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  • 8/9/2019 Fukishima Nuclear Case Study

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    Collusion and lack of governance

     Emergency response issues

    The government, the regulators, lacked the preparation and the mindset to efficiently

    operate an emergency response to an accident of this scope. None, therefore, were

    effective in preventing or limiting the consequential damage.In the critical period just after the accident, they did not promptly declare a state of

    emergency.

    Approximately !",""" people were evacuated in response to the accident...

    Insufficient evacuation planning led to many residents receiving unnecessary radiation

    exposure. #thers were forced to move multiple times, resulting in increased stress and

    health risks $ including deaths among seriously ill patients.

    %If there had &een even a word a&out a nuclear power plant when the evacuation was

    ordered, we could have reacted reasona&ly, taken our valua&les with us or locked upthe house &efore we had left. 'e had to run with nothing &ut the clothes we were

    wearing. It is such a disappointment every time we are &riefly allowed to return home

    only to find out that we have &een ro&&ed again.% ()omment &y a resident of #kuma,

    from report appendices*

    The Fukushima nuclear disaster showed us that nuclear reactors arefundamentally dangerous.cause significant damage to the environmentthe health of populations and to national economies, the heavy

    financial cost of a meltdown is inevitably borne by the public,Millions of people who live near nuclear reactors are at risk.

    + The lives of hundreds of thousands of people continue tobe affected by the Fukushima nuclear disaster, especiallythe 160,000 who fled their homes because of radioactivecontamination, and continue to live in limbo without fair, ust, and timely compensation. They have only a falsehope of returning home, yet the !apanese government iseagerly pushing to restart reactors, against the will of its

    people, and without learning true lessons fromFukushima.

    + A year after the Wall Street Journal report, TEPCO

    announced that the Daiichi plant's meltdown had released

    2.5 times more radiation into the atmosphere than initially

    estimated.

    + The utility cited broken radiation sensors within the plant

    as the main reason for this deficit and, claimed that 99

    percent of the total radiation released from the Daiichi

    plant occurred during the last three weeks of March 2011.

    http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/25/world/asia/radioactive-release-at-fukushima-plant-was-underestimated.html?_r=0http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/25/world/asia/radioactive-release-at-fukushima-plant-was-underestimated.html?_r=0http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/25/world/asia/radioactive-release-at-fukushima-plant-was-underestimated.html?_r=0http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/25/world/asia/radioactive-release-at-fukushima-plant-was-underestimated.html?_r=0http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/25/world/asia/radioactive-release-at-fukushima-plant-was-underestimated.html?_r=0http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/25/world/asia/radioactive-release-at-fukushima-plant-was-underestimated.html?_r=0

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    • A year later, in June 2013, TEPCO admitted that almost

    80,000 gallons of contaminated water had been leaking

    into the Pacific Ocean every day since the meltdown.

    • In February 2014, TEPCO revealed that groundwater

    sources near the Daiichi plant and 80 feet from the PacificOcean contained 20 million becquerels of the harmful

    radioactive element Strontium-90 per gallon (one

    becquerel equals one emission of radiation per second).

    • Even though the internationally accepted limit for

    Strontium-90 contamination in water hovers around 120

    becquerels per gallon, these measurements were hidden

    from Japan's Nuclear Regulation Authority for nearly

    four months.• And last month, TEPCO told reporters that 14 different

    rice paddies outside Fukushima's exclusion zone were

    contaminated in August 2013

    • meaning almost a year had passed since emissions had

    begun to accumulate at dangerous levels in Japan's most

    sacred food.

    • Why has a crisis that is gaining traction as the worst case

    of nuclear pollution in history — worse, emission-wise,than Hiroshima, Nagasaki, or Chernobyl—being

    smothered with internal censorship?

    • "Japan produces parts for nuclear reactors, like reactor

    containment vessels," she said in an interview with VICE.

    "They're heavily invested in nuclear power, even though

    they actually have access to nine times more renewable

    energy than Germany."

    • What separates Fukushima from Chernobyl is thecontinuous leakage of radioactive material

    • "The Japanese government took three months to tell the

    world that there had been three meltdowns, even though

    the meltdowns had taken place in the first three days,"

    • "They're not testing the food routinely. In fact, they're

    growing food in highly radioactive areas, and there are

    stories that the most radioactive food is being canned and

    sold to third-world countries."

    • Late last month, a long-term vice president of the Kansai

    http://rt.com/news/fukushima-radioactive-puddle-leakage-710/http://rt.com/news/fukushima-radioactive-puddle-leakage-710/http://rt.com/news/fukushima-radioactive-puddle-leakage-710/http://rt.com/news/fukushima-radiation-levels-underestimated-143http://rt.com/news/173048-tepco-disclose-fukushima-contamination-agriculture/http://rt.com/news/173048-tepco-disclose-fukushima-contamination-agriculture/http://rt.com/news/173048-tepco-disclose-fukushima-contamination-agriculture/http://fpif.org/peer-peer-science-century-long-challenge-respond-fukushima/http://fpif.org/peer-peer-science-century-long-challenge-respond-fukushima/http://blog.rmi.org/blog_2014_07_08_opposite_energy_policies_turned_fukushima_disaster_into_a_loss_for_japan_and_a_win_for_germanyhttp://blog.rmi.org/blog_2014_07_08_opposite_energy_policies_turned_fukushima_disaster_into_a_loss_for_japan_and_a_win_for_germanyhttp://rt.com/news/fukushima-radioactive-puddle-leakage-710/http://rt.com/news/fukushima-radioactive-puddle-leakage-710/http://rt.com/news/fukushima-radioactive-puddle-leakage-710/http://rt.com/news/fukushima-radiation-levels-underestimated-143http://rt.com/news/173048-tepco-disclose-fukushima-contamination-agriculture/http://rt.com/news/173048-tepco-disclose-fukushima-contamination-agriculture/http://rt.com/news/173048-tepco-disclose-fukushima-contamination-agriculture/http://fpif.org/peer-peer-science-century-long-challenge-respond-fukushima/http://fpif.org/peer-peer-science-century-long-challenge-respond-fukushima/http://blog.rmi.org/blog_2014_07_08_opposite_energy_policies_turned_fukushima_disaster_into_a_loss_for_japan_and_a_win_for_germanyhttp://blog.rmi.org/blog_2014_07_08_opposite_energy_policies_turned_fukushima_disaster_into_a_loss_for_japan_and_a_win_for_germany

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    Electric Power Company (KEPCO), which sourced

    nearly 50 percent of its electricity from nuclear power

    sources like Fukushima before the 2011 accident,

    revealed to Japanese reporters that the company's

    president donated approximately $3.6 million to sevendifferent Japanese prime ministers and other political

    figures between 1970 and 1990. The amount officials

    received was based on how much their incumbency

    profited the nuclear and electric energy sectors.

    + And if it's not money that lies beneath these multi-faceted

    attempts at obscuring information about Fukushima, it's

    the fear of mass hysteria.

    + it was revealed that the United Nations-affiliated pro-nuclear group International Atomic Energy Association

    made a deal with local government officials in Fukushima

    to classify information that might stoke public concern

    (like, observers speculate, cancer rates and radiation

    levels), civilian fears of a cover-up campaign crept out of

    the mischief associated with conspiracy and into the

    gravity of a situation that feels more and more surreal.

    + TEPCO the Tokyo electrical power company that ownsthe fukishima plants

    + Despite these efforts, plenty has come to light. As of

    August 2014, we know that radiation levels around the

    Fukushima area continue to rise, even after three years of

    containment attempts. We know that doctors have found

    89 cases of thyroid cancer in a study of less than 300,000

    children from the Fukushima area—even though the

    normal incidence rate of this disease among youths is oneor two for every million. We know that Japanese

    scientists are still reluctant to publicize their findings on

    Fukushima due to a fear of getting stigmatized by the

    national government.

    + We also know that US sailors who plotted a relief effort

    in Fukushima immediately after the disaster have

    reportedly been experiencing a well-up of different

    cancers, that monkeys living outside Fukushima's

    restricted zone have lower blood cell counts than those

    http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201407280041http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201407280041http://fukushimavoice-eng2.blogspot.com/2014/01/tokyo-shimbun-article-regarding.htmlhttp://rt.com/shows/big-picture/161892-fukushima-plant-radiation-us/http://fukushimavoice-eng2.blogspot.com/2014/05/seventeen-more-confirmed-cases-50.htmlhttp://fukushimavoice-eng2.blogspot.com/2014/05/seventeen-more-confirmed-cases-50.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/17/world/asia/concerns-over-measurement-of-fukushima-fallout.html?_r=0http://america.aljazeera.com/watch/shows/the-stream/the-stream-officialblog/2013/12/16/uss-reagan-sailorsreportcancersafterfukushimarescuemission.htmlhttp://www.foxnews.com/science/2014/07/25/fukushima-monkeys-blood-shows-signs-radiation-exposurehttp://www.foxnews.com/science/2014/07/25/fukushima-monkeys-blood-shows-signs-radiation-exposurehttp://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201407280041http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201407280041http://fukushimavoice-eng2.blogspot.com/2014/01/tokyo-shimbun-article-regarding.htmlhttp://rt.com/shows/big-picture/161892-fukushima-plant-radiation-us/http://fukushimavoice-eng2.blogspot.com/2014/05/seventeen-more-confirmed-cases-50.htmlhttp://fukushimavoice-eng2.blogspot.com/2014/05/seventeen-more-confirmed-cases-50.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/17/world/asia/concerns-over-measurement-of-fukushima-fallout.html?_r=0http://america.aljazeera.com/watch/shows/the-stream/the-stream-officialblog/2013/12/16/uss-reagan-sailorsreportcancersafterfukushimarescuemission.htmlhttp://www.foxnews.com/science/2014/07/25/fukushima-monkeys-blood-shows-signs-radiation-exposurehttp://www.foxnews.com/science/2014/07/25/fukushima-monkeys-blood-shows-signs-radiation-exposure

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    living in other parts of northern Japan

    + Others believe that Japan needs to look northwest,

    towards the Kremlin. Chernobyl gave Russia and Ukraine

    a level of experience in handling nuclear failures that

    stands apart from most of the world.+ But even though the ecological effects of Fukushima

    continue to be hotly debated by scientific organizations

    and the public, Dr. Klein wants to take a step back from

    the conversation in order to move towards the endgame.

    "I'd like to see a completely safe operation. It's

    complicated," he concedes, "but we need to help support

    the Japanese clean up efforts whenever we can."

    + After the 2011 magnitude 8.9 earthquake andresultant tsunami, the stricken Fukushima DaiichiPower Plant in orth !ast "a#an has su$ered coremeltdowns, leaked thousands of tonnes ofradioacti%e water into the ground water of "a#an andthe Paci&c 'cean, and a series of other calamities.

    +  (he (ok)o !lectric Power *om#an) +(!P*'res#onsi-le for the #lant has a##eared un&t tomanage the most com#le clean/u# o#eration in thehistor) of nuclear #ower. (!P*' are a-out to

    engage in the remo%al of highl) radioacti%e, unsta-lefuel rods. f the) make a mistake, we would witnessthe worst radiological disaster in histor).

    +  (!P*'s clean/u# is estimated to take 0 )ears andcost 342-n. 5orse, it is still the -est case scenario.

     (he "a#anese go%ernment has 6ust admitted to the140,000 e%acuees of the 12 mile eclusion 7one thatthe) will likel) ne%er return home.

    Contaminating Groundwater and the Pacifc Ocean  

    http://www.foxnews.com/science/2014/07/25/fukushima-monkeys-blood-shows-signs-radiation-exposurehttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/03/11/japan-earthquake-tsunami_n_834380.htmlhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fukushima_Daiichi_nuclear_disasterhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fukushima_Daiichi_nuclear_disasterhttp://www.globalresearch.ca/japans-triple-meltdown-tour-of-fukushima-daiichi-nuclear-power-plant/5353516http://www.globalresearch.ca/japans-triple-meltdown-tour-of-fukushima-daiichi-nuclear-power-plant/5353516http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-24739264http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-24739264http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/nov/12/fukushima-daiichu-residents-radiation-japan-nuclear-powerhttp://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/nov/12/fukushima-daiichu-residents-radiation-japan-nuclear-powerhttp://www.foxnews.com/science/2014/07/25/fukushima-monkeys-blood-shows-signs-radiation-exposurehttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/03/11/japan-earthquake-tsunami_n_834380.htmlhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fukushima_Daiichi_nuclear_disasterhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fukushima_Daiichi_nuclear_disasterhttp://www.globalresearch.ca/japans-triple-meltdown-tour-of-fukushima-daiichi-nuclear-power-plant/5353516http://www.globalresearch.ca/japans-triple-meltdown-tour-of-fukushima-daiichi-nuclear-power-plant/5353516http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-24739264http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-24739264http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/nov/12/fukushima-daiichu-residents-radiation-japan-nuclear-powerhttp://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/nov/12/fukushima-daiichu-residents-radiation-japan-nuclear-power

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    (he disaster in arch 2011 #um#ed :;;,000 *uries ofradioacti%e caesium into the Paci&c, the largest discharge ofradioacti%e material into the ocean in histor). Fifteen monthslater, ince then, matters ha%e steadil) worsened.

    5hen #ower was cut o$ during the tsunami, these #um#swere lost. >o, e%er since, groundwater runs down fromthe higher land -ehind the reactors, through the-asements and contaminated groundwater around thetanks, and, this newl) highl) contaminated water, thenruns straight into the Paci&c 'cean.

    n e$orts to re&ll the fuel #ools and cool the #lant, (!P*'workers #oured thousands of tonnes of water onto thereactors. (his water then -ecame radioacti%e andneeded to -e stored until it was decontaminated. (!P*'

    now has 1,000 tanks and other containers, holding;:0,000 tonnes of highl) contaminated water on site.

    >trontium/90 +a radioacti%e -) #roduct that is easil)a-sor-ed -) the human -od) and causes -one cancerhas -een found at :0 times higher than legal limits.

    (he tanks continue to leak. ?eaches surrounding the area ha%e -een closed and all

    &shing has sto##ed in this former &shing region. ?utconcerns are that the contamination is -eing carried well-e)ond the eclusion 7one, making it into the drinkingwater and food -eing consumed in "a#an -) rain water.@adiation has -een found in waters o$ Alaska and the5est coast of the >, ha%ing s#read o%er 2000 milesacross the Paci&c.

    The Next Chernobyl?

    (he -iggest crisis at Fukushima though are the im#acts ofthree meltdowns in reactors 1/;, and the fate of the fuel

    http://www.psr.org/environment-and-health/environmental-health-policy-institute/responses/costs-and-consequences-of-fukushima.htmlhttp://www.psr.org/environment-and-health/environmental-health-policy-institute/responses/costs-and-consequences-of-fukushima.htmlhttp://www.ctvnews.ca/sci-tech/slipshod-tanks-at-fukushima-raise-concern-about-more-leaks-contamination-1.1533606http://www.ctvnews.ca/sci-tech/slipshod-tanks-at-fukushima-raise-concern-about-more-leaks-contamination-1.1533606http://www.ctvnews.ca/sci-tech/slipshod-tanks-at-fukushima-raise-concern-about-more-leaks-contamination-1.1533606http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-24606357http://www.esquire.com/blogs/politics/fukushima-radiation-arrives-in-alaska-111213http://www.esquire.com/blogs/politics/fukushima-radiation-arrives-in-alaska-111213http://www.psr.org/environment-and-health/environmental-health-policy-institute/responses/costs-and-consequences-of-fukushima.htmlhttp://www.psr.org/environment-and-health/environmental-health-policy-institute/responses/costs-and-consequences-of-fukushima.htmlhttp://www.ctvnews.ca/sci-tech/slipshod-tanks-at-fukushima-raise-concern-about-more-leaks-contamination-1.1533606http://www.ctvnews.ca/sci-tech/slipshod-tanks-at-fukushima-raise-concern-about-more-leaks-contamination-1.1533606http://www.ctvnews.ca/sci-tech/slipshod-tanks-at-fukushima-raise-concern-about-more-leaks-contamination-1.1533606http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-24606357http://www.esquire.com/blogs/politics/fukushima-radiation-arrives-in-alaska-111213http://www.esquire.com/blogs/politics/fukushima-radiation-arrives-in-alaska-111213

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    #ools. After #rolonged e#osure the fuel rods melt, forming a-oiling #ool of radioacti%e fuel at the -ottom of the %esselcontaining the reactor. @eactors 1, ; and  are -elie%ed to -eat this stage. Bowe%er, it is clear that reactor 2 su$ered a-reach of containment at its core. n fact, (!P*' still ha%e no

    idea where the cores of the four reactors are. n the worstcase scenario, the cores will continue to melt through allmaterial -elow them until the) reach the groundwater, whereheat and steam will -uild until an e#losion occurs, releasingthe entire nuclear #a)load of the four stations into theatmos#here.

    C@emo%ing s#ent fuel is done at an) ordinar) nuclear#ower #lant, and the equi#ment and methods well -eusing here are not that di$erent.

    Cow nuclear fuel is like cigarettes in a #ack of

    cigarettes. f the #ack is new, )ou can #ull a cigarette out#rett) easil). ?ut if the #ack is distorted and )ou #ull toohard, )oull sna# the cigarette. >ame thing can ha##eninside this fuel #ool.

    @emo%ing the rods from the #ool is a delicate tasknormall) assisted -) com#uters according to (oshioEimura, a former (!P*' technician, who worked atFukushima Daiichi for 11 )ears.

    CPre%iousl) it was a com#uter/controlled #rocess thatmemori7ed the eact locations of the rods down to the

    millimeter and now the) dont ha%e that. It has to bedone manually so there is a high risk that they willdrop and break one o the uel rods, Eimura said.

    (hese s#ent fuel rods contain Plutonium, the most toicmaterial on earth trace amounts of which can kill ahuman -eing.

    Er)#ton 8< is also likel) to -e released into the air thisradiation is a-sor-ed -) the lungs, is fat solu-le anddamages s#erm and eggs resulting in genetic diseasesand deformities.

    According to inde#endent consultants )cle >chneiderand Anthon) Froggatt, writing in the recent 5orld uclearndustr) >tatus @e#ortG

    CFull release from the nit/ s#ent fuel #ool, without an)containment or control, could cause -) far the mostserious radiological disaster to date,, releasing three times the radioacti%e material of the 1984 *herno-)ldisaster, or 1,000 Biroshimas.

    (his #iece of work starts this month. f (!P*', who ha%e so far #ro%en %astl) incom#etent,

    somehow manage to #ull o$ this un#recedented acti%it)

    http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=nuclear-energy-primerhttp://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=nuclear-energy-primerhttp://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=nuclear-energy-primerhttp://fukushimaupdate.com/the-real-fukushima-danger-spent-fuel-pools/http://fukushimaupdate.com/the-real-fukushima-danger-spent-fuel-pools/http://fukushimaupdate.com/the-real-fukushima-danger-spent-fuel-pools/http://www.globalresearch.ca/japans-triple-meltdown-tour-of-fukushima-daiichi-nuclear-power-plant/5353516http://agreenroad.blogspot.co.uk/2013/01/krypton-85-dangers-cancer-causing.htmlhttp://agreenroad.blogspot.co.uk/2013/01/krypton-85-dangers-cancer-causing.htmlhttp://agreenroad.blogspot.co.uk/2013/01/krypton-85-dangers-cancer-causing.htmlhttp://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/12/us-japan-fukushima-removal-idUSBRE9AB15L20131112http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/12/us-japan-fukushima-removal-idUSBRE9AB15L20131112http://www.worldnuclearreport.org/http://www.worldnuclearreport.org/http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-24846819http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-24846819http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=nuclear-energy-primerhttp://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=nuclear-energy-primerhttp://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=nuclear-energy-primerhttp://fukushimaupdate.com/the-real-fukushima-danger-spent-fuel-pools/http://fukushimaupdate.com/the-real-fukushima-danger-spent-fuel-pools/http://fukushimaupdate.com/the-real-fukushima-danger-spent-fuel-pools/http://www.globalresearch.ca/japans-triple-meltdown-tour-of-fukushima-daiichi-nuclear-power-plant/5353516http://agreenroad.blogspot.co.uk/2013/01/krypton-85-dangers-cancer-causing.htmlhttp://agreenroad.blogspot.co.uk/2013/01/krypton-85-dangers-cancer-causing.htmlhttp://agreenroad.blogspot.co.uk/2013/01/krypton-85-dangers-cancer-causing.htmlhttp://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/12/us-japan-fukushima-removal-idUSBRE9AB15L20131112http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/12/us-japan-fukushima-removal-idUSBRE9AB15L20131112http://www.worldnuclearreport.org/http://www.worldnuclearreport.org/http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-24846819http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-24846819

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    without creating a nuclear holocaust, the) still ha%e to#erform the same e$ort with reactors 1 and 2, which will-e much more com#le due to e%en greater damage tothe -uildings.

    This is a Nightmare  

    ts time for us to start focussing on whats ha##ening inFukushima. t ma) seem a farawa) matter, on a distantcontinent -ut disaster at Fukushima could mean disaster forus all. f an) of the reactors full) dis#atch their toic contentsinto the atmos#here, it is the end of "a#an and a glo-alcatastro#he.

    (he im#acts are alread) -eing felt. An a%erage of 1.: #eo#le #er 100,000 in the general

    #o#ulation -etween the ages of 1< and 19 contracted (h)roid cancer in 200:. (his )ear, 12 #er 100,000 #eo#le)ounger than 18 at the time of the disaster in Fukushimawere diagnosed with the disease.

    According to Ph)sicians for >ocial @es#onsi-ilit)G C(he #recise %alue of the a-andoned cities, towns,

    agricultural lands, -usinesses, homes and #ro#ert)located within the roughl) ;10 sq miles +800 sq km ofthe eclusion 7ones has not -een esta-lished. !stimatesof the total economic loss range from H2e#tem-er 2012Fukushima oKcials stated that 1

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    small com#ensation to co%er their costs of li%ing ase%acuees. an) are forced to make mortgage #a)mentson the homes the) left inside the eclusion 7ones. (he)ha%e not -een told that their homes will ne%er again -eha-ita-le.

    n s#ite of all this, (!P*' continue to turn a #ro&t and "a#anese P >hin7o A-e #lans to restart "a#ans nuclear#ower stations.

    • What Three Mile Island,Chernobyl, and Fukushimacan teach about the next

    one• Following the accident at the nuclear power plant,

    government authorities realized to their horror that theirexisting plans for such an emergency were too vague toaddress the challenges now facing them. Making matters worse, technical experts disagreed about the state of thecrippled reactor and what might happen next. Someconfidently asserted that events were under control,

     while others warned that ongoing radioactive emissionsmight portend an imminent release of catastrophicproportions. More worryingly still, no one could predictthe likelihood or timing of such a developmentconfidently enough to inform decisions about orderingevacuations. Should the local population be evacuated, or would that measure only incite unnecessary panic!roximity to the capital gave the situation extra urgency.

    Might it, too, have to be evacuated, with all theunfathomable costs that might entail "ithout reliablemeasurements of the total radioactivity released to theenvironment or estimates of how large it might grow,policymakers had no choice but to answer these fraught#uestions on the basis of guesswork.

    • $hese events played out three times%at the &S state of!ennsylvania's $hree Mile (sland )uclear !ower !lant in*++, at then-Soviet &kraine's hernobyl )uclear !ower

    !lant in *+/0, and at 1apan's Fukushima 2aiichi in 34**.2uring the accident at $hree Mile (sland, only

    http://blogs.wsj.com/japanrealtime/2013/11/12/fukushima-watch-some-power-companies-in-black-without-nuclear-restarts/http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/japan/10193489/Shinzo-Abe-wins-mandate-to-remodel-Japan-as-party-wins-control-of-upper-house.htmlhttp://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/japan/10193489/Shinzo-Abe-wins-mandate-to-remodel-Japan-as-party-wins-control-of-upper-house.htmlhttp://blogs.wsj.com/japanrealtime/2013/11/12/fukushima-watch-some-power-companies-in-black-without-nuclear-restarts/http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/japan/10193489/Shinzo-Abe-wins-mandate-to-remodel-Japan-as-party-wins-control-of-upper-house.htmlhttp://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/japan/10193489/Shinzo-Abe-wins-mandate-to-remodel-Japan-as-party-wins-control-of-upper-house.html

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    authorities5 overly optimistic assessment of the damageto the reactor forestalled them from ordering a generalevacuation of the surrounding area, which might haveincluded state capital 6arrisburg. Several days after the

    explosion of hernobyl )uclear !ower !lant &nit 7, thesudden acceleration of radioactivity releases led theSoviet government to fear that the &krainian capital of8yiv, *44 kilometers 903 miles: distant, might have to beevacuated. (n the course of the crisis at Fukushima2aiichi, the 1apanese government grappled with asimilar dilemma; &nable to predict how far seriouscontamination might extend from the crippled plant, itsecretly pondered the prospect of evacuating $okyo evenas official pronouncements assured the public thatevents were under control.

    • (n all three of these cases, uncertainty about sourceterms%the #uantities and characteristics of theradioactive isotopes released in a nuclear event%hindered efforts to formulate an effective emergencyresponse. Source terms determine populations5 ultimateradiation exposure, and therefore decisions about shelter

    and evacuation necessarily depend on assessments ofthem.

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    prevent the release of radioactive material should thosefail. onfident that a serious accident would beprevented, in the *+04s and early *+4s the ommissiondid not re#uire reactor operators or local governments to

    plan for a nuclear accident with off-site conse#uences.• 2uring the *+4s the potential perils of this

    overconfident attitude became apparent, leading to thedevelopment of the assumptions that still undergirdplanning for nuclear accidents in the &nited States. "idely publicized concerns originating from within the >tomic

    shelter and evacuation difficult. (n many circumstances,evacuating populations from areas around a damagedreactor appeared most effective at reducing individuals5radiation exposure, but this measure also had numerousdownsides. For instance, a particularly extreme accidentthat dispersed large amounts of radioactivity #uicklymight not provide nearby populations with sufficienttime to evacuate. !resciently, analysts alsorecognized that evacuation stood to be expensive and

    disruptive, and that in less-extreme accidents these

    http://1.usa.gov/1lOeVLfhttp://1.usa.gov/1lOeVLfhttp://1.usa.gov/1lOeVLfhttp://1.usa.gov/1lOeVLfhttp://1.usa.gov/1lOeVLfhttp://1.usa.gov/1lOeVLf

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    considerations might outweigh the benefits of loweredradiation doses.

    • >lthough the )uclear Begulatory ommission and attempted to set conservative standards for emergency

    management planning around nuclear power plants, thelack of practical experience with nuclear accidents andexpert disagreement about their possible conse#uencesforced the two agencies to make policy based on onlyapproximate estimates. (n *+/, the )uclear Begulatoryommission and agreed on the concept ofCemergency planning zones,D which remain a prominentfeature of &S plans to ameliorate the conse#uences ofreactor accidents. $he agencies recommended two sizesof zones in anticipation of #ualitatively differentradiation hazards; one with a radius of *4 miles 9*0.*kilometers: to address whole-body radiation exposure,and another with a radius of =4 miles 9/4.= kilometers:aimed at preventing ingestion of radioactivity in foodand water. En the basis of the most sophisticatedanalysis then available, the )uclear Begulatoryommission and concluded that an accident

    creating radiation hazards dire enough to re#uireevacuation more than *4 miles from a plant wasextremely unlikely , and recommended that relocationplans only address the *4-mile zone.

    • $he minimal external impact of the accident at $hreeMile (sland &nit 3 in *++ helped dispel some of the worst fears about the conse#uences of nuclear accidents, but also demonstrated >merica's unpreparedness for aradiation emergency. >lthough only relatively minor

    radiological releases occurred, $hree Mile (slandrevealed both the inability of the )uclear Begulatoryommission to handle a crisis situation and the weakness of &S emergency management in general. >tthe time of the accident the ommission was directlyresponsible for overseeing plants' emergencymanagement planning, and had only Aust begunimplementing the recommendations it had developed inconAunction with the . (n the course of the crisis, it

     became apparent that no usable plans were available to

    http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0513/ML051390356.pdfhttp://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0513/ML051390356.pdfhttp://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0513/ML051390356.pdfhttp://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0513/ML051390356.pdfhttp://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0513/ML051390356.pdfhttp://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0513/ML051390356.pdfhttp://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0513/ML051390356.pdfhttp://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0513/ML051390356.pdf

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    needed. Forced to improvise, the Soviet authorities firstevacuated the city of !ripyat, a few kilometers from thedamaged plant, and then progressively expanded theevacuation to encompass areas within *4 kilometers 90.3

    miles: and finally @4 kilometers 9*/.0 miles:.

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    contained many years' worth of irradiated fuelassemblies and a much-greater #uantity of long-livedradionuclides than the failing reactors. (n theory, if thelevel of water in the pool fell below the fuel it might

    create conditions in which the assemblies' zirconiumcladding could burn, threatening to spread an immenseamount of radioactivity over 1apan. "ithout anyexperience with such a scenario, however, the 1apanesegovernment could neither ascertain how likely it might be to happen, nor determine how to best protect itscitizens. (t chose a precautionary approach to thereleases from the damaged reactors, evacuating the area within twenty kilometers of the plant before substantialradiation releases took place, but elected to Cwait andseeD about the possible spent fuel pool fire.

    • >s happened after hernobyl, these arrangements bothevacuated large numbers of people from relativelyuncontaminated territory while leaving some in areas with substantial radiation hazards. "hile favorable windconditions blew most of the radioactive material releasedfrom Fukushima 2aiichi over the !acific, an area of

    serious contamination extended outside the evacuatedzone 9even after it was expanded to a @4-kilometerradius: to encompass the village of (itate, @+ kilometers937.3 miles: from the plant. Following protests from the(>, the 1apanese government recommended theevacuation of this area in late >pril 34**, more than amonth after the disaster. Meanwhile, the evacuationcaused immense stress to the population that may have been greater than the health benefits it produced through

    lowered radiation doses. >lthough even during theaccident's immediate aftermath some argued thatcomputer models of the spread of radiologicalcontamination should be utilized to plan evacuations andother protective measures, these programs can onlymake realistic predictions when provided with accuratesource-term estimates. )ot only did the 1apanesegovernment struggle to produce real-time estimates ofthe radiological releases, available information about

    conditions within the damaged reactors was too sparse to

    http://www.stanford.edu/group/efmh/jacobson/TenHoeveEES12.pdfhttp://www.stanford.edu/group/efmh/jacobson/TenHoeveEES12.pdfhttp://journals.ametsoc.org/doi/abs/10.1175/BAMS-D-11-00158.1http://journals.ametsoc.org/doi/abs/10.1175/BAMS-D-11-00158.1http://www.stanford.edu/group/efmh/jacobson/TenHoeveEES12.pdfhttp://www.stanford.edu/group/efmh/jacobson/TenHoeveEES12.pdfhttp://journals.ametsoc.org/doi/abs/10.1175/BAMS-D-11-00158.1http://journals.ametsoc.org/doi/abs/10.1175/BAMS-D-11-00158.1

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    make confident predictions about possible futuredevelopments. Ence again, source-term uncertaintyproved a critical obstacle to emergency planning.

    • >lthough the experiences of hernobyl and Fukushima

    seriously challenge the assumptions that have remainedcentral to emergency planning for nuclear accidents inthe &nited States since the late *+4s, they offer few easy lessons for emergency managers. "hile hernobyl andFukushima failed to fulfill the worst fears about theconse#uences of nuclear accidents, their source termsdiffered #ualitatively from those that formed therationale for *4-mile and =4-mile emergency planningzones. Such simplistic geographic categories failed badlyin both cases, as evacuations proved necessary in areas well beyond a *4-mile radius. 2espite the clear exampleset by these cases, the )uclear Begulatory ommissioncontinues to insist that evacuation and communicationplanning for areas more than *4 miles from nuclearplants is unnecessary. >t the same time, hernobyl andFukushima also demonstrated that the costs ofevacuation sometimes outweigh the benefits, and suggest

    that if possible, populations should only be relocated as ameans of last resort. "eighing the relative benefits ofevacuation and possible alternatives, however, isextremely difficult in the absence of reliable source-termestimates.

    • Fortunately, measures exist that demonstrate howemergency managers can reduce the impact of source-term uncertainty. (llinois, which hosts more nuclearreactors than any other state, possesses its own 2ivision

    of )uclear Safety within the (llinois gency.

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    the areas surrounding them%maximizing theinformation available to decision-makers during a crisis.

    • (llinois demonstrates the feasibility and affordability ofthese measures, and emulating them could provide

    emergency managers in other parts of the country withthe means to make the best possible decisions to protectthe public following a nuclear accident. $his type ofintegration between remote monitoring and emergencymanagement could be made even more effective withimproved instrumentation and analytical techni#ues toproduce better source-term estimates. >lthough in thepast research in this area was hobbled by a lack ofexperience with serious accidents at light-water reactors,ongoing technical studies of the Fukushima releasesshould help alleviate this problem. Should the &nitedStates ever face a radiological emergency, investments inthese areas could pay for themselves many times over.

    Nuclear crises: How do

    Fukushima and Chernobylcompare?Japan has raised the severity level of its nuclear crisis 

    from five to the maximum seven, putting the emergency

    at the Fukushima Daiichi power plant on a par with that

    at Chernobyl in 1986. Mark Tran looks at the differencesbetween the two disasters

    What is the severity level?

    The International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) international

    nuclear and radiological event scale ranks nuclear andradiological accidents and incidents by severity from one to

    http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/12/japan-nuclear-crisis-chernobyl-severity-level1http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/tsunamiupdate01.htmlhttp://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/tsunamiupdate01.htmlhttp://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/12/japan-nuclear-crisis-chernobyl-severity-level1http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/tsunamiupdate01.htmlhttp://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/tsunamiupdate01.html

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    seven. Until now, the 1986 Chernobyl accident was the only

    nuclear accident to have been rated a level seven event, which

    the IAEA describes as "a major release of radioactive material

    with widespread health and environmental effects requiring

    implementation of planned and extended countermeasures".

    Officials from Japan's nuclear and industrial safety agency

    (Nisa) estimate that the amount of radioactive material released

    to the atmosphere from Fukushima is much less than Chernobyl.

    A spokesman for Nisa said the new ranking did not mean the

    Japanese plant posed the same threat to public health or

    involved similarly big releases of radiation as the Chernobyl

    disaster.

    What is the main difference between the two

    accidents?

    At Chernobyl, explosions destroyed a reactor, releasing a cloud

    of radiation that contaminated large areas of Europe. At

    Fukushima, which was damaged by an earthquake, the reactors

    still have mostly intact containment vessels surrounding theirnuclear cores. Japanese officials point out that at Chernobyl, the

    reactor itself exploded while still active. At Fukushima, the

    magnitude nine earthquake and tsunami crippled the plant's

    cooling system, leading to a partial meltdown of the reactor.

    Earlier attempts to cool the reactor by hosing water from fire

    engines and helicopters left pools of contaminated water and

    flooded basements, hampering the containment operation and

    efforts to restart the cooling pumps. To make room for morehighly radioactive liquid, the plant's operator, Tokyo Electric

    pumped tonnes of contaminated water into the Pacific but

    stopped after the move was criticised by South Korea. Tokyo

    Electric appears to be no closer to restoring cooling systems at

    the reactors, critical to lowering the temperature of overheated

    nuclear fuel rods.

    How much radioactive material has been

    http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/tsunamiupdate01.htmlhttp://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/04/japan-nuclear-plant-release-radioactive-waterhttp://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/04/japan-nuclear-plant-release-radioactive-waterhttp://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/04/japan-nuclear-plant-release-radioactive-waterhttp://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/04/japan-nuclear-plant-release-radioactive-waterhttp://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/04/japan-nuclear-plant-release-radioactive-waterhttp://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/tsunamiupdate01.htmlhttp://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/04/japan-nuclear-plant-release-radioactive-waterhttp://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/04/japan-nuclear-plant-release-radioactive-waterhttp://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/04/japan-nuclear-plant-release-radioactive-waterhttp://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/04/japan-nuclear-plant-release-radioactive-waterhttp://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/04/japan-nuclear-plant-release-radioactive-water

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    released at Fukushima?

    Japan's nuclear safety commission has estimated that the

    Fukushima plant's reactors had released up to 10,000

    terabecquerels of radioactive iodine-131 per hour into the air forseveral hours after they were damaged in the 11 March

    earthquake and tsunami. It said emissions since then had

    dropped to below one terabecquerel per hour, adding that it was

    examining the total amount of radioactive materials released. A

    terabecquerel equals a trillion becquerels, a measure for

    radiation emissions. The government says the Chernobyl

    incident released 5.2m terabecquerels into the air about 10 times

    that of the Fukushima plant.

    What were the effects of Chernobyl?Advertisement

    Fifty emergency rescue workers died from acute radiation

    syndrome and related illnesses, 4,000 children and adolescents

    contracted thyroid cancer, nine of whom died. More than

    100,000 people were immediately evacuated, and the total

    number of evacuees from contaminated areas eventually reached

    350,000. The explosions that destroyed the unit four reactor core

    released a cloud of radionuclides, which contaminated large

    areas of Europe and, in particular, Belarus, the Russian

    Federation and Ukraine, and affected livestock as far away as

    Scandinavia and Britain. Hundreds of thousands of people were

    exposed to substantial radiation doses, including workers whotook part in efforts to mitigate the consequences of the accident.

    The IAEA said the situation had been made worse by conflicting

    information, exaggeration in press coverage and

    pseudoscientific accounts of the accident reporting, for example,

    fatalities in the tens or hundreds of thousands.

    What have been the effects so far at

    Fukushima?

    http://www.theguardian.com/environment/fukushimahttp://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/2005/ebsp2005n008.htmlhttp://www.theguardian.com/environment/fukushimahttp://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/2005/ebsp2005n008.html

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    + The death toll from the tsunami is more than 13,000,

    but no radiation-linked deaths have been reported and

    only 21 plant workers have been affected by minor

    radiation sickness, according to Japanese officials.

    About 70,000 people living within a 12-mile radius of 

    the plant have been evacuated, while 130,000 living

    between 12 and 20 miles from the plant have been

    told to leave voluntarily or stay indoors. The

    government's chief spokesman, Yukio Edano, said the

    current evacuation zone would be extended to five

    other communities, including the village of Iitate,

    which lies 25 miles from the plant. Some experts havecriticised the raising of the severity level. "I think

    raising it to the level of Chernobyl is excessive," said

    Murray Jennex, associate professor at San Diego state

    university. "It's nowhere near that level. Chernobyl

    was terrible – it blew and they had no containment

    and they were stuck. Their [Fukushima] containment

    has been holding, the only thing that hasn't is the fuel

    pool that caught fire."

    • How does Fukushimadiffer from Chernobyl?

    • a!anese authorities ha"e raised the se"erity ratin# ofthe nuclear crisis at the dama#ed Fukushima $aiichi!ower !lant to the hi#hest le"el, se"en%

    • The decision reflects the ongoing release of radiation, ratherthan a sudden deterioration. &e"el se"en previously onlyapplied to the 1986 Chernobyl disaster, where 10 ties asuch radiation was eitted.

    • !ut ost e"perts agree the two nuclear incidents are verydifferent. #"plore the table below to find out how theycopare.

    Fukushima and Chernobyl com!ared

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    Cate#ory Fukushima $aiichi

    $ate of accident 11 $arch %011

    'ccident details  & agnitude'9.0 earth(ua)e anddaaged the plant*s power systecooling systes to fail. & series ofollowed

    (e"erity ratin# +evel ' a-or accident

    )umber of reactors i"/ but only three of concern, pluspent fuel

    Ty!e of reactors !oiling'water reactors. apanesethat unli)e at Chernobyl, the contat u)ushia reain intact. &lso,Chernobyl, the reactors at u)usha cobustible graphite core

    *adiation released 20,000 terabec(uerels3 4as of 1

    'rea affected fficials say areas e"tending or iles5 to the north'west of the pla70) to the south'southwest havlevels e"ceed annual liits

    +"acuation one %0)/ %0'20) voluntary one. beyond the e"isting evacuation been evacuated

    -eo!le e"acuated Tens of thousands

    *elated deaths o deaths so far due to radiation

    &on#.term health dama#e ot yet )nown, but ris)s to huan

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    thought to be low

    Current status #ngineers have brought the plantshutdown condition:, a )ey ilestunder control. ;t will ta)e decadescopletely however.