from private security to public good: regulating the private security industry in haiti by geoff...

7/31/2019 From Private Security to Public Good: Regulating the Private Security Industry in Haiti by Geoff Burt

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SSR ISSue PaPeRSN. 9 Jn 2012

Fr Prit Scrit t PbicG: Rgting th PritScrit Instr in HitiGff Brt

Haiti


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THe CeNTRe FoR INTeRNaTIoNal GoveRNaNCe INNovaTIoN SSR ISSue PaPeRS: No. 9

www.CIGIoNl INe.oRG FRom PRIvaTe SeCuRITy To PuBlIC GoodReGulaTING THe PRIvaTe SeCuRITy INduSTRy IN HaIT1

Copyright 2012 by The Centre for International Governance Innovation.

Research for this report was funded by a special project grant fromthe Canadian Department of National Defences Security and DefenceForum (SDF).

The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the author and donot necessarily reect the views of The Centre for International GovernanceInnovation or its Operating Board of Directors or International Board ofGovernors.

This work was carried out with the support of the Centre for InternationalGovernance Innovation (CIGI), Waterloo, Ontario, Canada (www.cigionline.org). This work is licensed under a Creative CommonsAribution Non-commercial No Derivatives License. To view thislicense, visit (www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/). For re-use or distribution, please include this copyright notice.

Cover photo: A Haitian security guard eyes the entrance of a warehouse asworkers unload bags containing our in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, followingthe earthquake on January 12, 2010. (AP Photo/Francois Mori)

About the SSr ISSue

pAperS

The Security Sector Reorm (SSR) Issue Papers,

produced by The Centre or InternationalGovernance Innovation (CIGI), are a product

o CIGIs Security Sector Governance project.

Authored by prominent practitioners in the

eld, policy makers, academics and inormed

observers, the papers in this series will contribute

to ongoing debates and infuence policy on issues

related to SSR. Combining analysis o current

problems and challenges, they will examine

thematic and geographic topics relating to the

most pressing SSR issues.

Series Editor: Mark Sedra

Series Coordinator: Michael Lawrence

SummAry

Haiti, like many countries, relies heavily on private

security companies to protect people and property

However, while the private security industry has a

vital role to play in stabilizing the country, it has long

unctioned without eective government oversight

Haitis security sector reorm (SSR) process has begun

to address this shortcoming. The paper analyzes the

current state o the private security industry in Hait

and the legal ramework under which it operates, and

makes recommendations or how a reormed legal

and regulatory regime can guide the next phase o

its development, based on interviews with owners

and agents o private security companies, industry

associations, senior Haitian police personnel, United

Nations (UN) planners and parliamentary leaders

The paper concludes that genuine consultation and

partnership between the government, industry and

civil society is required, i SSR programs in Haiti and

elsewhere are to successully marshal private resources

towards the public good.


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IntroductIon

Heavy reliance on private security companies (PSCs) to

protect people and property is a global phenomenon,

reshaping security provision in societies around the

world. In many developed countries, such as the United

States, the United Kingdom and Israel, the budgets o

PSCs and the number o personnel they employ exceed

those o public law enorcement agencies (Richards and

Smith, 2007), with some major North American cities

reaching a ratio o private security to police greater than

seven to one (Lalonde, 2010). In states undergoing SSR

it is common or the size o the private security industry

to exceed that o the public police orce, sometimes by a

wide margin. A recent study estimated that more people

are employed globally as civilian private security agents

than as police ocers (Van Dijk, 2008: 215). In Latin

America and the Caribbean, the ratio o private security

to police ranges rom less than 1:1 in Ecuador to 4.9:1 in

Honduras (Small Arms Survey, 2011). Unsurprisingly

PSCs are oten among the largest groups o armed actors

in a country. The SSR model emphasizes democratic

civilian control over all orms o armed orce both

public and private rendering the legal structure

licensing and regulation o the private security industry

an important consideration or reorm.

In well-unctioning systems, proper regulation helps

to ensure that, in the course o serving their particular

private interests, PSCs and their agents contribute to

public saety and security by providing a deterrent to

property crime and securing public spaces. They are alsoimportant partners in community policing strategies

reporting suspicious behaviour and relaying security

concerns to the police. In the absence o eective public

regulation, PSCs will naturally prioritise the needs o

owners and shareholders over those o the public at large

(Richards and Smith, 2007: 11). In the process, they may

be co-opted by political groups and become involved

AcronymS And

AbbrevIAtIonS

APAS Association Proessionnelle des Agences de

Scurit

DCPA Direction Centrale de la PoliceAdministratrive (Central Directorate o

Administrative Police)

DDR disarmament, demobilization and

reintegration

FAdH Forces Armes dHati (Haitian Armed

Forces)

FLACSO Latin American Faculty o Social Sciences

HNP Haitian National Police

ICOC International Code o Conduct or Private

Security Providers

MICT Ministre de lIntrieur et des Collectivits

Territoriales (Ministry o Interior and

Collective Territories)

MINUSTAH UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti

OAS Organization o American States

OECD DAC Organisation or Economic Co-operation

and Developments Development Assistance

Committee

OPC Oce de la Protection du Citoyen (Oce o

Citizen Protection)

PSCs private security companies

PSRA Private Security Regulation Authority

(Jamaica)

SSR security sector reorm

UN United Nations

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNICEF United Nations Childrens Fund

UNSG UN Secretary-General


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in criminal activity and in so doing, represent a source

o intimidation and insecurity or the public. The value

o a regulatory regime is largely based on its ability to

provide oversight and accountability, and deter abuses.

This requires, at a minimum, a set o laws stipulating the

roles that PSCs are allowed to assume; strict guidelinesgoverning the licensing and storage o rearms; a clear

procedure to issue and revoke operating licences; and

mechanisms allowing the state to oversee the industry,

establish benchmarks or training, perorm background

checks on agents and sanction companies that ail to meet

standards. In many developed countries, the relationship

between the state and private security extends ar

beyond the notion o control, to include public-private

partnerships and community policing strategies intended

to maximize the industrys contribution to public security.

In Haiti, the private security industry has long unctioned

without eective state regulation. The industry currently

operates under a series o presidential decrees. The rst

two, passed in 1988 and 1989, provide general guidelines

on the role o PSCs, the requirements they must meet to

be authorized and the kinds o weapons they may use. A

third decree, passed in 1994, gives the Haitian National

Police (HNP) the legal authority to enorce regulations

governing the industry.1 These three decrees provide a

basic breakdown o roles and responsibilities, but they

are insuciently detailed and should have been ollowed

by a set o laws to address legal voids that provide a

clear, more complete system o oversight and regulation.

Political strie, natural disasters and ongoing instability,

however, directed the attention o Haitian authoritieselsewhere. As the Haitian government struggled to

conront other pressing priorities, a more detailed set o

laws was never passed.

1 This authority had previously been vested with the armed orces.When President Jean-Bertrande Aristide disbanded the armed orcesin an attempt to halt a cycle o military coups, their responsibilitieswere passed to the HNP by decree.

Haitis current government and its international partners

in the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) are

aware o these shortcomings in regulation and oversight

and are taking concrete steps to address them. A process led

by the Ministry o Justice and Public Security is underway

to drat new legislation to replace the presidential decreesas the legal ramework governing the industry. The

ministry must decide whether the legislation will merely

close gaps in the existing structure or create an entirely

new regulatory regime. Any new regulatory ramework

must be accompanied by a renewed commitment to

actively enorce its requirements. An encouraging early

sign is that, unlike the previous HNP Reorm Plan or

20062011, the HNP development plan or 20122016

includes provisions to create and sta a specialized unit

in the Direction Centrale de la Police Administratrive

(DCPA) tasked with oversight o the industry.2 Taken

together, these two initiatives are a strong signal that the

Haitian government has decided to conront this issue

Even considering the current regulatory weakness, in the

past, the Haitian government has shown little resolve to

use the powers at its disposal to regulate the industry.

As a new legal ramework is established and the police

orce dedicates the necessary resources to build up

its oversight capacity, a clear picture o the state o the

industry and the challenges it aces in complementing

public SSR initiatives is needed. The rst section o this

paper examines the growing signicance o private

security in SSR theory and practice. Next, the paper

describes the current state o the private security industry

in Haiti and the shortcomings o the legal rameworkunder which it presently operates. The paper then

makes recommendations or how a reormed lega

and regulatory regime can guide the next phase o its

2 The HNP Reorm Plan was the strategic document that guidedMINUSTAHs assistance to Haitis police rom 2006 to 2011. A newplan, which will guide the next phase o cooperation rom 2011 to2016, is currently being nalized. Interview with senior MINUSTAHpersonnel, Port-au-Prince, October 2011.


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development, based on interviews with owners o PSCs

in Haiti, private security agents, industry associations,

senior HNP personnel, MINUSTAH planners and

parliamentary leaders. Haitis experience with private

security demonstrates that genuine consultation and

partnership between the government, industry and civil

society is required i SSR programs are to successully

marshal private resources towards the public good.

prIvAte SecurIty AndSSr

SSR seeks to guarantee the eective, accountable and

rights-respecting provision o security and justice in

countries recovering rom confict or transitioning

rom authoritarianism. A chie innovation o the SSR

concept is the belie that both too much and too little

security can threaten individual security. Refecting the

understanding that overbearing and predatory security

regimes are oten the principal threat acing a society,

SSRs emphasis on democratic oversight and control is a

key eature distinguishing it rom earlier orms o security

assistance that were narrowly ocused on improving the

eectiveness o security orces. The SSR model is based

on a paradigm shit in security thinking, rom state-

centred to people-centred approaches, represented by the

term human security. One o SSRs core concerns is to

control the eect o violence both organized (political

violence, organized crime) and disorganized (individual

opportunistic crime and predation) on the population

The mainstream SSR model views a public monopoly

over security and justice provision, operating under

the oversight and control o democratic leadership, as

the bedrock o a stable domestic political order. This is

why a key element o post-confict SSR is to disassemble

non-state armed groups, either by integrating them

into state structures or back into the civilian economy

Unsurprisingly, proponents o the SSR model have

characteristically reacted with suspicion towards thegrowth o the global private security industry, refexively

branding it as a negative and disruptive orce. Mainstream

theory and practice has tended to view private security

provision as external to the SSR process, despite the

act that the states regulatory role and attendant

interest in ensuring that the pursuit o private interests

serves, rather than undermines, the public good is a

critical dimension o SSR. This orientation means that

SSR ocuses almost exclusively on public security orces

neglecting the extent to which people in the developing

world have come to rely on private providers or their

day-to-day security needs (Abrahamsen and Williams

2006; see also Baker, 2010). As donors have struggled to

tailor SSR programs to increasingly challenging contexts

an emerging criticism is that the model largely excludes

the actors who actually provide security in developing

countries, and is consequently poorly adapted tosocieties where multiple actors apart rom the state

including PSCs provide state-like security and justice

unctions to citizens. The history o many liberal societies

involves the state consolidating a single public peace

out o a multiplicity o relatively autonomous private

peaces, as it asserts an exclusive right to determine who

can legitimately wield orce. This trend should not be

About the Author

Geo Burt is vice president o the Security

Governance Group, a private research and

consulting rm ocused on the security

dimensions o state building, peace building

and post-confict reconstruction, based in

Waterloo, Canada. Prior to joining the Security

Governance Group, he was a research ocer

at The Centre or International Governance

Innovation (CIGI).


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understood as universal to all societies and as Shearing

and Stenning (1987) note, it should not be assumed

that the move rom private to public responsibility

or maintaining public order is linear and irreversible

(1987: 12).

The concept o policing has evolved to refect this new

understanding o the state as just one o several actors

in the security realm. Policing is best dened in terms

o its objectives, which include saety, the security o

people and property, and predictable public order. Law

enorcement is merely one aspect o policing, though it

is so closely associated with the public police orce that

the two terms are oten used interchangeably. In act,

the public police employ a wide range o other policingstrategies, including surveillance (patrol), intelligence

gathering, investigation and environmental design.3 The

model o policing has changed rom a public police orce

concerned primarily with enorcing and upholding the

laws o the state, to a more plural model that denes both

PSCs and other non-state actors who uphold public order

as legitimate providers o policing; as two prominent

scholars noted more than 15 years ago, the police and

policing have become increasingly distinct (Bayley and

Shearing, 1996).

As the concept o policing expands rom a narrow

mandate o enorcing the law and apprehending

oenders to a broader goal o public order and security,

civilian private security personnel can be increasingly

regarded as providing aspects o a police service, while

remaining separate rom the public police (Lalonde,

2010: 8). The plural policing model urnishes the state with

a dual role as an important provider o policing, but also

the regulator o the policing industry. As one researcher

put it: This has given rise to the notions o rowing and

3 These non-law enorcement tasks are shared by the private sector.PSCs concerned with protecting persons and property, minimizingrisk and identiying perpetrators oten use some or all o thesestrategies.

steering with regard to security, or the ability o central

governments to steer or determine overall rameworks

and standards while entrusting the rowing the actual

security provision activities to other actors such as

corporate entities supplied by the market (Caparini,

2006). Regulation, oversight and the enorcement o basiclaws protecting citizens, and specic laws governing the

industry are the means by which the state authority can

maintain a harmonious relationship between private

security interests and the broader public peace.

Though both public police and private security agents

may provide policing services, some undamental

distinctions remain. The public police are, by necessity,

more reactive to crime, largely because they are called in torespond when a crime has occurred. The private security

industry, on the other hand, is more preventive, uture-

oriented and ocused on risk mitigation. The public police

are unded by the state and should, at least in theory, be

distributed equitably among citizens. Private security

is expressly distributed in terms o a clients ability and

desire to pay. This does not mean, however, that private

security cannot benet the public at large. In societies

undergoing SSR, private security can buttress weak or

ineective public security institutions.4 In act, a well-

regulated private security sector can in cooperation with

the police act as a orce multiplier, increasing the overall

sense o security (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2006)

Private security agents may provide an added level o

both ormal and inormal surveillance o private and

public spaces, enabling personnel to alert public police

and other emergency responders to events that negativelyimpact public saety and security (Lalonde, 2010)

Moreover, PSCs can contribute to community policing

4 The private security industry can similarly make contributionsto states undergoing processes o disarmament, demobilization andreintegration (DDR). The private security industry oten providesemployment or ormer combatants or decommissioned publicsecurity personnel, as was the case in Haiti, where many personnelrom the decommissioned Haitian armed orces ound employmentin the private security sector.


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strategies by providing visibility and interacting with the

civilian population. Studies have indicated that private

security personnel are naturally predisposed to work

with police (Nalla and Hummer, 1999).

In order or these benets to accrue and to ensure the

population is protected rom abuses o power, states must

maintain a reasonable degree o control over the industry.

Though domestic governments are the most signicant

actors in the regulation o the private security industry,

oversight can be exercised by several other groups,

including the donor community, international legal

actors, the private security industry itsel and civil society

(see Table 1). It is important to note that not all o these

mechanisms o control government oversight, market

orces, contract law, sel-regulation, citizen reporting and

international law are subject to democratic or evencivilian control. These categories can be urther divided

into: preventive measures that endeavour to create an

environment where abuses are less likely to occur; and

punitive measures that sanction PSCs and their agents

when abuse has taken place.

tal 1: t os f Pa S

Actor Mechanism o Oversight Preventive Punitive

Government Government oversight regulation;

clear legal ramework governingindustry;

regular reporting rom PSCs;

resources to investigate abuses;

mandatory training /education orprivate security agents; and

licensing or PSCs and agents.

enorcement o basic laws;

enorcement o specic laws governing theindustry;

imposing nes/penalties on non-compliantcompanies; and

criminal sanction o oending agents.

Donor Community Market

Contract law

conditionality o aid/assistance inwhich PSCs have a role; and

encourage PSCs to adopt voluntarycode o conduct.

establish standards or training, salaryand conduct in the contracts.

boycotts o non-compliant PSCs.

enorcement o contract stipulations.

Private Security Industry Sel-regulation voluntary codes o conduct andstandards or training.

expulsion rom the industry association ornon-compliant PSCs.

Civil Society Citizen reporting raise citizens awareness o their rightswith respect to private security agents.

ombudsmen elding complaints o abuseby PSC agents and reerring to governmentregulator or police.

International Legal Actors International law* clariying o legal responsibilities otransnational PSCs.

legal sanctions against companies and agentsviolating international law.

* International humanitarian law places constraints on private military and security companies operating in zones o confict and does not always apply to civilian private security,in particular companies that are domestically owned and operated.

Source: Author.

SSR programming can useully target any o these

actors, though the bulk o unding and attention will be

invariably ocused at the government level. A more rigid

and restrictive set o regulations is not necessarily the best

way to achieve the ultimate SSR goal o contributing to

the human security o citizens. The test or SSR programs

is to oster productive partnerships, while simultaneously

limiting the scope or private-sector abuses that imperil

public security. Regulatory regimes must have a dual

mandate: to be a competent and responsible state

authority capable o investigating PSCs abuses o

power and authorized to sanction oenders; while at the

same time, not being exclusively oriented towards state

control. It is important to note that state actions may or


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may not be motivated by the public good; state actors are

not necessarily or by denition serving some politically

neutral notion o the public good, although this is oten

assumed to be the case (Caparini, 2006: 269). To achieve

the greatest public benet, reorms must reinorce

partnership and cooperation between private securityactors and public law enorcement agencies; maintain

some orm o accountability to the donor community

(oten signicant clients); and maintain accountability to

the communities in which PSCs operate, in particular.

cASe Study: hAItI

hAitiS PrivAte Security induStry

According to the most recent inormation provided by

Haitis interior ministry (Ministre de lIntrieur et des

Collectivits Territoriales [MICT]), there are 41 PSCs

licensed to operate in the country. The size o these rms

varies rom approximately 2,000 agents to less than 50.5

The number o agents working or licensed PSCs in the

country is approximately 12,000,6 slightly larger than

the current HNP orce o 10,000 ocers. It is also larger

than the gure o 6,000 cited in a 2005 report and recently

quoted by MINUSTAH ocials.7 This gure should

represent nearly all private security personnel in the

country, as none o the directors, agents or government

ocials interviewed were aware o any unlicensed

security agencies operating in Haiti, and Haitian law bars

international citizens or rms rom owning or operating

5 Interviews with PSC directors, Port-au-Prince, October 2011.6 The Association Proessionnelle des Agences de Scurit (APAS)was established in 2004 and includes 10 o the largest PSCs in thecountry. According to interviews, the total number o agents in thisorganization is 9,000; additionally, there are limited cases o agents

being hired directly by clients, rather than through a PSC, or instance,at the US embassy, although interview subjects reported that thesecases are limited. It is estimated, thereore, that the total number oagents operating in the country is approximately 12,000. Interviewswith PSC directors, senior government ocials, Port-au-Prince,October 2011.

7 See Muggah (2005). Interview with senior MINUSTAHpersonnel, Port-au-Prince, October 2011.

PSCs within Haitis territory. The demand or private

security has been growing, in particular since the January

2010 earthquake and subsequent spike in international

engagement, and PSCs report that they are training more

agents8 and increasing the size o their rosters to keep up

with this demand.9

Haitis market or private security islikely to grow at least as rapidly as the global rate o seven

to eight percent annually (Small Arms Survey, 2011: 103)

Nonetheless, taking its population into consideration

Haiti has a low proportion o both police and private

security agents compared to other countries in the region

Specically, it has both the lowest ratio o private security

to police and the ewest private security agents per capita

o all the countries listed in Table 2. Haitis critical lacko public police personnel compared to other countries

in the region heightens the need or the private security

industry to complement the public security orces, rather

than act as a source o insecurity.

8 The training reported by agents and owners varies widelywith some (mostly owners) claiming that 12 weeks o training wereprovided and others (mostly agents) claiming that agents wereroutinely deployed with as little as one week o training. There areno codied standards or the training o personnel, but all agentsinterviewed reported that they received training in rearms usecompany procedures, non-lethal combat techniques and theirresponsibilities under Haitian law.

9 Interviews with PSC directors, Port-au-Prince, October 2011.


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tal 2: Pa S a Pl: Sl cs

CountryPopulation(2011)

Number oPolice Ofcers

Number o PrivateSecurity Agents

Ratio o PrivateSecurity to Police

Ratio o Police toPopulation

Ratio o Private Securityto Population

Haiti 10,000,000 10,000 12,000 1.2 1 to 1,000 1 to 833

Barbados 343,000 1,005 1,455 1.45 1 to 341 1 to 236

Costa Rica 4,660,000 13,000 19,558 1.50 1 to 358 1 to 238

El Salvador 6,060,000 16,000 21,146 1.32 1 to 379 1 to 287

Guyana 755,000 2,970 5,398 1.82 1 to 254 1 to 140

Honduras 6,900,000 12,300 60,000 4.88 1 to 561 1 to 115

Jamaica 2,700,000 8,441 15,778 1.87 1 to 320 1 to 171

Nicaragua 5,790,000 11,613 19,710 1.70 1 to 499 1 to 293

Trinidad and Tobago 1,340,000 6,415 13,610 2.12 1 to 209 1 to 98

Sources: Hill (2011), Small Arms Survey (2011), Pachico (2011), US Department o State (2012).

PSCs in Haiti mainly provide guard services protecting

a dened private property, though several companies

provide personal protection services. PSC industryleaders conrm that international organizations are

the largest clients o PSCs in Haiti chie among

them MINUSTAH, the UNDP, UNICEF and various

government embassies.10 Several PSC directors indicated

that international clients account or approximately

50 percent o their business.11 Other large client groups

include banks, non-governmental organizations, schools

and private businesses and residences. Approximately

80 percent o business comes rom Port-au-Prince.12

In some countries, robust growth in the private security

industry is seen as a threat to the development o public

law enorcement, either by luring qualied candidates or

tempting o-duty police ocers to moonlight as private

security agents. Other countries have experienced

problems with o-duty police providing private

security services, sometimes using police equipment

and weapons. This practice, however, is not permitted in

Haiti. Deections to the private sector are also unlikely,

as nearly all private security agents are paid at or near

10 Interviews with senior MINUSTAH personnel, PSCs owners,Port-au-Prince, October 2011.

11 Interview with PSC directors, Port-au-Prince, October 2011.

12 Unsurprisingly, the headquarters o all PSCs operating in Haitiare located there. Interview with PSC director, Port-au-Prince, October2011.

the minimum wage.13 Although average wages in the

industry were considerably lower beore 2009, when

Haiti passed a minimum wage law,14

at approximatelyUS$150 per month, agents salaries remain ar lower

than the starting salary o over $400 or an HNP ocer

(Charles, 2008). Moreover, agents report that some o the

stipulations o their contracts are routinely ignored by

some companies, such as overtime pay or shits longer

than eight hours and the requirement to provide them

with meals.15 Entry-level positions in private security are

considered low-skill jobs that require ew qualications

beyond basic literacy, physical health and a clean crimina

record. Employment in the industry entails long hours

low pay and risk. Nonetheless, owing to Haitis generally

dismal employment prospects, PSCs report a ready

supply o willing young men and women a act that is

likely to keep the average salary near the minimum wage

or the oreseeable uture.16

13 Interviews with private security agents, PSC directors, SSRanalyst, Port-au-Prince, October 2011.

14 PSCs and their clients reported that the price o security servicesrose sharply ater the minimum wage law was passed, as PSCs passedon some o the costs to their clients urther evidence that mostguards had previously been paid less than the new minimum wage.

15 Interviews with private security agents, Port-au-Prince, Octobe2011.

16 Interviews with PSC directors, Port-au-Prince, October 2011.


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hAitiS current LegAL FrAmework

Private security is a relatively recent phenomenon in

Haiti, as PSCs were not permitted during the Duvalier

dictatorship. The post-Duvalier Constitution o 1987 has

no provisions on private security. In act, Articles 263 and

263.1 o the Constitution speciy that the armed orces

and the police are the only armed groups allowed to

operate in the country (Republic o Haiti, 1987). It was

not until a 1988 decree issued by President Prosper Avril

that PSCs were legalized in Haiti.17 An amended decree

in 1989 remains the principal legal ramework under

which PSCs operate in Haiti. The main articles o the

presidential decrees are outlined in Table 3.

17 The provision o private security in Haiti actually began in 1987when Corvington Courier and Security Service were awarded acontract to guard the US embassy, but its legality was not addresseduntil the ollowing year.

tal 3: k Als 1988/1989 Psal ds

Article(s) Eect

13 Authorize PSCs to operate, provided they: have been authorized by the MICT are working under a written contract; and use orce toprotect persons and property within Haiti.

4 Stipulates that PSCs must be exclusively Haitian-owned and operated and cannot have an aliation with outside countries.

5 Describes the process needed to obtain authorization, which includes submitting ounding statutes registered at the Ministry o Commerceand Industry; a copy o internal regulations; a guaranteed deposit o 50,000 Goudes; a list o personnel and their qualications; Certicatsde Bonnes Vies et Moeurs (background checks) and certicates o aptitude in the management o rearms or the directors and or each othe personnel; and inormation about the uniorms, logos and insignias and communications equipment used by the company.

6a, 6b Clariy the kinds o weapons permitted to PSC personnel: 0.38, 9 mm and 7.62 mm weapons are permitted, while heavier weapons andexplosives are excluded (Muggah, 2005).

6c Limits rearms licences to hal the number o personnel in the company or one rearm or every two agents.

10 Requires PSCs to send quarterly reports to the MICT, outlining their activities or that quarter.

12 States that all violations o the decree will result in an immediate suspension o three to 12 months, along with a temporary conscation othe companys arms by the Forces Armes dHati (FAdH) (Haitian Armed Forces).

Source: Author.

As a legal ramework regulating an industry with theright to bear arms, detain suspects and even use deadly

orce, the 1988 and 1989 decrees contain an insucient

level o detail to cover many likely eventualities. For

instance, there is clearly conusion about the allowable

use o orce. Article 3 o the presidential decree entitles

PSCs to Prevent any act likely to cause harm to persons

and property under their supervision; at the same time,

Article 8 states that security agencies must comply

with the principles and saety regulations in orce in the

Republic and Article 9 that security agencies should

in all [their] activities comply with all civil and criminal

legal provisions. It is not clear, however, how much orce

may be used and under what circumstances. As a urther

deciency in detail, the decrees state that apprehended

suspects must be immediately turned over to law

enorcement authorities to ace legal consequences, butdo not dene how much orce can be used to detain

suspects. Can they be restrained? Beaten i they attempt

to escape? Shot? Does it depend on the level o the oence

committed?

The 1989 decree does contain certain provisions that, i

enorced, would acilitate some measure o oversight

Article 10 stipulates regular reporting rom the PSCs to

the MICT, although exactly what these reports shouldinclude is not clearly stated. Article 12 lays out a limited

range o potential punishments, but it includes no detail

about which sanctions apply to which violations. The

decree does not go into detail about the process or

modiying or dissolving operating licences, except or

the possibility o suspension. Article 69 o the 1994 decree

states that the HNP is responsible or the enorcement


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o laws issued by the Ministry o Justice and Public

Security concerning the creation, regulation, training and

operation o private security agencies.18 O course, these

laws were never passed in Parliament.

In addition to the legal rameworks lack o clarity, a

major gap in governance was created in 1995, when the

FAdH was disbanded by President Aristide. The armed

orces role in regulating the industry passed to the HNP,

again by presidential decree. The Ministry o Interior and

National Deence became the MICT, but retained its role

in licensing and oversight o PSCs. Article 8 o the 1994

decree gives the police the responsibility to control all

activities o private security companies.19 The control

and registration o rearms is regulated by the DCPA(Muggah, 2005) under Article 28.5, which gives that

18 Republic o Haiti (1994). 1994 HNP Act.

19 Ibid.

department the responsibility to maintain a nationa

register o rearms permits.20 According to a senior

MINUSTAH ocial, the current Martelly governments

plan to reinstate the FAdH creates some legal uncertainty

Do the armed orces retain their authority over the

industry as stipulated in the 1988 and 1999 decrees, or arethose superseded by the 1994 decree that gave the HNP

legal authority?21 It is an issue that must be addressed.

The problem with the current regulatory regime is not

that mechanisms to oversee and regulate the industry do

not exist at all, but that the regulations lack specicity

As a urther complication, responsibility or oversight is

divided among several institutions, each o which has

other pressing priorities (Table 4).

20 Ibid.

21 Interview with senior MINUSTAH ocial, Port-au-PrinceOctober 2011.

tal 4: A Fa os r

Area o Responsibility MICT HNP/DCPA Neither/unclear

Authorizing PSCs to operate X

Receiving inormation on directors and agents, including background checks X

Receiving certicates o aptitude in the management o rearms or agents at the time the company is registered XGranting rearms licences (annually) X

Receiving quarterly reporting on PSCs activities X

Overseeing the purchase o weapons and maintaining rearms registry X

Carrying out process to suspend PSCs or dissolve operating licences X

Conscating arms in the event o a violation o 1989 decree X

Inspection o PSCs rearms depots X

Regular background checks o agents X

Licensing individual agents X

Enorcing training standards X

Implementing standards or stockpile management,* inspection and record-keeping X

Mechanism or receiving complaints about industry X

Reviewing operating licences on a regular basis, according to set criteria X

* According to a report by the Small Arms Survey, National legislation rarely provides details on how PSCs should secure rearm stockpiles rom thetIn practice, the specics omanaging and securing PSCs stockpiles are usually let to the companies themselves (2011: 121).

Source: Author.


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With responsibility divided among several institutions,

none with a clear priority, the challenge remains not

only how to resolve outstanding legal issues, but how to

convince institutions to dedicate the resources necessary

to improve the sporadic and inconsistent oversight

they currently provide. The authorities have, up to thispoint, lacked the willingness or ability to coordinate

responsibilities, enorce rules and provide consistent

oversight.

the need For AccountAbiLity And

reguLAtion

Given the persistent state o crisis that the country

has aced in recent years, it is understandable that theregulation o private security was not immediately

addressed by the Haitian government or its international

partners. Other urgent SSR priorities, such as re-

establishing the HNP, engaged the majority o government

and donor attention. In all SSR contexts, the regulation

o private sector actors must be realistically prioritized

alongside other reorm needs (Bryden, 2006). This is

especially true in Haiti, where the need or regulation

must be balanced among other needs and must refect

available scal and institutional resources. Even with this

caveat, however, there are critical shortcomings in the

present regulatory and oversight regime that can and

should be addressed.

La f os

As the institution responsible or issuing licences to

PSCs and considering applications or rearms permits,

the MICT should have detailed inormation about each

company, its directors and agents, and ready access to

the agents background checks. In May 2007, however,

Haitian newspaper Le Matin reported that, when reached

or comment, the MICT was unaware o the number o

registered PSCs, and could not conrm whether there

were any unregistered PSCs operating in the country (Le

Matin, 2007a).

In 2008, the MICT required all operating PSCs to provide

detailed accounting or all o their rearms as well as

inormation and background checks or each o their

agents.22 The PSCs reported that there was no ollow-up

to their submissions, and urther, that the MICT has not

requested this inormation since this rst request in 2008

According to ocials at some o the PSCs, historically

any requests or updated inormation have tended to

correspond with changes in government, rather than

a regular schedule.23 This lack o basic inormation

gathering was evident in the list o accredited security

agencies supplied to the author by the ministry: o the 41companies included, more than three-quarters contained

incorrect or out-o-date phone numbers and/or oce

addresses. It is indicative o the ministrys poor oversight

that it would nd itsel unable to contact many o these

companies i it needed to. The HNPs DCPA, the other

institution with oversight responsibilities, has ared no

better. Until this point the HNP has not assigned any

ocers to this le.24 The combined eect is an industry

operating with little eective state oversight.

t ills f Pl o

Rates o homicide and violent crime have greatly

diminished in Haiti since 2004 (Daniel, 2011), and

Haitis crime rates compare avourably with its more

developed neighbour, the Dominican Republic, and

with other countries in the region. Nonetheless, actors

such as Haitis extreme economic inequality and earso kidnapping or ransom have let wealthy Haitians

anxious to protect their property and their homes. The

presence o armed security personnel in the streets

22 Based on submission rom PSCs obtained by author.

23 Interviews with PSC ocials, Port-au-Prince, October 2011.

24 Interview with senior MINUSTAH personnel, Port-au-PrinceOctober 2011.


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whether public or private may give some citizens a

greater sense o security and order. At the same time, the

most vulnerable populations those living in reugee

camps do not benet equally rom private security

provision. One o SSRs core assumptions is that poorly

trained, corrupt and unaccountable security personnel rom the public and private sector can become sources

o insecurity or citizens.

While the deployment o private security may deter

property crimes, it can also add to the volatility o

challenging public order situations. Haitis stability

is tested more by moments o acute crisis, such as

humanitarian disasters and political disorder, than by

unusually high rates o daily crime. Ater the January2010 earthquake, or example, several security incidents

involving private security agents contributed to public

insecurity. On January 28, in an attempt to protect his

clients property, a Proessional Security Services private

security agent killed one looter and was about to shoot

another when US soldiers intervened (Espinosa, 2010).

On February 4, another private security agent accidentally

shot an agent during a bank looting. According to a

statement by the Organization o American States (OAS)

Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: In

light o inormation received concerning the conduct o

private security orces, the Inter-American Commission

calls or the Haitian government and the international

community to enhance eorts to control the conduct o

these orces and ensure that human rights are respected

at all times (Inter-American Commission on Human

Rights, 2010). As several private security agents attestedto in interviews, the less training an agent receives, the

more likely he is to use his rearm.25

25 Interviews with private security agents, Port-au-Prince, October2011.

Sall As a L waps

One o MINUSTAHs overarching concerns about PSCs

is controlling the number o weapons held by companies

in the industry.26 The existing legal and regulatory

ramework should theoretically provide some control

over access to arms, but in practice, this is not always the

case. According to the 1989 presidential decree, PSCs are

limited to obtaining rearms licences or 50 percent o

their personnel in other words, the ratio o licensed

rearms to personnel is not greater than one gun or

every two agents (Republic o Haiti, 1989). This ratio is in

line with reported ratios in other countries in the region

which range rom 0.34 in Nicaragua to 0.45 in Costa Rica

to 0.86 in El Salvador (Small Arms Survey, 2011: 113)All rearms licence applications in Haiti must be made

in writing to the MICT, and are assigned to the agencies

themselves, not the individual agents.27 The HNP is

then responsible or delivering and accounting or all

rearms via the DCPA-controlled registry. In practice

however, Haitis system o rearms registration does not

unction properly. According to one study, PSCs in Hait

held over 9,300 rearms as o October 2009 (Commission

Episcopale Nationale Justice et Paix, 2010), while, based

on the estimated size o the industry, they should hold

approximately 6,000 rearms.

During the period o heightened insecurity rom 2004 to

2006, PSCs in Haiti are thought to have held thousands

o unregistered weapons, including illegal automatic

weapons (PSCs are only permitted to carry pistols and

shotguns).28 In August 2007, in an attempt to reassert

control over the industry, the MICT reportedly told

all PSCs to ensure that they met licensing rules or

26 MINUSTAH has pursued DDR and community violencereduction strategies in Haiti since 2004.

27 Interviews with private security agents and PSC owners, Portau-Prince, October 2011.

28 In a 2004 report on Haiti, the UN Secretary-General (UNSG) notedthat unregulated private security companies urther contributed toan unprecedented nation-wide prolieration and tracking o smalarms (2004).


14/29



rearms and personnel, or they would be shut down (Le

Matin, 2007b). A number o smaller rms closed down

permanently, perhaps to avoid scrutiny.29 The MICT

appears to be making some progress with weapons

control, whether directly or indirectly. When asked

about unlicensed rearms in 2011, those PSC directorswho were interviewed declared that violating the rules

by having too many rearms was not only not worth

the risk but unnecessary, since companies only needed

one rearm or each post, not or each agent. The agents

universally reported sharing rearms with other agents

assigned to a post either three agents per weapon in

the case o eight-hour shits, or two agents per weapon

with companies using 12-hour shits. Moreover, many o

the companies surveyed appear to have sound internal

procedures or keeping track o rearms. Agents are not

permitted to take rearms home with them at the end o a

shit, instead, they give them to the agent relieving them,

or store the weapon in a central depot.30 Most agents

interviewed reported signing a log sheet or the rearm

at the beginning o each shit, though this was done more

to satisy internal corporate regulations than to comply

with national standards. Assuming that PSCs currentlyoperate according to these guidelines, however, it is not

clear what happened to the unregistered weapons.31

Several PSCs reported occasional visits rom the HNP

to audit their weapons depots, but these visits were

irregular and had not taken place at all or several years.

Plal Afflas

A clear issue or Haitis private security industry is the

ownership and management o PSCs by current and

ormer members o the government and security orces,

including ormer FADH personnel, current HNP trainers

29 Interview with a PSC director, Port-au-Prince, October 2011.

30 Interviews with PSC agents, Port-au-Prince, October 2011.

31 In an interview, one director said he suspected other PSCs ohaving stores o unregistered rearms and exceeding the allowedratio o one rearm per two agents.

and Youri Latortue, the head o the Senate Committee on

Justice and Public Saety.32 In an ideal situation, persons

with close current aliations to government would not

be allowed to own and operate PSCs, but the current lega

ramework does not include such provisions. It is easy to

imagine the dilemma a police ocer assigned to overseethe industry would ace in reporting a violation by a PSC

owned by a senior government or even police ocial

Moreover, a PSC that had committed an oence could use

its connections within the orce to derail investigations

o abuse. Though the problem is acknowledged by

senior MINUSTAH ocials, it is generally agreed

that it cannot be addressed at this stage because these

current and ormer ocials have not violated any law

or regulation. It would be neither practical nor easible

to implement such provisions now, given the extent o

insider ownership that already exists. Nevertheless

the extensive connections between current HNP ocials

and the private security industry raise questions about

the HNPs central role in overseeing the industry. The

act that part o the root o the problem political

aliations and conficts o interest cannot easily be

addressed makes the general oversight and regulation othe industry even more important.

hAitiS reForm PrioritieS

The Haitian government and its international partners

have committed to a series o legal and administrative

reorms to improve the regulation o the industry

According to several interviews, the shooting o o-duty

HNP ocer Yacinthe Hudson in September 2011 by a

32 This situation is not unusual in the region. In Guatemala, oinstance, 75 percent o PSCs are either directed or managed by ormermilitary personnel; the remaining 25 percent are managed by ormepolice personnel (Dammert, 2008: 24). Some countries have includedprovisions in their private security legislation to limit these kindso associations. El Salvadors Private Security Services Law o 2001precludes active members o the national police, senior ministryocials and their close relatives rom being owners, shareholders orcontractors o PSCs while they hold the post and or a period o threeyears ater (Dammert, 2008: 19).


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private security agent ollowing an altercation outside o

a bank (Deend Haiti, 2011) and the PSCs subsequent

inability to assist in the investigation served as a

catalyst or the government and the international donor

community to prioritize better mechanisms o control.

The next section examines how SSR programmingcan help the Haitian government and civil society, the

international donor community and the private security

industry itsel to strengthen oversight o the industry.

g os

Provide Legal Clarity through New Legislation

The Ministry o Justice and Public Security is currently

considering proposals or a new law on private security

to ll the legal vacuum in which the industry currently

operates. Senator Youri Latortue, chair o the senate

committee on justice and public security, sent a proposal

to the Ministry o Justice or consideration, as did APAS

representatives. The ministry is now working to reconcile

these two proposals and come up with a single law or

Parliament to consider. This legislation should attempt to

accomplish our primary goals:

Eective legislation must establish a regulatory

regime with clear roles and responsibilities or the

actors overseeing the industry. The reinstatement

o the armed orces, however, creates some legal

uncertainty here, and whether the reconstituted

armed orces retain their original powers o

oversight over the PSC industry, or i these powers

are overridden by the 1994 decree granting thatauthority to the HNP, must be determined. The HNP

has a better understanding o, and experience with,

public saety and internal security, and legislation

should conrm that they are granted the legal

authority to oversee the industry.

The laws must provide more clarity on the

operational side o the industry, dening what

agents are permitted and not permitted to do under

certain circumstances. This will help to clariy

legal issues surrounding private security and the

use o orce and detention, and dene the scopeo criminal liability or abuses o power by private

security agents. The new legislation should more

explicitly lay out principles on the use o orce

based on international standards o conduct like the

International Code o Conduct or Private Security

Providers (ICOC).33 Agents should be required

to use the minimum amount o orce necessary in

all situations, always issuing a challenge beore

opening re. There needs to be a consensus on the

level o threat required to use the rearm, as well

as whether PSCs can use deadly orce to protect

property under their supervision or only to protect

persons at risk o injury. International standards

mandate that deadly orce should be authorized

only i an intruder is committing or about to commit

an act likely to endanger the agents lie or that o

another person.34

The legislation should establish the process by

which citizens can lodge complaints against private

security agents. The Oce de la Protection du

Citoyen (OPC) (Oce o Citizen Protection) is the

appropriate institution to eld such complaints

and should be directed to reer cases o abuse to

the relevant police and ministerial authorities to

investigate and sanction companies. This processshould be clearly laid out in the legislation.

The new legislation should anticipate uture

developments in the industry by considering the

33 See the ICOC, released in 2010. The ull text is available atwww.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/sede/dv/sede150311audcodeoconduct_/sede150311audcodeoconduct_en.pd.

34 See, or instance, ICOC (2010).


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use o private security in areas where they are

commonly deployed in other countries, including

prison surveillance, immigration control and airport

security.

In interviews, private security agents reported conusion

over the exact stipulations o the current law, a problem

owing at least partly to the lack o clear guidelines

provided to the industry. As a result o this uncertainty,

some agents are reluctant to involve the police in security

problems, and several PSC agents reported that taking

the blame or a security incident was a constant ear on

the job. This lack o clarity perhaps also explains the

unanimous, unwritten policy among PSCs that agents

rst call the company when an incident occurs, to allowthe PSC to decide whether, or how, to report the incident

to the police.35 Under such circumstances, the decision to

inorm the police o an incident is likely to be motivated

more by the private interests o the company, its agents

and its clients than by the needs o public saety. This lack

o legal clarity and associated uncertainty limits what

could potentially be a signicant contribution to public

saety the ability o PSC agents to report any suspicious

or criminal behaviour that they witness; under ideal

circumstances, private security agents would consider it

a responsibility to report all such behaviour to the police.

Explore Different Models of Regulation

The current regulatory regime divides responsibility or

the oversight o the industry between the MICT and the

HNP. Senior MINUSTAH ocials expressed concern

that, under the current model, PSCs are not clearlycontrolled by the MICT which is only responsible

or registering the companies and does not actively

oversee or enorce regulations. To register a PSC under

the 1989 Presidential Decree, directors must submit

35 One PSC director stated that the standard protocol was or theagent to call the company and the company to report the incident tothe police i it is more than they can handle. Interviews with privatesecurity agents and PSCs directors, Port-au-Prince, October 2011.

documentation as described in Table 3; once a company

has been registered, the primary ongoing reporting

responsibility is to renew rearms licences annually and

pay the associated ees. The responsibility or enorcement

rests with the HNP, although given that the DCPA has

devoted no sta to the task, it is hardly surprising thatoversight o the industry has been minimal. According

to MINUSTAH ocials, the regulation o PSCs has not

been a priority in the past.

The HNP development plan or 20122016 will

attempt to address this issue. The plan proposes

creating a special unit within the DCPA that will have

primary responsibility or the ongoing enorcement o

regulations.36

Ensuring that the HNP devotes resourcesand personnel to the regulation o private security is

necessary i Haitis current model is to succeed in asserting

control over the industry. The HNP development plan

should, thereore, be seen as a meaningul and credible

step in the right direction.

This course o reorm is best described as an attempt to

improve the unctioning o the current system. It would

see the MICT retain its role in licensing PSCs, receivingregular reports and granting rearms licences, while

the specialized unit in the DCPA would continue to

oversee the rearms registry, inspect rearms stores

and investigate abuses o power. It may be possible to

operate within the current general model o regulation by

clariying roles and responsibilities, and improving the

enorcement o regulations. This presupposes, however

retaining a model o regulation that is really only one

among several options available to Haiti, and one that

has considerable downsides. The HNP, or example, is

attempting to meet its commitments under the current

system, but there appears to have been little system-wide

consultation about how the regulatory regime could

36 Interview with senior MINUSTAH ocials, Port-au-PrinceOctober 2011.


17/29



or should work. In interviews, parliamentary leaders

involved in drating the new legislation suggested

that current discussions involve making incremental

improvements on the existing model, rather than

establishing a new one. The legal reorm plan, backed

by Senator Youri Latortue, envisions the HNP retainingresponsibility or oversight and enorcement o the

industry.37 The proposed changes under this plan include

measures to acilitate the purchase o rearms by PSCs,

by allowing private business to sell rearms to them

under the supervision o the HNP. Another proposed

change would see the government relaxing domestic

ownership requirements to allow up to 25 percent

oreign ownership/investment in PSCs, presumably

to give PSCs a source o capital needed to expand their

operations.38

Chile has had success with a model in which the

Carabineros (the national police orce) are the chie

supervisory authority, operating a subdirectorate or

private security that issues permits or armed and

unarmed personnel and perorms audits o PSCs,

including periodic site visits (Dammert, 2008: 12). In

Haiti, one o the primary challenges o retaining this kind

o model is that it relies on two institutions, the MICT

and the HNP, to commit resources to the oversight o the

PSC industry when they have other pressing priorities. It

is common across the region that, in countries where the

police are strapped or manpower, the work o regulating

and training private personnel is oten neglected in order

to ocus resources on crime prevention and control (OAS,

2008). Models vesting extensive authority in the policehave not proven eective in other Caribbean contexts,

largely because they add responsibilities to an already

overstretched police orce. Under these conditions, the

regulation o private security will invariably be a low

37 Interview with Senator Youri Latortue, Port-au-Prince, October2011.

38 Ibid.

priority. The act that high-ranking HNP ocials own

PSCs creates signicant scope or conficts o interest

and possible regulatory capture.39 As a study o private

security regulation in Bulgaria warns, because the

majority o PSCs are either staed or run by ormer

police ocers, assigning the oversight o PSCs solely tothe police leaves signicant room or inormal relations

between PSCs and their regulators (Gounev, 2006).

Another regulatory model adopted by severa

Caribbean countries40 is establishing boards or

committees to oversee the industry, usually comprised

o ocials rom various backgrounds including

law enorcement, justice and the private security

industry. The obvious drawback o this approach isthat, like the police themselves, committee members

have other responsibilities that require the majority o

their attention.41 The result has been that the boards are

rarely convened and when they are, they have diculty

ollowing through with the decisions that are made.4

In St. Lucia, or instance, legislation was passed in 2006

calling or the creation o a board to oversee the private

security industry, but almost six years later, that board has

still ailed to materialize.43 Again, the key consideration is

not so much the model itsel, but ensuring that ocials

devote the resources required to oversee the private

security industry (Hill, 2011).

39 Regulatory capture is dened as collusion between theregulated and the regulator as a result o shared experiences in themarketplace, shared ideologies, and circulation o members betweenthe industry and the government bodies designated as controllers

(Manning, 1987).40 The OAS has conducted research in Latin America and theCaribbean exploring dierent models or the regulation o the privatesecurity industry. These models to assert public control over theprivate security industry range rom establishing statutory agenciesresponsible or the oversight o the industry, to more permissivemodels that contain little more than a mechanism to grant operationsand rearms licenses.

41 Interview with Sheridon Hill, analyst and consultant at the OASNovember 2011.

42 Ibid.

43 Ibid.


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In each o the models discussed above, the

responsibility or oversight is divided between the

police and government ministries. In its SSR handbook,

the Organisation or Economic Co-operation and

Developments Development Assistance Committee

(OECD DAC) identies the lack o a single regulatoryauthority or oversight mechanism as a challenge to

eective reorm (2007: 217), while a 2007 report rom

the Latin American Faculty o Social Sciences (FLACSO)

recommended the creation o independent regulatory

bodies to oversee the industry in Latin America and

the Caribbean (Dammert, 2007). Thus, a third option

or Haiti is to replace the current regime with a separate

statutory body housed in the MICT that would assume

responsibilities that are currently divided between the

MICT and HNP, including the authorization to control

the licensing o companies and agents, ensure regular

reporting rom the industry, inspect rearms stores

and report violations to police authorities. A model or

such an option in Haiti is Jamaica, which has one o

the best-regulated industries in the region. Jamaicas

private security industry has been overseen since 1992by the Private Security Regulation Authority (PSRA), a

statutory body under the Ministry o National Security

This independent body is headed by a nine-member

board, with a secretariat o 29 sta members. Critically

the oversight o the industry is the sole responsibility o

the PSRAs directors and sta. This structure allows it

to assert much more control over the industry than the

current Haitian model.44

44 As an example o the departments better control over theindustry, the Jamaican PSRA regularly publishes and updates a listo PSCs licensed to operate, along with the number o agents and thedate o expiry o each companys licence on its website.

tal 5: rla mls Sl caa cs

Level Country Model

1 Jamaica Separate statutory body overseeing the industry

In 1992, Jamaica passed the PSRA Act, establishing a statutory body under the Ministry o National Security, whose sole unction is to regulate and monitorprivate security agents and companies. This independent body is headed by a nine-member board with a secretariat o 29 sta members. The PSRA receives

unding and stang rom the state and has the authority to: grant, reuse, suspend or cancel licences or registration cards issued to the private securityindustry; consider and determine applications made under the PSRA Act or registration and licensing and the renewal licences. Jamaica is unique in the regionin having an independent oversight body with permanent sta, legal authority and a guaranteed budget. Critically, the oversight o the industry is the sole taskand responsibility o agencys directors and sta.

2 Barbados and St. Lucia Board/committee oversight

Another model adopted by several Caribbean countries is to establish boards and committees to oversee and perorm regulatory unctions over the industrythat are made up o ocials rom various backgrounds, including law enorcement, justice and the private security industry. Without permanent sta devotedsolely to monitoring the industry, the boards typically do not take advantage o whatever powers o oversight or control are available to them. In St. Lucia,or example, legislation creating a board to oversee the private security industry was passed in 2006, but almost six years later, that board has still not beenestablished.*

3 Belize Oversight by individual ocials

This model is similar to the level 2 model, except that the responsibility or regulation rests with a single entity or individual, usually the minister o nationalsecurity or the police commissioner. The oversight o the private security industry is usually a very low priority to these senior ocials.

4 Dominica and Grenada No specic laws governing industry

Dominica and Grenada are examples o the lowest level o regulation in the region. Neither country has specic laws regarding the private security industry.The only means or oversight are general legislation, which covers the establishment o corporations, and rearms legislation, which covers the steps to obtaina rearms licence.

* Interview with Sheridon Hill, November 2011.

Source: Hill (2011)


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Haiti should select a model appropriate or its context.

Simply increasing the volume o regulation and oversight

is not a suitable context-specic strategy.45 The new rules

and regulations must not be unnecessarily burdensome

to either the companies or the state that has to enorce

them. One benet o the separate regulatory body isthat it rees up police resources that would otherwise

have been consumed perorming regulatory unctions.

In terms o nancial resources, the Jamaican model calls

or the regulatory body to be partially unded by the

dues and ees it collects rom the PSCs. This has the dual

benet o reducing the unding burden on the state46 and

giving the oversight body an incentive to ensure that all

companies are licensed and ees collected.47 Whatever

ramework is eventually adopted, it must: establish a

process or issuing and revoking operating licences or

PSCs and set out the criteria that will be used to evaluate

applications; ensure that licences or companies and

rearms are temporary and subject to re-evaluation on a

regular basis; perorm regular and random inspections o

PSC arms depots to ensure that weapons and ammunition

are stored in secure conditions and adequate accounting

mechanisms are in place (South Eastern and EasternEurope Clearinghouse or the Control o Small Arms

and Light Weapons [SEESAC], 2006a); and include clear

requirements or quarterly or semi-annual reporting to

the regulatory authority.

45 It should be noted that ull regulation is a recent phenomenon in

many developed countries (or example, the UK legislation was onlyormulated in 2001 and regulations and licensing only implementedin 2004 with the deadline or registration o guards only on 20 March2006) (Minnaar, 2007).

46 The Jamaican PSRA was described as a sel-sustainingoperation by one expert. Interviews with the ormer chie o policeand current owner o PSC in Jamaica conducted by Sheridon Hill,obtained by author.

47 None o the models developed in the region have been withoutproblems. One complaint about the Jamaican model is that it resultedin an increase in bureaucracy aced by company directors. Interviewswith ormer chie o police and current owner o PSC in Jamaicaconducted by Sheridon Hill, obtained by author.

Commit the Necessary Resources

An OAS report on private security in the Caribbean ound

that, although most countries have passed legislation on

private security, there is a lack o eective ollow-up

mechanisms to ensure compliance with the provisions o

the legislation (OAS, 2008).For instance, several models

require that a supervisory council or board be designated

to monitor activities in the security industry, but in

most cases, this has not happened (OAS, 2008: 42-43)

Refecting these shortcomings, an OAS report on private

security in Latin America has identied as a constant

the lack o mechanisms to carry out the tasks and apply

the instruments provided by law (Dammert, 2008).

The implementation o new legislation in Haiti must

be matched by a commitment to actively implemen

and enorce its provisions. Whatever model is adopted

in Haiti, the will to establish rm systems o oversight

is the most important prerequisite or success. The

HNP development plan or 20122016, which includes

creating and stang a special unit within the DCPA

responsible or oversight, is an encouraging rst step

As long as the current model remains in place, the MICTshould immediately resume the requirement or PSCs to

submit detailed reports o their operations, including

background checks or their personnel, accurate

accountings o their rearms and associated licences.48

I the government plans to collect this kind o detailed

inormation, it should rst determine what inormation

it needs, how it will be collected, how it will be stored

and how it can be accessed i needed. Industry leadersraised the concern that, in 2008, the ministry demanded

detailed inormation rom PSCs but did not seem to

48 The government should gather the inormation in a standardizedway, but more technology is not necessarily the best answer. Althougha database would provide some clear benets, the ministry would beable to improve its data management structure simply by issuinga standardized orm requesting specic inormation rom eachcompany about its security agents and rearms licences. This wouldmake it much easier or regulators to nd inormation about eachcompany.


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use or even review the inormation.49 One area where

inormation gathering should be improved is with

respect to individual agents. While the current regulatory

system requires each company to periodically submit

background checks or its security agents, in practice

it is enorced inrequently and irregularly. Inractionsinvolving personnel usually only come to light ater an

incident involving the police.

ma Fs a Slf-la

The state is not the only actor with the power to improve

accountability; opportunities exist or successul public-

private partnerships. An achievable rst step in this

direction would be to encourage industry leaders to

establish a voluntary code o conduct, based on the

developing international standards laid out in documents

such as the Sarajevo Code o Conduct or Private Security

Companies and the International Code o Conduct or Private

Security.50 The ounding statutes o APAS do not include

a code o conduct, but they do require members to have

solid internal legal structures and to be legally constituted

and recognized by the MICT.51 The MICT, the HNP and

industry leaders should agree on the basic parameters othe code, including a baseline requirement o personnel

training, standards o conduct or interacting with the

population and mechanisms or interacing with the

police.

To be successul, industry associations must provide

membership benets that exceed its perceived costs. The

principal benet that member PSCs derive rom private

security industry associations is reputational, that is, theperceived standards o conduct and proessionalism

vested in the association give the PSCs clientele

condence in their proessionalism. As De Nevers notes,

adhering to standards can be costly, and monitoring

49 Interview with APAS ocial, Port-au-Prince, October 2011.

50 For more inormation, see: SEESAC (2006a) and ICOC (2010).

51 The APAS ounding statutes obtained by author.

costs associated with sel-regulation are generally

covered by industry members. Companies are only

likely to pay these costs i there is a signicant market

payo (2010: 224). At present, joining APAS only costs

PSCs the registration dues associated with membership

Whatever standards the Haitian government and APASagree upon, the main sanction or non-compliance will

likely be expulsion rom the association, which will only

be costly to PSCs as long as the reputational benet o the

association is high.

This is an area where the international community, as

the industrys largest set o clients, has a responsibility to

improve the governance o the private security industry

by making use o the tools at their disposal. By providingmarket incentives, the international donor community

may be able to tip the balance in avour o greater PSC

sel-regulation. Interviews with PSC ocials indicated

that certain countries are already doing this on an

isolated, ad hoc basis. Canada, or instance, negotiates

clauses stipulating the agents rate o pay and the amount

o training they are required to have into the contracts

awarded to PSCs that are hired protect the Canadian

embassy in Haiti. These arrangements would have a

greater overall impact i they could be generalized into

a donor code o conduct or hiring PSCs. An example

o such a donor code is the Sarajevo Client Guidelines or

the Procurement o Private Security Companies, developed

in tandem with the Sarajevo Code o Conduct or Private

Security Companies mentioned previously. The Sarajevo

client guidelines seek to improve the procurement

practices o public sector institutions, many o whichhad previously awarded contracts on an inormal basis

on the grounds o cost alone (SEESAC, 2006b). In Haiti


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the push-pull o client demands and industry association

commitments would go a long way in establishing

baseline standards o training, accountability and

proessionalism.

An ancillary benet o sel-regulation is that, over time,

it will help to move Haiti rom a sanctions-based regime

where authorities impose penalties ater an event has

occurred, to a compliance-based regime that pre-empts

abuses by ostering a more closely controlled culture

in the industry. There is a tendency under the current

Haitian model to involve the police with the industry

only when something goes wrong.52 A compliance model,

however, seeks to impose conormity with a condition

or state specied in ruleswith the aim o preventingharm (Manning, 1987). A successul compliance regime

can reduce the states burden o oversight i it brings

about change in the way the industry regulates itsel,

or instance by ensuring that reports are submitted on

time and without being prompted, actively investigating

complaints and more thoroughly vetting employees.

cl S

In addition to partnering with the private security

industry, the Haitian government and international

community should engage with community groups

to assess the publics experience with private security.

O particular importance is the OPC, which should be

prepared to eld complaints about the industry and reer

them to the police to investigate.

Along with concerns over the relationship between

the industry and elements o society, the devolution o

public security responsibilities to private actors brings

up undamental questions o airness and justice. While

the same criticism may be levelled at public security

52 Interview with PSC directors, Port-au-Prince, October 2011.

orces, private policing explicitly avours the wealthy.5

Consequently, i public saety is considered a general

responsibility o government, perhaps even a human

right, then increased reliance on commercial private

policing represents a growing injustice (Bayley and

Shearing, 1996: 593). The commoditization o securityimplied by the private security industry arguably results

in the partial privatization o a unction that by its nature

should be essentially public and distributed according

to need. Insecurity is thus an additional actor which

reinorces inequality (OAS, 2008). As Wul argues

zones o asymmetric security have emerged, or rather

zones o insecurity or the poor and zones o relative

security provided or people and their wealth by private

companies (2006: 92).

In most countries, a key objective o SSR programs is

to rebuild the social contract between the state and its

citizens. The Haitian states ractured relationship with

its citizens and its perceived illegitimacy have proven

to be obstacles to providing eective judicial and police

services (Small Arms Survey, 2011: 233). Private security

tends to create and enorce zones o exclusion areas

where certain elements o society are permitted to enter

and others are not. For decades, researchers have noted

the blurring o distinctions between public and private

space, introducing the concept o mass private property

to describe public spaces that are privately owned

(Shearing and Stenning, 1987; Bayley and Shearing, 1996)

Many perceive Haitis instability as part o a broader class

confict that has spanned generations and continues to

ester. I the expansion o private security encourages theprogressive restriction o privately owned space to some

members o the public, PSCs may come to be regarded

as parties to economic and class conficts, charged with

53 Private securitys deterrent eect may be unequally shared awell. Empirical work indicates that the relationship between privatesecurity and crime prevention is not straightorward. While privatesecurity can deter crime by increasing perceived risks, it can alsosimply divert criminals towards other victims. See, or instance, Kooand Png (1994).


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enorcing a social order that is based on the exclusion o

the poor. These actors risk undermining social cohesion

and jeopardizing SSR goals. To adequately resolve these

longer-term issues, partnerships and dialogue between

what Bailes (2006) has called the triangle o security

governance governments, business and civil society must be strengthened and expanded. State regulators

and PSCs should organize a community orum on private

security to hear rom the public about their experiences

with the industry, both positive and negative. This would

help to identiy the areas

from private security to public good: regulating the private security industry in haiti by geoff...

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