GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE INCIDENT.

On the night 17 June 1992 a group of persons, the number of people has been estimated between 100 to 500, attacked the township of Boipatong and the nearby squatter camp Slovo Park in the Vaal Triangle. The attack was extremely violent and left 45 men, women and children dead and many more injured. The number of people killed directly during the attack or by injuries sustained during the attack differs in available documentation between 39 and 50 and is therefore not precise. It has been mentioned that the attackers damaged more than 300 houses. A lot of property were also looted or stolen from houses in the area.

It is clear from medical and autopsy reports, witness statement, the police investigation and from evidence submitted to the Goldstone Commission that the attackers carried a range of weapons including spears, pangas, firearms, knives and kieries.

The precise time of the attack has not been established but it probably commenced shortly before 22h00 and ended between 22h30 and 22h45.

It has been established that the absolute main part of the attackers came from the Kwa-Madela hostel situated to the west of Boipatong, distance approximately 1000 metres from the township. The number of attackers has been mentioned as between 100 and 500 people.

The majority of the residents of the Kwa-Madala hostel were employees of Iscor. The hostel was actually situated on the property of Iscor, although it was not managed or run by Iscor. The police estimated that 600 - 700 people were residents of the hostel at the time of the attack. Iscor estimated that approximately 430 were employees of Iscor and approximately 100 non-employees were resident in the hostel at the time of the attack.

It was also estimated by the police at the time that the township was approximately 8 square kilometres in size and that approximately 10 000 people were living in Boipatong and Slovo Park.

Attached to this report are copies of photographs and maps of the area, which formed part of the police investigation. Included is also a map of Boipatong, showing in which houses people were killed, houses that were damaged and where so called Apollo lights were erected.3

The legal team representing the victims also produced a document, “ Facts that are notin dispute, or cannot be disputed........The contents of this document have not indetail been investigated but it seems to be an accurate general description of the incident based on available information. There may, however, be points, which could be in dispute. A copy of this document is attached to this report.4

3 Annex A: 3 Photograph album and maps of Boipatong4 Annex A:4 “Facts which are not in dispute..... ”

Another important issue, which has to be included in the investigation into the events on the 17 June 1992, is the political situation in the Vaal triangle and specifically the nature of violence during a long period ahead of the Boipatong massacre. This is important when it comes to evaluate the security forces reaction on the night of the attack and to understand the extremely violent and ferocious nature of the attack. Attached to this report is summary of incidents that took place in the Vaal Triangle during the period July 1990 to July 1992, which is based on Newspaper clippings gathered by the Independent Board of Inquiry, chronology of “violence in the Vaal” drawn up by the IBI and it also incorporates relevant cases submitted by IFP to the commission which had not been captured by the media or IBI.3

POLICE INVOLVEMENT.

The question of any possible police involvement was investigated after the massacre.

• Commissioner of Police General Van Der Merwe initially appointed Major- General Hannes Gloy, commander of the Special Investigation Unit established in terms of the National Peace Accord, to investigate allegations of police involvement. Major Christo Davidson from the Unrest and Violence Crime Investigation Unit, SAP HQ, Pretoria, was put in charge for this investigation. He had approximately 12 investigators assisting him. There was no evidence presented by Davidson during the cause of his investigation that could link the SAP to the massacre.

• The SAP also conducted a “normal” crime investigation into the Boipatong massacre. Colonel du Pont initially headed the investigative team and he had 70 investigators in his team. The police investigation resulted in 74 Kwa-Madala residents being charged for murder of whom 17 being convicted for their involvement in the attack. They were all IFP members and are now applying for amnesty before the Committee. As far as this investigation have been able to establish the police investigation never found any evidence linking any member of the police to the massacre. In his judgement, regarding the 17 convicted, Judge J M C Smit dismissed allegations of police involvement.

• Mr. Justice Goldstone also investigated these allegations. Amongst all parties that gave evidence before the Goldstone Commission was Major Davidson who acted on behalf of the minister of Law and Order and the Commissioner of the SAP. In his submission, dated 1 July 1992, he stated that “the allegations that the security forces were involved in the attack and that they transported residents of the Kwa- Madala Hostel to and from the township are totally unfounded.”, “the allegation that the South African Police had prior knowledge of the attack and that the police failed to react thereto was thoroughly investigated and found to be unsubstantiated”, “the allegations that members of the South African Defence Force were involved in that Inkatha members were escorted to and from Boipatong by them was investigated and found to be false” etc. A copy of Major Davidson’s written submission, dated 1 July 1992, to the Goldstone Commission

5 Annex A:5 Violence in the Vaal Triangle - July 1990 - July 1992.

is attached to this report6 According to Davidson he made a second submission, probably in October 1992, to the Goldstone Commission. This submission has not yet been traced. The Goldstone Commission never presented any report from their investigation. In its final report it is stated in relation to the Boipatong massacre “The commission considers it inappropriate to submit a report while the matter is still subjudice”.

• Mr. Justice Goldstone also appointed a team, led by Dr. Peter Waddington(Director of Criminal Justice Studies, University of Reading, England) to inquire into all aspects of the police response to the Boipatong massacre. The report which was presented to Mr. Justice Goldstone on 22 July 1992 concluded that “the SAP response to and investigation of the massacre at Boipatong during the night of 17 June was and remains woefully inadequate in a number of respects”. The report deals with the issue of “Police Complicity” in chapter 19 of the report. It is stated that ’’this inquiry has uncovered no information that suggests any complicity on part of the SAP in the attack.” It has although to be mentioned that Dr. Waddington’s investigation was very limited in time and only briefly dealt with this issue. A copy of the Waddington report is attached to this report. A document titled “ Reaction of the South African Police to the report by Dr P A J Waddington.... ” is also attached to this report.8

The question of police involvement was raised immediately by residents of the township after the attack. Apparently a number of residents testified about police presence in the township at a very early stage of the investigation. Subsequently the police and the Goldstone Commission were tasked to investigate these allegations.

These allegations were taken seriously and Police Commissioner Van der Merwe therefore appointed a team to investigate these allegations. Mr Justice Goldstone was also subsequently tasked to investigate these allegations.

An important issue is of course to what extent information were gathered about police presence during the police investigation headed by Colonel Du Pont. An important part of this investigation has therefore been to study the police docket. The original docket has therefore been obtained at the office of the AG’s Special Investigative Team in Pretoria. The docket is a quit extensive docket consisting of at least 21 volumes of which no 4 and 9 were missing when it was handed over to the TRC. No explanation has been given from the AG’s office about the reason for the missing volumes. It is at the moment unknown which documents were included in the two missing volumes and it is also unknown if there were more volumes then the mentioned 21.

Of interest is, however, that an examination of the docket shows that it included 31 statements, obtained by the police during their investigation, referring to “whites”, the police, the army or all three as part of the attackers in Boipatong.

6 Annex A:6 Submission on behalf of the Minister of Law and Order and the Commissioner of SAP7 Annex A:7 The Waddington Report.8 Annex A:8 Reaction of the SAP to the report by Dr Waddington

A summary of the contents of these statements and copies of the statements are attached to this report.9 It should be noted that at least 27 of these statements have been signed after the Waddington report was presented on the 22 July 1992 and at least 28 of these statements have been signed after Davidson made his first submission to the Goldstone Commission.

Another interesting document related to the police enquiry into the Boipatong massacre is a document that was handed in to the Goldstone Commission, probably in October 1992, by the Commission on prevention of public violence and intimidation. The document is headed “Argument on behalf of the Minister of Law and Order and the South African Police”10 and are also dealing with the issue of police involvement in the incident. This submission was based both on Davidson’s- and Du Pont’s investigation and clearly concludes that there was no police involvement in the massacre. In paragraph 3.2 the submission deals with witnesses implicating, direct or indirect, members of the SAP. These witnesses are also named, Theoane, Koti, Ms A, Mthombeni, Molete, Ms B, Xaba, Sello and Mabuza, and then it is argued that several other persons also implicated members of the SAP but it was submitted that the evidence of these witnesses could not be accepted. Of the witnesses named in the submission only 2 occurs amongst the 31 statements found in the police docket as mentioned above. It is unclear if the other 29 statements were amongst the witnesses that could not be accepted.

It is unclear on which basis these statements were dismissed by the police investigators or by the prosecutor Advocate Antoniette De Jager. Attempts have been made to discuss this matter with Advocate De Jager. She has, however, resigned from the AG’s office and this office does not know her whereabouts. It is also unclear if these statements were presented to the Goldstone Commission.

In paragraph 15.2 of the Argument on behalf of the Minister of Law and Order (Annex A: 10) it stated that the South African Police was at all times ready to prove the whereabouts o f each o f its Casspirs countrywide, but did not do so by the virtue o f the fact that the Committee decided that no further evidence was to be heard. From discussions with Director Christo Davidson it has been understood that his investigation gathered all so called log sheets from police Casspirs countrywide related to 17 June 1992. This was done by his team for them to be able establish where the Casspirs were positioned on the night of the attack. Based on this information and from statements from police officers on duty in the Vaal area at the time of the attack they argued that they could prove that allegations of police personnel traveling in Casspirs were untrue.

It is obvious that the Goldstone Commission accepted the evidence related to the log sheets since it was not further investigation. It is unknown if Dr. Waddington investigated this aspect during the course of his investigation. As far as these investigations have been able to establish there was no evidence submitted in the criminal trial which contradicted the details of the log sheets.

Later in this report reference is made to a transcript of an interview with “Pedro” Peens, held in 1998, in which he admitted that he was in Boipatong, late at night of

9 Annex A:9 Summary of statements made by Boipatong residents with statements attached10 Annex A: 10 Argument on behalf of the Minister of Law and Order and the SAP

the attack, in a police Casspir (page 10 of this report). This Casspir was never accounted for in any documentation presented before the Goldstone Commission by the SAP, which obviously challenge the value of the log sheets as evidence. There seems to be a possibility that this kind of documentation could have been falsified. This investigation has not been able to investigate this aspect.

Apart from the police there was also NGOs which obtained statements from residents in the township within a week after the incident which also contained information about police presence at the night of the attack. Attached to this report is a copy of a report, dated 26 June 1992, submitted by the Independent Board of Inquiry to the Goldstone Commission. The report is a summary of “statements taken thus far” and contains 17 names of people who had been interviewed by members of IBI in connection with the massacre. At least 9 of these people testified about police or white people involved in the attack. Notable is that only two of the names, Florence Molete and Simon Moloi, occurs on the 31 statements obtained by the police. A copy of the report from IBI is attached to this report.11

During the cause of this investigation some of the documents related to the Goldstone Commission were found at Wits University’s historical archives. Amongst the documents there were also statements, obviously from people who gave evidence before the Goldstone Commission:

Reverent Paul Verryn testified that he received information before the attack about the possibility of further violence “in the area” on the 17 June. He then contacted Col. Gouws, SAP and informed him about the possibility of further violence. At the time of Verryn’s first report he was apparently not aware of where any possible violence could occur. Later that night he received several phone calls mentioning police involvement in the massacre in Boipatong. A copy of Rev. Verryn’s statement is attached to this report.12

Mr. Meshack Theoane was employed as a petrol attendant at Unipark Motors, on the comer of Frikkie Meyer Boulevard and Nobel Street close to the Boipatong township. He testified that he arrived at work at 9pm on the night of 17 June 1992. At about 9:20 he saw four or five police vehicles (he thought they were hippos) driven past the garage on Nobel Street. Theoane testified that he saw this while he was together with a security guard from the security company which was responsible for the security at the garage. This person is not identified in the statement but it appears to have been Mr. David Lengana who also testified before the Goldstone Commission. Two of the hippos entered the township at Bafokeng Street. He did not see what happened to the other hippos. Later he saw the two hippos that had entered the township return out of the township with an SADF vehicle. While the SADF vehicle drove of in direction of Sebokeng, the two SAP hippos were parked on the field north west of the township. Shortly after this he saw group of men walking across the field north of the township from the direction of the Kwa-Madala hostel in direction of the township. When Theoane saw this he feared that the township was going to be attacked and he therefore rang the alarm which was connected to the police. In Davidson’s submission to the Goldstone Commission he confirms that the alarm was activated at 22h04.Later Theoane saw more groups of people moving in direction of the township. In the

11 Annex A: 11 IBI report related to statements obtained from residents in Boipatong.12 Annex A: 12 Statement by Rev. Paul Verryn

statement he then describes how two police officers arrived as a response to the alarm while people were moving in the direction of the township on the field north of Boipatong. The police officers left without taking any action. Later other security personnel took him and the security guard away from the garage after instructions from two other policemen who arrived in an unmarked car. This is also commented in Davidson’s submission as “devoid of truth”. It is unclear when or by whom this statement was obtained. A copy of this statement is attached to this report.13 Theoane’s statement is also dealt with in the Argument on behalf of the Minister of Law and Order ( Annex A: 10, Paragraph 4).

Statement by David Lengana. This statement has not been found. The contents of his evidence are mentioned in the Argument on behalf of the Minister of Law and Order. According to paragraph 4.5 (Annex A: 10) Lengana testified that when the attackers entered Boipatong there were no police vehicles in the vicinity.

Mrs. Girlie Rhoda gave a statement about her observations from her home at 9 Amatolo Street in Boipatong. She stated that she, between 09:30 and 10:00, saw four

or five casspirs passing along “the tarred road that runs between our house and factories. They were moving in the direction of the Slovo Park squatter camp”. Later she saw a large group of men coming out of the township towards a number of casspirs that were parked near the gates of the factories. Some seemed to get lifts on the casspirs while others were escorted in the direction of the Kwa-Madala hostel. It unclear when or by whom this statement was obtained. A copy of this statement is attached to this report.14

Mr. Eddison Koti also gave a statement, probably on the 19 June 1992, about his observations on the night of the attack from his shack no 13 (Slovo Park?). He stated that he saw 3 white men taking part in the attack. Furthermore he saw “the hippos which had dropped of the men”. Again it is unclear when or by whom this statement was obtained. A copy of this statement is attached to this report.15 Koti’s statement is also mentioned in the Argument on behalf of the Minister of Law and Order (Annex A: 10, Paragraph 5)

NAMES OF POLICE OFFICERS INVOLVED.

Nosenga has in his amnesty application given names of police officers that took part in the attack in Boipatong and Slovo Park on 17 June 1992.

Nosenga mentioned that he often saw a police officer named Peens meeting Victor Kheswa, who was another resident from the hostel, and that Kheswa received money from Peens.

Nosenga also referred to a meeting in the hostel, about two weeks before the massacre, in which Peens and a certain Dani from the Murder and robbery Unit in

13 Annex B: 1 Statement of Meshack Theoane14 Annex B:2 Statement of Girlie Rhoda15 Annex B:3 Statement of Eddison Koti

8

Evaton took part. In this meeting the attack was discussed and Peens allegedly promised to supply Casspirs near the township at the time of the attack.

At the night of the attack the residents of the hostel were alerted by a trumpet signal at about 6-7 o’clock. They gathered on the stadium at the hostel and were later informed that Themba Khosa had obtained guns and that some of them were from Peens.

Furthermore he states that he left the hostel by feet together with approximately 100 other people from the hostel. When they approached the township he saw 4-6 Casspirs parked on the field, west of Boipatong and he and other people amongst the attackers entered the Casspirs. He claims that Peens, Shaka and Rooikop from the Police were in the Casspir.

In his statement Nosenga then described how they were transported into the township in the Casspirs and how they left the Casspirs and started to attack people and houses. While they were moving in the township the Casspirs were moving with them. He claimed that Peens also shot people. During the attack they stole items and money. Stolen goods were loaded into Casspirs and taken back to the hostel in the Casspirs.

In his first affidavit Nosenga claimed that Peens and Shaka approached him at a later stage when he had been arrested for other crimes and that they threatened to kill him if he mentioned their names.

An important part of this investigation has been to try to identify the members of the SAP that Nosenga implicated in his application. The names he mentioned in his application are Peens, Shaka, Rooikop and Dani. The result of the investigation is as follows:

Peens - Has been identified as Gerhardus Dirk, “Pedro”, Peens, id no 591222 5146 001, former member of the SAP with police force number 0402042-1. According to documentation from his personnel file he left the SAP on 31 August 1995 after being declared medically unfit. At the time of the attack Peens was attached to the SAP Murder and Robbery Unit in Vanderbijlpark.

A look at Peens SAP 96 file, which deals with his offences, shows that during his almost 20 years of service within SAP he was subject for internal investigations on a numerous of occasions. A copy of the cover of his SAP 96 file including a summary of the investigations that was conducted in which he was named as a suspect is attached to this report. This summary includes a number of murders, attempted murders and assault including torture.16

O f specific interest in relation to this investigation is the fact that Peens was subject of investigation in relation to the death of Victor Kheswa (Khetisi). According to a document in his file Peens and two of his colleagues booked Kheswa out for investigation from Vanderbijlpark police station on 6»July 1993 at 19h05. Kheswa was at the time held in detention in relation to a murder investigation. At 03h45 on 7 July 1993 Kheswa he was certified dead open the arrival of his body to Sosolburg’s Hospital. A murder docket was subsequently opened and Peens and his colleagues

16 Annex B:4 Summary o f charges against Peens

were suspended pending further investigation. The investigation was later closed and no prosecution followed.

Victor Kheswa is mentioned in Nosengas application as a person who dealt directly with Peens and it is therefore of interest to note that Peens was linked to his death.

There is also information available that Peens was on duty on the night of the attack and that he have admitted that he was in Boipatong late at night in a police Casspir. A transcript of an interview with Peens, conducted by a journalist in 1998, has been handed over to the Amnesty Committee evidence leader in January 1999.

There was also a Section 29, in terms of act 34 of 1995, in camera hearing held with Peens on 29 July 1997, in the Johannesburg office of the Truth & Reconciliation Commission. Peen was questioned about a number incident including the death of Victor Kheswa. A transcript of this hearing is available but not included in this report.

“Rooikop”- Has been identified as Gerhardus Johannes Greef. He has retired from the SAP. A section 19 notice, act 34 of 1995, was served on him in January 1999.The original section 19 document was handed over to the Amnesty Committee Evidence leader in January 1999.

Shaka - Has been identified as Tiekie Sidney Chaka, presently working for the SAPS, Murder and Robbery Unit in Vanderbijlpark. A section 19 notice, act 34 of 1995, was served on him in January 1999. The original section 19 document was handed over to the Amnesty Committee Evidence leader in January 1999.

Dani - Not yet identified.

WEAPONS.

Nosenga has testified that weapons were kept in the Kwa-Madala hostel prior to the massacre. Furthermore he testified that Themba Khoza used to deliver weapons to the hostel. In relation to this specific incident Nosenga refers to a meeting about two weeks before the attack in which representatives of the SAP stated that they would supply Themba Khoza with weapons for the attack on Boipatong. On the day of the attack Nosenga received information from the Indunas at the hostel that Khoza had obtained guns from one of the police officers as promised at the previous meeting at the hostel.

Nosenga has stated that he was given an AK 47 at the day of the attack, which he later used during the attack. According to Nosenga 38 Specials (revolvers) and shotguns were also used during the attack.

Furthermore he stated that he finished 4 magazines with about 30 rounds in each during the attack.

After returning to the hostel after the attack Nosenga mentions that their weapons were hidden in the ceiling of the hostel.

As far as this investigation has been able to establish there were at least 14 people who either were killed or injured by bullets. This information is based on information provided by IBI to the Goldstone Commission. There are also information available in the police docket that has not been analyzed.

The use of firearms has also been confirmed by a number of witnesses who gave statement to the police and to other organisations. In the police docket it can be noted that some of the people were arrested and interrogated also mentioned the use of firearms.

Of interest is the evidence given to the TRC in the section 29 in camera hearing on 29 July 1997 by Mr. Peens, in which he testified that he was handed 2 AK 47s by Mr. Chris Theunissen, which according to Theunissen had been used in the Boipatong massacre. Peens testified that he took this 2 AK 47s to Emanguzi in Northern Natal where he handed over the weapons over. This have been confirmed by a police officer at Emanguzi police station, Mabandleni Patrick Ntuli ID 6402255733083, who gave evidence in a statement, obtained on 22 August 1996, that he had received two AK 47s on 17 May 1994 from Peens. This incident has been investigated by the Special Investigative Team, Attorney General, Transvaal and given the reference number 475/97.

Theunissen is of interest related to another aspect of this investigation. It has also been alleged that he was subject to an internal IFP inquiry following a statement he did after the death of Victor Kheswa in which he claimed to be an IFP official. He also seemed to have connections with right-wing elements and was also allegedly involved in weapon training of IFP members.

During the cause of this investigation attempts have been made to try to establish if there was any ballistic test done on these weapons against exhibits found in Boipatong after the massacre. Captain Andrew Leask, Special Investigation Team, Attorney General, Transval informed me, that the weapons had not been tested since there were no ballistic material from the police investigation into the massacre to test them against. The issue of ballistic evidence is dealt with further on in this report.

The two AK 47’s are kept by the A-G, Transval, Special Investigation Team.

THE POLICE INVESTIGATION.

As mentioned before in this report the Investigative Unit of the Truth & Reconciliation Commission have had access to the police docket since it was handed over to this office on 23 February 1999. The docket consists of 21 folders of which no 4 and 9 are missing.

The purpose of this investigation has not been to evaluate the way the police conducted their investigation into this matter or they way the docket was organised. However, it is regarded as of great importance to test the details from Nosenga’s amnesty application against the information that was gathered during the police investigation. The fact that the evidence by Major Christo Davidson, on behalf of the Minister of Law and Order and the Commissioner of the South African Police, in his

first submission before the Goldstone Commission so clearly rejected all allegations about any involvement by any part of the security forces into the massacre is regarded as crucial for this investigation. Furthermore it has to be noted that Davidson’s first submission to the Goldstone commission was dated 1 July 1992, two weeks after the massacre, and in this submission the position regarding the allegations seems already to have been investigated and proven untrue. It is clear from the submission that the police already at this stage were absolutely convinced about a non-involvement by the security forces.

On what basis could then the police in such a short time come to this conclusion? The submission as such gives a few indications although it could certainly be argued that based on this information it was not possible to come to such clear position at this stage of the investigation. The following are quotes from Davidson’s submission:

• It is estimated that approximately 10 000 people are living in Boipatong and Slovo Park.

• 600 - 700 people are resident in the Kwa-Madala hostel.

• With the close industrial area and Iscor, the area is not well lit at night. As a result of the large volumes of smoke emanating from the adjoining industrial areas as well as the township itself, visibility is not good.

• Normal policing is carried out by the South African Police,, Normal policing includes general crime investigation and attendance to complaints by members of the public.

• 37 statements from victims and/or witnesses of the incident have been obtained.

• 137 statements have been obtained from members of the Defence Force, the Police and members of the public.

• As well as approximately 400 statements of residents of the Kwa-Madela hostel.

• Evidence obtained from members of the public who travelled along the Frikkie Meyer Boulevard and Noble Boulevards in order to get to their places of employment indicates that the attack was carried out by persons moving on foot from the direction of the Kwa-Madala hostel.

• Further investigation have revealed that no member of the security forces took part in the attack or that any white person was involved or had any form of command of the attack.

• The allegations that members of the South African defence force were involved in that Inkatha members were escorted to and from Boipatong by them was investigated and found to be false.

• The allegations that members of the South African Defence Force were involved in that Inkatha members were escorted to and from Boipatong by them was investigated and found false.

• “ vehicles carried out patrols in the area or attended at the scene after being called or sent to the township as a result of reports made to the SAP and the SADF”.

The police investigators were undoubtedly initially faced with an extremely difficult task. The first phase of the investigation, to control and obtain evidence from the crime scene, which is considered to be crucial for any crime investigation, was carried out under circumstances that were far from ideal. The huge area, the number of houses that had been attacked and the number of victims together with the tense relation between the residents of the township and the members of the SAP certainly made it very difficult for the forensic experts to conduct a proper investigation. In the response from the SAP to the report by Dr. Waddington it is clearly pointed out that this was also the opinion of the SAP. However, it has to be noted that Dr.Waddington’s criticism is also directed toward the reaction and the number of police officers called in by the SAP during the night after the attack.

The police investigators were also faced with hundreds of possible perpetrators and tremendous problems to access these people and the premises of the Kwa-Madala hostel. Davidson described these problems in his first submission to the Goldstone Commission. He mentioned that a large-scale search was conducted of the Kwa- Madala Hostel in the evening on the 18 June 1992 in which 200 members of SAP took part. The police experienced great resistance from the residents of the hostel and they refused to co-operate. The police to search the premises and secure evidence carried out several additional operations. Davidson mentioned that such operations were carried out on the 19, 22 and 23 June 1992. On 24 June 1992 a group of approximately 300 resident were arrested and taken to the Vanderbijl Park police station.

Davidson also mentioned the problems that the investigators experienced to obtain statements from victims or witnesses of the massacre in the township. Injured people that were visited in Sebokeng Hospital refused to give statements and people that were approached in the Boipatong Township and Slovopark camp either refused to supply their identities or to make statements.

The police investigation was furthermore complicated by the fact that the police had serious problems to move through the streets of the township.

Given the number of people living in the township, the number of victims, the difficulties that the police investigators faced, the number of obtained statements from victims and/or witnesses at the time of Davidson’s submission, and the overall complicity of the investigation, it becomes difficult to accept that it was possible to come to such clear conclusion only two weeks after the incident, as stated in the submission.

In the Argument on behalf of the Minister of Law and Order and the SAP (Annex A: 10) which was submitted to the Goldstone Commission in October 1992 all allegations of police involvement are again clearly rejected. At this time the

investigation was obviously taken much further and the basis for the rejections are also therefore more clarified. However, the following comments could be made in relation to these arguments.

• As mentioned before in this report only a few of the statements, implicating members of the police direct or indirectly, included in the police docket, were dealt with in this document.

• Only 1 of 9 the people testifying about police involvement, mentioned in the Independent Board of Inquiry’s report, dated 26 June 1992 (Annex A:11), was dealt with in this document.

• The document refers to an Inspection in Loco on 14 August 1992 (Paragraph 5.2). Apparently the SAP handed in a report to the Goldstone Commission based on recollections and impressions of this inspection. This report has not been found. However, from discussions with Davidson, now Director Davidson at the SAPS HQ in Pretoria, it is understood that the members of the Goldstone Commission and representatives of involved parties were taken to the Boipatong township to inspect the visibility conditions in the township under similar conditions as during the massacre. This was done in order for the Commission to be able to evaluate certain witness statements. According to Davidson the conclusion from this inspection was that the visibility was very limited due to smoke, fog, darkness and lack of wind. The findings from this inspection were then used in the Argument to reject some of the statements implicating the police. However, it was not used to reject the testimony of Kruger ( Paragraph 4.4) who contradicted the testimony of the petrol attendant Theoane. It is argued in the document that “We submit that Mr. Kruger would certainly have seen such vehicles (Casspirs) parked in the veld had they been there". The document also refers to several other witnesses, Crous, de Jager, Wilken, Marx, Viljoen and Radebe (Paragraph 15.8), who testified that they did not see any police vehicles accompanying the attackers. It is not clear from where these people did their observations but their evidence should also been evaluated in the light of the outcome of the inspection in loco concerning the visibility.

• In relation to Nosenga’s application it has to be mentioned that he describes how the attackers left the Kwa-Madala hostel by feet and only met up with the Casspirs at the field before the township. He also testified that he walked back to the hostel and that the Casspirs already had returned to the hostel and left when he came back to the hostel.

It is also of importance to mention other issues in relation to the police performance during the night of the attack which was not dealt with in the Argument or by Davidson. It has although to be mentioned that some of these issues were raised before the Goldstone Commission.

During the investigation into the Boipatong massacre it was established that a routine tape recording was made of all radio communication in the control room of the Internal Stability Unit of the SAP in Vereeniging. It was established the information recorded on the tape for the specific time period of the attack in Boipatong had been

erased. Evidence was given by people responsible for the handling of the tape recorder that they were not aware of the fact that if the cassette was turned over and re-inserted the new recording would erase what had already been recorded.

According to a report dated 17 November 199217, two relevant tapes were analyzed and it was established that a tape was running in the recorder during the time of the attack. However, all recordings covering the period between 20h00 and 02h00 on 17 and 18 June 1992 were erased as a result of the handling of the tapes.

It unnecessary to mention the importance that this information could have played for the establishment of the events on the night of the attack, specifically in relation to the alleged involvement of the police in the incident.

18Iscor Limited also made a submission to the Goldstone Commission , this submission was found in the National Archives in Pretoria. It is not dated but it seems like the submission was made in August 1992.

The submission deals with a number of issues related to the history of the hostel and the policy of Iscor related to the residents of the hostel. One issue raised in the submission is of specific interest for this investigation. Paragraph 9 of the submission is headed “The role of Iscor security personnel during the events of 17 June 1992” and deals with observations and actions taken by the 9 security personnel that were on duty during the evening of 17 June 1992.

It can be noted that an observation was done by a security personnel of a big group of people moving in the direction of the east gate at about 22h55. Mr F J Nel, a Senior Control Officer, who was in charge of the security personnel, attended to the report and later met two Defence Force vehicles in the area between the hostel and the township. Patrol was carried out in the area and later security personnel apprehended a man, Mr. M S Luvomo, a hostel resident, who told the security personnel that he was hiding in the field together with other people. Later the municipal fire brigade was called in, because they were equipped with spotlights, which were used in the search of people possible hiding in the field. Another person was spotted but disappeared. At 00h40 Mr. Nel met a Defence Force patrol at the east gate and took them to the place where the person had disappeared. A Major Jordaan of the Defence Force fired two tear gas grenades in the direction of where the person had disappeared. In Dr. Waddington’s report (Annex A:7, page 8) it is mentioned that Sgt. Kruger of the SAP fired tear gas in this area under similar circumstances.

The following is stated in paragraph 9.14 of the submission: ”It should be noted the Iscor Security Personnel were not informed by either the South African police nor the Defence Force o f the attack on the Boipatong residents during their shift. They were in fact not aware or suspected that the Kwa-Madala residents might have been involved in the attack on Boipatong residents during the night o f 17 June 1992

This submission should be compared with a submission by Pieter Gabriel Van Wyk, member of the Defence Force and attached to the Vaal Commando.19 In his

17 Annex B:5 Report regarding the Boipatong tapes18 Annex B:6 Submission by ISCOR19 Annex B: 7 Statement by Pieter Gabriel Van Wyk, Vaal Commando

submission, dated 1 July 1992, to the Goldstone Commission he states the he was in charge of the internal investigation into the Vaal Commando’s knowledge of the Boipatong massacre. Furthermore he describes the primary functions of the unit as the following:

• The protection of Iscor Vaderbijlpark as a National Keypoint.

• The protection of residential suburbs located close to Iscor Vanderbijlpark.

• The patrolling of roads in the vicinity of Iscor.

In his submission he mentions that in total three military vehicles from the Vaal Commando were involved in the duties related to attack on Boipatong. The first patrol, under command of a Lance Corporal Roberts, received a message from Vaal Commandos HQ that shots were heard in Boipatong. Upon arrival to Boipatong he saw a vehicle in flames on the eastern side of the township, which was reported the headquarters where after the patrol left the area since “everything was quiet in the township There is no time given for this incident but from the contents of the rest of the submission this must have happened before the attack.

Lance Corporal Roberts and his group proceeded with his normal patrol duties in Vanderbijlpark. Whilst doing this he heard gunfire from the township and returned to Boipatong. At the Cape Gate, which is situated north of the township on Noble Boulevard, they were stopped by a security guard. Shots were heard from the township and they called for reinforcements. An injured black man from the township reported that “people were busy in Boipatong committing acts o f violence

As response on Roberts report the Vaal Commando sent another patrol to Boipatong in a buffalo vehicle under the command of Lance Corporal Odendaal. At the intersection of Frikkie Meyer Boulevard and Noble Boulevard, Odendaal saw a large number of black people in the field west of Boipatong. He proceeded to the Cape Gate and picked up Robert’s group and then returned back along Noble Boulevard.

Approaching the intersection with Frikkie Meyer Boulevard the soldiers in Odendaal’s buffalo again a group of black people in field west of Boipatong and they realised that the group were moving towards Kwa-Madala hostel.

Another buffalo military vehicle of Vaal Commando, under command of Corporal Van Straaten, joined the area. Van Straaten decided to block of Frikkie Meyer Boulevard to allow the large group of people to cross the street.

Odendaal’s buffalo proceeded to the Kwa-Madala hostel where one SAP Casspir and one SAP Nyala joined them. Van Straaten’s buffalo also joined shortly after the group of people had passed over the street. At this stage Major Jordan of the Vaal Commando also arrived at the Kwa-Madala hostel.

From the submission it seems as the large group of people, which had passed over Frikkie Meyer Boulevard suddenly, disappeared. Major Jordaan ordered one buffalo vehicle to investigate what had happened to the people. Various attempts were made

to locate the group without success. Major Jordaan decided to withdraw all military personnel as nothing further happened.

Based on the submission from Major Van Wyk and from Dr Waddington’s report (Annex A:7, page 8) it must have been completely clear at the point in time when the Vaal Commando patrols under the command of Major Jordaan gathered outside Kwa- Madala hostel together with two SAP vehicles that an attack had taken place in the Boipatong township. It certainly raises a number of questions in relation to the reaction of the South African Police and the Defence Force:

• Would it not have been adequate to inform the security personnel of Iscor about the observations done by SAP and SADF patrols and the information received from township residents? There was obviously a threat towards the hostel residents, which at least the SAP was aware of at this stage.

• There were obviously resources from the SAP, SADF and Iscor available, which could have assisted in operation to secure evidence from the hostel residents who had been seen leaving the township and going back towards the hostel.

• Why was only one detective and his assistant sent to the township to the crime scene investigation?

Lastly another serious aspect of the police investigation is related to another document20 found in the National Archives. The document is a press release by Judge Goldstone dated 19 May 1993 and relates to evidence given in the Boipatong trial. According to the press release a Lieutenant D C van der Merwe testified in the trial that eight 9mm bullet shells and heads found at the scene of the Boipatong massacre had been destroyed on 20 November 1992 on the order of a Major Van Wyk.” No evidence concerning these bullets shells and heads was placed before the Commission's Committee which inquired into the Boipatong massacre

Apparently the criminal trial dealt with this issue and it was concluded that the destruction of these bullets was a “mistake But this investigation will strongly argue that such explanation is questionable in the light of other shortcomings by the police related to this incident. The fact also remains that this evidence was never presented to the Goldstone Commission and that it was destroyed after the leading of evidence was completed before the commission.

The issue of ballistic evidence is also of interest since Nosenga in his application mentioned that he was equipped with an AK 47 and that he finished 4 magazines with about 30 rounds in each during the attack. In the police docket there are also statements from people who were interrogated by the police who mention the use of firearms. As mentioned earlier in this report at least 14 people were either killed or injured by bullets.

This information should also be seen in connection with the lack of ballistic evidence documented in the police docket. According to what has been established from the analyze of the docket only two pieces of evidence were ballistic tested, one 9 mm

20 Annex B:8 Press release by Mr Justice Goldstone

bullet and one caliber 12 shotgun empty cartridge. SAPS Ballistic Unit in a copy of a report also confirmed this. File no. Vanderbijlpark MR 515/06/92 dated 5 July 1993.21

The fact that ballistic evidence were destroyed by the police investigators in November 1992 and that this evidence never was presented to the Goldstone Commission by Davidson or in the Argument on the behalf of the Minister of Law and Order raises additional questions.

During the January amnesty hearing into the Boipatong massacre the other applicants were confronted of Nosengas application. All of them argued that they did not have any memory of Nosenga being present in the Kwa-Madala hostel at the time of the attack. Some of the applicant testified that Nosenga only arrived after the attack.

This evidence is clearly contradicted by a Judgment in the Supreme Court of South Africa by Mr. Justice van Schalkwyk on 14 February 1995 in which Nosenga was convicted for murder, attempted murder and possession of weapon and ammunition. Of importance is that this incident took place in Evaton on the 15 June 1992, two days before the Boipatong massacre. Although the court file is far from complete the contents of the file clearly indicates that Nosenga was in the Kwa-Madale hostel at the time of this incident. Copies of relevant documents from court file are attached to this report.22

It is important that notice that Nosenga has applied for amnesty for these crimes as well. In his amnesty application this incident is dated 1993. The reason for this has not yet been investigated. But it seems to be absolutely clear from the description in application and the court records that these crimes were committed on the 15 June 1992. The fact that this incident actually occurred on 15 June 1992 is also corroborated by a newspaper article23 in the Star on 16 June 1992

In his application he also give names on other people involved in these crimes, Khetsi (Viktor Kheswa), Zwee, Sello Hunter Ndlovu, Michael Ramakau and Nhlanhla Gqindi. In another document in the court file, a handwritten letter from Nosenga addressed to the Supreme Court, which is a confession of the crimes he was charged for, he also mentions that they were 5 people involved in the crimes. He also implicates Viktor Kheswa as supplier of weapons for the people involved.

From the available court records it seems, as Nosenga was the only person who was prosecuted for these crimes. It is unclear why the other people involved were not prosecuted, apart from Victor Kheswa who was dead at the time of the trial.

In his application Nosenga also mentions that Peens and Shaka, from the SAP approached him, during the time of the trial and that they threatened him not to mention their names.

Other applicants during the January hearing also stated that Victor Kheswa was not in the hostel at the time of the attack of Boipatong. Other parties have argued that he was either in hospital or in police detention.

21 Annex B:9 Reports by SAP Ballistic Unit22 Annex B: 10 Court file documents related to Nosenga23 Annex B: 11 Article in the Star, 16 June 1992

This investigation has been able to obtain photocopies of pages of a police cell register.24 It has been alleged that these documents are from Vereeniging police station. Copies of two pages of the cell register are in the possession of this investigation. They are both from June 1992. One the first page, probably page no 58(1), Victor Kheswa’s name appear with the monthly serial number 351/05, which could be interpreted as he was detained in May 1992. The day for his detention is set out as 27 which then indicates that he was detained on 27 May 1992. The day and time of his release is 18 at 0915, which apparently should be understood as 0915 onl8 June 1992. The second page, probably page no 72(1), also for June 1992, the name Victor Kheswa appears with the monthly serial number 222. The day and time of the detention is 18 at 1555 and the date of release is 26.

This document clearly indicates that Victor Kheswa was in detention during the time of the attack of Boipatong, which contradicts Nosengas evidence. It is, however, suggested that further investigation be carried out in respect of these documents. It has to be mentioned that it also contradicts the contents of the court file related to the incident on 15 June 1992.

CONCLUSION

As mentioned earlier in this report this investigation is basically only dealing with Nosenga’s amnesty application. On the basis of this investigation it is argued that Nosenga’s description of the attack on the Boipatong Township and the Slovo Park squatter camp in large portions corespondents with facts established by the police investigation, by the evidence presented before the Goldstone Commission. The evidence submitted by the other applicants also corroborates Nosenga’s application in large portions. However, on one critical point, the involvement of members of the South African Police, it differs from other conclusions drawn from other investigations and certainly from the other applicants. The question of police involvement was dealt with as described by the Goldstone Commission and the South African Police. The Goldstone Commission never presented any report and the police investigation strongly argued that all allegations about police involvement were fabrications or proved untrue.

There are, however, a number of serious of issues that has to be mentioned in relation to this conclusion by the police:

• This investigation has found approximately 50 witnesses who testified aboutdirect or indirect involvement of the security forces. Some of these witnesses were presented before the Goldstone Commission and some might have been called to testify in the trial. However, it seems as several of the witnesses were either ignored or deliberately not presented. In addition to the witnesses who tegtifie^ about security force involvement it has be noted that there were a large people who testified that they did not make any observations related to the police, the defense force or white people. It has also to be noted that 50 witnesses are also a quit limited number of people considering the number of houses that were

24 Annex B: 11 Police Cell register, June 1992.

attacked and the area that the attackers covered during there movement. However, it could be argued that most of the residents in the township took cover and were hiding and therefore could not make any observations of the attackers.

• The lack of or “mistakes ” with ballistic evidence is completely unacceptable in an investigation of a mass murder in which at least 14 people were killed or injured by the use of firearms. This evidence was never presented to the Goldstone Commission.

• The destruction of the crucial tape recordings from the police control room in Vereeniging was investigated and explained but still remains as a question mark.

• The bad visibility during the time of the attack was used as an argument to dismiss certain witnesses that implicated the police but was surprisingly not used when it came to evaluate witnesses who testified in the favor of a non-police involvement.

• The value of using the log sheets of police vehicles as evidence for a non-presence of Casspirs in a specific area during a specific time could be questioned.

• The fact that the security personnel working for Iscor at the night of the attack never were informed about the massacre, although they had contacts with Defence Force patrols shortly after the attack, is completely unacceptable.

• Dr. Waddington raised serious criticism against the SAP concerning their reaction into reports about movement of people towards the township and later violence on the night of the attack. This report argues that this criticism was relevant and still remains an issue of importance when it comes to evaluate the allegations of police involvement in the massacre.

Based on this investigation it is argued that Nosenga was in the Kwa-Madala hostel at the time of the Boipatong massacre, which contradicts the other applicants’ evidence.

The role of Victor Kheswa is still unclear, however, there are strong indications that he might have been in police detention at the time of the massacre, which then would contradict Nosengas evidence.

\ — ------ -

Jan-Ake Kjellberg

la s t Warns

K HESW A

NTA N H SO

Firs t N am es 1

lEm m nilMdub?W Jdiannes

T F C n o Rt>f, no.

23C'1 JEtO K >4r««Vl'

VS7E0.J8O558O«X3Vr

K.HESWA \ |

^uctor Khislhisi a s & a 'J B O W W B V T

K H E S W A ! 'yictor Khetfiisi BS5& J B 0 t0 *7 /C 3 V T 1

M LA K G E N I-U 0 1 1 7 a O V T ;M A IA K O A N E .M aria ; 28083 J

M iA M G E M I- | M A IA K O A N E ! Marls 2SKS3 JB01170W SVT.M O T A U N 3 Rebecca "z:/6 J|3d‘o i48V03V'r

M O TA U N G '. F’etrcs 2 B K 8 J B 6 o i4 8 f i)3 V r

M O TA U N G F!e&e:cca. 2 ’8 J B 0 0 1 W 0 3 V T

W O SO ETSA ‘ ■senjiimiri 30871 iif lo T H W W v rw ib s b e t s A Samuel 30670 j ao i I-W 0 3 V TLERCiRANE __ EiarU-a 525? iB o iM a i o s v r ” '

G EN U tlenjumiri B a^na 30833 JBCOSgai'OSVT

fvlATHOFE M ro n 33846, J300124W 3V T

M D A TH A Paulina 2 081JB00140,'«3VT

M BATHA [’auliina 239 JB C 0 1 4 M 3 V T

M B A W A _ Paulina ‘ 203 J B 0 d i4 O T 3 y T

ElALOYI Mashiiile W lscn 371J JB 01138 /03V T

LATHA Ijndivve 55510 JB 00145 .03V T _

NTA N TISO : l.ldo OBKi JoJiaiiws 757i« JB0SS8a‘» \ T

EiALOYI Mashiiile Wilson 3718 jB o i i3 a r o 3 \T

L IN D A ’ Noimah 42772 jB b a ’t4 i‘ r a ' , TManiosenyelii

L.EROBANE Bef:ina 30667 JB O t2 8 5 » 3 V T

FtAMAJWEKlimatsfiidisoRebiJCCci 33644 JB O C 12 4«3 \T

8 I8 IS I .Phondula 43S93 J BO01 2 5 0 3 Vrr

S IB ISI . phonduivj | ' 4J&58 , jB 0o V 2S i03V T

MBC’NQO | Jane N oi'lik ' ;:n J B « i1 2 S -0 3 \rr

I.IBONGO Vict'oria 4303S j.IBOtH 2S J03W

:JOTSU S ab lia 4 4 u e .1230211.03V T

s o f s i j Vusi 44 I f ,:|jB b l)211 .l0J V T

iO T S U .............. E ra 'is tN jx iW lo • ’ ‘ " 40! .JB0ij2t1 W / T

3 0 T S U ’■" V ujan i PD JtSU'Wl UVOrfl

Ta c t n r v caiugoiy

6 :; ;e v e r e

1 jjO R T U R E

5 ASSO C IA TED

4 ,ASSOCIATED

!! KILLING

2 ASSOCIATED "1 A T T ,K lt l

2 ATT K ILL ~3 A SSO C IATE.0_

~1 K ILLING "S 'K iL L IN S

TASSOCft'ffeO1: K ill. INC

KILLING A tT KILL

i .v JV Il.'03VT_ T ~ ' liflMVT "

3 ssocivn:D I ASSjOC iATHD

AjsSOOIATS-OKILLING

2 ASSOCIATED i A tT_K ILL ’r i a j N d

1 MILLING

I KILLING

1 KILLING2 KILLING

3jA T I_K IL L

:

A SEVER E3 KILLING

a t t j<:u . severe 'ATT KILL

BOIPHATONG MASSACRE99«5/11

[H R V sub-oat

| A R S O N

P O S T U R E

ilN C A R C ER A T

D E P R IV E

.S5HOOTING

CORPSETABBING

STABBINGD E S TR O YiSTABBINCSTABBINGB EA T IN S ~

•SHOOTINGS H O O TIN GSTA B B ING

D E S T ROYD e s t r o y . . . .

THS.FT ; S H O O TIN G

T H E fTo t h e r ’ "SKOOTIMG

STABBING_

; S H O O TIN G

iSTABBiNGS H O O TIN G

STABBING

S1A B B IN G S H O O T IN G S H O O T IHG D E S T R O Y _ S H O a tlN C l

f }y y ;f /M jD O iV ic org V lotaficn d e la ils

G KOj 12 .'i.....

!g o i o

!3Di 1?

A P IA

10 12: 1■I

G I 82 j 6 17

; 92I 6 17G “ 82 6 -1 7 /g’ n 8 17 tV S2 8 17 7G ’ ' 92 e ’ 17 ’G 42 8' 17"

32 6 ‘ 17

G 32 6 17G >2 8 . 17G ‘ 92 6 17

V 92 e 17v ‘ 32 8 1 7 “

92 8 tTG ■ ' « ’ . ' 0 ; j 7

03 10o ' 92 6 17iG ..... 93 4 17

G : 92 6 17

--------------- O u tco m e ........................... . . .I’t lie house was uumt after the dealh »1 Chri»wph«r

HER HOUSE W A S B U R N T O O W N ............. jN egalcn ibe. His death / . « M anud on Vctof.| H is I* and we<® Med with th e bucfcgrourjd coat ■

behind fiis back. gm m ® K h t m was C W V C K d ancf S4;nleni*sJ to six ('(I)years in prison for possession of an A M ' V i:to r

SVAS A R R E S T E D I K h s s ™ re c a fred a lo t r y e a r s e r te n t * , d l i hit w a s

' A t Ih e h o sp ita l th e y lok l b m lh a U t ia y d o n o t ,re a l p e o p le

H A D B E E N S H O T .......................w n ti b e long to Ih e I.F .P .

Kills d -e itte r shot o r h a c k a d .v lo liite tl after bai rtg k ille d w ith a t ig h o le inSie stomach __ ______Stabbed under to r le ft b re a s t. .......................S la t bod In tiis b'sck. _ ........ ...................L e v in s d e p o n e n ts b e lo r s in g s___Stalibrxl and k illed . ............. ..........................g t il t ib id and W le d . .....................................She w a s h i o o j i e r h a n d w lir a : h 5 a v y _ .

iD e iitti

5 w eevil in hospital and sursiery :o Itfl side or torno in, jW w ndis and in juries to rds hack._

'""Loss oi property ______ ___ ____________''D e a th '” ......... .........'"Stabbed In the itorriach. an<l neck «ius»r^ d w th

A.F'LA

A N C

92 17

IV .92 « i

I

-17 M

S2 6 17

92 6 17 |

81 7 391 7 391 7 3VS 7 3

S bo land killed S ro t anii kill edstabbed "in'tlie nock, stomach and ba ck a tta d teri fcyjlt clothing from he.- wardraboand a ladta'sasseUe .................. ........Windows of the uhaci; bioken with stones;_ io b n to sU cfi oM he depanenVs Hi-fi sat. TV , dom es and other househod _apptia n i» »

"iShpt and tilled ......... ................

His wetah and a w a lle t y re iecon tere ied .Q r « a i* y o f doo’s andvvindews...........S h o t a t ........................................... .

S he was slabbed arid Killed.

Shot and killed

[Hacking ana stubbing

D eathD eath

'injury - paralysed

Lost of p r o p e r t y __j 'D a rn a g e js property,

:L o w of p/C'perty Death

fepaa'edly

House burnt.shs:......

•L u is s ' prceery . . . .■ iD e s tn id l^ n to p ra p e r ti ' ..........................................

" ' ’D eath. ................— .................S ^ e w as etabfced tn ’har neck, head «•»} W o e cm tie r t>r»ast this caused her dearti.

jCKattiJViotim is said t j hav« m anaged to run out 31 tf.e s h a .«1 vvha.'e he w as shoi cfeiid V filim die<i c-n ine scone

seel Deponent says trvait 1h«y then i^fiaad s-neano her idsughterw ho was also sta bba J with a ip « ir ftrdilionat jV ic tim v /a ii at Ihe i i i r e t f th a attack one yea' Old. H er m other Jaae , was, being a l la y e d had 1ratl to shield h er awsy from tne_assault br>,‘ the def^n eh t but 11D earh ................ ............ ... . . . .C iifc tiiy in ju re d . ........ ........... ......... .......................... .. ■p im aged'ahdi dee 'tr^ed - . . . . ___C ritically irijw ed._____________ _______________________

Paqe 1 of 4

11/05 '99

13:22 237813

TRC _

Hg. UJ

BOIPHATONG MASSACRE

, al Mamaw rS 'il”‘ BOtA! JATHA SVTHA, tNBE AS;

3ATHAiifA M B O

'iT /M B O3NJOLI3ATHA:BOLAIHBOLAI

TFiret N am es Const b h c j J M & N tlJ iaP aijl Mohitikl Jonas

Koh'.t Lira

| Popple' j a b b b M s iin y o

: Evelyn M asalw la I Nti>mUifil’<le Ipelrus Fsi r>a Anna Percival

'1 t f :c no.<14114

...............1 i «:>61£;5

BATHA jMcar,yaj:ana Anna i.......... MamalsVldisnA M iU ViE Fiebenxa

UTSHW A VVfelsahia Puieng

L T S H W Wele'Siiiti Pul eng

I0TAUMG Modleml ElizabethON JO Li M arllia Meini

MadliadiI0R EM I Chrintin: hiSTAMBO ,'a e c b M a iln y o

rtEK/>.BE Thorns* Puto■" EK/HBE Thornas Puli)

HESW A V id i ir Khelh'elHE SWA ’/ActorK iieW isilOCOKOTHO SanriuelATHA IJarrilrvaA THA iSamtOTSLJ M argaret LindiwiW SiEN iiA David4&SENSA Ponko Janre-s

JH KNOWN! VICT1M-2 W I7 B 5 W 9 7 !» 5ELLAI •o JELAI- -

jIONGALE

vflOISGALE.

= * HICMGALE

Johannas'Johannifs

M m a s e n a lo Betts';

M m a s e n a lc Belly

M n 'a s e m a lti Belly

Ref. no. _ _ j!300:2‘l j j0 3 V T J 9 0 1 3 1 5 i£ 3 V T JP01 V72i03VT

ACT

— I - •

- f:!S1f!4 J B 0 1172X>3VTI

;j a Uie IJ B 0 1 172 '03V T -156;!6! J&U1201 '0 3 \T

5 2 7 9 J B O t2 9 1 « 3 V r« 9 ! )9 'jB 0 1 1 4 V C 3 '/T

39l5Sj JB01172i‘03'.'T 449:>9 j J0O 1315i'03\r T 44S:1d !j B 01315,'03VT

3B<32 JB 01145 /03V T

3 3 6 4 4 |JB01145/03V^T_

76714 j ICZN1FW 3W FS

75714 K ZN flR /030 /FS

J H J W e a ': e g c r y 1 KIU.INGli l f t f r j a u

;2 .K (u .tN G

3|K1LI.LNC>

A K II1 .IH R1 KILLING2 A S S O C IA TE D 1 1 KIL-INCi1 j A TT .K IL L 2; KILLING3 KILLING

1 A T " _ K IU

2i A TT .K IL L

S EVER E

4+OCO44001

.IB0114£iA>3VT,iB 0 'il4 :u 'Q 3 '/t

2 KILLING

H R \r « u l)-c a ts k c j o t in g "O THER _ _ S H O O TIN G

STABBING

STABBINGSH O O TIN G

TEAKGAS SHOOTI MG SHOOTING STABBING SHO O TING

O T H E R _

STABBING _

STUBBING

BURNING

F l Y Yg " : _ 9 i ‘ G '■ 62

9 2

M M

JB G I14B/03V T JB 0:jO 9rra3 '/T " .JBC:3«7;!m3WR"j s S j b t iw w iv r '

3867aasoo5157731577 ___

" 8558 J BO 1047/03 VT8550

"6Se065&5i08

JB01047/03 V T JB0'3i4ti/Q3'1/ T jB 0 Q 1 « IW 3 ‘/ t

M 3 ' J B W 3 1 W 0 3 V T J .B 0 0 2 1 1 f 03 V I JB04523/C3VT J B 0 4 5 2 3 /0 3 V T

44115 57919 57?I20

2 . KILLING SHOOTING3 KILLING S H O O lfN G

1 M T J O U . STABBINGI KILLING SHO O ilN G -2 S E V E R E STABBING3 KILLING M L LTli* LE1 S EV ER E SHOOTIM G2 TO R TU R E 'EXPOSURE2 K ILLING " SHOOTINCI

~ j. K ILLING " S H O O TIN G "T A TT KILL S H O O TIN G; KILLING S H O O TIN G1 KILLING UN KNO VW} KILLING 'U N K N O W N

6 2 1 6 1 jA M /B S C tW 60 4 7 4 'AM/3S-W B760471 'A M 'f 123/97

63358 A M 1707/96

03350 A M 1707/96

5 )3 5 8 - A M 1707/06

1 K IL L IN G•I [a t t j u l l

' i U f f J q L L

;>:a i t k il l

J.KILLING ___

■tjASSOCIATEC

! BURNING M ULTIPLE M ULTIPLE

| U NKNO W N

M U L T IP L E

iTHEFT

9 2 . e!

i 92 613 .'. . « ! 6 j

v i 92 e!" i c : ' 92 ' e '

u ' 92 | 0G s z j 6

I G 92 6:

V 92 6

U _92 _6

92 e_

G . 92 6

G 92 6

. « Q

G 92 6r B2 6

’ 92 e■Q- ' 02 Q

" g " 90 1290 " 1 2 *

Cl" 92..

o ' 92 eG ' "92 6

- O ' j "9t' 7■ft | 92 * 7

i! 92 I 7

I93

I6.

" 9 2 7i .»? ! 7

J p D Vic Org_7 3 .............6 j 17 i “ 6 17_A NC

17

20 [ANC

ANC20 i i f 17 AN Ci7

17

17_____

12 IFP

IFP

231717.

SANCO

AND

92

95:

!

17;IFP

::6'Tf p

17 ANC

6 ; 17 j AN C

' 17 A N Ca;:[ b I___ i t _a i

unas"‘N

Page 2 of 4

99,'0£;/11

VlolatUO'Ti ■0€'tail;i _______ _____ .Shot deulh tit ckiss raivgo.__________________'Attacked.___________________ __________ _ ..'Joniis M batiia v.as li io i iwloe i(Uhe<h03i;,

Unah M baltia m s slabbed iri ths stoTiBC*. Popi M battw was'sfcibbed in the head- {she was a small d # 'J ).Havia* aiiwonlh* chest. headafxtdthe

O utcom eDentjx___

□ s n fr

Dc-.Jth

Death:n«3th

She wasjteargassed fry line po'-.cs. .........Shot d^ad .Death

i F a n , Mi jo in a w as sho: 3.1- Attempted r ^ r F s r o MbatHa fled to the sewage * » neat R a w la k l H acksd w i*i a spear. Oti m Dleil insta-lly.

' S M ins.ide tha rWoulh D eath .D ied instantly.

WSndowsarid fum itire broken.S fetsb i)' w W s c e a e . ' M 'n i n e ir» r th » old baby wns also s.tstaed.T t’jEt v id im was '«aVon u p and ax ed tiy

• D a m a ja to property

Injury ___ __________________ ____________S he d M . She was then BurniwHh peKol in front of her

a llageiiy Siirn t;huniaio and a group of A.NC m c lh « . T l v ^ r t o f was r a p ^ t a t ^ B u r ^ rK I f & H »>en peered ,/^n pfiVc; a id S h e died. The m allet was napotted at VandarWiiparLbumtto 8ah«s. -po lb fsW lon ............................................ - ...........

Shut de'ad. ;Shoi.

Stabbed seve« tirrss on her egi;.He was sficit dead

!The v ic tin w a> w w u lH d tTjiTvTctimwas sh c tjn d assau lted w ih S H O T 'LO CKED IN A B O OTH O F A C A R ____Slibt and killed......... .........Shot and killed ShwonMjiario ’ ‘SJi'Stdoatli a i doaa iamjB.K i l l e d ' .......................Killed

I Death. ............... ...............................................■Oied snmBlime later after receiving Ireatnien! at Ihe

Injured "Delatn. Se'Versi injur,1

jD eaih

D M thD !:at-InjurejDoa'th.

He wati stcinsd and tnarntto jiea<h.M<l ^ T h e h b e d a f ld t t i A M ’ H a was se rerly InjunadHe wa-» assaulted. poor«d vylth,=«irol a rd sc.tjHa su^alrieS jw ltip leinjunas from Dealings anti bui-is Various people vi’t i e ai;Lack.2d wiih iraditkans.i jZulu weapons in an unspeciled m anner.____jTheirphysical injudes are W t specifiediv if ic o s peopFe'■ w t’re aitacked wini lracfllonsil!Zulu weapons and shot, with tru<* bul sets in a r*;unspei;i»e<l rmmnar-______ _________V siious houses were k-otetl oflelsvisions,b ti^ e te .s ta v fe v a te .________________________ T ^ e day a B e n ^ n w j ^ ^ H Q g m g w a s buniV----------

O!,'*

€

e o i p h a t o n g m a s s a c r e

isitN am e First N antes T R C rto . R ef. n o . A C T H S V c a te g o ry____ IX !? I rI

10 N 3 A L F .............

3Af,1Ah)E

M m asw ia lo BellyEiizabertti ; Frandna^i |

333:?5 A W ir 0 7 « * 5 ASSO C IA TED D E S TR O Y ! 92 e 17 A N C

6«fl'37 J805013TO VT 1 KILLING S TA B B IN G G 92 6 17

NTWV'flO jg co U M az in jo 6 9900 ' i B06012ir03^T t KILLING S H O O TIN G G 92 6 2Ci

UTA M H O Jacoa M azln jo 69900 .B 05012M 3V T I 2KILLING S H O O TIN G -j S2|

0 20

HUMOU E velyn M aseabata; 67105 :JB 050 l2 i'C 3 \T 3 ASSOC IATED ‘ TEA R G A S |V 92; 5 2<i

a r ^ n x a Puraia 655S2iJB 0«9/'5 /t3XrT 1 -SEVERE S H O TT IN G G SO 0 j 20 PAC !

•rtoenm vlBHLE 3 , -EKABE: ^ THOOE

■f)

NK'MCVdN 4492 fti2N'PM A'Ot6'F!3 jflorr^the I

iK A N K IS W . G eliutle j 60363 JiBtM 9 5 3 « 3 \r rILA’ stGENI-IA IA K O A N E fla r ltj 26063 ,tB <x .9 i;^3vn ' 'I9ATHA I ’opfxe 2B-1 86 ,lB 0S853^03\/f.....

IBATHA wiottioKi Jonas 28-185 :lBKi6S3V03'/TIBATHfl (NEE i1IAS) K o h tili;« 28184 .tB o ae s jJo sy ttO SHC P E Florei Lu'it"icngo 77605 . IB a i*5 8 *1 3 V r |

IJJK N O iW I'shidi 77603 J B b i> i« « l3 WIMKNOVW Tahtpisci 77804 4B O ii8SW 03'/tik a La 1-bretTshldi 779S1 .JB0‘)660)XI3VI

lO IA U H G Mndiemi E tiia te 'h 44000 1BQ5&4JVI>3VT

l o h j o . i ' iilartha M e n i 44001 JB0S64<V03'/T ’. .Oauijhter O f Mernl

IO M JO II Ivlatlha 76230 JB03847AM VT'O EiTI .sje'.ia " " 78Ei4S JB0565<«J3'JT

W IL E Mokotc 79t)e5 JB0SW4W33’/T

,tOF:OKI=NG iV ta rh laesaM a 'ia 71599 JB 0564I5D 3VT|

W IL E .Selinah 791)88 JB 05C 4IVM V T

, OHE.SV/Ai■\Actor Khielhisi 4 6 5 e jj6 !)1 « '7 J M V T

> W .iL E Elizabeth M em e 790B4|JB0564<3m'k'T^OftJOI.I 'Ntom bifitite 43‘399:JB0£&4?iOJVT

M anhlc«isa Maria'AleUa i DavidjThomas P u b ’M aria Mathoce

71590 K 2W P M A /018;FS 7 6 W 5 iB 0 5 8 5 M )3 V T 8t 332 j B 0 3 « ^ M V f 51577 JBC 387 ZID3WK S2'S06 JBC 6087j6 s V T

2!kI»UWG1 SEVER E

* KILLING V KILLINO2 KILUNO

3 KILLING i;K tt.U N G i: 'k i.L IN '3 ’■'SEVERE 1 K ILLIN G '

K It.UNGKll.V!NG_

KILLING

3<l_?. ASSO C IA TED

2;K LLING

S T A E B N G

D E S T R O Y

S H O O T IN GSTABBING

'''''S H O T T IN G ’ '

STABBINGS H O O TIN G ’S H O O TIN GSH O O TIN GSH O O TIN G

U NKNO W N' u n k n o w n '

U N K N O W Nt h e f t ".....

STABEING

U 92 6i

17

0 64 «.

& 92 e VG 92 6 VG ' 92 _ '6 17’

G 92; B 17'G 92 "s 17

U 92.

•'c 17U" 92 6 17'G 92 "7 i r '

e 92 17G '92 e u

:.... •

U ! *2

3

92 G 92

«i .11 8| 170 17

Kl’. l IN G

4: SEVERE

i) A S SO C IA TEDV w l l ih g

liwiUNG

IjWLUNG i ls ia /E R E 1 A SS O C IA TE D F S E ;V £S E

' i* S E V E R E

STABE-ING ;G 92 6 17

STABBING. G . 92 E:1 ’I|O T H E «

JSO 1“ l 1 !

I STA B B IN G jO ! 92 8; 1 /(U N K N O W N !IJ .

92 6 17

S TA B B IN G M3 92 6 17S TA B B IN G i<3 92 6 17

jD E S T R O Y t>3 e : 6 13! S H O O TIN G ez 17■SHOOTING <3 e i 3

Page 3 of 4

99/015/11

~| Violation ctotalu .............................

Various h&uBes w eto aei: atlflht. ___

; Shei was sfcbbed from the back with a spear. | He was shot will l pallets end hia wSola right : sidu riddled wiifi pallets ' He was sfcbtwiiiTpaileLs and his whole right sld» riddled with paHets Thei yoi-cs inreti teargau- a t iJie victim anti Winnia Mandela.

I lh f! victim was :shol on the head a^-d the jbBtkw itt’. polcts.The victim was killed by IFF men w Hiding

i bxSiS A women and a child who wata w th | the two victi ms :;urv ved.

•K ef hcuse w as pelnsl bomfc«5d.

KV'.ed. ............. . ......................S lw ’wss slabbed ctose to liar left ear.

"H e was itio tin ijie h e a d and back._____

S h 3 was stibbsid to ds*ithi. .............S f ta iT '~ ~ " ' . . ................... -

shots n a ........ . . . ............S h e w js shot and killed.

T h i victim was t i i d ( t d or shot bo death.Thi s victim w as hacked or r f i f f to death .

Tri ? victim u*as hacked o r shot to death. T l i f t H f F i andV W b o w a r t i j i w e r e stolen Tbs vieiim",vas s la tte d in t i e abdomen and seriously wounded......................

The v ld im w a s s te tfo N ancljsillad. ................The victim Was stabbed in the chest ons

■ hultoeks arid sertousfy w ounded | CAR S P R lN K L E D W itH P E tR O L W H IL S Tl o c k e d i n s i d e THF. S O O TThe vfctin was stabbed in tila chesi and Tha vWtTn'was hacked or shotioddBth.

' t h e v k s ln ’w as fatally w o iir id e d by a n a;<e S o VI to h s i n e c k a r d h e r h a n d w as a lr w s l severed S h e * ras w ith iw o otheir w o n w n and

'S h o w a s s ia b S a d on_th» c h e s t a n d S ack His h o js ^ a n d Ih ^ 'o f h js p u e n ts w s/eThe victim was s h o t ___}h<: was shofln an unspecified part 3f iSis____

O u tc c rie

;Th» houses w ere des tro yed ._________________ _____

Death- site diec' a t !>ebokeng Hospital.

iH e died on the spot.

H e died on th e spa l

She ws.s taken :b liospKai ritierij a r - u l 10 of the palate v/a ■» rE-rrovfed. But she still has 10 palets on her back

|death................................. . . .

iHvarytiing w as c fe s tro y s d ....................................

Death . . . . . . .PcpTadied a l's ib c Kena twoplte lo o the _Bled a i t ™ te ih J u n e 1992 a t S e b c k e n j hospital

Death□ T « J ......... . . .Death _ ........tfljurei D t^ th ...........

OtiathDeath

Doath

Death • victim died in 1 9 *5 a * a result o f his injuries.

Ouatli - the vlcllm <Sieb in fJBB as a rtas jlt of his injuries. Pity-si:al injury - the v iotrn \va3 treated in SEho^enyhtispasl . . . .

’H©rrensgsct to csijapfi with tfo othar ftiends beifore 1r>eo M w a s s e ta B a h l . .DsathDa’atii

j . . . .

A post-m orteir w jas h o d an d the v id im ’/ m tout>3 tc- h a v e d ied as a i esult o f the injuries s h e s ^ s te iie d .

'b a m it je o f properly . ,’ i n j u r y ........... ....................... ... ... ..................jHi»'Mi"iin[iflnsclous a~d Wiis taken xa S'ebokant)_______

li/us

'yy

ik

l

BOJPHATONG MASSACRE 99/05/11r3U is l Name F irs t M am a* TRC no. Ret. n a . ACT HftV category H R Vs) ub-cat F YY M M DC» Vic org Vio lation deta ils O iitco n w

M ANZW I ; David Ivlavine 82903* JBD0OI35/03VT 1 K iO JTO B E A T W 3 ‘ ___| u 91 El 17 H e bealeri several tim es err t o head CJeadnXI- ■Linah H srn o H w rw « T '5a la iT w ltfi"B s lid :o n tfv i' ................................................................ ...........

MAN2|(\'I Mcror^jwenyaca 0;:qo4 j e » 0 * 5 « 3 V t 2 SEVERE BEATING 91 t; 17 fo reh iadLEKABE Pule Thomas ’’ b: icR'3. JSD6OH0/O3V7 I.K iU IN G STABBING ' G ""»2 ’ {,• 17 He was s tas fiM nm a sharp cibjetn on pie He died.MOLETE Innocenlia MHah e s o i ! JB O B M B /W VT 2 K IL IIN G STABBING _ " G 92 6. 17 S he was slabbed on unspacffiisd parts of her Shodied.

Christopher - ■ ■N A N G «.E M B E MpMKeieli 41D43 JB0S39W B3VT 1 AB D U C TIO N ABDUCTION 81 1 5 ANC H e y<<ib kidnapped. Prior to this incident he receivutf threats.

IChiistopher A wire m s fa i.ten M arou rd His nack a rd lieNANG ALEM BE iMphikeltfli 43(M 5 JB053»1A>3Vr 2 KILLING M U L H P .E |g 91 1 ANC was shot on the sfde c f hre- body. He diec.P/BELE : David 81832 JB0608W 03VT 1 KILLING SHO O TING je 92 8 13 H e v«is shot eifftt Bmes t>i his body. He diedWBELE David 81832 J6 0B 08» 03V T 2 SEVERE A R S O N 92 6 13 Hi9 hcusa w8:j bur nt down. F'lopiitl)1 was deslroyed.WAVUSO Veiile Jera.'nlah 8g t27J8D 64S 1A >3V T 1 ' KILLING SHO O TING G 91 8 A H e was shot ill the* head. He died.

He staye:! overnlQht at Sebototng Hospital as v result orM V U N D IA S illiong j Jacob 66580 JG0B3tt8rt>:JVT 1 SEV ER E SHO O TING G 90 3 26 AND Ha was sliol in 1h= back. his ln|uries (spinal tfanagei).MASHIYA S e n t /vnris 101S15 K Z IW 3 /3 5 W D N 1 A B D U C TIO N O iSA PPiiV? ui e<> ' ' « jU n w o w i S .ie tfsap pea ed jin d never fjiJlid UN tcdayW U L A N E Lind to e 105516 K Z W !3 f3S Q 'D N 2 -A B D U C TIO N OIISAPP5AR u 65 8 Unknown S iia disappeared and never found 11ll tcdajM BO NO O Sana 101517 KZWFi;ra5<VDW .. .. 15A B D U C TIO N O S A P P 6A R ■V a Unknown Sire disappeared ana inevw foundTiil todBj

F lcrenc* i Slabbed in the hand, private parts lind hll onMOLETE Mai<gwedi 25S J fll)0 i::3 iB 3V T 1 A T T K IL L S T A B »H G 0 91! 6 17 in a head. Injury

Pace 4 of 4 s

Collection Number: AK2672 Goldstone Commission BOIPATONG ENQUIRY Records 1990-1999 PUBLISHER: Publisher:- Historical Papers, University of the Witwatersrand Location:- Johannesburg ©2012

LEGAL NOTICES:

Copyright Notice: All materials on the Historical Papers website are protected by South African copyright law and may not be reproduced, distributed, transmitted, displayed, or otherwise published in any format, without the prior written permission of the copyright owner.

Disclaimer and Terms of Use: Provided that you maintain all copyright and other notices contained therein, you may download material (one machine readable copy and one print copy per page) for your personal and/or educational non-commercial use only.

People using these records relating to the archives of Historical Papers, The Library, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, are reminded that such records sometimes contain material which is uncorroborated, inaccurate, distorted or untrue. While these digital records are true facsimiles of the collection records and the information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to be accurate and reliable, Historical Papers, University of the Witwatersrand has not independently verified their content. Consequently, the University is not responsible for any errors or omissions and excludes any and all liability for any errors in or omissions from the information on the website or any related information on third party websites accessible from this website.

This document is part of a private collection deposited with Historical Papers at The University of the Witwatersrand.