gerald rehn - the power of diversified investing

48
Rehn Capital Management LLC 5916 Beaconpark Street, Lithia, FL 33547 | +1 813 300 2388 | [email protected] The Power of Diversified Investing through a “Risk Smart” Approach THIS IS A RESEARCH-BASED PRESENTATION FOR DISCUSSION ONLY, NOT A SOLICITATION TO BUY OR SELL ACTUAL COMMODITIES OR SECURITIES. PLEASE SEE IMPORTANT INFORMATION ON PAGES 2 AND 3 PRIOR TO REVIEWING

Upload: kiril-yordanov

Post on 02-May-2017

223 views

Category:

Documents


0 download

TRANSCRIPT

Page 1: Gerald Rehn - The Power of Diversified Investing

Rehn Capital Management LLC 5916 Beaconpark Street, Lithia, FL 33547 | +1 813 300 2388 | [email protected]

The Power of Diversified Investing through a “Risk Smart” Approach

THIS IS A RESEARCH-BASED PRESENTATION FOR DISCUSSION ONLY, NOT A SOLICITATION TO BUY OR SELL ACTUAL COMMODITIES OR SECURITIES.

PLEASE SEE IMPORTANT INFORMATION ON PAGES 2 AND 3 PRIOR TO REVIEWING

Page 2: Gerald Rehn - The Power of Diversified Investing

Important information

THIS PRESENTATION IS INTENDED FOR SOPHISTICATED AND QUALIFIED INVESTORS ONLY. PAST PERFORMANCE IS NOT NECESSARILY INDICATIVE OF FUTURE RESULTS. THE TRADING TECHNIQUES AND INVESTMENTS DISCUSSED HEREIN MAY CARRY A HIGH DEGREE OF RISK AND MAY INLCUDE LEVERAGE AND ARE THEREFORE NOT SUITABLE FOR ALL INVESTORS. THE RISK OF LOSS IN TRADING COMMODITIES CAN BE SUBSTANTIAL. YOU SHOULD THEREFORE CAREFULLY CONSIDER WHETHER SUCH TRADING IS SUITABLE FOR YOU IN LIGHT OF YOUR FINANCIAL CONDITION. THE HIGH DEGREE OF LEVERAGE THAT IS OFTEN OBTAINABLE IN COMMODITY TRADING CAN WORK AGAINST YOU AS WELL AS FOR YOU. THE USE OF LEVERAGE CAN LEAD TO LARGE LOSSES AS WELL AS GAINS. 2

Page 3: Gerald Rehn - The Power of Diversified Investing

Important information

THE CONTENTS OF THIS PRESENTATION ARE THE AUTHOR’S VIEWS AND BELIEFS, NOT STATEMENTS OF FACT. THIS IS NOT A RECOMMENDATION TO BUY OR SELL COMMODITIES OR SECURITIES. ALL MODELS, DATA AND GRAPHS USED ARE: • ONLY TO EXPRESS THE OPINION OF THE AUTHOR • BASED ON HISTORICAL MARKETS WHICH MAY OR MAY NOT OCCUR AGAIN IN THE

FUTURE IN ANY SIMILAR WAY • ONLY EXAMPLES, NOT EXHAUSTIVE OF ALL POSSIBLE HISTORICAL MARKET

OUTCOMES

3

Page 4: Gerald Rehn - The Power of Diversified Investing

6 year charts of broad investments (2006-2011)

A broad commodity indexed ETF investment A long duration US government bond index ETF investment

A US stock index ETF investment A Commodity Trading Advisor

4 PAST PERFORMANCE IS NOT NECESSARILY INDICATIVE OF FUTURE RESULTS. COMMODITY TRADING AND SECURITIES INVESTINGS

INVOLVES SUBSTANTIAL RISK OF LOSS.

Page 5: Gerald Rehn - The Power of Diversified Investing

…and 6 years of trading “Masters” (2006-2011)

Some good, some mediocre. We hope we pick the right one. 3 actual large CTA trading strategies with AUMs of $545 million, $396 million and $7.316 billion, respectively.

5 PAST PERFORMANCE IS NOT NECESSARILY INDICATIVE OF FUTURE RESULTS. COMMODITY TRADING INVOLVES SUBSTANTIAL RISK OF LOSS.

Page 6: Gerald Rehn - The Power of Diversified Investing

What if there was a better way?

THIS IS A HISTORICAL, HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE ONLY. THIS IS NOT A RECOMMENDATION TO BUY OR SELL COMMODITIES OR SECURITIES.

A hypothetical “Risk Smart” portfolio created as an example only.

6

PAST PERFORMANCE IS NOT NECESSARILY INDICATIVE OF FUTURE RESULTS. COMMODITY TRADING INVOLVES SUBSTANTIAL RISK OF LOSS.

Page 7: Gerald Rehn - The Power of Diversified Investing

A different way of looking at markets

Risk smart investing

7

Page 8: Gerald Rehn - The Power of Diversified Investing

Equity 60%

Bond 40%

Example of a traditional portfolio of 60% Equity, 40% US Government Bond

Traditional Equity & Bond portfolio

EXAMPLE FOR ILLUSTRATION PURPOSES ONLY. THIS IS NOT A RECOMMENDATION TO BUY OR SELL COMMODITIES OR SECURITIES. 8

Page 9: Gerald Rehn - The Power of Diversified Investing

60/40 Equity/Bonds: Viewed by volatility

Is this diversified?

60% S&P 500 tracker, 30% 1-3 year bond tracker, 10% long bond tracker. Risk measurement is standard deviation of monthly returns annualized 2006-2011.

Equity 79%

Bonds 21%

Example of risk weights of a hypothetical 60% Equity, 40% US Government Bond portfolio measured by volatility

9 EXAMPLE FOR ILLUSTRATION PURPOSES ONLY. THIS IS NOT A RECOMMENDATION TO BUY OR SELL COMMODITIES OR SECURITIES.

Page 10: Gerald Rehn - The Power of Diversified Investing

60/40 Equity/Bonds: Viewed by volatility

60% S&P 500 tracker, 30% 1-3 year bond tracker, 10% long bond tracker. Risk measurement is standard deviation of monthly returns annualized.

0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

10%

12%

14%

16%

18%

1-J

un

-06

1-A

ug-

06

1-O

ct-0

6

1-D

ec-0

6

1-F

eb

-07

1-A

pr-

07

1-J

un

-07

1-A

ug-

07

1-O

ct-0

7

1-D

ec-0

7

1-F

eb

-08

1-A

pr-

08

1-J

un

-08

1-A

ug-

08

1-O

ct-0

8

1-D

ec-0

8

1-F

eb

-09

1-A

pr-

09

1-J

un

-09

1-A

ug-

09

1-O

ct-0

9

1-D

ec-0

9

1-F

eb

-10

1-A

pr-

10

1-J

un

-10

1-A

ug-

10

1-O

ct-1

0

1-D

ec-1

0

1-F

eb

-11

1-A

pr-

11

1-J

un

-11

1-A

ug-

11

1-O

ct-1

1

1-D

ec-1

1

6 month rolling “look back” volatility to the portfolio

US S&P 500 Tracker US Gov Bond Tracker

10

EXAMPLE FOR ILLUSTRATION PURPOSES ONLY. THIS IS NOT A RECOMMENDATION TO BUY OR SELL COMMODITIES OR SECURITIES.

Page 11: Gerald Rehn - The Power of Diversified Investing

60/40 Equity/Bonds performance (2006-2011)

Jan ‘06- Dec ’11 Equity US Gov Bonds

Notional 60% 40%

Risk Weight 79% 21%

Total Return 22.04%

CAGR 3.38%

Standard deviation (Ann.) 10.3%

Quick Sharpe* 0.33

Max DD -30.9%

Worst Month -9.40%

Rebalancing Quarterly *CAGR divided by Std Dev Portfolio is 60% S&P 500 tracker, 30% year note, 10% 10 year note

11 PAST PERFORMANCE IS NOT NECESSARILY INDICATIVE OF FUTURE RESULTS. COMMODITY TRADING INVOLVES SUBSTANTIAL RISK OF LOSS.

EXAMPLE FOR ILLUSTRATION PURPOSES ONLY. THIS IS NOT A RECOMMENDATION TO BUY OR SELL COMMODITIES OR SECURITIES.

Page 12: Gerald Rehn - The Power of Diversified Investing

A different idea: Weighting by risk

Equity Risk 50%

Bond Risk 50%

12

PAST PERFORMANCE IS NOT NECESSARILY INDICATIVE OF FUTURE RESULTS. COMMODITY TRADING INVOLVES SUBSTANTIAL RISK OF LOSS.

EXAMPLE FOR ILLUSTRATION PURPOSES ONLY. THIS IS NOT A RECOMMENDATION TO BUY OR SELL COMMODITIES OR SECURITIES.

Page 13: Gerald Rehn - The Power of Diversified Investing

Volatility neutral: decrease equity, increase bonds

0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

10%

12%

14%

1-J

un

-06

1-A

ug-

06

1-O

ct-0

6

1-D

ec-0

6

1-F

eb

-07

1-A

pr-

07

1-J

un

-07

1-A

ug-

07

1-O

ct-0

7

1-D

ec-0

7

1-F

eb

-08

1-A

pr-

08

1-J

un

-08

1-A

ug-

08

1-O

ct-0

8

1-D

ec-0

8

1-F

eb

-09

1-A

pr-

09

1-J

un

-09

1-A

ug-

09

1-O

ct-0

9

1-D

ec-0

9

1-F

eb

-10

1-A

pr-

10

1-J

un

-10

1-A

ug-

10

1-O

ct-1

0

1-D

ec-1

0

1-F

eb

-11

1-A

pr-

11

1-J

un

-11

1-A

ug-

11

1-O

ct-1

1

1-D

ec-1

1

6 month rolling “look back” volatility to the portfolio

US S&P 500 Tracker US Gov Bond Tracker

13 PAST PERFORMANCE IS NOT NECESSARILY INDICATIVE OF FUTURE RESULTS. COMMODITY TRADING INVOLVES SUBSTANTIAL RISK OF LOSS.

Total notional weights were 225% 1-3 year US bond ETF, 25% long bond ETF, 34.1% S&P 500 ETF

EXAMPLE FOR ILLUSTRATION PURPOSES ONLY. THIS IS NOT A RECOMMENDATION TO BUY OR SELL COMMODITIES OR SECURITIES.

Page 14: Gerald Rehn - The Power of Diversified Investing

A volatility neutral equity/bond portfolio

Jan ‘06- Dec ’11 Equity US Gov Bonds

Notional 12% 88%

Risk Weights 50% 50%

Total Return 73.8%

CAGR 9.5%

Standard deviation (Ann.) 6.3%

Quick Sharpe* 1.5

Max DD -9.0%

Worst Month -5.7%

Rebalance Quarterly

Hypothetical example for illustration purposes only.

*CAGR divided by Std Dev. Total notional weights were 225% 1-3 year US bond ETF, 25% long bond ETF, 34.1% S&P 500 ETF.

14 PAST PERFORMANCE IS NOT NECESSARILY INDICATIVE OF FUTURE RESULTS. COMMODITY TRADING INVOLVES SUBSTANTIAL RISK OF LOSS.

EXAMPLE FOR ILLUSTRATION PURPOSES ONLY. THIS IS NOT A RECOMMENDATION TO BUY OR SELL COMMODITIES OR SECURITIES.

Page 15: Gerald Rehn - The Power of Diversified Investing

The “problem” with bonds

Jan ’06-Dec ‘11 Bond Only Portfolio (no leverage)

Total Return 26.57%

CAGR 3.95%

Standard Deviation 2.52%

Quick Sharpe* 1.57

Worst Month -1.69%

*CAGR divided by Std Dev Portfolio is 90% 1-3 year US bond tracker, 10% long bond tracker

Even during some of the best bond years recently….

I believe this is why most investors prefer to hold equities: the returns have traditionally been higher, even though risk-adjusted returns

may or may not be.

15 PAST PERFORMANCE IS NOT NECESSARILY INDICATIVE OF FUTURE RESULTS. COMMODITY TRADING INVOLVES SUBSTANTIAL RISK OF LOSS.

EXAMPLE FOR ILLUSTRATION PURPOSES ONLY. THIS IS NOT A RECOMMENDATION TO BUY OR SELL COMMODITIES OR SECURITIES.

Page 16: Gerald Rehn - The Power of Diversified Investing

A historical analysis of risk parity (1926 to 2010)

Source: Financial Analyst Journal, V68, #1, “Leverage Aversion and Risk Parity”, Asness, Frazzini, Pedersen.

THIS IS NOT A RECOMMENDATION TO BUY OR SELL COMMODITIES OR SECURITIES.

Note on construction: “The risk parity portfolio targets an equal risk allocation across the available instruments and is constructed as follows: At the end of each calendar month, we set the portfolio weight in each asset class equal to the inverse of its volatility, estimated by using three-year monthly excess returns up to month t – 1, and these weights are multiplied by a constant to match the ex post realized volatility of the value-weighted benchmark.” 16

Page 17: Gerald Rehn - The Power of Diversified Investing

Lessons from the markets

Risk smart investing

17

Page 18: Gerald Rehn - The Power of Diversified Investing

My beliefs and opinions

Volatility and risk are truths of investing.

18

Year Summary

1637 Tulip mania

1720 South Sea Co.

1772 East India Co.

1857 Railroads

1907 Banks, SF earthquake

1929 Global stock crash, great depression

1987 DJIA crash, portfolio insurance fault

2000 Tech crash, GDP productivity boom

2008 Housing, credit boom, global bank bust, Iceland default, Great depression (2)?

Year Summary

1974-75 Stocks, OPEC

1979-82 US banks, USD, global bank loans, OPEC (2)

1990 Nikkei crash, great deflation in Japan begins

1992 Sweden banking crisis, housing bubble

1994-95 Mexican banks, currency

1997 Asian currency crisis

1998 LTCM, Russia default

Often remembered, cited crashes Recent, less known…sometimes forgotten

Page 19: Gerald Rehn - The Power of Diversified Investing

1. Risk of loss of capital is a truth of investing.

We can either accept this or pretend its not true.

My view: Accept it and attempt to benefit by actively seeking out and investing in risky assets…

…but only when combined in a risk smart way.

My beliefs and opinions

19

Page 20: Gerald Rehn - The Power of Diversified Investing

My beliefs and lessons from the markets

2. Financial forecasts are generally not accurate within specific time periods. Also, predictions of crashes or crises do not benefit investors.

Dow 36,000 Crude $200

Natural Gas to $7

Maybe they will happen…’a broken clock is right twice a day’

S&P 500 down to 400

20

Page 21: Gerald Rehn - The Power of Diversified Investing

My beliefs and lessons from the markets

3. Returns of different asset classes over periods of time are usually different, but sometimes can be quite similar.

US Gov Long Bond ETF ($TLT)

DJ UBS Commodity Index ($DJP)

2007 9.9% 31.6%

2008 31.1% -31.8%

2009 -22.3% 12.6%

2010 9.0% 11.9%

2011 34.0% -2.6%

Annual total returns of 2 broad market trackers

Lesson: Real risk diversification can be difficult to achieve

EXAMPLE ONLY. THIS IS NOT A RECOMMENDATION TO BUY OR SELL COMMODITIES OR SECURITIES. 21 PAST PERFORMANCE IS NOT NECESSARILY INDICATIVE OF FUTURE RESULTS. COMMODITY TRADING INVOLVES SUBSTANTIAL RISK OF LOSS.

Page 22: Gerald Rehn - The Power of Diversified Investing

My beliefs and lessons from the markets

4. We all have behavioral biases and human operating faults that can negatively impact our investment returns.

Lesson: Understand your faults and take a systematic investment approach to help mitigate falling prey to our own biases.

Many investors try to “figure out” or guess what a return on some asset will be at a point in the future, but I believe we can use these lessons to invest

better.

22

Page 23: Gerald Rehn - The Power of Diversified Investing

One part of the picture: Correlation

Risk smart investing

23

Page 24: Gerald Rehn - The Power of Diversified Investing

Correlation (1)

A returned -5.9%, B +6.2%, what is the correlation?

88

90

92

94

96

98

100

102

104

106

108

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

ValueA

ValueB

24 AUTHOR GENERAGED STRING OF NUMBERS FOR DISCUSSION ONLY, NOT BASED ON ANY REAL WORLD COMMODITY OF SECURITY

Page 25: Gerald Rehn - The Power of Diversified Investing

Correlation (2)

Both return 12.6% over same period, what is the correlation?

98

100

102

104

106

108

110

112

114

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

ValueA

ValueB

25 AUTHOR GENERAGED STRING OF NUMBERS FOR DISCUSSION ONLY, NOT BASED ON ANY REAL WORLD COMMODITY OF SECURITY

Page 26: Gerald Rehn - The Power of Diversified Investing

What correlation?

Correlation Graph 1 Correlation Graph 2

time/data series correlation -0.96 0.96

return series correlation 1 -1

85

90

95

100

105

110

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

ValueA ValueB

98

103

108

113

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

ValueA ValueB

Be suspicious (or better yet run away holding your ears) when you hear people talk loosely about correlation!

26 AUTHOR GENERAGED STRING OF NUMBERS FOR DISCUSSION ONLY, NOT BASED ON ANY REAL WORLD COMMODITY OF SECURITY

Page 27: Gerald Rehn - The Power of Diversified Investing

My view of correlation

correlation - a coefficient which measures the tendency for two assets to under-perform or over-perform their average returns by the same number of standard deviations concurrently.

return series correlation – the correlation between two series of percentage returns. Using the above, this is the tendency for two assets to concurrently perform above or below their respective average percentage return over that period.

time series correlation – the correlation between two data series (e.g. the actual values of two indices). Using the above, this is the tendency for two assets to concurrently move higher or lower than their respective average time series figure over that period.

THESE DEFINITIONS AND DESCRIPTIONS REPRESENT MY VIEW AND ARE BASED ON MULTIPLE RESOURCES AND EXPERIENCE. THESE ARE NOT MEANT TO REPRESENT QUANTITATIVE OR EXACT DEFINITIONS. 27

Page 28: Gerald Rehn - The Power of Diversified Investing

Correlation misconceptions

“Its good to have investments with zero correlation to each other.”

“Having assets with negative correlation is bad because those assets

generating negative returns are cancelling out the good investments

making money…..therefore the total returns are lower, or worse

negative.”

THESE REPRESENT MY VIEWS AND OPINION ONLY ARD ARE BASED ON MY EXPERIENCE. 28

Page 29: Gerald Rehn - The Power of Diversified Investing

The way I try to use correlation

Invest (long) in assets or strategies with increasing price and correlations of:

1. The most negative return series (-1) possible;

2. Most positive time series (+1) possible.

#1 is a portfolio volatility reducer. Path important.

#2 is positive returns. Path not important. Key takeaways

29 THESE REPRESENT MY VIEWS AND OPINIONS ONLY.

Page 30: Gerald Rehn - The Power of Diversified Investing

Absolute returns with no volatility

The return of a portfolio holding 50% of each of the 2 Correlation (2) assets:

185

190

195

200

205

210

215

220

225

230

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

A+B

A+B

time/data series correlation 0.96

return series correlation -1

30

Does not exist in the real world

Page 31: Gerald Rehn - The Power of Diversified Investing

Correlations: Not at all set in stone

31

Understand characteristics of markets, look at as much history as possible

-0.60

-0.40

-0.20

0.00

0.20

0.40

0.60

0.80

1.00

1-Dec-06 1-Dec-07 1-Dec-08 1-Dec-09 1-Dec-10 1-Dec-11

12-month rolling return series correlation, Stocks and Commodities

S&P 500 ETF & Commodity ETF

Page 32: Gerald Rehn - The Power of Diversified Investing

In the real world there are no free lunches

Returns are not predictable within specific time periods….But I believe: • Over very long time periods broad asset classes and some strategies produce

positive returns. They have positive risk premiums.

• Assets and strategies generally have long term positive time series correlations to each other.

• These are candidates for positive time series correlations.

• Next, by aiming for low or negative return series correlation assets and strategies, even when some investments are performing poorly, even over long periods of time, there may be positive total performance. Anything less than a +1 return series correlation should be a benefit to a portfolio. The closer to -1 the better.

On a previous slide I said I believe that…

32 THESE REPRESENT MY VIEWS AND OPINIONS ONLY.

Page 33: Gerald Rehn - The Power of Diversified Investing

Side note: Uncorrelated fun for investors

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

A "developed" equity market A "frontier" equity market

There’s negative correlation ‘in the them thar hills’….its just the wrong one

EXAMPLE ONLY. THIS IS NOT A RECOMMENDATION TO BUY OR SELL COMMODITIES OR SECURITIES. 33 PAST PERFORMANCE IS NOT NECESSARILY INDICATIVE OF FUTURE RESULTS. COMMODITY TRADING INVOLVES SUBSTANTIAL RISK OF LOSS.

Page 34: Gerald Rehn - The Power of Diversified Investing

Correlation benefit example using CTAs

Risk smart investing

34

Page 35: Gerald Rehn - The Power of Diversified Investing

Within class diversification: CTA example

4 CTA Strategies – 31 December 2005 to 31 December 2011

Trend follower (1)

Trend follower (2)

Option Trader Option Seller

Total return 133.4% 26.9% 71.5% 12.0%

CAGR 15.2% 4.1% 9.4% 1.9%

Standard Dev 33.0% 29.4% 11.7% 28.6%

Quick Sharpe* 0.46 0.14 0.81 0.07

Max Loss (DD) -36.4% -46.5% -17.3% -51.4%

Worst Month -22.6% -15.5% -11.9% -51.4%

*CAGR divided by Std Dev

Is it riskier not to add risky CTAs to a CTA portfolio?

EXAMPLE ONLY. THIS IS NOT A RECOMMENDATION TO BUY OR SELL COMMODITIES OR SECURITIES. 35 PAST PERFORMANCE IS NOT NECESSARILY INDICATIVE OF FUTURE RESULTS. COMMODITY TRADING INVOLVES SUBSTANTIAL RISK OF LOSS.

Page 36: Gerald Rehn - The Power of Diversified Investing

Within class diversification: CTA example

4 CTAs – 31 December 2005 to 31 December 2011

Return series correlations

TF1 TF2 OT OS

TF1 1 0.25 -0.13 -0.24

TF2 0.25 1 0.12 -0.17

OT -0.13 0.12 1 -0.08

OS -0.24 -0.17 -0.08 1

There is a benefit to holding them together because of low or negative return series correlations

EXAMPLE ONLY. THIS IS NOT A RECOMMENDATION TO BUY OR SELL COMMODITIES OR SECURITIES. RETURN SERIES CORRELATIONS ARE THE CORRELATION BETWEEN MONTHLY PERCENTAGE RETURN FIGURES OVER THE PERIOD.

36

Page 37: Gerald Rehn - The Power of Diversified Investing

Within class diversification: CTA example

Hypothetically combining the 4 CTAs – 31 December 2005 to 31 December 2011

Portfolio1

Total return 85.1%

CAGR 10.7%

Standard Dev 12.2%

Quick Sharpe* 0.87

Max Loss (DD) -10.8%

Worst Month -7.4%

1. Investing in each by a risk factored risk weight. Actual notional percentage investments used were TF(1) 21.9%, TF(2) 21.9%, OT 37.5%, OS 18.8%. Quarterly rebalancing to original weights. *CAGR divided by Std Dev

The power of CTA diversification when low/negative return series correlation

HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE ONLY. THIS IS NOT A RECOMMENDATION TO BUY OR SELL COMMODITIES OR SECURITIES. 37 PAST PERFORMANCE IS NOT NECESSARILY INDICATIVE OF FUTURE RESULTS. COMMODITY TRADING INVOLVES SUBSTANTIAL RISK OF LOSS.

Page 38: Gerald Rehn - The Power of Diversified Investing

Using a risk smart approach to build portfolios

Risk smart investing

38

Page 39: Gerald Rehn - The Power of Diversified Investing

Risk groups: because we can’t predict returns

Equities Bonds

CTAs Commodities

? Other Alts

Focus on Risk Risk Groups:

Assets grouped by common return drivers and having low correlation return series to other risk groups under normal and stressful conditions.

Objective: Achieve a risk smart exposure to all.

39

Page 40: Gerald Rehn - The Power of Diversified Investing

Risk smart hypothetical example

The following slides contain a hypothetical example of a risk smart approach, generated for discussion purposes only. This is based on combining real world assets, including commodities and securities, however it was created only recently, after the fact of each assets’ returns were known. Please see the important information at the end of this presentation discussing the significant limitations inherent in hypothetical results.

40

Page 41: Gerald Rehn - The Power of Diversified Investing

Hypothetical risk smart portfolio: Asset class risk weightings

HYPOTEHTICAL EXAMPLE ONLY. THIS IS NOT A RECOMMENDATION TO BUY OR SELL COMMODITIES OR SECURITIES.

Some considerations for weights: • Extreme loss/volatility scenarios • Correlations across groups • Volatility stability • Correlation stability • Skewness, kurtosis • Leverage tolerance • Unique factors:

• Liquidity • Asset / strategy sustainability • Single manager risk • Counterparty risk

CTA Risk 31%

Commodity Risk 10%

Equity Risk 34%

Bond Risk 25%

Hypothetical example of risk weights

Actual notional weights used were CTAs(3 total) 52%, Equities (3 markets) 55%, Bonds (2 markets) 298% and Commodities (1 index) 15%. Quarterly rebalancing to original weights. The entire portfolio can be achieved through futures contracts. Approximate margin to equity would be 16%-20% currently for the entire portfolio

41 PAST PERFORMANCE IS NOT NECESSARILY INDICATIVE OF FUTURE RESULTS. COMMODITY TRADING INVOLVES SUBSTANTIAL RISK OF LOSS.

Page 42: Gerald Rehn - The Power of Diversified Investing

Rolling volatility for the hypothetical example

This is a measure of the “heat” of each weighted asset class to the portfolio each month, looking back 6 months and annualizing it. Due to low or negative return series correlations between asset classes, total volatility at the portfolio level is reduced by this cancelling out effect.

HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE ONLY. THIS IS NOT A RECOMMENDATION TO BUY OR SELL COMMODITIES OR SECURITIES.

0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

10%

12%

14%

16%

18%

20%

1-J

un

-06

1-A

ug-

06

1-O

ct-0

6

1-D

ec-0

6

1-F

eb

-07

1-A

pr-

07

1-J

un

-07

1-A

ug-

07

1-O

ct-0

7

1-D

ec-0

7

1-F

eb

-08

1-A

pr-

08

1-J

un

-08

1-A

ug-

08

1-O

ct-0

8

1-D

ec-0

8

1-F

eb

-09

1-A

pr-

09

1-J

un

-09

1-A

ug-

09

1-O

ct-0

9

1-D

ec-0

9

1-F

eb

-10

1-A

pr-

10

1-J

un

-10

1-A

ug-

10

1-O

ct-1

0

1-D

ec-1

0

1-F

eb

-11

1-A

pr-

11

1-J

un

-11

1-A

ug-

11

1-O

ct-1

1

1-D

ec-1

1

6 month rolling “look back” volatility to the hypothetical portfolio

Equities Bonds Commodities CTAs

42 PAST PERFORMANCE IS NOT NECESSARILY INDICATIVE OF FUTURE RESULTS. COMMODITY TRADING INVOLVES SUBSTANTIAL RISK OF LOSS.

Page 43: Gerald Rehn - The Power of Diversified Investing

Hypothetical risk smart portfolio: Return & risk table

A hypothetical risk smart portfolio example

31 December 2005 to 31 December 2011

Portfolio1

Total return 97.8%

CAGR 11.9%

Standard Deviation 9.0%

Quick Sharpe* 1.32

Max Loss during period (DD) -12.7%

Worst month during period -8.1%

1 Proprietary risk factored weights for each asset class: CTAs(3 total) 52%, Equities (3 markets) 55%, Bonds (2 markets) 298% and Commodities (1 index) 15%. The entire portfolio can be achieved through futures contracts. Approximate margin to equity would be 16%-20% currently for the entire portfolio. *CAGR divided by Std Dev.

HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE ONLY. THIS IS NOT A RECOMMENDATION TO BUY OR SELL COMMODITIES OR SECURITIES.

43 PAST PERFORMANCE IS NOT NECESSARILY INDICATIVE OF FUTURE RESULTS. COMMODITY TRADING INVOLVES SUBSTANTIAL RISK OF LOSS.

Page 44: Gerald Rehn - The Power of Diversified Investing

Return chart of the hypothetical portfolio example (2006-2011)

HISTORICAL HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE ONLY. THIS IS NOT A RECOMMENDATION TO BUY OR SELL COMMODITIES OR SECURITIES.

100

120

140

160

180

200

220

1-D

ec-0

5

1-F

eb

-06

1-A

pr-

06

1-J

un

-06

1-A

ug-

06

1-O

ct-0

6

1-D

ec-0

6

1-F

eb

-07

1-A

pr-

07

1-J

un

-07

1-A

ug-

07

1-O

ct-0

7

1-D

ec-0

7

1-F

eb

-08

1-A

pr-

08

1-J

un

-08

1-A

ug-

08

1-O

ct-0

8

1-D

ec-0

8

1-F

eb

-09

1-A

pr-

09

1-J

un

-09

1-A

ug-

09

1-O

ct-0

9

1-D

ec-0

9

1-F

eb

-10

1-A

pr-

10

1-J

un

-10

1-A

ug-

10

1-O

ct-1

0

1-D

ec-1

0

1-F

eb

-11

1-A

pr-

11

1-J

un

-11

1-A

ug-

11

1-O

ct-1

1

1-D

ec-1

1

Hypothetical “Risk Smart” portfolio example only

44

PAST PERFORMANCE IS NOT NECESSARILY INDICATIVE OF FUTURE RESULTS. COMMODITY TRADING INVOLVES SUBSTANTIAL RISK OF LOSS.

Page 45: Gerald Rehn - The Power of Diversified Investing

Why does this work? The positive reasons

1. Applies investment capital to investments in a more efficient way than most participants are doing.

2. Requires work to seek out and find truly diversifying, highly liquid assets and strategies, avoid pitfalls/shortcuts.

Allocates some capital to less well know liquid investment strategies. Follows the rule: “Additional investments do not add portfolio risk, but add diversification”

3. Utilizes tried and tested portfolio management techniques, but applied to the modern investing world.

45 THESE REPRESENT MY VIEWS AND OPINIONS ONLY.

Page 46: Gerald Rehn - The Power of Diversified Investing

Why does this work? The negative reasons

1. Investors are afraid to use leverage and apply capital as necessary to achieve these types of returns (“Leverage Aversion”1). This type of investing is not an easy road.

2. Behavioral biases (1): investors drawn into “hot”, positive recently performing assets (bull markets). Emotionally difficult to take money from stocks (e.g. in 1999) and put it in bonds or commodities.

3. Behavioral biases (2): investors cannot stick to the strict investment allocations and required rebalancing for many years – get bored and throw in the towel after a string of losses.

4. Investors not aware or do not have access to true diversifying investments, only see stocks in the media.

1 Financial Analyst Journal, V68, #1, “Leverage Aversion and Risk Parity”, Asness, Frazzini, Pedersen.

46 THESE REPRESENT MY VIEWS AND OPINIONS ONLY.

Page 47: Gerald Rehn - The Power of Diversified Investing

A non-exhaustive look at some of the specific risks

1. Correlations and/or volatility changes dramatically, beyond model expectations.

– Key input for success is volatility or loss expectations. My approach does not forecast, but sets a worst case scenario based on historical data.

2. A strategy, manager or market collapses completely (Armageddon scenario).

3. Counterparty risks (MF Global situation).

47 THESE REPRESENT MY VIEWS AND OPINIONS ONLY.

Page 48: Gerald Rehn - The Power of Diversified Investing

Additional important information

PAST RESULTS ARE NOT NECESSARILY INDICATIVE OF FUTURE RESULTS. THIS INVESTMENT UTILIZES LEVERAGE AND RISKS WHICH ARE NOT SUITABLE FOR ALL INVESTORS. HYPOTHETICAL RETURN RESULTS WERE USED IN THE CREATION OF THIS DOCUMENT.

HYPOTHETICAL PERFORMANCE RESULTS HAVE MANY INHERENT LIMITATIONS, SOME OF WHICH ARE DESCRIBED BELOW. NO REPRESENTATION IS BEING MADE THAT ANY ACCOUNT WILL OR IS LIKELY TO ACHIEVE PROFITS OR LOSSES SIMILAR TO THOSE SHOWN. IN FACT, THERE ARE FREQUENTLY SHARP DIFFERENCES BETWEEN HYPOTHETICAL PERFORMANCE RESULTS AND THE ACTUAL RESULTS SUBSEQUENTLY ACHIEVED BY ANY PARTICULAR TRADING PROGRAM.

ONE OF THE LIMITATIONS OF HYPOTHETICAL PERFORMANCE RESULTS IS THAT THEY ARE GENERALLY PREPARED WITH THE BENEFIT OF HINDSIGHT. IN ADDITION, HYPOTHETICAL TRADING DOES NOT INVOLVE FINANCIAL RISK, AND NO HYPOTHETICAL TRADING RECORD CAN COMPLETELY ACCOUNT FOR THE IMPACT OF FINANCIAL RISK IN ACTUAL TRADING. FOR EXAMPLE, THE ABILITY TO WITHSTAND LOSSES OR TO ADHERE TO A PARTICULAR TRADING PROGRAM IN SPITE OF TRADING LOSSES ARE MATERIAL POINTS WHICH CAN ALSO ADVERSELY AFFECT ACTUAL TRADING RESULTS. THERE ARE NUMEROUS OTHER FACTORS RELATED TO THE MARKETS IN GENERAL OR TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ANY SPECIFIC TRADING PROGRAM WHICH CANNOT BE FULLY ACCOUNTED FOR IN THE PREPARATION OF HYPOTHETICAL PERFORMANCE RESULTS AND ALL OF WHICH CAN ADVERSELY AFFECT ACTUAL TRADING RESULTS.

THE MEMBER HAS HAD LITTLE OR NO EXPERIENCE ALLOCATING ASSETS AMONG PARTICULAR TRADING ADVISORS. BECAUSE THERE ARE LITTLE OR NO ACTUAL ALLOCATIONS TO COMPARE TO THE PERFORMANCE RESULTS FROM THE HYPOTHETICAL ALLOCATION, CUSTOMERS SHOULD BE PARTICULARLY WARY OF PLACING UNDUE RELIANCE ON THESE RESULTS.

48