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___________________________________________________________________________ 2011/SOM3/DIA/005 Session 2 Fossil-Fuel Subsidies and the Poor in Asia Submitted by: ADB Policy Dialogue on Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform San Francisco, United States 23 September 2011

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Page 1: Fossil-Fuel Subsidies and the Poor in Asia · • E.g. Bolivia tried to raise fuel prices by between 53% and 87% in December 2010 but failed • GIZ recommends raising prices 10%

___________________________________________________________________________

2011/SOM3/DIA/005 Session 2

Fossil-Fuel Subsidies and the Poor in Asia

Submitted by: ADB

Policy Dialogue on Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform

San Francisco, United States23 September 2011

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1

FOSSILFOSSIL‐‐FUEL SUBSIDIES FUEL SUBSIDIES AND THE POOR IN ASIAAND THE POOR IN ASIA

ShikhaShikhaJhaJhaAsian Development BankAsian Development Bank

APEC Senior Officials Meeting, 23 September 2011APEC Senior Officials Meeting, 23 September 2011

San FranciscoSan Francisco

Outline of the presentation 

An overview of the energy scene in Asia

Political economy of subsidies

Proposed research study

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The Energy Scene in Asia: An overview 

Asia‐Pacific: Energy for all?

Fastest demand growth, esp fossil‐fuel energy

¼ of global energy; PRC accounts for ½ 

No access to basic electricity services

800 million (20% of population)

Reliance on traditional biomass

1.8 billion (44%)

ADB: Access to energy to 100 million by 2015

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The poor spend larger % on fuel and light

India Philippines

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

%

Monthly per capita exp deciles

Rural

5.0

5.5

6.0

6.5

7.0

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

%

Income deciles

Rural

Source: Household Consumer Expenditure in India, 2007‐08; Report No. 530; 2009 Philippines FIES

Prices differ substantially across the region – An example

0

40

80

120

160

US

cen

ts/li

ter

Retail Gasoline Prices in Developing Asia(Oct 2008) Gasoline

US Premium Gas Retail Price

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4

Challenge

To come up with ways and means to 

enhance energy supply security 

improve energy accessibility of the poor and 

provide them affordable modern energy services 

… while tackling climate change and other environmental issues

Strategies proposed by G20 Asian members – Some examples

PRC: To gradually reduce urban land‐use tax relief for fossil fuel producers

India: To work out implementation strategies and timetables for rationalizing and phasing out fossil‐fuel subsidies

Indonesia: To gradually phase out subsidies and adopt other measures to reduce fossil‐fuel energy consumption 

Korea: To phase out subsidies to anthracite coal and briquette producers

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Fossil‐fuel subsidies: The political economy angle

Characteristics of energy sector

Typical developed economy 

PRC Vietnam Indonesia

Political discretion in price setting 

Low  Moderate  Moderate  High 

Dominance by state‐owned vertically‐integrated utilities 

Low, some exceptions 

High  High  High 

Central planning in the             electricity sector 

Low, some exceptions 

High  High  High 

Political difficulty of reform 

Mixed  Moderate  N/A (Just starting) 

High 

Difficulty in finding instruments to compensate low‐income households for 

price changes 

Low  Moderate  Moderate  Moderate 

Source: World Bank, 2011, Climate Change  and Fiscal Policy: A Report for APEC

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Complexities of subsidies

Interest‐group influence Industry lobby

Vote banks

Off‐budget subsidies Tax holidays

Waiver of import duties

Logistical difficulties Users are organized differently

Government’s ability to deal with interest groups  varies

Responsible offices —foreign affairs, finance, energy, tax, national planning: Requires coordination

Varied energy pricing systems

Liberalized–market‐determined prices

Automatic – regulations establishing an automatic adjustment mechanism

Price controls – administer, regulate, or adjust prices on an ad‐hoc basis

Gasoline Pricing Mechanisms (2006) Number of economies

Liberalized 15

Automatic 8

Ad hoc 21

Total  44

Source: IMF 2008. Fuel and Food Price Subsidies: Issues and Reform Options

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Difficulties in measuring subsidies

Oil and gas subsidies easy to estimate: international price to benchmark economic costs

Subsidies for coal (partially traded, contractual prices) and electricity (non‐traded) hard to measure

No single on‐going process or consistent database

Reference Energy System 

CoalExtraction

Co

al Re

sources

Oil Import

Gas Import

Prim

ary Co

al

Prim

ary O

il

Prim

ary Ga

s

Coal PowerPlant

Gas PowerPlant

Oil PowerPlant

Hydro PowerPlant

Oil HeatingPlant

Cogeneration

Electricity

District H

eat

Ga

s

Oil

Coa

l

Electricity

District H

eat

Ga

s

Oil

Coa

l

CoalTransport&Distribution

Oil Transport&Distribution

GasTransport&Distribution

ElectricityTransport&Distribution

Distr ict HeatTransport&Distribution

Indu

strial He

at

Indus

trial E

lectricity

Re

sidentia

l/Com

me

rcial H

eat

Re

sidentail/C

om

me

rcial E

lectricity

Tran

sport

Coal Ind.

Oil Ind.

Gas Ind

Elec. Ind.

Coal R/C.

Oil R/C

Gas R/C

Elec. R/C

DH R/C

Oil Trp

RESOURCES PRIMARY SECONDARY FINAL DEMAND

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ADB Research Project

Rationalizing and Phasing Out Fossil‐Fuel Subsidies

Rationale

Energy subsidies are critical for development

can stimulate economic activity/ spur growth 

alleviate poverty

But these subsidies

are expensive and divert resources from other priorities

result in excessive production/consumption 

deplete exhaustible resources, harm the environment

Phasing out subsidies would 

save fiscal resources and energy

reduce carbon dioxide emissions

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Objectives of the Study

1. Identify and measure fossil‐fuel subsidies

2. Assess household impact of their elimination

3. Discuss options to mitigate impact on poor

Potential economies 

Bangladesh, PRC, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Pakistan, Thailand, Uzbekistan 

Korea, Philippines, Viet Nam

Contributions of the project

Systematic measurement and analysis of fossil fuel subsidies to consumers and producers

Asia‐wide evaluation of impact of subsidy elimination and social safety nets for the poor OECD: Case study of subsidy reform in Indonesia

WB: Poverty and Social Impact Analysis of subsidy removal on poor in Armenia, Sri Lanka and Tajikistan

Dissemination of the findings to governments to encourage reforms

Benchmark to initiate studies of macroeconomic impacts 

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10

Thank you!

Contact: 

ShikhaJha: [email protected]

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___________________________________________________________________________

2011/SOM3/DIA/002 Session 1

Fossil-Fuel Subsidies and Strategies for Reform

Submitted by: Global Subsidies Initiative (GSI)

Policy Dialogue on Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform

San Francisco, United States23 September 2011

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1

Fossil‐Fuel Subsidies and Strategies for ReformStrategies for Reform

APEC Senior Officials’ Policy Dialogue on Fossil‐Fuel Subsidies

Kerryn Lang, Global Subsidies Initiativey g23 September 2010

Global Subsidies Initiative (GSI)

• Established by the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) in 2005

• Purpose: to investigate and promote reform of subsidies that have negative economic, social or environmental impacts.

• Phase I (2006 – 2008): Biofuel subsidies• Phase II (2009 2011): Fossil fuel subsidies• Phase II (2009 – 2011): Fossil-fuel subsidies• Phase III (2012 – 2014): Energy and Water

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2

Outline of this presentation

1. Overview of fossil-fuel subsidies for both consumption and production

2. Benefits of fossil-fuel subsidy reform3. Increasing momentum for reform on international

agendas4. Elements of a successful reform strategy

1. Overview of fossil‐fuel subsidies

Consumption subsidies:• Estimated to amount to $312 billion in 2009,

$558 in 2008 (IEA 2010)$558 in 2008 (IEA, 2010)• Mostly in developing and energy-exporting

economies• Not well targeted for intended

beneficiaries (the poor)• Hurdles to reform include

swaying public opinion & developing effective welfare nets

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1. Overview of fossil‐fuel subsidies

Producer subsidies:• GSI’s estimate: $100 billion per year• Used in developed and developing economies• Used in developed and developing economies• Many different types (e.g. financial transfers, tax

breaks, royalty reductions, accident liability caps)• Canada study: 63 subsidies totaling CA$2.84 billion in

2008• Indonesia study: 3 subsidies totaling US$ 1.8 billion in

20082008• Hurdles to reform include political lobby groups

2. Benefits of fossil‐fuel subsidy reform

• Reforming fossil-fuel subsidies will:– Level the playing field for investments in clean

and renewable energy technologies energy and renewable energy technologies, energy efficiency

– Reduce global greenhouse gas emissions by 10% by 2050 (OECD, 2010)

– Reduce public expenditure; remove a fiscal liability in times of high and volatile oil pricesliability in times of high and volatile oil prices

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4

• G-20 and APEC commitments to rationalize and phase out over the medium term [inefficient] fossil-fuel subsidies that encourage wasteful

3. Increasing momentum for reform

fossil fuel subsidies that encourage wasteful consumption…while protecting the poor

Timeline

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4. Elements of a successful reform strategy

• Research: costs, benefits, options and impactsE.g. Government of Indonesia commissioned 3 university reports to inform its roadmap for university reports to inform its roadmap for

phasing out fuel subsidies, identifying various options:

1. Raise the price of subsidized fuel2. Limit the amount of subsidized fuel available and

target who receives it (e.g. older cars, not new cars)3. Phase out the subsidy by region (starting with Jakarta)

• Consultation and communication

4. Elements of a successful reform strategy• Price-setting mechanisms: independent,

transparent & adjustable.Price rises: gradual or sharp?g p• E.g. Bolivia tried to raise fuel prices by

between 53% and 87% in December 2010 but failed

• GIZ recommends raising prices 10% at a time, however

• E g Iran reformed fuel subsidies in one • E.g. Iran reformed fuel subsidies in one price rise, by providing compensation for entire population (~50% of the revenues)

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4. Elements of a successful reform strategy

• Complementary policies:• Cash transfers: conditional or unconditional• Reduce/abolish school fees provide free school mealsReduce/abolish school fees, provide free school meals• Increase the minimum wage• Extend credit facilities for entrepreneurs or small

businesses (e.g. farmers, fishermen, women in rural areas)• Increased investment in public transport systems, rural

electrification schemes and other essential services• Expand pension or health insurance schemes

4. Elements of a successful reform strategy

• Monitoring, evaluation and adjustment• E.g. monitoring energy price adjustments against the

international market priceinternational market price• E.g. evaluating and adjusting the targeting or delivery

of cash transfer payments

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Thank youy

email: [email protected] www.globalsubsidies.org/en

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___________________________________________________________________________

2011/SOM3/DIA/003 Session 2

IEA Analysis of Fossil-Fuel Subsidies for APEC

Submitted by: IEA

Policy Dialogue on Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform

San Francisco, United States23 September 2011

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© OECD/IEA 2011 

IEA analysis of fossilIEA analysis of fossil‐‐fuel fuel subsidies for APECsubsidies for APEC

Amos Bromhead

Office of the Chief Economist

International Energy Agency

San Francisco, 23 September 2011

© OECD/IEA 2011 

Primary energy demand in APEC Primary energy demand in APEC economies in the Current Policies economies in the Current Policies ScenarioScenario

APEC energy demand expands by 44% between now and 2035 – an average rate of increase of 1.4% per year – with fossil fuels remaining dominant in the energy mix 

01 0002 0003 0004 0005 0006 0007 0008 0009 000

10 00011 000

1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2035

Mto

e Other renewables

Hydro

Nuclear

Gas

Oil

Coal

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© OECD/IEA 2011 

Spending on oil &  gas imports as a Spending on oil &  gas imports as a share of GDP in APEC economies in the share of GDP in APEC economies in the Current Policies ScenarioCurrent Policies Scenario

The combination of higher prices and expanded imports translates to a growing import bill for the region, which can be a heavy burden on economic growth

 

0%

1%

2%

3%

4%

5%

6%

7%

1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2035

Indonesia

China

Japan

Mexico

United States

ASEAN*

Australia/

New Zealand

© OECD/IEA 2011 

EnergyEnergy‐‐related COrelated CO22 emissions in APEC emissions in APEC economies in the Current Policies economies in the Current Policies ScenarioScenario

APEC’s share of global CO2 emissions increases slightly to 59% in 2035, highlighting that the region will have to play a key part if climate objectives are to be met 

 

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2035

Gt Gas

Oil

Coal

World

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© OECD/IEA 2011 

FossilFossil‐‐fuel subsidies can have fuel subsidies can have unintended effectsunintended effects

Fossil‐fuel subsidies result in an economically inefficient allocation of resources and market distortions, while often failing to meet their intended objectives

© OECD/IEA 2011 

Quantifying fossil‐fuel consumption subsidies using the price‐gap approach A price‐gap is the amount that an end‐use price is below the full cost of 

supply or reference price

It is applicable where end‐use prices are regulated and fall short of international market levels

Does not capture: production subsidies, rebates to consumers, the effect of cross‐subsidies, cost of investing in new capacity (electricity)

What costs are represented by estimates from the price‐gap approach?

> For net exporters, these are essentially opportunity costs

> For net importers, these are estimates of direct, budgetary transfers

Relevant calculations

> Subsidy = (reference price – end‐use price) * consumption 

> Reference price (fuels) = int’l price (quality adj) +/‐ freight & insurance + local distribution + VAT

> Reference price for electricity is based on annual average‐cost pricing: calculated from a weighted average of the cost of electricity production (according to specific power mix), plus transmission and distribution

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© OECD/IEA 2011 

Quantifying fossil‐fuel consumption subsidies using the price‐gap approach

0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0

Gasoline

Diesel

LPG

Dollars per litre

International price

Freight and insurance

Internal distribution

Value-added tax

End-use pricePrice gap(subsidy)

The price‐gap method compares end‐use prices paid by consumers with reference prices that correspond to the full cost of supply – a subsidy is present If the end‐use price falls short of 

the reference price

© OECD/IEA 2011 

World subsidies to fossil‐fuel consumption using the price‐gap approach

Worldwide, fossil‐fuel consumption subsidies totaled $409 billion in 2010 – about $100 billion higher than in 2009; among APEC economies, we estimate they reached $105 billion

FossilFossil‐‐fuel consumption subsidies fuel consumption subsidies remain bigremain big

0

25

50

75

100

125

150

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

2007 2008 2009 2010

Do

llars

pe

r bar

rel

Bill

ion

dol

lars

Rest of world

APEC economies

IEA average crude oil import price (right axis)

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© OECD/IEA 2011 

FossilFossil‐‐fuel consumption subsidies per fuel consumption subsidies per capita and as a percentage of total GDP capita and as a percentage of total GDP 

The economic cost of subsidies can be more completely understood when viewed as a percentage of GDP or on a per‐capita basis

Economies with higher rates Economies with lower rates

Iran

Saudi Arabia

Venezuela

UAE

Iraq

Kuwait

Turkmenistan

Qatar

Libya

Egypt

Algeria

Brunei

PakistanEcuador

0

500

1 000

1 500

2 000

2 500

3 000

0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25%

Subsi

die

s per ca

pit

a (d

ollars

per ca

pit

a)

Subsidies as a share of GDP (MER)

See below

Scale (billion $)

40

10

Russia

IndiaChina

Indonesia

Argentina

Malaysia

Thailand

Mexico

Kazakhstan

Vietnam

Philippines

Nigeria

Azerbaijan

South Africa

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

0% 1% 2% 3% 4%

Subsi

die

s per ca

pit

a (d

ollars

per ca

pit

a)

Subsidies as a share of GDP (MER)

APEC

Other

Chinese Taipei

© OECD/IEA 2011 

Major energy producers are among Major energy producers are among the biggest subsidisersthe biggest subsidisers

For net exporters of oil and gas in APEC economies, subsidies to those fuels totalled $74 billion in 2010, compared with $31 billion in net‐importing economies

Fossil‐fuel consumption subsidies by net importer and net exporter of oil and natural gas in APEC economies

 

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

2007 2008 2009 2010

Bill

ion

dol

lars

Exporter

Importer

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© OECD/IEA 2011 

FossilFossil‐‐energy subsidies go energy subsidies go mostly to the richmostly to the rich

Only 8% of the amount spent on fossil‐fuel consumption subsidies in 2010, reached the poorest 20% of the population 

Share of fossil‐fuel subsidies received by the lowest income quintile by fuel in surveyed economies*, 2010

© OECD/IEA 2011 

Getting rid of fossilGetting rid of fossil‐‐energy subsidies energy subsidies would save energy & cut emissionswould save energy & cut emissions

Without further reform, spending on subsidies in APEC economies is set to reach $150 billion in 2020 

Subsidy reform would have energy security, environmental & economic benefits

Phasing‐out subsidies in APEC economies by 2020 would:

reduce energy demand  by 2.3%

reduce oil demand by 0.5 mb/d 

cut CO2 emissions by 0.6 Gt 

Savings would be considerably higher in the economies that have subsidies

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© OECD/IEA 2011 

Recent pricing reforms inRecent pricing reforms in selected selected economieseconomiesEconomy Description of actions or announced plans

Angola Raised gasoline & diesel prices by 50% and 38% in Sept 2010. Plans to reduce fuel subsidies by 20% per year until eliminated.

IndiaScrapped regulation of gasoline prices in June 2010, with plans to do the same for diesel; Plans to eliminate cooking gas and kerosene subsidies in a phased manner starting April 2012, replacing with direct cash support to the poor. 

IndonesiaPostponed a restriction of subsidised fuel for private cars in February 2011,  which could push state subsidies higher than the budgeted amount. Previous plans 

IranSignificantly cut energy subsidies in Dec 2010 as start of a 5‐year program to bring the prices of oil products, natural gas and electricity in line with international market‐ levels. Cash payments are being made to ease the impact of higher fuel prices.

Jordan Announced an expansion of their subsidy programme in January 2011 by further reducing kerosene prices and gasoline prices.

Malaysia Cut subsidies for gasoline, diesel and LPG in July 2010 as part of a gradual reform programme.. 

Mexico  Steadily increased gasoline, diesel, and LPG prices in 2011, with the goal of eliminating subsidies. 

Pakistan Raised gasoline, diesel and electricity prices in 2011, but prices increases have not kept pace with international prices. Plans are to reduce the power subsidy by 23% this year and gradually phase out.

Qatar Increased petrol, diesel and kerosene prices by 25% in January 2011.

Russia Plans to raise natural gas prices to international levels for industrial users through 2014.

South AfricaPlans to raise electricity prices by 20% per year through 2015 according to the Integrated Resource Plan, approved in March 2011. 

UAE Increased gasoline prices in April and July of 2010 to the highest level in the GCC

UkraineRaised gas price for households and electricity generation plants by 50% in August 2010 and announced plans to raise them by 30% in 2011.

© OECD/IEA 2011 

Consultation on pricing dataConsultation on pricing data

The IEA welcomes consultation with individual APEC economies about pricing data

IEA contacts on fossil‐fuel subsidies:

Fatih Birol, [email protected]

Amos Bromhead, [email protected]

Matthew Frank, [email protected]

Jung Lee, [email protected]

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___________________________________________________________________________

2011/SOM3/DIA/008 Session 3

Fuel Subsidy Policy in Indonesia

Submitted by: Indonesia

Policy Dialogue on Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform

San Francisco, United States23 September 2011

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10/12/2011

1

FUEL SUBSIDY POLICYFUEL SUBSIDY POLICY

Fiscal Policy Office Fiscal Policy Office –– Ministry of FinanceMinistry of Finance

FUEL SUBSIDY POLICYFUEL SUBSIDY POLICYIn IndonesiaIn Indonesia

San Fransisco,    23 September 2011

Outlines

1. General Information on fuel subsidy

2. Development of fuel subsidy budget

3 Policy of fuel subsidy3. Policy of fuel subsidy

4. LPG conversion program

5. Compensation program in reducing fuel subsidy in 2005 Fiscal stimulus and cash transfers 2009

2

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2

Fuel Subsidy

According to the Indonesian Budget Law, fuel subsidy defined as abudgetary allocation given to a company or institution that producesand/or sells the oil fuel and Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG), with thepurpose to provide access of energy at an affordable price forconsumers.

The fuel price is lower than the market price due to the application of administered price policy for premium, kerosene, and diesel.

Allocated directly through State Owned Enterprise/Company.

Problems:Problems:

• Volatility of raw fuel price makes domestic fuel price is also volatile• Fuel demand is still high.

3

Regulatory Framework on Fuel Subsidy

Law No.22/2001 on Oil and Gas

Govt Regulation No.36 /2004 on Downstream Oil and Gas

Presidential Decree No.55/2005 on retail domestic fuel prices and preceeding Presidential Decree No.9/2006

Regulation

4

Presidential Decree No.71/2005 on Provision and Distribution of Particular Type of Fuels

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3

Fuel Subsidy Calculation Formula

• Retail fuel price is the retail selling price per liter of fuel in domestic area.

• Tax is a Value Added Tax (PPN 10%) and Motor Vehicle Fuel Tax (PBBKB 5%).

• Reference price of fuel is calculated based on the MOPS price plus distribution costs and i

Fuel Subsidy :Fuel Subsidy := [Reference Price of Fuel = [Reference Price of Fuel -- (Retail Fuel Prices (Retail Fuel Prices -- Tax) ] x Fuel VolumeTax) ] x Fuel Volume

margins.

• Reference price of fuel = MOPS + α

α is the distribution cost + margin

MOPS (Mid Oil Platt’s Singapore) is the price on the stock sale and purchase transactions on the Singapore oil.

6.000

IDR/liter

Reference proce of fuel

5

0

4.500

MOPS Official Price Retail Price

VAT & PBBKB

Subsidy

THE RECIPIENTS OF SUBSIDIZED FUEL

Household Transportation

RECIPIENTS

Micro Industry Public Services

6Source: Presidential Decree No.9/2006

Fishery Industry

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4

Composition of Subsidized Fuel Consumption

Land transportation

Water transportation

= 1 %

household= 6%

Micro industry

Premium= 60 %M. Solar

= 34 %

Clusters of ConsumersType of Subsidized Fuel

GasolineDiesel

p= 89%

y= 1%

fishery= 3%

IBT = 10%

NTB dan NTT= 2% Sumatera

M. Tanah= 6%

Gasoline Consumption (Land Transportation)

Gasoline Consumption (by Region)

Motorcycle= 40%

Subsidized Subsidized Fuel Fuel 

ConsumptionConsumption

Kerosene

7

Sumatera Kota Besar

= 4%

Sumatera excKota Besar

= 18%

Kalimantan Kota Besar

= 2%Kalimantan exc Kota

Besar = 5%

Jawa – Bali = 59%

(Including Jabodetabek

18% from total or 30% from Jawa-

Bali)Private Car= 53%

Public= 3%

Business Car

= 4%Source : Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources 

BPH BPH MigasMigas

MinistryMinistryOf EnergyOf Energy

MinistryMinistryOf FinanceOf Finance

Determining of type and estimation of volume of subsidized fuel

Subsidized Fuel Budgeting Mechanism

Regulatory body for fuel and gas upstream activities

Of EnergyOf Energy

DPRDPR--RIRI

Proposing type and estimations of volume subsidized fuel FFinancinancialial Note Note

and and State State BudgetBudget

Calculation of estimated fuel subsidy based on some asumption and paramaters

Estimations of fuel subsidy

The ParliamentThe Parliament

Budget Budget LawLaw

Budget allocation for subsidized fuel

Amendment of budget allocation for subsidy fuelRevised Revised 

Budget Budget LawLaw

8

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5

Fuel Subsidy in State Budget

126.8

139.1

129.7 120.0

150.0

Trillion Rp

Gasoline Kerosene Diesel Gas

52.4

45.0

88.9 82.4

30.0

60.0

90.0

9

-Budget Revised

Audited Budget Revised

Audited Budget Revised

Audited Budget Revised

2008 2009 2010 2011

gas diesel kerosene gasoline

Fuel Subsidy Compared to  Others Subsidies, Central Government Expenditures, Total Expenditures, and GDP

40.0

60.0 

80.0 

100.0 

erce

ntag

e

20.0 

40.0 

2008 2009 2010 2011Revised Budget

Pe

PSO & Others Seeds & Fertilizer Food Electricity Fuel

20.0 

25.0 

age

10

5.0 

10.0 

15.0 

2008 2009 2010 2011Revised Budget

Per

cent

a

Total Exp. (%) Central Govt. Exp. (%) GDP (%)

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6

Volume of Subsidized Fuel Consumption, Year 2008 ‐ 2011 

38.2 37.4 38.240.5

40.0

50.0

Million KL

11.5 11.8 12.8 14.2

7.7 4.6 2.4 1.8

19.020.9 23.0 24.5

0.0

10.0

20.0

30.0

2008 2009 2010 2011 Revised Budget

11

Conversion program from kerosene to LPG since 2007 has reduced the volume of kerosene significantly from 10.0 million in kilo litters in 2006 to 1.8 million kilo litters in 2011.

Gasoline Kerosene Diesel

Commodities and Fuel Domestic Prices, 2003‐2010

Year 2003 2004 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

1Jan-31Des 1Jan-31Des 1Jan-1Oct 1Oct-31Des 1Jan-31Des 1Jan-31Des 1Jan-31Des 1Jan-31Des 1Jan-31Des

GASOLINE S S S S S S S S S

DIESEL S S S S S S S S S

2005

5 000

6.000 

7.000 

IDR

GASOLINE

DIESEL

KEROSENE S S S S S S S S S

DIESEL OIL FOR INDUSTRY

S S S NS NS NS NS NS NS

FUEL OIL S S S NS NS NS NS NS NS

12

1.000 

2.000 

3.000 

4.000 

5.000 

01-A

pr

01-Ju

n

17-Ja

n

01-Ja

n

21-Ja

n

01-Fe

b

01-Ja

n

03-Ja

n

01-O

ct

1Jan

-23 M

ay

24-M

ay

01-D

ec

15-D

ec

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2008 2009

DIESEL

KEROSENE

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7

Medium Term Expenditure Framework Fuel Subsidy

300.0

Trilion Rp

Electricity Subsidy Fuel Subsidy

88.9 82.4 95.9129.7 123.6

103.382.9

55.1 57.6 40.7

65.645.0

25.8

25.4

144.0 140.0 136.6

195.3

168.6

129.0

108.3

100.0

200.0

13

0.0

Rivised Budget

Realization Budget Rivised Budget

Proposed Budget

MTEF MTEF

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Fuel Subsidy Policy

Policy Implementation Reducing type of subsidized fuel in 2005 from 5 to 3 types by removing Diesel Oil for industry and

Fuel Oil (minyak bakar) from subsidy

Changing the subsidy payment mechanism from a cost and fee system to an alpha system (margin + distribution cost)

Continuing kerosene to LPG conversion program since 2007

Energy diversification (Gas for Bus and public transportation)

Retail fuel price rationalization

Improving the subsidized fuel distribution mechanism to enable the subsidy to be more targeted.

Policy 2011 Conversion of kerosene to LPG

Controlling the use of subsidized fuel through a closed distribution system, gradually and improving

14

the regulations

Increase the utilization of alternative energy (such as bio fuels)

The government has authority to make adjustments in subsidized fuel prices if the ICP within 1 year increased more than 10%

Subsidized bio-fuel at IDR2.000-per liters

Increasing Motor Vehicle Fuel Tax (PBBKB) by 5 percent.

Include motor vehicle fuel tax in the structure of fuel subsidy.

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8

Lower volume of

Decreasing energy intensity Rising fuel

i

Target Condition

Policy Framework for Phasing Out Fuel Subsidy

Lower volume of subsidized fuels

Minimum subsidy on fuels

Non-fuel diversified renewable energy sources

intensity

Provision of sufficient infrastructure and transport of fuel

Alleviating fuel subsidy along with compensating variation

Energy diversification

consumption

Fuel prices increases

Bottleneck domestic refineries

Restricting domestic fuel stock

Insufficient infrastructure of public

Fuel Subsidy Alleviation

15

publictransportation

Less consumption on non-fuel subsidy

Strategy

Current Condition

Fuel Subsidy Policy Reform, 2012 ‐ 2014

I. Policy 2012 ‐ 2014

Reducing the fuel subsidy gradually

Controlling the volume of subsidized fuel consumption through the control of subsidized fuel distribution especially for private carscontrol of subsidized fuel distribution, especially for private cars.This policy will start from Jawa and Bali, and finally all regions in Indonesia.

Increasing the subsidized fuel retail price

II. Earmaking saving from fuel subsidy reform

Cash Transfer

Infrastructure development

16

p

national and local roads,  train (Line north of Java, local cities including monorail). ports and airports (pioneer). urban transport system.  drinking water

Social development (health and urban environment).

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9

Impact of Impact of Kerosene to Kerosene to LPG LPG ConversionConversion

17%

100%

Kerosene Consumption LPG Consumption (energy equivalent)

74%83%

85%

51%

26%17%

40%

60%

80%

17

15%

49%

0%

20%

2008 2009 2010 2011 Revised Budget

Roadmap of Kerosene to LPG Conversion ProgramRoadmap of Kerosene to LPG Conversion Program

Up to 2007

• Kerosene used by majority households in Indonesia (9.9 million KL) and subsidized by Government (more than Rp 37 Trillion /year)

• LPG only used by 10% of households and more expensive than subsidized kerosene

2007 - 2009

• Government program : distribute 42 millions of conversion package to targeted households.

• Removing 2,069 million KL of kerosene and distribution of 19 million conversion package up to 2008.

• Removing 4,1 million KL of kerosene and

2010 forward…

• LPG will become major energy with estimated volume of 4.1 million tonnes/year.

• 6 million KL of kerosene will remove and only maintain 2 million KL.

Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam

Sumatera Utara

RiauKalimantan Timur

Sulawesi Utara

kerosene. gdistribution of 23 million conversion package up to 2009.T

Green area converted in 2009 with 23 million conversion

3

Sumatera Barat

Riau

Jambi

BengkuluLampung

Sumatera Selatan

Bangka Belitung

Kepulauan Riau

BantenJawa Barat

Jawa TengahDKI Jakarta

D.I. Yogyakarta Jawa Timur

Bali

Kalimantan Barat

Kalimantan TengahKalimantan Selatan

Nusa Tenggara Barat

SulawesiBarat

Sulawesi Tenggara

Nusa Tenggara Timur

Sulawesi Tengah

GorontaloSulawesi Utara

Maluku Utara

Maluku

Papua Irian Jaya Barat

Sulawesi SelatanRed area converted in 2007 and 2008 with 19 million conversion packages.

In 2007, 42 million conversion packages distributed in Java.

packages.

1 2

18Source : Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources

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10

Fuel Subsidy Reduction Compensation Program of 2005

The government raised fuel prices in March and October 2005 asthe result of high crude prices.

To mitigate the impact of rising fuel prices, the Governmentprovided compensation program for fuel subsidies reduction( l PKPS BBM) i th f f(namely PKPS-BBM), in the forms of:

Education (eq. School Operational Assistance/BOS andStudent Special Assistance /BKM)

Health (eq. basic health services, health care referrals, andother support services).

Rural infrastructure (roads, bridges, clean water, sanitation,boat moorings, basic irrigation system, and electricity supplyto isolated areas)

Direct Cash Transfers (BLT) for poor.

PKPS-BBM was allocated on the year of 2005 and 2006

Fiscal Stimulus Program, on 2009

In order to prevent the weakening of the domestic economy as the result ofthe global economic crisis, the Government provide countercycle policymeasures through fiscal stimulus, aiming of:

Increased purchasing power

Reducing personal income tax rates and broadening progressive taxg p g p grates, subsidies for cooking oil VAT, bio-fuels, for generic medicine.

Improved business competitiveness and durability

Reducing corporates and public companies income tax, subsidies forindustrial import duties, gas exploration tax, geothermal sales tax, article21 income tax, reducing diesel reail price, discount rates for electricityindustry, interest subsidy for water companies, and state equityinvestment to credit providers and guarantors.

I d l b i t i i f t t Improved labor-intensive infrastructure.

On the other hand, in order to maintain the purchasing power, Governmentallocates salary increases for civil servants and pensioners, paying 13th

salary, and two months of direct cash transfers.

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11

Changes in energy subsidies would have a very broad impact, including :

Inflation (first round effect and second round effect)

Poverty and Unemployment

Competitiveness industry

Impact of Changes in energy subsidies

Competitiveness industry

Economy growth

Fiscal sustainability

Energy sustainability

Therefore designed of a comprehensive subsidies reduction policy isneeded , including calculate the impact widely.

Subsidies reduction policy can be follow with compensation policy to the Subsidies reduction policy can be follow with compensation policy to thetarget communities or certain industries to reduce the negative impact

In developing economy such as Indonesia, the implementaition of thesubsidies reduction policy will strongly influenced by political policy

21

39.3037.17

34.9632.53

31.02 30.0230

35

40

The Number of Poor and Poverty Rate2006 ‐2011 

Although some macroeconomic indicators are still strong, the poverty rate in Indonesia has decreased slowly, as not as we hope....

17.75 16.58 15.4214.15 13.33 12.49

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Jml Penduduk Miskin (juta org) Tingkat Kemiskinan (%)

• The poverty rate in 2006 was high enough because of the fuel price’s increasing.• Since 2006, the number of poor and poverty rate has decreased.• During March 2010‐March 2011, the number of poor decreased from 31.02 million people to 30.02million people, and the poverty rate decreased from 13.33% to 12.49%.

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12

2005‐06 Gejolak Harga Pangan & BBM 2008 Gejolak Harga Pangan Harga pangan dan berasmeningkat tajamsebelum panen

Kemiskinan naikhampir 2 percentage 

points

The Fluctuation of food and fuel prices in the last six years in Indonesia could potentially increase the number of poor people ....

23

Source: BPS

Thank YouThank You

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13

Differentiation between fuel subsidy price and Economical Price

9,000 

10,000 IDR/Ltr

Gasoline Economic Price

Diesel Economic Price

Gasoline and Diesel Subsidies

P t

4,500 4,000 

5,000 

6,000 

7,000 

8,000  Pertamax

25

Gap between economical price and fuel subsidized price is getting wider. as the impact of the rising world oil prices

3,000 

Jan'10 Mar Mei Juli Sept Nop Jan'11 Mar Mei Juli Sept**

• Transform price subsidy to direct subsidy• Social Safety Net to shield the vulnerable

Compensating

Mid-Term Development Plan Fuel Subsidy Phase-out Strategy(According to Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources)

Social Safety Net to shield the vulnerable society (the poor)

a. Energy diversificationb. Closed distribution systemc. Incentive and disincentive fiscal

Reduction of Fuel

Subsidy

Variance

Less Volume of Subsidized

Fuels

a. Minimizing fuel distribution cost b. Full cost absorption of fuel provisionc. Effective targeting and costing of fuels

subsidy

Fuel Price Reference

26

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14

Sep ' 05 Okt ' 05 Apr ' 06 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Rumah Tangga S S S S SUsaha Mikro S S S S S

Industri NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS

Transportasi S S S S SPerikanan NS NS S S S

Pengguna BBMTahap VII Stage VIII

S/Tutup 1

Premium

S/Closed 2

S/Tutup 1S/Tutup 1

S/Closed 2

S/Tutup 1

Tahap V Tahap VI

Minyak tanahS/Closed 2

S/Closed 2

Challenge : The Implemention of Fuel Subsidy Roadmap 

Perikanan NS NS S S SIndustri NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS

Transportasi S S S S SPerikanan S S S S S

Industri NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS

Industri Pelayaran NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS

Industri Pelayaran NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS

Transportasi Udara NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS

S S b idi

S/Tutup 1 S/Closed 2

S/Tutup 1

Avtur

Minyak Tanah Untuk Industri Pelayaran

Solar untuk Industri Pelayaran

S/Tutup 1 S/Closed 2

Solar

S/Closed 2

S = SubsidiNS = Non SubsidiS/Tutup 1 = Uji coba penataan (2009-2010)S/closed 2

1. To decrease the state budget burden, the phasing out of fuel subsidy will be done gradually through the limitation of fuel volume.

2. Implement the diversification of energy conversion of kerosene to LPG and the provision of non-fuel fuel

3. Implement a closed distribution system for certain users.

4. The diversion of Price Subsidy to Direct Subsidy and Social Assistance through the strengthening of poverty reduction programs.

27

• To maintain the good and service price stability, to protect the lower income of society, to increase the agricultural production, and to give insentif for business and

Medium Term Subsidy Policy Direction

community.

• Redesign of subsidiy : Price Subsidy Targeted SubsidyDirect subsidy and/or closed subidy according to the targeted

receivers. Supported by a better population database.

R i l G t t d t h l i th• Regional Governments are expected to help in the supervision of subsidy distribution to minimize the leakage and to have a more targeted subsidy.

28

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15

The implementation of administered price policy has increased inflation rate in Indonesia….

6 5%

7.5%

8.5%

9.5%

16%

18%

20% mtmyoy Inflasi yoy (LHS) inflasi mtm (RHS)

1 & 15 Des 2008 : Penurunan

1 Okt 2005 : Kenaikan hargaBBM bersubsidi + 92% 

15 Jan 2009 : Penurunan harga

0 5%

1.5%

2.5%

3.5%

4.5%

5.5%

6.5%

4%

6%

8%

10%

12%

14%1 & 15 Des 2008 : Penurunanharga BBM bersubsidi + 4 & 11% 

15 Jan 2009 : Penurunan harga BBM bersubsidi +8% 

1 Juli 2010 : KenaikanTarif Dasar Listrik

+10%

1 Mar 2005 : Kenaikanharga BBM bersubsidi +

23%  24 Mei 2008 : Kenaikan harga BBM bersubsidi +31% 

Sumber: BPS

‐0.5%

0.5%

2%

4%

2004 … F M A MJ J A S O N D

2005  … F M A MJ J A S O N D

2006  … F M A MJ J A S O N D

2007  … F M A MJ J A S O N D

2008  … F M A MJ J A S O N D

2009  … F M A MJ J A S O N D

2010  … F M A MJ J A S O N D

2011  … F M A

Although the increase of subsidized fuel price and the electricity tariff impact significantly to the inflation rate, the implementation of these policy will have minimal impact if done when the inflation rate has historically been relatively low (such as the period from March to April during the main harvest and after the Idul Fitri)

29

In general, inflation rate in Indonesia is still high. August inflation was 0,93% (mtm),4,79% (yoy) and 2,69% (ytd) mainly driven by the increase of food prices which gave the highest contribution 0,24% (mtm). Gold prices pushed the core inflation up to 5,15% (yoy).

Monthly and Yearly Inflation

2.010.0(%)(%)

Inflasi Tahunan (yoy, LHS)

I fl i K l tif ( td LHS)

Yearly Inflation (yoy, LHS)820 (%)(%)

4.79

2.69

0.93

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

4.0

6.0

8.0

Inflasi Kumulatif (ytd, LHS)

Inflasi Bulanan (mtm,RHS)

Cumulative Inflation (ytd, LHS)

Monthly Inflation (mtm, LHS)

2.69

5.64

5.15

3

4

5

6

7

0

5

10

15

Source: BPS

30

‐0.5

0.0

‐2.0

0.0

J‐09

M‐09

M‐09

J‐09

S‐09

N‐09

J‐10

M‐10

M‐10

J‐10

S‐10

N‐10

J‐11

M‐11

M‐11

J‐11

0

1

2

‐10

‐5

J‐09

M‐09

M‐09

J‐09

S‐09

N‐09

J‐10

M‐10

M‐10

J‐10

S‐10

N‐10

J‐11

M‐11

M‐11

J‐11

Adm Volatile  Core

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10/12/2011

16

Indonesia growth remains strong in Q2 2011

GDP Growth (%)

9.5

1.60.70.8

3.4

0.5

6.5 

Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2

2010 2011

AS Inggris Italia Korea Selatan Cina Singapura IndonesiaUS UK Italy South Korea China Singapore

• Some economies experienced slowing GDP growth compared to Q2‐2010.

• Indonesia GDP growth in Q2-2011 was 6.5% or higher than Q2 2010 of 6.1%.

31Source: Statistic Bureau (BPS) & Bloomberg

AS Inggris Italia Korea Selatan Cina Singapura IndonesiaUS UK Italy South Korea China Singapore

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___________________________________________________________________________

2011/SOM3/DIA/006 Session 3

Managing Subsidy Reform in the Context of Sustainable Development

Submitted by: World Bank

Policy Dialogue on Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform

San Francisco, United States23 September 2011

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M i b id f M i b id f Managing subsidy reform Managing subsidy reform in the context of sustainable development in the context of sustainable development

Maria Vagliasindi, Lead EconomistMaria Vagliasindi, Lead EconomistEnergy Energy Anchor,WorldAnchor,World BankBank

Prepared for the Prepared for the APEC High Level Policy Dialogue APEC High Level Policy Dialogue on Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reformson Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reforms

September 23rd 2011

OutlineOutline

i.i. MethodologyMethodology

ii. Key Policy Questionsii. Key Policy Questions

iii. Summary Resultsiii. Summary Results

Have energy subsidy reforms managed to avoid adverse social Have energy subsidy reforms managed to avoid adverse social impacts?impacts?

iv. Lessons learnediv. Lessons learned

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MethodologyMethodology

Sample Selection for Case Studies AnalysisSample Selection for Case Studies Analysis

Net Energy Importer Net Energy Exporter

Low and Lower

Middle Income

Group AGroup A Group CGroup CAFR Ghana Ghana NigeriaNigeriaEAP IndonesiaIndonesiaECA Armenia, Armenia, MoldovaMoldova AzerbaijanAzerbaijan

MNA MoroccoMorocco, , JordanJordan EgyptEgypt, , IranIran, Yemen, Yemen

SAR India, India, PakistanPakistan

Upper-Middle

and High

Income

Group BGroup B Group DGroup DEAP Malaysia Malaysia ECA TurkeyTurkey

LACChile, Dominican Rep., Chile, Dominican Rep.,

PeruPeru Argentina, Argentina, MexicoMexico

Source: World Bank’s Background Paper

Have energy subsidy reforms managed to avoid Have energy subsidy reforms managed to avoid adverse social impacts?adverse social impacts?

To address such a question need to look at evidence from To address such a question need to look at evidence from household surveyhousehold survey

patterns of consumption of the different fuels, patterns of consumption of the different fuels, by quintiles or decilesby quintiles or deciles

implications for the direct and indirect impact implications for the direct and indirect impact of the removal of subsidiesof the removal of subsidies by the average consumerby the average consumer by different quintiles or decilesby different quintiles or deciles

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a)Patterns of consumption of the different fuelsa)Patterns of consumption of the different fuels

Kerosene is used for lighting and heating, especially in low income economies where households do not have access to electricity.The share of income spent on kerosene accounts for the poorest quintile up to 6 times more than for the richest quintile.

Kerosene Expenditure (% income), between top and bottom quintileKerosene Expenditure (% income), between top and bottom quintile6 times more than for the richest quintile.

Source: World Bank’s Background Paper

a) Patterns of consumption of the different fuels (a) Patterns of consumption of the different fuels (ctdctd))

G li E dit (% i ) b t t d b tt i tilG li E dit (% i ) b t t d b tt i til

Gasoline which is used in internal combustion engines is mainly spent by the richer quintile who consumes 10 to 20 times more than the poorest quintile.

Gasoline Expenditure (% income), between top and bottom quintileGasoline Expenditure (% income), between top and bottom quintile

Source: World Bank’s Background Paper

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a)Patterns of consumption of the different fuels (a)Patterns of consumption of the different fuels (ctdctd))

Electricity Expenditure (% income), by top and bottom quintileElectricity Expenditure (% income), by top and bottom quintile

Electricity is more important for the bottom quintile, with few notable exceptions.

y p ( ), y p qy p ( ), y p q

Source: World Bank’s Background Paper

b) Welfare Impact of Removing Fuel Subsidiesb) Welfare Impact of Removing Fuel Subsidies

Welfare Impact of Removing Fuel Subsidies (% loss in real income) Welfare Impact of Removing Fuel Subsidies (% loss in real income)

Source: Del Granado et al (2010)

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b) Welfare Impact of Removing Fuel Subsidiesb) Welfare Impact of Removing Fuel Subsidies

Welfare Impact of fossil fuel subsidy removal in Malaysia, by quintilesWelfare Impact of fossil fuel subsidy removal in Malaysia, by quintiles

Source: Del Granado et al (2010)

Source: Moradkani et al. (2010) based on Household Expenditure Survey (2005)

What What alternative alternative instruments instruments can be used to reach the can be used to reach the poor?poor?

The most recent CGE literature consider the results of“recycling” at least some of the savings coming fromreduction of subsidies through alternative policies.g p

In most of the cases, fossil fuel subsidy removal has adverseeconomic and social impacts. Incidence of poverty issignificantly lower where the subsidy removal does notinclude kerosene, supporting the evidence that among fossilfuel subsidies they are the most “progressive”.

To mitigate and offset the negative impact on the economy,the re-allocation of given percentage of the subsidy to thepoor through cash transfer have proven to be effective.

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Unconditional cash transfer (Indonesia)Unconditional cash transfer (Indonesia)

Welfare Impact of Removing Energy SubsidiesWelfare Impact of Removing Energy Subsidies(% increase in urban and rural poverty) in Indonesia(% increase in urban and rural poverty) in Indonesia

Soure: Yusuf (2008)

Scenarios 1.A and 1.B. report the 2005 package of reforms without or with the increase in the price of kerosene; Scenarios 2. A represent the 2005 package of reform together with an untargeted cash transfer (UCT). Scenarios 2B and 2C introduce a targeted cash transfer, with different degree of effectiveness (100% and 75%). Scenarios 3. A and 3.B introduce subsidy to targeted household for spending on education and health (in the same amount of the UCT) with and without the 2005 package of reform

The case of targeted cash transfer (Argentina)The case of targeted cash transfer (Argentina)

Welfare Impact of Removing Energy Subsidies (% loss in real income) in ArgentinaWelfare Impact of Removing Energy Subsidies (% loss in real income) in Argentina

(a) without cash transfers (b) with cash transfers(a) without cash transfers (b) with cash transfers

Source: Benitez and Chisari (2010)Note: P1-P5 refers to the 5 years period after the simulation of the tariff increase in 2006

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Lessons learnedLessons learned

1.1. Strengthening social safety nets and improving the targeting Strengthening social safety nets and improving the targeting mechanisms for subsidies: mechanisms for subsidies:

a)a) lifeline tariffslifeline tariffsb)b) geographical or sociogeographical or socio--economic targeting and subsidies economic targeting and subsidies

to enhance access to enhance access c)c) cash transfers cash transfers

2.2. Informing the public and announcing oneInforming the public and announcing one--off compensatory off compensatory measuresmeasures

33 E i th S t i bilit f S b id P li th h E i th S t i bilit f S b id P li th h 3.3. Ensuring the Sustainability of Subsidy Policy through Ensuring the Sustainability of Subsidy Policy through Broader Broader SectoralSectoral Reforms Reforms

1. Strengthening social safety nets and improving the 1. Strengthening social safety nets and improving the targeting mechanisms for subsidies: a) lifeline tariffs targeting mechanisms for subsidies: a) lifeline tariffs

Targeting mechanisms and methods for identifying those eligible for the subsidy program can vary, depending on the degree of coverage as well as the extent to which different programs are progressive, determining trade-offs between different solutionsbetween different solutions

Source: Komives et al. (2007)

In the case of lifeline tariffs while they offer the advantage of much higher coverage in middle income economies than other existing targeted programs, but they entail a relatively high cost of implementation

Source: World Bank’s Background Paper

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b) Geographical or sociob) Geographical or socio--economic targeting economic targeting

One approach to improve the targeting performance of electricity subsidies is to use of geographical or socio-economic targeting variables

An alternative approach is to replace consumption subsidies withconnection subsidies. Simulations show that connection subsidies designedto reach a majority of un-served population living in areas connected to thegrid are superior to consumption subsidies and in most of the cases are alsoprogressive

Source: Komives et al. (2007)

c) Cash Transfers c) Cash Transfers

Oportunidades is Mexico’s main anti-poverty government program usingcash transfers to households linked to regular school attendance andhealth clinic visits and in 2007 an energy component was added

Cash transfers have been found in general to be progressive, vis-à-vissubsidies which are highly regressive. However, the implementation oftargeted transfers can be challenging. Their effectiveness and efficiencydepend on the targeting method and administrative capacity.

Source: ENIGH (2008)

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9

2. Informing the public and announcing 2. Informing the public and announcing oneone--off compensatory measuresoff compensatory measures

Governments need to ensure public trust in the reformagenda through broad communication, appropriate timing

f b id l d i l i fof subsidy removal, and implementation of compensatorysocial policies.

While developing social safety nets is important to ensurethat consumers can cope with higher prices successfully inthe long run, tariff and fuel price increases may need to beaccompanied by immediate short term measures toaccompanied by immediate short-term measures toaddress any acute impacts of subsidy reform

Informing the public and announcing oneInforming the public and announcing one--off compensatory off compensatory measuresmeasures

In JordanJordan, the minimum wage was increased, with low-paidgovernment employees receiving higher wage increases than otheremployees as palliative measures, largely regarded as successful inemployees as palliative measures, largely regarded as successful indealing with price increases. An electricity lifeline tariff for thoseusing less than 160 kWh per month was kept. A one off compensationfor the non poor was also implemented. Along with subsidy reform,measures aimed at fuel substitution and energy efficiency were alsoimplemented.

In the case of GhanaGhana, budget savings from fuel subsidies were directedd d l bltowards transparent and easily monitorable poverty mitigation. In

addition, planned investment in the provision of mass urban transportexpansion was expedited and the existing rural electrification systemwas expanded.

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3. Ensuring the Sustainability of Subsidy Policy through 3. Ensuring the Sustainability of Subsidy Policy through Broader Broader SectoralSectoral Reforms Reforms

Where the quality of electricity services is low, engaging in broaderreforms to improve service ahead of reforming energy subsidies lendscredibility and improves consumer willingness to pay theunsubsidized prices.

Steps such as improvingimproving metering,metering, billingbilling andand paymentpayment collectioncollection,and enhancement of quality of service can make tariff increases moreacceptable as subsidies are removed.

ImprovingImproving energyenergy efficiencyefficiency will also help to reduce the potentialsocial costs of removing subsidies to consumers.

More generally, rationalizing the fuel mix for electricity and transportand discouraging private transport in favor of public transport canand discouraging private transport in favor of public transport canhelp support reforms, as will the prioritization of structural expensesthat benefit the poor (including sectoral road and rural electrificationschemes, but also social expenditure, including health andeducation).

Thank you!Thank you!

Let us know how we can best help you in your Let us know how we can best help you in your effort to implement subsidy reformseffort to implement subsidy reforms