from crisis response to state-building

his discussion paper is a joint piece bythe Humanitarian Policy Group of theOverseas Development Institute andGriffith University’s Asia Institute. It

was commissioned by AusAID for theAustralian Humanitarian Forum on 18 October2006. The paper is based on interviews withkey policy-makers and analysts in Europe,North America and Australia; a review ofliterature from the security, internationalrelations, development and humanitarianfields; and recent work by ODI and the GriffithAsia Institute.

As stated in the programme for theHumanitarian Forum, the 2006 White Paper forAustralia’s aid programme introduced aninitiative to strengthen Australia’s humani-tarian response capability in the Asia-Pacificregion, in order to support the objective offostering functioning and effective states. Theappropriate relationship between humani-tarian action and state-building has been thesubject of much debate. This paper seeks toexplore these issues by focusing on thetransition from crisis response to state-building in post-conflict contexts.

The international community’s increasedengagement in post-conflict contexts over thepast 15 years has given rise to manyopportunities, challenges and issues. It isbeyond the scope of this paper to deal withthe full breadth of these comprehensively.Instead, the paper seeks to tread a paththrough a range of international debates onthis topic, drawing out those elements that webelieve have most relevance to Australia givenits objectives, geographic priorities andapproaches in post-conflict contexts to date.In doing so, we seek to raise a number ofissues worthy of further discussion within the

Australian government, and between theAustralian government and its partners.

Our focus on transition is based on ourbelief that, in post-conflict contexts where statecapacity is weak and stability not assured, thequality of transition strategies and how thewithdrawal of the assistance provided duringthe crisis response is managed may provesignificant factors in determining how the statefunctions subsequently. The ineffectivemanagement of transition risks jeopardisingthe achievements of the initial crisis response,to the detriment of longer-term stability,security and livelihoods.

The mobilisation of emergency responsesin countries where donors also have state-building objectives raises two criticalchallenges. The first is how to ensureprincipled humanitarian action within conflict.The second is identifying when life-threatening need has been adequatelyaddressed, and state will has been sufficientlydemonstrated, for assistance providers tobegin investing in the relationship betweenthe state and society. Within donorgovernments and across portfolios, this willrequire consensus on indicators.

When it has been agreed that it isappropriate to wind down the initial crisisresponse and begin the transition to a differentmode of engagement, it will be important toensure that broader efforts to promote stabilityand state legitimacy are not undermined. Weargue that this requires increased attention tothe potential for a ‘service gap’, when reliefassistance is phased out but state capacity isinsufficient to ensure the provision of services.How the initial response has been framed mayinfluence the extent to which assistance cancontribute to stability.

hpgHumanitarianPolicy Group

A joint paper by the

Humanitarian Policy Group,

ODI and Griffith Asia Institute,

Griffith University

Overseas Development Institute

111 Westminster Bridge RoadLondon SE1 7JDUnited Kingdom

Tel. +44 (0) 20 7922 0300Fax. +44 (0) 20 7922 0399

E-mail: [email protected]: www.odi.org.uk/hpgand www.odihpn.org

Overseas Development

Institute

From crisis response tostate-building: servicesand stability in conflict-affected contexts

Discussion PaperOctober 2006

TVictoria Wheeler, Sue Graves and Michael Wesley

2

hpg Discussion Paper

The paper is divided into four sections. Section1 defines the contexts of concern to this discussion,considers how the confluence of governanceapproaches in the international developmentcommunity, and the growing ‘securitisation’ of aid,has led to the emergence of common approaches tostate-building in post-conflict contexts and outlineshumanitarian critiques of these trends. Section 2discusses the role of service provision in promotingstability, the contribution and limits of humanitarianaction within this and some potential policyresponses to possible gaps in service deliveryduring the winding down of a crisis response.Section 3 discusses the range of financingmechanisms and process developments that couldfacilitate the closing of this service gap. Finally,Section 4 raises some points for further discussion.

The durability of post-conflict stability isdependent on a range of political and economicfactors which are often outside the influence ofdonors. That said, further take-up anddevelopment of innovations in aid instrumentationwould help overcome gaps in service delivery inpost-conflict environments. In particular, a strongerfocus on ensuring people’s access to basic socialservices can contribute to improved statelegitimacy and stability over time.

Section 1Defining contexts and reviewing

policy responses

1.1 Defining contexts – some broad parameters

Throughout this paper, our primary concern is with‘post-conflict’ contexts and the challenges ofmoving from crisis response to more develop-mental, state-building approaches.

We recognise that there are difficulties indetermining what is and is not a ‘post-conflictcontext’, and what is or is not a ‘transitionalphase’. Does it depend on the presence of a formalceasefire and a peace process? Or do thepermissiveness of the environment and levels ofongoing violence determine the label? Shouldlevels of morbidity and mortality be thebenchmark? Or is transition marked by the point atwhich refugees and internally displaced peoplevoluntarily return to their homes?

To put this in perspective, while some wouldargue that Iraq is a post-conflict context, the levelof violence there would indicate otherwise. InAfghanistan, there is now an elected governmentand processes envisaged in the Bonn Process arecoming to a close, but large areas of the countryare still highly insecure for ordinary civilians. Therecent election in the Democratic Republic ofCongo (DRC) is a major milestone in that country’sattempts to resolve conflict – but international

peace-building attempts have been ongoing sincethe late 1990s, while 3.9 million people have diedfrom violence, malnutrition and morbidity over thepast eight years (IRC, 2004).

Difficult questions also arise closer to Australia.Have East Timor and the Solomon Islands, forexample, effectively moved beyond conflict andstate incapacity to a less dangerous set of state-building challenges? Or do recent riots in bothcapitals and low human development indicatorssuggest that each country is still in crisis?

Progress from conflict to peace is not linear.Conflict is often ongoing and widespread, even inthe presence of a peace agreement and a peaceprocess. People are often highly vulnerable to theindirect effects of political instability, violence-related or not, and need basic assistance. A neattransition from crisis response to more normaliseddevelopmental approaches cannot therefore beassumed, particularly in the short term.

This paper is primarily concerned with contextswhere a peace agreement has been settled orenforced, where plans for reconstruction, policydevelopment and implementation are supported bythe international community, and where violencemay be present in some areas, but is not dominatingthe entire country. Morbidity and mortality are stilllikely to be high, however, and acute or exceptionalin some areas, and there is still a significant risk of areturn to widespread, destabilising, violence. So, forinstance, contexts like Sierra Leone, East Timor andthe Solomon Islands currently.

• Stability: we take to mean political stability,

where disputes over power and resources are

resolved peacefully. The absence of wide-

spread violence is a key indicator.

• Transition: we use to mean the shift from crisis

response and ‘relief-like’ approaches, with

military assistance or not, to longer-term

developmental support.

1.2 Indicators and objectives: towards defining

complementarity

It is often assumed that there is a naturalcoincidence of objectives between humanitarian,military and other actors trying to assist people incrisis. Referring to a US military programme thatsends its engineers to build bridges and shelters inMorocco, one US military official asked: ‘Why isn’tour assistance programme humanitarian? The armybuilds bridges in a developing country, and they likeus better for it – what else would you call it?’.Comments such as these reveal commonmisperceptions about the aims, methods andprinciples of humanitarian action. The contextspoken of was not in crisis, and the implication isthat the aim of assistance is to win political favourrather than meet priority life-saving needs. Thesemisperceptions make it more difficult to define

3

comparative advantage amongst different actors.This in turn complicates decisions at the governmentlevel about what kinds of action to support, andagreements at field level about when to coordinate,cooperate, integrate or simply ‘co-exist’.

Among humanitarian organisations, need isassessed in varied, contested, technically complexand evolving ways. However, a common threadwithin definitions of humanitarian crisis is thenotion of widespread and exceptional (higher thannormal) threats to life – whether from rapid-onsetdisasters, such as earthquakes, floods, tsunamisor invasions, or from chronic crises, such as long-term famine and civil war (Darcy and Hoffman,2003). The humanitarian imperative, whileinterpreted differently by different actors, isgenerally taken to mean the primacy of assistingand protecting human life where this is threatenedon a widespread scale. Fundamental to this are theconcepts of impartiality and independence – thatis, assistance should be provided to peopleirrespective of their beliefs or their strategic oreconomic value. Neutrality (not favouring anywarring faction over another) is another keyoperational principle of humanitarian action formany – but not all – non-government actors.

From a government’s perspective, multipleobjectives may be present in any response.Twenty-two donors now participate in the GoodHumanitarian Donorship (GHD) initiative, and theobjectives and principles GHD outlines for donor-supported humanitarian action were endorsed bythe Australian government and the othermembers of the OECD’s Development AssistanceCommittee (DAC) in April 2006 (see Box 1).However, tensions between different policyportfolios may still exist, and governments arestill working through implementation andcommunication strategies with their partners andoperational agencies.

Within the security/defence, political andeconomic development realms, objectives and indi-cators of success are often different to those in thehumanitarian sector. For instance, a donor govern-ment’s objectives may be to bolster a regime that,while it does not cater for the needs of a greatnumber of its resident population, is effective inpreventing cross-border traffic in people and arms. Itmay be that the assistance provided by develop-mental actors targets certain communities overothers, contrary to the humanitarian principle ofimpartiality.

Objectives may coincide, however, and may becomplementary. For instance, military actors areobliged under international humanitarian law (IHL)to refrain from targeting civilians and to provide forthe relief of those not engaged in combat. They arealso increasingly being asked to use force toprotect civilians from the predation of otherbelligerents (Holt, 2006). Development actors alsoaim to protect livelihoods.

As the international community increasingly callsfor coherent action in response to conflict and statefragility, working towards what Macrae and Leadercall a ‘complementarity model’ is crucial (Macrae andLeader, 2000). In other words, clearly articulating thepotential policy trade-offs between security and aid,and defining respective complementarities betweensecurity, development and humanitarian actors willincrease the effectiveness of interventions, and willenhance accountability.

Developing and maintaining the flexibility torespond to increases and decreases in levels of riskand violence is also key to state-buildingenterprises in conflict-affected countries. Thismeans developing financial, political, contractualand security assets that can be scaled up or downdepending on the context.

Donors have developed financing and deliverymodels to cope with such fluctuations, but many ofthese mechanisms are still not sufficient. Inparticular, sporadic attention to basic social servicesand social protection has arguably underminedefforts at stability and state-building. In post-conflictperiods, basic services like health, water andsanitation remain highly projectised and ‘relief-like’ –i.e. short-term in outlook, often fragmented and ill-coordinated, and more concerned with immediateimpact than with sustainability. This is legitimate inthe short term, and when conflict is active. The initial

Discussion Paper hpg

Box 1: Good Humanitarian Donorship:definitions and principles

The objectives of humanitarian action are to savelives, alleviate suffering and maintain humandignity during and in the aftermath of man-madecrises and natural disasters, as well as to preventand strengthen preparedness for the occurrenceof such situations.

Humanitarian action should be guided by thehumanitarian principles of humanity, meaning thecentrality of saving human lives and alleviatingsuffering wherever it is found; impartiality,meaning the implementation of actions solely onthe basis of need, without discrimination betweenor within affected populations; neutrality,meaning that humanitarian action must notfavour any side in an armed conflict or otherdispute where such action is carried out; andindependence, meaning the autonomy ofhumanitarian objectives from the political,economic, military or other objectives that anyactor may hold with regard to areas wherehumanitarian action is being implemented.

Humanitarian action includes the protection ofcivilians and those no longer taking part inhostilities, and the provision of food, water andsanitation, shelter, health services and otheritems of assistance, undertaken for the benefit ofaffected people and to facilitate the return tonormal lives and livelihoods.

crisis response should not seek to be transformative.But it is important to consider what gaps will openup when relief declines, and whether and how thesegaps will be filled. This may present opportunities toframe crisis responses that achieve a smoothertransition.

1.3 Fragile states, interventionism and state-

building: trends and actors

Western governments and international organis-ations have increasingly promoted highly inter-ventionist approaches to conflict, state collapse andpost-conflict reconstruction. A dominant focuswithin these interventions has been security, lawand order and government functionality. Thissection considers the reasons behind this emergingfocus, the increased linkages between aid andsecurity policy, and the forms of civil and militaryaction that have been used to address crises andengage in post-conflict reconstruction. It alsoreviews the efforts being made by governments andmultilateral organisations to promote coherentplanning for crisis response and post-conflictreconstruction. Finally, it discusses some of thecurrent debates in the humanitarian communityrelating to these developments.

1.3.1 Development assistance: from

disengagement to re-engagement

Over recent decades, there have been significantchanges in the pattern of development cooperation(see Box 2), from donor support to recipientgovernments as service providers in the 1960s, todonor-driven projects in the 1970s and structuraladjustment and privatisation in the 1980s. Develop-ment agencies have thus moved through stages ofconcern about, intervention in and conditionalityattached to, the economic management, quality ofdemocracy, protection of human rights andstandards of governance in developing states(Wesley, 2005). In the late 1990s in particular, policy-makers in the World Bank and the DAC increasinglyfocused on governance and accountability as centralto development effectiveness.

A consensus has grown in the donorcommunity that disengagement from protractedcrises, including conflict-affected and ‘failed’states, is no longer viable (OECD-DAC, 2002; WorldBank, 2002a). Decisions to engage in ‘difficult’environments were in part a response to therecognition that commitments to the millenniumdevelopment goals (MDGs) were otherwiseunachievable, and in part a response to the factthat up to half of World Bank borrowers came fromconflict-affected states. New approaches to allowengagement with these states were thereforerequired (Macrae and Harmer, 2004).

Development aid actors have been expandingtheir capacity to mobilise, coordinate and disburseresources, as well as set the policy framework for

interventions in protracted crises. This hasincluded attempts to combine the flexibility andquick disbursement attributes of humanitarianbudgets with longer-term strategic policyprocesses, like country strategies (ibid., 2004).

However, aid in these contexts has remainedprojectised and fragmented, leading todiscussions about increased donor coordinationand harmonisation. In the OECD DAC’s Draft

Principles for Good International Engagement in

Fragile States and in other donor policies,governance remains a central concern. The draftprinciples argue that ‘state-building in the mostfragile countries is about depth, not breadth –international engagement should maintain a tightfocus on improving governance and capacity inthe most basic security, justice, economic andservice delivery functions’ (OECD/DAC, 2005).Needless to say, improving governance andbuilding capacity in any sector are lengthyprocesses, and interim measures to provide forbasic needs are necessary.

1.3.2 Increased securitisation of aid and new roles

for the military

Concerns about governance were reinforced by agrowing belief that dysfunctional states posed athreat to regional and international security, or toglobal norms of human rights (Buzan, 1991;Rosenau and Cczempiel, 1992; World Bank, 1997).Poverty, disease and conflict-related populationmovements, along with a host of other ‘soft’security threats, were seen as contributing tointernational instability – and consequently asissues with which the UN Security Council,

4


Box 2: Chronology of developmentcooperation trends

1960s: With donor support, newly independentgovernments displace the private sector:national development plans, government-led industrialisation, nationalisation.

1970s: Donors displace government: donor-drivenprojects with their own managementstructures outside government, integratedrural development.

1980s: Governments, responding to donor/IFIstipulations, return ownership to privatesector: structural adjustment,privatisation, conditionality.

1990s: Donors begin to return ownership togovernment: sector programmes, directbudget support, ‘partnership’ rhetoricreplaces conditionality.

2000s: Increased emphasis on accountability todomestic institutions: governance,participation, CDF, PRSPs.

Adapted from ODI Working Paper 216, August 2003.

5

regional security bodies and national securityplanners, alongside their developmentcounterparts, should be concerned. Meanwhile,the 9/11 attacks, the US-led ‘war on terror’ and ashift to countering the proliferation of weapons ofmass destruction have seen major US-led militaryinterventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as anumber of smaller counter-terrorist operationselsewhere (Wheeler and Harmer, 2006).

Forms of direct physical intervention haveevolved and become more extensive, numerousand intrusive. The number of United Nations and‘hybrid’ – part-UN and part-non-UN – interventionshas increased dramatically since the end of theCold War, and operations have become steadilymore ambitious in the range of tasks they seek toperform (Wheeler and Harmer, 2006). In 2005,there were 44 UN and hybrid operations worldwide(CIC, 2006). Regional organisations, such as theAfrican Union (AU), the European Union (EU) andNATO, have become active players in military andaid missions, and have engaged in stabilisationand state-building (Pugh and Sidu, 2003; Boulden,2004; Wheeler and Harmer, 2006).

From their original mandate (to monitorceasefires), the aims of peace operations haveexpanded to include imposing order, demobilisingcombatants, repatriating and rehabilitatingrefugees and demobilised combatants, organisingand holding elections, conducting post-conflictreconstruction, protecting civilians and supportingthe development of state institutions (Wesley,1997; Holt, 2006; Cottey and Bikin-Kita, 2006).This expansion has made a vital contribution tothe overall decline in the number of wars in theworld – particularly intra-state wars (UN HighLevel Panel, 2005; Human Security Centre, 2005;CIC, 2006).

As new actors have become engaged withfragile or conflict-affected states, attempts havebeen made to combine and integrate aid andmilitary assets in the pursuit of state-building, andto develop strategic, coordinated planningcapabilities. It is assumed that integration andcoherence between aid and security policies avoidduplication and increase impact. Although budgetcycles and institutional competition have hinderedthese efforts, the policy intention remains strong(Brahimi, 2000; Barth Eide et al., 2005; Wheelerand Harmer, 2006).

At headquarters level, governments in Europeand North America have invested in newcivil–military capacities to plan for and respond tocrises. These include the UK’s Post-ConflictReconstruction Unit (PCRU), the US Office for theCoordinator for Stabilisation and Reconstructionand the EU’s Civil–Military Planning Cell. Whileeach of these continue to find their feetinstitutionally, evidence from interviews in the UKsuggests that a unit like the PCRU facilitates cross-government planning by virtue of its staff ’s

experience across relevant government depart-ments. It is thus not merely mandate but alsoexperience and networks that make the difference.These bodies bring a post-conflict lens todeveloping and executing crisis response plans.

In addition, there has been renewedinvestment in CIMIC doctrine within Westernmilitaries, cross-postings between defence,policing and aid agencies are becoming morecommon and more senior CIMIC and humanitarianadvisors are being assigned to military-ledmissions in conflict-affected countries (Wheelerand Harmer, 2006). At the UN level, theMillennium Summit instituted a Peace-buildingCommission and Peace-building Support Office,


Box 3: Approaches to managingcivil–military relations

Several Western governments have produceddoctrinal documents and policy directives thatreflect central roles for the military in contributingto peace support operations or other stabilitymissions. Although these often assume acommitment to stability and reconstructionlasting upwards of a decade, most prioritiseeffective coordination with civilian actors and theearly exit of costly military deployments.

Important differences in doctrine andoperational preference shape the way nationalmilitaries approach civil–military relations, anddetermine the extent to which they engage inassistance activities, and the degree to which theyare responsive to humanitarian concerns.Australian doctrine, for instance, reflects a highdegree of awareness of humanitarian principlesand accords with international guidelinesgoverning civil–military relations in conflict. Thisreflects the ADF’s experiences in East Timor,Bougainville and elsewhere, as well as efforts todevelop doctrine with input from ACFID, AusAIDand other civilian aid experts. US force structureand doctrine is designed to apply overwhelmingforce, and strongly emphasises force protection.‘Civil affairs’ is a stand-alone activity, traditionallycarried out by reservists or non-combat troops. InBritain, the armed forces have more readilyembraced peacekeeping and intervention tasks,and contributing to peace support andhumanitarian operations. Responsibility foreffective civil–military coordination ismainstreamed throughout the forces. Thesedifferent approaches are evident in differentoperational styles on the ground, as has been seenin Afghanistan. The UK military, for instance, tendsto limit its activities to the provision of security andsecurity sector reform, whereas the US has tendedto engage more directly in the provision of aid –both for practical reasons (i.e. operating in insecureenvironments) but also to win hearts and mindsand contribute to force protection.

which will attempt to draw together theexperiences of conflict-affected governments,provide advice to the Security Council and bridgethe gap within the UN between agencies that dealwith crisis response and elements that engagewith rebuilding and development.

At field level, Coalition and NATO forces inAfghanistan and Iraq have employed variousintegrated models, such as Provincial ReconstructionTeams, and the UN is continuing to strengthen itsintegrated missions (operations where thepeacekeeping, political and humanitarian segmentsare under the control of one UN official – the SpecialRepresentative of the Secretary-General).

1.3.3 Humanitarian concerns

Many humanitarians have raised concerns overthese structural, doctrinal and operationaldevelopments. These centre on maintaining thedistinctiveness of humanitarian action, theacceptance of humanitarian actors by localauthorities and others and the primacy of meetingpeople’s needs, irrespective of their strategicvalue. Hearts and minds tactics – giving materialrewards in exchange for information, cooperationand political support – are particularly contentiousbecause they are seen to run counter to theprinciple of impartiality.

Although many humanitarian advocates acceptmilitary and development agencies ascomplementary partners in efforts to reach peoplein crisis, this acceptance is highly context-dependent and tensions persist. Resistance tocloser integration with the broader aims of state-building is particularly apparent when conflict is

ongoing or a high risk, and when missions areperceived locally as active participants in a conflict.Many humanitarian actors hold that beingassociated with a potentially unwelcome militaryforce deprives humanitarian actors of theprotective patina of neutrality. At the same time,however, humanitarian agencies have beeninconsistent in their approach. For example,concern has been expressed over the use ofmilitary transport in situations where it wasunnecessary, despite guidelines stating thatagencies should only call on the military inexceptional circumstances.

1.3.4 State-building general approaches

When an international transitional administration isdeployed, external actors supply crucial attributes ofthe state, with the intention over time of transferringthese attributes of ‘state-ness’ to an indigenousgovernment (Rubin, 2006). Basic state functions aretaken to include enacting statutes, making andexecuting policies, administering public businessefficiently, controlling graft, corruption and bribery,maintaining transparency and accountability ingovernment institutions and enforcing laws(Fukuyama, 2004). Dominant assumptions aboutthe stages of state formation emerge from manydeployments, including the consolidation of forceand the imposition of order; the transition fromcoercive to administrative capacity; and finally theevolution of a collective civic identity and broadunderstandings of political legitimacy and civil rightscentred around the state (Dodge, 2006).

How intrusive a state-building mission isdepends on the scope of the state functions and

6


Box 4: Quick Impact Projects

Quick Impact Projects in post-conflict contexts haveincluded re-establishing water supplies andelectricity and building community schools andhospitals. Although QIPs are increasinglyassociated with military-led projects, they are notan exclusively military phenomenon. Numerousagencies, including the International Organisationfor Migration (IOM), UNHCR, USAID and DFID, usethem as part of their recovery and stabilisationprogramming. Many donors provide QIP fundingthrough their own militaries (as well as throughdepartments such as DFID) as part of dual-trackforce-protection and stabilisation/reconstructionstrategies.

QIPs have proved controversial. Supportershighlight their perceived, but largely unmeasured,force-protection benefits; detractors stress theabsence of a requirement for impartiality, theircapacity to blur the distinction between militaryand humanitarian action, and the military’s relativelack of competence in managing community-based

projects. Moves within the UN have increasedhumanitarian staff oversight in the QIP approvalprocess. In the UK, the International DevelopmentAct of 2002 forbids the use of DFID funds ‘forprojects designed to support a “hearts and minds”campaign or for force protection purposes alone.DFID’s draft QIP criteria are that the project:

• meets urgent humanitarian and/or stabilisationand reconstruction needs;

• contributes to the resumption of normal life inpost-conflict societies;

• promotes employment and boosts the economy;and

• visibly demonstrates the benefits of peace.

British doctrine also seeks to limit militaryinvolvement to ‘geographic and technical areas inwhich [the military] has a comparative advantage’.This is largely defined in terms of the directprovision of security, facilitating security sectorreform and logistics support or, in exceptionalcircumstances, the direct provision of assistance asa last resort (Gordon, 2006).

7

attributes it addresses, and the level of authorityassumed by intervening agencies over thesefunctions. A key factor is whether the mission isintended to leave in place the political status quo,and simply strengthen a state’s capacities togovern (as in the Solomon Islands), or whether theaim is to replace what is seen as an unacceptableregime with a new state and a new political class(as in Afghanistan and Iraq) (Chopra and Hohe,2004). Interventions intent on replacing theexisting state face great problems in imbuing thenew regime with legitimacy (Chandler, 2004;Ismael and Ismael, 2005; Rubin, 2006).

A sensitivity to local politics is also important.Labelling states as ‘fragile’ or ‘failed’ tends to de-legitimise local politics as venal and disruptive: asthe problem to be addressed. Instead of treatinglocal politics as the source of political institutions,international constitutional advisers tend to rely ontheir own political understandings and commit-ments and their belief in the power of institutionsto shape political behaviour, rather than vice versa(Chandler, 2004). Even seemingly technocratictasks – deciding the nature and basis of elections;identifying which pressure groups to consult;setting school curricula; deciding on publicownership of enterprises or the status of women –confront international administrators withessentially political decisions (Caplan, 2004).

Recent research suggests that a ‘rush todemocracy’ and an overwhelming focus on thecentral institutions of the state may in fact not bethe first priority of state-building in a post-conflict

environment, if reducing or containing violence isthe primary goal (Chesterman, 2004; Collier et al.,2006; Yanacopolous and Hanlon, 2006). Rather, amore concentrated focus on social policy andservice delivery may be more conducive to stability,economic growth and establishing state legitimacy(World Bank, 2002; Collier, 2003; World Bank,2004a; World Development Report, 2004; Macraeand Harmer, 2004). This will be explored further inthe following section.

Section 2Closing the ‘service gap’: implications

for stability

The previous section outlined current trends ininternational interventions in conflict-affectedcountries, both in terms of the initial crisis responseand in terms of longer-term state-building initiatives.We turn now to the critical issue of managing astable transition between these forms ofengagement. Clearly, some aspects of the initialresponse will remain long into the state-buildingendeavour. Ensuring and maintaining a minimumlevel of security, for instance, is often seen as criticalto enabling other assistance efforts to progress.However, it is important to consider the respectiveroles of humanitarian and development actors intransitional contexts, especially given strengthenedcalls for coherence and the desire to restore andmaintain stability and build state legitimacy.

2.1 The role of humanitarian assistance

In the past, when donors have been unwilling toengage with conflict-affected states, they haveoften relied on humanitarian actors to providemore ‘developmental’ assistance – including theprolonged provision of services and socialprotection. This is in part due to political concernsnot to legitimise certain regimes. Moreover,‘lighter’ administrative procedures govern manyhumanitarian budgets. Because humanitarianagencies operate ‘around the state’, the assistancethey provide does not necessarily entail dealingwith the affected state’s government.

Such ‘stretching’ of humanitarian programmescan undermine the principles on whichhumanitarian assistance is based. It is clear toothat humanitarian aid is not a particularly effectiveway of delivering social protection or meeting acommunity’s wider needs (Macrae et al., 2004).Humanitarian assistance is usually provided by alarge number of generally uncoordinated actorsand is short-term in culture, staffing and fundingarrangements. It is also highly projectised,decentralised and patchy, and is largelycommodity-driven (Macrae et al., 2004; Leader andColenso, 2005; Harvey and Holmes, forthcoming).


Box 5: From intervention to rebuildingthe state: phases and emphases

From the past 15 years of peace interventions, it ispossible to discern a common approach to state-building in conflict-affected countries. While thereare exceptions, work by the International PeaceAcademy (IPA) and Paul Collier shows that threephases are typically present:

• The first phase concentrates on obtaining anegotiated settlement, establishing order,often with the deployment of troops, andsupporting humanitarian assistance.

• The second phases seeks to legitimise localleaders and state institutions (throughelections and constitutional development –what Collier calls ‘pump-priming democracy’)and build effective, efficient and transparentsystems of public administration.

• The third phase focuses on strengthening therule of law, promoting democratic processesand norms, and fostering the conditions formarket-driven growth. This includes improvingfood security and social services.

Adapted from Cutillo (2006) and Collier (2006).

Peoples’ percep-

tions of security often

differ from international

military and aid actors:

Sierra Leone

In 2005, as the UN

wound down its pres-

ence and planned to

withdraw from Sierra

Leone, international

perceptions viewed the

Sierra Leone army as

the biggest threat to

security. Yet, as one

local leader put it: ‘The

real security issue is

people’s livelihoods.

There has been a lot of

talk about food securi-

ty, but so far it has not

been translated into

anything very meaning-

ful.’ Securing peace

was a top priority for

everyone until 2002.

Yet large amounts are

still being spent by

donors on security and

governance related pro-

gramming, while eco-

nomic development

spending lags behind.

Donini et al 2005

In short, humanitarian approaches that areappropriate when there is widespread threat to lifeare insufficient to meet broad-based needs.Communities require reliable, consistent and long-term support to enable them to reinvest inlivelihoods and improve their material wellbeing.More predictable engagement in contexts ofcontested legitimacy has, however, beenhampered by a lack of alternative tools.

2.2 The conflict cycle and material well-being

Collier et al. (2003: 83) argue that ‘the typicalcountry reaching the end of a civil war faces arounda 44 percent risk of returning to conflict within fiveyears’. This means that assistance providers mustconsider risk factors and conflict prevention whenthey devise their programmes and policies.

There has been significant research into thedrivers of conflict, and what external actors mightdo to prevent and contain it, and help statesrecover from it. There is a fair degree of consensuson the main factors that increase the likelihood ofconflict and possible state failure. These includelow per capita income, high mortality, high verticaland horizontal inequality, the presence of easilyexportable natural resources and regional conflict(Collier, 2006; Cutillo, 2006). The US government-sponsored Political Instability Taskforce found thatlow levels of material wellbeing of the population(as measured by mortality rates) was a driver ofstate failure globally with 70–80% accuracy(Francois and Sud, 2006: 145). Assistance aimed atimproving equality, reducing mortality andimproving incomes is therefore a priority in theinitial post-conflict period. Predictable assistanceand engagement, the active participation of localpopulations, coordinated efforts and effectivecommunication about the scope of assistance alsoappear to be crucial in post-conflict reconstruction(Carlson et al., 2005; Longley et al., 2006).

Understanding the perceptions and expectationsof post-conflict populations will also be important.Recent research demonstrates that ordinary civilians’perceptions of security differ markedly from thesecurity perceptions and strategies of peace supportoperations and of many aid agencies, which aredominated by force protection concepts anddeterminations about whether it is safe to operate.Civilian perceptions extend beyond preservationfrom violence to encompass sure livelihoods andbasic economic opportunities (Donini et al., 2005;Maclellan, 2006). Research in Afghanistan, forexample, has shown that Afghan citizens have amuch wider understanding of security than physicalsecurity alone. While the absence of armed conflict isan important consideration, the lack of stable andsecure livelihoods is the fundamental determinant inthe security perceptions of local communities (Doniniet al., 2005). In conflict-affected countries subject toa large intervention, the promise of quick results can

lead to expectations of imminent tangibleimprovements in standards of living. Disappointmenthas caused discontent and, at times, further unrest(Francois and Sud, 2006; Collier, 2006). Conversely,‘service delivery interventions may act as a tangiblepeace dividend in countries emerging from conflict’(Berry et al., 2004: 12), thereby increasingcommunities’ interest in maintaining peace.

2.3 Filling the ‘service gap’

The draft DAC principles on engaging with fragilestates say that, where political will exists, supportingstate-building ‘means direct support for governmentplans, budgets, decision-making processes andimplementing instruments’ (OECD/DAC, 2005).Improving the governance and capacity of the state’sservice delivery functions is clearly an importantelement in any state-building initiative. However,state capacity is highly variable in post-conflictcontexts, and government plans, budgets, processesand instruments may not initially exist. Institution-building is a long-term process requiring significanthuman resources. Given this, we argue that relyingsolely on fragile state systems to ensure that socialservices are provided in a reliable, consistent andequitable way is insufficient and risky. As Harvey andHolmes (forthcoming) have argued:

There is … a need to be realistic about the

delivery capacity of the state. In particular

there is a need to guard against moving from

a situation of expensive and patchy but effec-

tive NGO delivery to one where in theory the

government is providing services, but in prac-

tice they don’t have the capacity (p. 19).

New instruments for closing the service gap andproviding predictable aid are being developed andtested. These reflect donors’ desire for greaterflexibility and the better integration of interventions,not only between relief and development, but alsobetween security and development. There is also agreater concern among donors to develop ways toeffectively intervene in areas of contestedlegitimacy, and in the highly political process ofreform and state-building.

The sections that follow focus on three differentmechanisms for delivering assistance in transitionalcontexts: social protection programmes, community-driven development and contracting non-stateactors. Each of these approaches seeks to fill theservice gap between relief assistance and state-leddelivery. They also provide opportunities to addresscommunities’ wider security needs, and managetheir expectations. While not comprehensive, the aimis to highlight approaches that we believe couldinform Australia’s management of transitionsbetween crisis response and state-buildinginitiatives. In selecting the approaches fordiscussion, we have considered Australia’s clear and

8


‘‘

‘‘

9

deliberate focus on the Asia-Pacific, and its relativelybilateral approach in countries in which it issubstantively engaged.

2.3.1 Social protection

Harvey and Holmes (forthcoming: 5) argue that ‘arenewed interest in social protection provides oneavenue for moving forward what had become astagnant debate about the appropriate roles ofrelief and development actors’. Social protectionrefers to public action taken in response tounacceptable levels of vulnerability, risk anddeprivation (Norton et al., 2001: 21). This includesboth the ‘absolute deprivation and vulnerabilitiesof the poorest, and also … the need of the non-poorfor security in the face of shocks’ (ibid.: 21).

Social protection programmes seek to addressbasic welfare needs by providing social transfers toindividuals or households. They differ from socialassistance programmes in that social assistancetraditionally involves transfers to the poorest and/orthe most vulnerable (Farrington and Slater, 2006:500). Social protection seeks to address structuralinequalities, and therefore has the potential toaddress grievances caused by these inequalities. Italso has the potential to provide greater reliabilityand consistency in assistance than is achievablethrough relief-style aid.

Cash transfers, as a form of social assistance,have received increasing attention in recent yearsas an alternative to in-kind or commodity transfers.There is a growing recognition that long-termwelfare safety nets may be a key component ofsocial protection strategies, that they may beaffordable even in poor countries, and that theymay have positive impacts on growth anddevelopment (Harvey and Holmes, forthcoming;Farrington and Slater, 2006). As Harvey andHolmes (forthcoming: 5) argue:

If longer-term cash transfers could be deliv-

ered predictably on a monthly basis, then

households would be able to plan them into

livelihood strategies and their own coping

mechanisms, making it more likely that cash

could be spent on productive investments and

strengthening livelihoods.

Recent research also shows that attempts to avoid‘dependency’ in aid recipients may produceperverse incentives in the way international actorsfinance and deliver aid (Harvey, 2005). Thepotential for cash to contribute to strengthenedlivelihoods challenges the assumptions arounddependency that have often informed pro-gramming choices in the past.

Cash transfers may also be a valuable way ofimproving service delivery. The extent to whichcash transfers enable access to services dependson the availability of those services, and whetheraccess constraints are income-dependent. Options

could include the use of cash transfers to pay userfees charged by public or private services, orpaying for transport if services are some distanceaway. Cash transfers may be particularly usefulwhere the weakness of public services has seen anincreased reliance on private providers. Forexample, by 2000 80% of all health services inSomalia were supplied by private providers. Duringthe 1990s, Kosovar Albanians were dependent onprivate pharmacies for drugs because they hadbeen excluded from the formal health system. InHaiti, private for-profit health providers haveaccounted for up to 80% of drug expenditure. Insuch instances, long-term welfare provision couldinfluence social outcomes if service providers havethe capacity to meet increased demand (Schubertand Slater, 2006: 571).

2.3.2 Community-driven development (CDD)

‘According to the World Bank, CDD represents abottom-up approach to development and povertyreduction, based on the participation andempowerment of economically poor people’(Strand et al., 2003: 11). CDD usually involvesprojects or programmes allocating funds to localcommunities to identify community needs andcarry out small-scale activities designed to meetthem. Projects typically rely on facilitators to assistcommunity groups plan, manage and maintainprojects. Local government officials or project staffprovide technical advice (Strand et al., 2003).


Box 6: The impact of cash grants inSomalia

An evaluation of a project providing grants andcash for work in northern Somalia found thatbeneficiaries were able to meet basic needs suchas food, debt repayment, water, clothing,education and medicine. In Togdheer, smallhouseholds were able to do limited re-stocking;elsewhere, families were spared having to disposeof livestock. The injection of money into the localeconomy expanded the demand for goods andservices, according to traders. Debt repaymentsrevived credit systems and relieved the burden onthe business community and social supportsystems. No inflation was reported. Partly, thiscould be explained by the small amounts of cashdistributed per month, pressure on the businesscommunity by religious leaders not to hike upprices and the fact that the business communityhad already stocked goods in anticipation of cashinjections. Gender balance and equitable access toresources were ensured through the deliberateencouragement of women’s participation, andtheir access to and control of project benefits.

Source: Acacia Consultants Ltd (2005), cited in

Harvey (forthcoming).

Afghanistan

‘Now we have security

but no jobs — so the

peace is not complete.’

said a Paghman farmer

in 2005. The dividends

of peace are still a dis-

tant mirage for the vast

majority of Afghans.

Afghan citizens value

more than physical

security alone. Group

discussions reveal that

the absence of armed

conflict is an important

consideration, but the

absence of stable and

secure livelihoods is

the fundamental deter-

minant in the security

perceptions of local

communities. Donini et

al., 2005

Solomon Islands

Peace is more than just

returning of arms — we

need peace in the

home, peace in the

heart, peace in the

community. Also look-

ing at security it means

financial security, you

can do your gardens,

sell your goods, sit

down with your family

— this is peace and

security within the

home. With govern-

ment, their contribution

to peace and security

(is that) services can

reach people and pro-

vide for health and

education and people

know what is happen-

ing. Interview, Margaret

Maelaua, Secretary,

Malaita Provincial

Council of Women,

Mcclellan, 2006

‘‘

‘‘

Social funds are an increasingly common formof community-driven development.1 A number offeatures of CDD are relevant to this discussion.Given that there may well have been a low level ofservice provision for some time (including beforethe conflict), communities often have ‘a long historyof self reliance and management’ (ibid.: 20). Theyare therefore well placed to know where self-reliance is sufficient, and where they need outsidehelp. Social funds can cater to a diversity of views,and can be an effective mechanism for deliveringsmall-scale infrastructure improvements. They canalso stimulate the private sector, through the use oflocal tradespeople and the local procurement ofgoods, and they are ‘quick disbursing and providetangible benefits to [the] community’ (Berry et al.,2004: 23). Because they are demand-driven, theycan promote efficiency and sustainability (Leaderand Colenso, 2005: 31).

2.3.3 Contracting service providers

Where the post-conflict state has limited capacity,alternative mechanisms to deliver services need tobe found. Contracting NGOs or private sectororganisations is one approach, and has been usedin key sectors such as health and water supplies.Contracting potentially allows governments, andthose supporting them, to harness the capacities ofnon-state providers, while simultaneouslyintroducing an accountability mechanism throughoutput-based contracts (Berry et al., 2004: 19). Ifthe environment in some areas is highly insecure orinaccessible, the military or private security firmsmay be best placed to deliver certain services in theshort term, but measures to avoid escalations inviolence and manage contracts with private securityproviders to ensure accountability and respect forIHL need to be well-planned and resourced(Wheeler and Harmer, 2006; Singer, 2006).

Contracting non-state actors may not be as rapidas the provision of humanitarian or relief assistance,but it may provide more long-term, dependableassistance and achieve more consistent coverage(see Box 9, page 000). This approach may alsoenable communities to make more developmentalinvestments and assist them to ‘rebuild’.

Non-state actors may also play an active role inservice delivery once state capacity is fullyestablished. In many countries health, education andwelfare services are provided by private or charitableorganisations, using state funds. It is important toremember that a state does not need to deliverservices itself to secure its legitimacy. However, asdiscussed in the following section, the role of the

state, and its association with the supply of services,will be important in terms of state–society relations.

Section 3From what to how: meeting basic

needs and strengthening the social

contract

This section focuses on the impact aidprogramming can have on state legitimacy andstability. For long-term stability, it is important thatthe state takes responsibility for its citizens. Wheredonors have clear state-building objectives, it isessential that opportunities to work with, andthrough, willing states are maximised. State-building is clearly not an objective of humanitarianassistance: ‘it is contradictory … to expect aninstrument designed to work around the state, andthat is frequently used by donors for precisely thisreason, to also play a role in state-building’ (Leaderand Colenso, 2005: 41).

Improving material wellbeing and strengtheningthe relationship between state and society areclearly related goals of the international community.If social protection and services are being providedby the international community, and not by thestate, how can this be done in such a way as tocontribute to state legitimacy? How can socialprotection and improved access to services bemanaged so that the ‘social contract’ is reinforced,not weakened?

3.1 Strengthening the ‘social contract’

A ‘social contract’ between populations (individualsor communities/families) and governments is animportant element of state legitimacy. Strong socialcontracts imply high levels of trust, low levels ofopportunistic behaviour and a willingness to thinktowards the future (Yanacopolous and Hanlon,2006). A social contract is a compact between thegoverned and the governing stipulating the rightsand responsibilities attached to both – formal andinformal, political, legal, moral and economic.Typically, the vulnerable have less influence over theshape of the social contract, and it is often up to civilsociety (national or international) to ensure that thegovernors keep their end of the bargain.

Views vary on the role of the state and itsresponsibilities, including in providing or supplyingwelfare and services. That said, the DAC’s draftprinciples on international engagement in fragilestates indicate consensus amongst DAC donorsthat the state has a role in service delivery. Thedraft principles identify strengthening thegovernance and capacity of the state’s servicedelivery functions as a high priority.

The assumptions relating to state respons-ibilities in the draft principles align with the view that

10


1 The Kecamatan Development Project (KDP) in Indonesiaand the Community Empowerment Program (CEP) in EastTimor are seen as examples of community-driven develop-ment. They are not defined as social funds because thedecision on which projects to fund lies with communitycommittees rather than the implementing agencies; theKDP includes in-built competition between proposals(Strand et al., 2003).

11

the modern ‘bargain’ between governed andgovernors relies fundamentally on the ability of thegovernors (ideally, the state) to provide for the basicsecurity and livelihoods of the governed. Whilelegitimacy can be both legally constituted (throughelections or constitutions) and performance-based(through the reliable provision of services andsecurity), performance legitimacy is arguably themore significant influence on citizens’ views. AsFrancois and Sud (2006: 147) argue: ‘States whichdo a good job of fulfilling the two core statefunctions of security/territorial sovereignty andimprovements in living standards possessperformance legitimacy in the eyes of theircitizens’.2 Internally, legitimacy depends both onformal and informal, performance-based processes(e.g. trust in the ability of the government to meetbasic promises and deliver basic services). Thus, a‘service gap’ can fundamentally undermine efforts tostrengthen state legitimacy.

State-building initiatives are often characterisedby a heavy focus on technical assistance andcapacity-building within the public administration.While we acknowledge the importance of suchassistance, we argue that it needs to becomplemented by assistance aimed at filling the‘service gap’ resulting (in part) from state fragility.

3.2 Programming choices

The role of the state in ensuring social protectionduring the state-building process will differ bycountry, by region and also over time. The ideal isto maximise state involvement withoutcompromising the consistency and reliability ofservice provision, over-burdening the staff anddepartments engaged in the institution-buildingprocess, or compromising the neutrality orimpartiality of humanitarian action.

If the right aid instruments and approaches areused, effective programmes can be established.These can then be progressively handed over to thestate, thereby contributing to performancelegitimacy. However, identifying when and howactors’ roles should change is complex and highlycontext-specific. When is it appropriate to start toinvest in this relationship? What should be donewhen state authorities show little desire to investin the social contract? How can programmes bedesigned to enable external assistance to have apositive impact on state–society relations?

Figure 1 (page 12) represents one approach tomapping different contexts onto a typology to guide

programming decisions. It is taken from a WorkingPaper developed by DFID’s Poverty Reduction inDifficult Environments (PRDE) team (Berry et al.,2004: 25). It clearly does not allow for an in-depthassessment of the strengths and weaknesses ofindividual states. However, such a mapping processcan be useful to inform pro-gramming decisions andthe selection of instru-ments. It can also be a usefulway of encouraging coherent approaches acrossdonor governments. It is important to note that aparticular country may fall into a number of boxes,and mapping at the regional or district level may alsobe useful.

This analysis relies on a sound understandingof state will and capacity. This understanding willbe more straightforward where donors and theirpartners have a long-standing engagement withthe state. The Australian government, NGOs andthe private sector have forged long-termpartnerships and built up significant in-houseknowledge of local contexts in the Asia-Pacific.Devolution, the mobilisation of greater numbers ofAustralian officials in operational roles andalliances with new partners, such as churchorganisations in Papua New Guinea, will enhancethis understanding. A typology through which tocapture this knowledge and use it to guide thedevelopment of programming approaches maytherefore be useful at an early stage in a crisisresponse.

The remainder of this section focuses on thosecontexts with will but limited capacity. Where there isan absence of both will and capacity (for instance,Sudanese government policies in Darfur, or theMyanmar government with respect to theRohingyas), and basic or life-saving assistance isneeded, the humanitarian imperative is primary andresponses should prioritise the provision ofhumanitarian assistance in line with humanitarianprinciples. It is only once humanitarian need hassubsided, and the state has demonstratedwillingness, that investments in strengthening statelegitimacy should be prioritised. Determinations ofneed must be made transparent and based oncredible independent assessments, to guard againstmanipulation by local governments or the influenceof other interests.

3.3 Harmonisation and alignment

The draft Principles for Good International

Engagement in Fragile States state that assistanceshould be in line with local priorities and/orsystems (OECD/DAC, 2005); see Box 7.Harmonisation and alignment are useful inconsidering how external assistance relates to thestate and its legitimacy in post-conflict contexts.

‘Harmonisation refers to the extent of coherencein approaches, policies and systems betweendonors’ (ODI, 2004: 7). Harmonisation betweendonors can reduce demands on under-resourced


2 While there is agreement that the international communi-ty should prioritise promoting higher standards of living inorder to promote stability, there is little consensus on howthis should be done once a level of peace has beenrestored. Many in the international community (political andaid agencies) support democratic reform as the means toachieve improvements in living standards, but there ismounting evidence that ‘pump-priming’ democratic gover-nance in post-conflict societies increases violence in theshort term (Collier, 2006; Francois and Sud, 2006).

administrations. Alignment is closely linked to ideasaround increasing ownership of those policies andsystems by a government, and can have a positiveeffect on the nascent ‘social contract’ between thegovernment and its people (ibid.: 8, 18).

Alignment may initially prove difficult in post-conflict contexts as policies and systems are stillbeing developed. However, systems or ‘shadow’systems alignment may enable an early focus onthe state’s future role in service provision. Shadowsystems alignment is based on the argument thatassistance ‘should be delivered in such a way as tobe compatible with the medium- to long-termambition of handing over to national authorities’(ODI, 2004: 43).

3.4 Joint national programmes

Joint programmes and pooled funding mechanismshave significant advantages in fragile, post-conflictcontexts: they facilitate harmonisation, they can bemore easily aligned at national and sub-national

levels, and they facilitate gradual absorption intogovernment policies and structures (Leader andColenso, 2005).

Lockhart (unpublished: 7) argues that jointprogrammes are valuable in post-conflict situations‘where there might be an advantage for a newinstitutional regime to demonstrate to thepopulation the “peace dividend” through a limitednumber of policies that are effectively implementedon an even-handed basis’. Harvey and Holmes(forthcoming: 16) describe the advantages of jointprogramming as follows:

Joint programming aims to respond to the

problems created by multiple donors, frag-

mented short-term funding, programming out-

side of government structures, and creating

parallel bureaucracies, leaving national civil

services stymied and incapable of maintaining

legitimacy. A Joint Program therefore aims to

harmonise the various donor programmes into

a unified transparent and criteria driven frame-12


+ WILL

Will but limited capacity Will and capacity

Policy-maker Policy-maker

• Partner with central government and line ministries • Strengthen government system to develop pro-poor to develop, implement and finance pro-poor policy policy, monitor the compact, respond to voice and be

accountable to citizens

Provider Provider

• Encourage partnerships between the state and • Build organisational and frontline provider capacitynon-state providers and provide incentives for frontline workers• Build state provider capacity where possible • Work to make providers more responsive to the poor

Poor people Poor people

• Strengthen the voice of poor people to demand • Build client power and voice their rights to services• Use community-based approaches that work through central and local government structures and link to sector interventions• Facilitate provider access

–CAPACITY + CAPACITY

Limited will and limited capacity Capacity but lack of will

Policy-maker Policy maker

• Use non-state mechanisms for policy coordination • Use non-state mechanisms for policy and financingcoordination and look for entry points to support political will

Provider Provider

• Deliver services through humanitarian agencies • Harness both state and non-state providers through and INGOs in ways that build capacity to manage some form of partnership arrangementtheir own service delivery needs

Poor people Poor people

• Use community-based approaches that build local • Use community-based approaches that build localgovernance structures and community capacity to governance structures and develop community capacitymanage their own service delivery needs to manage their own service delivery needs• Facilitate provider access • Facilitate provider access

–WILL

Figure 1: Possible approaches to strengthening service delivery relationships and actors indifficult environments (Berry et al., 2004)

13

work, designed and implemented by relevant

stakeholders at all stages. They have national

reach, long term objectives, are implemented

through multi year horizons and harness

national policy oversight to available capacity.

Joint programmes can be funded through trust funds(often multi-donor), the budget and international ordomestic revenue (Lockhart, unpublished: 13). Theycan also encompass different types of assistance,and can be conducted at national or below-nationallevels. They can include social transfers, community-driven development and the contracting of non-stateproviders (discussed in Section 2).

The content and design of joint programmesdetermine their contribution to state legitimacyand the state–society contract. As recommended inFigure 1, ensuring that the state has a role in policy-making should be an urgent priority. Governments,even if under-resourced, should be in the driver’sseat if they are not actively engaged in widespreadviolations of IHL. As Harvey and Holmes(forthcoming: 20) have argued in relation to cash-based social transfers:

Where government capacities to deliver large

scale social transfers are limited it may still be

possible to engage with relevant line min-

istries in the development of policy. Engaging

relevant line ministries in debates about social

protection policies may be part of a process of

rebuilding some analytical and implementa-

tion capacity within governments to deliver

social protection.

In relation to community-driven development, earlyroles that can be played by government (local ornational) in relation to social funds programmesinclude:

• Local government staff can provide technicaladvice or approve project proposals.

• Central government can establish policyframeworks that apply to all social fundactivities (e.g. relating to user fees or waterregulations) (policy alignment).

• Local or central government can manage thesocial funds using government systems(systems alignment).

During periods of conflict or extremely limitedcapacity, it may be appropriate to establish aparallel system (Leader and Colenso, 2005: 33).

Contracting alternative service providers offerssignificant potential for increasing alignment with


Box 7: Approaches to alignment with the state

Policy alignment: Alignment behind recipientgovernment policy frameworks. In certain situationsthere may be a lack of policies to align to (althoughthis should not be assumed in post-conflictcontexts). In this case, donors need to supportcountries in developing policies without stiflingnational ownership. Alternatively, there may be anumber of policy frameworks. Donors need to jointlyagree which policies to align to, or support thegovernment in their choice between policies. ‘In theabsence of government leadership on policypriorities, harmonisation and prioritisation of donoraction is vital in order to create the enablingenvironment for country leadership to emerge at alater stage and to create positive synergies betweeninterventions’ (ODI, 2004: 8). In some cases, this hasseen a lead donor taking on certain key tasks.

Systems (or ‘shadow’ systems) alignment: Donorstend to believe that policy alignment is a necessarycondition for systems alignment, but this isdisputable. The establishment of parallel systems,even in the absence of clear policy frameworks,should be avoided. Systems alignment can includefinancial disbursement channels, contracting,implementation arrangements, monitoring andevaluation and reporting. If donors believe aligningbehind a certain government’s policies wouldunjustly legitimise the government, ‘shadow’systems alignment could still be pursued. Thisinvolves donors adopting approaches that can becompatible with national systems (e.g. on-budgetassistance, working with established administrativeboundaries). Systems alignment allows for servicesto be ‘delivered on a programmatic basis, that [is]sufficiently modular and flexible to allow fortransfer of ownership to national authorities assoon as appropriate’ (ODI, 2004: 10).

Box 8: Potential advantages of jointnational programmes

• Coherence between donor approaches• Bringing NGOs, private sector into a policy

framework • Allowing government to set policy • Flexibility to adjust strategy and policy over

time, while keeping a network of relationshipsin place

• Potential to bring synergies betweenprogrammes over time

• Perception and reality of fairness and even-handedness

• Minimising the number of projects by bringingthem within an overarching framework

• Once a programme is designed, approved andfunded, reduces the need for continuousdesign of new projects; programmes can stillbe adjusted over time

From Lockhart (unpublished: 3).

state policies and systems. Ideally, non-state actorsoperate within a policy framework developed by thestate; work in close association with localgovernment officials; have a direct contract with thestate; and provide information in ways which feedinto state systems. Recruiting staff and developingexpertise in policy-setting and contract managementmay take on a higher priority. Where state capacityfor this role does not exist, it can be filled by a donoror multilateral agency on an interim basis. However,an agreed strategy for evolving the role of the stateover time will be important (Berry et al., 2004: 15).Non-state actors must be directly accountable to thestate, and the state must have the capacity to holdthem to account. This differs significantly fromtraditional project-style assistance, whereaccountability lines are primarily to the donor andaccountability is driven more by donor policies thanthose of the partner government.

In post-conflict settings, it will be important toensure that the state’s role in service delivery isclearly communicated. Irrespective of the state’scapacity, public information should seek tomaximise the state’s association with programmeslike social funds. If grants are seen as coming fromthe state, this can help enhance its legitimacy.

One issue with the contracting of non-stateactors relates to staffing and salary entitlements.Although programmes delivered through contractednon-state actors have the potential to be handedover progressively to the state, difficulties oftenarise if programme staff are unwilling to beemployed by the state because they face asignificant salary cut. Ways to avoid this should befound early in the cycle. For example, non-stateactors may agree to salaries that are consistentwith other non-state actors and also with proposedgovernment salaries. This may be difficult withhighly qualified staff, but may be achievable if staffare receiving significant on-the-job training.Alternatively, if state recruitment and humanresource systems are sufficiently established, the

government may be able to employ national staffwho are then seconded to contracted providers.This would also provide opportunities for civilservants to receive on-the-job training.

Effective and innovative contracting skills arecalled for here. Ensuring that contracts create theright kinds of incentives, strike the right balancebetween flexibility and accountability and ensurethat contracted parties are providing services to allgroups is difficult. While many bilateral andmultilateral agencies have worked closely withnon-state actors, this has often been on the basisof grant funding and partnership agreements.Sophisticated contracts are required under thismodel to ensure that appropriate accountabilitysystems are in place.

Donors may choose not to channel fundsthrough joint, national programmes. This is oftendue to an interest in ensuring identity and profile.However, such decisions bring costs with them.Fragmented assistance, not closely aligned with thestate, has limited potential to positively contributeto state legitimacy and the social contract. These areimportant considerations for any donor withstabilisation and/or state-building objectives.

Section 4Discussion

Crises can have a significant impact on thefunctions and effectiveness of states. Violentconflict in particular can severely undermine astate’s capacity and legitimacy, and its relationswith society. Enhancing Australia’s capacity torespond to crises can therefore play an importantpart in broader strategies to foster effective states.

The quality and speed of the initial response toa crisis is critical to ensuring that lives are savedand threats minimised. However, in post-conflictcontexts, where state capacity is weak and stabilitynot assured, how the winding down of the crisis

14


Box 9: Contracting alternative serviceproviders: the East Timor Health Sectorexperience

The Trust Fund for East Timor (managed by theWorld Bank) included a large number of sectorally-focused projects. The health sector project relied oninternational NGOs to provide basic health servicesduring the ‘transition’ period, largely because thegovernment (in the form of UNTAET) did not havethe capacity to deliver health services itself.Although NGOs were the principal service providersoverall coordination was provided by thegovernment under a memorandum ofunderstanding (MOU). In conjunction with theUNTAET Interim Health Authority, NGOs preparedhealth plans in each of the 12 districts outside Dili, a

task deemed beyond the capacity of the IHA alone.Although some NGOs were initially reluctant tosubmit to this arrangement, a good workingrelationship was reportedly established. The secondphase of the health sector project (designed in2001) focused more heavily on developing a policyand institutional framework, and service provisionshifted from NGOs to the government.

The achievements in the health sector in EastTimor during the transition period have beenrecognised (World Bank, 2004: 87–90). Thecontracting of NGOs to deliver services allowed theIHA to retain responsibility for the sector, while alsoprogressing work in governance, policy andcapacity-building areas.

Adapted from World Bank (2004b).

15

response is managed, and the quality of thetransition strategies, may prove equally significant.Effective and large-scale emergency responses inconflict-affected countries interplay withpopulations’ perceptions and expectations. Thesein turn influence the social contract and citizens’views of the state’s legitimacy. The type ofassistance provided, and the way in which it isprovided, is critical in the transition from conflict topeace, and relief to development.

International engagement in conflict-affectedstates has raised many challenges for bilateraldonors, international organisations, NGOs and theprivate sector. We do not suggest that there aresimple answers, or that solutions can be appliedacross the board. Australia, along with other donors,has initiated a number of new approaches to addresslimited state capacity and significant humanitarian ordevelopmental needs. We believe that it is timely toconsider how these approaches can be strengthen-ed, and what impact the initial crisis response has onlonger-term initiatives and objectives. The WhitePaper represents a valuable opportunity to explorethese issues; the recognition that ‘clear communitybenefits’ are essential for successful reform is auseful first step (AusAID, 2006: 17).

Issues we believe warrant further discussionare outlined below:

• How should the international community balancethe need to respect sovereignty with the need toensure stability and development? What is toointerventionist, and what is not interventionistenough? Is it possible to mobilise a large-scaleintervention, but limit responsibility and remit toniche areas? Or does this risk leaving gapsunfilled, undermining stability and entailing acontinued security presence?

• Is there a basic consensus between humani-tarian, strategic and defence policy-makers andoperational partners about how to gauge risks to

civilian populations and how to respond to them?Is there consensus around the point at whichcrisis response should give way to state-buildingsupport?

• In contexts requiring crisis responses andlonger-term state-building assistance (forexample East Timor and the Solomon Islands),how do the Australian government and itspartners determine when to start changingtheir mode of operating? Are there significantdifferences in views and approaches betweencivilian and military actors?

• How is the Australian government assessingstate will and capacity, and how does this informoperational approaches? How is this beingcommunicated to implementing partners? Howdoes this impact on assistance strategies and onimplementing partners and their programmes?

• Have Australian assistance strategies anddonor coordination efforts succeeded inpreventing ‘service gaps’? Is there greaterpotential to promote harmonisation andalignment in places where Australia is a leaddonor? Does Australia’s experience ofcontributing to multi-donor trust funds, forinstance in Afghanistan, hold any relevantlessons for the immediate region?

• How is Australia defining ‘humanitarianassistance’? Are humanitarian mechanisms andbudgets being stretched to cater to a broaderarray of issues? If so, what are the implications,in terms of principles and operationally? Ishumanitarian aid being stretched because noalternative mechanisms are available?

• Could the Australian government improve theway it provides humanitarian assistance tofacilitate a smoother transition? What role isthere for cash transfer programmes in relief anddevelopment phases? What opportunities existfor pooling funds or coordinating assistancemore effectively during the humanitarian phase?


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from crisis response to state-building

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