Presidential Leadership on Global Climate Change: Opportunities and Constraints

Jeffry BurnamVisiting Assistant Professor of Government

Department of GovernmentGeorgetown University

Burnamj@georgetown.edu

Presidential leadership on the environment matters (Vig 103),

including on the international environment (Daynes and Sussman). But

when do presidents lead on international environmental issues, what roles

do they play when they do and how effective are they in achieving their

objectives?

Executive branch agencies with differing missions and

constituencies are likely to disagree on the terms or even on the need for a

new international treaty. As Richard Neustadt says: “Executive officials

need decisions, and political protection and a referee for fights” (p. 6).

So, first, a president may choose to referee executive branch disputes over

international environmental issues as they arise. Second, a president may

work to persuade key legislators whose support he may need that it would

be in their interest to support his proposed treaty (Neustadt, p 41).1 Third,

a president may choose to bypass an unfriendly Congress and use executive

orders or other administrative means to secure his objectives (Howell). To

support his interventions in any of these three roles, a president may build

support by going public (Kernell) or by going local (Cohen 2009), a

technique that has become increasingly attractive given the limits that

media fragmentation imposes on appeals to the general public.

So presidents must be strategic. To be successful they must

“facilitate change by recognizing opportunities in their environments and

fashioning strategies and tactics needed to exploit them” (Edwards 188).

Edwards suggests this is the “essential” leadership skill (p. 6). Equally

important are the constraints on the president’s ability to lead. They often

derive from the same factors that provide opportunities for leadership.

In the case of international environmental treaties, the constraints

and opportunities a president confronts include: the state of the science,

economic impact, public perceptions of the need for action, congressional

and interest group support or opposition, and the presence of absence of so-

called “action forcing” events. His success in recognizing these constraints

and exploiting these opportunities will largely determine the effectiveness

of his interventions.

In this paper, I draw upon insights derived from these presidential

leadership theories and from original interviews with high-level officials

2

who worked closely with presidents from Reagan to Obama on ozone layer

and climate change protection, given the constraints and opportunities

these presidents confronted. But these have evolved, so a new kind of

presidential leadership is both possible and needed. That is strategic

advocacy in which the President through his words and deeds stresses the

moral urgency of addressing global climate change and employs the

techniques most likely to yield success in a given instance.

The Montreal Protocol on Ozone Layer

Protection

Background

The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer

(1987) is “perhaps the most successful international agreement to date”

(Kofi Annan) and one in which the United States and U.S. Presidents have

played a critical role.

The ozone layer is in process of recovering. The ecology and the

global environment have been protected. New industries have been

created, and consumers have generally benefitted from more efficient

means of refrigeration (UNEP 2012). In the United States alone, the U.S.

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) projects that 22 million cataract

3

cases and 6.3 million skin cancer deaths will be avoided at an estimated

savings in health care costs of $4.2 trillion over the period 1990-2165.

(US EPA 2010).

Ozone in the stratosphere forms a thin layer that protects humans,

animals, fish and crops from the damaging effects of ultraviolet (UV)

radiation from the sun. In 1974, scientists Mario Molina and Sherwood

Rowland demonstrated theoretically that certain industrial chemicals such

as chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) had the potential to migrate into the

stratosphere and be broken down by UV rays, creating significant amounts

of free chlorine radicals. These chlorine radicals would generate a

complex chemical reaction that would gradually deplete the stratospheric

ozone layer (Anderson and Sarma, 9-10).

Stratospheric ozone protection entered the policy arena long before

the White House became involved, which is also typical of many

presidential legislative initiatives (Rudalevige, 81). In 1978, the EPA

banned the use of aerosols in deodorant and other spray cans, a popular

move that industry also supported because substitutes for aerosol sprays

were readily available.2 But the European Commission (EC) did not

follow suit, adopting instead a loose cap only on CFC production. Public

4

interest subsided and attempts to further regulate CFCs came to a

temporary halt with the demise of the Carter Administration.

An Action Forcing Event: The Ozone Hole

In 1986, surprising news of a large winter depletion in the Antarctic

ozone layer (the Antarctic Ozone Hole) led industry officials on both sides

of the Atlantic to begin thinking about the prospects for international

controls. At the time, U.S. industry favored a global ban on CFC usage in

aerosols, whereas European industry was prepared to discuss only a

production cap. Japanese industry also had a keen interest in the issue,

since CFCs were used as a solvent to clean electronics; so did the USSR,

both as a significant producer and a significant consumer of CFCs. As

time went on, Japan and Russia came to favor strong controls, but the

European Community held out almost until the bitter end, largely due to

the intransigence of the British chemical industry (Rowlands, 101-123).

The unexpected discovery of the Antarctic Ozone Hole confounded

scientists and policy makers alike because it raised the possibility that

relatively small increases in CFCs could lead to much larger (non-linear)

reductions in the ozone layer once a certain threshold was reached.

5

In September 1986, the U.S. industry-led Alliance for Responsible

CFC Policy switched its opposition to controls and advocated a

“reasonable global limit” on increases in CFCs. Then, in October 1986,

U.S. industry leader DuPont called for an actual global reduction in CFC

production. These switches can be attributed to a number of factors, most

notably to DuPont’s capacity to develop marketable potential substitutes

for CFCs as well as to its fear that the United States Government might

decide to act unilaterally, placing it at a competitive disadvantage (Casin

and Dray, 308).

David Doniger

David Doniger joined the Natural Resources Defense Council in

1978, taking a lead for NRDC and for the environmental community on the

Montreal Protocol starting in 1986 and continuing to the present day.

Doniger remembers how bitterly industry in the 70s had “decried” the

science of ozone depletion and how strongly industry had opposed the

Carter Administration’s proposal to regulate CFCs in 1980. He recalls that

at an informally designed United Nations Environment Program (UNEP)

workshop hosted by the United States in Leesburg, Virginia, DuPont

presented an economic analysis that found the alternatives to CFCs to be

too costly. But when Doniger asked them if their analysis would change if

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CFCs were further restricted, by law, “their answer was somewhere

between ‘we hadn’t thought of that’ to ‘yes’!”

EPA Administrator Lee Thomas

In the fall of 1986, as the Department of State was seeking an

interagency determination of the U.S. negotiating position, EPA

Administrator Lee Thomas intervened at a critical moment. Thomas had

attended the Leesburg Workshop and had testified at a Senate Environment

Committee hearing in June 1986. He knew the issue in detail. In an

October 1986 meeting with EPA professionals, Thomas surprised them by

recommending a phase out of CFCs and not just a production freeze. Here

is how Thomas puts it:

It came through in the discussion that from a regulatory point of view we needed a more clear-cut goal to work with. From a scientific point of view a phase out was the correct goal because these were offending chemicals. All this discussion they were having about a freeze seemed to blur the fact that this was the ultimate goal…. I felt that a phase out was something we could defend better than what they were coming up with (Casin and Dray, 310-311).

Scientific Uncertainty: The Negotiator’s View

Ambassador Richard E. Benedick was the lead U.S. negotiator on

the Montreal Protocol from 1985 to 1987. In Ozone Diplomacy, he notes

7

that the science of ozone depletion was far from certain at the time that the

Montreal Protocol was negotiated:

Perhaps the most extraordinary aspect of the treaty was its imposition of substantial short-term economic costs to protect human health and the environment against unproven future dangers—dangers that rested on scientific theories rather than on firm data (Benedick, 2).

However, according to Benedick, scientific uncertainty actually

helped the State Department to propose the middle ground of a phased

reduction in ozone layer depleting substances. The phased reduction

allowed industry time to make available acceptable substitutes for CFCs,

thus maintaining industry support. At the same time, environmentalists

were pleased that the ultimate goal of the U.S proposal was the virtual

elimination of global emissions of ozone layer depleting chemicals. Major

U.S. producers of CFCs (DuPont in particular) supported a 50% reduction

for the interesting reason that a lesser reduction of, say, only 20% or a

mere freeze would not provide them with a sufficient incentive to produce

the chemical alternatives to CFCs they knew they could develop for the

market if given time and an incentive to do so (Benedick, 51-58).

The Assistant Secretary of State: John Negroponte

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Ambassador Benedick was not only the lead U.S. negotiator of the

Montreal Protocol; he was at the same time the Deputy Assistant Secretary

of State for Environment (E-DAS) in the Bureau of Oceans, Environment

and Science (OES), a position that I once held so I am aware of its

responsibilities. The E-DAS needs support as required from the Principal

Deputy Assistant Secretary and from the Assistant Secretary for Oceans,

Environment and Science, who at the time was Ambassador John

Negroponte. Negroponte recalls that while Benedick “drove” the

negotiations, it was up to him and to EPA Administrator Lee Thomas “to

shepherd the Montreal Protocol through the crucial higher levels of the

international and the domestic political processes.” He and Thomas

“pushed this thing through against considerable odds” with support from

Deputy Secretary of State John Whitehead and Secretary George Shultz.

Two tasks were important. One was to persuade key countries of the

merits of the science, especially Europe, Russia and Japan. So Thomas

and Negroponte worked with their counterparts in foreign governments

and deployed U.S. scientific and technical experts to meet with their

scientific and technical counterparts. Nor did Secretary Shultz hesitate to

inform foreign leaders of his support for our negotiators. The other task

was internal. According to Negroponte, the President’s Science Advisor

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William Graham “didn’t believe in the science” and Interior Secretary

Donald Hodel took issue with State’s position. Negroponte and Thomas

“worked to overcome those” views when the matter was elevated to the

Domestic Policy Council (Negroponte).

A Friendly Congress

In the spring of 1987, the Office of Management and Budget had set

up an interagency working group to reexamine the State Department’s

negotiating position. The OMB review was soon elevated to the cabinet-

level Domestic Policy Council (DPC). The DPC’s options paper included

Secretary of the Interior Donald Hodel’s “personal protection option” that

proposed (among other things) that the public be urged to wear sunscreen,

sunglasses and broad brimmed hats. A calculated leak of Hodel’s views by

his own staff generated an uproar (Doniger). The Washington Post’s

Herblock penned a famous cartoon that showed fish wearing sunglasses!

(The actual damage to fish from UV radiation results from its potential

negative effect on plankton, the source of all ocean life.)

Secretary of State George Shultz

Secretary of State George Shultz did not believe that the Domestic

Policy Council was an appropriate forum to determine the

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Administration’s position in an international treaty negotiation. But that

did not matter so much because Shultz had “raised and carefully talked

over the ozone layer issue on several occasions” in private meetings with

the President that Nancy Reagan had arranged for him on pending matters.

Shultz told the President that “although there was still some controversy

over the science, it was quite likely that CFCs were damaging the ozone

layer and if that was true, the result would be catastrophic and

irreversible.” So “it made sense to take out an insurance policy.”

According to Shultz, President Reagan was a “good man for grasping the

essence of an issue” and he did so in this instance. So Shultz knew that if

the issue were elevated to the President, Reagan would support an

international treaty (Shultz).

President Ronald Reagan: The Referee

On June 18 1987 President Reagan chaired a Domestic Policy

Council Meeting at which a majority of departments and agencies lined up

against the State Department’s negotiating position. Neither Benedick nor

Secretary of State George Shultz was present at the meeting with the

President. Shultz was on travel at the time, together with Negroponte.

Deputy Secretary of State John Whitehead represented the Secretary and

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followed up the meeting by sending a letter to Chief of Staff Howard

Baker to correct the distortions of the State Department options in the DPC

Staff Memo. The President decided to support “virtually all of the State-

EPA position” (Benedick 65-67). Benedick was in Berlin, giving a speech

at the fortieth anniversary of the Marshall Plan. He vividly recalls that a

young man from the U.S. Embassy delivered a sealed envelope to him with

a copy of the signed presidential decision memo that had a security

classification so high that it had to be burned after reading! Benedick was

amazed:

Usually, it’s some compromise, but in the case of Montreal, it was 99% for our list of options, which absolutely dazzled Negroponte and me. Neither of us had ever experienced such an uncompromising resolution of (strong!) interagency disagreement (Benedick 2011b).

Reagan made one exception and selected an option that would have

required the U.S. to propose at Montreal that 90% of all countries would

have to ratify the treaty before it went into force:

However, the President’s instructions were that if, after every other article had been decided at Montreal, we were still unable to attain this provision I (specifically I) was to fly back to Washington and explain this at an interagency meeting and then return the same day to Montreal and accept the consensus for the easier entry-into-force provision that State had favored from the beginning. This in fact occurred (Benedick 2011b).

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President Reagan had intervened to referee an executive branch

dispute in support of the State Department’s position despite significant

opposition from his Cabinet and his conservative advisors; it was this

strategic choice that allowed the United States to maintain its leading role

in negotiating the Montreal Protocol and to forge a reputation as a world

leader on the ozone depletion issue. And the President made this key

decision only after having been briefed twice by the Secretary of State and

after hearing both sides being presented at the Domestic Policy Council, a

procedure similar that he had often employed with his “super cabinet”

when he had been Governor of California (Svahn).

The President’s decision was not publicized, perhaps not to offend

his “base.” There had been a rumor that Benedick was about to be fired

and some European officials were surprised to learn just prior to Montreal

that Benedick was still our lead negotiator (Benedick, 2001b).

Despite President Reagan’s “hidden hand” leadership3, the outcome

of the September 1987 negotiations in Montreal was far from certain

(Benedick 74-76). As EPA Administrator Lee Thomas puts it:

The negotiations were quite contentious right up to Montreal. Actually they were quite difficult in Montreal with all night sessions by a smaller group of principals where we negotiated key elements of the agreement in the final hours (Thomas).

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The European Community was allowed a “bubble” over its

emissions to make it easier for its member nations to comply. Russia was

granted some deadline adjustments to conform to its five-year economic

plan. And the U.S.-backed provision to require that 90% of the Protocol

signatories must ratify the treaty before it went into effect was diluted to

67% (Shabecoff, 1987a; 1987b; 1987c).

Ironically, in late September 1987, just after the Montreal Protocol

was signed, new data were released that showed that the Antarctic Ozone

Hole was larger than ever. And a March 1988 study by the Ozone Trends

Panel showed not only that man-made chlorine emissions were causing

stratospheric ozone layer depletion, but also that the probable rate of loss

of ozone was far greater than the models had previously predicted

(Shabecoff, 1987d; 1987e; 1988a; 1988b; and Benedick, 110-111).

Science and the Montreal Protocol

What was the influence of the science of ozone depletion on policy

makers? In Ozone Discourses, Karen T. Litfin contends that the discovery

of the Antarctic Ozone Hole changed the terms of the debate, both for

scientists and policy makers. In 1986 and 1987, as the treaty was being

14

negotiated, scientists could still avail themselves of a variety of alternative

interpretations of the Antarctic Ozone Hole or even view it as an anomaly

that could not be explained by existing knowledge. Even the actual

depletion of the ozone layer was not an established fact.4

The discovery of the Antarctic Ozone Hole was a dramatic event that

not only had a major impact on public and legislative opinion; it led to

what Liftkin calls a “discursive shift” in favor of action. For the

unanticipated emergence of a hole much larger and much sooner than any

scientific model had predicted alarmed scientists and undermined their

faith in their own models, which had suggested a more gradual depletion of

the ozone layer over time. Policy makers sensed a crisis in the scientific

community, which could not at first explain these findings.5 They realized

that more immediate preventive action might need to be taken than they

had thought necessary (Litfin, 96-107).

Economics and the Montreal Protocol

The economic impact of the Montreal Protocol was mitigated because

the treaty’s targets and timetables could be adjusted to meet new scientific

assessment and changing expectations of when industry could produce

adequate and affordable substitutes. And unlike climate change, the

15

impact was not economy wide. But ways did have to be found to mitigate

its substantial impacts on consumers and small businesses, including

allowing “critical use exemptions” for methyl bromide as a key

agricultural fumigant or through recycling of CFC-based refrigerants, such

as Freon.6

Limited fears about the economic impact of the Montreal Protocol

may have accounted for the fact that both public and political elites

generally accepted the science on ozone depletion, even in the period when

the science was somewhat uncertain. Once elites are persuaded that there

are economically and politically acceptable solutions to problems such as

acid rain and ozone depletion, they are less inclined to question the

scientific information (Burnam, 2011). By contrast, powerful interest

groups have sown doubt in the public mind concerning the need for action

on climate change. As Steven Seidel notes:

One critical difference between the Montreal Protocol and climate change has been the existence of a well-funded opposition that jumps on any scientific uncertainties and stokes fears about the economic impacts of climate change (Seidel).

Doniger thinks that the key lesson from the Montreal Protocol process is

the importance of the environmental community and industry working

16

together. But he notes that some lobbyists have learned quite different

lessons that they use to fight action on climate change:

Paint the issues black and white, don’t rely on a process of scientific fact finding and consensus building to get things started and don’t admit that there are options for addressing the problem (Doniger)!

Congress and the Montreal Protocol

In response to the public outcry over the Herblock cartoon and

aware of the struggle within the Reagan Administration, the Senate on

June 5, 1987, debated a Baucus-Chafee Sense of the Senate Resolution

endorsing the State Department’s negotiating position, while adding

language to instruct the negotiators to consider the economic and

competitiveness impact of the proposed treaty. In a remarkable

demonstration of congressional support for the State Department’s

position, the Senate voted for the resolution 80-2.7 The House passed a

similar resolution some weeks later, but only after powerful Energy and

Commerce Chair John Dingell (D. Mich.), sensed industrial interest and

scientific support and thus came to favor international negotiations.

Previous Congressional hearings and support for negotiating an

international treaty had made it easier for the State Department and EPA to

prevail over those in the Reagan Administration who favored either a

17

limited response or no response to the ozone layer depletion problem

(Shimberg).

Lessons

President Reagan was persuaded to support the Montreal Protocol by

his Secretary of State. He never attempted to persuade Congress to support

the Montreal Protocol. But Senate Republicans and Democrats and Liberal

Republicans in the House had engaged through the hearing process in 1986

and 1987 in publicizing the threat to the ozone layer and to encourage the

Reagan Administration to take action. However, the Antarctic Ozone Hole

was its own persuader. Every school child in America knew about it

(Schmitt)—it was something the public could be easily comprehended in

the absence of any detailed knowledge of the science of ozone depletion.

Climate Protection

President Clinton and Vice President Gore

President Clinton started out his Administration in a manner pleasing

to environmentalists by assigning a lead role on the environment to Vice

President Gore, appointing two Gore aides to key environmental

18

positions--Kathleen McGinty to coordinate environmental policy

throughout the government--and Carol Browner to be EPA Administrator.

And on Earth Day, the President announced “our nation’s commitment to

reducing our emissions of greenhouse gases to their 1990 levels by the

year 2000,” promising that the United States would “take the lead in

addressing the challenge of global warming. ” And overruling his own

Treasury Secretary, the President accepted the Vice President’s proposal

for a tax on the heat content of fossil fuels as part of his deficit reduction

plan. The bill with the fossil fuel tax included narrowly passed the House

in May, but was rejected in June by the Senate Finance Committee and

was not included in the final law.8

However, climate change was not a high priority for the White House

during the remainder of the Administration’s first two years, either

domestically or internationally. In October 1993, the President and the

Vice President jointly announced a Climate Change Action Plan.

Ironically, like the “no regrets” plan of the departing Bush Administration,

it relied only upon administrative measures that could be implemented

under existing legislative authority (Parker and Blodgett).

Two important international meetings on climate change occurred in

1995 and 1996. In March 1995, in Berlin, at the First Conference of the

19

Parties (COP 1) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate

Change (UNFCCC), which President Bush had signed at Rio, the U.S.

acceded to the demands of the developing countries to draft a treaty that

would contain emission limits for developed, but not for developing

countries (The Berlin Mandate). The Clinton Administration thought it

had to concede to this demand “in order to keep the international process

moving along” (Pomerance). That proved to be a fateful decision.

In July 1996, at Geneva, Under Secretary of State Timothy Wirth

announced the principles that would guide United States negotiators in

preparing for a climate change treaty. First, the United States would

commit to “realistic and achievable” reduction targets provided that other

developed nations also did so. Second, the U.S. would insist that

“maximum flexibility” be allowed for countries to meet those targets,

including the deployment of “market based” mechanisms. Third, the U.S.

would support funding to assist developing countries in meeting the

challenge of climate change.

The Kyoto Protocol: Successes and Failures

In 1997, the White House assumed control of international climate

change policy and established a White House Climate Change Task Force

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headed by Todd Stern, who realized that outreach with key constituencies

was badly needed to communicate the Administration’s climate change

strategy (Royden 18). And a working group was established to draft

options for the President and Vice President. It was co-chaired by Gene

Sperling, Director of the National Economic Council (NEC), Kathleen

McGinty, Chair of the White House Council on Environmental Quality

(CEQ) and James Steinberg, Deputy Director of the National Security

Council (NSC) and also included David Sandalow (NSC and CEQ), Dan

Perrolli (NEC), Larry Summers (Treasury), and Under Secretary of State

for Global Affairs Stuart Eisenstadt, who became the US chief Kyoto

negotiator when Tim Wirth left in the summer of 2007 in order to head up

the United Nations Foundation. The working group met in Sperling’s

office in the West Wing. Sandalow recalls that it had a tough assignment:

“We realized that climate change was an issue in which economic,

environmental and diplomatic concerns intersected in somewhat

incompatible ways” and that there was “no way to come up with a U.S.

position that would make everyone happy.” He notes that the President

and Vice President were fully engaged throughout much of 1997: “We

recognized that this was a big decision that would require a big

commitment on the part of the United States.” The President’s distinctive

21

take on the issue was “to frame the issue in terms of opportunity.” Both

the President and the Vice President were “technology optimists who

believed that Americans could solve the climate change problem if only

they put their minds to it” (Sandalow). Kathleen McGinty, Chair of the

Council on Environmental Quality, recalls that the President and the Vice

President worked together on climate change:

The President and the Vice President functioned as a team, or perhaps I should say a partnership, that recognized a high degree of expertise on the climate change issue by the Vice President. But the President was fully engaged, especially in how to frame the issue in terms of economic opportunity and jobs, how to achieve a broader base of support and how and when to expend political capital (McGinty).

There were significant disagreements that needed to be refereed

between the President’s advisors, with Kathleen McGinty and his

environmental advisors “pushing for tough and specific cuts in greenhouse

gas emissions” while economic advisors such as Deputy Treasury

Secretary Larry Summers and White House Economic Advisor Gene

Sperling were more concerned with the potentially high costs of

implementation (Warrick). In a speech to the National Geographic Society

on October 22, President Clinton publicly announced that the U.S.

negotiating instructions for Kyoto would include a “binding and realistic

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target of returning emissions to 1990 levels between 2008 and 2012” with

further (unspecified) measures in the years thereafter (Clinton 1997).

The Kyoto Protocol required the United States to reduce its greenhouse

gas emissions by 7% below 1990 levels averaged over the period 2008-

2012. However, in return, the United States was able to include some

important general provisions (such as emissions trading and carbon sinks)

to make it easier for it (and others) to comply. Developed nations took on

binding reduction commitments, but no developing nation took on any

such commitments, even though it was known at the time that developing

nations’ share of global greenhouse gas emissions would eventually

surpass both Europe’s and that of the United States, which they have since

done. Attempts by Assistant Secretary of State Eileen Claussen to

negotiate bilateral agreements with China, India and South Korea prior to

Kyoto were frustrated by the Asian financial crisis.9

The Administration did succeed in permitting and influencing the

negotiation of an international climate change treaty at Kyoto. First, at

Berlin and Geneva, the U.S. prepared the way for the structure of the

Kyoto Protocol by fatefully acceding to the international consensus that

developing countries need not take on emissions limitations. Second, at

Kyoto, the U.S. was able to include in the Protocol such key objectives as

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an averaging of emissions limits over five years not to begin until 2008.

And against considerable odds, the U.S. won international support for its

emissions trading proposal.10 Third, Vice President Gore flew to Kyoto

during the last week of the conference, when the negotiations were on the

verge of collapse, and announced “flexibility” in the U.S. position.

According to Ron Klain, the Vice President’s Chief of Staff:

Gore himself decided to go to Kyoto. Clinton was comfortable with our fate being in the hands of the negotiating team, a mix of State Department folks and Stu Eisenstadt, who was then Undersecretary for Global Affairs and our chief negotiator at Kyoto. But the team had very limited negotiating instructions, and felt like they lacked the stature or authority to “get to yes.”  They asked Gore to come, with a broad delegation of authority to reach an agreement.  A lively debate at the WH ensued about the pros/cons of such a trip, and Clinton left the final decision in Gore's own hands. Gore elected to go (Klain).

The Vice President’s trip “injected energy” into the negotiations and

was essential to a successful international outcome (Sandalow). And,

showing flexibility, the U.S. agreed to reduce its emissions to 7% rather

than 0% below 1990 levels; however this made it even harder for the

Administration to contend back home that it had negotiated a treaty with

the “realistic and achievable” goals it had promised. 11

It was clear that the Senate would not accept the Protocol’s provisions

with respect to developing countries. While legislative opinion strongly

favored the Montreal Protocol, it strongly opposed the Kyoto Protocol.

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Months before the Montreal Protocol was signed, the U.S. Senate had

passed a resolution 82-2 that endorsed the U.S negotiating position.

Months before the Kyoto Protocol was negotiated, the U.S. Senate passed

a resolution 95-0 declaring that it could not support a treaty that did not

involve commitments from developing nations in the same time frame as

developed nations or that would cause economic harm to the United States

(Cushman, 1997a).

Nor was it clear that the Kyoto Protocol would not have significant

adverse effects on the economy. Remarkably, the Administration’s

economic analysis was not released until six months after Kyoto; it

underestimated the cost of the Protocol by a considerable margin.12 The

Administration pretended that the treaty might not have significant short-

term costs in addition to its long-term benefits (Claussen).

The Administration did not have the advantage of an action-forcing

event such as the Antarctic Ozone Hole to arouse public concern

(Claussen). Instead it tried to negotiating details at future conferences such

as The Hague to mitigate its economic impact through forestry credits. 13

Although the science was there, despite lingering uncertainties, the public

did not feel the need for action.

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Lessons

President Clinton played the role of referee on climate change,

deciding in favor of his Vice President to accept the BTU tax and allowing

Gore to decide to go to Kyoto. He also refereed executive branch disputes

over the Administration’s negotiating position for Kyoto. But he failed to

persuade either Congress or the public that the Kyoto Treaty could be

implemented at reasonable cost or that it was fair in excluding China and

other developing countries from emission reduction obligations. His

National Geographic Speech, a wonkiest event that he and Vice President

Gore held with leading scientists at Georgetown University14 and his 1998

State of the Union were his major efforts to go public on Kyoto. Kyoto

had the support of major environmental but not of major industrial

organizations. But his Administration had successfully negotiated a treaty

that included many of its key objectives and that it hoped would be

improved by further amendments.

President George W. Bush and Vice President

Cheney

Lessons: The Vice President as Referee

Candidate Bush opposed the Kyoto Protocol during his 2000

presidential campaign, but he delivered a speech designed to blunt

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Candidate Gore’s appeal committing his Administration to legislation

clarifying that CO2 could be regulated under the Clean Air Act.15

Once in office, Vice President Cheney and his staff strategized on

how to walk the newly elected president back from this campaign

commitment. On March 13 2001, the Vice President took a letter directly

to the President for his signature, bypassing even the internal White House

clearance process. The letter told key Republican senators that the

Administration did not support regulating CO2 emissions under the Clean

Air Act (Bush 2001a). The Vice President left the White House to

personally deliver the letter to the Senate just as EPA Administrator

Christine Whitman was arriving for a previously scheduled meeting to

discuss the issue with the President; the President told Whitman that he

had already made up his mind (Gellman, 81-90). Neither Secretary of

State Colin Powell nor National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice had

been consulted. She would have inserted language promising to work with

our allies to address the problem of climate change. The letter confirmed

the worst fears of European diplomats about American unilateralism (Rice,

41).

A Cabinet Level Review Committee, chaired by Condoleezza Rice,

was established in the spring of 2001 to study global warming. It was co-

27

led by John Bridgeland (Assistant to the President for Domestic Policy)

and Gary Edson (Deputy Assistant to the President for International

Economic Affairs). Cesar Conda represented the Vice President.

Bridgeland recalls:

Edson and I led Cabinet-level discussions with the Cabinet Level Secretaries themselves and came forward with significant policies to advance the science and technologies on climate change. We briefed the President regularly and he issued the policy in June 2001.

As good government types, we requested the latest science and facts from the National Academy of Sciences.  We summoned top experts—scientists, climatologists, former EPA Administrators, Pew Center, non-profits both advocates and skeptics, etc.

Kyoto was a non-starter. The key question was whether we’d follow through on our commitment to include CO2 in the regulatory regime (Bridgeland).

On June 11, the President went public and addressed the issue of

climate change on the White House lawn. While noting the finding of the

National Academy of Sciences that the “increase [in greenhouse gas

levels] is due in large part to human activity,” the President nevertheless

contended that “[w] e do not know how fast change will occur, or even

how some of our actions could impact it.” He called for a National

Climate Change Technology Initiative, but he did not propose any limits

on energy production from fossil fuels or any regulation of CO2 as a

28

pollutant under the Clean Air Act. The Vice President’s position had

prevailed.

In February 2002, in addressing a targeted audience at the National

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) President Bush

announced a Climate Change Action Plan that included a pledge to reduce

the carbon intensity of U.S. energy consumption by 18% by 2012. The

plan notably placed an emphasis on greenhouse gases that were not

generated by the burning of fossil fuels (Bush 2002).16 As CEQ Chair

James Connaughton recalls:

The President's Climate Change Action Plan included a component that required us to focus on non-CO2 gases. We initially publicly identified methane and black soot as key opportunities, and began to look more closely at the viability of accelerated phase-out of gases subject to the Montreal Protocol.  The President was briefed and approved this element of the Climate Change Action Plan, recognizing the power of the approach with respect to large and quantifiable co-benefits (Connaughton, 2012).  

Lessons: A New Lead

As his second term approached, the President took Connaughton

aside and told him he wished to take a new lead on climate change. He

sent him around the world as his “Personal Representative” to lay the

foundation for Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and

29

Climate Change, engaging China and India. In 2005, the President issued

a statement that “finally conceded the human influence on climate

change”; also in 2005 and in again in 2007, the Bush Administration

worked with Congress to enact new energy laws, including changes in

daylight savings time, an increase in vehicle fuel efficiency standards, an

aggressive biofuels mandate and a phase out of the incandescent light bulb!

In 2007, the President personally convened a meeting of the 18 major

economies (including major developing countries) to discuss national plans

for curbing greenhouse gas emissions. And the White House authorized

Under Secretary of State Paula Dobriansky to sign on to the Bali Plan of

Action, thus facilitating preparations for the 2010 UNFCCC Conference of

Parties in Copenhagen (Connaughton 2011).

The Bush Administration recognized that initiatives that can be

under the Montreal Protocol regime to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

With White House support, the State Department negotiated an accelerated

phase out of Hydroflourocarbons (HCFCs), which were the original

alternative to CFCs under the Montreal Protocol (Connaughton 2012).

Unfortunately, although HCFCs are now being phased out as a result of

these actions, many countries are now using HFCs as an alternative to

HCFCs. HFCs are not ozone depleters, but they are very powerful

30

greenhouse gases. So in the bipartisan fashion that it is typical of the

Montreal Protocol, the Obama Administration has followed through to

limit the production of HFCs under the Montreal Protocol. At the U.S.

China Summit in June 2013, President Xi and President Obama agreed to

support an amendment to the Montreal Protocol to phase down projected

increases in HFCs by 50% by 2050, a measure that if adopted by all

countries could avoid a temperature increase of 0.5 degrees centigrade

(Eilperin 2013; Y.Xu et.al.).

First Term: President Obama Goes to Copenhagen

In his first term, President Obama initially made climate change a

priority, but chose to place it behind health care reform, which in turn he

placed behind the need to stimulate the economy. In his 2009 State of the

Union, the President called for a cap and trade bill and spoke out

eloquently on climate change in an Earth Day Speech and to targeted

audiences on the promise of Green Jobs under the newly enacted American

Recovery Act (Going Local). But he did not send a bill to Congress;

instead he asked the House to send him a bill. Energy and Commerce

Chair Henry Waxman and Speaker Pelosi skillfully struck bargains with

major utility, coal and agricultural interests and the House passed a climate

31

change bill in June by a partisan majority of 217-212 (Neustadt).

However, the Administration lost control of the narrative, perhaps due to

low-key presidential involvement. Its opponents successfully labeled the

House bill a “Rube Goldberg contraption” filled with concessions to

special interests and a “Job Killer” (Pooley, 325-326, 359-403).

In the Senate, Senators John Kerry, Joe Lieberman and Lindsay

Graham launched a concerted effort to draft a climate change bill that

could be more broadly supported. But the Administration was not fully

engaged with them and actually undermined their efforts when it gave

away key items relating to offshore oil drilling and nuclear power that the

three senators had intended to use as bargaining chips (Lizza). However,

due to the economy and strong opposition from the Tea Party and

industry, their bill probably had no chance in any event. As Judith A.

Layzer notes:

(T) he Administration’s sporadic efforts to train the spotlight on energy and climate change, combined with its determination to characterize cap-and-trade as an economic boon, were not enough to overcome the inertia that has long plagued Congress on this issue. The poor economy, coupled with the efforts by Tea Party activists and other opponents to cast a carbon cap as a job killer created enough confusion among the public that, for fence sitting senators, simply doing nothing appeared to be the most prudent course (Layzer).

32

Theda Skocpol blames the Obama Administration for following an

“inside” (bargaining) strategy uncoupled from a robust grass roots

strategy to mobilize public opinion for action on climate change (Skocpol

2013). But she does not highlight the President’s decision not to prioritize

speaking in support of the bill nor on industry’s aggressive campaign

against it (Pooley 2013). And public support for climate change action

was weak as the nation was still in the midst of the Great Recession.

The President did act administratively (Howell), ordering the EPA

and the DOT to issue dramatically enhanced fuel efficiency standards for

light trucks and automobiles and advancing the time line for those

standards, as authorized by the Bush era Energy Independence and

Security Act of 2007. And he bargained with the major automobile

makers for even more. The Administration then used these standards plus

the emission reduction goals of the House passed bill as the basis for its

position in international negotiations, at Copenhagen and Doha, when it

promised to reduce U.S. emissions of greenhouse gases 17% by 2020

from 2005 levels.

In December 2009, President Obama personally travelled to

Copenhagen and met with the leaders of China, India, Brazil and South

Africa. The Copenhagen Accord set a goal of limiting the increase in

33

average global temperature to 2 degrees Celsius and requested that both

developing and less developed nations submit national plans and take

steps to monitor and report their greenhouse gas emissions, provisions that

were spelled out in more detail in the Cancun Agreement of 2010

(Broder). And in South Africa in December 2011, the United States, in

concert with the European Union, China, India and other key international

players, signed on to the Durban Platform, launching the negotiation by

2016 of a new climate change treaty with “legal force” that will require

for the first time that the major developing nations pledge to reduce their

projected emissions (Eilperin 2011). The significance of the Durban

Platform is that it envisions a structure in which all key countries

(developed and less developed) will pledge to make “meaningful emission

reductions on an appropriate timetable at acceptable cost,” superseding the

dichotomous Berlin Mandate between them upon which the Kyoto

Protocol was based (Aldy and Stavins).

Second Term: New Opportunities for Presidential Leadership

A new strategic plan is needed for climate change. The experience

of previous Administrations and the contrasting economics and politics of

ozone layer and climate change protection suggest that a larger presidential

34

role will be needed on climate change than on ozone depletion--not just the

role of referee of executive branch disputes, the role that presidents have

played so far both on ozone depletion and climate change. After all, a

climate change treaty would likely affect almost every sector of the

economy and many more constituencies. At the same time, its benefits

would be widely shared. To effectively lead, the president would have to

assume the role of strategic advocate—speaking out urgently on the need

to act and choosing the techniques (bargaining, going public, going local

administrative remedies) most likely to yield success in a given instance.

The new strategic plan must be the President’s plan in fact as well as name

and he must give its implementation the priority and sustained attention

that studies of presidential communication suggest are needed to

successfully frame a debate (Cohen).

Fortunately, the constraints upon presidential leadership on climate

change are in the process of being lifted. Galen Weber has shown that

public concern about environmental issues rises as the employment rate

falls, and it has now dropped below 8% (Weber). The economics of

climate change are more favorable than ever due to the dramatic impact of

new supplies and low prices for natural gas in reducing the use of coal for

generating electricity.

35

As patterns of extreme weather events continue to accumulate, the

public will increasingly feel the need for action on climate change. For

example, a December 2012 survey found that 80% of Americans believe

that global warming is a serious problem, including an amazing 61% of the

public who call themselves “climate skeptics.” According to Stanford

University poll consultant Jon Krosnick, these skeptics “don’t believe what

the scientists say, they believe what the thermometers say…. Events are

helping these people see what scientists thought they had been seeing all

along” (Borenstein).17

So a discursive shift is underway in which the public perceives that

the effects of climate change are already upon them in the form of

powerful hurricanes, droughts, floods and melting ice (Carey 2011). It no

longer needs to trust scientific elites to conclude that global warming is a

clear and present danger.18

So President Obama now has an opportunity to become a strategic

advocate on climate change -- by making it a presidential priority, by

engaging national and international leaders and by pointing out that action

on climate change is urgently needed but can be achieved at reasonable

cost only if we act now (Ropgelj).

In a memorable speech proposing a ban on nuclear weapons testing,

36

President Kennedy declared: “In the final analysis …our most basic

common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the

same air and we are all mortal” (Clymer).

On June 22, 2013, at Georgetown University, President Obama

delivered a moral message to the young: “As a president, as a father and as

an American, I am here to say ‘It is time to act’…I refuse to condemn your

generation and future generations to a planet that’s beyond fixing.” At the

same time, he announced specific steps that his Administration would take,

including a directive to the EPA to regulate carbon emissions from both

new and from existing power plants under the Clean Air Act, an authority

that the Supreme Court had generally upheld in Massachusetts v. EPA

(2007). Unfortunately, his moral message was temporarily overshadowed

by that announcement, which was roundly denounced by Republican

congressional leaders as tantamount to an “energy tax” that would destroy

jobs and raise electrical rates (Landler and Broder).

At present, the President is predominantly pursuing an

administrative strategy on regulating carbon emissions; he does not have

significant legislative options open to him right now. Howell suggests that

“Congress can rarely mount an effective and timely response” to unilateral

action by the President (p. 178). But sometimes it can. On September 20,

37

EPA Administrator Gina McCarthy proposed strict new carbon standards

for new coal fired power plants, to be followed in a year by what are bound

to be more controversial standards for existing plants.

Industry reaction to EPA’s proposed standards has been bitter and

McCarthy has been accused of relying upon the new technologies that are

not ready for prime time and may be subject to court challenge in that

regard (Wald and Shear). Senator Mitch McConnell and other Senators

from coal states have vowed to stop these rules. So she will need to

engage with industry and state leaders in order forestall congressional

attempts to delay or overturn these proposed rules. And the President will

need to continue to deliver the message that climate change action is a

moral obligation, perhaps in a major address to the nation such as the State

of the Union. But speeches are only a part of strategic advocacy. The

President’s actions and the pattern of his choices on issues affecting

climate change--such as the Keystone Pipeline--will be as important as his

words in indicating his priorities and in sending a message to the nation

and to the foreign leaders whose support he will need in forging a new

international climate treaty (Neustadt 84; Lizza 2013).

Conclusion

38

Presidents have played an important yet underappreciated leadership

role on international environmental treaties. But that role has been largely

limited to refereeing disputes within the executive branch or in pursuing

unilateral administrative means. Persuasion has played a more limited role

than might have been expected. This is partly because critical events such

as the Antarctic Ozone Hole and the recent accumulation of extreme

weather events have had a tendency to speak for themselves. Nor has

Congress been prepared to pass the kind of climate change legislation that

a president might have desired. However, the public realizes the need for

action and the economics of climate change action are more favorable than

ever due to low natural gas prices. So the President should be able to

succeed for the time being in employing administrative means to achieve

his regulatory objectives. And he can also go local to show communities

the merits of renewable energy projects. Most important, China is moving

in our direction, having recently announced an aggressive enforcement

plan to curb air pollution from coal plans and high polluting vehicles

(Wong). So the opportunities are there for President Obama to become a

strategic advocate for climate change action as he seeks to make the United

States a leader and to work with foreign leaders to negotiate a new climate

change treaty.

39

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48

Notes

49

1 In a previous paper (Burnam 2010), I reinterpreted Neustadt’s theory as a theory of

strategic choice in which a president leads by making choices, not speeches or bargains.

Bargaining and Going Public are important techniques of presidential leadership but the

advisability of their employment is governed by presidential strategic choices. I applied this

interpretation to George H.W. Bush’s successful leadership on the Clean Air Act Amendments

of 1990, in which he proclaimed himself to be an “Environmental President” and made

passage of that legislation his chief initial domestic priority. My interpretation is consistent

with that of George Edwards in The Strategic President, except in my understanding of what

Neustadt means by persuasion (Burnam 2012).

2 The EPA had proposed the ban on CFCs for aerosol spray cans under the authority of the

Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA). Additionally, the Rogers Amendment to the Clean Air

Act Amendments of 1977 obligated EPA to regulate any substance that in the judgment of the

Administrator “may reasonably be anticipated to affect the stratosphere, especially ozone in

the stratosphere, if such effect may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health and

welfare.” 3 The term used by Fred Greenstein to characterize Eisenhower’s leadership. 4 Note that David Brodeur’s influential June 1986 article in The New Yorker was titled, “Annals

of Chemistry in the Fact of Doubt” (Brodeur).

5 In 1988, the scientists concluded that the anomalous extent of the Antarctic Ozone Hole was

related to a chemical reaction that was accelerated by ice crystals.

6 The Protocol remained controversial in right wing circles into the 1990s.

In 1995, Congressman Tom Delay (R. -Texas), introduced legislation to repeal the title of the

Clean Air Act that authorizes regulation of ozone depleting substances.

7 Congressional Record, Senate, June 5, 1987: 14818-83

8 Al Gore in Earth in the Balance (1992) had called for a carbon tax to address global warming.

But after the stunning defeat of his proposed tax on the BTU content of fossil fuels, the Vice

President supported the Cap and Trade mechanism that the Administration successfully

promoted at Kyoto.

9 The Asian financial crisis may have limited the willingness of key Asian nations to engage

with the U.S. on climate change (Jordan).

10 Eisenstadt boldly threatened to withhold U.S. support for the Protocol when the chair failed

to include emissions trading in the text. Being the tough negotiator that he was, he meant it

(Sandalow). The flexibility that Gore won at Kyoto allowed the Administration to claim that

the 7% reduction in the Protocol was equivalent to the freeze that the President had

announced (McGinty).

11 Failure to reach an international agreement at Kyoto would have damaged Vice President

Gore’s standing with environmental organizations and thus his presidential electoral

prospects.

12 Once out of office, Clinton economic aides conceded that their cost estimates of the Protocol

had relied on overly optimistic assumptions (Weisman).

13 The author was a Senate Staff Observer at The Hague. In November 2000. On the last day of

the conference, U.K. Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott and U.S. Special Envoy Frank Loy

shook hands with German Environment Minister Jürgen Trittien and French Environment

Minister Dominique Voynet on a U.S. proposal to partially credit our vast forest and

agricultural carbon sinks. But Jennifer Morgan of the World Wildlife Fund (Trittien’s friend)

persuaded them to withdraw their support, which they did after discussing it with their

European colleagues. Prescott blamed Voynet, who chaired the EU delegation, telling the

British press that she was “too tired” to understand the agreement. She in turn called

Prescott’s remarks “disgusting and deeply macho! ” (Author’s Notes).

14 White House Conference on Climate Change, October 6, 1997

15 As the Supreme Court eventually held in Massachusetts v. EPA (2007).

16 Carbon intensity is the ratio of carbon dioxide emissions to GDP. China and India liked the

Bush approach and voluntarily pledged at Copenhagen to reduce their carbon intensity by

2020 by 40% and 23%, respectively.

17 2012 was the hottest year ever in the U.S. (Gillis).

18 Legendary climate change scientist James Hanson recently noted that “the five year mean

global temperature has been flat for a decade”. This poses complex questions as to why the

earth might be warming up more slowly than some scientific models have predicted (“Climate

Science: A Sensitive Matter”).