Framing Migration in the context of Climate

Change in Bangladesh

Research report

Wout Vriens

September 2017

Hydro-Social Deltas: Understanding flows of water and people to improve policies and

strategies for disaster risk reduction and sustainable development of delta areas in the

Netherlands and Bangladesh

NWO WOTRO Urbanising Deltas of the World programme

W 07.69.110

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Tables ............................................................................................................................ 3

List of Figures ........................................................................................................................... 3

Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 4

Urban migration in climate-vulnerable Bangladesh ............................................................. 4

Debates & significance study ................................................................................................. 4

Research objective and questions .......................................................................................... 5

Research Approach .................................................................................................................. 7

Data collection ....................................................................................................................... 7

Frame analysis ....................................................................................................................... 8

Global Climate Change-Migration Frames ......................................................................... 10

Climate Change-Migration Frames in Bangladesh ............................................................ 12

Problem identification ......................................................................................................... 12

Causality of migration ......................................................................................................... 15

Predictability & uncertainty ................................................................................................ 20

Terminology ......................................................................................................................... 23

Time frame ........................................................................................................................... 25

Solution framing ................................................................................................................... 29

Discussion – Depoliticizing migration & climate change ................................................... 32

Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 35

References ............................................................................................................................... 36

Appendix ................................................................................................................................. 46

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LIST OF TABLES

Table 1 Classification of global CC-M framings 10

Table 2 Problem identification in simplistic/complex CC-M frames 12

Table 3 Causality in simplistic/complex CC-M framings 16

Table 4 Predictability & uncertainty in simplistic/complex CC-M framings 20

Table 5 Terminology in simplistic/complex CC-M framings 23

Table 6 Time in simplistic/complex CC-M framings 26

Table 7 Solutions in simplistic/complex CC-M framings 29

Table 8 List of respondents 46

Table 9 Interview guide 47

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1 Typical process diagram of climate change impacts in coastal areas (WDB 2017) 18

Figure 2 Migration trend due to climate change factors (Ahsan 2013) 19

Figure 3 Migration motivation factors induced by climate change (Ahsan 2013) 22

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INTRODUCTION

Urban migration in climate-vulnerable Bangladesh

Whenever the words ‘Bangladesh’ and ‘migration’ are used in the same sentence in the media,

you will very likely hear ‘climate change’ in the next. In this report we investigate why this

implicit connection between migration and climate change is ubiquitous. We also investigate

alternative understandings of the reasons for migration. Here we briefly sketch the

geographical and historical context within which migration and climate change are discussed

in Bangladesh.

Bangladesh, like many so-called least-developed countries, is in the midst of a transition from

a rural-based to an urban-based society, as witnessed by the influx of rural emigrants into the

cities (Herrmann and Svarin 2009). Migration has historically been a common livelihood

strategy in the Bay of Bengal, both within poor and better-off groups (Haider 2010, 307-308).

The rapid and unplanned urbanization of the last decades, however, poses increasing challenges

to life and livelihoods in the city, not the least for the dwellers of the burgeoning slums on the

urban periphery. The congested infrastructure, overburdened public services and growing

poverty render this urban growth a cause of growing concerns for public authorities and

residents (DESA 2014, Begum 1999).

Literature portrays natural disasters as a red thread running through history in the Bay of

Bengal (Khatun 2013, Poncelet 2009). Due to its unique geographical location Bangladesh is

highly susceptible to a host of environmental hazards. This, in the words of the Government of

Bangladesh (GoB), “unfavourable natural heritage” acts in tandem with widespread poverty,

poor governance, insufficient infrastructure, and a rapidly-growing population, leaving

Bangladesh extremely vulnerable to environmental hazards (Myers 1993, Kalland and Persoon

2013).

Today, Bangladesh finds itself faced with yet another environmental challenge: climate

change. Global environmental change poses a threat especially to less economically developed

countries, low-lying densely-populated delta regions, and environmentally-dependent

livelihood systems (Climate Central 2015, McGranahan, Balk en Anderson 2007). Given that

Bangladesh portrays all three traits, it is generally acknowledged to be at the top list of countries

most vulnerable to the impacts of global warming and altering weather patterns (Harmeling

2012). Its unsolicited role as ‘climate change pioneer’ has catapulted Bangladesh into the

global climate change debates (Lewis 2011).

There is a broad consensus that climate change and migration are inextricably connected (Black

2001). Climate change is predicted to lead to an increase in the frequency and intensity of

natural hazards (IOM 2012) which are also recognized as drivers of migration (Ahsan,

Karuppannan and Kellett 2011).

Debates & significance study

. As climate change science has become more prolific and prominent in national and

international policy circles, , the study of climate change discourse has emerged. This report

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engages with and contributes to climate change discourse research. Specifically, the report

analyses the effect of climate change, as a discursive concept, has as on the way the migration-

environment-urbanization nexus in Bangladesh is portrayed (Arnall and Kothari 2015, 200).

Migration has historically been an important livelihood strategy in the Bay of Bengal, well

before climate change made its way onto the global agenda. Migration scholars have long

emphasised the complexity and multi-causality of human mobility and generally highlight its

positive potential for livelihood security (Black 2001, Morrissey 2012). This depiction is

increasingly facing headwind, nevertheless, as the environmentally-deterministic and typically

negative picture of migration, advanced by climate change scholars, wins terrain. However,

this calamity-imbued framing of migration has drawn sharp criticisms. Critics denounce that

this crisis narrative obscures the role of human interventions in the ecosystem, and of the

powerful yet disproportionate impact of economic, social and political constrains that place

underprivileged groups in a profoundly disadvantaged position to start with (Indra 2000,

Paprocki 2016).

This study builds onto previous research on discourse, politics and expert perceptions of

climate change. Notably germane to this article is the research of Grant et al., who reveal a

developing trend worldwide to label natural disasters as “climate change disasters”, a

discursive phenomenon for which the authors coined the term ‘climatization’. Their study

points at the risks for climatization “to be used as a means to cover up negligence or bad

management and there is a risk that by climatizing a disaster key vulnerabilities may be

overlooked” (Grant, Tamason and Jensen 2015). This article asserts an analogous trend in

regard to the discussion on (urban) migration.

Other research on discourses and politics of climate change in Bangladesh paints a critical

picture of the uses and abuses of this climatization of the discourse by powerful interests in

Bangladesh and in neighbouring countries (Siddiqi and Rai 2013). The comprehensive book

edited by Mallick and Etzold argues that climate change migration literature tends to overrate

the role of environmental drivers in general for migration patterns, overlooking other divers

such as evictions and pull factors like urban employment (Mallick and Etzold 2015).

This mixed picture of the written framings of climate change migration in policy documents

and scientific literature, where climatization dominates, stands in contrast with the findings of

Stojanov et al. on the spoken framings. They questioned Bangladeshi experts on their

perception of migration as a climate change adaptation strategy for Bangladeshis and found

that the experts’ perceptions generally “match the nuances and subtleties present in migration

and livelihoods literature” (Stojanov, Duzi and Kelman 2015).

Research objective and questions

The above-mentioned growing trend to frame climate change as the overriding driver of

migration in Bangladesh forms the incentive for and key focal point of this paper (Bettini

2013). Our paper places problem framing or problematization at the heart of the analysis,

probing what key stakeholders consider to be ‘real problem’ with regard to Bangladesh’

migration, urbanization, and climate change issues. The analysis integrates key informant

interviews with so-called grey literature (i.e. non-peer-reviewed papers, reports, speeches etc.),

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in order to scrutinize the tension between experts’ spoken framings and the written framings

circulating in the debate in Bangladesh and prevalent in key stakeholder grey literature.

Two questions are central here, the how and why of actors’ framing strategies. The first research

question asks: How do key stakeholders in Bangladesh – the GoB, researchers, international

donors, and NGOs – frame the on-going urban migration, and how do they consider peoples’

migration decision to be linked to climate change? The analysis also show which frame key

stakeholders adopt in different contexts and towards different audiences.

Next, the study explores why key stakeholders may use certain framings in certain contexts..

The chapter “Discussion – Depoliticizing migration & climate change” seeks to answer the

second research question: What are the rationales underlying the identified framings. This

question inextricably ties to the implications each framing entails for assessing and addressing

(urban) migration. The problem-framing that manages to dominate the debate defines the

available policy options and the range of legitimate actors for providing solutions (Feindt and

Oels 2006, 169). The ensuing decisions depend on which priorities the dominant framing sets,

and which trade-offs and risks are (tacitly) deemed acceptable (Bardwell 1991, 604).

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RESEARCH APPROACH

Data collection

Our analysis is based on qualitative data collected by means of semi-structured key informant

interviews and review of grey (key stakeholder) literature, most of which was carried out as

part of a three-month field study in Bangladesh’ capital city, Dhaka (January-April 2016) in

the context of a MSc International Development Studies dissertation at the University of

Amsterdam. The dissertation was supported by the research project “Hydro-Social Deltas:

Understanding flows of water and people to improve policies and strategies for disaster risk

reduction and sustainable development of delta areas in the Netherlands and Bangladesh

(funded by the NWO WOTRO Urbanising Deltas of the World programme under number W

07.69.110).

The geographical scope for respondent sampling confined itself to Dhaka Metropolitan

District. The economy governance system of Bangladesh is highly centralized and Dhaka

constitutes the country’s power centre (M. Ahmed 1996, Hossain 2004, Etzold and Mallick

2005). As a result, virtually all key stakeholders have their (national) head office in the capital.

A few interviews took place after the field work and were conducted through video call from

The Netherlands.

A total of 19 in-depth, semi-structured interviews were conducted with key informants (for a

full list respondents and interview guide: see appendix). The informants are numbered in the

text for anonymity reasons. Respondents were selected with a view to cover the four key

stakeholder groups in the migration-climate change debate in Bangladesh: international donors,

the GoB, researchers, and civil society organisations, on the grounds that they are in a position

to wield (at least some) influence on the course of migration policy in Bangladesh. The

migrants’ own perspectives – the ‘protagonists’ themselves – are not included; their voice in

the policy making process is negligible (Kamruzzaman 2014).

The informant group consists of Bangladeshi and non-Bangladeshi professionals working in

the substantive fields of development cooperation, poverty & economics, (urban) governance,

environmental & climate change management, migration, and/or disaster risk reduction (DRR).

All have enjoyed a higher education and many hold a senior position within their organization.

However, this latter point was not necessarily our goal; we first of all wanted to cover all key

stakeholders groups. A prior stakeholder mapping exercise that was conducted as part of the

research project ‘Hydro-Social Deltas’ provided the initial list of relevant informants, from

which half of the interviewees were selected. The remaining half was found by snowballing

and by contacting the authors of sampled grey literature. All informants’ accounts are dealt

with on equal terms, i.e. as one way to look at and talk about the issue at hand, regardless of

professional status or affiliation. Full confidentiality and anonymity set the norm for all

research-informant interactions, since an in-depth inquiry into migration and climate change

inevitably touches upon topics (read: interests) that are particularly sensitive in Bangladesh

(Manzoor, Rose and Sultan n.d.).

The information provided by the interviews is complemented by more than 100 key stakeholder

documents, so-called ‘grey literature’, that deals with migration in Bangladesh, whether or not

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in relation to climate change. Analysing these documents alongside the interview data allows

us to observe differences between written and spoken framings. Written documents arguably

have a greater outreach compared to verbal accounts.

The collection of this grey literature proceeded largely parallel with the sampling of

respondents, except that it continued throughout the entire analysis and paper write-up, mainly

by internet searches. Relevant publications of the Hydro-Social Deltas project partner

organizations were searched first1, as well as GoB action plans on climate change and

migration (e.g. BCCSAP, NAPA, etc.) The initial collection, contained references to other

texts, thereby providing new points of entry for further data digging. Websites of respondents’

organizations were searched for relevant literature. Only non-peer reviewed material, authored

or commissioned by (a) key stakeholder(s) is used as data and quoted in this paper (i.e. so-

called grey literature). Relevant Bangladesh-specific peer-reviewed research is only included

as reference, although it must be pointed out that many peer-reviewed publications result from

commissioned projects that were also published as grey literature.

Frame analysis

This paper approaches the issue of climate change migration by means of frame analysis, which

is a type of discourse analysis. Discourse, as conceptualized by Hajer, involves “an ensemble

of ideas, concepts and categorizations through which meaning is given to phenomena” (Hajer

1995). Through the creation of meaning and knowledge, discourse has the power to shape

human behaviour (Foucault 1979). Framing is more narrowly conceptualized, as describing

how an issue is defined and problematized (Hope 2010). It thus involves a concrete focus for

research. Moreover, the framing approach is more empirical and less normative than discourse

analysis (Johnston and Klandermans 2003). The core of framing analysis is the question “what

is the problem represented to be” (Bacchi 2009) also known as “problematization”. Problem

framing is an integral part of policy discourse and, more importantly, the dominant problem

framing also forms the dominant frame of reference through which an issue is interpreted. Each

problematization highlights certain elements while obscuring others and suggests particular,

differing solutions (Bacchi 2012).

The roots of our study design lie in the field of environmental politics, which emerged as a

distinct field of study from the early 1990s. Seminal work by Hajer and Litfin, among others,

revealed how environmental problems do not materialise by themselves but form the outcome

of a discursive struggle between differing interests (Hajer 1993, Hajer 1995, Litfin 1994).

Discourse analysis of policy making records has proven successful in discrediting the notion

that environmental problems simply arise from scientific facts, instead exposing the pervasive

influence of politics, social values, and expectations therein. (Schnaiberg 1990, Bardwell

1991). As such, climate change problems, like Bangladesh’ allegedly climate change-induced

displacement, are inherently political in nature (Hajer and Versteeg 2005) – despite of the aura

1 The two partner organizations of the Hydro-social Deltas project are Flood Hazard Research Centre (FHRC),

Bangladesh Centre for Advanced Studies (BCAS), and the close collaborating institutes include Deltas,

Vulnerability and Climate Change, Migration and Adaptation (DECCMA), and Refugee and Migratory

Movements Research Unit (RMMRU)

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of scientific objectivity surrounding the globally-dominant discourse (Arnall and Kothari

2015).

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GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE-MIGRATION FRAMES

Based on a review of global scientific literature a dichotomous ‘ideal-type’ classification of the

framings of migration in the context of climate change (abbreviated below to CC-M) was

developed by Hydro-Social Deltas project co-workers (Wesselink, Warner, Kooy et al. in

press) (

Table 1). The present research used this classification as starting point for the analysis of the

collected texts. Six descriptors were identified to provide a more detailed description: problem

identification; causality of migration; predictability & uncertainty; terminology; time frame;

and solution framing. These descriptors emerged from the ongoing analysis in this study,

informed by previous research on CC-M discourse classification and/or description (inter alia:

Methmann 2010, Black 2001, Bettini 2013, Morrissey 2012, Stojanov, Kelman, et al. 2014,

Stojanov, Duzi and Kelman 2015in press).

Table 1 Classification of global CC-M framings

Descriptors SIMPLICITY COMPLEXITY

Problem

identification

Problem = urban migration

Migrants form a threat to national

and/or international security

& risk for development BD

Migration = involuntary & negative

Impending doom narrative

Scale migration abnormal due to climate

change

Urban growth = general trend BD

Problem = lacking/inadequate urban

policy to manage inflow of urban migrants

Migrants are driver development BD

Migration = positive & livelihood strategy

Migration inevitable long run

Also planned relocation

Scale logic consequence context

Bangladesh & region

Different urbanization trends across BD

Some cities decline, others growth

Causality

migration

De facto mono-causal;

climate change = push factor overriding

other drivers

Simplification: Direct causal link

environment hazards-migration

Inherently multi-causal;

climate change = one of many push & pull

factors & exacerbating other drivers

Complexity: Human mediation impact

environmental hazards on migration

Predictability

&

uncertainty

CC-M link = Obvious & unequivocal

Indeterminable

yet self-evident & common sense

CC-M link = Complex & ambiguous

Indeterminable

plus link can be counter-intuitive

Terminology

Climate refugee

Environmental refugee

Ecological refugee

Economic migrant;

Environmental migrant;

Environmentally-induced displacement;

In-situ displacement….

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Time

frame

Outspoken future outlook and tense

Future Predictions key element

Future as evidence for today’s claims

Present-day as part of future

Preceding historical developments not

considered

Targets primarily actual processes

Problematizes future predictions for lack

accuracy & usefulness

Historicizing present process;

Considerable attention paid to

historical processes

Solution

framing

Address problem

Reduce “bad” rural out-migration by

making rural areas more attractive; urban

‘deterrence policy’

External solution

Demand funding and technological

support from industrialized countries;

New international convention for

protection of climate change-related

displacement

Address problem

Facilitate “good” migration & steer

migration to regional cities not Dhaka

Internal solution

Internal policy reform:

Nation-wide urban (development) policy;

GoB decentralization governance and

economy; Invest rural DRR where possible

& proactive planned relocation where

impossible in long-term

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CLIMATE CHANGE-MIGRATION FRAMES IN BANGLADESH

The following section presents how key stakeholders, in both public documents and interviews,

frame migration in Bangladesh and its link to climate change. The analysis is organised using

the descriptors in

Table 1 (page 10), which are then made specific for Bangladesh using the collected data

(interviews and key stakeholder documents). Respondents are numbered in order to make them

anonymous (see Table 8 in Annexe). Each section starts with a summary of the findings, which

are then expanded and detailed using quotes from interviews and key stakeholder documents.

The six descriptors are key to a systematic demonstration of the differences between and within

the different framings adopted by key stakeholders. Notably, it facilitates systematic scrutiny

of what key informants are saying but also what they are not saying. However, the distinction

between the descriptors is not always clear cut. For example, in the interviews the problem

identification was often linked to the identification of causality (see below). This of course is

exactly the point of using “framing” as overarching concept: a frame is a coherent combination

of all six descriptors.

In addition, it is important to note that the debate on the migration-climate change link cannot

be reduced to yes or no questions. The dichotomous classification of ‘simplicity-complexity’

framings should therefore rather be seen as the ends of a continuum. Key stakeholders can be

placed on this continuum based on the extent to which they assert climate change plays a role

in migration decisions. Contingent on the descriptor, migration driver and/or context, the role

attributed to climate change can vary between ‘none’ to ‘partly’ to ‘overriding’. The framing

put forward by a single actor is therefore rarely entirely simplistic or entirely complex, but is

usually made up of both simplistic and complex representations. Moreover, as the following

will show, actors can adopt different, even contradictory framings vis-à-vis different audiences.

Problem identification

The issue of unfettered urban growth and the manifold problems this entails for Bangladesh

has given rise to assertions that urban migration is a problem which should be discouraged and

counteracted. This section deals with the question of problem identification: whether,

according to the key stakeholders, the inflow of migrants to the cities does indeed represent a

problem or, if not, what then is the ‘real’ problem? If migration should not be seen a problem

then how should it be construed? The ideal-type answers are listed in Table 2.

Table 2 Problem identification in simplistic/complex CC-M frames

SIMPLICITY COMPLEXITY

Problem = urban migration

and/or international security

& risk for development Bangladesh

Problem = not urban migration but

lacking/inadequate urban policy manage

the inflow of migrants

Migrants = driver development BD

Migration = positive livelihood strategy

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Migration = involuntary & negative

Impending doom narrative

Scale migration abnormal due to

climate change

Urban growth = general trend BD

Migration inevitable long run

Also planned relocation

Scale logic consequence context

Bangladesh & region

Different urbanization trends across BD

Some cities decline, others growth

Migration is not necessarily a problem

Overall, respondents share the view that it would be wrong to list all migration in Bangladesh

under the heading ‘problem’, and that doing so may have far-reaching repercussions for the

effectiveness of Climate Change Adaptation (CCA) action now and in the future. A frequent

line of argumentation in interviews and documents dismisses the notion that migrants

represents a problem but depicts migration as an historically commonplace strategy in the Bay

of Bengal in light of livelihood security and calamities, which includes (but is not limited to)

violent conflicts and environmental hazards (IOM 2010, Etzold 2015, Haider 2010, 307-308).

Moreover, it is emphasized repeatedly that migration forms a keystone of Bangladesh’

economic development.

“Migrants are a fundamental part of Bangladesh’ success story. Their labour is

crucial for the economic development. [There is a] constant labour shortage in

Dhaka, they are much needed.” [12]

“Migration is an integral component of the development process in contemporary

Bangladesh. Migration is recognised as a driver of development” (GED 2015, 249).

In the context of climate change, migration emerges in some literature as a positive adaptation

mechanism with a view to cope with and offset the adverse impacts of climate change – just as

it has done throughout the ages for life and livelihood security (Tanner, et al. 2007, 27, 121).

Labour mobility, which is primarily temporary of nature, is therefore considered a solution

instead of a problem (I. A. Khan, et al. 2010, Etzold and Mallick 2015, Kartiki 2011, Poncelet

2009, Rayhan and Grote 2007, GED 2015, 946-7). The following quotes from the interviews

illustrate this position.

“Temporary or circular migration is a livelihood adaptation strategy. … People are

already adapting, doing the best they can in the current circumstances.” [8]

“.. [t]emporary migration aimed at income differentiation, which is mostly

individuals, who send remittances back home. This is very important and should

be supported. This way migration enhances people’s resilience.” [1]

"Diversification of livelihood income {within families} is already rising in BD.

This way the problem will get much more manageable.” [10]

Another, related framing also sees migration as a solution, albeit the only possible solution.

Several respondents argue that in light of future sea level rise, emigration from coastal regions

will be inevitable in the long run.

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“[P]articularly in de context of BD with its coastal population, I see the issue of

migration as a solution rather than a problem." [11]

“Too many people are living in climate change-vulnerable areas. Out-migration

forms a solution to this issue.” [1]

“In the early phases we were thinking of adaptation in situ. Helping people to

manage where they are. … But in the long run they cannot continue to live there.

In the long run, they have to move.” [11]

Respondent 1 and 10 agree that urban migration should not be bracketed with the problems

arising from the rapid, unfettered urbanization.

“GoB says ‘urbanization is a problem’. But migration isn’t the problem. That is not

to say that there aren’t any problems with it. It induces certain problematic trends

in Bangladesh. … Slum dwellers living in vulnerable situations, that’s an acute

problem.” [1]

“Urbanization forms a big problem for many, especially for slum dwellers, a

problem. You get overpopulation, which has negative implications on a lot of

aspects of many peoples’ lives. … It often leads, sustains and even reinforces

patterns of poverty.” [15]

Respondent 15 also emphasizes the need to distinguish between migration and problems linked

to urbanization, which is corroborated by an expert report informing GoB’s Seventh 5-year

plan (Ahmed, Huq, et al. 2015, 20-21). To illustrate his point, respondent 15 highlights how

migration only became considered a problem when the urban growth began to cause problems.

“Migration wasn’t considered in terms of a ‘problem’ before climate change. …

Only when it began to lead to congestion of cities that migration really got to the

attention of the government and development people.” [15]

Respondent 17 notes that talking about the ‘issue of urbanization’ is a faulty generalization by

itself as not all cities are growing.

“Urbanization trends differ across Bangladesh. … Turbo-growth in Dhaka but at

the same time a decline in Khulna & Bershal.” [17]

Migration can be a problem after all

However, respondents and the stakeholder documents concur that, in some cases, migration

can represent a problem. Notably in cases where the decision to move is seen to be involuntary,

rendering the phenomenon a matter of survival rather than an elective livelihood strategy

(Akter 2009a, Zaman 2012).

“Natural hazards destroy people’s livelihood and then migration. This is forced

migration, not voluntary, these people have no other option.” [1]

Respondent 7 links the latter type specifically with family migration to urban areas.

“Families only move to urban areas in case of extreme events, like cyclones or

extreme floods. It is a survival strategy.” [7]

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Nevertheless, contends respondent 10, this concerns only a minor part of the total population

of migrants in Bangladesh.

“There is also the problem of involuntary migration. People who do not want to

leave their areas, but have to. Although I wouldn't say that is a significant portion

of the total displacement.” [10]

In the simplified framing the diversity in migration patterns found in the interview data

presented above is patently discarded. Instead, migration is framed within a crisis narrative and

thereby (implicitly) equated to involuntary displacement (EquityBD 2009, Percot 2012).

Notably the GoB is found to simplify migration as forced displacement in its policy documents.

GoB lists “curbing internal migration and displacement” as one the key priority issues in her

7th FYP for Climate Change Adaptation (GED 2015, 416). Other key stakeholders critique the

GoB positionthat depicts migration as a source of problems, because it subsequently reduces

the scope of migration policies (RMMRU 2013, Siddiqi and Rai 2013, 10).

“Social consequences of mass scale migration to cities would to some extent be

halted. … In the long–term people might get a means to continue with farming,

instead of migrating to cities after the flood” (MoEF 2005, 36-37).

Furthermore, GoB policy documents specifically focussing on CC-M deal exclusively with

sudden (forced) displacement due to extreme weather events and environmental hazards

(CDMP II 2014, Siddiqui, Towheedul and Akhter, NSMDCIID 2015). Migration is thus only

considered in relation to disasters. The implicit message of this crisis narrative is the

assumption that migration, by definition, is involuntary. This message is echoed in some grey

literature and interviews too.

“Displacement, internal migration or seasonal mobility of the lowest social classes

can hardly be considered as a choice in Bangladesh” (Percot 2012, 92).

“Internal migration is done by poor people. … and is forced in a way, they have no

other livelihood options so they have to migrate.” [7]

“Natural hazards destroy people’s livelihood and then migration. This is forced

migration, not voluntary, these people have no other option.” [1]

Some respondents argue that this perception is in fact that of the migrants themselves too.

“People don’t perceive internal migrants in a negative way. No migrant is

discriminated against in Dhaka. … - Migrants themselves feel bad” [10]

“Erosion is a big problem in Bangladesh. People are forced to move to the city. We

talked with slum dwellers, they don’t like to live in Dhaka! They have to in order

to survive.” [14]

Causality of migration

Causality probes the question ‘what causes urban migration’? Which factor(s), according to

key stakeholders, make(s) people decide to migrate to the city? What is climate change’s role

in this decision-making process? The consensus in migration studies of migration as an

inherently complex and multi-causal phenomenon is contested by some key stakeholders who

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assert that the ‘push’ of climate change-induced natural disasters is discernibly overriding other

drivers, rendering urban migration essentially a mono-causal phenomenon.

The discussion of the drivers of urban migration amongst key stakeholders in Bangladesh,

however, does not quite fit with the complexity versus simplicity framework (Table 3), given

the broad consensus that are more than one drivers are at play in Bangladesh. However, the

simplicity-complexity dichotomy comes to the surface when examining how key stakeholders

link – or do not link – these drivers with climate change.

Table 3 Causality in simplistic/complex CC-M framings

SIMPLICITY COMPLEXITY

De facto mono-causal;

climate change = push factor

overriding other drivers

Simplification: Direct causal link

environment hazards-migration

Inherently multi-causal;

climate change = one of many push &

pull factors & exacerbating other drivers

Complexity: Human mediation impact

environmental hazards on migration

When asked the question ‘what are the drivers of migration in Bangladesh’, respondents

consistently describe a multitude of interacting push- and pull-factors that lead to a variety of

migration patterns. This is also the position most commonly found in key stakeholder literature

(Etzold and Mallick 2005, Azam and Falk 2013, Siddiqui 2017, Siddiqui, Towheedul and

Akhter 2015, Sajjadur Rahman 2010, RMMRU 2013, CDMP II 2014, Ackerly, Anam and

Gilligan 2015, Ahmed, Huq, et al. 2015, Rahman, et al. 2007, Poncelet 2009, Ahmed, Hassan,

et al. 2012, Lazar, et al. 2015, 13-14). Respondent 7 lists what he sees to be the main types of

migration in Bangladesh.

“When you talk about migration, you have entire families moving to urban areas;

you have seasonal migration to the cities, migration between [rural] villages,

migration abroad, and also religious persecuted migrants.” [7]

Socioeconomic factors are most often highlighted as the primary motivation – which can act

as ‘pull’ or ‘push’ – for people to move (Marshall and Rahman 2012, RMMRU 2013, Garrett

and Chowdhury 2004, Kartiki 2011). Respondent 8 is markedly outspoken on this.

“One certainty: most migrants are moving for economic reasons.” [8]

Economic motivations are particularly highlighted in the context of rural-urban migration

(Martin, Billah, et al. 2014, ADB 2012, 43, 55, Martin, Kang, et al. 2013, Ahmed, Hassan, et

al. 2012, 28, Ahmed, Hassan, et al. 2012, Marshall and Rahman 2012). Respondent 17 gives

the gist of the dynamic at work when he advances that, “the urban economy attracts people.”

This position is also implied by the GoB’s Climate Change Gender Action Plan.

“The multimillion-dollar garment industry is a major draw card for women who

migrate to urban areas in Bangladesh in search of work” (MoEF 2013).

Worth noting is respondent 18’s assertion that GoB itself also acts as a catalyst of migration.

“Government projects are an underexposed element that encourages migration. …

GoB builds a bridge to connect a rural area with Dhaka. This facilitates, which

17

practically means ‘promotes’, migration. Their projects carry part of responsibility

of problematic consequences of migration.” [18]

Environmental stresses and shocks form another key driver in the data (Walsham 2010, Rabab

and Sirajee 2009, CDMP II 2014, Etzold and Mallick 2005, Rahman, et al. 2007, Mortreux and

Adams 2015, Nasreen, Hossain and Azad 2012, Marshall and Rahman 2012, Displacement

Solutions 2012). Riverbank erosion is typically the first to be mentioned in the interviews, and

also much-discussed in key stakeholder literature (Karim 2014, Poncelet 2009, Elahi 1991,

Hutton and Haque 2004, Rahman and Sohag 2011, M. Rahman 2010, Climate Change Cell

2008, RMMRU 2007). Respondents 6, 10 and 14, in unison, name riverbank erosion as the

most important environmental factor behind migration in Bangladesh.

As for other frequently-raised environmental drivers, the interviews largely resonate with key

stakeholder literature, for example salinization of the soil in coastal regions (Lein 2009, A. I.

Khan, et al. 2010, 28).

“Coastal line of the Bay of Bengal is facing an increased saline intrusion. When farmers used

to cultivate rice there, the salinization makes that now impossible. What options does a

farmer have who only knows how to grow rice? He can decide to migrate to an urban area.”

[8]

Water stress such as and droughts are also listed as drivers (Climate Change Cell 2008, Lein

2009, (Displacement Solutions 2012, Afifi, et al. 2015, A. I. Khan, et al. 2010, 29). Respondent

13 sees water excess and shortage to be an acute problem particularly in Northern Bangladesh.

“During the monsoon they [people in Northern Bangladesh] get too much water and during the

dry periods they suffer because they have don’t get not enough.” [13]

Last, extreme weather events, notably cyclones, are highlighted (Siddiqui, Towheedul and

Akhter 2015, Climate Change Cell 2008, Rahman, et al. 2007, Mortreux and Adams 2015,

Ahmed, Hassan, et al. 2012, 29). Respondent 6 explains how these so-called sudden onset

events often serve as the final straw.

“Locals' perception of their displacement, they will attribute it to an extreme event,

like a cyclone.” [6]

Respondents therefore generally endorse the complexity framing.

“Migration is a multi-causal phenomenon. You cannot talk about a single cause.

There are a lot of factors interacting in a very complex way, which ultimately leads

to urbanization.” [8]

“There are many factors playing a role in migration patterns, both push- and pull-

factors. The socio-economic conditions are already there. The environmental

pressures are already there.” [14]

Respondents’ perceptions resonate with the framing of migration in key stakeholder

commissioned expert reports (Walsham 2010, Siddiqui 2010, RMMRU 2013, MoEF 2009,

Siddiqui 2017, Kniveton, Martin and Rowhani 2013, Mallick and Etzold 2015, Alam n.d.,

CDMP II 2014, 8-10).

18

“Migration is a multi-causal phenomenon; even in cases where the environment is

a predominant driver of migration it is usually compounded by social, economic,

political and other factors” (Walsham 2010).

It follows from this that attempts to single out ‘that one decisive driver’2 are rendered

problematic. (Walsham 2010, CDMP II 2014, 3).

So how does climate change coming into this picture in the complexity framing?

“Climate change reinforces the other factors that cause migration.” [9]

The general thrust of the interviews and key stakeholder documents is that climate change,

above all, exacerbates existing problems.

“Climate change reinforces existing vulnerabilities.” [10]

“Development issues such as population growth, seasonality and access to finance

are being exacerbated by climate change.” [13]

Figure 1 visualizes how natural

scientists project the global

phenomenon to exacerbate

environmental stress and

hazards in the Bay of Bengal –

here specifically for coastal

regions (WDB 2017).

This means – if the models turn

out right – that issues such as

food security, livelihood

security, health and safe

housing, which were already

areas of concern in Bangladesh

(Choudhury 2002), may become

increasingly acute in the future

(Azam and Falk 2013, Lewis

2011, Rahman, et al. 2007,

MoEF 2009).

When rephrasing the above question ‘what drivers of migration exist in Bangladesh’ to the

more open question of ‘what causes migration in Bangladesh’, a fault line is discernible

between the interviews and a significant number of the key stakeholder documents. Most

interviewees say that migration in Bangladesh today is primarily driven by pull-factors.

Respondent 10 cites the disproportionate growth of Dhaka vis-à-vis regional cities to evince

the key importance of socioeconomic pull-factors in migration patterns. Respondent 17

compares the current situation to the situation in the 70s and 80s.

2 For example, (Poncelet 2009) makes such attempt.

Coastal Embankment Improvement Project, Phase-I (CEIP-I)

Bangladesh Water Development Board

Environmental Impact Assessment

Chapter 2: Approach and Methodology

Polder 40/2- 14

Figure 2.4: Typical process diagram of climate change impacts in coastal areas

42. The polder has been previously affected by some of the major climate change

induced natural disasters, and therefore, may be considered as sensitive hotspots of climate

variability. The polders were heavily impacted during the events of Aila and Sidr, which left

severe damages on the polder infrastructures, and created widespread impacts on the lives

and livelihoods of local people. Furthermore, vulnerability of saltwater intrusion is another

major concern.

43. During field level consultations, the major regional and local issues in connection with

climate change and variability were identified. Besides, data on different meteorological

parameters such as rainfall, temperature, sunshine hours, humidity and wind speed are

collected from the Bangladesh Meteorological Department (BMD). The historical variations

of the information were used to develop an understanding of climate science for the polders.

Afterwards, the qualitative field findings were compared with the analyzed historic

information on climate science, from which the regional and local climate change

vulnerability may be inferred. Moreover, intensive reviews of existing literatures and national

reports were made to validate the identified climate change issues and concerns.

2.2.11 Scoping

44. A structured scoping process in two stages was followed for identifying the IESCs

which would potentially be impacted by the proposed Project. In the first stage a preliminary

list of the components which could be impacted by the Project was prepared. In the second

stage village scoping sessions were held where opinions of the stakeholders were obtained

on their perception about the environmental and social components which could be impacted

by the project interventions. With the help of the professional judgments of the

multidisciplinary EIA team as well as the opinions of the stakeholders, the preliminary list of

the important environmental and social components was finalized.

2.2.12 Assessment and Scaling of Impacts

45. At this stage, attempts were made to quantify the impacts of the proposed

interventions of the polder as much as possible. In cases, quantification was not possible,

qualitative impacts were assessed and scores were assigned with (+P) sign for positive

impacts and (-N) sign for negative impacts. HN, MN, HP and MP indicated the magnitude of

River Erosion

Climate Change

Sea level rise

Salinity intrusion

Change in temperature and precipitation

Increased tidal f looding

Cyclone andstorm surge

Water and Land Management system damaged and malfunctioned, impacting the coastal resources

Drainage Congestion and Water Logging

Figure 1 Typical process diagram of climate change

impacts in coastal areas (WDB 2017)

19

“In the 80s, migration was primarily caused by push-factors: Disasters, social,

natural (e.g. riverbank erosion) Today, migration in BD is primarily driven by pull-

factors.” [17]

This view is contested in key stakeholder literature, however. The simplistic doom narrative

states that climate change is tipping the scale in Bangladesh, making life unbearable for those

already encumbered by natural stress and thereby forces people to move and is found to have

gained wide acceptance among key stakeholders. In this narrative, the link between people’s

decision to migrate and the global phenomenon climate change is rendered unequivocal. The

crucial difference with the complexity framing is that here climate change-induced disasters

are asserted to be overriding other drivers of urban migration in Bangladesh (Percot 2012, 7-8,

Hossain and Miah 2011, Sajjadur Rahman 2010, Rahman and Rahman 2015, 104).

Our study found a significant number of key stakeholder documents probing the impact of

natural hazards on migration in Bangladesh, that assert an upward trend over the last decades

of migration due to climate change. A minority discerns an increase as early as the 70s, but the

general thrust is that an ascendant trend becomes unequivocal from the turn of the millennium

on as is visualized in Figure 2 (Ahsan 2013, Khatun 2013, Mehedi 2010, Ahsan, Kellett and

Karuppannan 2014, Ahsan, Karuppannan and Kellett 2011, Herrmann and Svarin 2009, Akter

2009a, Al Faruque and Khan 2013, 6).

AHSAN ET AL.: DEFINING CLIMATE INDUCED MIGRATION

economic push and pull factors (BBS 2001). The pull factors included both the economic

opportunities of jobs and the social benefits of better education and health in the cities. The push

factors included poverty, natural disasters and ethnic discrimination. Migrants moved both from

rural areas and from small towns to the adjacent large cities. Currently, each year between

300,000 and 400,000 migrants move to Dhaka to improve their economic prospects. Therefore

internal migration is the dominant factor driving rapid urbanization in Bangladesh. This scale of

migration presents a challenge for balanced development (Rana 2010). The 35 million people

living in the coastal belt in Bangladesh are front line victims of climate change. With a climate

induced one meter of Sea Level Rise (SLR) 15 million (11% of the total population) are

potentially affected (UNEP 2007). Associated with this impact, 60% of the total population could

be affected by flash flooding from river over-flow. Furthermore, with one meter SLR 13% of the

total agricultural land, 8000 km of roads and 2 major cities could be impacted (Islam 2001).

Much of the population in these vulnerable coastal districts will have no choice but to migrate to

other parts of the country as their homes and land are destroyed. There is also the risk of serious

health impacts due to shortage of water and polluted water supply in their original settlements,

where these survive.

Over the last two decades soil salinity, river erosion and frequent, extreme climate events,

have forced many marginal coastal communities to migrate in search of safer conditions. The

trend of migration due to climate events has increased since 2006 because of frequent disasters in

the coastal belt. A sample survey of climate migrants in Khulna and Dhaka carried out in 2010,

suggests that the volume of migrant flow is clearly influenced by extreme climatic events. Figure

1 shows the migration trend based on this field survey of 200 heads of households, who were

identified as climate migrants.

Figure 1: Migration trend due to climate change factors

Source: Ahsan 2013. Figure 2 Migration trend due to climate change factors (Ahsan

2013)

20

The line of argument here is that climate change exacerbates the intensity and frequency of

natural disasters (D. Mallick 2008, Rahman and Rahman 2015), notably droughts (Pender

2008, 35), cyclones (Islam 2011, Ahsan, Karuppannan and Kellett 2011)3, and floods and

riverbank erosion (Chowdhury 2016, Akter 2009b, Herrmann and Svarin 2009, 5-9); climate

change is also claimed to engender so-called ‘mega-disasters’ (Rashid 2014).

Predictability & uncertainty

Predictability probes how key stakeholders consider uncertainty. How do their framings fill in

the “blank spaces”? What are the underlying assumptions about how climate change is linked

to the causality of migration? The interviews make clear that the question of ‘what causes

migration’ cannot be seen as separate from the – more epistemological – question of ‘what can

we know about what causes migration’. It is evident from our analysis that by far most of the

contention around CC-M centres on issues that lie beyond the boundaries of today’s science,

and thus outside the scope of evidence-based conclusions.

It is generally accepted that there is still a lot of uncertainty on how climate change will impact

migration (Ahmed, Hassan, et al. 2012, Kniveton, Martin and Rowhani 2013, The Nansen

Initiative 2015, ADB 2012). Broadly speaking, two opposing positions can be discerned (Table

4). The simplistic framing that climate change’s multiplier effect is self-evident from today’s

migration trends and future models is contested by the complexity framing contending that

evidence remains ambiguous at best and contradictory at worst, therefore warranting prudence

rather than leaping into conclusions. So far the empirical evidence on the migration-climate

change nexus in Bangladesh is weak (Marshall and Rahman 2012).

Table 4 Predictability & uncertainty in simplistic/complex CC-M framings

SIMPLICITY COMPLEXITY

CC-M link = Obvious & unequivocal

Indeterminable

yet self-evident & common sense

CC-M link = Complex & ambiguous

Indeterminable

plus link can be counter-intuitive

The interviews and key stakeholder documents indicate that two issues are key to uncertainty

in understanding CC-M framings. The first relates to the complex, multifactorial decision

making process that precedes migration, whereas the second pertains to the inability to

accurately determine the sensitivity of existing environmental drivers to the impact of climate

change.

The first issue is addressed in a multitude of key stakeholder documents (Ahmed, Hassan, et

al. 2012, RMMRU 2013, Walsham 2010, Joarder and Hasanuzzaman 2008, Martin, Billah, et

3 Ahsan, Karuppannan, & Kellett claim that “the frequency of cyclones in Bangladesh has increased more than

five times compared to the last three decades,” and hereby cite a World Bank report (World Bank, 2000). No such

mentioning is found in the latter source however (Ahsan, Karuppannan, & Kellett, 2011).

21

al. 2014, Penning-Rowsell, Sultana and Thompson 2013, Rayhan and Grote 2007, CDMP II

2014, 4). The decision to stay or not to stay takes into account many factors, such as the

likelihood of natural hazards, available resources, and social networks. It is constrained or

incentivized by micro-level characteristics like gender, age, and education; and shaped by

personal, social and cultural beliefs and attitudes (RMMRU 2013, Siddiqui 2010, Martin,

Billah, et al. 2014, Joarder and Hasanuzzaman 2008, Mortreux and Adams 2015, Poncelet

2009, Hutton and Haque 2004, 59).

Respondent 10 highlights furthermore that people’s response to climate change impacts can be

counter-intuitive, which is also argued in the literature (Paul 2005). Respondent 10 refers to a

survey among floodplain dwellers conducted under his direction, to find out what they

considered to be considered the ‘real’ problem and main reasons for migration. Contrary to his

own assumption and the mainstream perception, floods were not considered a serious problem

nor a reason to move.

When turning to the second issue, i.e. how climate change is linked to existing environmental

drivers in Bangladesh, our analysis reveals a sharp discrepancy between the framing commonly

found in key stakeholder literature and respondents’ perception of the role of climate change

may play in ‘traditional’ environmental hazards in Bangladesh. The main thrust of the

interviews, in line with the complexity framing, is sceptical when it comes to lumping all

environmental migration drivers together under the heading of climate change driver.

Multiple interviewees question the prevalent framing of riverbank erosion and related

displacement as representing an impact of climate change.

“River bank erosion, for instance, is it climate related? ... The water needs to go

somewhere and simply grabs areas of land in its course. Is that {a result of} climate

change? I don't know.” [13]

“Displacement due to erosion is a common phenomenon in Bangladesh.” [18]

Respondent 6 is of the opinion that those who attribute salinization issues to climate change-

induced SLR alone are telling only part of the story.

“Hard to determine how many people are forced to migrate due to sea level rise

because we currently lack exact data … uncertainty remains of how much the

salinity increase is caused by other reasons than sea level rise.” [6]

With respect to water stress (i.e. droughts and floods) respondents also dismiss the climate

change-centred depiction often found in key stakeholder documents. Respondent 14 contends

that the growing problems of flooding in Bangladesh have little to do with climate change.

“Farmers have to deal with changeable weather patterns. … but these rain patterns

aren’t causing it [i.e. extreme flooding], 92% of the water comes from outside of

Bangladesh, only 8% comes from rain.” [14]

When we turn to the simplified framing, the above nuances and reservations about uncertainty

appear to be discarded wholesale. The majority of key stakeholder documents, notably those

of Bangladeshi (co-)authors, brackets historically recurrent environmental hazards in

Bangladesh with (future) climate change hazards. The cited sources in the last two paragraphs

22

of the previous sub-section (under Figure 2) are all examples of this practice, which is

illustrated by the following quote.

“Climate change has led to frequent floods and cyclones in Bangladesh” (Ranjan

2016, 3).

The quoted study takes it as a given that climate change is a key factor behind manifold

environmental hazards in Bangladesh. Following this logic, key stakeholder research probes

the climate sensitivity of mobility patterns rather than the climate sensitivity of environmental

drivers for mobility, for example Kniveton, Martin and Rowhani (2013). The common practice

in key stakeholder literature to equate environmental migration drivers to ‘climate change’

migration drivers forms the ostensibly logical extension of this taken-for-granted assumption.

Figure 3 exemplifies this practice (Ahsan 2013). It asserts self-evidently that recent natural

disasters are linked to climate change. Noteworthy here is a speech of a division director of the

Bangladesh Center for Advanced Studies (BCAS), one of the country’s leading research

institutions on climate change policy, who claims that “nine out of 10 [natural] disasters are

now climate related” (D. Mallick 2008).

Because the effect of climate change is assumed to be self-evident, environmental hazards are

now re-labelled ‘climate (change) hazards’, and environmentally-induced displacement

becomes ‘climate displacement’. Examples if this are found in GoB reports (MoEF 2009, A.

U. Ahmed 2006), in NGO publications (Displacement Solutions 2012, Seal and Baten 2011,

Akter 2009a), in scientific studies (Nasreen, Hossain and Azad 2012), and in conference

speeches (Rashid 2014, D. Mallick 2008).

The framing of riverbank erosion-induced displacement is case in point. In key stakeholder

literature riverbank erosion and associated displacement is found to be axiomatically bracketed

Figure 3 Migration motivation factors induced by climate

change (Ahsan 2013)

23

with climate change impacts (Displacement Solutions 2012, Anwer 2012, Sajjadur Rahman

2010, Ahsan, Kellett and Karuppannan 2014, Sharmin 2013, Klein 2015, Akter 2009a, Finance

Division 2012). However, scientific substantiation of how climate change would impact

riverbank erosion and associated displacement is consistently lacking. Only a few key

stakeholder documents are found to highlight the lacking evidence linking the erosion process

and climate change (Indra 2000, Prabhakar, Alam and Uzzaman 2009, 43).

“The monsoon floods have come early to Bangladesh, with thousands of people

losing their homes and crops to river erosion, in what specialists say is a clear sign

of climate change” (IRIN 2008).

A number of key stakeholder documents asserts that even if practical (and political) obstacles

mean that climate change effect cannot be established yet, the prediction that more and more

people will decide to move in the future in response to climate change impacts is merely a

matter of common sense (EquityBD 2009, CARE 2011, Akter 2009a).

“Forced migration provoked by environmental changes is not a new phenomenon;

it is rather a logic consequence of interaction between people and nature”

(Herrmann and Svarin 2009, 7).

Overall, therefore, uncertainly does not impede key stakeholder documents to make strong

statements about climate change impacts, as if effects had already been proven.

Terminology

The emergence of new vocabularies is a recurrent phenomenon in migration studies. This

reflects the desire to give more visibility to a particular group of migrants that arguably

underexposed by existing terminology (Vandergeest, Idahosa and Bose 2007). "There are

always new words coming and going with regard to urban migration" [6]. However, the

significance of the debate around labelling goes beyond the issue of terminology; scientific

concepts typically link to a body of scientific research that is asserted to provide evidence for

the correctness of the label. Following on from the previous sections the dichotomy centres on

the specified prime migration driver (Table 5).

Table 5 Terminology in simplistic/complex CC-M framings

SIMPLICITY COMPLEXITY

Climate refugee

Environmental refugee

Ecological refugee

Economic migrant

Environmental migrant

Environmentally-induced displacement

In-situ displacement….etc.

The simplification of migrants in Bangladesh as ‘climate refugees’, while still kicking up

considerable dust in global-level debates (Siddiqi and Rai 2013, 12), is expressly dismissed by

respondents for the notion’s lack of validity on the ground. In fact, respondent 11 brushes the

24

whole climate refugee debate off as a non-topic in Bangladesh, the oft-quoted ‘climate refugee

hotspot’ itself.

“I do not engage in a lot of the climate refugee debate. I don't find it interesting nor

useful. It is a lot of heat and no light. … I find the notion to be a very confusing,

incorrect, misused term in the current context.” [11]

“Climate refugee is a problematic concept. The definition of 'refugee' is not

appropriate for climate-induced displacement.” [6]

Respondents and key stakeholder documents point at the term’s problematic grounds as a legal

misnomer, highlighting that fear of persecution is a necessary element of a refugee, which is

absent in climate-related migration. Even in those cases where the term could arguably be

appropriate – e.g. displacement due to human-induced salinization – respondent 3 asserts, you

first need to be able to accurately identify the driver, which is still a long way of. These issues

undermine the term’s validity in the Bangladesh context today (GIZ 2012, Laczko and

Aghazarm 2009, EquityBD 2009).

All interviewees state that they never use the term themselves. A recurrent perception is that

the notion is not used in ‘formal’ discussions, by which they mean academic debates or

governmental documents or negotiations. Two respondents working for the International

Organisation for Migration (IOM) reiterate their employer’s recommendation to employ the

working definition of ‘environmental migration’, for reasons that it allows to include non-

climate-related environmentally-induced migrants as well (A. R. Khan 2016).

However, some evidence of the simplification framing is nevertheless found. Some

respondents point to the potency for of the climate refugee label for advocacy purposes, which

can explain the persistence of the term ‘climate refugees’ in global debates. “This narrative has

become a popular tagline for highlighting the urgency of climate change in Bangladesh”

(Siddiqi and Rai 2013, 12). The concept has proven to be an effective tool to raise public

awareness on an important yet highly complex issue. From this point of view, its simplifying

nature turns into a strength.

“The term 'climate refugees' is used in Western media to draw attention to a

complex issue. The notion could represent a simplification but might appeal to

people who do not have a complex understanding of multifaceted nature of people

who are moving in the context of climate change.” [5]

Bangladesh, insists respondent 11, is the last place you will find climate refugees.

“Climate refugees exist solely as a discourse. Today, the concept is detached from

reality. [11]

A respondent, who is closely affiliated with BCAS, vehemently opposes the doom narrative

that typically goes together with the notion climate refugees in global debates.

“It is just not true, it’s a false picture that they represent.” 4

4 Respondent’s number is not mentioned for anonymity reasons

25

When scanning for evidence of the simplified framing, it becomes evident that the contentious

‘climate refugees’ is not as absent om key stakeholder circles as respondents perceive it to be;

neither in in policy papers (EJF 2011, Ahsan, et al. 2011, CDMP II 2014, 9).

“…frequent disasters might trigger out- migrations from impacted rural areas and

create ecological refugees within Bangladesh” (A. U. Ahmed 2006, 30).

Nor in scientific publications (Ranjan 2016, Rashid and Paul 2013); nor in so-called ‘formal’

discussions, as is evinced by two Bangladeshi scholars, who most emphatically employ the

concept ‘climate refugees’ in their speech on climate change in Bangladesh – interesting

sidebar: among which Mallick D., the division director of the above-mentioned BCAS (Rashid

2014, D. Mallick 2008).

It is observed the prominence of ‘climate refugees’ in title, summary and/or introduction does

not necessarily reflect the actual relevance of the term in the document itself, a Brot Für Die

Welt-commissioned study on ‘climate refugees’ in Bangladesh is a good example of this

(Anwer 2012). Moreover, the terms ‘climate refugees’ and ‘environmental refugees’ are

typically used interchangeably in stakeholder literature. Although the GoB recognizes status

of ‘environmental refugee’ and not ‘climate refugee’ (MoEF 2009).

“…sea level rise could result in the displacement of millions of people -

'environmental refugees' - from coastal region” (MoEF 2009, 1).

Secondly, many reports have dropped the term ‘refugee’ adopted other terminologies instead

seeking to capture the nature of involuntary environmental-related migration without the

attached controversy (CDMP II 2014, 28).

When we turn the attention to the first half of ‘climate refugee’, the label ‘climate (change)’

emerges from the data as a catch-all term the use of which is expanding. The trend among

proponents of the simplified framing to bracket Bangladesh’ manifold environmental problems

of the past with today’s climate change issues means that arguably pre-climate change events

are now framed as speaking for an impact of climate change. Moreover, so too is the pertaining

evidence: an extensive collection of environmental migration literature is now appropriated by

climate change science. Several key stakeholder documents are found to read (environmental)

migration literature of the 70s-80s, notably Brown’s milestone work (Brown 1976), as though

they self-evidently relate to the (then still to emerge) issue of climate change and related

migration (Anwer 2012, D. Mallick 2008, Ahsan, Kellett and Karuppannan 2016).

“Brown used the term of Environmental Refugee to attribute the emergence of

addressing displaced people forced by environmental degradation and impacts of

climate change” (Mehedi 2010, 2).

Time frame

Time frame involves the period of time taken into consideration. Key stakeholders, by dint of

treating events within a certain time span, attach differing weight to past, present, and/or future

to understand and address the issue at hand.

26

Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina has been quoted that most climate change migrants

“would seek migration, and they would be from LDCs moving within their borders, or beyond,

and such movements would cause social disorders, political instability, cross border conflicts,

and upheavals” (The Daily Star 2010). Sheikh Hasina’s quote epitomizes the pronounced

future conditional tense invoked by the simplicity framing. The practice to use the future as

basis for present-day action, for example in the form of scientific scenario modelling, is facing

headwind from critics who highlight the historically-grown and context-contingent nature of

so-called ‘climate change issues’ as well as today’s migration patterns in Bangladesh. In the

complexity framing, historical processes and today’s state of affairs take precedence over

arguably tenuous scientific models (Table 6).

Table 6 Time in simplistic/complex CC-M framings

SIMPLICITY COMPLEXITY

Outspoken future outlook and tense

Future Predictions key element

Future as evidence for today’s claims

Present-day as part of future

Preceding historical developments not

considered

Targets primarily actual processes

Problematizes future predictions for lack

accuracy & usefulness

Historicizing present process;

Considerable attention paid to

historical processes

Respondents are by and large critical of what are seen as mere speculative guestimates of future

migration. For example, respondent 15 questions the expediency of modelling the future impact

of climate change on migration. He stresses that these projections have repeatedly turned out

to be wrong due to unanticipated reactive factors.

“Climate change does not follow a consistent and constant linear path. … Changes

in natural ecosystems can both induce and mitigate the gravity of CC impacts. The

outcome of this interplay in the future is impossible to predict.” [15]

The GoB-based CDMP is also noted to pay considerable attention to criticisms of future

estimation research, especially in regard to the estimates’ inaccuracy and underlying faulty

assumptions (CDMP II 2014). Respondent 15 exemplifies this critical standpoint.

“Climate refugee projections are based on an unsophisticated, overly-simplified

approach to the complex interaction between hydrological and social processes.”

[15]

What are currently perceived to be climate change vulnerability and related issues in fact have

a long pedigree tracing back to (long-)standing development and environmental problems in

Bangladesh. For example, the GoB State of the Environment report asserts that a major

contributor to Bangadesh’s environmental problems should be sought upstream in India, Nepal

and China, where interventions in the ecosystem end up enhancing the magnitude of natural

disasters, like flooding and flash floods, downstream in the Bay of Bengal (DoE 2001, 97).

27

In response to a question about the role of India’s hydro-dams vis-à-vis what he was calling

“climate-induced drivers of migration”, respondent 11 elucidates that salinity intrusion and

growing water stress are not some novelties that emerged in the wake of the rise of the climate

change issue.

“The dam predates climate change and has had major impacts, particularly on the

Sundarbans and on the water supply in coastal areas. Sea level rise exacerbates it.

It is not the only problem, but it is an additional problem in terms of saline intrusion

etc.” [11]

Respondent 16 highlights that patterns of forced displacement existed even before climate

change became an issue. What’s more, he implicates that the GoB, arguably unintentionally,

reinforces the displacement trend.

“Farakka Barrage was implemented in June '75 and within a month the salinity had

increased tremendously … They [i.e. the farmers] started changing to alternative

livelihoods, one of them was shrimp farming. Shrimp farming started to become a

profitable business in the late 70s. At the same time the GoB started encouraging

entrepreneurship. … As consequence, the big gangsters, particularly the land

mafias, started pouring into that area and grabbed lands of the poor people,

displacing the poor people.” [16]

Adherents of the complexity framing advocate the need to first examine pre-existing mobility

patterns and livelihood systems in order to understand how climate change impacts migration.

It is from this perspective that the authors discern clear parallels between the increase in

migration and innovations in the field of transportation and innovations (Etzold, Ahmed, et al.

2015). Another noteworthy insight generated from an historical perspective is the role of the

legal system regarding land tenure “in creating the social vulnerability of millions of floodplain

inhabitants” (Hutton and Haque 2004, 42, Lewis 2011, Paprocki 2016, Nadiruzzaman 2012,

101-104).

Respondent 10 gives another example of historicizing present migration patterns when stating

that “today’s urban migration is a consequence of how things are going in Bangladesh”. Urban

migration, he argues, is simply a corollary of major cities’ economic attractiveness, which he

in turn attributes to centralized nature of power in Bangladesh.

Nevertheless, our study finds that default future outlook as presented in the simplified framing

is prevalent among the sampled key stakeholder documents. These documents often use

scenario modelling to estimate the future impact of climate change on natural hazards that act

as driver of migration (Ali 2003, Dasgupta, Huq, et al. 2011, Rahman, et al. 2012, World Bank

2000, Shourav, et al. 2016), and subsequently the future impact of climate change on migration

(Dasgupta, Laplante, et al. 2009, Tanner, et al. 2007, Akter 2009a, Mortreux and Adams 2015).

It is noteworthy that the GoB is an important party in the area of international (future) climate

change modelling as well as related policy discussions in the IPCC and elsewhere (Climate

Change Cell 2009, Climate Change Cell 2009, Climate Change Cell 2006, A. U. Ahmed 2006,

A. Uddin 2006, CDMP II 2014).

The contentious notions ‘climate refugee’ and ‘environmental refugee’ typically go together

with a future tense, as they are mostly used in context of migration scale projections (Pender

28

2008, CDMP II 2014, Displacement Solutions 2012, EquityBD 2009, Ahsan, Kellett and

Karuppannan 2014, D. Mallick 2008).

“Over 35 million will be climate refugees in Bangladesh by 2050” (D. Mallick

2008).

“Bangladesh is expected to have massive environmental displacement [..]. The

growth in environmental displacement is found to be 42% of the total populations

in 2020, a startling fact indeed” (Akter 2009a).

Respondent 11 acknowledges that the link between climate change and environmentally-

induced migration is still tenuous, rendering the use of ‘climate refugees’ problematic.

Nevertheless, he empathically asserts to have the future on his side: it is only a matter of time

before carbon-induced climate change’s is unequivocally proven to reinforce natural hazards

and associated displacement in Bangladesh.

“I'm talking about future migrants, who will be climate refugees. In the next 20-30

years, we can almost certainly attribute the {forced} movement of about 10 million

people from coast to inland, to climate change.” [11]

"My interest is in the future where there is a very clear attribution” [11]

That future, continues respondent 11, is already starting today.

"The storm surges of today and tomorrow are no longer ‘God-given’ or ‘natural

events’. [There’s a] human element of causation." [11]

Respondent 10’s perception that Bangladesh is already experiencing the adverse impact of

climate change today is shared by very few interviewees – only respondent 2 and 19 expressed

similar convictions. In the sampled texts, however, the notion of climate change being a reality

today appears to prevail.

“As an evidence of early climate change, people along in the coastal zone bear

testimony to rapid erosion of coastal islands, which may be attributed to aggressive

wind-wave interaction with the coastal shorelines under a higher sea surface

temperature regime” (Mehedi 2010, 5).

“Climate change is no longer something to happen in the future, it is here and now”

(MoEF 2009).

“Climate change is now a reality” (Rahman, et al. 2007).

“It is a slow process, a ‘slow onset doom’. … In some ways, it is happening already

because people are migrating.” [9]

“Sudden increase of large-scale migration because of climate induced human

displacement” (D. Mallick 2008).

The pronounced future outlook is precisely what distinguishes a climate change lens from a

development lens.

"The future dimension that you need to start thinking about now and then planning

about." [11]

29

“CC-projects ... development projects, work very similarly although there are small

changes. The difference is that CC-projects are much more planning towards the

future and calculating in hazard.” [15]

Respondent 15 adds that in practice ‘future’ is conceived as ‘near future’.

“CC [policies] focus on near future changes, which can be predicted quite

accurately. Initiatives today do not anticipate on predicted events over 50 years.”

[15]

Solution framing

Lastly, a problem-framing suggests (a) particular solution(s), and often by inference who is

responsible for solving the perceived problem. The simplification of rural-urban migration as

involuntary displacement, thus essentially negative, will lead to policy that seeks to halt rural

out-migration. A positive framing of rural-urban mobility patterns as a tried and tested

livelihood strategy that holds potential for effective climate change adaptation, is predisposed

towards measures that support migration. Moreover, proponents of the simplified framing

argue that Bangladesh is not causing climate change and therefore demand action, in the form

of financial and technological support, from the developed countries to help reduce

displacement and migration in rural areas. Advocates of the complexity framing, on the other

hand, assert that it is not (solely) a matter of more external funding and technology but that the

‘real’ solution lies in internal reforms, i.e. a nation-wide urban policy and decentralization of

governance and economy.

Table 7 Solutions in simplistic/complex CC-M framings

SIMPLICITY COMPLEXITY

Address problem

Reduce “bad” rural out-migration

by making rural areas more

attractive; urban ‘deterrence policy’

External solution

Demand funding and technological

support from industrialized countries;

New international convention for

protection of climate change-related

displacement

Address problem

Facilitate “good” migration & steer

migration to regional cities not Dhaka

Internal solution

Internal policy reform:

Nation-wide urban (development) policy;

GoB decentralization governance and

economy; Invest rural DRR where

possible and proactive planned relocation

where impossible in long-term

Respondents from all four key stakeholder categories markedly agree when it comes to the

solution required to tackle Bangladesh’ urbanization issues in the coming age of climate

change. Two key elements keep cropping up. First, the imperative to facilitate what is described

as ‘good’ migration, in order for it to end up enhancing people’s resilience rather than

undermining it.

30

“[Migration has] lots of potential to make people more resilient so they are able to

cope and overcome the impacts of climate change. But what we see is a big risk

that they end up in climate change-vulnerable slums.” [1]

Supportive polices should target both temporary migrants, which is primarily mentioned in the

context of income diversification (Ahsan 2013).

“Temporary migration … aimed at income differentiation. … This type of

migration is very important and should be supported, it enhances people’s

resilience.” [1]

“Diversification of livelihood income {within families} is already rising in BD.

This way the problem will get much more manageable.” [10]

Second, steps towards permanent resettlement of people living in climate change-vulnerable

areas should be taken too (Displacement Solutions 2012, MoEF 2009, Percot 2012). Several

respondents maintain that the GoB should proactively develop a country-wide (urban) policy

to steer migration away from Dhaka to regional centres. Respondent 11 spells out what such

national urban strategy should do exactly.

“So what I want is to enable them to migrate at their own pace, at their own will,

to where they want to go. ... It's a good thing, they will be better off, economically

better off.” [11]

“So we need the next 10 million, who are going to come anyway, to not come to

Dhaka. Ultimately, you cannot force them to not come to Dhaka. You have to

persuade them ... [T]he solution for Dhaka, is to not invest in Dhaka. Rather to

invest in 5-10 other cities, away from the coast. ... So, it’s about steering

urbanization and investment in urbanization which will enable us to successfully

manage that migration.”

The strategy implies a far-reaching decentralization of power in Bangladesh’ traditionally

highly-centralized system of governance.

“Decentralization of power is key … to ameliorate migration and urbanization

problems. … boost the economy of regional cities so they become more attractive

for migrants, so they are less likely to come to Dhaka.” [12]

Respondents repeat that the central government remains the only obstacle.

“Officially, [the GoB] does not take an anti-urban migration position. Look at their

policies … They acknowledge the phenomenon. … But they think that an urban

policy that improves the living conditions for slum dwellers … will end up

promoting migration to the city.” [17]

Current policy concentrates specifically on rural areas. Respondent 10 and 11 challenge the

effectiveness of the GoB’s rural initiatives to discourage people from going to the Dhaka.

“If there is labour shortage then there is no point to discourage people to come to

Dhaka.” [10]

“You can't scare people off to come [to Dhaka]. That will happen by itself. It is a

comparative advantage situation. You can't force it.” [11]

31

One recommendation is the planned relocation of people out of highly climate change-

vulnerable areas, which is also highlighted in key stakeholder literature to hold potential as a

positive adaptation measure which can reduce the vulnerability of, especially poor, displaced

people (Akter 2009b, Uddin and Basak 2012, Rabbani, Shafeeqa and Sharma 2017)

“Too many people are living in vulnerable areas. Out-migration is the only solution

here … but this is only a partial solution because the poorest lack resources to

emigrate.” [1]

“Sea level rise makes out-migration an inevitability in coastal regions. We need a

proactive policy to stimulate positive migration, which gives a positive impact on

people’s well-being and resilience … instead of making them more vulnerable.”

[1]

Respondent 17 challenges the helpfulness of a climate change lens to solve problems of

urbanization.

“Ideal scenario [is that] urban planning gets taken as starting point. [Climate

change] is not always the best lens, because conditions differ between regions,

between cities. … [should be] based on the local context.” [17]

So, what are the solutions proposed by the simplified framing? Three points are central here.

Firstly, halting/reducing migration to the cities, secondly, demanding compensations, in the

form of financial and technical support, from the industrialized countries, and thirdly, calling

for a new international convention for protection of climate change-related displaced people.

The GoB comes forward as the main driving force behind the simplified solution framing,

seeing that its programs are predominantly centred on rural areas and it strongly advocates loss

& damage compensations on the international stage. In the international negotiations doom

scenarios of mass climate change-forced displacement play a key role, as demonstrated by the

above quoted by Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and other speeches of prominent

Bangladeshi politicians (Foreign Secretary Haque 2015). Considering that the industrialized

world’s historical responsibility for the vast majority of greenhouse gas emissions, argues

respondent 11, it is simply a matter of ‘the polluter pays’-principle.

The validity of the demands for an externally-provided solution hinges on the time frame in

the simplification framing, namely to attribute present and past problems of (urban) migration

and displacement retrospectively and implicitly to the adverse impacts of climate change. This

is an often-found argument in grey literature (Islam 2011, Mehedi 2015, EquityBD 2009, Akter

2009a). In addition, the GoB has what respondent 16 describes as “a rural bias”. Although

several of the sampled GoB documents adopt a holistic approach and mention the need to

address urban issues as well as rural ones (CDMP II 2014, Climate Change Cell 2008), many

governmental policy and action plans – often implemented in cooperation with and with

funding from international donors – nevertheless focus predominantly on vulnerable rural areas

(Water Resources Planning Organization 2006, EKN 2012, DMB 2008).

Bangladeshi actors, furthermore, are at the forefront of the campaign for a new legal protection

regime “to ensure social, cultural and economic rights of the ‘climate change induced forced

migrants’” (EquityBD 2009, Titumir, Kabir and Baten 2012, Ahsan 2013).

32

DISCUSSION – DEPOLITICIZING MIGRATION & CLIMATE

CHANGE

Having established what key stakeholders say and write regarding the six descriptors, the

following discussion probes why they say and write what they say and write, i.e. how the

findings may fit into broader strategies. The interviews proved invaluable here, since it was the

opportunity to ask questions like: What is the underlying aim of the identified framings? What

direct goal(s) do other stakeholders pursue and with what intention do they do so?

First of all, the interviews corroborate the conclusion of Stojanov et al., who found that

Bangladeshi experts convey a complex, nuanced perception of the (urban) migration-climate

change nexus in their country (Stojanov, Duzi and Kelman 2015). We found that this also

applies to non-Bangladeshis working in Bangladesh. The grey literature, by contrast, shows

that these nuances are often not reflected on paper. This apparent inconsistency between the

spoken complexity framing and the written simplistic framing could indicate that written

documents serve specific interests other than understanding the complexity of migration.

The simplification framing has a pervasive influence on the written narrative from all four key

stakeholder categories. The simplified framing essentially revolves around shifting

responsibility, firstly, for causing and/or continuing the problem, and secondly, for providing

its solution. It is generally agreed that climate change is caused by humans, notably the

industrialized world (IPCC 2013). In this reasoning, due to its position at the climate change

frontier Bangladesh’ problems now become part of the (industrialized) world’s problems too

(Lewis 2011). The below quotes of respondent 11 illustrates the climatization of urban

migration issues.

“What climate change does is adding a very different dimension to the problem,

[a] new dimension that allows to revise old problems in a new light. … Climate

change should be seen as an opportunity instead of a problem.” [11]

"Now you have to say ‘the world is also responsible for protecting Bangladesh’,

because the world is causing the problem. [11]

The findings thereby corroborate the research by Grant et al., who demonstrate a similar trend

in Bangladesh with regard to natural disasters. They advance that the practice of framing

disasters as being caused by climate change, which the authors label ‘climatization’, is focused

on “ensuring international financial aid and deflecting responsibility for improper action or

inaction” (Grant, Tamason and Jensen 2015).

The GoB operates as a frontrunner in promoting this simplified narrative on the global stage.

Bangladeshi actors, both governmental and non-governmental, often centre their speeches at

international conferences on simplistic depictions for lobby and advocacy purposes.

Respondents paint the GoB’s strategy for citing climate change whenever Bangladesh’

urbanization and migration issues are raised as a manoeuvre to gloss over its own failures and

responsibility to address these issues. Instead of directing efforts to design a national urban

policy and transfer power and resources to local governments, respondents criticize the GoB

for solely focussing on attracting (more) international funding.

33

“When you look into the discourse … the GoB says that Bangladesh is the victim

of sea level rise and climate change. Therefore, they ask money from the polluter,

the West.” [16]

Paprocki argues that GoB’s case in international loss & damage negotiations hinges on linking

Bangladesh’ variety of problems to climate change (Paprocki 2016). The gloom and doom

narrative around (future) climate change-induced migration serves as leverage of the GoB in

international negotiations.

“It empowers Bangladesh to demand money in the form of compensations, which

have no demands attached.” [15]

“It is no longer charity, its responsibility.” [11]

We also encountered the criticism that the GoB documents focus exclusively on migration in

the form of involuntary displacement induced by sudden onset extreme weather events

(Siddiqui 2017). For example the National Strategy on the Management of Disaster and

Climate Induced Internal Displacement (NSMDCIID) “focuses solely on internal

displacements caused by climate-related disasters” (Siddiqui, Towheedul and Akhter 2015, 6).

For respondent 1 this is no coincidence, since in the case of migration due to extreme weather

events push factors arguably outweigh pull factors. In this case the link to climate change is

most likely to be proven first.

Respondents assert that the reduction of rural-urban migration to weather-induced involuntary

displacement obscures other factors driving migration such as economic inequality, unequal

power relations and bad governance. Respondents further reproach inadequate and badly-

maintained DRR infrastructure for much of the damage and displacement caused by natural

disasters today. Respondent 16 is more outspoken when he discards the position that climate

change is to blame for the large-scale destruction caused by cyclone Aila in 2009.

“Aila was not a very strong cyclone, it was one of the weakest cyclones in history,

in fact.5 All the damage, all the people displaced, it was not due to the cyclone, but

due to structural failure. The embankments were simply very inadequate and in

poor shape.” [16]

Climatization is not the exclusive practice of governmental actors but, according to (most)

interviewees, the prevailing money-attracting strategy across all four key stakeholder

categories. Respondents 17 elucidates the underlying rationale for downplaying or omitting

other (human) drivers of migration and persisting uncertainties about the migration-climate

change.

“Climate change has triggered a new global awareness. New efforts at national and

international level. We should grab this momentum. In this regard, climate change

can be considered a positive development.” [17]

The phenomenon of urban migration in Bangladesh is thus dramatized to mobilize awareness

and action. Li has shown that engaging simplifications as part of advocacy agendas can be

5 Cyclone Aila was classified as a category-1 cyclonic storm, the lowest category on the Saffir-Simpson Hurricane

Wind Scale (NASA 2009).

34

successful to raise public awareness, but “offers a problematic basis for justice” (Li 2002). The

most contentious concept of ‘climate refugee’ is a powerful attention-getter for Bangladesh’

migration and urbanization issues. Nevertheless, in line with Li’s conclusions respondents say

that the practical and legal usefulness of this simplification for enhancing Bangladeshi

migrants’ well-being has been negligible.

As described in the section ‘terminology’ the simplification framing gains credibility by means

of two strategies which draw on the past and the future respectively. Firstly, our study finds

what can be described as a climate change teleology, i.e. the bracketing of (past) environmental

migration literature with today’s climate change migration research in both peer-reviewed

papers and key stakeholder documents on CC-M.

Secondly, proponents of the doom and gloom narrative are “using he future as evidence” (Brun

and Blaikie 2016, 213). The discursive concept ‘future’ plays a pivotal role in climate change

discourse. Prediction models of future climate change and migration trends are deployed as

leverage to enforce present demands in on-going negotiations and serve as basis for large-scale

investments in projects and programs. It is in the future, assert proponents of the simplification

framing, that the climate change-centred framing of migration will prove itself right.

Respondent 11 exemplifies the broadly-shared assumption among notably Bangladeshi key

stakeholders ‘to have the future on their side’.

“My interest is in the future where there is a very clear attribution.”

"The storm surges of today and tomorrow are no longer ‘God-given’ or ‘natural

events’ … is a human element of causation. We don't know at the moment how

much percent this is. We will know that in the future.” [11]

Present-day policy making and investments are being drafted based on future models of

migration and climate change. Although in these future modelling studies themselves caveats

regarding inaccuracy are made, these are not taken into account in the policy documents

(Wesselink et al. in press).

“Estimates indicate investments … would cost more than $2.4 billion, … These

estimates can serve as a prototype of the adaptation costs to extreme weather events

in climate negotiations” (Dasgupta, Huq, et al. 2011).

Geopolitical sensitivities are occasionally raised in interviews as another motive for

climatization. Respondents argue that Bangladesh’ weaker geopolitical position vis-à-vis India

impels Bangladeshi stakeholders to obscure the asserted real roots of environmental

degradation and ensuing migration in Bangladesh, i.e. India’s hydro-dams that induce droughts

in Bangladesh, and exaggerate the role of climate change instead. Geopolitical constraints

would thus be another motive for (Bangladeshi) key stakeholders to adopt the simplified

framing of urban migration.

35

CONCLUSION

In line with migration studies’ findings, respondents generally use the complexity framing

when interviewed and dismiss the simplified framing as inadequate. The occurrence of the

simplified framing in speeches and documents intended for a wider audience (i.e. beyond the

key stakeholder debate in Bangladesh) corroborates the conclusion that the simplified depiction

of Bangladesh’ migration and urbanization issues is primarily used for advocacy and lobby

purposes.

The key stakeholder documents show that climatization works in subtle ways in Bangladesh.

The simplification framing plays primarily on popular – but nonetheless unsubstantiated –

assumptions that climate change induces environmental hazards and thereby reinforces rural-

urban migration patterns. Environmental drivers and extreme weather events are often self-

evidently labelled ‘climate change-induced migration drivers’, even though the link between

climate change and the drivers of migration, as well as the link between these drivers and

peoples’ migration decisions remains ambiguous. As evidence remains inconclusive today, the

proponents of the simplification framing find their case bolstered by the many ominous

predictions of climate change and migration in Bangladesh.

The simplification framing centres on relocating responsibility for the problem and thereby for

solving the problem. Climatizing urban migration issues in Bangladesh draws in the

industrialized countries, which are demanded provide financial and technical support to

Bangladesh since they are to blame for climate change. Proponents of the complexity framing

counter this narrative arguing that external support should only be secondary, and instead

prioritize the need for Bangladesh to get its own house in order. These respondents argue that

more donor money is pointless if current funds are not well spent.

The line of argumentation for the simplification framing appears to be that “a truth with a twist

is not by definition a lie” if the result is a positive impact on Bangladesh. Furthermore,

climatization tendencies in regard to urban migration in Bangladesh have the appearance of

taking the path of least resistance. In light of geopolitical sensitivities regarding key

contributing factors (i.e. India’s interventions in the hydrological ecosystem) the worldwide

momentum around climate change is taken as an opportunity to address migration and

displacement issues through a less contentious lens.

Nevertheless, a ‘big if’ remains when talking about climatization of migration. Do the means

do indeed justify the ends in this case (Grant, Tamason and Jensen 2015) Can ensuing policy

be effective in dealing with Bangladesh’ growing urban migration and urbanization issues if it

does not address (all) the real issues, issues that pre-date climate change and/or exist

independent of climate change? These two questions beg further examination and scrutiny. The

simplification framing is likely to lead to policy that is inadequate for dealing effectively with

the manifold issues migration and urbanization issues that Bangladesh faces, now and in the

future.

36

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APPENDIX

Table 8 List of respondents

Respondent Origin Profession Expertise

1 Bangladeshi University department

director

Disaster & vulnerability

studies

2 Bangladeshi Business consultant

donor-funded program

Pro-poor & rural market

development

3 Bangladeshi Business consultant

donor-funded program

Pro-poor & rural market

development

4 Bangladeshi University professor &

donor advisor Environmental economics

5 Bangladeshi Department director

INGO Climate finance governance

6 Bangladeshi Resource & information

manager INGO Public policy

7 Bangladeshi Program director INGO Pro-poor policy &

women empowerment

8 Bangladeshi Policy & research officer

IGO

Migration, environment &

climate change nexus

9 Non-Bangladeshi Policy & research officer

IGO

Migration, environment &

climate change nexus

10 Bangladeshi University professor Development economics

11 Bangladeshi Director research

institutions

Climate change-

development nexus in

development countries

12 Non-Bangladeshi Director agency

development cooperation

Good governance & social

development

13 Non-Bangladeshi Policy advisor embassy Water management

14 Bangladeshi

Director research

institution & affiliate GoB

ministry

GIS, natural resource

management & climate

studies

15 Non-Bangladeshi

Policy advisor &

Associate

research centre

Floods & floodplain

management

16 Bangladeshi Research director NGO Critical geography

Disaster, CC & development

17 Bangladeshi Policy advisor Urban policy, pro=poor &

good governance

18 Bangladeshi Research associate & ass.

university professor

Migration & development

nexus

19 Bangladeshi GoB National project

director

DRR policy & climate

change adaptation

47

Table 9 Interview guide

Themes Aspects to be discussed

Climate refugees

& labelling

Their positioning on the ‘climate refugee’ concept & their comments on the use

of the ‘climate refugee’ concept.

Future projections &

doom narrative

Position on the popular doom narrative on climate change & migration

Position on estimates future climate-induced migration/displacement

Comparison debates International debates vs. personal/national depiction CC-M

Framing strategy

Comparison of framings adopted by different stakeholders

Naturalization strategy; ‘CC as opportunity’

Beneficiaries of the dominant CC-M framing

Pre-climate change

issues

Bangladesh long history of disasters

Development-induced environmental degradation

Effect CC on development issues & policy in Bangladesh

Migration

policy making

Main causes of migration & urban issues

Differentiation between migration drivers

Internal vs. external migration; migrants inclusion in policy making process

Problem identification

Climate change natural vs. human issue; ‘Real’ problem?

Human mediation climate change impacts

Inequitable impacts climate change; Assigning blame & liability

Funding & corruption

Solution framing Pros & cons climate change lens; ‘Hard’ vs. ‘soft’ solution

Funding; Role & hierarchy governance levels

Expertise Traditional knowledge vs. technical expertise