peking and brezhnev
TRANSCRIPT
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Peking and the Brezhnev DoctrineAuthor(s): Kenneth W. ReaSource: Asian Affairs, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Sep. - Oct., 1975), pp. 22-30Published by: Heldref PublicationsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30171400
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e k i n g
n d
t h
r e z h n e v
D o c t r i n e
KENNETH W. REA
HE
INVASION
of Czechoslovakia
by
WarsawPact forces
in
August
1968
produced
harp
reactionsaround he world. The
Western
nations,
led
by
the
United
States,
were
quick
to
denouncethe
event,
which was so reminiscent f the
Hungarian
nvasionof the mid-1950s.
The Brezhnev
doctrine,
which
was used to
justify
the
invasion,
also
constituteda threat to other Communist
ountries
seeking greater
n-
dependence
rom Moscow.
Among
them was the
People'sRepublic
of
China. The intense
ideological
debate that characterized he Sino-
Soviet schism
in
the
early
1960s mushroomed
after Czechoslovakia
to the brink of a full
military
confrontation.
China refused to
accept
the Soviet contention
hat
Moscow
had the
right
to intervene n
any
country
wheresocialism
might
be threatened.
China's initial
response
was a massive
propagandacampaign
againstthe Brezhnevdoctrine.The firstmajordeclaration ame from
Premier Chou En-lai on
August
23.
Speaking
to a
banquet
at the
Rumanian
Embassy,
he
charged
the Soviet
Union
with
practicing
Fascist
politics,
great
power
chauvinism,
national
egoism,
and social-
imperialism.
He
equated
the invasion
with
Hitler in
the
1930s,
and
with the American
ntervention
n Vietnam.
On
this and
subsequent
occasions,
Chou
virtually
called
upon
the
Czechoslovak
and
Russian
peoples
to rebel
against
their leaders and
establish he
dictatorship
f
the
proletariat.
Socialist
countries,
he
argued,
should bolster
their
de-
fenses
to
thwart imilarSoviet ntervention.1n
support
of Chou'sstate-
ments,
the invasionwas
condemned
by
the
Eighth
CentralCommittee
of the CCP on October 31.
2
The
Chinese
rejected
he
Soviet
argument
hat the
invasion
was
necessary
in
order to
protect
Socialist
gains
and
strengthen
he So-
1
New
China News
Agency,
August
23,
1968;
September
30,
1968.
2
Ibid.,
November
1,
1968.
22
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Peking
and the
Brezhnev
Doctrine
23
cialist commonwealth.The commonwealth
espoused
by
the
Soviet
Union was comparedto Japan's GreaterEast Asia Co-Prosperity
Sphere,
Hitler's New Order n
Europe,
and America's FreeWorld
Community.
The Soviet
Union
was
practicing
socialism n
words,
imperialism
n
deeds. 3
The
Socialist
unity
that
existed
during
he
early
1950s had been
destroyedby
the revisionism
of
Soviet leaders. So-
cialist
gains,
whether n the
Soviet
Union
or in
Czechoslovakia,
had
long
been forfeited
by
their
leaders,
and could
only
be
regained
by
the
masses.4
While
criticizing
Dubcek's
capitulation
to
Moscow,
the
Chinese
sought
to
place
the burden of
responsibility
n
Soviet
ideo-
logical leadership.
Dubcek,
they
maintained,
was
merely emulating
policiesalreadypracticed
n Moscow. The
dispute
between Brezhnev
and Dubcek was
compared
to a
quarrel
between
dogs
of the same
breed;
and
moreover,
the revisionismof
the Soviet Union was
far
greater
and more
dangerous
han that
practicedby
Czechoslovakia.5
Developments
n both countries
supported
Mao's assertion hat a So-
cialist
country
would become revisionist f the
dictatorship
f the
pro-
letariatand
class
struggle
were
forgotten.
In his
writings,
Mao has
emphasized
he existence of contra-
dictions
within Socialist countries.Such contradictions ften
develop
between the
people
and their leaders because the latter isolate them-
selves
from
the masses.
In their
analysis
of
developments
n the
Soviet
Union and Czechoslovakia, he Chinese maintained that the basic
contradiction
n both countrieswas between the
bourgeoisie
and
the
proletariat.
Only by applying
Mao's
theory
of mass
struggle
and the
mass line could the
people
expose
revisionistswho had
gained
leader-
ship positions.
The mass
struggle
which
had
engulfed
China
since
1965 could be emulated
by
othersto drive
the revisionists
rom office.
Until
such
a
struggle
was
waged
in the Soviet
Union,
the Russian
leadership
would
continue
to
practice imperialism
under the
guise
of
proletariannternationalism. 7
3
Lin
Piao,
Report
to the Ninth
National
Congress
of the Communist
Party
of
China,
The
Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China (Documents) (Peking: Foreign
Language Press, 1969),
pp.
89-90.
4
NewChina News
Agency,
September
9,
1968.
During
the
Hungarian
crisis,
Communist
China
supported
Soviet intervention on the belief that its own
security
was linked with con-
tinued
Socialist
unity.
By 1968,
Socialist
unity
as
directed
by
Moscow was considered a threat
to China's
security.
5
Ibid., September
2,
1968.
6
Lin
Piao,
loc.
cit.,
pp.
22-23.
7
Ibid.,
p.
83.
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24
Asian
Affairs
Internationalism,
s
interpreted
by Peking,
did not demand
or
assume the loss of nationalindependenceor territorialntegrity.The
Chinese
thus
renewed their
charge
that
Moscow was
using
inter-
nationalism
o subvert he
independence
of Socialist states. The
chief
instruments f
subversionwere
COMECONand the Warsaw
Pact.8
n
an
editorial
attack on the Warsaw
Pact,
People's
Daily
charged
hat
it
enabled Moscow
to
manipulate
he East
European
countries
politi-
cally
and
militarily,
and to
push
(its)
social-imperialist
olicy
of
ag-
gression. 9
A memberof the
WarsawPact has no
guarantee
hat
its
sovereignty
and territorial
ntegrity
will
be
respected.
In
reality,
the
Soviet Union was
attempting
o create an international
dictatorship
by limiting
the
sovereignty
of other
states.
The
concept
of
limited
sovereignty
embodied in
the
Brezhnev
doctrine
was
repugnant
o the
Chinese,
and
revived memoriesof
the
semicolonial
status that had
been
forced
upon
China in the
19th
century
by
the
Western
powers,
including
Tsarist
Russia. It
also
challenged
China's view
of
the
proper
relations
that should subsist
between
Socialist
states.Mao has
consistently
arguedagainst
the
patri-
archal
relationship
hat
Soviet
leaders were
attempting
o
establish.
During
the
Sino-Soviet
polemics
of
1963,
Peking
declared: '
The relations
among
fraternal
parties
should under no
cir-
cumstancesbe likethe relationsbetweena leadingPartyand
the
led,
and
much less like the
relations between a
patri-
archal
father and his son
. . . What we
desire
is
merely
the
independent
nd
equal
status of the
fraternal
parties.
Speaking
at
the Ninth
Party
Congress
n
April
1969,
Lin Piao reiter-
ated
China's
position
that
relationsbetween
Socialist states must be
built
on the
principle
of
equality
and
noninterferencen
each other's
internal
affairs.
He also
emphasized
he
Maoist
belief
that
the
people
should
settle
their
own
domestic
struggles.
Lin's
speech
indicated he
concern of
Chinese
leaders that
the
Soviet
Union would
try
to
intervene
overtly
in
China'saffairs.
8
lenmin lihpao,
August
23,
1968; September
12, 1968;
January
9, 1969;
New
China
News
Agency,
November
9,
1968;
February
5,
1968.
9
Jenmin
lihpao,
September
12,
1968.
o10
The
Origin
and
Development
of the
Differences Between
the
Leadership
of the
CPSU and
Ourselves,
in The Polemic on
the General Line
of
the
International
Communist
Movement
(Peking: Foreign
Language Press, 1965),
pp.
102-103.
11
Lin
Piao,
loc.
cit.,
p.
97.
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Peking
and the
BrezhnevDoctrine
25
While
launching
a verbal attack on
the Brezhnev
doctrine
and
its application,the Chinese also became alarmed about their own
security
and that of China's
European ally,
Albania. Their
anxiety
was increased
by
the
build-up
of Sovietforces
along
the
borderand
the
installation
of missiles
in Outer
Mongolia.
The intrusion
of
Soviet
military
aircraft
into
Chinese
airspace sharply
increased
after
the
invasion
of Czechoslovakia.
On
August
26 and
September
5, 1968,
respectively,
China
lodged
official
complaints against
these
provo-
cations
and the
treatmentof Chinese
Embassypersonnel
n
Czecho-
slovakia.12
China's
concern for its own
security
and for the
safety
of
Al-
bania was
reflected
n
top-levelmilitarymeetingsheld in Peking in
early
October.
Chinese
newspapers
arried
numerous
ditorials
empha-
sizing
the
militant
olidarity
between
the two
countries,
which was
further
evidenced
by
Huang
Yung-sheng's
isit to Albania
in
Decem-
ber.
According
o one
report,
Huang
concludeda
defense
pact
allow-
ing
Chinato
establishand
operate
missile and naval
bases in
Albania.
It
was
also
during
Huang's
visit
that the Chinese
detonated
a
hydrogen
bomb,
and
stressed ts
importance
or
both
China
and
Albania.'3
This
was in
line with
Chou's
promise
to
assist
countries
willing
to
oppose
social-imperialism.
Calling
for
a
unitedfront
against
the
Soviet
Union,
Peking praised
Albania's
decision to
withdraw rom
the
War-
saw Pact and calledupon otherEast Europeannationsto follow this
positive
example. '
China now
began
to
cultivate
better
relations
with
Rumaniaand
Yugoslavia,
which
were also
threatened
y
the
Brezhnev
doctrine. In
an
effort
to divert
Soviet
attention
away
from
China,
Peking
also
began
to
revise
ts attitude
oward
he
European
Economic
Community
and
the
maintenanceof
a
strong
NATO,'5
although
the
Chinese
leadership
doubtless
recognized
the
limitations of
these
policies.
The
ominous
mplications
of
the
Brezhnev
doctrine
forced Mao
2lNew
China News Agency, September 16, 1968; September 30, 1968; Denver Post, April
28,
1968.
The Soviet
Union
denied
these
charges.
See Protest
Against
Hostile
Action
of
Chinese
Authorities,
Pravda,
November
1, 1968,
in
Current
Digest
of
Soviet
Press,
vol.
20,
no. 43
(November
20,
1968),
p.
17.
1a
New
China
News
Agency,
September
28,
1968;
October
2,
1968;
December
2, 1968;
December
31,
1968.
M
Ibid.,
September 28,
1968.
5
Dick
Wilson,
China and the
European
Community,
China
Quarterly,
No.
56
(October-
December
1973),
pp.
647-666.
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26
Asian
Affairs
to
end the
CulturalRevolution.
The
Chinese
feared
that the
Soviet
action in Czechoslovakiawas a prelude to similar intervention n
China. If Dubcek's
policies
were
a threat to
socialism,
then
Mao's
would,
of
course,
all into the
same
category.
Mao
seems to have
been
concerned
that Moscow
would
intervene
to
restore Liu
Shao-ch'i
o
power.
Although
Liu
had been
the
main
target
of
the Cultural
Revo-
lution,
he had
been able to
retain his
offices n the
Party
and
govern-
ment. In
the
aftermath
of
the
Czechoslovakian
nvasion,
Mao
hastily
called the
Twelfth
Enlarged
Plenum of the
Eighth
Central
Committee
to
discuss
the
international ituation
and Liu's removal
from
office.
In
his
address,
Mao
assertedthat
China had
more to
fear from
the
Soviet
Union that
from
the United
States,althoughthe communique
issued at
the
close of the
session
maintained hat the
United
States
had
tacitly
approved
Soviet
actions n
Czechoslovakia.'6
Peking's
concern
deepened
when
Sino-Soviet orces
clashed
along
the
Ussuri
River
in
March
1969. The
Chinese
leadership quickly
acted to
defuse the
explosive
border issue
by
emphasizing
that
it
shouldbe
settled
through
negotiations. 7
hinese eaders
watchedwith
considerable
anxiety
as the
International
Conference
of
Communist
and
Workers
Parties
convenedin
Moscow in
June,
and
they
must
have
been
greatly
relieved
when
Brezhnev ailed to
obtain a
blanket
indictmentof
the
Maoists. The
possibility
of
overt Soviet
interference
in Chinese affairswas therebysignificantlyreduced.Brezhnev next
called for
the
creation
of
an Asian
collective
security
system, 's
which
implied
that
Moscow
would
now
attempt
to
establish its
own
Chinese
containment
policy.
To
counterthis new
development,
China
launcheda
diplomatic
offensive
of
its
own,
and
in
particular
ought
better
relationswith the
United
States.
II
The
Nixon
Administrationwas
responsive
o
China's
desire to
upgrade
its
limited and
irregular
contacts
with
Washington
with more
mean-
ingful
relations. Even
before his
election,
President
Nixon's attitude
toward
China and its
role in
Asia had
changed
from
earlier
years.
In
16
Peking
Review, no. 44
(November
1,
1968),
Supplement,
p. viii;
Far
Eastern Economic
Review,
(January 30, 1969),
p.
175.
17
Lin
Piao, loc.
cit.,
p.
91.
18
See Oton
Ambroz,
The Moscow
Summit
Conference,
East
Europe,
vol.
19,
nos.
8-9
(August-September
1969),
p.
16.
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Peking
and the
Brezhnev
Doctrine
27
a 1967
article,
he
pointed
out the need
to
recognize
the
reality
of
China, and to help bring the PRC into the familyof nations.' US
government
pecialists
were also
convinced hat
the time
was
propitious
for a
change
in
policy
towardthe
mainland.
In the aftermathof
the Czechoslovakian
nvasion,
the
Chinese
Foreign Ministry
announced ts
willingness
o
improve
relations
with
the
United
States,
and even to
sign
a
coexistence
treaty.
Moscow
quickly
denounced his new
departure
as a deal
being
concocted
at
the
expense
of the Socialist commonwealth. 20
he threat
inherent
n
this Soviet
response
was
apparently
sufficient
o
prompt
Peking
to
cancel
talks with the United
States that were
scheduled
to
convene
shortly
in
Warsaw. But as the
possibility
of
Soviet
militaryaction
against
China
dissipated
after
the Moscow
conference n the
Summer
of
1969,
Peking
felt that the time
was
right
to
seek
an
improvement
in its
relationswith the
United
States.
Mao's
decision to
opt
for
better
relations
with the
United
States
was
undoubtedly
difficult n
the
light
of
past
history;
nor
did it meet
with universal
support
within
the
Party.
The decision
produced
deo-
logical confusion,
and
contributed o
the
schism between Mao
and
Lin
Piao,
the heir
apparent.
Lin refused
o
support
Mao's
revolution-
ary
diplomacy,
and
reportedly
avored the
alternative
of
reducing
tensions
with the
Soviet
Union.
Peking
has admitted
hat
bitter
oppo-
sition developedamongthose who questioned he ideologicalbasis
for
a
detentewith
the
United
States;
and
the
emphasis
which
continues
to be
placed
on
explaining
the detente in
ideological
terms indicates
the
degree
to
which this
feeling permeated
he
Party.
Opponents
of the
detente
said
that it was
similar o
the relation-
ship
that
existedbetween
the
United
States
and
the
Soviet Union.2
The
difference,
according
o
Chou
En-lai,
was
that the
Chinese initi-
ative
was a
necessary
ompromise,
nlike the
sinister
ompromise
of
the
two
imperialist
nations.
Quoting
from
Lenin,
Chou
maintained
that
one
must
learn to
distinguish
between
a
man
who
gave
the
bandits
money
and
firearms
n
order
to
lessen the
damage hey
can do
19
Richard M.
Nixon,
Asia After
Vietnam,
Foreign
A
flairs,
vol.
46,
no. 1
(October
1967),
p.
121.
20
Izvestia,
December
1968,
in Current
Digest of
Soviet
Press,
vol.
20,
no. 49
(December
25,
1969), p.
18.
21
Reference
Materials
Concerning
Education
on
Situation,
No.
43,
in
Chinese
Communist
Internal Politics
and
Foreign
Policy
(Taipei:
Institute of
International
Relations,
1974),
p.
133.
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28 Asian
Affairs
and facilitate their
capture
and
execution,
and a man who
gives
ban-
ditsmoneyand firearmsn order o share n the loot. 22 ekingadmitted
that its tactics in
dealing
with the United States had
changed,
but in-
sisted that the
principle
of
struggle
remained he same.
Nixon's visit
to China was in line with
the
Maoist dictum
of
exploiting
ontradic-
tions,
winning
over the
majority,opposing
he
minority,
and
destroying
them
one.
by
one. The Sino-American etente
has,
according
o the
Maoists,
fostered contradictions etweenthe two
imperialist
nations,
and
complicated
he
decisionmaking rocess
n the Soviet
Union.23
While both the
United
States
and the
Soviet
Union
are considered
to
be
imperialistic, nly
the latter is seen as
aggressive
oward
China
at the presenttime. The detente simplymeans that China's contra-
dictions
with the United States are no
longer given top priority.
But
coexistence
does not
mean
an
end
to
struggle.
Socialist ountries
are
able to coexist
peacefully
with the
imperialist
countries
at
particular
times
throughstruggle
and
through struggle
alone;
what
is
more,
sharp
complex struggles
continue under conditions of
peaceful
co-
existence. 24 he detentewith the
United States
was
necessary
n order
that China could concentrate on the
principal
enemy---the
Soviet
Union.
Imperialist
nations,
according
o
the Maoist
belief,
should be
classifiedas either
primary
or
secondary
enemies,
depending
on
their
policies
toward
China. The current
view of
the
United
States as a
secondaryenemyis similarto that taken toward the Kuomintangon
two
previous
occasions. The first
compromise
with the
Kuomintang
came with the
United
Front
(1923-27),
when
the
Party
treated
the
warlordsand
imperialists
s the
primary
nemies.At the end of
1936,
the
Party
elevated the
Japanese
to that
position
and
downgraded
contradictions ith the
Kuomintang.
In
periods
of
compromise,
he
CCP
has taken
advantage
of the
opportunity
o
strengthen
tself and broaden ts base
of
support.
The
new detente affords China similar
advantages.
Thus,
the
tributary
appearance
of
PresidentNixon's visit carried enormous
mplications
for Asian
international
elations;
and the visit
greatly
assisted China
22
Chou
En-lai,
Report
to the Tenth National
Congress
of the Communist
Party
of
China,
Peking
Review,
nos. 35-36
(September
7,
1973),
p.
23.
23
Reference
Materials
Concerning
Education on
Situation,
No.
43,
loc.
cit.,
p.
136.
24
Red
Flag, April
30,
1965.
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8/9/2019 Peking and Brezhnev
9/10
Peking
and
the
Brezhnev
Doctrine
29
in
gaining
formal
diplomatic
recognition
rom
numerouscountries
at
the expenseof Taiwan.The legitimacy hat accompanied uch recog-
nition
also
strengthenedPeking's
claim over
Taiwan. In the
Shanghai
Communique,
he
United States
acknowledged
hat all
Chinese
on
either side of
the
Taiwan Strait
maintain
here is but
one
China,
and
that Taiwan is
a
part
of China. 25
eking
could
readily
nterpret
his
statement
as tantamount o
recognizing
ts
claim
to the island.
What
remainedto be solved
was
merely
the
time
and nature
of
a
final
solution. The
existence of
Liaison Offices n
Washington
and
Peking
also reinforces
the
belief that the
liberation of Taiwan
is
making
progress;
and in their
approach
to the
Chinese on
Taiwan,
Peking
has
usedthe
ShanghaiCommunique
nd the
existence of
the Liaison
Offices
to indicate
the
foolhardiness
of
depending
upon
the
United
States.
III
The Brezhnev
doctrine
proved
to be
a
catalyst
prompting
China to
abandon ts
self-imposed
slation
and
become an
active
memberof the
international
ommunity.
t
was seen as a
direct
threat to
Maoist
as-
cendancy
n
China
and,
indeed,
to
China's
national
security.
The ava-
lanche of
criticism rom
Peking
in
response
to the
doctrine
reflected
the
importance
hat
the
Chinese
regime
attaches o
ideological
eader-
ship. By exposingMoscow'sideologicalcorruption,Pekinghopedto
prove
the
validity
of
Mao's
thought.
But
while
they
were
obviously
deeply
concerned over
the
ideological
implications
of
the
doctrine,
China's
eaders were
perhaps
even
more
alarmed
by
what
they
con-
sidered
to be
a
threat
to China's
ndependence.
Thus the
natural
re-
sponse
was to
seek
detentewith
the
United
States.
From
the
Maoist
perspective,
he
detente has
been
successful
n
creating
contradictions
etween he
United
States,
the
Soviet
Union,
and
Japan.
It
has
strengthened
China's
position
n
international
ffairs,
reduced
he
possibility
of
a Soviet
invasion,
and
opened
new
avenues
for
acquiring
much-needed
echnology.
It
is
impossible
o
know how
long
the
United
States will be
relegated
o
the
position
of a
secondary
enemy.
The
detente
has had
the
approval
of
both
Mao
and
Chou,
25
Department
of
State
Bulletin,
vol.
66,
no.
1708
(March
20,
1972), pp.
437-438.
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8/9/2019 Peking and Brezhnev
10/10
30
Asian
Affairs
both of whom
will, however,
probably
fade from the
political
scene
in the next few years. Duringhis visit to the United Nations, Teng
Hsiao-p'ing
eportedly
assured
Secretary
of
State
Kissinger
hat Sino-
American
relations
were
not
in
jeopardy.
This is
understandable,
nas-
much
as the
factors that
prompted
he detente still
prevail.
China's
deep feelings
of
insecurity
will be a
major
factor in the
continuation
of
the Sino-American
etente.