponding date and local ity of the damage to a ship by amine. ^

AccordingtoLie ut.C omm anderLafrenz, oft he German submarineU-65, which wassunk by theFrench submarine TJ-15, onNovember3, 1917,the German policy as to mine laying is to sowminesinthe



1 2 3INE-LAYING OPERATIONS.

four off another, and so on, as the same sweeping opera tions a re necessary to sweep up four mines as eighteen. In practice, hesaidthat the submar ine commanders are usually too anxious to get rid of their mines and solay them ingroups close toone another . I t isleft to the commanding officer as to where his mines are to belaid.

Lafrenz s ta ted , a lso , tha t there was l jtt le danger in laying minesin the sameplace in which mines had been previously laid, but that ifhe went to the same place a second t ime he would a lways makeitapointtocomeinatthehigh-watermark.

THE U-151.

From the character of the operat ions of the U-151 jus t after she arrived off th e A m erican A tla ntic co ast, i t is a pp are nt t h a t h ercommanding officer was extremely anx ious to p lan t h is mines assoon as possib le before engag ing in h is o ther ac tivi ty . After the submarinehadengagedthesteamship Crenellainlatitude37°50'N.,longitude 75° 50 ' W., on May 21, 1918, she seems to have taken a coursesouthward and tohave proceeded to the vicinity of CurrituckSoundwhereshepossiblylaid minesnear False Cape. Then movingnorthward she came to the entrance to Chesapeake Bay where shelaidminesnearCapesH enry and Charles.

Havingcompleted her mine laying in these waters , the submarine

continued her course nor thward. OnMay25 shemade-the a t tackson the American schooners Hattie Dunn, Hauppauge, and Edna,within about 30 miles of the coast. The commanding officer did not see fit to begin his active raid upon coastwise shipping a t thistime, however, but continued his nor thward route , p lant ing mines as he wen t. On or about t he morn ing of the 26th , the submarinepossibly v isited wate rs along tha t port ion of the coast south andnorth ofW inter Qu arter Shoals.

Inmovingnorthward the submarinesoon reached thevicini tyof

theentrances to Delaware Bay. Here she planted mines near CapeMayand Cape Henlopen. OnJune 3 , a t 3.35 p . m., the Herbert L.Pratt, an unarmed American s teamship of 7,145 tons gross, ownedby the Standard Refinery Co., of Philadelphia , Pa . , was damagedby a mine a t h is po in t. T his fact furnished the on ly convincing evidence of the mine-planting operations of the U-151 u p to th istime,for asnomines had been placed by the United States Government, and as i t was known tha t the U-151was in this vicinity two



1 2 4 GERM AN SU BM AR IN E A CT IV IT IE S ON ATLANTIC. COAST.

OnJune23, the s teamship Gloucester repo rted sighting amineoffS hrewsbury L ight, Ambrose C hannel. T his repor t ind icates thatthe U-161 may have v is ited the neighborhood of the entrance to A m brose C hann el. E v en th ou gh th e TJ-161m ay have laid afew-minesalongthecoastofLongIsland,itisthoughtthattheminethat

sankthecruiserU.S.S. San^Diego,Ju ly 19,near FireInlet, wasoneof those depos ited there by the TJ-156 whichlater appeared off theAmerican coast and was engaged in mining activi ties from July 8 toJuly18.

T he m a jo rity of th e m ines sw ep t u p in w a te rs t ha t th e TJ-151possibly v is ited, conform to the description of the mines that theTJ-151w as know n to c arry . T he dim ensions in th e m ain were:Diameter, 1 9 | inches; length, exclusive of horns , 4 feet 9£ inches.

They held in their center a charge of approximately 200poundsoft r in i t ra te of to luol. They were usually of the four-horned variety withasinglemooring.

Having unburdened herself ofher mines, during the intervalMay25 to June 2, the TJ-151 recommenced her activit ies against coastwise vessels, beginning her harvest with the at tacks on the vessels Isabel B. Wileyandthe Winneconne.

THE U-156.

Asnoactivitiesof U-156werereportedbetweenJuly8,1918,whenshesank the Norwegian schooner Manx King in lati tude 40°N.andlongitude 53°W., and Ju ly 17,when shew assighted bytheU.S.S.Earrishurginlatitude40°10'N.,longitude68°55'W.,itisprobablethat the in terval of e ight days was uti lized in laying mines in the ap proach es to New Y o rk . T he c h ar t evidence show s t ha t TJ-156was in a posit ion from which she could easily have performed this task which was, of course , a par t of her mission. I t is , therefore,

al together probable tha t theminewhichsank theU.S.S. San Diegoon July 19, 10 miles from Fire I sland Lightship , was la id by th is

submarine.T H E U - 11 7 .

OnAugust29,1918,theU.S.S. Minnesotastr uc k amine20milesfrom Fenwick I sland Shoal L igh tship in l a ti tude 38° 11 ' 05 "N.,longitude 74° 4 1 ' 0 5 "W.,sustaining considerable damage but wasable tomakeport . Thech art evidence indicates tha t thisminewasin allprobabili ty laid by the U-117while she continued her course



SUBMARINE MINES ON ATLANTIC COAST. 1 2 5

U-155.

Between the a t tack by U-155 on th e Newly Hall on Sep tember13, 1918, in la t i tude 42° 18 'N ., longitude 58° 22 ' W ., and her next

reported a tt ac k on Octob er 20, when she c ap tu re d an d su nk th eAmerican fishing vessel Kingfisher in la t i tude 43° 3 1 'N., longitude61° 53 ' W., i t is p robable tha t the in te rven ing seven days of herinactivity m a y be a tt ri bu te d to th e fact t h a t it w as rep orted inadvance tha t one of her purposes was to lay mines off Halifax andNovaScotia coasts . The sighting of an enemysubmarine there andthechartevidenceshowingthat TJ-155wasin th at vicinity and that mineswerediscovered off Halifax confirm th a t report.

SUBMARINE MINES ON THE ATLANTIC COAST OF THEUNITED STATES.

The s to ry of the submar ine mines on the At lan tic coas t can bebriefly told.

There w ere no m ines laid on th e A tla ntic coast either by th eUnitedS tatesG overnment orany oftheAllies. Alldestructionwas,therefore, by mines placed by the enemy.

Thesailordoesnotfearanyoftheterrorsoftheseaoroftheenemy,

so long as those ter rors a re in s ight. Whether the vessel be undersail orsteam, he enthusiastically prepares to meet thestorms or theenemy. I t is the h idden, inv isib le enemy tha t gives him g reatestconcern. These enemies were the fog and the submarine mine, towhichinthiswarhasbeenaddedthesubmarinevessel.

Seven vessels, three of which were of great value, were damagedonthe Atlantic coast bythe enemy's mines. Thesewerethesteamship Herbert L. Pratt,U. S. S. San Diego,steamship Mirlo,U.S.S.Minnesota,steamship San Saba,steamship Chaparra,andtheU.S.S.Saetia. Somedetailsareherewithgiven concerning thesevessels.

Steamship Herbert L. Pratt, June 8, 1918.— On June 3 , a t 3.35 p.m.,the Herbert L. Pratt, anunarmed Americansteamship of 7,145tons gross, owned bythe Standard Refinery Co., Philadelphia, Pa. ,cameincontactwithoneoftheseminesandsentoutaS.O.S.:

Overfalls L igh tsh ip D elaw are B reak water: H av e eith er struc k m ine or amtorpedoed.

Upon str iking the mine the Herbert L. Pratt headed for the shore



1 2 6 GERMAN SU BM AR IN E A CT IV IT IES ON ATLANTIC COAST.

of my recollection this message was received by us at 8in the morning onJune3.I ordered the chief engineer to connectu p aboiler that wasoutofoperation, forthepurpose of gett ing a ll the speed possib le in case of a t tack. Wewere a t th^s timeapproximately off the Winter Quarter Lightship. I was keeping the regular course

andfolloweduptheusualtrack.Nothing further occurred unti l about 3.35p. m., when I heard asl ight explosionand felt the vibrat ion of the ship which lurched forward apparently str ikingasubmerged object and with indications ofbouncing over; onlyone explosion occurred.I s topped the engines and s tar ted them immediately heading ship for the beach,ordered men to lifeboat stations, wen t below for my signal codebooks, and orderedwire less to send the posi tion of the ship , her name, and that she had been either mined or torpedoed. I then went back on bridge of ship, gave chief officer ordersnot to allowthe men totake the boats unti l I had givenorders; I ran the shipfor approxim ately 15minutes-un til sherefused tostir, the n Iordered the menoutoftheengineroom,andal lhandsintoboats. Wethenleft theship.

Just previous to th is , I hailed a guard boat ( I don ' t know her nameor number)andorderedher tostandb yt ha t I wassinking. Thisguard wasapproximately2,000feet on my port s ide. He s igna led me "Al l r igh t, " and stood by un ti l we left in boats. The p ilot boa t came up in the meant ime .

Werowedover to the pi lot boat where the crewwastaken aboard, and I wasput on board the guard boat . The guard boa t s ta rt ed for Cape May and met anotherguard boat and hailed him. Wethenturned around and started for CapeHenlepen.Wehailed the sameguard boat again. While speaking to this guard boat I sawthewakeofw hat appeared to be asubm arine approximately 1,000 feet from starboard.Thiswake,Ishouldsay,wasabout2milesfromwheremyvessel,the Herbert L . Pratt,

wasstruck. I donot suppose the t imeor durat ion of thiswake lasted morethanaminute. I desire to s ta te again in connect ion wi th the explosion that prior to the explosion Iobserved nothing that led me tobelieve tha t asubmarinewasoperatingin th is v ic in i ty . Both guard boats s tar ted immediately , the one I wasonrunningtowardCapeHenlopenandtheothertowardCapeMay.

Shortly after, weheard g unsfiredfrom theguard boa tt ha tha dgoneinthedirectionof CapeMay. I could dist inct ly see from my posi tion ah i t ting ®fthe shells inthewater. I donot recall howmany he shot,b ut I heard the explosionat leastthreeorfour t imes. Wecontinuedontothe naval baseat Lewes, landingthereandwaitingforthe crewwhichwasbeingbrought inby the pilot boat. Allthe crewwaslanded

andtakentothenavalbasewheretheywerefed.

Im m ediately upon the receipt of th e S O S message from theHerbert L. Pratt, a number of S. P . boa ts were dispatched to therescue. O n Ju ne 3 , a t 9 p . m ., th e Herbert L. Pratt was visitedbyNaval C onstructo r Dav is and a t 4 p . m ., J une 4, p repa rations toraiseher werebegun ; onthe same date she wasfloated and broughtto anchor in th e b re ak w ate r. T he Herbert L. Pratt left theBreakwa ter at 11p .m., onW ednesday, Jun e 5, 1918,and arrivedinPhila



SINKING OF THE TJ. S. S. SAN DIEGO. 127

That the loss of life and injury to personnel was incurred in the line of duty andin no way due to their own misconduct.

That at the time of the disaster and thereafter the conduct of the captain, officers,and crew was in the highest degree commendable, and that the remarkably small losaof life was due to the high state of discipline maintained on board.

That no officer should be held responsible for the loss of funds or property for whichhe was accountable, and that no further proceedings should be held in this case.

The court in its report reviews the main points in the testimonyas follows:

TheTJ. S. S. San Diego, under the command of Capt. H. H. Christy, United StatesNavy, was making passage from Portsmouth, N. H., to New York, N. Y., and at orabout 11.05 a. m. July 19, 1918, she was in approximate latitude 40° 30 / N., longitude73° W., on base course 304 true, and zigzagging by an approved plan; speed, 15 knots.

The captain was steering a safe and proper course at the time to minimize the sub

marine and mine dangers in those waters. A careful inspection watch had beenmaintained while last coaling ship to prevent the introduction of any foreign matterin the coal bunkers. All lookouts, gun watches, fire-control parties, etc., as prescribed by the "Orders for Ships in Convoy" of the commander cruiser and transportforce were at their stations and on the alert. All reasonable and necessary orders tosafeguard the water-tight integrity of the ship in dangerous waters had been givenand were being carried out.

The following is a report by the Secretary of the Navy regardingthe sinking of the U. S. S. San Diego:

At about 11.05 a. m., July 19, 1918, an explosion took place in proximity of theskin of the ship, at about frame No. 78, on the port side and well below the water line.As a result of this explosion the ship began to list to port and she finally rolled overand sank bottom up at about 11.25 a. m., July 19, 1918. The explosion was an exterior one and as a result of this explosion the skin of the ship was ruptured in thevicinity of bulkhead No. 78, at the level of the port engine room; and bulkhead No. 78wasso deformed that water-tight door No. 142, between the port-engine room andNo. 8fireroom, was opened to the ingress of water to No. 8 fireroom. The effect of thisrupture was to immediately fill the port-engine room and adjacent compartments,and No. 8 fireroom was soon filled also. The effect of this water would give the ship

a list of 17$° to port. With the increased displacement water entered through 6-inchgun port No. 10, which was justifiably open to permit using that gun, when the shiphad listed 9J°. This resulted in flooding the gun deck and accelerated the heelingof the ship and her final capsizing. Relatively small quantities of water entered theupper dynamo room through nonwater-tight voice tubes, but this had no appreciableeffect on the sinking of the ship.

The captain properly withheld the order to abandon ship until he was certain thatthe ship would capsize and sink. The ship was abandoned in good order, and excellent discipline prevailed. Gun crews remained at their guns and continued firingat all suspicious objects until they were forced to jump into the water. The captainwas the last to leave the ship.



1 2 8 GEBM AN SU BM AR IN E A CT IV IT IE S ON ATLA NTIC COAST.

and asplendid spiritin taking their shipsinto these waters, wherea submarinehadapparently been operat ing , and deserve commendat ion for their actions and i t i srecommended th at su itable acknowledgment be made by the Navy Department oftheir gallantry.

Onthe day subsequ ent toth is disaster six contact mines werelocatedb ythenavalforces in the v ic in i ty of the posit ion where the d isaster of the U. S. S . Sa n Diego

occurred.

Asaresultofthis disastersix enlisted men wereinjured and sixliveslost.

Thesixmenlostinthesinkingofthe San DiegowereClydeChesterBlaine, engineman, secpnd class ; Thomas Everet t Davis , fireman,first class;P aul John H arris , seaman, second class;AndrewMunson,machinis t' s m ate, second class; James Francis Rochet, engineman,second class;Frazier O.Thom as, ma chinist 's m ate, secondclass.

THE SINKING OF THE S. S. MIRLO.

The Bri tish s teamship Mirlo, 6 ,978 gross tons, was sunk at 3.30p. m. onAu gust 16,1918,ab out one-half of am ile off WimbleShoalBu oy; causedby anexplosion. Theship tookfire,beingloadedwithgasoline, andwas abandoned after ana t tem pt tobeachher . Duetolater explosions,shebroke in two, in approximately latitude 35°30'N.and longitude75°18' W.

Thecreditfor thedestruction ofthe Mirloh asformerly beengiventotheactivityoftheGermansubmarine U-117,whichwasoperatingoff theAtlanticcoast at th at t ime. Thecom manding officer claimedthat the ship was torpedoed. However, no onesaw a submarineorthewake ofatorpedo. Therewasnothing toconfirm thefirstreporttha t asubmarinewas sighted.

Therew ere nine other vessels in the vicinity, one within sightofthe Mirlo, andnorep orts ofsighting asubmarine weremadebyanyof them . The Mirlow as located at the time ofher destruction overanowwell-knownmine field. (SeeCh artNo.2.) T heU .S.S. Taylorsighted a floating mine the nex t day 1 mile eas t of the wreck. It,therefore, seemshighly probable tha t the Mirlo was sunk by asubmerged anchored mine, notwithstanding the captain 's very positives tatement tha t theshipwas torpedoed.

STATEMENT OF CAPT. W. R. WILLIAMS, MASTER BRITISH S. 8 . "MIRL O."

OnA ugust16,1918,at 3.30p .m . A.T . S.,wh en the steamerwas steeringanorthcourseoff Wimble ShoalB uoy, bearingnorth by westhalf am ile distance, shewas



M

m PI



GERMANANDAMERICAN SUBMARINESAT HARWICH, ENGLAND.



AMERICANTANKER HERBERT L. PRATTAFTER BEINGMINED.

(Page125.)



DAMAGE TO THE AMERICAN TANKER H ERB ERT L. PRA TT BY MINE EXPLOSION.

Page 125.)



U.S.S.SANDIEGO.

(Page120.)



U . S . S . M I N N E S O T A .

(Page 130.)



DAMAGE TOTHE U.S.S. MINNESOTA BYMINE EXPLOSION.

(Page 130.)



.PIECE OFTHE MINE REMOVED FROMTHE U.S.S. MINNESOTAA FTER MINE EXPLOSION.

(Page130.)



129HE SINKING OFTHE S. S.MIRLO.

andentered thewaterall right,when it wasnoticed that the tiller fouled the after

falls,causingtheboattoshearoff from theshipand capsize. Allthementhatwere

inherwerethrownintothewater. At thesametimetheboat capsized shecleared

herselffromtheship. Thestarboardboattried togototherescue. Theorderswere

giventocleartheafterboatsand lowersame.

Afterascertainingthatallhandswereoff theshipweloweredaway. Duringthese

operations the boat's falls caught fire, and itwaswith great difficulty that we suc

ceeded in pulling away from the vessel. In a few minutes after leavingit the

shipexploded with terrific force fore and aft, at the same time catching fire fore

andaft. Itwaswithdifficulty thatwemanagedtoclearthefireand smokethatwas

floatingonthewater, causedby the shipburstingandall the cargocomingout.

The ship had been towing her otter gears from Florida Straits, and was towing

them at the time ofaccident. The shipwassteeringastraight course north, mag

netic,andinmy opinionitwouldhavebeen impossiblefor theseexplosionstohave

beencausedbymines—theexplosionsbeing12to14feetbelowthewaterline. The

twoexplosionswerealmost simultaneous.

Acareful lookout had beenmaintained throughout the passage, and neither sub

marinesnormineshadbeen sighted. Therewasnowakeofeithertorpedoobserved

norwarninggiven.

Theshipwasarmedwithone4-inchbreech-loadinggunaft andmanned byagun

crewofthreemen, BritishNavy ratings. Assoonasthe torpedoes struck, the ship

tookfireaft. Theguncrewwasonthe lookout,but nothingwasseentofireat.

After clearing the ship 1lost sight of the other twoboats, owing tothe fire and

smokewhich I thoughthad enveloped them. After pulling away and sailing clear

ofthefireandsmokewelooked fortheothertwoboats,but nothingwasseenofthem.

Itwasthendecidedtotaketheboat inshore. After proceeding inshoreforsometime

amotorboatwassighted,which came to usand spoke tous,and turned out tobefrom CoastGuard Station No. 179. He asked if therewere any other boats about,

and I requestedhimtogotothefire,astherewere twootherboatswith 34men in.

Hethendirectedmehowtomake forthe landingandhewentawaytowardthefire,

asnothingwasthen seen of the ship.

The captain of theCoastGuard station succeeded in locating the upturned boat

and the other boat whichwasintact. He took sixmen from the upturned boat.

It was found that 10men had been drowned from the upturned boat. Themen

whowererescued from the upturned boat stated tomethat someof themenwere

under the boat when she capsized, and were not seen again. The second officer

jumpedfrom theboatintothesea,andtold theothersitwasbesttotry toswimclear

ofthefire,which threatened to envelop them, as they assumed the fire was then

only 10yards from them. The boat then drifted away faster than the men could

swim,andtheywereunabletoreachtheboatandwereseentodrownbytherescued

men.

I could attach noblame to anyone for this disaster, and had it not been for the

heroicmannerinwhichtheCoastGuardwentinandoutofthefiretorescuetheloss

oflifewould have beenmuch greater; and I take this opportunity to congratulate

andthank themfor theirheroicworkofrescue,and theirkindnessandattention to

allafter the rescue.

U. S. S.MINNESOTA,



1 3 0 GERMAN SU BM AR IN E A CT IV IT IE S ON ATLA NTIC COAST.

Ship, bearing 346°(true), aheavy explosionund erth estarboard bow,about abreastframe 11, occurred.

2. A t t h is t im e I w as i n t h e c h ar t h ou se e xa m in in g t h e c h ar t. I im mediately repairedtoth e bridge andtookcharge. Collision and torpedodefense quartershadbeensoundedandofficersan dmenwererepairingrapid lyan dq uie tlytotheirstations.

The sh ip had set tl ed by the bow wi thou t apprec iab le l is t. Ear ly reports showed thattheship wasintactabaftframe 16butthatforwardofthatframeallcompartmentswere probably f looded. The shor ing of the water- tight bulkhead a t frame 16wasimmedia te ly s ta rt ed and pushed ahead as r ap id ly as possib le . At 3.18 a. m . theengineswereslowedto two-th irdsspeed (64revolutions) toeaseth epressureofbulkhead a t frame 16. At 3 .20 a . m. changed course to 270° ( t rue) in order to get in to shoaler water should the shored bulkhead fai l. At 4 .23 a . m. , having reached the 10-fathom curve,changed courseto0°(true), and at4.32a.m .to10°(true). Passed2.7milestotheWestwardofFenwickIslandShoalLightShipandproceededtoDelawareBreakwater viaMcCries Shoal gasand whist ling buoy and the sweptchannel. Arrivedoff DelawareBreakwater at 9.30a. m.; tookonboardpilot and proceededto

navyyard,Philadelphia,wherearrivedabout7.45p.m.,andwassuccessfullydockedat9.30p.m.

3. When the dock had been unwatered, i t wasfound tha t on the s tarboard s ide,betweenframes 5and 16,and from th e lower edge oft he armor belt tothe keel,thesh ip 's s t ruc tu re was p rac ti ca lly ob li te ra ted . The skin p lat ing had been ruptu red and blown in past th e centerl ine, the forward and after portionsfolding in sharplyovertheedgesof thebulkheads at frames 5and 16. CompartmentsA-3,4,5,21,36,and 37arepract ical ly obli terated. A-38is badly dished in and correspondingcompartmentson the portsideare nolonger water- tight . The protect ive deckis intact. Adetailed examination hasbeenm ade by the yard authoritiesand estimatesoftime

andm aterialfornecessaryrepairsarebeingprep ared.4. Atthetim eofthe explosionth eseawassmooth and th en ightdark, thewaning

moon, abouttwoand one-half hourshigh, beingobscuredb y clouds. Thevisibil ityw as such t h a t t h e U . S. S. Israel, the escort ing destroyer , wasvisible when about 800yardsdistant.

5. Noonesawa nytr ac eofasu bm arin eoraperiscope norwasth ew akeofatorpedonear the si te of the explosion seen by any one ei ther before or after the explosionoccurred, andI amofthe opinion th atth edamagew ascausedb yth eexplosionofananchored mine. There i s b ut onep iece of tes timony tha t might indicate that thecausewasatorpedo. Afewminu tesafterth eexplosionoccurredandw hilethecourse

wasbeingchanged to west (true), L. O. Griggsby, electrician, second class,whowasstationed at No.7searchlight, reported the wak e of atorpedo crossingthe sternfromstarboard to por t. He i s qui te posit ive tha t he saw th is wake, though nooneelse observed i t . If there wassuch a wake i t should have been seen by the Israel, asitmust have passed very c lose to her . She made no repor t of s ightingsuch a wake,and as, after escort ing th is sh ip to Delaware Breakwater , she proceeded onotherassignedduty,Ihavehadnoopportunitytogetinformationfromheruponthispoint.

6. Notwithstanding Griggsby's test imony, I am of the opinion tha t the causeof thedamagewastheexplosionofanenemymine. Fortun ately,it isbelievedthatthecausecan be definitely determined by athorough examination ofanearlycomplete



T H E S IN K IN G OF THE U. S. S. MINNESOTA. 1 3 1

[1stindorsement.]

UNITED STATES ATLANTIC F L E E T ,

BATTLESHIP FORCEONE,

U. S. S. " M I N N E S O T A , "F LA G SH IP ,

6 October, 1918.From:Comm ander Ba ttleship ForceOne.

To: CommanderinChief.Subject: Re port ofdamagesustained bystriking amine.

1. Forwarded.2.The Minnesotawasproceeding in accordance with prescribed routing instruc

tions; therewasnolossoflife; theefficient condition oftheship asregards watertightintegrity wasdemonstrated.

3. Undernormalconditions,investigation by meansofacourtofinquiry ofallthecircumstances at tendant upon this casualty would be he ld . I t would , however, seriouslyinterfere with im po rtan t operationstoordera courtofofficers ofappropriaterankatthepresent time ; therefore, in view ofthefactssetforthabove,unlessother

wisedirected bythe

department, a

court of

inquiry willnotbe

ordered.4.Theability oftheship toproceed to port after sustaining sosevere an injuryreflectscreditupontheofficersandcrewofthe Minnesotaandher efficient conditionastowater-tight integ rity.

A. W. G R A NT .

U. S. S. " M IN N ES O TA ,"

9 October, 1918.

From:Comm anding Officer.To: Commander Battleship ForceOne.

Subject: Supplem entalreportondamagesustainedby MinnesotaSeptember29,1918.Reference: (a)Repor t ofdamagesustained by strikingamineOctober3, 1918.Inclosures: (6)StatementofL.0.Griggsby,El.2cl.

" A.E.Lynn, Sea.2cl." E.J .Meyer,Yeo.Id.

" " L.S.R.Steadman,Cox.

" " W.Kent, Sea.2cl." A.W.Singer,Sea.

1. Ihavetosubmitthefollowingreportsupplementing andmodifying paragraph5ofreference.

2. Inparagraph 5of referenceitisstatedthatL.O.Griggsby,El.2cl.,reported thewakeof atorpedocrossingth esternfromstarboard toport,b utnooneelseobservedthis

wake. Amorethorough investigation than hadbeen possibleatthetime referencewaswritten showsth atfiveothermenstateth atth eyobservedatorpedowakecrossingfromstarboard toport. Thestatementsofallsixmenareinclosed.

3.Anexamination of these statements indicates that whateveritwas that thesesixmensaw,theyprobablyallsawthesame th ing . Twoofthemenwereonlookoutwatchatthetimeoftheexplosion,theotherfourwereawakened bytheshockoftheexplosion. If thesemendidseeatorpedowake,itisevidentfrom their statementsthatthetorpedo hadnodirect connection withtheexplosion,aswhen they sawthewaketheshipmusthavebeenatleast1,000yardsfromthesceneoftheexplosion.

4. Itwillbenoted that four ofthesemenstatethatatthetimetheyobserved thetothe a of of



1 3 2 GERMAN SUBM ARINE A CTIV ITIES ON ATLANTIC COAST.

5. I t wasabout thistime that adark object onthe portbowwasreported fromtheforward net ting , and I d i rected the Israel to invest iga te thi s object. She turned passed under the stern, and proceeded off the portbow.

6. Thisship continued toturntocoursewest(tru e),asIdeem edth isthebest coursetopursueunderthecircumstances,fortheshipwasthusbeingbroughtparalleltothereported torpedowakeandh eading forthedarkobject, shouldi tprovetobeanenemysubmarine. Asamatter of fact I did notbel ieveei ther report tobecorrect.

7. Through a duplicat ion of orders, the s iren was sounded a second t ime. This duplication wascausedbyamisund erstanding ofareportwhichledmetobelievethatthegeneralalarmhad beensounded bu t thesirenhadnot beenblown. Thissecondblastwasabout threem inutesafter the firstblast.

8. Aftercareful consideration oftheinclosed statem ents, I stilldoubt veryseriouslyifatorpedowakewasreallyseenandbelievethatwhatwasseenwassomecommotioninthewater causedbythe Israel,com bined possibly with thedebristhatm usthavebeenw ashedfrom thew recked storeroomsinw akeofthe explosion. Asforthedarkobject reported on the port bow, nothing came of i t and i t apparently disappeared.

I donotbelieveit had any real existence.9. The fragment found by the yard authorities in the damaged section oftheship

has been photographed and forwarded by the commandant to the Office of NavalOperations. Itishopedth atanexamin ationofthisfragment willdeterminedefinitelythecauseofthedamagetothisship.

J . V . C HA SE .

OCTOBER 6, 1918.

From: Commandant, Fifth Naval District. To: Chief ofN aval Operations.

Subject: AmericanS.S. San Saba,formerly S.S. Colorado,2,458tonsgross,ownedby

theMalloryLineu ntil taken overby the United StatesR ailroad Administration.1. The above vessel left New York October 3, 1918,a t 5p.m., bound forTampa,

Mobile,with ageneralcargo. Them asterwasCapt.B .G.Birdsall.2. Jus tpriorto the sinkinghercoursewasfrom Ambrose Light,vesselsailingsouth

by west i west. At 11.30p. m., October 3, 1918,shehad Barnegatonfour pointsat12.25a. m.; October 4, 1918,Barnegat was abeam. At 12.30a. m., her coursewaschangedtosouthwest,and 15minu teslaterwh ileonthiscourseshewasstruck. Shiphad notbee nzigzagging. At12.45a.m.t hevesselwasstruc k am idshipwellbelowthewaterlinewithsuchforceth atshe practically brokeintwoand sank infiveminutes,being completely submerged by 12.50a. m., with her colors f lying. There wasno

moon,andthevesselwasunderfullwaywhenshewasstruck.3. Asstated by the secondofficer ininclosure (A)at 12.30a.m. October 4,1918,he

sighted avery dimgreenlighttwopo intstoth ep ortbowabout 500feetd istant; afterthe vesselwasstruck this light disappeared, and because ofthiscircumstancesecondofficer is convinced tha t the light came from an enemy submarine and wasexposedwithth eintent of deceiving the San Saba. I t isfelt , however, that thisopinionisnotconclusive, asthe light may have come from a sailing vessel which, warned bythe destructionofthe San Sabaandassumingtherewasan enemy submarine,extinguished herlight and escaped without attem pting torender assistancetothecrewofthe San Saba. Nosignalswereseenotherthan theabovelighttoindicatethepresenceof a submar ine. At the t ime the San Sabawasstruck another vessel heading north



THE SINKING OF THE U . S. S. SAETIA. 1 3 3

PierNo.36,North River, N.Y.,whohasthe crewlistand insurance papers. At thetimethe vessel sank there wasno chance to launch the boatsorgetbuoys, andi t isbelieved that many were killed by the forceofthe explosion, which wassogreat thatthebelief isentertained that it camefrom ananchored mine. It will benotedin thethirdanswerto inclosure (A)the second officer expressed himself ashaving "heard a

heavynoiseknockingonthe ship'ssidewhichfollowed with anexplosion aminuteorsoafterwards." There was in all probability ashorter lapseoftimethanthe minutedescribed by the second officer between hisfirsthearing the knocking and the subsequentexplosion. Thiswasprobablyth em inebumpingalongthebottomofthe vesselfromthebowbacktoam idshipw herethe explosiontookplace.

6. Referring to inclosure (D), Adolph Beer, the second officer; Edwardo Simona,seaman; and Pedro Aceredo, coal passer, are the only survivors known to us. Mr.Beersustainedhimself by meansofalife buoy, andw astaken up,accordingtohiaownstatement,at4p.m.,bytheNorwegianS.S. Brdford. Theothertwomen, accordingtotheirstatements, sustained themselvesonanimprovised life raft madeinthe waterfromwreckage,andweretakenupat4.30p.m.bytheS.S. Brdford. These twomen

further stated that twoother membersofthe crewshared their life raft, but that onediedfrom exposure at6a. m.and thesecond atnoononOctober 4. These three survivorsasnoted inreference (E)left Norfolk forNewYork viathe NewYork, Philadelphia&Norfolk R. R. at6 p .m ., October 5,1918.

OnNovember9,1918,theU.S.S. Saetia,oneofthenavaloverseastran sp orta tio n ships of 2,873 gross to ns, ow ned b y th e U nitedStates ShippingBoard, bound from France to Philadelphia, with 10officers and 74enlisted men, oneA rmy officer acting as quarterm aster,atotal of85,struck amine 10milesSSE.,m agnetic course, Fen-wickIsland Shoal, from the stateme nts of them embers of thecrew,about 8.10 o r 8.30 a. m. L ieut. Commander Walte r S. Lynch , thecommanding officer of the U. S. S. Saetia,sayshewasinthewheelhousewhen the accident occurred and that hewent immediately tothe side of the shfp and saw tha t the explosion occurred abreastNo.3hatch, and tha t theb oats weregotten awayimmediately, orinaboutfiveminutes after the explosion. Sixty-six men werein boats

1,2,3,and 4, and 19men on twoliferaf ts . The papers of the shipwereplaced in aweighted bag and thrown overboard, as the captainbelievedtheshiphadbeentorpedoedbyasubmarine.

Theshipwasreturning to the United States in ballast . The chiefengineerwasinjured and the barber (aseaman) sustained a sprainedback; two o ther men were hu rt . One had his head sp lit, and theotherasplit nose—m aking threem en injured slightly and the chiefengineerseriously. Thechief engineerwasinhisroom ; the explosiontookplace right under hisroom, and the d6bris thrown up wounded



1 3 4 GERMAN SU BM AR IN E A CT IV ITIE S ON ATLANTIC COAST.

Twoofthe men, Ensign E. E. Cornell and C.E. America, anoiler,arecertain they saw theconningtower ofasubmarinen otmorethan200 feet away. However, i t is thought probable that theysawpartof theirownwreckage,and th at theshipwassun kbyamine. Atotal

of 85 survivors were later accounted for.OnO ctober 27, 1918,a bout 10p.m., the Ohaparra,Cubansteam

ship of 1,505 gross tons, with a cargo of sugar, bound from CubatoNew York , was blown up by a mine 10^ miles south by east offB arn eg at L ig ht. T he crew of 11 m en cam e in th e In le t w ith thecaptainin one of their ownbo ats; the balance of the crewlandedonNo rth Beach, CoastG uard Station 112.

Capt. Jose Vinolas, the capta in of the Chaparra,testifies tha theisanative ofBarcelona, Spain; th at hewasthe captain ofthe Chaparra,andthatshewasflyingtheCubanflag,herownerbeingEmpresaNaviera deCuba, S.A. , Hab ana, Cuba. That they had a full cargoof sugar consis ting of 14,000bags . That the agents for theship in New Y ork w ere M anuel Caragol & Son. T h at th ey sailed from Cardenas, Cuba, onOctober 22, 1918,bound for NewYork. At thet ime of the ship 's destruct ion her location wa s: South 60°, 10miles from B arn eg at, m aking 8 m iles an h ou r. T h at on th e night ofOctober 27, a t 10 p . m. , they fe lt a heavy blow jus t forward of the

bridgeonth ep ort side; there was a terrific explosion, and thevesselwasfairlylifted outofthew ater. A tthesametimeacolumnofwaterwas thrown upwhich covered the bridge. The vessel l is ted to portand capsized, s inking within 2\ m in ute s. T hey only had tim e tolaunch two boats from the s tarboard s ide , and managed to save23of the crew of their 29. That he fears that the 6 miss ingmenwere killed. Th at theymadefor Barnegat Light , Stat ion 113,andlandedabout8p.m. on October 28. They werepickedup at th at placebya boat which took them toB arnegat . Theweather wasc learwith a

moderatesea. Sawnosubmarine. Therewerevariousothervessels in the vicinity which were not molested,which leads him tobelievetha t theships truck amine. Ship 's papers wentdownwith theship.

The testimon y ofCa pt. Vinolasis corroborated by the membersofhiscrew, allofwhom agreet h at the Chaparrawassunkbyamine.

MINE-SWEEPING SHIPS.

Themine-sweepingop erationsontheE urop ean sideoftheA tlantic



135IN E-S W EE PIN G S H I P .

Name. S. P. No. Length. Draft.

EasthamptonLong islandLapwing

SurfCrestBreakerBillowStarling (formerly Petrel).Ibis (formerly Sea G u ll ). .

Macomber,B.F.WhitecapComberLawrencePricePocomokeArdentMansfield.

SprayRippleFoamSenecaNewEnglandLowellConeyFreeholdAuroraKnickerbockerTasco.NewarkCrawfordFultonPentucketP .R .R .No . 9

FIRST DISTRICT.

SECOND DISTRICT.

THIRD DISTRICT.

Cayuga(formerly Powhatan).

DelawareGarnerMcKeeverBros...8.W.McKeever.E.J.McKeever...BreakwaterBrownFearlessVester

SpartanS. T .N o .2.

BellowsKajeruna. . .StruvenMessickMcNealMargaret . . .

A las ka . . . A d a m s . . . R anger . . .Montauk.

ChameMarinerEngineer

F O U R T H

FIFTH

S I X T H

E I GHT H

DISTRICT.

DISTRICT.

DISTRICT.

DISTRICT.

573572

N a v y .

341•'i 339'-' 1707

170429813051

340344858839265280691

249124392496

4271222504346347345479502266366247

Navy.679

Navy.

467682683

1169684681

1050724

366267

323389332322312328

3035

400

392

Army.Army.Army.Navy.

Ft. in.

168 8

164 4

180

128 5125

119 8

119 8

141 5

141 5

138

143

143

157

125

115

106

100

126 5

126 5

126 5

150

130

119 4

112

110 1

110

110

109

107

100 2

93 3

92 6

92

101

140

140

136

136

136

105

103

103

96 4

105

101

162153

152

145

140

128

131 8

113 3

137 4

121

Ft. in.

139 9}

1313131313 613 6

1213 513 5108 88 67

10

222222 6129 89

1411131112131112 18 9

1310

11 41412121011109 68

1011

1469 512

12



1 3 6 GERMAN SUBMARINE ACTIVITIES ON ATLANTIC COAST.

ous and carr ied on in connection with the rout ing of vessels. Asanillu stra tio n th e p o rt of B osto n h ad th re e channels of approach.The rout ing officer selected one of these as the channel of exit orentrancefor aspecified time and this wasm ade in the secretrouting

ins tructions issued to the capta in of each vessel. This informationbeing given to the comm andant of the dis tr ict , tha t part icular channel of en trance was swept cons tan tly and a lways immediately in advance of any i mpor tan t vessel o r vessels t ha t were leaving orentering p ort. W hen th e e ntran ce channel w as changed by therouting officer the mine-sweeping operations moved with thechange.All this work was precautionary, and did not becomeof real importanceuntil th e arrivalofth e first G erman submarine onthiscoast.

MINE-SWEEPING OPERATIONS ON UNITED STATESATLANTIC COAST.

7 F EB R U AR Y , 1919.

1. On 18 November a message was received from Admiral Sims,g iving location of mine fie lds la id on At lant ic coast by Germans.Thesefieldsareshown on cha rts Nos. 524 and 3924in yellow.

2. On November 27, asecond message was received from AdmiralSims, giving location of minefields laid by Germans on the Atlantic

coas t. This differed somewhat from the first message in thatfie ld wereshown inth e firstm essage th at wereno t inth e secondmessage.F our German cha rtle ts were sent, showing loca tions of m ines insecond message. T hese field s a re shown on char ts Nos. 524 and3924inred.

3. On 16 J anua ry , a th ir d message was received from AdmiralS ims s ta ting tha t i t was comple te German in formation re la tive to m ine fields on A tla ntic co ast. T hese are show n on ch arts Nos.

524 and 3924inblue. Chartlets werereceived on February 3showing the location of these fie lds. All of the fie lds g iven in th is lastmessage were also given in both other messages and the numberofmines was given in some cases .

4. These fields were as follows:

No. 1: N o rth ea st of F ire Islan d L ig htsh ip . N um ber ofminesnotgiven.

No. 2 : Off B a rnegat L ight. Number of m ines, 9.No. 3 : S ou th of F enwick Island S hoal L ightsh ip . Num



M IN E-SW EEPING OPERATIONS ON ATLANTIC COAST. 1 3 7

No. 6 : Off Chesapeake B ay Buoy 2cB . N um ber m inesg iven by message, 6. Not shown on char tl et .

No. 7 : Off Wimble Shoal Buoy. Number mines,9 .5. Allofthese areas,and allofth e areasgiveninother tworeports,

have been carefully swept .6. Mineshave been found as follows:

Area No. 1: Fire Island.Number.

SanDiego—Sunk 19July 120July— Destroyed 3

5August— Found onFire Island 25September— Found onFire Island 18September— Found onSandy Hook 1

Total 8

Area No. 2: Barnegat.Number.

7September— Mine cut loose by U . S. S. South Carolina 18September—Destroyed 14.5milesN E.Brigantine ShoalsBuo y.. 14October—U. S. S. San Saba sunk 1

10October—Destroyed b y U. S. S.Teal 112October— Destroyed by U. S. S.Teal 114October— Destroyed by U. S. S.Teal 116October— Destroyed by U. S. S. Freehold 127October—U. S. S. Chaparra sunk , a

Total 8German repo rt giveninem ines in thisfield.

Area No. S: South of Fenwick Island Lighthouse.Number.

29September— U. S. S.Minnesotamined 19November— U. S. S. Seatia sunk . 19January— Destroyed by U . S. S.T eal. 1

12January— Destroyed by U . S. S.Teal 113January— Destroyed by U . S. S.Teal 114January— Destroyed by U . S.S.Teal 1

20January— Destroyed by U. S.S.Teal 1

Total 7

German report gave seven in this area.

Area No. 4: South of Winter Quarter Shoal Lightship.

Number.

23November— Destroyed byU . S.S. Rail 424November— Destroyed byU. S. S.Rail 3

Total 7



1 3 8 GERMAN SUBM ARINE A CTIV ITIES ON ATLANTIC COAST.

Area No. 6: Off Chesapeake Bay Buoy 2CB.Number.

22June— Two milesfrom V irginia Beach Buoy, destroyed 15July—Lat.36°38

/N ., 75°44'W ., destroyed 1

31July— Found ashorea t Gargathy In le t 1

18August— Lat. 36°08 'N ., 75°34'N ., destroyed 118A ugust— Four m ile s off C apeH e nry B uoy 2C B,destroyed 1

9September— Lat. 36° 52'N ., long. 75° 44'W ., destroyed 19September— Found ashore Coast Guard S tation No. 168 1

Total 7

None of thesem ines wereswept up. Those destroyed werefoundfloating or ashore. From German reports , s ixmineswereplanted inthis area. Theminefound at Garg athy Inlet might becreditedwiththisfieldor the Overfalls field.

Area No. 7: Wimble Shoal.Number.

15August— S. S.Mirlosunk 118August— Destroyed by U . S. S.Teal 225August— Destroyed b y U . S. S.Teal ..' 230August— Destroyed by U . S. S. Teal 2

5September— Destroyed by U. S. S.Teal 3

Total 10

German reportsgavenine minesin thisfield.

Area No. 8: Off Overfalls Lightship.

ThisHeld was not shown on any German char tle t, a lthough one message fromAdmiralSimsstates"acrossmouthofDelawareRiver2mileseastofOverfallsLight."

Number.

3June— S.S.H erbert P ra t t sunk 13June— Destroyed 23June— Destroyed ". 19June— Destroyed 1

16August—Destroyed 5 mi les from Five Fathom Bank Lightsh ip . . 1

10Jun e, 1919—Found ashoreCoastGuard Light No.140 1

Total 7

The mines swept up in th is area were not across the entranceofDelaware, bu t wereon al ine abo ut S. by E . from Overfalls Light.

7. Besides these repor ted a reas , the following mines have been reported:

Number.

20September—Cut loose by P. V., not destroyed; lat . 40° 48' N.,



VESSELS DESTROYED BY THE SUBMARINES. 139

8. Thegrand total ofallminesfound isasfollows:Number.

Outsidereported fields 6

VicinityOverfallsLightship '. 7

VicinityWimble Shoal 10

VicinityChesapeakeBay 7

VicinityWinter Quarter ShoalLightship 9

Vicinity Fenwick Island ShoalLightship 7

VicinityBarnegat 8

VicinityFire Island Lightship 8

Total 62

Of these , three mines were found off Nova Scotia, leaving 57ontheUnited States Atlantic coast.

9. Besides these mines which have been sunk , r eports ofmines

sighted drifting have been received to thenumber of 29. W hilethesereports ofdrifting minescouldn ot beau thenticated , only thosethat the sourcew as considered reliable have been counted.

10. Inviewof theabove, andthefact thatallfieldsreported havebeen carefully swept,andsome of them several t imes,itisbelievedthattheUnitedStatesAtlanticcoastmaybedeclaredclearofmines,andsweeping discontinued.

TABLE N O .1.— Vessels destroyed by the submarines acting on the surface, using gunfireand bombs, in western Atlantic.

(Vessels American unless otherwise noted.)

GunfireName. Class. Tons. orbomb. Date. Position.

HattieDunn Sch.. 435 M ay 25 37°24 ' N.,75°05'W. Hauppauge (salved) . .do . 1,446 .do 37°27' N . ,75°(W W. Edna .do. 325 . . . d o . . . . 37°3C N . .74°52'W. IsabelB.Wiley . .do . 776 June 2 39°1CN. ,73°07' W . JacobM.Haskell . .do . 1,778 . . . d o . . . . Barnega tLight , E. by S . ,50 miles.EdwardH.Cole . .do . 1,791 . . . d o . . . . Barnega tL igh t ,50 milesSE.of.Winneconne S.S.. 1,869 J u n e 2 39° 26 ' N., 72° 5CK W . Texel . .do . 3,210 . . . d o . . . . 38° 58'N . ,73°13' W .

Carolina . .do . 5,093 do 38"57 ' N . .73°06' W . Samuel C.Mengel Sch.. 915 J u n e 3 38° 08' N . .73"35' W . Eidsvold (Norwegian) S.S. . 1,570 June 4 37"12

7N . ,73°55' W .

EdwaTd R.Baird,jr Sch. 279 . . . d o . . . . 37° 35' N . ,74° W W .Vinland (Norwegian) 1,143 J u n e 5 36° 3 ^ N . ,73°58' W . PinarDelRio 2,504 J u n e 8 36° 16 ' N.,73° 5WW. .s..Vindeggen (Norw egian)... . .do . 3,179 J u n e8-10 36" 25' N . ,73°2C W . HenrikLund (Norwegian). . .do . 4,322 J u n e10 36° 30' N . ,71°29' W . Samoa(Norwegian) . .do . 1,138 J u n e14 37° 30' N . ,72° W W . Kringsjaa (Norwegian) Bk. 1,750 38° 02 ' N.,71°40

7W. do. do

Chiller (Belgian) S .S . . 2.966 J u n e22 39° 30 ' N.,53° W W . Augvald (Norwegian) . . .do . 3,406 J u n e23 38°3C N . ,53° 4 ^ W . Marosa(Norwegian) Bk. 1,987 J u l y 7 40° 00 ' N.,50°35' W . ManxKing (Norwegian).. Sch.. 1,729 J u l y 8 40° 00 ' N.,52°00'W. PerthAmboy Tug.. 435 J u ly 21 CoastGuard No.40W.(T),3miles. Lansford Bge.. 830 .do 3milesfromOrleans, Mass. BargeNo.403 .do. 422 . . .do Do.




TABLE NO.1.— Vessels destroyed by the submarines acting on the surface, using gunfireand bombs, in western Atlantic—Continued.

GunfireClass. Tons. Date. Position.Name. or bomb.

Agnes G. H o ll an d (C ana- S ch 100 B Aug. 5 Lehave Banks, 15 miles SE . of.dian).

Gladys M. Ho llett (Cana- . . d o . . . 203 B . . . d o . . . Do.dian).

Stanley M. Seaman . . d o . . 1,060 B . . . d o . . . 34° W N., 73° 18' W.Merak B Aug. 6 34° 57' N., 75° 40' W .S . S . . . . 3,024Diamond Shoal L. S C.G.Ves G . . . d o . . Near Cape Hatteras, approxi

590 ma tely 35° 05' N. , 75° W W.Sydland (Swedish) 3,031 B Aug. 8 41° 30' N . , 65° 22' W.

Kat ie L. Palmer G. S. 31 B Aug. 10 41° 45' N . , 67° lC W.Reliance .do. B9 . . . d o . . . 41° 45' N ., 67° 10- W .Wil l iam H. Starbuck... .do. 53 B . . . d o . . . 41° 45' N ., 67° W W .Progress .do. 34 B . . . d o . . . 41° 45' N . , 67° KK W.Aleda May -d o . 31 B . . . d o . . . 41° 45' N., 67° 10' W .Mary E. Sennett .do. 27 B . . . d o . . . 41° 45' N . , 67° W W .

Earl and Nettie .do . B . . .do. . . 4 41° 45' N ., 67° 1C W .28 41° 45' N . , 67° W W .Cruiser .do. B . . .do. . .

41° 45' N . , 67° 1C W .Old Time .do . 18 B . . d o . . ./G2,088 JAug.14 38° 54' N . , 74° 24' W .

Madrugada(Brazilian) G. S.. 1,613 Burned Aug. 15 37° 50' N . , 74° 55' W .DorothyB.Barrett Sch. \B

SanJose(Norwegian) S. S.. 1,586 B Aug. 17 42° 1C N., 64° 42' W .Nqrdhav(Norwegian) Bk... 2,846 B . . . d o . . . 35° 42' N ., 74° 05' W.Triumph (Canadian) S. T . 239 C Aug. 20 60 miles S. by W. of Cranberry

Island (T ) (captured).LucilleM.Schnare(Cana- Sch.. 121 B . . .do. . . Cape Canso, N . £ E. (T), 52 miles.dian).

FrancesJ.O'Hara,jr . .do. 117 B . . . . . .do. . . Do.A.PiattAndrew . .do. 141 B . . . . . .do. . . Do.Uda A. Saunders (Cana- . .do. 124 . .do.. . 44° 31' N., 60° 3C W.dian).

Pasadena(Canadian) .do. 119 . .do. . . 55 miles SSE. from Cape Canso,

Nova Scotia.Sylvania .do. 136 Aug. 21 Cape Canso, S E. by E. 90 miles.Diomed(British) S.S. 7,523 G. . . . d o 40° 43' N., 65° 15' W .Notre Dame de Lagarde F. V. 145 Aug. 22 45° 32' N . , 58° 57' W.(French).

Bianca(salved)(Canadian) Sch.. 408 Aug. 24 43° 13' N., 61° 05' W .E.B.Walters(Canadian).. . .do. 126 Aug. 25 46° 33 ' N ., 57° 33 ' W.C.M.Walters(Canadian).. . .do. 107 B . . . . .d o 46° 33 ' N., 57° 33' W.Verna D. Adams (Cana- . .do. 132 B . . . . . . d o . . . 46° 33 ' N . , 57° 33' W.dian).

J. J. Flaherty ...do. 162 . . . d o . . . 46° 33 ' N., 57° 33 ' W.Eric (British) 583 . . . d o . . . Gallantry Light, SE . by E. 70

miles.Gloaming (Canadian) Sch. . 130 Aug. 26 46° 02 ' N., 57° 35 ' W.Rush S. T . 162 . . . d o . . . 44° W N . , 58° 02

7 W.

Potentate(Canadian) Sch. . 136 B . Aug. 30 50° 30' N . , 47° 00' W.ElsiePorter(Canadian)... . . . d o . 136 . . . d o . . . 50° 3C N., 47° 00* W.Gamo(Portuguese) .do. 315 Aug. 31 46° W N . , 32° 00' W.Cqnstanza (Danish) . . . d o . 199 Sept. 11 62° 30' N., 35° 00' W .

Kingfisher S. T . 353 Sept. 20 43° 31' N . , 61° 53' W.Industrial(British) 330 Oct. 4 37° 57' N., 66° 41' W.Stifinder(Norwegian).. s. v.. 1,746 Oct. 13 37° "OH N . , 53° ZV W.

B k . . .

TABLE No. 2.— destroyed by the submarine submerged and firing torpedoes.

(VesselsAmericanunless otherwisenoted.)

Name. Class. Tons. Date. Position.

Harpathian(British). S. S 4,588 June 5 36° 3C N., 75° 00' W.Dwinsk(British) . . d o . . . 8,173 June 18 38° 30' N., 61° 15' W.

Tortuguero(British) . . d o . . . 4,175 June 26 55° 5C N., 15° 30' W. 1 W.



141NALYSIS OF TABLES—CONCLUSIONS.

T A B L E N O . 3 .— Vessels damaged or destroyed by mines.

Name. Class. Tons. Date. Position.

HerbertL.Pratt(salved). Tanker 7,145 June 3 OverfallsLightship,N.45°W.(T), 2*miles.SanDiego(salved) 13,6801 J u ly 19 40° 30' N . ,73° W W .

Mirlo(British) u..s.s.s. 6,978 Aug. 16 35" 30"N.,75°18' W . Minnesota(salved) u.s.s. 17,6501 Sept. 29 38°05'N. , 74°05'W.; mad ep ort , Philadelp h ia , P a .

SanSaba S.S. . 2,458 O ct. 4 39° 40* N . ,73°55' W . Chaparra(Cuban). . . .do. 1,505 O ct. 27 8. 60°E., 10milesf rom Barnegat . Saetia . . .do . 2,873 N ov. 9 E . fro m O cea n C i ty , M d ., a b ou t 10 m i l es

S S E. (m a gn etic ) from F en w ic k Is la ndLightship.

1 D i spl a ce me n t.

An analysis oft he abovetablesisofconsiderableinterest. Of thevessels a t tacked by the submarine on the surface , 62 were sa iling

vesse ls, tugs, barges , and motor boats , and 17 were steamers. Ofthe sailing vessels, therewill benoted tha t man y of them were verysmall, schooners from 100 tons up, besides anum ber ofm otor boatsvaryingbetween 18and 117tons.

I t will be noted tha t the vessels to rpedoed were all steamshipsfrom m o dera te to large size. I t is a pp are nt t ha t th e sub marineintended to take no chances , and where the vessel appeared largeenough to probably be armed the torpedo wasresorted to, whereas thesmallhelplesscraft wasopenly attacked andruthlessly destroyed.

Of the vessels destroyed orinjured by mines allwerelargevessels.The German campaign, bymeans of submarines on the At lantic

coast of theU nited States, sofar as concerned the major operationsof the war, was a fa ilure . Every t ranspor t and cargo vessel boundfor Europe sailed asif nosuch campaign wasinprogress. Allcoastwise shipping sailed as per schedule , a l it tle more care in routingvessels being observed. T here w as no in te rru ptio n to th e coastp atro l w hich, on th e c on tra ry , becam e ra th er m ore active. Thesmall vessels of the submarine chaser and converted yacht types,armedwithverysmallgunsbutprovidedwithdepthcharges,scouredthe coast regard le ss of t he fact t ha t t he enemy submarines wereequipped wi th ordnance very much heavier than their own. There was no s tampede on the At lant ic coas t; no exci tement ; everythingwent on in the usual calm wayand,above all,thisenemyexpeditionof the At lan ti c coast d id no t succeed in re ta in ing on the At lan tic coast anyvesselstha thad beendesignedford uty inEurop ean waters.



A P P E N D I X .

NAVY DEPARTMENT,

OFFICE OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,

Washington, 6 February, 1918.From:A specialboa rd toformulate ap lan of defense in home waters.To: Chief of Naval Operations.Subject:Defenseagainstsubmarineattackinhomewaters.Reference: (a) O p na v. l et te r N o. of*February 1, 1918, c on ven in g Board .

1. Purs uan ttoinstructions, reference (a),the Board conveneda t10a.m .,M onday,

4February,1918,allmemberspresentexceptLieut.CommanderFoy,whowaspresentbeginning wi th the afternoon session. As a result of i t s deliberations, the Board submits the following report:

B A S IS O F D IS C US S IO N .

2. The Germans have completed a number of cruising submarines of large radiusandlargecapacity > and thesemaybe usedonourcoastwith aviewtodivertsomeofour mi l itary act iv ity away from European waters . The constant increase of anti submarine forcesabroad may compelan enemy effort tocausesuch a diversion, andthecom parativeopenness of American watersoffers agoodfieldforsubmarine activities. Information is indefini te as to the number of enemysubmarinespossiblyintendedfor American waters, bu t an approximation issufficient for discussion. Thesalientfeaturesofthesituationarethereforetakentobeasfollows:

GENERAL SITUATION.

3. A division of four submarine cruisers, each armed with 6-inch guns, 36mines,and 16 torpedoes, and capable of a t least one month 's ac t iv i ty on our coast, mayappear in American waters without warning.

4. Thei r a im wi ll be to destroy shipping, in ter rupt the t ransport of troops andsupplies to Europe, interfere with our coastwise shipping, by these means causingtherecallfrom abroad ofsome ofournaval force for defense ofhomewaters. Bomboardmentofcoasttownsmayalsobedone,withaviewtoheightenpopulardemandforlocal protection, and thereby embarrass the naval administration.

5. Theywillemploymines,guns,torpedoes,andbombs. Theirprincipalactivitiesmaybe expected to be directed against the main shipping centers—Halifax, NewYork,Hampton Roads, and Florida Strai ts. Atthe samet ime, by act ivi ty of somekindin several localitiessoseparated astosuggestth e presenceofa largeforce, theymayexpect to produce a maximum popular disturbance early in their campaign.

G E N ER A L P O LI CY .

6.The general policy ofth e United Statesistosend the maximum possible force



144 APPENDIX.

naval force based on America, depends for its success upon a sufficient guard in

American aswell asin European waters. The force retained in American waters

cannotwithreasonablemilitary prudencebereducedbelowtheminimumrequired

formeetingthe emergencyherebeingconsidered. It hasdevolveduponthisBoard

to determine what that minimum is; and such determination should be held to

against the repeated urgings, to send all force abroad, of individualswhohavenotfully considered thesituationasawhole. In the courseofourdiscussionsthisprin

ciplehadrepeatedly tobeadverted toand reaffirmed. Emphasis is laiduponitas

thebasisofany planfordefense againsthostileoperationsnearourcoast.

POLICY IN THE FACE OP SUBMARINES.

8. In the eventofactual submarinehostilitiesonthiscoast, first disclosedperhaps

bythesinkingofasteamerbyamine,whatshallbethepolicyastoshipping? Shall

it continue,with theleastpossibleinterruptions, orshallit beheldinportuntilthe

enemysubmarinesshallhavebeenlocatedanddestroyed? Thelattercoursewould

betosurrenderat onceto the enemyalargemeasureofsuccessinhispurpose.9. It is recognized that to keep onsending out shippingmay involve the lossof

somevesselssoonafter departure fromourports;weare,notwithstanding, convinced

that this course should be pursued. Tohold vessels in port until all is clearwill

encouragetheenemy,bothnearandabroad;itwillhelpprolonghisperiodofactivity

on our coast and will demoralize and confuse our arrangements on shore farmore

than would the lossof one or two vessels. Abroad the suspension of arrivals for

severalweekswouldhaveaneffect seriousbeyond calculation. On the otherhand

tocontinuewith oursailingsboldly,unshaken inourgeneraloffensivepolicy,would,

heartenourownpeoplewhilegivingnogroundtothe enemysubmarine. Theescort

withourconvoyswouldforcethesubmarinestotake achanceforeverysinkingthey

might attempt. From the first disclosure of their presence their accomplishing

anything in ourwatersshouldbecomeincreasingly difficult, and thiscanonlycome

aboutby our taking the strongline ofaction.

10. Onthispoint it istherefore the decisionof theBoard thatweshould keeponsendingshippingoutwiththeleastpossibledelay,atthesametimetakingallpossible

offensive measures toremovethe danger.

11. The measures necessary to put into effect the foregoing policy divide under

twogeneral heads—control ofshippingandmilitary offensive.

CONTROL OF SHIPPING.

12.After discussing the several questionsinvolved successively, the Boardcameto the following conclusions:

OUTBOUND SHIPPING.

(a) That wheremineshave appeared, outbound shipping should be routed clear

ofthemthroughasweptchannel.

(6) Thatshippingshould usesweptchannelsassoonafter the sweepingascircum

tances permit.

(c)That coastwise shipping should proceed at night and independently. (See

change.)



APPENDIX. 145

(ft) That convoysshouldbeaccompaniedby anoceanescort,by an antisubmarine

escort tothe 50-fathom curve, and by oneormoreescortingsubmarines for lookout.

(Seechange.)

(i) That the ocean escort should be a cruiser, or a converted merchant vessel in

naval commission, armedwith gunsof 5-inch orlarger caliber.

(j) That the antisubmarine escort should consistofsubmarinechasersarmedwith

depth bombsand gunsup to3-inch caliber. (Seechange.)(k)That theantisubmarine escortforaconvoyshouldbethenumberrequired by

approved instructions in force at the time.

(I)That the escortingsubmarineswithaconvoyshouldprecedeit , runningawash,

tokeep lookout for enemy submarines and warn and divert the convoy before the

enemysubmarine cansight it. (Omit;see change.)

13. Consideringasuggestion that interference withshippingwouldbemademore

difficult by sending convoys out ofmore ports than are soused at present, it was

concluded that available escortvesselsweretoofew, that land transportationwould

be disarranged, and that harbor facilities would be taxed toomuch beyond their

normal capacity, tooffer anysuccessforsuchameasure. Accordingly,

(m) Thedispatchofconvoysshouldbelimited toNewYorkandHamptonRoads,

asat present.

14. Theforegoing appliesmainly tothe areabetweenNantucketShoalsand CapeHatteras. Shipping out of the Gulf, including the important fuel-oil supply, has

notasyetbeenconvoyed and escortforceisnotavailable toestablishsuchaconvoy

service.

15. Adivisionofsubmarinesandanaviation stationarelocatedatKeyWest,anddependence must be placed upon theseand upon localand passing traffic and the

coastwise lookout service for information ofhostilesubmarines in the vicinity; and

insuch event, shipping outof the Gulf ofMexico should berouted southofCuba.

(Seechange.)

16. In the event ofsubmarines operatingagainst shipping comingfrom the canalshipping may be routed via CapeHorn; but action as to this would be toomuch

subjecttotheparticularsofthesituation atthetimeforanymoredefiniteconclusion

bythisBoard. (Omit;see change.)

INCOMING SHIPPING.

17. In order to route incoming shipping clear of submarine dangers, it is theconsensusof theBoard that the bestmeanswould be return convoys. Thiswould

insurethe correctreceipt ofand compliancewithroutinginstructions. Notenough

cruisers beingavailable toconvoyreturn shipping, however, there isnochoice butthat—

(n) Return shipping totheUnited Statesmustbeindependent ofconvoys. (See

change.)

18. Considering the great extent of coastalwaters inside the 50-fathom curve, itwillbeatbestpossibleonlytokeeponeavenueofapproachtoNewYorkandoneto

HamptonRoadssufficiently sweptforapracticaldegreeofsafetyfromenemymines.

Oursweepingtaskis lessenedby the factthat onlyasmallnumberofminescanbe

broughtoverbysubmarines. Judgingbythelatestexperienceabroad,thesemaybe

planted in smallgroups in severalwidely separated locations. There beingonly a



1 4 6 APPENDIX.

SECRECY IN ROUTING.

19. To the end that vessels may be warned dai ly of the posit ions of submarines and minesan>ireceive directions forthe ir movements—

(p) Return shipping to the Uni ted Sta tes should be controlled byradio from the United States.

20. Toprovide for the necessary secrecy of such radio control—(q) Eac h belligerent vessel should carry a commissioned communication officerof

her own or of United States nat ionali ty. Such officer would be in charge of codes,would decipher code messages and t ransmit them to the master of the vessel, butwould have no author ity over nor responsibil ity for the vessel. He need have noseagoing experience, bu t must be trustworthy and of sufficient education; hencetosupply these communication officers, our trained personnelneed notbe drawnupon.

21. The foregoing provision must be undertaken immediately, to be availablefor usewhenwanted;butwhollyapartfromitsvalueinemergency,theBoardstronglyrecommends its adoption asa measure tha t will greatly promote the safe routingofshipsinthewarzoneandtherebyreducetonnagelosses.

22. Unt i l commissioned communication officers shal l have been established onboard belligerent vessels, asprovided in paragraph (q)above, other means tofacilitate communication with incoming ships are recommended to be established, consisting of a system of secret routing for ships approaching this coast similar to themethod in usein the war zone. The Board doesnot consider this asan alternat ivebut only as a temporary means, pending the adoption of the commissioned officer system, which alone of the twohas the requisi te reliabi li ty and f lexibi li ty.

M IL IT AR Y O F F E N S IV E .

23. The foregoing measures cover the procedure necessary to carry out the policyrecommended affecting shipping, namely, to continue sending i t out with the leastposs ib le in te rrupt ion . These measures a lone cons ti tu te one means of combating e ne my sub ma rin es b ot h a ct iv el y, b y re sistin g t he ir a tta ck s u po n convoys, and passively, by wearingout their endurance, ul t imately depriving them of their mainobject—breaking thesupplyabroad. Bu t act ivemeasurestoremovethesubmarinesfrom our waters are necessary, in addition, lest their stay be prolonged to our disadvantage and the at tendant r isk to shipping continue long enough tohave seriousinternal effect in this country.

FIXED AND LOCAL DEFENSE.

24. Connected with measures of act ive offense the subject of purely passive defensive measures were considered. F ixed fortifications under the Coast Artillery should be sufficien t to p reven t the ac tua l pene tr at ion of our in te rio r wate rs. In 'addit ion to this, all districts have patrols at the entrance to pr incipal harbors, andin the second, third, and f if th distr icts there are guns afloat in the old batt leshipsMassachusetts, Indiana, and Iowa. These means the Board considers sufficient to frustrate any at tempt which might be made to enter inter ior waters.

25 . Requesthasbeen madeoftheW arD epartmen t tosupplement theforcesofthenavaldistrictsemployedincoastdefensebyoneortwogunbatteriesatsalientpointsa long the coastwhich might be bombarded. While such an a t tack might causeno



APPENDIX. 147

wereavailable, the operation of planting them is too extensive to be undertaken

withinashorttime; andevenwheninplace,thenetsareofsmalleffectunlessthor

oughlypatrolled,nottomention theeffort andmaterialrequiredforupkeep.

(r) TheBoard concludes, therefore, that nooutsideneteshouldbeconsidered,but

thatinsidenets asmaintained orplanned by theCoastArtillery, andatBaseTwo

andCapeHenryby theNavy,shouldberetained, andthat thesenets,togetherwith

fixed fortifications andharborpatrols,willaffordsufficientsecurityagainstanyhostileattempttoenteraprincipal harbor.

MINES.

27.Mineswhich are submerged at a depth which is dangerous to surface craft,includingsubmarines (subsurfaceminefields),wouldbeagreater embarrassmentto

ourownvesselsin the situation under consideration than tothe enemy's. Wecan

notafford toendangerorrestrict themovementsofourownvessels,whichareatbest

very limited in number, and there being no hostile surface vessels involved, the

Boardconcludes—

(s)Thatnosubsurfaceminefieldsshouldbeincludedin thepresentplans. (See

change.)28. AtpresenttheMarkVIminehasnoattachment for safety in caseofshallow

planting, and the minesof earlier marksare not capable of deep plantingwithout

modification ofthedepth-regulating apparatus. Even withsuchmodification, they

couldnot beplanted at a rapid rate. Thesemines alsohave nosafety provisions

againstshallowplanting. Asawhole,therefore,wehavenominessuitablefordeep

minefieldsatpresent. Asafetyattachment for theMarkVImineisbeingdeveloped,

and mines of that mark are being manufactured in considerable number, so that

withinseveralmonthswemayhaveasupplywhichcouldbe usedin emergencyfor

deepminefieldsonourowncoast, thoughdestined foranotherprojectabroad.

29. The free operation of our own submarines would,however,beendangeredinthevicinity ofdeepminefields,and hostilesubmarinesmaybeexpected tooperate

farenough offshore to be clear of any deepfields large enough toembarrass them,

unlessweusedanumber ofminesbeyondany possibilityofsupply. Thechanceof

deepminefieldscontributingmaterially tothe destruction ofenemysubmarinesis

remoteonaccount alsoof the small number of submarines that maybe expected

tooperate. TheBoardthereforeconcludesthat—

(i)Unless hostile activities on our coast be prolonged beyond control by other

measures,nodeepminefieldsshouldbeplanted; but

(u)Thatnavaldistrictsbepreparedtoplantminesandthatstepsbetakentomake

minesavailable forplantingadeepbarrieracrosstheapproachestoNewYorkHarbor

andHamptonRoads. And,further (seechange),(v)Thatdistrictsshouldbepreparedtoannouncefictitiousminefieldsintheevent

oftheemergencycontemplated actuallyarisingand torouteshippingaccordingly.

30. Asawhole,thepassivedefensesofthefirst,second,third, andfifthdistrictsaredeemedsufficient forthedefenseoftheprincipal harborsinthosedistricts.

ACTIVE OFFENSIVE.

31. Thepurposeofmeasuresofactiveoffenseistolocateanddestroythesubmarines.

32. Theprincipal operationsof thesesubmarinesmustbeconducted in the offingofNewYork,offtheCapesoftheChesapeake,andin theFloridaStraitsandYucatan



148 APPENDIX.

wideextent andconnections. Theseshouldbewarned tobeonthe lookoutforevi

dencesofanyuseofourcoastsand ofanysupport toenemysubmarines from onor

nearourcoast.

34. Thesameappliestothepossibilityoftheenemy'suseofabaseintheBahamas.Connectionofourintelligence servicewiththat oftheBritishin theBahamaIslands

shouldbesufficient provision tosecuretimelyinformation. In thisconnection it isstated by the commander of squadron 2, cruiser force, that areconnoissance of the

BahamaIslandsshowslittle suitability ofthatregionforuseasasubmarinebase.

AIR PATROL.

35. TheNavalAirService,in addition toassistingtheescortofconvoys,maycontributemateriallytothelocatingofsubmarinesbyairscoutingoffourcoast,including

the useofkitesand dirigibles, especially betweenNantucket ShoalsandCapeHat

teras. Itisassumedthat thismayandwill bedoneshould the contemplatedemer

gencyarise.

ACTIVE FORCES.

36. The situation has not yet sufficiently developed to enable the Board todo

more than outline the offensive action that may be taken. The conclusion was

reached—

(act) That provisionshouldnowbemadefor forcestobe availablewherelikelyto

beneeded, todetect and locate enemysubmarines, toact uponinformation oftheir

whereabouts,and tobecapableofattackingasubmarineif encountered.

37 . Thekindofforce thatshouldaccompanyconvoyshasalreadybeenstated. Inaddition,itistheBoard'sconclusion—

(bb)That, in addition toharborandinshorevessels,thereshouldbeaforceofde

stroyersand ofsubmarinesready toactuponinformation ofhostilesubmarines nearourcoast.

(cc)That thestrength oftheseshouldbe,in thefirstnaval district,2destroyers,1

submarine; thirdnaval district,4destroyers,5submarines;fifthnavaldistrict,4de

stroyers,5submarines.

38. Thepossibilityof there beingmoresubmarines capableof serviceat theNewLondon and other bases, and of more destroyers being under shakedown, after the

buildingprogramshallhavebegun toyieldmorefrequent deliveries,wastakeninto

account, asalso the submarines atKeyWestandPanamaand thevesselsalreadyin

the several districts. The forces named in paragraph (cc)above are the minimum

increaseneeded. ONTROL OP ACTIVE FORCES.

39. The lookoutserviceandreportsofcoastwiseand otherpassingtrafficfirstcomeunder the cognizanceof thenaval districts, and these districtswillhaveat"disposal

theforces intended toactaccordingto the situation that mayarise. The successof

measures against submarines in the majority of caseswill probably depend on the

celerity with which forces act on information received. This indicates that their

direction and control should be in the hands of the respective naval district com

mandants, and theBoardsorecommends.

THE NECESSARY



APPENDIX. 149

sideration. Besides,the delayisnotsolongasatfirstapparent. Notlessthantwo

weeks is the probable minimum required by the average new destroyer for pre

liminary shakedown. To this somefew daysmoremay beneeded fornewfittings

constantly beingadded, whichwould beinstalled onboard,on thissideinsteadof

abroad. During the time sospent thedestroyerwould be available for emergency

ifhere; but if abroadshewouldnotbeoperatingsonooperatingtimeis loston thisaccount. Further, by a somewhat longer shakedown time on our coast, together

withaquickrun acrossinsteadofaslowpassageforshakedownenroute,theultimate

dateofbeginningservicein thewarzonewouldbelittleaffected. Thesameapplies

tothesubmarines.

42. TheBoard concluded, therefore—

(dd)Thatnewdestroyersshouldremainonourcoastforonemonthshakedownafter

commissioning, to be available for service in the event of the appearance hereof

hostilesubmarines;but that notmorethannine atonetime needbesodetainedif

prepared earliertosailfor distant service.

(ee)Thattheninedestroyerssodetainedshallbestationedoneinthefirst,andfoureach in the third and fifthnaval districts, the commandantsofwhich shall be in

structedtousethemasnecessaryintheeventofhostilesubmarinesappearingonthis

coast;otherwisenottoemploythem, but instead toallowthemallpossible freedom

intheir trainingforactive service.

(ff) That to provide the necessary submarines for the emergency service con

templated, new submarines should have a shakedown period of twomonths; their

trainingcoursenottobeinterruptedbuttocontinueinitsnormalcoursefromitsusual

base; but uponthe appearanceofhostilesubmarines,onedivisiontobe escorted to

NewYorkandonedivisiontoHamptonRoads; further, whilebasedontheseplaces,

tocontinue their trainingtosuchextent asthesituationmaypermit; therespective

navaldistrictcommandantstoobservethesameattitude astowarddestroyers,statedinparagraph (ee).

43. Still other forces are required, which, with available sources,may be stated

briefly:

(gg)Participation by any force from the Atlantic Fleet, other than the Cruiser

Forceasnowemployedin convoy,duty,isnot countedupon.

(hh)A force of 30submarine chasers each, based onNewYorkandonHampton

Roads, will beneeded for convoy escort and listening service. Toprovide these,

theearliestdeliveriesintended forotherdistrictsshouldbedivertedtothe thirdand

fifthdistrictsuntil thenecessarytotalnumbersarepresentin thesedistricts.

(ii) One destroyer and one submarine permanently employedin experimentationarecountedupon,withonenewdestroyerunderparagraphs (dd)and (ee), tomakeuptheforceforthefirstnavaldistrict.

(jj) In order to accomplish the sweeping task without delaying shipping, in or

outbound, theremust bebased atNewYorkandHampton Roads,,sweepersenough

tokeepin service twosweepinggroupsof threepairseach. For this there must be

18ormoreminesweepersateachplacenamed. Asneither thethirddistrictnorthe

fifthhasthisnumber, theBoardrecommendsthat sweepersfrom thefirstandsecond

districtsbeaddedtothoseofthethirddistrictwhentheoccasionarises,and,similarly,

thosefrom thefourthdistrict togotothefifthdistrict.

(kh)Fortheairservicetobeperformed, it isestimated that aforceof40airplanes



15 0 APPENDIX.

(II)Thatin viewofthepossibleappearanceofsubmarinesarmedwith 5or6inch

guns, the armament ofdistrict vesselsbereplaced by largercalibersassoonasprac

ticable, but nottothedeprivation of suitable armament for vessels navigating the

warzone.

AID TO NAVIGATION.

45. In order toincrease the navigating difficulties of submarines, especiallyin fog

and darkness,and alsotoprevent the convergingof shippingatapoint favorable for

submarinestooperate, the Board recommends—

(mm) Thatimmediate steps betaken toinstall on board all outside lightshipson

theAtlantic Coastradio and listening equipment;

(nn) Andthat, upon theappearanceofahostilesubmarineinAmericanwaters,all

submarine signalbellsbe stopped, the bellsandwhistlesonoutside buoyssilenced,

and Nantucket Shoal lightship be withdrawn. (See change.) (See additions- (oo)

and (pp)-)

46. TheBoardhasincluded in thisreportonly suchdetail ashasseemednecessarytomakeitsrecommendationsclear, toshowthe extent towhichexistingdispositions

have been taken into account, tomake adecisionwhere there hasbeenormay be

doubtorwidedifference ofopinion, and especially tostrengthen the statement asto

theminimumofincreaseinforce necessary toretain on this side. In viewof exist

ingmachineryforexecuting plans,it seemsinadvisable togofurther intodetails.

Signed) M. JOHNSTON,

Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy.

PHILIP ANDREWS,

Captain, U. S. Navy.

S. S. ROBINSON,


L . R. DE STEIGUER,

Captain U. S. Navy.

R. R. BELKNAP,


L. MCNAMEE,


J . R. Y . BLAKELY,


S . P . FuLLINWIDER,

Commander, U. S. Navy.

J. V. BABCOCK,

Commander, U. S. Navy.

E. J . FOY ,

Lieut. Commander, U. S. Navy.

Approvedaschangedbymodifications, etc., appended.

W. S. BENSON.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,

OFFICE OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,



APPENDIX. 1 5 1

work to allocate the smallest and least valuable shipstothe coast ing trade, i t , asamatter of expediency, should be the policy to protect said shipping by the meanswithinthecapacityofthenavaldistrictsthroughwhichthecoastwiseshippingpassesratherthantoattempttodivertgunsfromshipsinthetrans-Atlantictradeortoallocatecruisersfortheprotectionofourcoastwisetrade,exceptinsuchcaseswherethe

districts could not afford protection or the guns were readily available. That if i twere found expedient to route coastwise ships at night that they should sai l independent ly , being routed wi th due regard to the warnings received of the locationofenemysubmarines.

PAR. 12( /) . Change to read: That convoys should be preceded to the 50-fathomcurveorasfarbeyondasnecessarybyfoursubmarinecliasersequippedwithlisteningattachments.

PAR. 12 (g). Change to read: That air scouts should patrol the convoys' intendedcourseouta tleasttoth e 50-fathom curveand asfarbeyo nd ascircumstances permit,oruntildarknesscomeson.

PAR. 12 (h). Omitthewords"an d byoneormoreescortingsubmarinesforlookou t."Itisthepolicytouseoursubmarinesoffensively againsthostilesubmarines,and theirmovem entsareinfluenced by the movem entsofhostilesubm arines, notby them ovementsofourconvoys.

PAR. 12 (j). Add at the end of paragraph: "an d alsoof destroyersif advisable." PAR. 12 (I). Omit ent irely. PAR. 15. Lasttwolines,changetoread: "sh ipp ing outoftheGulfofMexicoshould

be routed north or south ofCubaascircumstancesexisting at the timerenders mostexpedient ."

PAR. 16. Held to be not sound, as the delay thus caused to shipping practically

reduce sitsefficiency toalowerlimitth an the actua lsubm arinesinkingscouldimpose.PAR. 17 (n). Addthe words "u nti l sucht imeasconvoys canbe established."PAR. 27(s) . That in view of the slight advantages to be derived as compared to

the inordinate risk to shipping, the subsurface mine will not be used offensively against hostilesubmarines. Tha tit islegitimate touseit defensively, bu t that suchuse should be confined to the purpose ofbarring entrance and exit toour principalshipping ports and confined to the lowest l imits compatible with a fair degree of safe ty . That even when a defensive mine fie ld is la id , a c lear and ample passagemustbe left forthe transitofshipping,and thispassagemust under no circumstancesbe mined, bu t be patro lled and p ro tected by o ther means . Tha t a ll mines uponbeingdetached from their mooringsmust becomeinnocuous. That thethree places

tobe considered nowascorningwithin the scopeofdefensive miningare New York,capesofthe Chesapeake, eastentranceto LongIsland Sound.

PAR. 29 (u). After the wordsH ampton Roads, add: "B ut that owing to the greatdemand forminesabroad thisstepbe notconsidered now."

PAR. 43 (kk). Read that a force consisting ofat least onesquadron of20airplaneswil l beneeded at eachstation (Rockaway Inlet and Hampton Roads) , and that thisnumber should be made available as soon as pract icable, not to interfere with theEuropeanprogram.

PAR. 45 (nn). Omit the words "and Nantucke t Shoal L ight sh ip be wi thdrawn." PAR. 45.Add newparagraph: (oo). "B e prepareduponspecialorder of theN avy



1 5 2 APPENDIX.

28754-26:146.Op-36.

N A V Y D E PA R T M EN T ,

Washington, March IS, 1918.

[Memorandumforal l divisionsof Office ofN aval Operations.]

Subject: Execution ofaplan for defense against submarines in homewaters.1. In accordancewiththea ttached plan andapproved modifications, the following

parts thereof are assigned to the divisions of this office for information and action.Wherea part hasb een assigned tom ore tha n onedivision, the officers in chargewillcooperateinitsexecutioninaccordancewiththedutiesoftheirrespectivedivisions.

2. Provisionsoftheplantha trequirethe actionofany bureau willbeprepared bythehead of the division concerned and transmit ted to the bureau after signature bytheChiefofNavalOperations.

Operations Division.—A ssistantforoperations, paragraphs 6, 7,10.and 45; overseastransportation, paragraphs 12 (c) (d) (e),13(m), 17 (n), 19 (p), and 22; shipmovements,paragraphs 12 (i),19(p),36 (aa),37(66) (cc),39,42(dtf) (ff), 43 (gg) (hh)(it) (jj);

submarinedetection,paragraphs12 (j), 36 (aa),37(66) (cc),42 (dd) (ee) (ff), 43 (hh)(ti)(jj), and 45 (mm) (nn) (pp).

Material Division.—Paragraphs 12(t) (j), 26 (r),27 (s),29 (t) (u), 36 (aa),43(it) (kk),

44 (II),45 (mm) (pp).

Intelligence Division.—Paragraphs 32,33,and34.Communications D ivision.—Paragraphs 19 (p), 20 (q),and21.Naval DistrictsDwm on.-^-PaTagraphs 12(a) (b) (c) (f) (g) (h) (j) (k), 15,18 (o),24,

26 (r), 27 (s), 29 (t) (u) (v),32,33,34,35,37(66) (cc), 39,42 (dd) (ee) (ff), 43 (hh)(it)(jj) (kk), 44 (II), 45 (mm) (nn) (oo) (pp).

Aviation Division.—Paragraphs 12 (g),15,35,36 (aa),and43 (kk).(Signed) W. S. BENSON.

Op-23.

From-: Chief ofN aval Operations .28 MARCH, 1918.

To: Commandant, first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighthnavaldistricts.

Subject: Plan for coastwiseshipping in case of submarine activities onthis coast.

1. I t isrequestedth atthecomm andant ofeachnavaldistrict forward tothedepartment (operations) general recommendations on the above subject and detailed recommendationsasi t concernshisdistrict. I t is desired that therebe takenintoconsideration all local conditions affecting the plan, such asthe prevalence offogsandparticularly unfavorable weather at certain seasons;th e facilities for coastwiseshippingenteringharborsu nder all conditionsoftide , night, etc .;characterofthe coastalwaters, whether coasting may be done in less than 10fathoms; the offshore areasinwhichtherem aybedangerofcollidingwithoutbound convoysatnight, etc.

2. Outlinesbelowasaguideisaplanunde r consideration by the department.(a) Toall customs officials, shipowners, and others connected with operatingves

selsin coastwise trade will be sent out immediately a circular letter stating that in



APPENDIX. 153

(6) Until the actual presence of submarineson this side, coastwise shipping is to

followthenormalroutesand schedules.

(c) Actinguponwarningsreceived ofthe locationofenemy submarines, shipping

willberoutedinthosedistricts,whereitmaybenecessary,alongthefollowinggeneral

plan:

(1) In allcasesthecontrolofshippingwithinadistrictwillbeinthe handsofthedistrictcommandant inorderthat the propercoordinationmaybeobtainedalongthe

wholecoast. Thiscontrolwillfollowageneraldoctrine,andthecommandantofeach

districtwillbeinformed ofthecontrolofthesedistrictsadjacent tohisdistrict.

(2) The best practice istohave coastwise shippingproceed by day, hugging the

shoreand keepingwithin the 5-fathom curve orasnear to it aspracticable. Also,

sinceit isthe policyofthe shippingcommittees chargedwithsuchwork toallocate

thesmallestand leastvaluable shipstothe coastingtrade, it, asamatterofexpedi

ency, should be the policy to protect such shipping bymeanswithin the districts

throughwhichthecoastwiseshippingpasses.

(3) Whenitisfound expedienttoroutecoastwiseshippingbynight,it shouldpro

ceed independently, being routed with due regard to the warningsreceived of the

locationofenemysubmarine.

(4) Districts 1, 2, and 3—New York and northward.—Allcoastwise shipping boundtoor from NewYork, proceed via Long Island Sound, keepingtothenorthernshore,

andtravelbynightordayasfarasNewLondon.

Sinceit isimpractical tofollow the 5-fathom curve from NewLondon northward,

proceed (1)bydayornight via BuzzardsBayandCapeCodCanal,or(2)bydayor

night via Vineyard Sound, or (3) independently by night coastingwhen necessary

togooutside. ,

Northward from Nantucket ShoalsorCapeCodCanal proceed independently by

nightcoasting.

(5) Districts 3, 4, 5, and 6—Between New York and Jacksonville.—Shippingproceedby day, hugging the shore and keepingwithin the 5-fathom curve asnear asit is

practicable. This shippingwill be protected by the meanswithin the capacityof

the naval districts throughwhich it passes.

(6) District 7—Jacksonville to Key West.—The coasthereistoosteep toallowday

lightcoastingin lessthan 10fathoms, andlackofsheltered anchorageswillnotallow

night cruising from port to port (except for small craft that can use anchorages at

Settlement Point, Bimini Islands,and TurtleHarbor).

The Florida Straits should then be made safe for traffic by having it convoyed

through or by aircraft and destroyer patrol. Shipping out of the Gulf ofMexicoshould be routed north or southofCubaasthe circumstancesexistingat the time

rendermore expedient.

(7) Districts 7 and 8—Between Key West and Galveston.—Same as New York toJacksonville.

(8) District 8—Between Galveston and Tampico.—Nightcoasting.

Op-14-A-D 5/4.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,

OFFICE OF NAVAL OPEEATIONS,

Washington, May 4, 1918.



15 4 APPENDIX.

2. Uponnotificationby theNavyDepartment,thecontrolofallshipping,coastwiseand overseas, for routing and within the defensive seaareasand outside ofharbors

will be assumed by the Navy Department. This control will be.exercised locally

bythecommandantsoftheseveralnavaldistricts.

3. Beforeleavingport,mastersofvesselsmustinallcasesapplytothe commandantofthedistrict forordersand routinginstructions.

4. Vessels at sea should be prepared to receive at any time radio instructions toputintothenearestportorsomeportotherthanportofdestination fororders.

5. Orderstomakeportshouldbepromptlycarriedoutandarrivalreportedatoncewith requestforfurther ordersandrouteinstructions.

6. In coastalwaters and at sea the boundaries of the naval districts shall becon

sideredtoextendseawardasfollows:

First naval district.—Whennorth of the parallel of latitude of Chatham,Mass.

(41°41'), communicate with the commandant first naval district, Little Building,

cornerofBoylston and Tremont Streets,Boston,Mass. Telegraphaddress,Boston;

telephoneaddress,Beach7620.Second naval district.—Whenwithin the area bounded as follows, communicate

withthe commandant, secondnavaldistrict: Onthenorthbytheparalleloflatitude

ofChatham,Mass.(41° 4VN); ontheeastbylongitude67°45/;onthesouthbyaline

passingwest true from longitude 67°45'toNantucket ShoalsLight Vessel, thenceto

MontaukPoint, thence toBartlett'sReef LightVesselsouthandwestoftheentrance

toNew London Harbor, address commandant second naval district, naval station,

Newport, R. I.; telegraph address, Newport, R. I.; telephone address, Newport27.

Third naval district.—Whenbetween latitudes of Chatham, Mass. (41°41'), and

that ofBarnegat, N.J. (39°45/),excepting the areasdescribed for the second naval

district, communicate with commandant third naval district, 280 Broadway,.NewYork; telegraphaddress,NewYork,N.Y.; telephoneaddress,North 8900.

andourth naval district.—Whenbetween the latitude of Assateague (37°500

Barnegat, N. J. (39°45/), communicate with commandant fourth naval district,

WhiteBuilding,cornerofTwelfth andChestnut Streets,Philadelphia, Pa.; telegraph

address, Philadelphia, Pa.; telephoneaddress,Walnut5060.

Fifth naval district.—WhenbetweenthelatitudeofNewRiverInlet,N.C.(34°300,

andAssateague(37°50'),communicatewithcommandantfifthnavaldistrict, Citizens

NationalBankBuilding,Norfolk,Va.; telegraphaddress,Norfolk; telephoneaddress,

Norfolk6200.

Sixth naval district.—Whenbetweenthe latitude ofSt.Johns River, Fla.(30°220,and NewRiver Inlet, N. C. (34°300, communicate with commandant sixth naval

district, Peoples Office Building, Charleston, S. C; telegraph address, Charleston,

S.C.

Seventh naval district.—Whenwithin theareatothesouthward andeastward ofthe

latitudeofSt.JohnsRiver,Fla. (30°22/),andboundedonthewesterlyandsoutherly

sidesby a linerunningasfollows: Westonthe latitude ofTampa to longitude83°;

thencesouthtothe IslandofCuba; thence following the shoretoCapeSanAntonio;

thencesoutheasterly toapoint latitude18°35'north, longitude78°25'west; thence

easterlypassingtothesouthwardoftheIslandsofHaitiandPortoRicoand St.Croix;

thence northeasterly throughAnegada Passage; thence 84° true, communicatewith



APPENDIX. 155

Fifteenth naval district.—Whenwithinthewaterstothesouthwardoflatitude18°35'

northandtothewestwardoflinepassingfromlatitude18°.35'north, longitude78°25'

westtoCapeTiburon, RepublicofPanama,communicatewithcommandantfifteenth

navaldistrict, Cristobal,CanalZone; telegraphaddress,Cristobal,CanalZone.

Signed.) JOSEPHUS DANIELS.

[Confidential.]Op-14-A-D-5/6,

C-26-146.

MAY '8,1918.

From: Chief ofNaval Operations.

To: Commandants first naval district; second naval district, third naval district,fourthnavaldistrict,fifthnavaldistrict,sixthnavaldistrict, seventhnavaldistrict,

eighth naval district, fifteenth naval district, commanderinchief,United States

Atlantic Fleet.

Subject: Dispositionsforcontrolofcoastwiseshipping in eventofsubmarineactivityoff eastern coastofUnited States.

Reference: (a) C.N.O. let.March 28, 1918,Op-23. (6)Noticetoshipmastersand

shipowners,May4,1918. (c) C.N.O.let.May6,1918.

Inclosure: (A) Reference (b).

1.Until submarine activity developsin thewesternAtlantic, coastwise shipping

willproceed alongnormal routesand schedules.

2. WhennecessityarisesfortheNavytoassumecontrolofcoastwiseshipping, this

willbedonebythevariouscommandantsofnavaldistrictsuponreceiptofadispatch

from thedepartment (operations): "Assumecontrolofcoastwise shipping."

3. Unlessfurther advised, commandantsofnavaldistrictswill,uponreceiptof theabovedispatch, takeactionalongthe linesoutlined in reference (a),paragraph2(c)

(1-8), making adaptations required bylocal conditions. It is to benoted that thisplancontemplates coastwiseshippingsailingindependently ofconvoy, beingrouted

withdueregard,towarningsreceivedofthe locationofenemysubmarines.

4. Attention isinvited to reference (6)inclosed. It isof the highest importance

that district commandantsshouldhayeallroutingpossibilitiesand the requirements

ofcoastwise shipping and militaryandcommercialrequirementsonshorefullydevel

oped and understoodwith thevarious parties interested. Thisinorder that vessels

diverted from regular routes in accordance with instructions,orarrivinginportfor

orders,maysuffer the leastdelayinobtainingroutingorders.

5. District commandants will have the inclosed letter tomariners, reference (b),printed in sufficient quantity and cause them to be distributed to shipowners and

shipmastersand tocustomofficers andcaptainsofthe portandothersinsuchmanner

astoinsuretheir reachingthevariouspartiesinterested aspromptlyaspossible.

(Signed) W.S.BENSON.



INDEX.

A.

Aceredo, Pedro (San Saba) 133Acushla, Americangasscrew 86Adelheid, American s. s 29Advance, American s. s 48A gnes G . H allia rd . (See A gnes

G. H olland 58

Agnes G. Holland, Canadianschooner 58

Ainsleigh, Charles (Lansford) 54

Alban, British s. s 106A lb ert W . B lac k, A merican gas

screw 83AlbertoTreves, Ita lian s. s 104A leda M ay, A m erican s c h o o n er . .. 82

Algeria, Swedishs. s 96

Alicke,Ru dolph (Ticonderoga). 110-111Allied Intelligence S ervice 101America, C.E . (Saetia) 134American Telephone & Telegraph

Co 120Amirau lt,Louis(Ka ti eL.Palmer ). 89 Amphion, American s. s 104Analysisof tables 141Andrews,Ph i l ip ,Capt.,U . S .N . . 150 AnnieP erry, Americanschooner. . 59-58Ansaldo I I I , Ita lian s. s 96AnsonM.Bangs, American tug 30A ppendix 143

A. P ia tt Andrew, Americanschooner 66

Appleby, British s. s 38Arabian,TJ.S. tug 24

Aras, B ritish s.s 48A rnau ld de la P erfere ( U - 139 ) .. .. .. 12 A tlanticM aritim e Co.(Muriel) 57

Atlas ShippingCorporation 30Augvald, Norwegian s. s 49Author, British s. s 46

B.

B a bc oc k, J. V ., Com m a nder ,U . S.N . 150

Page.Barge 740 54Barge 766 54BaronNapier, Britishs.s 11,82Bastin, Rene H . (O.B.Jennin gs).. 74,75B att, Alfred E. (Diomed) 81Beer, Adolph (San Saba) 133B elk nap , R . R . , C apt.,U . S .N . . . . 150B ellivea u, F orm an (K .L .P a l m e r) . 90 Bencleuch, British s. s 77

Benne tt , H . H. (Herbe rtL .P ra t t ) . 125 Benson,W.S .,Admiral,U .S .N . 38 ,150,151,152,155

Bergsdalen, Norwegian s. s 99Bianca, Canadianschooner 97Birch, Capt. (MoorishPrince) 108Birdsall, B .G. (San Saba) 132B lake ly , J .R . Y. , Capt., U .S .N . 150 B oard re com me ndations for de

fenseagainst submarines 38,143,151,152,155

Birmingham, U.S.S 19Blaine, Clyde (San Diego) 128Blommersdijk, Dutch s.s 22Boundariesofnaval districts 154

Breiford, Norwegian s. s 133Brewer, Capt. (Bussum) 127Briarleaf, British s. s 117

Brigh t,C .J . , L ieu t. (San Diego). . 127 Bristol,American s. s 34,36BritishMajor, Britishs. s 71

Brown, Capt. (Maiden) 127B ru ce, C ap t. W allace (A . P ia tt

Andrew) 66Bryssel, Danishs.s 38Bussum, U .S .S 127

C.Cablecutting 25Cablecutting (U-151) 25,119,123Cacique, Americans. s 45Camilla Rickmers (Ticonderoga) . . 106



158 INDEX.

Page.

Charts In pocket .Chase,J.V. (Minnesota) 130,132Chester, II.S.S 113

Chilier, Belgianrelief ship 49

Chope,Capt.(LlanstephanCastle). 46

Christine,Americanbark 18Christy,H.H.(SanDiego) 127

Chr. Knudsen, Norwegian s.s 22

Circular let ter to sh ipmas tersandshipowners 153

Ci,tyofCalcutta, Brit ish s.s 48

Clan MacArthur, British s.s 105

C. M.Walters,Canadianschooner. 69

CoastGuard StationNo.82 56

CoastGuard Station No.83 46

CoastGuard StationNo.115 45CoaetG uard Station No. 1 7 9 . . . . . . 129

Coastwiseroutingoffice 39

Coffey, M.(C.G.M.,U. S . N . ) . . . . 22

Colhoun,TJ.S.S 56

Collister, Thomas(K eem un) 47

Colorado. (SeeSan S a b a ) . . . . . . . . 132

Commandant5th nava l d i s t r i c t . . . 132

CommercialCable Co 120

Constanza, D anish schooner 11,106Cook,F.L.(Madrugada) 94

Corinthian, American s.s 87

Cornell,E.E.(Saetia) 134

Crenella, British s.s 24,123

Cretan,American s.s 78

Cruiser,American Ga.s 83

D.

D-2(U.S.submarine) 19

Daniels,Josephus,SecretaryoftheNavy 155

Davis,ThomasE.(SanDiego) 128Davis,W.H.(J.M.Haskell) 33,126Defenseagainstsubmarinesinhome

waters 143

Defenseagainstsubmarinesinhomewaters—Alteration ofp lans 150

DeSteiguer,L.R.,Capt. ,U.S.N. 150

Derbyshire, Britishs.s 62,65

Deutschland 7,15,100

Diamond Shoal Lightship 75,77Dias,M anuel, Capt.(M.E.Sennet) 87

Page.

District defense 9,38,152Dochra,U.S.S.. 49

Dodge,Capt.(F.P.Jones) 127

Doon, American bark 43

Dornfontein, British schooner 56

Dorothy B. B arre tt, Americans c h o o n e r . . . : 93

Doucette, Fred (AledaMay) 83

Droscher,Kapitanleutnant(U-117) 82

Dwinsk, Brit ish s.s 48

E .

Ear landNet t ie , Amer ican Ga.s. . 83

E .B.Walters,Canadianschooner. 69

E ck el ma nn , E ric , K a pi ta n leut

n an t (U-155) 18,100Edna, Amer icans ch oon er . . . 24,121,123

Edwa rd H . Cole, Ame ri ca n

schooner 34

EdwardH.ColeCo 34

Edward R. Baird, jr., American

schooner 42

Eidsvold, Norwegians.s 43

Elizabeth vonBelgie(BelgianRe

liefship) 59

Ella Swift, American schooner 44ElsiePorter , Canadianschooner. . . 99

EmpresaNavieradeCuba 134

Eric, Brit ish s.s -. 68

Ev a B . Dougl as , Amer i ca n

schooner 38

Evans, David (Pennistone) 61

Execution

against

waters

of

sub

a

m

plan for

arines in

defense

home

152

F .

Fairfax,U.S.S 105

Fassett, J. A., Ensign, S.P. No.

507 38

FlemmingJ.W.(Saetia) 133

FlorenceOlson,Americans.s 56

Folkmans,Jens(Vindeggen) 45

Fooks,D.J. (Edw.R. Baird,jr.). 22

Force Commander European Dispatches 9



INDEX. 159

Page.

Franz , Kapit an l eu tnan t (U-152) . . 106,111,113

Freder ick R. Kellogg, .Americans .s 92

Freehold IT.S. S 137

Frehe, Tarwald (Stifinder) 115Fulche r, L i eu t , ( j. g .), (T iconderoga) 109,111

F ullinw ider, S. P . , C om mander,U . S. N 150

F urness W i th y & Co., San Jose. . . 61Fuylcher, Surgeon (U-152) 112

G.

Galveston, U . S. cruiser 70Gamo, Portuguese schooner 101

George G. Henry, U . S. S 106George W. Tru it t, jr ., American

schooner 47German submarines—arrivals' and

departures 7Gi lmore , Capt . C . W. (Edna) . . . . . 25,27G ladys F r ehale it (G . M . H o l le t t) .. 58 G l ad y s M . H o l l e tt , C a n ad ia n

schooner 58Gleaner, Americangasscrew. 83Gleaves, Albert , Rear Adm iral, U.

S .N 19Glenlee,British s.s 49Gloaming, Canadian schooner 70Gloucester, American s.s 124Golart, Joseph (Rush) 98Goodspeed, American s .s 88Granpian, British s.s 108,111

Grant,Adm iralA.W.(Minnesota). 9,131Grecian, American s.s.'. 33Griggsby, L. O. (Minnesota) 130

Grostock, Harold (Samoa) 47Gymeric, British s.s 56

H .

H aggart, R . S. (U . S. S. H u l l ) . . . . 42H am burg,German cruiser 76

Hansen, George, Capt. (Sommer

stadt) 91Hansen , Hans T . , Capt. Sam. C.

Mengel 42Hansen, Louis(MarinersHa rbo r).. 77,79

Page.

H art, W alterM.(Bristol) 36Ha t t ie Dunn,American schooner . 24,

26,121,123Hauppauge,Americans,v.24,26,121,123Hawaiian, American s .s 105

H e ine, C hief E nginee r ( U - 152 ) . . . 112 Helen E .Murley,American Ga.s. 89,91Henley, U . S. S.destroyer 41Henrik Lund, Norwegians.s 46H erbert L . P ra tt , A m e r i c a n

tanker 30,41,123,125,138Herman Winter, American s.s 61Holbrook, Capt . (Hat t ie Dunn) . . . 25,26Holte, S.E . (Marosa) 52H ull, U . S. S 42,74Huntress, British s.s 23H untsend, British s.s 45

I .

Industrial, British schooner 104Inland, American s.s 137IntelligenceSection 9In te r- Allie d R ad io C o n fe re n ce .. . 121I s a b e l B . W ile y , A m erican

schooner 27,30,121, 124

Israel, U . S. S 130,131

J .

Jacob Jones, U . S. S 113J a c o b M . H a s ke l l , A m e r i c an

schooner 33,121Jacobsen &Thon (Samoa) 47J . C.Donnell, American s. s 24

Jerd en , W m. an d W . S. (K . L .

Palm er) 88J.J . Flahe rty, Americanschooner. 69,70J . L . L u ck en ba ch , A merican s. s .. 18

JohnJ.Fallon, /*m erican s chooner 99JohnsonJ . (Eidsvold) 43John Twohy, American s .s 18

Johnson,M., RearAdmiral, U.S.N. 150Jonancy, American s. s 24Joseph Cu dah y, A m erican t an k er . 70

K.

Kat ie L. Palmer, A mericanGa.s . 82,88Kearsarge,U . S. S 95

Keemun,Britishs.s 46,47



160 INDEX.

Page.

Kingfisher, U . S.S 93Kingfisher, s team trawler, Ameri

can 103,125K irin Maru, Japanese s. s 118Knoeckel, J. (U-156) 61,65

Knudsen,Waldemar (Winneconne)• 31K nudsen and Christiansund

(Kringsjaa) 48K oe nig , Cap t. P au l ( D e ut sc h la nd) . 15Kohler, Lieu t. (U-151) 29,35,42,48Koln, German s. s. (See Am

pliion.) 104K o p h a m e l K orvettenkapitan

(U-140) 70Kringsjaa, Norwegian bark 48

Kronprinz He inr ich , Germans. s . . 114Kroonland, U. S. S 54

L.

L-5, American subm arine 46Lackaw anna, British s. s •.. 64,75Lacy, Albert ( 0 . B . Jennings) 24Lafrenz , Lieut. Commander (U-65) 122

Lake Bridge, IT.S. S 50

Lake Erie, U . S. S . . . 50Lake Forest, U . S. S 49

Lane, W. (captain of Eric) 68Lansford, A merican barge 54L arson, A le xa nder (m aster S yd

land) . . . 59Launo, G. (captain E va B .

Douglas) 38

Leary, C.F . (masterLucia) 104Leixoes, Portuguese steamer 102Let ter from Force Commander in

European waters 12

Linda, British schooner 53L la ns te ph an C astle, B ritis h s.s . . . 46Loriat, Mr. (cableengineer) 120Louisiana, U . S battlesh ip 29Lowrey, K. B . (Texel) 34Lucia, U. S. A. C. T 104,118L ucille M. Schnare, Canadian• schooner 66Luckenbach Co 81L uzB la nc a, Can adian ta n ks h i p . . . 58Lynch, W alterS.(Saetia) 133

Page.M agnusdel, G unw ald (K r ingsja a) .. 48Maiden, American s. s 127Mallory ,S .S.Co.(San S ab a ) . . . . . . 132M anning W .J . (O . B .J e nn i ngs ) . . . 74M antella, B ritish s. s 45

ManuelCaragol &Son (Chapa rra) .. 134ManxK ing,Norwegianschooner. 53,124Mapleleaf, British s. s 46Marcussen, Sven (Nordhav) 95M ariners H arb or, A merican s . s . . . 77

Marosa, N orwegian bark 51M arsh, 0 . C. (C ap tain U . S. N .

retired) 5MaryE. Sennet t , American Ga.s . 82,87McClellan, IT.S. A. C.T . 49

McDonald , George E . (Frank H.Buck) 101

McNamara, John (Pleiades) 82McNamee,-L.,Capt., U . S.N 150Melitia, British s. s 56,71Melville', U . S. S 22Mengel C. C. & Bros. (S. C.

Mengel) , . 41Merak, American s. s 77

M erritt W illiam (Dorothy B.

Barrett) 93M esquita, Jo seph P . (F ra ncis J .

O'Hara) 66Messina,British s.s 117Meusel,Lieut .Commander(U-155) 18

MexicanU . S.S : . 48Mexico,Americans. s 31Meyer, E . J . (Minnesota) 131

Mine-laying Operations 122Minelaying(U-151) 30,41Mine-sweeping Operations, Atlan

tic Coast 136Mine-sweeping ships (nava l d is

tricts) 134Minneapolis, U . S . cruiser 50M innesota, U . S.S 124,125,129,137

Mirlo, British s.s 125,128,138Modifications and changesin plans

for defense aga inst submar ine

attack in homewaters : . - - 150Mohawk, American s.s 24



INDEX. 161

Page.

Pennistone,Britishs.s 61,65Perth Amboy, American tug 54Pierce, Mr. (cable engineer) 120Pinar del Rio, American s. s 45Plan for coastwise shippingin case

ofsubmarineactivitiesonAmerican coast 152

Plassey, British s. s 138Pleiades, American s. s 81Pluos. (See Rush.) 98Porto, Portuguese bark 71Potentate, Canadian schooner 99Potomac, British s. s 44Prairie, U . S. S 48Preble, U . S. coast to rp ed o v essel. 41

PrincessMatoika, U . S. S 48,118Progress, American Ga. s 82Proteus, American s. s 43Publi cover , Capt. (Uda A. Saun

ders) 67Pyrrhus, British s. s 92

Q.

Q uadros, A lvro P . , C ap t. ( R u s h ). . 98Quinlan, Fred., crew (K. L.

Palmer) 90

R.

Radioleine,Frenchtanker 42,43RadioService (adequate if cables

had been destroyed) 121R a i l , U . S. S 137Randw ijk, U . S. S. (formerly

Dutch) 46Reginolite, British s. s 104Relay, American cablevessel 120

Reliance, American Ga. s 83,86Rheinhard, W. M., master (Els ie

Porter) 99Rijndijk, TJ.S. S 88Ringlem an, Gustav ( T i c o n d e

roga) 106,109Risberg, E ric, Capt. (Algeria) 96R ob ert an d R ich ard , A merican

schooner 55Rob Roy, American schooner 57Robinson, S .S ., Capt ., U.S . N . .

Muriel, American schooner 57Myhre, G. (Trium ph) 65

N .

Naval censorship 119

Navaldi st rict s, sea boundaries of.. 154NelsonA., Canadianschooner 58N elson, G usta ve ( J. M.H a s ke l l ) . . . 33N elson, H ., L ie ut. Comm ander

(Dwinsk) 48Nelson John (Reliance) 87Nevasa,British s.s 50,104Newby Hall, British s.a 102,125NewcombeH.G. (EdwardH.Cole) 34 N ew H am psh ire, U . S . b at tl es h ip . 29

Newton, U . S. S 76NewYork and Porto R icoS.S.Co. 36 Nicholson,AmericanwhalerNickersonEldridge(Muriel)Nickerson,James(Reliance)Nordhav, Norwegian barkNordstrom, George W. ( 0 .

Jennings)North Sea Mine Barrage

44 57 86

95 B .

73 70,113,119

Nostitz v. Korvettenkapitan,

U-151N otre D am e de 1 G arde, F re nc h

schoonerNyanza, American s. sNyhus, Andrew A. (Marosa)

O.

O.B.Jennings,AmericantankshipOffice of Naval IntelligenceO'Hara , Jack (K. L. Pa lmer)Ohio,U. S . ba t t l eship

O ldenburg v . K a p i t a n l e u t n a n t(U-156)

Oldham,Capt . (Ralay)Old Time, American Ga.sOlive isa,d ' , Jose Tude da Velha ,

captainofPorto

P .

Pan-Amer i can Pe t . & Trans .Co.

(Fredk. R. Kellog)Pasadena, Canadianschooner

27

67 23

51

73 119

88 29,30

50 120

82,87

71

92 66



162 INDEX.

Page.

Rush, Americansteam trawler 98

Russell,Edward(K.L.Palmer) 87,88,90

S.

Saetia, U.S.S 125,133,137Sam C.Mengel,Americanschooner. 41

Samoa,Norwegianbark 42

Sanchez, R. A. (Wm. H. Star-buck) 85

SanDiego,TJ.S.S 54,57,124,125,126,137

Sanghove, Clifford T. (T ico nde

roga) 108

SanJose,Norwegian s.s 60,65

SanSaba,Americans.s. 32,124,125,132Santiago,American s.s 31

Saunders,M.H. (Edna) 25,28S.C.No.234(U.S.) 46

S.C.No.294(IT.S.) 117

Schuill, Marsi ("Rose") 55

Schwarz, Lieut. (U-152) 112

Seaborne,F.O. ( N e w b y H a l l ) . . . . 102

Seidlitz, Germans.s 76

Shipping 8

Shortind, Norwegian steamer 101Simona,Edwardo (SanSaba) 133

Sims,AdmiralW.S 12,136,138Singer,A.W.(Minnesota) 131

Small,C.A.(Edna) 24

Smith,R.Lawrence(Hauppauge). 26

Smith,RobertH. (Kermanshah) . . 72

Sodral,Norwegian s.s 46

Solberg,Norwegian s.s 99

Somm erstadt, Norwegian s.s 91

Sorkness,Norwegianbark , 53

South Carolina,U.S.S 46,137Specialboard toformulate planof

defenseinhomewaters 10,143SpecialPlanningBoard ofFeb.6,

1918 38, 143S.P .No.507 ( U . S .S.) 38

Standard Refinery Co. (Prat t) 123

Stanley M. Seam an, A mericanschooner 75,77

Staples,John 132

Page.

Stringham, U. S. S 79

Submarine mines, Atlantic coast,

United States 125

Sucena, J oaquimF . ( Leixoes). 102

Susquehanna, U. S. S 50Swain, CharlesH. (AnniePerry) . . 58

Sweeney, Capt. (Hauppauge) 25,66

Sydland, Swedish, Belgian Relief

ship 59

Sylvania, American schooner 66

Sydney B . Atwood, American

schooner 57

T.

T. A. Scott, jr., American s.s 17

Table, arrivals and departures of

German submarines 7

TableNo.1, vesselsde stroyed. . 139,140

TableNo. 2, vessels destroyed 140

TableNo. 3, vessels destroyed 141

Tampa, U. S. S 113

Tapley, J. P . (Perth Amboy) 55

Tappley, Geo.S. (Ticonderoga).. . 109

Tasida, Jos. (Rush) 98

Taunton, Norwegian s. s 95

Taylor, U. S. S 128

Teal, U. S. S 137,138

Telles, Joseph (Rush) 98

Temple, E .Dorr,American s. s 56

Texel, American s. s 34

Thespis, British s. s 96

Thomas, Frazier O., M. M., 2d

class 128

Thomassen, Thorn. I (Isabel B .

Wiley) 30Thorbyonsen,Capt.Hans,San Jose" 60

Ticonderoga, U. S. S 100,106

Tingey, U. S. S 60

TokuyamaMaru, Japanese s. s 73

Tortuguero. British s. s 50

Triumph,Canadiantrawler(steam) 65

Turner, W.M. Seaman (Ticonde

roga) 109

U.



INDEX. 163

Page.

U-139,German submar ine .. . 7,8,12,102U -140, German subm arine 7,70,99U-151, Germansubma rine.. 7,10,23,123U-152, German submarine 7,16,106U-155, German submarine 7,18,

100,118,125U-156,Germansubmarine. 11,50,75,124Uberaba, Brazilians.sUda A. Saunders, Canadian

schoonerUmbria, I talians. sU na P . Saunders. (See U da A.

SaHnders.)U. S.Hydrog raphic OfficeU. S . Rai l roadAdminis t ra t ion . . . .

V.

V elha, Jose T u d e d 'O liv eis a, d acaptainofPorto

Verna D. A d a m s , C a n a d i a nschooner

Vindeggen, Norwegian s. sVinland, Norwegian s. sVinolas,Jose, captain (Chaparra)..Von Nostitz und Janckendorf

(U-151)Von Schrader, Commander (U-53)VonSteubon, U. S. S

79

66,69 73

665

132

71

69,70 45,46

44 134

23 113 48

W. Page.

Wagadesk, Norwegian s. s 18Walters, Capt. Cyrus (E. B. Wal

ters) 69Walters,C apt.W ilson (C.M.Wal

ters) 69War Ranee, British tank ship 82WarWarnings 8Wasch, H . (W inneconne) 32WestHaven, U. S. S 70WestPoint, British s. s 22W harton, R o bt. A . (R ob ert and

Richard) 56W hite, C. H . (Fredk. R. Kel

log) 92

W ilk in s, Jo hnW . ( S.C.Me ng el ). . 42W ille,L ieut. (U-152) 112,114W illia m H . S ta rb uc k, A m erica n

Ga.s 82.85W illiams, W. R. (Mirlo) 128W illie, G., C anadian schooner 68Wi lloughby, Edw. J . Carpen te r,

Ticonderoga 109Wilson,Pres iden tWoodrow. 42,56,57,88Winneconne,Americans.s 27,31,

32,121,124Winsborg, T. L. (Hauppauge) 25Wireless. 9

o



CHART NO. t 56964

in the

Western Atlantic Ocean 1918

TO ACCOMPANY

MONOGRAPH NO. I

n Submarne Actv tes on the Atantc Coas

of he Un ted States and Canada

NAVY DEPARTMENT

O c e o Nava Recods and Library

Historical Secon

1920



GERMAN SUBMARINE ACTIVITIES IN THE WESTERN ATLANTIC OCEAN, 1918

/ I s V »

/ ///A J/TPYJ/A

«k / ^JUN 8

~JUL27

TRACKS OF GERMAN SUBMARINES

(DE UT S CHLA ND T Y P E )

(DE UT S CHLA ND T Y P E )

(K RE UT Z E R T Y P E )

U. M. 117 (MINELAYER TYPE)

U. D. 155 (E X -DE UT S CHLA ND)

U. D. (DE UT S CHLA ND T Y P E /

U. K. KREUTZER TYPE)

Indicates vessel sunk by submar ineindicates vessel attacked but not sunk

GranCanar i Indicates sub l o ca ted by 'a l l o "o r d i rec t iona l

F rom in fo rma t ion fu rn ished by IntelligenceSection, U. S. Naval Headquarters L ondon.

March 1919

I l i n i n g "



5G964H A R T N O . 2

on United States AttontkrCoast

TO AOOOMPANY

M O N O G R A P H N O . I

Submarine Activit ies on the Atlantic Coast

of {f ie United States and Canada"

NAVY DEPARTMENT

Offce of Naval Records and Library

Historical Section

1920



SUMMARY OF ENEMY M INING ACTIVITIES ON U.S.AT LAN TIC COASTShowing positions of all mines accounted for from beginning of activities until coast was declared clear of mines. Feb. 17, 1919.

NANTUCKET

SOUND

NANTUCKETi

MONTAUK PT

NEW YORK

NANTUCKET SHOALS

Sandy Hook

FIRE I ^ ^U.S.S. San Diego sunk

A 7

4cr

german submarine activities on the atlantic coast of the united states and canada

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