FROM BREZHNEV TO ANDROPOV: ORDERLY SUCCESSION

OR CRISIS? Peter Frank

Both the C o n s t i t u t i o n o f t he USSR and t h e S ta tu tes o f t h e Communist Pa r t y of the Sov ie t Union (CPSU) emphasise the c o l l e c t i v e na tu re o f leadersh ip i n t h e Sov ie t p o l i t i c a l system, and t h i s i s cons i s ten t w i t h t h e under l y ing c o l l e c t i v i s t ideo logy . I n p rac t i ce , however, t he re has been a tendency towards s t rong, i n d i v i d u a l leadership: Lenin, S t a l i n , Khrushchev and Brezhnev a l l a t t a i n e d p o s i t i o n s o f personal power t h a t were considerably a t odds w i t h the s p i r i t o f the w r i t t e n c o n s t i t u t i o n s . One reason fo r the ex t rao rd ina ry power of these leaders, and a l s o t h e main reason why, o t h e r than by death, they have been so d i f f i c u l t t o remove o r rep lace, i s t h a t t he re i s no we1 7 understood , regu la r , convent ional o r s t a t u t o r y mode o f succession. Consequently, succession i n the USSR tends t o be uncommonly d i s r u p t i v e and accompanied by c r i s i s (Frank, 1980). Yet t he changeover f rom Brezhnev t o Andropov i n November 1982 seemed t o take p lace smoothly and e f f i c i e n t l y ; so does t h i s mean t h a t l eadersh ip succession i n the Sov ie t Union i s no longer a problem?

Rites de passage

The l a t e l e a d e r ' s funera l went o f f w i t h o u t a h i t c h , Andropov having a l ready been e lec- ted the new General Secretary a t a plenum o f t he CPSU Centra l Committee h e l d on November 12 1982. Then, a t a second plenum on November 22nd, a t which the s t a t e p lan and budget f o r 1983 were discussed, Andropov made a major speech which was d i r e c t , t o the p o i n t , and r e f r e s h i n g l y sho r t o f c l iche's. The same i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f shortcomings t h a t has charac ter ised so many speeches t o t h e autumn plenum was there; b u t t he re was a l so a br iskness and no te of confidence t o encourage the op in ion t h a t t h e new man might he lp t h e system t o break o u t o f t he ' i n e r t i a , t h e preference f o r o l d p r a c t i c e s ' r e f e r r e d t o near the beginning o f h i s speech. S i m i l a r l y , t he personnel changes announced a t the c lose of the plenum d isp layed a b lend o f v a l e d i c t i o n ( t h e re t i remen t w i t h fulsome t r i b u t e o f Brezhnev's longstanding co l league and f r i e n d , A.P. K i r i l e n k o ) and unan t i c ipa ted promot ion ( o f a former KGB c h i e f and then Par ty f i r s t secre tary of the Azerbaidzhan c e n t r a l committee, G.A. A l i e v ) t h a t suggested the end o f an era . Jus t as suggest ive of a new approach, b u t l ess w i d e l y no t iced , was t h e appointment t o the S e c r e t a r i a t o f N . I . Ryzhkov. He was a technocra t who had j o i n e d t h e Par t y on l y i n 1956, had never h e l d P a r t y o f f i c e , and who rose f rom t h e shop f l o o r t o be head even tua l l y o f t he g i a n t i n d u s t r i a l combine Uralmash be fore h i s more recent appointment as a deputy head o f Gosplan. Together w i t h i n d i c a t i o n s g iven i n Andropov's speech, these two appointments symbolise t h e t w i n approach t o s o l v i n g the USSR's c u r r e n t domestic d i f f i c u l t i e s : t h e need f o r g rea te r d i s c i p l i n e and a more exper t , competent s t i m u l a t i o n o f the economy.

t o have occurred q u i c k l y , c lean ly , smoothly, e f f i c i e n t l y , and w i t h a complete absence o f c r i s i s . Does t h i s mean, the re fo re , t h a t t he Sov ie t p o l i t i c a l system has matured t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t i t can now cope w i t h changes o f leader no l e s s e f f e c t i v e l y than can o the r k inds of p o l i t i c a l system, i n c l u d i n g mu1 t i - p a r t y , compet i t i ve democracies? Indeed, g iven the man i fes t t r a n q u i l i t y o f t h e Brezhnev-Andropov t r a n s i t i o n , i s t h e Sov ie t Union now b e t t e r ab le t o do t h i s than systems which requ i re , f o r instance, prolonged e l e c t i o n campaigns and s u b s t a n t i a l tu rnover o f bo th l e g i s l a t o r s and (as i n the American case) admin i s t ra to rs , as w e l l as o f t h e leader h im/herse l f?

From the moment o f Brezhnev's death was announced Andropov d isp layed a sure touch.

I n shor t , then, t he t r a n s i t i o n f rom Brezhnev's leadersh ip t o Andropov's appears

4 Peter Frank

Table 1: POLITBURO & SECRETARIAT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSJ (as a t 22 November 1982 f o l l o w i n g t h e p lenary session o f the CPSU Central Committee h e l d t h a t day)

P o l i t b u r o f u l l members

S e c r e t a r i a t

ANDROPOV, Yu.V. . . . . . . . . . . . . Andropov (Gen. Sec) ALIEV, G.A.

GORBACHEV, M.S. . . . . . . . . . . . . Gorbachev

GRISHIN, V.V. GROMYKO, A.A. KUNAEV, D.A.

PEL'SHE, A. Ya. ROMANOV, G.V. TIKHONOV, N.A. USTINOV, D.F. CHERNENKO, K.U. . . . . . . . . . . . . Chernenko SCHERBITSKI I , V .V.

Candidate members

DEMICHEV, P.N.

KISELEV, T.Ya. KUZNETSOV , V. V. PONOMAREV, B.N. . . . . . . . . . . . . Ponomarev KASHIDOV, Sh. R. SOLOMNETSEV, M.S.

SHEVARDNADZE , E . A.

DOLGIKH, V. I. . . . . . . . . . . . . Dolg ikh

Zirnyanin, M.V. Kapi tonov , I .V. Rusakov , K. V . Ryzhkov, N . I .

The mode of succession c r i s i s The answer t h a t w i l l be o f f e r e d here i s t h a t leadersh ip change i n the Sov ie t

Union i s s t i l l a c r i t i c a l j unc tu re , b u t t h a t c e r t a i n features, s p e c i f i c t o the p r e s e n F t r a n s i t i o n have va r ied both t h e nature o f t h e c r i s i s ( v i s -a -v i s previous t r a n s i t i o n s ) and i t3 chronology.

From Brezhnev t o Andropov: GrderZy Succession o r Crisis 5

Table 2: BRIEF BIOGRAPHY OF MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO AND SECRETARIAT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSUZ

ANDROPOV

ALIEV

GORBACHEV G R I SH I N

GROMY KO

KUNAE V PEL ' SHE

ROMANOV T I KHONOV UST I NOV C HE RNEN KO

SHCHERBITSKII DEMICHEV

DOLGI KH KISELEV

KUZNETSOV

PONOMAREV

RASH I DOV

SOLOMENTSEV SHEVAR~NADZE Z IMYAN I N KAP ITONOV

RUSAKOV

RY Z H KOV

Date o f B i r t h

1914 1923

1931 1914 1909 1912

1899

1923 1905 1908 1911

19538 1918 1924 1917 1901

1905

1917 1913 1928

1914 1915 1909

1929

Date when j o i n e d m

1939 1945

1952

1939 1931

1939 1915

1944 1940 1927

1931

1941

1939 1942 1940 1927

1919

1939 1940 1948 1939 1939 1943

1956

-

Current R e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s

General Secretary CC CPSU

F i r s t deputy chai rman USSR Counci 1

Secretary CC CPSU ( a g r i c u l t u r e ) F i r s t secre tary Moscow gorkom CPSU

USSR M i n i s t e r o f Fore ign A f f a i r s 1 s t secre tary CC CP Kazakhstan

Chairman, Committee o f Pa r t y Cont ro l

F i r s t secre tary Leningrad obkom CPSU

Chairman USSR Counci l o f M i n i s t e r s USSR M i n i s t e r o f Defence

Secretary CC CPSU (present responsi - b i 1 i t i e s unce r ta in )

F i r s t secre tary CC CP Ukraine

USSR Min is t .er o f Cu l tu re Secretary CC CPSU (heavy i n d u s t r y ) F i r s t secre tary CC CP Beloruss ia

F i r s t deputy chairman o f the Presidium o f the USSR Supreme Sov ie t

Secretary CC CPSU ( r e l a t i o n s w i t h non- ru l ing communist p a r t i e s )

F i r s t secre tary CC CP Uzbekistan

Chairman RSFSR Counci 1 o f Mini s t e r s F i r s t secre tary CC CP Georgia

Secretary CC CPSU ( ideo logy) Secretary CC CPSU (pa r t y o rgan isa t ion) Secretary CC CPSU ( r e l a t i o n s w i t h

Secretary CC CPSU ( r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s

o f M i n i s t e r s

at tached t o t h e CC CPSU

r u l i n g communist p a r t i e s )

n o t y e t known)

H i the r to , the argument has been t h a t c r i s i s i s consequent ia l upon the demise I n f a c t , we descr ibed t h e typo logy o f leadersh ip i n the o f the incumbent leader .

USSR i n the f o l l o w i n g way (Frank, 1980, p.95):

6

DEMIS OF DOMINANT LEADER F COLLE'CT IVE LEADERSHIP

PRIMA I, Y OF PARTY SECRETARY

LINK1 r, G OF PARTY SECRETARYSHIP AND PREMIERSHIP OR PRESIDENCY (= DO INANT LEADERSHIP) r

Peter Frank

D E M I S ~ OF DOMINANT LEADER

In other words, t h i s implies t h a t the period of maximum disruption to the system occurs i n the interval between the demise of the dominant leader and the emergence of the General Secretary as the unambiguous new leader within the collective leader- s h i p (incidentally, we are concerned here w i t h the notion of 'dominant leadership' and not 'dictatorship' which could occur only i f the Politburo were reduced t o playing a purely symbolic ro le ) .

I n the present case, Andropov appears t o have established himself immediately as the dominant leader within the collective. This i s i n marked contrast t o the decade or more t h a t i t took Stal in (following Lenin's death) or the f ive years that elapsed af te r S ta l in ' s death before Khrushchev was firmly in charge, o r , indeed, the f ive or s ix years needed by Brezhnev (following the ousting of Khrushchev) t o eradicate r ivals and challengers t o the leadership. However, two reservations must be made. take into account the age and mortality of the Brezhnev collective leadership i n general which, as we shall see, worked ultimately i n Andropov's favour . second place, because of the extreme lengevity of the Brezhnev leadership (a factor connected with the f i r s t point) , the c r i s i s of the transit ion occurred before the demise of Brezhnev, arid not a f t e r (as the model would imply). And, f i n m w e shall argue that the conjunction of these two factors i s l ikely t o give r i s e t o a t h i r d , namely that the time available t o Andropov i n which to e f fec t the radical change that

F i r s t of a l l , any explanation o f Andropov's re la t ively easy passage must

In the

the Soviet Union so manifestly needs i s - s o limited as t o ra ise much sooner than in the Dast the sPectre of succession c r i s i s . L

A t the beginning of 1982 the average age of the fourteen fu l l members of the Politburo was 66 years, yet such was the dis t r ibut ion that only three came below th i s mean, and none of these could be considered serious immediate contenders fo r the leadership i n the event of Brezhnev's death. Seven of the remaining eleven members came within the range 72 t o 82 years, leaving only four who on grounds of age alone could be considered possible successors. Moreover, since i t i s ewtremely unlikeJy that a non-Slav would be made General Secretary, the potential candidates could be reduced to three (as Kunaev, a Kazakh, had l i t t l e chance of being preferred on grounds of nationali ty). T h u s , a t the beginning of January 1982, three possible successors stood o u t : Andropov and Grishin (both aged 67) and Chernenko (aged 70) . Now, while Grishin had the advantage of having served his en t i re career i n Moscow, by the same token he had never had the opportunity e i ther i n terms of geographical mobility or functional responsibility to b u i l d up a network of support. Chernenko had been more mobile geographically, b u t had never real ly attained an influential position except under the aegis of Brezhnev his patron. Rumour has i t tha t Chernenko was Brezhnev's preferred choice t o succeed. I f that were not t rue then Chernenko had l i t t l e t o corrmend h i m independently; and i f i t were t rue , then e i ther Brezhnev could not muster enough support to effect the succession while a l ive, o r , once Brezhnev had died, Chernenko became, - vis-a-vis Andropov, a very weak candidate indeed.

From Brezhnev t o Andropov: Orderly Succession or Crisis? 7

There i s no reason t o suppose t h a t , had he l ived, Suslov would n o t have supported Andropov i n the contest f o r succession. one man who could have organised a ' s top Andropov' lobby w i t h some reasonable pros- pect of success. whereupon Andropov I s i ntel 1 i gence , pol i t i cal acumen, career background, and the informational resources tha t go with being head of the KGB became even more valuable in the ensuing manoeuvring for position. plenum held on 24 May Andropov was appointed t o the Secre ta r ia t and shor t ly afterwards relinquished the KGB post, h is candidacy for the succession began t o look unstoppable.

Now, any po l i t i c i an , in any pol i t ica l system, needs luck from time t o time; b u t i t must be c lear t ha t in t h i s case the ro le of chance loomed large. This i s fur ther supported by the f ac t t h a t , although Andropov seems t o have used the time between the end of May and 10 November t o good purpose, he was nevertheless unable t o hasten the leadership t rans i t ion and had, once more, t o wait upon chance - the death of Brezhnev - before he could actual ly assume of f ice . merits of the putative contenders, leadership chanqe occurred only when the incumbent

B u t what i s cer ta in , i s t h a t Suslov was the

However, providentially f o r Andropov, on 25 January Suslov died,

Consequently when a t a Central Committee

I n sho r t , i r respect ive of the i n t r i n s i c

dominant leader had perforce t o relinquish office: unpredictabil j ty remains the name of the game.

Gerontocracy and inert ia

dominated the co l lec t ive leadership (although he added the presidency t o the party general secretaryship only in 1977). To begin with, he gave t o the Soviet U n i o n ' a much needed s t a b i l i t y a f t e r years of S t a l i n i s t a rb i t ra r iness and Khrushchevite unpredictabi 1 i t y and spontan eous experimentation. B u t , imperceptibly, s tabi 1 i t y became ine r t i a and from a t l e a s t the middle 1970s (and some observers would date i t sooner than t h a t ) a kind of po l i t i ca l paralysis crept th rough the Soviet body p o l i t i c . Even the massive Soviet arms build-up, i t might be argued, was as much the r e su l t of i ne r t i a as of any obvious major new policy i n i t i a t i v e . Yet even though the problems of the economy and society became more and more manifest ( f a l l i ng ra tes of g rowth , waste and ineff ic iency, r i s ing corruption, cynicism and apathy), and desp i t e the increasingly e x p l i c i t and public recognition o f these problems (not l e a s t by Brezhnev himself), the system appeared t o be qui te incapable of resolving them. Brezhnev seemed t o have neither the imagination nor the energy t o tackle the problems, ye t without an i n i t i a t i v e by him the r e s t of the col lect ive leadership was a l so beset by immobilism. of leader, b u t , as i s commonplace in other types of po l i t i ca l system, the desire t o replace the leader i s f a r from being the same thing as agreement about who the new leader should be. And so the Soviet po l i t i ca l system limped along waiting, l i t e r a l l y , for the leader t o die. occurred in this instance before, ra ther than a f t e r , the actual t ransfer of o f f i ce .

S ta l in became General Secretary a t the age of 43, and when he died in 1953 aged 74 he was succeeded by fifty-nine-year-old Khrushchev who was 70 when he was deposed i n 1964. The new leader , Brezhnev, was 58 when he became General Secretary (or First Secretary, as the post then was) and he held o f f i ce f o r eighteen years un t i l j u s t a few weeks shor t o f his seventy-sixth birthday. probabili ty suggest t ha t Andropov, known t o be i n ind i f fe ren t heal th , m i g h t have, a t most, seven years ahead of h i m . succession will once more be r i f e . In other words, the i r resolut ion created by Brezhnev's long tenure of o f f ice will be compaunded by the shorter interval available t o Andropov before his position comes in to question once more. The f i r s t post-Brezhnev promotions and appointments of younger men i n t h e i r middle t o l a t e f i f t i e s indicate tha t Andropov i s seeking t o prevent a recurrence of gerontocracy. B u t even i f he succeeds there is no guarantee in the longer term tha t the pattern will not rever t back t o post-transit ion c r i s i s i n the shape of a lengthy and complicated consolidation process.

Brezhnev held o f f i ce f o r eighteen years and f o r t h e l a s t twelve of these he

That i s t o say,

Eventually, the way out of the impasse came t o be seen as a change

In shor t , the dysfunctional aspect of leadership change

Lenin was only 47 when the Bolsheviks seized power in 1917 and 54 when he died.

Precedent and actuar ia l

T h u s long before he i s 75 speculation about the

8 Peter Frank

I t could be objected, quite reasonably, t h a t seven years i s a significantly longer term than t h a t enjoyed by a British prime minister or a United States president, and therefore, that there i s no reason why Andropov should n o t have a t l eas t as good a chance of securing his policy goals. enormous power i n the matter of cabinet selection and policy determination, and, i f threatened by r iva ls , can appeal direct ly or indirectly to the electorate both as a means t o beat off any attempts a t usurpation and as a renewal of the mandate t o govern. On the other hand, a Soviet leader, precisely because he i s unhampered by general e lect ions, must expend an excessive degree of time and ef for t i n securing his primacy, gaining support fo r policy in i t i a t ives , and, subsequently, in holding off putative successors.

However, a newly elected western leader wields

The costliness of leadership succession

off ice he must spend a prolonged period devoted to consolidation of his power with a consequent need for greater e f for t t o secure the approval of new policies. The difference i n th is case i s that Brezhnev had served for so long that the actual change- over was smooth, b u t his successor has so l i t t l e time i n which to secure his position and i n i t i a t e and follow through urgently needed policies that a f t e r only a compara- m e l y short time there will be speculation about a l ikely replacement. and immobilism that t h i s ' en t a i l s will be costly.

Obviously, an orderly, we1 1-establ ished succession procedure cannot inoculate a poli t ical system, whatever i t s nature, against c r i s i s . not about c r i s i s as a general phenomenon; i t i s concerned w i t h c r i s i s (understood as disruptiveness, dysfunctional ism) brought about by the t ransi t ion from one leader t o another. I n the present case, the actual following the death of Brezhnev has been unprecedentedly smooth. However, viewed from a longer perspective, i t becomes clear tha t the c r i s i s generated by the absence of an orderly succession procedure has acted as a brake on the more e f f ic ien t working of the system for years and i s l ikely once more t o manifest i t s e l f i n the not-too-distant future.

to display considerable pol i t ical s k i l l . propaganda i s s t r iking, and his command of the Soviet pol i t ical machine seems for the present to be complete. B u t there are no signs o f structural change or major economic reform. The answer to domestic i l l s consists i n one word, disci l ine. Should th i s

l e f t o f f . cbanged? Or does i t require major restructuring, beginning perhaps w i t h a more pre- cise definition of the concept of leadership i n the Soviet pol i t ical process?

This implies t h a t when the leader i s comparatively young upon the commencement o f

The iner t ia

However, this analysis i s

assumption of office by Yurii Andropov

Three months a f te r his assumption of off ice , i t can be said that Andropov continues His aptitude fo r the game of international

f a i l o r prove to be counterproductive then Soviet po l i t i cs w i 1Tg-6. e ack where Brezhnev Then the question will be: i s the Soviet system capable of change or being

Notes 1 . A t th i s plenum A . P . Kirilenko was dropped from the Politburo, and G.A. Aliev was

promoted from candidate to fu l l membership (and the next day a t a meeting o f the Supreme Soviet was appointed a f i rs t deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers). N I R zhkov (formerly f i r s t deputy chairman of Gosplan) was made a secretary t o &U. t e unfounded. There are now 12 f u l l members of the Politburo and 8 candidates. There are 9 secretaries (3 f u l l members, 2 candidates, and 4 who do not belong t o the Politburo i n any capacity). Eighteen o f these 24 men were born before 1920; 5 were born in the 1920s (Aliev, Romanov, Dolgikh, Shevardnadze and Ryzhkov); Gorbachev was born i n 1931. Pel 'she's membership of the party dates from before the Revolution; Ponomarev joined d u r i n g the c iv i l war; and Ustinov and Kuznetsov both became party members i n 1927. Gromyko's and Chernenko's membership dates from from 1931, while no fewer than 7 men (including Andropov) joined i n 1939. E i g h t more were recruited

Rumours t h a t A.Ya. Pe1':he had died proved t o be

2.

From Brezhnev t o Andpopou: Orderly Succession or Crisis? 9

between 1940 and 1945, Shevardnadze (1948) and Gorbachev (1952) joined i n the period from the end of the war up t o S ta l in ' s death i n 1953. recrui t t o the top leadership group, i s the only one t o have joined the party i n the post-Stalin period ( i n 1956). Of the 12 f u l l members of the Politburo 3 are secretaries while Pel'she heads the Committee of Party Control, a central body. Grishin i s in charge of the Moscow party gorkom, and three major regional party organisations are represented: i . e . there are 8 party functionaries i n a l l . The remaining four members occupy posi- tions i n the government. A similar pattern prevails amongst the candidate members.

Ryzhkov, the newest

Referenees Frank, P . (1980), 'Leadership in Soviet-Type Pol i t ical Systems', Government and Opposition, Vol. 15, no. 1 , pp. 92-100. There i s only one book-length study of leadership i n the Soviet Union: R u s h , M. (1974), How Communist States Change Their Rulers (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press). Other works which touch upon th i s question in te r a l i a and which are excellent t rea t - ments of the i r subjects are: Brown, A. (1980), 'The Power o f the General Secretary of the CPSU' i n Rigby, T . H . , Brown, A , , and Reddaway, P . , A~ thor i ty , Power and Policy in the USSR (London: Macmillan). Bialer, S. (1980) , Sta l in ' s Successors. Leadership, S tab i l i ty , and Change in the Soviet Union (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Breslauer, G.W. (1982), Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders: Building Authority in Soviet Pol i t ics (London: George Allen & Unwin) .

-0-000-0-

THATCHERISM, LIEERALISM, AND TOR!' COLLECTIVISM ROBERT F LEACH

In a recent newspaper interview Milton Friedman claimed, 'Margaret Thatcher i s n o t in terms of bel iefs a Tory. (Observer, 26/9/82) Conservatism marks a sharp break from the Tory t radi t ion, and has more i n common w i t h a nineteenth century Liberalism, tha t is his tor ical ly the an t i thes i s of Toryism. The main elements of Liberalism and Toryism are too well known t o require restating. Most relevant here is that Tory t h i n k i n g was less host i le t o s t a t e power t h a n Liberalism. R . A . Butler once asserted, 'A good Tory has never been in history afraid of the use of the s t a t e . ' (Commons debate 10/3/1947) 'Paternalism' i s a term fre- quently linked w i t h Toryism, and some writers have talked o f 'Tory collectivism' (Beer, 1969, Greenleaf 1973) while one recent judgement concluded, 'The mainstream of ~onservatism has always been co l l ec t iv i s t and paternal is t i n basis. ' (Bennett, 1977). I t i s from this Tory collectivism tha t Mrs. Thatcher i s alleged t o have departed I t will be argued here that while her leadership has involved a s h i f t i n emphasis in the Conservative party, both her Liberalism and the co l lec t iv i s t t radi t ion she i s supposed to have abandoned are exaggerated.

She i s a nineteenth century Liberal. ' I t has become almost an accepted truth that Mrs. Thatcher's brand o f

Mrs- l'htcher's Liberalism In a ser ies of speeches made before she became Prime Minister, Mrs. Thatcher se t

outher views in forthright terms. v i t ies .

She argued that Government must l imit i t s ac t i - The s t a t e had attempted t o do too much and had intervened in areas where i t