german official account of the russo-japanese war

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ERMAN OFFICIAL ACCOUNTOF TH E

RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

THE SCHA-HO(TEXT)

t . ! !! I la^

Presented to the

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTOLIBRARY

by the

ONTARIO LEGISLATIVE

LIBRARY

1980

VOLUMES PREVIOUSLY ISSUED.

Vol. I. THE YA-LU.With nine Appendices and six

Maps.

Price 10«. Qd. net.

Vol. II. WA-FAN-GOU, and actions

preliminary to LIAO-YAN."With four Appendices and

eleven Maps.

Price 10*. Gd. net.

Vol. III. THE BATTLE OF LIAO-

YAN.^Vith ten Appendices and ten

Maps

Price 10*. M. net.

THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WARTHE BATTLE ON THE SCHA-HO

Digitized by the Internet Archive

in 2010 with funding from

University of Toronto

http://www.archive.org/details/p1russojapanesewar04prus

^V^^v^-^m.'^y«^

^4 i^^^mm

Russo-Japanese WarTHE BATTLE ON THE SCHA-HO

PREPARED IN THE HISTORICAL SECTION OF THEGERMAN GENERAL STAFF

'..1 »*•'»«... i'TK «^

-. •.'•.-,> *I

^ ~/

AUTHORISED TRANSLATIO!t BY

KARL VON DONATLATE LIEUT. 83rD (eaST PRUSSIAN) FUSILIER REGIMENT^ GERMAN ARMY

Author of " Stvdiet in Applied Tacties "

1r^- //-

WITH ELEVEN MAPS AND EIGHTEEN APPENDICESINCLUDING FIVE PHOTOGRAPHIC VIEWS

XonöonHUGH REES, Ltd., 119, PALL MALL, S.W.

1910

[AU rights reserved]

PRINTED BTHAZELL, WATSON AND VINEY, LD.,

LONDON AND AYLESBURY.

EXPLANATION OF TERMS USEDON THE SKETCHES

Abds. = in the evening.

Abt.= Abteilung.

Abteilung = (if au Artillery unit)

2-4 batteries (equivalent to

a British Artillery Brigade),

otherwise = Detachment.

Ag. = Advanced Guard.

A. K. = Army Corps.

Allg. Res. = General Reserve.

A. R. = Army Reserve, General

Reserve.

Arrieregarde = Rearguard.

Artillerie Brigade= 2 Regiments of

Artillery of 2-4 Abteilung«

each.

Berg = Hill, Mountain.

Bhf. = Bahnhofe Railway Station.

bis = until.

Brücke = Bridge.

Ehem. = formerly, former.

Eisenbahn = Railway.

Fmhnen Hügel = Colour or Stan-

dard Hill.

Fels Hügel = Rock Hill.

H. Q. = General Headquarters.

Hj. R, = General Resej-'/e.

Hügel, hügel = Hill, Hillock,

Knoll.

J. D. = Infantry Division.

/. R. = Infantry Regiment.

Kaisergrab = Imperial Tomb.Kas. = Cossack.

^fli). = Cavalry.

K. B. — Cavalry Brigade.

Khf. = Graveyard, Cemetery.

Kohlengruben = C'oal-pits.

Kolonne = Column.

Komp. = Company.Kp. = Company.

Kuppen = Knolls.

Lj. = Liubavin.

n. — nach = (if along a road) to.

0. = East.

0. A. = Eastern Detachment or

Group.

Ostl., Oestl. = Eastern.

Ost = East.

Ost-Abteilung = Eastern Detach-

ment or Group.

RJ. = Riab, ikin.

yu

vüi EXPLANATION OF TERMS

Süd = South.

Teile der = Portions of.

Tempelhügel — Temple Hill.

Truppen = Troops.

u. = und = and.

V. = (if along a road) from.

verst. = verstärkte = reinforced.

von = of, from.

Vorposten = Outposts.

West-Abteilung = Westerntachment or Group.

Westlicher = "Western.

De-

Zentrum = Centre.

Zgl. = Brickfield.

zu = to, belonging to.

zu (D.) = belonging to (Derabov-

ski).

zwei = two.

Zwei Kuppen Huge =« Hill with

two knolls.

LIST OF NAMES SPELT IN THE TEXTDIFFERENTLY TO THOSE GIVEN ON THE MAPS

Baranovski = Baranowski.

Bolotov = Bolotow.

Dembovski = Dembowski.

Kondratovitsh = Kondratowitsch.

Koshelevski = Koschelewski.

Kossovitsh = Kossowitsch.

Levestam = Lewestam.

Lipovaz - Popovitsh = Lipowaz -

Popowitsch.

Lissovski = Lissowski.

Mishtshenko = Miscbtschenko.

Musshelov = Musshelow.

Novgorod = Nowgorod.

Novikov = Nowikow.

Peterov = Peterow.

Pliesbko = Pljeshko.

Putilov = Putilow.

Riabinkin = Rjabinkin.

Sackarov = Sacharow.

Sarubaiev = Sarubajew.

Shabyko = Schabyko.

Shatilov = Schatilow.

Sbdanovski = Schdanovski.

Shileiko = Schileiko.

Shitkovski = Scbitkowski.

Sivizki = Ssiwizki.

Soboliev = Ssoboljew.

Solomko = Ssolorako.

Stakovitsh = Stakowitsch.

Wassiliev = Wassiljew.

Wolkov = Wolkow,

Woltshanovski= Woltschanowski.

Yenissei = Jenissei.

Yepifaii — Jepifan.

Yuchnov = Juchiiov.

ZurikoT = Zurikow.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. General Situation after the Battle of

LlAO-YAN ...... 1—25

(a) Russians ...... 1—17

Kuropatkiii discontinueg his retreat at Mukden, p. 1.

Concentration of the Army around Mukden, 8. The" Position of Mukden," 8. Drafts and reinforcements

arrive, 12. Kuropatkin's resolve to assume the offen-

sive, 13. Strength of the Army, 16. Intelligence about

the enemy, 16.

(b) Japanese ...... 17—25

Disposition after the battle of Liao-yan, 17. Positions

prepared, 19. Drafts and reinforcements arrive, 19.

Lines of communication, 20. Intelligence about the

enemy, 22. Concentration of the Japanese Army north

of the Tai-tsy-ho, 22. Action of Bian-yu-pu-sa, 24.

Shifting the 1st Army more to the East, 24.

II. BEGiXxVma of the Russian Movements . 26—49

The order for the advance, 26. Kuropatkin's Proclama-

to the Army, 32. The battlefield, 33. Advance of the

Western Detachment on October 5 and 6, 35. Fresh

intelligence about the enemy, 39. The M'estern Detach-

ment remains halting on October Ö, 41. Advance of the

Eastern Detachment until October 6, 43. llie Piastern

Detachment rests on October 7, 45. Umesawa escapes

from Bian-yu-pu-sa, 46. Portions of the Eastern Detach-

ment advance on October 8, 47. The General Reserve

*nd 6th Siberian Army Corps follow, 48,

ix

xii TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAP.

III. The Measures of the Japanese at the Be-

ginning OF October .... 50—59

Signs of a Russian offensive, 50. Kuroki's Order for the

1st Army, 62. Oyam<a intends to await the Russian attack

and then himself assume the offensive, 63. Distribution

of the forces on the extreme right wing, 54. Action of

Wu-li-tai-tsy on October 7, 67.

IV. The First Four Days of Battle . . 60—222

October 9 60—73

Russians 60—-70

Tlie Western Detachment and Centre advance, 60. The

Eastern Detachment attacks at Pen-si-hu, 65.

Japanese ...... 71—73

The 12th Division reinforces the right wing, 71. Out-

posts of the 4th and 2nd Armies withdraw, 72.

October 10 73—102

Japanese ...... 73—89

Intelligence about the enemy, 73. Oyama resolves to

assume the counter-offensive, 74. Oyama's attack-order,

75. Order for the 1st Army, 76. Recapture of positions

on the extreme right wing, 77. Strengthening the posi-

tions of the Guard and 2nd Divisions, 78. The 4th Array

occupies the left bank of the Schi-li-ho, 82. The 2nd

Array advances to come in line with the 4th Army, 86.

Russians 89—102

Kuropatkin's instructions to Stackelberg for enveloping

the enemy's right wing, 89. Kuropatkin's interference

with the Western Detachment, 90. Advanced bodies of

the Western Detachment are pushed back to the Schi-

li-ho, 91. ITie 6tli Siberian Army Corps is to support

the Western Detachment in case of need, 95. Stackel-

berg's order of October 9 in the afternoon, 97- Stackel-

berg's answer on Kuropatkin's request to advance, 98.

Stackelberg orders the attack for October 11, 100. Result*^ of October 10, 101.

TABLE OF CONTENTS xiii

October 11 102—157Disposition of the Western Detachment, 103. Oyama's

plan of attack, 104. Attack-order for the 1st Army, 105.

Attack of the Eastern Detachment, 106. Reinforcing of

the Japanese right wing, 112. Attack-order for the Guard

Division, 112. Attack of the Guard Division on the Wai-

to-san and ^V^atanabe-yama, 113. Attack of the Japanese

3rd Brigade on the Western San-jo-shi-san, 124. Attack

of the Japanese 1.5th Brigade on Temple Hill, 127.

Man gives up Temple Hill, 130. Kuroki orders the

attack to be continued during the night, 132. Sarubaiev

determines to withdraw, 132. Unsuccessful attacks of the

4th Army against the 1st and 10th Army Corps, 133.

Attack-order for the 2nd Army, 139. The Japanese

3rd Division captures Nan-kuan-tsy, 139. The Japanese

6th Division captures Yen-kia-wan, 141. 'llie Japanese

4th Division captures Ta-yu-tschun-pu, 142. Advance of

the 6th Siberian Army Corps, 144. Oyama's attack-order

for October 12, 146. Nocturnal surprise of Nan-kuan-tsy

by the 17th Army Corps, 147. Stackelberg discontinues

the attack, 151. Night attack of the Russians at the

Ta-lin Pass, 152. Recapture of Fahnen Hill by the

Japanese, 153. Night attack of the Russians on the Tu-

men-tsy-lin Pass, 154. Recapture of the Tu-men-tsy-lin

Pass by the Japanese, 156. Result of October 11, 156.

October 12 157—222

Kuropatkin's view of the situation, 157. Prince Kan-in

surprises Sarasonov, 158. 3rd Siberian Army Corps and

Rennenkampf retire, 159. Situation of Ino-uye's Detach-

ment, 160. Attack-order for the Guard Division, 161.

Night attack of the Japanese 1st Brigade at Man-hua-pu,

162. Night attack of the Japanese 2nd Brigade on Pa-

kia-tsy and on the AVatanabe-yama, 162. Further advance

of the 4th Guard Regiment, 167. Occupation of the Ba-

ji-san by the Japanese 1st Brigade, 168. The Japanese

Guard Division covers its right flank against the 5th East

Siberian Rifle Division by troops on the Ka-ko-rei-san, 171.

Order for the Japanese 2nd Division for a night attack,

172. The .Tapanese 3rd Brigade captures the Western

San-jo-shi-san at night, 172. The Japanese 15th Brigade

captures at night the heights near Orr-wa and the Nan-san,

172. The Japanese 3rd Brigade captures the heights

south-east of Sia-liu-ho-tsy, 17"^ Matsunaga moves off

to the right wing, 177- The J inese 15th Brigade tries

I

xiv TABLE OF CONTEXTS

to capture the Lo-to-sauj 179. Storming by night of the

San-kai-seki-san and of Sau-kuai-schi \-illage by the Japanese

10th Division, 180. The 11th Kobi Brigade tries to cap-

ture the Djo-sau, 184. llie M'esteru Detachment main-

tains its advanced-guard positions, 186. Kuropatkiu's

correspondence with Stackelberg about the öth East

Siberian Rifle Division, 188. ITie 4th Siberian ArmyCorps is being reinforced by portions of the 1st ArmyCorps, 193. The 2nd Army rolls up the advanced-guard

positions of the 17th Army Corps, 196. Advance of tlie

2nd Army during the night, 197. Disposition of the

17th Army Corps, 200. The Japanese 6th Division cap-

tures Orr-schi-kia-tsy, Siau-tun-tai, and Lan-tsy-tai, 201.

The Japanese 3rd Division captures Nan-kuan-tsy, 204.

Counter-attacks of the 17th Army Corps, 205. Wolkov's

order, 207. The Japanese 3rd DiWsion captures Schi-

li-ho, 208. The Japanese 4th Division captures Siau-tai,

Tsun-lun-yeu-tun, and Ta-tai, 210. Oku's orders for

pursuit, 214. Retreat of the 17th Army Corps in the

position Ku-kia-tsy—La-mu-tun, 214. Nocturnal retreat

of the 10th Army Corps into the position south of Scha-

ho-pu, 216. Result of October 12, 221.

V. The Last Days of Battle . . 223—368

October 13 223—264

Kuropatkiu's retreat-order for Stackelberg and Saru-

baiev, 223. Retreat of the Eastern Detachment to the

line Yen-sin-tun—Kan-to-li-san—Huan-lin, 226. Oyama's

order for pursuit, 228. luo-uye remains in his position,

229. Matsunaga's action at the Tschau-hsien-lJn Pass, 230.

Attack-order for the Guard Division, 231. Counter-

attacks of Russians at Mishtshenko's instigation, 232.

Retreat of the Japanese 1st Brigade of Guards from the

Ba-ji-san, 234. Attack of the 4th Guard Regiment, 235.

Watanabe's retreat from the Ka-ko-rei-san, 238. Attack-

order for the 1st Army, 240. Tlie Japanese 5th Division

joins the 1st Army, 240. Yamada's Detachment re-

mains at Huu-kia-tschuan, 240. The first e'chelous of

the Japanese 8th Division are arriving, 241. Capture of

the Lo-to-san by the Japanese, 241. The 4th Siberian

Army Corps' retreat from the Len-ge-san, 244. The37th Infantry Division retires to the Sei-ko-san, 247.

Mau withdraws from the D'o-san on Orr-tau-kou, 248. The

4th Siberian Army Corp ' retreat on Fön-kia-pu, 248.

TABLE OF CONTENTS xv

FAOEB

Mishtshenko's retreat to the Ba-ken-ji-san, 249. Disposi-

tion of the 17th Army Corps, 250. Disposition of the

10th Army Corps, 2.52. Six battalions are to go back

from the 17th Army Corps to the 10th, 254. The 6th

Siberian Army Corps and Dembovski are placed under

orders of the Western Detachment, 255. Half of the

Japanese 6th Division is moved up to the right of the 3rd

Division, 257. Attack of the Japanese 3rd Division, 258.

The 6th Half-Division makes an attack on Tschien-huau-

hua-tien, 259. Koizumi surprises Hun-lin-pu and attacks

La-mu-tun, 260. Advance of the 4th Division, 261. Re-

sult of October 13, 263.

October 14 264—306

Orders for the 1st Army, 265. Advance of the 1st

Army, 265. Order for the Eastern Detachment, 266.

Kuropatkin adopts measures for forming a General Re-

serve, 266. Order for the Japanese Guard Division, 268.

Mishtshenko evacuates the Ba-ken-ji-san, 270. The

Japanese 5th Division at the Wai-tau-schau, 271. The

Russian 37th Infantry Division evacuates the Sei-ko-san

and the San-kaku-san, 273. Penetration of the 10th ArmyCorps' position at the Hou-tai Hill, 277. The Japanese

3rd Division captures the southern portion of Scha-ho-pu,

281. Portions of Shatilov's Brigade rejoin the 10th ArmyCorps, 283. Supports for the 10th Army Corps, 284.

Futile attack of the 36th Infantry Regiment on Scha-

ho-pu, 285. Kuropatkin's order for a concentric attack

on Ku-kia-tsy, 289. Sivizki pushes forward to Hou-huan-

hua-tien, 291. Kuropatkin collects fresh reserves, 292.

Koizumi captures Lin-schin-pu, 295. Counter-attack of

the Russians, 297- Advance of the 6th Siberian ArmyCorps, 298. The Japanese 4th Division delays the 6th

Siberian Army Corps, 299. Dembovski advances, 802.

Order for the 2nd Army, 303. Bilderling's order to the

6th Siberian Army Corps, 304. Result of October 14, 305.

October 15 307—330

Oyama's order, 307. Kuroki's order, 307. The Japan-

ese 3rd Division captures Tschien-san-ta-kan-tsy, 309.

The 11th Brigade rejoins th, 24th Brigade, 310. The6th Division captures La-mu *un, 311. The western

wings are containing each other. 312. Misunderstandings

at the 17th Army Corps, 316. Disposition of the 10th

XVI TABLE OF CONTENTS

Army Corps^ 320. Misunderstandings between Knro-

patkin and the 10th Army Corps, 323. The Centre and

Eastern Detachment remain stationary, 327. Result of

October 15, 329.

Octoher 16 330—344Yamada captures the height with the lonely tree, 331.

Kani's Detachment at the Wai-tau-schan is covering the

right flank of the 1st Army, 333. Preliminaries to the

attack intended by Kuropatkin, 335. Kuropatkin's letter

to the 10th Army Corps, 338. Preparations for the attack

on the heights east of Schan-lan-tsy, 340. The Eastern

Detachment retains its position, 343. Result of Octo-

ber 16, 343.

Octoher 17 344—356General Putilov recaptures the height with the lonely

tree, 344. The 10th Army Corps fights a futile action for

Scha-ho-pu with the Japanese 3rd Division, 351. Result

of October 17, 355.

October 18 and the End of the Battle 356—368

Kuropatkin defers the attack, 357. Kuropatkin's Order

of October 19, 358. The Russian positions, 359. The

Japanese positions, 364. The fight for the ^Vai-tau-

schan, 366.

Total Losses

Comments

Russians

Japanese

Result .

368

369—405

369—389

389—405

405

APPENDIX I

War Organisation of the Russian Army of Manchuria

during the battle on the Scha-ho in October, 1904

between pages 406—407

APPENDIX II

War Organisation of the Ja; anese Field Army during

the battle on the Scha-h j in October, 1904

between pages 406—407

TABLE OF CONTENTS xvii

APPENDIX IIIPAGES

Order to the troops of the Army of Manchuria,

No. 5 407—408

APPENDIX IV


No. 6 409—412

APPENDIX V

Order No. 1 for the defensive troops of the entrenched

position of Mukden . . . . . .413

APPENDIX VI


position of Mukden ..... 414—415

APPENDIX VII


position of Mukden ...... 416

APPENDIX VIII

Instructions for the defence of the main position of

Mukden 417—418

APPIilNDIX IX


No. 8 \ . . 419—423

APPENDIX X

Kuropatkin's Proclamation of October 2, 1904 . 424—425

APPENDIX XI

Order to the troops of the Western Detachment . 426—427

xviii TABLE OF CONTENTS

APPENDIX XIIPAGES

Order to the troops of the Western Army Detachment . 428

APPENDIX XIII

To the Commander of the Western Detachment . . 429

APPENDIX XIV

Order to the troops of the Western Army Detachment

for October 16 . . . .'

. . .430

APPENDIX XV

The General Order issued on October 19 . . 431—432

APPENDIX XVI

V^iew of the Schi-H-ho and of Putilov Hill . . at end

APPENDIX XVII

View of the San-kai-seki-san . .... at end

APPENDIX XVIII

View of the ground at the Ta-lin Pass and at Temple

Hill ........ at end

EXPLAXATIOX OF TeB^IS USED ON THE SKETCHES . . VÜ

List of Najies with Different Spellings . . . ix

LIST OF MAPS(in separate case)

No.

1. General sketch for the battle on the Scha-ho, October,

1904.

2. Advance of the Russians and positions of readiness of

the Japanese from October 5 to 8, 1904.

3. Situation on October 9, 1904.

'*•i1 ?? ?5

10 „

fj n

"• ?9 ?» ?> '•^ 5?

7 1^•• ?> J> 5? •";?

"• » 5» 55 1^ 55

9 15«'• 55 55 55 '^ 55

10. „ „ „ 16 and 17, 1904.

11. Disposition of both Forces after the battle on the

Scha-ho in October, 1904.

ifit* i.i^- JSr ' ,

i0 VL-t «'•.'t^^,

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

GENERAL SITUATION AFTER THE BATTLEOF LIAO-YAN

(a) Russia?is

When, during its retreat after the battle ofRuropat-

Liao-yan,^ the Russian Army had succeeded iHgof^gg'to

getting away from the Japanese, all its portions stay at

continued their march in the general direction on his retreat

Mukden. On September 6 the main bodies of J^P™^ Liao-yau

the Army crossed the Hun-ho. General Kuro- on Tie-

patkin, the Commander-in-Chief, had first intended

to conduct the Army straight back to Tie-lin.'^

He wished to resume the fight in the position

prepared there, to which, from the beginning of

the campaign, he had paid special attention, owing

to its supposed great defensible capabilities. Only

the 10th as well as the 2nd and 3rd Siberian

Army Corps were to remain for the present in

the earthworks of Mukden,^ designed as a kind

» Vol. III. "The Battle of Liao-yan/' pp. 194-207.

* 65 kilometres north-east of Mukden.* The construction of the " Mukden Position " had been commeuced

under the personal supervision of the G.O.C. Engineers of the

Manchurian Army during the summer, when the Japanese Armies

began their advance, converging on Liao-yan.

2 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARof bridge-head, to cover the crossing of the re-

mainder of the Army. But when it became clear

that the Japanese, contrary to all expectations,

did not pursue, and were not in any strength

advancing north from Liao-yan beyond the branch

hne leading from Yen-tai Station to the coal-pits,

General Kuropatkin resolved to discontinue his

retreat, to concentrate the Army again at Mukden,and to offer renewed resistance to the enemy's

advance.

This resolve meant for the Russians a moral

gain. The prestige of the Russian arms, which

had sunk low after all these previous defeats,

decidedly rose when the Army, scarcely a three

days' march distant from the battlefield, faced

about again with the object of renewing its re-

sistance. The Russians had certainly not been

completely defeated at Liao-yan—they had retired

only because their supreme commander had not

had the strength of mind to fight the battle to

the bitter end ; yet the final result of the last

actions, which had entailed such heavy sacrifice,

was after all a retreat, making the Japanese undis-

puted masters of the battlefield. In addition to

the moral advantages gained by ceasing to retreat,

certain material gains accrued as well. By re-

taining possession of Mukden, the rich resources

of that wealthy, thickly populated city continued

to be available for supplying the Russian Army.

Politically it was not without importance that the

Manchurian capital, the ancient home of the reign-

ing Chinese Dynasty, with its sacred imperial tombs,

should thus remain in the hands of the Russians.

AFTER THE BATTLE OF LIAO-YAN 3

Having determined to stay his retreat, Kuro-

patkin next tried to form an opinion on the value

of the "Mukden Position." He therefore charged

the Generals Commanding the 3rd Siberian and

10th Army Corps to inspect the works thoroughly.

While General Ivanov ^ was against the use of

the position, chiefly for reasons of Artillery defence,

General Slutshevski^ was much in its favour,

recommending the work to be continued. OnSeptember 6, the Commander-in-Chief himself

inspected the works ; agreeing with General

Slutshevski's opinion, he ordered him to adopt at

once comprehensive measures for the completion

of the "Mukden Position."

Based on his resolve of holding for the present a Kuropat-

position on the Hun-ho with a portion of his Army,rallies by

General Kuropatkin gave his directions to thej^enerai

troops in General Order No. 5 ^ of September 7. the dis-

The bulk of the Army, in compliance with them,Jf his""

was concentrated around Mukden on the northern troop« at

Hun-ho bank, while General Slutshevski was to

occupy the " Position " with the 10th Army Corps sketdi i.

and the 2nd Siberian Corps.* The 2nd Siberian

Corps was to push protective detachments to Kuan-

lin-pu and Lin-schin-pu, south-west of Mukden,

and the 10th Army Corps an advanced guard to

Fön-kia-pu, south-east of Mukden. By this General

Order were to stand :

' General Commanding the 3rd Siberian Army Corps.

^ General Commanding the 10th Army Corps. * Appendix III.

* By General Order No. 4, the actual text of which is not known,it had been settled for the 2nd Siberian Army Corps to occupy the

section west of tlie railway, and the 10th Army Corps the section to

the east of that line.

4 THE RCSSO-JAPANESE WARThe 4th and 5th Siberian Army Corps south-

west of the town on both sides of the railway

;

The 17th Army Corps on the Mandarin Roadinside the area between Mukden and the Hun-ho,

with an advanced guard at Scha-ho-pu, under the

orders of the General Commanding the 10th ArmyCorps ;

The 1st Siberian Army Corps east of the Man-darin Road, likewise between the river and the

town

;

The 3rd Siberian Army Corps south-east of

Mukden, on the northern Hun-ho bank at Szö-

wan-fön and Tschin-wan-fön ;

^

The 1st (European) Army Corps, the main body

of which was still on the way, close north-west of

the town between the roads to Sin-min-tun and to

San-dia-sa.

The right flank was covered by General Kossa-

govski's reinforced brigade standing on the road

to Sin-min-tun.^ In front, about halfway between

Mukden and Liao-yan, on the general line Hun-lin-

pu—Hun-pau-schan

—

Fön-kia-pu, were Grekov's,

Mishtshenko's, and Samsonov's Cavalry forces,

which were to extend their reconnaissances be-

yond that line. Three detachments under Generals

I^iubavin, Peterov, and Eck were pushed to the

Kau-tu-lin Pass, the Da-lin Pass, and to In-pan, to

cover the left flank. Eck having advanced bodies

at Sin-tsin-tin.

^ Kuropatkin had dropped his original intention of using the 3rd

Siberian Army Corps in the defensive position as well.

- Kossagovski is said to have advanced on the road to Sin-min-tuu,

close to the border of the neutral territory, i.e. the railway line

Sin-min-tun— Schan-hai-kwau.


Next day, September 8, the Commander-in-

Chief issued a fresh Order,^ based in the main on

the former, but making various changes in the

distribution of the forces. Although the Order

began with the words, " It being my intention

to make preparations for assuming the offensive

with the Army," the Commander-in-Chief at that

time had probably not yet made up his mind to

attack, but merely wished to raise perhaps the

spirit of his troops by these introductory remarks.

The essence of the Order was in the arrangements

for the defence of the " Mukden Position," in which

Kuropatkin thought to offer a determined resist-

ance to the Japanese should they advance. Thepositions the Russians occupied by General Order

No. 6 were then as follows :

The 2nd Siberian and the 10th Army Corps,

under the orders of General Slutshevski, re-

mained in the sections of the " MukdenPosition " assigned to them, their advanced guards

on the line Kuan-lin-pu—Lin-schin-pu—Huan-schan.^ The 17th Army Corps, forming the

nearest support for the main position, was also

left in its former place immediately south of

Mukden. The greatest care was taken to secure

the flanks, especially the left flank, for which

Kuropatkin seemed most anxious, probably on

account of the mountainous character of the

• Appendix IV.

' Different from tbe General Orders Nos. .5 and 6, which prescribed anadvanced guard of the 10th Army Corps to be at Fön-kia-pu. AnotherRussian source states that the protective detachments at Lin-schin-

pu and Kuan-lin-pu were furnished by the I7th Army Corps since

September i).

6 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARcountry. The main task of securing the left flank

was entrusted to General Ivanov, who in addition

to his own, the 3rd Siberian Army Corps, which

moved to Fu-schun, was also placed in commandof the 3 advanced detachments in the south and east.

The disposition of the latter remained the same;

their strength merely seems to have been some-

what altered. Liubavin's Detachment (6 battalions,

12 sotnias, 14 guns) had to occupy the passes at

Fan-schön and the Kau-tu-hn Pass ; Peterov's

Detachment (3 battalions, 6 sotnias, 4 guns), the

Da-lin Pass ; Eck's Detachment (9 battalions,

4 sotnias, 20 guns, 1 Sapper company) remained

at In-pan, with a guard at Sin-tsin-tin. The 1st

Siberian Army Corps was to move from its former

position close south of Mukden to the neighbour-

hood of Fu-lin and Kiu-san, as a " near protection

to the left flank "; that corps served at the same

time as a connecting-link between the main body

of the Army and the 3rd Siberian Army Corps,

to which it was also its first support. The march

was not to be carried out on the next day

(September 9), but on the 10th of that month.

The security of the right flank was entrusted to

General Dembovski, commanding the 5th Siberian

Army Corps, who, however, had at his disposal

only 10 battalions, 10 sotnias, 24 guns, and 1

company of Sappers.^ This detachment was to

move to Tszö-kia-pu to oppose any hostile forces

^ Appendix I. The rest of the 5th Siberian Army Corps was dis-

tributed among various detachments ; one portion was, moreover,

handed over to the 1st and 3rd Siberian Army Corps to make up their

losses.


advancing by the right bank of the Hun-ho, or

to prevent any crossing in the south. The pro-

tection of the " extreme right flank " was left to

General Kossagovski's Detachment (6j battaHons,

9 sotnias, 16 guns), which moved to Tun-ta-wan,

on the Liao-ho. The '* General Reserve " was

formed of the 1st Army Corps, whose place of

assembly was removed farther north to the country

between Hu-schi-tai Station and Pu-ho, and of the

4th Siberian Army Corps, which was to go to the

north-west of INIukden into the former quarters of

the 1st Army Corps. The Cavalry detachments in

front remained in the places assigned to them,

namely, the Orenburg Cossack Brigade under

General Grekov (12 sotnias, 6 guns), in the country

west of Hun-lin-pu ; the Transbaikal Cossack

Brigade under General Mishtshenko (24 sotnias,

10 guns), at Hun-pau-schan ; and the Siberian

Cossacks under General Samsonov (18 sotnias,

6 guns), at Fön-kia-pu. The Order did not assign

fresh tasks to the Cavalry ; reconnaissance was to

be continued as hitherto. The actual text of

General Order No. 4 outlining these duties not

being available, we do not know the objects and

limits for this reconnaissance.

The whole position was very much extended;

including the guard at Sin-tsin-tin from Eck's

Detachment, the distance between the extreme

wings measured over 160 kilometres. Uncom-monly strong forces

—

34-^ battalions, 43 sotnias,

and 78 guns, not counting the 1st and 3rd Siberian

Army Cv rps—had been detailed to protect the

flanks. Their protection might very well have

8 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

been left entirely to the Cavalry if its duties

and employment had been better understood

generally.

During the time the movements of the troops

as arranged by General Order No. 6 were carried

out, progress was made in further entrenching the

" Mukden Position."

The"Po- The entrenchments then existing were partly

Mikden" finished and partly still unfinished earthworksis being \[]^q forts, rcdoubts, lunettes, trenches, and gun-

structed pits. They embraced like a bridge-head the roads

bridge- Converging on Mukden, with their crossings over

head with the Hun-ho. The villages Yen-schu-tien-tsythree de- . .

feusive (southcm portion), Ti-kia-wan, Yü-schu-tai, and

hhS e^ch Hun-ho-pu were fortified in addition.

other. General Slutshevski, by a series of Orders,^

Sketch 2. arranged for the further consolidation of the

" Position." Three lines, one behind the other,

came to be constructed, resting with their flanks

on the Hun-ho. The foremost line, containing

five forts,^ was looked upon as the " Main

Position." It stretched in the form of a slight

arc from the river-bend west of Tso-tsuan-tun,

across the railway junction and Tschien-yü-

schu-tai, to the country north-east of Hun-ho-

pu village. The second line extended from the

neighbourhood north-west of Lan-wa by Yen-

shu-tien-tsy and Sa-kan-tsy to the bridge east

of Tia-ho ; and the third line from Schu-Han-za

by Ma-kiao-tun and Hou-kia-ho to the little wood

' Appendices V. to VIII.

' Not forts in the proper sense of the term ; they were closed earth-

works of a type more or less provisional.


west of Tia-ho. Each of these positions was

carefully strengthened by completing the works

started, by designing new works, and by forti-

fying the villages situated within the "Position."

The fire-trenches were provided with overhead

cover and other structures. Only in the two

front lines were fire-positions prepared for the

Artillery. To clear the field of fire in front of

the " Position," large tracts of gaoljan and tshu-

misa^ were mowed off, and only where the gaoljan

was required to mask the entrenchments or hide

movements of troops was it left standing. Ranges

were, moreover, marked, roads improved, newroads laid out, guide-posts erected, numerous

obstacles constructed in front, and bridges thrown

across the Hun-ho, their number amounting to

fifteen towards the end of September. So as

to enfilade the approaches to the " Position," em-

placements, for a battery each, were established

on the northern bank of the river at Kin-tien-tun

and San-kia-la.

As garrison were apportioned : the 2nd Siberian

Army Corps to the section west of the railway,

and the 10th Army Corps to the section adjoining

east ; the portion up to, but excluding. Fort II

being assigned to the 9th Infantry Division, and

the portion from Fort II up to the left flank, to

the 31st Infantry Division.

In addition to the general arrangements for the

further consolidation of the "Position," Slutshevski's

Orders contained numerous directions of various

kinds. With the object of getting early notice

^ A sort of millet.


of a nocturnal surprise, large heaps of dry woodwere to be ignited in front by listening-posts.

Even by day it was hoped to demoralise the

enemy by kindling fires in front of the " Position,"

Slutshevski sajang in one of his Orders ^:

" Ata distance of 800 paces in advance of the fore-

most trenches large fires must be prepared, which,

at the moment the enemy is approaching, are

to be ignited by electricity to illuminate the fore-

ground. These fires are to be lit even by day

so as to impress the enemy." General Slutshevski

also hoped to impose on the Japanese by shammines. He ordered that, " where it is impossible

to construct mines in advance of the works, red

flags, marking as it were the position of the mines,

must be placed so as to confuse the enemy."

The course of events giving the Japanese no

chance of attacking the " Mukden Position," the

effect of the burning heaps of dry wood and of the

red flags could not be tested.

When the Commander-in-Chief inspected the

"Position" on September 12, the new works as

well as all the measures adopted met with his

approval.

It was inherent in the peculiar Russian conduct

of war to bestow far too much care and attention on

the works south of Mukden than was legitimately

their due, for they were after all not suited to an

obstinate defence. The position in itself was not

a strong one ; the country, completely flat, did

not offer much view, which, moreover, was greatly

hampered by numerous villages, hamlets, and

' Appendix VIII.


cultivated fields. But the low water-level of the

Hun-ho at that time was especially disadvan-

tageous, being fordable at many places in spite of

its imposing breadth (up to 500 metres). Tomarch on Mukden the enemy was therefore not

obliged to attack the bridge-head, but could cross

over to the other bank at any other place he

pleased.

At the same time that the " Position of Mukden " En-

was being constructed new positions were started i^ents are

on the northern bank of the Hun-ho. West of^«^"?

Mukden a number of villages and low sandhills structed

were fortified facing west, and connected with each äirnorth-

other by shelter-trenches, thus causing a fresh em bank• • • 1 . P TT ^

, -.^ oftheposition to arise stretching from Hou-ta by Yu- Hun-ho.

liuan-tun

—

Yan-szö-tun to Kin-tien-tun. There

were further created a series of fortifications,

extending close to the river-bank east of the

Mandarin Road by Fu-lin to Kiu-san. These

entrenchments came into prominence afterwards

in the battle of Mukden.

On September 10 General Kuropatkin drew the sketch i.

2nd Siberian Army Corps ^ south-east, away from

the "Main Position," with the object of moving it

to Hei-sun-pu, 13 kilometres north-east of Bian-

yu-pu-sa, where it too formed a kind of advanced

flanking position. The gap thus formed in the" Position of Mukden " was to be filled by portions

of the 10th Army Corps. General Slutshevski

' T\\e 2nd Siberian Army Corps chiefly consisted of only the 5th

East Siberian Rifle Division ; the other Division (1st Siberian) belong-

ing to the corps was employed as garrison, and apportioned to other

units. (Appendix I.) /

12 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARre-arranged the occupation of the " Position " by

assigning the defence of its right half to the 9th

Infantry Division, and of its left half to the 31st

Infantry Division. The inner flanks of the Divi-

sions were in touch east of Fort III.

Arrival of The Ist (European) Army Corps was completely

ment«!^^^^ssembled north of Mukden soon after Sep-Draftsto tember 15 ; the first transports of the 6th Siberianreplace ^

losses. Army Corps had begun to arrive.^ By the arrival

of these reinforcements not only the losses of the

battle of Liao-yan and of the actions preceding

it were made good, but the Army gained also

considerably in strength by them. Drafts, how-ever, arrived in addition to fill the gaps, especially

of those regiments which had suffered most.

With the object of making good to some extent

the severe losses of the 1st and 3rd Siberian ArmyCorps, men of the 5th Siberian Army Corps were

handed over to those two corps. ^ The lightly

wounded rejoined their units in large numbers.

Until the end of September the Army had been

increased in strength by 50,000 men ; it must be

left open how far in this number are included

drafts and men recovering from wounds. Thewastage in horses, materiel, equipment, and cloth-

' The 6th Siberian Army Corps commenced detraining first at Tie-liu,

and with its last troops at Mukden^ remaining for the present at the

disposal of the Viceroy, whose Headquarters had been transferred to

Charbin. On September 28 the first troops began to detrain at Mukden ;

they were one battation 220th Infantry Regiment. The corps was

then placed under the orders of Kuropatkin for his offensive. In

addition to the 6th Siberian and 1st Army Corps, there arrived the

1st, 3rd, and 4th Mountain Batteries, the East Siberian Siege Company,a balloon detachment, and one bridging battalion.

2 P. 6, footnote.


ing was soon made good as well. At the same

time the spirit of the troops was rising visibly.

After the retreat had been discontinued the general

despondency soon gave way to a more hopeful

spirit. This change was aided by the phlegmatic

nature of the Russian, who is not slow in shaking

himself free of the impressions produced by ill-

luck and misfortune. Within a comparatively

short time General Kuropatkin was convinced of

having in his hands again an Army ready to strike

and to operate. This favourable impression, jointly

with the passive attitude of the Japanese, caused

the Commander-in-Chief gradually to view the

situation in a different light from that he had

gained under the depressing effects of ill-success

and retreat ; the resolve to assume the offensive

was maturing in his thoughts.

If the fortune of war was to change at all, it Kuropat-

could only be brought about by an offensive in solves to

grand style—it was necessary to force the enemy assume

to a decisive battle and to wrest victory from him. sive.

Kuropatkin saw that a defensive or expectant

attitude of his Army would only bring it nearer

to its doom. The situation of the enemy, more-

over, invited to offensive action. The Japanese

strength was exhausted after the obstinate combats

around Liao-yan. The main body of their Armyhad been unable to conquer the Russian works

in front, in spite of great sacrifice ; the intended

envelopment of the Russian left across the Tai-

tsy-ho with insufficient means had not succeeded

to its fullest extent. When the Russians finally

began to retreat to the surprise of their adversary.

14 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARthe Japanese had no longer the strength of follow-

ing up their success by a vigorous pursuit ; their

movements came to a standstill at the branch line

leading to the coal-mines of Yen-tai. It was then

found that the Japanese apparently felt altogether

unable to continue their operations for some

considerable time. Presumably they awaited the

arrival of the 8th Division, of whose dispatch

Russian General Headquarters had received know-

ledge. That force being unable to reach Liao-yan

before the beginning of October, it was not likely

that the Japanese would resume active operations

before the middle of October.

The opportunity was therefore altogether favour-

able for a Russian offensive, considering the numbers

concerned. By the arrival of the 6th Siberian as

well as of the 1st Army Corps the Russian Armywas superior to the enemy. If the resolve to

attack had been steadily and rapidly turned into

action it might have led to great results being

obtained. But Russian General Headquarters

were never in a hurry when deciding on any course

of action. First of all, Kuropatkin obtained the

views of his Generals in command, who were not

over-confident. They generally held that the

moment for assuming the offensive had not yet

arrived. General Slutshevski proposed to await

the Japanese in the "Position of Mukden," to

beat off their attack, and then only to assume the

offensive. Stackelberg, too, advised to be cautious,

counselling the Commander-in-Chief to wait as

yet a while. Kuropatkin justly urged against

these proposals that any delay would procure the


enemy time to bring up his reinforcements and

to strengthen his positions about Liao-yan with

all available means. It was, moreover, likely that

Port Arthur would soon succumb to the siege,

its power of resistance being not much thought

of at Russian Headquarters ; in that case Nogi's

Army would become available, and might appear

at Liao-yan in support of the Field Army within

measurable time. Now, on the other hand, the

Japanese as yet had hardly made good their recent

losses ; in their present plight they seemed to need

some urgent rest still ; if the Russians wished to

make use of this favourable situation, it was

necessary to strike soon.

In addition to these reasons arising from the

general state of affairs, some reasons of a personal

nature urged Kuropatkin to strike at once.

By an Imperial Ukas of September 24 General

Gripenberg had been appointed to command a

Second Army of Manchuria, which was to consist

of the 6th Siberian and 8th Army Corps, as well as

of the 61st Infantry Division and 4th Don Cossack

Division, the Ukas at the same time co-ordinating

him to Kuropatkin. The Viceroy, Alexeiev, was

nominated Supreme Commander over all the forces.

Kuropatkin cherished the legitimate hope of being

summoned to the first place himself; but it was

not likely that he could count upon being appointed

Commander-in-Chief, if he did not gain a real

success in the near future.

All these considerations led Kuropatkin to adhere

to his resolve, against the opinions of his subordinate

commanders, and to prepare to attack the Japanese.

16 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARStrength Including the 6th Siberian Army Corps, the

Army. Army numbered roughly 250 battalions, 143

squadrons or sotnias, 744 guns, and 32 machine-

guns.^ The strength of the units varied very

much. The companies probably numbered only

150 to 160 men, and frequently less than that.'

At the beginning of October the Commander-in-

Chief gave the strength of his Infantry as " 147,000

bayonets "; but according to another trustworthy

Russian source, becoming known only after the

campaign, they were 181,000 men.^ Adding to

these numbers the mounted branches, one can

hardly go wrong in estimating the numbers of

the whole fighting troops of the Army as roughly

210,000 men.

intelii- Intelligence about the enemy was extremely

about the poor. Japanese advanced bodies were said to beenemy, standing at Bian-^Ti-pu-sa, 21 kilometres north-east

of the coal-pits of Yen-tai, on the upper reaches

of the Scha-ho, also south of the Schi-li-ho, and

at Tschan-tan on the Hun-ho, north-west of

San-de-pu ; these were all the details the Russian

Cavalry had ascertained. There was still want of

* War Organisation, Appendix I.

* The companies of the 213th Infantry Regiment are said to have

numbered but 120 to 130 men.* Tliis total strength of Infantry is arrived at as under :

1st Siberian Army Corps


clearness about the disposition of the enemy's

main bodies, Ukewise about his strength. Thereports of the spies proved inaccurate and contra-

dictory. When, on September 21, the news came

in of Peterov's Detachment having been attacked

at the Da-Hn Pass on the 19th, and forced to

retreat in a north-westerly direction on J\Ia-tsiun-

dan,^ a general attack upon the Russian left wing

was expected as a matter of course. But such

an attack was not made ; the Japanese—it was

only a small body—evacuated the pass again,

enabling General Peterov to reoccupy it without

fighting. A few days afterwards an attack was

feared upon the right wing, reports having come

in of an advance by Japanese columns from

Yen-tai in a north-westerly direction. Soon after

this alarming news, too, all was quiet again in

front of the Army. It remains unintelligible whythe 54 sotnias in front of the Army were unable

to gain any insight into what the Japanese were

doing.

(b) Japanese

After the actions around Liao-yan the 1st ofDisposi-

the Japanese Armies alone was completely north[Jj^J^japa-

of the Tai-tsy-ho, the 2nd Army and strong ^ese

portions of the 4th being still on the southern afte^the

bank at Liao-yan.^ The 12th Division of the 1st 1*^"^^ ""^

•' Liao-yaii.

Army on the right was standing at Yüan-kia-pu, 6^ sketcb i.

kilometres south-west of the coal-pits of Yen-tai,

the Guard Division to the west of it at Fa-schi-

' The action is not mentioned by the Japanese.'' Vol. III., " The Battle of Liao-yan," p. 205.

2

18 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARko-schan, and the 2nd Division at Siau-miau-tsy.

Army Headquarters were at Fon-schan, 4 kilometres

north-east of I^iao-yan. During the first decade

of September ^ General Baron Kuroki moved the

12th Division somewhat more east to Ta-yau-pu,

and the 2nd Division to Yiian-kia-pu into the

place of the 12th. The Guard Division was

therefore now stationed on the left. The GuardKobi Brigade, under the command of General

Umesawa, forming part of the 1st Army, had,

after its participation in the recent fights, marched

to Bian-yu-pu-sa, 21 kilometres north-east of the

coal-pits, arriving there on September 9. It was

therefore a day's march distant from the right

wing of the Army it belonged to. The Japanese

being provided only with very unreliable maps of

that particular country, of which whole districts

were not marked at all on them, they knewlittle about the various distances. Headquarters

of the 1st Army thought Bian-yu-pu-sa to

be very much nearer to the coal-pits ; it was

some time before Army Headquarters became

aware of the isolated position of the Guard Kobi

Brigade.

Of the 4th Army, Headquarters of which

were billeted at Tun-tu-dia-wa-tsy, 4 kilometres

south of Liao-yan, the 5th Division was standing

north-east of Liao-yan, on the northern bank of

the Tai-tsy-ho at the Mandarin Road ; and the

10th Division, as well as the formations attached

to that Army, were still south of the town.

The 2nd Army had sought shelter with the

' Exact date not known.


3rd and 6th Divisions in that quarter of Liao-yan

which the Russians had raised outside the city

walls ; the 4th Division was standing at Si-guan,

close west of Liao-yan.

Headquarters of the Japanese Field Army and

the General Reserve were in Liao-yan.

Immediately after the battle of Liao-yan, Marshal Positions

Marquis Oyama had arranged for a series of posi-^'^^'*'^'

'

tions to be prepared for an obstinate defence in sketth 2.

case of a sudden and unforeseen attack. Theheights east of Liao-yan were strongly fortified

;

there were, furthermore, extensive positions at Bian-

yu-pu-sa, on the heights between Man-hua-pu and

Tsien-tau on the Schi-li-ho, along the branch line

and at La-mi-pu, likewise at Hun-ai-tsy south-east

of La-mi-pu, and west of Tschan-tai-tsy south-west

of La-mi-pu.^

Directly the pause in the operations began, Drafts to

strenuous efforts were made for raising again the^ses'^^

striking power of the Japanese Army. ^".*^f''^^^° ^ ^ •'

^reiniorce-

Making good the enormous losses suffered in the meats.

battle of Liao-yan proceeded but very slowly. It

was not till the end of September that all units had

been brought up again to their proper strength. Offresh reinforcements, there arrived up to the middle

of the month only the 2nd Cavalry Brigade under

General Prince Kan-in, as well as some Kobi

formations.^ The value of these formations, of

which in other respects there was little to choose

between them and the Line formations, was some-' The entrenchments along the branch line and at La-mi-pu are

identical with the positions of the 10th and 6th Divisions marked on

Sketch 2.

* Their exact names ai*e not known.


what impaired by the different armament with

which they were equipped (captured rifles, or of an

old pattern). At home there were still available,

of regular troops, the 7th and 8th Divisions ; but

General Headquarters could not make up its mind

to bring up these forces at once. The conditions

in front of Port Arthur seem to have decided that

question. It is alleged that originally it was

intended to employ these two Divisions for a siege

of Vladivostok, but this idea was dropped whenPort Arthur was holding out longer than was

anticipated, and the Field Army could no longer

be reinforced by the Siege Army. It is not

known when it was finally decided to issue the

orders for the dispatch of the 8th Division to

the Field Army. The first echelons arrived at

Liao-yan on October 13 ; but the Division did

not take part in the combats on the Scha-ho.

The 7th Division was retained in Japan to cover

the Island of Yesso, particularly Port Otaru,

against likely enterprises of the Russian Vladivostok

Fleet.

The numbers of the Japanese Field Army,^ even

including the 8th Division, were inferior to those

of the Russians. If the companies had all their

full strength of 200 men, the Japanese Army,

including the mounted arms, must have numbered

about 170,000 men.

iiie lines Japanese Headquarters took special care to

of com- reorganise the lines of communication. Themuuica- o

--» i • 2 i.tionare change of gaugc of the railway from Dal-ni bybeing re-

arranged. 1 War Organisation, Appendix II.

» Sketch 1 of Vol. I., " Ya-lu."


Kin-tschou to Liao-yan had progressed far enough

to allow traffic to commence on the whole line

from the beginning of October, thus facilitating in

particular the evacuation of the wounded.^

In addition to this line of railway, the sea tran-

sport by Yin-kou,^ at the mouth of the Liao-ho in

the Liao-tung Bay, became of increasing importance,

as the winter was closing the roadsteads of Da-gu-

schan, a port on the south coast of the Liao-tung

Peninsula, and the mouth of the Ya-lu ; and the

overland route by the mountains to the seaports

of Korea ^ was far too long and of too little use

for supplying the three Armies for any length of

time.

Difficulties arose in the supply of ammunition.

The small arsenal at home was not capable of

manufacturing rapidly enough the quantities of

ammunition necessary for the Army, and the less

so because the siege of Port Arthur made ever-

increasing demands for ammunition. Even after

its enlargement it was only able to meet these

demands after the utmost exertions. The supply

of draught horses caused some difficulties. In

place of the rather useless Japanese horse, Chinese

ponies and mules were drafted into the service in

large numbers, these animals proving very useful.

The supply of sufficient provisions from home for

' The first Japanese trains ran on the line on August 1 as far as

Liau-tau ; on August 20 the portion was finished up to Kai-ping ; onSeptember 12 up to Ta-schi-tschao and Yin-kou ; and on October 3 upto Liao-yan.

' Sketch 1 of Vol. I., ''Ya-lu."

' Japanese railway troops worked at the laying of a railway throughKorea ; but the line was not yet open to traffic.


man and beast was a constant anxiety, for even the

Japanese soldier does not so easily bear up with

shortness of rations,

inteiii- Until September 11 the Japanese were in

about thepossession of the following intelligence about their

enemy, enemy. Two new Russian Army Corps, the

Sketch 1. 1st European and the 6th Siberian, were said to be

arriving north of IVIukden ; strong Cavalry was

standing on the road Fu-schun—Bian-yu-pu-sa

;

there had further been seen a Cavalry detachment,

with some guns as well, on the San-kai-seki-san,

9 kilometres north of the coal-pits ; at Fön-

kia-pu, north-east, and ISIen-hu-lu-tun, north-west

of Yen-tai, Cavalry had also been observed ; finally,

strong Cavalry was said to be on the road between

Sin-min-tun and JNlukden. In addition some

entrenchments had been ascertained south of

Mukden, and the departure from the city of

strong forces in an easterly direction on Fu-schun

had been noticed.

All this intelligence the Japanese owed less to

the activity of their weak Cavalry than to the

services of Chinese spies, whom both belligerent

powers were particularly fond of employing.

Marshal About the middle of September Japanese Head-Oyama quarters decided to concentrate the Armies on thedecides to ^

i r^ •i rr< i

concen- northern bank of the Tai-tsy-ho. To the 1st

I Armiesmi Army was now apportioned the section fromthenorth- Sieu-tschan-tsy, 10 kilometres south of Bian-yu-pu-

the Tai- sa, to the coal-pits ; the 4th Army was to move*^^" ^'

to the west of it, and the 2nd Army was to form

up as the left wing within the space between

Nan-tai, 16 kilometres north east of Liao-yan,


and Schan-tai-tsy, 11 kilometres to the west of

Nan-tai.

The 1st Army seems, howev^er, to have remained

in its former position/ The 2nd Cav^alry Brigade,

arriving at Liao-yan on September 17, was placed

under the command of the 1st Army. General

Baron Kuroki charged General Prince Kan-in, its

commander, to reconnoitre north and north-east

of the coal-pits and establish communication with

the Guard Kobi Brigade at Bian-yu-pu-sa.

It is not known how far the 4th Army complied

with the General Order. The 5th Division seems

to have advanced on the Mandarin Road to about

Tschan-tai-tsy. If the other portions of that Armydid cross at that time, they probably did not

advance far beyond the country north-east of Liao-

yan. As a measure of security the 5th Division

had pushed a weak detachment to La-mi-pu on

the Mandarin Road, which was afterwards reheved

by the 8th Brigade,^ to which ,were attached some

Cavalry, Artillery, and an Engineer detachment.

This brigade was commanded by General Otani.

The 2nd Army had crossed completely ; and of

that Army were standing west of the Mandarin

Road the 3rd Division at Ta-pa-tai-tsy, with an

advanced guard at Ta-tu-san-pu on the Scha-ho ;

the 4th Division at Licn-kia-kou-men, with an

advanced guard at Lan-tun-kou ; and the 6th

Division, which had pushed some protective troops

to Liu-tiau-tschai, was standing at Si-ku-kan-tsy,

in the centre behind the two other Divisions. The

» p. 18.

' From the 10th Division. The exact date is not known.

24 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR1st Cavalry Brigade was reconnoitring from the

neighbourhood of Pan-puo-sa, on both banks of

the Hun-ho.

On September 17 the first serious action took

place at Bian-yu-pu-sa, revealing the exposed

position of the Guard Kobi Brigade.^ At11.30 a.m. two Russian battalions, with a few

squadrons, advanced from Siau-yau-pu in the

Scha-ho valley, east of Bian-yu-pu-sa, on Bian-yu-

pu-sa. General Umesawa deployed his troops in

the prepared position south of that place, receiving

the enemy with a brisk fire. The Russians

replied to it, but abstained from advancing farther

when becoming aware of the strength of the

Japanese ; about 3 p.m. they withdrew, not with-

out loss, on Tschin-hsi-sai and Kan-to-li-san, east

and north of Bian-yu-pu-sa respectively. This

reconnoitring action, which is not mentioned by

the Russians, took therefore a turn favourable to

the Japanese ; but the situation of the Guard Kobi

Brigade might have become very serious if General

Liubavin, who probably had ordered the attack,

had pushed forward with his whole detachment,

or had acted jointly wiih the 2nd Siberian ArmyCorps standing at Hei-sun-pu.

The 1st When General Baron Kuroki received knowledge

heSg*^ ^^ these events and was, moreover, by the activity

pushed of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade informed about the

actual distance to Bian-yu-pu-sa,^ he shifted his

Army somewhat east so as to bring his right wing

nearer to General Umesawa's Brigade ; the posi-

tions assigned to the Divisions are not known.

1 p. 18. ' p. 18.

east.


Meanwhile reports from spies came in about the

advance of strong hostile forces in a south-easterly

direction from the neighbourhood of Mukden.General Baron Kuroki looked upon this as a threat

to the Japanese right wing, his view of the matter

being strengthened when, on September 22 and 23,

reports came in of strong Russian forces really-

advancing upon the right wing and right flank of

the 1st Army, The Guard Kobi Brigade nowseemed to be in serious danger ; decisive measures

for its protection were urgently demanded. Kuroki

once more ordered his Army to shift to the right

;

at the same time the 12th Division was pushed out

in a south-easterly direction for employment on

the right wing. Again the objectives to be reached

are not exactly known ; the 12th Di\asion seems

to have taken post at Kau-kia-pu-tsy, south-east of

the coal-pits of Yen-tai ; the 2nd Division movingto the coal-pits, and the Guard Division to the

country west of them. These movements had been

executed by October 1.

No more changes in the position of the forces

comprising the 2nd and 4th Armies seem to have

occurred up to that date.

The outposts in front of the Armies stretched

from the neighbourhood east of Tschin-hsi-sai to

the Hun-ho at Tschan-tan.

' '' '^-.''t^T/M Air

II

BEGINNING OF THE RUSSIAN MOVEMENTS

General Ai'TEii General Kuropatkin had finally decided to

kinT«ues ^ttack,^ he issued the particulars for the advance

the Order in a detailed General Order - on September 28.

advance. But somc extcnsivc preparations were to be carried

out before the movements began ; General Head-

quarters therefore reserved to itself the fixing of

the first day of march.

The General Order organised all the forces into

several independent groups, each of which was to

be employed in a special manner. The two main

groups were the AVestern Detachment (10th and

17th Army Corps, 2nd Orenburg Cossack Brigade,

and Ural Cossack Brigade ^) under General of

Cavalry Baron Bilderling, hitherto commanding

the 17th Army Corps, and the Eastern Detach-

ment (1st, 2nd, and 3rd Siberian Army Corps

and Siberian Cossack Division*) under General

Baron Stackelberg, commanding the 1st Siberian

Army Corps. In addition, the Order provided for

' p. 16. ^ Appendix IX.

• 64 battalions, 40 squadrons, 190 guns, and 2 Sapper battalions.

* 73 battalions, 32 machine-guns, 34 squadrons or sotnias, 170 guns,

and 3 Sapper battalions.

26

THE RUSSIAN MOVEMENTS 27

Flank Guards, a General Reserve (4th Siberian, and

1st European Army Corps, and the independent

Transbaikal Cossack Brigade ^), and a Rear Pro-

tection (6th Siberian Army Corps).

General Headquarters intended to advance with

the left wing of the Army—the Eastern Detach-

ment—against the right wing of the Japanese, en-

veloping it; to push back the enemy's forces in

the mountains, and then, jointly with the WesternDetachment, to advance for a decisive attack upon

the enemy's main forces supposed to be concen-

trated at the coal-pits of Yen-tai. In this operation

the General Reserve, which was retained behind

the centre, was meant to co-operate either by

reinforcing one of the Army groups or filling the

gap between them.

The most important task fell to the lot of the

Eastern Group. General Baron Stackelberg was sketch 2

directed to concentrate his forces on the line Tai-

kia-miau-tsy—Hei-sun-pu—Pa-kia-tsy, 12 to 17

kilometres north and north-east of Bian-yu-pu-sa,

with the object of making an enveloping attack

upon the right wing of the Japanese supposed to

be stationed at that place.

The task of the Western Group demanded from

it a somewhat reserved attitude. Conforming to

the operations as they were intended, it ought to

have attacked too, but no word was said as yet in

the Order to that effect. The troops were first to

assemble on the Scha-ho, and then to advance onLiao-yan on both sides of the railway between

the Hun-ho and the road east of the railway

' 66 battalions, 20 sotnias, 224 gnns, and 2 Sapper battalions.

28 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARrunning from Huan-schan (18 kilometres south-

east of JNlukden) — Liian-fan-tun— Pu-tsau-wa

—

Ta-pu—coal-pits of Yen-tai. But for the time

being it was given the limits of two day's marchesSketch 1. only. The main bodies were to halt on the second

day of march on the line Lin-schin-pu—Scha-ho-

pu

—

Lüan-fan-tun, after covering therefore about

half the distance to Yen-tai, and then to proceed,

preparing entrenched positions ; the advanced

guards were to push to the northern tributary of

the Schi-li-ho.

Kuropatkin's anxiety of his wings becoming

enveloped, which had been apparent already in the

former grouping of his units, is shown again in his

present arrangements. The detachments charged

hitherto w^th protecting the flanks continued in

this duty. The Order distinguished between a

" right " and " extreme right " flank, and a " left"

and " extreme left " flank.

Dembovski's Detachment, which had been

charged with the close protection of the right, was to

advance on the western bank of the Hun-ho along

that river, and construct a bridge at Tschan-tan,

covering it by forming a double bridge-head on the

banks of the Hun-ho. General Dembovski had

for that purpose available the respectable force

of 12 battalions, 16 sotnias, 32 guns, and two

battalions of technical troops.^

The " extreme right flank " was secured by

General Kossagovski with the troops he had before.

That detachment was to advance along the left

* The composition and strength of the advanced detachments had

meanwhile been partly changed.


bank of the Liao-ho and to keep connection with

Dembovski's Detachment.

The close protection on the left was provided

by the detachment of General von Rennenkampf,^

who took united command of the former individual

detachments of Liubavin, Peterov, and Eck.' Hehad available 13 battalions, 16 sotnias, and 30 guns.

By the General Order this detachment was to

concentrate in the direction of Ma-tsiun-dan—Da-

lin Pass, advancing then by Siao-syr, 45 kilo-

metres south-east of Pen-si-hu, probably against

the right flank of the Japanese. But the Com-mander-in-Chief dropped again this intention,

doubts having probably arisen in his mind about

the advisability of detaching so strong a force

for making this wide turning movement ; it

seemed to him more practical to let this detach-

ment closely co-operate with the Eastern Groupas a reinforcement for that enveloping wing.

General von Rennenkampf was therefore ordered

to join the Eastern Detachment in the direction

of Pen-si-hu, by San-kia-tsy, north-east of the

former place, after he had begun the movementoriginally ordered. ^ On the extreme left, the

flank protection was effected by Colonel Madritov's

Detachment, who was to advance with 1 battalion,

2 Scout detachments, 2 sotnias, and 2 guns by

' General vou Rennenkampf had been wounded on July 13, but bad

now returned to tbe Army convalescent. During the battle of Liao-

yan he was seconded by General Liubavin.

" With some modifications ; Rennenkampf's newly formed detach-

ment was somewhat weaker than tlie total strength of those three

detachments,' It cannot be ascertained when Kuropatkin issued the order to that

effect, and where that order reached Reimenkanipf.

30 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARTa-pin-di-schan on Sai-ma-tsy,^ keeping at the

same time in touch with General von Rennen-

kampf.

Sketch 2. The General Reserve was directed to concentrate

on the first day of the march on the northern

bank of the Hun-ho on both sides of the Mandarin

Road, and to march next day, after crossing the

river, to the neighbourhood of San-lin-tsy—Wan-ti-sai, south-east of Mukden.

The 6th Siberian Army Corps, after finishing

detraining, was to remain north of Mukden as

'• rear-protection."

Independent Cavalry corps were not mentioned

in the Order. Apart from General Mishtshenko's

Transbaikal Cossack Brigade belonging to the

General Reserve, the Cavalry, consisting of 143

squadrons or sotnias, was distributed along the

whole of the front. With the left wing, which

had to operate in the mountains, 50 sotnias were

to co-operate ; in the Hun-ho plain, on the other

hand, where strong Cavalry could have rendered

excellent service, particularly on account of the

small numbers of Japanese squadrons, no inde-

pendent Cavalry detachment was employed at

all. The Cavalry forces attached to the Western

Group, as well as to Dembovski's and Kossagovski's

Detachments, were partly split up for minor

duties, and partly kept in such close contact with

the main bodies, that they were altogether removed

from their real duties, reconnoitring on a large scale.

• Ta-pin-di-schan is 32 kilometres south of Sin-tsin-tin, Sai-ma-tsy

100 kilometres south-east of Liao-yau. Madritov's Detachment is no

longer mentioned afterwards in any report-


It seemed as if the Russian commanders

voluntarily abandoned all efforts for obtaining by

their Cavalry an insight into the dispositions of

the enemy. This limited comprehension of the

use of Cavalry for distant reconnoitring is all the

more remarkable because the detachments of

mounted Scouts were available for tactical or close

reconnaissance and other minor duties.

At the same time the Order was issued for

the advance of the Army, General Headquarters

directed the commanders to make some prepara-

tions " in view of the impending movements of

the Army for the offensive, or in case the enemy

should attack." The additional sentence " or in

case the enemy should attack " makes us believe

that the Russian Commander-in-Chief at heart

did not seriously mean to act on the offensive

;

perhaps he had a sort of presentiment that the

initiative would soon be again in the hands of the

Japanese.

For preparation were recommended, among other

items, the making good of deficiencies in arms,

equipment, clothing, and boots, the storing of

ammunition, procuring of large live stock, keeping

ready pack-animals ^ with the Siberian Army Corps,

which were going to advance in the mountains,

so as to bring up ammunition, supplies, water, etc.

The commanders were directed to make use of local

supplies, and advised to establish magazines and

collect fodder for the horses. Reconnaissances of

the roads and probable billeting-areas were ordered

for tactical reasons as well as for reasons of supply.

' Mostly small donkeys.


These measures were, of course, necessary and

justifiable ; it is strange only that Kuropatkin should

have felt obliged to call his commanders' attention

to things which are a matter of course, and to

which they might have attended for the most

part some weeks before, when the operations cameto a standstill. Great activity being now dis-

played everywhere by the orders of General Head-

quarters, it was more than likely that Chinese

spies would report this to the enemy. Theattention of the Japanese was in this way roused

artificially, and the Russians lost some precious

time, which they could no more retrieve, for every

day of delay in the offensive was only of advantage

to the enemy.

Kuropat- But General Kuropatkin apparently did not

ciainirto think it even necessary to hide his intentionsthe Array from the Japanese as long as possible, for on

solve of October 2 he issued a long address to the Army,

the"effen- ^^^ marked " Confidential," and therefore bound to^iv®- become very soon known to the enemy too. In

this Proclamation ^ the Commander-in-Chief madeknown to the Army his resolve in high-sounding

terms. Therein he stated that the failures hitherto

had been caused only by the inadequacy of the

forces ; considerable difficulties had to be overcome

for bringing up the Army to a strength that wouldensure victory. But now they would no longer

retreat, as the Army was this day strong enough to

assume the offensive and crush the Japanese by

decisive blows.

The Proclamation of the Commander-in-Chief

' Appendix X.


was received by the troops with great enthusiasm.

The announcement of the offensive was joyfully-

re-echoed in the heart of every soldier. At last

they were to go forward to search for and beat

the enemy before whom they had continually re-

treated after bloody contests.

The day before he issued this Proclamation

General Kuropatkin sent the Commanding Generals

a wire in cypher fixing the advance for October 5.

The country which was to become the scene Topo-

of the combats is of very unequal nature. onhe^

West of the Mandarin Road an almost perfect country.

plain stretches to the Hun-ho ; apart from culti-

vation, view is only hampered by some few low

eminences. Some few hundred metres east of the

Mandarin Road a narrow low range of hills

stretches north and south, from which rise the

eminences east of Wu-li-tai-tsy, and of Schi-li-ho

and the Ko-ho-san, east of Pan-kiau-pu. North of

the Ko-ho-san the elevation continues as a terrace

8 to 10 metres high as far as the Hou-tai Hill,

thence descending gently to the Scha-ho. This

range of hills is separated from the heights forming

the western edge of the mountains by a broad

plain, gently rising and narrowing as it extends

north. While the western portion of the heights

forms a continuous bare hilly country, with some

eminences up to 100 metres high within the space

included by the roads Hou-liu-tun (4 kilometres

east of Scha-ho-pu)—Tun-san-tsy—Ta-pu, and

Fön-kia-pu— Ma-niu-tun— Sia-liu-ho-tsy— Ka-mi-

yo-ka-ko, the country east of it assumes more and

more a real mountainous character ; tlie individual

3

34 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARhills attain the heights of the lesser mountain

ranges in Germany, but are more rugged and

steeper, thus rendering movements of troops very

difficult off the few roads and bridle-paths, and

causing even Infantry much hardship when moving

outside the roads ; the other arms are altogether

confined to the roads.

The Scha-ho, a right tributary of the Tai-tsy-

ho, is on the average 50 to 80 metres broad at

the bottom ; the Schi-li-lio ^ and its northern

nameless affluent are of lesser breadth. All these

rivers are very sinuous, with a sandy bed about

8 to 10 metres deep, and sometimes steep banks.

Carrying but little water in the dry season at the

beginning of October, these rivers were fordable

at many places, affording therefore nowhere a

serious obstacle to Infantry, at least not on the

first days of battle, their valleys rather affording

cover to troops in motion and at rest. Artillery

was obliged to cross by the bridges.

None of the rivers mentioned were particularly

suitable for the defence ; their defensive use was

still more reduced by the fact that the villages

were frequently situated on both banks of the

river, forcing the defenders to select their position

at the edge of the village on the enemy's side,

thus leaving the obstacle in rear of the defender.

In addition to a few very open pine and

poplar woods, villages surrounded by high trees

and Chinese burial-places are strewn over the

country. The houses are frequently built of stone,

the yards and gardens being surrounded by clay

* Appendix X^'I.


walls 50 to 60 centimetres thick, and easily

adapted for defence. The villages are connected

by numerous roads formed by traffic ; they were in

good repair on the first days of battle.

The crops of the fields, millet and beans in

addition to gaoljan, were mostly cut, but the

rather pointed stumps of the gaoljan left in the

ground hampered the movements of troops, es-

pecially those of the mounted branches.

The heavy clay-soil can be worked easily, is

very firm, and was therefore very suitable for

constructing field entrenchments.

On October 4 ^ the Eastern Detachment began The

to move ; the remainder started on the next day. Detach-

Bv orders of the General Commanding tj^gnientbe-•' ^ gins to

Western Detachment,' the 17th Army Corps was advance

to advance on the right between the Hun-ho and beV5^

^

the road Tia-ho—San-ho-kuan-tun—La-mu-tun,

ending about 2 kilometres east of the railway

to Liao-yan, and the 10th Army Corps on the

left, the last-mentioned road and all the other

roads as far as the road Mukden—Pai-tschi-tschai

—Huan-schan—Pu-tsau-ma—Ta-pu— coal-pits of

Yen-tai being placed at its disposal.

The 17th Army Corps marched in two columns.

The right column (8 battalions, 24 guns, and half

a company of Sappers') crossed the Hun-ho by

• By Kuropatkin's telegram the advance was fixed for October 5 ;

but according to Russian accounts the Kastern Uetachnient began the

movement already on the 4th, probably on account of having to cross

the Hun-ho. The places reached on the 4th are not known.* Appendi.x XI.

' 1st Brigade 3rd Infantry Division^ one Abteilung 3rd Artillery

Brigade, and half a company 17th Sapper Battalion.

36 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARthe railway bridge, and then took the road by

Tso-tsuan-tun to Ta-su-kia-pu, the village its

main body was to reach on the 5th. The left

column (16 battalions, 48 guns, and 1 companyof Sappers ^) crossed somewhat farther east by

one of the numerous bridges, marching by Ma-kiao-tun along the railway to Su-ya-tun. Themarch of the corps was to be secured by General

lanshul. With this object the advanced guard of

5^ battalions, 16 guns, 5 squadrons, and half a

company of Sappers, hitherto standing at Scha-

ho-pu, was to mo^'e a few kilometres west to

Lin-schin-pu, on the Scha-ho, uniting, after being

relieved by the 10th Army Corps, with another

adv^anced guard, of 2 battalions and 8 guns,

standing there. A battalion which had been pushed

out to the right by the detachment at Lin-schin-pu

remained in Kuan-lin-pu.

The 10th Army Corps formed two advanced

guards. General Man's advanced guard, standing

already at Huan-schan, 18 kilometres south-east

of Mukden, and numbering 8 battalions, 1 sotnia,

16 guns, and 1 company of Sappers,' was to

stand still on October 5, and to march on the

6th by Lüan-fan-tun (7 kilometres south-west of

Huan-schan) and Pu-tsau-wa on Ta-pu at the

San-kai-seki-san ; for relieving the advanced guard

of the 17th Army Corps standing in Scha-ho-pu,

a new " right advanced guard," under General

' 35th Infantry Division, together with the 35th Artillery Brigade

and 1 company 17th Sapper Battalion.

' 1st Brigade 31st Infantry Division, 1 sotnia 1st Orenburg

Cossack Regiment, 1st and 7th Batteries 3l8t Artillery Brigade, and

1 company 6th Sapper Battalion.


Riabinkin, was formed, which, numbering 8 bat-

tahons, 1 sotnia, 24 guns, 1 company of Sappers,

and 1 Balloon company,^ was to arrive in Scha-

ho-pu on the 5th, reaching, on the 6th, Hun-pau-schan, 7 kilometres south of Scha-ho-pu. Themain body of the corps ^ was marching with one

column each by the Mandarin Road, and by the

road Tia-ho—San-ho-kuan-tun

—

Szö-kau-tun, and

was to advance on the first day's march to about

Sia-örr-tun, reaching on the second day's march

the line of villages Scha-ho-pu—Llian-fan-tun.

General Grekov's half Orenburg Cossack Division

(12 sotnias and 6 guns ^), attached to the Western

Detachment, was directed to continue reconnoitring

between the Hun-ho and Scha-ho, to keep touch

with Dembovski's Detachment, and to concentrate

on the second day's march at Wan-tschuan-tsy,

10 kilometres north-west of Schi-li-ho. Colonel

Shabyko, commanding the Ural Cossack Brigade,

was charged with continuing reconnoitring in front

between the Scha-ho and the Mukden

—

Fön-kia-pu

—Bian-yu-pu-sa road ; the main body of the

brigade was to concentrate at Hun-pau-schan on

October 6.

The orders for the advance were carried out,

with some few alterations. On the evening of

* 2nd Brigade 31st Infantry DivisioHj 2nd, Gth, and 8th Batteries

31st Artillery Brigade, 1 sotnia 1st Orenburg (Jossack Regiment,

1 company 6th Sapper Battalion, and East Siberian Balloon (Company.

The actual commander of the 2nd Brigade 31st Infantry Division wasGeneral Wassiliev, who, however, had not yet recovered from his

wounds.' 9th Infantry Division, 9th Artillery Brigade, 4 sotnias 1st

Orenburg Cossack Regiment, and 1 company 6th Sapper Battaliou.

* Horse Artillery.

38 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARPoints October 6 the Western Detachment occupied the

on^Octo- following positions : The 17th Army Corps on^^ ^- the right had reached with its advanced guard

Hun-lin-pu and Liu-kia-san-kia-tsy, and, with an

advanced detachment, Liu-tan-kou ; outposts were

standing on the Schi-li-ho. The main body

was standing in two groups, at Ta-lian-tun (3rd

Infantry Division), and at Lin-schin-pu (35th In-

fantiy Division).

Of the 10th Army Corps, General Riabinkin's

advanced guard was at Hun-pau-schan, a small

mixed detachment ^ under Colonel Solomko having

been pushed forward to Sin-tschuan. The left

advanced guard was standing at Ho-schen-kou,

with outposts on the heights north of San-kia-tsy.

The main body, under General Gerschelmann, had

reached Scha-ho-pu.

Within the lines of the advanced guards, as well

as within those of the main bodies, entrenching

commenced as demanded by Bilderling's Orders.^

Grekov's Cavalry was at Wan-tschuan as directed,

echeloned in advance of the 17th Army Corps'

right wing ; the Ural Cossack Brigade, with the

exception of two sotnias, remaining with the 10th

Army Corps, had disappeared behind the front.

The captive balloon, " Field-Marshal Gurko,"

had also arrived at Scha-ho-pu, together with the

Balloon Company, but it was never used ; for

on the very next day it tore loose in a strong

wind, flying away without its crew.

' Two battalions 124th Infantry Regiment, 4 guns, 3 troops of

Cossacks, and detachments of Scouts from 124th Infantry Regiment.* Appendix XI.


General Dembovski had apparently received

another order, directing him not to advance on

the right bank of the Him-ho, but on the left.

The detachment crossed the stream at Ma-tou-lan

on October 6, taking up a position at Ta-wan-

kan-pu, and pushing an advanced guard to Sin-

tai-tsy.

The result of the first two days of operations

with the Western Detachment was extremely

poor. On October 5 the troops had started in

high spirits and with flourish of trumpets, in joyful

expectation of a vigorous offensive ; but, scarcely

10 miles distant from the " JNIukden Position," a

halt was made again on the 6th, to prepare once

more some fresh "positions."

Meanwhile, reports about the enemy had come Fresh in-

in, which, though they were of a general nature, aboSTheseemed to General Baron Bilderling significant enemy is

enough for making some new arrangements.^'""""^

One spy reported that nine hostile Divisions,

at least 120,000 men, were concentrated about

Yen-tai, the Japanese Commander-in-Chief being

there too.

This report should have certainly been received

with a great deal of caution. It was not likely

that the Japanese should have concentrated almost

their whole Army within a limited space that could

be enveloped by the Russians in the east and west.

But there could be no surprise that strong forces

should be reported in the neighbourhood of

Yen-tai. According to Kuropatkin's General

Order ^ four Divisions were supposed to be north

^ Appendix IX

40 THE RUSSO-JAPAT\^ESE AVAR

of Liao-yan. Since, moreover, two Divisions

were assumed to be south of San-de-pu and twoat the coal-pits, the Western Detachment wasbound to expect meeting with strong forces of the

enemy. For the success of the operations this could

only be looked upon as favourable ; for the moreforces of the Japanese Army the Western Detach-

ment was holding fast, the more successfully would

turn out the advance of the Eastern Detachment,

w^hich was to bring about the decision. By im-

mediately reinforcing Bilderling's weak forces from

the reserves, Kuropatkin could have made himeasily strong enough to attack, which would have

been the best way of solving his task.

But, after the intelligence received, the situation

was now looked upon by the Western Detachmentas having completely changed. General Slut-

shevski, commanding the 10th Army Corps, being

asked for his opinion, declared it impossible for

the Western Detachment to continue its move-ment in the face of the far superior forces of the

enemy. The effect of the Eastern Detachment's

operations must be awaited absolutely. It would

be therefore necessary to halt for the present, or

even to retire again eventually, so as to be able

to repel the attack of the Japanese in a "goodposition." General Baron Bilderling agreed with

this opinion in all essentials, ordering the WesternDetachment to remain in its present position on

October 7, saying that the greatest caution was

necessary, and that it was perhaps possible to

work forward from "position to position." General

Kuropatkin, who took quarters in San-lin-tsy on


October 6, evidently approved of these measures

too, for no orders were received from him altering

anything.

Though there was no sign of an impending

attack by the Japanese, the Russian offensive was

ah'eady paralysed, even at this early stage, by a

preconceived notion.

Consequently the Western Detachment remained

halting on October 7, the advanced guards only

pushing some portions farther south, probably

for the purpose of reconnoitring. This brought

about a small action with Japanese outposts at

Wu-li-tai-tsy, leading to a temporary occupation

of that place by the Russians.

On the following day, October 8, the Western The

Detachment was to resume its advance. ButJJ^^^^j^"

taking into consideration the supposed state ofmentre-

affairs with the enemy, and no intelligence from halting

the Eastern Detachment arriving. General Kuro- ^^^^^^^'

patkin decided to stop the Western Detachment

for the present. He ordered the entrenchments to

be continued, and, in case of a hostile attack, to

hold with the main bodies the positions occupied

by the advanced guards. The main body of the

17th Army Corps thereupon moved forward to

the line Tsun-lun-yen-tun—Tschien-liu-tan-kou

—

Liu-tan-kou—Pan-kiau-pu, improving further the

positions begun by the advanced guards. Themain body of the 10th Army Corps (9th Infantry

Division, the 31st Infantry Division having been

detailed as advanced guards) only marched to the

line San-kia-tsy— Hou-huan-hua-tien, The ad-

vanced guards of the 10th Army Corps worked

42 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARat the position Hun-pau-schan—Nin-kuan-tun

—

Man-kia-fön. The earthworks on the Scha-ho,

evacuated by the main bodies, were now named"rear-position," and still further improved. Toprotect the working-parties in the main position,

the 17th Army Corps pushed its advanced guard

to the Schi-h-ho between Nan-kuan-tsy and the

village of Schi-li-ho, where it had to entrench

itself. The corps therefore, on the fourth day of

the " offensive," could make use of three defensive

positions, one behind the other, not including the

"Position of Mukden." The 10th Corps secured its

working-parties by the detachments it had pushed

to Sin-tschuan and to the neighbourhood between

Man-kia-fön and San-kia-tsy. With the object

of strengthening General Man's advanced guard,

which, as left wing of the Western Detachment,

with its front refused, was to entrench the heights

between Man-kia-fön and Yin-schou-tun, and

helping his working-parties, General Kuropatkin

sent him from the General Reserve four battalions

of the 4th Siberian Army Corps, whose advanced

guard reached the neighbourhood of Hsin-lun-tun

on October 8.

The heights occupied by the Western Detach-

ment afforded an extensive view. Towards the

west and south-west the plain stretched perfectly

level for miles without the slightest rise. Towards

the south, too, the country was very flat, height

" 99," about 7 kilometres south-west of Liao-yan,^

being distinctly visible. But view was inter-

cepted here by the heights of Wu-li-tai-tsy, 4

1 Vol. III., " Liao-yau," Sketch 2.


kilometres south of Schi-li-ho, which were occupied

by Japanese outposts. The Russian entrenchments

consisted of shelter-trenches and numerous pivots ;

gun-pits had been constructed about half a kilo-

metre in rear of the main position.

For the advance of the Eastern Detachment the Advance

GeneralOrder had apportioned the space enclosed by Eastern

the roads Fu-lin—Pu-lie-san-tsy—Bian-vu-pu-sa— Detach-ment

Pen-si-hu, and Fu-schun— Ta-yu— Pa-kia-tsy— until Oc-

Tschau-huan-tschai—San-kia-tsy on the Tai-tsy-ho. *° ^^ *

The line Yen-tau-tsy

—

Schi-hui-tschön was to be

reached with the main bodies -on October 5, and

the line Tai-kia-miau-tsy—Hei-sun-pu—Pa-kia-tsy

on the next day.

The 1st Siberian Army Corps was marching on

the right with a column each by Ko-kuan-tsy and

Yen-tau-tsy, and the 3rd Siberian Army Corps ^

on the left by La-ku-yu and Schi-hui-tschön. The2nd Siberian Army Corps in the centre had already

moved to the neighbourhood of Hei-sun-pu before

the middle of September.^ On the evening of

October 6 the Eastern Detachment was stationed

as follows : The 1st Siberian Army Corps had got

to Hou-schi-tai and Tai-kia-miau-tsy, having pushed

an advanced guard to Tsai-kia-tun. Lieutenant-

Colonel Grekov, with six sotnias, was dispatched to

Liu-tschen-ku-tun, 4 kilometres east of Fön-kia-

pu, to reconnoitre towards the line Sia-liu-ho-tsy—

Bian-yu-pu-sa, and to establish touch with Mish-

tshenko's Brigade, standing at Liian-fan-tun, from' Right column : 3rd East Siberian Rifle Division ; left column :

Corps Headquarters, 6th East Siberian Rifle Division, and 2nd Brigade

2nd Siberian Infantry Division.

» P. 11.

44 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAROctober 6 to 8. The reinforced 5th East Siberian

Rifle Division, which was more or less the 2nd

Siberian Army Corps, ^ was standing at Hei-sun-pu,

its advanced guard being at Yin-pan, east of Kan-

to-H-san. Of the 3rd Siberian Army Corps the

main body had reached the Pan-mau-Hn Pass and

Pa-kia-tsy ; advanced guards were at the Tsöu-tu-

lin Pass and at Kau-tu-hn, on the road to Yin-pan;

a detachment under Colonel Drushinin,^ which

was afterwards to act as flank-guard, had been

pushed to Tschau -huan-tschai. The Siberian

Cossack Division, under General Samsonov, was

standing at Tun-kou in front of and half-way

between the two columns of the 3rd Siberian

Army Corps ; it was ordered to reconnoitre be-

yond the line Huan-lin-tsy (9 kilometres south of

Tun-kou)—Tschau-huan-tschai, and to report on

all the roads and paths leading in a westerly

direction towards the section of ground Bian-yu-

pu-sa— Sien-schan-tsy (10 kilometres north of

Pen-si-hu) from the line Ta-pei-kou (6 kilometres

south-west of Tun-kou)— Kau-tai-tsy (7 kilo-

metres north-east of Pen-si-hu). Samsonov was,

moreover, to establish touch with Rennenkampf 's

Detachment standing on the Tai-tsy-ho within the

space San-kia-tsy— Mi-tsy— Pei-lin-pu-tsy. Themovements of the Eastern Detachment having

constantly to be prepared first by detailed reconnais-

sance, owing to the very imperfect maps, General

Baron Stackelberg employed on that duty General

»p. 11, footnote 1.

' Two battalions, three detachments mounted Scouts, two guns, one

sotnia, and half a Sapper company.


Staff officers in addition. They established during

the first days of the march the fact of the Japanese

having entrenched themselves on the steep hills

south of Bian-yu-pu-sa ; an entrenched advanced

position on the line Hu-schi-tai—Tun-kou was

occupied by them as well.

Although this intelligence did not furnish any stackel-

new information, the occupation of the heightso^Jf j.g ^

at Bian-yu-pu-sa having been known already day of

through the reconnoitring action of September 17,^ October

it had a similar paralysing effect upon the opera- ^'

tions here, as with the Western Detachment, for

General Baron Stackelberg ordered October 7 to

be a day of rest—it is true by order of superior

authority, as it seems. After performing a marchof scarcely 30 kilometres this solicitude for the

welfare of the troops was, we may say, uncalled

for. The day was wasted, and again to the ad-

vantage of the enemy. Only the 3rd Siberian

Army Corps extended somewhat its feelers by

portions of its advanced guards pushing to the line

Tschin-hsi-sai—Schin-hai-lin Pass ; the left flank-

guard remained at Tschau-huan-tschai. Samsonov's

advanced bodies, too, pushed forward, driving awaysome Japanese patrols in the valley Scliin-hai-lin

—Li-kia-wo-pön.

Yet, not even on the following day, but only

on October 9 did General Baron Stackelberg in-

tend to attack the Japanese at Bian-yu-pu-sa.

The 8th of October he wished to make use of

for moving the main bodies up to the advanced

guards, and reinforcing the Artillery in front.

' p. 24.

46 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARAnother day was therefore to be spent in pre-

parations. By this o\'er-caution a favourable

chance for gaining a success was missed. HadStackelberg decided to attack the enemy at Bian-

yu-pu-sa already on October 7, he might have

gained a victory which, as a preliminary to the

great offensive, must have had a most valuable

effect. On the heights south of Bian-yu-pu-sa

was standing completely isolated the reinforced

Japanese Guard Kobi Brigade under General

Umesawa.^ All the Eastern Detachment needed

to do was merely to continue marching by its

former roads, the right of the 1st Siberian ArmyCorps by Liu-tschen-ku-tun—Yen-sin-tun, and the

left of the 3rd Siberian Army Corps by the Kau-

tu-lin Pass—Schun-schui-tsy. The Japanese could

then, while the 2nd Siberian Army Corps wasadvancing in front, be attacked and enveloped on

both wings and be beaten. Success was guaranteed

alone by the overwhelming numbers of the

Russians. But as Stackelberg did not make use

of the favourable chance he had, or perhaps

shirked the responsibility of entering upon decisive

action without special orders, the Japanese were

able to escape in time the danger of being enve-

loped. On the morning of October 8 the Russians

found the heights abandoned. The Japanese

brigade in its retreat having left behind in their

former position small tents, accoutrements, also

portions of a telegraph station, the Russians almost

thought they had gained a victory. Kuropatkin,

too, looked upon the event in that light, as he

' Six battalions^ one squadron, and one battery. (Pp. 24, 25.)


afterwards congratulated the Commander of the

Eastern Detachment on this first success.

The withdrawal of the Japanese having been Portions

ascertained, the leading portions of the Eastern Eastern

Detachment pushed forward, being on the evening ^^^^'

of October 8 in the following positions : The move for-

advanced guard of the 1st Siberian Army Corps October

had entrenched itself on the heights at Sun-wu- ^•

pu-tsy, outposts having been pushed some kilo-

metres south-west in the general direction of

Yin-tsien-pu. A portion of the 2nd Siberian

Army Corps' advanced guard was holding the

position on the knolls south-east of Wei-tsy-kou.

It cannot be ascertained whether the main bodies

of the 1st and 2nd Siberian Army Corps closed

up as intended on the advanced guards, and up

to what places they moved forward. With the

3rd Siberian Army Corps the Field Artillery,

hitherto attached to the left column, was handed

over to the right column (3rd East Siberian Rifle

Division) ; that column only marched about 7

kilometres in a southerly direction to Hou-lou-

tsy-gou, while the left column (6th East Siberian

Rifle Di\dsion) reached with its main body Tschui-

kia-pu-tsy—Li-kia-pu-tsy, thus approaching Pen-

si-hu to within about 13 kilometres. The centre

of the Eastern Detachment (2nd Siberian ArmyCorps), and the right column of the 3rd Siberian

Army Corps were therefore remarkably far behind,

whilst the left had already come in touch with

the enemy.

Samsonov's Cavalry had advanced in the direc-

tion of Sien-schan-tsy, occupying that village after

48 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARhaving driven away weak hostile outposts from

the neighbourhood of Kau-tai-tsy.

Rennenkampfs Detachment, after leaving a

guard at San-kia-tsy, reached with its foremost

portions the line Kau-tai-tsy— VVei-niu-nin ; two

companies occupied a pass east of Sei-ko on the

road to Pen-si-hu.

The The General Reserve had marched forward in

Reserve Compliance with orders.^ On October 6 the 1st

aud 6th Army Corps moved into the space Schan-hsün-

Army kou-tsy—Pai-tschi-tschai— San-lin-tsy, and the

foUow. '^^^ Siberian Army Corps into the space Liu-

kuan-tun—Yin-tschen-tsy. An advanced guard

of the 1st Army Corps was standing at Huan-schan. The Transbaikal Cossack Brigade of

General Mishtshenko which had hitherto been

active in front concentrated at Liian-fan-tun on

the Scha-ho. On October 7 the 4th Siberian

Army Corps got on to the road San-lin-tsy

—

Örr-tau-kou,^ while the 1st Army Corps remained

on the whole stationary, pushing only its advanced

guard from Huan-schan to Sa-ho-tun. OnOctober 8 the 4th Siberian Army Corps, which

had received orders from Kuropatkin to close the

gap between the Eastern and Western Detach-

ments, reached Hsin-lun-tun with its advanced

guard ; the 1st Army Corps reached Pai-tschi-

tschai and Lo-sien-tun.^

^ The 4th Siberian Army Corps bivouacked at Orr-tau-kou on

October 7, with its advanced guard in the neighbourhood of Fön-

kia-pu.

' Army Corps Headquarters and 22nd Infantry Division : Pai-tschi-

tschai ; 37th Infantry Division : Lo-sien-tun.


The 6th Siberian Army Corps, having meanwhile

completed detraining at IVIukden, had likewise

marched forward on the 7th, reaching the space

Ta-tai— Lan-schan-pu— Ta~su-kia-pu ; it was

therefore standing echeloned to the right behind

the right wing of the AVestern Detachment. Thecorps having been obliged to leave behind the

1st Brigade 55th Infantry Division as well as two

batteries which were to be employed in the posi-

tions at Tie-lin and Mukden, it entered operations

weakened by a quarter of its strength. It was

also very annoying for the corps to be without

either Cavalry or detachments of mounted Scouts,^

being thus unable to reconnoitre or establish touch

with the neighbouring troops by means of its

own. On October 8 the corps remained in the

space assigned to it.

The weather was dry and bright, but at night

and in the morning already sensibly cool ; at times

strong winds were blowing, raising up a great

amount of disagreeable dust. The mounted arms

mostly marched in great-coats ; those dismounted

partly in tunics, partly in shirt-blouses ; some menalso in blue padded Chinese jackets.

* According to a Russian source. Afterwards six sotuias of different

units are said to have joined the corps—namely_, three from the

2nd Werchueudinsk Cossack Regiment, two from the 5th Ural Cossack

Regiment, and one from the 10th Orenburg Cossack Regiment.

Ill

THE MEASURES OF THE JAPANESE ATTHE BEGINNING OF OCTOBER

Various On tlie Japanese side the impression gained daily

pSntto ^^^^^ ground, during the first days of October,a Russian that the Russians were planning some extensive

operations. Especially Headquarters of the 1st

Sketch 2. Army were convinced of the enemy entering upon a

general attack and directing the main blow against

the Japanese right wing. Oyama's Headquarters

did not share this view at first ; the events, how-

ever, of the next few days showed that General

Baron Kuroki was right. On October 6, strong

Russian forces, entrenching on the heights north-

east of Bian-yu-pu-sa,^ appeared opposite General

Umesawa's Brigade. Several strong cavalry de-

tachments, moreover, advanced towards the weakoutpost-line between Bian-yu-pu-sa and the San-

kai-seki-san, trying to pierce it. The Japanese

Cavalry available here being inferior to the Russian

Cavalry, there was the danger of the Guard Kobi

Brigade being completely cut off.

Opposite the 4th and 2nd Armies the symp-

toms of an impending Russian offensive were' Probably from the 2nd Siberian Army Corps. (P. 44.)

50

THE MEASURES OF THE JAPANESE 51

increasing too. Small Russian detachments

appeared here and there ; frequent skirmishes

with Japanese outposts took place. As the

strength of the Russian detachments advancing

was constantly growing, the 2nd Army drew back

somewhat the detachments it had sent forward

on October 5.

On the afternoon of October 6 intelligence

arrived at Headquarters of the 1st Army re-

moving every doubt about the enemy's intentions.

It was reported, probably by spies, that the

Russian Army had begun crossing the Hun-hoon October 3. On the 5th, there had remained

only weak forces on the northern bank ; the

main forces were marching in a south-easterly

direction.

The forces standing opposite General Umesawa's Kuroki

Brigade were therefore to be viewed as the [^^^^^j.^®

advanced guards of the Russian Offensive Army ; '" ^ posi-

the brigade seemed very much in danger. So readiness

as not to sacrifice it, it had either to be with-t^e Hue

drawn in line with the Army, or the Army i^en-si-

itself must be pushed to the heights south of pit»,

the Scha-ho. General Baron Kuroki, not wishing

to be responsible for the isolated advance of his

Army without an order from General Headquarters,

resolved to withdraw the brigade. But also his

Army seemed seriously threatened, should it con-

tinue further in its present position in an expectant

attitude. General Baron Kuroki therefore re-

ported to Oyama's Headquarters that the Russians

were, without any shred of doubt, advancing to

attack the Japanese right wing, and that he was

52 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARtherefore going to place the 1st Army in a

position of readiness behind the hne Pen-si-hu

—

coal-pits. With this object he issued at 2 a.m.

on October 7 in Fön-schan, the following

Army Order

" 1. The enemy is advancing south from the

Hun-ho valley east of Mukden. The heads of

his columns must have reached the line Schun-

schui-tsy ^—Kan-to-li-san "—Tsu-ti-tschuan-tsy ^ on

October G.

" 2. The Army will occupy the line : neighbour-

hood of Liu-schu-kia—heights south of Yin-tsien-

pu— coal-pits.

" 3. The Guard Kobi Brigade will go back to

Liu-schu-kia as quickly as possible, occupying a

position on the heights there.

" 4. The 12th Division wall start to-day and

occupy the heights south of Yin-tsien-pu.

" 5. The Guards will concentrate at Tschan-hei-

tun. Entrenchments are to be constructed on the

heights north of that place.

" A detachment of the Guards will remain on

the height north of the coal-pits.

" 6. The 2nd Division will remain in its present

position.

" 7. The 2nd Cavalry Brigade will reconnoitre

towards Schuan-tai-tsy.*

^ 10| kilometres east-north-east of Bian-yu-pu-sa.^ 6 kilometres north of Bian-yu-pu-sa.^ lOj kilometres north-west of Bian-yu-pu-sa.* 5 kilometres east of Schi-li-ho.

I


" 8. The General Reserve will arrive at Ta-yau-

pu^ on the 8th.

" 9. I shall be in Fön-schan."

After this Order had been issued to the troops,

the directives of the Commander-in-Chief arrived.

Marshal IMarqiiis Oyama had also arrived at Oyama, . , , ,^ . . agrees

the conclusion that the Russians were going to with

assume the offensive. The latest intelligenceJ^j^^g

'^

arriving at his Headquarters had confirmed the

advance of strong hostile forces ; large masses of

troops were said to be standing at Schun-schui-

tsy (10|^ kilometres east-north-east of Bian-yu-pu-

sa), at the San-kai-seki-san (9 kilometres north of

the coal-pits), and at Wu-li-tai-tsy (3^ kilometres

south of Schi-li-ho). This intelligence, supple-

mented by the reports of the 1st Army, brought

Oyama round to the same view Kuroki had

already expressed —namely, that the Russians

intended to direct their main blow upon the right

wing of the Japanese. A lucky chance, moreover,

so willed it that at the Ta-lin Pass a detailed order

of Kuropatkin to Stackelberg was found on the

dead body of a Russian General Staff officer,

according to which Stackelberg was to turn the

right flank of the Japanese and push on to Liao-

yan. The moment Marshal Oyama had clearly

discerned the enemy's intentions he matured the

resolve not to be forced into the defensive by the

attack of the Russians, but to assume the offensive

himself He did not, however, intend to attack

at once, but to let the Russians first run up

against his prepared positions, so as to break the

' 5 kilometres south of the coal-pits.

54 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARforce of their offensive. For the moment it

appeared therefore advisable only to get the

Armies into a position of readiness. The 4th

and 2nd Armies received orders to concentrate

their troops within the sections assigned to them

;

the 4th Army was at the same time to extend

towards the right to the coal-pits, and replace

the outposts of the Guard Division which was

moving east ; every one was to be prepared to

assume the counter ofFensiv^e. The intentions of

the 1st Army's Headquarters were approved.

The 1st Army, on October 7, carried out the

movements ordered by its commander : the 12th

Division was standing south of Yin-tsien-pu ; of

the Guards, the 1st Brigade had marched by Hui-

yau to Tan-kia-pu-tsy, and the 2nd to Tschan-hei-

tun ; there they commenced at once to entrench in

the evening. Great difficulties were met in pre-

paring the position, owing to the steepness of the

slopes and the hardness of the rocky soil. The2nd Division had remained in its former position,

where it likewise began to entrench.

Rennen- Meanwhile, on the extreme right the advance of

adduce Rennenkampfs Detachment had made itself felt,

is being Qn the evening of the 7th the 1st Army received

the ex- a report from the commander of a Line of Com-

rlffhTmunication battalion stationed at Pen-si-hu, that

wing. about 2,000 hostile Cavalry with five or six guns,

advancing in the Tai-tsy-ho valley, had reached

San-kia-tsy on October 6. This intelligence, as

well as the Army Order, was communicated to

General Umesawa by the telegraph connection

leading by Pen-si-hu to Bian-yu-pu-sa. In the


face of the Russian forces advancing in the Tai-

tsy-ho valley General Umesawa considered it

imperative to get away from the enemy opposite

him by a hurried night march. Thanks to Stackel-

berg's inactivity the brigade succeeded in escaping

unmolested ;^ it arrived at Liu-schu-kia on the

morning of October 8. During that march its

commander received the report of the Russian

forces advancing on Pen-si-hu having been

strengthened by Infantry, about three battalions ;

and of the enemy having already pushed back the

weak Japanese outposts, and crossed the Tai-tsy-ho

with a portion of his force, probably with the

object of advancing on Pen-si-hu from the south

as well. Large supplies of all kinds ^ being stored

in Pen-si-hu and Si-ho-yan, it was undesirable to

let these places fall into the hands of the enemy,

particularly Pen-si-hu. General Umesawa there-

fore decided to send to Pen-si-hu one battalion

4th Kobi Regiment and two guns in support of

the Line of Communication Defence Troops.

The commander of the Line of Communicationbattalion in that place, consisting of three com-

panies 39th Kobi Regiment, had already with-

drawn his outposts to the fortified Mei-san and

La-ut-ha-la-sa on October 8 ; they were composed

of one company and a half, and had probably been

standing along the stream between Wei-niu-nin

and Jo-gu. The retirement was made under

> P. 46.

' lu Si-ho-yan (1,5 kilometres south of Peu-si-hu) there were,

moreover, large stores of ammunition for the Murata Rifle, with which

the Kobi troops were armed. One company of Line of Communication

Defence Troops formed the garrison of Si-ho-yan.


Russian Artillery fire, and hence not without some

loss. But Rennenkampfs vanguards, following

up the outposts, confined themselves to occupying

the outpost position that had been abandoned.

After the arrival of the Guard Kobi Brigade at

Liu-schu-kia the forces on the extreme right were

distributed as follows : The battalion of the 4th

Kobi Regiment detailed in support of the Line of

Communication Defence Troops marched to the

heights east of Pen-si-hu. Colonel Hirata, com-

manding the 39th Kobi Regiment, with the seven

companies now at his disposal, formed three groups,

directing the right gi'oup to occupy the heights

east of Riu-wo-bio ; the centre group, with which

were also the eight guns, to occupy the Mei-san

and the La-ut-ha-la-sa Hill ; and the left group

the Seki-san and the heights adjoining west of it.

The position to be defended extending almost 10

kilometres, the defensive line was exceedingly

weak. The military bridge constructed at Riu-

wo-bio was guarded by a section of Pioneers

;

Pen-si-hu village was not occupied at all.

The 1st Guard Kobi Regiment and one battalion

4th Kobi Regiment were stationed astride of the

Ta-lin Pass, two companies of the 2nd Guard

Kobi Regiment being sent to the Tu-men-tsy-

lin Pass ; the rest remained in reserve at Liu-

schu-kia.

The The portions of the 4th Army still south of Liao-

4th Army yan—the 10th Division, 3rd, 10th, and 11th Kobiis being Brigades, and 1st Field ArtiUery Brigade—were, by

trated Oyama's directions, moved forward to the northernforward,

^^^^^j^ ^f ^j^^ Tai-tsy-ho. The 10th Division took


up a position on the branch Hne to the coal-pits,

the 20th Brigade occupying the eastern half of

the position prepared there from the coal-pits to

Sia-tai-tsy, and the 8th Brigade the western

portion. At the Mandarin Road the 5th Division

continued the front, moving up to La-mi-pu. Tothe Kobi Brigades, as well as to the 1st Field

Artillery Brigade, places were assigned behind

the 10th and 5th Divisions/ Army Headquarters

went from Liao-yan to Fa-schi-ko-schan.

The detachment which the commander of the A small

10th Division had pushed to La-mi-pu ^ had mean- fouXt at

while got in close touch with the enemv.^ When ^^^"-^i-

,,. . p .tai-tsy

mtelligence came m or strong Russian columns on Octo-

having crossed the Hun-ho between Fu-schun and^^

Kiu-san, General Otani ^ caused the 40th Infantry

Regiment, with Artillery and Engineers, to goforward and reconnoitre in a northerly direction

early on October 6. The detachment reached

Wu-li-tai-tsy without encountering the enemy

;

it left there, as well as on the height east of it,

some small force for further observation, going

then back to Yen-tai. On the following day

these posts of observation ascertained a hostile

Infantry brigade, with one regiment of Cavalry,^

to be standing in an entrenched position at Pan-

kiau-pu, and about five battalions in a similar

' The places are not known.^ P. 23. At first the 5th Di^'ision puslied an outpost to La-mi-pu,

being relieved afterwards by Otani's Detachment from the 10th

Division. Otani seems to have remained at La-mi-pu even after the

5th Division had moved up to that place.

^ P. 41. * Commanding 8th Brigade.

' From the Russian 17th Army Corps.


one at Hun-pau-schan.^ About 11.40 a.m. a

Russian battalion and several guns advanced from

Liu-tan-kou south along the railway, halting west of

Schi-li-ho. The village itself was being occupied

by some other Infantry and Cavalry. In the

aiternoon a battalion came out of Schi-li-ho, de-

ploying at Siau-wen-kou against Wu-li-tai-tsy, and

pushing back the Japanese post of observation.

Eight guns at Schi-li-ho opened fire on the post

on the neighbouring hill, forcing it to give way

south. On hearing the sound of guns Colonel

Kamada advanced with the 40th Infantry Regi-

ment from Yen-tai, deploying the 1st Battalion

on the road, the 2nd Battalion to the left of it,

and ordering the mountain-guns to come into

action. Towards 4.30 p.m. the Japanese guns

opened fire, the Infantry attacking the Russians and

pushing them again from Wu-li-tai-tsy, as well

as from the height on which they had meanwhile

established themselves. Colonel Kamada then

left the 3rd Battalion in the captured position,

returning with the rest to Yen-tai towards evening.

On October 8 two additional mountain batteries

were attached to the regiment to make it more

fit for an eventually renewed reconnaissance. But

Colonel Kamada, fearing that, when reconnoitring

with the whole of his detachment, an action might

easily ensue, the limits of which he could no longer

control, pushed only the 2nd Battalion to Schan-

yau-pu, so as to be able to support the 3rd Battalion

in case of need, but keeping for the rest his forces

concentrated at Yen-tai.

' From the Russiau 10th Army Corps.


Oyama's orders apparently did not cause anyTheJapa-

change in the disposition of the 2nd Army. A?my re-

Army Headquarters went from Liao-yan to Ta- j"^"^

tsy-fan, on the northern bank of the Tai-tsy-ho,

on October 8. The 1st Cavalry Brigade had

pushed to the neighbourhood of Hei-kou-tai, on

the Hun-ho ; during the last days it had already

had some slight skirmishes with Russian advanced

bodies, probably from Dembovski's Detachment.

IV

THE FIRST FOUR DAYS OF BATTLE

October 9

RrssiAKs General Kuropatkin was well aware of the

The Wes- difficulties the Eastern Detachment had to con-

tachraeiit tend with in its operations, and that no rapid

^^^, success could be expected fi'om it. He thereforeCentre ^

^advance scnt the ordcr to Stackelberg on October 8, before

banks of ^^^ intelligence of the Japanese having evacuatedthe Schi- ^j^g position of Biau-yu-pu-sa had come in, "to

against confiue himsclf on the 9th to an attack merely

nese^^^ upon the advanced position." To give more

front. emphasis to this short directive, he soon afterwards

Sketch 3. supplemented it by another letter,^ enjoining him

once more not to attack the enemy's main position

until the 10th, especially on account of the 4th

Siberian Army Corps and of Rennenkampfs

' " Even if the eneniy^ threatened by Genei-al Ivanov with euvelop-

ment, evacuates the advanced position on October 8 or during the

night 8-9 without fighting, I do not consider ourselves sufficiently

prepared to venture already upon the attack on the enemy's main

position on the 9th, having special regard to General v. Rennenkampf

and to the 4th Siberian Army Corps. 1 fix upon the 10th for that attack.

Should great difficulties arise through the topography of the country,

or owing to superior numbers of the enemy, the attack must be

continued for several days consecutively.'

60

FIRST FOUR DAYS OF BATTLE 61

Detachment. The Commander-in-Chief probably

wanted to bring up the 4th Siberian Army Corps

farther south first, to have it ready in support ; of

the arrival of Rennenkampfs Detachment on the

extreme left he apparently had not yet received

any news.

Kuropatkin therefore expected the decisive at-

tacks of the Eastern Detachment to begin on

October 10. To prevent the Japanese from sup-

porting the portions opposite the Eastern Detach-

ment, he considered it necessary to push the

Western Detachment somewhat south. General

Baron Bilderling was therefore ordered to movethe main bodies of the 10th and 17th Army Corps

up to the line of the advanced guards (which,

moreover, had been done in part already on

October 8 ^), and to push these likewise a little

more forward, but not so far as to involve them

in serious action—about as far as the line

Nan-wu-li-tai (near the railway bridge over the

Schi-li-ho)—Fan-kia-tun. The General Reserve,

too, received orders to march forward. The 1st

Army Corps was to push its advanced guard to

Tun-san-ho, and the 6th Siberian Army Corps

was to occupy the villages of Schau-kia-lin-tsy,

Lan-schan-pu, and Pen-tien-tsy.

The Commander of the Western Detachment

having transmitted Kuropatkin's order to the

Generals commanding, another order of the Com-mander-in-Chief arrived, placing the left advanced

guard of the 10th Army Corps (Mau) and the

Transbaikal Cossack Brigade (Mishtshenko) under

' p. 41.

62 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARthe orders of the 4th Siberian Army Corps.

General Sarubaiev, commanding that army corps,

was directed to advance and take up a position to the

left, and in advance of the Western Detachment.

The advanced guard of the 17th Army Corps

had already been pushed to the Schi-li-ho on

October 8'

; it therefore continued its march on

the 9th by the Mandarin Road, driving weakJapanese outposts from Örr-tai-tsy, Schuan-tai-tsy,

and Ke-de-gou, and occupying these villages as

well as \A'^u-li-tai-tsy, from which the Japanese

withdrew without fighting. Colonel Stakovich ^

was sent with a small force (one battalion, six

squadrons, and two guns) by the right bank of the

Scha-ho to the \illage of Ta-tu-san-pu, from which

the enemy's outposts likewise withdrew. General

Grekov's Orenburg Cossack Brigade also arrived

at Ta-tu-san-pu. The main bodies of the 17th

Army Corps, on the evening of October 9, were

standing as follows : The 35th Infantry Division

with a brigade each at Liu-tan-kou and Liu-kia-

san-kia-tsy (one battalion had been pushed out

to the southern portion of Hun-lin-pu) ; the 1st

Brigade 3rd Infantry Division, with an Abteilung

3rd Artillery Brigade, and half a Sapper company,

had billeted in Lan-tsy-tai, on the Schi-li-ho, west

of the railway. Portions of the 35th Infantry

Division were entrenching along the right tribu-

tary of the Schi-li-ho between Tschien-liu-tan-kou

and Pan-kiau-pu.

While the left advanced guard of the 10th

Army Corps was joining the 4th Siberian Army* P. 42. * Commanding 52nd Dragoons.


Corps, General Riabinkin, in carrying out the

General Order, was marching with the right ad-

vanced guard at noon from Hun-pau-schan to

Fan-kia-tun, sending thence the 124th Infantry-

Regiment with two batteries, under Colonel

Solomko, still farther south-west. The Colonel

determined to capture Ku-schu-tsy village, which

he knew to be occupied by the Japanese.^ Heordered his batteries to come into action, proceed-

ing to attack with the Infantry after the Artillery

had played for some time upon the enemy. TheJapanese were pushed from the village, and evacu-

ated also the height west of it. The Russians

occupied first Ku-schu-tsy, and, when it became

dark, also the height abandoned by the enemy,

as well as the village of Siau-kan-kia-tsy, the

outposts being pushed to Tschou-kuan-tun. Fromthe main body of the 10th Army Corps the

main portions of the 9th Infantry Division were

meanwhile moving up from the line San-kia-tsy

—

Hou-huan-hua-tien to the line Hun-pau-schan

—

Nin-kuan-tun, occupying the positions left by the

advanced guard.^ Corps Headquarters went to

Hou-huan-hua-tien.

The 4th Siberian Army Corps, with Man's De-tachment under its orders, was standing in the

evening to the left and in advance of the Western

Detachment ; its advanced guard (5th and 8th

Siberian Infantry Regiments, from the 2nd Siberian

* This occupation of Ku-schu-tsy is not mentioned in Japanese

records.

^ A portion of the 9th Infantry Division seems to have arrived

within the line Hun-pau-schan—Nin-kuan-tun only on the forenoon

of October 10.

64 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARInfantry Division) had marched first from Hsin-

lun-tun to Sia-hu-ho-tsy, and was then pushed

forward to the western San-jo-shi-san to entrench

it ; the 3rd Siberian Infantry Division/ with the

Artillery, had moved from Örr-tau-kou to Sia-

hei-niu-tun. Portions of the corps, during their

march, had met with some weak outposts of the

Japanese, which they pushed back jointly with a

right flank-guard of the 1st Siberian Army Corps.

Mau's Detachment was standing on the heights

east of Tan-hai-schi. General Mishtshenko was

originally to advance on Bian-yu-pu-sa ; but, whenit became known that the Japanese had evacuated

that village, the General was, by wire, summonedto General Headquarters, when he was ordered

to march with the Transbaikal Cossacks on Ta-pu

on the Schi-li-ho.

Of the 1st Army Corps, the advanced guard

reached Tun-san-ho behind the left wing of the

Western Detachment, and the main body Liian-

fan-tun—Sa-ho-tun. Corps Headquarters went to

San-kia-tsy. One battalion from the 37th Infantry

Division was sent to Orr-tau-kou as escort to

General Headquarters, marching with it on the

next day to Tun-san-ho.

The 6th Siberian Army Corps had advanced by

two roads ; the 1 st Brigade 72nd Division as

advanced guard reached Schau-kia-hn-tsy by the

evening ; the 2nd Brigade Lan-schan-pu ; and the

2nd Brigade 55th Infantry Division Pen-tien-tsy,^

' Less 11th Infantry Regiment, being with Mau's Detachment.' The 1st Brigade 55th Infantry Division was left behind at Tie-

lin and Mukden. (P. 49.)


where Corps Headquarters were too. The Artillery

was apportioned to the brigades. Immediately

after arrival in those villages entrenching com-menced. The corps remained in this position

on the next day. Dembovski's Detachment re-

tained its former position at Ta-wan-kan-pu—Sin-tai-tsy.

General Baron Stackelberg had decided to attack The East-

the Japanese at daybreak on October 9 ; he knew tachment

them to be on the heights between Pen-si-hu and ^dvanTOs^ against

Liu-schu-kia. Before the movements had begun, the passes

Kuropatkin's two letters ^ came to Headquarters Bian-ya-

early in the morning, the one shortly after theP"^'^

other, urging delay of the attack. But Stackelberg the Japa-

having already issued the orders for the attack, of Pe^he decided to carry it out, He had probably ä^"^'*-

arrived at the conclusion that further delay

could only be injurious ; and since it was, after

all, not improbable that the attack on the 9th

would not at all strike the main position, but

only the enemy's advanced positions, he believed

himself to be acting in the spirit of the Com-mander-in-Chiefs intentions, if he did not stop the

movements he had ordered.

The General had given the troops the task of

getting first possession of the passes in the country

south of Bian-yu-pu-sa. With this object the ad-

vanced guards, with the left wing bent forward,

were to push to the Hne Tschien-kou-lin Pass

—

Tu-men-tsy-Hn Pass— Ta-lin Pass— Wei-niu-nin.

Pa-kia-tsy was to be occupied on the extreme right,

and the ford over the Tai-tsy-ho at Ja-un-ssun on

p. 60.

5


the left. General Samsonov was sent to recon-

noitre with his Siberian Cossacks on Pen-si-hu,

while General von Rennenkampfs Detachment,

which, for the time being, was placed under the

orders of the Eastern Detachment, was at the

same time charged with watching to the left of

Samsonov, in a southerly and south-easterly direc-

tion, and with keeping occupied San-kia-tsy, on

the Tai-tsy-ho.

The 1st Siberian Corps on the right continued

its march forward on October 9 in two columns,

detailing a flank-guard to protect its right. Theright column, under General Krause (3 Infantry

Regiments,^ 24 guns, 1 machine-gun company, and

1 Sapper company from the 1st East Siberian

Rifle Di\dsion), was to march on Yin-tsien-pu,

north of the Tschien-kou-lin Pass ; but, missing

its way—the country on the maps available show-

ing merely a blank—got south of Bian-yu-pu-sa

behind the left column of its army corps, on the

road to Schan-pin-tai-tsy. General Gerngross,

commanding the 1st Siberian Army Corps, stopped

General Krause's column at Schan-pin-tai-tsy, so

as to send it by the Tschau-hsien-lin Pass to

Yin-tsien-pu." The left column (9th East Siberian

Rifle Division), under General Kondratovich,

marched by Bian-yu-pu-sa to Sia-schi-tsiau-tsy,

where it closed up. The column had pushed for-

ward two protective bodies, namely, a right advanced

guard (33rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment and

8 guns), under Colonel Lissovski, on Kau-kia-pu,

' 1st, 2nd, and 3rd East Siberian Rifle Regiments.

* This movement was apparently executed only on October 10,


north of the Tu-men-tsy-hn Pass, and a left one

(34th East Siberian Rifle Regiment and 8 guns),

under Lieutenant-Colonel Musshelov, on Sien-

schan-tsy. Colonel Lissovski's advanced guard

came, some time during its march, under the fire

of a Japanese battery standing south-east of

Kau-kia-pu, which in turn was fired at by the

Artillery of the left advanced guard. Lieutenant-

Colonel Musshelov reached the object of his marchunmolested. South-west of Sien-schan-tsy the left

advanced guard relieved portions of Samsonov's

Siberian Cossack Division, and established touch

with the 24th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, from

the 3rd Siberian Army Corps.

The right flank-guard of the 1st Siberian ArmyCorps (4th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, with

a battery) marched by Fön-kia-pu to Sia-liu-ho-

tsy. On the way the column came in touch

with portions of the 4th Siberian Army Corps,^

when they jointly pushed back Japanese out-

posts. At Sia-liu-ho-tsy tlie flank-guard met someoutposts of the enemy as well, but these soon

withdrew. In the evening the regiment reached

Pa-kia-tsy.

On the left of the Eastern Detachment the

Gth East Siberian Rifle Division, of the 3rd Siber-

ian Army Corps, marched only from Tschui-kia-

pu-tsy to Jo-gu, reaching that place with the

main body towards evening. The left flank-guard,

under Colonel Drushinin,'"^ was pushed across the

Tai-tsy-ho ; it constructed across the river twobridges, one of which was passable for all arms, and

' p. 64. » p. 44.

68 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARoccupied the heights south of Ja-un-ssun. The3rd East Siberian Rifle Division, General Baron

Stackelberg apportioned as his reserve ; it seems

to have marched on the 9th only to Ta-pei-kou,

and to have stopped there.

The 5th East Siberian Rifle Division, from the

2nd Siberian Army Corps, followed the left column

of the 1st Siberian Army Corps likewise as re-

serve, closing up at Sia-pin-tai-tsy and Bian-yu-

pu-sa in the evening.

General Samsonov's Siberian Cossack Division,

which had advanced from Sien-tschan-tsy against

the line Liu-schu-kia—Pen-si-hu, came upon the

enemy in the neighbourhood of Kau-kia-pu at

the Ko-san-shi-sen-san. The Japanese, who had

entrenched themselves on the heights north-east

of Liu-schu-kia, offered a determined resistance

to the Cossacks, who at once attacked. They did

not succeed in driving back the Japanese, even

after General Ivanov, commanding the 3rd Siberian

Army Corps, had sent forward the 24th East

Siberian Rifle Regiment in support of them. The

Russians were at last obliged to desist from the

attack and to look, in turn, for cover in the country.

They entrenched themselves on the height south-

west of Sien-schan-tsy ; at night, as has been

stated, they were relieved by the left advanced

guard of the 1st Siberian Army Corps.

Rennenkampfs Detachment came in close touch

with the enemy as well on October 9. This

detachment, transgressing the observant attitude

prescribed to it by Stackelberg,^ had advanced in

' F. 06.


two columns on the left of the 3rd Siberian ArmyCorps. The right column, under General Peterov,

was directed to go to Pen-si-hu, on the right bank

of the Tai-tsy-ho ; while General Liubavin, with his

Cavalry Brigade and one battery,^ was to advance

south of the river. Peterov 's column had scarcely

got on the way when it encountered the position

occupied by Colonel Hirata.^ The Japanese,

cleverly adapting themselves in very extended

formation to the accidents of the ground, opened

at once on the Russians a brisk fire from the

steep heights, prominent of which is especially

the La-ut-ha-la-sa by its rugged forms. General

Peterov determined to capture the heights. Butthe position of the Japanese proved so strong,

that the Russian attack, in spite of repeated

rushes, did not succeed. General Ivanov, who had

already supported General Samsonov's Detach-

ment, helped in this action too, by sending two

battalions with six guns of the 6th East Siberian

Rifle Division from Kau-tai-tsy against the left

wing of the Japanese. The action dragged along

almost the whole day without the Russians

succeeding in driving the Japanese from the

precipitous I^a-ut-ha-la-sa. After a hot contest

the more weakly occupied JNIei-san was at last

captured by the Russians ; portions of the 6th

East Siberian Rifle Division, moreover, succeeded

in establishing themselves on the Ha-shi-ra-yama,

which had been defended by two companies of

' 2nd Brigade Traiislmikal Cossack Division, with a horse mountainbattery of tlie Frontier Guard.

» P. 56.


the 1st Guard Kobi Regiment/ But the Russians

were unable to gain any further advantages.

General Liubavin, on the south bank of the

Tai-tsy-ho, had pushed back small Japanese out-

posts ; it was; only possible to defend the road to

Pen-si-hu by the few skirmishers distributed on

the heights east of Riu-wo-bio. But Liubavin,

probably fearing to meet at Pen-si-hu with stronger

forces of the enemy, outmatching his Cavalry, and

his request to Rennenkampf to give him some

Infantry and some few more guns being declined,

decided to remain on the left bank. Two kilo-

metres from the bridge leading to Pen-si-hu, he

selected a position, in which his troops entrenched

themselves towards evening. From the trenches

it was noticed in the evening that two buildings

in Pen-si-hu were in flames ; spies reported that

the Japanese had set fire to the magazines. Thebattery had previously been sent to the main

body, after having spent all its ammunition in

shelling the Japanese pontoon-bridge at Riu-

wo-bio.

Though the Eastern Detachment's attack on

October 9 was lacking in sufficient energy, it

revealed to the Japanese once more the dangerous

situation of their right wing. It is true the

strength of the Russians who had appeared east of

Pen-si-hu were estimated at one Division only, but

it was to be anticipated that the enemy would con-

' Ru6siau reports do not mention the occupation of the Ha-shi-ra-

yama ;probably because the height was lost again next morning.

Some reports maintain that the La-ut-ha-la-sa , and not the Mei-san, was

captured by the Russians, but that its occupation by the Russians had

been temporary only.


tinue his attack next day with far superior forces. Japanbse

In front, too, the enemy had everywhere been The ist

. . c 11 Army re-

pushmg on ; at various points strong lorces had inforces

shown themselves, driving back the Japanese out- ^j^J with

posts. There could be no longer any doubt of a the main

1 1 , , T^ . ? • • • ^ body ofgeneral attack by the Russians being imminent. the i2th

While these facts caused in Oyama fresh ideas ^^V^^'^^^

and resolutions to mature, he left the measures the

necessary for reinforcing the right wing in the attacks;

hands of the 1st Army.^^^^*2nd

General Baron Kuroki resolved to strengthen Armies

the threatened wing with the 12th Division, which, their po.

however, was to leave a portion of its troops in sitions.

their former position south of Yin-tsien-pu.^ Atthe same time, General Umesawa's Detachment

was placed under the orders of that Division.

General Baron Ino-uye, commanding the 12th

Division, left the 23rd Brigade, with Artillery and

Cavalry attached, under General Kigoshi, south

of Yin-tsien-pu, he himself starting in a south-

easterly direction with the 12th Brigade and the

bulk of the Artillery on the afternoon of October 9.

While the 47th Infantry was at once branched off

to the Tu-men-tsy-lin Pass, General Shimamuracontinued marching on to Pen-si-hu, with the

14th Infantry Regiment and one battery. It was

night, and the fight for the La-ut-ha-la-sa had died

away long ago, when this detachment, exhausted

by the arduous march, arrived to bring relief to

Hirata's defensive force,' already greatly reduced

» P. 64.

* P. 66. This force is said to have lost two-thirds of its fighting

strength.


in numbers. The troops having rested a few

hours, General Shimamura, about 2 a.m., appor-

tioned one battalion to the defensive group at

Riu-wo-bio, another battalion and the battery to

the group at the La-ut-ha-la-sa ; the third battalion

probably remained as reserve at Sei-ko.^

When, during the day, the passage of Russian

forces to the southern bank of the Tai-tsy-ho had

been established. General Prince Kan-in was

ordered to march with the 2nd Cavalry Brigade

from the left wing of the 1st Army to Si-ho-yan,'

and cover that post on the line of communications.

One regiment started thither in the evening ; the

other regiment, being still charged with recon-

noitring, was to follow next day. With the

object of strengthening the garrison of Si-ho-yan

by Infantry as well, the Inspector of Communica-tions apportioned for that purpose 300 men—Lines

of Communication Troops—that had just arrived.

The Guard and 2nd Divisions were busy pre-

paring their positions. The Guard Cavalry Regi-

ment, which had been sent to reconnoitre towards

the Ba-ji-san on October 8, was obliged to with-

draw again, before superior hostile forces, on

the 9th. The enemy, strong Infantry and Cavalry,

seemed to follow by Pa-kia-tsy—Man-hua-pu,

some patrols pushing to the Wai-to-san. Hostile

Cavalry appeared on the Ohara-yama opposite the

2nd Division ; the Western San-jo-shi-san was

being occupied by Russian Infantry.

* Some batteries of the 12th Division were probably distributed along

the whole line.

* 15 kilometres south of Pen-si-bu. (Sketch 1.)


With the 4th Army, the 3rd Battalion 40th

Infantry Regiment, which Otani had pushed to

Wu-H-tai-tsy, retired south on the approach of

strong Russian forces ; the 2nd Battahon of the

same regiment, which had been pushed to Schan-

yau-pu, rejoined the detachment in Yen-tai^ as

well.

Nothing of importance occurred with the 2nd

Army on the 9th ; the outposts standing in Schuan-

tai-tsy, Orr-tai-tsy, and Ta-tu-san-pu fell back

before the vanguards of the Russian 17th ArmyCorps and Stako\dch's Detachment.^

October 10

The events of October 9 on the Japanese right Japanese

wing had confirmed the surmises about the intelli-

direction of the Russian main attack. From the fbout the

reports, which frequently varied in their state- «"^™y-

ments, and were often contradictory too, it was

difficult for Oyama's Headquarters to gain a true Sketch 4.

insight into the distribution of the enemy's forces.

Opposite the right of the 1st Army the enemywas reported to be in strength as follows : Onthe left bank of the Tai-tsy-ho about a brigade ;

east of Pen-si-hu at least a division ; north of the

Ta-lin and Tu-men-tsy-lin Passes another brigade;

and between the Tschau-hsien-lin Pass and Saii-

kia-tsy about two divisions. Opposite the Guardand 2nd Divisions, Russian vanguards had on the

9th advanced to the line Wai-to-san—Ohara-yama(height " 238 ")—Western San-jo-shi-san. By the

' p. 58. ' p. 62.


reconnaissances of General Otani's Detachment,

and by the action of Wu-li-tai-tsy/ the 4th Armyhad ascertained strong forces on the INIandarin

Road in the neighbourhood of Schi-h-ho. Op-posed to this was the inteUigence received by the

2nd Army, that the Russians had been reinforced

on the Mandarin Road, but had not advanced

beyond Pan-kiau-pu. Hostile bodies were said to

have advanced in unknown strength west of the

Mandarin Road on both banks of the Scha-ho to

the line Liu-tan-kou—Li-kia-tun, the main bodies

standing at Ta-tai and Li-kia-tun. The outposts

of the 2nd Army had retired already, on October 5,

before the Russian vanguards." The sum total of

all these reports corroborated the fact that a

general attack by the Russians was imminent.

Based on the intelligence received from the

Armies, supplemented probably by reports from

spies, Japanese General Headquarters believed the

Russian forces to be grouped as follows :^ In the

country east and north of Pen-si-hu two corps

were supposed to be standing ; at Fön-kia-pu, as

well as on the Mandarin Road, three corps each

to be assembling ; and north of Fön-kia-pu one

more corps to be in reserve. The Russian extreme

right was assumed to be at Li-kia-tun, and the

extreme left south of Pen-si-hu, on the left bank

of the Tai-tsy-ho ; from this it followed, that the

Russian front extended about 70 kilometres.

Marshal Marquis Oyama thought the situation

' P. 58. » P. 51.

' The ideas General Headquarters had formed did not quite co-

incide with the various intelligences received ; the reports of the

armies therefore seem to ha\e been accepted as only partly correct.


to be now clear enough to warrant his assuming

the offensive. Being probably impressed by the

threat to his right, and assuming that the enemy's

main forces had not yet finished their concentration

on the southern bank of the Hun-ho, he dropped

his original intention of awaiting first the Russians

in the prepared positions, and then to assume the

offensive,^ and resolved to anticipate the enemy's

offensive.

Japanese General Headquarters therefore issued Oyama

the following Order at 10 p.m. on October 9 : Armies to

" / shall attack the enemy before he is completelyf^^^ ^t-^^

deployed, and advance against the line Kan-to-li- tack.

san ^

—

Fön-kia-pu—Li-kia-tun.

" The First Army will attack, with the 12th

Division and Major-General Umesawa's Brigade,

in the direction of Sia-schi-tsiau-tsy,^ and, with

its main bodies, in the direction of Fön-kia-pu ; it

will delay its attack until the Fourth Army has

captured Wu-li-tai-tsy.

" The Fom^th Army will advance on the 10th

in the morning, attacking in the direction of

Nin-kuan-tun." The Second Ai'my will advance to attack the

line Pan-kiau-pu—Tai-pin-tschuan. Strong forces

are to be retained behind its right wing. The left

wing is to advance more rapidly, and make an

enveloping movement."

The Order meant to leave full liberty to the-

Army Commanders in carrying out the general

' P. 53.

' 6 kilometres north of Bian-yu-pu-sa.

' 6 kilometres south of Biau-yu-pu-sa.


intentions, General Headquarters expecting the

Army Commanders to adapt the directives given

to any change in the situation. And, therefore,

to the 1st Army was also left the extremely

important task of securing the right flank. Withthe object of discussing the probable future course

of the operations, the Chiefs of the Staffs of the

Armies had been summoned to General Head-

quarters at Liao-yan as early as October 6 ; it was

already on that occasion that Marshal Marquis

Oyama said he intended to assume the offensive.

The 1st Based on Marshal Marquis Oyama's directives,

stands General Baron Kuroki gave the following Orderfast on ^-Q ^Yie 1st Army:the ex- •'

treme

''^^*'. "Ta-yau-pu, October 9, 11.30 p.m.

maintani-ing and <« 1 y^^ enemy, at least 4 Divisions strong, is,

ening the sincc last night, gradually advancing against our

rS' front, right flank, and rear.

''Another Uivision is advancing on Liao-yan

along the Mandarin Road, its head haWng reached

Wu-li-tai-tsy. West of that road, the enemy is

standing on the line Liu-tan-kou—Li-kia-tun.

"2. The Fourth A r/fiy is going to assume the

offensive to-morrow, on the 10th, attacking in

the direction of Nin-kuan-tun.

" The Second Army, in touch with the Fourth,

is going to advance against the line Pan-kiau-pu

—Tai-pin-tschuan.

" 3. The Firat Army will attack the enemy in

front in the direction of Fön-kia-pu after the

Fourth Army has captured Wu-li-tai-tsy.

" 4. The \'2th Divisio7i will act in comphance


with its former orders,^ advancing on Kan-to-li-san

after the enemy has been repulsed.

" 5. The Gimrd and 2nd Divisions will for the

present hold their positions.

"6. The General Reserve^ will reach Hui-yau

at 5 a.m. on the 10th.

" 7. The Cavalry Brigade will remain with its

main body at Kan-sa,^ covering the Army to the

right rear, while watching the Tai-tsy-ho valley.

" 8. / shall be in Ta-yau-pu."

The 2nd Cavalry Brigade was previously directed

to move to Si-ho-yan ^ ; but there being every

reason to expect, from the intelligence that had

meanwhile come in, that this important line-of-

communication post would be occupied by the

Russians before the Cavalry could possibly arrive

there, the Army Commander kept at first the

brigade on the right bank of the Tai-tsy-ho. But,

strangely enough, the Russians did not pay any

attention to that place, with all its stores. This

omission enabled the Cavalry Brigade to occupy

Si-ho-yan on October 11, and to intervene on the

12th in a most effective manner in the action on

the southern bank of the Tai-tsy-ho.

The detachment east of Pen-si-hu, which liad

been reinforced by the 14th Infantry Regimentand one battery,^ and being now commanded by

Major Honda, in place of the wounded Colonel

Hirata, made use of the fog in the early hours' p. 71.

* 29th Kobi Regiment, Kobi Artillery Abteilunj^, ami Hidikata's

Battery. (P. 63.)

* 20 kilometres west of Pen-si-hu on the northern Tai-tsy-ho

bank.

* P. 72. * P. 71.

78 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARof the 10th by retaking from the Russians the

positions they had captured. The Ha-shi-ra-yama

was simultaneously attacked by the 3rd Company14th Infantry Regiment and by the 1st Company1st Guard Kobi Regiment, who drove back the

Russians after an obstinate resistance. Both

companies then occupied the height jointly with

a third. ^ As the action lasted all the morning

before it was decided, General Baron Ino-uye had

taken the precaution of calling up to Liu-schu-kia

the 24^1 Infantry Regiment of the 23rd Brigade as

a reinforcement. But, on the leading battalion

of that regiment arriving at Kuan-lin-tsy about

10 a.m., the Ha-shi-ra-yama had been captured,

being occupied by the three companies. Mean-

while the fog had cleared away ; from the Japanese

position, a cainp could be seen in an easterly

direction, with innumerable Russian tents, stretch-

ing in a wide arc even beyond the Tai-tsy-ho, and

revealing a tremendous superiority of the enemy.

General Baron Ino-uye, therefore, did not send

back the 24th Infantry Regiment, but employed

it in reinforcing the positions at Pen-si-hu gener-

ally, and forming a reserve. The Mei-san, too,

was recaptured at the point of the bayonet, and

maintained in the face of vigorous counter-attacks,

likewise delivered with the bayonet. The positions

at the Ta-lin and Tu-men-tsy-lin Passes had not

been seriously attacked hitherto ; nor were they

on the 10th. General Baron Ino-uye having on

his side no reason for advancing from his covered

positions against the superior enemy, no actual

' According to Japanese reports, from the Nakagawa Battalion.


fighting took place on this portion of the front,

the batteries on both sides only firing at each other

for some time, without, however, obtaining any

material effect.

The Guard and 2nd Divisions maintained an

expectant attitude on October 10, in compliance

with the Army Order. They occupied a con-

tinuous defensive position, stretching by Ni-do-

ko to the coal-pits, in prolongation of the trenches

of the 46th Infantry Regiment, which, together

with one or two batteries of the 12th Division,

had remained at the Tschien-kou-lin Pass. The 1st

Brigade of the Guard Division "was on the right

;

it had pushed forward a small detachment to

occupy the Sa-to-rei Pass. In advance of Tschan-

hei-tun was the 2nd Brigade, facing north-east.

The entrenchments, groups of fire-trenches, con-

structed in the rocky soil, possessed throughout

great defensive strength. The position was at

first but weakly occupied ; the main body of the

1st Brigade was at Tan-kia-pu-tsy, and that of

the 2nd at Tschan-hei-tun. Some few companies

had been pushed to the various knolls in front

of the position, as a measure of security. TheArtillery was standing ready at Huan-kia-pu-tsy

;

Divisional Headquarters were at Tan-kia-pu-tsy.

The 2nd Division adjoined the Guards at Ni-do-

ko. The position of the Division formed an arc

salient to the north, and, like the Guards' position,

was tactically ably chosen, and very carefully

fortified. The Infantry line had everywhere the

profile of trenches for firing standing, with

numerous overhead cover, traverses, look-outs,

80 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARand covered approaches from the cover-trenches

of the reserves behind the Hne. The height east

of Tsien-tau, which had to be included in the

position, is a rocky cHff falling steeply to the

north-east, with a clear field of fire in every

direction up to 1,500 metres ; at the corner pro-

jecting farthest north-east were several tiers of

fire-trenches ; the village of Tsien-tau, surrounded

by a clay wall, was placed in a state of defence

in front and on both sides ; owing to the con-

figuration of the ground, the batteries were dis-

tributed throughout the position. For the guns,

entrenched on the height east of Tsien-tau, cover

had been constructed wüth boulders, on which

earth was heaped. One battery at Schi-hui-yau,

in the plain, was very cleverly masked by gaoljan.

Cover-trenches with casemates had been con-

structed for the gun detachments as well, by

partly making use of con-ugated iron taken by

the Japanese from Russian barracks.^ All along

the front were abattis and wire entanglements.

The position was occupied as follows : On the

right was the 4th Infantry Regiment, in con-

tinuation of which, to the left, was the 29th

Infantry Regiment ; the western portion of the

position, from Tsien-tau to the low knoll north

of the coal-pits, was occupied by the 15th Brigade.

On the morning all remained quiet opposite the

Guards. Towards noon four hostile guns cameinto action at the road east of the Ohara-yama,

' At the coal-pits of Yen-tai were unfinished Russian barracks, which

were intended for the 22nd Sotnia Frontier Guard. The Japanese after-

wards used them for lines-of-communication purposes.


firing about twenty rounds in the direction of

the 2nd Brigade of Guards. The Japanese

Artillery not replying, the fire ceased again. TheJapanese Infantry remained under cover. During

the day only a few more Cavalry patrols of the

enemy were noticed ; for the rest, nothing else

happened on that day.

Opposite the 2nd Division, someRussian batteries,

perhaps three in number, having got into

position unobserved at the north-west slope of

the Western San-jo-shi-san, about 7 a.m. suddenly

opened fire on the Japanese batteries standing

entrenched on the right wing of the Division.

It was previously known ^ that the Western San-

jo-shi-san was also occupied by hostile Infantry;

they were troops of the 4th Siberian Army Corps.

It being impossible from the Japanese position

to locate exactly the Russian Artillery, in spite

of its fire, an observation officer, with signal-flags

and mounted orderlies, was sent forward to a small

eminence east of Pan-la-schan-tsy, by whose signals

the fire was replied to. The Russian Artillery de-

Hvered a rapid fire for half an hour, and then abated

it. But it had no effect at all, all the shrapnels

passing beyond the mark. The Artillery force onthe Japanese left did not take part in the action

at first. Towards 11 a.m. Russian Infantry, abouta battalion strong, advanced to the height south-

west of the Western San-jo-shi-san; two Japanesebatteries began directing a brisk fire on them, butceased the moment the Russian batteries poureda rapid fire into those of the Japanese. This

' p. 72.

6

82 THE RUSSO-JAPAXESE WARalternate firing of both Artilleries—of the Japanese

on Infantry, and of the Russians on the Japanese

batteries—was several times repeated until noon.

Towards 12.45 p.m. the head of a long Russian

Infantry column on the march appeared on the

road leading over the heights north of TempleHill, in the direction of San-kia-tsy. This column,

about the size of a brigade, probably likewise

portions of the 4th Siberian Army Corps, con-

tinued its march to a low crest north-east of

Temple Hill ; here it partly formed up, extended

a long skirmishing line until about 2 p.m., and

began to entrench. Soon afterwards the Russian

Artillery, again unnoticed, moved off by East

San-kia-tsy. During the afternoon a Russian

battery once more appeared north of San-kia-tsy,

firing a short time, and then disappearing again.

The Japanese Artillery occasionally fired on

Russian Infantry.

The 4th Marshal Marquis Oyama had ordered the 4th

^™J Army to advance on Nin-kuan-tun ; but Generalposses- Count Nodzu considered it necessary to abstainsioii of

f. 1

the irom an attack on iNm-kuan-tun lor the present.

tSouth^ ^ general attack by the Russians on October 10em bank being looked upon as certain, the General assumedof the , ° ^

, ^ , „

Schi-ii- the enemy would try to push strong lorces to^""

the gentle range of hills stretching from Ku-

schu-tsy in the direction of the coal-pits. That

would have made it impossible to advance in a

northerly direction on Nin-kuan-tun, and would

have necessitated a costly attack to drive the

enemy away again from the heights. Count Nodzu

therefore determined to occupy them at once with


the 10th Division ; the 5th Division was mean-

while to take possession of Wu-li-tai-tsy and the

height adjoining it. If he captured the low hills

east of Yun-kuan-tun—Tu-men-tsy, as well as

Wu-li-tai-tsy, the Army was in a correct position

with regard to its neighbour, the 2nd Division on

its right still standing in its former position, and

in a favourable situation for future operations in

the general direction on Nin-kuan-tun.

General Baron Kawamura, commanding the

10th Division, ordered the 39th Infantry Regi-

ment, with some mountain-guns, to start at

6 a.m. from Tun-ta-lien-kou for Yun-kuan-tun.

Should this advanced detachment meet with strong

forces of the enemy already east of Yun-kuan-tun, it was to hold back, and be sustained by

the main body of the Division coming up behind;

should it meet with weak forces, it was to attack

at once. The low heights east of Yun-kuan-

tun were very weakly occupied by Russian out-

posts, belonging probably to Man's Detachment.

On Colonel Yasumura approaching the height with

his detachment, the Russians withdrew, after a brief

resistance. Towards 11 a.m. the main body of

the 10th Division occupied the heights gained.

The Artillery action previously described had

meanwhile developed with the 2nd Division onthe right. The positions of the Russian batteries

on the Western San-jo-shi-san could in part be

clearly seen from the heights east of Yun-kuan-tun

; General Kawamura therefore ordered the

Artillery of his Division, as well as the 14th Field

Artillery Regiment from the 1st Field Artillery

84 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARBrigade (probably being under his orders), to come

into action east of Po-lin-tsy and Yun-kuan-tun

and intervene in the fight of the 2nd Division.

The Japanese batteries gradually drew upon them-

selves the fire of sixteen Russian guns standing

at Temple Hill, and belonging probably to Mau's

detachment, fighting them until darkness set in.

The 5th Division, to which the Commander of

the 4th Army had gone, ad^ anced by Yen-tai

;

at Schan-yau-pu it came under a heavy Artillery

fire from Wu-li-tai-tsy and the height east of it,

as well as from the railway line. The Divisional

Commander decided to attack the height east

of Wu-li-tai-tsy, and deployed the Division.

The attack met with great difficulties. Theassailant did not succeed in capturing by frontal

attacks the narrow Russian position strengthened by

deep trenches. The attempt of enveloping it in the

west was frustrated by a flanking fire of Artillery

near the railway. The Russian batteries were so

cleverly placed that they could not be located by

the Japanese batteries. The hope of being some-

what relieved by the 3rd Division of the 2nd

Army on the left advancing on Wu-li-tai-tsy was

not realised. Considerable loss was being suffered

already, without the attack making any progress

;

the situation became more and more serious the

more the day advanced.

On General Baron Kawamura being informed of

the nature of the action in which the 5th Division

was involved, he at once sent tke 8th Brigade

of his 10th Division, together ^vith some batteries

of the 1st Field Artillery Brigade, in support.


While the Infantry was preparing for the attack

on the height at Wu-H-tai-tsy the batteries un-

limbered under cover at Tschiu-tsai-tai, opening

fire at 3.30 p.m. Its effect became soon apparent.

Scarcely forty minutes had elapsed when the fire

of the Russian guns east of the height, being

now enfiladed, was growing sensibly weaker ; at

5.30 p.m. it ceased altogether. Many horses of

the limbers and first and second line waggons were

killed apparently ; it could be seen from Tschiu-

tsai-tai how the Russian artillerists were trying to

push back their guns by hand to get them safely

away.

Kawamura's intervention gave new life to the

attack of the 5th Division. Though the Russians

made several counter-attacks from Wu-li-tai-tsy,

as well as from the height, the Japanese, perse-

vering with tenacity, constantly renewed their

attacks, until at last, when it was pitch dark,

they succeeded in driving the Russians from their

trenches, and in capturing the height east of the

village. Portions of the Division had penetrated

also into Wu-li-tai-tsy, driving the hostile garrison

out of it. The 5th Division had therefore accom-plished its task for the day. The action cost it:

1 officer dead, 10 officers wounded, and 246 mendead or wounded.

Whether and to what extent the 8th Brigade

had been intervening in the fight cannot be ascer-

tained ; nor is there any clue as to what became onthat day of the 3rd, 10th, and 11th Kobi Brigades,

as well as of the portions of the 1st Field Artillery

Brigade not engaged ; they were moved up pro-


bably to the neighbourhood of Yun-kuan-tun

—

Po-lin-tsy after the 10th Division had occupied the

low height north-west of the coal-pits.

The 2nd General Baron Oku had arranged for the 2nd

tl,^L^l', Army to advance in three columns in a north-ValxC6B OH »

^oth easterly direction. The right column (6 battalions,banks of , . • i ^ -¥-»•

the Scha- 3 squadrons, 7 batteries, and 2 Pioneer companies

w^rthe^ of the 3rd Division) was to advance between the

4th railway and the line Ta-pa-tai-tsy

—

Scha-örr-tai—^Sng Schuan-tai-tsy—Nan-kuan-tsy to attack the line

Russian Pau-kiau-pu— Tschen-kia ; the centre columnoutposts. (6 battalions, 3 squadrons, 6 batteries, and 3 Pioneer

companies of the 6th Division) between the right

column and the left bank of the Scha-ho against

the Hne Tschien-liu-tan-kou — Tsun-lun-yen-tun

(the latter exclusive) ; and the left column (6 bat-

talions, 3 squadrons, 7 batteries, and 3 Pioneer

companies of the 4th Division) was to march with

its right wing along the western bank of the Scha-

ho towards the line Tsun-lun-yen-tun—Tai-pin-

tschuan. The columns were to start at 6.30 a.m.

The other eighteen battalions and five Pioneer

companies were to assemble at 8 a.m. on the

line Pei-siau-fan-tsy—Si-siau-fan-tsy as reserve of

Army Headquarters. The 1st Cavalry Brigade

was charged with covering, jointly with the left

column, the left flank and rear of the Army, and

to reconnoitre especially towards Tschou-kuan-pu,

north of San-de-pu.

Each division advanced in two columns. The

right column of the 3rd Division (2 battalions,

2 squadrons, 1 battery, and 1 Pioneer company)

reached Schin-lien-tun at 10.50 a.m., and the


left column, consisting of merely 2 companies,

Men-hu-lu-tun about the same time. The other

portions followed on Schin-lien-tun as reserve of

the Divisional Commander. When the heads of the

columns had just passed the villages named, the

commander of the left column heard that Schuan-

tai-tsy was occupied by the enemy ; at the sametime a lively fusillade, soon mixed with the thunder

of cannon, became audible, coming from the neigh-

bourhood of Wu-li-tai-tsy. The columns were

stopped for the moment. Intelligence arrived from

the 4th Army saying that the 5th Division was in

action with the enemy, who was holding Wu-li-

tai-tsy. General Baron Oshima, commanding the

3rd Division, intended first to advance on Wu-li-

tai-tsy (probably having previously agreed with the

Commander of the 5th Division to do so), and

with that object reinforced his right column by

two companies and one battery. But as his ad-

vance could be enfiladed from Schuan-tai-tsy he

resolved to attack that village in the first instance.

By pushing next towards Nan-kuan-tsy he in-

tended to render the 5th Division indirectly the

wished-for support. The right column was there-

fore stopped at Schin-lien-tun, the reserve wasmoved behind the left column, and the latter wasreinforced. The attack on Schuan-tai-tsy made,

however, but slow progress ; it was 5.30 in the

evening before the Russians, weak outposts of

the 17th Army Corps, evacuated the place.

When the Japanese showed themselves at the

north edge of the village, they were at oncebriskly fired on by Artillery from a northerly and

88 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARnorth-easterly direction ; it being further ascer-

tained that Nan-kuan-tsy was strongly held by

the enemy, the Divisional Commander decided to

delay the attack until next day. The Division

remained during the night in fighting formation

in the position it had reached.

The right column of the 6th Division (1 battalion

and 1 squadron only) marched by Scha-örr-tai, and

the left column (2 battalions, 1 quarter-squadron,

3 batteries, and 1 Pioneer company), followed by

the Divisional reserve, marched by Kan-ku-tun.

Between 10 and 11 a.m. both columns—the right

at An-kia-san-kia-tsy, and the left at Siau-tun-

schan-pu—met weak outposts of the 17th ArmyCorps, who, after a brief resistance, withdrew on

Orr-tai-tsy and Ta-tu-san-pu. The Japanese fol-

lowed, driving, until 5 p.m., the Russians also

out of these places. The right column had been

strengthened for that purpose by three battalions.

Strong forces of the enemy having meanwhile

been reported to be standing at Nan-kuan-tsy

and Yen-kia-wan, the further attack was discon-

tinued. The two columns established themselves

for the night in the villages captured. The reserve

of the Division went to Siau-tun-schan-pu.

Of the 4th Division, 2 battalions, with 1 troop

of Cavalry, 3 batteries, and 1 Pioneer company,

marched by Tschu-tschuan-tsy—Si-kuan-schan-tun

on Yen-kia-tien-tsy, pushing back here some weakhostile outposts, and pursuing the Russians, whobelonged to Stakovich's Detachment, to Yu-kia-

tien-tsy. To the west of this column, two battalions

advanced by Ku-kia-tsy, reaching Hua-kia-tun at


noon ; weak Russian Cavalry fell back before them

north. Taking into consideration the points the

other Divisions had reached in their march, General

Tsukamoto, commanding the 4th Division, halted

it at Yu-kia-tien-tsy and Hua-kia-tun ; the reserve

closed up at Schu-pei-tai.

The 1st Cavalry Brigade, under General Aki-

yama, started from Hei-kou-tai about noon,

reaching San-de-pu at 3 p.m. It left a small

detachment behind in its late quarters, and another

party, which had been sent to the right bank of

the Hun-ho, got as far as Tu-tai-tsy.

Army Headquarters arrived in Sun-lun-pu at

noon, going for the night to Pu-tsau-kou ; the re-

serve of the 2nd Army moved forward to Sun-

lun-pu and Scha-örr-tai.

On the evening of the 10th the main bodies of

that Army were standing on the line Schin-lien-tun

— Örr-tai-tsy— Ta-tu-san-pu— Yu-kia-tien-tsy—Hua-kia-tun.

The General Reserve advanced, by orders of

Oyama, to Lö-ta-tai ; General Headquarters appar-

ently continued to remain in Liao-yan.

Although General Kuropatkin had distinctly Russianb

stated in the two letters which Stackelberg re- J^rdeTtte"

ceived early on October 9,^ that he expected the Eastern De-

T-v 1 11«. taclmienttoJiiastern Detachment to attack the mam position attack,

of the Japanese on the 10th, yet he thought it the enem/snecessary to furnish the Commander of the Eastern ^'?^* 7'"^'

TA 1 -1 T • T^ •while he 18

Detachment with new directives. During the holding back

9th two more letters were dispatched to Stackel- wJltem De-

berg. The first document reaching Stackelberg on tachment.

» Pp. 60 and 66.


the same day, in addition to the congratulations

on the occupation of the Bian-yu-pu-sa position/

contained the adWce to proceed cautiously with

the attack on the main position ; in the second

letter Kuropatkin sent to the General an explicit

and firmly worded directive. This document,

dispatched late in the evening of October 9, was

worded as follows

:

'' Orr-tac-koVj Qth October, 11 p.7n.

" I propose to you to make a wheel forward

with the left wing of the Eastern Detachment.

Advance with that wing along the Tai-tsy-ho in

a westerly direction against the right of the

enemy's position. Push back the Japanese, form-

ing your front in such a way as to bring your

left to Kan-kwan-tun on the Tai-tsy-ho,' and your

right near the heights east of Tsien-tau at the

coal-pits. You must apportion sufficient forces

for guarding your rear and left flank. Direct

General v. Rennenkampf to remain for the present

at Pen-si-hu, and to keep the Tai-tsy-ho occupied

east of that place. Your right will be secured by

the 4th Siberian Army Corps and by one brigade

of the 31st Division,^ which to-day has occupied

the heights east of Tan-hai-schi.

" Let me know by return how far you want

to go to-morrow and on the 11th. The main

bodies of the 4th Siberian Army Corps will stay

to-night at Sia-hei-niu-tun. Report on your move-

ments of to-day by the morning of the 10th."

' P. 46-47. * 12 kilometres south of the coal-pita.

' Mau's Detachment.


General Kuropatkin, adhering to the view that

the Western Detachment must not attack before

the Eastern Detachment had made some moredecisive progress, gave no orders to Bilderhng to

advance. All he considered necessary were a few

movements by some troops of the 10th ArmyCorps, sending therefore his orders straight to

the chief of the staff of that corps. These

movements he altered twice until forenoon of

October 10. On the evening of the 9th the

Commander-in-Chief made known that the left

flank of the 10th Army Corps would be sufficiently

secured by the advance of the 1st Army Corps,

which was going to move into the line Tun-san-ho

—Schi-miau-tsy, as well as by the attack of the

Eastern Detachment ; the 10th Army Corps wastherefore to place its reserves behind its right

wing so as to be capable of supporting, in case

of need, the 17th Army Corps. A little later

the order was dispatched to occupy, with General

Riabinkin's advanced guard, the height west of

Ku-schu-tsy. Finally, on the next morning,

Kuropatkin ordered the height west of Ku-schu-

tsy to be occupied with only three battalions, while

Riabinkin was to move with the rest of the

advanced guard into a fortified position on the

Schi-li-ho between Fan-kia-tun and Yin-pan

;

this position, he said, was selected as the pivot

of "the position of the 10th Army Corps" in its

further progress.

The 17th Army Corps, as far as is known, did

not receive any orders ; but it was probably in-

formed of the 6th Siberian Army Corps having

92 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARbeen directed, " to respond to General v. Bilder-

ling's request for support, in case the enemy should

proceed to make a decisive attack."

The ad- During October 10 the 17th Army Corps began

troops to feel the pressure of the Japanese 4th and 2nd

Western Armies.^ The detachment sent under ColonelDetach- Stakovich to Ta-tu-san-pu, as well as the outposts

back into pushed by the advanced guard to Örr-tai-tsy and

*osiSon°Schuan-tai-tsy, were in the afternoon driven back

on the by portions of the Japanese 2nd Army.^ Stako-

in the vicli established himself again at Yen-kia-wan,face of

^j^g other portions withdrawing into the positionJapanese ^ ... . . .

attacks, of the 3rd Infantry Di\'ision behind the Schi-li-ho.

Centre is General Grekov, with his Cossack Brigade,entrench- „g^^g wav in the direction of Li-kia-tun.mg its o ./

main po- Latc in the evening the main bodies of the

Sia-liu- advanced guard gave up Wu-li-tai-tsy, when pressedho-tey.

i^y ^bg ^^^ Japanese Division, having previously

been told not to engage in serious action. Theywithdrew on Schi-li-ho.^

The various orders of Kuropatkin caused at first

great confusion in the 10th Army Corps. On his

first directing to place the reserves behind the

right wing, General Slutshevski ordered General

Riabinkin, when obliged to evacuate the advanced-

guard position, to move behind the right wing to

Tschan-sin-tien, 5 kilometres south of Scha-ho-pu.

When next Kuropatkin's second order, to send

Riabinkin 's Detachment to the heights of Ku-schu-tsy, crossed his arrangements, he meant to

withdraw the 1st Brigade of the 9th Infantry

Division into the reserve at Tschan-sin-tien ; this

' Pp. 82-89. 2 pp 88 and 89. ^ P. 86.


movement to be carried out during the forenoon

of October 10. Finally, only the last of Kuro-

patkin's orders, demanding the occupation of the

heights at Ku-schu-tsy with some portions, cameto be executed.

Having received this last order from Slutshevski,

Riabinkin directed Colonel Solomko to remain

with his party ^ on the height near Ku-schu-tsy,

causing at the same time two battalions of the

123rd Infantry Regiment and two batteries to

occupy the villages of Siau-fan-kia-tun and Fan-

kia-tun, as well as the course of the Schi-li-ho

between these places ; two companies and the

Scouts of the 123rd Infantry Regiment of that

force were detached to move to Yin-pan. Twobattalions from the 123rd Infantry Regiment, and

one battalion from the 124th, were stationed as

General Reserve south of Sin-tschuan. Colonel

Solomko pushed one battalion as outposts beyond

Tschou-kuan-tun, occupying, with one battalion

each, Ku-schu-tsy village and the height west of

it ; here they used the trenches abandoned by the

Japanese. The outpost battalion beyond Tschou-

kuan-tun was directed not to engage in decisive

action, but to withdraw in time before an attack

by the enemy behind the height at Ku-schu-tsy,

so as to be available as reserve of the detachment.

The battery was standing ready under cover west

of the village, behind a ridge.

The attack of the Japanese 5th Division de-

veloped towards noon against the height between

' ITiree battalions from the 124th Infantry Regiment, and the 2DdBattery 3lBt Artillery Brigade. (Pp. 62-63.)


VVu-li-tai-tsy and Ku-schu-tsy ^ ; the outpost bat-

talion had previously retired from Tschou-kuan-tun

to that height. After the Japanese Artillery had

opened fire on the heights, the Russian battery

left its position, withdrawing to the country north

of Ku-sehu-tsy. As it did not reopen fire, and the

Japanese continued to fire upon the unoccupied

height, its losses were very small.

The issue of the fight for the height, lasting till

dark, is described by both parties in a different

way. While, according to Russian reports, the

hill remained in the hands of Solomko's Detach-

ment, the Japanese insist upon having captured

it at 10 in the evening." At any rate, Solomko

evacuated the position at daybreak on October 11,

leading his battalion back behind the Schi-li-ho,

between Hun-kia-tschuan and Fan-kia-tun.

During October 10 the last portions of the 9th

Infantry Division's main body of the 10th Corps

moved forward, in compliance with the Order, early

on October 9, with the object of occupying the

former position of the advanced guard. After com-

pleting the movements, the troops were stationed

in the following manner : Of the 9th Infantry

Division the 2nd Brigade, with the 2nd Abteilung

9th Artillery Brigade, was on the right, the 35th

Infantry Regiment having occupied Kian-hu-tun

village and the pagoda west of the height of

Hun-pau-schan, and the 36th Infantry Regiment

1 p. 84.

* p. 85. The Japanese probably captured only the southern part

of the height on the evening of October 10, the northern portion still

remaining in the hands of the Russians.


Hun-pau-schan and Wan-kia-lou-tsy villages. The

Abteilung Artillery had unlimbered in the gun-pits

on the western and eastern slopes of the height of

Hun-pau-schan. The 1st Brigade, together with

the 1st Abteilung 9th Artillery Brigade, was on

the left, the 33rd Infantry Regiment standing in

Nin-kuan-tun, while the 34th Infantry Regiment,

with the Artillery, was pushed forward to Schuan-

tai-tsy, to establish touch with Man's Detachment,

from the 4th Siberian Ai-my Corps, which was

standing with its main body at Tan-hai-schi.

Headquarters of the 10th Army Corps remained

in Hou-huan-hua-tien.

The 4th Siberian Army Corps and Man's De-

tachment remained in their positions north of

Sia-liu-ho-tsy and at the Nan-san, which they

had to fortify. The 4th Siberian Army Corps

seems to have reinforced the regiments standing

already on the Western San-jo-shi-san by dis-

patching there some more troops. The 1st

Brigade 3rd Siberian Infantry Division probably

also advanced to Pa-kia-tsy as early as October 10.

Man's Detachment occupied Temple Hill with

an advanced guard, after weak outposts had aban-

doned the low heights on the western bank of

the Schi-li-ho on the approach of the Japanese

4th Army.^ Mishtshenko's Cossack Brigade was

moved from Ta-pu to tlie left wing of the 4th

Siberian Army Corps. The Artillery of the 4th

Siberian Army Corps on the Western San-jo-shi-

san had some passing fight with Japanese Artillery

east of the coal-pits."

' P. 83. •' p. 81.


The 6th Siberian Army Corps did not advance

on October 10. During the night October 9-10

its commander had received the following directive

from the Commander-in-Chief:" In case the enemy is advancing for decisive

attack against the Western Detachment, I have

left it to General v. Bilderling to apply to you

for any support he should need. Respond to such

request, but not with small parties, nor, if possible,

by breaking up units.

" But remember that you are forming myStrategic Reserve."

Dembovski's Detachment on the right of the

corps was standing, as before, at Ta-wan-kan-pu—Sin-tai-tsy ; the 1st Army Corps in the east had

likewise retained its widely scattered position at

Tun-san-ho and Liian-fan-tun.

General Kuropatkin, with his Staff, went to

Tun-san-ho on the left of the 10th Army Corps.

The Eas- General Baron Stackelberg had probably ex-

tachmeut, pected somc better success with the Easterncontrary Detachment, in spite of his insufficient measures,to Kuro- ^ . . .

patkin's being consequently disappointed with the real

remains coursc of cvcnts. The rugged mountainousinitspo- country without roads, represented by very im-

perfect maps giving little information, coupled

with the awkwardness of the Russians in

moving through the hills, made it not easy for

the Eastern Detachment to carry out its task.

Without once more thoroughly reconnoitring the

ground, the Commander thought it hopeless to

continue the attack against the steep heights.

Though Stackelberg's Staff did not think they


were facing a superior enemy, still they were

convinced that even a small force could suc-

cessfully face far superior forces on ground so

exceedingly favourable for defence as it was here.

General Baron Stackelberg therefore decided to

make use of October 10 merely for reconnoitring

purposes. In this decision the General was con-

firmed by the Commander-in-Chiefs last letter

arriving on the 9th/ and exhorting him to be cau-

tious in the further attack upon the main position.

On the afternoon of October 9 General Baron

Stackelberg issued the following Order

:

" The Eastern Detachment will remain in its

present position to-morrow. The 1st Siberian

Army Corps will occupy the point of observation

north-west of Yin-tsien-pu ^ and Sia-schi-tsiau-tsy;

advanced guards are to be left on the line

Kau-kia-pu—Sien-schan-tsy.

" The S7^d Siberian Army Coi'ps ^ will remain at

Kau-tai-tsy and Jo-gu ; advanced guard at Wei-niu-nin.

" The 27id Siberian Army Corps will remain in

general reserve at Bian-yu-pu-sa.

" To-morrow, October 10, each Army Corps will

reconnoitre in its section the enemy's position, with

the object of ascertaining the approaches and roads

for turning it ; at the same time the strength of

the enemy is to be established.

" The Siberian. Cossack Division will march from

Sien-schan-tsy to Hoe-lin, reconnoitre towards the

' P. Ö9. ^ It caunot be ascertained which point is meant.' The 3rd East Siberian Rifle Division was placed again under the

orders of the 3rd Siberian Army Corps.

7


Kuan-lin-tsy—Pen-si-hu valley, and serve as a

connecting-link between the 1st and 3rd Siberian

Army Corps. All roads and paths leading into

the valley named are to be followed up, so as to

ascertain whether it is possible to turn the passes

occupied by the enemy. Lieutenant-General von

JRennenkampf s Detachment will look to the safety

of the left flank. He is requested to co-operate

on the left bank of the Tai-tsy-ho by marching on

Pen-si-hu ; a provisional protective force is to be

pushed to San-kia-tsy on the Tai-tsy-ho for guard-

ing the lines of communication of the 3rd Siberian

Army Corps."

When day broke on October 10, the letter^

dated October 9, 11 p.m., arrived from General

Headquarters, calling upon the Commander of the

Eastern Detachment, in contradiction to the ex-

hortation just previously given, to act with vigour.

In reply Stackelberg sent a lengthy document

to General Headquarters, pointing out the awk-

ward situation of the Eastern Detachment, and

at the same time complaining about the deficiency

of his maps

:

" Despatch 10,053 I have received. The enemyhas occupied a strong position on the line Tan-kia-

pu-tsy ^—Pen-si-hu facing north-north-east, holding

as advanced posts the strongly entrenched positions

on the Tschien-kou-lin, Tu-men-tsy-lin, and Ta-lin

Passes in front, as well as the three successive

defiles on the road Wei-niu-nin—Pen-si-hu. This

day (October 10) I have ordered to be spent in

• p. 90.

' 6^ kilometres south-west of the Tschien-kou-lin Pass.


reconnoitring the approaches and roads leading

to the enemy's positions ; to-morrow, the 11th,

I intend to attack only the advanced positions.

You have not yet received my report apparently,

describing the situation of my Force. I cannot

execute the envelopment demanded of me until I

have captured the position of Pen-si-hu ; if matters

proceed normally and favourably this cannot be

done before the 12th or 13th. On the maps in

our hands the country where the attack is to be

made is a blank surface, with only one road leading

from east to west (from Pen-si-hu to the coal-pits),

without showing any kind of features. On the

other hand, the country through which we have

to ]^march is in reality exceedingly mountainous,

and scarcely passable for artillery. The map not

showing any roads deprives me of the possibihty

of apportioning to the columns the roads, the

choice of which I must first settle by reconnais-

sance. Thus, for instance, the road from Kau-

kia-pu by Pa-kia-tsy to Schan-liu-ho-tsy is only

a narrow path, completely impassable for artillery

and military wagons." I report this, expecting further orders. Should

there be maps at General Headquarters showing

the country in which my troops liave to move,

1 beg you to send them liere."

Nothing was changed in the orders for the 10th.

At daybreak the Japanese, under cover of the

fog, recaptured the positions they had lost on the

9th. Apart from the unsuccessful counter-attacks,

no other attack was made on the Russian side.'

' Pp. 77-79.

100 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARAt 8.40 p.m. Kuropatkin's answer to Stackelberg's

letter arrived. The Commander-in-Chief wrote

:

*' The report you sent by Lieutenant-Colonel A.

I have received. The directives given to you

remain in force. The time for executing themis left to your discretion, but you must not lose

another day without urgent reasons, especially not

if only weak forces are opposing you."

General Baron Stackelberg had already decided

to attack the Japanese with the utmost vigour

on October 11. "For to-morrow, the 11th," so

ran the order to his troops, " I order you to attack

the enemy in his advanced positions, driving himfrom there, and, cost what it might, to take

possession of the passes."

The 1st and 3rd Siberian Army Corps were the

forces apportioned to attack ; with this object

Rennenkampf's and Samsonov's Detachments

were placed under the orders of General Ivanov,

commanding the 3rd Siberian Army Corps. The1st Siberian Army Corps was to drive the Japanese

from the Tschien-kou-lin, Tu-men-tsy-lin, and Ta-

lin Passes, General Ivanov was to attack the

enemy's extreme right wing at Pen-si-shu, and

to threaten it by a movement on the left bank

of the Tai-tsy-ho ; a strong detachment on the

road Hoe-lin—Kuan-lin-tsy had to establish touch

with the 1st Siberian Army Corps.

With the object of particularly calling the

attention of the troops to the difficult tasks of

the next day, Stackelberg, in addition to his

Order, made known the following address :

" You heroic troops of the Eastern Group and

1


of General von Rennenkampfs Detachment

!

From to-morrow we will have to face a series

of fights with the Japanese. Remember, all Russia

is looking on you during these days, expecting

from you the highest courage, manliness, and heroic

deeds. We will ever keep before our eyes that

we are Russians, and that we must be victorious."

October 10, in the course of events, brought Result of

about a change of decisive importance. Marshal ^^^^o^®!*

Marquis Oyama did not wait for the further

advance of the Russians, but directed his Armies,

in conformity with his orders of October 9, in

the evening, to go forward, with the object of

forestalling the enemy's attack. The 4th and

2nd Armies pushed back the Russian outposts

south of the Schi-li-ho, as well as on the western

bank of the Scha-ho, arriving on the line generally :

heights east of Yun-kuan-tun—Wu-li-tai-tsy

—

Hua-kia-tun ; the Guard and 2nd Divisions of the

1st Army, who were to give a start to the 4th

Army on their left, maintained, for the present,

their positions on the right bank of the UpperSchi-li-ho. The 12th Division of the 1st Army, onthe right, succeeded in snatching from the Russians

the advantages they had gained on October 9.

On the Russian side, the intended offensive,

though hardly begun, was nearing its end. TheWestern Detachment had remained halting onthe Schi-li-ho and its right tributary, and wasentrenching by orders of Kuropatkin, the 10th

Army Corps having thus as well the use of three

defensive positions, one behind the other. TheEastern Detachment was, it is true, directed to

102 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARattack, but it also remained halting, its com-mander considering it first necessary to makesome special reconnaissances. Even at this stage

it could be guessed pretty well that it wouldnot be long before the whole Russian Army wasconfined to the defensive.

October 11

Karopat- After the directives he had given to the Eastern

pect« the Detachment «on October 10, with his peremptoryEastern demand to continue the offensive. General Kuro-Detach-mentto patkin thought he could calmly await the course

^ctorv, of events on his left wing. He hoped that within

J^^^™^^the next few days he would hear of the longed-

ern De- for mcssage of victory, the effect of which would

to'^reTap^ probably mean the end of the campaign. Generalturethe Headquarters were therefore absolutely confident.positions .....south of A participation in the attack of the Centre (the

li-hoit^ term applicable to the General Reserve after it

hadiost had moved into the front line), and of the

ber 10. Western Detachment, the Commander-in-Chief

did not consider necessary ; it seemed to him

sufficient if these Army Groups would proceed

to attack the moment the Eastern Group had

accomplished the main work. On the other hand,

it was not permissible to allow the Western

Detachment to be pushed back previously, as it

would otherwise not be able to march at once

with the Eastern Detachment on Liao-yan and

envelop the Japanese after Stackelberg's victory.

But the initial retrograde step had already been

taken, since the 10th and 17th Army Corps had


left their advanced positions in the hands of the

Japanese on the 10th. Kuropatkin therefore

thought it proper to cause these Army Corps to

recapture on the 11th the positions they had

evacuated on the 10th ; he issued orders to that

effect to the Commander of the Western De-tachment.

On the morning of October 11 the Western

Detachment was disposed as follows : The 17th

Army Corps occupied, with the 3rd Infantry

Division, the strongly entrenched position extend-

ing on the Schi-h-ho from Örr-schi-kia-tsy to

Schi-li-ho village, two battalions of the 10th

Infantry Regiment, the 9th Infantry Regiment,

and three batteries standing in the western section

from Örr-schi-kia-tsy to Nan-kuan-tsy, and three

battalions of the 11th Infantry Regiment, two of

the 12th, and likewise three batteries in the eastern

section from Lun-wan-miau to Schi-li-ho. Three

battalions and a half remained available as local

reserve south of Pei-wu-li-tai. The 35th Infantry

Division was standing in brigades as general

reserve of the Army Corps at Tschien-liu-tan-

kou. With the 10th Army Corps the advanced

guard, under General Riabinkin, was in the Schi-

li-ho position east of Siau-schan-tun, the 9th

Infantry Division being in reserve at Hun-pau-schan.

When, towards 9.30 a.m., the Commander-in-Chief's request to recapture the former positions

had become known to the Western Detachment,

General Slutshevski, commanding the 10th ArmyCorps, gave General Riabinkin the order to hold

104 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARthe position Hun-kia-tschuan—Fan-kia-tun occu-

pied by him, at the same time requesting himto state what numbers he considered sufficient

for recapturing the height west of Ku-schu-tsy.

General Riabinkin thought an Infantry Division,

with the proper amount of Artillery, would be

necessary ; but that an attack on the Mandarin

Road ought to be made at the same time as

well. To have the forces ready for such an

attack. General Baron Bilderling, commanding the

Western Detachment, then ordered the 17th

Army Corps, about noon, to send one Infantry

regiment, together with an Artillery Abteilung

from the 35th Infantry Division in reserve, on

Schi-li-ho.

Meanwhile the action had been proceeding all

along the front.

Oyama For continuing the attack on October 11

pSthr ^I^rshal Marquis Oyama had issued an Order to

Russians the Armics, expressing the intention of pushing

east. The the enemy north-east.^ The 1st Army'' was there-

isfArmy ^^^^ ^^ advance from its position in a northerly

initiates direction to the line Ba-ii-san ^ — Yen-tschien-the at- .

tack in a tschai *; the 4th Army to regulate its advance

di'rectiolf^" Conformity with the Armies on the wings, to

push the enemy from the height east of Wu-li-

' According to Japanese sources of Captain Sanders (retired). Theintention of making a wheel with the 2nd Army was only apparent

in the General Order issued at 10 in the evening of October 9. (P. 75.)

* The Order, the wording of which is not known, does not contain

anything about the task of the 12th Division, which was covering the

right flank on the extreme right of the 1st Army.' 10 kilometres west of Bian-yu-pu-sa.

* 8 kilometres west of the Ba-ji-san,


tai-tsy^ before daybreak, and then carry out a

right wheel in the direction on Tan-hai-schi ^ ; and

the 2nd Army to push back the enemy opposing

it, and then advance on Scha-ho-pu—Lin-schin-pu

in support of the attack of the 4th Army.Based on these directives of General Head-

quarters, General Baron Kuroki issued in Ta-yau-

pu the following Order for the 1st Army on the

evening of October 10 :

" 1. The enemy facing the Army is entrenched

on the line : Height north of Man-hua-pu—San-

kia-tsy ; outposts are standing on the heights

south of Schan-liu-ho-tsy and north of Shimo-ro-

kun-ko.^

" The right Division of the Fourth Army is

going to attack the enemy to-morrow, October 11,

in touch with the left of the First Army." 2. The First Army will at daybreak on the

11th, with its main bodies, advance to attack the

line : Heights north of Schan-liu-ho-tsy—heights

north of Sia-liu-ho-tsy.

" 3. The 12th Division will hold its position, but,

if it can possibly be done, will support the attack

of the main body of the army by an offensive

stroke of some portions in the direction of the

Tschau-hsien-lin Pass.

" 4. The Guards will push the enemy from

height ' 238 ' before daybreak, attacking then the

heights north of Schan-liu-ho-tsy.

" 5. The 2nd Division will capture the height

' The height east of Wu-li-tai-tsy was, as a matter of fact, in the

hands of the Japanese already at daybreak of October 11. (P. 85.)* 9 kilometres east of Wu-li-tai-tsy.

* North and south of the Watauabe-yama.

106 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARnorth-west of Ka-mi-yo-ka-ko, advancing then to

attack the heights north of Sia-liu-ho-tsy.

" 6. TJie General Reserve will be south of

Hui-yau at 4 a.m.

"7. / shall be on the Ma-tsi-schan^ at 8 a.m."

The 5th Kobi Brigade, under General Aibara,

after landing at An-tung ^ on October 10, was

placed under command of the 1st Army, re-

ceiving orders to move on Si-ho-yan by forced

marches.^

TheRus- At daybreak on the 11th Stackelberg initiated

g^^jj^j)^^*" the Eastern Detachment's attack by a powerfultachment fire of artillery ; more than 100 ffuns of the 1st andattacks . . .

the right 3rd Siberian Army Corps poured their fire into the

the Japa-Positions of General Baron Ino-uye. The troops

uese. then deployed for attack. The 1st Siberian ArmyCorps, on the right of which was the Cavalry of

the Army Corps under Lieutenant-Colonel Grekov,

attacked the Tschien-kou-lin, Tu-men-tsy-lin, and

Ta-lin Passes, the 3rd Siberian Army Corps and

Rennenkampfs Detachment, reinforced by five

battalions of that corps, at the same time pushing

on the left of the 1st Siberian Army Corps ^ to the

heights north and east of Pen-si-hu. Between

both these attacking groups there was a wide gap.

The 5th East Siberian Rifle Division of the 2nd

Siberian Army Corps, together with the 2nd East

Siberian Field Mortar Battery, attached from the

' At the coal-pits.

* At the mouth of the Ya-lu.

* 15 kilometres south-south-east of Pen-si-hu.

* The 1st Siberian Army Corps was fighting with the 9th East Siberian

Rifle Division on its right ; but the units seem to have got mixed

afterwards.


3rd Siberian Army Corps, as well as the 1st Bri-

gade 1st East Siberian Rifle Division, from the

1st Siberian Army Corps, were retained in reserve

at Sia-schi-tsiau-tsy.

The attack turned out to be very difficult

generally. In the morning the air was cool and

bright, the heat, however, increasing during the

forenoon, until it was oppressively hot about noon.

The troops being all in full marching order, the

movements over the mountainous country were

extremely trying and fatiguing. Noon was ap-

proaching without the attack making any progress.

The Japanese Infantry, hidden in their deep

trenches at wide intervals, presented but a bad

target to the Russian fire ; while the Japanese

themselves were able to make good practice from

their commanding heights. Nor did the Russian

Artillery much assert itself in spite of its enormous

superiority, because coming into action in suitable

positions was very difficult on the one hand, and,

on the other, because the batteries became engaged

mostly singly, never unitedly ; and were, therefore,

unable to establish superiority of fire anywhere.

The Japanese batteries often evaded the Artillery

duel, with the object of using their full strength

against the enemy's Infantry. It was difficult for

the Russian Artillery to locate the hidden bat-

teries of the Japanese. The Russians, moreover,

diminished their effect by needlessly keeping at

too great a distance from their enemy, mostly

4,000 metres ; at these long ranges the battery

commanders allowed themselves to be misled to

fire on sham batteries, with which the Japanese

108 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARdeceived them by exploding powerful detonators.

Of the 122 guns^ apportioned to the attack,

large numbers were not engaged at all, it is

said, owing to the difficulties of ground; yet

the great numbers actually engaged in the action

ought to have produced some effect, if properly

employed.

Climbing and clambering up from one hill to

the other, the Russian Infantry was working its

way forward ; sometimes the men had to crawl

on all fours to avoid slipping and falling on the

poHshed surface of the rocky soil. Wheneverthe skirmishers had gained some gi'ound for a

short distance, they lay again for hours engaged

in fire-action on the rocky ground, which was

kept at red heat by the rays of the sun.

General Baron Ino-uye's troops awaited the

attack in their positions on the rocks. For the

time being it was impossible for the General to

think of any counter-attack, which Kuroki, by his

Order, expected him to make ; he looked upon his

task as accomplished if he succeeded in merely

holding at bay the superior forces of the enemy.

The whole position from the valley of the Tai-

tsy-ho at Pen-si-hu to the Tschien-kou-lin Pass

had now been occupied, in some places strongly,

in others weakly, just as the ground necessitated

it. Units could not be kept intact ; defensive

groups were apportioned to the various sections

of ground, battalion commanders being given

' 1st Siberian Army Corps 62 guns (less H.A. mountain battery).

3rd „ „ „ 60 „ (less mortars).

122 guns.


charge of them. The reserves still available

were placed so as to rapidly reach any point

threatened.^

While the troops of the 1st and 3rd Siberian

Army Corps were attacking frontally the passes

south of Bian-yu-pu-sa, General von Rennenkampfhad charged General Liubavin wath making once

more an enveloping movement from the southern

bank of the Tai-tsy-ho. No Infantry having

been attached to the General in this case either,^ it

could be foreseen that the result would be just as

indifferent as on October 9. General Shimamura,

commanding the 12th Brigade and in the section

east of Pen-si-hu, had already made provision to

meet this expected attempt of the Russians to

turn the position. A battalion was formed of odd

companies,^ and pushed to the southern bank of

the river. When the Cossack Brigade came on,

the battalion occupied the heights south of Riu-

wo-bio, preventing the enemy by their fire from

pushing beyond To-ka-ho-shi. Liubavin, finding

the road to the northern bank barred, gave up the

enveloping movement, and retired in an easterly

direction. General Samsonov's attitude may have

contributed to this resolve ; he had been charged

with guarding Liubavin's left fiank and had like-

' More details about the occupation of the Japanese positions are not

known.* Tlie detachment of the 3rd Siberian Army Corps (2 battalions,

2 guns, 1 sotnia, and 3 detachments of mounted Scouts) underColonel Drushinin, which had been pushed to tlie heights of Ja-un-ssun, on the south bank of the Tai-tsy-ho, was withdrawn to the northbank of the river during the night (X-tober 10-11.

* Two companies 39th Kobi Regiment, 2 companies 4th Kobi Regi-

ment, and 1 company 14th Infantry Regiment.

110 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARwise fallen back east, feeling himself threatened

from Si-ho-yan probably/

The Japanese composite battalion had been

directed to co-operate with the 2nd Cavalry

Brigade, whose arrival in the country south of

Pen-si-hu was expected on that day. But Prince

Kan-in, who, after an exceedingly fatiguing march,

reached Si-ho-yan on the 11th, did not turn up

yet. The Japanese battalion, after having repulsed

the Russians on the south bank, returned to the

right bank of the Tai-tsy-ho, and was then being

distributed along the whole front.

When noon had passed without the Japanese

on the right wing having abandoned a single

point of their position, Stackelberg by a verbal

order urged the '* attack to be carried forward

now." The 3rd Siberian Army Corps and Ren-nenkampfs Detachment then engaged all their

forces, the reserves following each other like

waves, carrying the firing-lines with them. Six

times the assault was repeated, but not in a

single instance did they succeed in breaking into

the enemy's main position. It is true, the gallant

assailants at some points pushed far enough for-

ward to oblige their Artillery to cease firing, for

fear of hitting their own Infantry ; some Japanese

advanced trenches were also temporarily captured

by General von Rennenkampfs troops, but the

strength failed them for the final decisive blow.

Completely exhausted from the fatigues of the un-

accustomed tactics, tormented moreover by thirst

lu Si-ho-yau were only Lines of Communication Troops on the

morning of October 11.


in the excessive heat, the Russians broke downahiiost when in the enemy's trenches, exposed to

the cross-fire of the enemy, unable to make an-

other step forward. They crowded together in

dead ground and holes not seen into, waiting for

dusk. Till night the 3rd Siberian Army Corps

and Rennenkampfs Detachment had lost about

5,000 men, surely an eloquent testimony of the

heroic self-sacrifice and devotion of these troops.

The 5th East Siberian Rifle Division of the

2nd Siberian Army Corps had remained standing

inactive all day at Sia-schi-tsiau-tsy ; the General

Commanding had been unable to make up his

mind to stake it.^

The Japanese, too, paid for that day with heavy

sacrifice. When darkness set in, ending the fight

for the moment, one-third of the brave troops

was dead or wounded. Major Honda's composite

battalion, which had to face the most serious

attacks east of Pen-si-hu, had suffered most of

all. General Baron Ino-uye reported to Head-

quarters of the 1st Army in the evening :

" The enemy east of Pen-si-hu has increased in

strength to about one division and a half. Theriglit and centre of Shimamura's Detachment are

being attacked in very great strength. General

Shimamura was obliged to engage all his forces,

' Only tlie 20th East Siberian Rifle Regiment was started at 6 p.m.

for the riglit wing of the 1st Siberian Army Corps ; this regiment was

to guard against envelopment a battalion of the .3rd East Siberian

Rifle Regiment which the 1st East Siberian Rifle Division bad engaged

on the extreme right of the Eastern Detachment in support of the

attack of the 9th East Siberian Rifle Division. The General Com-manding the 1st Siberian Army Corps probably disposed of the let

Brigade 1st East Siberian Rifle Division.

112 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARand is fighting a desperate action. The division

has sent thither a battaHon from its last re-

serve.

" Enemy in direction of Ta-lin and Tu-men-

tsy-lin superior in numbers. Severe action pro-

ceeding there.

" The division is obliged to move up a battalion

from Kigoshi's Detachment."^

General Baron Kuroki, seeing from this report

the great danger still threatening his right, sent

orders to General Kigoshi to leave only one

battalion of the 4Cth Infantry Regiment south of

Yin-tsien-pu, and to march with the rest at once

to the 12th Division. Kigoshi, thereupon, movedto the Tu-men-tsy-lin Pass, pushing from there

his troops into the left of Ino-uye's force.

The Japa- General Asada, commanding the Guard Division,

Guards decided to capture before daybreak the Wai-to-san,

s'dir^on which the enemy had not yet shown himself

vision ad- in Strength ; he did this to enable him to carry

against ^^^ ^^^ attack on the heights north of Schan-liu-

*J^ . ho-tsy in the direction required. He thereforeRussian .

•'

.

^Centre issucd the following Order

:

berian" "^^^^ right column^ under Major-General Izaki

^rmy (5 battahons of the 1st Brigade ^ and half a troopCorps and p ,

,

Maus of cavalry), will be ready in the valley south of

ment), ^^^ Wai-to-san at 5 a.m., and attack that heightgaining a at daybreak.

ing on " The left coluvin, under Major-General Watanabe

soifh^and (5 battalions of the 2nd Brigade' and half a troopwest ofSchan- ' The detachment under General Kigoshi, left behind by the 12th

liu-ho- Division south of Yin-tsien-pu. (P. 71.)tsy. i One battalion remaining as Divisional Reserve.


of cavalry), will stand at Shi-mo-ro-kun-ko before

daybreak, ready to attack height ' 238.'

" Of the Artillery^ the batteries on the heights

north of Tan-kia-pu-tsy and north of Tschan-hei-

tun will remain in their positions, supporting, if

necessary, the infantry attack. The four batteries

standing at Huan-kia-pu-tsy will be prepared to

advance.

" The Engineers will remain with the last-

named batteries to aid and improve roads, in case

the artillery is moved forward.

" The Guard Cavalry Regiment will advance on

the right of the right column, covering the right

flank of the division.

" One battalion each of the 1st and 2nd Brigades

will remain at Tan-kia-pu-tsy and Huan-kia-pu-tsy,

at the disposal of the General Commanding the

Division."

The 1st Brigade started from its bivouacs

between 2 and 3 a.m., advancing in the direction

of the Wai-to-san ; the 1st Guard Regiment was

marching on the right, and the 2nd Guard Regi-

ment on the left. It was soon seen that the

Wai-to-san was occupied by the Russians with but

very weak outposts, which at once withdrew in

a northerly and north-easterly direction on the

approach of the Japanese. The height was oc-

cupied by the brigade at 6.30 a.m.—the brigade

halting there for the present. At the same hour

the Guard Cavalry Regiment arrived at Hi-ro-

ki-rei, covering the right flank of the Guards

after establishing touch with the left of the 12th

Division at the Tschien-kou-lin Pass.

8

114 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARGeneral Watanabe, commanding the 2nd Brigade

of the Guard Division, received the Divisional Order

at 1.30 a.m. On this, the 4th Guard Regiment,

of which the 1st Battalion was apportioned as

the Divisional Commander's reserve, was movedto a road east of Ni-do-ko, and the 3rd GuardRegiment to that village, both regiments to be

ready there at 3 a.m. The commander of the

brigade, who was with the 3rd Guard Regiment,

retained two companies of that regiment at his

disposal.

The men of the 2nd Brigade had their rifles

loaded, it is true, but they had been ordered not

to fire before it grew light, and to close on the

enemy with the bayonet. In case a fire-action

should ensue after all, in the dark, the men were

recommended to fire on those who were taller

than the Japanese. Both regiments advanced

from their position of assembly across country

—

the 4th Guard Regiment to the right of and past

Shimo-ro-kun-ko in the direction of height " 238 ";

and the 3rd Guard Regiment past the left of the

village named, against a low knoll west of the

height. The regiments suited their formations to

the ground. The 3rd Guard Regiment covered its

front by a battalion moving on a broad front and

forming a chain of patrols, followed at 50 metres'

distance by three companies in line, the fourth

company in the same formation keeping in third

line at about 150 metres' distance. The other two

battalions were marching in column of route

—

partly in fours, partly in groups—behind the

battalion in front, at 200 metres' distance. The


4th Guard Regiment was advancing in a similar

manner. The night was very dark. Marching off

the roads proving rather difficult, frequent halts had

to be made. Towards 5 a.m. the advanced patrols

of both regiments were approaching height " 238 ";

when the skirmishing line of the 4th Guard

Regiment was mounting the slopes, it suddenly

came upon Russian sentries, who at once gave

fire. Without replying to it, the Japanese patrols

fell back on their companies. The regiment con-

tinued its advance ; the Russians, who were out-

posts of a brigade pushed to Pa-kia-tsy by the

4th Siberian Army Corps,^ after a few shots retired

into a position a little more north. When the

foremost battalion of the 4th Guard Regiment had

approached that position to within about 300

metres it began to dawn. The Russians then

opened fire. The individual Russian marksmenbeing clearly visible against the brightening sky-

line, thus presenting a good target, the Japanese

began to fire too ; at the same time, the front

of the leading battalion was prolonged to the right

by two companies. It was soon seen that the

Russians had only a weak garrison there ; the

Japanese therefore advanced to within closest

distance of the position. Meanwhile the leading

battalion of the 3rd Guard Regiment, after

advancing over the low knoll west of height" 238," had deployed against the right wing of the

enemy.

The Russians, threatened in front and flank,

did not wait for the assault, but withdrew to the

' p. 95.


northern portion of the VVatanabe-yama.^ Six

wounded Russians were found in the advanced

trenches, which had been occupied by one company,

and one Russian was made prisoner ; the main

position, somewhat farther north, had been de-

fended by one battalion. The 3rd Guard Regiment

now occupied the Ohara-yama, and the 4th Guard

Regiment on the right the slopes east of it on both

sides of theroad from Ka-mi-ro-kun-ko to Pa-kia-tsy.

The Divisional Commander had meanwhile been

holding back the 2nd Battalion of the 3rd Guard

Regiment for his own use. The regiments at

once entrenched. By this time it was broad day-

light. The commander of the Russian brigade

engaged a fresh battalion, which had been standing

on the road to Ka-mi-ro-kun-ko, against the 2nd

Guard Brigade, ordering also a battery to come into

action east of Pa-kia-tsy. This battalion deployed,

advanced to within 200 metres of the fire-trenches

of the 4th Guard Regiment, and opened a brisk

fire. Lieutenant-Colonel Ida, commanding the

regiment, on this account reinforced his front by

one of the companies still available. The Russian

garrison of the X^'^atanabe-yama farther north

maintaining also a hot fire on the 4th Guard

Regiment, it had a rather hard struggle. Its

losses were increasing ; at noon the last company

had to be engaged. It was afternoon, after the

Japanese Artillery had done some good practice,

' This height was afterwards named Watanabe-yama, after the

Japanese General of that name^ who had captured it. 'ITie Ohara-

yama is named after Colonel Ohara, commanding the 3rd Guard

Regiment.


before the situation of the hard-pressed regiment

was improving.

When the Divisional Commander received the

report of the capture of the Wai-to-san and Ohara-

yama, he ordered the four batteries standing at

Huan-kia-pu-tsy to advance. The order found the

batteries already on the march, the Artillery com-mander having been watching the action, and

having started the batteries on his own initiative

without waiting for orders.

The 4th Battery therefore arrived already, shortly

after 9 a.m., at Ka-mi-ro-kun-ko, coming into

position east of that village, and opening fire onthe Watanabe-yama.

In the afternoon the Russian detachments lying

immediately opposite the 4th Guard Regimentwithdrew to a distance of about 500 metres, but

resumed their fire-action there. The losses of the

two battalions of the 4th Guard Regiment fight-

ing here amounted to 180 dead and wounded, of

whom 50 by Artillery fire.

The 3rd Guard Regiment, too, had been unable

to advance beyond the Ohara-yama. The Russians

were lying quite close opposite the regiment, upto within 100 metres. Towards 8 a.m. they

strengthened this portion of their fighting-line

;

some batteries at the same time came into action

north of the Western San-jo-shi-san, directing

their fire chiefly on the right wing of the 2ndDivision, but at times also upon the 3rd GuardRegiment. Three sotnias as well, probablyfrom General Mishtshenko's Transbaikal CossackBrigade, rode up in a long extended line, in the

118 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARvalley east of the Western San-jo-shi-san, against

the left wing of the 3rd Guard Regiment. Onecompany was deployed against the Cavalry, driving

it back rapidly by fire.

Towards 9.30 a.m. the Russians were again

considerably reinforced on the Watanabe-yama,

whilst Mishtshenko at the same time was trying

once more to make his arm felt by moving forward

strong Cavalry from the neighbourhood of Schan-

liu-ho-tsy against the left wing of the 3rd Guard

Regiment. But this attack also failed, with con-

siderable loss.

At 11 a.m. the 1st and 5th Batteries of the

Japanese arrived at Ka-mi-ro-kun-ko, directing

their fire, jointly with the 4th Battery, upon the

Watanabe-yama.^ But the Russian Infantry found

good cover on the steep slopes, and was, moreover,

entrenched ; the effect of the Artillery was therefore

too small for allowing the 3rd Guard Regiment

to advance.

Towards 1 p.m. the Russians made more vigorous

efforts for pushing back the 2nd Guard Brigade,

General Sarubaiev, commanding the 4th Siberian

Army Corps, ordered fresh Infantry to advance

from Schan-liu-ho-tsy against the 3rd GuardRegiment, and the batteries north of the WesternSan-jo-shi-san and east of Pa-kia-tsy to direct,

at the same time, an enveloping fire upon the

Japanese lines ; the Russian Infantry on the

\\^atanabe-yama began to fire more vigorously too.

But the 3rd Guard Regiment, having reinforced

' It cannot be ascertained what became of the fourth of the batteries

that had been ordered up from Huu-kia-pu-tsy.


its firing-line, was able to stay the adv^ance of the

Russians ; nevertheless the situation of the regi-

ment continued to be very difficult.

Meanwhile, on the right of the Japanese GuardDivision, affairs had developed in the following

way.

After the 1st Brigade had occupied the Wai-to-

san at daybreak, patrols ascertained the enemy to

be standing with about two companies ^ at JNIen-

ka-ko. The commander of the brigade then

pushed a party to the right, to cover his right

flank ; he deployed the 2nd Battalion of the

1st Guard Regiment against height " 135 " on

the northern slope of the Wai-to-san, which the

Russians had occupied but weakly. The battahon

succeeded in pushing back the enemy and occupy-

ing the height at 7.30 a.m. after a brief fire-action.

Shortly after 10 a.m. a long column, estimated

at five battalions of Infantry, was ascertained from

the Wai-to-san to be marching from Pa-kia-tsy onMan-hua-pu ; it was evidently the 1st Brigade

3rd Siberian Infantry Division from the 4th Siberian

Army Corps under General Shileiko, which had

been pushed to Pa-kia-tsy already on October 10.'

One battalion of that force deployed against height" 135," held by the 2nd Battalion of the 1st GuardRegiment, and opened fire at perhaps 700 metres'

range ; about two companies continued marchingon JNIen-ka-ko, and, with the two companies already

there, advanced against the right flank of the

1st Brigade ; the rest seemed to remain halting at

' Probably from the 4th East Siberian Rifle Regiment.« P. 9Ö.

120 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARMan-hua-pu. Simultaneously with the Infantry,

a battery of eight guns appeared east of Man-hua-

pu, taking under fire the Japanese Infantry lying

on the Wai-to-san. The situation of the brigade

would doubtless have become very serious had

the Russians engaged all their forces available

in a decisive assault on the right of the GuardDivision ; though the strength of the column

marching from Pa-kia-tsy on Man-hua-pu mayhave been overestimated, there is no doubt it was

several battalions strong. But its commander,

according to Russian custom, being unable to makeup his mind to stake his whol-e force, and supporting

the troops engaged in fighting merely by driblets,

the Japanese succeeded in maintaining themselves

after their firing-line had been reinforced by all

the reserves available. The Infantry was sup-

ported by Major Hidikata's Battery,^ which, shortly

before 2 p.m., unlimbered north of Ka-mi-ro-kun-

ko, firing with good effect upon the battery at

Man-hua-pu. Towards 3 p.m. the 1st Brigade

received further welcome aid by the intervention

of a battalion from the 46th Infantry Regiment,

which had probably been standing as Kigoshi's

reserve ^ at Ria-ka-ho-shi. Jointly with this

battalion the right wing of the brigade advanced

as well, driving the Russians back at Men-ka-ko

;

at 4.30 p.m. the heights east of that place were

occupied by the Japanese.

When, shortly after 1 p.m., the Divisional Com-mander was informed of the great straits in which

^ Composed of Russian guns captured on the Ya-lu.

» P. 112.

I


his 2nd Brigade was, he handed back to the 3rd

Guard Regiment the 2nd Battahon he had retained

as his reserve after the Ohara-yama had been

occupied. About this time General Asada had

gained the impression that the right wing of his

division was not in very great danger, and wouldbe able to hold on in spite of the Russian attempt

to envelop it by Men-ka-ko ; but the 2nd Brigade,

forming his left wing, on the other hand, seemed

to be threatened seriously, because the 3rd GuardRegiment was unable to gain ground ; and, more-

over, the 3rd Brigade of the 2nd Division, fighting

on the left of that regiment, had as yet been

unable to capture the strongly occupied height

of the Western San-jo-shi-san. To safeguard the

left of the Guard Division it seemed urgent to

make first sure of that hill. The 2nd GuardBrigade was therefore ordered " to attack the

Western San-jo-shi-san jointly with the 3rd

Brigade, with as many troops as were available."

General Asada, in addition, ordered the com-mander of the Artillery to unlimber an Artillery

Abteilung south-west of the Ohara-yama, near the

road from Ka-mi-ro-kun-ko to Ka-mi-yo-ka-ko,

in support of the attack.

But, owing to a report wrongly delivered, the

attack of the 2nd Guard Brigade did not come off

in the manner intended.

The 2nd Battalion 3rd Guard Regiment having

arrived south-west of the Ohara-yama, the com-mander of the brigade attached it to the 4th

Guard Regiment, ordering Lieutenant-Colonel

Ida, commanding the regiment, to advance with

122 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARthat battalion and his own 1st Battalion, which

during the night attack had remained as Divisional

Reserve at Huan-kia-pu-tsy, to attack the WesternSan-jo-shi-san in co-operation with the 3rd Brigade.

While General Watanabe was issuing this order,

a warrant officer (holding an honorary commission)

of the 3rd Brigade 2nd Division turned up,

reporting that his brigade was facing a strongly

superior enemy, and was withdra^\'ing into its

original position north of Tschan-hei-tun. Underthese circumstances it was no longer a question

of attacking the Western San-jo-shi-san, but for

General Watanabe rather a question of directly

protecting his seriously endangered left wing. Hetherefore ordered the 2nd Battalion 3rd GuardRegiment to occupy the knoll north-west of

Shi-mo-ro-kun-ko, the Di\dsional Commander at

the same time dispatching immediately after

receiving this report an adjutant to the 3rd

Brigade, to inform himself more exactly about the

state of affairs there. When the adjutant returned,

at 4.20 p.m., it proved the warrant officer had

delivered the report he had to transmit wrongly.

Its wording should have been actually: "Thebrigade is unable to capture the Western San-

jo-shi-san alone in the face of the strength of the

opposing enemy ; it will therefore remain for the

present in its position on the heights south of

Ka-mi-yo-ka-ko.

"

The misunderstanding having been cleared up,

GeneralW atanabe, at 4.30 p.m., ordered Lieutenant-

Colonel Ida to proceed now with the attack in

support of the 3rd Brigade. As the 1st Battalion


4th Guard Regiment, coming up from Huan-kia-pu-tsy, did not arrive before dark, the 2nd

BattaHon 3rd Guard Regiment alone was available

at once. That battalion deployed in the direc-

tion of the Western San-jo-shi-san, engaging the

Russians occupying the north-eastern slopes of

that hill ; but it did not succeed in making mate-

rial progress, the Russian Infantry, entrenched and

supported by the batteries in the v'alley west of

Schan-liu-ho-tsy, taking the assailants under an

effective fire. Even when the 1st Battalion 4th

Guard Regiment was being engaged towards

evening, the attack did not make progress beyond

Ka-mi-yo-ka-ko. The Divisional Commander finally

ordered General Watanabe to withdraw his troops

from Ka-mi-yo-ka-ko to the heights north-west of

Shi-mo-ro-kun-ko.

The Japanese 2nd Division, on the left, received

the Army Order for October 11 about midnight.

General Baron Nishijima then ordered the 3rd

Brigade to attack the Western San-jo-shi-san at

daybreak, and the 1.5th Brigade to be standing at

the same time ready on the line Pan-la-schan-tsy

—

Schuan-lun-szö, so as to turn against TempleHill and the Russian position on the heights north

of San-kia-tsy in co-operation with the advance of

the 4th Army.During the night one battery was brought

forward to the north-west corner of Tsien-tau, and

the three batteries standing hitherto on the left

were brought forward into positions south andsouth-east of Pan-la-schan-tsy. The Artillery regi-

ment had orders to support the attack.


General JMatsunaga, commanding the 3rd Brigade,

was standing ready at Ka-mi-chin-ka-ko at 5 a.m.

with the four battahons he had still available, the

1st and 2nd Battalions 29th Infantry Regiment

having been taken away from him to form the

reserve of the Divisional Commander. He ordered

the 4th Infantry Regiment to advance against the

heights of the Western San-jo-shi-san. The 3rd

Battalion 29th Infantry Regiment remained behind

in reserve.

The Western San-jo-shi-san and the heights

south of it are steep and perfectly bare. Thevalley in front of the Japanese, stretching south

of the block of hills, and being 500 to 600 metres

broad, could be completely seen into from the

Russian positions, the gaoljan having been every-

where harvested. Ditches traversing the fields,

and numerous nullahs on the slopes, were the

only means affording some cover to the attacking

Infantry.

The Colonel Commanding the 4th Infantry Regi-

ment deployed the 2nd Battalion in the direction

of Ka-mi-yo-ka-ko and of the Western San-jo-

shi-san, and the 1st Battalion on the left against

the height south-east of Pan-la-schan-tsy, jutting

out south-west, and occupied by the Russians as

early as October 10.

During the advance of the regiment, and while

it was approaching the bottom of the valley, it

was seen that the Russian lines on the Western

San-jo-shi-san were being gradually reinforced

;

the main hill-top was ascertained to be very

strongly occupied ; the occupants of the height


south-west of the hill were estimated at about

two battalions. There was further reported an

advance of strong Russian Infantry—about a

brigade—from Sia-liu-ho-tsy towards the Western

San-jo-shi-san. These were troops of the 4th

Siberian Ariny Corps, evidently bent on offering

here a determined resistance.^ Under these con-

ditions General Matsunaga decided to confine

himself to an attack on the height south-west of

the hill. After giving the Colonel of the 4th

Infantry Regiment the necessary instructions, the

latter brought his 3rd Battahon on the left wing

into action too.

Meanwhile the Japanese batteries had opened

fire, directing it partly on the Russian Infantry

on the Western San-jo-shi-san, and partly on the

height south-west of it. The Russian Artillery

had come into action in the same position as on

the previous day, that is to say, on the north-

western slope of the hill, firing on the Japanese

Artillery and on the 15th Brigade, which was

advancing farther in the west. The Japanese

batteries did not engage with the Russian in decisive

action. They followed generally the tactics fre-

quently used by them, to fire only when the Russian

Artillery was firing slowly or not at all ; but whenthe Russians directed a rapid fire on the Japanese

batteries they at once became silent, the gun-

detachments withdrawing under cover.

The 3rd Battalion 4th Infantry Regimenthaving prolonged the left of the firing-line, about

' Nothing is known about the employment iu detail of the 4th

Siberian Army Corps.

126 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR10.45 a.m., the whole Hne began to advance against

the San-jo-shi-san in rushes. The attack across the

valley against the slopes occupied by the Russians

took a pretty long time ; more than two hours

elapsed before the Japanese had worked up close

enough to deliver the assault. In the last portions

of the field of attack the nullahs on the slopes

afforded the skirmishers in part good cover, enabling

them on their left to approach the enemy to within

30 paces. When the Russians found themselves

face to face with their assailants at such close

quarters, they rose from their trenches, rushing out

to meet the Japanese, who were charging themwith the bayonet. After a violent struggle, last-

ing a few minutes, the Russians were pushed back

in a north-easterly direction, pursued with a hot

fire by the victor. The pursued crowded together

in a deep ravine in the west, at the foot of the

Western San-jo-shi-san ; afterwards more than 200

dead from the 8th Siberian Infantry Regimentwere found in there.

The advance of the Japanese 4th Infantry

Regiment came to a standstill after this success.

General Sarubaiev, commanding the 4th Siberian

Army Corps, was determined to hold the northern

portion of the Western San-jo-shi-san at all cost.

He occupied that height very strongly, ordering,

in addition, several counter-attacks for recapturing

the lost advanced positions ; all of which, how-ever, failed, in face of the Japanese Infantry andArtillery fire.

Such was the situation when in the afternoon

General Matsunaga made another vain attempt


of advancing against the northern portion of the

Western San-jo-shi-san, aided by portions of the

Guard Division.^ Further attacks had to be post-

poned till night.

The 15th Brigade of the 2nd Division, in

accordance ^\ath Orders, was standing at daybreak

of October 11 on the line Pan-la-schan-tsy—Shuan-

lun-szö ready to advance, the 16th Infantry Regi-

ment being on the right, and the 30th on the left.

Two companies of each regiment were stationed

south-west of Schuan-lun-szö as reserve of the

brigade. On the left the brigade was in touch

with the right Division of the 4th Army. Theadvanced guard of Man's Detachment on the

Russian side had occupied Temple Hill." TheRussian position extended from the country

north of San-kia-tsy in the direction of Siau-pu;

in the centre the line occupied formed a salient

projecting from Temple Hill south. ^ The posi-

tion was not well chosen. The salient angle was

exposed to the danger of being enveloped on

both sides by an assailant. The country north of

Pan-la-schan-tsy to the line San-kia-tsy—TempleHill being perfectly open, the Russian position

might have been chosen much better perhaps

from the southern extremity of Temple Hill to

East San-kia-tsy along the bed of the brook south

of Temple Hill. In front of this ready-made trench

was a clear field of fire of more than 1,500 metres'

extent ; the villages of West and East San-kia-' P. 124. 2 p. 05.

^ Temple Hill is a knoll wooded on its western slope, and contain-

ing a large temple, several buildings enclosed by walls. (AppendixXVIII.)

128 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARtsy, consisting of massive buildings suiTOunded by

stone and clay walls, would, moreover, have served

as excellent pivots. The position selected by the

Russians was occupied by five or six companies

;

weaker parties had been pushed to San-kia-tsy and

Ko-ka-tsy.

As the Orders ran, the 15th Brigade was to

time its attack with that of the 4th Army.^ But

as the 10th Division on the left did not attack

at all in the morning, the 15th Brigade was

lying idle too in its position of readiness until

the afternoon. Russian batteries standing north-

west of the Western San-jo-shi-san, further, one

battery north of East San-kia-tsy, and one on the

San-kai-seki-san, sometimes directed their fire upon

the troops resting, who, however, covered by the

country, did not suffer any loss ; only the 1st Bat-

talion of the 16th Infantry Regiment, finding no

proper cover, lost 10 men dead or wounded by

Artillery fire. The Russian battery north of East

San-kia-tsy was fired upon by two batteries stand-

ing at Pan-la-schan-tsy, and by some batteries of

the 4th Army ; it therefore changed its position

frequently, but continued firing until evening.

Towards 3 p.m. the 15th Brigade was ordered

not to wait any longer for the advance of the

4th Army, but to attack Temple Hill now.

General Okasaki, commanding the brigade, there-

upon deployed his troops for attack : The 16th

Infantry Regiment was to advance on West San-

kia-tsy, and the 30th Infantry Regiment to try

gaining as rapidly as possible Ko-ka-tsy, and then

' p. 123.


to capture Temple Hill. The regiments deployed

aligned in line ; the skirmishers moved at first

with intervals of two to three paces, but drawing

closer together as the attack proceeded. At first

the whole line moved at a walk, but shortly after-

wards began to run, because the Russians opened

fire the moment the advance commenced. TheJapanese skirmishing-line opened fire, after arriving

within about 900 metres of the Russian de-

tachments at San-kia-tsy and Ko-ka-tsy ; thence

the advance over the perfectly level plain began

in rushes, mostly carried out by companies.

Though the gaoljan cut was still lying on

the fields, their small bundles did not afford any

cover to the troops. The supports, as well as

the companies in reserve, advanced by rushes ; in

doing so they adopted generally a single-line forma-

tion with loose touch. Nowhere on the field of

attack were column formations seen which wouldhave offered favourable targets to the Russian

Artillery on the flanks. The four companies of

the brigade reserve also advanced from Schuan-

lun-szö by rushes in single line, following each

other echeloned to the right and left at about

75 metres' distance.

From Ko-ka-tsy a portion of the 30th Infantry

Regiment's right wing made very clever use of

the deeply cut bed of the brook south of TempleHill for pushing the attack farther.

The Russian Artillery took the assailants under

a severe fire, but without obtaining any material

effect. Only the 10th and 11th Companies of the

30th Infantry Regiment, which had remained in

9

130 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARreserve, were, about 4 p.m., struck by two per-

cussion-shells, killing or wounding some 50 men.

The attack proceeded without material delay.

On the Japanese approaching the villages the

Russian advanced detachments withdrew ; at

4.45 p.m. Ko-ka-tsy village was left behind by

the 30th Infantry Regiment. The fire-fight became

now most violent. It was necessary to engage

one company of the brigade reserve, which had

followed behind the left wing, against the Russian

Infantry on the San-kai-seki-san, to ward off

flanking fire.

Shortly after 5 p.m. the firing-line assaulted

Temple Hill, capturing its foremost trenches.

The Russians hurried back to the northern

edge of the hill, offering renewed resistance

behind the rocks there. The Japanese pushed on.

Another violent fire-action developed at close

range on Temple Hill, producing no longer any

decisive result. The riglit of the 16th Infantry

Regiment, having somewhat lagged behind during

the main attack, probably on the report of Russian

Infantry advancing from the east on East San-

kia-tsy, the advance of the brigade now came to

a standstill. The Japanese, as was their custom,

at once began to entrench after their successful

assault ; the newly captured position, beginning

west of East San-kia-tsy, stretched to the western

slopes of Temple Hill, projecting on the hill

itself in a salient bent north. The villages East

and West San-kia-tsy, as well as Ko-ka-tsy,

remained occupied.

During the e\'ening, troops of General Mau's


Detachment and portions of the 4th Siberian The

Army Corps made several counter-attacks, with- centreT

out succeeding in pushina; the Japanese from ^'»iQiy »t-°

. . , . F tempts to

Temple Hill. Appreciatmg the situation correctly, drive the

General Okasaki, commanding the Japanese 15th 2nd^D!-^

Brigade, had previously asked support from the ^^^'?"

Divisional Commander, so as to have fresh troops from

at hand to oppose any likely counter-attacks. hIu.^^*

General Baron Nishijima then placed at the

disposal of the brigade six companies of the 29th

Infantry Regiment, belonging to the 3rd Brigade.

Two counter-attacks, made by General Mauagainst Temple Hill from a north-easterly andnorth-westerly direction in the evening failed,

owing to the well-directed fire from the Japanese

trenches. But the repulse of an attack from the

east was more difficult. General Sarubaiev had

detailed a regiment from the 4th Siberian ArmyCorps to attack the right flank of the 15th Brigade

from Sia-liu-ho-tsy. In dense columns, and with

bands playing, the Russians advanced on East

San-kia-tsy, but then stopped short north-east

of the village, looking calmly on how the six

companies of the Japanese 29th Regiment pro-

ceeded to occupy that village, quietly adopting

measures for meeting the expected counter-attack.

Three more companies of the IGth Infantry Regi-

ment were moved up to reinforce the garrison.

When darkness had set in, the Russian regiment

began to assault, penetrating into the village on

three sides at one and the same time ; there wasan obstinate fight of man against man, ending

finally with the discomfiture of the Russians. The

132 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARRussians withdrew in the dark in a north-easterly

direction. East San-kia-tsy remained in the hands

of the Japanese.

All the counter-attacks having failed, the troops

of General Man's Detachment abandoned the

portions of Temple Hill still held by them in

front, ev^acuating the height completely during

the night, and retiring to the knolls situated

farther north. Behind the rocks where the

Russians had once more established themselves

the Japanese found afterwards, in addition to

some wounded, about 50 dead, of the 121st and

and 122nd Infantry Regiments,^ mostly shot in

the head ; they found, moreover, at various other

spots on Temple Hill more than 300 dead, and

buried them.

That day cost the 15th Brigade 921 men, of

whom 112 were dead.

The course the fight was taking with the Guard

Division and with the right wing of the 2nd

Division caused General Baron Kuroki to think

that the position the enemy was still holding on

the general line Man-hua-pu—Watanabe-yama

—

Western San-jo-shi-san could no longer be captured

on October 11; he therefore, at G.30 p.m., arranged

for the Guard and 2nd Divisions to continue

the attack during the night.

Although the two Divisions had not succeeded

till the evening of the 11th in pushing the troops

of the 4th Siberian Army Corps entirely from

the Watanabe-yama and Western San-jo-shi-san,

yet General Sarubaiev, taking into consideration

' 1st Brigade 31st Infantry Division, belonging to Mau's party.


the severe losses, thought he could no longer

maintain himself there ; he therefore determined

to withdraw gradually during the night to the

heights north of Sia-liu-ho-tsy—Schan-liu-ho-tsy.

Man's Brigade, after the loss of Temple Hill,

had fallen back in a north-easterly direction to

the heights at Orr-wa, thus gaining touch again

with the 4th Siberian Army Corps.

General Mishtshenko's Cossack Brigade was

still on the left of the 4th Siberian Army Corps,

where he had made some local attacks on the

Japanese Guards/

General Count Nodzu, after capturing the heights Tiie Japa-

east of Wu-li-tai-tsy, which the Russians, by the ^Tmy a^.

way, had already evacuated,^ was to make with tacks the

his 4th Army a right wheel, timing his advance orthelst

with that of the 1st and 2nd Armies.' The move- ^rm^^^ments of his Army thus depending in the first Corps

instance on the progress the Armies on his flanks making

were making, he decided to support their attacks ^"^ P^**"

with strong forces. He ordered the 5th Division

to continue its attack upon the line Fan-kia-tun

—

Schi-li-ho, in touch with the 2nd Army, and

caused the 20th Brigade of the 10th Division

to co-operate with the attack of the 1st Army.Colonel Kamada, commanding the 8th Brigade

(also of the 10th Division), in place of General

Otani, fallen ill, received orders to attack the San-

kai-seki-san, but to arrange beforehand with the

20th Brigade and 5th Division.

To each of the two brigades of the 10th Division

were apportioned as a reinforcement one Abteilung' P. 118. » p. 85. 3 p 104.

134 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARof the Di\4sional Artillery, one Kobi regiment,

another Abteilung from the 14th Field Artillery

Regiment, as well as a detachment of Cavalry

and Pioneers.

Just the same as the 15th Brigade of the

2nd Division, adjoining on the right, had been

waiting for the advance of the right of the

4th Army before deploying for attack against

Temple Hill, so the Commander of the 20th

Brigade seems to have waited for the start of

the 15th Brigade. The Infantry remained in-

active north-east of Tu-men-tsy, while the

Artillery attached to them was intervening in

the Artillery fight of the 2nd Division from

positions north of Yun-kuan-tun. The Russians

bringing gradually numerous batteries into action

at different places, General Baron Kawamura,commanding the 10th Di\'ision, sent one more

Abteilung of the 1st Field Artillery Brigade into

the fire position, probably on the authority of his

Army Commander, there being thus finally in action

at Yun-kuan-tun, 18 mountain-guns of the 10th

Division and 36 field-guns. When the 15th Bri-

gade proceeded to attack Temple Hill in the

afternoon after the Japanese Artillery had madegood practice for some considerable time, the 20th

Brigade started, too, deploying and advancing

against that height on the left of the 15th Brigade,

without, however, keeping in close touch with it.

In the actual assault the brigade did not take

part. As the 15th Brigade was making rapid

progress, the 20th Brigade gradually wheeled

north in the direction of the San-kai-seki-san,


reaching the country east of Ta-pu when it began

to grow dark.

The 8th Brigade had not done anything decisive

up to this time either. General Baron Kawamura,commanding the 10th Division, probably wishing

to wait first for some success of the 5th Division,

directed the Artillery attached to the 8th Brigade

to support the advance of that Division. Thebatteries unlimbered east of Tschou-kuan-tun,

taking the Russian Artillery standing at Schi-li-ho

under fire.

The hesitating attitude of the 10th Division was

of advantage to the enemy, who at first had not

occupied the threatened San-kai-seki-san at all.

The critical situation of his Centre had caused

the Russian Commander-in-Chief already some

anxiety. When the Japanese, early in the morn-

ing, attacked the Russian front, the interval,

several kilometres long, between the left of the

10th Army Corps at Fan-kia-tun and Man's

Detachment on Temple Hill looked rather

serious, a downright challenge to penetrate. Tomeet this danger Kuropatkin, by direct orders,

moved up the nearest available portions of the

General Reserve — 3 battalions 145th Infantry

Regiment and the 1st Battery 43rd Artillery

Brigade from the advanced guard of the 1st

Army Corps—directing them to occupy the San-

kai-seki-san. Orders were dispatched to the 10th

Army Corps to hold Yin-pan village so as to pro-

tect the right flank of JNIau's Detachment.

Meanwhile the Japanese 5th Division, supported

by Artillery of the 10th Division, was attacking


the advanced-guard position of this Army Corps

on the Schi-h-ho, where General Riabinkin was

in command. The attack did not make any pro-

gress during the day. The Japanese Infantry,

insufficiently supported by its own Artillery,

suffered from the fire of the Russian batteries

;

various attempts to assault were beaten off.

The indifferent progress the 5th Division was

making was somewhat due to the hesitating atti-

tude of the right of the adjoining 3rd Division

belonging to the 2nd Army.^

Riabinkin's troops had nevertheless a hard time.

When the Commander-in-Chiefs request to occupy

Yin-pan village for protecting the left flank of

Mau's Detachment was received, the commanderof the advanced guard had but two battalions still

in reserve, which he could not spare. General

Gerschelmann, commanding the 9th Infantry

Division, which was standing idle at Hun-pau-

schan, was therefore ordered to send two battalions

of the 34th Infantry Regiment to Yin-pan,^ and

to place them under General Riabinkin, who was

to keep touch with Mau's Detachment. After-

wards the 9th Infantry Division was obliged to

detach two more battahons from, the 35th Infantry

Regiment in support of the advanced guard, whose

reserves had been quickly used up. Under these

' More details about the combat of the 5th Division are wanting.

Nor is it known where on this day the 10th, 11th, and 3rd Kobi Bri-

gades, as well as the portions of the 1st Field Artillery Brigade not

employed in action, were stationed.

* Yin-pan had been occupied by two companies on October 10, but it

looks as if these two companies retired early on October 11 into the

Schi-li-ho position with Colonel Solomko's Detachment. (Pp. 93 and 94.)


circumstances recapturing the height of Ku-schu-

tsy was out of the question. Apart from the

severe losses suffered by the Infantry (the 124th

Infantry Regiment had lost in the morning 7

officers and 250 men), the superiority of the

Japanese Artillery was very much in evidence

too, the very unskilful handling of the Russian

batteries certainly contributing to that effect. Theadvanced guard having in all only three batteries

available,^ these ought to have been brought into

action at least together ; instead of this, General

Riabinkin ordered first one battery to unlimber, and

later on a second. The third battery the General

did not engage at all, but sent it back to the main

body at Hun-pau-schan at 4 p.m., with the remark

that he had no use for it. The two batteries in

action were fought down within a short time

without having obtained any effect against the

batteries of the Japanese which had unlimbered

under cover. In the evening the batteries had

lost a third of their gun-detachments and numer-

ous horses. It was not till matters had come to

such a pass that General Slutshevski, commandingthe 10th Army Corps, made up his mind to push

forward to Sin-tschuan an Abteilung of the 9th

Artillery Brigade to reinforce the advanced guard,

and to withdraw to the main body during night

the 6th and 8th Batteries, which had fought with

so much loss. The other Abteilung of the 9th

Artillery Brigade was to go into position between

Fan-kia-tun and Ta-kou ; to Ta-kou were to move,

' Two batteries 31st Artillery Brigade belouged to Mau's Detach-

ment,

138 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARmoreover, another battalion and a half of the 34th

Infantry Regiment, which had already pushed two

battalions to Yin-pan. These measures were to

be carried out during night.

The 4th Battalion 145th Infantry Regiment,

from the 1st Army Corps, arrived in the afternoon

at the San-kai-seki-san from Tun-san-ho, while the

146th Infantry Regiment, the 2nd and half the

3rd Battery 43rd Artillery Brigade were marching

to the height east of Tan-hai-schi, prolonging

the position of the 145th Infantry Regiment east-

ward. The 146th Infantry Regiment established

touch with Mau's Detachment standing at Orr-wa.

The 2nd Brigade 37th Infantry Division, together

with the 2nd Abteilung 43rd Artillery Brigade,^

was then moved up to Tun-san-ho by order of

Kuropatkin ; one battalion of the 147th Infantry

Regiment, serving as escort to Kuropatkin's Head-quarters, was there already.

The 22nd Division of the 1st Army Corps

moved forward to Tun-san-tsy ; Kuropatkin's

Headquarters remained at Tun-san-ho.

The 2nd General Baron Oku, with the 2nd Japanese

Army^^ Army, had, after the actions on October 10, ascer-

^'^JJ'^^^tained that the enemy's main position into which

tacks on the Russiau advanced troops had retired, was on the

of the^^^

lir"^^ Schi-li-ho—Yen-kia-wan, and had decided to

Scha-ho attack that position on the 11th. He therefore, onthe ad- ^

vanced Octobcr 10, at 8.30 in the evening, issued an Armyof the""^ Order embodying the following

:

Russian i The 6th Battery 43rd Artillery Brigade, during its transport by17th

J.3Q fj.Qjjj home, had managed to provide itself on its own initiative with

Cori^protective shields giving cover against shrapnel and Infantry fire up to

500 metres' range.


" The A?^my will attack the enemy to-morrow

;

the first objective of the attack is the enemystanding on the Schi-li-ho.

" The foremost line of Infantry will begin to

move for attack from the line Schuan-tai-tsy

—

Ta-tu-san-pu at 6 a.m., the Srd Division against

the section Schi-li-ho—Nan-kuan-tsy (inclusive),

and the 6th Division against the section to the

west of the former as far as Yen-kia-wan.

" The Mh Division is to advance against Ta-yu-

tschun-pu and to the west of it.

" The General Reserve will assemble in their

bivouacs at 6 a.m."

When, after issuing this Order, Oyama's direc-

tives for October 11 ^ arrived, there was no need

for changing that Order.

General Baron Oshima started with the 3rd

Division at 6 a.m. on October 11. Branching off

two battalions, probably from the 6th Infantry

Regiment, to go from Men-hu-lu-tun to Wu-li-

tai-tsy, to establish touch with the 5th Division,

the main body of the Division advanced from

Schuan-tai-tsy on Nan-kuan-tsy over the gaoljan

fields, mostly cleared of their crops. The 2nd

Battalion 18th Infantry Regiment formed the

advanced guard. On approaching Nan-kuan-tsy

to within 800 metres, it met with intense Infantry

fire coming from the southern edge of the village

;

at the same moment several Russian battalions

from the 1st Brigade 3rd Infantry Division 17th

Army Corps, as well as two batteries of the 3rd

Artillery Brigade and one sotnia, advanced from

' P. 104.


the north on Nan-kuan-tsy. While the Russian

batteries unhmbered south-west of the place, the

Japanese advanced-guard battalion deployed, en-

gaging in a fire-action ; but Russian Infantry

advancing was threatening its left flank. The3rd Battalion of the same regiment, which was

marching at the head of the main body, then

prolonged the left of the 2nd Battalion, the 1st

Battalion advancing to reinforce the right. TheArtillery of the Division came into action in two

groups north-east of Men-hu-lu-tun.

The two battalions 6th Infantry Regiment had

meanwhile traversed Wu-li-tai-tsy, which the

Russians had previously evacuated, and were

moving in the direction of Siau-wen-kou. Schi-

li-ho being strongly occupied, the 5th Division on

the right being hotly engaged without making any

progress, and on the left the 17th Brigade, which

was engaged south of Nan-kuan-tsy, seeming to be

hard pressed, the 6th Infantry Regiment was also

unable to advance any farther. The commandertherefore decided to halt for the present at Siau-

wen-kou.

The action at Nan-kuan-tsy had meanwhile

assumed the character of a stationary fight.

Vigorous counter-attacks of the Russians with two

battalions of the 3rd Infantry Division's Reserve

obhged the Japanese to engage gradually all their

forces available ; the Japanese line was but slowly

gaining ground at some points. At first the front

of the 18th Infantry Regiment was prolonged to

the right by the other regiment (the 34th) of the

17th Brigade ; later, after severe loss, General


Baron Oshima brought up as reinforcement the

last reserve, the 33rd Infantry Regiment of the

5th Brigade. Once, by an energetic counter-attack

of the Russian 9th Infantry Regiment from

Nan-kuan-tsy, the Japanese were driven back for

a considerable distance ; but ultimately, towards

evening, after engaging also portions of the General

Reserve of the 2nd Army, they succeeded in

repulsing the Russians for good and occupying

Nan-kuan-tsy. Especially the Japanese 18th In-

fantry Regiment had suffered much in the ex-

ceedingly bloody action. A striking feature was

the small effect of the Russian Artillery ; the

batteries, hampered in their view by the gaoljan

which was still partly uncut, probably could not

locate the Japanese guns, and hence fired at

random, without any material results.

The Japanese Gth Division, advancing in two

columns to the left of the 3rd Division, had

some more rapid success. Though the 45th

Infantry Regiment, advancing by Orr-tai-tsy as

right column, was gaining ground but slowly,

owing to the ground being open, the left and

stronger column, the 24th Brigade, succeeded

about 3 p.m. in driving Colonel Stakovitch's

Detachment, belonging to the 17th Army Corps,

from Yen-kia-wan, and in occupying that place.

On the right column hearing of this, it worked

its way up closer, too, when reinforced by portions

of the 13th Infantry Regiment, reaching by

rushes, without undue loss, the little wood south

of Yen-kia-wan, where it began to entrench.

Of the Artillery of the Japanese 6th Division

142 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARfour batteries had unlimbered west of Örr-tai-tsy,

and two east of Ta-tu-san-pu, supporting the

advance of their Infantry.

Great alarm was caused in the Russian position

by the evacuation of Yen-kia-wan ; this alarm

increased when, farther west, General Grekov, with

his Orenburg Cossack Brigade was, owing to the

advance of the Japanese 4th Division, obliged to

give way north from Li-kia-tun, exposing the

Hank of the 17th Army Corps. With the object

of recapturing Yen-kia-wan, General Wolkov,

commanding the 17th Army Corps, reinforced

Stakovich's Detachment by two battalions 140th

Infantry Regiment and one battery, these being

taken from the 35th Infantry Division in reser\'e,

and put in motion on Tsun-lun-yen-tun. Butnothing came of it, the right column of the

Japanese 4th Division having meanwhile deployed

on the western bank of the Scha-ho against Ta-yu-

tschun-pu, threatening to capture that place.

The 4th Division, after starting in the morning,

likewise in two columns,^ to advance, in compliance

with Army Orders, against Ta-yu-tschun-pu and

west of it,^ received about 10.30 a.m. instructions

from General Baron Oku to keep more to the right,

and drive the enemy from the line Yen-kia-wan

—

Ta-yu-tschun-pu, so as to facilitate thereby the

attack of the 6th Division.

But the left column of the 6th Division having

meanwhile made progress unaided, and driven the

' From the 7th Brigade ; the 19th Brigade is said to have joined the

General Reserve altogether.

» P. 139.


enemy from Yen-kia-wan, the Army Commanderordered the 4th Division to push in the general

direction on Lin-schin-pu, to threaten the right

flank of the Russians. General Baron Tsukamoto,

commanding the 4th Div ision, was, however, unable

to carry out the order, he having ascertained the

presence of strong Russian forces ^ in the neigh-

bourhood north-west of Lin-schin-pu. He was,

moreover, obliged to deal with the enemy at

Ta-yu-tschun-pu first. The right column there-

fore, deployed against that village, attacking six

companies of the 11th Infantry Regiment, from

Colonel Stakovich's Detachment, which had retired

thither. After a prolonged and obstinate resist-

ance, Stakovich gave way to the superior pressure

of the Japanese, retiring on Tsun-lun-yen-

tun. The Japanese, however, did not pursue,

but established themselves for the night at

Ta-yu-tschun-pu. The left column of the 4th

Division had merely met portions of General

Grekov's Orenburg Cossack Brigade, driving themaway as the column advanced. The columnremained overnight at Li-kia-tun, so as to be

ready for opposing at once any likely attack of

the enemy from the country north-west of Lin-

schin-pu. General Baron Oku reiterated, in the

course of the day, several times his order to

the 4th Division to advance on Lin-schin-pu ; he,

therefore, does not seem to have been sufficiently

informed by the 4th Division about the 6th

Siberian Army Corps. A vigorous intervention

by that corps might have placed the whole of

' Gth Siberian Army Corps.


the 2nd Army, or at least the 4th Division, in a

very tight corner. Headquarters of the 2nd Armybilleted in Pu-tsau-kou ; the General Reserve

bivouacked there too.

The General Baron Bilderling had requested General

?th^T° Soboliev, commanding the 6th Siberian Armyberiau Corps, already in the morning, to relieve the

Corps ad- right flank of the 17th Army Corps by going

protect*"forward. But, having regard to Kuropatkin's

the Rus- telegram, in which the Commander-in-Chief hadsian right . ^ lo-i- *. /^ i«flank. designated the 6th biberian Army Corps as his

strategic reserve,^ General Soboliev did not think

himself justified in responding to this request.

He only promised to look after the protection of

the right flank in case the Western Detachment

was going to retire ; he would then accept

battle in his prepared positions. After this reply

General Baron Bilderling applied to the Com-mander-in-Chief direct, obtaining from him at

12 noon an order causing the 6th Siberian

Army Corps to move with the advanced guard

on Wan-tschuan-tsy, and with the main body to

the line Schau-kia-lin-tsy—Ta-lian-tun. After

this movement had been completed at 4 p.m.,

the sorely pressed Colonel Stakovich, and General

Grekov, also turned to Soboliev, wüth the request

of supporting them by an offensive move of his

advanced guard. Thereupon, General Soboliev

directed, at 7 p.m., three battalions of the advanced

guard to go forward in a south-westerly direction

and occupy Ta-tai. This order had been effected

about 10 p.m., but when, during the night, General

P. 96.


Soboliev heard of General Grekov retiring with

his Cossacks farther north, he ordered the three

battalions to face about likewise, and to withdraw

on the main body of the advanced guard.

Nothing is reported on what Dembovski's De-

tachment was doing ; it therefore seems that

Dembov ski was standing fast at Ta-wan-kan-pu

—

Sin-tai-tsy on the 11th as well.

The Japanese 1st Cavalry Brigade had reached

San-de-pu in accordance with orders. In the

afternoon the brigade was attacked by several

Russian companies, which, probably belonging to

Dembovski's Detachment, were advancing from

Ku-kia-tsy. After a brief fire-fight, in which the

brigade was considerably supported by the Infantry

attached to it, the attack was repulsed, the

Russians withdrawing again in a northerly

direction.

At 6 p.m., before the 3rd Division had suc-

ceeded in capturing Nan-kuan-tsy, Headquarters

of the Second Japanese Army dispatched to

Oyama's Headquarters a report on the situation,

and on the further intentions. This report stated

that after the capture of Yen-kia-wan, on the

Scha-ho, the Army, having been opposed by at

least two Divisions, had continued the attack in

the direction ordered, but had failed to make any

more material progress ; that, if at dusk no further

advantage was gained, it was intended to continue

the attack during the night and in the early morning.

Marshal Marquis Oyama did not, even on

October 11, obtain quite an accurate picture of

the actual distribution of the Russian forces.

10

146 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARViews From the reports coming in, he thought he mustandinten-

, i ,. /. i ^

tions of concluae the mam mass oi the enemy to be con-

cSraf centrated about Fön-kia-pu. He therefore hopedHead- in the further conduct of his operations, which

on the were to consist of a gradual wheel of his whole

of o"to^^"^y north-east, to be able to meet the main

ber 11. forces presently, and to beat them. With the

object of the better quahtying for its task the 4th

Army, which had certainly initiated the wheel de-

manded of it for October 11, but had not carried it

through completely, and in all likelihood was bound

to come across the main forces of the enemy about

Fön-kia-pu, the Commander-in-Chief placed under

its orders the whole of his General Reserve, re-

taining in its stead at his disposal the 5th Division,

which was being assembled at Ku-schu-tsy. TheGeneral Reserve of the Japanese Army had

marched during the day from Lo-ta-tai to Tu-

men-tsy ; thence it could be moved up by the

4th Army. In the evening the Armies received

orders to continue the attack on October 12

;

the right wing of the 1st Army was to remain

on the defensive, and its left was to attack jointly

with the 4th Army. The task of the 2nd Armyto advance on Scha-ho-pu and Lin-schin-pu, with

the object of facilitating the right wheel of the

4th Army, remained unaltered.

The closing of the day did not synchronise with

the finish of the fighting. The action continued on

the western and eastern wings. When the Japanese

succeeded in capturing Nan-kuan-tsy towards

evening,^ General Wolkov, commanding the 17th

» p. 141.


Army Corps, became very anxious at the loss of The Rus-

that place. Taking into consideration the fact that Army

this extensive place close opposite Yen-tou-niu-lu ^**^P^ ^^'^ ^^

^captures

village might form an excellent pivot for any the vil-

further attacks by the Japanese, and be of the nJ,!."

utmost value to them, especially in any attempt J<uan-tsy.

at penetration, he resolved to retake that village.

But the 3rd Infantry Division was no longer fit

to do it ; for the combat lasting all day had

absorbed already all its reserves. The right at

Örr-schi-kia-tsy had been reinforced by one bat-

talion of the 10th Infantry Regiment ; it had

been also necessary to support the 12th Infantry

Regiment fighting at Lun-wan-miau. But the re-

capture of the heights west of Ku-schu-tsy having

meanwhile been abandoned,^ the 138th Infantry

Regiment, that had been brought up to Schi-li-ho,

became available ; six companies of it were to

march to Lun-wan-miau, and to advance at once

on Nan-kuan-tsy. But on the news coming in

from the right that Colonel Stakovich, after his

retreat from Yen-kia-wan to Ta-yu-tschun-pu,

could no longer hold on even to tliat place, the

attack was given up for the moment ; the General

Commanding resolved, however, to capture the

place by a night attack.

With growing darkness the fire-fight was dying

away gradually. When darkness was complete,

General Wolkov ordered the General Commandingthe 35th Infantry Division to attack Nan-kuan-tsy.

The latter detailed for this duty the 139th Infantry

Regiment and two battalions of the 140th Infantry

' P. 137.

148 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARRegiment that were closest at hand. The last

reserve of the 137th Infantry Reghnent, with somebatteries, was placed in readiness at Tschien-liu-

tan-kou in case of failure, and to protect the

right flank.

The troops attacking were ordered to leave

behind their knapsacks, to put on their greatcoats,

and to carry out the assault without firing a shot.

The start was made from Tschien-liu-tan-kou, the

139th Infantry Regiment leading. The night was

perfectly dark. When the leading companies

marching through the man-high gaoljan were

approaching Lun-wan-miau, a lively fusillade was

suddenly heard. General Glasko, who commandedthe 2nd Brigade 35th Infantry Division, and was

leading the troops, was afraid his approach had

been discovered by the Japanese, and thought he

had better carry out the attack at daybreak sup-

ported by the Artillery. But the fire soon ceasing,

the advance was continued. Next morning it

became known that the fire they had heard had pro-

ceeded from their own troops of the right section.

At Lun-wan-miau the colour of the 139th Infantry

Regiment was left behind, escorted by the 3rd

Company, the 1st and 2nd Companies extending

skirmishers, and the 4th Company following in

support. The 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Battalions formed

up in companies, following the 1st Battalion after-

wards. Of the 140th Infantry Regiment, the 1st

Battalion traversed Lun-wan-miau to assault Nan-

kuan-tsy from the east, the 2nd Battalion of that

regiment forming the General Reserve. The troops

having gone forward in this formation for about

I


another quarter of an hour, they suddenly metwith a severe fire, doing but little damage, the

Japanese firing too high. The contours of Xan-kuan-tsy village now emerged from the darkness.

The 4th Company 139th Infantry Regiment wasbrought up into the first line ; the skirmishers

descended the precipitous slopes of the river-bank,

resolutely forcing their way into the village on

the other bank. Portions of the battalions of that

regiment following in rear had previously wheeled

off to assault the village from the west, while

the 1st Battalion. 140th Regiment pushed into

the village from the east. A furious fight with

cold steel ensued, ending with the victory of the

Russians. The Japanese, being taken partly by

surprise, so much as to leave behind their piled

arms on the village green, gave way, and are said

(according to Russian reports) to have left about

1,000 dead in Nan-kuan-tsy. The chief loss of

the Japanese fell upon the 33rd Infantry Regimentof the 3rd Division ; the Russian loss was insig-

nificant. It was 11 in the evening when the

attack was decided.

The 17th Army Corps was now^ holding again

its position as in the morning ; but this success

was purchased by staking almost the whole of

the reserves, although the troops who had at-

tacked Nan-kuan-tsy had suffered little. Offresh forces the General Commanding had nowonly available fifteen companies of the 137thRegiment and four batteries ; of these troops onemore battalion had to be detailed during the night

to go to Orr-schi-kia-tsy to reinforce the right

loO THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARsection, movements of the enemy being constantly

noticed in front, giving rise to fears of a night

attack. The chances for a successful continuation

of the battle on October 12 were therefore, in

spite of the nocturnal success, not favourable at

all ; and the less so because the right wing was

exposed to an envelopment, owing to the loss of

Yen-kia-wan and Ta-yu-tschun-pu.

There was, of course, no need to be afraid of

this, if the 6th Siberian Army Corps could be

relied upon to intervene vigorously. But General

Wolkov having waited all day in vain for this

intervention, the co-operation of that corps on

October 12 did not seem to be ensured at all.

Portions General Baron Stackelberg had been firmly

sfbl^Ln^*^ resolved to push the eastern wing of the JapaneseArmy back and carry through the task imposed on him.Corps rle-

, ,, i /y» i •

feat Japa- But whcu the day passed on and evenmg came

"anted without liis troops by their efforts being rewardedtroops at with succcss, he almost gave up the game. Helin and Certainly had the intention of continuing the

tsy-Jhi"attack during the night, but dropped it at once

Passes, when hearing of the state of affairs in the Centre

to pive up of the Russian front.^

position's^Towards evening, reports came in from the

captured. 4th Siberian Army Corps adjoining on the right,

saying that the corps was unable to hold its

advanced positions any longer, and that the General

Commanding felt therefore induced to withdraw

his troops to the heights north of Sia-liu-ho-tsy

and Schan-liu-ho-tsy.

This message greatly alarmed General Baron1 Pp. 132 and 133.

I


Stackelberg. Not only had the attack of his

troops failed, but his own right wing, the portion

of the 1st Siberian Army Corps standing at the

Tschau-hsien-lin Pass, was now also unguarded,

and liable to be enveloped, owing to the retro-

gi'ade movement of the 4th Siberian Army Corps.

The General therefore decided to discontinue the

attack against the heights of the passes, so as to be

able to meet the new danger. About midnight he

issued the following Order :

^

" 1. The attack initiated will be discontinued.

" 2. At once, during night, under cover of dark-

ness, as many troops as possible are to be with-

drawn from the fighting-line, to reinforce the

reserves of the corps.

"3. The positions occupied are to be en-

trenched.*' 4. The main reserv^e (5th East Siberian Rifle

Division), reinforced by a portion of the artillery

3rd Siberian Army Corps, will move to Sia-pin-

tai-tsy,^ establishing there a position, in case of a

hostile attack through the gap between our right

and the 4th Siberian Army Corps. Two regiments,

with two batteries, will march to the Wai-tau-

schan ^ and the hill with the two knolls.*

" 5. If the 4th Siberian Army Corps continue*»

retreating, only what is absolutely necessary mustbe left on the heights mentioned ; the main reserve,

with all the rest, will advance from the Wai-tau-

' According to sources of Captain Markov of the Russian GeneralStaff (" Woienni Sbornik," 1905).

^ 2^ kilometres south of Biau-yu-pu-sa.

' West of Bian-yu-pu-sa.

* South-west of Bian-yu-pu-sa (" Zwei Kuppen Hügel " on the map).

152 THE KUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

schan, vigorously attacking flank and rear of the

enemy pressing the 4th Siberian Army Corps."

But before this Order had become known to all

the troops, which, owing to the difficulties of trans-

mission in the mountainous country, may have

taken all night, the various attacks for capturing

the passes continued.

On the Japanese side, the 2nd Guard Kobi Regi-

ment and one battalion 4th Kobi Regiment, from the

Guard Kobi Brigade, were holding the small hills on

both sides of the Ta-lin Pass. The largest of these

hills was east of the pass, somewhat in advance of the

rest of the hill range, being defended by one section

of the 2nd Company 2nd Guard Kobi Regiment.

Although the ground favours an attack on these

heights at the passes ^ much more than an attack

on the southern section of the Japanese position

east of Pen-si-hu, the 1st Siberian Army Corps

had not seriously attacked them during the day.

The Japanese only noticed the enemy pushing

gradually closer to the Ta-lin Pass position.

General Baron Ino-uye therefore reinforced his

line towards evening, placing at the disposal of

the 2nd Guard Kobi Regiment one company

of the 24th Infantry Regiment, from General

Kigoshi's 23rd Brigade,^ as reserve. The Russian

movements continued also during the night, until

towards 3 a.m. about two battalions rushed forward

to attack on both sides of the pass-road. But this

surprise having been anticipated,^ it was easily

I Appendix XVIII. » P. 112.

' Patrols on the foreground had, moreover, signalled the approach

of the Russians by setting fire to fagots of dry wood.


beaten off by the Japanese. At 5 a.m., however,

another attack was made in greater strength, the

Russians (portions of the 34th and 36th East

Siberian Rifle Regiments) this time rushing the

enemy on the small advanced hill and capturing

the height. In the furious bayonet charge, every

man of the Japanese section was cut down.

If the Russians had now made use of this

success by establishing themselves on that height,

bringing up at once strong reserves behind it, and

continuing the attack upon the main position after

a brief rest, there was every likelihood of their

piercing the thin Japanese line in the centre. Butan attempt of this kind was not made. The main

forces engaged in the attack apparently retired

again at once ; on the height they had stormed

only a small force was left behind, which wasbound to succumb to a determined counter-attack.

When Colonel Ota, commanding the 2nd GuardKobi Regiment, heard of this event, he charged

the 3rd Company 24th Regiment, which had comeup in the evening, to recapture the hill in the

dark. The company advanced, and, arriving to

within 20 paces of the knoll, was then pushed

back by a counter-attack of the Russians. Mean-while it began to dawn. Two Japanese guns in

the neighbourhood of the position could make out

the contours of the hill, and began to take it underfire. Colonel Ota, placing himself at the head of

his colour-company, which was joined by the other

two sections of the 2nd Company, as well as bythe rest of the 3rd Company 24th Infantry Regi-

ment, seized the colour, and assaulted the hill

154 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARwith his troops. The Colonel was killed, likewise

the officer commanding the 1st Battalion, the

officer carrying the colour, and the Regimental

Adjutant, who, one after the other, had seized the

colour. Finally a private planted it on the hill,

henceforward called " Standard Hill " (Gun-gi-

yama).^ The Russians were driven away, leaving

95 prisoners, and making no other attempt to

attack the Ta-lin Pass. Among their numerous

dead (exact data are wanting) was also Lieutenant-

Colonel Pekuta, of the General Staff, who was

found with sword in hand, and having apparently

led the Russian attacking troops. A document

found in his pocket contained the task assigned to

the Eastern Detachment,

The half-battalion of the 2nd Guard Kobi

Regiment, engaged in that fight, lost 4 officers and

48 men killed, 5 officers and 148 men wounded.

The loss of the 3rd Company 24th Infantry Regi-

ment was 40 men dead, and about 100 menwounded.

The Russians made a night attack also on the

Japanese positions at the Tu-men-tsy-lin Pass,

occupied by the 47th Infantry Regiment and one

mountain battery.

About 700 metres in front of the Japanese

position, held by the 2nd Battalion 47th Infantry

Regiment, east of the pass-road, was an isolated

rocky hill of rugged shape," affording an extensive

view, but otherwise rather unsuitable for placing

troops. If that hill was left unoccupied, an ex-

' Called " Fahnen-Hügel " on the map.* Called " Felshügel " on the map.


ceedingly favourable point of observation would

be surrendered to the Russians, from which they

would be able to overlook completely the Japanese

position ; but if, on the other hand, the height wasincluded in the general line of defence, a prominent

salient would be created, challenging envelopment

on both sides. Colonel Sugihara, commanding the

iTth Infantry Regiment, pushed, therefore, merely

the 5th Company to that height, to deny its

occupation by the Russians. The Captain of the

company ordered one section to occupy a position

to the right of the hill, and two sections to the

left of it, where they entrenched. The rocky

hill itself was apparently not occupied at all, or

only weakly. The trenches to the left of the hill

were the object of attack of the Russians. Several

field batteries and heavy mortars having taken

these trenches under fire since early morning, but

with little effect it seems, the Russian Infantry

—

portions of the 33rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment,

under Colonel Lissovski—moved forward against

them, the Infantry being continually reinforced

during the day.

In the ensuing fire-fight, the 5th Companywas supported by the firing-lines, not far in

rear, but upon it was concentrated the bulk of

the Russian fire ; it suffered, therefore, consider-

ably. Night came on without the Russians pro-

ceeding to deliver the assault. Both adversaries

were lying opposite each other at closest range,

' until about 3 o'clock in the morning, when the

Russians rose to storm. The two sections of the

5th Company, after a gallant defence, succumbed

156 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARto the superior numbers, being almost completely

annihilated. The Captain was killed ; all the other

officers were wounded. The noise of the action

was heard in the main position, but no support

was sent, because leaving the main position in the

darkness seemed inadvisable. The Russians were

therefore able to establish themselves within the

line captured ; but they did not adopt any

measures for taking advantage of their success

here either. At daybreak on October 12, Colonel

Sugihara proceeded to make a counter-attack,

pushing the Russians back again after a hot contest,

bravely fought on both sides, and lasting for somehours. The 47th Infantry Regiment lost 146 men,^

most of whom belonged to the 5th Company. TheRussians left 200 corpses on the field of action.

No more night attacks were made by the 3rd

Siberian Army Corps and Rennenkampfs Detach-

ment.

Result of The result of October 11 was the following :

October Qj^ |.|^g Japanese side the extremely weak right

wing maintained its position east of Pen-si-hu and

at the Ta-lin, Tu-men-tsy-lin, and Tschien-kou-lin

Passes. The rest of the Japanese Army gained

ground in the attack, the 1st Army reaching the

line Men-ka-ko—Temple Hill, the 4th and 2nd

Armies the Schi-li-ho. On the left wing the 4th

Division overlapped the enemy's right wing, since

the 6th Siberian Army Corps was hanging back.

The Russian Western Detachment was sorely

pressed, the Centre was wavering, the Eastern

Detachment gave up the attack.

' 1 oflicer ami -i2 men dead, 3 officers and 100 meu i\ ouuded.


Kuropatkin's battle-plan of attacking the enemy

and enveloping his eastern wing had therefore failed

already.

October 12

General Kuropatkin had not obtained a correct Kuropat-

idea of what had happened on the eastern wing on ^jj" ^^^Aia-

October 11. Maybe General Baron Stackelberg t;»" of

had sent in favourable reports, maybe he had «ians in

not yet reported at all ; the Commander-in-Chief, abie^H^ht

at any rate, felt confident that all was well

with the Eastern Detachment, and that ultimate Sketch 6.

victory was ensured. Kuropatkin had given up

the original plan of supporting the enveloping

movement of the Eastern Detachment by an

offensive along the front ; he thought there was

no longer any need at all for the Western Detach-

ment to attack in order to complete the enemy's

defeat. It seemed to him sufficient if the main

forces of the Army held their ground until the

decision had been brought about in the east. TheCommander-in-Chief had therefore ordered the

Western Detachment, on the evening of October 11,

to continue the battle on October 12 in the

positions of the advanced guards, and to continue

strengthening them during the night. General

Slutshevski, commanding the 10th Army Corps,

on this, pushed to Ta-kou the other two battalions

of the 34th Infantry Regiment (two being already

in Yin-pan'), placing them likewise under the

orders of General Riabinkin, so as to form in this

way a strong connecting-link between the 10th

' P. 1^8.

158 THE RUSSO-.IAPANESE WARArmy Corps' position and the brigade of the

1st Army Corps ' standing on the heights east

and west of Tan-hai-schi.

The Japanese continued their attacks early in

the morning : the battle on the eastern wing

assumed the character of a stationary action.

The After Ino-uye's Detachment had steadfastly

Extern Tcpulscd all attacks of the Eastern Group duringDetach- October 11, as well as during the night following,

opposite the strength of the assailant seemed to fail him

Japanese hiially. The Russians certainly opened fire againDetach- with Artillery tfcnerally at dawn, but there was nonient dis- -^ .^ •'

coutinues longer any vigorous attack by Infantry ; someIts attac

^^i^gj^p^ Qf pushing once more to the heights

east of Pen-si-hu were soon given up again, whentowards noon the sound of brisk rifle-fire was heard

coming fi'om the southern bank of the Tai-tsy-ho.

A composite half-battalion, with Cavalry attached,

had been pushed out to the heights south of Riu-wo-

bio, as on the previous day, to guard the right flank.

General Samsonov's- Siberian Cossack Division

came upon this detachment, but was attacked in

turn by the Japanese 2nd Cavalry Brigade.

General Prince Kan-in had arrived in Si-ho-yan ^

on October 11. Reinforced by 359 men, Lines

of Communication Troops, he started at 6 a.m. on

October 12, by several roads, for Pen-si-hu, to

remove, by an attack against the Russian forces

on the south bank of the Tai-tsy-ho, the danger

of the Japanese right wing being enveloped. The

' 145th and 146th Infantry Regiments. (P. 138.)

* P. 109.

^ 15 kilometres south-south-east of Pen-si-hu. (Pp. 77 and 110.)


advance through the roadless, rugged, mountainous

country proved very difficult, the four-horsed

vehicles carrying the machine-guns ^ being only

able to proceed after the utmost exertions. Themachine-guns had to be carried by the men over

the steep passes of the road, the limbers and

waggons finding it impossible to follow. Yet, for

all that, the brigade succeeded in approaching

General Samsonov's Cossack Division unobserved,

and in occupying with the main body a position

almost in rear of the enemy. About 11 a.m. a

hot fire from rifles, carbines, and machine-guns

suddenly poured into the hostile Cavalry masses ;

the Russians, completely taken by surprise, hurriedly

retreated in an easterly direction, a portion of the

Japanese Cavalry following them. The main bodyof the brigade remained for the present in the

position occupied. One machine-gun section,

moreover, fired with some good effect on Russian

battalions standing in close formation as reserve

on the northern bank of the Tai-tsy-ho, pro-

bably in the neighbourhood of Cho-ka-ko. Theintervention of Kan-in's Cavalry Brigade greatly

alarmed the Russian Eastern Detachment. Stackel-

berg believed the whole wing of the Japanese

standing east of Pen-si-hu was advancing to

attack, ordering therefore the 3rd Siberian ArmyCorps to hold its ground at all cost.

General Ivanov, nevertheless, withdrew fromthe fighting-Hne all the portions he had still

' In place of this mode of transport, ill-adapted for Manchuria,pack-horses were introduced for carrying the machine-guns ; but it wasnot till the end of January that the former system of transport wascompletely replaced hy the pack-horse system.


engaged, except the 24th East Siberian Rifle

Regiment, which was fighting in the direction of

Kuan-hn-tsy ; the main body of his Army Corps

remained all day in a position north of Kau-tai-tsy ;

during the night the corps began to retreat in a

north-easterly direction on the Kau-tu-lin Pass.

General von Rennenkampf, who in the morning

had assailed once more the heights east of Pen-si-

hu, abstained from any further attack the momenthe heard of Samsonov's Division having been

attacked by surprise and forced to give way in

an easterly direction, and all the more did he

abstain because he had to return to the 3rd Siberian

Army Corps the five battalions General Ivanov

had given him on October 11. Anxiety for his left

flank caused him to abandon all the positions he

was still holding opposite the enemy, and to retire

in the direction of San-kia-tsy on the Tai-tsy-ho.

By the timely intervention of Prince Kan-in the

last danger was removed from the Japanese right

wing. But General Baron Ino-uye was looking

upon the situation of the troops under his com-

mand as being, all the same, extremely serious

early in the morning. Not knowing anything

about the Russian intentions to retreat, he was

bound to assume they would continue their attacks

with every man available. He therefore, with the

consent of General Headquarters, withdrew the

last battalion of his Division from the extreme

left in the neighbourhood south of Yin-tsien-pu,

so as to give a little fresh strength to the greatly

reduced numbers of the defensive troops at Pen-

si-hu. Until the morning of October 12 Major


Honda's composite battalion, which had been

fighting east Pen-si-hu, had lost all its officers ;

of the five companies, three had about 20 menleft, one only 16, and one even had no more than

12 men in the ranks ; it was just possible to form

one section with the rest of the battahon.^ Thetotal loss of Ino-uye's Detachment amounted in

all to 1,765 men, over 1,000 of whom fell to the

lot of the 14th Infantry Regiment alone.

The gap still remaining between the 12th

Division and the Guards in the neighbourhood

of the Tschien-kou-lin Pass was closed by the

combined Cavalry of the Guards and the 2nd

Division under Colonel Kasa.

On the afternoon of October 1 1 General Baron The Japa-

Kuroki had ordered the Guards and the 2nd cfuard

Division to continue the attack during the night ;Division

the Guard Division was first to capture the through

Watanabe-yama, and then the heights east ofgi^^ "J.

Do-mon-shi. The 2nd Division was given the ^'^'^ ^*

1 p 1- o-Ti iii«i Man-hua-task oi attackmg aia-nu-ho-tsy and the heights pu,

north-west of it, after capturing the Western 5^.°^

San-jo-shi-san. tshenko's

As the enemy was still holding strongly the Brigade

general line Man-hua-pu—Watanabe-yama— JionJ*of'

Western San-jo-shi-san, the General Commanding the ist

the Guard Division decided to capture first the Army

position JNlan-hua-pu—Watanabe-yama, and then[i°JJor*tJi

to push on gradually farther, in conformity with »"fi po""

1 1 A y-v 1 tioUS ofthe Army Order. the 4th

The order for the attack was issued at 11 p.m. ^'1?,^"^"

on October 11. The 1st Brigade was to capture <^W? to

the uorth-.\ccording to Japanese accouuts of Captain Sauder (retired). west.

11

162 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARMan-hua-pu and the heights farther north, the

2nd Brigade to drive the enemy from the Watanabe-

yama, and then to advance to the heights east

of Pa-kia-tsy. It being assumed that the 2nd

Brigade would meet with more serious resistance,

the 1st Brigade was ordered to time its advance

by the former.

The 1st Brigade started at 3 a.m. on October 12.

The 1st Guard Regiment advanced on a broad

front over the northern extremities of the Wai-to-san and the heights east of it, its left taking

the direction on Man-hua-pu. The 2nd GuardRegiment was following in second line. Onecompany was pushed out to the left to keep

in touch with the 2nd Brigade ; but it did

not succeed in maintaining it, the touch with

the neighbouring brigade being soon lost. Onthe first line approaching Man-hua-pu village, the

4th East Siberian Rifle Regiment of the 1st

Siberian Army Corps withdrew in a northerly

direction, Mishtshenko's Cavalry Brigade at the

same time giving way in a north-easterly direction.

This being reported to the Commander of the

1st Brigade, he resolved to continue his advance

alone, although he had been ordered to time it

by that of the 2nd Brigade. Scarcely meeting

with any resistance, the brigade occupied the

heights north of Man-hua-pu about 7 a.m.,

pursuing the retreating Cavalry by fire.

The attack of the 2nd Brigade was not so

simple. General Watanabe had ordered the 4th

Guard Regiment of his command to start from

its position at 2.30 a.m., and, marching with its


left past the eastern outskirts of Pa-kia-tsy, to

attack the heights east of that place. The 3rd

Guard Regiment was to drive the Russians from

the Watanabe-yama, and then to occupy Pa-kia-

tsy. The Brigadier remained with the 3rd GuardRegiment, of which he retained the 1st Battalion

at his disposal.

When, in the evening, the 4th Guard Regiment

received the order to move forward, the enemy's

positions on the Watanabe-yama and east of it

were still occupied, as during the day, by portions

of the 1st Brigade 3rd Siberian Infantry Division,

under General Shileiko ^; but the Russians fell back

before the 4th Guard Regiment had any chance

of attacking. With bayonets fixed and rifles

unloaded, the two battalions " of the regiment

started at the appointed time from the country

east of Shi-mo-ro-kun-ko, in the direction generally

on the heights east of Pa-kia-tsy, some few shots

only being fired at them by the retreating Russians.

But they could hear, in a westerly direction, the

3rd Guard Regiment being hotly engaged in

action, the left of their own regiment even suffering

considerable loss by stray shots from the Watanabe-yama. When the regiment, moving on a broad

front, was approaching a height south-west of

Man-hua-pu, the glare of bivouac-fires becameclearly visible at Pa-kia-tsy. Lieutenant-Colonel

Ida, commanding the regiment, expected, from

the last reports, to meet there with strong resist-

ance. The advance having taken a long time

' P. Ill)

* One battalion was Divisioual Reserve.


hitherto, owing to darkness and the difficulties

of ground, he was afraid it would be daylight

before the regiment had crossed the valley in

front for attacking the heights east of Pa-kia-

tsy. As a matter of fact it was dawning whenthe foremost lines arrived in front of the village

;

but it was only weakly occupied—by about one

company—the same as the heights east of it, from

which a brisk fire was directed upon the Japanese.

AVhen six companies of the first line advanced

to charge with the bayonet, the Russians, after

a brief resistance, withdrew in a northerly direction.

By 7 a.m. the heights were taken.

The left company of the regiment had pene-

trated into Pa-kia-tsy, which was evacuated by

its garrison ; the company then fired with some

effect upon a Russian battery bivouacking to the

west of the village. Most of the battery succeeded

in limbering up in time and escaping, escorted

by fifty Cavalry, but three vehicles remained

behind, disabled by the fire of the Japanese.

The 3rd Guard Regiment was standing deployed

at the cross-roads, 1 kilometre north-east of Shi-

mo-ro-kun-ko, ready for the advance at 3 o'clock in

the morning, the 2nd Battalion being on the right,

and the 3rd Battalion on the left ;* the 8th

Company was held in reser\'e by the Colonel.

It was believed the enemy would not be met

until the Hachi-maki-yama was reached, but the

foremost lines of the 3rd Battalion met him before

that. The 2nd Battalion therefore advanced its

right shoulder, so as to wheel a little to the left,

' The 1st Battalion remained at the disposal of the Brigadier.


towards the west. On the approach of the enemya loud whistle was heard in the Russian position,

followed by the word of command to fire a volley

;

this was done at about 100 metres' range. TheJapanese, being put on their guard by that whistle,

threw themselves down flat on the ground, just

in time to let the projectiles pass harmlessly over

their heads. They then deployed a dense skirmish-

ing-line, firing on their own part several volleys

on the Russian skirmishers, clearly visible against

the sky-line. The 2nd Battalion, receiving someflanking fire from the Hachi-maki-yama, after

executing the wheel, the battalion commander sent

one section of the 7th Company of his reserve

to the right to guard the flank. The 5th and

6th Companies meanwhile ascended the steep

slopes of the Watanabe-yama to assault. TheRussians delivered a rapid fire, throwing somehand-grenades at short range, which caused great

loss. The first bayonet charge was beaten off,

and likewise a second, in which the two sections

of the 7th Company still in reserve took part as

well. The two adversaries were now lying opposite

each other at from 2 to 20 metres' range, until

at last a third assault succeeded. The Japanese

on the steep slopes are said to have slipped right

underneath the Russians, seizing the muzzles of

the rifles projecting beyond the edge and breaking

off the bayonets. The 3rd Battalion advanced

to assault, too. After a furious hand-to-hand fight

the Russians withdrew to the Hachi-maki-yama,

and to the heights west of it. The Japanese

followed, reaching, at 5.30 a.m., the neighbour-

166 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARhood close south of the Hachi-maki-yama, where

they halted for the moment.

Three companies of the 1st Battalion, standing

behind the left wing at the disposal of the

Brigadier, were securing the left flank, and drove,

with the bayonet, a weak Russian garrison from

a knoll on the southern slope of the Watanabe-

yama, north-west of height " 238."

The night attack had cost the 3rd Guard Regi-

ment heavily, especially the 2nd BattaHon, which

lost its commander, 9 officers, and 197 dead or

wounded. About four-fifths of the casualties were

caused by the hand-grenades. The Russians also

lost very considerably ; on the Watanabe-yamaand its slopes were found about 400 dead.

The 4th Guard Regiment was meant, by Brigade

Orders, to take possession of the heights east of

Pa-kia-tsy only ; but the Colonel commanding the

regiment thought he would be acting more cor-

rectly, after carrying out this task, if he followed

up the enemy. He therefore engaged in the first

line the company he had till then held back, ad-

vancing with his eight companies north of the road

Pa-kia-tsy—Schan-liu-ho-tsy to a gentle elevation

half-way between both these villages ; a weakgarrison remained in Pa-kia-tsy. When the regi-

ment had reached the height named, the advanced

detachments of General Shileiko's ^ troops, as well

as those of General Levestam, who commandedthe 2nd Siberian Infantry Division,^ were just then

' Pp. 119 and 163.

* It was impossible to ascertain when the troops under General

Levestam occupied the Hachi-maki-yama, and what units they were.


retiring north across the valley from the Hachi-maki-

yama, from Kami-yo-ka-ko, and from the Western

San-jo-shi-san, with the object of rallying. The4th Guard Regiment faced about, opening at once,

at 1,200 to 1,400 metres' range, a hot fire on the

enemy's forces, about a brigade in strength, of

whom some portions were at first endeavouring to

reach Pa-kia-tsy ; but under the fire they thronged

together in the direction of Schan-liu-ho-tsy, suffer-

ing heavy loss.

The garrison left behind by the 4th Guard Regi-

ment in Pa-kia-tsy had meanwhile found there a

weak Russian Infantry detachment, hiding in the

buildings. Then ensued a brief street fight, in

which the Russians were cut down.

Colonel Ida, commanding the 4th Guard Regi-

ment, seeing the 3rd Guard Regiment adv^ancing

from the Watanabe-yama in pursuit of the enemy,

and knowing also that the Divisional Reserve had

started from Kami-ro-kun-ko on Pa-kia-tsy, de-

termined to push on in the direction of the heights

east of Do-mon-shi, so as to cut off the enemyretiring on Shan-liu-ho-tsy. The regiment started,

and occupied with one battalion a steep height

north-east of Schan-liu-ho-tsy ; the other battalion

was being rallied under cover behind the height.

Soon the last battalion of the regiment that had

been following as Divisional Reserve arrived here

also. Further advance was inadmissible, the heights

south of Do-mon-shi being strongly occupied by

the Russians, who were, moreover, directing from

various sides a strong Artillery fire upon the

regiment.

168 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARThe 1st Brigade of the Guard Division had

meanwhile rested for some time upon the heights

north of JNIan-hua-pu. It then continued its

movement over the Eastern San-jo-shi-san, drivdng

away without serious fighting a few protective

parties of the Russians (probably from the 4th

East Siberian Rifle Regiment), and occupying with

the 1st Guard Regiment the Ba-ji-san, unmolested,

at 11.30 a.m.

On the Russian side the vanguards of the 4th

Siberian Army Corps had, after the loss of the

Watanabe-yama and Western San-jo-shi-san, re-

tired to the heights near Do-mon-shi. The main

body was standing at Schan-hei-niu-tun. General

Kossovich, commanding the '3rd Siberian Infantry

Division, had occupied the heights east of Sia-liu-

ho-tsy with the 12th Siberian Infantry Regiment

and two batteries, so as to cover the retreat of

General Shileiko's battalions from Schan-liu-ho-tsy

to Yen-san-sai.

The Japanese 1st Guard Regiment ha\dng

arrived on the Ba-ji-san, its left wing noticed the

retreat of Shileiko's column, and at once opened

fire on it. The Russians deployed with some

portions against the regiment, which wheeled to

the left, facing north-west. By degrees the 2nd

Guard Regiment also came into action on the

right of the 1st Guard Regiment.

As soon as Pa-kia-tsy, as well as the heights

north-east of that place, had been captured, early

in the morning, the General Commanding the

Guard DiWsion sent orders to his Artillery to

move forward. At 8 a.m. three batteries arrived in


the valley at Pa-kia-tsy and unlimbered south of

the village, taking under fire a Russian battery

of the Artillery of the 4th Siberian Army Corps'

main body in position south of Sia-hei-niu-tun.

As no effect could be obtained, owing to the

distant range, the batteries were brought forward

to the gentle elevation close north of Pa-kia-tsy,

whence they afterwards supported the attack of

the 3rd Brigade adjoining on the left against the

heights of Sia-liu-ho-tsy.

Of the 2nd Brigade, the 4th Guard Regimentwas as yet standing on the heights north-east of

Schan-liu-ho-tsy, and the 3rd Guard Regimentwas standing with its main body concentrated at

Pa-kia-tsy. Small parties were still holding the

Watanabe-yama.

About this time—perhaps 9.20 a.m.—the ap-

pearance of strong hostile Cavalry with Infantry ^

in the Scha-ho valley, near the villages of Wai-tau-schan and Ta-tsy-pu, was reported to the

Divisional Staff, whose position is not known. Noreports on the movements of the 1st Brigade

having been received up to that hour, the

Divisional Commander detached two companies

of the 3rd Guard Regiment, which occupied the

Ka-ko-rei-san, to guard the right flank of the

Division.

The last batteries of the Division had meanwhile

been moved up. It having become apparent that

the effect upon the enemy's Artillery was too

little, even from the position north of Pa-kia-tsy,

these two batteries, as well as one of those stand-

' TTie reinforced öth East Siberian Rifle Division. (P. 151.)


ing north of Pa-kia-tsy, were ordered to come

into action west of Schan-liu-ho-tsy. A portion

of the road thither was under fire from the

Russian battery stationed south of Schan-hei-niu-

tun ; the guns were therefore obHged to advance

singly at long distances. With the aid of the

Pioneers, forming the escort to the Artillery, it

was possible to bring the batteries into action

by 3 p.m. The fire was then opened from this

new position with good effect upon the Russian

Artillery. Major Hidikata's^ battery, which the

day before had suffered considerable loss, especially

in teams, did not arrive at Pa-kia-tsy until about

5 p.m.

No more attacks were made by the Japanese

Guard Infantry. The 1st Brigade on the Ba-ji-

san entered into a stationary fight against portions

of the 4th Siberian Army Corps on the Lien-hua-

schan, lasting into the afternoon ; neither Russians

nor Japanese made any decisive step. The 4th

Guard Regiment, standing north-east of Schan-

liu-ho-tsy, did not advance either ; the 3rd Guard

Regiment was still at Pa-kia-tsy, with two of its

companies on the Ka-ko-rei-san.

In the afternoon the Divisional Commanderreceived a message from the Chief of General

Staff, 1st Army, saying that about one regiment of

Russian Infantry was apparently marching against

the Guard Division from the direction of Sia-pin-

tai-tsy, south of Bian-yu-pu-sa. Colonel Kasa's

Cavalry, on the right flank of the Division, more-

over, reported the presence of strong hostile forces

' P. 120.


—about 10,000 men— between Wai-tau-schan and

Bian-yu-pu-sa, natives estimating the enemy's

strength in that neighbourhood even at 20,000

men. These reports evidently referred to the

5th East Siberian Rifle Division, which the Com-mander of the Eastern Detachment was pushing

forward in a north-westerly direction from its

position at Sia-schi-tsiau-tsy.^

The right wing of the 2nd Division, having at

that time not yet pushed beyond the heights east

of Sia-liu-ho-tsy, the Guard Division, deployed as

it was towards the north-west, with its back turned

against the newly reported hostile forces, was in

a very dangerous situation. So as to have at once

strong forces available to oppose the new enemy,

should he continue to advance from Wai-tau-

schan, the Divisional Commander decided to abstain

for the present from continuing the attack on the

Lien-hua-schan. As an immediate protection, the

detachment the 3rd Guard Regiment had sent to

the Ka-ko-rei-san was reinforced by two more com-

panies. The Division then spent the night in the

position it was holding, the 1st Brigade probably

in close touch with General Shileiko's battalions

which were occupying the Lien-hua-schan.

When, on October 11, the attack of the 3rd

Brigade 2nd Division on the Western San-jo-

shi-san was making no progress. General Baron

Nishijima asked for support from Headquarters

of the 1st Army, which then gave him the 29th

Kobi Regiment. The Divisional Commander placed

the regiment at the disposal of the 3rd Brigade,

' P. 151.

172 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARThe Japa- with the objcct of capturing the Western San-

Division jo-shi-san at night, while the 15th Brigade was to

the'i-rhtattack the heights north-west of Sia-Hu-ho-tsy.

wing of The 3rd Brigade, after a severe contest, succeeded

Siberian in completing its task. The attack, of whichArmy

details are not known, began as early as 7 p.m.

from the on Octobcr 1 1 , but it was past midnight before

San-jo-° the Japanese were masters of the Westernshi-san San-io-shi-san. The losses of the four battalions ^

back to ^ ...the taking part in the attack, including the action

wSof on October 11, were 185 men dead and 718 menDo-mou- wounded. The 29th Kobi Regiment was taking

south- part in the night attack only as reserve.

Len-ge-^ 1'he great exhaustion of the troops obliged the

san,aud Commander to give the brigade a rest for a few

Detach- hours in the position captured.

from the 'J^'he 15th Brigade, which, on the afternoon ofheights October 11, had captured Temple Hill, continued

waand its advaucc at 3.30 on the morning of October 12,

from the proceeding to attack the heights of Örr-wa, held

back to by portions of the 4th Siberian and 1st Armysan. Corps, as well as by Plan's Detachment. The

following were to attack : The six companies of

the 29th Infantry Regiment,^ the heights east of

Örr-wa; the 16th Infantry Regiment, the height

projecting south of the Nan-san ; and the 30th

Infantry Regiment, to the left of the 16th Infantry

' Tlie 4th Infantry Regiment and the .3rd Battalion 29th Infantry

Regiment ; the other two battalions of the regiment were the reserve

of the Divisional Commander. Nishijima had six companies of it

attached to the loth Brigade on the afternoon of October 11.

' Belonging to the 3rd Brigade;placed under orders of the 15th

Brigade by the Divisional Commander on the afternoon of October 11.

(P. 131.)


Regiment, the slopes west of the Nan-san. TheDivisional Commander was following from WestSan-kia-tsy with two companies in reserve behind

the centre of the 16th Infantry Regiment. Thelatter formed up at Orr-wa after some strong

officers' patrols had driven away small protective

bodies the Russians had left behind before the

movement had begun. Then seven companies ad-

vanced to assault with the bayonet the height south

of the Nan-san, driving back, after a brief struggle,

the Russian garrison, completely taken by surprise

and furnished by the 146th Infantry Regiment,

which, by direct orders of Kuropatkin, had occupied

the heights east of Tan-hai-schi on October 11/

The Japanese were in possession of the heights

at 5.10 a.m. One company of the 16th Infantry

Regiment was acting as flank-guard, and had

passed Orr-wa on the east ; one of its sections,

without meeting with any resistance, had just been

reaching the knoll east of that place, when, in the

dark, one battalion of General Man's Detachment,

probably from the 121st Infantry Regiment, was

marching past it at a distance of not more than

50 metres. The section delivered a rapid fire at

this range, taking the battalion completely by

surprise and causing it to face about and stream

back into the valley west of Sia-liu-ho-tsy.

The six companies of the 'iOth Infantry Regiment

occupied the height south-east of Orr-wa without

serious opposition by the enemy. The 30th In-

fantry Regiment, advancing against the western

slopes of the Nan-san, met at first with superior

' r. 138.

174 THE RUSSO-JAPAXESE WARRussian Infantry, which, however, withdrew in a

northerly direction as soon as the sahent height

south of the Nan-san had been captured by the

16th Infantry Regiment. During its advance the

regiment had estabhshed touch with the right

wing of the 4th Army ^ ; that wing, having likewise

taken its direction on the Nan-san, the 30th In-

fantry Regiment was moved towards the right,

behind the 16th Infantry Regiment, and engaged

between it and the 29th Infantry Regiment.

The 16th Infantry Regiment had meanwhile

continued its attack, capturing the Nan-san

itself without meeting with any material resist-

ance. That height was then given over to the

4th Army.On the morning of October 12 the brigade was

holding a position extending from the ridge west

of Sia-liu-ho-tsy by Örr-wa to the Nan-san, facing

north-east generally. The firing-lines entrenched,

the reserves finding good cover in the deep nullahs

and clefts on the slopes.

When it began to be light the Russian Artillery

commenced to fire. At first two batteries did so

from the neighbourhood east of Sia-liu-ho-tsy, but

they soon ceased and moved off. Then somebatteries came into action farther north at the

Len-ge-san, without producing any effect what-

ever, the projectiles, as usual, overshooting the

mark.

The patrols, sent by the 15th Brigade beyond

the position, ascertained that the heights north-

east of Örr-wa were strongly occupied ; a Russian

'11th Kobi Brigade.


Infantry brigade was reported to be in reserve

at Ha-ma-tan.

The 3rd Brigade, which had captured the

Western San-jo-shi-san, had started again after a

repose at night of some hours' duration, and at

6.30 a.m. was standing south of Sen-kiu-yo ready

to attack the heights south-east of Sia-liu-ho-tsy.

As soon as the concentration of these troops was

noticed, the Russian batteries opened fire from

these heights, but, the bursting points of the shells

behig far too high, no results were obtained. Theright half of the Japanese 2nd Artillery Regimentthen came into action on the western slopes of the

Western San-jo-shi-san, drawing upon itself the

fire of the Russian batteries ; the other half, having

taken up a position north of Pan-kia-tsy already

on the evening of October 11, resumed its fire too.

W ith considerable expenditure of ammunition they

succeeded in silencing, about 9.30 a.m., the Russian

batteries standing at Sia-liu-ho-tsy ; they could nowdirect their fire entirely upon the Russian Infantry

position. Previously two batteries of the GuardArtillery, at the request of General Matsunaga,

commanding the 3rd Brigade, had fired from

Pa-kia-tsy upon that position. At 10.30 a.m. the

3rd Brigade deployed for attack. When emerg-

ing from Sen-kiu-yo the Russians began firing

volleys from their shelter-trenches ; the Japanese

returned the fire, after having come up by rushes

to within 1,300 to 1,400 metres. Meanwhile the

Russian Artillery resumed its fire, but again with-

out effect, the sights not being altered to suit the

advance of the Japanese. Only at one spot of the


space covered by the fire seemed the ranges exactly

to agree with the length of time-fuze ; the Japanese

turned that dangerous zone by closing in to the

right and left.

The attack was carried through rapidly. After

brief fire-pauses the whole line advanced by rushes

in groups of comparatively large size, mostly com-

panies ; but frequently men singly threw them-

selves down to recover their breath or to shoot.

Although the Japanese were obliged to traverse

a perfectly level and open valley, the Russians

were unable to repel the attack. At about 700

metres' range the main fire-fight blazed up, lasting,

however, for seven minutes only, after which the

Japanese lines resumed their rushes. The Russian

fighting-line was as yet being reinforced by some

battahons of the 1st Brigade 8rd Siberian Infantry

Division, under General Shileiko, which were just

at that moment retiring from the neighbourhood

of Pa-kia-tsy to the Lien-hua-schan,^ but when, at

300 metres' distance, the attacker made ready to

assault, the Russians abandoned the position. Theretreating croAvd was rallied by supports mo\dng

up and occupying a crest-line east of Sia-liu-ho-tsy.

About 12.30 p.m. the 3rd Brigade was in posses-

sion of the height south-east of Sia-liu-ho-tsy.

The comparatively small losses—29 men dead and

213 wounded—were pretty evenly distributed over

the whole distance traversed in the advance, thus

indicating that the Russians made no better prac-

tice even at the close ranges. General Matsunaga

first reorganised his troops in the position captured,

' P. 166


and then gave them some rest ; he meant to

resume the offensive against the Len-ge-san in the

afternoon. But about 2 p.m. he was ordered to

march with his brigade and two batteries by wayof the Tschau-hsien-Hn Pass, urgent reinforcements

being needed on the eastern wing.

For, about 10.30 a.m., a message of the 4th

Army came in at Headquarters of 1st Army,saying that its Infantry had captured the heights

of Man-kia-fön, north of the San-kai-seki-san.

The Guards, moveover, had reported that they had

already reached the heights east of Do-mon-shi.

Army Headquarters concluded from these reports

that the attack was making progress, and that the

Russians were falling back generally, opposite

the Guard and 2nd Divisions ; the situation of

the 12th Division being still looked upon as

critical. General Baron Kuroki resolved to rein-

force the right wing by the 3rd Brigade. Themessage from the 4th Army was afterwards found

to be erroneous, the 10th Division having not got

beyond the San-kai-seki-san.

In view of the Russian batteries still in position

at Do-mon-shi and south-west of the Len-ge-san,

an immediate departure of the 3rd Brigade through

the open valley of Tsun-yau—Pa-kia-tsy did not

seem feasible ; the Commander therefore ordered

his troops to cook, and arranged for them to start

at 7 p.m. When about that time the brigade

was on the point of moving off, the report of a

patrol seemed to indicate that the Russians were

advancing to attack from the Len-ge-san ; but it

was soon found that it was nothing more than a

12

178 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARsmall party, probably pushed forward to re-

connoitre. Th'j skirmishers deploying against

them drove them back after a brief fire-fight.

At 7.30 p.m. the brigade started for the eastern

wing, leaving one battalion of the 29th Kobi

Regiment behind to hold the captured position

south-east of Sia-liu-ho-tsy.

The 15th Brigade, after occupying the heights

east of Örr-wa, remained at first in the position

captured, fortifying it by numerous fire-trenches.

The Infantry fire of General Man's troops, directed

from the Lo-to-san at distant ranges, was not

replied to during the forenoon. About noon the

left Abteilung of the 2nd Artillery Regiment,

standing hitherto in action north of Pan-la-schan-

tsy,^ was placed under the orders of the brigade.

The Abteilung then advanced by batteries on Örr-

wa. The battery arriving first unlimbered on the

low-lying slope north-east of Temple Hill, between

1 and 2 p.m. ; about 3 p.m. the other batteries

had completed their change of position too. Onecame into action at Örr-wa, firing common shell

upon Russian Infantry north of the Lo-to-san,

the other joined the battery which had arrived

first. About this time Headquarters of the 2nd

Division arrived on Temple Hill. Afterwards the

last battery of the regiment ^ was brought up too;

it did no longer come into action, but remained

limbered up in reserve east of Temple Hill.

Close south-west of Temple Hill was standing

an Abteilung of the 10th Division adjoining on

• p. 175.

' Two batteries had been hauded over to the 3rd Brigade.


the left, firing in a north-westerly direction upon

Russian batteries, probably belonging to the 1st

Army Corps. The officer commanding the Abtei-

lung was on 'I'emple Hill directing the fire from

there with the aid of a chain of men, transmitting

his orders by word of mouth.

When the Japanese batteries had opened fire,

the 15th Brigade made several attempts to storm

the Lo-to-san, each attempt failing owing to the

severe fire of General JNIau's Infantry. Those

portions of the firing-line which, rushing forward,

had left the trenches, were unable to maintain

themselves on the open groimd, and were therefore

obliged to crawl back again into the trenches.

Darkness coming on, the attempts for assaulting

were given up for the present. The brigade lost

569 men on October 12, and spent 110,000 rounds

of ammunition.

A heavy thunderstorm broke during the night,

lasting till morning. Under cover of that storm

General Okasaki, commanding the 15th Brigade,

once more tried to capture the Lo-to-san. But

the Russians were not to be surprised ; they beat

off the attack.

The Staff of the 2nd Division, together with the

Divisional Reserve ^ still available, spent the night

at East San-kia-tsy.

To comply as quickly as possible with Marshal

Marquis Oyama's demands of executing a right

wheel in the direction of Tan-hai-schi,- General

' Two companies 2yth Infantry Regiment and one battalion Syth

Kobi Regiment.» P. 106.

180 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARThe Japa- Couiit Nodzu had ordered the 10th Division on thencsc 10thDivision evening of October 11 to capture the San-kai-seki-

th^San- ^^^ ^y ^ night attack. This rocky height, rising

kai-seki- abruptly from the plain, named by the Japanese

pushes also Futa-go-yama or Twins Hill, owing to the

of the"^similarity of its two knolls, seemed to them to be

Russian the key of the Russian position ; at the foot of the

Corps hill, as well as on its slopes, were strong entrench-north, rnents ; on the saddle between the knolls was a

Chinese temple surrounded by a wall.^

The troops of the 10th Division, after what they

had been doing on October 11, were, on the even-

ing of that day, standing in two separate groups.

While the 20th Brigade, under General Marui,

was to make a frontal attack from its position

south of Ta-pu, Colonel Kamada, with the 8th

Brigade and 12th Kobi Regiment, was to attack

from the west ; both columns were to start at

a fire-signal appearing on a hill to their rear. Theassaulting troops took off their knapsacks, leaving

behind all clattering and rattling objects, and

put on their greatcoats. To recognise each other

more readily in the dark, they fastened a white

band round their left arm. At 1 a.m. the fire

blazed up, and so they started.

Of the 20th Brigade, the 39th Infantry Regiment

was in first line, the battalions being deployed on a

broad front, in line with each other ; the 20th In-

fantry Regiment was following, Echeloned to the

right. In spite of all precautionary measures the

attack was discovered early in the Russian position,

which was occupied by the 145th Infantry Regiment,

' Appendix XV'II.


from the 1st Army Corps/ the regiment directing

a hot fire upon the assailants in the darkness.

The Japanese did not return it, but advanced byrushes as far as San-kuai-schi village, at the foot

of the San-kai-seki-san. Here they met with an

obstinate resistance. A destructive fire was poured

on them from the houses and loopholed walls,

forcing them to seek cover and take up the fire-

fight. Their fire proving, however, ineffective,

they presently rose again and attacked the trenches

at the foot of the hill, rushing from all sides into

the village, where a furious hand-to-hand fight

developed.

The 20th Infantry Regiment, sweeping around

farther east, and losing touch with the 39th

Infantry Regiment, took part in the fray from

3 o'clock in the morning. Rifle-fire being, mean-

while, also heard in the neighboin-hood of the

Nan-san, a battalion was left behind to protect

the right flank ; the other two battalions, on

hearing the noise of the action at the San-kai-

seki-san, wheeled around north-west and attacked

the Russians holding the rocky knolls.

The struggle lasted for some time indecisively.

When, finally, both regiments had engaged their

reserves, they succeeded in driving the enemy from

the trenches on the southern and south-eastern

slopes, and pushing them in a northerly direction,

after charging vigorously with the bayonet ; the

Russians in San-kuai-schi village alone continued

to offer an obstinate resistance, their retreat having

been cut off. With the object of avoiding un-

1 p. 138.


necessary bloodshed, the Adjutant of the 20th

Brigade, acting for his wounded Commander,

called upon the senior Russian officer commanding

in the village to lay down arms ; but Lieutenant-

Colonel Gringenberg, the acting Colonel of the

145th Infantry Regiment, replied he had ordered

his men to hold out to the very last. Another

summons to surrender, which a non-commissioned

officer addressed to the Russian privates straight,

was responded to by some 100 men ; the re-

mainder, about 200 men, determined to continue

the fight. Tlien the Japanese rushed into the

village ; many of them were carrying in their

hands dry gaoljan fagots, laying fire to the

houses. In a few minutes the village was ablaze.

All the Russians remaining in the village were

either cut down or perished in the flames.

The sister brigade of the 20th (the 8th Brigade)

took an active share in the attack, too, as ordered.

The 'iOth Infantry Regiment was set to assault

the San-kai-seki-san from the south-west, and the

10th Infantry Regiment to assault from the west.

The 40th Infantry Regiment, with two battalions

deployed in first line, and followed by one battalion

as well as by the 12th Kobi Regiment in second

line, gained touch with the 39th Infantry Regi-

ment at Sui-tsy-schan. At Ta-pu its left came in

touch with the 10th Infantry Regiment, which

had likewise deployed two battalions, with one in

reserve. The attack of both regiments proceeded

slowly at the same rate, as the 20th Brigade

gained ground. As the 145th Russian Infantry

Regiment was holding especially strongly the


westernmost of the two hilltops, the position could

not be stormed ofF-hand ; the 10th Infantry Regi-

ment was, moreover, being enfiladed by fire from

Tsan-kia-tun. Towards the morning the 5th

Company of the regiment worked its way forward

single-handed, climbing up the south-western slopes,

and breaking by surprise into the enemy's position.

The Russians fell back, leaving a large portion of

the rocky knoll in the hands of the Japanese.

On the other companies of the 2nd Battalion

following the example of the 5th, the whole

western portion of the hill was gradually taken

possession of. Only in a few clefts of the

rocks, difficult of access, the defenders were still

offering a desperate resistance. The combatlasted till daybreak ; when it was perfectly light,

the whole height was in the hands of the

Japanese.

The 10th Division had lost heavily ; 15 officers

dead and 45 wounded, 1,250 men dead or wounded.The Russians left about 800 dead behind on the

hillsides ; in addition, 200 prisoners, 2 field-guns,

and 8 ammunition waggons fell into the hands

of the Japanese. To give some rest to the much-exhausted troops after the attack, and to allow

them to reorganise their units. General CountNodzu, early on the morning of October 12, whenthe Banner of the Rising Sun was floating over

the captured hill, ordered the 10th and 11th KobiBrigades to continue the attack against the line

:

heights east of Yen-tschien-tschai—JNIan-kia-fon,

and the 10th Division to stand fast for the present

at the San-kai-seki-san. The 8th Brigade was

184 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARapportioned by General Baron Kawamura as

Divisional Reserve.

On the Russian side, the 1st Brigade 37th In-

fantry Division, from the 1st Army Corps, after

losing the San-kai-seki-san and the Nan-san, with-

drew to the line Tsan-kia-tun—heights south of

Ha-ma-tan, being reinforced there by the 2nd

Brigade. In addition, the 88th Infantry Regiment,

the 4th Battery 7th Artillery Brigade, the 7th

Siberian Cossack Regiment, as well as the two

Transbaikal Cossack Batteries, were brought up

from Tun-san-tsy to Tun-san-ho, and placed at the

disposal of the Division. In this new position the

division was no longer attacked on October 12.

On the east, the 37th Infantry Division was

again in touch with Mau's Detachment, which had

fallen back before the Japanese 15th Brigade^ to

the heights south of Ha-ma-tan.

The attack of the Japanese 10th Division was

continued by the Kobi troops. The 11th Kobi

Brigade had been moved up so early that it was

already deployed and advancing from Siau-pu on

Tan-hai-schi when the 15th Brigade was making

its attack on the Nan-san. The Kobi Brigade

resumed touch on the right with the 30th Infantry

Regiment of the 15th Brigade 2nd Division, and,

advancing over the Nan-san after the Russians had

given way to the pressure of the 15th Brigade,

occupied a two-knolled low hill to the west of

Yen-tschien-tschai. The 2nd Division, on the left

of the 1st Army, intending to continue its attack

on the Lo-to-san, the 11th Kobi Brigade was given

' Pp. 176 and 179.


as its next objective the occupation of the Djo-san,

east of Yen-tschien-tschai. The brigade was de-

ployed on a broad front, with the 43rd on the

right and the 22nd Kobi Regiment on the left.

The 10th Kobi Brigade and portions of the 10th

Division were standing at the San-kai-seki-san,

covering the left flank of the 22nd Kobi Regiment.

The Divisional Artillery Regiment, as well as the

14th Field Artillery Regiment, unlimbered in the

plain east of the San-kai-seki-san ; the former was

firing upon hostile Artillery of the Russian 1st

Army Corps in the direction of Tun-san-ho and

Ku-kia-tsy, and the latter, pushing some batteries

to the foot of the height west of Yen-tschien-

tschai, was firing upon the strong position at the

Djo-san. The various attacks made by the In-

fantry against the heights failed in like manner as

those made by the 15th Brigade on the right against

the Lo-to-san. The Russians had again strongly

entrenched themselves on the Djo-san. The ad-

vance was, moreover, rendered very difficult by

the flanking fire of Artillery from the neighbour-

hood of Tun-san-ho. The day passed without any

material progress being made ; an attack madeafter 9 o'clock in the evening likewise failed.

The 10th Kobi Brigade, and the portions de-

ployed of the 10th Division, who might have

attacked frontally in the direction of Tsan-kia-tun,

to relieve the pressure on the 11th Kobi Brigade,

abstained from doing so, in consideration of the

evident superiority of the enemy in the positions

opposite.

The 5th Division, which, by Oyama's order, had

186 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARThe concentrated as his reserve at Ku-schu-tsy on

Western Octobcr 11,^ deployed again on the 12th, in co-

Detach- operation with the 3rd Division, against the

cider, to advanccd-guard position of the 10th Army Corps

advanced ^^ the Schi-h-ho ; but did not carry out an attack

guard\yy Infantry, merely confining itself to firing

ou the with Artillery. The Russians replied with theirSchi-h-

^j,^iiigj.y from their position, but for the rest did

nothing decisive against the Japanese Division.

The Russian Commander-in-Chief had no inten-

tions at all of acting offensively with the Western

Detachment ; the loss of the San-kai-seki-san and

Nan-san having become known to him, he even

considered it necessary—in consideration also of

the threatening attacks of the 2nd Japanese

Army on October 11—to withdraw the advanced

portions of the 10th and 17th Army Corps to the

main position on the hne Liu-tan-kou—Hun-pau-

schan. He directed orders to be sent to that

effect to the Commander of the Western Detach-

;

ment, adding that the 10th Army Corps should atj

the same time concentrate at least one Division,

keeping it as long as possible in reserve.

The 17th Army Corps being already hotlyi

engaged with the Japanese 2nd Army wheni

this order arrived, at 7.30 a.m.. General Baron]

Bilderling considered it impossible to comply with

it. Retreating at once under the fire of the'

Japanese simply spelt ruin. He, moreover, knew

the 6th Siberian Army Corps to be echeloned to

the right behind the 17th Army Corps, and wasj

hoping that that force, as well as Dembovski'si

' P. 146.


Detachment, would prevent his right flank from

being enveloped. He therefore resolved to con-

tinue the fight in the advanced-guard positions

on his own responsibility. This intention was

made known to the Generals in command, the

10th Army Corps receiving Bilderlings order at

8.15 a.m.

But General Slutshevski had already received

the directive above mentioned straight from Kuro-

patkin, and had handed it down to the commander

of the advanced guard ; General Riabinkin had

thereupon reported that the retrograde movementwas being gradually initiated from the left.

General Baron Bilderling, shortly after sending

his order to stand fast in the advanced-guard

positions, requested the 10th Army Corps to keep

its reserves behind its right wing, so as to be

able, in case of need, to close the gap between

the 10th and 17th Army Corps. But almost at

the same moment a fresh order came in from the

Commander-in-Chief demanding the reserves of

the corps to be placed behind its left wing, ready

to support Man's Detachment with one regiment

or with one brigade. General Riabinkin, more-

over, asked to be allowed to delay the retreat into

the main position until evening, as a withdrawal

by day would be causing too much loss.

All these contradictory demands General Slut-

shevski thought he would meet best by agreeing

with Riabinkin's intentions. With the units of

the 9th Infantry Division assembled around Hun-pau-schan, he was able to meet requests for

support, as well as to prolong the right of his

188 THE RUSSO JAPANESE WARadvanced-guard position. To enable him in ur-

gent cases to bring rapid aid to the Centre, he

ordered General Gerschelmann, commanding the

9th Infantry Division, to move up the 33rd

Infantry Regiment from Nin-kuan-tun to behind

the left wing of the corps, and to occupy the

\dllage mentioned by one battalion from the 36th

Infantry Regiment. General Slutshevski reported

the arrangements he had made to the Commander-in-Chief, and to the leader of the Western

Detachment.

Kuropat- Kuropatldn's directive to Slutshevski, to place

tends to his reserv'cs behind the left wing, probably ori-

closethe orinated from the Commander-in-Chiefs generalgap be- <^ . ...tween the anxiety for the Centre. The possibility of the

Detach- Japanese advancing into the gap between thementand Eastern Detachment and the ^th Siberian ArmyCentre Corps, in the neighbourhood of the Eastern San-

Teserve^of jo-shi-san, breaking thereby the Russian Centre,the East- ^,rjs Constantly preying on the mind of Kuropatkin.

tachment, The danger of penetration was increasing, when

5th East during the day it became known that the 1st

Jji^erian Brigade of the Japanese Guard Division had

vision, occupied the Ba-ji-san, thus actually penetrating

into the imperilled gap ; staking strong forces was

all that was wanted now for completely breaking

the Russian battle-fi'ont.

It seeming impossible to spare for the momentthe only reserve still available in the Centre, the

22nd Infantry Division, from the 1st Army Corps,*

' The 88th Infantry Regiment and one battery of the 22nd Infantry

Division had already been moved up from Tuu-san-tsy to Tun-san-ho

in support of the 37th Infantry Division. (P. 184.)


standing north of Tun-san-ho, Kuropatkin decided

to bring up the 5th East Siberian Rifle Division,

forming the reserve of the Eastern Detachment,

and to close the gap with it.

But General Baron Stackelberg did not feel

inclined to comply with Kuropatkin's request. Byreason of the reports arriving from the 4th Siberian

Army Corps on the evening of October 11, he had

finally resolved to give up the attack, and to con-

fine himself entirely to the defensive.^ The 5th

East Siberian Rifle Division, which he had not

yet engaged, he wished to keep available for

guarding his right flank, which he believed to be

in danger of being enveloped ; but he had not

yet reported to the Commander-in-Chief the grave

resolve he had come to. Even in the letter

Stackelberg was dispatching to General Head-

quarters at 6 a.m. on October 12, there was not

a single word of it. He reported on the measures

he meant to adopt in case of his right flank being

enveloped ; but kept silent on the fact that all

attacks of the Eastern Detachment had hitherto

failed, and that he had given up persisting in themfurther. He therefore kept the Commander-in-

Chief for the moment still in the belief that all

was going well with the Eastern Detachment.

A lively correspondence was carried on between

the Commander-in-Chief and the leader of the

Eastern Detachment about the employment of

the 5th East Siberian Rifle Division, dragging

along from early morning till nightfall.

As early as 5 o'clock in the morning Kuropatkin

' P. 151.

190 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARhad sent General Baron Stackelberg tlie order to

start at once the whole available reserve of the 2nd

Siberian Army Corps, or at least ten battalions,

for joining temporarily the 4th Siberian ArmyCorps ; the height, moreover, west of Yen-sin-tun,'

was to be secured by one battalion with some

guns. Of this intention the Commander-in-Chief

informed General Sarubaiev, commanding the 4th

Siberian Army Corps, by a message received by

him about 10 a.m. The letter proposed, in the

first instance, to keep, in case of retreat, the eye on

Örr-tau-kou, 4j kilometres north of Fön-kia-pu,

but to fall back only step by step, offering

an obstinate resistance, especially on the heights

north of Schan-hei-niu-tun. " If you are obliged,"

Kuropatkin concluded his letter, " to evacuate

your present position in the face of a superior

enemy, I authorize you to demand, in my name,

from the leader of the Eastern Detachment, the

dispatch of the 2nd Siberian Army Corps ^ to

Fön-kia-pu ; that corps will then come under your

orders. The leader of the Eastern Detachmentwill be informed of this at the same time."

When the Japanese 3rd Brigade was about to

capture the height of Sia-liu-ho-tsy, and General

Kossovich in front was gradually falling back

upon the main position, south of Schan-hei-

niu-tun,^ General Sarubaiev thought the time had

come for moving up the 2nd Siberian ArmyCorps, dispatching therefore about noon to

* On the Upper Scha-ho, north-west of Bian-yu-pu-sa.' That is to say, essentially, the 5th East Siberian Rifle Division.

^ P. 168.


the Eastern Detachment a summons to that

effect.

Stackelberg had abeady rephed to the Com-mander-in-Chief, at 9.45 a.m., in a negative sense,

after receiving his letter. " If the 4th Siberian

Army Corps is retiring farther north into the

position of Schan-hei-niu-tun," he wrote, " I shall

support it with the 2nd Siberian Army Corps.

With that object I have moved up one regiment

of infantry, with artillery, to the west of Bian-

yu-pu-sa. Should it become necessary, I intend

to advance with the 2nd Siberian Army Corps,

and attack the right flank of the enemy pressing

the 4th (Siberian) Army Corps. . . . The 1st and

3rd (Siberian) Army Corps," he goes on in the

same telegram,^ "have orders to go forward, and

in no case to retire."

The Commander of the Eastern Detachment

thought he was relieved by his report to the

Commander-in-Chief from replying to the General

Commanding the 4th Siberian Army Corps.

The additional remark, referring to the 1st and

3rd Siberian Army Corps, is worthy of notice.

Even at this hour General Baron Stackelberg

fought shy of reporting clearly how matters were

proceeding on his wing. Instead of reporting that

the attack was given up as impossible, and that

the Eastern Detachment had assumed already the

defensive, Stackelberg thought fit to choose someambiguous terms.

Before this letter arrived at General Head-

quarters, General Kuropatkin had drawn up a

' The complete wording of the telegram is not available.


fresh order for Stackelberg, dispatched at 9.40 a.m.

from the heights of Tun-san-ho, and received by

the Eastern Detachment about 2.30 p.m.^ Thenote ran as follows :

" Since the Eastern Detachment's attack is

hanging fire, and the Japanese, on the other hand,

are continuing their attack on the 4th Siberian

Army Corps with great obstinacy, leading perhaps

to penetration between the Eastern and WesternDetachments, I have left it to General Sarubaiev,

when forced to evacuate the position he is occu-

pying, to move up to him the 2nd Siberian ArmyCorps. Should General Sarubaiev make this

demand, I propose you should start the Corps on

Fön-kia-pu. Try to avoid that necessity. [?] 1

have ordered General Gerngross - to-day to support

General Sarubaiev, and to send at least one brigade

to the left wing of the latter."

In reply to this, Stackelberg reported at 3.40

p.m. the following

:

"With the object of securing myself and the

4th Siberian Army Corps against penetration by

the Japanese between Yen -sin-tun and Bian-yu-

pu-sa, 1 have pushed forward the 2nd Siberian

Army Corps into a position south of Tin-kia-tai

—

Sun-wu-pu-tsy, facing west and south-west ; touch

has been established with the 1st Siberian ArmyCorps by the Tschau-hsien-lin Pass. During the

night 1 will withdraw from the fighting-line every

• The indifferent connection between General Headquarters and the

Eastern Detachment is striking, orders and reports needing five to six

hours before reaching their destination.

- General Commanding the 1st Siberian Army Corps.


unit that can be spared, so as to strengthen the

General Reserve of the corps and the better

secure the right flank of the 1st Siberian ArmyCorps. By day it is difficult for the troops to

carry out the movements, having regard to the

commanding positions of the enemy. The General

Reserve, seven battalions from the 2nd Siberian

Army Corps, is standing between Ta-tsy-pu and

Wai-tau-schan at the northern foot of the height

with the temple, so as to hide its position from

the Japanese post of observation at ' A.' ^ I have

no longer any sectional reserve, since, by your

Excellency's Order (10,081), I am holding ready

the 2nd Siberian Army Corps for placing it at

the disposal of the 4th Siberian Army Corps.

At the same time I consider it my duty to report

that, by the withdrawal of the 4th Siberian ArmyCorps to Fön-kia-pu, the country between Yen-

sin-tun and the Tschau-hsien-lin Pass will be

completely denuded of troops, and thus open to

an attack by the Japanese."

As the asked-for support by the 2nd Siberian The 4th

Army Corps failed to arriv^e, General Sarubaiev, Army*"

meanwhile, appealed directly to Kuropatkin's Head- porps

quarters for help. On this he received a note rein-

from the Chief of the Staff* at 2.10 p.m., sayingf%^'p^

^^

that three remments and five batteries of the 22nd from the

22ndDivision 1st Army Corps ^ had starte 1 and were infantry

coming under his orders. But since the Com- '^'^'^"'°"-

mander-in-Chief, in his constant practice of always

' The position of this post of observation " A " is not known.* The 85th, 86th, and 87th Infantry Regiments, and the 1st, 2nd,

3rd, 5th and Gth Batteries 7th Artillery Brifj:ade.

13

194 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARforming fresh reserves, was holding back the 86th

Infiintry Regiment, as well as the 5th and 6th

Batteries 7th Artillery Brigade, only two regiments

of two different brigades and the 1st Abteilung

7th Artillery Brigade, as well as a Sapper com-

pany, joined the 4th Siberian Army Corps ; and

with them arrived the General Commanding the

Division and three Generals of Brigade ! Ofthese reinforcements two battalions from the 87th

Infantry Regiment were engaged in first line at

Ma-niu-tun, on the left wing of the 4th Siberian

Army Corps ; the other portions did no longer

come into action on October 12, but bivouacked

2 kilometres north-east of Schan-hei-niu-tun.^

In spite of this direct support he had given to

the 4th Siberian Army Corps, General Kuropatkin

adhered to his intention of moving up the 2nd

Siberian Army Corps as well for reinforcing the

Centre. "Without waiting for Stackelberg's reply

to his letter dispatched at 9.40 a.m., he there-

fore sent another order to Stackelberg, worded as

follows

:

^* SCHI-MIAU-TSY, EAST OP TuN-SAN-HO.

" Dispatched \.\5 p.m.

" General Sarubaiev, who was holding a position

north of Schan-liu-ho-tsy and Pa-kia-tsy, is forced

to retire, and is falling back in the direction of

Yen-san-sai and Schan-hei-niu-tun. I am sending

the 22nd Division in his support. Immediately

' During the action, lasting all day, two battalions of the 147th

Infantry Regiment and one battery of the 43rd Artillery Brigade were

already engaged by the 4th Siberian Army Corps. The battalions

were employed on the right wing of the 4th Siberian Army Corps.


after receipt of this order, start the 2nd Corps

(by forced march) on Yen-sin-tun^ ; continue then

further, as the General Commanding the 4th Siberian

Army Corps may arrange. If you have already

engaged portions of that corps, you must at all

cost replace the missing units, or relieve them by

parts of other corps. I grant that the situation

of the 1st Siberian Army Corps is rather alarming.

There must not be an isolated withdrawal without

maintaining close touch with the left of the 4th

Siberian Army Corps. Let me know your views

on the co-operation of the 1st and 3rd Siberian

Army Corps."

With the portions attached to him from the

22nd Division General Sarubaiev thought himself

now strong enough for holding the heights south

of Sia- and Schan-hei-niu-tun without the aid of

the 2nd Siberian Army Corps. He reported this

view to General Kuropatkin.

When, late in the afternoon. General Baron

Stackelberg received the Order dispatched at

1.15 p.m., he reported in reply at 6 p.m. briefly

the following :" Order No. 108, dispatched

1.15 p.m., just received. The 2nd Siberian ArmyCorps is entrenching for the last three hours in

a position south-east of Yen-sin-tun, facing south-

west ; the right is standing at the knoll with the

temple."

"

General Sarubaiev's last report to General Head-

quarters was settled by a message from Kuropatkin

' 9 kilometres north-west of Bian-yu-pu-sa.

* He probably means the Wai-tau-schan.


to General Baron Stackelberg, being dispatched

by way of the 4th Siberian Army Corps, and

reading as follows:

I " Dispatched 5A^ p.m.

" The whole front of the 17th and 10th ArmyCorps has been standing fast until sunset. The

4th Siberian Army Corps has somewhat retired,

so as to be in line with the other corps ; reinforced

by fresh troops, it is occupying a very favourable

position.

"The issue of to-day's fight on this front maybe looked upon as very favourable generally.

From you 1 have no news. The orders regarding

the 2nd Siberian Army Corps you need no longer

execute, the 4th Siberian Army Corps having

been reinforced by portions of the 1st ArmyCorps. Your report on the 1st Siberian ArmyCorps approaching Sarubaiev's left wing I have

received."^

The main body of the reinforced 5th East

Siberian Rifle Division from the 2nd Siberian

Army Corps remained therefore at Sun-wu-pu-tsy.

TheJapa- While General Kuropatkin was focussing his

Army wholc interest on his Centre, a decision was

th^^Ru?brought about on the western wing determining

sian ad- tlic final issuc of the whole battle—the 17th

guard Army Corps succumbed to the attacks of the

\Tuir Japanese 2nd Army.17th Oyama's Order on the evening of October 11,- by

Coi^s which the 2nd Army was to continue the attackfrom the

west. ' This report is not known. * P. 146.


on its former objects, that is to say, against Scha-

ho village and to the west of it, was followed at

1.15 a.m., during the night October 11-12, by a

telegraphic direction requesting the 2nd Army to

reach, above all, the line Pan-kiau-pu—Liu-tan-

kou, to enable the 4th Army to continue its right

wheel.

The Commander of the Army had already

previously informed the Commander-in-Chief of

his intention to continue to attack during the night

October 11-12.

Of the 3rd Division, the 6th Infantry Regiment,

reinforced by two battalions from the General

Reserve of its Army,^ advanced, about midnight,

from Siau-wen-kou to within 800 metres of Schi-

li-ho village, entrenching a position opposite that

village, which the Russians had strongly fortified.

The fire-trenches were occupied by six companies,

and connected by a communicating trench with

Siau-wen-kou. Three batteries of the Divi-

sional Artillery unlimbered at 3 a.m. close south

of, and the others south-east of, Siau-wen-kou.

In addition, one battery of the 4th Division and

one composite battery of 10*5 centimetre guns,

captured at Kin-tschou, took up a position on the

western border of VVu-li-tai-tsy. The advance

and the entrenching of the Japanese were dis-

covered by the Russians, who fired at the Japanese,

but without material effect, the fire being too high

in the darkness. The Japanese remained in their

trenches till morning, the trenches being con-

structed to allow them to fire standing-.

' From the 34th Infautry llegimeut.


The main forces of the Division, after having

been driven out of Nan-kuan-tsy ^ by the Russians

at 11 p.m. on October 11, entrenched themselves

again 800 metres away from the village, waiting

for the morning of October 12. The reserve of

the Division was standing at Schuan-tai-tsy.

From its positions at Yen-kia-wan, and the little

wood south-east of it, the 6th Division worked its

way up to the enemy slowly, by very cleverly

taking advantage of the darkness ; but the

greatest caution had to be exercised, the Russians

keeping a sharp look-out, and frequently opening

fire. Repeatedly it was thought the enemy was

going to sally from his position at Siau-tun-tai and

Orr-schi-kia-tsy for counter-attack.

The 11th Brigade 6th Division, which in the

evening had reached the little wood south-east

of Yen-kia-wan, and was commencing to throw

up shelter-trenches," was suddenly surprised at

night by a violent fire. The commander decided

to await the enemy's attack in the shelter-trenches.

But when, after some time, the firing ceased, and

patrols, pushed forward, reported that all was quiet

again in the enemy's position, the commanderseized the favourable moment to lead his battalion

some 400 metres forward, where it began to en-

trench once more.

The left column of the 6th Division—the

24th Brigade—^which had captured Yen-kia-wan,

resumed its movement after sunset on October 11

by advancing on Orr-schi-kia-tsy. But the column

had proceeded only a short distance when it also

• P. 149. ' P. 141


met with a heavy fire. The leading lines

entrenched, waiting till all was quiet again. Thenthe advance was continued. Three times the

Japanese found themselves obliged to stop and

work with the spade before they succeeded in

getting within 600 metres of Örr-schi-kia-tsy. The1st Battalion 45th Infantry Regiment, which, at

5 p.m. on October 11, had been moved up from

the reserve to Yen-kia-wan, had cooked, and re-

ceived there the order at 9 p.m. to advance and

envelop the enemy's right wing at Örr-schi-kia-tsy,

was unable to carry out the order completely. It

is true, it succeeded in advancing a good distance

without loss in the deeply cut bed of the Scha-ho ;

but when it had to quit that cover, the battalion

was obliged by heavy fire to seek shelter by

entrenching. It then advanced for about another

300 metres, when trenches were constructed once

more, because news came from the battalion on

the right that it was likewise unable to advance

any farther.

The 3rd and 6th Divisions had worked their

way up to the enemy far enough for enabling

them to continue their attack against the right

wing of the Western Detachment at dawn on

October 12.

The 4th Division remained during the night

October 11-12 in the places they had reached on

the 11th at the end of their march, on the line

Ta-yu-tschun-pu—Li-kia-tun.

The 17th Army Corps of the Russians madeuse of the night for feeding the troops and pro-

viding them with ample ammunition, but it had

200 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARbeen impossible to reorganise the strongly mixed

units.

On the right, under the uniform command of

Colonel Stakovich, at Tsun-lun-yen-tun, were

standing : 2 battalions from the 140th Infantry

Regiment, ^ battalion from the 11th Infantry

Regiment, 1 battery of the 35th Artillery Brigade

and 2 guns of the 3rd, and, in addition, the 52nd

Dragoon Regiment and a detachment of Scouts

from the 10th Infantry Regiment.

The section Orr-schi-kia-tsy—Lan-tsy-tai—Siau-

tun-tai was held by: 1 battalion 137th Infantry

Regiment, 2 battalions 10th Infantry Regiment,

the whole of the 9th Infantry Regiment, 6

companies from the 12th Infantry Regiment, and

3 batteries 3rd Artillery Brigade. The 139th

Infantry Regiment was standing in Nan-kuan-tsy.

Two battalions 140th Infantry Regiment, and

1 battalion 10th Infantry Regiment, were at Lun-wan-miau. Between Lun-wan-miau and Schi-li-

ho were Ij battalions from the 138th Infantry

Regiment, and 2 batteries 3rd Artillery Brigade.

On the left, Schi-li-ho village was occupied by

2J battalions from the 11th Infantry Regiment,

6 companies 138th Infantry Regiment, 2 com-

panies 12th Infantry Regiment, and, in addition,

by 3 batteries 35th Artillery Brigade and 2 batteries

of the 3rd, One battalion 138th Infantry Regi-

ment and 2 squadrons 51st Dragoon Regimentwere standing at Nan-wu-li-tai as sectional reserve

;

the main reserve—3 battalions 137th Infantry

Regiment and 4 batteries 35th Artillery Brigade—

•

was standing somewhat behind the centre.


Some other battalions and batteries seem to

have been distributed, moreover, all along the

front, the place where they were employed being

unknown.

Headquarters of the Japanese 2nd Army was

staying in Pu-tsau-kou from daybreak, October 12.

In like manner, as partly on the previous days,

officers of the Staif were sent to the Divisions with

the object of keeping the General Commandingthe Army constantly informed on the progress

of events.

After it had become known that the 1st Armyhad successfully advanced during the night, and

that the 4th Army had captured the San-kai-

seki-san. General Baron Oku ordered the Divisions

to carry out the attack now at all cost.

The advance of the 3rd Division did not makerapid progress in the forenoon. While the left

column, which, during the night, had suffered

heavily, was slowly working its way up towards

Nan-kuan-tsy, the 6th Infantry Regiment, being

too weak for carrying out a frontal attack on the

strongly fortified Schi-li-ho village, remained for

the moment in its position. The Divisional Com-mander first wanted to wait for the Artillery to

have some effect, and also to see how the attack

on Nan-kuan-tsy would turn out, before carrying

out the attack on Schi-li-ho village.

More rapidly and more effectively proceeded the

attack of the 6th Division, which, at daybreak,'

opened with an overwhelming Artillery fire. ArmyHeadquarters had, from its reserve, placed at the

disposal of the Division one Field Artillery regi-

202 THE RUSSO.TAPANESE WARment, which the Divisional Commander, together

with five batteries of his own Division, ordered

to come into action at Örr-tai-tsy ; one battery

unhmbered at Yen-kia-wan. When it began to

dawn, the Infantry commenced to attack. TheRussian position was at first indicated merely by

some glimmering points, which the Japanese took

for glowing cigarettes. With the object of inducing

the enemy to fire, some companies of the 2nd

Battalion 45th Infantry Regiment, standing north

of Yen-kia-wan, began to shoot. The Russians

at once replied, and, contrary to their habit, not

with volleys, but with a wildly delivered individual

fire. The fire-fight now ensuing increased in

violence as daylight was growing. About 9 a.m.

the 2nd Battahon was reinforced by the 3rd. Theeffect of fire could not be mistaken ; clearly could

the Japanese watch how the Russians were carrying

back from their trenches numerous wounded, and

perhaps also dead. To the 1st Battalion 45th In-

fantry Regiment, which, the night before, had been

designated by the Divisional Commander to turn

the Russian right at Örr-schi-kia-tsy, the order

was renewed at 10 a.m. to cross the Schi-li-ho

and carry out the envelopment. The battalion

first pushed one company to the left bank of the

Schi-li-ho, with orders to occupy the farther edge

of the river-bank ; then a second company followed,

and finally a third. The movement was a com-

plete success : the Japanese skirmishers appeared

straight on the right flank of the Russian entrench-

ments ; the Russians were altogether taken by

surprise. Its effect increased when, about 11 a.m,,


on the left of the 1st Battalion ^Sth Infantry

Regiment, came up the 1st Battalion 13th Infantry

Regiment, which the Divisional Commander had

likewise ordered to turn the position, with the

object of increasing the pressure.

There being no longer any sectional reserves

behind the right wing of the Russian position on

the Schi-li-ho capable of meeting this envelopment,

the Russians were exposed to the full effect of this

enfilade fire. Within a short time they began to

lose heavily ; disorder and consternation began

to spread, and, without waiting for any orders,

the firing-line commenced to retire, pursued by

the withering fire of the Japanese. When the

first signs of demoralisation in the Russian lines

were being noticed, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions

45th Regiment stormed forward against the front.

Soon after 11.30 a.m. Örr-schi-kia-tsy was captured

by these four battalions. A flag, hoisted on a tall

tree, announced to the troops in rear, and par-

ticularly to the Artillery, the success gained. For

the moment the Russians were still holding out

in Siau-tun-tai, and in the trenches to the east

of it ; their Artillery, too, was keeping up a brisk

fire on the assailants. Portions of the lines, surging

back, established themselves again at Lan-tsy-tai.

The Japanese, after rallying and reorganising at

Örr-schi-kia-tsy, pushed on towards Siau-tun-tai

and Lan-tsy-tai, capturing those places about

1.30 p.m. The 48th Infantry Regiment, hitherto

held back in reserve, arrived about that time in

Lan-tsy-tai. A Russian battery of the 3rd Artillery

Brigade, north of that village, standing in an

204 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARunfavourable position near a little lake, and almost

unable to move, was attacked and captured by

one company of the first line. With great difficulty

the artillerists succeeded in escaping with the

breech-blocks, which they took with them.

When the Japanese were advancing from Örr-

schi-kia-tsy on Lan-tsy-tai, an attack was madefrom a northerly direction upon their left flank

by seven or eight Russian squadrons, probably

from the 2nd Independent Cavalry Brigade,

belonging to the 17th Army Corps. The horse-

men, however, did not charge ^ith cold steel, but

fired at pretty close range, sitting on their horses.

To ward off the attack, one company of the 1st

Battalion 13th Infantry Regiment, acting as flank

protection, deployed, succeeding within a short time

in driving away the hostile Cavalry by fire.

The 2nd and 3rd Battalions 13th Infantry Regi-

ment had been carrying on a lively fire-fight against

the Nan-kuan-tsy—Siau-tun-tai section of ground

since daybreak. When, towards noon, the fire of

the Russians began to slacken, the Japanese

advanced ; their left wing penetrated into Siau-

tun-tai, crossed the Schi-li-ho, and, together with

the right wing of the 45th Infantry Regiment,

captured a Russian battery standing east of that

\'illage.

Two companies of the right wing had been

facing Nan-kuan-tsy since morning, and were but

slowly working up to that place, with heavy losses.

The Divisional Commander therefore reinforced

them by one battalion 23rd Infantry Regiment,

which the Army Commander had placed at his


disposal. But the Russian 139th Infantry Regi-

ment, holding Nan-kuan-tsy, and being attacked

by the 3rd Division, stood fast with great gallantry.

It was only when, at 1 p.m., the troops of the

6th Division were penetrating into the village

from the west, and those of the 3rd Division

from the south, that the bulk of the defenders

withdrew north ; isolated groups, however, were

still making a stand in some few buildings, and

could not be driven out until about 3.30 p.m.,

after an obstinate contest.

After the capture of Lan-tsy-tai, the Commanderof the Gth Division moved up all his Artillery,

except one battery, which he attached to the

13th Infantry Regiment, and initiated the pursuit.

To carry it out, he detailed 4 battalions—of

which two were from the 23rd Infantry Regiment— 2 squadrons, 3 batteries, and 1 Pioneer company,

all under General Koizumi, commanding the 24th

Brigade.

After his right wing had given way. General Th« ^^*-

Wolkov, commanding the Russian 17th Army Army

Corps, made some futile attempts to restore the tHeHnbattle. Whatever of intact bodies he had available ^'^"1 1^>

he engaged in counter-attack. Several battalions positiuu

of the right section, having probably been inJ5cij\*.\^.

reserve north of Lan-tsy-tai, were the first to ho.

make a counter-attack, which, however, failed

completely. In dense columns, as on review,

the battalions advanced without firing a shot.'

The Japanese, being deployed in firing-lines in

and near Lan-tsy-tai, allowed them to approach

within about 600 metres, wlien they poured a

206 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARrapid, withering fire on the Russians, which they

were unable to resist. With heavy loss, they

streamed back in a northerly and easterly direction.

General Baron Okubo, commanding the Japanese

6th Division, expecting further counter-attacks

by the Russians, reinforced the troops apportioned

for the pursuit by one more battalion and five

batteries. The Japanese then pressed on. Whenthey were about 1 kilometre north of Lan-tsy-tai,

the Russians made another counter-attack. After

many urgent requests from Bilderling, the 2nd

Brigade 55th Infantry Division was placed at last,

by the 6th Siberian Army Corps, at the disposal

of the Western Detachment, and arrived at

Tschien-liu-tan-kou during the forenoon. At 12

noon the 219th Infantry Regiment of that brigade

received orders to attack, with the object of giving

relief to the 17th Army Corps. But the counter-

attack being made in the same impracticable manneras the first, this attempt to turn the fortune of the

day ftiiled too. With the same result ended a

counter-attack made by portions of the 139th In-

fantry Regiment about 3 o'clock in the afternoon.

When the Commander of the Russian 3rd

Infantry Division saw that the position on the

Schi-li-lo was no longer tenable, he issued orders

to withdraw to the main position on the line

Tschien-liu-tan-kou—Pan-kiau-pu. All the troops

who had not yet evacuated their former positions

began the movement in the direction ordered.

The General Commanding the 17th Army Corps,

on the other hand, seemed to be of opinion that

there was no need for evacuating the Schi-li-ho


position at once ; he thought it more practical to

begin the retreat under cover of night, and there-

fore issued the following Order to the Generals com-

manding Divisions, as well as to Colonel Stakovich :

" The General Officer Commanding orders the

positions occupied to be held till dark, to withdraw

then into the position Pan-kiau-pu—Liu-tan-kou

—

Tschien-liu-tan-kou—Hun-lin-pu, and to makethere the following dispositions :

" The 35th Infantry Division will occupy the

section Pan-kiau-pu to Tschien-liu-tan-kou in-

clusive ; the 2nd Brigade 55th Infantry Division

will move to the right of the 35th Division, and

extend to Hun-lin-pu ; Stakovich's Detachment

will occupy Hun-lin-pu ; the 3rd Infantry Division

will be stationed in reserve at Schu-lin-tsy.

'' The General Commanding 35th Infantry Divi-

sion will rally the troops retreating, organise them,

and occupy with them the second position. The3rd Infantry Division will not stop in the second

position, but march at once to Schu-lin-tsy. Thebrigade from the 55th Infantry Division will rally

and move into the line assigned to it, a portion

of which it has already been occupying to-day.

All the positions taken up are to be defended.

Colonel Stakovich will establish touch with the 6th

Siberian Army Corps, and General Dobrshinski

with the 10th Army Corps.

" I shall be at Scha-ho Station ^ at the beginning

of the action. xVmmunition is to be replenished

during night." -

' " Bhf. Scha-ho" on map.* The Order also contained details about baggage and ambulances.

208 THE RUSSO JAPANESE WAR

Under the conditions then prevailing, it was

impossible to carry out the Order. When, about

4.45 p.m., the Order was received by the Com-mander of the 35th Infantry Division, the whole

of the position between the Scha-ho and Schi-

li-ho village was already evacuated. All the

troops were mixed, moreover ; it was therefore

out of the question to disentangle the various

units. Not only was it impossible to hold the

Schi-li-ho position till dark, but rallying and dis-

posing the troops on the line indicated by General

Wolkov were also impossible, as the Japanese were

pressing hard in pursuit, and the last pivot of the

position defended, the village of Schi-li-ho, had

fallen into the hands of the enemy as well.

TheJapa- The right column of the Japanese 3rd Division

Division had, by direction of the Divisional Commander,captures remained in its trenches, north of Siau-wen-kou,

ho village, to Wait for the result of the attack on Nan-kuan-

tsy, in which the main forces of the Division were

engaged.

About noon it became clear, from the din of

battle, that the crisis was near at hand at Nan-

kuan-tsy. Its effect seemed already to spread to

the position at Schi-li-ho village, it being distinctly

noticed how, at first, single men were quitting the

Russian trenches, and then small groups. Andas, moreover, the Japanese Artillery had evidently

gained the mastery over the Russian batteries, the

moment for successfully carrying out the assault

seemed to have arrived. At 3 p.m. the order to

attack was given. Increasing their Artillery and

Infantry fire, by which means the Russians were


kept down in their trenches, the Japanese suc-

ceeded in approaching by rushes to within 600

metres without any loss. Then the Russians, with

portions of the 2nd Brigade 3rd Infantry Division,

as well as of the 138th Infantry Regiment,^ en-

gaged in a fire-fight with volleys. The Japanese

slowly worked their way forward ; an envelopment

of the enemy's right wing accelerated the success

of the assault. The position west of Schi-li-ho

village having already been abandoned by the

Russians, two companies of the 34th Infantry

Regiment, advancing along the railway, succeeded

in crossing the Schi-li-ho by the railway bridge

unmolested, and in appearing then on the right

flank, and in rear of the Russians. The attack in

front was continued by rushes. The Russians fell

back from the southern portion of the village, but

were still maintaining the trenches on either side,

and the portion of the village north of the river

;

the Russian batteries resumed their fire against the

Japanese Infantry with great violence, too. TheJapanese advanced by rushes of small groups.

The flat country affording no cover at all, the

men individually, after each rush, formed some small

earth-cover with their spade, as was the custom

with the 2nd Army generally after its experiences

at Liao-yan ; the wounded, too, tried to protect

themselves in this way from being hit once more.

The whole field of attack was strewn with these

small earth-heaps.

When the Japanese had approached to within

about 300 metres, the Russians withdrew in large

' P. 147.

14

210 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARtroops also from the trenches outside the village,

retiring at first to the cover offered by the deep

valley of the Schi-li-ho, and then through the

northern portion of the village. The two com-

panies which had made their appearance on the

right flank took the retreating Russians under a

most effective fire, shooting down also some of

their artillery horses. When next the Japanese

rose to assault in front, the trenches had all been

abandoned ; four guns and five ammunition wag-

gons fell into the hands of the assailants. Thefight was over at 4.20 p.m. One regiment followed

the Russians to Pan-kiau-pu. The heights east

of the village being still strongly occupied by

portions of the 9th Infantry Division 10th ArmyCorps, and darkness meanwhile setting in, the

Japanese abstained from further pursuit, and

bivouacked at Pan-kiau-pu.

TlieJapa- On the left wing of the 2nd Army the 4th

LHvtsfonDivision likewise commenced to attack early in

attacks the momiug, the right column of it (4 battalions

sian of the 7th Brigade, J squadron, 3 batteries, and

we? of^ Pioneer company) being directed on Tsun-lun-

the Scha- yen-tun—Hun-lin-pu ; while the 1st Battalion

38th Infantry Regiment, with 2 squadrons, as left

column, was to attack the line Ta-lian-tun—Kuan-

lin-pu. The reserve of the Division assembled

at Yu-kia-tien-tsy. It was known of the enemythat there was about one regiment with eight guns

at Tsun-lun-yen-tun, and that there were troops of

unknown strength at Ta-tai—Siau-tai. In con-

sideration of the enemy being at Ta-tai— Siau-tai,

the object indicated to the left column seemed


rather far away ; the Divisional Commander there-

fore changed his order, directing the column,

supported by three companies, to attack first

Siau-tai. The weak protective party from the

6th Siberian Army Corps standing there withdrew

without fighting on the approach of the .Japanese ;

the left column therefore succeeded in capturing

Siau-tai as early as 8.20 a.m.

The right column was, meanwhile, attacking

Tsun-lun-yen-tun, which Colonel Stakovich had

occupied with six companies of the 11th Infantry

Regiment and some Artillery on October 11, after

his retreat from Ta-yu-tschun-pu.^ Fearing he

would again be obliged to give way to superior

forces of the Japanese, he addressed a request for

support to the advanced guard of the 6th Siberian

Army Corps" standing at Wan-tschuan-tsy.

General Bolotov, commanding the advanced guard,

did not feel justified in giving troops away ; but

he decided to give relief to Stako\'ich's Detachment

by an offensive move of his advanced guard on

Siau-tai.

The .Japanese attack, meanwhile, continued to

make progress. Towards noon the Japanese Ar-

tillery succeeded in silencing Colonel Stakovich's

guns at Tsun-lun-yen-tun ; but it was not long

before three Russian batteries turned up at Wan-tschuan-tsy, probably as a preliminary to General

Bolotov 's intended offensive move, drawing upon

themselves the fire of the whole Divisional

» p. 143.

^ llie 1st Brigade 72nd Infantry Division^ with an Abteilung lOtb

Artillery Brigade.

212 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARArtillery. The Russian battery at Tsun-lun-yen-

tun was therefore soon able to resume its fire. TheJapanese left column had, meanwhile, been rein-

forced by one more company and three batteries.

The Japanese Divisional Cavalry was pushed to

Li-kia-tun to cover the left flank.

About 1 p.m. General Baron Tsukamoto, com-manding the Japanese 4th Division, was informed

by Army Headquarters of the success of the other

two Divisions, being at the same time requested to

contiime his attack. The Divisional Commanderthen reinforced the right column by one battahon,

ordering the attack on Tsun-lun-yen-tun to be

pushed home.

It was about this time that the Russian 17th

Army Corps was making tlie futile counter-

attacks with its reserves in order to retain

possession of the Schi-li-ho line.^ One battalion

of the 138th Infantry Regiment was directed to

counter-attack from Nan-wu-li-tai on Lan-tsy-tai

;

its attack, Hke that of the 139th and 219th In-

fantry Regiments, failed ; the battalion was driven

in a north-westerly direction, where it metStakovich's Detachment, to which it was a wel-

come reinforcement. Tlie battalion was then

engaged north-west of Tsun-lun-yen-tun. Whenthe Russian batteries in action at Wan-tschuan-tsy,

as well as their advanced Infantry at Ta-tai, were

being reinforced, the Commander of the 4th

Division thought the Russians were now going

to make a counter-attack ; but General Bolotov

was still holding back, causing the Japanese attack

' Pp. 205-207.


to make further progress. At 4.30 p.m. the right

column succeeded in penetrating into Tsun-hm-yen-tun, and pushing back the Russians still in

there. The evacuation of Tsun-lun-yen-tun was

perhaps a ^•oluntary act, because, meanwhile,

Colonel Stakovich had probably received General

Wolko\'s order directing him to establish touch

with the 6th Siberian Army Corps, and occupy

Hun-lin-pu.' It was only now that several bat-

talions of Bolotov's advanced guard sallied forth

to make a counter-attack from the line Ta-tai

—

Ho-lien-tai. The Japanese having been on the

look-out for this attack, it did not come uponthem as a surprise. The Russians were opposed

by a strong fire-front at Siau-tai, and were obliged

to fall back with considerable loss' to AVan-

tschuan-tsy, after they had fought and carried the

attack forward to some distance.^

The left column of the 4th Division followed,

occupying Ta-tai.

Owing to darkness coming on, the Division

' p. 207.

^ In the attack took part in first line: the 14th, 15tb, and 16th

Companies 286th Infantry Regiment^ and the 2nd Battalion 28otli

Infantry Regiment. Of each regiment one battalion formed the

reserve.

Losses.—285th Infantry Regiment : 3 officers dead, 9 wounded.

„ „ „ 139 men dead, 348 wounded.

Losses.— 286th Infantry Regiment : 23 men dead.

„ „ „ 3 officers, 78 men wounded.

During the night October 12-13 the advanced guard was ordered to

march back to Schau-kia lin-tsy ; at .5 a.m. it started unperceived bythe enemy. Grekov's Orenburg Cossack Brigade, which had taken nopart in the action of October 12, withdrew from Kau-kia-tai in a

northerly direction too.

' According to Japanese information the Russian Infantry is said to

have been firing standing all the time in that attack.


did not go beyond the line Tsun-lun-yen-tun

—

Ta-tai.

The main body of the 1st Cavahy Brigade had

remained in San-de-pu. The party which had

been dispatched to the right bank of the Hun-hoadvanced 3 kilometres farther north from Tu-

tai-tsy.

Based on the reports giving information on the

favourable course of the attack all along the front

of the Army, General Baron Oku issued in the

afternoon the following Order

:

" The 3rd Division will pursue the enemy with

some portions to Pan-kiau-pu, occupying with the

rest the line Hun-pau-schan—Liu-kia-san-kia-tsy ;

the 6th Division will go forward to the line Liu-

kia-san-kia-tsy—Hun-lin-pu ; the 4th Division to

that place, and to the west of it."

It was not possible at first to carry out this

order completely, for at Hun-pau-schan were still

some strong hostile forces, as the 3rd Division had

ascertained, Hun-hn-pu being also still occupied.

The 3rd and 4th Divisions remained at the

places previously mentioned. The pursuit, initi-

ated by the Gth Division, came to a standstill on

the right tributary of the Schi-li-ho. The main

body of that Division closed up.

While General Baron Oku was taking his

measures for pursuit, the 17th Army Corps was

in full retreat.^ The events at Schi-li-ho, as well

as the steady advance of the 4th Division against

the right flank, made it clear that taking up a

position between Tschien-liu-tan-kou and Pan-' P. 206.


kiau-pu was no longer possible. To save the Contrary

much-weakened corps, and disengage it from the orderl

vdctorious enemy, it was imperative to continue ?! *^^,•^ ^ (jdieral

the retreat a good way beyond the right tributary Com-

of the Schi-li-ho. The Divisional Commanders ™d"^therefore agreed to retreat behind the Scha-ho. visions of

The Japanese constantly pressing forward, es- sian 17th

pecially from Lan-tsy-tai, the troops were directed ^™^to rally in the direction on the railway. The withdraw

137th Infantry Regiment, standing in reserve at the Scha-

Tschien-liu-tan-kou, was ordered by the General ^°'

Commanding the 35th Division to hold the trenches

there at all cost, with the object of ensuring the

retreat of the troops ; with the same object, twobattalions from the 140th Infantry Regiment, whohad fought at Lun-wan-miau, were sent towards

Nan-wu-li-tai. These measures were reported to

the General Officer Commanding, who was staying

at Scha-ho Railway Station.

Under cover of darkness, which had meanwhile

set in, it was possible to lead back the rest of

the Divisions, and thus save them from destruction.

Nevertheless, they still incurred considerable loss,

especially when crossing the Scha-ho at Han-kui-

pu, where, at the ford and at the small bridge

previously constructed, the troops were crowding

together under the fire of Japanese Artillery.

At Scha-ho Station the intelligence of the corps'

defeat produced the greatest consternation. In

feverish haste, measures were adopted to bring into

safety the wounded—more than 500 in number

—

as well as to send back the stores collected there.

The ; general confusion was increased by the


numberless vehicles of the baggages that had

assembled there, and had now to be started north-

wards as well.

According as the troops arrived, places were

assigned to them in the position prepared before-

hand, extending from Ku-kia-tsy (on the right) by

Lin-schin-pu to La-mu-tun ; three battalions of

the 138th Infantry Regiment were detailed to

occupy the trenches at La-mu-tun.^ The 2nd

Brigade 55th Infantry Division, which the 6th

Siberian Army Corps had placed at the disposal

of the 17th Army Corps,'^ was directed to con-

tinue marching on Pen-tien-tsy to rejoin its corps.

It was broad daylight before it arrived there.

The bringing back of the wounded and of the

stores, likewise the crossing of the impedimenta,

was carried out in perfect order under the direction

of General Dobrshinski, commanding the 35th

Division ; by 3.30 in the morning not a single

vehicle was left on the southern bank of the river.

TheRus- Xhe 10th Army Corps, the advanced ffuard ofsian 10th J ir ^ oArmy which, uudcr General Riabinkin, was still holding

wSr ^^^ position on the Schi-li-ho, while the main bodydraws of the 9th Infantry Division was standing in thefrom the . ..

"" i^ii-iSchi-li-ho mam position at Hun-pau-schan, had received

polkionduring the day, from an officer dispatched to the

south of 17th Army Corps, several reports on what was

pu. happening with that Army Corps on October 12.

From this intelligence, as M^ell as from the re-

peated requests addressed to him for support,

^ The other details are not known. Stakovich's Detachment, too,

probably withdrew from Hun-lin-pu to the new position.

» P. 206. 3 p 103


General Slutshevski, commanding the 10th Army-

Corps, who was on the height at Hun-pau-schan,

gathered that the neighbouring corps was in great

distress.

Towards 2 p.m. two orders, arriving simultane-

ously, were received at Corps Headquarters. In

the one the Commander-in-Chief requested six to

eight battalions, without Artillery, to be held in

readiness to support, in case of need, the right wing

of the Army ; the other was a demand from the

Commander of the Western Detachment to send

him one Infantry brigade at once. General

Slutshevski thereupon directed General Shatilov,

commanding the right section of the main position,

to dispatch the 36th Infantry Regiment in support

of the 17th Army Corps. He ordered General

Riabinkin to start two battalions of the 35th

Infantry Regiment with the same object. And,

finally, General Gerschelmann was to conduct the

33rd Infantry Regiment to the right of the corps,

and occupy with it the section formerly held by

the 2nd Brigade 9th Infantry Division.

Three battalions of the 36th Infantry Regiment

moved off first to the 17th Army Corps, then the

two battalions from the 35th Infantry Regiment

of the advanced guard started, and lastly the 4th

Battalion of the 36th Infantry Regiment followed ;

the last-named battalion had only just gone to

Nin-kuan-tun, in compliance with an order issued

but a short time previously.'

The issue having been decided meanwhile with

the 17th Army Corps, these supports from the

' v. 188.

218 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR10th Army Corps were no longer able to change

the fortune. The two leading battalions of the

36th Infantry Regiment, on arrival, were first

employed in securing the departure of transport

from Scha-ho Station, and afterwards in forming

the rearguard ; it was impossible to ascertain

whether, and where, employment was found for

the other two battalions of the regiment, as well

as for the portions of the 35th Infantry Regiment.

At 4 p.m. General Riabinkin, in response to

Kuropatkin's order,' began to withdraw with the

advanced guard on and through the main position.

The retreat was carried out in perfect order and

without any loss. By a strong Artillery fire from

the main position the enemy was prevented from

pressing too closely or occupying the position

evacuated. The advanced guard of the 10th ArmyCorps retired as far as Hou-huan-hua-tien, where

it remained as reserve.^ The Japanese 5th Division

did not follow until the 3rd Division had captured

Schi-li-ho, reaching then Hun-kia-tschuan in the

evening of October 12. The Japanese records

do not mention whether the General Reserve of

the Japanese Armies, which had been placed at

the disposal of the 4th Army on October 11, waspushed forward.^ It does not seem to have been

employed at all.

It was evening before General Slutshevski ob-

• Pp. 186-188.

^ The 34th Infantry Regiment had already evacuated Yin-pan andTa-kou when the 1st Brigade 37th Infantry Division gave up the San-

kai-seki-san.

' Accordingto alecture given on the battle by General Baron Kodama,Chief of the btaif of the Army, at the beginning of 1905. (P. 146.)


tained a more exact knowledge of what had

happened to the 17th Army Corps. He had sent

a General Staff Officer to the western wing, hear-

ing through him from the General Commandingthe 3rd Division, as well as from the Chief of the

Staff of the 17th Army Corps, that the corps,

severely shaken after fighting hard, was retreating,

and would be unable to make another stand in

the main position ; it would, therefore, continue its

retreat to behind the Scha-ho.

Headquarters of the 10th Army Corps had

meanwhile ridden to Hou-tai, intending to billet

there. General Slutshevski was now placed before

the alternative of either continuing next morning

the battle in the position of Hun-pau-schan, or of

retiring likewise into the prepared positions south

of Scha-ho-pu.

Having available for the defence of the position,

extending on a front of about 7 kilometres, only

18 battalions,^ 8^ of which had been fighting for

some days already, the right flank, by the retire-

ment of the 17th Army Corps, having nothing to

lean upon, and no orders from the Commander of

the Western Group coming in at all, the General

Commanding decided to withdraw into the position

south of Scha-ho-pu.

The beginning of the retreat was fixed for

12 midnight, the Commander-in-Chief^ being in-

formed of the decision arrived at. The officer

' Tlic 2ii(l Brifj^ade 31st Infantry Division (8 battalions), the 1st

Brigade !)tli Infantry Division (8 battalions), and 2 battalions from the

35th Infantry Regiment. ' Riabinkin's Brigade.

' It was impossible to ascertain whether the Commauder of the

Western Group was iut'ormed as well.

220 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARcarrying the dispatch to Kuropatkin, whose Head-quarters were not exactly known, but were guessed

to be in San-kia-tsy, had scarcely left at 7.30 p.m.,

when an order of the Commander-in-Chief to the

leader of the Western Group, issued at 6 p.m.,

arrived, instructing him "vigorously to hold the

main position to-morrow, the 13th ; to resist at

the point of the bayonet ; and in no case to retire

to the Scha-ho."

Though this order was issued earlier than the

Commander-in-Chief could have known of the

17th Army Corps' defeat, General Slutshevski

nevertheless thought he could now no longer

depart for the Scha-ho without a special order

;

he therefore resolved to move, for the present

only, all the trains to the right bank of the Scha-

ho, and otherwise to wait for special orders. At9.5 p.m. an aide-de-camp of the General Officer

Commanding was dispatched to Kuropatkin's Head-

quarters at Liu-tsien-tun to report in this sense.

This officer saw the Commander-in-Chief before

the General Staff Officer, who had brought the

first dispatch, had left General Headquarters. Onthe report of the 17th Army Corps' retreat,

General Sakarov, Chief of the Staff of the Army,had replied "that the corps, even if it should

have actually retired, would, after receiving the

order for an obstinate resistance, surely have re-

turned to the position indicated, and that, therefore,

the right flank of the 10th Army Corps was abso-

lutely secure." In the name of the Commander-in-Chief, General Sakarov gave the order to

maintain at all cost the position of Hun-pau-schan.


Before, however, the the two officers dispatched

to Kuropatkin's Headquarters had returned, an

order by wire from the leader of the Western

Detachment was received by the 10th Army Corps

at 11.15 p.m., to withdraw during the night to the

Hne of the Scha-ho.

General Slutshevski then no longer waited for

the Commander-in-Chief's decision, but began to

retreat at night during a heavy thunderstorm, in

perfect order. Early on October 13 the prepared

position, south of the river at Scha-ho-piu, was

occupied. Corps Headquarters billeted in Pa-ta-

kia-tsy.

On the evening of October 12 fate had irre- Result

vocably decided in favour of the Japanese in the ^er 12°

combats on the Scha-ho. The Japanese right

wing, under General Baron Ino-uye, was repelling

the last attacks of the Russian Eastern Groupagainst his position on the heights of Pen-si-hu

and at the passes north-west of those heights.

By the retreat of General Samsonov's Cossack

Division, General von Rennenkampf and the 3rd

Siberian Army Corps were induced to retire too.

The Japanese Guard Division had pushed over the

Eastern San-jo-shi-san to the Ba-ji-san, embracing

the left wing of the 4th Siberian Army Corps

;

and the Japanese 2nd Division had pushed back

the right wing of the 4th Siberian Army Corps

to the heights of Do-mon-shi and to the Djo-san.

In the centre, the 10th Division of the Japanese

4th Army had captured the San-kai-seki-san, de-

fended by portions of the 1st Army Corps. Andfinally, on the western wing, the Russian 17th

222 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAKArmy Corps was pushed back by the Japanese

2nd Army from its advanced-guard position on

the Schi-h-ho to behind the Scha-ho, beyond the

main position on the northern tributary of the

Schi-li-ho ; in this retreat the Russian 10th ArmyCorps joined, though remaining still soutli of the

Scha-ho. The Russians had thus been thrown on

a very trying defensive, after conducting an offen-

sive in a half-hearted manner. But the Japanese

had not succeeded in pushing them north-east

;

the Russians retired straight back on the Hun-ho.

V

THE LAST DAYS OF THE BATl^LE

October 13

After the Western Detachment had retired to General

and behind the Scha-ho on October 12, the kinTmti-

Russian Centre seemed to be affain in an ex- ^^^ ^Y'^_ _

retreat

tremely dangerous situation. The positions of of his

the 4th Siberian and 1st Army Corps were pro-^iugto

jecting Hke a bastion beyond the general Hne of^^^^^PP^''

the front, and downright challenging the enemyto a twofold envelopment. But withdrawing the Sketch 7.

Centre at once seemed impracticable, having regard

to the Eastern Detachment, which otherwise might

be completely cut off. General Kuropatkin there-

fore decided to reinforce, for further resistance,

the 4th Siberian Army Corps, whose left flank

was being threatened in the first instance by the

Japanese Guard Division. At 5 a.m. he dispatched

an Order to the Eastern Detachment, request-

ing it, as before, in his Order of 1.15 p.m.* on

October 12, to put in motion the whole available

reserve of the 5th East Siberian Division, from

the 2nd Siberian Army Corps, and to place it

> P. 194.

223

224 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARunder the temporary command of the 4th Siberian

Army Corps. In a letter dispatched at 7.20 a.m.

he informed General Sarubaiev, commanding the

4th Siberian Army Corps, of this measure.

General Baron Stackelberg had already, at

3.55 a.m., dispatched a report to the Commander-in-Chief, describing in a few words the situation

of the Eastern Detachment :" I have given orders

for the position to be held to the last man ; there

will be no retreat." Apparently somewhat later,

he reported further :" If the 4th Siberian Army

Corps continues to retreat, my rear will be un-

covered ; I am anxious for the safety of my right

flank and rear, but I cannot do anything myself

to protect them, having no more reserves." Acopy of this last report was also sent to the 4th

Siberian Army Corps.

If General Kuropatkin had still any doubt,

before receiving the first of these messages,

whether success could be looked for from the

Eastern Detachment or not—such doubts being

justified by Stackelberg's ambiguous reports of

October 12^—this last dispatch must have madehim see clearly the hopeless situation of Stackel-

berg. As it must be assumed that Stackelberg's

message of 3.55 a.m. did not reach General Head-

quarters before 9 or 9.30 a.m., owing to the

defective mode of transmission, the Commander-in-Chief seems to have made up his mind im-

mediately after receipt of the letter to look upon

Stackelberg's operations as having finally failed,

and to withdraw now the Eastern Detachment.

' Pp. 191-193.

LAST DAYS OF THE BATTLE 225

He sent its commander the following directive

at 10 a.m. :

" The 17th Army Corps has suffered a defeat,

and was obliged to retire on the Scha-ho line.

This defeat, together with the failure of your

operations, forces me to abandon the task imposed

upon the Eastern Detachment, and to withdraw

your troops north, so as to bring them in closer

touch with the other units. The retreat of the

17th Army Corps, and, after it, that of the 10th

Army Corps, entailed the withdrawal of the 4th

Siberian Army Corps by my orders. A gap was

thereby caused between the latter corps and your

own troops. I have ordered the 4th Siberian

Army Corps to make a stand again at Schan-

hei-niu-tun. I propose to you to abandon further

operations for gaining the passes, and to select

a position covering the left flank of the Army.The retirement of the troops must be effected

rapidly, since another failure on the right wing

may lead to the retreat of that wing being con-

tinued on Mukden even to-morrow." Forward the order to General von Rennen-

kampfs Detachment to go to San-kia-tsy and

cover the Army against any enterprises the

Japanese may plan towards its line of retreat.

" Report to me at once when and how you

intend to concentrate the 1st and 3rd Siberian

Army Corps and the portions of the 2nd Siberian

Army Corps not belonging to the reserve you

dispatched to General Sarubaiev."

In this letter General Kuropatkin was still

counting upon the 4th Siberian Army Corps

15

226 THE KUSSO-JAPANESE WARmaking a stand at Schan-hei-niu-tun ; an hour

afterwards he decided to withdraw also that corps.

At 11.20 a.m. the Commander-in-Chief sent the

following Order to General Sarubaiev

:

" During the night the Japanese forced the 17th

Army Corps to retire to the Scha-ho. This move-

ment affecting the 10th Army Corps, that corps

retired too. I am therefore obliged to order you

to evacuate your position south of Yen-san-sai,^

and to retire somewhat more north into a position

which you may select at your discretion."

Kuropatkin had thus initiated the retreat of the

w^hole of the eastern wing of the Army.Since an immediate retreat by the 4th Siberian

Army Corps in face of the Japanese GuardDivision would probably have entailed great loss,

General Sarubaiev decided to carry out the retro-

grade movement at dusk.

After receiving Kuropatkin's instructions to

retreat, General Baron Stackelberg issued the

necessary orders to his troops. The following

places were to be reached by the main bodies :

The 2nd Siberian Army Corps, portions of which

were meanwhile attacking in a south-westerly

direction in relief of the 4th Siberian Army Corps,

Tai-kia-miau-tsy- ; the 1st Siberian Army Corps,

Kuan-tai ^ and Hei-sun-pu ; the 3rd Siberian ArmyCorps, Pan-mau-lin, still farther east ; rearguards

were to be left 5 to 7 kilometres south of these

places on the line Tsai-kia-tun — Kan-to-li-san —Hou-lou-tsy-gou by the 2nd, 1st, and 3rd Siberian

' North of the Len-ge-san.

* 7 kilometres uorth of Kaii-to-li-san.

^ 5i kilometres uorth-east of Kan-to-li-saii.


Army Corps respectively. The beginning of the

movements was fixed for 7 p.m. When the troops

were on the march, Headquarters of the Eastern

Detachment received at 8.15 p.m., the following

brief Order of Kuropatkin

:

" Make at once arrangements for the Eastern

Detachment to retreat on a level with Bian-yu-pu-

sa ! Army is facing about on the Scha-ho."

After this Order had left General Headquarters,

probably a message from Stackelberg came in,

stating the various places he intended to reach.

But Kuropatkin desiring the Eastern Detach-

ment to be somewhat in advance on the left of

the Centre, he sent an Order modifying matters,

this Order being received by the Staff of the

Eastern Detachment at 1.25 a.m. on October 14.

Stackelberg then reported to the Commander-in-Chief, at 3.30 a.m., that, in compliance with the

changes ordered, he had arranged for the 2nd

Siberian Army Corps to remain in its former

position south of Yen-sin-tun— Hu-schi-tai, the

1st Siberian Army Corps to occupy the fortified

position south of Bian-yu-pu-sa ; and that the

3rd Siberian Army Corps had been ordered to

entrench on the line Scliin-hai-lin Pass (11 kilo-

metres south-east of Bian-yu-pu-sa)—Tschau-huan-

tschai (7 kilometres east of Schin-hai-lin).

Owing to the difficulties of transmitting orders,

it was, however, not possible to concentrate the

troops at the places mentioned in the report.

When receiving the fresh Order during the night,

they had already marched beyond the points

reported, except the 2nd Siberian Army Corps.


Early on October 14 there were on the Scha-ho :

the 2nd Siberian Army Corps, between Yen-sin-

tun and Sun-wu-pu-tsy ; the 1st Siberian ArmyCorps, north and north-east of Bian-yu-pu-sa, with

one Division each at Kan-to-H-san and Ya-ma-

hn-tsy ; and the 3rd Siberian Army Corps on the

Une Tschin-hsi-sai—Huan-hn, 6^ kilometres east

of Bian-yu-pu-sa, and 10 kilometres east of Tschin-

hsi-sai respectively.

Rennenkampfs Detachment had fallen back to

San-kia-tsy on the Tai-tsy-ho, to cover the left

flank of the Army. In the days succeeding, it

gradually drew near the Army, marching east of

the Kau-tu-lin Pass.

Disengaging the Eastern Detachment from the

enemy had succeeded without difficulty ; but the

nocturnal retreat proved very difficult, all the more

since, owing to the bad roads, most of the wounded

had to be carried.

Marshal Bascd OR the cvcuts of Octobcr 12, MarshalUyama Marquis Ovama issued the following Generalorders a ^ •' '^

pursuit to Order ^ in the afternoon :

Lnk^of " ^ shall pursue the enemy to the left bank ofthe Scha-

^j^g Scha-ho.ho.

" The First Army has to reach the line Tai-

kou -

—

Tun-kia-fön ^ ; Matsunagas ^ march is to be

accelerated as much as possible, to cut the Russian

line of retreat.

" The Fourth Army will advance on Lu-su-tun^

' Summary only known.* 7 kilometres north-west of Bian-yu-pu-sa.

* 3 kilometres south-east of Fön-kia-pu.

« P. 177.

* 1^ kilometres south-east of Fön-kia-pu.


— Tschien-tschan-lin-tsy ^ ; the Second Army on

Scha-ho-pu—Lin-schin-pu."

" If the enemy is standing with strong forces in

an entenched position on the right bank of the

Scha-ho, he is no longer to be attacked there.

*' The General Reserve of the Army will con-

centrate at Ku-schu-tsy." ^

General Baron Kuroki, after receiving the afore- ino-uye's

mentioned Order, arranged for the Japanese 1st ênTofArmy to continue the attack on October 13, and tê -âpa-

116^6 r6-

to reach the line Tai-kou

—

Tun-kia-fön. mains \x\

General Baron Ino-uye, on the right, thought [^j''^'^''

already on October 12 that the Russian attack was

slackening *; this impression grew stronger on the

13th ; it even seemed as if the Russians were

retiring, especially in the section on the Tai-tsy-ho.

To assume the offensive himself, Ino-uye did not

think feasible, having regard to the extensive

ground occupied by his greatly reduced numbers.

His party therefore confined itself to holding the

position, and opposing the fire-action which the

Russians were still carrying on in a half-hearted

manner on various points along his front. Towardsnight, the 5th Kobi Brigade, under General Aibara,

arrived at last in Pen-si-hu ^; it had been eagerly

looked for during the last few days. The brigade

had landed at An-tung, and was then put in

motion, going by Tiu-ren-tschin on the Ya-lu ;

it came under the orders of the 12th Division.

' 9 kilometres west of Fon-kia-pu.' On the Scha-ho, not far from the railway.* 4 kilometres south-east of Schi-li-ho. * P. In8.^ According to Japanese sources of Captain Sander (retired^.

230 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARGeneral General JMatsimaga, with the reinforced 3rd

aga's"re- Brigade of the 2nd Division,^ being apportioned

D^r*'}i"^to support the 12th Division, had got as far as

ment Man-hua-pu ' on the evening of October 12, after

iifdeci.Se various detours, and was taking a rest there. Ataction at 4 a.m. on October 13 the detachment startedMan-hua- . .ii , • r, ...puagainst agam. With the object oi contmumg its march by

Rifle*"Kau-kia-pu. When, towards 5 a.m., the brigade

R«gi- was approaching the Tschau-hsien-hn Pass, it came

of the upon the enemy. General Matsunaga determinedEastern ^^ attack. The Russians—the 3rd and 20th EastOroup.

Siberian Rifle Regiments, from the 1st and 2nd

Siberian Army Corps, forming the right wing of

the Russian forces engaged at the passes—had,

however, chosen a very favourable and strongly

commanding position, from which they repelled

repeated attacks of the Japanese. The situation

of the 3rd Brigade grew very difficult, and it was

only due to the effect of its two batteries that

the brigade was able to hold its own.

On General Baron Stackelberg learning of

this action, he became anxious for the safety of his

right flank, and therefore at once moved Infantry,^

with two batteries from the 2nd Siberian ArmyCorps, in support, the force starting from the

country south of Tin-kia-tai, north-east of the

Wai-tau-schan.

About 1 p.m. this Russian detachment arrived

at the Tschau-hsien-lin Pass, and proceeded to

' Less the six companies 29th Infantry Regiment, being with the

15th Brigade. (Pp. 131 and 172.)

' South of the Eastern San-jo-shi-san.

' The 17th East Siberian Rifle Reerimeut apparently.


attack the left flank of the 3rd Brigade. General

Matsunaga, having meanwhile abstained from any

further attempts of attacking the exceedingly

strong position of the Russians, and having con-

fined himself to the defensive, succeeded in warding

off this attack, as well as the blows directed on

him by the other Rifle Regiments. The fire-action

continued till cA^ening ; the Japanese tried to avoid

too great losses by looking for shelter in the rents

and clefts formed by the thunderstorm of the

previous night, as well as behind the numerous

high boulders strewn about there. ^ No decisive

results were obtained on either side.

The Japanese remained during the night in

fighting order within the position ; next morning

the Russians had disappeared.

On Kuroki's orders for continuing the attack, The Japa-

General Asada had given the following directions Guard

to the Guard Division :

Divisiou

unsuc-" The 3rflf Guard Regiment, with one battery, cessfuiiy

under the command of General Watanabe, will ^^ftu por-

occupy the line Riu-ka-san—Ka-ko-rei-san, cover-Jj^"^

^^

ing at the same time the right flank of the division, aud 4th

As soon as the situation allows it, the detachment Army^"

will reioin the division. Corps,**

.and ^vith

" The \st Brigade will advance at 6 a.m., attack- theTrana-

ing the enemy on the Lien-hua-schan ; on the left c^^saik

of the brigade one battalioji of the Uh Guard Regi- Brigade

ment will likewise deploy for attack. The rest o/' heights

the regiment will remain as divisional reserve at the^K^ko-rei-

' Their loss was :sa» and

4th Infantry Regiment, 27 men dead, 102 wounded. Do-mon-

29th „ „ 36 „ 325 „

232 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARSchan-liu-ho-tsy. The Artillery will support the

attack from its positions at Pa-kia-tsy and Schan-

liu-ho-tsy."

Cavalry having appeared on the right flank of

the 1st Brigade, its commander, at daybreak,

pushed the 1st Battalion of the 1st Guard Regimenton the Ba-ji-san forward to the right. The 2nd

Battalion of that regiment, as well as one battalion

from the 2nd Guard Regiment, deployed in their

positions on the Ma-örr-schan, engaging in a fire-

fight with Russian Infantry (portions of General

Shileiko's Brigade ^) holding the Lien-hua-schan.

The other two battalions of the 2nd Guard Regi-

ment were ordered to make an enveloping attack

on that height from the east. The battahons

started, reaching, without meeting with serious

resistance, the country east of Ma-niu-tun, after

passing over the Ba-ji-san, when they were sud-

denly met by a hot fire.

General Mishtshenko, who, with his independent

Transbaikal Cossack Brigade, had fallen back from

the Eastern San-jo-shi-san north-east," had been

watching the Japanese battalion advancing, and

immediately informed the 85th Infantry Regiment,^

standing north-east of Ma-niu-tun, which, with

other portions of the 1st Army Corps, had been

handed over to the hard-pressed 4th Siberian ArmyCorps on October 12. The colonel of that regi-

ment at once moved the 1st and 2nd Battalions

against the enemy. In view of the imminent

danger, he abstained from obtaining first the con-

» Pp. 166 and 168. » P. 162.

' TheColonel-in-Chief is his Majesty the Gennaii Emperor. (P. 193.)


sent of General Sarubaiev, commanding the 4th

Siberian Army Corps, whose reserve the regiment

was forming. The battalions deployed, taking the

skirmishers of the 2nd Guard Regiment under

fire, as these latter were advancing ; especially two

companies of the 2nd Battalion were able to fire

with great effect. The enveloping movement

initiated by the Japanese came to an end thereby.

Meanwhile, the Artillery on either side had

opened fire too, the Russian north of Do-mon-shi,

and the Japanese from Pa-kia-tsy and Schan-liu-

ho-tsy. The Russian batteries had made good

practice, especially against the left wing of the

1st Brigade at the Ma-örr-schan. When against

that wing Russian Infantry advanced to attack

fi-om Do-mon-shi, the brigade commander engaged

the 3rd Battahon of the 1st Guard Regiment.

The battalion came into action on the JNla-örr-schan

about 8 a.m., drawing upon itself strong forces of

the enemy ; it had a very hard time until dark,

suffering considerable loss, especially from Artillery

fire. The battalion commander and all captains

were placed out of action, a lieutenant ultimately

commanding the battalion. Here, as well as on

the right wing of the 1st Brigade on the Ba-ji-san,

the attack did not make any progress, support by

Artillery being wanting. It is true, the Japanese

Artillery did fire from their positions at Pa-kia-tsy

and Schan-liu-ho-tsy, but the 1st Brigade could

not see any effect upon the enemy opposing it.

The Japanese Infantry had the sort of feeling

that the batteries shirked leaving their protecting

earth-cover for a more effective range farther

234 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARforward ; but the Infantry was wrong, because the

Artillery, as a matter of fact, was firing in a

direction altogether different.

The battalions of the 2nd Guard Regiment,

north of the Ba-ji-san on the right, makingrepeated attempts of gaining ground, General

Mishtshenko once more turned to the 85th Infantry

regiment with a request for support. The colonel

of the regiment gave him the 3rd Battalion, and

afterwards two more companies, hitherto not

engaged, of the 2nd Battalion. These forces were

engaged east of Ma-niu-tun, on the left of the

portions of the regiment first sent forward. Mean-while the 4th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, which

Mishtshenko had attached to his detachment on

October 12, had also deployed, advancing against

the 2nd Guard Regiment from the neighbourhood

of Wu-tin-kou. Under the destructive fire of the

Russians on its right flank, the situation of the

1st Brigade was beginning to be serious. Con-siderable loss was caused in a short time ; reserves

were no longer available. The commander of the

brigade, therefore, with the consent of the Divi-

sional Commander, decided at 2 p.m. to withdraw

his troops to the Eastern San-jo-shi-san as far as

the country south of Tia-tun-nan-kou. The move-

ment was carried out in dchelons. The Russians

pushed after them, establishing themselves again

opposite the Japanese on the line Ma-örr-schan Hill

—Tia-tun-nan-kou.

On the left of the Japanese 1st Brigade, the

2nd Battalion 4th Guard Regiment, in compliance

with Divisional Orders, had started at daybreak


from the neighbourhood south of Na-ka-ko-ri-ki-ko,

advancing in the direction on Do-mon-shi ; but

it was not long before it was obhged to engage

in a fire-action, owing to severe hostile fire from

the heights opposite. The enemy, showing him-

self considerably superior, and threatening the right

of the battalion by advancing into the gap between

the battalion and the 1st Brigade, General Asada,

commanding the Guard Division, convinced him-

self of the impossibility of the battalion attacking

Do-mon-shi single-handed ; he therefore placed the

battalion again under the command of the colonel

of the regiment, ordering him to carry out the

attack with two battalions and a half. Twocompanies were held back as Divisional Reserve

at Schan-Uu-ho-tsy.

It was 8 a.m. when the 4th Guard Regiment,

starting from , Schan-liu-ho-tsy, deployed for attack

against the heights north of Na-ka-ko-ri-ki-ko. It

had to traverse first a broad, open depression.

At about 1,800 metres from the enemy the regi-

ment began to deploy. The 2nd Battalion was

ordered to advance against the heights south-east

of Do-mon-shi, with its left skirting the road

Schan-liu-ho-tsy—Do-mon-shi ; the 3rd Battalion

was engaged on the right, keeping touch with

the 2nd Battalion. The two companies available

of the 1st Battahon were being held in reserve

by the colonel.

At about 1,500 metres the Russian Infantry

(portions of General Shileiko's Brigade^) opened

fire from the heights at Do-mon-shi. The 4th

' Pp. 168 and 232.


Guard Regiment, without replying to the fire,

began to advance in rushes of companies for

distances of 40 to 80 metres. In this manner

it succeeded in traversing the depression rapidly,

and even without any material lass, for, although

the Russians were firing pretty rapidly, they fired

badly. The Japanese did not open fire until the

leading lines had approached the enemy's position

to within 600 metres. Till then the regiment had

not suffered by Artillery. The three Japanese

batteries at Schan-liu-ho-tsy had kept up a brisk

fire since daybreak, supporting the attack of the

4th Guard Regiment ; the Artillery Abteilung at

Pa-kia-tsy was acting against the heights north-

west of Do-mon-shi, thereby supporting the 2nd

Division, adjoining on the left.

On the foremost line of the 4th Guard Regiment

reaching the foot of the heights north of Na-ka-

ko-ri-ki-ko, the two companies of the regimental

reserve followed. The companies were marching

in company columns, the sections in fours at 15

to 20 paces' intervals, and not behind the front

line, but somewhat farther east, for cov^er's sake.

The regiment had hitherto been making but

slow progress. By engaging, however, the com-

panies retained in support, the leading line finally

succeeded in working up so close to the enemythat portions of both adversaries were lying partly

opposite each other at shortest ranges, up to

150 metres. The losses were very great, especially

on the right wing, where the company on the

right lost all its officers. The colonel decided

to engage his reserves now, ordering, at 2.30 p.m.,


the two companies in reserve, together with the

company on the right, to storm the enemy's

position with the bayonet, after dehvering for a

few minutes a rapid fire ; the remaining companies

were to support that assault by a rapid fire.

The assault, delivered by the three companies,

was successful. The portions of General Shileiko's

Brigade opposite were pushed back in a northerly

direction on Schan - hei - niu - tun. But, the

victorious companies trying to push farther,

they came under such a hot cross-fire that the

attack came to a complete standstill. Then fresh

Russian forces made a counter-attack in front,

causing considerable loss to the Japanese assaulting

companies ; it was only with the greatest difficulty

that they were able to maintain themselves in the

position they had captured.

The small success on the right was therefore

of no use to the regiment as a whole. Lieutenant-

Colonel Ida, commanding the 4th Guard Regi-

ment, had meanwhile tried to assault with the

remaining portions of his regiment, too, all

attempts, however, failing under the vigorous

fire of the Russians. Nor did it help to change

the situation when the 7th Company was shifted

from the left of the firing-line to the right.

The Artillery of the Division was trying its

best to be of some help to the 4th Guard Regi-

ment. It seems that, in the afternoon, all the

batteries received orders to support the attack

of the regiment. Lieutenant-Colonel Ida had

asked the commander of the Artillery to continue

tiring heedlessly until the very last moment before

238 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARhis own Infantry was in the enemy's position.

The Artillery complied with this request. TheJapanese shrapnels therefore burst immediately in

front of their own skirmishers. The whole height

is said to have been under Japanese and Russian

Artillery fire, to such an extent that it was scarcely

possible to distinguish where their own and where

the enemy's projectiles were coming down.

But, in spite of this vigorous support of the

Artillery, no success was gained. Darkness came

on without the regiment having succeeded in

pushing the enemy from the heights.

The loss of the ten companies the regiment

had engaged was 132 dead and 338 wounded.

Ammunition had been spent freely—354,447

rounds, it is said, were fired ; several times the

ammunition had to be replenished. The pack-

horses had been moved up to Na-ka-ko-ri-ki-ko.

When, in the afternoon, the ten companies had

all been extended, the ammunition was brought

up into the firing-line by Army Service Corps

men ; many of their carriers were killed or

wounded.

The 3rd Guard Regiment, with a battery, under

General ^^^atanabe, which had been detached to

cover the right flank of the Guard Division, was

meanwhile holding the position assigned to it on

the line Riu-ka-san—Ka-ko-rei-san,^ where four

companies of the regiment had been standing onthe previous day,- without seeing any enemy,

until noon. But in the afternoon an attack was

made by strong Russian forces ; from the direction

1 P. 231. « p. 171


of the Wai-taii-schan were deploying six battalions

and a half, with Artillery and Cavalry, of the 5th

East Siberian Rifle Division.^ Without waiting

for the final assault, the 3rd Guard Regiment

abandoned its position, retiring into the valley

of the river at Man-hua-pu. Nor was Colonel

Kasa's ^ Cavalry able to stay the attack when,

at Kuroki's orders, it advanced from the country

south of the Riu-ka-san, in relief of the 3rd

Guard Regiment. The enemy occupied the height

evacuated about 6 p.m. The Russians could have

continued the attack against the right flank of

the 1st Brigade, which had gone back from the

Ba-ji-san to the Eastern San-jo-shi-san,^ but

probably abstained from doing so as it was be-

ginning to grow dark. During the night they

joined in the general retreat of the Eastern

Detachment.

At 10 p.m. the Commander of the GuardDivision issued the following Order

:

" The Division will remain in its present position,

ready to advance at any moment."• The troops will bivouac in fighting formation,

keeping in close touch with the enemy."

The Divisional Commander at that time had

already been informed of the enemy being in

retreat with some portions.

During the night preceding October 14 the follow-

ing Army Order was received by the Division :

* Tlie 19th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, 2^ battalions from the 18th

East Siberian Regiment, 1 battalion from the 2nd Siberian Infantry

Regiment, 1st, 2nd, and ;3rd Batteries .5tli East Siberian Rifle Artillery

Brigade, 1 detachment of Scouts, and 1 squadron Dragoons.' P. 161. 3 p_ 234.

240 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR" 1. The Army will continue the attack to-

morrow." 2. The Guard Division will advance to the

east of, and the 2nd Division to the west of, the

road Do-mon-shi

—

Fön-kia-pu.

" 3. Watanabe's Detachment will be relieved bya portion of the General Reserve."

The Divisional Commander gave no further

orders on that evening.

When Marshal Marquis Oyama received during

the day the report of the Guard Division having

given up the Ba-ji-san, the Ka-ko-rei-san, and the

Riu-ka-san, he gave the Commander of the 1st

Army to understand that he would send himsupport so as to continue the fight on the 14th

with better success. For reinforcing the 1st

Army he apportioned the bulk of the 5th Division

and a Mortar Abteilung, standing at his disposal

in the neighbourhood of Hun-kia-tschuan.^ Theywere sent to Headquarters of the 1st Army at

Pan-la-schan-tsy, where they arrived on the evening

of October 13.

The 41st Infantry Regiment, with an Artillery

Abteilung, was left behind at Hun-kia-tschuan

by the 5th Division ; to these were added, as a

reinforcement, the 20th Kobi Regiment, and two

batteries of the 1st Field Artillery Brigade.

General Yamada, commanding the 9th Brigade,

was in charge of this detachment.

Oyama's General Reserve was not employed on

this day either. If it was still in existence, and

• p. 218. The Mortar Abteilung probably belonged to the General

Reäerve of the Army, which \va=i standing at Tu-meu-tsy,


not perhaps dissolved, it probably remained at

Tu-men-tsy, as on the 12th. We must assume

it to be still there on the days succeeding, since

no further mention is made of it in the sources

available.

The first Echelons of the 8th Division arrived at

Liao-yan on October 13, and were thus at the

disposal of the Commander-in-Chief.

The 15th Brigade of the 2nd Division was fighting The Japa-

with more luck on the left of the Guard Division. Division

After its vain attempts of capturing the Lo- f'jlji^g^f

to-san durinff the night of October 12-13,^ the Maus

brigade assumed an expectant attitude on the Detach-

forenoon of October 13. The Divisional Artillery "^Ji^he

available had since early morning been firing upon Lo-to-

Russian Artillery of the 4th Siberian Army Corps the'rigiit

on the Len-ge-san, but with little effect apparently,f^^^>^^_

The Russian batteries replied to the fire, searching berian

and sweeping, moreover, with a great amount of corps

ammunition, the neighbourhood of San-kia-tsy,l^i^ e^.^

south of the Lo-to-san, and more particularly san.

the low ground close south-west of Temple Hill,

where, on October 12, the batteries of the 10th

Division had been standing.

Shortly after 2 p.m. the 15th Brigade was

ordered to attack, one battalion of the 29th Kobi

Regiment being placed at its disposal for that

purpose. The I^o-to-san, which was held by the

bulk of Mau's Detachment,^ and by portions of

' P. 179.

^ Portions of Mau's Detachment seem to have withdrawn already,

on October 12, in a northerly direction, to the heights north of

Schi-miau-tsy—Tun-sau-ho.

16

242 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARthe 1st Army Corps, being still looked upon as

the key of the Russian position, General Okasaki

ordered the 16th Infantry Regiment to capture

that height. With the object of supporting this

attack, the six companies of the 29th Infantry

Regiment on the right, which on the afternoon

of October 11 had been attached to the brigade,^

and the .30th Infantry Regiment, were to engage

the enemy in the direction of the Len-ge-san.

The Artillery Abteilung received orders to

engage the Russian Artillery with two batteries,

and with one battery to keep playing on the

Lo-to-san. The Kobi Artillery Abteilung went

into position at Sen-kiu-yo, firing at Russian

batteries near the Len-ge-san.

The space at Örr-wa, within which the 16th

Infantry Regiment was to attack the Lo-to-san,

being rather limited—the right of the 4-th Armywas fighting on the left of the regiment—the

colonel only deployed the 1st Battalion. The

attack made rapid progress at first. The skir-

mishers worked forward by rushes, making partly

use of the deep nullahs for cover, and arriving

about 3.45 p.m. close below the knoll, thus

bringing the right wing of the battalion to

within 60 to 70 metres from the Russian hne

at the least. In its rushes the firing-hne

became a deep dense swarm, into which the

Russians were firing. The Russian trenches were

sited so far back on the heights that the menhad to rise to fire, else the assailant would have

remained invisible in the dead ground. The' p. 131.


bearing of the Russian rank and file deserves the

highest praise ; in spite of the sev^ere Japanese

Infantry and Artillery fire, the individual menregularly rose to their full height, deliberately

aiming and firing.

The Japanese Artillery was firing here, too, over

the heads of their own Infantry to the very last

moment, the shells bursting sometimes within

their own line.

Within close range of the Russian position the

1st Battalion's force of attack was spent. The2nd Battalion was therefore deployed shortly after

4 p.m. The supports came up to the firing-line

of the 1st Battalion by long rushes, and, on en-

tering the firing-line, made it denser still. Towards

5 p.m. two officers, followed by an irregular crowd

of about two sections, broke out from the right

wing of the firing-line to assault the height. TheRussians started to their feet, rushing forward to

meet the Japanese with the bayonet. Fresh

Russian Infantry hurried up from the left ; but

the Japanese were receiving reinforcements too.

A furious struggle with cold steel was enacted,

ending after ten minutes with the victory of the

Japanese. The Russians were defeated, and the

Lo-to-san was occupied by the Japanese.

The whole slope was covered with the slain

;

particularly in the last Japanese fire-position severe

loss was suffered. The assault cost the twoJapanese battalions 15 officers, of whom 6 were

dead, and 337 men. Major Nihira, commandingthe 1st Battalion, who with his Adjutant had

followed the firing-line, was also killed. The


Commander of the 1st Army, who had been

watching the assault from a small eminence north

of Pan-la-schan-tsy, at once sent by wire a

"Kanjo"^ to the 1st Battalion 16th Infantry

Regiment. The 1st Battalion of the regiment

kept the height occupied during the night ; the

other two battalions went to Sia-liu-ho-tsy.

The regiment spent 212,950 rounds of ammu-nition in the attack on the Lo-to-san.

About 500 Russian dead were found on the

Lo-to-san ; these were from the 1st Army Corps,

and from the 10th, of which Man's Detachment

had been originally the advanced guard.

While the 16th Infantry Regiment was attack-

ing the Lo-to-san, the 30th Infantry Regiment

and, to the right of it, the six companies from

the 29th Infantry Regiment, advanced against the

Len-ge-san, held by troops of Generals Kossovich

and Levestam from the 4th Siberian Army Corps.

The battalion of the 29th Kobi Regiment which

General Matsunaga's Brigade had left behind in

the position east of Sia-liu-ho-tsy - took part in the

attack too ; but the other battalion of that regi-

ment, which had been placed at the disposal of

the brigade, seems to have remained in reserve.

The attack over the open country was exceedingly

difficult. To avoid unnecessary loss. General Oka-

saki, commanding the 15th Brigade, ordered the

attack to be delayed till after dark. The firing-

lines therefore remained in their positions from

4.45 p.m. until about 7 p.m., when the movements

were continued. At 8 p.m. the assault with the

' A letter in praise of valour. * P. 178.


bayonet was delivered ; the Russians were driven

off. But having previously decided to retreat, their

retirement, at least in part, was probably a volun-

tary act. The Russians eased their withdrawal by

two counter-attacks.

The Japanese lost about 300 men in this attack;

the Russians left 180 dead behind.

Marshal Marquis Oyama had given the 4th The Japa.

Army the task of advancing aisfainst the line ^.^^^ ^*^''

J_ ,

ArmyLu-su-tun—Tschien-tschan-lin-tsy ^ on October 13. pushes

To be able to advance with the right wing on Sf the"*^

Lu-su-tun, the Djo-san had first to be captured, iftArmy

That height, which was being held by General andViau's

Man's Detachment and by portions of the 37th „lenT*

Infantry Division 1st Army Corps, had been un- ^-"".^^'^

successfully attacked by the 11th Kobi Brigade and from

on the 12th, as well as during the night following try nor"h

that day. ^ The Djo-san being still strongly occu- "^^^'J^

.

pied on the morning of the 13th, repeating theseki-?au.

frontal attack looked rather hopeless even now.

But, in order to carry out his task, the ArmyCommander decided to advance first with his left

in the direction of Tun-san-ho and Schuan-tai-tsy

against the Russian 37th Infantry Division, and

then to attack the Djo-san, enveloping it from

the north. He not only hoped to capture the

position by this movement, but also to cut the

Russian line of retreat.

As a preliminary to the attack, General Count

Nodzu brought into action strong Artillery, with the

object of subduing the hostile batteries which had

been maintaining a brisk fire since early morning.

' P. 228. » Tp. 184-185.


The 14th and 15th Field Artillery Regiments,

belonging to the reserve of the 4th Army, un-

limbered at the San-kai-seki-san, taking under fire

a Russian Artillery force of about 24 guns from

the 1st Army Corps, which, from the heights

north of Ha-ma-tan, were enfilading the 11th

Kobi Brigade, as well as portions of the 1.5th

Brigade ; one portion of the Japanese batteries

was firing upon a long line of Russian guns of

the 1st Army Corps at Schuan-tai-tsy, which had

been further remforced in the morning. Of the

Artillery of the 10th Division, one Abteilung was

fighting against General Man's batteries standing

at the Djo-san.

Towards 10 a.m. it was noticed that the enemywas gradually withdrawing from the line Ha-ma-

tan — San-kia-tsy— Schuan-tai-tsy. The ArmyCommander at once gave orders to follow up the

enemy, some Kobi regiments and the 8th Bri-

gade being, with that object, sent forward on a

broad front. On the right, the 10th Kobi Regi-

ment advanced on Ha-ma-tan, with the 34th Kobi

Regiment on its left. The 12th and 40th Kobi

Regiments took the direction on Tun-san-ho

—

Schuan-tai-tsy,^ and the 8th Brigade of the 10th

Division on the left on Schuan-tai-tsy. To cover

this movement the 14th Field Artillery Regiment,

and one Abteilung of the 15th, fired upon the

Russian batteries that had still remained in action.

One Abteilung of the 15th Field Artillery Regi-

ment followed the 12th and 40th Kobi Regiments.

' It is remarkable tliat the Kobi troops were not employed in

brigades.


The retreat of the Russians proceeded slowly,

effectively covered by their Artillery. It was5 p.m. before the 12th Kobi Regiment arrived as

the first at Tun-san-ho and the heights east of it

;

gradually the other portions came up, establishing

themselves to the right and left of the 12th Kobi

Regiment. The weak rearguards the Russians had

left behind evacuated their positions after a brief

resistance. The Russian 37th Infantry Division,

less the portions attached to the 4th Siberian

Army Corps, ^ retired to the heights north of

Schi-miau-tsy, that is to say, to the Sei-ko-san,

where they were supported by the 86th Infantry

Regiment.'' The reserve of the 37th Infantry

Division—that is, the 88th Infantry Regiment, the

4th Battery 7th Artillery Brigade, and the 7th

Siberian Cossack Regiment, with the two batteries

—moved to Tun-san-tsy, Corps Headquarters going

to Pu-tsau wa.

The Artillery Abteilung of the 15th Field

Artillery Regiment, which followed the 12th Kobi

Regiment, came into action at Man-kia-fx^n, facing

south-east, and taking under fire the right flank

and rear of the enemy at the Djo-san. Soonafterwards one more Abteilung of the Artillery,

' Two battalions of tlie l-47tli Infantry Regiment, and one battery of

the 4.3rd Artillery Brigade.

^ According to other information, the 87th Infantry Division wasalso supported by tlie whole of Man's Detachment, which in that case

must have been standing on the hciglits north of Sclii-miau-tsy already

since October 12. But after the attack of the Japanese 1.5th Brigade

against the Lo-to-san on October 13, numerous dead of the 121st and122nd Infantry Regiments (belonging to Mau's Detachment) having

been found, the assumption seems justified that the main body of Mau'sDetachment had been standing fast on the heights south of Ha-ma-tan(Lo-to-san—Djo-san) as yet October 13. (Pp. 2-41-242.)

248 THE RUSSO-JAPAXESE WARstanding at the San-kai-seki-san—probably the other

Abteilung of the 15th Field Artillery Regiment

—

advanced to the height south-east of Tun-san-ho.

The effect of the Japanese batteries was, how-

ever, a limited one, as it was beginning to growdark. When all was dark, General Mau's De-tachment evacuated its position on the Djo-san,

the position having become untenable after being

turned by the Japanese Kobi Regiments, and

retired by the Sen-san on Orr-tau-kou during the

night. The withdrawal of the Russians was

carried out under the vigorous pressure of Nihira's

Battalion,^ and of the 11th Kobi Brigade.

The Japanese remained during the night in the

positions they had reached ; the 20th Brigade of

the 10th Division seems to have halted at the

San-kai-seki-san.

The Rus- By the opportune intervention of the 85th In-

Sü)eriau fautry Regiment, as well as of the 4th EastArmy Siberian Rifle Regiment, and the Cossack BrigadeCorps re- "

,

'^

tires on under the command of General Mishtshenko,

pu°äud' which had pushed the 1st Brigade of the Japanese

M'*^; , Guard Division from the Ba-ii-san to the Easternt«henko s

. , . „i om • * /-i

Brigade San-jo-shi-san, the 4th Siberian Army Corps was

ken-jl* able to carry out the retreat ordered by Kuro-

^*"- patkin' to Schan-hei-niu-tun in perfect order, and

to disengage itself without particular difficulty

from the enemy.

The 37th Infantry Division, and with it Mau 's

Detachment, having gradually given way in the

' TTie 1st Battalion of the 16th Infantry Regiment, which had the

largest share in the storming of the Lo-to-san.

' Pp. 232-234. » Pp. 226-226.


course of the day, thus enabhng portions of the

Japanese 4th Army to make their appearance at

Tun-san-ho about 5 p.m., any protracted resistance

of the 4th Siberian Army Corps about Schan-hei-

niu-tun would have no longer been feasible either.

Moreover, all reserves available had gradually been

engaged, so that there were no fresh troops at

hand for a continuation of the battle in the

former position.^

General Sarubaiev resolved to retire on Fön-

kia-pu, issuing orders to that effect at 6 p.m. Theretreat was carried out under cover of a rearguard

formed of troops from the 22nd Division, under

the orders of the General Commanding the 1st

Brigade of that Division. The 85th Infantry

Regiment was entrusted with forming the rear

party, which at the same time had to fulfil the

duty of not allowing any man, or any wounded,

or any vehicle to be left behind. The march of

the regiment in the dark of night, on bad roads,

with the soaked soil, was exceedingly wearisome

and fatiguing ; it was 5 o'clock in the morning

when the exhausted troops, after picking up on

the road numerous wounded and vehicles of all

kinds, arrived at their rendezvous, 1 kilometre

south of Fön-kia-pu ; at 7 a.m. they continued

their march to that place itself.^ Mishtshenko's

Transbaikal Cossack Brigade, together with the

4th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, joined in the

• Apart from Kuropatkin's last reserve—i.e. the 86th Infantry Regi-

ment, as well as the 5th and 6th Batteries of the 7th Artillery Brigade,

which probably had not yet been engaged. (P. 194.)

' Loss of the regiment on (October 1-3:4 officers, 59 men dead;

6 officers, 210 men wounded.


retreat of the 4th Siberian Army Corps, withdramng

from Ma-örr-schan in the direction of the Ba-ken-

ji-san, and occupying that height, probably by

order of General Kuropatkin.

Tl)e No instructions were given apparently by the

Western Commander-iu-Chief to the Russian WesternDetach- Detachment, regulating its attitude in the newßtii Si- position on and behind the Scha-ho/ Kuropatkin

Anny ^^ ^^^^ ^^ have been very angry about the issue of

Corps, October 12, although the defeat of the 17th Armybovski's Corps can be mostly attributed to his failing of

meift rleaking up his mind to place at the disposal of

pel on the the Western Detachment the 6th Siberian

the at- Army Corps and General Dembovski's Detach-tacksof ^^ ^^the pur-siii'i^ On the morning of October 13 the 17th Army^apaii i,e

^^^.p^. j^^^ taken up the following position :

Army. ry^^^ main position between Ta-lian-tun and

La-mu-tun was occupied by the 35th Infantry

Division; two battalions of the 139th Infantry Regi-

ment were standing west of Lin-schin-pu ; and the

137th Infantry Regiment in the village itself, and

in the position adjoining east, as far as the railway.

To the left of it fourteen companies of the 138th

Infantry Regiment occupied the position extending

to the western outskirts of I^a-mu-tun. The other

two battalions of the 139th Infantry Regiment

were retained as sectional reserve north-west of

Lin-schin-pu ; the 140th Infantry Regiment was

forming the General Reserve at Yin-kuan. The35th Artillery Brigade was apparently posted in

two groups north of Lin-schin-pu.

I Pp. 215-216 aud 220-221.


Colonel Stakovich's troops were, in the morning,

not altogether in their new position west of Lin-

schin-pu ; they were not complete there until

about 1 p.m.

Of the 8rd Infantry Division, the 11th and 12th

Infantry Regiments, with all the Artillery still

available, were standing in the section Ku-kia-

tsy

—

Szö-fan-tai, farther in rear ; the 9th and 10th

Infantry Regiments, each formed in three battalions,

were in position close north of Szö-fan-tai.

With the 17th Army Corps were, moreover, the

six battalions General Slutshevski had sent in

its support from the 10th Army Corps on the

afternoon of October 12^; and of these the 36th

Infantry Regiment was standing not far from

the 140th Infantry Regiment at Yin-kuan ; while

the two battalions of the 35th Infantry Regiment,

which at first had also been at Yin-kuan, movedto La-mu-tun about 10 a.m.

Nothing was seen of the Japanese until noon,

but towards 1 p.m. strong forces were ascertained

witiiin the spaceTschan-lin-pu—^Ki-siau-tun, further

at Schu-liri-tsy, and at Scha-ho Railway Station.

Both Artilleries conmienced to fire ; the Japanese

were firing chiefly upon Lin-schin-pu village and

on a series of gun-emplacements constructed bythe Russians some time ago, but not occupied

by them now ; the Russians were firing uponthe places where the Japanese were assembling,

and upon their batteries. No attack was made bythe Japanese Infantry in front ; but the Russians

were expecting an attack on their right wing» P. 217. ^

252 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARbefore evening. Little reliance being placed on

the 6th Siberian Army Corps, standing with its

advanced guard on the line Lan-schan-pu—Pen-

tien-tsy, after what had occurred during the last

few days, the General Commanding the 35th

Infantry Division ordered the line Szö-fan-tai—Yin-kuan, as well as these places themselves, to

be artificially strengthened, in case of the front

line having to retreat ; one battalion of the 36th

Infantry Regiment was, moreover, ordered to con-

struct trenches between Yin-kuan and Kuan-tun,

and some earthworks behind them at Han-tschen-

pu, as far as time would admit. For reinforcing

the garrison of I^a-mu-tun, one more battalion

of the 140th Infantry Regiment was sent forward

to that place ; the 36th Infantry Regiment then

occupied the line Szö-fan-tai—Yin-kuan. The17th Army Corps was thus standing in two

entrenched lines, one behind the other.

At La-mu-tun the position of the 10th ArmyCorps adjoined that of the 17th ; its extent was

about 6 to 7 kilometres, stretching by Yu-kia-

la-tsy, the heights north of Hou-tai, and by Ku-kia-tsy to Tschien-tschan-lin-tsy, and consisting

of shelter-trenches, small earthworks, gun-pits,

and fortified villages. For its occupation, after

deducting the six battalions handed over to the

17th Army Corps, General Slutshevski had avail-

able eighteen battalions only, of which some had

been in action for some days already ; towards

noon two battalions had, moreover, to be detailed,

by order of Kuropatkin, to occupy the heights

east of AVa-ho-pu-tsy, so as to keep in touch


with the Centre. Considering the extent of the

position, the available forces were thus very weak.

General Slutshevski retained only one battalion

at his disposal ; he was hoping General Baron

Bilderling would, after the request addressed to

him, presently send back the six battalions the

10th Army Corps had given to the 17th ArmyCorps on October 12 ; these forces were to be

held ready in reserv^e. The position was occupied

in the following manner ; In La-mu-tun was

1 battalion of the 35th Infantry Regiment

;

2 battalions of the 124th Infantry Regiment were

standing between La-mu-tun and Yu-kia-la-tsy

;

the salient portion of the position projecting south

between Yu-kia-la-tsy and Ku-kia-tsy was being

held by the 123rd and 34th Infantry Regiments ;

at Ku-kia-tsy 3 battalions of the 33rd Infantry

Regiment adjoined on the left ; the 4th Battalion

of this latter regiment was standing in reserve

at Scha-ho-pu. Of the 31st Artillery Brigade,

3 batteries, under escort of 1 battalion 35th

Infantry Regiment, were entrenched north-east

of La-mu-tun ; the 9th Artillery Brigade wasstanding in two groups south of Scha-ho-pu and

north-east of Ku-kia-tsy.

General Gerschelmann was in command of all

the troops occupying the position. The right

section, extending to Hou-tai Hill, was at first

under General Riabinkin, who, however, in the

evening, handed over the command to General

Wassiliev, the convalescent Commander of the

2nd Brigade 31st Infantry Division ; Riabinkin

was to resume next day command over his own

2.54 THE RUSSO.JAPANESE WAR

brigade, the 1st of the 9th Infantry Division,

which was holding the left section, but did not,

as he was shot before he could do so.

General Baron Bilderling, like the General Com-manding 17th Army Corps, anxious for the right

wing of the Western Detachment, thouglit he could

not yet spare on the western wing the six battalions

of the 10th Army Corps, declining, therefore. General

Slutshevski's request. But on the General Com-manding the 10th Army Corps renewing his request,

representing that, with the great extent of his

position, he ought to have a strong reserve, and

must, at all cost, count upon these six battalions,

the leader of the Western Detachment informed

him, at 5.35 p.m., that the six battalions would

rejoin the 10th Army Corps, but that, in order not

to rouse the enemy's attention, their departure for

rejoining the corps would not be eiFected till dark.

General Slutshevski thereupon requested the 17th

Army Corps to start the battalions for Scha-

ho-pu, where they were to remain for the night

at the disposal of General Gerschelmann ; he

intended to place these six battalions next morning

as General Reserve farther back at Pa-ta-kia-tsy.

Opposite the 10th Army Corps the enemy did

not make a decisive attack with Infantry either.

The Japanese 3rd Division, it is true, tried to

advance against the position, but was unable to

make any progiess ; it therefore chiefly confined

itself to firing with Artillery. The Russian

batteries replied, directing their fire mainly on

the villages in advance of the position.

General Kuropatkin's constant anxiety was that


the Japanese, disregarding the 10th Army Corps,

might advance against the right flank and rear

of the 1st Army Corps in the Centre, and thus

carry out the much-feared penetration of the

Russian front ; for that reason he had ordered

the heights east of Wa-ho-pu-tsy to be occupied

by two battalions, as previously stated. The con-

centration of strong Japanese forces being reported

south of Hou-tai, he directed, moreover, by a

telegram, that Hou-tai and the country east of

that village should be taken under a severe fire of

Artillery. Several batteries, by degrees, began to

fire thither, 56 guns of the 10th Army Corps

finally uniting their fire in the direction indicated.

Apart from these measures, Kuropatkin had also

come to the conclusion that the most effective

means of preventing penetration was to assume

the offensive himself. The Gth Siberian ArmyCorps and Dembovski's Detachment had not been

engaged as yet ; if these fresh forces were to

attack the Japanese 2nd Army, it could be assumed

that not only that Army would be placed in a

very difficult position, but that this offensive

would also make itself felt with the 4th Army,preventing it from making attempts at penetrating

in the Centre. General Kuropatkin, therefore, at

last resolved to place the Gth Siberian Army Corps,

as well as Dembovski's Detachment, under the com-mand of the Western Detachment ; on the evening

of October 13 an order to that effect was received

by its commander.

But General Baron Bilderling still hesitated to

make the only practical use of the forces placed

256 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARunder his command. He merely ordered ^ the 6th

Siberian Army Corps to advance at daybreak on

October 14 to the Une Schau-kia-hn-tsy—Ta-han-

tun. Dembovski's Detachment was even to remain" on the right bank of the Hun-ho." Bilderhng,

therefore, did not know at all that Dembovski's

Detachment was already for some time on the

left bank of the Hun~ho, and thus available for

use at once. The Caucasian Cavalry Brigade,

attached to Dembovski, was to reach, with its

main body, Yen-schu-lin-tsy, pushing its advanced

guard farther to the south-east. Grekov's Cavalry

Brigade was directed to cover the right flank of

the Western Group, and to drive the enemy

from San-de-pu. The 10th and 17th Army Corps

were to continue obstinately defending their

positions on the Scha-ho, but " to be ready for

assuming the offensive."

It being expected from the results of this day,

when the Japanese did not make any material

progress opposite the Western Detachment, that

they would continue their attacks during the night,

measures were adopted to guard against surprise.

With the 10th Army Corps, General Gerschelmann

gave orders to keep the trenches on the Hou-tai Hill

occupied, and those on either side of it. Detach-

ments of Scouts were pushed farther out, and a

double row of listening-posts was established. Thepivots remained occupied by small parties, the

actual garrisons being withdrawn to have some rest.

On the left, the two battalions of the 124th Infantry

Regiment, as well as the Scouts of the 33rd and

' Appendix XII.


34th Infantry Regiments, had resumed touch with

the 1st Army Corps.

General Gerschelmann went into quarters at

Scha-ho-pu, anxiously awaiting the arrival of the

2nd Brigade of his Division, which had been with

the 17th Army Corps.

General Baron Oku, commanding the Japanese

2nd Army, had given it orders for October 13 to

advance from the line Pan-kiau-pu—Liu-tan-kou

—Ta-tai in a northerly direction, with the object

of continuing the attack upon the line Scha-ho-pu

—Lin-schin-pu, in compliance with the General

Order. ^ It being reported to him ^ that strong

hostile forces were still on the height east of Pan-

kiau-pu on the Mandarin Road, he ordered the

11th Brigade, retained in reserve by the 6th Divi-

sion, together with the units of the other arms

attached to the brigade, to move as a flank-guard

to the right of the 3rd Division, so as to enable

the latter to employ its full strength in the direction

of Scha-ho-pu. General Baron Okubo, command-ing the 6th Division, had started already with the

reinforced 11th Brigade from Tschen-kia in a

northerly direction, with the object of following

General Koizumi, who, on October 12, with 5

battalions of the 24th Brigade, 2 squadrons, 8

batteries, and 1 Pioneer company, was in pursuit

of the enemy after the capture of Lan-tsy-tai,^

when he received the order of his Army Com-mander ; the direction of the march was thereupon

" P. 229.

' The report was probably dispatched ou the evening of October 12,

when the 10th Army Corps was still holding Hun-pau-schan.' Pp. 20Ö and 214.

17


at once changed to the east, in the direction of

the Ko-ho-san. About noon the brigade met

several orderlies of General Headquarters, one of

whom was bringing the 6th Division a " Kanjo"

of JNlarshal Marquis Oyama for its conduct on

October 12. General Baron Okubo, on this, at

once dismounted, reading to the officers assembled

this mark of approval. When the head of the

column had reached the Ko-ho-san, it was seen

that the height was no longer occupied by the

enemy. General Baron Okubo rode up to it,

meeting there the Army Commander and General

Baron Oshima, commanding the 3rd Division, both

watching the Russian position of the 10th ArmyCorps at Hou-tai,^ as well as a captive balloon

which had ascended behind it.

The Army Commander, on the morning of

October 13, had ridden forward from INIen-hu-lu-

tun by Nan-wu-li-tai to the Ko-ho-san. That

height was the objective also of the 3rd Division,

whose commander believed it to be still occupied

by the enemy in the morning ; he had therefore

adopted measures before daylight for attacking the

Ko-ho-san ; but the troops found the trenches and

gun-pits abandoned by the enemy, and so they

occupied the hill at 7.30 a.m. When the report

came in of strong forces—a Division, at least

—

standing on the heights north of Hou-huan-hua-

tien, the Army Commander reinforced the 3rd

Division by the greater part of his reserve," order-

' Pp. 253 and 256.

' It cannot be ascertained how strong the reserve was on October 13,

consisting on October 10 of 18 battalions and 5 Pioneer companies.


ing the Division to support the attack of the

4th Army upon the hne Tun-san-ho—Schuan-

tai-tsy/ by an offensive blow against Hou-huan-

hua-tien.

General Baron Oshima, commanding the 3rd

Division, charged a mixed brigade {5^ battalions,

2 squadrons, 3 batteries, and 1 Pioneer company)

to deliver this blow in a northerly direction. Therest of the 3rd Division was being concentrated

at Pan-kiau-pu ; the two batteries which, on

October 12, had been attached to the Division,^

were returned to the General Reserve.

The advance of the troops of the 3rd Division

encountered but little resistance at first. At10 a.m. two battalions occupied Tschan-sin-tien ;

the three batteries came into action east of the

village, opening fire against the line Hou-tai Hill

—

La-mu-tun, occupied by portions of the Russian

10th Army Corps,^ but the batteries did not suc-

ceed in silencing the Russian batteries standing at

the latter place. Being, moreover, fired at from

the neighbourhood of Ku-kia-tsy, the attack camehere to a standstill for the moment.

The Army Commander becoming aware, about

noon, that the Russians were still holding Tun-san-tsy on his right flank, it being therefore clear

that the Army adjoining on the rigiit could not

have made any material progress, he thought the

right flank of the 3rd Division seriously threatened;

he therefore ordered General Baron Okubo to

advance with the 11th Brigade on Tschien-huan-

hua-tien, placing, for that purpose, at his disposal

' P. 246. ' V. 1Ü7. ' P. 263.


eight batteries of the General Reserve ; the 3rd

Division was to attack the enemy in front.

General Baron Okubo ordered his Artillery to

come into action east of ^^'^an-kia-lou-tsy, and

to fire on the heights east of Wa-ho-pu-tsy ; the

Infantry did no longer attack, owing to the day

rapidly declining. The reinforced 11th Brigade

slept during the night at AVan-kia-lou-tsy—Hun-pau-schan.

The 3rd Division moved as yet its whole

Artillery into position south-east of Tschan-sin-

tien, and reinforced the right wing of the leading

brigade with three battalions ; but the attack did

not gain ground ; one battalion did push to Hou-tai, but, finding itself quite alone here, 100 metres

distant from and opposite the enemy's line, was

ordered to come back after darkness had set in.

The foremost line of the Division remained during

the night on the line Kian-hu-tun—^Tschan-sin-

tien.

Of the 6th Division, General Koizumi's Detach-

ment^ had started from Liu-tan-kou at 6 a.m. ;

on October 12 it had pursued the retreating Russian

17th Army Corps from Lan-tsy-tai, getting as far

as Tschien-liu-tan. Reconnaissance having estab-

lished the fact that the enemy was still in Hun-lin-pu, the brigade detailed a weak right-flank-guard,

which was to march on Han-kui-pu, and itself

attacked Hun-hn-pu, surprising here two Russian

battalions, probably from Colonel Stakovich's De-

tachment,^ resting there quite unconcerned ; they

fled in disorder north, leaving behind them most' Pp. 205 and 214. - Pp. 213, 216 (footuute 1), and 251.


of their equipments. At the same hour—about

8.20 a.m.—troops of the 4th Division hkewise

entered Hun-Hn-pu from the south-west.

After capturing that place, General Koizumi's

reinforced 24th Brigade continued its advance,

reaching the line Schu-lin-tsy—Ki-siau-tun at

11 a.m., and engaging there with its Artillery the

hostile batteries of the 10th Army Corps at La-

mu-tun. The Russian 17th Army Corps, having

strongly occupied ^ the Hne La-mu-tun—Lin-schin-

pu, the brigade could not advance beyond the line

it had reached. The portions on the eastern bank

of the Scha-ho were barely able to repel several

counter-attacks of the Russians.

The Japanese 4th Division had formed two

columns on the morning of October 13. The right

column started from Tsun-lun-yen-tun, occupying

Hun-lin-pu simultaneously with troops of the

6th Division. It then continued its advance,

reaching, at 11 a.m., the line Ki-siau-tun—Tschan-

lin-pu, in spite of the fire from three Russian

batteries at Ta-lian-tun ; the Artillery of the

Division unlimbered at Tschan-lin-pu.

At 1 p.m. the Division was ordered by the

Army Commander to support the attack of the

3rd Division and of the reinforced 11th Brigade,

by vigorously advancing jointly with General

Koizumi's Brigade of the 6th Division.

The enemy facing the 24th Brigade and 4th

Division was about this time assumed to be in a

strong position on the general line Lin-schin-pu

—Ta-lian-tun—Schau-kia-lin-tsy ; three batteries

' p. 250.


were said to be at Ta-lian-tun, one at Schau-kia-

lin-tsy, and one between both places.^

The right column of the 4th Division tried to

carry forward the attack on Lin-schin-pu, after

three batteries from Hun-hn-pu and six (including

three from General Koizumi's Detachment) from

Schu-lin-tsy had been firing on Lin-schin-pu ; but,

owing to the severe flanking fire from Ta-lian-tun,

it was impossible to advance over the open plain.

The troops were therefore ordered to wait until it

was dark, but as a matter of fact the fight was no

longer continued in the evening.

The left column of the 4th Division advanced

from Tsun-lun-yen-tun on Ta-tai, but was unable

to get beyond Ta-tai, owing to strong forces of the

enemy being at Wan-tschuan-tsy. One battalion

of the enemy at AVan-tschuan-tsy made a counter-

attack on Ta-tai, but was easily repelled by the

two battalions standing there ; three batteries, sent

by the Divisional Commander in support, did not

come into action any more.^

The Divisional Cavalry was again to cover the

left flank at Li-kia-tun. But when the 1st Cavalry

Brigade moved to Li-kia-tun, the Divisional Cavalry

left that place to the brigade, going to Tai-pin-

tschuan.

The Japanese 1st Cavalry Brigade had arrived

in Li-kia-tun at 7.30 a.m. When, at 2 p.m., it

' The country about Schau-kia-lin-tsy was free from the enemy ; on

the other hand, Russian batteries were standing 2 kilometres north of

Ta-lian-tun at Ku-kia-tsy.

* Russian reports do not mention the forces left behind in Wan-

tschuan-tsy ;probably a rear party of the 6th Siberian Army Corps is

meant.


resumed its march on Ho-lien-tai it was attacked

by strong hostile Cavalry—presumably Grekov's

Brigade^which, however, withdrew on San-kia-tsy,

when fired upon by the battery of the Japanese

brigade. The detachment of the 1st Cavalry

Brigade, hitherto on the right bank of the Hun-ho,

went to San-de-pu.

Headquarters of the 2nd Army, together with

the reserve, spent the night at Pan-kiau-pu.

Two Orders had come in from Oyama's Head-

quarters during the day. While the one, arriving

about 5 p.m., contained the information that the

enemy was advancing to attack the Guard Division,

and that, therefore, the larger portion of the 5th

Division was placed under the orders of the 1st

Army ; the other, arriving at 10 p.m., demanded

the continuation of the attack next morning in the

direction ordered. Based on the latter directive

General Baron Oku ordered the 3rd Division,

together with General Koizumi's Detachment, to

attack the enemy at La-mu-tun on the 14th, and

all other troops to attack straight ahead.

No material success was gained by either party Result

on October 13.J^^^^'g*"-

On the Japanese side, the danger threatening the

right wing was finally removed by the withdrawal

of the Russians. But the greatly reduced 12th

Division was unable to follow up the enemy, and

remained in its position about Pen-si-hu, where

the 5th Kobi Brigade arrived in support. In the

Centre, the 15th Brigade of the 2nd Division and

the 4th Army pushed the right wing of the

Russian Centre from the Len-ge-san and Lo-to-san

;

264 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARwhile the Guard Di\dsion, being itself enveloped

on its right, had to fall back to the Eastern San-

jo-shi-san, unable to advance again till evening.

Nor was the 2nd Army able to gain ground

opposite the strong position of the Western

Detachment, reaching only the line generally

Tschan-sin-tien—Tschan-lin-pu. Everybody began

to feel exhausted.

Kuropatkin gave up the plan of deciding the

battle by an enveloping attack with the Eastern

Detachment, ordering therefore this detachment

and the Centre to retreat. Stackelberg faced

about again in the country north of Bian-yu-pu-

sa; the main body of the Centre took up a position

at Fön-kia-pu, but portions established themselves

still on the southern bank of the Scha-ho, on

the line Sei-ko-san—Ba-ken-ji-san. The Western

Detachment maintained its position on both banks

of the Scha-ho ; for future operations the 6th

Siberian Army Corps and Dembovski's Detach-

ment were placed under its command.

Although the Russians began to feel somewhat

exhausted too, Kuropatkin, probably in view of

the events of the day having not been altogether

unfavourable for the Russians, was filled with fresh

hopes.

October 14

Japanese General Headquarters ordered the

Armies, during the night October 13-14, to con-

tinue the attack next morning in the directions

prescribed ; for the rest Oyama probably expected

the Army Commanders to push the enemy beyond


the Scha-ho in conformity with the directive given TheJapa-

on October 12, but to attack him no longer on Army ad-

the northern bank of the river. yanres to

the Sena-

General Baron Kuroki issued various separate ho, push-

Orders to the 1st Army. The Guard and the 2nd potions

Divisions were, as previously mentioned,^ directed 2^*^?

to continue the attack by advancing on both Eastern

sides of the road Do-mon-shi

—

Fön-kia-pu. The ment and

5th Division,^ attached to the 1st Army on fent^e

,

•' beyondOctober 13, received the following Order : the river.

*' Russians have apparently withdrawn. The sketch 8.

division will follow in the direction of Wai-tau-

schan, pushing to the Scha-ho." The reinforced

3rd Brigade of the 2nd Division, under General

Matsunaga, which on October 13 was stopped by

the Russians at the Tschau-hsien-lin Pass,^ re-

ceived orders to cut off its opponent * by advancing

in the direction of Schan-pin-tai-tsy. The GuardKobi Brigade, under General Umesawa,was directed

to march from the neighbourhood of Liu-schu-kia

to San-kia-tsy, 4 kilometres south-west of Scha-

ho-pu. The 1st Army having been reinforced by

the 5th Kobi Brigade,'^ Umesawa was to join the

General Reserve of the Japanese Army.On the morning of October 14 the whole of

the 1st Army advanced again. General Ino-uye's

Detachment included, which apparently had re-

ceived no fresh orders. The last of Stackelberg's

weak rearguards, which had been holding their

positions hitherto, having been withdrawn during

' P. 240. 2 p 240. 3 pp_ 230-231.* Portions of the 1st Siberian Army Corps.

* P. 229.

266 THE RUSSO JAPANESE WARthe night, General Baron Ino-uye thought it use-

less to keep his forces any longer scattered in their

extensive positions ; he therefore concentrated the

bulk of his forces and advanced on Schan-schi-tsiau-

tsy in pursuit, probably going by Sien-schan-tsy.^

Following the example of the Army's right

wing, the 2nd Cavalry Brigade went forward too

on the left bank of the Tai-tsy-ho from the neigh-

bourhood south of Pen-si-hu ; it crossed the river,

marching on the northern bank to San-kia-tsy,

which Rennenkampf's rearguard had probably

evacuated already. General Matsunaga's Brigade,

establishing touch with the 12th Division on the

right, started from the Tschau-hsien-lin Pass on

Schan-pin-tai-tsy.

General Baron Stackelberg made arrangements

for the Eastern Detachment to continue its re-

treat. The 1st Siberian Army Corps, which, early

on October 14, had reached Ya-ma-lin-tsy with the

1st East Siberian Rifle Division, and Kan-to-li-san

with the 9th East Siberian Rifle Division, was

ordered to march on Hei-sun-pu ; the 3rd Siberian

Army Corps was to continue its retreat to the

Kau-tu-lin Pass, and the 2nd Siberian Army Corps

to cover the retreat as rearguard at Bian-yu-pu-sa.

During the forenoon an order of the Com-mander-in-Chief arrived, demanding the immediate

dispatch of 2.5 battalions to r^o-sien-tun, 8 kilo-

metres north-west of Fön-kia-pu, for the formation

of a General Reserve of the Army. Stackelberg,

probably assuming that Kuropatkin was going to

' Tlie 5th Kobi Brigade, which had arrived on October 13, seems to

have goue ahead with the 12tli üivisiou as well.


cencentrate such a strong reserve only for oifensive

purposes, thought he would most effectively sup-

port such an attack if he likewise assumed the

offensive with all his available forces. He there-

fore dispatched an officer to General Headquarters

with the report that he " intended to concentrate

the whole of the Eastern Detachment, and to fall

upon the right flank of the Japanese in a south-

westerly direction to-morrow, if the Commander-in-Chief was going to attack towards the south."

Kuropatkin insisted upon his demand. JMeanwhile

the retreat had commenced. General Baron

Stackelberg detailed, for the use of the Com-mander-in-Chief, the 9th East Siberian Rifle

Division, which had already arrived at Yin-pan,

and was now marching back to Kan-to-li-san, and,

in addition, the 19th and 20th East Siberian Rifle

Regiments, from the 2nd Siberian Army Corps,

as well as the 218th Infantry Regiment, attached

to that Army Corps ; in all, 22 battalions. These

troops, under the united command of General

Gerngross, commanding the 1st Siberian ArmyCorps, were put in motion, going by Orr-tau-kou,

and arriving at liO-sien-tun on October 1.5.

The 1st East Siberian Rifle Division was directed

not to march now to Hei-sun-pu, but to march

back to Kan-to-li-san, where it remained for the

present. The main body of the 3rd Siberian

Army Corps went back to about the Kau-tu-lin

Pass, its rearguard reaching the line Schun-schui-

tsy—Wan-fu-lin Pass. The rest of the 5th East

Siberian Rifle Division, of the 2nd Siberian ArmyCorps, remained halting north-west of Bian-yu-


pu-sa. The protective detachments, which had

remained on the left bank of the Scha-ho, at the

Wai-tau-schan and Tsio-tso-schan, were attacked

and pushed back to the right bank by portions

of the Japanese Guard Division and by the 5th

Japanese Division.

The Japanese Guard Division had been noticing

since midnight that the Russians facing them ^

were in full retreat;portions only, opposite the 3rd

Guard Regiment, were holding still the Wai-tau-

schan and Wu-tin-kou village.

At 8.30 a.m. General Asada issued the following

Order, north-east of Schan-liu-ho-tsy

:

" 1. The Division will pursue the enemy.

"2. The 1st Brigade will advance at 11 a.m.

from the country north-east of Do-mon-shi, with

the object of occupying the line Hua-sa-tun

—

Kin-cho-san. It will reconnoitre on Fön-kia-pu

and secure the right flank. One battalion is to

be left north of Do-mon-shi, at the disposal of the

Divisional Commander." 3. The Mh Guard Regiment (less one battalion)

will advance from Do-mon-shi at 10 a.m., occupy-

ing the line from the Kin-cho-san to the road

Schan-liu-ho-tsy

—

Fön-kia-pu.

" 4. One battalion of the Mh Guard Regiment,

the Artillcrij, and the Pioneer battalion will follow

the 4th Guard Regiment.

"5. Watanabe's Detachment^ will rejoin the

' The 4th Siberian Army Corps and Mishtshenko's Brigade.

* Watanabe's Detachment consisted of the 3rd Guard Regiment and

one battery ; it was to cover the right flank of the Guard Division on

October 13, and had retired before superior Russian forces to the

neighbourhood of Man-hua-pu. (P. 238.)


Division, after being relieved by the General

Reserve."

The late hour of starting is said to have been

due to the difficulty of reconnaissance. TheDivisional Cavalry Regiment having joined Kasa's

Detachment since October 11,^ the Guard Division

had but a very small party of horse.

The 1st Guard Brigade, which at daybreak had

pushed one battalion of the 2nd Guard Regimentto the Ba-ji-san, to cover the right flank, musthave started earlier than the Order prescribed, for

its vanguards occupied the Sen-san as early as

11 a.m. During its further advance thence it

was reported to the brigade that strong forces of

the enemy, with advanced detachments on the

Tsio-tso-schan, were standing to the east in the

Scha-ho valley ; the forces in question were por-

tions of the 5th East Siberian Rifle Division. It

being not safe under these circumstances to marchstraight on Kin-cho-san village, the brigade com-

mander detached a force of some strength, which,

in co-operation with the battalion from the 2nd

Guard Regiment on the right, on the Ba-ji-san,

succeeded, after a short action, in driving the

enemy from the Tsio-tso-schan. The advance of

the brigade was considerably delayed by this inci-

dent ; it was 5 p.m. before its head arrived at

Tai-kua-tun and established touch with the 4th

Guard Regiment.

The latter had started at the appointed time

from Do-mon-shi, probably marching by the road

' p. 161. The wlieroabouts of Kasa's Detachment cannot be traced

fur October 14 aiul the days afterwards.

270 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARthrough Yen-san-sai, driving back weak Russian

rearguards and occupying the Kin-cho-san with

its vanguard at 1 p.m. It having become knownmeanwhile that the enemy was still in strong

force on the Ba-ken-ji-san (Mishtshenko's Brigade,

with the 4th East Siberian Rifle Regiment), the

bulk of the Japanese 4th Guard Regiment was

formed up south of the Kin-cho-san ready to

attack the height mentioned. The Artillery had

meanwhile also arrived, and gone into position at

Ta-yin-schou-tun ; four batteries were firing upon

Mishtshenko's troops on the Ba-ken-ji-san, and

on his Artillery, which was ascertained to be east

of the hill ; three batteries ^ took under fire the

Sei-ko-san, being held by the Russian 37th In-

fantry Division, against which the Japanese 2nd

Division, on the left, was advancing to attack at

the same time.

Together with the 4th Guard Regiment, which

about 5 p.m. was deploying against the Ba-ken-

ji-san, the 1st Guard Brigade advanced to attack

that height from Tai-kua-tun, the 2nd Guard

Regiment being in first line, and the 1st in second

line. The Infantry attack having been well pre-

pared by the Artillery, and being well supported

also by the batteries, it made at first good progress ;

but shortly after 5 p.m. a terrible thunderstorm

broke suddenly, rendering all further movements

impossible. The rolling of thunder drowned the

roaring of the guns ; regardless of the action, friend

and foe alike looked for shelter in the country to

' Tlie seventh battery was probably Major Hidikata's Battery.

(P. 170.)


save themselves, at least to some extent, from the

floods of the torrential rains. With the thunder-

storm dusk came rather quickly. Under cover of

darkness the Russians evacuated their position,

retiring behind the Scha-ho, probably to the neigh-

bourhood of Orr-tau-kou. When the storm had

abated sufficiently for the action to be resumed,

the enemy had already disappeared. Growingdarkness prevented pursuit. The Commander of

the Guard Division therefore ordered the troops

to rest. Having probably learned meanwhile of

the evacuation by the Russians of the Sei-ko-san,

he ordered outposts to be placed merely facing

the Scha-ho, between Yen-sin-tun and the country

west of Fön-kia-pu. To the 1st Guard Brigade

was assigned the section from the Kin-cho-san to

beyond the Ba-ken-ji-san, and the task of estab-

lishing touch with the 2nd Division ; the main

body bivouacked at Ta-yin-schou-tun. Adjoining,

on the right, the 4th Guard Regiment furnished

outposts as far as the Sen-san, and bivouacked near

Kin-cho-san village. The Artillery bivouacked near

its positions, and the Divisional Reserve north of

Do-mon-shi.

It cannot be ascertained whether, and when,

Watanabe's Detachment rejoined the Guard Divi-

sion on October 14.

The 5th Division,^ wliich was detailed to relieve

it, had meanwhile advanced against the Wai-tau-

schan, west of General Matsunaga's Detachment,

pushing back there rearguards of the 5th East

Siberian Rifle Division. At 12.30 p.m. the Divi-

» Pp. 240 and 2G5.


sional Commander reported to the 1st Army that

the 5th Division was on the point of crossing the

Scha-ho ; that the enemy facing it was retreating.

But an order of Marshal Marquis Oyama having

in the meantime arrived, saying that the Armies

were to halt on the left bank of the Scha-ho, and

finish the battle as soon as possible, the intention

of the Division was no longer carried out.

Conforming to General Baron Kuroki's directive,^

the 15th Brigade of the 2nd Division continued

its advance, too, early on October 14. Patrols had

pushed during the night to the heights of Schau-

schi-miau-tsy without meeting any enemy ; the

brigade therefore started in good time, occupying

the heights mentioned as early as 7 a.m.

Russian batteries being observed there on the

Ba-ken-ji-san, and farther north (Mishtshenko's

Artillery), the Divisional Artillery moved into

position, two batteries unlimbering on the heights

of Schau-schi-miau-tsy, and two east of Miau-kou,

all four then uniting their fire upon the Russian

guns on the Ba-ken-ji-san. The Divisional Ar-

tillery was supported by the Mortar Abteilung

attached to the Army on October 13,- which

General Baron Kuroki engaged east of Miau-kou

between the Guard and 2nd Divisions. Theenemy's Artillery moving off from the Ba-ken-ji-

san^ about 1 p.m., the batteries of the Division

stationed east of Miau-kou went forward to the

northern slope of the heights of Schau-schi-miau-

' I'p. 239-240. ' P. 240.

' Probably to change its position merely, because in the afternoon

the Guard Artillery was firing still upon Russian guns at the Ba-ken-

ji-san. (P. 270.)


tsy, shelling, jointly with the other two batteries,

the Sei-ko-san, occupied by portions of the Russian

37th Infantry Division ; of the Infantry of the

brigade, only the 30th Infantry Regiment was

deployed for attack, in touch with the right wing

of the 4)th Army. The Artillery fire was very

effective, the Russians retreating before the actual

assault was pushed home by the Infantry. Whendelivered in the afternoon, jointly with troops of

the 4th Army, the assault by Infantry met with

small forces only of the enemy, who, after a brief

resistance, retired.

The 15th Brigade, apparently, did not advance

afterwards beyond the Sei-ko-san.

After the 4th Army had pushed back the The Japa-

Russian 37th Infantry Division to the heights ^^^^ ^^'^^

north of Schi-miau-tsy—Tun-san-ho on October 13,^ the right

General Count Nodzu, acting in the spirit oftbeind

Oyama's Order, dated October 1 2 in the evening,^tick ^h*e"

decided to continue the attack on October 14, and 37th in-

clear the left bank of the Scha-ho of the enemy DhrisLu

completely. ?f*^?

^ "^

, , .Russian

By reconnaissance it was ascertained that the ist Army

enemy was, with strong forces, still on the Sei-ko- aud^^'

san, and on the heights at Tun-san-tsy ; the first Pr^^vJ^"^

object was, therefore, to capture these heights, loth, on

The Army Commander charged the 10th and koVan

11th Kobi Brigades to carry out the attack, ^"<^j^^^"-

the 10th Division being held back in reserve.^ sau.

The 11th Kobi Brigade formed up in readiness

» p. 247. * P. 228.

' Locality of its position not known ; the Division was probably

standing north of the Nan-san.

18

274 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARsouth of Schi-miau-tsy, and the 10th Kobi Brigade

at Tun-san-ho. The Russians—portions of the

37th Infantry Division—had entrenched their

position as usual, but without special care, the

lines of trenches and gun-emplacements being

clearly visible on the Japanese side. Four batteries

were counted on the Sei-ko-san and on the heights

of Tun-san-tsy, and, in addition, about three

batteries (probably from the 4th Siberian ArmyCorps), which had gone into position on the

northern bank of the Scha-ho, on the south-eastern

slope of the To-san, rising steeply from the

lowland, and were directing an ineffective fire upon

the Japanese at Schi-miau-tsy and Tun-san-ho, of

course, owing to the distant range. ^ With the

object of fighting down the hostile Artillery on the

heights straight in front, three Abteilungs of the

14th and 15th Field Artillery Regiments, as well

as an Abteilung of the 10th Division, unlimbered

on the slopes east and west of Man-kia-fön, opening

an overwhelming fire at 9 a.m. ; some batteries

prepared to accompany the attacking Infantry

during its advance.

While the Artillery of the 4th Army was thus

engaging the enemy's position in front, General

Baron Okubo, of the 2nd Army, commandingthe Gth Division, advanced, by direct orders of

Oku, early on October 14, with the reinforced

11th Brigade, to attack the heights east of Wa-ho-pu-tsy, bringing his batteries into action east of

Tschien-huan-hua-tien. By this he managed to

enfilade freely the Russian guns at Tun-san-tsy.

• According to Japanese sources of Captain Sander (retired).


This superior fire from two directions the Russian

batteries were unable to stand long ; within a

comparatively short time they all ceased fire.

The Infantry had in the meantime deployed for

attack, the 11th Kobi Brigade advancing against

the Sei-ko-san, and the 10th Kobi Brigade against

the heights of Tun-san-tsy ; of the 11th Brigade

of the 6th Division, two battalions attacked the

heights north of Tun-san-tsy, and two battalions

the San-ka-ku-san. The Russians being kept downin their trenches by the strong Artillery fire, and

the fog, which was lying over the lowlands on the

morning, facilitating the approach, the attacking

Infantry gained ground without undue loss, the

11th Brigade of the 6th Division capturing the

coveted heights even before noon. The attack

of the Kobi Regiments, which had begun later,

to let the Artillery have some effect first, maderapid progress too.

When, about 2 p.m., most of the Artillery of the

4th Army was obliged to cease fire, in order not

to endanger its own Infantry, which had arrived

quite close to the enemy's position, four batteries

of the 2nd Division of the 1st Army on the right

intervened most effectively in the action of the

4th Army ; the batteries had unlimbered east of

Schau-schi-miau-tsy, and were partly enfilading

the Russian position on the Sei-ko-san. The30th Infantry Regiment of the 2nd Division, as

was mentioned,' took a share in the attack of the

Kobi Brigades. The Russians do not seem to

have waited for the final blow of the assailant,

' P. 273.

276 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARbut to have evacuated their position previous to

that. When the heights were in the hands of

the Japanese, Artillery was brought up at once,

taking the troops streaming back under a withering

fire, without the Russian batteries on the To-san

being able to prev^ent it. Nine ammunition

waggons had been left behind in the captured

position. Batteries of the 6th Division had mean-

while unhmbered on the heights east of Wa-ho-pu-

tsy, and were joining in the concentric pursuing

fire. The Russians fell back to the country north-

west of ürr-tau-kou ; Headquarters of the 1st ArmyCorps billeted in Huan-schan. The 2nd Battalion

of the 40th Kobi Regiment, and the 30th Infantry

Regiment of the 2nd Division went in pursuit, pre-

venting the defeated from making a renewed stand,

and inflicting fresh losses on them by cutting off

portions of them. It was only when the thunder-

storm began,^ and the tremendous rain made it im-

possible for the gunners and marksmen to continue

their fire, that the remnants of the Russians suc-

ceeded in escaping further pursuit under cover of the

storm, and in gaining the right bank of the Scha-ho.

The 1st and 4th Armies had accomplished

their task ; the enemy opposing them had been

pushed to the northern bank of the Scha-ho.

Continuing the attack across the river was for

the present not the intention of General Head-

quarters ; Marshal Marquis Oyama therefore

ordered both Armies to establish themselves in

the positions captured.

General Yamada's Detachment, which the 5th

» p. 270.


Division had left behind on its recent battle-

ground in the country east of Schi-li-ho onOctober 13,^ did not take any part in the combats

of October 14 ; it therefore seems to have remained

in reserve at Hun-kia-tschuan.

The action on October 14 having brought about

a temporary mixture of units on the inner wings

of the 4th and 2nd Armies, General Headquarters

ordered the country east of Tschien-tschan-lin-tsy

to belong to the 4th Army, and therefore the troops

of the 2nd Army within that area to be withdrawn

therefrom. On this, the Commander of the 6th

Division left three battalions only on the heights

south-east of Tschien-tschan-lin-tsy in the evening,

concentrating the rest of his troops as reserve at

Tschien-huan-hua-tien. Next day the whole of

the 11th Brigade started to rejoin the 24th Brigade,

making the 6th Division thus complete again.

The losses of Nodzu's Army during the combats

from October 10 to 14 were roughly 3,140 men,

among whom were 40 officers dead and about

100 wounded.

Complying with the Army Commander's direc- The Japa-

tive to attack, jointly with the 24th Brigade of ^hisfjn

the 6th Division, in the direction of La-mu- attacks

thetun,^ the General commanding the 3rd Division Russian

got his troops ready for attack long before day- J)^^^["

break ; three battalions were to advance against "!«"*;

Hou-tai Hill, and six battalions on their left its front.

against Yu-kia-la-tsy. Before these had started,

a reconnaissance was made in the dark by twoRussian companies from Hou-tai Hill. They

• P. 240. » p. 263.

278 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARpushed to Hou-tai, but retired again apparently

satisfied when they were not fired upon from

the village, which the Japanese had not yet

occupied. Without being noticed by the enemy,

the Japanese followed to the northern edge

of the village, while the lines deployed on the

Mandarin Road were at the same time gaining

ground as well. About 3.30 a.m. the whole

line rose to assault the enemy's position on Hou-

tai Hill and at Yu-kia-la-tsy ; but the Russians

(123rd Infantry Regiment, and 4th Battalion

34th Infantry Regiment,^ which had been moved

up for the night to Hou-tai Hill) were not to

be surprised, for they repelled the assault by a

hot fire. The Japanese then rallied and formed

for another assault, made shortly after 5 a.m.,

but failing likewise. The vigour of the assaults,

however, had shaken the Russians to such an

extent that soon afterwards a third assault suc-

ceeded ; but it must be stated that some por-

tions of the garrison (two companies of the 123rd

Infantry Regiment and the 4th Battalion of the

34th Infantry Regiment) had retired already after

the second assault, thus weakening the defensive

front.

While the Japanese made their first assaults

chiefly with the bayonet, their third assault at

daybreak was opened by a sudden fire of the

whole line on the Russian position, producing

extraordinary consternation. Making use of the

disorder prevailing, the Japanese pushed on,

capturing the whole section of the front assaulted.

' From tlie 10th Army Corps.


The Russians streamed back in disorder, pursued

by the Japanese, into whose hands fell the whole

of the 2nd Abteilung of the 9th Artillery Brigade,

under the command of Colonel Smolenski—24

guns in all, as well as some ammunition waggons.

The gunners, taken by surprise, vainly tried to

mow down with case-shot ^ the swarms of

skirmishers assaulting them so suddenly, and which

they had taken at first to be their own Infantry ;

within a few minutes the whole Abteilung was

disabled. The commander of the Abteilung and

two commanders of batteries were killed, the third

battery commander was wounded ; in addition,

the Abteilung lost 8 officers and 151 men dead

or wounded, and most of its horses.

On the report of his front having been pierced,

General Gerschelmann, commanding the Russian

9th Division, engaged the only battalion ^ he had

available as reserve at Scha-ho-pu ; but this weak

force did not succeed in stopping the Japanese,

who, on the contrary, pushed forward along the

Mandarin Road as far as Scha-ho-pu. Here they

met with a more obstinate resistance. The village,

as well as the fire-trenches in front of it, had been

occupied, after the retreat from Hou-tai Hill, by

the 4th Battalion 34th Infantry Regiment, which

obstinately defended its position ; but the Japanese

by degrees gained ground.

While the centre of the Japanese attack pushed

through as far as Scha-ho-pu, the wings of the

3rd Division were meeting with far greater

' Shrapnels with time-fuze set O.

' From the ySrd Infantry Regiment.

280 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARdifficulties. The left wdng certainly succeeded,

after a short time, in pushing beyond the Scha-ho

the Russian garrison holding the portion between

Yu-kia-la-tsy and La-mu-tun, and furnished by the

124th Infantry Regiment, but inside the village

of La-mu-tun the adversary held his ground with

the utmost obstinacy; the 1st Brigade of the

Russian 9th Infantry Division maintained itself in

like manner opposite the Japanese right wing on the

southern river-bank ; the brigade was facing there

south-west, leaning with its right on the Scha-ho.

In spite of the success in the centre, the situation

of the 3rd Division was therefore not favourable

at all. It was fighting on three fronts ; if fresh

strong forces were going to make a counter-attack

now, the Division was not only running the risk

of losing the advantages gained, but also of being

hemmed in on three sides, and of being defeated

itself. General Baron Oshima, commanding the

Division, nevertheless determined to remain on

the defensive with his right wing only, and, for

the rest, to continue the attack on Scha-ho-pu

and I^a-mu-tun. Six batteries of the 2nd Army's

General Reserve had been placed for support at

the disposal of the Division ; these came into

action south of Yu-kia-la-tsy. The Divisional

Artillery had come into action probably previous

to that ; but its fire-position is not known.

^

^ Nor was it possible to ascertain how many batteries the Division

had available on that day. The Japanese Army Commanders mostly

detailed a portion of the Artillery of each Division into their General

Reserves ; but it seems that the number of batteries taken from the

Divisions was not always the same. General Baron Oshima had most

likely not more than three batteries with his Division on October 14.


This most determined attack on Scha-ho-pu the

Russians were unable to resist ; they evacuated

the southern portion of the village, withdrawing

to the right bank of the river, where they estab-

lished themselves in the northern part of the

village for renewed resistance. The Japanese fol-

lowed them, occupying the southern part of the

village. Shortly before the Russians crossed the

river. General Riabinkin, who, after handing over

the right section of defence^ to the convalescent

General Wassiliev, was on the point of returning

to resume command of his own brigade,' was

mortally wounded by a rifle-bullet at the southern

edge of Scha-ho-pu village.

That the 3rd Division succeeded in pushing

back the Russian front south of Scha-ho-pu, was

probably due only to the want of strong reserves

with the 10th Army Corps. If the six battalions

of the 2nd Brigade 9th Infantry Division had

returned in time to its corps from the 17th ArmyCorps,^ they might have changed the fortune of

the day.

But, in spite of the assurance given by the

General Commanding the 17th Army Corps, these

battalions had not yet arrived on the evening of

October 13. In vain did General Gerschelmannwait during the night for the brigade to make its

appearance at Scha-ho-pu. When, on the morning,

the enemy had penetrated into the fortified posi-

tion, the General Commanding dispatched twotroops of Cossacks in search of the brigade, andto bring it up to Scha-ho-pu ; he presumed the

' P. 253. - 1st Brigade yth Infautry Division. » P. 254.

282 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARbrigade to have missed its way in the darkness,

or its commander not to have received the order.

A General Staff Officer was sent off with the

same mission ; he was, moreover, to carry to the

Commander of the 35th Infantry Division 17th

Army Corps the request to move to Pa-ta-kia-tsy

whatever he could spare of troops, because the

front of the 10th Army Corps had been pierced,

and the corps was now retiring behind the Scha-ho.

The officer, riding off at 7.30 a.m., met near the

railway south of Han-tschen-pu General Wolkov,

commanding the 17th Army Corps, who was

greatly astonished on hearing that Shatilov's

Brigade had not yet joined the 10th ArmyCorps, he having given orders for its departure

yesterday already. North of Lin-schin-pu village

the General Staff Officer met General Dobr-

shinski, commanding the 35th Infantry Division,

learning from him that Shatilov's Brigade had

been hitherto at his disposal, but had now started

to rejoin the 10th Army Corps ; that he could

not spare any of his own troops, on account of

his own corps being hard pressed itself. It proved,

however, that of the missing brigade only three

battalions of the 36th Infantry Regiment had

started for Scha-ho-pu, General Dobrshinski having

sent the two battalions of the 35th Infantry Regi-

ment to La-mu-tun, with the object of reinforcing

his own troops engaged there ; the fourth battalion

of the 36th Infantry Regiment General Dobr-

shinski had retained at first too, but allowed it

to follow its regiment afterwards. The first three

battalions arrived at Scha-ho-pu towards 9 a.m.,


where they formed a rallying-point for the retiring

firing-Hne of the 123rd Infantry Regiment. Thetwo battalions of the 35th Infantry Regiment it

was impossible to withdraw from the fighting-line

at La-mu-tun ; one company of them seems to

have been the only one not engaged ; General

Shatilov, commanding the brigade, reached Pa-ta-

kia-tsy with that company at 10 a.m/After the capture of the southern part of Scha-

ho-pu, the Japanese got some machine-guns into

position along the bank of the river, overwhelming

the Russians on the northern bank with a murder-

ous fire. After a short time the latter evacuated

the northern part of the village as well, withdraw-

ing on Pa-ta-kia-tsy without the Japanese pushing

after them. Generals Gerschelmann and Shatilov

succeeded in staying the masses streaming back,

and occupying with them the fire-trenches existing

half\\ây between Scha-ho-pu and Pa-ta-kia-tsy at

about 11 a.m. It was 1 p.m. before the last

battalion of the 36th Infantry Regiment arrived

here.

General Kuropatkin, having heard of what had The

occurred with the 10th Army Corps, at once ^}^g'^"^

resolved to come to the rescue with his reserve, iêtach-

At 11.35 a.m. Headquarters of the 10th Army vainly at-

Corps were informed by telephone from General ^^"^P^^jj^g

Headquarters that tlie Commander-in-Chief was -"^t-îa-

advancing to attack with all his available forces in from the

Japanese• On his arrival at Pa-ta-kia-tsy, he reported that General Dobr- q^^ Divi.

shinski on the day before, when receiving the order to send back the sion.

brigade to the 10th Army Corps, had said "he would never dream of

obeying the order until after the battle ; he was expecting an attack

himself."

284 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARthe direction of Tschien-san-ta-kan-tsy ^—Ku-kia-

tsy against the enemy's right flank. The 10th

Army Corps was to maintain itself obstinately, and

to attack as soon as Kuropatkin's counter-attack

became effective.

Somewhat later the copy of an Order' by the

Commander-in-Chief to the leader of the Western

Detachment came to Headquarters of the 10th

Army Corps, saying that the 1st Army Corps

was going to join the General Reserve in the

neighbourhood of Lo-sien-tun—San-kia-tsy, and

that INlau's Detachment had started from the

neighbourhood of Örr-tau-kou^ to join the 10th

Army Corps ; that the 10th Army Corps, whose

left flank was being secured by the disposition of

the General Reserve, was to prepare a position

on its left, in which it would be able to delay the

enemy's attack until the General Reserve, under

the personal command of the Commander-in-Chief,

was advancing to attack.

About the same time tliis last message arrived

at Headquarters of the 10th Army Corps, General

Gerschelmann, commanding the 9th Division,

received a message direct from the Commander-in-Chief, dispatched from San-kia-tsy :

" I amcoming to help you, and am advancing in the

direction of Tschien-san-ta-kan-tsy, with the object

of pushing against the right flank of the enemyattacking you. For the present I have only four

North-east of Hou-tai Hill. ^ Appendix XIII.

' The main forces of Mau's Detachment, after the action at the

I>jo-san on October 13, had probably retired, jointly with the 4th

Siberian Army Corps, to the country north of Fön-kia-pu during the

night following that day.


battalions, but hope to gather together eight to

twelve."

At 1 p.m. General Slutshevski, commandingthe 10th Army Corps, was ordered by the Com-mander of the Western Detachment to retake at

all cost the position of Scha-ho-pu, so as to

come in line again with the 17th Army Corps.

Finally, at the same time, a message from the

Quartermaster-General arrived, saying that the

leading regiment of the promised supports had

started from San-kia-tsy in the direction of Tschien-

san-ta-kan-tsy.

From all this intelligence General Slutshevski

was justified in concluding that help for his corps

was coming up soon ; for, apart from the fact that

the Commander-in-Chief was apparently marching

to his aid, the arrival of Man's Detachment could

be expected. Although Kuropatkin had demanded

of the 10th Army Corps not to advance before

the reserves were intervening against the Japanese

3rd Division, General Slutshevski, probably influ-

enced by Bilderling's urgent order, resolved to

attack Scha-ho-pu at once.

The attack was to be carried out by the 36th

Infantry Regiment, which was now complete, and

standing in the trenches half-way between Scha-

ho-pu and Pa-ta-kia-tsy. While two battalions,

under Colonel Shdanovski, commanding the regi-

ment, were to make a frontal attack along the

Mandarin Road, General Shatilov, commanding

the brigade, was to attack with the other two

battalions from Schan-lan-tsy. In support of the

attack were detailed the Abteilung of the 31st

286 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARArtillery Brigade and the 3rd Battery of the 9th

Artillery Brigade ^ which had gone into position

south of Pa-ta-kia-tsy, the former to the west,

and the latter to the east, of the Mandarin Road.

Shatilov's column succeeded in crossing the river

at Schan-lan-tsy, and taking possession of the little

wood north-east of Scha-ho-pu. All attempts,

however, of pushing farther failed, owing to the

severe fire of the Japanese. Colonel Shdanovski,

commanding the 36th Infantry Regiment, occupied

the empty northern portion of Scha-ho-pu ; one

part of his column worked its way still farther

forward at the north-east corner of the village,

gaining the southern bank of the river, and

establishing touch wäth Shatilov's firing-line, in

prolongation of which they engaged in the fire-

fight. The frontal attacks of Shdanovski 's main

forces were all repelled, the Russians maintaining

themselves, however, in the part of the village

situated on the northern bank.

The attack, made in reliance upon supports

that were promised, thus ended without any

material gain ; it was, of course, evident from

the beginning that four battalions alone would not

be able to snatch from an ever-victorious Japanese

Division anything it was holding, if the promised

aid failed to come up. Neither JVIau's Detachmenthad arrived, nor had Kuropatkin intervened. To-

wards 2.30 p.m. Man's Detachment had reported,

it is true, that it was marching in support of the

corps to San-kia-tsy, on Kuropatkin's personal

' I'he ] et and 2nd Batteries were still on the southern bank of the

Scha-ho


direction ; the attempt, too, had been made of

sending an officer to meet the detachment, so as

to bring it up in the direction on Hou-tai-lin-tsy

:

but the detachment did not arrive, and nothing

more was heard of what had become of it.

When it began to grow dark during these vain

attempts of carrying through the attack, to which

no vigour could be given, from want of fresh sup-

ports, the General Commanding the 10th ArmyCorps resolved to abandon the attack finally. Thetroops on the southern bank of the river were

ordered at 8 p.m. to go back to the northern bank,

but the 36th Infantry Regiment was to hold the

northern part of Scha-ho-pu at all cost.

To prevent being surprised again, all the bat-

teries were sent back for the night to the country

north of Pa-ta-kia-tsy, with instructions to resume

their positions on the northern Scha-ho bank at

daybreak.^

General Slutshevski reported to the Commanderof the Western Group the situation of the 10th

Army Corps, asking him at the same time to send,

during the night, at least one brigade of intact

troops to Pa-ta-kia-tsy ; else his Army Corps,

owing to the loss and exhaustion of the troops,

would be unable to face fresh fights

The 1st Army Corps at Huan-schan was re-

quested by Slutshevski to send back again to the

10th Army Corps the two battalions of the 124th

Infantry Regiment which had been covering the

right Hank of the 1st Army Corps.^

' During the night the Artillery, except one Abteilung, was brought

back still farther north, beyond Hua-schi-lio. * Pp. 252-253.

288 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARThe river was crossed during the night, as

ordered. The troops of the left defensive section

went into bivouac east of Pa-ta-kia-tsy ; the re-

maining portions were probably stationed between

Pa-ta-kia-tsy and Kuan-tun. On the southern bank

of the Scha-ho, La-mu-tun village only remained

occupied by two battalions of the 35th Infantry

Regiment ; the 36th Infantry Regiment was hold-

ing the northern part of Scha-ho-pu, as directed.

Maus Detachment not having arrived after dark,

a General Staff officer was dispatched in search of

it, and to conduct it to Pa-ta-kia-tsy. After manywanderings, the officer found the brigade at last

near Fu-kia-tun-kou at 1 o'clock in the morning.

The men were exceedingly tired, after marching to

and fro on the bad roads softened by rain ; General

Kuropatkin had ordered them, therefore, to spend

the night wherever they would be at dusk.

After its first rapid success the Japanese 3rd

Division had a hard struggle. The last man of

the Division had to be engaged to maintain the

position gained and to beat off the various counter-

attacks. It vainly attempted to recapture from

the Russians also La-mu-tun. When night madeat last an end to the combats, the Japanese re-

mained in the position captured on the Scha-ho,

where they had probably entrenched themselves

during the day. Infantry fire lasted all night in

Scha-ho-pu, without, however, leading to moreserious fighting.

General Kuropatkin, as we mentioned before,^

on the intelligence of the Japanese having pierced

' p. 283.


the front of the 10th Army Corps at dawn, de- General

termined to push with strong forces against the kiuTnes

right flank of the Japanese 3rd Division in relief *^ ^^^^P"

of the 10th Army Corps. The General Command- ho-pu

ing the 1st Army Corps was to advance with the TastVe-^

37th Infantry Division from Yin-schou-tun at the s^''^®^-

Sei-ko-san, whilst the Commander-in-Chief himself

intended to attack with portions of the 22nd In-

fantry Di\dsion from Liian-fan-tun in the direction

on Ku-kia-tsy, east of Hou-tai Hill. General

Baron Meiendorf, commanding the 1st ArmyCorps, who was in his quarters in the neigh-

bourhood of Huan-schan, therefore received, at

9.55 a.m., the following Order

:

" The enemy has broken through the 10th ArmyCorps' position at Hou-tai. AVhile covering your

front, advance to attack the right flank of the

enemy, who is pressing the 10th Army Corps.*' I myself am proceeding to attack with the

reserve, eight or twelve battalions from the 22ndInfantry Division ; for the moment I have only

four battalions. I shall direct my blow from

San-kia-tsy ^ on Ku-kia-tsy; you must direct your

attack so as to let your right touch my left."

Attached to this Order was a sketch showing

the converging advance of both attacking columns

in the direction on Ku-kia-tsy.

After the Commander-in-Chief's directive had

arrived at Headquarters of the 1st Army Corps,

the Chief of the Staff sent the document to Head-quarters of the 10th Army Corps, accompanied bythe following commimication

:

' North-east of Lüan-fan-tun.

19

290 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE AVAR

"Dispatched 11.35 a.m.

" In compliance with the accompanying order

of the Commander-in-Chief, the 37th Infantry

Division, together with its artillery, one sotnia 7th

Siberian Cossack Regiment, and 2nd Siberian

Cossack Battery, which has been standing south

of the villages Yin-schou-tun—Tun-san-tsy, are

advancing at once to attack the right flank

of the Japanese, who have pushed through

the centre of the 10th Army Corps. The same

order has been given to the 1st Battalion 88th

Infantry Regiment, standing in the section east of

Wa-ho-pu-tsy." The Chief of the Staff of the Army wishes

to inform you that he is collecting reserves in your

support."

At the time the Commander-in-Chief, apparently

from Huan-schan, was disposing of the 1st ArmyCorps, and the General Commanding that ArmyCorps was directing the 37th Infantry Division to

march on Ku-kia-tsy, and the Chief of the Staff

of the Army was informing the 10th Corps of the

imminent intervention of these forces, the 37th

Infantry Di^dsion itself was being attacked on all

sides at the Sei-ko-san by portions of the Japanese

1st, 4th, and 2nd Armies, and able only to escape

annihilation by favour of the disturbances in the

weather.^

On the other hand, of the 22nd Infantry Division

1st Army Corps, which, since October 12, had been

broken up, some troops were collected for carrying

' r. 276.


out the intended attack. In addition to the

Commander-in-Chief's last reserve—86th Infantry

Regiment and 2nd Abteilung 7th Artillery

Brigade, from the 1st Army Corps—which

Kuropatkin had retained on October 12, when the

4th Siberian Army Corps was being supported by

portions of the 22nd Infantry Division,^ there

were detailed for this attack : the 88th Infantry

Regiment,- likewise from the 1st Army Corps ; the

2nd and 3rd Transbaikal Cossack Batteries, as well

as the 7th Siberian Cossack Regiment, which,

about 12 noon, had been withdrawn from Pu-tsau-

wa, north-east of the San-kaku-san, into the General

Reserve of the Army. During the afternoon these

forces, by General Kuropatkin's personal arrange-

ments, made a counter-attack from Liu-tsien-tun

in a south-westerly direction against the line Hou-tai-lin-tsy—Tschien-tschan-lin-tsy under the com-

mand of Colonel Sivizki. The attack was at first

accompanied by success on both wings, but, whenmeeting at Hou-huan-hua-tien the reinforced 11th

Brigade of the Japanese 6th Division, it was repelled

by that brigade, with the co-operation of portions

from the Japanese 3rd Division. The attack

therefore could not materially relieve the 10th

Army Corps. The troops engaged in the attack

withdrew again north-east. In the evening they

were standing north-west of Liu-tsien-tun and at

Liian-fan-tun, with outposts on the heights north-

east of Ku-kia-tsy;portions occupied the height

> Pp. 193-194.

' Probably less 1st Battalion^ which had been fighting already on

the heights east of Wa-ho-pu-tsy.


with the isolated tree south of the Scha-ho, after-

wards called Novgorod Hill.

The 85th and 87th Infantry Regiments and the

1st Abteilung 7th Artillery Brigade of the 22nd

Infantry Division, which were ^Wth the 4th Siberian

Army Corps after Kuropatkin had placed them at

the disposal of the General Commanding that

Army Corps on October 12,^ had retired with that

corps on the morning of October 14 from Fön-

kia-pu, where during the night October 13-14 they

had interrupted their retreat, in a north-westerly

direction, by order of Kuropatkin ; the 5th and 8th

Infantry Regiments of the 2nd Siberian Infantry

Division,- and half the 3rd Siberian Infantry

Di\ision, had moved to Örr-tau-kou, the remaining

portions of the 3rd Siberian Infantry Division

being placed as reserve of the Commander-in-Chief

at San-kia-tsy—Lo-sien-tun. Thither was also

directed, by Kuropatkin s direct order, the 85th

Infantry Regiment, which, after its arrival at Fön-

kia-pu,^ had marched on to Orr-tau-kou, to join

the 2nd Siberian Infantry Division. After cooking

its dinner it continued its march to Lo-sien-tun

on muddy roads, at 1.45 p.m., during a violent

thunderstorm ;going, moreover, by roundabout

ways, the troops arrived completely drenched and

exhausted, at their place of destination, only 3 to 4

kilometres distant, which took them several hours

to cover.

The 87th Infantry Regiment was likewise

» p. 193.

^ The 6th and 7th Infantry Regiments were with the 3rd Siberian

Army Corps. (War Organisation, Appendix I.) ' P. 249.


detailed to reinforce the reserves of the Com-mander-in-Chief, the regiment being in the

evening at San-kia-tsy, south-west of Huan-schan.

It is not known where the 1st Abteilung of the

7th Artillery Brigade went to.

The Japanese Gth Division was on October 14TheJapa-• • • . D6S6 24tll

still divided. While General Baron Okubo, com- Brigade

manding the Division, was attacking the heightsß[i^*^pj_

east of Wa-ho-pu-tsy with the reinforced 11th vision

Brigade from Tschien-huan-hua-tien, and Hou- the

huan-hua-tien, covering thereby the right flank off-"^^'*'^

the 3rd Division, as well as facilitating the frontal Army

attack of the 4th Army,^ General Koizumi, with over*the

the reinforced 24th Brigade, was lying opposite the^t ui**

Russian position of the 17th Army Corps between schin-pu.

La-mu-tun and Lin-schin-pu, held by the 137th

and 140th Infantry Regiments.

After the futile attempts of capturing the

strong position on October 13,- General Koizumi

continued his attacks on the 14th. The brigade

had been bivouacking at Schu-lin-tsy, one companyhaving been pushed to Scha-ho Railway Station.

Reconnaissances during the night had established

the following :" Close north of La-mu-tun are

large bivouacs. Lin-schin-pu is being defended

by one battalion entrenched south of the village.

The Scha-ho is fordable everywhere, its bed

affording good cover for an attack on Lin-schin-pu.

The country between La-mu-tun and Lin-schin-pu

is a perfectly open plain ; the attack upon one

of the villages can be flanked from the other

;

both places must therefore be attacked at one

' l\ 291. » V. 2G1.

294 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARand the same time." But the strength of the 24th

Brigade was not sufficient for that purpose ; it

seemed therefore imperative to carry out the attack

jointly with the 4th Division. But the neighbour-

ing Division being itself hard pressed, the brigade

was left for the moment to its own resources.

General Koizumi made, however, some prepara-

tions for carrying out the attack, in case the 4th

Division should be able to render some assistance

:

two battalions occupied Scha-ho Railway Station

at 11.15 a.m., and two battalions crossed the river

at Schu-lin-tsy, deploying along the outskirts of

the northern portion of that place.

The Russian 17th Army Corps had occupied

the position practically in the same way as on

the day before.^ By reconnaissance at night, the

enemy was established to be in force at Scha-ho

Station, at Schu-lin-tsy, Han-kui-pu, and at Ki-

siau-tun. Kuropatkin's directive for the Western

Detachment was for it to hold its position with

obstinacy. General Wolkov had therefore given the

necessary orders to his Army Corps. At 7 a.m.

the officer commanding the 2nd Battalion 137th

Infantry Regiment, in the fire-trenches south of

Lin-schin-pu, reported the approach of three hostile

columns from the direction of Schu-lin-tsy. General

Wolkov then ordered the position to be held to

the utmost. When later, between 10 and 11 a.m..

Headquarters of the 17th Army Corps became

aware of the 10th Army Corps' front having

been pierced at Scha-ho-pu, the General Officer

Commanding sent his last Reserve—two battalions

» r. 250.


of the 140th Infantry Regiment—to La-mu-tun,

for reinforcing his left wing. The troops were

exhorted once more to hold their ground firmly.

Meanwhile, the Japanese had commenced to

attack. When, at 10.30 a.m., two battalions and

a half of the 4th Division adjoining on the left

were advancing from Siau-san-kia-tsy on Lin-

schin-pu, establishing touch with the 24th Brigade,

General Koizumi gave the order for the attack

to be carried through on La-mu-tun and Lin-

schin-pu. Whilst the two battalions holding

Scha-ho Station were unable to gain any ground

over the perfectly open plain towards La-mu-tun,

especially owing to the heavy fire of Artillery

directed upon them, the attack proceeding from

Schu-lin-tsy and Siau-san-kia-tsy on Lin-schin-pu

made good progress. Until noon the firing-line

succeeded in approaching Lin-schin-pu to within

about GOO metres. The attack was supported by

three batteries of the 6th Division attached to

the 24th Brigade, their position being unknown.

The Artillery of the 4th Division had gone into

a fire-position south-west of Tschan-lin-pu during

the night ; but it seems to have taken no part in

the attack on Lin-schin-pu.

On the Russian side, batteries were firing from

the neighbourhood of Ta-lian-tun and Szö-fan-tai

upon the Infantry attacking Lin-schin-pu, as well

as La-mu-tun ; the 2nd Abteilung J35th Artillery

Brigade, from its position north-west of La-mu-

tun, took Scha-ho-pu especially under fire. Thevigour of the attack of the Infantry advancing

against Lin-schin-pu threatened to grow weary


under the effect of this Artillery fire, and all the

more so, because the Russian fighting-line was

also being reinforced at 10 a.m. by a composite

battalion of the 9th Infantry Regiment, and at

12 noon by one battalion from the 12th Infantry

Regiment. General Koizumi therefore ordered

two companies of his reserve to advance from

Schu-lin-tsy along the bed of the Scha-ho river

against the left flank of the enemy's firing-line,

south of Lin-schin-pu, facilitating thereby the

continuation of the attack in front. The two

companies succeeded in coming up entirely un-

noticed and in opening at 400 metres' range

unexpectedly an enfilade fire upon the Russians

in the fire-trench south-east of Lin-schin-pu.

flaking use of the confusion caused thereby, one

of the two companies continued to rush forward,

penetrating into the fire-trench at 1.15 p.m.

JMeanwhile, the other firing-lines attacking in

front had also pushed on, and were now rising to

assault as well ; about 2.30 p.m. the whole of the

enemy's line in front of Lin-schin-pu was captured.

But the Russians were still holding on at the

southern borders of the village, and, reinforced by

reserves,^ were even making repeated counter-

strokes. The Japanese being at that momentshort of ammunition, their situation grew rather

serious. But when, after the arrival of pack-

horses at Schu-lin-tsy, fresh supplies of ammuni-

tion were brought up into the firing-line by

' Details are not known;probably by degrees the two battalions

13S)tb Infantry Regiment were engaged which had been kept back as

sectional reserve uorth-west of Lin-schiu-pu.


companies held in reserve, it was possible to

prepare the assault on Lin-schin-pu by a brisk

fire. The assailants succeeded in penetrating into

the village during the time the thunderstorm

broke in the afternoon. The Russians offered a

determined resistance ; it was only after a long

and severe street-fight that they were pushed back

to the northern edge of the village, where they

still maintained themselves in a group of houses

at the north-west corner of the village. To pro-

tect themselves from the strong Artillery fire

coming from the neighbourhood of Szö-fan-tai, the

assailants at once proceeded to construct somecover. The Infantry fire-fight continued to last

till dark.

The news of the loss of Lin-schin-pu made the

General Commanding the 17th Army Corps feel

very uneasy ; he immediately ordered the village

to be recaptured by the troops charged with the

defence of that section. At 11 p.m. two com-panies of the 140th Infantry Regiment and the

2nd Battalion 12th Infantry Regiment advanced

to attack, probably from the neighbourhood of

Szö-fan-tai ; but the attack failed, in spite of their

gallantry, especially of the companies from the

140th Infantry Regiment,^ owing to the hot fire

of the vigilant Japanese. A small portion only

succeeded in pushing into the village, but their

inferior number was unable to hold its own

;

after a long and obstinate hand-to-hand fight the

Russians were again obliged to abandon Lin-

schin-pu.

' The two companies lost 120 meii^ 70 of whom were killed.

298 THE RUSSO-JAPAXESE WARWhile the combat was raging around the

position of the 35th Infantry Division, General

AYolkov was casting his eyes west, distinctly

expecting the 6th Siberian Army to attack at

last, in his relief, the left wing of the Japanese

2nd Army.The Gth General Soboliev, commanding the 6th Siberian

Army Army Corps, had ordered an advance to be made

amSted ^^^^Y ^^ October 14, in compliance with Bilder-

in tiie hng's directive.^ The corps started at 5 o'clock

bourhood in the morning with a right column from Lan-

kSn-"" schan-pu on Schau-kia-lin-tsy, and with a left

t*y by the column from Pen-tien-tsy on Ta-lian-tun, passingattack of n r^ ^ • -r» 1 1 -nthe Japa- west ot Ku-kia-tsy. Reports stated the villages

Dh'lsfou^^ Sin-tai-tsy, San-kia-tsy, AVu-tschan-yin, Tschan-

lin-pu, and Lin-schin-pu to be occupied by the

Japanese.

When the 6th Siberian Army Corps had

reached with its vanguards the line Schau-kia-

lin-tsy—Ta-lian-tun at 7 a.m., the General Officer

Commanding received from the Commander of

the Western Group the following letter :" Please

begin the attack on Hun-lin-pu—Ta-tai, and

occupy the places mentioned. The 17th ArmyCorps has orders to support you as reserve

;

General Dembovski is instructed to post himself

as a protection for your right flank in the neigh-

bourhood of Pau-sen-tun—Fu-kia-tschuan-tsy. I

request you to start at once, reporting to me."

The movement began by the right column first

turning on Sin-tai-tsy and San-kia-tsy, 800 metres

south of Sin-tai-tsy, and attacking and driving

1 p. 256.


thence the Japanese protective parties^ stationed

there ; the left column, meanwhile, does not seem

to have advanced beyond Ta-lian-tun. The attack

was continued after 9 a.m., the right column taking

now its direction on Ta-tai, and the left by Tschan-

lin-pu on Hun-lin-pu.

On the Japanese side, the 4th Division had

arranged to advance with one battalion and a

half on Ton-tai-tsy whilst the attack on Lin-

schin-pu was proceeding, so as to prevent the

enemy standing there from flanking the attack.

The Artillery of the Division had gone into

position south-west of Tschan-lin-pu ; the reserve

was in a position of readiness south of that place

—

one battalion occupied Wan-tschuan-tsy as a flank

protection.

The Japanese troops detailed to advance on

Ton-tai-tsy seem to have met the 6th Siberian

Army Corps first, forcing its leading portions to

engage in a fire-fight, the Japanese Artillery at

the same time intervening in the action. Thestrongly superior forces of the Russians succeeded

in pushing back the .Japanese for the moment,

thus enabling the Russian right colinnn to occupy,

with portions, Wu-tschan-yin, and the left to

push on to Tschan-lin-pu by Ton-tai-tsy and Ta-

lian-tun. While General Baranowski, commandingthe 72nd Infantry Division, was then continuing

with a portion of the right column his advance

on Pau-tsy-yan, reaching it about 11 a.m., General

^ In Japanese reports nothing is mentioned of protective detachments

standing- in Sin-tai-tsy and San-kia-tsy ; they were therefore probably

quite insignificant parties.

300 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARLaiming, commanding the 55th Infantry Di\asion,

with the left column, was meeting with an ob-

stinate resistance at Tschan-lin-pu. Probably the

main body of the Japanese 4th Division was

being engaged here. In spite of the conspicuous

gallantry of the Russian troops, of whom the

greatest sacrifices were demanded, they did not

succeed in pushing the Japanese from Tschan-

lin-pu. The reason for it was probably, in the

first instance, the antiquated and unsuitable tactics

insisted upon by the Russians the same as ever,

notwithstanding all their bitter experiences.

An eye-witness of the combats on the Japanese

side gives the following account of one of the

Russian attacks on Tschan-lin-pu : "About 11 a.m.

two more battalions advanced from Ton-tai-tsy

;

they acted as if they were attacking a skeleton

enemy ; in Ton-tai-tsy they formed up ; the

mounted officers dismounted and inspected their

troops. Then they moved off in column, forming

a dense firing-line after covering a distance of

300 to 700 metres, and advancing without firing

to within 700 metres of Tschan-lin-pu. When,at that moment, the Japanese Infantry and

Artillery opened fire on them at one and the

same time, they suffered at once severe loss,

and retired completely disorganised."

The Japanese battalion standing in AVan-

tschuan-tsy as flank-guard, and being meanwhile

attacked by the Russian right column, had been

reinforced by the 1st Cavalry Brigade, with one

company and two guns ; afterwards two morecompanies arrived from the Divisional Reserve to


support the left wing of the Division. TheRussian right column, which was to continue its

advance from San-kia-tsy on Ta-tai, succeeded in

approaching the Japanese line at Wan-tschuan-tsy

to within about 500 to 600 metres, where it

commenced to entrench itself. In all attempts

at pushing home the attack, the Russian tactics

failed similarly, as with Laiming's column.

Under the calm and deliberate fire of the

Japanese, the clumsy attack broke down, the

Russian battalions streaming back again in a

hurried retreat north—so hurriedly that the

battery with the column had to leave behind two

guns and five ammunition waggons.^

The disorder arising with the Russians, by their

repulse in the attack, was made use of by the

troops of the 4th and 6th Divisions, opposite Lin-

schin-pu, for a further advance.

After one battalion of the General Reserve had

been placed at the disposal of the 4th Division, the

Russians, at 4 p.m., advanced once more from San-

kia-tsy and Wu-tschan-yin to within 1,000 metres

of the left wing of the Division at Wan-tschuan-

tsy, where they entrenched themselves. TheDivisional Commander, expecting another attack

by the enemy, reinforced the threatened wingby three companies. But the Russians madeno further attack ; they remained for some time

in their position, and then retired north at

dusk. The Japanese followed, with their left, to

Pau-tsy-yan ; the main body of the Division

' The guns were, however, brought back by the Russians during thenight.

302 THE RUSSO-JAPAXESE WARbivouacked within the Hne Lin-schin-pu—Wan-tschuan-tsy.

The Japanese 1st Cavalry Brigade had remained

with its main body at Ho-Hen-tai. One portion

of it, as intimated, supported the left of the

4th Division at AVan-tschuan-tsy, and another

portion occupied Li-kia-tun, posts of observation

being stationed between the latter place and the

Hun-ho. On the Russians advancing to attack

Wan-tschuan-tsy, the battery of the brigade^

came into action, materially contributing by its

flanking lire to the repulse of the attack. It was

at the same time so cleverly placed that three

Russian batteries, appearing at San-kia-tsy to

combat it, were unable either to locate it or

effectively to bombard it.

Towards 6 p.m. General Dembovski's troops

advanced from a westerly direction on Fu-kia-

tschuan-tsy, driving in some Japanese Cavalry

and then occupying Li-kia-tun. The covering

detachment standing there fell back on Tai-pin-

tschuan, where also the squadrons returning from

the 4th Division arrived at 7.30 p.m. Occupying

the villages Fu-kia-tschuan-tsy and Li-kia-tun was

all that General Dembovski thought he could

achieve, and yet he was standing with 14 bat-

talions, 16 sotnias, and 32 guns on the flank of

the Japanese 2nd Army.Headquarters of the Japanese 2nd Army and

its General Reserve remained during the night at

Pan-kiau-pu.

' Less two guns, handed over to the garrison of ^Van-tschuan-tsy

(P. 300.)


At 10 p.m. General Baron Oku issued the fol-

lowing Order

:

*' The viain forces of the enemy are in retreat all

along the line ; some detachments are still makinga stand west of the main road.

"The Srd Division will push back the enemyopposite it on both sides of the Mandarin Road."The 6//^ Division will keep Hou-huan-hua-

tien occupied and support the attack of the 3rd

Division ; General Koizumi's Brigade will attack

La-mu-tun." The Mh Division will support the attack of

General Koizumi's Brigade, but otherwise main-

tain the line occupied to-day.

"The Reserve will assemble at Tschan-sin-tien

to-morrow at 5 a.m. Hcadqnarters of the Armywill be on the Ko-ho-san at 5 a.m."

Portions of the 8th Division having arrived fromhome at Liao-yan/ were moved up by General

Headquarters to Yen-tai ; but they did not comeany more into action.

The day had caused great loss to the Gth Siberian

Army Corps. The 219th Regiment, belonging to

Laiming's column, lost almost all its officers in the

attack on Tschan-lin-pu. As was customary with

the Russians, the companies which had no moreofficers left had then simply retired. General Laim-ing, as well as the officers of his staff, were obliged

to step in personally to conduct the retreating

troops back into action again. Nevertheless, the

repeated attacks failed under the murderous fire

of the enemy. Having regard to the enormous' p. 241

304 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARloss suffered by the left column—2nd Brigade,

55th Infantry Division ^—the General Officer Com-manding ordered the 219th Infantry Regimentto be withdrawn from the fighting-line during a

retrograde movement, and to be replaced by

another regiment.

After its last futile attempts to attack, the ArmyCorps was on the point of entrenching itself north

of Tschan-lin-pu, when the following letter arrived

from the Commander of the Western Detach-

ment, dispatched from Han-tschen-pu village on

the railway

:

"Thanks to your forward move we succeeded

in maintaining the Scha-ho line ; but the lOth and

17th Army Corps had to engage all their reserves.

I request you to lead back for the night your

main body to the line Schau-kia-lin-tsy—Ta-lian-

tun as echelon behind the right wing of the 17th

Army Corps, awaiting in that position further orders

of the Commander-in-Chief. Keep in closest touch

with the 17th Army Corps and take care of your

right flank. Send frequent reports on your situa-

tion. I shall spend the night at Su-5^a-tun village."

"

General Soboliev, on this, led back his ArmyCorps into the position it had been holding early

in the morning at Schau-kia-lin-tsy—Ta-lian-tun.

Although the success of the 6th Siberian ArmyCorps on October 14 was an extremely moderate

one—if it can be called a success at all—yet the

Commander of the Western Detachment saw fit to

' The 219th Infantry Regiment is said to have lost 2,000 men, dead

or wounded.* Near the railway junction, 9 kilometres north of Lin-schin-pu.


express once more his special acknowledgment to the

General Officer Commanding for what he had done.

Next morning Soboliev received the following letter

:

" As an act of duty and comradeship T take the

liberty of expressing to you my deep gratitude for

the timely and vigorous support rendered to us

yesterday by the 6th Siberian Army Corps, en-

abling thereby the Western Detachment, and

especially the 3 7th Army Corps, to sustain the

severe combat with the enemy's main bodies, and

to maintain all the positions they had occupied.

" General Bilderling."

General Grekov's Orenburg Cossack Brigade

seems to have taken no part in the combats of

October 14, but to have remained at Kau-kia-tai.

By continuing their attacks on October 14, the Result of

Japanese had almost gained their object of driving ^^^*"^^''

the Russians from the southern bank of the Scha-

ho ; apart from the low hills west of Liian-fan-tun,

only La-mu-tun remained in the hands of the

Russians.

Of the 1st Army, the left wing—that is to say,

the Guard Division and the 15th Brigade of the

2nd Division—had met as yet with serious resistance

at the Ba-ken-ji-san and Sei-ko-san. Opposite the

right wing of the Army, the Eastern Detachmentfell back without fighting behind the Scha-ho.

The 5th Division, sent in support of the 1st Army,did not become fully engaged, INIarshal MarquisOyama prohibiting the intended attack of the

Division from the Wai-tau-schan on the northern

bank of the Scha-ho.

20

SOG THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WARThe forces of the 4th Army, which had taken

part in the combats, as well as the half-division (6th)

of the 2nd Army, also attacked the Sei-ko-san and

the heights north of it, in close touch with the

1st Army, gaining roughly the line Sei-ko-san

—

Tschien-tschan-lin-tsy.

With the 2nd Army, the 3rd Division succeeded

in piercing the front of the Russian 10th ArmyCorps and pushing to Scha-ho-pu ; its success had,

however, no further effect, the 24th Brigade of

the 6th Division, engaged on the left of the 3rd

Division against the line La-mu-tun—Lin-schin-pu,

as well as the 4th Division, fighting on the left

against the Russian 6th Siberian Army Corps,

being unable to make any progress, apart from

the capture of Lin-schin-pu.

For the Russians the day was one causing only

fresh losses. By using the 6th Siberian ArmyCorps in the impracticable way it was done, that

corps had now lost much of its fighting strength

too.

Of the Centre, the main forces had retired during

the night October 13-14 to the neighbourhood

of Örr-tau-kou, only the 37th Infantry Division of

the 1st Army Corps and JNlishtshenko's Detach-

ment remaining without any object still south of

the Scha-ho. As could be anticipated, they were

attacked there again, and pushed back to the

northern bank of the Scha-ho with loss.

In spite of all the failures of the day, Kuropatkin

concentrated in the neighbourhood north-west of

Fön-kia-pu strong reserves, with which he int^nd^d

to assume the offensive presently.

I


October 15

Early on October 15, Oyama's Headquarters The Japa-

issued the following General Order

:

"^dVth" 1. The First, Fourth, and Second Armies have Armies

pushed the enemy north. posftion*

" 2. Marshal Marquis Oi/ama intends to re- ^^ ^^^^^'

organise the troops and prepare for continuing the south of

{^ . the Scha-oiiensive. ho.

" 3. The First Army will reorganise its forces sketch 9.

south of the line Tai-kua-tun^—Hsin-lun-tun,"

reconnoitring on INIukden ; the 12th Division and5th Kobi Brigade will remain south of Bian-

yu-pu-sa.

" 4. The bth Division will rejoin the Fourth

Army.^*' 5. The Fourth Army will hold the line Pu-

tsau-wa*—heights north of Tschien-tschan-lin-tsy,

reconnoitring on Mukden." 6. The Second Army will gain the line Scha-

ho-pu—Lin-schin-pu ; it will reconnoitre west of

the Hun-ho."

Based on this Order, General Kuroki directed

General Baron Ino-uye's Detachment to movefrom Schan-schi-tsiau-tsy ^ somewhat farther north.

The 12th Division, reinforced by the 5th KobiBrigade, therefore marched to the neighbourhood

of Sia-pin-tai-tsy. Opposite of it, on the heights of

Kan-to-li-san, portions of the 2nd Siberian Army' 1 "G kilometres north-east of the Kin-cho-san.' 4 kilometres north-west of Tai-kua-tuu.» r. 240.

* 3 kilometres west of PIsin-lun-tiin.

' Ji kilometres south of ßian-yu-pu-sa.

308 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARCorps and of the 1st East Siberian Rifle Division

entrenched themselves. The 2nd Cavahy Brigade

continued its reconnaissance in a northerly direction

from San-kia-tsy on the Tai-tsy-ho. The 3rd

Brigade of the 2nd Division, under General Mat-

sunaga, which on the 14th had advanced to Schan-

pin-tai-tsy, 5 kilometres south-east of Bian-yu-pu-sa,

was relieved of its task of cutting off the Russians,^

and marched to rejoin the rest of its Division

—

probably by INIan-hua-pu, 3 kilometres north of

the Wai-to-san. The 5th Division received orders

to start returning from the Wai-tau-schan to the

4th Army on the 16th.'

The Guard Division seems to have advanced

somewhat from the position it had reached at the

Sen-san and Kin-cho-san^ on the 14th, pushing its

outposts farther east to the Tsio-tso-schan, and

occupying and fortifying the low heights south-

east of Fön-kia-pu, facing north and north-east.

On the left, the 15th Brigade of the 2nd Division

adjoined, holding the Ba-ken-ji-san. General

Umesawa's Brigade, after departing from General

Baron Ino-uye's Detachment, was marching to

San-kia-tsy,'*' with the object of remaining there at

the disposal of General Headquarters.''

The disposition of the 4th Army on October 15

is not known in detail ; it probably advanced to

the line Pu-tsau-wa—heights north of Tschien-

tschan-lin-tsy—in conformity ^vith Oyama's Order.

There was no longer any serious fighting on the

15th, either opposite the 1st or the 4th Army.

' P. 200. ^ Pp. 271-272. ' P. 271.

* South-west of Scha-ho-pu. * P. 265.


At times a feeble and ineffective Artillery duel

was carried on. On the other hand, a portion of

the 4th Army had an opportunity of supporting

the 2nd Army, where the combats were con-

tinued.

The Commander of the 2nd Army had requested The Japa-

. nese 2u(i

the 3rd Division to push back the enemy opposing Army

it on both sides of the Mandarin Road.^ But after J!"^!-^^.,portions

the great exertions imposed upon the Division on of the

the previous days, especially on October 14, the Western

troops were no longer able to continue the attack ^gjj^*^'

over the Scha-ho section with sufficient vigour, from

General Baron Oshima confined himself to de- san-ta-

ploying M^eak forces for capturing the low heightsaj^^*"j!f_

north-east of Ku-kia-tsy, on which were standing mu-tun.

advanced detachments of the Russian 86th and

88th Infantry Regiments, from the 1st ArmyCorps.^ Under the severe but ineffective fire of

Russian batteries from the neighbourhood north

of Schan-lan-tsy, to which six Japanese batteries

were replying from Hou-tai Hill, the capture of

the heights mentioned was effected by 10 a.m.

In Tschien-san-ta-kan-tsy the Russians maintained

themselves with greater obstinacy ; the portions

engaged here by the 3rd Division were unable to

push them from the village ; it was only when, at

3 p.m., a detachment of the 4th Army intervened

in the action,^ and continued the attack, that any

progress was made. The Russians evacuated the

village, as well as the small eminence east of it,

retiring to the one-tree hill south of the Scha-ho

;

two guns with two ammunition waggons fell into

1 r. 303. * r. 2Ü1. 3 More detail not known.


the hands of the Japanese, who at once pushed

after the Russians, occupying the small eminence

after sunset.

The reinforced 11th Brigade of the 6th Division

was in the morning in its former position,^ three

battalions standing south of Tschien-tschan-lin-tsy,

and the main body at Hou-huan-hua-tien ; to give

the support to the 3rd Division demanded by the

Army Order, one battalion was pushed forward in

the direction of Tschien-san-ta-kan-tsy ; with the

same object the three batteries of the brigade had

moved into a position of readiness east of Hou-huan-hua-tien. General Baron Oku, after con-

ferring with the Commander of the 4th Army,having gained the impression that there was no

longer any attack of the enemy to be feared from

the east, gave, at 10 a.m., orders to the Commanderof the 6th Division for assembling the troops of the

reinforced 11th Brigade at Kian-hu-tun, 5 kilo-

metres south of Scha-ho-pu. By noon this order

was executed. When next, at 1.20 p.m.. Head-quarters of the 2nd Army received notice of

portions of the 4th Army being on the point of

attacking Tschien-san-ta-kan-tsy in support of the

3rd Division, the 11th Brigade was evidently nolonger wanted in its former section of defence east

of Scha-ho-pu. General Baron Oku therefore

ordered the Commander of the 6th Division to

support with his whole strength the attack of the

24th Brigade on La-mu-tun ' ; for this purpose

the Artillery of the 11th Brigade was to come into

action at San-kia-tsy, south of La-mu-tun, and to

^ P. 293 2 p_ 303^


be under the orders of the Artillery Commanderof the Division.

The 24th Brigade of the 6th Division continued,

on the morning of October 15, the attack on

La-mu-tun, which it had begun already on

October 13. One battalion from the General

Reserve at Tschan-sin-tien was placed at the

disposal of the brigade ; General Koizumi engaged

this battalion to reinforce the two battalions at

Scha-ho Station, with orders to press home nowthe attack on La-mu-tun. The three batteries

of the brigade had to support the attack from

their fire-position at Schu-lin-tsy. The garrison of

Lin-schin-pu was also directed to co-operate against

La-mu-tun : but the forces standing there were

held fast by a counter-attack of the Russians.

About 6 a.m. three Russian battalions, probably

from the 12th Infantry Regiment, suddenly ap-

peared about 30 metres in front of the village,

having approached from the 17th Army Corps'

position in rear, at Szö-fan-tai—Yin-kuan, by

making able use of the cover afforded by the

group of houses north of Lin-schin-pu. By the

rapid fire of the defenders their further advance

was stayed for the moment ; but, when two morebattalions then came up in their support, the whole

line, with the greatest gallantry, made a rush for

the village. A furious hand-to-hand struggle

ensued, in which the Russians were ultimately

the vanquished. With great loss, they retired on

Szö-fan-tai, where they were supported by fresh

troops. Under these circumstances, the Japanese

battahons at Scha-ho Station were left to their


own resources in their attack on La-mu-tun. At7.30 a.m. they began to advance, but were gaining

ground very slowly, because the defenders, being

well covered by the clay wall surrounding the

village, were difficult to reach by the Japanese

fire, and because Russian batteries were enfilading

the Japanese attack, as on the day before, from the

neighbourhood of Szö-fan-tai. About 9 a.m. the

Japanese had worked up their way to within 600

metres of the village—farther they could not go

for the present ; a hot stationary fire-action then

originated.

When, at 11 a.m.. Headquarters of the 2nd

Japanese Army was informed of the difficulties

the attack on La-mu-tun was encountering, the

whole of the Artillery reserve came into action

to support it, and was placed under uniform

command. At 12.30 p.m. thirteen batteries,^ on

the line Tschan-sin-tien—Pa-kia-tsy, opened fire

on La-mu-tun. At 1 p.m. the Commander of

the 24th Brigade was informed that the rest of

the 6th Division had also been detailed for the

attack on La-mu-tun. The 23rd Infantry Regi-

ment, standing in Lin-schin-pu, having about this

time to ward off a counter-attack of the Russians,

and the enemy having evidently been reinforced

in La-mu-tun, General Koizumi decided to await

the co-operation of the 11th Brigade before he

continued the attack.

Towards 3 p.m. the 45th Infantry Regimentarrived at the northern exit of San-kia-tsy, south

of La mu-tun, and began to deploy against La-

' Including a captured Russian field-battery.


mu-tun with two battalions in first line. Thedefender had meanwhile been very much shaken

by the severe Artillery fire, individual groups

commencing already to retire north. It was

therefore not a particularly difficult task which

the 45th Infantry Regiment had to perform. Theattack, which the battalions from Scha-ho Station

had also resumed, was then carried out almost

without a single stop ; at 4 p.m. the southern

portion of the village was captured after a short

fire-action, and at 4.40 p.m. the portion also on

the right bank of the Scha-ho. The Russians

retired north, pursued by a hot fire of Infantry

and Artillery.

Noticing this failure, the Russian detachments,

which had again advanced against Lin-schin-pu,

now also gave up their attack. The Russian

trenches on either side of Lin-schin-pu had been

evacuated already early in the afternoon. Theretrograde movement, which the Japanese never

expected, began in the section between Lin-schin-

pu and the railway, and was spreading everywhere.

In the evening the whole of the Scha-ho position

was abandoned by the Russians.

The right of tlie Japanese 4th Division supported,

from Siau-san-kia-tsy, the garrison of Lin-schin-pu

in repulsing the enemy's attacks. The Division

was unable to make any progress against the

strongly occupied line of the Gth Siberian ArmyCorps west of the Scha-ho, between Ta-lian-tun

and San-kia-tsy, which was being supported by a

long row of batteries at Schau-kia-lin-tsy.

The main body of the Japanese 1st Cavalry

314 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARBrigade, reinforced by two companies of the

4th Division, tried to push General Dembovski's

troops again from Li-kia-tun.^ But that village

and Fu-kia-tschuan-tsy proved to be too strongly

occupied ; the attack was, moreover, being enfiladed

by two Russian batteries from a northerly direction.

The Cavalry Brigade, after failing to capture Li-

kia-tun till sunset, was concentrated at Tai-pin-

tschuan. The Russians evacuated Li-kia-tun

during the night ; the village could then be

re-occupied by portions of the brigade.

A detachment of the Cavalry Brigade was

standing during the day at Han-schan-tai, main-

taining itself there, in spite of repeated attempts

by General Dembovski's troops to push it back

from there.

The 2nd Army, having attained the object

assigned to it by the General Order for the 15th,

General Baron Oku did not intend to advance

any farther. Army Headquarters went back for

the night to Schi-li-ho ; the General Reserve was

being assembled at Tschan-sin-tien.

As we can guess already, from the acknowledg-

ment addressed by General Baron Bilderling to

the General Commanding tlie Gth Siberian ArmyCorps,^ he looked upon the task of the Gth Siberian

Corps, as well as of Dembovski's Detachment, as

altogether accomplished ; neither of these two

commanders received any intimation for continuing

the attack on the left wing of the Japanese 2ndArmy. General Soboliev, being not inclined to

advance on his own initiative, in view, probably,

1 P. 302. » p. 305.


of the bloody action on October 14, confined him- The Rus-

self, from his position between Schau-kia-Hn-tsy Army

and Ta-Han-tun, to replying with his batteries at^^J^^^tes

Schau-kia-lin-tsy to the Artillery fire the Japanese its posi-

4th Division was keeping up in a half-hearted the Scha-

manner. Dembovski's Detachment, likewise, re-^'^^j^^j^^_^J^"

mained standing inactive at Pau-sen-tun, Fu-kia- and La-- 1 T • 1 • . T • i j_

mu-tun in

tschuan-tsy, and Li-kia-tun, merely mtent on face of

repelling any attempts of the Japanese 1st CavalryJ^^j^^*"

Brigade to attack. theJapa-

The 17th Army Corps had been hotly engaged in Army"

the fight for Lin-schin-pu and La-mu-tun since theJj'Jg/fj^,,

morning of October 15, the action increasing initsposi-

violence towards noon. When, about that time, farther

Headquarters of the 6th Siberian Army Corps JJ^rth«'^^

received intelligence of portions of the 17th Army of Yin,

Corps evacuating the first position at Lin-schin-pu

under the pressure of the enemy, and retiring to

the second position on the line Ku-kia-tsy

—

Szö-

fan-tai, the whole of the 40 guns, which were

engaged in the Artillery combat, transferred their

fire, by Sobohev's order, to the section of the

17th Army Corps, which was in imminent danger ;

the 285th Infantry Regiment was, moreover,

moved up to Ta-lian-tun from the reserve stand-

ing at Kuan-lin-pu, to cover, at the request of

the Commander of the 35th Infantry Division, the

right flank of the first position, w^hich was much

shaken already. For the rest, the Gth Siberian

Army Corps retained its former position ; the four

Infantry regiments—285th, 28Gth, 288th, and 220th

—belonging to three different brigades, and seven

batteries were, in the evening, ui the entrenched

316 THE RUSSO-JAPAx\ESE AVAR

line Schau-kia-lin-tsy — Ta-lian-tun ; the 287th

Infantry Regiment, as well as the much reduced

219th Infantry Regiment, with three batteries, were

standing in reserve at Kuan-lin-pu. Touch with

General Dembovski's Detachment was effected

by a sotnia of Ural Cossacks, which, at the same

time, was charged with securing the right flank

of the Army Corps.

The evacuation of the position held by the

3oth Infantry Division astride of Lin-schin-pu,

coming as a surprise even to the Japanese,

must be attributed to the unsuitable measures

adopted. In his Order for October 15, the General

Commanding the 17th Army Corps had arranged

for the Commander of the 35th Infantry Division

to send back, on October 15, all the troops he

had received from the 3rd Infantry Division as

reinforcement on the 14th. There was no difficulty

in bringing back to the 3rd Infantry Division the

two battalions of the 12th Infantry Regiment, one

of which had been engaged in Lin-schin-pu, and

the other in the nocturnal counter-attack on Lin-

schin-pu ;^ two companies of the 9th Infantry

Regiment, which on the day before had fought

in the trenches south of Lin-schin-pu, could be

sent back without any trouble too ; but it was

not possible, for the moment, to return again the

other two companies of the 9th Infantry Regiment.

These companies were being engaged in the section

close east of Lin-schin-pu, just at the moment' On October 14, in the erening, jointly with two companies of the

140th Infantry Regiment. (P. 207.) 'Hie renewed attack on Lin-

schin-pu early on October ITj was probably als;o made by battailous of

the 12th Infantry Regiment. (P. 311.)


when the southern portion of the village was

captured by the Japanese ; it was their task,

therefore, to cover the right flank of the section

Lin-schin-pu—railway against the hostile garrison

of that village. The Russians not succeeding in

recapturing Lin-schin-pu, the task of the two

companies continued the same for the night, as

well as for the coming day. It, therefore, did not

seem feasible to withdraw them from their position.

But during the day urgent requests were repeatedly

addressed to the Commander of the 35th Infantry

Division to send the two companies to Han-tschen-

pu as reserve for the Army Corps. ^ Although

General Dobrshinski begged to be allowed to wait

until it was dark, the General Commanding de-

manded the execution of the order given. TheDivisional Commander then issued the order for

the departure of the two companies ; he intended,

in case of need, to move into their place one

battalion of the 138th Infantry Regiment, which,

during the night, had been detailed to the left

section.

General Wolkov, commanding the 17th ArmyCorps, had meanwhile taken measures to occupy

Han-tschen-pu and Kuan-tun, east of the railway,

with portions of his reserve, should retreat become

necessary ; he had, moreover, given verbal in-

structions to Colonel Martynov,^ commanding the

left section, " that, should the right section retire,

he was to fall back likewise behind the line Han-' Two battalions of the 10th Infantry Regiment had been there

already since the evening of October 14 ; the composite battalion of

the 9th Infantry Regiment was to join them in addition.

* Commanding the 140th Infantry Regiment.

318 THE KUSSO-JAPANESE WAKtschen-pu—Kuan-tun, and not to make a stand

again before he reached that hne, so as not to

mask the fire from the position in rear." This

order, of wliich the Commander of the 35th

Infantry Division had. not been informed, entailed

some undesirable and unexpected consequences;

for when, at 3 p.m., the two companies of the

9th Infantry Regiment, during a pause in the

action, retired in groups, led by their officers, to

march to Han-tschen-pu as directed, the adjoining

portions of the 138th Infantry Regiment began

to evacuate their positions too. These were joined

by others, thus causing the whole section between

Lin-schin-pu and the railway gradually to be

abandoned. True, at some places it was possible

to make the retreating forces see the mistake they

had made, and to induce them to re-occupy the

position ; but the movement had already made such

progress as to make it altogether impossible to

hold the position between Ta-lian-tun and La-mu-

tun any longer. The order had therefore to be

given to abandon the Scha-ho position, and to halt

again in the second position Szo-fan-tai—Yin-

kuan—Kuan-tun. The 138th and 140th Infantry

Regiments, under a most severe fire of Japanese

Artillery, entrenched themselves on the line Yin-

kuan—Kuan-tun, in which portions of the 36th

Infantry Regiment had commenced digging

trenches already on October 13.^ The evacuation

of the Scha-ho position, commencing at 3 p.m.,

' Losses

:

1.38th Infantry Regiment : 4 officers, 48 men.

UOth „ ,, 8 ,, 217 „


was probably also the main cause why the Japanese

6th Division, after its former vain attempts,^ was

able to execute the attack on La-mu-tun without

delay at 4 p.m.

During the time the 35th Infantry Division was

evacuating the Scha-ho position, fresh disquieting

reports were coming in ; it was said that strong

forces of the enemy were being concentrated at

Ki-siau-tun and Schu-lin-tsy, on both banks of

the Scha-ho, south of Lin-schin-pu ; and it was

feared that the Japanese were on the point of

advancing against the second position. No more

fresh reserves being available, the Commander of

the 35th Infantry Division resolved to stop the

enemy from continuing his attack by massed

Artillery fire.

All the batteries of the Division were directed

to sweep and search by their fire the area in which

the Japanese were supposed to be concentrating.

An exceedingly violent cannonade developed

;

within 40 minutes, of which 20 minutes must be

deducted for observation and change of target, the

48 guns engaged fired about 8,000 rounds." Theresult of this rapid fire is said to have been" splendid." According to reports from observing

officers, the Japanese had been thrown into the

greatest confusion ; columns had been literally

scattered ; the men had dispersed, and had dis-

appeared behind houses and in the folds of the

ground. Of losses suffered, the observing officers

> p. 313.

* Each gun 166 rounds, i.e. 8 to 9 rounds per minute (allo«-ing" ?0

©inutcis for .^ctug,,! .firings).

320 THE KUSSO-JAPANESE WARdid not mention anything. The Russian massed

Artillery fire not being mentioned in Japanese

reports, its effect seems to have been very small

only ; it was, at any rate, out of all proportion

to the enormous amount of ammunition spent.

But as the Japanese desisted from continuing then*

attacks, confining themselves to occupying the

position abandoned on the Scha-ho, the Russians

believed this result to have been brought about by

their Artillery.

Tlie Rus- After the proceedings of October 14, General

Armv^ Slutshevski, commanding the 10th Army Corps,Corps looked forward with anxiety to what might happen

weak pro- on the 15th. He was afraid the Japanese were

dSch- going to continue their attack beyond the Scha-ho,

meiits on and believcd his troops unfit to resist another on-tne Sena- ,,f. ,. n ^ jho, and slaught after the precedmg exhaustmg nght, and

en^S*^' ^^1 ^^^ i^ore unfit when INIau's Detachment hadposition not vet arrived from Örr-tau-kou by 2 o'clock insouth of "^

. n ^ r-\ 1

Pa-ta-kia- the mornmg.^ The officer of the 1st Orenburg*®^* Cossack Regiment, who had been dispatched in

search of tliis detachment at 2.30 p.m. on the

14th," returned without having effected his object.

No hope being thus held out for the arrival of

the anxiously looked-for reserve at daybreak, the

Chief of Staff of the 10th Army Corps informed

the Chief of Staff of the Western Detachment at

2.30 a.m. of the httle-hopeful views entertained by

his Commanding General on the situation, asking

at the same time for any fresh body of troops to

be sent to the Mandarin Road as reserve. The

reply to this request is not known ; but the ques-

• p. 288. * Pp. 286-287.


tion of support became less urgent, because the

Japanese did not continue their offensive against

the 10th Army Corps either during the night

or on the next day. Early on the morning of

October 15 the General Staff officer who had been

dispatched to Man's Detachment ^ returned, more-

over, with the reassuring report of the detachment

having spent the night at Fu-kia-tun-kou, and of its

going to march at daybreak to Pa-ta-kia-tsy. Atnoon the Quartermaster-General of the Army gave

the additional information of the 85th Infantry

Regiment from the General Reserve, together with

a battery of the 7th Artillery Brigade, going to

start about 12 noon f»'om San-kia-tsy, 3 kilometres

south-west of Huan-schan, north of the Scha-ho,

with the object of joining the 10th Army Corps.

Somewhat later this information was supplemented

by an order arriving from Kuropatkin, saying that

this regiment was to be looked upon as the last

reserve, and to be engaged only in the very last

instance.

The reinforced 1st Brigade of the 31st Infantry

Division, under General JNIau,^ arrived at last at

Pa-ta-kia-tsy at 12 noon, and the 85th Infantry

Regiment at 6 p.m. These troops now formed

the " general reserve " of the corps, being posted

north of that village.

On the orders of Kuropatkin and of the Com-mander of the Western Detachment, to offer an

• p. 288.* The 121st and 122ntl Infantry Regiments, the 1st and 7th Batteries

of the 31st Artillery Brigade, tlie 3rd Sotnia of tlie 1st Orenburg Cos-

ßack Regiment, and one Sapper company. (1*. 36, footnote 2.)

21

322 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARobstinate resistance to the enemy in case of attack,^

the fortifications of the position south of Pa-ta-kia-

tsy, which had been commenced already the day

before, were continued on October 15. Theposition was divided into two sections : the right

section, stretching from Kuan-tun village to the

IVIandarin Road, was occupied by the 2nd Brigade

31st Infantry Division^ as well as by two bat-

talions of the 35th Infantry Regiment, under

General Wassiliev ; in the left section, east of the

Mandarin Road, was the 9th Infantry Division,'

under General Gerschelmann, commanding the

Division. Of the 35th Infantry Regiment two

battalions, jointly with portions of the 17th ArmyCorps, were still fighting at La-mu-tun ;

* between

that village and the northern portion of Scha-ho-

pu, which was still being held by the 36th Infantry

Regiment,^ there remained only weak detachments

on the right bank of the Scha-ho. To keep in

touch with the 1st Army Corps, Wu-kia-tun was

occupied by two sotnias of the 1st Orenburg Cos-

sack Regiment.

The Artillery of the Army Corps was movedup from Hua-schi-ho in the afternoon only. Thebatteries came into action south of Pa-ta-kia-tsy,

on both sides of the INIandarin Road, taking the

southern portion of Scha-ho-pu under fire. TheJapanese Artillery rephed to the fire, but not

vigorously.

* Pp. 283-285. It is not certain wlien Kuropatkin gave the order

to that effect.

» 'fhe 123rd and 124th Infantry Regiments.^ Less the 35th Infantry Regiment.* P. 282. * Pp. 287-288


The Commander-in-Chief was standing with his General

Staff on the hill east of Schan-lan-tsy. He was i^jJJ^jPf

*"

planning an offensive for October 16, with the^'^^^^toattack

Western Detachment and all the reserves he had with the

available. But to do this it was necessary for the Dg^aSi"

Army to hold its present positions on the 15th. ment and

Kuropatkin therefore became very indignant when, reserve«

quite unexpectedly, the 10th Army Corps reportedbe/i6*°"

that the General Officer Commanding was deter-

mined to evacuate the position north of the Scha-ho.

This information was, however, wrong, and seems

not to have emanated from General Slutshevski.

The facts were the following

:

When General Slutshevski, in the morning, re-

ceived from the Quartermaster-General the rather

hazy intelligence " that those units of the 1st ArmyCorps which had captured the height of Hou-tai

on October 14"^ would be handed over to the

10th Army Corps, when he knew nothing about

the capture of the height indicated, he charged the

Commander of the 0th Infantry Division with

clearing up the matter. When next a report camefrom Colonel Sivizki, who on October 14 had con-

ducted the attack from Liu-tsien-tun in a south-

westerly direction under the immediate orders of

Kuropatkin, that he was standing on One Tree

Hill- at the disposal of the 10th Army Corps, with

the 88th Infantry Regiment, 3 battalions of the

* Colonel Sivizki's troops were evidently referred to, who, onOctober 14, had carried out the attack from Liu-tsien-tun in a south-

westerly direction. (P. 291.) They had, however, not captured the

height at Hou-tai, but had only pushed to the neighbourhood of Hou-tai-lin-tsy.

* Afterwards called Novgorod Hill.

324 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR86th Infantry Regiment, and 1 company each of

the 87th Infantry Regiment and 11th Siberian

Infantry Regiment, as well as with 4 batteries of

the 7th Artillery Brigade, a General Staff officer

was dispatched to him Avith the order to support

the left of the corps, and, should the Japanese

advance to attack the 10th Army Corps, to take

the enemy's right flank under Artillery fire from

the height. The General Staff officer was, more-

over, directed to inquire, in passing the Commander-

in-Chief, whether the troops mentioned of the 1st

Army Corps were actually at their entire disposal,

or were charged with a special task. If on that

occasion the Commander-in-Chief should inquire

after the situation of the Army Corps, this officer

was to report that, "having regard to the great

exhaustion of the troops and their bad condition

after the combats of October 14, the Army Corps

was unfit for active employment on that day,

but that, after the expected arrival of Man's De-tachment, the General Officer Commanding was

counting on being able to maintain his position." ^

But, as a matter of fact, the General Staff

officer reported to the Commander-in-Chief some-

thing quite different, as can be guessed from the

written reply Kuropatkin handed to the bearer :

** The officer you dispatched reported to meyou were determined to evacuate the Scha-ho

position.

*' 1 direct your attention to the fact that such a

step would entail the retreat of the whole Army.

' General Slutshevski insists upon having charged the officer with

delivering tliis report.


If you have no confidence in the troops placed

under your command, I recommend you to remind

them by your personal example of the glory of

the colours under which they are ser\dng.

" Supported you shall be to the utmost ; of

retreat there can be no question !

" You have completely misled me by your

report of yesterday, as I inferred from it that

Scha-ho-pu had been recaptured." ^

Verbally, the Commander-in-Chief added that

the 10th Army Corps was to hold its position at

all cost.

The officer was further told that the detachment

on One Tree Hill was now under the commandof General Novikov,^ and entirely at the disposal

of the 10th Army Corps. On the General Staff

officer expressing some doubts regarding the

capture of the Hou-tai height on the day before,

General Kuropatkin replied that its capture by

troops of the 1st Army Corps had been reported

to him ; it had, moreover, been reported to him

the day before, that General Gerschelmann had

recaptured Scha-ho-pu,^ in consequence of which

he had initiated the attack, not on Scha-ho-pu,

but ftu'ther south.

With the 10th Army Co^ps nobody knew any-

thing about a report on Scha-ho-pu ; but no

' Tlie misunderstanding may have arisen l)y the General Staff

officer explaininj^ to tlie Commander-in-Chief where the 10th ArmyCorps had been standing with the main bodies on the morning of

October 1.5. The officer probably did not mention the weak outposts

in the actual Sclia-lio position.

* Commanding the 1st Brigaile 22nd Infantry Division.

^ As a matter of fact, the portion of Scha-lio-pu north of the ri\-cr

was still iu possession of the 10th Army C'orps ou October 15,

326 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARattempt was made of clearing up the matter

either.^

During all that time, at Tschien-san-ta-kan-tsy

the action was still going on, ending with the

retreat of the Russian advanced troops of the

86th and 88th Infantry Regiments to One Tree

Hill, and with the occupation of Tschien-san-ta-

kan-tsy village, as well as the small eminence east

of it, by portions of the Japanese 3rd Division.'^

Although Kuropatkin had only a moment before

expressly emphasised the fact that retreat was

out of the question, he himself suggested to the

General Commanding the 10th Army Corps a

few hours afterwards to retire a little. When,in the afternoon, the evacuation of the 17th ArmyCorps' advanced position had become known,

Kuropatkin dispatched the following letter to

General Slutshevski

:

*' According to reports I have received, the 17th

Army Corps has retired a little. I leave it to you

to retire likewise somewhat for the time being.

" Novikov's Detachment of seven battalions and

a half (of the 86th, 87th, 88th, and 11th Infantry

Regiments), with artillery, will secure your left

flank.

*' The height east of Schan-lan-tsy will be

' Wlien^ afterwards^ the General Staff officer brought General

Slutshevski's order to General Novikov on One Tree Hillj to support

the left wing of the 10th Army Corps, he happened to mention also the

capture of the Hou-tai height. It came to light that an error had

been committed : the Russian troops who made the attack on

October 14 did not capture Hou-tai Hill, but temporarily occupied

a height situated farther east ; it was probably the eminence north

of Tschien-tschan-lin-tsy,

' P. 309,


occupied, and the position on both banks of the

Scha-ho entrenched, as I have directed.

" Of my General Reserve I have pushed twelve

battalions to Tou-sien-tun ; 22 battalions, under

General Gerngross, remain at San-kia-tsy.

" With these forces I intend to make a decisive

attack to-morrow."

Only weak protective parties of the 10th ArmyCorps being on the Scha-ho, whilst its main

bodies were holding the entrenched position south

of Pa-ta-kia-tsy, there was no reason for retiring

farther back without being forced by the enemy.

The request addressed to General Slutshevski,

therefore, to go back makes it appear as if

Kuropatkin was even then not yet clearly informed

of how the 10th Army Corps was disposed. TheCommander-in-Chief, moreover, in spite of the

assurance distinctly given, that Novikov's Detach-

ment was under tlie orders of the 10th ArmyCorps, seemed to wish to dispose of it himself,

as is apparent from his remark about the flank

protection and the construction of a position on

both banks of the Scha-ho.

Not many changes were made in the dis- The,, , _^ , ^ /-v 1

Russianposition or the Russian Centre on October 15. Centre

Of the 1st Army Corps, the 37th Infantry Divisionen^ife***"

remained at Örr-tau-kou, whither it had retired tachment

r^ 1 1 * 1 n^ 1 T • • establishon October 14. At the lo-san, and adjoining them-

east, were the two half-divisions of the 4thpo^sjtimis

Siberian Army Corps ;- on the left was standing »orth of

Mishtshenko's Detachment,^ with which was as ho.

yet the 4th East Siberian Rifle Regiment." These

' r. 27(1 » p. 240. » V. 270.: * 1\ 234,

328 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARtroops entrenched a continuous line, stretching

from the country north-west of Örr-tau-kou over

the To-san in the direction on the Tio-to-san.

The troops under General Gerngross,^ dis-

patched by the Eastern Detachment for forming

the General Reserve of the Army, arrived on

October 15 at Lo-sien-tun, 2 kilometres south-

west of Huan-schan. The Commander-in-Chief,

who had billeted in Huan-schan, thus had at his

disposal 411 battalions,^ with Artillery attached,^

including Novikov's Detachment, standing on the

heights west of Liian-fan-tun.

The remainder of the Eastern Detachment did

not continue its retreat. The 1st Brigade of the

.5th East Siberian Rifle Division, with the battalion

of the 2nd Siberian Infantry Regiment attached to

it by the ^Var Organisation, and four batteries,

occupied a position on the Hou-ho,* from Tsai-

kia-tun to Kan-to-li-san ; one detachment was

pushed to Tso-kou. On the left, to the east, the

' p. 267.

' 1. 9th East Siberian Rifle Division (from 1st

Siberian Army Corps) . . . . .12 battalions.

2. loth and 20th East Siberian Rifle Regiments

(from 2nd Siberian Army Corps) ... 6 ,,

3. 213th Infantry Regiment (from 5th Siberian

Army Corps) ...... 4 ,,

4. Half 3rd Siberian Infantry Division (from 4th

Siberian Army Corps) ..... 8 „5. Novikov's Detachment (from 1st Army Corps) 7^ }>

4 batteries.

6. 87th Infantry Regiment (from 1st ArmyCorps) ........ 4 battalions.

Total 411 battalions.

' It was not possible to ascertain the number of batteries in detail,

* Right tributary of the Scha-ho.


1st East Siberian Rifle Division,^ from the 1st

Siberian Army Corps, adjoined, its left reaching

as far as east of Yin-pan. The 3rd Siberian Army-

Corps continued in its former position, with the

main body at the Kau-tu-hn Pass, and with its

rearguard on the Hne Schun-schui-tsy—Wan-fu-hnPass.^ Headquarters of the Eastern Detachmentbilleted in the Ya-ma-lin-tsy.

October 15 showed Oyama's efforts to finish the Result of

battle as quickly as possible. All was quiet already 15.

with the 1st and 4th Armies. The troops on the

southern bank of the Scha-ho proceeded to entrench

their positions—the 12th Division, with the 5th

Kobi Brigade, south of Bian-yu-pu-sa ; the GuardDivision and the 15th Brigade of the 2nd Division,

in the neighbourhood south of Fön-kia-pu ; and

the 4th Army, in touch with the 1st, between Pu-tsau-wa and Hou-tai-lin-tsy. Nor did anything

of importance occur on both wings of the 2nd

Army ; the 3rd Division captured Tschien-san-ta-

kan-tsy, and the 4th maintained the positions it

had gained already on October 14. The 6th

Division alone, now again re-united, continued its

attacks on La-mu-tun, the Russian 17th ArmyCorps falling back before it from the Scha-ho to

its position in rear, between Szö-fan-tai and Yin-

kuan.

On the Russian side, October 15 may be charac-

terised almost as a day of rest too. The portions

of the Eastern Detachment which had remained

under Stackelberg's orders entrenched themselves

' Less the 4th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, being with Mishtshenko's

Detachment, ^ P. 2(57.

330 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARgenerally on the line Kan-to-li-san—Kau-tu-lin

Pass, and the Centre—half the 4th Siberian and

half the 1st Army Corps—north of Fön-kia-pu.

The 10th Army Corps, after its front was pierced

on October 14, held the Scha-ho section with out-

posts only, taking up the positions of readiness

south of Pa-ta-kia-tsy on October 15, with the

main bodies. The 6th Siberian Army Corps, apart

from Artillery fire, remained inactive opposite the

Japanese 4th Division. Every one of the Western

Detachment felt more and more exhausted. Yet,

for all that, Kuropatkin thought this detachment

still strong enough to advance with it, and, with

the reserves collected at Lo-sien-tun and Tou-sien-

tun, to attack on October 16.

October 16

TheJapa- The Japanese 2nd Army, having attained thenese orce

QJi^jg^^. assigned to it, of Capturing the Scha-hoheie:ht8 section La-mu-tun—lin-schin-pu. HeadquartersCHst or n t -r • t TITSchan- of the Japanese P'leld Army looked upon the

keeping battle as finished. Marshal jNlarquis Oyama seemsoccupied to havc given no order for October 16 ; but the

tions they Armics had been directed to entrench the positions

ainedoccupied ou October 15, and to hold them against

on Octo- any attacks of the enemy, thus causing all move-

ments on the Japanese side to cease generally on

Sketch 10. the morning of October 16.

But, during the night of October 15-16, an

attack was made by some Japanese forces, entail-

ing disastrous consequences for the Japanese arms

afterwards.


The 11th Brigade, having moved on October 15

from the right wing of the 2nd Army to the left

wing, the 6th Division being thus re-united for

the attack on La-mu-tun/ the detachment which

the 5th Division had left behind at Hun-kia-

tschuan, under General Yamada,^ was to moveup to the right of the 3rd Division, thus re-

establishing touch of the 2nd Army with the

main body of the 4th.

The detachment had started on October 15, in

the evening. The object it was to march on is

said to have been a height situated south of Scha-

ho-pu, east of the JNlandarin Road—most likely,

therefore, Hou-tai Hill. But General Yamadadid not find the height indicated, and mistook

for it a group of hills west of I^iian-fan-tun and

Scha-ho-yan, prominent and clearly visible for

some long distance in the flat country. Thecolumn therefore advanced in a direction some-

what more north-easterly, encountering, north of

Hou-san-ta-kan-tsy and Tschien-san-ta-kan-tsy,

outposts of Novikov's Russian Detachment,^ and

pushing them back. The Japanese then attacked

One Tree Hill,"^ as well as the hill east of Schan-

lan-tsy. General Novikov's Russian troops stand-

ing here had received orders already in the

afternoon to evacuate tlie position, as being too

salient of the line held by the 10th Army Corps,

and at dusk had begun to retire across the Scha-ho.

» p. 310.

' The 41st Infantry Regiment and an Artillery Abteilung, rein-

forced by tlie 20tli Kobi Regiment ami two batteries of the 1st Field

Artillery Brigade—altogether 5 battalions and 30 guns. (P. 240.)

» P. 335, * Afterwards called Novgorod Hill,


Only two battalions, the detachments of Scouts

from the 86th and 88th Infantry Regiments, and

two batteries, were as yet standing on the heights

mentioned, covering the retreat. At the momentthe Japanese were making their attack, the 3rd

and 4th Batteries were just being withdrawn

over the river, with the help of some men of the

88th Infantry Regiment. The sudden and violent

fusillade caused great confusion. But soon the

noise of battle abated. About midnight all was

quiet again. During the night the Russian troops,

which had covered the withdrawal of the main

body, remained on One Tree Hill. The main body

bivouacked at Scha-ho-yan and in the trenches

north of it.

On October 16, between 8 and 9 a.m., the

Russian covering troops abandoned One Tree

Hill, owing to a panic, it seems. The whole of

Novikov's Detachment retired, under the fire of

Japanese Artillery, 1 kilometre farther north at

first, and ultimately to Wu-kia-tun. The 1st and

2nd Battalions of the 88th Infantry Regiment

covered their retirement at great sacrifice, two

oflficers and one man of the 4th Company only

being unwounded. The detachment covered

itself by outposts on the line Wu-kia-tun—Fu-

kia-tun-kou ; strength, three companies and five

batteries.

General Yamada's troops at once occupied and

entrenched the position captured on the heights.

For the rest, only individual units of the Japanese

carried out some movements on October 16. Themain forces of the 5th Division were, by Kuroki's


orders, to start from the Wai-tau-schan on

October 16, to rejoin the 4th Army.^ It cannot

be ascertained how far the Division, which left a

battahon on the Wai-tau-schan, actually got on

that day.

General Prince Kan-in's 2nd Cavalry Brigade

advanced to Ko-dai-rei,- in compliance with the

reconnoitring duties it was charged with, but,

encountering there strong Russian forces of the

3rd Siberian Army Corps, withdrew again to

Tschau-huan-tschai.

The 3rd Brigade of the 2nd Division, led by

General JNIatsunaga, which, after the action at the

Tschau-hsien-lin Pass,^ had advanced to Schan-pin-

tai-tsy, with the object of cutting off the Russians,

but was then withdrawn, arrived at Ha-ma-tan at

2 p.m., rejoining the main body of its Division on

tlie following day.

The 5th Division, having left behind on the

Wai-tau-schan only one battalion. General Baron

Kuroki dispatched thither Lieutenant-Colonel

Kani * with three battalions ^ to mve more strength

to the force protecting the right Hank of his Army.One regiment of the Guard Division, which had

been put in motion with the same object, as well

as one mountain battery, ^^ was placed under his

command. The detachment reached the neigh-

bourhood of Tien-liu-yu, south of the ^^^ai-tau-

schan, hearing there that the battalion of the

• P. 308. * 18 kilometres north-east of Bian-yu-pu-sa.» Pp. 230-231. ^ Comuianding tlie 2i)tli Kobi Ilegimeut.^ Impossible to ascertain more detiiils.

* 'ITie mountain battery ])elong^e(l to the 5th Division^ and had beeu

employed with the Guai-d DivLsiou.

334 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR5th Division had been pushed back by superior

forces of the Russians (these were six companies

from the 18th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, be-

longing to the 1st Brigade 5th East Siberian Rifle

Division), and had abandoned the Wai-tau-schan.

Lieutenant-Colonel Kani, however, did not makeany counter-attack, but confined himself to watching

the enemy.

General Umesawa's Brigade, which Oyama had

detailed for his reserve, continued its march to

San-kia-tsy, south-west of Scha-ho-pu.

The at- General Kuropatkin had given his orders in

theVua- conformity with his intention of making a final

«'a" attempt to attack ^ with the newly formed GeneralWestern , .

Detach- Reserve, in co-operation with the Western Detach-

IJ^^i^*^^"^ment. The General Order is not known, but

Russian scems to havc arranged for the Western Detach-Reserves ,

does not ment to attack straight ahead generally, whilst

iSarf- ^^^^ Commander-in-Chief intended to push with

tions are the General Reserve in a south-westerly direction,

made for The hour for commencing the enterprise was to

hirSie"^'^^ communicated separately. The portions of the

heights 1st and 4th Siberian Army Corps standing at Örr-

Schan- tau-kou—the 37th Infantry Division, half the 2nd,lan-tsy.

^^^^ ^vdli: the 3rd Siberian Infantry Divisions, as well

as Mishtshenko's Detachment—were to hold their

positions, supporting the attack by Artillery fire.

Based on the General Order, General Baron

Bilderling issued his orders for the Western

Detachment." The places to be reached by the

troops were fixed rather distant, probably in

compliance with Kuropatkin 's directives.

' p. 323. -' Appendix XIV.


General Dembovski's Detachment, under the

command of the 6th Siberian Army Corps, which

could have taken advantage of its position muchearlier for enveloping the enemy's left wing, was

to push to Tsun-lun-yen-tun on the Scha-ho ; the

unnamed right tributary of the Schi-li-ho was

indicated to the three corps as their objective

—

namely, the 6th Siberian Army Corps was to

reach Tschien-liu-tan-kou ; the 17th Army Corps

the section Liu-tan-kou—Pan-kiau-pu ; and the

10th Army Corps the section Hun-pau-schan

—

Nin-kuan-tun. General Grekov's Orenburg Cos-

sack Brigade, which had last established connec-

tion between the 6th Siberian Army Corps and

General Dembovski's Detachment, was to cover

the right flank of the Army.As a preliminary to the attack, a strong Artillery

fire was opened at daybreak all along the front of

the Western Detachment on either side of Yin-

kuan. The 6th Siberian Army Corps, ^ on its owninitiative, began to advance with some portions.

General Soboliev, thinking it advisable to take

possession of VVu-tschan-yin village for the future

development of the attack, ordered General Bolotov,

commanding the right section of the attack, to

advance against that place. The place was probably

but weakly occupied by the Japanese 4th Division,

the right column of the 6th Siberian Army Corpssucceeding, therefore, in capturing it without gi-eat

loss by 11 a.m. Before continuing the attack

' The 217th Infantry Regiment, belonging to the 1st Brigade 55thInfantry Division 0th Siberian Army Corps, which had remained in tlie

" Position of Tiii-lin," joined the corps. (1*. 4Ü-)

336 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARGeneral Soboliev waited for the order of the

Western Detachment to advance, as it was to be

communicated separately ; but the order never

came. General Dembovski's Detachment seems

to have advanced a little in an easterly direction

as well, but to have stopped again shortly after-

wards.

The Artillery of the 17th Army Corps took

under fire the Scha-ho position held by the Japanese,

and the batteries of the 10th Army Corps fired

from their positions south of Pa-ta-kia-tsy upon

the Artillery of the Japanese 3rd Division at

Hou-tai Hill ; both vigorously replied to that

fire. The distance inter\'ening between the two

Artilleries was 5 to 6 kilometres.

At early dawn two battalions of the 34th Infantry

Regiment, from the 10th Army Corps, advanced

from their position west of AVu-kia-tun across

the river, occupying Schan-lan-tsy. The colonel

commanding the regiment had received the order

for this already the night before ; by occupying

Schan-lan-tsy it was intended to fill the gap

between the 36tli Infantry Regiment in the

northern portion of Scha-ho-pu, and the 33rd

Infantry Regiment in the trenches on the right

bank of the river. But the order having arrived

very late, the regiment had first occupied the

northern portion of the village only ; at daybreak

the southern portion was then taken possession

of. But the battalions could not stay there long;

for, after General Yamada's Detachment had driven

General Novikov from the heights east of Schan-

lan-tsy on the morning of October 16, the Japanese


batteries directed their fire upon the village. Toprevent the troops being altogether annihilated

by the effective flanking fire, the colonel com-manding the regiment obtained from General

Gerschelmann, commanding the 9th Division,

permission to evacuate Schan-lan-tsy again. Thebattalions withdrew into the position of the 33rd

Infantry Regiment north-east of the village, whenColonel Shitkovski, commanding the regiment, waswounded.

On the intelligence of General Novikov's retreat

into the line Wu-kia-tun—Fu-kia-tun-kou, General

Gerschelmann was afraid of losing touch with that

general's detachment ; he therefore ordered a low

eminence at Wu-kia-tun to be occupied by the

other two battalions of the 34th Infantry Regimentwhich had belonged to the sectional reserve.

General Slutshevski, commanding the 10th ArmyCorps, placed, moreover, the 121st Infantry Regi-

ment at the north-east corner of Pa-ta-kia-tsy ready,

in case of need, to support the left wing of the

Army Corps.

At 8.10 a.m. a note came from the Chief of the

Staff of the Army, saying that Novikov's Detach-

ment was withdrawn again from General Slut-

shevski's command, and placed under the orders

of the General Commanding the 1st Army Corps.

The detachment had been ordered by the 10th

Army Corps to hold and strengthen its newposition for the present, because the Commanderof the Western Detachment had apparently

deferred the general attack. Slutshevski had,

moreover, made use of the opportunity of recalling

22

338 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARto his own Army Corps the two battalions of

the 124th Infantry Regiment attached to Novikov's

Detachment. Towards 11 a.m. the two battaUons

of the 35th Infantry Regiment detained by the

17th Army Corps ^ returned at last to the com-

mand of the 10th Army Corps, too, the corps being

thus again completely united, excepting the Artillery

Abteilung the enemy captured on October 14.^

Whilst the Artillery duel was proceeding, which

both adversaries conducted with great violence,

the troops of the Western Detachment were

w^aiting in vain for the order to advance, which

Kuropatkin had reserved to himself. It seems

the successful night attack of General Yamada's

Detachment exerted at first a paralysing influence

on Kuropatkin's decisions in the morning. TheCommander of the Western Detachment is said

to have received at 11.15 a.m. the following com-

munication from the Commander-in-Chief :" I do

not intend carrying out the attack, considering

it sufficient if the Western Detachment holds

the Scha-ho line to-day." Bilderling accordingly

directed his troops to remain in their positions,

the attack being postponed. But inconsistent

with this is a letter sent by Kuropatkin to the

General Commanding the 10th Army Corps in

the afternoon, containing the following

:

" By whose directions has General Bilderling

abandoned the attack ? Don't you think it

necessary to make use of the presence of myreserves for recapturing the village of Scha-ho-pu ?

If you prefer postponing the attack until to-

' Pp. 282-283. - P. 279.


morrow, report to me how you intend preparing

the attack by artillery fire, and whether you do

not think it advisable to take hold of Schan-lan-tsy

village as yet to-day, whence the attack on Scha-

ho-pu could be prepared by common-shell batteries ^

from my reserve. General von Meiendorf's - task

for to-day is to retake One Tree Hill, and the

positions of the 86th and 88th Infantry Regi-

ments. Support General von INIeiendorf by the

fire of your batteries."

Kuropatkin, nevertheless, seems still to have

counted upon the Western Detachment assuming

the offensive on October 16, late in the day as

it was, for at 2.30 p.m. word came from the Chief

of the Staff of the Army to the 10th Army Corps

that the 1st Army Corps had been ordered to

push to the line Tschien-san-ta-kan-tsy—Liu-tsien-

tun in support of the Western Detachment's

attack, and that a brigade of the General Reserve

of the Army would be moved against Schan-lan-

tsy village, for supporting, in case of need, the

left wing of the 10th Army Corps.

But no one of the Western Detachment thought

of attacking any longer ; the troops did not stir

in their positions.

Of the General Reserve, single batteries first,

then constantly more and more batteries, had,

since early morning, come into action with General

Yamada's Artillery standing on One Tree Hill

' Only with the 4th Siberian Army Corps were some guns still of an

old pattern firing common shell, llie shrapnels of the quick-firing

guns having proved ineffective against masonry, the old guns had comeinto prominence again in village fighting.

* General Commanding the 1st Army Corps,

340 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARand north-west of it. General Baron Meiendorf,

commanding the 1st Army Corps, of whosetroops the 22nd Infantr}'^ Division, as well as someother units, belonged to the General Reserve,^

hearing in the morning of the loss of the height

mentioned, ordered the commander of the 7th

Artillery Brigade belonging to his corps, before

having received any directive from Kuropatkin, to

support Novikov's Detachment with 2j battalions

of the 87th Infantry Regiment, 2 batteries of his

brigade, and the 2 Transbaikal Cossack batteries,

in case the capture of the heights should be

ordered.

But, meanwhile. General Gerngross," command-ing the 1st Siberian Army Corps, who was with

the General Reserve and in command of the

portions detailed by the Eastern Detachment to

the General Reserve, was ordered by Kuropatkin

to recapture the heights lost, with a reinforced

brigade from the General Reserve, and with the

2nd Transbaikal Cossack Brigade, which was

going to be placed under his command. General

Gerngross detailed for that purpose the 2nd

Brigade of the 5th East Siberian Rifle Division

under General Putilov, as well as the 36th East

Siberian Rifle Regiment, from the 9th East Siberian

Rifle Division. General Baron INleiendorf then

ordered General Novikov, at 11.35 a.m., to join

the attack of Putilov's Brigade with the 86th,

87th, and 88th Infantry Regiments, the 1st and

5th Batteries of the 7th Artillery Brigade, the

3rd and 6th Batteries of the 43rd Artillery Brigade,

' P. 291. -' P. 267.


and one Sapper Company. In addition, the 11th

Siberian Infantry Regiment was to take part in

the attack.

All the other tasks assigned by Kuropatkin to

the Western Detachment, and to the General

Reserve for October 16, were relegated to the

background in favour of the imminent recapture

of the lost heights.

At 4f p.m. the Commander-in-Chief informed

the 10th Army Corps that the brigade of the

General Reserve which was going to be movedon Schan-lan-tsy had now been detailed to attack,

jointly with Xovikov's Detachment, One Tree Hill

;

it would therefore not be available for taking part

in the attack on Scha-ho-pu until that height had

been re-occupied.

A General Staff officer of the 10th ArmyCorps, who, on this, was sent forward to find out

what was going on, met the commander of the

19th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, belonging

to Putilov's Brigade, in the position this regiment

was occupying at U^u-kia-tun, learning from

him that that brigade had orders to attack the

knoll east of Schan-lan-tsy at dusk ; and that

General Novikov was going to attack One TreeHill.

When, about that time, movements were noticed

on the western slopes of the knoll east of Schan-

lan-tsy, as if the Japanese were retiring, the

colonel ordered his regiment to start, with the

object of advancing first to the Scha-ho. Shouldthe Japanese be actually retiring, he intended to

cross the river at nightfall. He begged the 10th

342 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARArmy Corps to make a move forward with its

left wing in support of the attack.

On his General Staff officer's report, General

Slutshevski ordered General Gerschelmann, com-

manding the 9th Division, to support the attack

of Putilov's Brigade, and to re-occupy Schan-lan-

tsy should the attack prove successful.

When reporting tliese measures, the General

Commanding the 10th Army Corps at the same

time informed the Commander-in-Chief regarding

the attack on Scha-ho-pu, that " he considered

it necessary to capture first One Tree Hill, and

next the villages of Hou-san-ta-kan-tsy and Tschien-

tschan-lin-tsy ; the attack on Scha-ho-pu and

Hou-tai Hill must then be prepared by common-shell batteries from these places."

INIeanwhile it was evening. For the night the

121st Infantry Regiment, standing at Pa-ta-kia-tsy,

placed two battalions at the disposal of General

Gerschelmann, commanding the left section of the

attack, and one battalion at the disposal of General

AVassiliev, commanding the right section. Theleft section was, moreover, reinforced by the two

battalions of the 35th Infantry Regiment which

had arrived in the forenoon.^

In the Centre, the batteries of the 37th Infantry

Division, of half the 4th Siberian Army Corps,

and of IMishtshenko's Detachment, kept up a brisk

fire on the left wing of the Japanese 1st Army,and on the right wing of the Japanese 4th

Army, both of which vigorously returned the fire.

But neither the Russians nor the Japanese seem' p. 338


to have felt much of the effect of the Artillery

duel, conducted on the whole front with great

\iolence.

Not much was altered in the disposition of the Th« Ras-

forces with the Eastern Detachment. The 1st em De-"

Brigade 5th East Siberian Rifle Division 2nd*^'!™^."*Ö_ _

maintains

Siberian Army Corps, whose main body was stand- it« post-

ing north-west of Kan-to-li-san, hearing that the north of

Wai-tau-schan was occupied by but weak parties ^^^ ^^^^'

of the enemy, the 18th East Siberian Rifle Regi-

ment, forming probably the rearguard standing at

Tso-kou,^ drove the Japanese from that height,

and re-occupied it.

The 1st East Siberian Rifle Division remained

in its former position, north-east of Kan-to-li-san;

the 3rd Siberian Army Corps, likewise, at the Kau-tu-lin Fass ; its rearguard only seems to have

been withdrawn a little farther back. An attack

of the Japanese 2nd Ca\alry Brigade, penetrating

as far as Ko-dai-rei, was repulsed after a brief

action.^ Rennenkampfs Detachment arrived at

the Da-lin Fass.^

AU had become quiet on the whole of the Result

Japanese front. Yamada's Detachment alone ber i^6.

'

pushed back some weak Russian protective parties

of General Novikov's Detachment from the last

Russian position, south of the Scha-ho, on the

heights east of Schan-lan-tsy.

This small success of the Japanese affected the

Russian Commander-in-Chief to such an extent

that the grand attack of the AVestern Detachmentand of the newly formed Reserves, planned by

• P. 328. > p. 333. 3 Sketch 1,

344 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARKuropatkin, did not come off, but merely shrunk

into preparations for the recapture of the heights

east of Schan-lan-tsy.

October 17

TheRus- From the events of October IG it appeared to

troops of General Yamada as though his small detachmentGeneral "would be unable after all to hold for any length of

push back time the heights it had captured east of Schan-lan-

nese De- ^^Y- ^^^^^ strong Russian Artillery fire directedtachment upon and maintained against the position for hours,

Yamada as wcll as the enemy's masses of Infantry pushing

heights^ gradually against the heights, made it clear thateast of i\^Q Russians were bent on recapturing the position

lan-tsy. ou the heights at any price. It being, further,

Sketchio. almost impossible to count on being reinforced

by own troops, General Yamada decided to

abandon the heights as yet on October 16, after

darkness had set in.

General Yamada had distributed his forces in

this way : the 20th Kobi Regiment ^ was standing

on the left, therefore with its main body probably

on the height east of Schan-lan-tsy, and the 41st

Infantry Regiment was occupying One Tree Hill

;

the 3rd Battalion of the 41st Infantry Regiment,

and the 7th Company, with the colour, remain-

ing concentrated in reserve. The two batteries

furnished by the 1st Field Artillery Brigade were

standing on the western slopes of the height behind

the 20th Kobi Regiment ; the Abteilung mountain-

guns of the 5th Division had come into position

^ At two battalions.


somewhat farther to the left, and in rear. Theretreat was intended to be carried out by the

Artillery moving off first, then the Kobi Regiment

and the reserve battalion were to retire, the 1st

and 2nd Battalions 41st Infantry Regiment finally

following as rearguard. But before all the orders

had been issued, and before it was possible to

begin the movement, the Russians had begun

to attack.

General Putilov having, at 4 p.m. on October 16,

been placed in command of all the troops detailed

for the attack,^ got his forces ready for attack in

four columns at 6 p.m. With the right column,

consisting of the 2nd Brigade 5th East Siberian

Rifle Division, under his personal command, he

intended to attack, from Wu-kia-tun, the western

height, afterwards called Putilov Hill. The centre

main column, formed of the 86th, 87th, and 88th

Infantry Regiments, under the command of General

Novikov, was to turn from Wu-kia-tun on Scha-

ho-yan, capturing One Tree Hill, afterwards called

Novgorod Hill ; and, to the left of this column,

the centre minor column, the 11th Siberian Infantry

Regiment, was to push forward from Fu-kia-tun-

kou by Lüan-fan-tun. The left column, or 36th

East Siberian Rifle Regiment, was to sweep round

from Sa-ho-tun by Liu-tsien-tun to get on the

right flank and in rear of the Japanese on the

Novgorod Hill. It was therefore intended to

envelop Yamada's Detachment on both sides.

With the centre main column, the 87th Infantry

Regiment was to attack in first line. The com-1 Pp. 340-342.

346 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARmander of the regiment therefore sent his detach-

ments of Scouts, before 5 o'clock in the afternoon,

from Wu-kia-tun to Scha-ho-yan. They succeeded

in driving from that village Japanese outposts of

General Yamada.

This rapid success led to the whole centre main

column advancing to attack already, at 5 p.m.

instead of at G p.m. : in first line, the 87th Infantry

Regiment ; in second line, three battalions of the

88th Infantry Regiment echeloned to the left,

and two battalions of the 86th Infantry Regiment

echeloned to the right ; the reserve of the column

—one battalion 88th Infantry Regiment, and two

battalions 86th Infantry Regiment—remained at

first in Wu-kia-tun. The first line occupied Scha-

ho-yan ; the second moved up ; then fire was

opened. The troops in the neighbourhood of the

village took cover from the Japanese Artillery fire

behind the walls of that place. The 88th Infantry

Regiment was the first to reach the steep banks

of the river, under heavy loss ; many officers were

disabled already. It "was, nevertheless, possible

to bring the regiment across the Scha-ho, M'hich,

owing to the numerous projectiles falling into it,

is said to have looked as if it was boiling. Then,

on the right of the 88th, the 87th Infantry Regi-

ment, from Scha-ho-yan, gained the left bank

;

Colonel Rondenko, commanding the regiment,

and the lieutenant-colonel were killed. In dense

masses the regiment now tried to climb Nov-

gorod Hill, the same as the neighbouring sister-

regiment (88th) on its left. Four times the troops

were on the point of streaming back, but were pre-


vented by their officers from doing so. At 6 p.m.

the 86th Infantry Regiment, on the right of the

87th, had got at last across the river too. At the

same time, the enveloping wings began to inter-

vene as ordered, and the reserves were moving up.

The 19th East Siberian Rifle Regiment surrounded

the left battalion of the 20th Kobi Regiment,

penetrating with portions into the batteries and

ammunition column standing behind the Kobi

Regiment. The left company of the 10th ArmyCorps—the 12th of the S-ith Infantry Regiment

—was led away by the neiglibouring skirmishers,

and, likewise, took part in the attack. In the front,

flanks, and rear of the Japanese a hot fire-action

ensued.

General Yamada now urged an immediate re-

treat, charging the 41st Infantry Regiment with

covering the withdrawal. Owing to the rains of

the days preceding, the roads had changed into

a deep mire ; and, worse still, the night had grown

pitch dark. The movement of all vehicles was

therefore but very slow. To maintain the posi-

tion of his regiment for some time longer against

the overwhelming odds of the assailant, Lieutenant-

Colonel Uzawa, commanding the 41st Infantry

Regiment, detailed also the 3rd Battalion to rein-

force the foremost fighting-line ; the 7th Company,

as well as one section of the 9th Company, was

all that remained available as reserve. The 20th

Kobi Regiment disengaged itself from the enemy

with heavy loss ; after a furious hand-to-hand

struggle it succeeded in cutting its way through,

in the direction on Hou-san-ta-kan-tsy. The com-

348 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARplete darkness, aiding it thereby, was to the dis-

advantage of the assailants.

On One Tree Hill, on which was the Japanese

right, the situation had, meanwhile, grown from

bad to worse. With the few bodies still intact,

the commander of the 41st Infantry Regimentwas behind the front on a small eminence, makingarrangements for the retreat of the colour-com-

pany, as well as for the removal of the wounded,

when he heard in his rear hot rifle-fire. By patrols,

it was ascertained that the Russians—about twocompanies strong, probably from the 36th East

Siberian Rifle Regiment—were close in rear of

the regiment, and attacking the trains.^ Thecommander of the regiment thereupon ordered

the ensign to go back with the colour on Hou-san-ta-kan-tsy.

Immediately afterwards, the enemy emergedfrom the dark, pushing forward from behind

against the small eminence. The 7th Companyand the section of the 9th rushed to meetthe Russians witli the bayonet ; the colonel andhis staff joined them, swords in hand. In

the hot fire-action at closest range, and in the

hand-to-hand struggle, both adversaries suffered

enormous losses. Lieutenant-Colonel Uzawa andthe officers of his staff were killed. Ultimately,

the Russians occupied the small eminence. Onthe noise of battle behind the front of the regi-

ment. Major Ino-uye, with two companies of the

3rd Battalion 41st Infantry Regiment, which were

just going up to reinforce the front line, hurried

' Probably first-line transport.


back again to the height on which he thought

the commander of the regiment to be. Whenfinding the enemy in possession of the height he

at once deployed the companies for attack. Once

more a hot struggle developed, ending almost

with the annihilation of the Russians, exhausted

as they were already. Portions of the 20th Kobi

Regiment intervened in the action too. Theremnants of the Russian troops were pushed back

south, thus leaving the Japanese free to retreat

south-west. After more severe losses the foremost

line of the 41st Infantry Regiment succeeded in

gradually evacuating the position and withdraw-

ing in the dark. By order of Major Ino-uye, the

dead bodies of the officers killed, as far as they

could be recognised, wxre picked up and carried

along. The last unit to leave One Tree Hill was

the 1st Battalion, whose share it was to form the

rearguard. Towards 3 o'clock in the morning, the

Russians were finally able to occupy the heights.

General Yamada's Detachment fell back on the

Japanese 3rd Division, in the neighbourhood of

Ku-kia-tsy.

The nocturnal struggle cost both adversaries

heavy sacrifice. The Japanese estimate their loss

at, roughly, 32 officers and 1,000 men. With the

41st Infantry Regiment, 8 officers and 322 menwere killed, 9 officers and 184 men Avounded.

The great number of dead, in proportion to the

wounded, shows how gallantly the Japanese had

been fighting. The equally high losses of the

20th Kobi Regiment are not known in detail.

The Japanese Artillery seems to ha\'e taken an

350 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARactive share in the combat as well. Not all the

batteries succeeded in limbering up and getting

away in time ; nine field and four mountain guns,

and one machine-gun, all intact, remained in the

hands of the Russians. The two Russian guns

captured by the Japanese the night before were

also left behind by them on the height.

The Russian losses were still greater ; in all,

they were 2,250 men, the 36th East Siberian Rifle

Regiment alone losing about 800 men. The regi-

ment is said to have met in the dark with some

of their own troops, who opened a withering fire,

believing they were facing the enemy.

Early on October 17 General Kuropatkin

inspected the theatre of the nocturnal combats.

With the consent of the Tsar, to whom the

message of victory was conveyed by telegraph,

the height fought for was named " Putilov Hill," ^

after General Putilov, commanding the 2nd

Brigade 5th East Siberian Rifle Division, whohad directed the attack. But the Russian Armyafterwards gave this name only to the height

east of Schan-lan-tsy actually attacked by Puti-

lov's Brigade, One Tree Hill being named " Nov-

gorod Hill," after the peace garrison of the

regiments engaged against that height. By order

of Kuropatkin, the ridge was occupied by the

Putilov Brigade, as well as by the 33rd and 35th

East Siberian Rifle Regiments, with Artillery

attached, under the command of General Gern-

gross. The 86th and 88th Infantry Regiments

and one Sapper company were stationed in reserve

' Appendix XVI.


at the eastern foot of the height. The other

troops which had shared in the attack returned

to the General Reserve at San-kia-tsy.

The success gained during the night roused The Rus-

the spirit of enterprise of the 10th Army Corps, Army

which had intended the recapture of Schan-lan- ^^l^f^^

* lighting

tsy ^ already on October 16. When, at daybreak, with the

the Russian victory became known, Colonel 3*^01^^

Woltshanovski, with the 1st Brigade 9th Infantry ^jon a

Division and two battalions of the 121st Infantry action for

Regiment, advanced from his position north of ^^'^'

Schan-lan-tsy across the Scha-ho, occupying the

village, and, by an offensive move against the

line Scha-ho-pu—Hou-san-ta-kan-tsy, taking part

in the attack of General Putilov's Brigade, which

about that time was descending on the enemy's

side from the height it had captured. The last-

named village had been occupied already by

Putilov's skirmishers ; the portions of the 10th

Army Corps ensconced themselves at the edge

of the ravine situated north-east of Scha-ho-pu,

entering into a fire-action with the Japanese

holding the southern portion of Scha-ho-pu. Whenthe General Commanding received intelligence of

the successful advance of the troops of his ArmyCorps, and at 7 a.m. was, moreover, informed of

the enemy's Artillery, standing at Scha-ho-pu,

limbering up and retreating, he decided to attack

the southern portion of Scha-ho-pu. The reserve

of the corps was moved up to Pa-ta-kia-tsy. Thetroops of the left wing, which had crossed over

to the southern bank of the Scha-ho, were ordered

' r. 342.

352 THE KUSSO-JAPANESE WARto entrench themselves in the position they had

taken up, and to wait there for the general attack.

The 1st Abteilung 9th Artillery Brigade, standing

east of Pa-ta-kia-tsy, was directed to prepare the

attack by their fire on Scha-ho-pu.

At the same time, General Gerschelmann, com-

manding the 9th Infantry Division, pushed two

battalions of the 36th Infantry Regiment from

his reserve to the northern portion of Scha-ho-pu,

while charging two battalions of the 35th Infantry

Regiment with supporting the portions already

on the left bank of the river. The colonel

commanding the 35th Infantry Regiment then

took command over all the troops in first line

on this wing of the corps.

AVhen, at 9.30 a.m., these arrangements had

been made, the 10th Army Corps receiv^ed an

Order of the Commander-in-Chief to the leader

of the Western Detachment, dispatched on

October 16, at 11.40 p.m. The Order contained

the tasks of the Army for October 17—namely,

the 10th Army Corps to capture Scha-ho-pu,

while the Jst Army Corps was to attack the

line Scha-ho-pu—Hou-tai Hill ; General Dembov-ski's Detachment, as well as the 6th Siberian

and 17th Army Corps, to hold their positions.

At the same time, to the 6th Siberian and the

10th ^Vrmy Corps were handed over two mortar

batteries ^ each and to the 17th Army Corps one,^

for preparing and supporting the attack. It is not

• The 2iid East Siberian Field Mortar Battery and 1st Battery 5th

Field Mortar Regiment.' 1st East Siberiau Field Moi-tar Battery.


known how far the Commander of the Western

Detachment acted upon this Order ; General

Baron Bilderhng, at any rate, does not seem to

have issued any special orders to the 10th ArmyCorps.

Conforming with Kuropatkin's directive, General

Dembovski's Detachment and the 6th Siberian

and 17th Army Corps confined themselves to

ordering their Artillery to fire on the enemy. Themortar battery attached to the 17th Army Corps

went into position at Yin-kuan, taking La-mu-

tun under fire. The effect was small, though the

battery is said to have fired 181 shells.

With the 10th Army Corps, the portion of

Scha-ho-pu south of the Scha-ho still in the

hands of the enemy was to be prepared by the

mortars for an assault. But the batteries apparently

arrived too late for fire to be opened on the 17th.

The Japanese 3rd Division replied to the Artillery

fire from Hou-tai Hill, overwhelming, especially,

the Mandarin Road and the ground adjacent to

it with high explosive shells. Though the whole

road was covered with vehicles and troops of the

Russian 10th Army Corps, and shells were falhng

into the Russian reserves, the actual effect was

likewise very small.

^

The preparation of the offensive by heavy

Artillery recommended by Kuropatkin, as well as

his intimation of common-shell batteries going to

' The Japanese Shiraose shell took effect only close to the point of

impact ; a few paces distant from it there was hardly any danger. Oneshell, for instance, on October 17, fell right into one battalion of the

85th Infantry Regiment, between two companies lying close behind

each other in column formation, without a single man being injured.

23

354 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARbe attached to the 1st Army Corps, with the

particular object of attacking Scha-ho-pu, was, for

the General Commanding the 10th Army Corps,

a welcome inducement for postponing his attack

to the next day. Slutshevski was confirmed in his

decision by the report of strong forces of the enemyadvancing on Scha-ho-pu.

The troops of the 10th Army Corps on the

southern bank of the river were, meanwhile, en-

gaged in a severe and costly combat. No orders

for executing the attack, nor fresh forces as rein-

forcement arriving, their situation grew moredifficult from hour to hour. Of this. General

Slutshevski, who, as on October 16, was spending

all day in a trench at Pa-ta-kia-tsy, seems to

have had no report, as he did not adopt any

counter-measures. In the afternoon, Kuropatkin's

order came for withdrawing the troops of the 10th

Army Corps stationed on the southern bank of

the Scha-ho, so as to give the common-shell

batteries of the 1st Army Corps, which had comemto position at Schan-lan-tsy, and on the Putilov

Hill, the chance of bombarding Scha-ho-pu. TheCommander-in-Chief himself, therefore, no longer

thought of carrying through the intended attack

on October 17.

General Slutshevski directed the portions of his

Army Corps on the southern bank of the Scha-ho

to effect the recrossing in the dark. The ex-

hausted troops, who would have been obliged to

retire, anyhow, without any orders, began the

movement at night, the southern part of Schan-

lan-tsy alone remaining occupied on the left bank.


In the Russian Centre, the 37th Infantry Divi- The

sion, the portions of the 4th Siberian Army Corps, centre

and Mishtshenko's Detachment, remained in their ^"^ ^^®hastern

positions about Orr-tau-kou. The batteries shared Detach-

in the general Artillery duel. thdrpii-

The Eastern Detachment retained its position ^?"^v^ ^ .

IheJapa-at Kan-to-li-san, and at the Kau-tu-hn Pass as nase re-

well.^ The Wai-tau-schan remained occupied by ^y^^Jj of

six companies of the 18th East Siberian Rifle ^^®^^^*"

Regiment, by three detachments of Scouts, and

by two machine-guns.

On the Japanese side, the troops completed

the movements as ordered.- General Umesawa'sGuard Kobi Brigade got as far as San-kia-tsy,

south-east of Scha-ho Railway Station. The 5th

Division seems to have joined the 4th Army,^

and taken up a position on that Army's left ; but

no other details are known.

October 17 caused only indifferent changes in Result

the position and distribution of both forces, ex-bL^i^?'*

haustion being felt generally. On the eastern

part of the battlefield, where fighting had ceased

already for days, individual groups, widely separ-

ated from each other, had formed on either bank

of the Scha-ho, the Russians being north, and the

Japanese south of that line. But on the western

portion, where the battle had not yet completely

died away, both adversaries were standing opposite

each other at gun-shot range, in long, continuous

positions, which were being entrenched. Serious

actions were no longer fought on October 17 ; the

successful recapture, during the night preceding

» P. 343. » Pp. 307-30Ü. " Pp. 308 and 332-333.


October 17, of the Putilov and Novgorod Hills

—

the only success of a lasting nature the Russians

had during the whole of the battle—was merely

of local importance.

Marshal INIarquis Oyama looked upon the battle

as finished already on October 15. On the Russian

side the battle had finished, as a matter of fact,

too, though Kuropatkin had not yet given up

completely his intentions to attack.

October 18 and the End of the Battle

Tiie Rus- During the night of October 17-18 a steady,

siaiisab- copious rain came down, lasting till noon onstainfrom ^^ , n • • ^^ i i i

attacking Octobcr 18, softemng agam all roads and paths,

r^ht'^re-^^^ changing them into a mire. Under cover of

maining this bad wcathcr, the Japanese tried to regain

tion north posscssion of the lost heights. But the attack,

SchaSioprobably made by the main body of the 5th

Division, was repulsed by the Russians.^

Kuropatkin intended to carry out at last, on

October 18, the offensive ^ he had deferred day

after day. The 10th Army Corps—probably, as

yet, on the evening of October 17—was ordered to

get possession of Scha-ho-pu at daybreak. Thereserve of the corps had therefore been standing

under arms all night at Pa-ta-kia-tsy, in pouring

rain. The troops were waiting, in vain, for the

heavy Artillery to open the fire which was to

prepare the attack thoroughly. One of the

mortar batteries, however, had selected its position

' The 6th Division is said to have arrived again on the left of the

4th Army on October 17 ; General Yamada'a Detachment belonged

to that Division. " P. 323.


in the dark so close to the enemy, that at day-

break it found itself within 600 metres opposite

Scha-ho-pu. It was at once overwhelmed by a

rapid fire, without being able to fire even a single

shot ; its ammunition waggons had, moreover, stuck

fast on the muddy roads. ^ The attack was there-

fore postponed again ; the reserve of the corps

—the 85th and 122nd Infantry Regiments—re-

turned to its bivouacs at Tschan-kia-pu-tsy. Soonafterwards an order of Kuropatkin's arrived, fixing

the commencement of the attack for 3 p.m.

But on General Slutshevski reporting that his

reduced and exhausted troops, without a previous

thorough rest, were not in a position to carry out

an attack with any hope of success at all, Kuro-

patkin yielded, withdrawing the order. He re-

solved to defer the attack for a few days, to grant

the troops some rest during that time, and to

prepare the attack by Artillery. The positions

occupied by the troops were to be held and

fortified. The order having been issued to that

effect, the troops at once began to entrench.

Headquarters of the 10th Army Corps went to

Hua-schi-ho towards evening.

With the 17th Army Corps, the 1st East

Siberian Field Mortar Battery had taken under

fire Lin-schin-pu, but without result on this day

too, the Japanese being not induced to evacuate

that village. On Kuropatkin's order coming in to

strengthen the positions occupied, the troops

began to establish themselves on the line Szö-fan-

' llie locality and employment of the other mortar batteries are not

known.

358 THE RUSSO JAPANESE WAR

tai—Yin-kuan^country north of Wan-tie-ku-

kia-tsy.

The 6th Siberian Army Corps and General

Dembovski's Detachment, probably by a separate

order, disengaged themselves without difficulty

from their opponent. The former took post on

the right of the 17th Army Corps between Kuan-

lin-pu and Szö-fan-tai ; General Dembovski's

Detachment was withdrawn behind it to the

neighbourhood of Siau-su-kia-pu.

No material changes occurred in the disposi-

tion of the Centre and Eastern Detachment on

October 18.

On the morning of October 19 a wire from the

Commander-in-Chief was received by the General

Officers Commanding, ordering the troops to set

to work at once constructing pivots, with over-

head cover, obstacles, etc. These measures were

meant to give the Army the chance of holding

its positions for some time. The intention of

resuming the offisnsive within a limited time was

expressed in a General Order ^ made known to

the troops in the forenoon. This Order at the

same time testifies to the imperturbable optimism

the Commander-in-Chief was imbued with. Side

by side with a partly exaggerated estimate of

the enemy's forces, Kuropatkin pointed to the

alleged deplorable state of the Japanese Army

:

the Japanese had incurred enormous losses, and

were suffering from want of supplies and from

the cold of the nights ; their defeat at Putilov

Hill, where three regiments had been completely

' Appendix XV


annihilated, had caused the utmost consternation

and depression in their ranks. " We must wish

the Japanese some more of these lessons," con-

cludes Kuropatkin ; "we are already somewhat

superior in numbers : we are more experienced

in the conduct of an action. We must take

advantage of the defeat we have inflicted on

them. The troops must be made clearly to

understand that fresh and vigorous efforts are

necessary for the relief of Port Arthur ; that no

time must be left to the enemy for reinforcing

himself and making good his losses."

The Order produced but a faint impression on

the troops ; not much weight was attached to the

vague announcement of continuing the offensive.

The physical and psychical exhaustion of every one

was so great as to produce merely a general

craving for rest. Nor did Kuropatkin return any

more to his intention of " leaving no time to

the enemy " ; he probably became aware of the

Army, in its present condition, being unable to

deliver any decisive blows. The idea for the

offensive faded more and more out of sight,

being for the next month finally abandoned alto-

gether.

The Army had meanwhile begun consolidating Positions

its position. On the right, the main position of Russian

the Western Detachment stretched from Kuan- f^om^

lin-pu by Ku-kia-tsy

—

^Szö-fan-tai—Kuan-tun to October

the northern part of Schan-lan-tsy. General

Dembovski's Detachment, by its position behind sketchii.

the right wing of the 6th Siberian Army Corps

at Siau-su-kia-pu, was securing the right flank


of the Army. Facing the Japanese 1st Cavalry-

Brigade were Cossacks, probably from General

Grekov's Detachment and from the 4th DonCossack Division,^ who, in continuation of the

advanced troops of the 6th Siberian Army Corps,

entrenched a position.^ At Schan-lan-tsy the

Western Detachment was in touch with General

Gerngross's Detachment, which was in occupation

of Putilov and Novgorod Hills. East of Liian-

fan-tun, in the neighbourhood of Örr-tau-kou, was

the position of the 4th Siberian Army Corps,

which was rejoined by half the 3rd Siberian

Infantry Division on October 26 ; this latter had

moved to Lo-sien-tun and San-kia-tsy on Octo-

ber 14, forming part of Kuropatkin's General

Reserve.^ The 1st Army Corps was to form

the reserve of the Army, in addition to the 9th

East Siberian Rifle Division, standing as yet at

Lo-sien-tun, but was rather scattered within the

space Ta-san-pu *—Huan-kia-tun ^—Liu-tsien-tun

—Lüan-fan-tun. The 85th Infantry Regiment, with

the battery attached to it from the 7th Artillery

Brigade, was still with the 10th Army Corps ;

^

and the 146th Infantry Regiment, with one

battery from the 43rd Artillery Brigade, was in

the position held by the 4th Siberian Army Corps/

' The 4th Don Cossack Division began to arrive in Mukden on

October 20, being placed under the command of the 6th Siberian

Army Corps.

' Sketch 11 only indicates the general line of the position.

' P. 292.

* 2 kilometres north-west of Huan-schan.* 3 kilometres south of Huan-schan.

* P. 321. ' P. 138.


Corps Headquarters was billeted in Ta-san-

pu.^

Mishtshenko's Detachment, including the 4th

East Siberian Rifle Regiment, seems to have gone

forward to the Scha-ho, and to have taken up

a position at Fön-kia-pu ; it was charged with

keeping connection between the 4th Siberian

Army Corps and Stackelberg's Detachment.

The Eastern Detachment made some few more

changes in the distribution of its forces. Theposition north-west of Kan-to-li-san held by the

1st Brigade 5th East Siberian Rifle Division

being too extended for that force, two regiments

of the 1st East Siberian Rifle Division ^ were

handed over to it ; these had been making a

reconnaissance in force in a south-westerly direc-

tion, by order of Stackelberg, but had returned

without having met the enemy. On General

Sassulitsh' reporting, however, on October 19 that

' The disposition of the 1st Army Corps on October 20 was, in

detail, as follows : Of the 22nd Infantry Division were standing in

Lüan-fan-tun, as reserve for General Gerngross's Detachment, Divisional

Headquarters, the 86th and 88th Infantry Regiments, five batteries of

the 7th Artillery Brigade, and one Sapper Company ; the 85th Infantry

Regiment and one battery were with the 10th Army Corps ; the

87th Infantry Regiment was stationed behind the 4th Siberian ArmyCorps on the road to Huan-schan. Of the ;J7th Infantry Division,

the Staff, tlie 145th and 148th Infantry Regiments, as well as the

43rd Artillery Brigade (less one battery) and one Sapper company,were at San-kia-tsy ; of the 147th Infantry Regiment, two battalions

were at Sa-ho-tun, two being pushed to Liu-tsien-tun ; the 14(ith

Infantry Regiment, with one battery, was with the 4th Siberian ArmyCorps. The 7th Siberian Cossack Regiment and the 3rd Transbaikal

Cossack Battery were in Ta-san-pu. The position of the 2ndTransbaikal Cossack Battery, as well as of the company missing from

the Sapper battalion, cannot be traced.

* The 1st and 3rd East Siberian Rifle Regiments.* General Commanding the 2nd Siberian Army Corps.

362 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARthe forces at his disposal were insufficient for

occupying the whole of the position at Kan-to-

li-san, hecause it had meanwhile been still further

prolonged in a north-westerly direction to the

neighbourhood of Liu-tschen-ku-tun, the 6th and

7th Siberian Infantry Regiments, from the 4th

Siberian Army Corps/ were placed, a few days

afterwards, under the orders of General Sassulitsh

as well.

The 1st East Siberian Rifle Division at first

retained its position east of Kan-to-li-san ; but on

October 24 it was moved, by Kuropatkin's orders,

in a north-westerly direction. The Division

marched in two nights by Örr-tau-kou—Huan-schan to Siau-tschan-örr-tun, 5 kilometres north of

Putilov Hill, and to Tou-sien-tun.- The 9th East

Siberian Rifle Division, of which only the 36th

East Siberian Rifle Regiment had shared in the

attack on One Tree Hill, being still at Lo-sien-tun,

the 1st Siberian Army Corps was again united

towards the end of October.^ Corps Headquarters

billeted in Fu-kia-tun-kou. The position the 1st

East Siberian Rifle Division had abandoned was

occupied by five battalions from the 6th and 7th

Siberian Infantry Regiments.

The 3rd Siberian Army Corps remained as it

was before, forming an entrenched position on the

' They had been attached to the 3rd Siberian Army Corps. (WarOrgauisation Appendix I.)

* The 4th East Siberian Rifle Regiment returned to its Division on

October 27.

* Tlie 1st and 3rd East Siberian Rifle Regiments, which Stackelberg

had placed under the orders of Sassulitsh on October 18, seem to have

joined in the march.

1


line Fan-schön—Kau-tu-lin Pass. Three Infantry

regiments of this Corps are said to have moved to

Yin-pan, 1*5 kilometres north-east of Kan-to-li-san,

to form the reserve of the Eastern Detachment.

Corps Headquarters billeted in Schan-ha-lin-tsy,

and General Baron Stackelberg, on October 20, in

Kan-to-li-san.

Kuropatkin's Headquarters was in Huan-schan.

All along the front, the troops were actively

engaged in consolidating their positions. By means

of groups of fire-trenches, batteries, and fortified

localities, entrenchments grew up, gradually attain-

ing powerful defensive capabilities, through the

great amount of labour spent on them. Putilov Hill

was particularly strongly fortified. Some localities,

like Liu-tsien-tun—Sa-ho-tun, in the section of the

1st Army Corps, were almost changed into small

fortresses, by the clay walls of the farms and

buildings being prepared for defence, by deep

trenches being dug in front of them and connected

with the localities by communicating trenches, and

by surrounding the whole position with a thick

belt of obstacles, like military pits, abattis, and

wire entanglements. The fire-trenches, being

generally well adapted to the ground, were mostly

narrow, and sunk into the ground almost 6 feet

deep. They were often covered against Artillery

fire by roofs formed of doors, tops of tables,

window-frames, or planks, which, again, were

covered by straw mats on which earth was piled.

In a similar way were also constructed the trenches

for the gun-detachments.

364 THE RUSSO JAPANESE WARPositions After the futile attempts of recapturing Putilov

Japanese HiH» the offensive power of the Japanese was also

wti^'^^ spent. Marshal Marquis Oyama had, moreover,

declared already on October 14 that he wished to

end the battle. The 1st and 4th Armies had

therefore on that day already begun to entrench

the positions occupied by them. On October 16

the 2nd Army began to entrench as well.

The actual positions of the 1st Army immedi-

ately after the battle cannot be exactly traced.

The 12th Division, with the 5th Kobi Brigade,

was still in the country south of Bian-yu-pu-sa ;

it had constructed a very extensive position

stretching from the Schin-hai-lin Pass, west, some

few kilometres beyond Schan-pin-tai-tsy. TheGuards and the 2nd Division had evacuated the

heights they had recently been occupying south of

Fön-kia-pu and had somewhat retired ; the line

now occupied by them probably extended from the

country east of the Eastern San-jo-shi-san over the

Ba-ji-san to the Sen-san.

On the Sei-ko-san was the right of the 4th

Army, whose position ran by Pu-tsau-wa to the

heights north of Tschien-tschan-lin-tsy. The en-

trenchments were occupied by the 10th Division,

with the exception of a small portion on the left,

where Kobi troops were standing. The main body

of the Kobi troops, probably under the uniform

command of General Uchiyama,^ was quartered

within the space Tschien-tschan-lin-tsy—Hou- and

Tschien-huan-hua-tien. The 5th Division, Marshal

Marquis Oyama again retained at his own disposal,

' Commandiug the 1st Field Artillery Brigade.

I


ordering it to move to Schi-li-ho.^ Headquarters

of the 4th Army was in Ta-kou, north-west of

the San-kai-seki-san. The position of the 2nd

Army stretched from Hou-tai-Hn-tsy by Ku-kia-

tsy—Hou-tai Hill—La-mu-tun— Lin-schin-pu

—

Tschan-lin-pu to Wan-tschuan-tsy. Adjoining

on its left were the outposts of the 1st Cavalry

Brigade, which extended by Fu-kia-tschuan-tsy to

Han-schan-tai, thus making the position of the

2nd Army 25 kilometres long. It was probably

owing to the futile attempts of recapturing Putilov

Hill that General Headquarters ordered the evacua-

tion of Scha-ho-pu, which could be permanently

enfiladed from the hill named. The troops of

the 3rd Division garrisoning Scha-ho-pu with-

drew therefore to Hou-tai Hill during the night

October 19-20. When, at noon on October 20,

the abandonment of that village became knownon the Russian side, General Slutshevski at once

ordered the village to be re-occupied. The with-

drawal of the Japanese was looked upon as a fresh

sign of the demoralisation affecting the Japanese

Army.The Japanese, too, took great pains in consoli-

dating their positions. The great amount of woodavailable in the numerous villages made it possible

to provide the trenches and Artillery positions with

the requisite structures, like casemates, ammuni-tion chambers, and overhead cover, and to con-

struct extensive obstacles. The Russians having,

as usual, constructed, mostly, several defensive lines

• Instead of it, the Guard Kobi Brigade was again placed under the

orders of the 1st Army.

366 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARin advance of each other, and the Japanese having

covered various sections of defence by fortified

advanced outpost positions, both adversaries were

at some places lying opposite each other, within a

stone's throw. The consequence was that both

parties had a most trying time on outpost duty,

especially at the beginning, when skirmishes were

frequent, though ending mostly without any

tangible result. Both opponents, moreover, tried

to disturb each other from time to time in their

entrenching operations by fire from heavy and

light guns. But there was no longer any serious

fighting ; the 1st Army alone had one more action

of some importance to record.

Because General Baron Kuroki felt it annoying

for the Russians to be in occupation of the Wai-tau-schan, on the left bank of the Scha-ho, at

such comparatively close distance opposite the

position of his Army,^ he ordered General

Umesawa, on October 26, to recapture that

height. Covered by the Artillery fire of the

Guard Division, the 1st Battalion of the 1st GuardKobi Regiment and the 1st Battalion of the

39th Kobi Regiment deployed, at 8 a.m. on

October 27, in the valley of Tia-tun-nan-kou, and

attacked the Wai-tau-schan, while the main body

of the Guard Kobi Brigade was standing as reserve

in the valley Avest of that height. The attack of

the two Kobi Regiments, made under the eyes

of numerous representatives of foreign nations, metwith an obstinate resistance on the part of the

Russian ga/rison.- It was not till 4 o'clock in the

» p. 34;.. » p. 355.


afternoon that the height was finally in the hands

of the Japanese, who lost 12 officers and 190 men,

dead or wounded. The Russians, under the orders

of Colonel Lipovaz-Popovitsh, had been obliged to

fight unsupported by any Artillery ; the firing-lines,

apart from the losses, were weakened by many of

the men, without authority, insisting on helping

to carry away the wounded. The losses were

very considerable ; they are said to have been

426 men ; all the officers except two were wounded.

The Russians, in their retreat on the main position,

left about 30 dead behind ; in addition, both

machine-guns fell into the hands of the victors.

A counter-attack, attempted by the Russians in

the night of October 28-29, and preceded by a

strong Artillery fire directed against the Wai-tau-

schan on October 28, failed. The Japanese re-

mained in possession of the height, but did not

prevent the Russian outposts from establishing

themselves on the left bank of the Scha-ho, north-

east of the Wai-tau-schan and Tsio-tso-schan.

The fortified position was now advanced to the

Wai-tau-schan, and occupied by the GuardDivision. The Guard Kobi Brigade was with-

drawn behind the front to Man-hua-pu—Pa-kia-

tsy.

Both adversaries stood opposite each other, in

the positions indicated, for three months, mostly

inactive.

The Russians awaited the arrival of the rein-

forcements mobilising at home, and the Japanese

the fall of Port Arthur, with the object if hurrying

368 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARup the besieging Army for the final decisive

battle.

It was not until the middle of January, 1905,

after the surrender of Port Arthur, that Kuropatkin

felt strong enough for renewing the offensive ; he

hoped to beat the Japanese decisively before

General Baron Nogi's Army could make its

appearance on the battlefield.

Total Losses from October 5 to 20

(a) Russians

Dead . . . . 187 Officers . 4,964 Men.Wounded ... 854 „ . 31,002 „Missing' . . . ,5,638 Officers and Men.

Total . 42,645 Officers and Men.

' Most of the missing may be counted as dead.

{Ö) Japanese

Reliable statements are wanting in detail. Total loss, roughly,

20,000 all told.

'ITie Japanese captured 46 guns, 1 machine-gun, 37 ammunitionwaggons, 5,474 rifles, and, in addition, entrenching tools, tents, and

clothing.

I

COMMENTS

After the unfortunate battle of Liao-yan the Russians.

Russian Army regained its freedom of action by

an able retreat, and by completely disengaging

itself from the enemy. There is no need for

arguing the point that this advantage of the

situation, after reorganising and reinforcing the

Army, left no other course open than to attack the

enemy, who remained on the Tai-tsy-ho, apparently

inactive and weakened. That not all the General

Officers Commanding agreed with the good

reasons the Commander-in-Chief urged in favour

of attack showed already before the battle howlittle impressed the Russian Commanders were

with offensive ideas. The open and noisy manner

in which Kuropatkin pursued his preparations for

the attack made, however, every one expect that

he at least was thoroughly imbued with the firm

will to act, and with the conviction of doing the

right thing by what he had resolved. But, then, he

certainly forgot the precaution we must practise

in war, of hiding from the adversary one's ownplans. It could not, and ought not to, have been

unknown to the Russians that they were sur-

rounded by spies who secretly informed the enemy369 24

\

370 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARof all that was worth knowing. The Russian

unconcern was in strong contrast with the scrupu-

lousness with which the Japanese used to guard the

secrets of their intentions.^

General Kuropatkin followed the principle de-

rived from military history, that, in attack, a blow

directed on the flank or the rear of the enemyoffers the best chances for victory. There was,

indeed, the possibility of gaining the flanks of the

Japanese, though not their rear. From what was

known of the Japanese, their outpost position

stretched from San-de-pu on the Hun-ho to the

country east of Bian-yu-pu-sa ; the main body was

behind the centre, and two Divisions were behind

each of the two wings.- The left wing, it seemed,

was leaning on the Hun-ho, and the right was

without support. This offered a chance of success-

fully enveloping the right wing. But against it

could be raised weighty objections. It would be

* The carelessness in the handling of things which it is absolutely

necessary to keep secret is a fault to be frequently noticed with the

Ru«sian9. In the " Memoirs from the Life of the Imperial Russian

General of Infantry Carl Friedrich Graf von Toll," Bernhardi recountsthe

following incident :" In 1812, a i&w weeks before the battle of Borodino,

some papers were captured during a village fight in the quarters of the

French General Sebastiani. Among them was an Order of the Day,

in which Murat was informing General Sebastiani of the Russians

being on the point of marching with all their forces on Rudnia, and

requesting him to withdraw on the Infantry. On the Russian side they

were astonished at finding the enemy so well informed, treason being

suspected. But afterwards it was found out that an equerry of the

Emperor had heard the Russian plan of attack being discussed in the

open street among young officers of General Headquarters in Smolensk.

He hastened to warn his mother, who was living in the country where-

about the operations were in progress, by a letter written in French ;

and Murat being quartered in the house of the lady, the information

came as straight as it could be to the right man."* Appendix IX.

COMMENTS 371

necessary to make the envelopment in a moun-

tainous country, of which there were only defective

maps or none at all, where the movement of troops

would meet with many difficulties, where the dis-

play of Russian superiority might be hampered,

and where everything favoured the defence.

Hitherto the Japanese had proved far superior to

the Russians in the conduct of mountain warfare ;

it was therefore to be expected that, when forced

to retire, the Japanese would give way only inch

by inch, defending in their retreat every newheight and every fresh section of ground with

the utmost obstinacy. The Russians could hope

for a really decisive result only if they succeeded in

pushing the enemy from the railway line Charbin

—

Port Arthur, which, for the Japanese, as well as

for the Russians, was the all-important line of

communication to the rear. But this was hardly

possible by enveloping the enemy's right wing

;

from the neighbourhood of Bian-yu-pu-sa and Pen-

si-hu to Liao-yan is a long distance, and it was

not likely that the Japanese could be denied an

orderly retreat along the railway line. These

objections therefore point to an envelopment of

the enemy's left wing. This would have been

carried out in the plain, would have allowed a

full use of superior forces, and would have severed

the Japanese from the railway with greater cer-

tainty. The operations in the open country could

have been veiled by 143 squadrons or sotnias. Thesupport the Hun-ho gave to the enemy's left wing

was only an imaginary one,^ and if it had been

' Sketch 1.

372 THE RUSSO JAPANESE WARa support, as the Russians were bound to assume,

there would have been hardly any objection of

pushing enveloping troops to the western bank of

the Hun-ho, and dividing the forces by this

watercourse, the river here forming no material

obstacle.

We do not know what considerations decided

Kuropatkin to envelop the Japanese right wing.

Perhaps the fact finally settled the matter that

this unsupported wing was already overlapped by

the disposition of the Russian forces, which were

extending far to the east. There is no doubt

that success could have been achieved by the plan

adopted, if only the enveloping attack had been

conducted with circumspection and energy, after

once the Russians had deprived themselves of the

advantage of surprise.

But they did not act with circumspection ; they

rather acted with too much caution, energy being

replaced by a hesitating mode of procedure, which

has nothing in common with the sine qua non

of success, nothing in common with the firm con-

fidence in the performances of commanders and

troops, and nothing in common with the imper-

turbable will to conquer.

The distribution of the forces alone for the

attack makes it clear that Kuropatkin was morebent upon guarding himself against reverses than

securing success at all cost. Of the eight ArmyCorps available on the spot, not less than three

were retained by the Commander-in-Chief at his

own disposal, one of these corps being used in

securing the rear. Although these three Army

COMMENTS 373

Corps, as well as other detachments, with the

exception of far-distant flank-guards, ultimately

took a share in the battle, yet the numbers allotted

to the main fighting groups, viz. the Eastern and

Western Detachments, were insufficient from the

outset. Especially for the Eastern Detachment,

which was meant to bring about the decision by

its enveloping attack in the mountains, it was not

possible to be too strong. It had to be reckoned

with that the enemy would oppose a fresh front to

the enveloping force, perhaps on the line Pen-si-hu

—Bian-yu-pu-sa ; that front it would have been

necessary to pierce, or to turn on the southern

bank of the Tai-tsy-ho if required, and it was then

necessary to carry the attack farther in the direction

on Liao-yan.

For his difficult task General Baron Stackel-

berg disposed in all about three Army Corps,^

which were obliged to extend over a space of

30 kilometres' length. The Western Detachmentwas to advance in front on both sides of the

railway, with the object of engaging the enemy's

main body and pinning it to the ground, while

farther in the east the decision was maturing and

brought to an issue. The two Army Corps of

the Western Detachment were faced by the 2ndand 4th Japanese Armies in superior strength,

necessitating very soon afterwards fresh forces to

be brought up to the Western Detachment for

repelling the hostile attacks. By placing his

' The .5th East Siberian Rifle Division and Rennenkampfs Detach-

ment together were about the size of an Army Corps. In addition,

there was the Siberian Cossack Division.


General Reserve behind the centre of the whole

battle-front, Kuropatkin had, from the outset, kept

in view the contingency of having to close with it

the gap existing already between the Eastern and

Western Detachments at the beginning of the

movements, and increasing as operations proceeded.

He thereby interpolated between the two main

fighting groups another group, never uniformly

commanded, and, although badly wanted in the

front line, yet reluctantly used as reserv^e after all.

An allotment of the General Reserve to the

Eastern and Western Detachments would have

strengthened tliem for their task and made matters

clearer ; the Gth Siberian Army Corps would have

sufficed as General Reserve for the Army. Thefighting power of an Army Corps is great enough

for the Commander-in-Chief to ensure his influence

on the course of the battle at the spot where he

desires that influence to be felt. True, the 6th

Siberian Army Corps was not complete ; one

brigade had remained behind at Tie-lin and Mukden,

to occupy the positions there. The Russians were

still far from adhering to the principle of staking

for final decision everything, even the very last

man.

But the mistake in the allotment of the forces

might have been made good during the battle,

if only the attack had been carried through with

the utmost energy. It was then the Commander-in-Chief himself who, by his directive for the

advance,^ paralysed the undoubted longing of his

soldiers for closing with the enemy. The object

' Appendix IX.

COMMENTS 375

of the advance was the defeat of the enemy ;

but he gave it as the task of his Array " to take

possession of the right bank of the Tai-tsy-ho first."

The Western Detachment ought to have attacked

the enemy in front, the same as Prince Friedrich

Karl's Army did attack the Austrian front on

the Bistritz on July 3 of 1866. But in the task

assigned to the Western Detachment there was

no mention made of attack ; merely a slow advance

from position to position by short marches was

prescribed to it, which did not bring it in touch

with the enemy, even after a two days' march.

For the Eastern Detachment it was a question

of bringing rapidly against the enemy's right flank

as strong a force as possible, the remainder, mean-

while, gripping the Japanese right wing in front

;

true, it was charged with attacking the enemy in

front and on the right flank, but the start necessary

in the difficult mountainous country to be traversed

by it was denied to the detachment. The points

to be reached by it were on the same level as

those of the Western Detachment, far away from

the enemy's front, and farther still from his

right flank. It was first to capture the Japanese

position projecting north at Bian-yu-pu-sa, in front

of which the whole of the Eastern Detachmenttherefore stopped. Against the right flank of the

Japanese was sent, alone, across the Tai-tsy-ho,

on the line Mi-tsy—Siao-syr, llennenkampfs De-tachment, less than a division strong, and far too

weak in comparison with the forces engaged in

front.

It was certainly justifiable in itself when General


Kuropatkin prescribed certain objects to be reached

by his troops before they were in touch with the

enemy, so as to harmonise their advance ; but it

was out of place to give this first move against the

enemy the impress of an over-cautious, nay almost

timid, operation. Where did come in the self-

consciousness, the assurance, and the eagerness to

accomplish great feats, with which the commander

of an army proceeding to attack must be ani-

mated? Cautious and reserved as the Commander-

in-Chief was, his subordinate commanders were

not less so, especially the Commander of the

Eastern Detachment, General Baron Stackelberg,

who had dissuaded General Kuropatkin from

attacking, and had advised him to wait.^ OnOctober 7, when, with greater expedition of the

advance, the attack of the Western, as well as

of the Eastern, Detachment could have com-

menced, Stackelberg—probably by superior orders

—interposed a day of rest not justified by any-

thing ; he therefore did not attack the enemy's

position at Bian-yu-pu-sa, but rather allowed the

enemy to escape thence, and even on October 8

advanced only by quite short marches, without

reaching the enemy. To prepare the envelop-

ment, he sent ahead, in a southerly direction, a

Division, which was approaching Rennenkampfs

Detachment. Yet even the idea of envelopment

had much of its wings already clipped. Rennen-

kampf 's original direction of advance towards the

line Mi-tsy—Siao-syr would have almost led him

into the enemy's rear on the southern bank of the

> p. 14.

COMMENTS 377

Tai-tsy-ho. But this seemed too bold ; he was

recalled to San-kia tsy, on the northern bank

;

here he was certainly still on the flank, but the

portions of the Eastern Detachment next to him

he pushed towards the enemy's front, causing him

afterwards to execute the decisive flank attack,

chiefly by himself alone.

The Western Detachment made as little pro-

gress on October 7 and 8 as the Eastern Detach-

ment. Here it was an exaggerated report of

very strong hostile forces being at Yen-tai which

destroyed every trace of offensive spirit that was

still alive, replacing it by the idea that all that

was wanted was repelling the superior attack of

the Japanese in the three positions prepared behind

each other ; here the appreciation of the situation,

afterwards adopted by Kuropatkin, too, asserted

itself, that there was no need for the Western

Detachment to attack at all until the Eastern

Detachment's decisive operations had become effec-

tive. By this they failed to recognise the principle

that pinning the enemy to his ground in front is the

first condition for successfully enveloping one or

the other of his flanks. It is true, it was not till

October 13, after they had become certain of being

superior to the Western Detachment, that the

Japanese dispatched a portion of their western wing

(5th Division) in support of their 1st Army ; but

it was not permissible for the Russians to count

upon the enemy acting in this manner. It was

to be presumed that the Japanese would endeavour

to transfer forces as strong as possible in support

of their more seriously threatened right wing

;

378 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARaccordingly, it was the duty of the WesternDetachment to attract upon itself as many forces

as possible by its attack. If it suffered a reverse,

there were sufficient reser\'es available to support

it in the entrenched positions.

When, on October 9, the Russian Eastern

Detachment began to attack in earnest, contrary

to Kuropatkin's wish, success was still possible.

The Japanese right wing, against which the

envelopment was directed, was extremely weak.

Between the Tai-tsy-ho at Pen-si-hu and the Tu-men-tsy-lin Pass about seven Japanese battahons,

with one battery,^ were standing, on a front more

than 20 kilometres long, in a mountainous position

undoubtedly rather strong ; the short flank east

of Pen-si-hu, refused towards the south, was

originally defended by but three companies.

Stackelberg could not know that the enemy was

so weak ; but, in spite of this ignorance, it would

have been advisable to give the attacking troops

more distant objects than was done on October 9.

" If we wish to attack, we must do so with de-

termination. Half-measures are out of place

;

vigour and confidence alone carry the troops awayand assure success."^ The day had no results to

show ; only on the enemy's right flank some small

progress was made by Rennenkampfs Detach-

ment, whose attack did not agree with Stackel-

berg's intentions. This should have been a hint

' Six battalions of the Guard Kobi Brigade, three companies of

Lines-of-Commimication troops, one Pioneer company, and one battery,

^ From "Instructions to Superior Commanders" ("Verordnungenfür die höheren Truppenführer "), of June 24, 1869.

COMMENTS 379

where the strongest lever was to be applied next

day. Kuropatkin, too, recommended, on October 9,

in the evening, an enveloping movement with the

left wing along the Tai-tsy-ho. But Stackelberg,

becoming doubtful, owing to the strong positions

of the enemy and the repeated reminder of the

Commander-in-Chief to be cautious, did not con-

tinue the attack on October 10, thus taking the

fatal step leading to failure. The advantages

gained were lost again on October 10; the Japanese

found time to reinforce their right wing by one

Division. Their position was therefore a little

improved when Stackelberg carried out the attack

on October 11.

It was in accordance with Russian custom, whenhe retained a very strong reserve—more than a

Division—behind the centre of the Eastern Detach-

ment ; but it cannot be approved that he did not

stake it even in the afternoon, when he ordered his

troops, which had been fighting hitherto without

success, to deliver the final desperate blow. A re-

serve is never provided for its own sake, but must

be engaged to the last man when the struggle for

the mastery demands it. If on October 11 the 5th

East Siberian Rifle Division, in touch with Rennen-

kampf's Detachment, had attacked on the southern

bank of the Tai-tsy-ho, thus completing the

envelopment of the Japanese right wing, the

Eastern Detachment would probably have been

the victor, and the Russians, pushing by Pen-

si-hu on Liao-yan, would have seriously menaced

the Japanese fighting in front. Yet it might have

been possible to pierce even the front of the

380 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARJapanese right wing, if the Division had been

employed more promptly and judiciously, for the

defenders were still far inferior to the assailants,

and near the end of their resources, with the

positions quite thinly occupied.

October 1 1 thus became a failure of the Eastern

Detachment, and, worse, the fundamental idea of

the Russian operations, to decide the battle by

the enveloping attack of Stackelberg's troops, was

wrecked. On the evening of October 11, Stackel-

berg found himself being threatened on his right

flank, owing to the 4th Siberian Army Corps,

adjoining on his right, intending to fall back a

little during the night before the Japanese GuardDivision. His resolve to discontinue the attack

now altogether can hardly be justified. He knewthe Commander-in-Chief had reserves available

;

he could therefore ask him to look after the safety

of the Eastern Detachment's right flank ; he him-

self ought to have tried with every possible meansto accomplish on October 12 the task he had failed

to solve on October 11. But having once thwarted

the Commander-in-Chief's plan, he should in nocase have left him in ignorance of it for such a

long time as he afterwards did. The excessive

anxiety for the flanks was, moreover, peculiar to

most of the Russian commanders ; Rennenkampf,Liuba\dn, and Samsonov, too, succumbed to it

in the actions east of Pen-si-hu. Nothing can

more illustrate this anxiety than the employmentof Stackelberg's reserve, which, on October 11 or

12, might have decided the day on the left wingby enveloping the enemy's right wing, but on

COMMENTS 381

October 12 was standing as a flank-protection

behind his own right wing, where never a flank

attack was made by Japanese forces really worth

mentioning.

The Eastern Detachment having once given upthe attack, the Russians were then actually fight-

ing merely to ensure their retreat. The WesternDetachment had allowed itself to be forced on the

defensive from the outset, it is true ; but this did not

prevent the offensive being resumed at the proper

moment. At first the Japanese left wing proved

superior to the Western Detachment ; but when,

by October 11, the 1st (European) and the 4th

Siberian Army Corps had marched into line with

it on the east, and the 6th Siberian Army Corps

and Dembovski's Detachment had been placed

in readiness behind its right wing, the forces were

at least equal, and the troops retained on the

right wing offered tlie means of attacking and

enveloping the left wing of the Japanese engaged

opposite the front of the Western Detachment

and of the Centre. But in spite of this equality

in numbers, the Japanese had already gained a

moral superiority on October 11. The tentative

and hesitating advance of the Western Detach-

ment, the construction of several entrenched

positions behind each other (although the talk was

previously of attack), and a series of small successes

by the enemy against the Russian advanced detach-

ments on October 10—all this served to depress

officers and men. To this must be added the

fatal view that the Eastern Detachment alone was

to carry out the main task. In this way, on

382 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAROctober 11, and on the days following, it was

omitted to strike a great blow and regain again

the initiative. Especially remarkable is the con-

stant omission of recognising the possibility of

enveloping the Japanese left wing. Neither

Kuropatkin, nor Bilderling, commanding the West-em Detachment, ever gave the slightest thought

to employing the 6th Siberian Army Corps and

Dembovski's Detachment with that view. Nothing

could be hoped from the initiative of the General

Commanding the Gth Siberian Army Corps after

Kuropatkin, during the night of October 9-10,

had certainly given him permission to support

the Western Detachment, but with the additional

remark, " Remember that you are forming mystrategic reserve !

" With this remark all idea for

bold and decisive action was nipped in the bud.

All that Kuropatkin did from October 11 for

conducting the battle on the western wing

were small and indifferent measures adapted to

meet momentary tactical wants. On October 11

he ordered the Western Detachment to recapture

the positions lost on October 10. Nothing cameof it ; but the Japanese on that day successfully

advanced against the front of the Centre and

of the Western Detachment. On October 12

he decided to withdraw the advanced guards of

the 10th and 17th Army Corps in the main

positions ; but it was already too late for that.

The advanced guard of the 17th Army Corps was

enveloped on the Scha-ho by the Japanese 2nd

Army, the whole corps being pushed behind the

Scha-ho ; the 10th Army Corps was of necessity

COMMENTS 383

forced to join in this retrograde movement.

The envelopment was made scarcely half a day's

march distant from the main bodies of the 6th

Siberian Army Corps and of Dembovski's De-

tachment, who remained inactive. How was it

possible that the Commander-in-Chief did not

make use of these reserves to prevent the Western

Detachment being defeated ? It may be ex-

plained, but not excused, by the unsatisfactory

state of affairs with the Russian Centre on October

12, which drew his attention entirely away from

the right wing. The Japanese 1st Guard Brigade

had pushed between the Centre and Eastern

Detachment as far as the Ba-ji-san ; it must be

conceded that such a penetration, although mostly

highly dangerous to the penetrating troops them-

selves, is certainly apt to cause the leader of the

affected party great anxiety. It is intelligible that

Kuropatkin should have turned his attention thither

and looked for fresh forces to meet the danger

in the Centre ; but for the means of warding off

the danger he was looking in the wrong direc-

tion. Of his former General Reserve he had still

directly available the 22nd Division of the 1st

Army Corps at Tun-san-ho. That he did not

engage it, was on all fours with the reluctance

of the Russian Commanders generally to engage

in case of urgent need even the last man ; he

therefore preferred asking for the reserve of the

Eastern Detachment, from a portion of his Army,therefore, which at his bidding was fighting the

really decisive action of the battle. He thought,

of course, that all was going well with the Eastern

384 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARDetachment, but he knew that it was still in

action, and he had no report of its having defeated

the enemy's right wing, One almost feels inclined

to think that at that time already he no longer

seriously believed in a victory of his Army, and

that the order for the 5th East Siberian Rifle

Division to come up was a makeshift, inspired

by the wish of preventing a defeat above all

things.

Strange is the correspondence between Kuro-

patkin and Stackelberg, who refused the Com-mander-in-Chief the reserve, but at the same

time hid from him the hopeless situation of the

Eastern Detachment. Ultimately, portions of

22nd Di\dsion were, after all, placed at the dis-

posal of the threatened 4th Siberian Army Corps.

In all this, there is nothing indicating energy

and mastery of the situation, nothing of that in-

timate co-operation between Commander-in-Chief

and subordinate commanders so essential for the

welfare of the whole. Why were not the Japanese

who had penetrated, attacked and pushed back,

or annihilated, by all the Russians troops available

in the neighbourhood ?

On October 11 the Russian Army, thanks to

its superiority in numbers, could have obtained a

victory by enveloping both wings of the Japanese;

on October 12 the conditions were not at all

unfavourable to a degree as to prevent the situa-

tion taking a favourable turn by staking and

uniformly employing every unit available ; on

October 13 defeat was an accomplished fact,

the Eastern Detachment was retreating, the

COMMENTS 385

Centre in danger of being enveloped, and the

Western Detachment severely pressed. That

the Centre was still able to escape from its dan-

gerous position was due to the weakness of the

Japanese, who had not troops enough for achiev-

ing here a great success. And it was just at this

period that the Russian Commander-in-Chief con-

ceives the astonishing idea of assuming the offen-

sive. Did he really hope to make good his

omissions, or did he wish to make sure of being

vindicated for having tried his utmost ? Withthe Eastern Detachment he had done ; now the

Western Detachment and a newly formed reserve

were to be the bearers of a belated victory. Mean-

while the Western Detachment was obliged to

give up, with heavy loss, the whole of the southern

bank of the Scha-ho; general exhaustion increased;

nobody shut his eyes to the fact that the severely

tried troops would need first some considerable

rest before they were able to strike another blow.

And, therefore, the offensive idea met with no

response during the last days of the battle, but

faded aAvay more and more, until only the capture

of Putilov and Novgorod Hills, during the night

of October 16-17, was all the trace it left

ultimately behind. Although unimportant in

itself, and made by superior numbers, this capture

was at least some performance, the only one

during the whole of the battle of lasting success.

The two hills, as well as a short stretch of country

north-east of the Wai-tau-schan, were maintained

after the rest of the Russian Army had crossed

over to the northern bank of the Scha-ho. The'25

386 THE RUSSO-JArAXESE WAR

insignificant portions of ground the Russians were

holding on the southern Scha-ho bank could not

alter the fact that the Russian arms had suffered

a severe and costly defeat.

The battle was lost because the deliberate attack

was made in a half-hearted manner and with too

many in reserve, and because it was prematurely

abandoned after some few failures. The chief

blame must therefore be attached to General

Headquarters, which is responsible also for the

frictions and evils revealed in the inner working

of the Russian Army. The Commander-in-Chief

acted judiciously when he formed armies in the

shape of the Eastern and AA''estern Detachments

;

for the number of army corps had increased to

such an extent as to render guidance from one

place difficult. It was rather bad that the

Commanders of the Eastern and AVestern Detach-

ments did not take over their commands before

the forward movement began, having thus no time

to accustom themselves and their troops to the

new order of things ; but it was worse when the

Commander-in-Chief himself broke the chain of

responsibility he had forged, by sending over the

heads of the Army Commanders orders direct

to the Generals Commanding Army Corps, and

occasionally even to their Chiefs of the Staff.

From this, the Western Detachment, in whose

neighbourhood the Commander-in-Chief was con-

stantly staying, had especially to suffer ; while the

Eastern Detachment was a little more removed

from him. This habit originated with him from

a strongly developed desire of advising his subordi-

COMMENTS 387

nate commanders, and of disposing, if possible, of

every single unit himself Admirable is the amountof work the Commander-in-Chief managed to get

through, he even finding time to write long letters

and orders during the battle, and to arrange for

many details forming no part of a Commander-in-Chief's office. He thought he was guiding the

battle, yet his reins were dragging along the ground.

Communication between him and his subordinate

leaders was bad ; it is almost inconceivable that

the transmission of letters and messages from the

Commander-in-Chief to the Army Commandersand vice versa took hours and hours, and this not

only with the Eastern Detachment, but also with

the Western Detachment, standing much closer to

him. The telegraph seems to have been used in

a most perfunctory manner. Under these circum-

stances the Commander-in-Chief was not always

sufficiently informed about the progress of the

battle ; he frequently assumed things more in har-

mony with his wishes than with the hard facts,

and, in his desire of directing everything, often

enough adopted measures not suiting the occasion,

and which had to be adjourned, changed, or with-

drawn, or were not carried out by the subordinate

leaders at all. It was his own fault if his will was

not enforced everywhere ; though we cannot denythat little support was rendered him by many of

his subordinate leaders.

Conspicuous as was the want of precise and firm

command, the disadvantage of mixing units which

in part had existed already before the battle was

no less of nn evil. A complete division was


broken up and distributed among other units

;

some bodies of troops were not with the unit

they originally belonged to, but were forming

special detachments newly organised. This process

of breaking up the established war organisation

continued during the battle. Higher points of

view had never a share in deciding such a ques-

tion—merely the demands of the moment were

consulted ; the Commander-in-Chief's mania for

constantly forming fresh reser\es had something

to do with it too. Thus brigades, regiments, and

battalions were shifted from corps to corps, and

from division to division ; new units were created ;

the commanders were robbed of their troops, and

these were placed under leaders unknown to them.

It was due to this practice that the .Japanese suc-

ceeded in penetrating at Scha-ho-pu on October 14

in their fight with the 10th Army Corps, which

found itself deprived of two brigades, getting

them back only after some difficulty, and then too

late. At the conclusion of the battle the powers

of command with Kuropatkin's newly formed re-

serve were perfectly undefined. ^Ve need only

recall to mind from what a chaos of orders the

attack on the Novgorod and Putilov Hills origi-

nated, where troops of four different army corps

were engaged. But the Russian commanders

were so much used to the arbitrary manner in

which their troops were employed, that Stackelberg

was the only one who, for a time, refused to be

deprived of his reserve.

In the face of the defects of an injudicious

military organisation it is the Russian soldier

COMMENTS 389

alone who deserves high praise. The same as

the Japanese, the Russians captured \dUages and

heights, defeated attacks after fighting hard, stood

their ground in hopeless situations, and bore in-

finite fatigues and privations. But, if we add up

on both sides the performances decisive for the

issue, a tremendous balance for the Japanese will,

after all, be the result. They had the advantage

of a better field-training, of better command, and

of a more judicious employment of their forces.

They knew what they were fighting for ; whereas,

on the Russian side, the war had no place in the

heart of the people.

When after the battle of Liao-yan the Japanese Japanese,

did not pursue the Russians, the former were

perfectly aware of the disadvantage of having, at

no distant date, to repeat the struggle for the

decisive issue of the war.

They might have gained much by a pursuit, no

doubt. The retiring masses of the Russians were

thronging together on few roads, made almost

impassable by the heavy rains, and it was to

be anticipated that the retreat would suffer

dangerous delay at the Hun-ho bridges, south of

JMukden, as really proved to be the case.

It would hav^e been easy, therefore, to close

with the retreating enemy. If, for all that, the

Japanese did not continue beyond the battlefield,

there must have been weighty reasons preventing

their doing so and tying them to the Tai-tsy-ho,

logical as they were in all they did. And so it

was indeed. Exhaustion of man and beast was

so great after the battle as to make it quite hope-

390 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARless to exact anything from the troops in the wayof rapid marching. INJoreover, the ammunition

was almost spent, especially that of the Artillery,

there being little prospect of replenishing it soon.

There was also want of provisions, and the losses

much exceeded those of the enemy.

One may certainly urge against this that the

Russians, after the same battle, proved still fit to

march, and that the feeling alone of being pur-

sued, even without great quantities of ammunition,

would have accelerated disorganisation. Howevermuch value we may therefore attach to the reasons

preventing the Japanese from following up their

victory at once, by the fundamental principles of

war it must be considered a neglect of having not

at least attempted to pursue.

But the Russians once having been permitted

to withdraw without molestation, it was certainly

wise of the Japanese after a short respite and

hasty reorganisation, not to have followed the

enemy, who, on September 6, disappeared with the

bulk of his force behind the Hun-ho. It was

then no longer possible to strike terror into his

ranks ; it was known that the Russians were fall-

ing back on their resources, and it was necessary

to bear in mind the possibility of having to fight

another battle, which could not be fought without

sufficient ammunition. It was a characteristic

feature of the Japanese conduct of war never to

venture upon anything adventurous, and always

to avoid reverses and failures. The Japanese re-

sources were not as inexhaustible as those of the

Russians ; bringing up reinforcements and supplies

COMMENTS 391

was not safe, as long as complete command of the

sea was not yet assured. The si7ie qua non for

continuing the campaign were a thorough re-

habilitation of the forces and of the materiel, and

the bringing up of reinforcements. The latter was

very important, it being expected that the Russians

would be reinforced too, but it extended the pause

in the operations more than was desired. At first

it was probably hoped that the fall of Port Arthur

would set free the besieging Army ; it was only after

this hope had disappeared that the 8th Division

was called up from home. It arrived too late ; the

Japanese had to meet the unexpected attack of

the Russians certainly well furnished with materiel

of every kind, but inferior in numbers by about

40,000 men.

The attack of the Russians came as a surprise

indeed, not in the sense of the Japanese having

had no timely warning of it—the Russians them-

selves took care of that ; but it was scarcely ex-

pected that the enemy would recover so soon after

his defeat at Liao-yan. There was the danger of

the Russians retaining the initiative if the Japanese

did not act promptly. Oyama's Headquarters were

not, even for a single moment, in doubt that the

Russian attack must be met by a counter-attack.

But on October 7 it was at first decided to let the

enemy, who, in the plain, had already approached

to within about 10 kilometres, and, in the moun-

tains at Bian-yu-pu-sa, was still closer to Umesawa's

Brigade, run up against the prepared positions, and

then to issue from them for counter-attack.

A plan was therefore adopted frequently recom-

392 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARmended by Field-Marshal Count von JNloltke.^ Aslate as 1874, when criticising a tactical problem,

he expressed the view that the improvement in

firearms was to the advantage of the defensive,

and that it would be much better to assume

the offensive after several attacks of the enemyhad been repulsed, than to attack, oneself, the

enemy at great sacrifice.^ Undoubtedly the

Field-lSIarshal was perfectly aware of the fact

that he who acts in this way leaves, of course, to

his opponent, up to the moment of the counter-

attack, certain advantages—namely, greater free-

dom of action and gaining time—advantages

which, for the other side, mean so many dis-

advantages. JMoltke, in his campaigns, had never

to deal with these disadvantages, but always man-aged to retain the initiative from the outset, which

is proof that he never sought salvation in principles,

but always acted as suited the occasion. Oyamawas acting in a similar way when the expected

attack of the Russians did not come off.

Perhaps the defensive plan was merely adopted

to allow the Armies time for properly arranging

their forces, and to wait for more information,

giving a clearer view of the situation. But on

October 8 the situation was already clear enough

to leave no doubt, either in Oyama's or Kuroki's

mind, that the right wing of the 1st Armywas most seriously threatened by an enveloping

• Von Moltke, ''Taktisch-strategische Aufsätze" ("Tactical and

Strategical Essays "), Preface, p. xii.

* " Moltke's Tactical Problems," Solution of Problem 60, p. 105.

(Hugh Rees, Ltd., 119, Pall Mall, Loudon, S.W.)

COMMENTS 393

attack of the Russians. It is astonishing that

only the Guard Kobi Brigade, which had retired

from Bian-yu-pu-sa, and three companies of

Lines-of-Communication troops were employed,

without any reserve, for holding the extensive posi-

tions at Pen-si-hu. If the Russians had attacked

them there on October 9 with stronger forces,

making better use of the chances offered to an

envelopment, Umesawa could not have avoided

defeat. It was only due to the mistakes com-

mitted by the Russians that the Japanese were

able to reinforce in time their right wing by one

Division (the 12th) before the attacks were renewed.

Even then the total of all the forces engaged there

was far too small ; it almost looks as if the danger

so imminent was not recognised.

Until the evening of October 9, Japanese General

Headquarters had obtained an idea of the distribu-

tion of the enemy's forces pretty well corresponding

with what it actually was, being at the same time

certain that the Russian advance, which had led to

a serious encounter on the extreme right wing

only, was hanging fire. The moment, therefore,

was propitious for anticipating the enemy by the

counter-attack that had been planned already.

Oyama's first attack orders of October 9, at 10

o'clock in the evening, combined with the later

directives he issued, up to October 11 inclusive,

make it clear that he did not mean to push the

Russians back in the direction they had come from,

but to cut them off from Mukden and Tie-lin.

This was to be attained by the Army during its

advance and in the combats (for the advance was


bound to lead at once to fighting) executing a

right wheel, with the 1st Army, which, however,

was to advance on its own part too, acting as pivot.

The right wing of the 1st Army was given an

objective for attack close at hand ; to its left wing

and to the 4th and 2nd Armies were prescribed

more distant objectives. The 1st Army was to

wait with its attack until the 4th Army had gained

ground for some distance ; the 2nd Army was to

advance more rapidly with its left wing, and inake

a wide enveloping movement, but to keep strong

forces ready behind its right wing.

No exception can be taken in these arrangements

against the resolution, proving self-reliance and

boldness, to advance for attack with inferior num-bers. But it must have been questionable, from

the outset, whether the battle could still be turned

into a decisive victory by pushing the enemy from

his line of communication. The plan of attaining

this by a right wheel found the Army in a situation

where, close in front of the enemy, it was no

longer master of its own movements ; the enor-

mous fronts were pretty well running parallel and

close to each other. Pushing the enemy away

from his line of communication is, as a rule, the

consequence of a blow directed against one or the

other of his flanks, such a blow being necessarily

initiated by forming up in depth. But it was nowtoo late for shifting considerable forces towards the

right flank of the Russians ; nor was the Japanese

Army strong enough for that. An effort was

therefore made to obtain the decisive effect by

prescribing to the left wing an enveloping move-

COMMENTS 395

ment, in addition to the wheel, with the hope,

probably, of outflanking the Russians west of the

Scha-ho. But absolutely opposed to this was the

further arrangement of keeping strong forces ready

behind the riglit wing of the 2nd Army. Theone prevented the other ; for the envelopment that

was planned, these forces were needed behind the

left wing. General Kodama, Chief of the General

Staff at Japanese General Headquarters, after-'

wards explained this by saying that it was hoped

to pierce the Russian front at Pan-kiau-pu on the

Mandarin Road ; that it was then intended, with

the forces retained by the 2nd Army, either to act

against the left flank of the enemy's group, as-

sumed to be on the INlandarin Road, or against the

right flank of the group at Fon-kia-pu. Twothings were therefore in preparation—namely, a

wheel with envelopment, and penetration.

We have to prove still, by the progress of the

battle, that the Japanese Army could not execute

a wheel in the battle It is true that, during the

later days of the battle, the centre was in advance

of the right wing, and the left wing in advance of

the centre. But that was only the result of an

advance in echelon, which took a different shape

with the individual Armies, according to the amountof opposition offered by the enemy, and to the pro-

gress they themselves were making. If a right

wheel had really been executed, the left wing of

the 2nd Army must have ultimately crossed the

JNIandarin Road in a north-easterly direction south

of Mukden ; but it remained always west of the

Mandarin Road. There were envelopments and

39(? THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARpenetrations, but not in the sense of great opera-

tions deciding a battle. The Russians were pushed

back rather in a straight Hne on their starting-points.

The means, therefore, the Japanese were trying

to make use of for increasing as much as possible

the defeat of the Russians did not assert them-

selves. This was a natural consequence of

the late resolve to attack, and of the Russian

superior numbers, but would have failed per-

haps, even under more favourable circumstances,

owing to the arrangements as they were made.

It is always a delicate thing to pursue two objects

concurrently in a battle. The leading idea wasthat of a wheel, with a simultaneous envelopment

of the Russian right wing ; this alone, and not

the side issue of penetrating, ought to have

decided the employment of the forces A^'ith the

2nd Army. In a manner similar to Oyama,Napoleon had tried, in the battle of Wagram on

July 6, 1809, at one and the same time to envelop

the right wing of the Austrians at JNIarkgraf-

neusiedl, and to penetrate their centre at Siissen-

brunn ; he succeeded only in the envelopment.

But on the Scha-ho it would have been impossible

to execute the envelopment as well, even if the

troops in reserve had been echeloned behind the

left wing ; for the Russians were holding back

very strong forces behind their right wing.

Denuded of all reserves, the Japanese left wing

itself was even now being threatened by an

envelopment. That it did not come about in the

course of the battle is not the merit of the

Japanese, but a consequence of the want of

COMMENTS 897

activity on the part of the Russians, who failed to

recognise the advantage of their situation.

The menace to both the Japanese wings clearly

shows that they were fighting with a minority

against a majority. It is remarkable that Oyama,

on October 9, in the evening, demanded also of the

extreme right wing, opposite which he assumed

two Russian Army Corps to be, to make a moveforward, though but a short one. He probably

had not been aware yet of the severe combats at

Pen-si-hu on October 9. Kuroki, commandingthe 1st Army, rectified the Commander-in-Chiefs

order by imposing some restraint upon the 12th

Division, which had meanwhile reinforced Ume-sawa's Detachment, by not permitting it to go

beyond the position hitherto defended, until the

enemy was beaten off. But for the rest he left

this, the most threatened portion of the Japanese

battle-order, all to itself.

The trust reposed by him in the firmness of

his troops was fully justified by General Ino-uye

repelling on October 11 with his weak forces the

furious assaults of far superior numbers of the

Russians. The heroes fighting almost to the last

man at the passes north of Pen-si-hu and on tlie

steep edges of tlie valley east of the town were

the real victors of the battle ; for at no other

point of the battlefield were the Russians so near

victory as here. It was highly fortunate for the

Japanese that their enemy did not use sufficient

force on October 11 for completing the envelop-

ment on the southern bank of the Tai-tsy-ho.

But ought we to allow Kuroki to count upon such

398 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARgood luck ? Or had he good reasons for hoping

Prince Kan-in to be in time with the 2nd Cavalry

Brigade to ensure the safety of the extreme right

wing? The Prince arrived only on October 12,

and, even granted that the Japanese had no

occasion for estimating very highly the per-

formances of the Russians in the attack, yet there

remains the fact that what was exacted from

Ino-uye's small force was too much to be com-

patible with the situation, the superior numbers

of the Russians, and the want of reserves.

But the extreme right wing was without doubt

intentionally kept as weak as possible. The special

significance of General Baron Ino-uye's desperate

fight lies in the fact that, with his Division and

General Umesawa's seven battalions, he riveted

the attention of almost three Russian Army Corps.

This alone permitted the Japanese to employ on

the other portions of their extensive battle-front

sufficient forces to feel on equal terms with the

Russians. In this way they were able on Octo-

ber 11 to carry out with some chance of success the

deliberate attack against the mass of the enemy

standing fast in its positions, while the Russian

Eastern Detachment was assaulting the extreme

right wing. At the end of the day it almost

seemed as if the intended right wheel of the Armywas really preparing. The 4th Army, in the

centre, had actually effected a kind of right wheel

towards Tan-hai-schi, as ordered for October 11

;

the 2nd Army had sufficiently far advanced north-

wards to cover the left wing of the 4th Army,

overlapping, as it seemed, the extreme right wing

COMMENTS 399

of the Russians. At that time the Japanese

were probably not yet accurately informed about

the presence of the 6th Siberian Army Corps

and of Dembovski's Detachment. It is therefore

intelligible that Oyama should still adhere to the

idea of a right wheel when arranging for the con-

tinuation of the attack on October 12 ; only the

extreme right wing, after the experiences of

October 11, was directed to continue in its position.

On October 12 the 2nd Army, on whose rapid

advance all depended, certainly gained a splendid

victory over the Russian Western Detachment,

which was pushed into its last prepared positions

on the Scha-ho ; but just that day proved the

impossibility of carrying out the wheel. Theenvelopment, to which the 2nd Army owed its

victory, affected only a portion of the Russian

right wing, and did not prevent the WesternDetachment from retiring in the direction fromwhich it had come ; but at the same time the 6th

Siberian Army Corps and Dembovski's Detach-ment made their presence felt between the Hun-ho and the Scha-ho. The 2nd Army thus found

itself opposite an overlapping Russian front whichit was impossible either to envelop or to pushfrom its line of communication. This obliged

also the 4th Army to continue the attack

frontally in a northerly direction and to give upthe wheel already initiated, as it would otherwise

have been endangering its left wing.

Japanese General Headquarters did not hesitate

to adapt themselves to the altered conditions. Theobjective of attack assigned to the three Armies

400 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARfor October 13, Tai-kou

—

Tun-kia-fön to the 1st

Army, I^u-sun-tun—Tschien-tschan-lin-tsy to the

4th, and Scha-ho-pu—Lin-schin-pu to the 2nd,

prove that the intention of pushing the enemyfrom JNlukden and Tie-hn had been given up. Onthe other hand, these objectives, by the additional

paragraph that the enemy was no longer to be

attacked on the northern bank of the Scha-ho,

should he be standing there in entrenched positions,

make it clear that Oyama did not intend to carry

the attack and pursuit beyond the Scha-ho. Thereasons for it are intelligible. Oyama saw there

was, anyhow, no longer any chance of defeating

the enemy decisively, and that his own troops,

who had been fighting already since October 9,

would be exhausting their strength in trying

combats without achieving more than a retreat

of the Russians. But it was likely that this retreat

would come to an end at the latest on the Hun-ho,

or perhaps already on the northern bank of the

Scha-ho, where it was thought the Russians had

some more troops in reserve. In that case the

Japanese, immediately after the recent fights,

would have to face another struggle for a strong

position. It seemed imperative to let them first

recover their breath and gather fresh strength for a

decisive battle afterwards. Oyama thought, as the

victor in the present struggle, he had it in his

hand to make an end to the battle on the Scha-ho.

It was surely no easy matter for Japanese

General Headquarters to arrive at this decision.

It meant postponing once more the struggle for the

issue of the war. It would be a mistake to look

COMMENTS 401

upon this as want of energy. It is better to

abandon a hopeless operation, and to construct a

new basis upon which to act afresh, than to waste

the strength of the fighting force in endeavouring

to attain an object that cannot be reached. Yet it

cannot be done with disregard to the enemy ; of

this the Japanese were to become aware as yet.

But Oyama did not wish to let the Russians

escape across the Scha-ho without inflicting on them

at least some damage. With the 3rd Brigade of

the 2nd Division, which Kuroki, on October 12,

had moved from the left wing of the 1st Armyto its right wing, he intended to separate and cut

off" from the Centre those portions of the Russian

Eastern Detachment which were still lying

opposite General Baron Ino-uye's Detachment.

They were actually separated already on the morn-

ing of October 13, the 4th Siberian Army Corps

having, on October 12, retired more than Stackel-

berg's troops ; the 1st Guard Brigade, indeed, had

already penetrated into tlie gap by occupying the

Bai-ji-san. The operation, by itself, had therefore

some chance of succeeding, but was made with

too weak a force. The 3rd Brigade of the 2nd

Division met with superior Russian Infantry on

the right wing of the Eastern Detachment, and

was gaining no ground. Over and over again is

seen the disadvantage of the inferior numbers of the

Japanese ; it deprived them also at another place

of the chance of taking advantage of a situation

particularly unfavourable for the Russian Centre.^

• When, where, and how Oyama's General Reserve was used cannot

be ascertained.

26

402 THE RUSSO-JAPAXESE WAR

By the retreat of the Western Detachment to the

neighbourhood of Scha-ho-pu on October 12, the

right of the Ist Army Coi'ps at Man-kia-fon had

become most seriously endangered. Between it

and the left of the 10th Army Corps at Tschien-

tschan-lin-tsy there yawned a wide gap, open to

the west, which the Russians were unable to close

in any strength. Had Oyama had sufficient troops

with the 4th Army to continue his advance against

the front of the Western Detachment, as well as

against the right flank and rear of the Centre,

the fate of the 1st Army Corps and of the 4th

Siberian Army Corps would have probably been

sealed. But just then, on October 13, he sent

the 5th Division from the 4th to the 1st Army,with the object of supporting the Guard Division,

wliich on that day was deprived again of the

advantages of its penetration at the Ba-ji-san by

the 4th Siberian Army Corps and the 5th East

Siberian Rifle Division. On October 14 the

Centre and Eastern Detachment had retired

approximately in line with the Western Detach-

ment ; now there were no longer opportunities

for cutting ofl" or annihilating portions of the

Russian Army.It may have been a mistake of Oyama to call

the 5th Division away from a spot where it could

achieve a great success ; the danger threatening

the Guard Division was, as a matter of fact, already

removed when it was joined by the 5th Division.

It is, of course, difficult to determine with cer-

tainty after the event what induced Oyama to act

as he did^ In any case, he bad no more hopes

COMMENTS 403

now of reaping special advantages, and was therefore

most anxious to end the battle at last. The 1st and

4th Armies were stopped by him on the southern

bank of the Scha-ho on October 15, and the 2nd

Army alone was to do the final work by capturing

the heights east of Schan-lan-tsy, and the village

of La-mu-tun, the pivots that were still in the

hands of the enemy. Oyama's plan of breaking off

the battle synchronised with Kuropatkin's fresh

thoughts of leading the Western Detachmentand his newly formed General Reserve forward

to attack. The Japanese Commander-in-Chiefs

wish was, therefore, not responded to by the

intentions of the hostile Commander.Oyama had certainly a right to suppose the

Russians to be equally fatigued as his own troops,

perhaps even more fatigued than the latter, owing

to the effects of constant failure ; nevertheless, it

is shown here again that the enemy can do as he

likes so long as his will is not crushed by a decisive

victory. Kuropatkin's eagerness to attack could,

of course, no longer be turned into any violent

action. But the defeat suffered by the Japanese

at the Putilov and Novgorod Hills during the

night of October 16-17 gave them clear proof that

they had no right to look upon the battle as

finished at a moment when it suited their intentions

best. It was not till October 19 that a tacit

agreement was established between both parties for

abstaining from further fighting. Now came the

curious situation of both Armies standing, almost

inactive, opposite each other for a long time at

close distances.

404 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARThe Japanese Commander had to face a difficult

task in the battle on the Scha-ho. The battle wasforced upon him by superior numbers. He dis-

cerned the riglit moment for snatching the advan-

tages of resolute action from the hesitating enemy.

But all attempts of giWng a decisive turn to

the extensive frontal attack failed. This is not

meant as a reproach, though the critic, looking

backwards, may not approve of all the measures

adopted by the Commander ; it rather shows the

determined efforts, indispensable for success, of

trying everything to gain something. What was

achieved was, after all, an almost unbroken chain

of successes in detail, but no complete victory—

a

defeat of an enemy pushed back, but not his

destruction.

The situation, as it was, scarcely permitted to

achieve more, and the gains must not be under-

rated. Not the great losses of the Russians,

exceeding twice those of the Japanese, indicate

the gain ; for the Russians were able to make good

their losses at any time. The tremendous superiority

possessed by the Japanese since the days of Liao-

yan was once more established, and to a degree

which deprived the Russians of all hope of ever

giving the war a turn in their favour. They had

been unable to hold out in the defence, and nowtheir attack had failed likewise. They certainly

contributed themselves to the success of their

enemy, and the fortune of war was on the side

of the Japanese. But this fortune was well

deserved by the constant manifestations of a firm

will to beat the enemy, by the indefatigable energy

COMMENTS 405

of the attacks, and by the cheerful sacrifice of the

troops.

In clear and firm lines the Commander-in-Chief

defined the limits within which his subordinate

commanders had complete freedom of action in

sohdng the tasks imposed on them. This trust

in the performance of commanders and com-

manded was transmitted down to the lowest

private, producing that sureness and those methods

which seemed almost natural and characterised

everything the Japanese were taking in hand.

Frictions and difficulties disappeared in the enor-

mous working of the Japanese Army because

every one, from the highest Commander downto the lowest coolie-soldier, was imbued with the

feeling that he was responsible for the issue of

the war.

The strategic result of the battle on the Scha-ho Result of

falls behind the moral results. The Japanese had ^hebattle.

certainly made a step forward ; but the Russians

ultimately remained half a day's march south of

the positions they had originally intended to

defend after the battle of Liao-yan. The situation,

however, created by the battle on the Scha-ho

was of importance for this reason—that it formed

the starting-point for the final great struggle for

the issue of the war, and naturally influenced the

course of events in the battle of Mukden.

WAR OKGAXIZ.VTION OF THE RUSSIAN A.KilY OF MAXCHUKIA DÜKIX(i TllK BATT

CnMMAXDKH-ix-CHlKF: liENEH.U. OF INFAXTUY. (iKXEKAI. AlT)E-I)H-C'A.\ir KriiUI'ATKIX. CiiiKK of the Staff: 1,1 Kl TKXA.NT ( I I:m:i,'.\ I,

n, MNJnr

KIM I)li>-

I'-niHliwdiiiu-dll,,

fr. Ith Sib. Iiil. li-l

aaa

< nun» «if L'mh I uNiis.if llh iK"»All. HriKwIf Sili.Arl.Alili-ilj;. Kmiilii-i-

'.'ml lirijiaili' »I llic rillli Iiil, |ii\.

„M.MIi llM..iiliik Jliilli lii-ii

llniM llir . I~l lilt Um

JMlli TM'liriMhnl'

InilqiL'iiik'Mt rwiciis. Ciiviiliv iiripi.l.'

Miij. (Jfh.Pi'iiu-c Orbcliniii

ick Kiibtinski Horse Dn^ostanski lloitsi-

I SI .\rL;uiisl,.l'niMsliiiik.rn->. l;..:i

Western Dccachmeut or Grcmp

Kineral of Cavaliy Baron Bildfilin.u

I liii'f of Staff: Major Oeneral Baron Tbiesciiba

XVIIth Army Corps

l^iriitenanl (icneral Wolkov .

'liief of Staff: Colonel DrajiOininiv

Klh Inf. Div. 3ril Inf. Div.

Ll.Hen.Dobrshinslti Maj. (ien. .lalisbnl

1 St Drinade 1 st Brigade

Maj. (ien. Glinski Maj. (ien. Sasht-sliulc

»Ih Old Ingcnnali-

10 th

Kl.Sth liolcbov New Ilinerina

;l:,-kn .Maj.lieii..hiknlii

ll. ,

MY OF MA2JCHUKIA DÜRJNG THE BA.TTLE OX THE SCHA-HO ffi OCTOBEE 1904.

CiiiKi- ipi- Till-: Stakf: UHITIONAXT lilCNEKAI- SACKATJOV. — Qiarterslvsteh-Gknkhal: LIElTTKNA.XTl (iEXEKAL CH Alv'KllC\rrsil.

Ai thr distinsal of 111,

I Sil.. Kill.

lit l)inj;,>

, .|, «,

I. Uiflo Uiv.

1). Cobs.

li Ail.lirij!.

|. (S B„,„l

Sil,. Sal.p.

Liciileiiaiit (icnerul Ivaiiü

'hill of Slaff: Mnj. lien. Dra:

(i 111 ICast Sill. Kifk Uiv. 3 nl Kast Sib. liiflc DivMaj. (ii'ii. Daiiilüv

|

Maj. (luii. Kai^htnlinHki

...n l!«iiiciik:,iii).l

fr. ."i-lth Inf. Uiv.

L'UthMottshali

Ist Dripiile

.Maj.(icM..fiizii

ai l.i..-utuiaiil li

tr. 7 1 si Inf. Uiv.

•2s2ii,lTsheinoiars

2.s:;nl Biwulnia

I'VoJitiaCrJ. fr. 2Glh Ait.lin;;, Pion. Conip.

.ji 2 guns .|. .|. .|. 24 giMLs Hi

fr.2iid Sill, Int. R.gl. fr. I st Sib. Inf. l!-t.

.'ml lirigadi-Tiuiisbuiknl ( 'oss. Uiv.

Maj. Ceil. Liubaviii

2 Mil Arguiisk

IM Army Corps

ncral of Cavalry, Cencral Aiilf-df-Can

Baron MeiondorfChief of Stuff : Maj. (Jen. Laskievilsh

:i7tlj Inf. Div. 22nd Inf. Div.lA. (.Ten, Tshekinariov 1 Lt. (tcii. Affanassovich

1st BrigadeMaj. ("Jen. Novikov

Udih Zarizvii

"JUL"2nd Brigade

117 th Samara

i.lli i;a.i >il.. Kill,- :\v\ Ki.-l Sill. Uifl,.

-Vil. Kiigadr All. I'.iigade

(.'oloiicl Meister Colonel Schwerin

t >|i .|. lis guns)I

.|i .|. ,|i i|. ^2J guns)

2ikI •r.^hitilisk rraiisbiiikal Cossaeks

.Maehine gun ( imi|.. .Mlaelied. fr. IVtli

|- (S Maeh.guiis) ~'''- -^"'ly Corps

2iidlCast,Sili,Sai.)).liatl. ''Ii/ih. Inf. Kgi.

2 lid N.rlshinsk

fP Horse .M itaiii litty, of Frontier ( lid,

Amur Coss, 1 st Argvilisk. Transbaikal ( oss.

i:i Balls, — 1Ü Sotniius — ISO guns —1 I'ion. Comp.

1 l.sih Kaspii

l:;nl An. I'.rl-a.lr

.|. ill ij. ,|, ,|, t ,|. ,|, ,|, ,|, ,|, ,|,

7 th Sib. Coss. Hgt.

Eipierry. Colonel Prinee 'rnibrlzkui

Joiirl .Ma.bilov

.•li.nVei.-hlieliililiskt

_at t

ir, (J. F. Mounlaiii

III

7 lb Sill. Inf. Kgi"^'enissei

Ir, lb PieldMoItgt.

O C. morliir

lib 2iilh lloi-se Art. Hitv

tmjna qiii'igunsi'

Mmiiu»-*! I>eUiL-hmerite of Si-oiii^ frimi;

1-. .1. K:,sl Sil,, liiik- U-t. 1 st K;L>t Sib. lull,- lii:

1 liatl. - 2 Mid. IVt.S,.is. - 5 Sotns. 2 gum

•riansbaikal Coss. Baity.

:;r.l 2 lid i>i

[fl IJl

12 guns

:12 Balls. — J Sotiiias _ Hjl Sapp. Hall.

IVlh Siberian -\riiiy Corp-

l.ient. Ceneral Siiriibai.v

lii.-l of Blaff: Muj, Cell, WebrI

Vhli Sibeiiaii \niiv Corp-

liiiieial of liifaiilery .Sobiiliev

liief of Slaff: Colonel Poslov-ki

:!rd Sib, Inf. Div., 2ml 8ib. Inf, Uiv

Miij, (ten. ICossovitsh • Maj. ({en. Levesta

Ist Brigade Ist BrigadeMaj, Ceil. Sbileiko Maj, (ieii. Pliesliko

MIth Diiisk Cilli Krasiioiiii>k uilli

IllHlSili.Aniivi.irp,

Jii.l llrigade 2 ml I'.iiga.lr

.Maj. (irii, Maj, (li-li, ()gaiin,ski

I'.aroii 11,-libilidiT *

II lb Selilijialulinsk 7lll Yenissei «nil

ninlS \,un i.irp..

from 2 lid. :!nl. and Itll Sib. .\i

VAE OEGANIZATIOX OF THE JAPANESE FIELD ARMY DURIX(t THF-: B^

CoM«AM'i:ii-IN-<'iin:F: MA i;sll AL lIAi;(;r]S ()Ya:\IA^ — CHIEi-ni-THK Staff: I.TErTKNAXT IH-^XICKAI. HAK'OX K()l)A:\rA. (Jf.nekai. i

Hecond Ami:

fJeiieral Baron * '^ n

r|ii,.| ,,l S;;ilt; Maj'ir 1 Imcral Ochi-ai. I'.|mt.v Chii'f: r..l..iicl Yiirhi

;E KIKLD AKJIY DI'liLVr IHK BA'ITLK (iX THE SCHA-H(» IX OCTOBEK' 1904.

NKKAI, MAKiiV KiiDAMA iIkvkiim, Staff: MA-l'iH OEXEKAL MIIIHI. MAJOIi (JKN'EUAL FIKISHIMA. cnLdN'KI, M ATSIKAWA,

.\l;.|ur ll.'iicml r.vchara. Dipuly Clii.-f: CiNim-l -niliilii

Fir-il Arniy

I it'iierai Haron Iviiroki

luif nf Staff: Major Cpiicral Fujii, Deputy Chief: Cnloiifl Malsiiishi

lOlli Divinion

IjriiliiianI (ii'jiCTal Boron Kawamiin

Colorii-I Kurosawa

L'lill. Hrifja.li' Klh lirigadi-

Mai. Cell, Marui Maj, (icu. Otal

olduc'l Kainada

liMli Cav. Ktrl.

Maj,.r Vasu.la

[11(1, I'iuiKvr llall.

Kith Kolli ürigadc

Colom-l .Mnji

4Uth -ilith Kith

nth Kolli iiri«ailc'

.Ma] lirii. Ilki

'•1(1 Kobi Brigade^i

Maj. Geu. Okubo

;)4th mil isthan n a1 St Field Art. I!rif;a<le

Maj. flen. rohiyama

lilh 11 th l.-,th

t i|i t .j. .|. .j. .|i ij. .|i .[. .]. .|. t ,|, ,|, ,|, ,|, ,|,

Lieuteuaut (Jeneral Baron Nishijinia

Colonel Ishibashi

Ihivr Knlii llii..,aJ,-''i. one Fi.-I.l Art, \:n-.:,.W, and ll.-av» Arlill.-iv.

h |)ivi^i...l Ilia- fii-sl |«,iii,,ii>. al I.iao.yau on Oiloher 13.1

111- Kuns, 1 1 s,,iia<ln about :M guns, Heavy Arlillc-ry in additit I'/, Pioneer Battalit

l.'ith Brigade I 3 rd Brigade

Maj. (ien. OkasakiI

Maj. Oen. JVIatsumaga

Lt. Colonel Yoshida

nOth 2!lth

oloiiel Kavasaki Colonel Shiiiiada

2n,l Cav. l;^t.

I.t. Colonel Akivania

2nd Field Art. Ki;t.

Colonel Tada

,|, ,|, ,|, ,|i ,|, ,|,

2 lid Pioneer liatl.

(luard Division

Lieutenant Tieneral Asada-i

Colonel Shigemi

2ud Brigade

Maj. ({on. Watanabe Maj.tieu.Kimuralzaki-'')

I luard Cav. ligt.

Lt. (,'olonel Kasa

Cuard Field Art. Rgt.Colonel Kuniaiuoto

t i|i .|i i|i i|. i|.

(iuard riouei-r Ball.

12 th liivisioii

Lieuleuant (icneral Baron Ino-nye

Colonel (^bara

23 rd BrigadeI 1 2 th Brigade

Maj. Gen. Kigoshi Maj. Oen. Shiinaniuri

21 th

Colonel Hit:

APPENDIX III

Order No. 5 to the Troops of the Army of Manchuria

Mukden, September 7, 1904, 9.30 p..-«.

The following is to be carried out by the Army of Manchuria on Sketch 1.

September 8 :

1. The IQth Army Corps and the 2nd Siberian Army Corps will re-

main under the orders of Lieutenant-General Slutshevski, in the

section assigned to them by General Order No. 4.' Advanced guards

are to be pushed forward : by the 10th Army Corps, in the direction

on Pen-si-hu, to about the village of Fün-kia-pu ; by the 2nd Siberian

Army Corps, to the railway bridge on a level with Lin-schiu-pu, with a

flank-guard at Kuan-lin-pu.

2. The 17th Army Corps will remain in the section prescribed to it

by General Orders,- pushing its advanced guard to Scha-ho-pu village.

The advanced guard, until it is withdrawn behind the entrenched

position on the left bank of the Hun-ho, is to be placed under the

orders of the General Commanding the 10th Army Corps.

3. The advanced guards will keep in touch with each other.

4. The 3rd Siberian Army Corps ^ will cross to the right bank of the

Hun-ho, and be stationed in the neighbourhood of Tschin-wan-fou

village.

5. The 1st Siberian and the Ath Siberian Army Corps will remain iu

the sections indicated by General Order No. 4.*

' By General Order No. 4, of which there is no verbatim copy, the

portion of the Mukden Position west of the railway was assigned to

the 2nd Siberian Army Corps, and that east of the railway to tlie 10th

Army Corps. Headquarters of the 1 0th Army Corps went to Tia-ho,

on the Hun-ho.* On the northern bank of the Hun-ho, on the Mandarin Road,

south of Mukden.' The 3rd Siberian Army Corps, on September 6, had occupied the

left wing of the fortified position on the southern bank of the l^un-ho,

at Hun-ho-pu.* North of the Hun-ho : 1st Siberian Army Corps, east of the

Mandarin Koad ; 4th Siberian Array Corps, at the railway.

407

408 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR6. The \st Army Corps will remain in the space opposite the north

west corner of Mukden, between the roads indicated.

7. [Refers to the portions of the 5th Siberian Army Corps detailed

to other units.]

8. Major-General Kossagovski s Brigade will unite opposite Sin-min-

tuu to cover the extreme right of the Army.

9. General Liuhaviri.s Detaehnipnt will be stationed at the passes on

the road Fu-schun— Bian-yu-pu-sa, near Fan-schön village, as well as

at the Kau-tu-lin Pass, occupying- the passes for defence.

10. Lieutenant-Colonel Koshelevaki's Detachment will march to Fan-

schön, joining Major-General Liubavin's command.

11. Major-General Peterov's Detachment will remain at the Da-lin

Pass.

12. The detachment at Sin-tun-tin will remain in that place, covering

the extreme left of the Army.

13. The Orenburg Co.smrk Brigade will move forward 5 versts, con-

tinuing in the duties laid down in General Order No. 4.

14. Major-General Mishtshenko's- Detachment will advance as much as

possible, to about Hun-pau-schan village, continuing in its duties in

accordance with my directions given in General Order No. 4, but con-

fining them towards the east, to the line Mukden—Bian-yu-pu-sa.

15. The Siberian Cossack Division will concentrate on the line

Mukden—Bian-yu-pu-sa, in the neighbourhood of Fön-kia-pu, cover-

ing and reconnoitring in front of the Army, between the line Mukden

—Bian-yu-pu-sa and the line Mukden

—

Fan-schön. Reconnaissance

towards the enemy in the section Fön-kia-pu—Fan-schön.

16. The Terek-Kuban.yki Regiment will continue carrying out the task

prescribed in General Order No. 4.

17. All units will establish communication with their Corps Head-

quarters by flying post, or, if possible, by telephone and telegraph ;

Corps Headquarters, in their turn, with General Headquarters.

18. General Headquarters will be at Mukden Railway Station.

(Signed) The Commander-in-Chief:

General Aide-<le-Camp KUROPATKIN.Chief of the Staff : Lieutenant-General SACKAROV.

APPENDIX IV

Okder No. 6 to the Troops of the Army of Manchuria

Mukden Station, September S, 1904, 11 p.m.

It being my intention to prepare for assuming tlie oiFensive with the

Army, I consider it necessary to oppose strong resistance to the enemyin the position near Mukden, should he advance on that town. W^ith

this object, I order the units of the Army to adopt the following

measures :

1. Main Position

Likutenant-Gkneäal Slutshevski

(a) 10th Army Corps : 32 battls.,

6 sotnias, 104 guns,' 6 Sapper

battls.

{b) 2ud Sib. Army Corps : 12

battls., 2 sotnias, 32 guns, 24

mortars, 3rd E. Sib. Sapper Battl.

(c) Advanced Guard of 17th

Army Corps.

(rf) 2nd Sib. Art. Abteilung.

will remain in the position pre-

scribed by General Order Xo. 5

;

the preparation for defence of

the entrenched position is to be

continued. The ground in front

is to be secured by the advanced

guards on the line of the vil-

lages Fon-kia-pu—Lin-schin-pu

—Kuan-lin-pu. In case of a

hostile attack, the position will

be defended, the advanced guards

at the same time being with-

drawn, when tlie advanced guard

of the 17th Army Corps will

rejoin its corps iu time.

' Tlie number of guns with the 10th Army Corps was only 88, the3rd, 4th, and 5th Batteries of the 31st Artillery Brigade being dis-

banded, and all other batteries organised at 8 guns each.

409


2, Covering the Lefi Flank

Lieutknant-General Ivaxov

(«) 3rd Sib. Army Corps : 24

battls., 6 sotnias, 64 field guns,

24 mtn. guns, 4 Horse Artillery

mtii. gunSj 2ud E. Sib. Sapper

Battl.

(ft) Major-General Liubavin's De-

tachment :

213th Infantry Regt. . 4 battls.

26th Artillery Brig. . 8 field gns.

1st Sib. Infantry Regt. 1 battl.

2nd Sib. Infantry Regt. 1 battl.

Frontier Guard . . 2 field gns.

2nd Brig. Trausbaikal

Cossack Division . 12 sotnias.

4th H.A. Mtn. Batty. 4 mtn. gns.

Total : 6 battls., 12 sotnias, 10 field

guns, 4 mtn. guns,

{c) Major-General Peterov's De-

tachment :

214th Infantry Regt. 3 battls.

26th Artillery Brig. . 4 guns.

2ud Dagestan Cossack

Regt. . . .6 sotnias.

Total : 3 battls., 6 sotnias, 4 guns.

APPENDIX IV 411

3. Close Protection of the Left Flank

Lieutenant-General Baron Stack-

ELBERG

1st Sib. Army Corps : 24 battls.,

10 squadrous or sotuias, 56 field

guns, 1 Sapper and 1 Telegraph

company from 1st E. Sib. Sapper

Battl.

will secure and defend the right

bank of the Hun-ho within the

section Fu-lin—Kiu-san, serving

as connecting-link between the

main body of the Army and the

3rd Siberian Army Corps, to

which it will form the nearest

support. This force will moveon the 10th inst. into the section

mentioned.

4. Covering the

Lieutenant-General Dembovski

215th Infantry Regt. .

412 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR6. Cavalry

will remain in the sections ap-

portioned to them by General

Order No. 5, continuing in their

duties.

(a) Majob-Genkral Grekov

Orenburg Cossk. Brig. 12 sotnias.

11th H.A. Batty . 6 guns.

Total : 12 sotnias, 6 guns.

(h) Major-Gexeral Mishtshenko

Independ. Transbaikal

Cossack Brig. . 12 sotnias.

1st Transbaikal Cos-

sack Batty. . . 6 guns.

Ural Cossack Brig. . 12 sotnias.

6th H.A. Batty. Fron-

tier Guard . . 4 guns.


(c) Major-Gknekai, Samsoxov

4th, 7th, and 8th Sib.

Cossack Regts. . 18 sotnias.

20th H.A. Batty . 6 guns.


7. Nearest Suppoii, of the Mahi Position

General of Cavalry BaronBiLDERLiNG will remain in the section appor-

17th Army Corps, less the units tioned to it by General Order

detailed as advanced guard in front ^o. 5.

of the main position.

8. General Reserve

(a) NorthernportionjCiEyERAh AiDK-

de-Camp Baron JMeiendorf will concentrate between Pu-ho

1st Army Corps and .5th Sib. Cos- village and Hu-schi-tai Station,

sack Regt. (6 sotnias).

will concentrate on September 9

opposite the north-west corner

of Mukden city, between the

roads to Siu-min-tun and San-

dia-sa.

(6) Southern portion, Lieutena.nt-

General Sarubaiev

4th Sib. Army Corps, less the

brigade detached to Tie-lin ; 2nd

Werchneudinsk Cossack Regt. (6

sotnias).

9. All units will establish conxmunication witli their Corps Headquarters

by flying post, or, if possible, by telephone and telegraph ; Corps Head-

quarters, in their turn, with General Headquarters.

10. General Headquarters at Mukden Station.

(Signed) General Aide-de-Camp KUROPATKIN.Lieuteuaut-Genercd SACKAROV.

APPENDIX V

Order No. 1 for the Troops Defending the EntrenchedPosition of Mukden

TiA-HO Village, September 9, 1904.

With the object of making the defence as strong as possible, the Sketch 2.

Commandant of Defence has ordered :

1. In addition to tlie Main Fortline of Defence, two more defensive

lines are to be prepared in its rear, viz. :

(a) From Tia-ho village to Sa-kan-tsy— centre portion of Yen-schu-tien-tsy—Lan-wa villages ; the flanks of the line are to be

turned inward to the Hun-ho.

{h) From the copse near the footbridge, by Ma-kiao-tun andSchu-lian-za, to the Hun-ho.

2. The sectional commanders will prepare the main line and the

2nd line ; the Commander of the General Reserve, the ord line.

To be carried out

:

(a) Strengthening the Main Position : clearing the field of fire

to within 1,000 metres at least, daoljan and high tsliumisa are to

be cut down in front of the position ; belts are to be left standing

behind the position, for masking artillery and covering movements.

{b) In the 2nd and Srd Positions : preparing the villages for de-

fence, clearing the field of fire, etc., as above.

(c) Ranges are to be measured and marked, roads to be improved,

bridges to be constructed, guide-posts to be erected.

3. A\'ith every unit must be officers who have made themselves

thoroughly familiar with the country, to guide the troops by day andby night.

4. The detachments of scouts will thorouglily reconnoitre the groundin front of the entrenchment«, directing their attention to the mostsuitable approaches to the position, as well as to likely positions for

the enemy's batteries, etc. The maps of the entrenclied position are

to be verified during these reconnaissances.

5. Working hours, daily from 7 a.m. to 11 a.m., and from 2 to 6 p.m.

(Signed) Chief of the Staff of the Defence :

Major-General ZUR! K0\'.

413

APPENDIX VI

Order No. 3 for the Troops Defending the Entrenched

Position of Mukden

TiA-HO ^'ILLAGE^ September 11, 1904.

lu compliance with the General Order of yesterday I order :

1. From Major-General Jakubinski's advanced guard, standing at

Scha-ho-pu, are to be detailed three battalions, eight guns, and one

squadron, and to be dispatched at once to relieve the units of the

2nd Siberian Army Corps standing at Lin-schin-pu and Kuan-lin-pu;

the first-named of the two places will be occupied at the same time by

two battalions, eight guns, and half a squadron, and the last-named

by one battalion and half a squadron, lliese units form the right

advanced guard of the defending troops, and will remain under the

direct orders of Major-General Jakubinski.

2. Lieutenant-Colonel Savitsh's advanced guard (121st Infantry Regi-

ment, half a battery, and half a sotnia 1st Orenburg Cossack Regiment)

will remain in tlie neighbourhood of Fön-kia-pu, guarding in the

direction on Bian-yu-pu-sa.

3. Aff advanced guard.'', if obliged by superior hostile forces, will

retire simultaneously, keeping in touch with each other, and continuing

to guard in the directions they have done so hitherto. In that case,

Major-General Jakubinski's advanced guard will join tlie General

Reserve of the Defence, and be stationed at Tia-ho village. Lieutenant-

Colonel Savitsh's advanced guard will join the local reserve in the

left section of the position, and be at the disposal of Major-General

Riabiukin.

4. The 2nd Siberian Army Corps having been charged with a new task,

the entrenched position will be occupied in the following manner :'

(a) The 9th Infantry Division, after detailing one regiment and

half a battery to the General Reserve, will occupy the right sec-

tion, from the Hun-ho to fort "III." inclusive, and half the interval

between the latter aiul redoubt " G."

' Till then had occupied : the 2nd Siberian Army Corps, the section

west of the railway ; the 10th Army Corps, the portion east of the rail-

way to fort "II." exclusively, with the 9th Infantry Division ; the portion

from fort "II," to tbe left wing on the Hun-lio, with the 31st Infantry

P,ivisioi>,

4U

APPENDIX VI 415

(h) Tlie ölst Infantry Division, after detailing the 122nd TambowInfantry Regiment, with half a battery, to the General Reserve at

Tia-ho village, will occupy the left section from the centre of

the interval between fort "III." and redoubt "G" to the Hun-ho.

5. For enfilading the approaches to the position mentioned, the

sectional commanders will select artillery positions on the right bankof the Hun-ho, near the villages of Kin-tien-tun and San-kia-la,

occupying them each with a battery with escort.

6. From the 5th Mortar Regiment, two mortar batteries will be

attached to each of the 9th and 31st Infantry Divisions.

7- The General Reserve—a combined Infantry Regiment of the 0th Infantry Division,

122nd Tambow Infantry Regiment,

two half-batteries,

two sotnias of Cossacks

—

will be commanded by Major-General Kuswin.

8. The sectional commanders and the Commander of the General

Reserve will continue strengthening the fortified position, in compliance

with Order No. 1.

9. Having regard to the great distance of the enemy, outposts are to

be furnished only during the night, and these in small strength only,

to give less fatigue to the men :

(a) by the 9^A h\fardr]j LVu-ision, beginning at the Hun-ho, along

the brook to Sia-ho-tun village, then farther along the railway

branch line, to the point where tlie railway crosses the road ^V'an-

schi-tun—Tia-ho.

(ft) by the ?>\st Infantrxj Division, from that crossing to tke Hun-ho.

10. By the \st Orenburg Cossack Regiment will be detailed :

one sotnia each to Generals Gerschelmann and Riabinkin, the

latter sotnia including the half-sotnia with the 121st Infantry

Regiment

;

two sotnias to the General Reserve at Tia-ho village.

11. Of the bridges over the Hun-ho will be used :

by the 9th Infantry Division, the railway bridge and the bridge at

Lau-wa village;

by the 31st Infantry Division, the bridge north of Tia-ho village,

and the great Mandarin Roail Bridge.

12. The Divisional dressing-stations are to be established on the right

bank of the Hun-ho, as directed by the Divisional Commanders.

13. The Ambulant parks are to be stationed as directed by the

Divisional Commanders.

14. Reports are to be sent to Tia-ho village.

15. Deputies: Major-Gkxkral GKnsrnEi-MAN.v.

MAJOR-GlCNKnAL KlSWIN.

(Signed) The Cominandant of the Defence :

I^ieuten^nt-GeneralSLLTSHEVSKJ,

APPENDIX VII

Order No. 4 for the Troops Defexdixg the EntrenchedPosition of Mukden

TiA-Ho ViLLAGK, Septemhcr 13, 1904, 11 a.m.

One more Infantry regiment from the 17th Army Corps having

heen detailed and being at my disposal when the action begins, I

order, amending Order No. 3 :

1. The half-batteries of the 9th and f31st Infantry Divisions nowwith the General Reserve will be returned to their sectional com-

manders.

2. The Infantry regiments of the 9th and 31st Infantry Divisions

now with tlie General Reserve are to be placed at the disposal of the

sectional commanders Avhen the action begins, after Major-General

Jakubinski's advanced guard has been withdrawn into the entrenched

position.

3. To the General Reserve, under the orders of Major-General

Kuswin, will be detailed

:

(a) Major General Jakubinski's advanced guard—strength :

one Infantry Brigade, one battery, and five squadrons Dragoons

—

which, after its arrival in the entrenched position, will be stationed

at Tia-lio village.

(/>) (_)ne Infantry regiment of the 17th Army Corps on the

right bank of the Hun-lio, whicli, at tlie beginning of the action,

will likewise move to Tia-ho village.

4. Batteries from Major-General Jakubinski's advanced guard,

after its arrival in the entrenched position, will be detailed, one

to each of the sectional commanders, who will arrange for cover

being prepared for these batteries now ; the selection of the position

for these batteries is left to the sectional commanders.

(Signed) ITie Commandant of the Defence :

Lieutenant-General SLUTSHEVSKI.

416

APPENDIX VIII

iNSTRUCTIOiJS FOR THE DeFENCK OF THE MaIN POSITION OF

Mukden ^

1. For the occupation of the works, the garrison will be divided into

:

(a) the fighting portion, and

(6) the inner reserve.

The outer reserve of the work concerned is to be formed of troops

not belonging to the garrison.

For the figliting portion are to be detailed three-quarters of the

garrison, and for the inner reserve one-quarter.

For the fighting portion must be allowed one man per pace of crest

of the faces and flanks, and for the inner reserve one man for every

two or three paces of gorge parapet of the work.

2. During the bombardment of the work by Artillery the garrison

will be kept in the trenches on either side. When the enemy's

Artillery fire ceases—his Infantry having approached to within half

a kilometre—the garrison must rapidly mount the banquets \^' fighting

portion "] or take post behind the parados [" inner reserve "] so as

to be able to open fire at once.

Cover must be prepai'ed for the outer reserve where there is no

natural cover.

3. Husbanding ammunition : in the defence, fire to be opened only

on visible objects !—100 rounds in addition to the regulation number

to be held ready for every man in the works ; targets clearly to be

indicated !

4. When tlie enemy rises fi-om the ditch to mount the parapet,

the garrison of the work will rapidly go to meet him, pushing him

back with the bayonet.

5. In advance of the line of forts, at a distance of about half a

kilometre, fire-trenches are to be constructed, or the villages lying

within that distance must be put into a state of defence on the side

facing the enemy.

Then a second line of fire-trenches nmst be constructed along the

line of forts, and finally, about half a kilometre behind it, cover

for artilkry behind the intervals of the works.

The Artillery here will fire over the heads of their own Infantry

in the trenches about 1 verst in front of the Artillery ; in the

second line of trenches intervals must be left through which tlie

Artillery can fire on the assailant.

' Complete text not available.

417 27

418 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR6. [Refers to the mortar batteries; as much as possible centrally.]

Here to be kept in view that the effect of their fire is best at 1,600

to 2,500 metres' range.

7. Behind the first line of defence are to be established :

(a) A second defensive line from Tia-ho village to Sa-kan-tsy

village—centre portion of Yen-schu-tien-tsy village—Lan-wavillage to the Hun-ho.

{h) A third defensive line from the copse at the footbridge

at Tia-ho village to Ma-kiao-tun and Schu-lian-za villages.

Construction of fire-trenches, preparation of villages for defence,

etc. Batteries are to be constructed in the second, but not in

the third, defensive line.

In case of retreat on the third defensive line, first the Ax-tillery

must be gradually withdrawn to the right bank of the Hun-ho, andthen, by degrees, the Infantry. The Artillery will open fire at once

from the other bank.

8. Small bridge-heads are to be constructed in front of the bridges

to ensure the crossing.

9. —10. [Refers to guarding against surprise by night.] In order to give

the garrison timely warning of a surprise by night, fires are to be

lit, apart from other measures, by advaned listening-posts, for which

purpose they must keep handy dry material.

At a distance of 800 paces in advance of the foremost trenches

large fires must be prepared, which at the moment the enemy is

approaching are to be ignited by electricity to illuminate the fore-

ground. These fires are to be lit even by day, so as to impress

the enemy.

11. The mines constructed in advance of the works are to be

ignited only by orders of the commandant of tlie work. Wehere it

is impossible to construct mines, red flags, marking, as it were, the

position of mines, must be placed so as to confuse the enemy !i

12. [Refers to construction of roads within the position to connect

the works and the reserves and river crossings behind ; erection of

guide-posts. ]

13. I allow the troops of the foremost trench-lines to retire on the

firing-line of the line of forts, if it is absolutely necessary ; but I do not

allow the latter line to be abandoned without a distinct order from

a superior, for the fort-line is our main defensive line, in which we can,

and must, offer the greatest possible resistance. The troops holding

the works must be deeply rooted in them, such that they can only

be pulled out with the roots—that is to say, tliey must die, but not

surrender the works.

(Signed) ITie General Commanding 10th Army Corps :

Lieutenant-General SLüTSHEVSKI.

APPENDIX IX

Order No. 8 to the Troops of the Army of Manchuria

Mukden Station, September 28, 1904, 6 p.m.

Outposts of the enemy are holding the line of villages Tschan-tan '— Sketch 1.

Ta-tu-saii-pu '—Sia-liu-ho-tsy '—Tschin-hsi-sai.*

On our wings have been ascertained : on the right, small bodies of

the enemy on the left bank of tlie Liao-ho, on the line of villages Ta-

wan—Ma-my-kai ; on the left, about one Infantry brigade, opposite

the Da-lin Pass.

ITie enemy's main forces are distributed as follows :

About two Divisions echeloned on the line Sau-de-pu—Ho-kun-pu ;

*

About four Divisions within the space Tschan-tai-tsy—Sa-chu-

tun—Liao-yan;

About two Divisions at the coal-pits of Yen-tai;

About two Divisions echeloned on the line Bian-yu-pu-sa

—

Pen-si-lxu.

The enemy is entrenching positions :

1. On the line of villages Sclian-kan-tsy—Tschan-tai-tsy—on

the heights south of Yin-tschezi-tsy village, on the line of villages

Tun-ta-lien-pu—Tsien-tau—on the heights east of Tsien-tau;

2. North of Bian-yu-pu-sa village, and south-west of that place

in the direction on Yin-tsien-pu.

In rear of the first position are being fortified the heights on the

Tai-tsy-ho between the villages of Mu-t^chan and Sy-kwan-tun, and

behind the second position another at Schan-pin-tai-tsy village.

The Army of Manchuria under my command will advance and

attack the enemy in the position he has occupied. Its first task will

be to get possession of the right bank of the Tai-tsy-ho.

On the Hun-ho, 4 kilometres north-west of San-de-pu.

On the Scha-ho, 13 kilometres south-east of San-de-pu.

G kilometres south-oast of the San-kai-seki-sau.

6 kilometres east of Bian-yu-pu-sa.Wehere the Scha-ho joins the Tai-tsy-ho.

419

420 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR1. Western Detachment

General of Cavalry Baron Bilderlinq

lOth Army Corps

17th Army Corps

32 battls. , 6 sotnias,

88 guzis, 1 Sap.

battl.

32 battls., 12 sqns,

96 guns, 1 Sap.

battl.

1 1th and 1 2th Orenburg

Cossack Regts. . 12 sotnias.

Ural Cossack Brig.^ . 10 sotnias.

11th H.A. Batty. . 6 guns.

will assemble at the Scha-

ho, with the object ofadvancing thence on both

sides of the railway, be-

tween the Hun-ho and the

road Mukden—Ho-nii-kan

— Pai-tschi-tschai— Lüan-fan-tun—Pu-tsau-wa—Ta-pu—coal-pits of Yen-tai

;

in doing so, the last-named

road is to be used only byprotective detachments,

the road being apportioned

to the advance of the

General Reserve.Total: 64 battls., 28 sotnias, 12 sqns.,

190 guns, 2 Sapper battls.

On the first day's march the advanced guards will remain in the posi-

tions they are in now. The main bodies of the 10th and 17th ArmyCorps will occupy the line Ta-su-kia-pu—Bhf. Su-ya-tun—Sia-orr-tun

—Pai-tschi-tschai.

On the second day's march the advanced guards will occupy the line

Tschien-liu-tan-kou—Hun-pau-schan—Yin-schou-tun, proceeding to en-

trench the position. The main bodies will occupy the line Lin-schin-

pu—Scha-ho-pu—Liian-fau-tun, entrenching this position.

2. Eastern Detachment

Lieutenant-General Baron Stackel-

Ist Sib. Army Corps

2nd Sib. Army Corps'

,

3rd Sib. Army Corps*

Sib. Cossack Division

20th H.A. Batty

24battls., 16mach.

guns, 10 sotnias,

60 guns, 1 Sap.

battl.

17 battls., 8 mach,

guns, 2 sotnias, 32

guns,l Sap. battl.

32 battls., 8 mach,

guns, 7 sotnias, 66

guns, 1 Sap. battl.

15 sotnias.

6 guns.

Total: 73 battls., 32 mach, guns,

sotnias, 164 guns, 3 Sap. battls.

34

will assemble on the line

of villages Pa-kia-tsy*^

Hei - sun - pu — Tai - kia -

miau-tsy, with the object

of attacking the enemy's

position in front and on

the right flank. The

space for its advance ia

limited by the roads Fu-

echun — Ta - yu — Yin -

8chou-pou-tsy— Pa-kia-

tsy— Tschau-huan-tschai

—San-kia-tsy, and Fu-lin

—Pu-lie-san-tsy

—

Fön-kia

pu— Bian-yu-pu-sa—Pen-

si-hu, both roads inclusive.

' The Ural Cos.sack Brigade had to leave Mishtshenko's Division on

the evening of the second day's march, and join the Western Detach-

ment.* 3 kilometres north-east of the Kau-tu-lin Pass.

[For notes 3 and 4, see next page.]

APPENDIX IX 421

On the first day» march the main bodies will reach the line of

villages Schi-hui-tschön—Yen-tau-tsy.

On the second days march the main bodies will occupy the line of

villages Pa-kia-tsy—Hei-sun-pu—Tai-kia-miau-tsy ; advanced guards

are to be pushed forward to the line Wan-fu-lin Pass—Hou-lou-tsy-

gou—Yin-pau—Liu-tschen-ku-tun.The first task of the Eastern Detachment is to seize the enemy's

position at Bian-yu-pu-sa.

3. General Reserve

(a) Lieutenant-GeneralSarubaiev will assemble on the first days

4th Sib. Army Corps : 24 battls.,

6 sotnias, 48 guns^ 1 Sapper battl.

2nd, 3rd, and 4th ' Sib. Artillery

Abteiluiigs : 36 old guns.

march in the space between

Mukden and the Hun-ho, east

of the Mandarin Road ; on the

second days march, the bridges

in the neighbourhood of Ho-mi-kan village are to be crossed.

Billeting within the space Liu-

kuan - tun— Yin - tschen - tsy—Schi-kia-tsv.

5th Mortar Regt. : 18 mortars.

1st and 2nd E. Sib. Mortar

Batteries ' : 12 mortars.

Total: 24 battls., 5 sotnias, 114

guns, 1 Sapper battl.

(6) Gexeral Aide-de-Camp BaroxMeiendorf

1st Army Corps : 32 battls., 4

sotnias, 96 guns, 1 Sapper battl.

2nd and 3rd Transbaikal Cos-

sack Batteries : 12 guns.

Total: 32 battls., 4 sotnias, 108

guns, 1 Sapper battl.

(c) Ma.tor-Gknkral MishtshhnkoA LA SLUTE OF H.M.

Independent Transbaikal Cossack

Brig. : 1 1 sotnias, 6 guns.

6th H. A. Batty, of Frontier

Guard : 2 guns.


' Only half a battery.* ITie 2iul East Siberian Mortar Battery was afterwards attached to the

3rd Siberian Army Corps. In tlie \V^ar Organisation (Appendix 1.) it is

therefore shown with the 3rd, and not with the 4th, Siberian Army Corps.

[Notes continued from previous page.]* Attached to the 2nd Siberian Army Corps were : 213th Infantry

Regiment, 4 battalions ; 2nd Siberian Infantry Regiment, 1 battalion;

26th Artillery Brigade, 8 guns.• Attached to the 3rd Siberian Army Corps were : 6th Siberian In-

fantry Regiment, 4 battalions ; 7th Siberian Infantry Regiment, 4battalions ; 2ud Werchneudinsk Cossack Regiment, 1 sotnia.

will assemble on the first daysmarch between Mukden and the

Hun-ho, west of the Mandarin

Road ; on the second day tlie

bridges of the Mandarin Roadand at Tia-ho village are to be

crossed. Billeting within the

area San-lin-tsy—Yin-pan.

will assemble at Liian-fan-tun,

after the advanced guards of the

\Yestern Üetachment have occu-

pied the line Tschien-Iiu-tan-

kou— Hun - pau - schan— Yin -

schou-tun.

422 THE RUSSO-JAPAXESE WAR

(a) Right Flank.

General Dembovski

215th Infantry Re^. 4 battls

216th Infantry Regt. 4 battls

284th Infantry Regt.

28th Artillery' Brig. .

4th Sib. Artillery Brig.

1st Argunski C'ossack

Regt. .

Independ. Caucasian

Cavalry Brig.

4th Transbaikal Cos-

sack Batty.

5th E. Sib. Sap. Battl. It, 4.4.1

East Sib. Bridg. Battl. /- °*"^

4, Covering the Flanks

LlEUTEXANT-

4 battls.

APPENDIX IX 423

Colonel Madritov, of the GeneralStaff

1st Sib. Infantry Regt. 1 battl.

Detachments ofMounted Scouts of

1st and loth E. Sib.

Rifle Regt8. .

Ussuri Cossack Regt.

Caucasian Volunteers

Frontier Guard .

1 sotnia.

1 sotnia.

2 guns.

Total : 1 battl., 2 sotnias, 2 de-

tachments, Scouts, 2 guns.

will cover the extreme left flank

of the Army ; advance in the

direction of Ta-pin-di-schan

—

Sai-ma-tsy, keeping in touch with

Rennenkampfs Detachment.

5. Covering the Rear

Rth Sib. Army Corps: 32 battls.,^ will be echeloned between Muk-6 sotnias, 96 guns,^ 1 Sapper battl. den and Tie-lin, in conformity

with a special Order.

Total strength of fighting troops : 257| battalions, with 32 machineguns, 143 squadrons or sotnias, 760 field guns (among whicli 48 old

field guns, 36 mortars, 16 quick-firing mountain guns, and 14 old

mountain guns), 9 Sapper battalions, 1 Bridging battalion.'

6. A supplementary Order will be issued when the advance ü to begin.

7. 2nd fine transport will be half a day's march, and Zrd line transport

one whole day's march behind the end of the columns marching on the

roads assigned to them by the Commanders of the Detachments.

8. Reports will be sent to the head of the 4th Siberian Army Corps,

which is going to advance by the road Mukden—Ho-mi-kan—Pai-tschi-

tschai

—

Örrr-tau-kou.

Deputies: Lieutenant-General Sackarov.

General Aide-de-Camp Baron Meiendorf.

(Signed) The Commander-in-Chief of the Army :

General Aide-de-Camp KUROPATKIX.Chief of the Staff : Lieutenant-General SACKAROV.

' In the War Organisation (Appendix I.), the 1st Brigade 55thInfantry Division is not included, hence only 24 battalions there.

* Two batteries of the 10th Artillery Brigade are not included in

War Organisation (Appendix \.), hence only 80 guns there.* Including the troojis remaining behind in the positions of Tie-lin

and Mukden. >\'ithout them results the total strength calculated in

War Organisation (Appendix I.).

APPENDIX X

KuROPATKix''s Proclamation of October 2, 1904

More than seven months have now passed since the enemytreacherously surprised us wnthout preWous declaration of war. Since

that time, the Russian troops liave achieved many great deeds by land

and sea, of which our fatherland may be proud ; but the enemy has

not only been hitherto unconquered, he is also constantly striving

to beat us completely. llie troops of tlie Manchurian Army were

certainly strong in courage, but not strong enough in numbers for

driving away the Japanese Armies. Much time was required for

removing all obstacles, and making the Army strong enough for

taking in hand, with full confidence, the solution of the heavy but

honourable and glorious task imposed on it. This was the reason whyI did not think tlie time had arrived yet for assuming the offensive

myself, but ordered a withdrawal on the occasions Avlien we success-

fully repelled the Japanese attacks at Ta-schi-t*;chao, Lian-dia-san, and

in the positions of Liao-yan. You have abandoned the heroically de-

fended positions, strewn with countless Japanese corpses, without being

pressed by the enemj';you have withdrawn to the prepared positions

ready to resume the combat after the fights lasting five days around

Liao-yan, which cost the Japanese heavy loss. Tliough completely

successful, you have abandoned every position, retiring under mostunfavourable conditions. Attacked by Kuroki's Army pushing against

the flank, you have marched on Mukden, have waded through bottom-

less morasses, have fought day and night, and brought away guns and

vehicles witli your own hands;you did not leave a gun or a prisoner

in the hands of the enemy—have taken along with you all wounded,

and not lost a vehicle. With sadness in my heart, I have ordered you

to retire, but also with the unshakable confidence that our retreat

was absolutely necessary to gain a decisive victory over the enemy,

when the time has come. By the supreme will of His Majesty the

Emperor, new forces have been detailed, which shall ensure us

victory. AU difficulties of bringing up the fresh reinforcements the

424

APPENDIX X 425

long distance of 10,000 versts from home have been overcome in

splendid manner by the persevering energy and ability of the author-

ities and persons who have dealt with this difficult transport, which

is without a parallel. Several 100,000 men, many thousands of horses

and vehicles, million puds ' of material have been brought up into

Manchuria by rail from European Russia and Siberia, without inter-

ruption, in the course of seven months, and this stream is still swelling.

If the number of troops available do not appear sufficient, newregiments will arrive ; the firm will of His Majesty the Emperor, how-

ever, that we shall beat the enemy, must be carried out at all cost.

Hitherto, our adversary, by making use of his superior numbers, and

by disposing his Army to envelop us, has operated according to his

own free will, choosing his time for attacking us wlien it pleased him.

But now the time the Army has been longing for has at last arrived,

that we should go forward and meet the enemy. The moment has

arrived for us to force our will upon the Japanese, for we are nowstrong enough for assuming the offensive. But you must not forget

that, to gain a victory over a powerful and brave enemy, it is neces-

sary, in addition to numerical superiority, for every one, from the

oldest to the youngest, to be resolute to the last, whatever sacrifice it

may cost. Hold in mind, every one of you, the importance of a

victory for Russia ; remember, especially, how necessary it is for

us to join hands with our brethren in Port Arthur, who for the last

seven months have been heroically defending the fortress entrusted

to their care. Our Army has in all wars achieved great deeds whenprotecting throne and fatherland, and has acquired the highest fame

among every nation. Now bear in mind tliat, by the will of the Tsar,

you are charged witli upholding Russia's position and her rights in

the Far East ; tliink that, by the trust imposed in you b)' our Tsar,

you are charged with preserving the honour of the Army of Russia.

Our august Master and, witii liim, all Russia are praying for us and

bless us ! Invigorated by this prayer, and fully conscious of tlie im-

portance of the task entrusted to us, we will fearlessly advance,

firmly resolved to stake our lives in fulfilling our duty to tlie last.

May the will of the Almiglity guide us all !

• Pud = 40 Russian lb. = 33 English lb. (about)

APPENDIX XI

Order to the Troops of the Western Detachment

Mukden, September 30, 1904.

Information about the Enemy \ Verbatim,

Intentions of the Commander-in-Chief V ae in

Distribution and Task of the Western De/«cA??2en< J General Order.

Sketch 1. 1. 10th Army Corps (Lieutenant-Gkneral Slutshev.ski) : 32 bat-

talions, sotnias, 88 guns, 1 Sapper battalion. For concentration at the

Scha-ho the road Tia-ho—San-ho-kuan-tun—La-mu-tun—Pan-kiau-pu,

and the roads east of it as far as the road Mukden—Ho-mi-kan—Pai-

tschi-tschai

—

Lüan-fan-tun—Pu-tsau-wa—Ta-pu—coal-pits of Yen-tai,

are apportioned to the corps ; the latter road must only be used by pro-

tective detachments, it being proposed to use that road for the advance

of the General Reserve.

On the first day's march the advanced guard will remain in its

position at Huan-schan ; a new advanced guard is to be sent forward

by the main body, relieving on that same day the portion of the

advanced guard of the 17th Army Corps standing at Scha-ho-pu.

The main body will advance on a level with Sia-orr-tun village.

On the second days march the advanced guards will reach the line

of villages Pan-kiau-pu—Hun-pau-schan—Yin-schou-tun, entrenching

that line ; the heights near Yin-schou-tun village are to be fortified

particularly strongly. The main body will reach the line of villages

Scha-ho-pu

—

Lüan-fan-tun, proceeding to entrench the position south

of that line;particular attention must he paid here to fortifying the

height north of Hou-tai village.

2. nth Army Corps (Lieutexaxt-Ge.neral "VYolkov) : 32 battalions,

11 squadrons,' 96 guns, 1 Sapper battalion. For concentration at

the Scha-ho the roads along the railway embankment, and west of it

as far as the road Ma-kia-pu— Kuan-lin-pu—Ta-tu-san pu

—

Ko-tschen-

pau, are apportioned to the corps.

On the first day's march the portion of the advanced guard of the

17th Army Corps standing at Scha-ho-pu will join the portion of

the advanced guard .standing at Lin-schin-pu after it has beenrelieved by the advanced guard of the ] 0th Army Corps. The portion

of the advanced guard standing at Kuan-lin-pu will remain in its

position on the first day's march. 'ITie main body of the corps will

reach the line of villages Ta-su-kia-pu—Su-j'a-tun Station (Bhf.).

On the second day's march the advanced guards will' reach the line

' One squadron of the 52nd Dragoon Regiment is charged with 9

special task in paragraph 4 of this Order.

426

APPENDIX XI 427

Liu-tan-kou — Tschien-liu-tan-kou — Tsun-lun-yen-tun, constructing

entrenchments here. The main body will reach the line of villages

Lin-schin-pu—La-mu-tun, proceeding to entrench the position south

of that line.

3. Cavab'if :

(a) Ma.tor-General Grekov. Orenburg Cossack Division : 12

sotnias, and 6 guns. Watching and reconnoitring in front between

the Scha-ho and Hun-ho is to be continued. Protecting the

right flank of the ^V^estern Detachment during its advance. Touch

is to be maintained with Dembovski's Detachment and with the

Ural Cossack Brigade.

On the second day's march the main body will concentrate at

Wan-tschuan-tsy.

(i) CoLoxKL Shabyko. Ural Cossack Brigade : 10 sotnias. After

the line of villages 'J'schien-liu-tan-kou—Hun-pau-schan—Yin-

schou-tun has been occupied by the advanced guards, the Ural

Cossack Brigade will continue watching and reconnoitring in front

between the Scha-ho and the road Mukden

—

Fön-kia-pu—Bian-

yu-pu-sa.

Touch is to be maintained with the Cavalry of the Eastern Detach-

ments and with Grekov's Detachment.

On the second day's march the main body of the brigade will

concentrate at Hun-pau-schan village.

4. Connnunication.—Lieutenant-Colonel Mirbach, with a squadron

52nd Dragoon Regiment. \\'hen the advance begins, communication

will be established between the staff of the Western Detachment under

my command and the staifs of the Army Corps, Grekov's Detachment,

and General Headquarters.

5. Attention is called to tlie necessity of the columns keeping in touch

with each other.

6. Verbatim, as in paragraph 7 of the General Order.

7. I request most energetic measures to be taken for keeping the

intended operations secret from the inhabitants of the country.

When our operations begin. Chinamen nmst be prevented at all cost

from passing our line in the direction of the enemy.

8. Reports are to be sent to the head of the main body of the

17th Army Corps, which is going to march by the road along the

railway embankment.

9. Deputies : Lieutknant-General Smtshevski.

Lieutenant-General Wolkov.

10. A supplementary Order will bo issued, stating the time when

the adx'ance is to begin.

(Signed) The Commander of tlie ^\'estern Detachment of tlie Army :

General of Cavalry Baron BILDERLING.Chief of the Staff: Major-General Baron THIESENHAUSEN.

The Ordkr is Dispatched October 1, 12 noon,

APPENDIX XII

Oeder to the Troops of the Western Detachment of

THE Army

Han-tschen-pt-, October 13, 6 p.m.

1. The Commanrler-in-Chief has placed under my orders the Gth

Siberian Army Corps and Devihov.skis Detachnimt.

2. The enemy is standing on the line Hun-lin-pu—Schu-lin-tsy

—

San-kia-tsy.

3. To-morrow the 10th and 17th Army Corpx will continue obstinately

defending their positions on the Scha-ho.

4 The 6fh Siberian Army Corps will advance at daybreak to the line

Schau-kia-lin-tsy—Ta-lian-tun.

6. Dembovskis Ddarhntent will remain on the right bank of the

Hun-ho. The Caucasian Cavalry Brigade, with the two battalions

attached to it, will go to-morrow with its main body to Yen-schu-

lin-tsy, and with its advanced guard to Ho-lien-tai.

6. Grekov's Cavalry liriyade will continue its reconnaissance in front

between the Scha-ho and Hun-ho, advancing with its main body in the

direction on San-de-pu, covering the right flank of our Army Group,

and endeavouring to drive the enemy out of San-de-pu.

7. The troops of our Army Group will be prepared to assume the

offensive.

(Signed) BILDERLING.

428

APPENDIX XIII

To THE Commander of the Western Detachment

October 14,

Received 11.45 a.m.

General Sarubaiev is withdrawing into a position in advance of

Orr-tau-kou to align himself with the Army.

The 1st Army Corps, which is still in action, will be conducted back

to the General Reserve at Lo-sien-tun—San-kia-tsy. Mau's Brigade

is going to rejoin its corps.

Your left flank is thus secured by the disposition of the General

Reserve;

you will have to adopt only measures for watching the

interval between your position and that of the 4th Siberian ArmyCorps.

On the left wing of the 10th Army Corps a position must be prepared

in which that corps, while refusing its left wing, can delay the enemy's

attack long enough for me to bring into action the General Reserve,

and neutralise the enemy's envelopment.

Hold your position, giving more frequent information on the

situation to enable me to dispose of the General Reserve accord-

ingly.

(Signed) KÜROPATKIN.

429

APPENDIX XIV

Order to the Troops of the Western Detachment of theArmy for October 16

1. The enemy is in occupation of the southern bank of the Scha-

ho and of Lin-schin-pu village.

2. Our troops are on the line Fu-kia-tun-kou—Kuan-tun—Ta-lian-

tun—Schau-kia-lin-tsy.

3. The Army is going to attack ; tlie General Reserve is advancingto attack on our left.

4. The 10th Army Corps will reach the line Nin-kuan-tun— Hun-pau-schan,

the \1th Army Corps: the line Pan-kiau-pu— Liu-tan-kou,

the Gth Siberian Army Corps: Tschien-liu-tan-kou,

Dembovskis Detachment : Tsun-lun-yen-tun.

l)embov,ski's Detachment is placed under the orders of the 6th

Siberian Army Corps ; a flank guard will be left behind at Li-

kia-tun.

5. Grekov's Cavalry Briyade will cover the riglit flank of the Army.6. Touch with Novikov's Detachment from the 1st Army C'orps

will be maintained by two sotnias of the 1st Orenburg Cossack

Regiment.

7. The hour for beginning the attack will be issued in a supplementary

order.

8. The units will mutually inform each other of their position,

so as to avoid flring into each other as they have done.

(Signed) BILDERLING.

430

APPENDIX XV

The General Okder Issued on October 19

The series of the past combats have confirmed what we assumed

to be the distribution of the Japanese forces.

Oku's Army, about 00 battalions and 30 squadrons strong, is on

the left, opposite Dembovski's Detacliment, the Gth Siberian, the 17th,

and part of the 10th Army Corps.

In the centre have been ascertained : the 5th and 10th Divisions or

Nodxus Army, about 32 battalions strong, opposite the 10th ArmyCorps and Gerngross's Detachment (1st Army Corps).

Farther east, in the direction of the Yen-tai mines and Orr-tau-kou,

Kuroki's Army is operating—strength : three Divisions with reserve

brigades ; of these, one or two Divisions, with one or two reserve

brigades, are opposite the 4th Siberian and 1st Siberian Army Corps ;'

farther east, at Bian-yu-pu-sa, about two reserve brigades are opposed

to General llennenkami)f. One or two Divisions of Kuroki's Army are

stationed as General Reserve nortli of the Yen-tai coal-pits ; this reserve

may be used against our left flank as well as against our centre.

At Port Arthur have been ascertained ; the 1st, Dtli, and 11th

Divisions. As regards the 7th and 8th Divisions, their station is not

exactly known ; but probably one of these Divisions is at Liao-yan, if

not both.

Prisoners state that the Japanese have suffered heavy lo-sses in

the recent combats, that their companies are far from being up to their

full strength, and that the number of their sick is great. 'I'lie .Japanese

Army is suffering from want of food and from the cold niglits. In

the action of October 10* three regiments of the 5th and 10th

Divisions were completely annihilated, tlie Japanese losing here

14 guns and 1 machine gun, and suffering enormous losses in dead

and wounded. Judging by the moods of the prisoners, this bloody

action has crushed the spirit of the Japanese completely.

That is to say, somewhere near Köu-kia-pu.

Fight for Putilov Hill.

431

432 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WARWe must wish the Japanese some more of these lessons ! We are

already somewhat superior in numbers ; we have greater experiencein conducting an action. We must take advantage of the defeatinflicted on them. The troops must be given to understand that freshand energetic efforts are required for relieving Port Arthur, andthat we must leave the enemy no time .for reinforcing himself andmaking good his losses.

(Signed) KUROPATKIN.

PrinUd by BomII, Watton Jt Finty, Ld., London and Ayiabury.

Scha-ho.Appendix XVIII.

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