from the chancellor’s deskphilja.judiciary.gov.ph/files/bulletin/bul80.pdfof preliminary...

1Volume XX Issue No. 80

From the Chancellor’s Desk

Volume XX Issue No. 80October–December 2018 ISSN 2244-5862

These activities rounded up the Academy’s last quarter of 2018:

Regular programs—the 16th

Orientation Seminar-Workshop for Newly Appointed Sheriffs and Process Servers nationwide (held at the PHILJA Training Center [PTC] in Tagaytay City);

the Third Orientation Seminar-Workshop for Newly Appointed Court Stenographers from the National Capital Judicial Region (NCJR) and Regions II to XII (Manila); three successive Orientation Seminar-Workshops for Court Decongestion Officers of Beneficiary Courts (Davao, Cebu and Manila, respectively); a Seminar for Executive Judges and Vice Executive Judges from the NCJR and Regions I to IV (Manila); four Career Enhancement Programs [CEP] for RTC Clerks of Court of Regions I, II and V [Round 3]; plus those for the Regional Trial Court Sheriffs of Regions IX and XII and for Lawyers-Clerks of Court of NCJR [Batch 1, Round 3] at PTC, Tagaytay City; and three batches of the Continuing Legal Education Program for Court Attorneys of the Supreme Court (PTC, Tagaytay City).

Eight special focus programs—Capacity Building on Environmental Laws and the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases for Selected Judges and Branch Clerks of Court of Regions III, IV and V (PTC, Tagaytay City); a Personal Security Training for Judges of Regions I to IV and X (PTC, Tagaytay City); a Seminar on Election Laws for Selected Regional Trial Court Judges nationwide (Manila); two Seminar-Workshops for Court of Appeals Lawyers on the Philippine Competition Act and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (Manila); a Seminar-Workshop on Cybercrime for Judges from Regions VI to IX (Cebu City); a Seminar-Workshop on Dangerous Drugs Law for Judges, Prosecutors and Law Enforcers of Region V (Legazpi City); a Training on International Humanitarian Law for Judges, Prosecutors, and Law Enforcement Officers from Regions X and XII (Cagayan de Oro City); and a series of Training Seminars on Special Issues on the Implementation of the Revised Guidelines for Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases for Judges, Prosecutors and Public Attorneys (CDO, Davao, Iloilo, Laoag City, Pasay City, Palo, Leyte and Dipolog City).

(continued on page 2)

Furthermore, the 15th Metrobank Foundation Professsorial Chair Lecture on “Tax Principles and Remedies: Tools for Inclusive Economic Growth, Development, Prosperity and Stability” by Court of Appeals Justice Japar B. Dimaampao was held at the Session Hall of the Supreme Court last October. PHILJA lent a hand in three convention seminars for different organizations of judiciary employees: the Philippine Judges Association Mid-term Convention with the theme “PJA: Forging Partnerships in the International Legal Communities” (Tagaytay City); the National Convention and Seminar of the Philippine Trial Court Judges League, Inc., titled “PTJLI: Celebrating 25 Years of Committed Leadership, Fostering Camaraderie and Independence” (Puerto Princesa City, Palawan); and the National Convention and Seminar of the First Level Clerks of Court Association of the Philippines on “Embracing Changes, Conquering Challenges” (General Santos City).

PHILJA joined the Supreme Court’s Enhanced Justice on Wheels (E-JOW) Program with the conduct of the Information Dissemination through a Dialogue among Barangay and Court Officials and Mobile Court-Annexed Mediation (MCAM) in Kidapawan City, Province of North Cotabato attended by barangay officials from the area.

The Philippine Mediation Center Office, in furtherance of Alternative Dispute Resolution, conducted Refresher/

DCA Leo T. Madrazo gives updates on administrative circulars and issuances at the National Convention and Seminar of the First Level Clerks of Court Association of the Philippines held on November 27 to 29, 2018 at the Family Country Hotel and Convention Center, General Santos City.

2 October–December 2018

From the Chancellor’s Desk(continued from page 1)

ADOLFO S. AZCUNAChancellor

Advanced Courses for Court-Annexed Mediators (Skills Enhancement Course): the Nueva Ecija, Tarlac, Camarines Norte, and Pampanga Programs (PTC, Tagaytay City); the Samar, Leyte and Biliran Programs (in Palo, Leyte); the Benguet, Pangasinan, La Union, Aurora, and Quirino Programs (in Baguio City); and the Metro Manila and Nueva Vizcaya Mediation Programs (PTC, Tagaytay City). Two batches of Judicial Settlement Conferences for Judges were given: one Skills-based for Judges of the NCJR and Regions II to V (PTC, Tagaytay City) and another for Judges of Regions V to VII and X to XI (in Cebu City). An Orientation Seminar for Clerks of Court and Branch Clerks of Court on Judicial Dispute Resolution for Albay and Sorsogon (in Legazpi City) and an Orientation of Law Practitioners on Judicial Dispute Resolution for PAO and IBP lawyers and Philippine Mediation Center Unit staff from Albay and Sorsogon (in Legazpi City) were also held.

Contents

From the Chancellor’s Desk ...................................... 1

Judicial Views .......................................................... 3

Training Programs and Activities ............................. 9

Judicial Moves ......................................................... 14

First Impressions ...................................................... 18

New Rulings ............................................................ 19

Doctrinal Reminders ................................................ 20

CircularsOCA Circular No. 229-2018 – Disposal of Unserviceable/Unnecessary Property of the Judiciary.................................. 33OCA Circular No. 235-2018 – Mandatory Submission of Financial Monthly and Quarterly Reports to the Accounting Division, Financial Management Office, Office of the Court Administrator via Private Couriers ....................................... 33 OCA Circular No. 236-2018 – Mandatory Inclusion of the Official Receipt Number and Amount of Cash Bond in the Court Order ........................................................................... 33OCA Circular No. 246-2018 – Discontinuance of Submission of Reports Required under Administrative Circular No. 62-2002 dated November 20, 2002 (Re: Submission of Reports on the Status of Temporary Restraining Orders or Writs of Preliminary Injunction Issued in Various Cases) and Administrative Circular No. 118-2007 dated November 22, 2007 (Re: Report on the Status of Petitions for Writ of Amparo)................................................................................ 34OCA Circular No. 247-2018 – Dropping of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) Circulars Requiring the Submission of Reports by the First and Second Level Courts 34OCA Circular No. 250-2018 – Resolution dated November 13, 2018 in A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC (Re: Rule of Procedure for

Small Claims Cases) Relative to the Provision on the Appearance of a Party Through Representative under Section 18 of the 2016 Revised Rules of Procedure for Small Claims Cases...................... 36OCA Circular No. 251-2018 – Resolution dated November 13, 2018 in G.R. No. 231989 (People of the Philippines v. Romy Lim y Miranda) Providing, among others, Further Clarification on the Application and Interpretation of the Mandatory Policy that Shall Govern the Practice in Maintaining the Chain of Custody to Preserve the Integrity and Evidentiary Value of Seized/Confiscated Illegal Drugs and Other Drug-Related Items ............ 37OCA Circular No. 253-2018 – Renewal of Registration with the Bureau of Internal Revenue ......................................................... 42

OCA Circular No. 263-2018 – Service of Summons, Subpoenas and Other Court Processes by Police Personnel ........................... 42 OrdersMemorandum Order No. 47-2018 – Creating the Special Committee on the Rules of Procedure in Election Contest before the First Level Courts ................................................................... 44

Memorandum Order No. 49-2018 – Designating the Members of the Project Management Team and Technical Working Group for the Lawyer Information System .................................. 45Memorandum Order No. 51-2018 – Reorganizing the Special Committee on Certain Administrative Concerns .......................... 47 Memorandum Order No. 57-2018 – Reorganizing the Committee on Family Courts and Juvenile Concerns ...................................... 47Memorandum Order No. 60-2018 – Reorganizing the Committee on Computerization and Library .................................................. 48Memorandum Order No. 61-2018 – Reorganizing the eCourts Technology Governance Committee ............................................ 49Memorandum Order No. 63-2018 – Reconstituting the Technical Working Group for the Judiciary’s Compliance with the United Nations Convention Against Corruption ...................................... 50

New decisions of the Supreme Court were noted and reminders given on doctrinal rulings, as well as on newly issued Court orders, resolutions, and circulars through our website http://philja.judiciary.gov.ph. We also took note of new OCA circulars.

As we close 2018, I thank our ever-reliable officials and staff, our exceptional corps of professors and lecturers, as well as our generous program partners for giving their best to the Academy. Special thanks, too, to our new Chief Justice, Lucas P. Bersamin, and to the Court En Banc for their solid support of all our programs and activities. Above all, thanks to God Almighty for making all good things possible.

All the best.


To the Frontiers and Beyond: Assessing the Refugee Crisis and Large-Scale Human Migration within the ASEAN Context* **

MARIA JOSEFINA G. SAN JUAN-TORRES***

“By any measure this is an unacceptable number.” - Filippo Grandi, UN High Commissioner for Refugees

Current National Legal Framework

The two main government initiatives instituting a refugee determination procedure for the Philippines are illustrated by Department Circular No. 58 of the Department of Justice, series of 2012, and its predecessor, DOJ Department Order No. 94, series of 1998.

In Department Order No. 94, the Philippines, in compliance with its obligations under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol and in consonance with Section 47(b) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, established the procedure for the processing of applications for refugee status26 and constituted a four-member Refugee Processing Unit through Department Order No. 115, series of 1998.

In 2012, the Philippines was cited for having become a state-party to the 1954 UN Convention on Stateless Persons. It made history as the first and only country to do so in Southeast Asia.27 In line with its treaty obligation, it instituted a statelessness status determination procedure through Department Circular No. 58 (Establishing the Refugee and Stateless Status Determination Procedure). It renamed the Refugee Protection Unit (RPU) and established the Refugee and Stateless Persons Protection Unit (RSPPU) within the Department of Justice.

* A Discussion Paper delivered at the Eighth International Organization for Judicial Training Conference on November 5–9, 2017 at the Shangri-la The Fort, Taguig City, Philippines. The paper is based on the author’s personal analysis of references and sources and does not reflect in toto the view of the institution it represents.

** Second of two-part series

*** Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 79, Morong, Rizal.26 Establishing a Procedure for Processing Applications for the Grant of

Refugee Status, Approved on March 4, 1998.27 The Philippines as Haven for Refugees, Presidential Museum and Library,

Republic of the Philippines.

In conjunction with Department Circular No. 58, DOJ Department Order No. 324, series of 2016 reconstituted RSPPU’s composition to 17, with 15 Protection Officers. It then reorganized the RSPPU further expanding its composition to 20, with 17 State Counsels designated as Protection Officers.

With the Philippines’ refugee determination procedure as a model of best practices for the ASEAN community, Department Order No. 58 contains important features not present or practiced in other countries who signed the 1951 Convention, Protocol and the 1954 Convention. The key features are:

a. Preservation and promotion of family unity;

b. Non-detention on account of statelessness or of being a refugee;

c. Non-deprivation of refugee or stateless status and non-discrimination in terms of applicability of the Conventions on account of race, religion, membership of a particular social group, political opinion, or country of origin;

d. Non-refoulement: non-expulsion of an applicant/dependents or of a refugee to a country where there are valid reasons to believe that his or her life or freedom would be threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion;

e. No punishment/penalty on account of illegal entry or presence in the country provided that the applicant presents himself without delay and/or shows good cause for the illegal entry or presence;

f. Shared burden of proof by applicant and the protection officer: collaboration to determine whether the person is stateless. Non-adversarial in nature;


g. Access to justice: legal assistance, counselling and representation, remedy of appeal, written decision, access to UNHCR, due process clause (right to be heard/interviewed);

h. Priority of refugee status determination: determination of stateless status is suspended;

i. No contact with authorities of a foreign status where there is a claim of persecution pending determination of stateless status;

j. Right to residence for person found to be stateless: includes family members.

Given the mandate under Department Circular No. 58, the RSPPU has already processed claims for refugee determination and currently addressing the needs of persons who are at risk of being “stateless” in Southern Philippines.

As of September 2017, UNHCR data show that there are 477 recognized refugees and 247 asylum seekers covered under the Philippines’ refugee determination program.

At present, the Philippines, in keeping with its treaty obligations, through the DOJ-RSPPU, commenced initiatives to expand the protection space for asylum seekers, refugees and stateless persons while within Philippine territory by providing them with access to certain basic human rights.

Some of these current programs are:

• Establishment in 2015 of the Philippine National Action Plan (NAP) to End Statelessness, adopting seven action points from the UNHCR’s 10-year Global Action Plan to End Statelessness which was launched in 2014;

• Creation of the Technical Working Group on Birth Registration as part of the Philippines’ National Action Program;

• Identification of the populations at risk of statelessness in the Philippines in 2011–2012;28

• Initiative and success of the project for the Registration and Confirmation of Nationality of Persons of Indonesian Descent (PID) in Southern Philippines. On March 14, 2016, after years of living in legal limbo, a first group of over 660 people in the southern Philippines had their citizenship confirmed.

This was an important step in the global campaign to end statelessness by 2024. The event took place on Monday at the Municipal Hall of Glan in Sarangani as the governments of the Philippines and Indonesia, with the support of the UNHCR, continue efforts to assist people who are at risk of being stateless. The mission was spearheaded by the Department of Justice for the Philippine government and the Indonesian Consulate for the Indonesian government. Representatives from the Bureau of Immigration and the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) also took part in the process;29

• Formal Signing of the Inter-agency Agreement on the Protection of Asylum Seekers, Refugees and Stateless Persons in the Philippines, which institutionalized the referral system being observed by the DOJ-RSPPU to address issues and concerns of these persons of concern;30

• Creation of the Technical Working Group for Stateless Migrants Residing in the Philippines;

• Engagement of faith-based organizations and civil society organizations (CSOs) under the same objective as the Inter-agency Agreement.31

Anent to this, with the implementation of the Philippine Government’s National Action Plan to End Statelessness in full swing, two technical working groups were convened to create strategic workplans to promote children’s right to nationality (National Action Plan Point Number 2) and protection and facilitated naturalization of stateless persons and refugees (National Action Plan Point Number 4):

– Technical Working Group on Facilitated Naturalization and Children’s Right to Nationality.32

– Technical Working Group Workshop on Birth Registration.33

28 To address this issue, a confirmation and registration of persons of Indonesian descent (PIDs) was launched in 2014. The exercise registered more than 8,745 PIDs in seven provinces and two cities which include Davao del Sur, Davao del Norte, Davao Oriental, Sarangani, Sultan Kudarat, North Cotabato, South Cotabato, General Santos City and Davao City.

29 UNHCR Report, March 14, 2016.30 Held last October 12, 2017.31 Ongoing consultations.32 This TWG (of which the Judiciary is a member) aims to create institutional

reforms that would contribute to the reduction and prevention of statelessness in the Philippines.

33 The TWG brings together key stakeholders from the government (including the Judiciary) and civil society to establish a workplan that aims to achieve a 100 percent birth registration within the country and among Filipinos in migration settings by 2024 (to coincide with the 10-year UNHCR’s Global Action Plan).


Institutionalizing Protection Space within the ASEAN Region as a Durable Solution

So while all solutions or at the very least recommended actions point to New York,34 the Asia-Pacific rim may be where sustained action on forced migration will be brewing over the next few years. For as Europe and other Western countries have, to a certain extent, reached a saturation level for absorbing large waves of asylum seekers,35 flight patterns will soon find their way into Southeast and the Asia Pacific. Should this come to pass, all countries in the region must step up to the plate.

Several countries in the region have found that to be a challenge, at great human cost. They must be persuaded to switch gears and make forced migration a core and constructive part of their agenda. The promised global compacts will be strengthened immeasurably if robust progress can be made in the Asia-Pacific, particularly in the ASEAN bloc before a further crisis explodes.

Forced migration, by default, has been a part of the ASEAN society since the Indo-Chinese refugee crisis in the late 1970s until the recent Rohingya exodus. The uncertain international response to reduce the burden of asylum countries indicate that forced migration would end up in a protracted situation, still waiting for a durable solution to address them.36

There is an urgent call for a cohesive regional policy for refugees and asylum seekers based on common traditions, shared values, including the principles of tolerance and mutual respect, a clear commitment to the right of asylum, and a strong will to confront the root of human exodus.

Countries in the ASEAN region must ensure that their domestic approaches are in sync with their regional action. This would mean veering away from short-term, unilateral action on forced migration, and in place of it, to prioritize in its regional and integration initiatives a system that allows its Member-States to advance the welfare of their citizens and better protect the vulnerable migrants and refugees residing within them. The rationale is that it is better to manage and integrate them rather than being oblivious to their presence within the region. To render them faceless and forgotten are potential hotspots for breeding hostility and resentment making them vulnerable to exploitation, which may in the long run result in security issues both national security and human security.

At this point, it is worth acknowledging that important progress has been made in the examination of national security concerns arising from forced migration flows and the need for better regional information cooperation and national identification and (civil) registration systems, especially to address the issue of statelessness.

At its current state, the 1951 Refugee Convention fails to cover all refugee situations, particularly within the ASEAN community whose concept of sovereignty is closely guarded and given the complexity of the diverse cultures of its Member-States. Developed after the World Wars, the Convention may not be relevant nor suitable for future refugee situations in the region. To widen the protection of refugees, States will have to either reexamine the Convention and its 1967 Protocol or develop new methods to facilitate the asylum process.

Preventive stage: A coordinated and coherent ASEAN policy to effectively manage large migration flows calls for examining the root causes of human exodus.37 A regional and subregional contingency planning and preparedness must be reassessed within this context. Active intervention in the realm of respect for human rights, due process and access to justice while exercising cultural sensitivity, and recognizing a state’s exercise of sovereignty, and supporting development are a much more effective approach than building walls or doing pushbacks.

It bears stressing on the amplified use of early warning systems in order to avert mass migrations. This scheme may be utilized not only for adequate monitoring and for the preparation of relief assistance to meet emergency flight situations but also for the purpose of identifying potential human movements with sufficient lead time to counteract the cause of the exodus.38

Simply absorbing refugees is not really an option, or at least not a complete one. To do so would be farther from the truth of a durable solution. The only real option for tackling the refugee crisis is to address the causes of people’s displacement, including terrorism, hunger, disease, oppression, inadequate infrastructure, scarce vital resources, a lack of jobs and economic prospects, and falling standards of living. Supporting development is not some discretionary act of generosity but a matter of mutual survival.39 There is a need to tap the private sector’s potential to support development.

37 Maria Josefina G. San Juan, ASEAN REFUGEE POLICY: A COLLECTIVE LEGAL APPROACH TO REFUGEE PREVENTION AND PROTECTION (CLAPP), Thesis in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Juris Doctor, College of Law, Ateneo de Manila University, 1991.

38 Supra note 27.39 Nirj Veda, Private-sector Solution to Refugee Crisis, World View, July 10,

2017 <www.inquirer.net> (last accessed October 2017).

34 New York Declaration which established the Global Compact for Refugees, September 2016.

35 Claimed to be compassion fatigue and having reached its saturated absorption.

36 Supra note 8 [The Comprehensive Plan of Action, Operation from late 1970s until 1996.]


In this way, we also expand the protection space for asylum seekers, refugees and stateless migrants. On the other hand, the development strategy can ameliorate the grievance of the host population, improve socio-economic conditions, reinforce availability of infrastructure projects.

Multilateral approach to address the nexus of potential flight is through participatory regionalism through solidarity in the grassroots level. There is a recognized need to provide for asylum seekers and refugees and stateless persons access to a fair and expeditious procedure. It calls for open decision making and consultation among State and non-state actors to expand protection space in terms of provision of basic socio-economic rights (e.g., education, health, shelter, food, employment) and access to justice (ensuring respect for the rule of law and due process). The new consultation mechanism can be developed to: (1) broker early understanding of situations of potential and actual displacement, (2) generate coordinated and effective responses warning system to prevent and manage displacement, and (3) address the causes of people’s displacement (i.e., terrorism, hunger, disease, oppression, inadequate infrastructure, scarce vital resources, lack of employment opportunities, decreasing standards of living). Seen in this perspective, supporting development initiatives up to the grassroots level is not just some humanitarian gesture but one of mutual survival.

Norm entrepreneurship in refugee protection: Civil society organizations (CSOs) can be tapped to develop visibility, capacity and connected through a community/cooperation of practice. Local stakeholders go beyond domestic contexts to engage and reach out with State and non-state actors within the regional and international environment.40 Networking, as part of the region’s inclusion policy (to conform with the ASEAN’s theme of “engaging the world”) be promoted but keeping in mind intra-network sensitivities to avoid member disengagement.

Monitoring stage: This involves the adoption of a legal database network to anticipate possible refugee flight and human migration with refugee-like situations. This legal database shall utilize the early warning system and shall function as an interlinking mechanism among affected countries, organization, voluntary agencies at the local and international levels. On the same vein, there should be a responsible and updated use of the country of origin information (COIs) as an effective tool not only for credibility assessment of the refugee determination process but also for prevention of potential human movement with refugee-like characteristics.41

Legislative stage: Requires the formulation of regional instruments for refugee prevention and protection. ASEAN member nations should be encouraged to promote prevention and protection policies in the light of moral commitment, shared values and common tradition. They should strive to incorporate and harmonize their respective municipal law and international law to provide lasting and durable solutions to refugee and refugee-like phenomenon.

It is about time that the ASEAN takes the baby steps to develop its distinctive concept of a refugee, or an expanded and flexible definition of a refugee (a take-off from the traditional 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol) to meet the peculiar conditions producing migratory flows in the region, while providing an acceptable minimum standard of protection to the individual, and at the same time, ensuring the rights of the State to the exercise of its sovereignty vis-à-vis national and human security issues.

Remedial stage: This entails implementation of basic legal principles of respect for due process, access to justice as a way of addressing the legal, policy and practical challenges when lawyers and judges are confronted with large numbers of claims and cases.

Due to the divergences among the prevailing legal systems of the ASEAN Member-States, and considering that courts in national jurisdiction have significant roles in shaping national perceptions with international legal implications, there must be a synchronization of the diversified degrees and graduated approaches among Member-States on refugee and asylum cases on the application of the refugee definition, reception and treatment, grant of asylum and status determination, and judicial review.42

Other durable solutions:

Ad-hoc measures through inter-agency cooperation

Inter-agency collaboration may be strengthened especially in providing support services to refugees, stateless persons and asylum seekers in terms of addressing basic needs: shelter, education, healthcare, employment/livelihood.

There must also be easier access to consular services, counseling services and legal aid.

Advocacy

Increase public awareness through information drives on the promotion and protection of the rights of refugees, asylum seekers and stateless persons.

Documentation (qualitative and quantitative data)

Decentralization of documentation services (especially those on civil registry), simplification of procedures to expedite 40 Supra note 6. As suggested by Alice M. Nah. [Alice M. Nah <http://

www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13642987.2016.1139333?>(last accessed October 2017).]

41 Supra note 28. 42 Id.


processing of claims, computerization of database of asylum claims, status determination applications, birth registration, and related claims involving refugees, asylum seekers and stateless persons; establishment of profile of persons affected, identification of underlying causes and consequences of flight/movement, and assessment of the roles of stakeholders. There must be a tailoring of data collection exercises and implementation of dedicated surveys.

Role of the Judiciary within the ASEAN Region

Engagement of the Judiciary as a durable solution

On Capacity Building

• Institutional trainings for judges and justices, court personnel and facilitate discussions and workshops on asylum procedures, rights of asylum seekers/refugees/stateless persons, correction of entries in civil registry particularly on birth registration issues of stateless persons

• Trainings/workshops in collaboration with various judicial training centers/academic institutions

• Awareness of legal issues concerning refugees, stateless persons, asylum seekers through publications in law journals, scholarly research/studies, consultative and focus group discussions, dialogue with stakeholders

Procedural Reforms

• Promulgate specific rules of procedure for appeals concerning refugees, asylum seekers and stateless persons on the claim for status determination on appeal/review

• Revisit rules of procedure on gender-related cases (those under CEDAW) to ensure better protection for women and children covered by the refugee and stateless status determination proceedings

• Revisit rules of procedure on civil registration proceedings filed in court affecting refugees, asylum seekers and stateless persons and promulgate rules of procedure to fit their needs and circumstances, including present rules of procedure involving children particularly foundlings, unaccompanied minors

• Designation of specialized courts to handle appeals of status determination decisions, petitions for naturalization and citizenship, entries in civil registry involving asylum seekers, refugees, and stateless persons (expedite judicial proceedings or facilitated proceedings in petitions for naturalization and/or citizenship)

Tracking Jurisprudence

• Improve monitoring and documentation of case law and jurisprudence involving claims of refugees, asylum

seekers and stateless persons and the use of soft law (ICJ Principles, Bali Process, ADHR)

Thus, there is a need for judiciaries (judges and decision makers) and legal professions to ensure that practitioners receive appropriate training and better access to information about international standards on status determination and reliable information about country situations.43 The role of judges/decision makers is to ensure that individuals’ procedural rights in such situations are protected, that the rule of law is respected, and that access to justice is available. They should be oriented on reviewing the constitutionality and international legality of relevant national and regional/international policies and practices. For those countries who have not as yet signed or ratified international refugee conventions/treaties, its judicial institutions can resort to soft law in the absence of treaty obligations and national law. Examples of these are the Bali Process44 and the Principles on the Role of Judges and Lawyers in Situations of Large-scale Movement of Refugees and Migrants.45 Also, the limited concepts of justice which have found expression in the countries’ respective Constitutions, the laws and even some of the customs and traditions are major obstacles faced by the judiciary so as to limit judicial intervention based on professional ideals. An enlightened public opinion plays a crucial role in removing these legal barriers so as to constitutionally recondition and expand judicial review without violating the separation of powers doctrine.

The judiciary needs to be sensitive to the public outcry and outrage on injustice. It is only in this manner that public confidence in justice could be restored, particularly in critical issues like large-scale migration and refugee flows, dislocation of people, and other similar crisis which require a genuine response from the judiciary.

As judges, how then can the rule of law transform the rule of life? After all, when we consider large scale migration and refugee flow, it all boils down to the essence of the right to life.

Ultimately, large scale migration and refugee flow being a multi-layered issue, the author believes that it is still the holistic/multi-layered best practices approach,

43 Cited in the Geneva Forum 2016, Large Movements of Refugees and Migrants: The Role of Judges and Lawyers, International Commission of Jurists.

44 Supra note 12. [Principles Concerning Treatment of Refugees Adopted in the Asian-African Consultative Committee at its Eighth Session in 1966.]

45 Prepared by the International Commission of Jurists as a result of the 2016 Geneva Forum. The Principles complement ICJ’s 2011 (updated 2014) Practitioners’ Guide No. 6 on Migration and International Human Rights Law.


through consultations with stakeholders, that will point the way forward for judges and lawyers to raise awareness and address viable solutions. It is hoped that we, as judges and lawyers, can start creating ripples and be the harbingers of putting migration and asylum law into a new dimension within our respective jurisdictions.

We put a face on the faceless;We give a name for one who has none;We build a home for one who has fled;We offer a new life to one who had to give it up.

As judges, we are part of that process. It is not enough that we interpret and apply the law. We delve into the spirit of the law.

If we go beyond the peripheries and see through the eyes and hear the stories of those floating in legal anonymity, of those who wander endlessly hoping to find their way home or to find a new home, it is unsettling to pretend that they don’t exist and for us not to care at all.

“Amidst the numerous starfish stranded along the shores, for each that we throw back into the ocean they call home, it makes a big difference to each one of them.”46

Other References/Sources of Facts/and Figures/Acknowledgments

Ambassador Rosario G. Manalo (interview on ASEAN human rights mechanism)

Department of Justice–Refugees and Stateless Persons Protection Unit (DOJ-RSPPU), with special acknowledgment to State Counsel Melvin Suarez

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)– Philippines

Ateneo Human Rights Center (AHRC)–Ateneo Law School, with special acknowledgment to Dean Sedfrey M. Candelaria

International Commission of Jurists (ICJ)

International Association of Refugee Law Judges (IARLJ)–Asia Pacific Chapter

Asian Network for Refugee and International Protection (ANRIP)

46 Paraphrasing an anecdote shared by a UNHCR (Malaysia) retainer counsel during the ANRIP (Asian Network for Refugee and International Protection) affiliated UNHCR Workshop held last October 3, 2017 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

Annex “1”

Who is a refugee?

A refugee is someone who has been forced to flee his or her country because of persecution, war, or violence. A refugee has a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group. Most likely, they cannot return home or are afraid to do so. War and ethnic, tribal and religious violence are leading causes of refugees fleeing their countries. <www.unrefugees.org/refugees-facts/What-is-a-refugee/>

Refugee: A person who meets the eligibility criteria under the applicable refugee definition, as provided for in international or regional refugee instruments, under UNHCR’s mandate, and/or in national legislation.

Who is a stateless person?

A stateless person is someone who is not a citizen of any country. Citizenship is the legal bond between a government and an individual, and allows for certain political, economic, social and other rights of the individual, as well as the responsibilities of both government and citizen. A person can become stateless due to a variety of reasons, including sovereign, legal, technical or administrative decisions or oversights. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights underlines that “Everyone has the right to a nationality.”<www.unrefugees.org/refugees-facts/What-is-a-refugee/>

Stateless Person: A person who, under national laws, does not have the legal bond of nationality with any State. Article 1 of the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons indicates that a person not considered a national (or citizen) automatically under the laws of any State, is stateless.

Who is an asylum seeker?

When people flee their own country and seek sanctuary in another country, they apply for asylum—the right to be recognized as a refugee and receive legal protection and material assistance. An asylum seeker must demonstrate that his or her fear of persecution in his or her home country is well-founded. <www.unrefugees.org/refugees-facts/What-is-a-refugee/>

Asylum-Seeker: An asylum-seeker is an individual who is seeking international protection. In countries with individualized procedures, an asylum-seeker is someone whose claim has not yet been finally decided on by the country in which he or she has submitted it. Not every asylum seeker will ultimately be recognized as a refugee, but every refugee is initially an asylum-seeker.

What is refugee status determination?

Refugee Status Determination Procedures: Legal and administrative procedures undertaken by UNHCR and/or States to determine whether an individual should be recognized as a refugee in accordance with national and international law.

References:

UNHCR (USA)UNHCR Master Glossary of Terms (Published 2006)


Training Programs and Activities

Twelve Training Seminars on Special Issues on the Implementation of the Revised Guidelines for Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases were conducted by the Philippine Judicial Academy, in partnership with the SC Technical Working Group on Continuous Trial and The Asia Foundation, from August to December 2018.

A total of 2,439 regional trial court judges, selected prosecutors, and lawyers from the Public Attorney’s Office attended the training seminars aimed at addressing the issues encountered by stakeholders in the implementation of the revised guidelines on Continuous Trial in Criminal Cases (CTCC).

Supreme Court Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta discussed the Overview of the Special Issues in the Implementation of the Revised Guidelines on Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases, Special Issues on the Use of Documents submitted during Preliminary Investigations and Drafting of Flowcharts in the Pre-Trial, Special Issues on Family Courts and Child Witnesses, Special Issues on Plea Bargaining Guidelines in Drug Cases, and Frequently Asked Questions on the Revised Guidelines on Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases during the training seminars. The results of the Continuous Trial Monitoring System were presented by Atty. Maria Alma Corazon H. Puncia, Court Attorney IV, Judicial Supervision and Monitoring Division, Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)-Court Management Office. Participants were able to express their concerns during the open discussion sessions with

Training Seminars on Special Issues on the Implementationof the Revised Guidelines for Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases

Justice Peralta, Court Administrator Jose Midas P. Marquez, Atty. Puncia and other OCA representatives as panelists. The discussions focused on plea bargaining, bail, evidence, penalties, substantive provisions of the guidelines for CTCC, pre-trial and stipulation of facts, mediation, probation, and case decongestion, as well as other OCA concerns.

This training series was a follow-up activity to the Training Seminars on the Revised Guidelines on Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases also conducted by the Academy in 2017 upon the effectivity of the Revised Guidelines for Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases.


Orientation-Seminar

16th Orientation Seminar-Workshop for Newly Appointed Sheriffs and Process Servers

Date: October 16–18, 2018Venue: PHILJA Training Center, Tagaytay CityParticipants: 68 sheriffs and process servers

Third Orientation Seminar-Workshop for Newly Appointed Court Stenographers

Date: October 25–26, 2018Venue: Bayview Park Hotel, Manila Participants: 55 court stenographers

Orientation and Seminar-Workshop for Court Decongestion Officers of Beneficiary Courts

MindanaoDate: October 10–11, 2018Venue: The Pinnacle Hotel and Suites, Davao CityParticipants: 33 court decongestion officers

VisayasDate: November 27–28, 2018Venue: Quest Hotel, Cebu CityParticipants: 53 court decongestion officers

Luzon and NCJR Date: December 6–7, 2018Venue: Bayview Park Hotel, ManilaParticipants: 66 court decongestion officers

Seminar for Executive Judges and Vice Executive Judges

Date: November 22–23, 2018Venue: Bayview Park Hotel, ManilaParticipants: 45 RTC, MeTC, MTCC and MTC, executive and vice executive judges

Pre-Judicature Program

47th Pre-Judicature Program

Date: November 12–23, 2018Venue: PHILJA Training Center, Tagaytay CityParticipants: 52 lawyers, namely:

NCJRAlthea Barbara E. AcasCeezay A. BaldomarShelamarie M. BeltranMary Angieline L. BelzaGizelle Lou M. Cabahug-FugosoRhoderick P. CaraigGerard L. Chan*Beverly Elvy B. De MesaKatrin Jessica I. DistorThelma A. Ducusin-BucaoRyan D. FerrarenVirgilio R. FolloscoMaria Corazon D. GarcianoMarie Karen C. JizSuzette L. Legislador-LopezJennifer S. Luego-Dela MercedCristina A. MabazzaHazel V. Macalalag-TomasDana Paula B. MendiolaMaria Cecilia A. MoldezEric Voltaire A. PabloBernalyn A. PerezLuithe Lovella C. Quitalig-CabangunayRodolfo V. Quitolbo, Jr.Karen Christine S. Red-LockAmabel R. Sanvictores-CasteloJennie A. Trinidad

Region ICarla N. AndresMa. Valenie G. BlandoKathleen Ann S. Bromeo-OrduñaEmmylou V. Rubang-MangasarMyraflor G. Saculles

Region IIHelga Anne Treasure L. Ayuyang

* Incomplete attendance (was not able to attend the afternoon session on November 22)


** From Batch 45. Attended the morning session on November 15, 2018 (morning session). Was issued Certificate of Completion

*** Incomplete attendance (was not able to attend the morning session on November 12)

**** Incomplete attendance (attended sessions from August 12 to 14)

Region IIIIrene Charmaine C. ConcepcionMaria Katrina P. DayritRaquel Rosechell P. DoloresRochelle V. Lorenzo Regina C. Galang-Guarin**

Region IV Shari-Christine S.J. AlmarioXavier Elbert V. Gordula***Melinda B. Nedic-BastianGlenn Raymond O. ParadelaRosa B. Patulot-BesedillasElsiemarie B. Ramos-Tejada

Region VDante C. CastilloAris R. MontillaValentin A. Pura IIICharlie R. Romano, Jr.

Region VIIIRhahezza N. MaidinAlbert P. Yruma

Region XAlma L. Sabuga

Region XI Danilo A. Balucos****Rogelio G. Largo

Career Enhancement Program

Career Enhancement Program for RTC Clerks of Court

First and Second Judicial Regions (Round 3)

Date: October 9–11, 2018 Venue: PHILJA Training Center, Tagaytay CityParticipants: 102 RTC clerks of court

Fifth Judicial Region

Date: November 6–8, 2018Venue: PHILJA Training Center, Tagaytay City Participants: 54 RTC clerks of court

Career Enhancement Program for Regional Trial Court Sheriffs of the 9th and 12th Judicial Regions

Date: November 13–15, 2018Venue: PHILJA Training Center, Tagaytay CityParticipants: 53 RTC sheriffs

Career Enhancement Program for Lawyer-Clerks of Court of NCJR (Batch 1) (Round 3)

Date: November 27–29, 2018Venue: PHILJA Training Center, Tagaytay CityParticipants: 58 lawyer-clerks of court

Continuing Legal Education Program

Continuing Legal Education Program for Court Attorneys of the Supreme Court (3 batches)

Date: November 19–20, 2018Venue: PHILJA Training Center, Tagaytay CityParticipants: 102 Supreme Court attorneys

Date: December 3–4, 2018Venue: PHILJA Training Center, Tagaytay CityParticipants: 92 Supreme Court attorneys

Date: December 6–7, 2018Venue: PHILJA Training Center, Tagaytay CityParticipants: 113 Supreme Court attorneys

Special Focus Programs

Capacity Building on Environmental Laws and The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases for Selected Judges and Branch Clerks of Court of the Third, Fourth and Fifth Judicial Regions (Batch 2)

Date: October 23–25, 2018Venue: PHILJA Training Center, Tagaytay CityParticipants: 32 RTC, MTC and MCTC judges and clerks of court


Information Dissemination through a Dialogue between Barangay Officials of North Cotabato and Court Officials

Date: December 6, 2018Venue: Amas Provincial Capitol, Kidapawan CityParticipants: 600 barangay officials

Personal Security Training for Judges

Date: December 3–5, 2018Venue: PHILJA Training Center, Tagaytay CityParticipants: 25 RTC, MTCC, MTC, and MCTC judges

Seminar on Election Laws for Regional Trial Court Judges

Development Partner: Commission on ElectionsDate: December 7, 2018Venue: Bayview Park Hotel, ManilaParticipants: 49 RTC judges

Seminar-Workshop for Court of Appeals Lawyers on the Philippine Competition Act and Its Implementing Rules and Regulations

Development Partner: Philippine Competition CommissionDate: October 15–16, 2018Venue: Court of Appeals Auditorium, Court of Appeals, ManilaParticipants: 90 Court of Appeals lawyers

Date: November 15–16, 2018Venue: Manila Prince Hotel, ManilaParticipants: 99 Court of Appeals lawyers

Seminar Workshop for Judges on Cybercrime

Development Partner: United States Department of Justice, Criminal Division, Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training (USDOJ-OPDAT)Date: November 15–16, 2018Venue: Marco Polo Hotel, Cebu CityParticipants: 21 RTC judges

Seminar Workshop on Dangerous Drugs Law for Judges, Prosecutors and Law Enforcers of the Fifth Judicial Region

Development Partner: Dangerous Drugs Board Date: November 5–7, 2018Venue: Hotel St. Ellis, Legazpi CityParticipants: 94 RTC judges, prosecutors and law enforcers

Training on International Humanitarian Law for Judges, Prosecutors, and Law Enforcement Officers

Development Partner: International Committee of the Red CrossDate: November 14–15, 2018Venue: New Dawn Hotel Plus, Cagayan de Oro CityParticipants: 33 RTC judges, prosecutors, law enforcers and representatives from the Regional Commission on Human Rights and Office of the Ombudsman

Training Seminar on Special Issues on the Implementation of the Revised Guidelines for Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases

Development Partners: United States Agency for International Development, American Bar Association–Rule of Law Initiative and The Asia Foundation

Date: October 4, 2018Venue: Mallberry Suites Hotel, Cagayan de Oro CityParticipants: 157 RTC judges, prosecutors and public attorneys

Date: October 12, 2018Venue: Davao Convention Center, Davao City Participants: 184 RTC judges and prosecutors

Date: October 22, 2018Venue: Courtyard by Mariott, Iloilo CityParticipants: 180 RTC judges, prosecutors and public attorneys

Date: October 29, 2018Venue: Fort Ilocandia Hotel and Resorts, Laoag CityParticipants: 142 RTC judges, prosecutors and public attorneys

Date: December 6, 2018Venue: Conrad Hotel, Pasay CityParticipants: 257 RTC judges, prosecutors and public attorneys

Date: December 12, 2018Venue: The Oriental Hotel, Palo, LeyteParticipants: 142 RTC judges, prosecutors and public attorneys

Date: December 14, 2018Venue: D’ Hotel and Suites, Dipolog CityParticipants: 72 RTC judges, prosecutors and public attorneys

Special Lecture 15th Metrobank Foundation Professorial Chair Lecture on “Tax Principles and Remedies: Tools for Inclusive Economic Growth, Development, Prosperity and Stability” by Justice Japar B. Dimaampao


Development Partner: Metrobank Foundation, Inc.Date: October 17, 2018Venue: Supreme Court En Banc Session Hall with satellite venues at the Division Hearing Room and Lobby of New Building, Supreme Court, ManilaParticipants: 424 Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and Court of Tax Appeals justices, officials and employees, judges and lower court employees, students and other guests

Convention-Seminar

Philippine Judges Association Mid-term Convention

Theme: “PJA: Forging Partnerships in the International Legal Communities”Date: October 17–19, 2018Venue: Taal Vista Hotel, Tagaytay CityParticipants: 494 judges

25th National Convention and Seminar of the Philippine Trial Judges League, Inc.

Theme: “PTJLI: Celebrating 25 Years of Committed Leadership, Fostering Camaraderie and Independence”Date: October 17–19, 2018Venue: Princesa Garden Island Resort and Spa, Puerto Princesa City, PalawanParticipants: 223 judges

National Convention and Seminar of the First Level Clerks of Court Association of the Philippines

Theme: “Embracing Changes, Conquering Challenges”Date: November 27–29, 2018Venue: Family Country Hotel and Convention Center, General Santos CityParticipants: 428 clerks of court

Alternative Dispute Resolution

Court-Annexed Mediation

Refresher/Advanced Course for Court-Annexed Mediators (Skills Enhancement Course)

Nueva Ecija, Tarlac, Camarines Norte, and Pampanga Mediation Programs

Date: October 10–11, 2018Venue: PHILJA Training Center, Tagaytay CityParticipants: 39 mediators

Samar, Leyte, and Biliran Mediation Programs

Date: November 14–15, 2018Venue: The Oriental Hotel, Palo, LeyteParticipants: 23 mediators

Benguet, Pangasinan, La Union, Aurora, and Quirino Mediation Programs

Date: November 21–22, 2018Venue: Hotel Veniz, Baguio CityParticipants: 51 mediators

Metro Manila and Nueva Vizcaya Mediation Programs

Date: November 27–28, 2018Venue: PHILJA Training Center, Tagaytay CityParticipants: 57 mediators

Judicial Dispute Resolution (JDR)

Judicial Settlement Conference for Judges on Judicial Dispute Resolution (Skills-based Course)

Date: October 1–4, 2018 Venue: PHILJA Training Center, Tagaytay CityParticipants: 44 RTC, FC, MTCC, MTC, and MCTC judges

Date: November 5–8, 2018 Venue: Hotel Elizabeth, Cebu CityParticipants: 52 RTC, MTCC, MTC, and MCTC judges

Orientation of Clerks of Court and Branch Clerks of Court on Judicial Dispute Resolution

Date: November 15, 2018 Venue: Hotel Venezia, Legazpi CityParticipants: 56 clerks of court, branch clerks of court and PMCU staff

Orientation of Law Practitioners on Judicial Dispute Resolution

Date: November 15, 2018 Venue: Hotel Venezia, Legazpi CityParticipants: 63 PAO and IBP lawyers, and PMCU staff


On November 28, 2018, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte appointed then Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin as the 25th Chief Justice of the Philippines, to serve until his compulsory retirement on October 17, 2019. On the same day, he received the Gusi Peace Prize International at the Philippine International Convention Center in Manila as one of the 16 Laureates for 2018 for excellence in his field of activity or profession.

Hon. LUCAS P. BERSAMINChief Justice

Judicial Moves


Chief Justice Bersamin is the Chairperson of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal. Prior to his assumption as Chief Justice, he alternated as Member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal and as Member of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, as one of three senior magistrates representing the Supreme Court by mandate of the Constitution.

Chief Justice Bersamin was appointed Associate Justice of the Supreme Court on April 2, 2009 by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. He was then an incumbent Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals. He was appointed CA Associate Justice by President Arroyo on March 10, 2003. Prior to his stint in the Court of Appeals, he was appointed on November 5, 1986 as Presiding Judge of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court Branch 96.

Chief Justice Bersamin hails from Bangued, Abra, where he was born on October 18, 1949 to the late Dr. Luis F. Bersamin, Sr., a World War II veteran and survivor of the infamous Death March involving the captured Filipino and American soldiers, and the late Dr. Rosario Purugganan-Bersamin, a pharmacist and educator. His father was elected Provincial Governor of Abra after the conclusion of World War II. His oldest brother was the late Congressman Luis P. Bersamin, Jr., representing the Lone District of Abra. Another brother, Eustaquio P. Bersamin, completed three terms as an elected Provincial Governor of Abra.

Chief Justice Bersamin finished his elementary and high school studies in Bangued, Abra at the top of his classes graduating in 1960 and 1965. He earned a Bachelor’s Degree (Major in Political Science) in 1968 from the University of the Philippines in Diliman, Quezon City. He received his Bachelor’s Degree in Law from the University of the East, Manila, in 1973. He placed ninth in the 1973 Bar Examinations, with a score of 100 percent in Criminal Law, and was in active practice of law from 1974 until his appointment to the Regional Trial Court in November 1986.

He earned distinction as an even-handed and scholarly magistrate in trying and deciding sensational criminal cases some of which were reported or featured in national and international media. In 2000, the Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro Memorabilia Commission awarded him the much-coveted distinction of having written the Best Decision in Civil Law and the Best Decision in Criminal Law among Regional Trial Court Judges in the year 1999, the only time ever that the same judge earned both awards in the same year. Justice Ricardo C. Puno, Sr., the chair of the awarding Commission, described the feat as “unprecedented.” The citation for the award reads:

The two categories of the Best Decision competition were judged separately by two different Boards of Judges on different dates. Noteworthy is the fact that both sets of judges decided on one and the same winner in both categories, Judge Lucas Bersamin, one of the finalists in the 10th Awards for Judicial Excellence.

Chief Justice Bersamin has been gifted with a high degree of intelligence, an incisive and analytical mind, and many other skills. His mastery of the English language, eloquence, clarity of expression and deep knowledge of the law—not to mention his high sense of justice—are clearly manifested in his decisions. The extensive citations and footnotes, the perfect format and presentation, provide an insight about his sense of order and the amount of time and energy he spends preparing his decisions.

Chief Justice Bersamin has always been an accomplished person: valedictorian in grade and high schools, a college entrance scholar at the University of the Philippines, and a Bar Exams ninth placer.

In 2002, Chief Justice Bersamin won the Chief Justice Jose Abad Santos Award as Outstanding RTC Judge of that year given by the prestigious Foundation for Judicial Excellence, a private foundation, in coordination with the Supreme Court.

Chief Justice Bersamin is the author of the 413-page “Appeal and Review in the Philippines” (now in its second edition).

Before joining the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Bersamin was active in the academe, teaching Remedial Law at the law schools of the Ateneo de Manila, the University of Sto. Tomas, the Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila and the University of the East. He lectured in various law review centers. He was a resource person in the continuing legal education programs of the UP Law Center–Institute of Judicial Administration and the Philippine Judicial Academy. He is a fellow of the Commonwealth Judicial Education Institute based in Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada. He has written a book on appellate remedies used by law students and lawyers.

Chief Justice Bersamin has represented the Philippines in international judicial conferences and learning seminars in the USA, Canada, Switzerland, Germany, India, Japan, South Korea, Thailand and Singapore.

We invite Your Honors to share your views...

Since 2015, PHILJA Bulletin’s JUDICIAL VIEWS section has been featuring speeches delivered or papers written that have direct impact to the Judiciary.

We continue to invite contributions from the members of the Judiciary. The speeches, articles, or papers must be at least 3,000 words. Lengthy speeches/papers may be published in parts. Kindly include a brief profile of the author. The PHILJA Bulletin Editorial Board reserves the right to review the submissions prior to publication.


The newest member of the Supreme Court is a woman, bringing to two the number of women justices in the highest court of the land. She comes with sterling academic credentials and an extensive background in both private practice and public service.

Appointed on November 28, 2018 by President Rodrigo Duterte, Justice Rosmari De Claro Carandang is slated to serve in the SC for three years or until 2022 when she reaches the mandatory retirement age of 70. She fills the vacancy for SC Associate Justice created when Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro was appointed Chief Justice.

Fondly called “Rory” by her colleagues and close friends, Justice Carandang hails from Batangas. Intellectually, she is every bit as sharp as the butterfly knife (balisong) and as strong as the kapeng barako (barako coffee) which Batangas is famous for. She displayed her mental acuity early on, graduating valedictorian of both her elementary and high school class. She went on to obtain degrees in Political Science and Law (cum laude and class salutatorian) from the University of the Philippines in 1971 and 1975, respectively. Later on, she placed ninth in the 1975 Bar examinations with an average of 84.95 percent. She also found time to be among the founders of the Tau Gamma Sigma Sorority.

In 1976, Justice Carandang worked as a technical assistant in the Commission on Audit. She later went into private practice and worked with various financial institutions. Among others, she became legal counsel of Filinvest Development Corporation, and corporate secretary and legal counsel of Filinvest Land, Inc.

In December 1993, she began her judicial career when she was appointed Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 12. In March 2003, she was promoted to the Court of Appeals where she became Chairperson of its Third Division

Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando was born in Tuguegarao City, Cagayan on August 27, 1966.

His primary years of schooling, from 1972 to 1978, were spent at the Tuguegarao East Central School. He later went to St. Louis High School of Tuguegarao for his secondary education, graduating with the Class of 1982. In 1986, he earned the degree of Bachelor of Arts in Literature from the Pontifical University of Sto. Tomas, paving the way for his eventual enrolment in law school, a boyhood wish. San Beda College of Law conferred on him the Bachelor of Laws degree in 1990.

Prior to his admission to the Bar in 1992, Justice Hernando already commenced work in the public sector as a Confidential Assistant in the office of Supreme Court Justice Edgardo L. Paras in

1991. He never left government service from thereon. In the succeeding years, he worked in the office of Supreme Court Justice Florenz D. Regalado (1992 to 1998), the Department of Justice as a State Prosecutor (1998 to 2003), Presiding Judge of the RTC of San Pablo City, Laguna (2003 to 2006), RTC Judge of Quezon City (2006 to 2010). He was appointed Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, on February 16, 2010 at the age of 43.

He joined the Supreme Court on October 10, 2018 and is poised to serve in the High Court for the next 18 years, having turned 52 last August 27, 2018.

Fulfilling further a deeper childhood aspiration, Justice Hernando joined the academe at about the same time that he started his service in government. Since 1992, he has been teaching Civil Law, Remedial Law and Commercial Law in various law schools, including San Beda College of Law, Ateneo de Manila University School of Law, UST Faculty of Civil Law, FEU Institute of Law, San Sebastian College of Law, Angeles University Foundation School of Law (Angeles City), University of San Carlos School of Law and Governance (Cebu City) and Xavier University–Ateneo de Cagayan College of Law (Cagayan de Oro City).

He shared his expertise in Commercial Law as a Bar Examiner in the 2009, 2011 and 2016 Bar Examinations.

Hon. RAMON PAUL L. HERNANDOAssociate Justice, Supreme CourtAppointed on October 10, 2018

Hon. ROSMARI D. CARANDANGAssociate Justice, Supreme CourtAppointed on November 26, 2018

(continued on page 32)


Justice Loida Sales Posadas-Kahulugan is a blend of Visayas and Luzon: her father, Cornelio Batilo Posadas, being a native of lloilo and her mother, Alejandra Dumlao Sales, who hailed from llocos Sur. Her parents decided to make their home in Kalamansig, Sultan Kudarat where they raised

their 10 children, the Justice being the eldest.

Justice Florencio M. Mamauag, Jr. obtained his Bachelor of Laws and Bachelor of Science in Commerce, major in Accountancy, at the San Beda College in Manila (now San Beda University).

A Certified Public Accountant, he worked as an Associate Auditor at the

Sycip Gorres Velayo & Company (SGV) and thereafter as an Examiner at the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) before he went back to San Beda to pursue his law degree.

Upon passing the Bar, he started his legal career as an Associate Attorney in one of the prestigious law offices in Makati City before he joined the government as a State Corporate Attorney at the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) where he worked for four years before he moved again to the private sector.

A member of the academe, Justice Mamauag is a Professor of Law at the College of Law of San Beda University where he teaches Corporate and Labor Law and at the Arellano University Foundation School of Law where he teaches Labor Law. Justice Mamauag is also a Bar Reviewer in Labor Law at the San Beda University Bar Review School.

Prior to his appointment to the Court of Appeals, Justice Mamauag was Vice President and Group Head of Legal, Corporate Secretary and Compliance Officer of a publicly-listed group of companies with business interests in sugar, bio-ethanol fuel and power generation.

Justice Mamauag is a native of Cabagan, Isabela. He is the eldest son of the late Atty. Florencio B. Mamauag, Sr. and Ms. Rosalina F. Mallanao, both of whom were public servants.

Hon. FLORENCIO M. MAMAUAG, JR.Associate Justice, Court of Appeals

Appointed on August 22, 2018

Hon. LOIDA SALES POSADAS-KAHULUGANAssociate Justice, Court of Appeals

Appointed on October 10, 2018

Atty. LAURA C.H. DEL ROSARIODeputy Clerk of Court and Judicial Reform Program Administrator, Supreme CourtAppointed on October 2, 2018

Justice Kahulugan is a homegrown Mindanaoan. She finished valedictorian in elementary and high school in Sultan Kudarat. She took up Bachelor of Science in Business Administration at Notre Dame University and National College of Business and Arts. She became a Certified Public Accountant in 1975.

She worked in the private sector for 16 years as Accountant, Auditor and Finance and Administrative Officer. She had a short, but meaningful, stint as part of the Audit Team of the PCGG in 1986 to 1987.

When she turned 32, and by then a mother of three, Justice Kahulugan decided to pursue a career in the legal profession. In 1985 she enrolled at the Ateneo de Davao College of Law while working full time until she graduated in 1989. She took the Bar Examinations in 1990 and was admitted to the Bar in 1991.

She served the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao as Administrative Officer from 1989 to 1991; Graft Investigation Officer from 1991 to 1999 and Prosecution Officer from 1999 to 2004. She was awarded a Plaque of Recognition by the Office of the Ombudsman for her high performance in 1994.

On March 1, 2004, she was appointed Regional Trial Court Judge of RTC Branch 21, Bansalan, Davao del Sur, a position she held until her appointment to the Court of Appeals on October 10, 2018.

She is a member of the Philippine Institute of Certified Public Accountants (PICPA), Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Sigma Tau Mu Sorority, Philippine Judges Association Past Regional Director of Region XI, Philippine Women Judges Association Regional Director of Region XI, Davao Lady Lawyers Association Past President, Girl Scout of the Philippines Executive Board, Davao City Council, and Toastmasters International as Past President of the Bench and Bar Toastmasters Club and Past Division E Governor.

She considers her children as her priceless achievements: Abigail, a nurse in the UK, married to Michael Corbett; Joecyrnax Jr., a nurse at Southern Mindanao Medical Center, married to Katrina Ingrid Therese Rodillas; and Auda Bea, a lawyer with the Europa, Dacanay, Cubelo, Europa & Flores Law Office.

NEWLY APPOINTED SUPREME COURT OFFICIAL


Land Registration Law

The six year prescription period of the Assurance Fund runs from the registration of the innocent purchaser and actual knowledge of the title holder

Another important provision in Chapter VII of PD No. 1529 is Section 102, which incidentally stands at the center of the present controversy. This provision sets a six-year prescriptive period “from the time the right to bring such action first occurred” within which one may proceed to file an action for compensation against the Assurance Fund, x x x.

x x x x

Jurisprudence has yet to interpret the meaning of the phrase “from the time the right to bring such action first occurred”; hence, the need to clarify the same.

x x x x

The Assurance Fund was meant as a form of State insurance that allows recompense to an original title holder who, without any negligence on his part whatsoever, had been apparently deprived of his land initially by a usurper. x x x As exemplified by this case, original title holders are, more often than not, innocently unaware of the unscrupulous machinations of usurpers and later on, the registration of an innocent purchaser for value’s title. If the constructive notice rule on registration were to apply in cases involving claims against the Assurance Fund, then original title holders—who remain in possession of their own duplicate certificates of title, as petitioners in this case—are in danger of losing their final bastion of recompense on the ground of prescription, despite the lack of any negligence or fault on their part. Truly, our lawmakers would not have intended such an unfair situation. As repeatedly stated, the intent of the Assurance Fund is to indemnify the innocent original title holder for his property loss, which loss is attributable to not only the acts of a usurper but ultimately the operation of the Torrens System of registration which, by reasons of public policy, tilts the scales in favor of innocent purchasers for value.

Thus, as aptly pointed out by Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen during the deliberations on this case, the constructive notice rule on registration should not be made to apply to title holders who have been unjustly deprived of their land without their negligence. The actual title holder cannot be deprived of his or her rights twice—first, by fraudulent registration of the title in the name of the usurper and second,

by operation of the constructive notice rule upon registration of the title in the name of the innocent purchaser for value. As such, prescription, for purposes of determining the right to bring an action against the Assurance Fund, should be reckoned from the moment the innocent purchaser for value registers his or her title and upon actual knowledge thereof of the original title holder/claimant. x x x

Declaration of insolvency not a requirement before a claim against the Assurance Fund can prosper

x x x Section 97 of PD No. 1529 states:Sec. 97. Judgment, how satisfied. — If there are defendants other than the National Treasurer and the Register of Deeds and judgment is entered for the plaintiff and against the National Treasury, the Register of Deeds and any of the other defendants, execution shall first issue against such defendants other than the National Treasurer and the Register of Deeds. If execution is returned unsatisfied in whole or in part, and the officer returning the same certificates that the amount due cannot be collected from the land or personal property of such other defendants, only then shall the court, upon proper showing, order the amount of the execution and costs, or so much thereof as remains unpaid, to be paid by the National Treasurer out of the Assurance Fund. In an action under this Decree, the plaintiff cannot recover as compensation more than the fair market value of the land at the time he suffered the loss, damage, or deprivation thereof.

Based on Section 97 of PD No. 1529, it is apparent that a prior declaration of insolvency or inability to recover from the usurper is not actually required before the claimant may file an action against the Assurance Fund. Whether or not funds are to be paid out of the Assurance Fund is a matter to be determined and resolved at the execution stage of the proceedings. Clearly, this should be the proper treatment of the insolvency requirement, contrary to the insinuation made in previous cases on the subject. Perlas-Bernabe, J., Spouses Jose Manuel and Maria Esperanza Ridruejo Stilianopoulos v. The Register of Deeds for Legazpi City and The National Treasurer, G.R. No. 224678, July 3, 2018.

Criminal Law

Qualified trafficking in persons

Section 3(a) of RA No. 9208 defines the term “Trafficking in Persons” as the “recruitment, transportation, transfer or harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim’s consent or knowledge, within or across national borders by


means of threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person for the purpose of exploitation which includes at a minimum, the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs.” The same provision further provides that “[t]he recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation shall also be considered as ‘trafficking in persons’ even if it does not involve any of the means set forth in the preceding paragraph.” The crime of “Trafficking in Persons” becomes qualified under, among others, the following circumstances:

Sec. 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons. – The following are considered as qualified trafficking:

(a) When the trafficked person is a child;

x x x x

(d) When the offender is an ascendant, parent, sibling, guardian or a person who exercises authority over the trafficked person or when the offense is committed by a public officer or employee;

x x x x

In this case, accused-appellants were charged of three counts each of Qualified Trafficking in Persons under Section 4(e) in relation to Section 6(a) and (d) of RA No. 9208. XXX was further charged with another count of the same crime under Section 4(a) also in relation to Section 6(a) and (d) of the same law. Section 4(a) and (e) of RA No. 9208 reads:

Sec. 4. Acts of Trafficking in Persons. – It shall be unlawful for any person, natural or juridical, to commit any of the following acts:

(a) To recruit, transport, transfer, harbor, provide, or receive a person by any means, including those done under the pretext of domestic or overseas employment or training or apprenticeship, for the purpose of prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage;

x x x x

(e) To maintain or hire a person to engage in prostitution or pornography;

x x x x

As correctly ruled by the courts a quo, accused-appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three counts of Qualified Trafficking in Persons under Section 4(e) in relation to Section 6(a) and (d) of RA No. 9208 as the prosecution had established beyond reasonable doubt that: (a) they admittedly are the biological parents of AAA, BBB, and CCC, who were all

minors when the crimes against them were committed; (b) they made their children perform acts of cybersex for different foreigner customers, and thus, engaged them in prostitution and pornography; (c) they received various amounts of money in exchange for the sexual exploitation of their children; and (d) they achieved their criminal design by taking advantage of their children’s vulnerability as minors and deceiving them that the money they make from their lewd shows are needed for the family’s daily sustenance.

In the same manner, the courts a quo likewise correctly convicted XXX of one count of the same crime, this time under Section 4(a) in relation to Section 6(a) and (d) of RA No. 9208, as it was shown that XXX transported and provided her own minor biological child, AAA, to a foreigner in Makati City for the purpose of prostitution, again under the pretext that the money acquired from such illicit transaction is needed for their family’s daily sustenance.

In light of the foregoing, the Court finds no reason to deviate from the factual findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the CA, as there is no indication that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied the surrounding facts and circumstances of the case. x x x As such, accused-appellants’ conviction for Qualified Trafficking in Persons must be upheld. Perlas-Bernabe, J., People of the Philippines v. XXX and YYY, G.R. No. 235652, July 9, 2018.

Remedial Law

Fact finding investigations no longer considered included in the period for determination of inordinate delay

When an anonymous complaint is filed or the Office of the Ombudsman conducts a motu proprio fact-finding investigation, the proceedings are not yet adversarial. Even if the accused is invited to attend these investigations, this period cannot be counted since these are merely preparatory to the filing of a formal complaint. At this point, the Office of the Ombudsman will not yet determine if there is probable cause to charge the accused.

This period for case build-up cannot likewise be used by the Office of the Ombudsman as unbridled license to delay proceedings. If its investigation takes too long, it can result in


the extinction of criminal liability through the prescription of the offense.

Considering that fact-finding investigations are not yet adversarial proceedings against the accused, the period of investigation will not be counted in the determination of whether the right to speedy disposition of cases was violated. Thus, this Court now holds that for the purpose of determining whether inordinate delay exists, a case is deemed to have commenced from the filing of the formal complaint and the subsequent conduct of the preliminary investigation. In People v. Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division, the ruling that fact-finding investigations are included in the period for determination of inordinate delay is abandoned. Leonen, J., Cesar Matas Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division, Quezon City; Office of the Ombudsman; and People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 206438 and 206458, July 31, 2018; and Leonen, J., Cesar Matas Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division, Quezon City; Office of the Ombudsman; and People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 210141–42, July 31, 2018.

Constitutional Law

Right to speedy trial

An accused’s right to “have a speedy, impartial, and public trial” is guaranteed in criminal cases by Section 14(2) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Its salutary objective being to assure that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his or her guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he or she may interpose. Thus, the right to speedy trial is deemed violated when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured; or when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having one’s case tried. Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine whether a person has been denied the right to speedy trial, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant is weighed, and such factors as length of the delay, reason for the delay, the assertion or non-assertion of the right, and prejudice resulting from the delay, are considered.

In Villareal, we held that the right to speedy trial of Ramos, Saruca, Escalona, and Adriano was violated, because

the prosecution failed to comply with the Orders of the trial court requiring it to secure certified true copies of the records of the case from the CA and there was no action at all on the part of the trial court for a period of almost seven years. We also pointed out that: “on January 10, 1992, the final amended Information was filed against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, Ampil, S. Fernandez, Adriano, Cabangon, Concepcion, and De Vera. On November 29, 1993, they were all arraigned. Unfortunately, the initial trial of the case did not commence until March 28, 2005 or almost 12 years after arraignment.”

In the present petition, Villa insists that the right to speedy trial of Fernandez, Ampil, and Cabangon was not violated because the reasons for the delay were attributable to them, and they failed to timely invoke their right, unlike Ramos, Saruca, Escalona, and Adriano.

Contrary to Villa’s assertion, the CA’s ruling, as supported by the records, reveals that the following circumstances delayed the proceedings against Fernandez, Ampil, and Cabangon: (1) the prosecution failed to comply with the Order of the RTC Branch 130 dated September 21, 1995, reiterated in another Order dated December 27, 1995, requiring it to secure the records of Criminal Case No. 38340(91) from the CA; (2) from Ampil’s and Cabangon’s arraignment on November 29, 1993 and Fernandez’s arraignment on December 3, 1993, the initial trial of the case commenced only on March 28, 2005, or more than 11 years later; (3) the RTC Branch 130 resolved Ampil’s motion to quash filed on October 10, 1994, and Fernandez’s omnibus motion filed on October 19, 1994, only on March 8, 2005 or more than 10 years after the motions were filed; and (4) the RTC Branch 130 resolved Fernandez, Ampil, and Cabangon’s Joint Motion to Dismiss filed on December 5, 2006, only on January 9, 2012, or more than five years after the motion was filed. Moreover, the RTC Branch 130, in its Order, stated the reasons for the delay of the proceedings before it, such as: (1) the dismissal from the service of Judge Hamoy; (2) Judge Sardillo’s heavy workload; (3) the CA’s order restraining the proceeding of the case; and (4) the Motion for Transfer of Trial Venue and the Motion for Inhibition filed by the prosecution. Clearly, the reasons for the delay of the proceedings against Fernandez, Ampil, and Cabangon are not attributable to them.

Moreover, the reasons for the delay in the proceedings against Ramos, Saruca, Escalona, and Adriano are similar to the reasons for the delay in the proceedings against Fernandez, Ampil, and Cabangon. In Villareal, we held that the prosecution’s failure to comply with the Orders of the trial court for almost seven years amount to a violation of the right to speedy trial of Ramos, Saruca, Escalona, and Adriano. In this case, not only were the reasons for the delay in the proceedings against Ramos, Saruca, Escalona, and Adriano present as to Fernandez, Ampil, and Cabangon, but also more


unjustifiable circumstances added delay to the proceedings against them, such as the RTC’s delayed resolution of the motions to quash and motion to dismiss. Thus, there is more reason to apply our ruling in Villareal to Fernandez, Ampil, and Cabangon, and find that their right to speedy trial has been violated. Carpio, J., Gerarda H. Villa v. Stanley Fernandez, Florentino Ampil, Jr., and Noel Cabangon, G.R. No. 219548, October 17, 2018.

Civil Law

Award of consequential damages as a result of expropriation

Consequential damages are awarded if as a result of the expropriation, the remaining property of the owner suffers from an impairment or decrease in value. In NAPOCOR v. Marasigan, the Court awarded consequential damages equivalent to 50 percent of the BIR zonal valuation of the property segregated by the electric transmission lines.

x x x xx x x [I]f the expropriation resulted in benefits to the remaining lot, such consequential benefits may be deducted from the consequential damages or from the value of the expropriated property. However, such consequential benefits refer to the actual benefits derived by the landowner which are the direct and proximate results of the improvements as a consequence of the expropriation and not to the general benefits which the landowner may receive in common with the community. x x x

Here, while the area of the property subject of expropriation was 39,347 square meters, the parcel of land is part of a much bigger lot with a total area of 874,450 square meters. In their Narrative Report, the board of commissioners justified the award of consequential damages to respondents because of the insignificant consequential benefit, if at all, and the harm posed by the electric transmission lines. In the estimate of the commissioners, about one-third of the total area was prejudiced, but the determination of the actual consequential damages was left to a licensed geodetic engineer after the conduct of a survey.

The trial court adopted the recommendation of the commissioners and gave credence to the submission of respondents that 310,908 square meters of their lot would be rendered useless by the construction of high-voltage electric transmission lines. Hence, the trial court awarded consequential damages in the amount of P22,463,103, representing 10 percent of the fair market value of the 310,908-square meter segregated area. x x x

x x x x

While the award of consequential damages is proper, the Court finds the amount of 10 percent of the fair market value of the segregated property without basis. Rather, the more reasonable computation is the one laid down in NAPOCOR v. Marasigan, which is 50 percent of the BIR zonal valuation of the affected property.

To recall, when the trial court granted petitioner’s motion for the issuance of a writ of possession, petitioner deposited an amount equivalent to 100 percent of the value of the property based on the BIR zonal valuation pegged at P17.50 per square meter. Hence, the amount of consequential damages is limited to 50 percent of the value of the 310,908-square meter property at P17.50 per square meter, or P2,720,445. Carpio, J., National Transmission Corporation v. Ma. Magdalena Lourdes Lacson-De Leon, et al., G.R. No. 221624, July 4, 2018.

Bare allegation of tolerance not enough to establish a cause of action for an unlawful detainer case

Remarkably, in Quijano v. Atty. Amante, the Court ruled that in an action for unlawful detainer, the plaintiff must show that the possession was initially lawful, and thereafter, establish the basis of such lawful possession. Similarly, should the plaintiff claim that the respondent’s possession was by his/her tolerance, then such acts of tolerance must be proved. A bare allegation of tolerance will not suffice. At least, the plaintiff must point to the overt acts indicative of his/her or predecessor’s permission to occupy the disputed property. Failing in this regard, the occupant’s possession could then be deemed to have been illegal from the beginning. Consequently, the action for unlawful detainer will fail. Neither may the ejectment suit be treated as one for forcible entry in the absence of averments that the entry in the property had been effected through force, intimidation, threats, strategy or stealth.

Similarly, in Suarez v. Sps. Emboy, the Court warned that “when the complaint fails to aver the facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected or how and when dispossession started, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.

x x x x

Perforce, guided by all the foregoing cases, an action for unlawful detainer fails in the absence of proof of tolerance, coupled with evidence of how the entry of the respondents was effected, or how and when the dispossession started. This rule is so stringent such that the Court categorically declared in Go, Jr. v. CA that tolerance cannot be presumed from the owner’s failure to eject the occupants from the land. Rather, “tolerance always carries with it ‘permission’ and not merely silence or inaction for silence or inaction is negligence,


not tolerance.” On this score, the petitioner’s tenacious claim that the fact of tolerance may be surmised from her refusal for many years to file an action to evict the respondents is obviously flawed. Reyes, Jr., J., Cecilia T. Javelosa v. Ezequiel Tapus, et al., G.R. No. 204361, July 4, 2018.

Registered owner’s action to recover possession not barred by prescription or by laches

An action to recover possession of a registered land never prescribes in view of the provision of Section 44 of Act No. 496 to the effect that no title to registered land in derogation of that of a registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. It follows that an action by the registered owner to recover a real property registered under the Torrens System does not prescribe. The rule on imprescriptibility of registered lands not only applies to the registered owner but extends to the heirs of the registered owner as well. Therefore, petitioner’s right to recover possession did not prescribe.

Likewise, laches did not bar petitioner’s right of recovery. An action to recover registered land covered by the Torrens System may not generally be barred by laches. Neither can laches be set up to resist the enforcement of an imprescriptible legal right. It is a principle based on equity and may not prevail against a specific provision of law, because equity, which has been defined as “justice outside legality,” is applied in the absence of and not against statutory law or rules of procedure. Gesmundo, J., Carmen Aledro-Ruña v. Lead Export and Agro-Development Corporation, G.R. No. 225896, July 23, 2018.

In passing on the writ in a child custody case, the Court is not bound by any mere legal right of parent or guardian

The Court cannot also subscribe to petitioners’ contention that even if there are compelling reasons to separate Queenie from her mother, Renalyn, pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code, Ricky James would still not acquire custody over their daughter because there is no provision of law granting custody rights to an illegitimate father.

In the event that Renalyn is found unfit or unsuitable to care for her daughter, Article 214 of the Family Code mandates that substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent. However, the same Code further provides in Article 216 that “[i]n default of parents or judicially appointed guardian, the following persons shall exercise substitute parental authority over the child in the order indicated:”

Art. 216. x x x

(1) The surviving grandparent as provided in Article 214;

x x x x

(3) The child’s actual custodian, over 21 years of age, unless unfit or disqualified.

The same order of preference with respect to substitute parental authority is reiterated in Section 13 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, the “Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors,” to wit:

Sec. 13. Provisional order awarding custody. – After an answer has been filed or after expiration of the period to file it, the court may issue a provisional order awarding custody of the minor. As far as practicable, the following order of preference shall be observed in the award of custody:

(a) Both parents jointly;

x x x x

(e) The actual custodian of the minor over 21 years of age, unless the former is unfit or disqualified; or

x x x x

It was not disputed that Ricky James was in actual physical custody of Queenie when Renalyn left for Manila to pursue her studies until the instant controversy took place. As such, Ricky James had already assumed obligations and enjoyed privileges of a custodial character, giving him a cause of action to file a case of habeas corpus to regain custody of Queenie as her actual custodian.

Indeed, it may be argued that Article 176 of the Family Code has effectively disqualified the father of an illegitimate child from exercising substitute parental authority under Article 216 even if he were the actual custodian of the child under the premise that no one is allowed to do indirectly what he is prohibited to do directly. However, the Court cannot adopt a rigid view, without running afoul to the overarching consideration in custody cases, which is the best interest of the minor. Even way back, Article 363 of the Civil Code provides that in all questions relating to the care, custody, education and property of the children, the latter’s welfare is paramount. Under present rules, A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC explicitly states that “[i]n awarding custody, the court shall consider the best interests of the minor and shall give paramount consideration to [her] material and moral welfare. The best interests of the minor refer to the totality of the circumstances and conditions as are most congenial to the survival, protection, and feelings of security of the minor encouraging to [her] physical, psychological and emotional development. It also means the least detrimental available alternative for safeguarding the growth and development of the minor.”

Doctrinal RemindersCivil Law (continued)


In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that Queenie’s best interest demands that a proper trial be conducted to determine if she had, indeed, been neglected and abandoned by her mother, rendering the latter unfit to exercise parental authority over her, and in the event that Renalyn is found unsuitable, whether it is in Queenie’s best interest that she be in the custody of her father rather than her grandparents upon whom the law accords a far superior right to exercise substitute parental authority. In the case of Bagtas v. Santos, which was a tug-of-war between the maternal grandparents of the illegitimate minor child and the actual custodians of the latter, the Court faulted the trial court for hastily dismissing the petition for habeas corpus and awarding the custody of the minor to the grandparents without conducting any trial. The import of such decision is that the preference accorded by Article 216 of the Family Code does not automatically attach to the grandparents, and is conditioned upon the determination of their fitness to take care of their grandchild. In ruling as it did, the Court ratiocinated that the child’s welfare being the most important consideration, it is not bound by any legal right of a person over the child. Reiterating its pronouncement in the early case of Sombong v. CA, the Court held that:

[I]n passing on the writ in a child custody case, the court deals with a matter of an equitable nature. Not bound by any mere legal right of parent or guardian, the court gives his or her claim to the custody of the child due weight as a claim founded on human nature and considered generally equitable and just. Therefore, these cases are decided, not on the legal right of the petitioner to be relieved from unlawful imprisonment or detention, as in the case of adults, but on the court’s view of the best interests of those whose welfare requires that they be in custody of one person or another. Hence, the court is not bound to deliver a child into the custody of any claimant or of any person, but should, in the consideration of the facts, leave it in such custody as its welfare at the time appears to require. In short, the child’s welfare is the supreme consideration.

Considering that the child’s welfare is an all-important factor in custody cases, the Child and Youth Welfare Code unequivocally provides that in all questions regarding the care and custody, among others, of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration. In the same vein, the Family Code authorizes the courts to, if the welfare of the child so demands, deprive the parents concerned of parental authority over the child or adopt such measures as may be proper under the circumstances.

The Court cannot close its eyes to the sad reality that not all fathers, especially those who have sired children out of wedlock, have risen to the full height of a parent’s responsibility towards his offspring. Yet, here is a father of an illegitimate child who is very much willing to take on the whole gamut of parenting. He, thus, deserves, at the very least, to be given his day in court to prove that he is entitled

to regain custody of his daughter. As such, the CA’s order to remand the case is proper. Perlas-Bernabe, J., Renalyn A. Masbate and Spouses Renato Masbate and Marlyn Masbate v. Ricky James Relucio, G.R. No. 235498, July 30, 2018.

Criminal Law

Prescriptive period for violation of RA No. 6713 requiring the filing of SALN

Section 8 of RA No. 6713 mandates the submission of the sworn SALNs by all public officials and employees, stating therein all the assets, liabilities, net worth and financial and business interests of their spouses, and of their unmarried children under 18 years of age living in their households. Paragraph (A) of Section 8 sets three deadlines for the submission of the sworn SALNs, specifically: (a) within 30 days from the assumption of office by the officials or employees; (b) on or before April 30 of every year thereafter; and (c) within 30 days after the separation from the service of the officials or employees.

RA No. 6713 does not expressly state the prescriptive period for the violation of its requirement for the SALNs. Hence, Act No. 3326—the law that governs the prescriptive periods for offenses defined and punished under special laws that do not set their own prescriptive periods—is controlling. x x x

x x x x

The complaint charging the petitioner with the violations was filed only on October 28, 2004, or 13 years after the April 30, 1991 deadline for the submission of the SALN for 1990, and 12 years after the April 30, 1992 deadline for the submission of the SALN for 1991. With the offenses charged against the petitioner having already prescribed after eight years in accordance with Section 1 of Act No. 3326, the informations filed against the petitioner were validly quashed.

The relevant legal provision on the reckoning of the period of prescription is Section 2 of Act No. 3326, to wit:

Sec. 2. Prescription of violation penalized by special law shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the violation be not known at the time from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.

Under Section 2, there are two modes of determining the reckoning point when prescription of an offense runs. The first, to the effect that prescription shall “run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law,” is the general rule. We have declared in this regard that the fact that any


aggrieved person entitled to an action has no knowledge of his right to sue or of the facts out of which his right arises does not prevent the running of the prescriptive period. The second mode is an exception to the first, and is otherwise known as the discovery rule.

x x x x

The application of the discovery rule was amply discussed in the 2014 ruling in Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) v. Carpio-Morales, which cited a number of rulings involving violations of RA No. 3019. The Court said therein:

In the 1999 and 2011 cases of Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, the Court, in said separate instances, reversed the ruling of the Ombudsman that the prescriptive period therein began to run at the time the behest loans were transacted and instead, it should be counted from the date of the discovery thereof.

In the 1999 case, We recognized the impossibility for the State, the aggrieved party, to have known the violation of RA No. 3019 at the time the questioned transactions were made in view of the fact that the public officials concerned connived or conspired with the “beneficiaries of the loans.” There, We agreed with the contention of the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee that the prescriptive period should be computed from the discovery of the commission thereof and not from the day of such commission. x x x

Similarly, in the 2011 Desierto case, We ruled that the “blameless ignorance” doctrine applies considering that the plaintiff therein had no reasonable means of knowing the existence of a cause of action. In this particular instance, We pinned the running of the prescriptive period to the completion by the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee of an exhaustive investigation on the loans. We elucidated that the first mode under Section 2 of Act No. 3326 would not apply since during the Marcos regime, no person would have dared to question the legality of these transactions.

x x x x

Conformably with the foregoing, we cannot apply the discovery rule or the blameless ignorance doctrine to the criminal charges against the petitioner herein.

x x x x

The Sandiganbayan’s reliance on Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee v. Desierto was misplaced. Therein, the concealment and supposed connivance and conspiracy among the concerned public officials were emphatically mentioned as factors for applying in the reckoning of the period of prescription the second mode instead of the general rule. The Court further noted that prior to the ouster of President

Marcos through the February 1986 EDSA Revolution, the Government as the aggrieved party could not have known of the violations when the questioned transactions were made; and that no person would have dared to assail the legality of the transactions at that time.

The guidelines summarized in Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Carpio-Morales already settled how to determine the proper reckoning points for the period of prescription. Whether it is the general rule or the exception that should apply in a particular case depends on the availability or the suppression of information relative to the crime should first be ascertained. If the information, data, or records from which the crime is based could be plainly discovered or were readily available to the public, as in the case of the petitioner herein, the general rule should apply, and prescription should be held to run from the commission of the crime; otherwise, the discovery rule is applied. Bersamin, J., Melita O. Del Rosario v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 199930, June 27, 2018.

Arias doctrine subject to the qualification that the public official has no foreknowledge of any facts or circumstances that would prompt him to exercise a greater degree of care

This Court’s ruling in Arias v. Sandiganbayan cannot exonerate petitioners from criminal liability.

Arias laid down the doctrine that heads of offices may, in good faith, rely to a certain extent on the acts of their subordinates “who prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations.” This is based upon the recognition that heads of offices cannot be expected to examine every single document relative to government transactions. x x x

x x x x

The application of the doctrine is subject to the qualification that the public official has no foreknowledge of any facts or circumstances that would prompt him or her to investigate or exercise a greater degree of care. In a number of cases, this Court refused to apply the Arias doctrine considering that there were circumstances that should have prompted the government official to inquire further.

In the present case, the Arias doctrine cannot exonerate petitioners Abubakar, Baraguir, or Guiani from criminal liability. There were circumstances that should have prompted them to make further inquiries on the transactions subject of this case.

In Criminal Case Nos. 24963-24969 on the early mobilization of contractors, the irregularity was already apparent on the face of the certificates of mobilization, which bore dates earlier than the scheduled public bidding. This should have already roused suspicion from petitioners

Doctrinal RemindersCriminal Law (continued)


Baraguir and Guiani, who were the last signatories and final approving authorities.

The same can be said from Criminal Case No. 24970. The Contract of Survey Work, which was used as the primary supporting document for the disbursement of the 30 percent mobilization fee to Arce Engineering Services, contained a patently illegal stipulation. Petitioner Guiani cannot blame his subordinates and claim that he acted in good faith considering that he entered into the contract with Arce Engineering Services.

Petitioners should have also made further inquiries regarding the P14,400,000 advance payment for sub-aggregates. There were no appropriate documents such as purchase orders and delivery receipts to support this disbursement.

The rules on public bidding and on public funds disbursement are imbued with public interest. The positions and functions of petitioners Abubakar, Baraguir, and Guiani impose upon them a greater responsibility in ensuring that rules on these matters are complied with. They are expected to exercise a greater degree of diligence. Leonen, J., Farouk B. Abubakar, Ulama S. Baraguir and Datukan M. Guiani v. People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 202408, 202409 and 202412, June 27, 2018.

Prescriptive period for offenses punishable under RA No. 3019

At the outset, it should be stressed that RA No. 3019, Section 11 provides that all offenses punishable under said law shall prescribe in 10 years. This period was later increased to 15 years with the passage of Batas Pambansa (BP) Bilang 195, which took effect on March 16, 1982.

When the subject transactions took place, the period of prescription for all offenses punishable under RA No. 3019 was 10 years. As to which of the two periods should apply, the Court in People v. Pacificador explained that in the prescription of crimes, the period which appears more favorable to the accused is to be adopted. x x x

x x x x

The loan transactions subject of this case were granted by the PNB to BISUDECO from 1977–1985. Applying this Court’s pronouncement in Pacificador, the period of prescription for offenses committed prior to the passage of BP Blg. 195 is 10 years. The new 15-year period cannot be applied to acts done prior to its effectivity in 1982 because to do so would violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws. Transactions entered into and consummated prior to the effectivity of BP Blg. 195 on March 16, 1982 are exempt from its amendments. The new 15-year period shall only be applied to acts done after its effectivity.

x x x x

While RA No. 3019 is silent as to when the period of prescription begins to run, RA No. 3326, specifically Section 2 thereof fills the gap. Section 2 provides in part:

Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceeding for its investigation and punishment. x x x

In the 1999 and 2011 cases of Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, et al. v. Hon. Desierto, et al., the Court ruled that the prescriptive period began to ran from the date of discovery of the subject transactions and not from the time the behest loans were transacted. In the 2011 Desierto case, the Court ruled that the “blameless ignorance” doctrine applies considering that the plaintiff at that time had no reasonable means of knowing the existence of a cause of action, viz:

Generally, the prescriptive period shall commence to run on the day the crime is committed. That an aggrieved person “entitled to an action has no knowledge of his right to sue or of the facts out of which his right arises,” does not prevent the running of the prescriptive period. An exception to this rule is the “blameless ignorance” doctrine, incorporated in Section 2 of Act No. 3326. Under this doctrine, “the statute of limitations runs only upon discovery of the fact of the invasion of a right which will support a cause of action. In other words, the courts would decline to apply the statute of limitations where the plaintiff does not know or has no reasonable means of knowing the existence of a cause of action.” x x x

In Disini v. Sandiganbayan, the Court reiterated that the prescriptive period commenced to run not on the date of commission of the crime or offense, rather, from the discovery thereof, i.e. date of discovery of the violation after the PCGG’s exhaustive investigation.

In the more recent case of the PCGG v. The Ombudsman, et al. likewise involving behest loans, the Court applied the same rule in determining whether or not prescription had already set in. x x x

x x x x

Applying this to the present case, the date of discovery was April 4, 1994, the date of the Terminal Report that was submitted to President Fidel V. Ramos. The Terminal Report classified the subject BISUDECO loans as behest loans. Records show that the PCGG filed its affidavit-complaint before the Ombudsman only on January 28, 2005 or a little more than 10 years from the date of discovery. Clearly, the crimes imputed to private respondents for loans transacted in the years 1971 to 1981 have already prescribed. As to the loans covered


by the years 1982 to 1985, the 15-year prescriptive period shall apply since BP Blg. 195 was then already in effect. Thus, insofar as the 1982 to 1985 loan transactions are concerned, the complaint was filed on time and without a doubt, within the prescriptive period.Reyes, Jr., J., Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Hon. Ma. Merceditas Gutierrez, et al., G.R. No. 189800, July 9, 2018.

Circumstances not alleged in the information cannot be appreciated even if proven in trial

It must be noted that the Information charging the accused-appellants with carnapping under RA No. 6539, as amended, failed to allege that the carnapping was committed by means of violence against, or intimidation of, any person, or force upon things. While these circumstances were proven at the trial, they cannot be appreciated because they were not alleged in the Information. Hence, pursuant to the strict constitutional mandate that an accused must always be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation against him, the accused-appellants may only be convicted of simple carnapping. x x xReyes, Jr., J., People of the Philippines v. Renato Cariño y Gocong and Alvin Aquino y Ragam, G.R. No. 232624, July 9, 2018.

Marking of seized drugs starting point in the custodial link and crucial in proving the chain of custody

Crucial in proving the chain of custody is the marking of the seized drugs or other related items immediately after they have been seized from the accused. “Marking” means the placing by the apprehending officer or the poseur-buyer of his/her initials and signature on the items seized. Marking after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link; hence, it is vital that the seized contraband be immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the specimens will use the markings as reference. The marking of the evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time they are seized from the accused until they are disposed of at the end of the criminal proceedings, thus, preventing switching, planting or contamination of evidence. Martires, J., People of the Philippines v. Evelyn Patricio y Castillo, alias “Ningnay”, G.R. No. 202129, July 23, 2018.

Stipulations required for the effective dispensation of the forensic chemist’s testimony

In People v. Pajarin, the Court ruled that in case of a stipulation by the parties to dispense with the attendance and testimony of the forensic chemist, it should be stipulated that the forensic chemist would have testified that he had taken the precautionary steps required to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized item, thus: (1) that the forensic chemist received the seized article as marked, properly

sealed, and intact; (2) that he resealed it after examination of the content; and (3) that he placed his own marking on the same to ensure that it could not be tampered with pending trial.

The said stipulations are wanting in this case.

Here, the prosecution offered and the defense admitted that PCI Ebuen is an expert witness; that on May 19, 2009, she received two small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets including the subject of this case, with marking “MCV/LD BUY BUST”; and that the contents of the sachet yielded positive results for methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu after the laboratory examination thereon.

Although herein stipulations satisfied the first requisite as stated in People v. Pajarin, they failed to cover the second and third requisites required to establish that, after the laboratory examination, there would have been no change in the condition of the seized drug and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of and to tamper with the same. Absent any testimony regarding these precautions, doubt, that the illegal drug allegedly confiscated from the accused is not the same as that presented in court, remains. As a result, this reasonable doubt would prevent the prosecution from overcoming the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused.

x x x x

To repeat, the failure to include in the stipulations the precautions taken by the forensic chemist after the conduct of the laboratory examination on the illegal drug, as well as the manner it was handled after it left her custody, renders the stipulations in her testimony ineffective in completing an unbroken chain of custody.

With the prosecution’s failure to establish an unbroken chain of custody, the Court is now duty bound to render a judgment of acquittal. Martires, J., People of the Philippines v. Michael Cabuhay, G.R. No. 225590, July 23, 2018.

Guidelines in appreciating age as an element or as a qualifying circumstance in the crime of rape

In People v. Pruna, the Court established the guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance, viz:

1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party;

2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age;



3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost, destroyed, or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim’s mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:

a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years old;

b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old;

c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old.

4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victim’s mother or relatives concerning the victim’s age, the complainant’s testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused;

5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him; and

6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim.

In the present case, no documentary evidence such as a birth certificate or other authentic documents were offered to prove AAA’s age and there was no explanation why none was presented. Neither was there testimonial evidence from the concerned individuals to establish her age as only the medico-legal testified as to AAA’s age. While the medico-legal may have testified as to her age, he was not among the individuals enumerated in Pruna who may testify in case the birth certificate or authentic documents were lost or otherwise unavailable. In addition, his testimony as to AAA’s age was hearsay as he had no personal knowledge because BBB merely relayed the said information to him. Thus, it is readily apparent that the prosecution miserably failed to prove AAA’s exact age.

As outlined in Pruna, the prosecution has the burden to prove the age of the offended party and the lack of opposition to the testimonial evidence on the part of the accused should not be taken against him. It is noteworthy that in the present case, there was no testimonial evidence that Gozo could have objected to. In addition, the trial court is required to make a categorical finding of the victim’s age. Here, however, the RTC simply opined, based on its observation, that AAA could not have been more than 12 years of age. Clearly, the prosecution

failed to prove with sufficient and appropriate evidence that AAA was below 12 years of age.

Thus, the designation of the crime Gozo committed should be corrected from statutory rape to simple rape, consistent with the Criminal Law principle that doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused, x x x. Martires, J., People of the Philippines v. Venerando Gozo y Velasquez, G.R. No. 225605, July 23, 2018.

Elements – Kidnapping for Ransom

In order that the accused can be convicted of kidnapping and serious illegal detention, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime, namely: (a) the offender is a private individual; (b) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (d) in the commission of the offense any of the following circumstances is present: (1) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; (2) it is committed by simulating public authority; (3) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (4) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer.

If the victim of kidnapping and serious illegal detention is a minor, the duration of his detention is immaterial. Also, if the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of extorting ransom, the duration of his detention is immaterial. It is settled that the curtailment of the victim’s liberty need not involve any physical restraint upon the latter’s person and it is not necessary that the offender kept the victim in an enclosure or treated him harshly. The crime of serious illegal detention is committed by detaining a person or depriving him in any manner of his liberty. Its essence is the actual deprivation of the victim’s liberty, coupled with indubitable proof of the intent of the accused to effect such deprivation.

The elements of kidnapping as embodied in Article 267 of RPC have been sufficiently proven in the case at bench. It is undisputed that Damayo is a private individual, and that he took Jerome from his school at Sucat Elementary School, Barangay Sucat, Muntinlupa City on August 7, 2008 at 12:00 noon, brought said victim to his house at No. 301 Telabastaga, San Fernando, Pampanga, and kept him there until he was safely recovered by his parents and the police officers on August 9, 2008. That Damayo had no justification whatsoever to detain Jerome is undeniable.

Although it was not established that Jerome was placed inside an enclosure or was locked up, he was nonetheless deprived of his liberty because he cannot leave the place where Damayo brought him as the latter remained outside and kept watch of him. This only goes to show that Jerome


was constantly guarded by Damayo during the period of his captivity. Also, let it be underscored that leaving a child in a place from which he did not know the way home, even if he had the freedom to roam around the place of detention, would still amount to deprivation of liberty inasmuch as under this situation, the child’s freedom remains at the mercy and control of the abductor.

Peralta, J., People of the Philippines v. Francisco Damayo y Jaime, G.R. No. 232361, September 26, 2018.

Land Registration Law

Indefeasibility of title not a defense when a certificate of title is issued over an inalienable land of the public domain

As a rule, a certificate of title issued pursuant to a homestead patent partakes the nature of a certificate of title issued through a judicial proceeding and becomes incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year. x x x

x x x x

Nevertheless, the rule that “a certificate of title issued pursuant to a homestead patent becomes indefeasible after one year, is subject to the proviso that ‘the land covered by said certificate is a disposable public land within the contemplation of the Public Land Law.’”

When the property covered by a homestead patent is part of the inalienable land of the public domain, the title issued pursuant to it is null and void, and the rule on indefeasibility of title will not apply. x x x

x x x x

In Republic v. Ramos, this Court held that despite the registration of the land and the issuance of a Torrens title, the State may still file an action for reversion of a homestead land that was granted in violation of the law. The action is not barred by the statute of limitations, especially against the State. x x x

x x x x

Likewise, Spouses De Guzman v. Agbagala did not apply the principle of indefeasibility where “the patent and the title based thereon are null and void.” x x x

x x x x

Heirs of Spouses Vda. De Palanca v. Republic also held that the State may recover non-disposable public lands registered under the Land Registration Act “at any time and the defense of res judicata would not apply as courts have no jurisdiction to dispose of such lands of the public domain.”

As this Court ruled in that case, Lot No. H-19731, the land covered by Homestead Patent No. V-67820, is still part of the inalienable lands of the public domain there being no positive act declassifying it. Consequently, OCT No. G-3287, issued pursuant to Homestead Patent No. V-67820, is null and void. Thus, the State is not estopped from instituting an action for the reversion of Lot No. H-19731 into the lands of the public domain.

Lands of the public domain can only be classified as alienable and disposable through a positive act of the government. The State cannot be estopped by the omission, mistake, or error of its officials or agents. It may revert the land at any time, where the concession or disposition is void ab initio.Leonen, J., Republic of the Philippines v. Heirs of Ignacio Daquer and the Register of Deeds, Province of Palawan, G.R. No. 193657, September 4, 2018.

Remedial Law

Admissibility of official record kept in foreign country–requisites

Under Rule 132, Section 24 of the Rules of Court, the admissibility of official records that are kept in a foreign country requires that it must be accompanied by a certificate from a secretary of an embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, consular agent or any officer of the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in that foreign country:

Sec. 24. Proof of official record. – The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.

The Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce was accompanied by an Authentication issued by Consul Bryan Dexter B. Lao of the Embassy of the Philippines in Tokyo, Japan, certifying that Kazutoyo Oyabe, Consular Service Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan was an official in and for Japan. The Authentication further certified that he was authorized to sign the Certificate of Acceptance of



the Report of Divorce and that his signature in it was genuine. Applying Rule 132, Section 24, the Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce is admissible as evidence of the fact of divorce between petitioner and respondent. Leonen, J., Rhodora Ilumin Racho a.k.a. “Rhodora Racho Tanaka” v. Seiichi Tanaka, Local Civil Registrar of Las Piñas City, and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the National Statistics Office, G.R. No. 199515, June 25, 2018.

Republic Act No. 8974 superseded the deposit system under Rule 67 in expropriation proceedings

The general rule is that upon the filing of the expropriation complaint, the plaintiff has the right to take or enter into possession of the real property involved if he deposits with the authorized government depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property. An exception to this procedure is provided by RA No. 8974 with respect to national government projects, which requires the payment of 100 percent of the zonal value of the property to be expropriated as the provisional value. It must be emphasized, however, that whether a deposit is made under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court or the provisional value of the property is paid pursuant to RA No. 8974, the said amount serves the double-purpose of: (a) pre-payment if the property is fully expropriated, and (b) indemnity for damages if the proceedings are dismissed.

Section 2, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court requires the expropriator to deposit the amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property to be expropriated prior to entry. The assessed value of a real property constitutes a mere percentage of its fair market value based on the assessment levels fixed under the pertinent ordinance passed by the local government where the property is located. In contrast, RA No. 8974 requires the payment of the amount equivalent to 100 percent of the current zonal value of the property, which is usually a higher amount.

In Republic of the Philippines v. Judge Gingoyon, the Court recognized that while expropriation proceedings have always demanded just compensation in exchange for private property, the deposit requirement under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court “impeded immediate compensation to the private owner, especially in cases wherein the determination of the final amount of compensation would prove highly disputed.” Thus, it categorically declared that “[i]t is the plain intent of [RA] No. 8974 to supersede the system of deposit under Rule 67 with the scheme of ‘immediate payment’ in cases involving national government infrastructure projects.” x x x

x x x x

Statutes are generally applied prospectively unless they expressly allow a retroactive application. It is well known that the principle that a new law shall not have retroactive effect

only governs rights arising from acts done under the rule of the former law. However, if a right be declared for the first time by a subsequent law, it shall take effect from that time even though it has arisen from acts subject to the former laws, provided that it does not prejudice another acquired right of the same origin.

In this case, the government had long entered the subject land and constructed the transmission towers and lines. However, petitioner initiated inverse condemnation proceedings after the effectivity of RA No. 8974 on November 26, 2000; hence, procedurally and substantially, the said law should govern. Notably, the payment of the provisional value of the subject land equivalent to 100 percent of its current zonal value is declared for the first time by the said law which is evidently more favorable to the landowner than the mere deposit of its assessed value as required by Rule 67. Accordingly, the application of the provisions of RA No. 8974 to the instant case is beyond cavil. Besides, there is no legal impediment to the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of respondent, as successor of NPC, despite entry to the subject land long before the filing of the inverse condemnation proceedings before the RTC because physical possession gained by entering the property is not equivalent to expropriating it with the aim of acquiring ownership thereon. x x x

x x x x

It must be emphasized that RA No. 8974 does not take away from the courts the power to judicially determine the amount of just compensation. It merely provides relevant standards in order to facilitate the determination of just compensation, and sets the minimum price of the property as the provisional value to immediately recompense the landowner with the same degree of speed as the taking of the property, which reconciles the inherent unease attending expropriation proceedings with a position of fundamental equity. Perlas-Bernabe, J., Felisa Agricultural Corporation v. National Transmission Corporation, G.R. Nos. 231655 and 231670, July 2, 2018.

Requirements for recognition of foreign issued divorce decree

x x x [A]s similarly held in Manalo, We cannot yet grant petitioner’s Petition for Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment for she has yet to comply with certain guidelines before our courts may recognize the subject divorce decree and the effects thereof. Time and again, the Court has held that the starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s


applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. Since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court applies. Thus, what is required is proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

In the instant case, the Office of the Solicitor General does not dispute the existence of the divorce decree, rendering the same admissible. What remains to be proven, therefore, is the pertinent Japanese Law on divorce considering that Japanese laws on persons and family relations are not among those matters that Filipino judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. Peralta, J., Stephen I. Juego-Sakai v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 224015, July 23, 2018.

Section 15 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC provides for temporary visitation right, not temporary custody

While the appellate court correctly remanded the case for trial, the Court, however, holds that it erred in granting Ricky James temporary custody for a limited period of 24 consecutive hours once every month, in addition to visitation rights, invoking “humane and practical considerations,” which were based solely on Ricky James’ allegations.

It should be stressed that Section 15 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC provides for temporary visitation rights, not temporary custody, as follows:

Sec. 15. Temporary visitation rights. – The court shall provide in its order awarding provisional custody appropriate visitation rights to the non-custodial parent or parents, unless the court finds said parent or parents unfit or disqualified.

The temporary custodian shall give the court and non-custodial parent or parents at least five days’ notice of any plan to change the residence of the minor or take him out of his residence for more than three days provided it does not prejudice the visitation rights of the non-custodial parent or parents.

It is only after trial, when the court renders its judgment awarding the custody of the minor to the proper party, that the court may likewise issue “any order that is just and reasonable permitting the parent who is deprived of the care and custody of the minor to visit or have temporary custody,” pursuant to Section 18 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, to wit:

Sec. 18. Judgment. – After trial, the court shall render judgment awarding the custody of the minor to the proper party considering the best interests of the minor.

If it appears that both parties are unfit to have the care and custody of the minor, the court may designate either the paternal or maternal grandparent of the minor, or his oldest brother or sister, or any reputable person to take charge of such minor, or to commit him to any suitable home for children.

In its judgment, the court may order either or both parents to give an amount necessary for the support, maintenance and education of the minor, irrespective of who may be its custodian. In determining the amount of support, the court may consider the following factors: (1) the financial resources of the custodial and non-custodial parent and those of the minor; (2) the physical and emotional health, special needs, and aptitude of the minor; (3) the standard of living the minor has been accustomed to; and (4) the non-monetary contributions that the parents would make toward the care and well-being of the minor.

The court may also issue any order that is just and reasonable permitting the parent who is deprived of the care and custody of the minor to visit or have temporary custody.

By granting temporary albeit limited custody ahead of trial, the appellate court overturned the tender-age presumption with nothing but Ricky James’ bare allegations, to which the Court cannot give its imprimatur. As earlier intimated, the issue surrounding Renalyn’s fitness as a mother must be properly threshed out in the trial court before she can be denied custody, even for the briefest of periods, over Queenie. Perlas-Bernabe, J., Renalyn A. Masbate and Spouses Renato Masbate and Marlyn Masbate v. Ricky James Relucio, G.R. No. 235498, July 30, 2018.

Excusable grounds for non-compliance with the requirement of attaching a written explanation for resorting to other modes of service

x x x [T]he strict requirement of attaching a written explanation on why the pleading was not served personally is susceptible of exceptions. In Spouses Ello v. CA, and Peñoso v. Dona, the Court enumerated the grounds that may excuse the absence of a written explanation, to wit: “(i) the practicability of personal service; (ii) the importance of the subject matter of the case, or the issues involved therein; and (iii) the prima facie merit of the pleading sought to be expunged x x x.” Notably, the Court warned that the exercise of discretion to dismiss an appeal must be exercised properly and reasonably. To be sure, the appellate court must first consider the situation of the petitioner/appellant and the reasons proffered for non-compliance with the said rule. Reyes, Jr., J., Narciso Victoriano v. Juniper Dominguez, G.R. No. 214794, July 23, 2018.

Doctrinal RemindersRemedial Law (continued)


Taxation Law

Local taxation – A taxpayer who had protested and paid an assessment may later on institute an action for refund

The taxpayers’ remedies of protesting an assessment and refund of taxes are stated in Sections 195 and 196 of the LGC, to wit:

Sec. 195. Protest of Assessment. – When the local treasurer or his duly authorized representative finds that correct taxes, fees, or charges have not been paid, he shall issue a notice of assessment stating the nature of the tax, fee, or charge, the amount of deficiency, the surcharges, interests and penalties. Within 60 days from the receipt of the notice of assessment, the taxpayer may file a written protest with the local treasurer contesting the assessment; otherwise, the assessment shall become final and executory. The local treasurer shall decide the protest within 60 days from the time of its filing. If the local treasurer finds the protest to be wholly or partly meritorious, he shall issue a notice cancelling wholly or partially the assessment. However, if the local treasurer finds the assessment to be wholly or partly correct, he shall deny the protest wholly or partly with notice to the taxpayer. The taxpayer shall have 30 days from the receipt of the denial of the protest or from the lapse of the 60-day period prescribed herein within which to appeal with the court of competent jurisdiction otherwise the assessment becomes conclusive and unappealable.

Sec. 196. Claim for Refund of Tax Credit. – No case or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any tax, fee, or charge erroneously or illegally collected until a written claim for refund or credit has been filed with the local treasurer. No case or proceeding shall be entertained in any court after the expiration of two years from the date of the payment of such tax, fee, or charge, or from the date the taxpayer is entitled to a refund or credit.

The first provides the procedure for contesting an assessment issued by the local treasurer; whereas, the second provides the procedure for the recovery of an erroneously paid or illegally collected tax, fee or charge. Both Sections 195 and 196 mention an administrative remedy that the taxpayer should first exhaust before bringing the appropriate action in court. In Section 195, it is the written protest with the local treasurer that constitutes the administrative remedy; while in Section 196, it is the written claim for refund or credit with the same office. As to form, the law does not particularly provide any for a protest or refund claim to be considered valid. It suffices that the written protest or refund is addressed to the local treasurer expressing in substance its desired relief. The title or denomination used in describing the letter would not ordinarily put control over the content of the letter.

x x x x

Where an assessment is to be protested or disputed, the taxpayer may proceed (a) without payment, or (b) with payment of the assessed tax, fee or charge. Whether there is payment of the assessed tax or not, it is clear that the protest in writing must be made within 60 days from receipt of the notice of assessment; otherwise, the assessment shall become final and conclusive. Additionally, the subsequent court action must be initiated within 30 days from denial or inaction by the local treasurer; otherwise, the assessment becomes conclusive and unappealable.

(a) Where no payment is made, the taxpayer’s procedural remedy is governed strictly by Section 195. That is, in case of whole or partial denial of the protest, or inaction by the local treasurer, the taxpayer’s only recourse is to appeal the assessment with the court of competent jurisdiction. The appeal before the court does not seek a refund but only questions the validity or correctness of the assessment.

(b) Where payment was made, the taxpayer may thereafter maintain an action in court questioning the validity and correctness of the assessment (Section 195, LGC) and at the same time seeking a refund of the taxes. In truth, it would be illogical for the taxpayer to only seek a reversal of the assessment without praying for the refund of taxes. Once the assessment is set aside by the court, it follows as a matter of course that all taxes paid under the erroneous or invalid assessment are refunded to the taxpayer.

The same implication should ensue even if the taxpayer were to style his suit in court as an action for refund or recovery of erroneously paid or illegally collected tax as pursued under Section 196 of the LGC. In such a suit for refund, the taxpayer cannot successfully prosecute his theory of erroneous payment or illegal collection of taxes without necessarily assailing the validity or correctness of the assessment he had administratively protested.

x x x x

Equally important is the institution of the judicial action for refund within 30 days from the denial of or inaction on the letter-protest or claim, not any time later, even if within two years from the date of payment (as expressly stated in Section 196). Notice that the filing of such judicial claim for refund after questioning the assessment is within the two-year prescriptive period specified in Section 196. Note too that the filing date of such judicial action necessarily falls on the beginning portion of the two-year period from the date of payment. Even though the suit is seemingly grounded on Section 196, the taxpayer could not avail of the full extent


of the two-year period within which to initiate the action in court.

The reason is obvious. This is because an assessment was made, and if not appealed in court within 30 days from decision or inaction on the protest, it becomes conclusive and unappealable. Even if the action in court is one of claim for refund, the taxpayer cannot escape assailing the assessment, invalidity or incorrectness, the very foundation of his theory that the taxes were paid erroneously or otherwise collected from him illegally. Perforce, the subsequent judicial action, after the local treasurer’s decision or inaction, must be initiated within 30 days later. It cannot be anytime thereafter because the lapse of 30 days from decision or inaction results in the assessment becoming conclusive and unappealable. In short, the scenario wherein the administrative claim for refund falls on the early stage of the two-year period but the judicial claim on the last day or late stage of such two-year period does not apply in this specific instance where an assessment is issued.

x x x x

Simply put, there are two conditions that must be satisfied in order to successfully prosecute an action for refund in case the taxpayer had received an assessment. One, pay the tax and administratively assail within 60 days the assessment before the local treasurer, whether in a letter-protest or in a claim for refund. Two, bring an action in court within 30 days from decision or inaction by the local treasurer, whether such action is denominated as an appeal from assessment and/or claim for refund of erroneously or illegally collected tax.

In this case, after Cosmos received the assessment of Toledo on January 15, 2007, it forthwith protested such assessment through a letter dated January 18, 2007. Constrained to pay the assessed taxes and charges, Cosmos subsequently wrote the Office of the City Treasurer another letter asking for the refund and reiterating the grounds raised in the previous submitted protest letter. In the meantime, Cosmos received on February 6, 2007 the letter of Toledo denying its protest. Thus, on March 8, 2007, or exactly 30 days from its receipt of the denial, Cosmos brought the action before the RTC of Manila.

Under the circumstances, it is evident that Cosmos was fully justified in asking for the refund of the assailed taxes after protesting the same before the local treasurer. Consistent with the discussion in the premises, Cosmos may resort to, as it actually did, the alternative procedure of seeking a refund after timely protesting and paying the assessment. Considering that Cosmos initiated the judicial claim for refund within 30 days from receipt of the denial of its protest, it stands to reason that the assessment which was validly protested had not yet attained finality.

and Rules Committee. Justice Carandang also taught law at the Philippine Christian University and the Manuel L. Quezon School of Law.

In her first SC flag ceremony on January 7, 2019 she spoke to her colleagues and SC officials and employees of being “overjoyed and humbled at my appointment to this High Tribunal. I am filled with nothing but happiness and gratefulness, being thankful to God for this rare and golden opportunity to serve my country, more specifically the Judiciary.” A woman of deep faith, she said her work in the Supreme Court shall be her “offering to God, my tithe to him.”

Justice Carandang spoke of her expectations for herself: “I know my three years in this Court will be short. Nevertheless, I want it to be meaningful, meaningful not only to me but [also] to the legal profession, which I hold so dearly. Thus I would like—God if He wills it—to leave a legacy to the Judiciary and to the legal profession. As my appointment has been a special gift from Him, and from you my friends and colleagues, I would like my work to be a gift also to all of you.”

Sources:

• Written by Atty. Maria Victoria Gleoresty Sp. Guerra from Benchmark, Issue 1, Volume 4, First Quarter of 2019.

• “CA Associate Justice and UP alumna Rosmari Carandang appointed to the Supreme Court,” November 29, 2018 posted by MPRO_Admin <https://www.up.edu.ph/index.php/ca-associate-justice-and-up-alumna-rosmari-carandang-appointed-to-the-supreme-court> (accessed 1/15/19).

• Court of Appeals: 80 years (1936–2016), p. 33

Judicial MovesJustice Rosmari D. Carandang (continued from page 16)

Doctrinal RemindersTaxation Law (continued)

To reiterate, Cosmos, after it had protested and paid the assessed tax, is permitted by law to seek a refund having fully satisfied the twin conditions for prosecuting an action for refund before the court. Martires, J., City of Manila and Office of the City Treasurer of Manila v. Cosmos Bottling Corporation, G.R. No. 196681, June 27, 2018.


OCA CIRCULAR NO. 229-2018

TO: ALL JUDGES, CLERKS OF COURT, BRANCH CLERKS OF COURT, OFFICERS IN CHARGE, AND MEMBERS OF THE REGIONAL DISPOSAL COMMITTEES OF THE FIRST AND SECOND LEVEL COURTS

SUBJECT: DISPOSAL OF UNSERVICEABLE/UNNECESSARY PROPERTY OF THE JUDICIARY

This refers to the disposal of unserviceable/unnecessary properties of the lower courts which has been placed under the supervision of the Regional Disposal Committee (RDC). Pursuant to Administrative Circular No. 90-2007, several RDCs shall be created in each of the 13 Judicial Regions to take charge of the disposal of unnecessary properties of the lower courts in any particular Judicial Region.

Notably, under Item 6, Section III of the Administrative Circular No. 7-2004, as amended, it is provided that “[t]he responsible officer in the lower court shall first obtain authority to dispose of the unnecessary property from the Property Division of the Office of the Court Administrator prior to disposal. x x x.”

It has been observed, however, that there are several RDCs that have disposed of their unserviceable/unnecessary properties in their area of administrative supervision without first securing authority to dispose from the Property Division, Office of the Court Administrator as mandated. This contravenes an express provision under Revised Administrative Circular No. 7-2004, as amended. Thus, all concerned are enjoined to strictly observe the procedure stipulated in the said administrative circular.

For your information and strict compliance.

October 31, 2018.

(Sgd.) JOSE MIDAS P. MARQUEZCourt Administrator


TO: ALL JUDGES, CLERKS OF COURT AND OFFICERS IN CHARGE/ACTING CLERKS OF COURT OF THE LOWER COURTS

SUBJECT: MANDATORY SUBMISSION OF FINANCIAL MONTHLY AND QUARTERLY REPORTS TO THE ACCOUNTING

DIVISION, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT OFFICE, OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR VIA PRIVATE COURIERS

For the timely recording of financial reports in the books of accounts of the lower courts, all clerks of court and officers in charge/acting clerks of court shall submit their financial monthly reports (in compliance with OCA Circular Nos. 113- 2004 dated September 16, 2004 and 23-2009 dated March 3, 2009) to the Accounting Division, Financial Management Office (FMO), Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) using the services of private couriers for fast delivery of the reports, such as, but not limited to, AIR21, 2GO Express, LBC, Xend Business Solutions, JRS Express, ABest Express, and DHL Express.

Related costs/expenses for the submission of the financial reports shall be charged to the Extraordinary Miscellaneous Expense (EME) allowance of the concerned Executive Judge/Presiding Judge or, in case of the absence of the latter, the concerned Acting Presiding Judge.

Strict compliance is enjoined.

November 13, 2018.



TO: ALL JUDGES, CLERKS OF COURT, BRANCH CLERKS OF COURT AND OFFICERS IN CHARGE/ACTING CLERKS OF COURT OF THE FIRST AND SECOND LEVEL COURTS

SUBJECT: MANDATORY INCLUSION OF THE OFFICIAL RECEIPT NUMBER AND AMOUNT OF CASH BOND IN THE COURT ORDER

One of the causes of erroneous return/refund of cash bonds posted in the Office of the Clerks of Court and Single Sala Courts is that the Order of Release does not indicate the Official Receipt (OR) number issued and the amount of cash bond to be released.

In this regard, all judges of the first and second level courts are hereby DIRECTED to include in the Order of Release the OR Number and Amount of the cash bond posted which is being ordered to be withdrawn or refunded to the bondsman or claimant.

Strict compliance is enjoined.

November 16, 2018.




TO: ALL JUSTICES AND CLERKS OF COURT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS AND SANDIGANBAYAN, AND ALL JUDGES AND CLERKS OF COURT OF THE FIRST AND SECOND LEVEL COURTS

SUBJECT: DISCONTINUANCE OF SUBMISSION OF REPORTS REQUIRED UNDER ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 62-2002 DATED NOVEMBER 20, 2002 (RE: SUBMISSION OF REPORTS ON THE STATUS OF TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDERS OR WRITS OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ISSUED IN VARIOUS CASES) AND ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 118-2007 DATED NOVEMBER 22, 2007 (RE: REPORT ON THE STATUS OF PETITIONS FOR WRIT OF AMPARO)

Upon the recommendation of the OCA Reportorial Committee, Hon. Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio approved the discontinuance of the submission of the reports required under the following issuances which are either already incorporated in the monthly report of cases or are required for “one-time submission and/or implementation” only:

COURT ISSUANCE SUBJECT DEADLINE OF SUMISSION

1. Administrative Circular No. 62-2002 dated November 20, 2002

Submission of Report on the Status of Temporary Restraining Orders or Writs of Preliminary Injunction Issued in Various Cases

Not later than January 15, 2003

2. Administrative Circular No. 118-2007 dated November 22, 2007

Report on the Status of Petitions for Writ of Amparo

Not later than November 30, 2007, and thereafter, before the 10th day of every month

Henceforth, all concerned are DIRECTED to DISCONTINUE the submission of reports required under the above-listed issuances until further instruction from the Court.

November 23, 2018.



TO: ALL JUDGES (PRESIDING/ACTING PRESIDING/ASSISTING) AND BRANCH CLERKS OF COURT/OFFICER IN CHARGE OF THE FIRST AND SECOND LEVEL COURTS NATIONWIDE

SUBJECT: DROPPING OF THE OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR (OCA) CIRCULARS REQUIRING THE SUBMISSION OF REPORTS BY THE FIRST AND SECOND LEVEL COURTS

The OCA Reportorial Committee reviewed the issuances of the OCA relative to the submission of reports by the lower courts to determine which among those issuances will be recommended for dropping to streamline and simplify the reportorial requirements of said courts.

Relative thereto, the committee recommended the dropping of some OCA circulars considering that the reports required of by these issuances are already incorporated into other reports, or the required report is for “one-time submission and/or implementation” only.

In view of the foregoing, the submission of reports under the following OCA issuances is no longer required:

COURT ISSUANCE SUBJECT FREQUENCY OF

REPORT SUBMITTED BY SUBMITTED TO

1OCA Circular No. 18-2002 dated June 20, 2002

Submission of Copies of Final Orders, Decisions, Warrants of Arrest and File Photographs Involving Cases of Illegal Recruitment

–All Presiding Judges of the RTCs, MeTCs, MTCCs, MTCs and MCTCs

Atty. Rosemarie G. Duquez, Director of Anti-Illegal Recruitment Branch, POEA

2OCA Circular No. 53-2009 dated May 13, 2009

Reiteration of OCA Circular No. 18-2002 dated June 20, 2002 – - do - - do -

3OCA Circular No. 46-2009 dated April 20, 2009

Reiteration of OCA Circular No. 103-2007 dated October 16, 2007 (Re: Compliance with Administrative Order No. 25-2007 dated March 1, 2007 on Mandatory Continuous Trial of Cases Involving Extra Judicial Killing of Political Ideologists and Members of Media)

On or before the 10th day of the succeeding month

All Judges and Clerks of Court of the Regional Trial Courts

Office of the Court Administrator

4OCA Circular No. 14-2008 dated January 24, 2008

Monthly Report of Status of Cases Involving Terrorism On or before the 10th day of every month

All Judges and Clerks of Court in the RTCs

Office of the Court Administrator thru Court Management Office


5OCA Circular No. 34-2008 dated March 19, 2008

Inventory of All Environmental Cases MonthlyJudges and Clerks of Court of the First and Second Level Courts

Court Management Office, OCA

6OCA Circular No. 43-2008 dated April 18, 2008

Submission of Data Regarding Smuggling and Other Customs Related Cases

Within 10 days upon receipt of notice

All Judges and Clerks of Court of the First and Second Level Courts

Office of the Court Administrator thru Court Management Office


Adopting an Ecological Solid Waste Management System in the First and Second Level Courts and Creating a Task Force for the Purpose

Within 30 days from notice

All Judges of First and Second Level Courts

Court Management Office, OCA

8

OCA Circular No. 152-2009 dated October 28, 2009; OCA Circular No. 101-2005 dated October 6, 2005

Commitment of Juveniles in Conflict with the Law; Inventory on Conviction and Its Sanction of Children in Conflict with the Law

Every 10th day of January and every 10th

day of July of each year

All Judges of Family Courts; All Judges and Clerks of Court of Second Level Courts

Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council, 3rd Floor DOJ Agencies Building, NIA Road, Diliman 1100 Q.C., Metro Manila and Office of the Court Administrator

9

OCA Circular No. 160-2009 dated November 10, 2009; OCA Circular No. 05-2006 dated January 13, 2006; OCA Circular No. 72-2003 dated June 16, 2003

Eviction and Demolition Cases Involving Urban Poor; Submission of Copies of Decision, Writs of Eviction/Demolition and/or Orders of Similar Report Issued in Cases Involving Urban Poor to the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC)

Five days prior to its intended implementation

All Judges, Clerks of Court, and Sheriffs of the First and Second Level Courts

Furnish The Secretary General, Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council, 15th Floor, Banco de Oro Plaza, Paseo de Roxas St., Makati City


Report on Cases Involving Violation of RA No. 9208, otherwise known as the “Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003,” as amended by RA No. 10364 or the “Expanded Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2012”

Within 20 days from receipt of notice

All Judges and Clerks of Court of the RTCs

Court Management Office, OCA via regular mail or electronic mail at [email protected]


Submission of Monthly Report of Cases Using the Approved New Forms Under Administrative Circular No. 81-2012 dated September 17, 2012, in addition to the Monthly Report of Cases Under Administrative Circular No. 4-2004 dated February 4, 2004

Beginning the month of June 2013 and on or before the 10th day of the succeedingmonth

All Judges and Clerks of Court/Officers in Charge of the RTCs, MTCCs, MTCs and MCTCs

Statistical Reports Division, CMO, OCA

12OCA Circular No. 17-2014 dated June 27, 201[4]

Complete Addresses/Locations and Other Contact Information of the Lower Courts

Within five days from receipt of Circular


Court Management Office via courier or email at [email protected]

13OCA Circular No. 42-2014 dated March 20, 2014

Modification of OCA Circular No. 175-2009 dated December 18, 2009 (Submission of Monthly Report on the Status of Cases Involving Indigenous Cultural Communities [ICCs] and Indigenous Peoples [IPs]

On or before the 10th day of every month


Court Management Office via courier or email at [email protected]

14OCA Circular No. 250A-2016 dated December 5, 2016

Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Circular No. 910 dated April 22, 2016

Submitted on or before January 31, 2017

All Clerks of Court of the First and Second Level Courts

Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas–Cash Department

15OCA Circular No. 01-2017 dated January 9, 2017

Submission of Quarterly Reports by Regional Trial Courts ordered to hear, try and decide drug cases

End of the month following every quarter (starting October–December 2016)

All Judges and concerned court personnel of the affected Regional Trial Courts

SRD-CMO, OCA, via personal delivery, mail or email at [email protected]

16OCA Circular No. 33-2017 dated February 7, 2017

Implementation of Sections 11 and 12 of the Guidelines for Decongesting Holding Jails by Enforcing the Rights of Accused Persons to Bail and to Speedy Trial (A.M. No. 12-11-12-SC), in Relation with the Full Roll Out of Hustisyeah! In Hustiyeah! Courts (A.M. No. 13-04-11-SC)

Concerned Judges and Branch Clerks of Court of the First and the Second Level Courts in Cebu Province and the Provinces in Judicial Region 4-A Under the Hustisyeah! Project

Office of the Court Administrator by electronic mail at [email protected]

For your information, guidance and strict compliance.

November 23, 2018.




TO: ALL JUDGES AND CLERKS OF COURT OF THE FIRST LEVEL COURTS

SUBJECT: RESOLUTION DATED NOVEMBER 13, 2018 IN A.M. NO. 08-8-7-SC (RE: RULE OF PROCEDURE FOR SMALL CLAIMS CASES) RELATIVE TO THE PROVISION ON THE APPEARANCE OF A PARTY THROUGH REPRESENTATIVE UNDER SECTION 18 OF THE 2016 REVISED RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR SMALL CLAIMS CASES

For the information, guidance and strict observance of all first level courts, appended herein as Annex “A” is the Resolution dated November 13, 2018 of the Honorable Court, En Banc, in A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC (Re: Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases).

In the Resolution, the Court explicitly requires observance of the requisites under Section 18 of the 2016 Revised Rules of Procedure for Small Claims Cases, to quote:

x x x x At any rate, the 2016 Revised Rules of Procedure for Small Claims Cases will not apply, as the said requirement is very clear and needs no interpretation, to wit:

Sec. 18. Appearance. – The parties shall personally appear on the designated date of hearing.

Appearance through a representative must be for a valid cause. The representative of an individual-party must not be a lawyer and must be related to or next-of-kin of the individual- party. Juridical entities shall not be represented by a lawyer in any capacity.

The representative must be authorized under a Special Power of Attorney (Form 7-SCC) to enter into an amicable settlement of the dispute and to enter into stipulations or admissions of facts and of documentary exhibits.

Under the foregoing provision, the appearance through representative of an individual party is allowed as long as such representative is (1) not a lawyer; and (2) must be related to or next-of-kin. The same provision does not provide for any exception. x x x (emphasis supplied)

November 29, 2018.

(Sgd.) RAUL BAUTISTA VILLANUEVADeputy Court Administrator

and Officer in ChargeOffice of the Court Administrator

(Per Office Order No. 13-2018dated November 23, 2018)

Republic of the PhilippinesSupreme Court

Manila

EN BANC

N o t i c e

Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that the Court en banc issued a Resolution dated NOVEMBER 13, 2018, which reads as follows:

A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC (Re: Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases). – This refers to the letter dated November 8, 2018 of Atty. Juanito L. Garcia of Garcia Garcia & Associates Law Offices & Notaries, seeking action on his letter dated August 14, 2017, requesting (1) for clarification on the requirements for filing small claims cases [A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC], particularly the requirement that a representative of a complainant should be a relative within the third degree of consanguinity or affinity, and (2) for exemption from compliance with the said requirement [of] his client, Kok Wah Herman Bryan Chan, a Singaporean National who has no relative residing in the Philippines, but has appointed an attorney-in-fact to represent him in filing a complaint for sum of money. Attached as Annex “A” of the letter-request is an accomplished and notarized Statement of Claim (Habla ng Pagsingil) Standard Form.

The letter-request dated August 14, 2017 should “be denied because under Section 3, Rule 3 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court, the Court cannot issue advisory opinions on the state and meaning of laws, subject only to notable exceptions involving constitutional issues. While Atty. Garcia claims that the Municipal Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, requires that the representative of his client must be his relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, there appears to be no Order issued by such court dismissing the small claims case on that ground. Hence, there is no actual case or controversy that is ripe for adjudication even on a pure question of law.

At any rate, the 2016 Revised Rules of Procedure for Small Claims Cases will not apply, as the said requirement is very clear and needs no interpretation, to wit:

Annex “A”


have personal knowledge of the civil affairs of the represented individual party.

At this point, to exempt the client of Atty. Garcia from the twin requirement is tantamount to an implied amendment of the procedural rules on small claims, which cannot be countenanced without due deliberation by the Court En Banc. Considering that the client of Atty. Garcia is a foreigner, who has no representative, who, in turn, is related to him or a next-of-kin, such client cannot file a small claims case through a representative. Nonetheless, the representative of that client—even if not a relative or next-of-kin—can still file an action before regular courts, which may be governed by the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure or the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, depending on the total amount of the claim.

WHEREFORE, the letter-request dated November 8, 2018 of Atty. Juanita L. Garcia is DENIED. Jardeleza, Tijam, Gesmundo and Hernando, JJ., on official leave. (adv31)

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) EDGAR O. ARICHETAClerk of Court

Sec. 18. Appearance. – The parties shall personally appear on the designated date of hearing.

Appearance through a representative must be for a valid cause. The representative of an individual-party must not be a lawyer and must be related to or next-of-kin of the individual-party. Juridical entities shall not be represented by a lawyer in any capacity.

The representative must be authorized under a Special Power of Attorney (Form 7-SCC) to enter into an amicable settlement of the dispute and to enter into stipulations or admissions of facts and of documentary exhibits.

Under the foregoing provision, the appearance through representative of the individual-party is allowed as long as such representative is (1) not a lawyer, and (2) must be related to or next-of-kin. The same provision does not provide for any exception. The reason for the first requisite is that the presence of lawyers and the use of cross-examination during traditional open-court trials, tend to polarize the parties, increase antagonism and heighten the differences.1 The reason for the second requisite is that the relative or next-of-kin may

1 Rationale of the Proposed Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases, A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC dated September 9, 2008.


TO: ALL JUDGES AND CLERKS OF COURT OF THE SECOND LEVEL COURTS

SUBJECT: RESOLUTION DATED NOVEMBER 13, 2018 IN G.R. NO. 231989 (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROMY LIM y MIRANDA) PROVIDING, AMONG OTHERS, FURTHER CLARIFICATION ON THE APPLICATION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE MANDATORY POLICY THAT SHALL GOVERN THE PRACTICE IN MAINTAINING THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY TO PRESERVE THE INTEGRITY AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF SEIZED/CONFISCATED ILLEGAL DRUGS AND OTHER DRUG-RELATED ITEMS

For the information, guidance and strict observance of all second level courts, appended herein as Annex “A” is the Resolution dated November 13, 2018 of the Honorable Court, En Banc, in G.R. No. 231989 (People of the Philippines v. Romy Lim y Miranda). In the Resolution, the Court provides,

among others, further clarification on the application and interpretation of the mandatory policy that shall govern the practice in maintaining the chain of custody to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of seized/confiscated illegal drugs and other drug-related items.

This circular relates to OCA Circular No. 210-2018 dated October 1, 2018 (Re: Decision dated September 4, 2018 in G.R. No. 231989 [People of the Philippines v. Romy Lim y Miranda] Providing, among others, for the Mandatory Policy that Shall Govern the Practice in Maintaining the Chain of Custody to Preserve the Integrity and Evidentiary Value of Seized/Confiscated Illegal Drugs and Other Drug-Related Items).

November 29, 2018.

(Sgd.) RAUL BAUTISTA VILLANUEVADeputy Court Administrator and

Officer in ChargeOffice of the Court Administrator

(Per Office Order No. 13-2018dated November 23, 2018)


Republic of the PhilippinesSupreme Court

Manila

EN BANC

N o t i c e

Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that the Court en banc issued a Resolution dated NOVEMBER 13, 2018, which reads as follows:

G.R. No. 231989 (People of the Philippines v. Romy Lim y Miranda) – In a Letter dated October 17, 2018, the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) states that since the promulgation of People v. Romy Lim y Miranda on September 4, 2018, there has been an alarming increase in the number of dismissals or acquittals made with undue haste premised on the said ruling, apparently requiring three witnesses to be present during the conduct of the physical inventory and the taking of photographs of pieces of drug evidence seized from a drug suspect. The PDEA claims that what seems to have assumed significance in Lim is the apparent misinterpretation or misapplication of Section 21 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165, which requires three witnesses to be present during the physical inventory and taking of photographs of pieces of evidence seized from a suspect.

The Court notes the Letter dated October 17, 2018 of the PDEA, but denies the request for a detailed and more precise guideline of the ruling in People v. Romy Lim y Miranda.

The mandatory policy laid down in Lim should not be given retroactive effect. Pertinent portion of Lim clearly indicates a prospective application of such policy:

To conclude, judicial notice is taken of the fact that arrests and seizures related to illegal drugs are typically made without a warrant; hence, subject to inquest proceedings. Relative thereto, Section I (A.1.10) of the Chain of Custody Implementing Rules and Regulations directs:

A.1.10. Any justification or explanation in cases of noncompliance with the requirements of Section 21(1) of RA No. 9165, as amended, shall be clearly stated in the sworn statements/affidavits of the apprehending/seizing officers, as well as the steps taken to preserve the integrity and

1 Sec. 5. When warrant of arrest may issue. – (a) By the Regional Trial Court. – Within 10 days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted the preliminary investigation or when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to Section 6 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within 30 days from the filing of the complaint of information.

2 Emphasis added.

evidentiary value of the seized/confiscated items. Certification or record of coordination for operating units other than the PDEA pursuant to Section 86(a) and (b), Article IX of the IRR of RA No. 9165 shall be presented.

While the above-quoted provision has been the rule, it appears that it has not been practiced in most cases elevated before Us. Thus, in order to weed out early on from the courts’ already congested docket any orchestrated or poorly built up drug-related cases, the following should henceforth be enforced as a mandatory policy:

1. In the sworn statements/affidavits, the apprehending/seizing officers must state their compliance with the requirements of Section 21(1) of RA No. 9165, as amended, and its lRR.

2. In case of non-observance of the provision, the apprehending/seizing officers must state the justification or explanation therefor as well as the steps they have taken in order to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized/confiscated items.

3. If there is no justification or explanation expressly declared in the sworn statements or affidavits, the investigating fiscal must not immediately file the case before the court. Instead, he or she must refer the case for further preliminary investigation in order to determine the (non) existence of probable cause.

4. If the investigating fiscal filed the case despite such absence, the court may exercise its discretion to either refuse to issue a commitment order (or warrant of arrest) or dismiss the case outright for lack of probable cause in accordance with Section 5,1 Rule 112, Rules of Court.2

CircularsOCA CIRCULAR NO. 251-2018 (continued)

Annex “A”


3 AN ACT TO FURTHER STRENGTHEN THE ANTI-DRUG CAMPAIGN OF THE GOVERNMENT, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTION 21 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE “COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002.”

4 Sec. 23. Demurrer to evidence. – After the prosecution rests its case, the court may dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution the opportunity to be heard or (2) upon demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of court. If the court denies the demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the accused may adduce evidence in his defense. When the demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of court, the accused waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution. (15a)

The motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence shall specifically state its grounds and shall be filed within a non-extendible period of five days after the prosecution rests its case. The prosecution may oppose the motion within a non-extendible period of five days from its receipt.

Synonymous to “henceforth” are “from now on,” “from this point forward,” “henceforward,” “afterward,” “later,” “subsequently,” “hereupon” or “thereupon.” Without doubt, the mandatory policy in Lim is applicable only to drug cases under RA No. 9165, as amended by RA No. 10640,3 filed in court after the promulgation of Lim on September 4, 2018.

The mandatory policy in Lim was laid down “in order to weed out early on from the courts’ already congested docket any orchestrated or poorly built up drug-related case.” The said policy is a procedural rule adopted for the purpose of giving the trial courts discretion to either refuse to issue a commitment order (or warrant of arrest), or dismiss the case outright for lack of probable cause in accordance with Section 5, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, if there is no statement in the sworn statements or affidavits of compliance with Section 21, RA No. 9165, as amended by RA No. 10640. Such policy does not apply to cases filed before the promulgation of Lim where the accused has already been arraigned and is undergoing continuous trial, because the justifiable reasons for non-compliance with Section 21, RA No. 9165, as amended by RA No. 10640, can still be established during trial. Non-compliance with the policy in Lim is not a ground for acquittal based on reasonable doubt or violation of the chain of custody rule, which can only be decreed after trial, or pursuant to a demurrer to evidence under Section 23,4 Rule 119 of the Rules of Court.

Contrary to the claim of PDEA, Lim does not always require three witnesses to be present

If leave of court is granted, the accused shall file the demurrer to evidence within a non-extendible period or 10 days from notice. The prosecution may oppose the demurrer to evidence within a similar period from its receipt.

The order denying the motion for leave for court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before judgment. (n)

5 G.R. No. 224290, June 11, 2018. 6 People v. Sagana, G.R. No. 208471, August 2, 2017.

during the conduct of the physical inventory and taking of photographs of the seized dangerous drugs. It bears emphasis that the accused in Lim was charged in two Informations dated October 21, 2010 for drug offenses committed prior to the approval of RA No. 10640 on July 15, 2014; hence, the applicable law then was Section 21, RA No. 9165 and its Implementing Rules and Regulation (IRR), which requires the presence of three witnesses.

In People v. Vicente Sipin y De Castro,5 the Court pointed out that under the original provision of Section 21, RA No. 9165 and its IRR, the apprehending team was required to immediately conduct a physical inventory and photograph the drugs after their seizure and confiscation in the presence of no less than three witnesses, namely: (1) a representative from the media, and (2) the DOJ, and; (3) any elected public official who shall be required to sign copies of the inventory and be given copy thereof. The presence of the three witnesses was intended as a guarantee against planting of evidence and frame up, as they were “necessary to insulate the apprehension and incrimination proceedings from any taint of illegitimacy or irregularity.”6 In contrast, RA No. 10640, which amended Section 21 of RA No. 9165 and its IRR, now only requires two witnesses to be present during the conduct of the physical inventory and taking of photograph of the seized items, namely: (1) an elected public official; and (2) either a representative from the National Prosecution Service or the media.

It is not amiss to stress, however, that both the IRR of Section 21 of RA No. 9165 and RA No. 10640 similarly provide that the physical inventory and photograph shall be immediately after seizure and confiscation of the dangerous drugs, etc. (1) at the place where the search warrant is served; or (2) at the nearest police station, or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures.


7 People v. Vicente Sipin y De Castro, supra. 8 Senate Journal, Session No. 80. 16th Congress, 1st Regular

Session, June 4. 2014, p. 348. 9 Id. 10 Id.

Assuming that there is a perceived misinterpretation or misapplication of Lim, the proper remedy is to file a timely motion for reconsideration or appeal unless double jeopardy has set in, or even a petition for certiorari, in case there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the judge.

The PDEA further laments that law enforcement agencies are really having a hard time securing the attendance of the witnesses stated in RA No. 9165, as amended by RA No. 10640, because many witnesses, especially those of the National Prosecution Service and locally-elected officials, would not want to get involved in anti-drug operation and post-operation processes. The PDEA adds that there are instances when the available witnesses in the locality where the physical inventory and taking of photographs of the pieces of evidence seized from an accused are suspected to be connected or related to the suspect or the drug syndicate or group the said witnesses are affiliated with, precluding the operating units from inviting them as witnesses.

It would do well for PDEA to bear in mind that if there is any difficulty in complying with Section 21, RA No. 9165, as amended by RA No. 10640 [e.g., absence of an elected public official and a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media], the law enforcement officers must state in the sworn statements/affidavits the justifiable grounds for non-compliance with the requirements, as well as the steps taken to preserve the identity and evidentiary value of the seized/confiscated items, in order to avoid dismissal of drug cases for lack of probable cause. Lim has, in fact, restated some justifiable reasons that may be alleged and that the prosecution would be obliged to prove during trial:

(1) their attendance was impossible because the place of arrest was a remote area; (2) their safety during the inventory and photograph of the seized drugs was threatened by an immediate retaliatory action of the accused or any person/s acting for and in his/her behalf; (3) the elected official themselves were involved in the punishable acts sought to be apprehended; (4) earnest efforts to secure the presence of a DOJ or media representative and an elected public official within the period required under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code prove futile through no fault of

the arresting officers, who face the threat of being charged with arbitrary detention; or (5) time constraints and urgency of the anti-drug operations, which often rely on tips of confidential assets, prevented the law enforcers from obtaining the presence of the required witnesses even before the offenders could escape.”7

Besides, the legitimate concerns of the PDEA are not novel, and have been addressed and considered in the enactment of RA No. 10640. In her Sponsorship Speech on Senate Bill No. 2273, which eventually became RA No. 10640, Senator Grace L. Poe conceded that “while Section 21 was enshrined in the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act to safeguard the integrity of the evidence acquired and prevent planting of evidence, the application of said Section resulted in the ineffectiveness of the government’s campaign to stop the increasing drug addiction and also, in the conflicting decisions of the courts.”8 Senator Poe stressed the necessity for the amendment of Section 21 based on the public hearing that the Senate committee on Public Order and Dangerous Drugs had conducted, which revealed that “compliance with the rule on witnesses during the physical inventory is difficult. For one, media representatives are not always available in all corners of the Philippines, especially in the remote areas. For another there were instances where elected barangay officials themselves were involved in the punishable acts apprehended and, thus, it is difficult to get the most grass-root elected public official to be a witness as required by law.”9

In his Co-sponsorship speech, Senator Vicente C. Sotto III said that in view of a substantial number of acquittals in drug-related cases due to the varying interpretations of prosecutors and judges on Section 21 of RA No. 9165, there is a need for “certain adjustments so that we can plug the loopholes in our existing law” and “ensure [its] standard implementation.”10 Senator Sotto explained why the said provision should be amended:

Numerous drug trafficking activities can be traced to operations of highly organized and powerful local and international syndicates. The presence of such syndicates that have



11 Emphasis added

the resources and the capability to mount a counter-assault to apprehending law enforcers makes the requirement of Section 21(a) impracticable for law enforcers to comply with. It makes the place of seizure extremely unsafe for the proper inventory and photograph of the seized illegal drugs.

x x x x

Section 21(a) of RA No. 9165 need[s] to be amended to address the foregoing situation. We did not realize this in 2002 where the safety of the law enforcers and other persons required to be present in the inventory and photography of seized illegal drugs and the preservation of the very existence of seized illegal drugs itself are threatened by an immediate retaliatory action of drug syndicates at the place of seizure. The place where the seized drugs may be inventoried and photographed has to include a location where the seized drugs as well as the persons who are required to be present during the inventory and photograph are safe and secure from extreme danger.

It is proposed that the physical inventory and taking of photographs of seized illegal drugs be allowed to be conducted either in the place of seizure of illegal drugs or at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending law enforcers. The proposal will provide effective measures to ensure the integrity of seized illegal drugs since a safe location makes it more probable for an inventory and photograph of seized illegal drugs to be properly conducted, thereby reducing the incidents of dismissal of drug cases due to technicalities.

Non-observance of the prescribed procedures should not automatically mean that the seizure or confiscation is invalid or illegal, as long as the law enforcement officers could justify the same and could prove that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are not tainted. This is the effect of the inclusion in the proposal to amend the phrase “justifiable grounds.” There are instances where there are no media people or representatives from the DOJ available and the absence of these witnesses should not automatically invalidate the drug operation conducted. Even the presence of a public local elected official also is sometimes impossible especially if the elected official is afraid or scared.11

12 Eagle Realty Corp. v. Republic, G.R. No. 151424, July 31, 2009. 13 Id.

While the PDEA concedes that Lim squarely falls on the application of Section 21, RA No. 9165 prior to its amendment, the PDEA, likewise, insists that the ruling in Lim—which requires three witnesses to be present during the physical inventory and taking of photograph—should not apply to cases that happened after the effectivity of RA No. 10640.

Suffice it to state that the ruling in Lim is a contemporaneous construction of the original Section 21 of RA No. 9165 and its IRR. Judicial interpretation of a statute constitutes part of the law as of the date it was originally passed, since the Court’s construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the interpreted law carried into effect.12 Such judicial doctrine does not amount to the passage of a new law, but consists merely of a construction or interpretation of a pre-existing one.13 Significantly, the mandatory policy in Lim was adopted precisely to address the pervasive issue of non-compliance with Section 21 of RA No. 9165, as amended by RA No. 10640, thus:

To conclude, judicial notice is taken of the fact that arrests and seizures related to illegal drugs are typically made without a warrant; hence, subject to inquest proceedings. Relative thereto, Section 1(A.1.10) of the Chain of Custody Implementing Rules and Regulations directs:

A.1.10. Any justification or explanation in cases of noncompliance with the requirements of Section 21(1) of RA No. 9165, as amended, shall be clearly stated in the sworn statements/affidavits of the apprehending/seizing officers, as well as the steps taken to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized/confiscated items. Certification or record of coordination for operating units other than the PDEA pursuant to Section 86(a) and (b), Article IX of the IRR of RA No. 9165 shall be presented.

While the above-quoted provision has been the rule, it appears that it has not been practiced in most cases elevated before Us. Thus, in order to weed out early on from the courts’ already congested docket any orchestrated or poorly built up drug-related


cases, the following should henceforth be enforced as a mandatory policy: x x x14

WHEREFORE, the Letter dated October 17, 2018 of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency is NOTED, and the request for a detailed and more precise guideline of the ruling in People v. Romy Lim y Miranda is DENIED for lack of merit.

The Court further Resolved to NOTE the Letter dated November 6, 2018 of C/Supt. Rufino A. Martin, MBA, CSMS, Officer in Charge, Davao Prison and Penal Farm, B. E. Dujali, Davao del Norte, informing the Court that pursuant to the Decision with Order of Release and Entry of Judgment, all dated September 4, 2018, Person Deprived of Liberty (PDL) Romy Lim y Miranda (No. D214P-0106) was immediately released from confinement at the Davao Prison and Penal Farm on November 5, 2018. Jardeleza, J., no part and on official leave. Tijam, Gesmundo and Hernando, JJ., on official leave. (adv43)

Very truly yours,

Edgar O. ArichetaClerk of Court


TO: ALL CONTRACTUAL COURT STENOGRAPHERS AND COURT FINANCIAL AIDES OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS, FAMILY COURTS, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS AND MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES

SUBJECT: RENEWAL OF REGISTRATION WITH THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE

Pursuant to Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 51-2018 dated June 8, 2018 [Amending Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 69-2017 dated August 17, 2017 Re: Registration and Compliance Requirements of Individuals under a Job Order or Service Contract Agreement with the Departments and Agencies of the Government, Instrumentalities, Local Government Units (LGUs), State Colleges and Universities including Government-Owned and/or Controlled Corporations (GOCCs) and Government Financial Institutions (GFIs)], the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) requires that all individuals under a Job Order or Service Contract Agreement comply with the Registration and Tax Compliance Requirements including Payment of Annual Registration Fee (ARF) under the category specifically classified by the BIR in RMC No. 51-2018, particularly letters A or B.

In view of the foregoing BIR requirements on registration and tax compliance, YOU ARE HEREBY DIRECTED to submit the photocopy of your Registration using BIR Form 1901, updated Income Payee’s Sworn Declaration of Gross Receipts for self-employed, and the Payment of Annual Registration Fee (ARF) for the taxable year 2019 using BIR Form No. 0605, duly stamped received by the Revenue District Office where you are registered as such. Said documents shall form part of your documentary attachments to your claim for payment of services rendered, otherwise, your claim shall not be processed for failure to submit the abovementioned documentary requirements.

For your information and strict compliance.

December 5, 2018.



TO: JUDGES, CLERKS OF COURT, SHERIFFS AND PROCESS SERVERS OF THE FIRST AND SECOND LEVEL COURTS

SUBJECT: SERVICE OF SUMMONS, SUBPOENAS AND OTHER COURT PROCESSES BY POLICE PERSONNEL

Due to numerous inquiries and concerns on the service of court processes by personnel and officers of the Philippine National Police (PNP), all judges and clerks of court are hereby reminded that the service of summons, subpoenas, and other court processes, is primarily the duty of court sheriffs and process servers. It is only in exceptional circumstances when the life and safety of the court personnel may be at risk, that the PNP may be requested to serve or assist in serving the aforesaid court processes.

In civil cases, the expenses for the service of court processes are covered by Section 10, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court on legal fees. The required statements of estimated transportation and travel expenses shall be prepared by the sheriff or process server of the court issuing the court process. Upon approval thereof by the judge of the issuing court, the clerk of court shall disburse the amount requested to the sheriff or process server concerned and the latter shall release the amount to the police personnel, subject to the latter’s acknowledgment of receipt. The liquidation, which is also subject to the approval of the court, shall be prepared by the sheriff or process server concerned and submitted together with the return filed by the police personnel.

In criminal cases, the reimbursement of transportation and travel expenses may be requested from the Financial Management Office, OCA, in accordance with Administrative


14 People of the Philippines v. Romy Lim y Miranda, G.R. No. 231989, September 4, 2018.


Circular No. 15-2005 dated March 22, 2005, Administrative Circular No. 51-2010 dated July 7, 2010 and OCA Circular No. 140-2010 dated October 7, 2010, subject to the submission of the following documents:

(1) Duly accomplished disbursement voucher

(2) Duly accomplished obligation slip

(3) Travel order or authority

(4) Duly accomplished itinerary of travel detailing (a) the permanent residential address and temporary residence, if there is any, (b) place of origin and destination, (c) distance (in kms.) between the official station/residence and destination, (d) time of departure from place of origin and arrival at place of destination and back, (e) means of transportation used, and (f) transportation and travel expenses incurred.

(5) Certificate of Travel Completed

(6) Certificate of appearance/valid proof of travel (duly acknowledged summons, subpoenas/court processes served/return of service, bank deposit/withdrawal slips)

If applicable, the following documents should also be submitted:

(1) Bus, plane or boat ticket used

(2) Certification under oath by the claimant as to the kilometer distance between the (a) official station and the place of destination, and (b) residence and the place of destination (for travel beyond the 50 kilometer radius)

(3) Justification for staying overnight/several nights in the place of temporary assignment and valid proof of payment for hotel/lodging (for travel within the 50 kilometer radius)

In case the official or employee did not avail of the ordinary mode of transportation, the following supporting documents shall also be submitted: (1) affidavit of claimant justifying the hiring or rental of vehicle indicating the actual distance traveled and its reasonableness duly certified by the Presiding Judge, Executive Judge, or Deputy Court Administrator; (2) certification as to the prevailing rate of vehicle hire duly issued by the Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) or the City Franchising and Regulatory Board/Local Auditor or Municipal Treasurer: and (3) official receipt or any valid proof of payment. The hiring of private vehicles in an amount exceeding P1,000 per trip must be approved by the Chief Justice.

Executive judges and judges of single sala courts are directed to submit a uniform fare matrix to simplify and expedite the disbursement and liquidation of transportation and travel expenses.

Attached for your reference and information are disbursement voucher, obligation request, itinerary of travel and certificate of travel completed forms.

For strict compliance.

December 27, 2018.


REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

SUPREME COURT OF THE PHILIPPINES DISBURSEMENT VOUCHER

Fund Cluster:

Date: DV No.:

Mode of Payment □ MDS Check □ Commercial Bank □ ADA □ Others (Please specify) ___________________

Payee TIN/Employee No.: ORS/BURS No.:

Address Particulars Responsibility

Center MFO/PAP Amount

Amount Due

A. Certified: Expenses/Cash Advance necessary, lawful and incurred under my direct supervision.

___________________________________________________ Printed Name, Designation and Signature of Supervisor

B. Accounting Entry: Account Title UACS Debit Credit

C. Certified: D. Approved for Payment

Cash Available

Subject to Authority to Debit Account (when applicable)

Supporting documents complete and amount claimed proper

Signature Signature Printed Name Printed Name

Position

Position

Head, Accounting Unit/Authorized Representative Agency Head/Authorized Representative Date Date E. Receipt of Payment JEV No. Check/ ADA No.:

Date: Bank Name & Account Number

Signature: Date: Printed Name: Date

Official Receipt No. & Date/Other Documents

Republic of the Philippines Supreme Court of the Philippines Office of the Court Administrator

Manila

OBLIGATION REQUEST No.

Payee

Office

Address

Responsibility Center

Particulars F.P.P. Account Code Amount

Total A. Certified B. Certified

Charges to appropriation/allotment necessary, lawful

and under my direct supervision Supporting documents valid, proper and legal

Existence of available appropriation

Signature Signature Printed Name Printed Name

Position

Position MARIETTA R. ESDRELON

Head, Requesting Officer/Authorized Representative SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer Budget Division, FMO

Date Date


MEMORANDUM ORDER NO. 47-2018

CREATING THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE RULES OF PROCEDURE IN ELECTION CONTEST BEFORE THE FIRST LEVEL COURTS

WHEREAS, on April 24, 2007, the Supreme Court En Banc promulgated A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC or the Rules of Procedure in Election Contests Before the Courts Involving Elective Municipal and Barangay Officials “[p]ursuant to the provisions of Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution,1 and in order to achieve an expeditious, inexpensive and just determination of election cases before the courts;”

WHEREAS, the Rules governed the filing of pleadings, practice and procedure in election protests and petitions for quo warranto before courts of general jurisdiction and courts of limited jurisdiction relating to elective municipal and barangay officials;2

WHEREAS, the Metropolitan and City Judges Association of the Philippines, Inc. (MetCJAP) is the national association of metropolitan and city judges in the Philippines;

WHEREAS, pursuant to its mandate to assist its member judges in the effective discharge of their judicial functions, the members of its Board of Trustees issued Board Resolution No. 2018-1, praying that the Court create a Committee for the revision of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC or the Rules of Procedure in Election Contests Before the Courts Involving Elective Municipal and Barangay Officials and that the Court En Banc and/or the Committee to consider proposed amendments to the existing Rules, which was attached to the Letter;

1 Sec 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: (5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

2 Rule 1, Section 1, A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC or the Rules of Procedure in Election Contests Before the Courts Involving Elective Municipal and Barangay Officials.


APPENDIX A ___________________________

(Agency)

ITINERARY OF TRAVEL Number:

Name

Position Monthly Salary: P

Official Station

Purpose of Travel

Residence

DATE PLACE TO BE VISITED

TIME DEPARTURE

TIME OF ARRIVAL

MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION

ALLOWANCE EXPENSES TOTAL

AMOUNT TRANSPORTATION PER DIEMS DAILY ALLOW

TOTAL P P P P

(2) I certify that I have reviewed the foregoing itinerary (2) This is necessary to the service (3) The period so covered is reasonable and (4) The expenses claimed are proper.

(1) Prepared by:

____________________________________________

(Official or Employee) ___________________________________

__________________________________________ (3)

(Supervisor) APPROVED

________________________________________ (Chief of Office)

APPENDIX B ____________________________________________

(Agency)

CERTIFICATE OF TRAVEL COMPLETED

SUPREME COURT (Agency Head) Official Station M a n i l a _ (Date)

I certify that I have completed the Travel authorized in Itinerary of Travel No. ___________________ dated ________________________________, under conditions indicated below.

Strictly in accordance with the approved itinerary. Cut short as explained below. Excess payment in the amount of _______________________ was refunded

on C.A. No. _________________ dated ________________________

Extended and explained below, Additional Itinerary was submitted.

Other deviation as explained below. Explanation or justifications: ___________________________________________________________________

_____________________________________________________________________________________________

_____________________________________________________________________________________________

Evidence of travel attached hereto: _____________________________________________________________

_____________________________________________________________________________________________

_____________________________________________________________________________________________

_____________________________________________________________________________________________

Respectfully submitted:

_________________________________________ (Officer or Employee)

On evidence and information of which I have knowledge, the travel was actually undertaken. _________________________________________ (Supervisor)


WHEREAS, in the Letter dated April 5, 2018, Hon. Leilani Marie D. Grimares, President, MetCJAP, submitted for the Court’s consideration the proposed amendments for the Court’s consideration and approval;

WHEREAS, pursuant to the mandate of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC to achieve an expeditious, inexpensive and just determination of election cases before the courts, there is a need to create a Committee to study and review the proposed amendments and the existing Rules;

NOW THEREFORE, the Special Committee for the Revision of A.M. No. 07-4-I5-SC or the Rules of Procedure in Election Contests Before the Courts Involving Elective Municipal and Barangay Officials Committee on Rules of Procedure in Election Contest is hereby created and constituted as follows:

Chairperson

Hon. Diosdado M. Peralta Associate Justice, Supreme Court

Vice Chairperson

Hon. Alexander G. Gesmundo Associate Justice, Supreme Court

Members

Hon. Leilani Marie Dacanay-Grimares Metropolitan Trial Court, Parañaque City, Branch 87

Hon. Belen S. Carasig Metropolitan Trial Court, Parañaque City, Branch 88

Hon. Christian Emmanuel G. Pimentel Metropolitan Trial Court, Pasig City, Branch 69

Atty. Camille Leelin Ting Office of the Court Administrator

Secretary

Atty. Ralph Jerome D. Salvador Office of Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta

Assistant Secretary

Atty. Anna Katrina M. Martinez Office of Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta

The Committee shall have the following functions and duties:

1. Assess the nationwide impact of the Rules of Procedure in Election Contests Before the Courts Involving Elective Municipal and Barangay Officials;

2. Survey and compile the best practices employed by the trial court judges in relation to election contests procedure;

3. Propose amendments to the existing Rules of Procedure in Election Contests Before the Courts Involving Elective Municipal and Barangay Officials;

4. Formulate guidelines for the nationwide implementation of approved amendments to the Rules of Procedure in Election Contests Before the Courts Involving Elective Municipal and Barangay Officials.

To enable it to perform its functions and duties, the Committee shall be authorized to:

1. Create technical working groups, as the need arises, to look into special issues to be determined by the Committee;

2. Collaborate with the Philippine Judicial Academy for the development of skills and advancement training modules for trial court judges;

3. Invite resource persons who are expert in election law and procedure; and

4. Do such other acts as may be necessary in the performance of its mandate.

The Chairperson, Vice Chairperson, Members and Members of the Secretariat of the Committee shall receive the usual expense allowances.

This Memorandum Order shall take effect upon its issuance this 28th day of August 2018.

(Sgd.) TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTROChief Justice

Chairperson, First Division

(Sgd.) ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice

Chairperson, Second Division

(Sgd.) DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice

Acting Chairperson, Third Division


DESIGNATING THE MEMBERS OF THE PROJECT MANAGEMENT TEAM AND TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP FOR THE LAWYER INFORMATION SYSTEM1

1 The Lawyer Information System (LIS) aims to facilitate the management of the processes and information related to the conduct of the Bar Examinations and the implementation of the MCLE program. The LIS, as an upgrade, shall integrate the existing systems of the Supreme Court, the Bar Examinations Management System (BEMS), the Roll of Attorneys Information System (RAIS), and the Mandatory Continuing


OrdersMEMORANDUM ORDER NO. 49-2018 (continued)

In the interest of the service, and in addition to their regular duties, the following are designated as head and members of the Project Management Team (PMT) and Technical Working Group (TWG) for the Lawyer Information System: Project Management Team

Head

Atty. Ma. Cristina B. LayusaDeputy Clerk of Court and Bar Confidant Office of the Bar Confidant

Members

Representative (Member of the Governing Board) Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Office (MCLEO)

Representative (Member of the Board of Governors) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)

Representative, Office of the Chief Justice (OCJ)

Representative, Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)

Joselito N. Enriquez, SC Chief Judicial Staff OfficerManagement Information Systems Office (MISO)

Technical Working Group

Representative, Office of the Chief Justice (OCJ)

Representative, Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)

Representative, Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC)

Representative Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Office (MCLEO)

Joselito N. Enriquez Management Information Systems Office (MISO)

Ma. Ruby Castillo Management Information Systems Office (MISO)

Joan Bessat Management Information Systems Office (MISO)

Haidee Yacat Management Information Systems Office (MISO)

Janeth Acia Management Information Systems Office (MISO)

Hernan Galapon Management Information Systems Office (MISO)

Secretariat

Gary Louie Comia Management Information Systems Office (MISO)

Hanzel Fletch Hernandez Management Information Systems Office (MISO)

Karlo Ray Tanodra Management Information Systems Office (MISO)

The PMT and TWG shall perform the following functions:

1. Manage and monitor all activities pertinent to the project;

2. Identify the users that will be allocated with licenses and user’s access;

3. Review and finalize the project implementation plan in coordination with the service provider and ensure its consistency with the project objectives and the EISP;

4. Evaluate and approve the deliverables of the service provider and recommend corresponding payments;

5. Coordinate with the appropriate offices and the Committee on Computerization and Library (CCL), to resolve any technical and management issues;

6. Ensure project’s compliance to court policies and other laws, rules, and regulations;

7. Assist in the conduct of communication and advocacy activities;

8. Recommend guidelines and policies to ensure smooth project implementation;

9. Conduct regular meetings with the service provider for updating the project status, as well as to immediately address corrective measures;

10. Identify necessary resource requirements for the roll-out, operations, maintenance, and expansion of the project; and,

11. Prepare and/or review technical and progress reports for submission to the CCL.

The members of the PMT, TWG and/or their representatives, the Secretariat, and other Court personnel, should they be invited to serve as resource persons, shall receive expense allowance presently authorized. The PMT and the TWG are authorized to use the existing cash advance for EISP project implementation being managed by the Management Information Systems Office for meeting expenses, subject to the usual accounting and auditing rules.

Legal Education Information System (MCLEIS). It will also feature an online system to facilitate the submission of applications for the Bar Examinations. The Supreme Court en banc approved the awarding of the LIS contract to Systems and Software Consulting Group, Inc. in A.M. No. 18-05-06-SC Re: Award of the Contract for the Installation of the Lawyer Information System.


This Memorandum Order shall take effect upon its issuance this 10th day of September 2018.

(Sgd.) TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Chief Justice


(Sgd.) DIOSDADO M. PERALTAAssociate Justice

(Sgd.) LUCAS P. BERSAMINAssociate Justice

(Per S.O. No. 2595)


REORGANIZING THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON CERTAIN ADMINISTRATIVE CONCERNS

WHEREAS, in the interest of efficiency and to streamline the process of vehicle procurement and renovation (including the Supreme Court Complex in Baguio City) of the Justices of the Supreme Court, the Special Committee on Certain Administrative Concerns was created to evaluate all related concerns and recommend guidelines;

WHEREAS, some of the members of the Committee have already retired or are no longer with the office that they represent; NOW THEREFORE, the Special Committee on Certain Administrative Concerns is hereby reorganized as follows:

Chairperson

Hon. Andres B. Reyes, Jr. Associate Justice of the Supreme Court

Vice Chairperson

Hon. Jose C. Reyes, Jr. Associate Justice of the Supreme Court

Members

Atty. Edgar O. Aricheta Clerk of Court, En Banc

Atty. Corazon G. Ferrer-Flores Fiscal Management and Budget Office

Atty. Maria Carina M. Cunanan Office of Administrative Services

Representative from the Office of the Chief Justice

Secretariat

To be designated by the Chairperson

The Committee shall have the following functions and duties:

1. Recommend to the Supreme Court En Banc guidelines to streamline the process of vehicle procurement, and room allocation and renovation (including the Supreme Court Complex in Baguio City) of the Justices of the Supreme Court;

2. Coordinate with the Fiscal Management and Budget Office for the required funding; and

3. Coordinate with the Supreme Court Office of Administrative Services on the implementation of the guidelines abovementioned.

The Chairperson, Vice Chairperson, Members and Secretary of the Committee shall receive the usual expense allowances.

This Memorandum shall take effect upon its issuance this 18th day of September 2018.



(Sgd.) LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice(Per S.O. No. 2595)

(Sgd.) MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLOAssociate Justice (Per S.O. No. 2601)


REORGANIZING THE COMMITTEE ON FAMILY COURTS AND JUVENILE CONCERNS

In view of the recent changes in the membership of the Committee on Family Courts and Juvenile Concerns (CFCJC) and its Technical Working Group, it is hereby reorganized as follows:

Chairperson

Hon. Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe

Vice Chairpersons

Hon. Victoria Isabel A. ParedesCourt of Appeals


Hon. Geraldine C. Fiel-MacaraigCourt of Appeals

Members

Court Administrator or his representative

Hon. Ma. Theresa V. Mendoza-Arcega Sandiganbayan

Hon. Lorifel Lacap PahimnaSandiganbayan

Judge Angelene Mary W. Quimpo-Sale RTC Branch 106, Quezon City

Judge Evelyn G. NeryRTC Branch 19, Cagayan de Oro City

Judge Sita Jose-ClementeRTC Branch 16, Malolos City, Bulacan

Chief, Fiscal Management and Budget Office

Chief, Office of the Chief Attorney

Chief, Management Information Systems Office

Judicial Reform Program AdministratorProgram Management Office

Chief, Public Information Office

Chief, Office on Halls of Justice

Atty. Myrna S. Feliciano, Philippine Judicial Academy

Representative, Office of the Chief Justice

Technical Working Group Members

Justice Geraldine C. Fiel-Macaraig

Justice Ma. Theresa V. Mendoza-Arcega

Justice Lorifel Lacap Pahimna

Deputy Court Administrator Jenny Lind R. Aldecoa-Delorino

Assistant Court Administrator Ma. Regina Adoracion Filomena M. Ignacio

Judge Angelene Mary W. Quimpo-Sale

Judge Evelyn G. Nery

Judge Sita J. Clemente

Judge Cesar Pabel D. SulitRTC Branch 162, Pasig City

Judge Cristina Javalera-SulitRTC Branch 140,Makati City

Judge Jose Lorenzo R. Dela RosaRTC Branch 4, Manila

Judge Emily L. San Gaspar-Gito RTC Branch 5, Manila

Judge Rosalina L. Luna-PisonRetired Family Court Judge, Quezon City

Atty. Myrna S. FelicianoPhilippine Judicial Academy

Secretary

Office of the Chairperson

Assistant Secretaries

Atty. Apple Jane B. Clemente Philippine Judicial Academy

Ms. Rouschelle G. Mercado Philippine Judicial Academy

Mr. Carmelo Suyo or the stenographer assigned by the Clerk of Court

The Chairperson, Vice Chairperson, Members, and Secretariat of the CFCJC and its TWG, including those who have rendered service as part of the CFCJC and its TWG prior to the issuance of this Memorandum Order, shall receive the expense allowance presently authorized.

Members of the CFCJC and its TWG who are stationed outside the National Capital Region shall also be entitled to transportation allowance and reimbursement of plane fares for attendance in meetings.

This Memorandum Order shall take effect upon its issuance this 9th day of October 2018.



(Sgd.) ANTONIO T. CARPIOChairperson, Second Division

(Sgd.) DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Chairperson, Third Division


REORGANIZING THE COMMITTEE ON COMPUTERIZATION AND LIBRARY

WHEREAS, there is a need to harmonize and integrate all computerization efforts at all levels of the judiciary to implement the Enterprise Information Systems Plan of the Judiciary and related reforms;

WHEREAS, there is a need to modernize and enhance court library collections, facilities, and e-library systems to assist justices, judges, and court personnel in their adjudication functions;



NOW, THEREFORE, in the interest of service, the Committee on Computerization and Library (CCL) is hereby reorganized as follows:

Chair

Hon. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen

Vice Chairperson

Hon. Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe

Members

Hon. Andres B. Reyes, Jr.

Hon. Alexander G. Gesmundo

Hon. Romeo F. Barza, Court of Appeals

Hon. Amparo M. Cabajote-Tang, Sandiganbayan

Hon. Roman G. Del Rosario, Court of Tax Appeals

Court Administrator, Office of the Court Administrator

Chief, Office of the Chief Attorney

Chief, Public Information Office


Management Information Systems Office Personnel designated by its Chief

Judicial Reform Program AdministratorProgram Management Office

President, Philippine Judges Association

National President Metropolitan and City Judges Association of the Philippines

National President, Philippine Trial Judges League, Inc.

Chief Librarian of the Supreme Court

Chief Librarian of the Court of Appeals

Chief Librarian of the Court of Tax Appeals

Chief Librarian of the Sandiganbayan

Representatives of the librarians from the lower courts [To be designated by the Chief Justice]

Secretariat

Atty. Jeanne Carla T. Ferrer Secretary

Atty. Annabelle G. Palomar Assistant Secretary

Atty. Rachel B. Miranda Assistant Secretary

Ms. Stefanie B. Noto Assistant Secretary

Mr. Jeremy Lloyd E. Vidal Assistant Secretary

Mr. Karlo Ray I. Tanodra Assistant Secretary

Ms. Editha M. Pontaoe Assistant Secretary

The Committee shall be authorized to create such Technical Working Groups (TWGs) and/or hire consultants as it deems necessary to carry out its duties.

The Chair, Vice Chairperson, Members or their representatives, Members of the Technical Working Group/s, and Members of the Secretariat shall receive the usual expense allowances.

This Memorandum Order shall take effect upon its issuance this 24th day of October 2018 in the City of Manila.

(Sgd.) ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Acting Chief Justice Chairperson, Second Division

(Sgd.) DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice



Acting Chairperson, First Division


REORGANIZING THE eCOURTS TECHNOLOGY GOVERNANCE COMMITTEE

WHEREAS, in A.M. No. 13-05-07-SC, the Supreme Court En Banc approved the launch of the eCourt Project in Quezon City on June 14, 2013;

WHEREAS, in Resolution No. 2014-01, the Committee on Computerization and Library recommended the creation of the eCourts Technology Governance Committee (TGC), which will resolve issues relating to the eCourts implementation;

WHEREAS, in its September 15, 2014 meeting, the Committee on Computerization and Library unanimously approved recommendation for the creation of the TGC;

WHEREAS, on September 22, 2014, the Chief Justice approved Resolution No. 2014-01;

WHEREAS, in Resolution No. 2014-02, the Committee on Computerization and Library recommended the membership expansion of the TGC to include representatives of the Court of Tax Appeals, Sandiganbayan, and the Supreme Court Office of the Clerk of Court;



NOW, THEREFORE, in the interest of service, the eCourts Technology Governance Committee is reorganized as follows:

Chair

Hon. Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr., Court of Appeals

Vice Chair

Court Administrator, Office of the Court Administrator

Members

Hon. Maria Filomena D. Singh, Court of Appeals

Hon. Niño Delvin Embuscado, Metropolitan Trial Court


Clerk of Court Office of the Clerk of Court En Banc, Supreme Court

Mr. Ricardo Lai, Jr. Management Information Systems Office

Representative, Office of the Chief Justice

Secretariat

Atty. Khrystynn Cyd Rhia G. De Leon-Garcia Office of Justice Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr. Secretary

Ms. Veronica A. Jimenez, Program Management Office Assistant Secretary

Resource Persons

Ms. Ruby CastilloManagement Information Systems Office

Mr. Michael Rivera Management Information Systems Office

The TGC shall be authorized to create such Sub-Working Groups as it deems necessary to carry out its duties.

The Chair, Vice Chair, Members of their representatives, Members of the Sub-Working Group/s, Members of the Secretariat, and Resource Persons shall receive the usual expense allowances.

This Memorandum Order shall take effect upon its issuance this 24th day of October 2018 in the City of Manila.

(Sgd.) ANTONIO T. CARPIOActing Chief Justice







RECONSTITUTING THE TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP FOR THE JUDICIARY’S COMPLIANCE WITH THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION

WHEREAS, the Supreme Court was previously invited to participate in the Assessment of the Implementation of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) specifically to review Article 11 (Measures relating to the judiciary and prosecution services);

WHEREAS, in view of the periodic review cycles for the UNCAC, there is a need for the continued involvement and participation of the Judiciary in the compliance and implementation of the UNCAC;

WHEREAS, certain offices of the Judiciary also need to regularly provide information on the specific measures against corruption that are in place and the evidence of their implementation;

WHEREAS, there is a need to have an entity that will provide the requested information of the Country Working Group for the UNCAC, and to render technical assistance and support in the regular assessment and review of UNCAC-related activities of the Judiciary;

WHEREAS, the Court En Banc has directed that the Technical Working Group (TWG) on the UNCAC previously created by Memorandum Order No. 23-2014 be reconstituted as provided in its Resolution dated September 11, 2018 in A.M. No. 14-09-07-SC;

NOW THEREFORE, the TWG on the UNCAC is hereby reconstituted with the following members:

• One representative from the Office of the Chief Justice,

• One representative of the Public Information Office,

• One representative of the Office of the Court Administrator,

• One representative of the Judicial and Bar Council,

• One representative of the Philippine Judicial Academy,

• One representative from the Office of the Chief Attorney,

• One representative from the Program Management Office, who shall also act as the TWG Secretariat.

The respective Chiefs of Offices are hereby requested to provide the Secretariat with names of their representatives as soon as possible.


The TWG shall have the following duties:

a) gather the necessary data/statistics to support the identified measures as may be requested by the UNCAC for purposes of its regular review cycles,

b) review existing laws and Court issuances relevant to Article 11 of the UNCAC,

c) conduct a compliance and gaps analysis of the Judiciary’s compliance with the provisions of the UNCAC, specifically Article 11,

d) review the results of the gaps analysis vis-a-vis disclosure policies and other Court issuances and make the necessary recommendations for consideration of the Court En Banc,

e) prepare a report on gaps in policies and measures addressing corruption in the Judiciary, which shall be submitted to the Supreme Court En Banc through the Chief Justice for approval,

f) submit the Summary of Applicable Measures and Evidence of Implementation with the Compliance and Gaps Analysis to the Supreme Court En Banc for approval,

g) attend the consultation meetings to be scheduled by the Office of the President and the Ombudsman, and

h) perform such other tasks necessary for or related to the Judiciary’s UNCAC compliance.

The TWG Members shall be entitled to receive the expense allowances presently authorized.

This Memorandum Order shall take effect upon its issuance this 7th day of November 2018.

(Sgd.) ANTONIO T. CARPIOSenior Associate Justice






Supreme Court of the PhilippinesManila

MEMORANDUM

FOR : The Supreme Court En Banc

Through: Hon. ANTONIO T. CARPIO Senior Associate Justice

FROM: The Technical Working Group on the UNCAC (Memorandum Order No. 23-2014)

DATE: November 5, 2018

SUBJECT: A.M. No. 14-09-07-SC. Compliance with the Court’s Directive on the Reconstitution of the Technical Working Group (TWG) for the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC)

Your Honors:

1. This refers to the Resolution of the Court in the above-quoted Administrative Matter on the UNCAC compliance and implementation by the Judiciary, dated September 11, 2018.

2. In paragraph (a) thereof, the Resolution resolved to:

RECONSTITUTE the Technical Working Group (TWG) created under Memorandum [Order] No. 23-2014 dated September 18, 2014 to include representatives from the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), PIO, JBC, PMO and PHILJA as its Members.

3. May we respectfully recommend the inclusion of a representative from the Office of the Chief Attorney in the TWG since Memorandum Order No. 23-2014 has included a representative from the said office. We also respectfully recommend the inclusion of a member from the Office of the Chief Justice to ensure that the Chief Justice, as head of the institution, will be updated with regard to the TWG’s work.

4. In view of the foregoing, we respectfully submit the herein attached draft Memorandum Order reconstituting the TWG.

5. For Your Honors’ information and kind consideration.

(Sgd.) MARIA VICTORIA GLEORESTY SP. GUERRAPublic Information Office

(Sgd.) LEAH EASTER P. LAJA-OTTOJudicial and Bar Council

(Sgd.) ANTONIO ANDRE D. CALIZO Program Management Office

(Sgd.) MA. MELISSA DIMSON-BAUTISTAPhilippine Judicial Academy


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