forgotten predecessors: the russian conservative historians of the french revolution

International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society, VoL 9, No. 1, 1995

IL Mirrors on the Past: Visions and Revisions Alter the Cold War

Forgotten Predecessors: The Russ ian Conservat ive Histor ians of the French Revolut ion

Dmitry Shlapentokh

MIRRORS OF HISTORY: THE UNITED STATES AND U.S.S.R.

Long before the final collapse of the Soviet Union and the resulting global political readjustment, the ideological trends of what could be called the post-Cold War era were visible. In the West most of these trends could be dubbed as a shift to the "right" or, to be more precise, toward "conservatism." The American brand of this movement implied a more strict adherence to the basic premises of liberal free market capitafism and political pluralism, a "conserving" of the philosophical principles of the found- ing fathers, the American variant of the Enlightenment. Moreover, the philosophy, a legacy of the eighteenth century, not only incorporated the traditions of rationalism, but it also supported a linear vision of history, which in a sort of oversimplified manner could be described thusly: The goal of all humanity is a march toward political pluralism ("freedom") and a market economy. One might suggest, then, that America more than any other country in the West had preserved the premises of the liberal philosophy of the eighteenth century and that its push to the fight mostly implied a political "restorationism" rather than conservatism.

However, the case in Europe, both West and East, was altogether different. There, the push to the right implied not a movement toward liberal capitalism, but a movement toward authoritarianism in its various forms. Conservative thought in Europe was hardly a return to a universalist vision of history in the context of the philosophical legacy of the eighteenth century, but rather an absorption of the heritage of post-modernism, which at one time had leftist rather than rightist implications. Modernism and especially post-modernism had already abandoned the universalist vision of history and the idea that there might be a cohesive pattern to political

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phenomena with the various social groups playing the most important role (and here Marxism and the eighteenth century vision of history were viewed similarly). In the context of post-modernism, the historical process was regarded as chaotic, as resisting any tenet of sociological explanation. This anti-sociological drive, so to speak, of post-modernist thought was incorporated into European conservative thought, making it an altogether different phenomenon than American conservatism.

Although they took their final shape in the post-Cold War era, the new ideological trends had emerged in Europe, both East and West, long before. For example, France was one of the most intellectually sensitive nations of the West and, more than any other country, responsive to the new ideological trends. France was one of the hotbeds of leftist radicalism, yet at the same time it became one of the first countries where conservative ideology became enmeshed in post-modernism. No less important, French history, precisely the French Revolution, whose image later was incorporated into the image of the Bolshevik Revolution, was traditionally the ideological battleground for these conflicting schools of thought.

By the late 1960's-1970's, the study of the French Revolution had led to the emergence of "revisionists" whose interpretation of the event put them sharply at odds with the left and, consequently, their interpretations of the French Revolution. They include: Francois Furet in France, 1 Richard Cobb in England 2 and lately Simon Schama 3 in the USA. (While teaching at Harvard and Columbia, Schama was trained in England and thus could be described as a European historian, rather than American.)

"Revisionism" has mostly emerged, not as an attack on the revolution per se, but as an attack against the left's interpretation of the French Revo- lution. The main point here was to demonstrate the uselessness of the radical stage of the revolution in the final victory of the principles of "1789." It was an attempt to disentangle "1789" (i.e., the liberal principles of the revolution) from "1793" and to prove that "1793" was nothing but a sort of aberration of the historical process.

Although the "revisionists" initial intention was not to discard the French Revolution as a force which had contributed greatly in shaping Western civilization, the logic of deconstructing, i.e., divorcing of "1789" from "1793," led to the decomposition of the French Revolution as a phenomenon, and even more so to the decoustmcting of the historical process per se.

The deconstrnction started as a disentanglement of one chronological chain from the other on the basis of denying their historical connections, for example, that "1793" was in many respects the logical outcome of "1789." First, it was a sort of "ideological" or, to be precise, a politico- ideological explanation for the radicalization of the revolution. According

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to this interpretation, the drive for an ideal society, for utopia, the essential element of the philosophical paradigms of the Enlightenment, had pushed revolutionary development beyond the confinements of the liberal principles of "1789." The revolutionary drive for the creation of a harmonious society had faced the resistance of reality, and the reaction resulted in the creation of the machinery of terror and the traditions of violence which became an integral dement of French political culture.

These traditions explain the chain of revolution upheavals which shook France. "Political Culture," as a distinct mode of political behavior, emerged as independent from social forces. All of these references--to the role of utopian ideologies, the role of violence in the shaping of political culture and finally the stressing of the independence of the political culture from the social forces beneath the surface--were implicit attacks on the traditional interpretations of the French Revolution (traditionally dominated mostly by liberal and leftist historians). They also ran counter not only to the very essence of Marxism and its idea that political development depended upon the social-economic basis of society, but also to the legit- imization for the Bolshevik idea that communism was the future of humanity. However, the loosing of the ties that bound revolutionary upheaval to an economic basis was the most important part of the revisionists' para- digm, for it provided the final blow to legitimacy of any revolution as the inevitable result of class conflicts.

The French Revolution and implicitly the Bolshevik Revolution was disjointed and in various ways its stages lacked any horizontal cohesiveness. The revolutionary regime also lost its vertical cohesiveness, in the sense that every segment of society became independent from each other. The revolution became a conglomerate of almost independent fragments, from both chronological and structural points of view. The operational law of each of these segments became questionable and, consequently, put the existence of any operational model under question. Thus, it is not surprising that, in this situation, the subjective elements of the historical process became crucially important. Indeed the idea of the ideal society, so important as the driving force of revolutionary development, was a product of the creative minds of a few individuals. Debunkment of the monarchy and the following radicalization of the revolutionary violence was not much caused by the "objective," i.e., social economic conflicts of the French society, but rather was caused by the liberalism of the king and the elite in general. This "subjectivization" of the historical process in general and the revolutionary process in particular might explain why some of the leading "revisionists," e.g., Schama, had a strong penchant to make their writings on the French Revolution a sort of historical novel with often free unstructured narration.

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In their deconstructivist drive, the European "revisionists" certainly aimed to destroy the leftist paradigms of the revolution and implicitly the theoretical justifications of the Soviet regime. Though they certainly pro- fessed their adherence to the principles of 1789, their conclusion was that these principles would have been better preserved if there had been no revolution at all; it would have been better if everything had been done in the context of the French monarchy. As a matter of fact, the last French king was blamed not so much for his toughness as for his liberalism. It was implied that it was the king's liberalism which was certainly responsible for the future calamities.

Some of the "revisionists" implicitly suggested that a moderate authoritarian regime would have been the best solution for eighteenth century France. The contemporary political implication was that the "revisionists" might also opt for strong executive power and would have some reserva- tions about the applicability of the notion of the popular will. In short, the "revisionists" would rather cling to conservative elitism and were merely one step short of moderate authoritarianism. While most "revisionists" would see their approach to the French Revolution as being quite innova- tive, their approach, however, had its predecessors. They include not only those who could be easily discernible in the West, such as the European Taine, but also Russian precursors as well. Indeed, while the achievement of the Russian school of the study of the French Revolution has been acknowledged for a long time, historians paid attention only to the school of liberal representatives such as Ivan V. Luchitsky, Maksim Maksimovich Kovalevsky, and Nikolai Ivanovich Kareev. At the same time the work of the conservative historians of the French Revolution are almost unknown. At the same time their works are interesting not only because they demonstrated that many of the "revisionist" ideas had been known a long time before, but also, and this is from our point of view, the most important indicator of the deeply situated common cultural trend which Russians and West Europeans shared.

In our essay we deal with two prominent Russian conservative historians of the French Revolution: Liubimov and Ger'e. While Liubimov was on the extreme right of the political spectrum, Ger'e was more moderate in his political philosophy. Both of these historians had incorporated the image of the French Revolution into the political context of late imperial Russia. Alexander the Second played with the idea of establishing a sort of advisory body to the crown in the last years of his n~e. The persistence of the liberal opposition, revolutionary activity, revolutionary terror and the glamorous vision of the revolutionaries as personalities and revolution as event--all of these were of deep concern to the conservative intellectuals. Their political opponents had often turned to the French Revolution to

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buttress their arguments. Consequently, the conservatives also employed the examples of the past to prove their points. All of them shared a strong dislike of the revolution and believed that it could have been easily avoided through a tough approach to the opposition, and they shared an infatuation with the conservative and fight-wing historians of the West and a corollary dislike of the leftist and liberal historians of the French Revolution. While having a lot in common with each other, the two historians were, never- theless, different from each other in the major thrust of their arguments. For Liubimov the French Revolution was due to the stupidity and moral rottenness of both the liberal elite and the revolutionaries along with a misplaced idealization of democracy. In Russia, he saw an additional danger: the glamorous image of the French Revolution because of the popularity of the leftist and liberal historians of the French Revolution.

Ger'e's approach to the French Revolution was somewhat different from Liubimov. His main onslaught was not against liberals, but rather radicals. Ger'e's image of the opposition was more complicated than Liubi- mov's. Ger'e hardly spared the radicals as individuals, yet he also pointed out that their intention to be engaged in the revolution was in many cases a result of their idealized vision of post-revolutionary society.

THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF NIKOLAI A. LIUBIMOV

Nikolai A. Liubimov began teaching physics at the age of 22 at Mos- cow University. 4 Toward the end of his life, together with Mikhail N. Katkov (1818-1887), also a conservative Westernizer, 5 he edited the Russian Mes- senger and published numerous works on politics and history. He was quite close to Katkov and could be called his "alter ego."

By fighting the subversives, he antagonized not only his liberal colleagues, but also several senators and ministers of public education. Yet he secured the protection of Konstantin Pobedonostsev (1827-1807), Kat- kov and later, of Alexander III. Protected by their blessing, Liubimov not only secured his teaching position, but also made further advances. He was appointed Minister for Public Education and in this position, participated with other reactionaries in suppressing the student movement. Liubimov died in 1896.

In order to stigmatize Russian leftists and liberals, whom Liubimov associated with the French, Liubimov attempted to discredit the works of liberal and leftist historians of the French Revolution. At the same time, he presented rightist historians of the French Revolution as people who displayed the real picture of revolutionaries and revolution. During the reign of Alexander II, Alexander III and the first part of Nicolas II (until

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the 1905 revolution), the tsarist government made attempts to prevent the publication of undesirable works. Despite the government's efforts, however, the works of leftists and liberal historians such as Blanc, Michelet, Mignet and Thiera were extremely popular. 6

The butt of Liubimov's criticism of liberal historians was their inability to understand the link between liberal and radical stages of the French Revolution. From this point of view, liberal historians of the Revolution glamorized French liberals as people of political wisdom. Criticizing the liberal approach, Liubimov quoted the German historian K. Hillebrand, who did not appreciate the achievements of the liberal school. Hillebrand sarcastically wrote that the liberal school of historians of the French Revo- lution liked to claim that the "movement of 1789 was full of wisdom and magnanimity in its goals, and it was only the Convention which directed it in the wrong direction."

Furthermore, liberal historians did not understand that "it was during the first years of the revolution that the fatal break with the old order was made, under the influence of passion and pre-conceived theories, "7 that it was the principles of 1789 which gave rise to the principles of 1793. It was the liberal government which caused the emergence of the despotic and terroristic Jacobin regime.

Liubimov came to the conclusion that neither French liberal and leftist historians nor Russian liberals and leftists approached the French Revolu- tion objectively. Liberals and leftists of all countries attempted to "adjust" historical accounts to suit the social illusions they cherished, as though to plead: "We want to be comforted. Even if we are deceived, we demand from the doctor not only the diagnosis, but therapy for the disease--even if there is no remedy--and we expect a favorable prognosis from the doctor as well. "s

Writers in the Russian Messenger supported Liubimov's vision of leftist and liberal historians of the French Revolution. Some Russian Messenger authors, however, appreciated Laimartine's moderatism 9 and Michelet's condemnation of the excess of terror. Yet despite these positive remarks about leftist and liberal historians of the French Revolution, they generally approached them with criticism. According to many contributors, Michelet's history of the French Revolution "marked a decay in his talents as a historian."10

According to them, L. Blanc's glamorous image of the Revolution and the revolutionaries was erroneous. The reason for this was twofold. First, Blanc was himself deceived by his sources, not understanding that they had been falsified by the French revolutionaries, n Second, he openly falsified his sources further in order to present revolutionaries as impeccable per- sons.


Similar to Blanc in his erroneous interpretation of the French Revo- lution, Thiers "lamented the tyrannical government of the Convention and the criminal terror, yet he recognized their 'necessity' and presented his work so as to demonstrate his view that, for all its heinousness, the tyranny could be justified since it saved France. "12 The Russian Messenger authors protested how wrong these writers all were, and how terrible were the im- mediate consequences of the Revolution.

Whereas leftist and liberal historians of the French Revolution created glamorous images of the Revolution and revolutionaries, Sybel, Taine and Mortimer-Temaux, rightist historians, presented quite a different picture. They labeled French liberals and radicals as a stupid and base people and their political theories as wrong. Taine and Sybel also condoned the harsh repression of the opposition. Liubimov and his Russian Messenger appreciated such an approach to the revolution and revolutionaries and they did their best to uphold the scholarly prestige of rightist historians and de- fended them against their critics.

Mortimer-Temaux was one of the first French historians who studied the archives. In the History of the Terror, he was one of the first historians to approach terror from a negative point of view. Of course, writers from Russian Messenger pointed out the work was trustworthy. 13

H. Sybel, one of the most serious historians of the French revolution, was the author of one of the first books by a Western historian to be translated into Russian. 14 However, the book was translated by leftist translators who falsified it. Liubimov rose to protest this falsification, writing that these translators had written virtually a new book, which had nothing to do with the original. As a result of the translator's work, "many parts of the book were erased completely, others were distorted, and finally, all the translation was bestrewed with incongruous commentaries in which the interpret- ers approached the famous author with ridiculous arrogance. "15

This was not all. Ososov and Putiata, the translators, wrote that they were "tired of checking Sybel and correcting his faulty judgment every- where," and that they were going to "publish a special book in which they would present all of their objections. ''16 They pointed out that the book would prove that the German historian did not understand "the ideals of the workers" (chemorabochie idealy). Sybel did not understand the ideals of the future when the "very nature of capitalists would be changed so much that they would feel it uncomfortable and undesirable to keep their capital for themselves." Liubimov ironically mentioned that "to the regret of all lovers of amusing reading," this book had not yet been published. 17

Sybel's original text, despite its conservative backbone, could hardly be used for the propagation of anti-revolutionary ideas. The reason for this was the historian's heavy style and his German origin--his anti-revolution-

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ary barbs could have been interpreted as part of the traditional German- French rivalry.

Taine's "Origin of Contemporary France" changed the situation in several ways. is It was openly anti-revolutionary, rejecting not only elements of the Revolution and some of its stages, but revolution per se. Though a scholarly work, it was written in a vivid and picturesque style. The book was an event in the Western historiography of the French Revolution and "introduced into Revolutionary historiography an attack more powerful than any since Burke," and his historiography had great influence on his generation in France.

One would assume that he was under the direct influence of Taine's work when Gobineau wrote that his contemporaries had begun to reevalu- ate their approach to the French Revolution. They came to the conclusion that "Terror led to slavery, the directory to theft, the empire to servi- t u d e . . . - 1 9 One could judge "Paine's popularity by the fact that right-wing and conservative intellectuals often appealed to Taine, even to support anti- Semitism.

AI~ the rightist writers from Russian Messenger awaited the publication of Taine's work with great interest, 2° but Taine's influence over Liubimov was among the strongest, and he became one of Taine's most ardent sup- porters. 21 In general, Russian Messenger published positive articles about Taine, albeit with some exceptions. 22 Liubimov, while praising Taine's book, explained why, in France, it was "stained by liberal opinion," and labeled a counterrevolutionary pamphlet, z3 The reason for this was simple. Taine argued that the events of 1793, with all their terror, provided a logical continuation of 1789. Long before the writings of Taine, a similar approach to the Revolution could be found in Sybel's History of the Revolution ("Ceschichte der Revolutionzeit"). Yet, the French did not regard this book as solid, scientific work. Rambaue, a "cautious and sober-minded writer," reviewed the German historian's book as a "pamphlet directed against the grandeur and glory of the French people. ''z4

Taine, however, was no German who might be suspected of bias in observing the French Revolution. He was a native Frenchman reaching similar conclusions Such "treachery" may not have been appreciated. "Paine antagonized not only French liberals and leftists, but Russian liberals and leftists as well, for the same reason: ~ n e simply destroyed their illusions regarding their approaches to Russia's current political life.

Liubimov offered an explanation as to why the appearance of Taine's book created so much alarm among the Russian leftists and liberals in his book, Downfall of the Monarchy in France. One of the first monographs on the French Revolution published in Russia, it was originally published in Russkii Vestnik, under the title 'gtgainst the Current," and reappeared as a


separate brochure before it was finally enlarged to the size of a monograph. The conservative intellectual, Fedor M. Dostoevsky, for example, gave the work accolades, z5 The editorial staff of Russkii Vestnik pointed out that the articles '9~gainst the Current" were a sensation, even while its leftist critic tried not to mention the articles at all.

Russian liberals pointed to what they saw as major problems in Russia, problems insolvable through violent revolutions, but not through reforms. Reforms, they assumed, provided an alternative to the revolutionary catas- trophe. Thus, they believed that the French autocracy of the late eighteenth century could have averted their own downfall by making concessions to the opposition. According to Liubimov, Taine demonstrated that revolution could never be prevented in this way. Once one concession was made, all the other steps to the revolution were set into motion. Thus, reforms in- evitably culminated in destructive revolution. Liubimov continued that Rus- sian leftists could by no means be satisfied with Taine's work, given their views of revolution and revolutionaries. He noted sarcastically that:

Virtue, honesty and other good qualities are the essential characteristics of the leftist's self-image. This ideology might contain errors, even horrible errors with terrible consequences, but the motivation for these errors is noble. The changes should take place and the obstacles should be obliterated. Whether these changes should be implemented by all means possible, as the more impassioned suggest, or step- by-step, as the more moderate suggest, can be discussed: yet the essence of the proposal remains the same. ~

According to Liubimov, Taine destroyed the romantic and idealistic image of the revolution and its revolutionaries with his "conclusions based on f ac t s . . . t he factual aspect of his work is spotless. ''27 The revolution was shown not to be a manifestation of the noble aim of the liberation of mankind from the fetters of oppressions, but rather an event of fanatic terror. The revolutionaries were shown to be not noble fighters for freedom but mad fanatics. Taine compared the revolution to intoxication and delirium, and his conclusions about the revolution were "suicidal for the friends of the revolution. ''2s Reinforced by Taine's authority, Liubimov gave his own characterization of French liberals and leftists whom he directly associated with their Russian counterparts.

In Liubimov's view the revolution was mostly the work of the elite. It was a push for self-destruction which had finally engulfed the monarchy and the elite alike. The elite had contributed to the end of the monarchy in several ways. First of all, its members were plainly stupid; they did not understand the delicacy of the political order and that any slackening of the control would lead to a chain of violence. The stupidity and short-sight- edness of the French elite demonstrates their complete lack of understanding their long-term interest. The representatives of the elite did not

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understand that in their attempt to wrestle privileges from the autocracy, they had undermined the very foundation of the political order from which they directly benefited. Secondly, members of the elite who joined the revolutionary movement (and it was their leadership which was crucial in the beginning of the revolutionary process) did so for base reasons. As was the case with Mirabean, they were people with no moral principles and the revolutionary upheaval provided them with the perfect chance to indulge themselves.

According to Liubimov, a considerable part of the French ruling elite were useless parasites. 29 Cynical and imbued with liberal ideas, the members of the elite spent most of their time amusing themselves. Cynicism stupefied the French gentry, and not surprisingly, they demonstrated ex- ceptional narrow-mindedness in dealing with general political issues and long-term political interests. 3°

The liberal elite did not understand that any slackening of governmen- tal control would entail a catastrophic downfall, which would engulf both the monarchy and the elite. Playing with liberalism as if it were a game, these representatives of the elite pressured the monarchy to abolish censorship. Judging their actions Liubimov wrote--with some pathos:

It is really hard to blame the government (of Louis XVI) for encouraging freedom of speech, which was so dear to every intellectual--and at a time when freedom of speech was the real wish of the entire nation. One would evidence this by the orders given by the electors to their representatives (to the State General): practi- c.ally all of these orders name freedom of speech as one of the main demands of the people. 31

Liubimov followed with the statement that this freedom was one of the great achievements of modern civilization, and that the dark times of the inquisition were not to be resurrected. Yet, he added, "the realm of political evaluation was much more delicate than the freedom [to do] scientific research. ''32

The political scientist, suggested Liubimov, should not only publish books to be read solely by a narrow circle of specialists, but also should express his point of view in the press, which is read by the populace. "The press, especially the political press, is not only a means for the free expres- sion of opinion--it is a tool for very powerful propaganda. The French press, under review here, proves very well how much can be done by the press to influence public opinion in a very sort period of time. "33 He ended with the conclusion that freedom of speech and of the press was dangerous for a government and should not be tolerated in any form: to demand from the government that it be indifferent to public opinion, especially when it is hypercritical, is one of the greatest stupidities.


However, despite the apparent danger of abolishing censorship the French government moved ahead and allowed subversives to publish their propaganda. Subversives "preached that government is less than a man- a g e r - i t is a servant. "34 Liubimov observed that such a "delir ium" (goriachechnyi bred) should normally cause no more than a "smile of dis- dain," and have no effect. But this was not the case in late eighteenth-century France where liberal elitists had accepted these concessions as a sign of the government's weakness and pushed for even more concessions.

Liubimov implied that he was not against reformers as such, and together with the other writers from Russian Messenger praised "lhrgot 35 and pointed to self-government as being very important for the French monarchy's stability. Yet he was convinced that these reformers should never be allowed to slacken the control of the monarchy over society. This had not been the case with the Congress of Notables, which was indeed implicitly aimed at reducing the power of the autocracy. It was not surprising, then, that in this context Liubimov viewed the decision to summon the Congress of Notables as detrimental to the fate of the French monarchy and the most heinous crime of the liberal bureaucracy.

While underscoring the danger of the Congress of Notables, Liubimov alluded to Lofts Melikov's project to summon an advisory institution, some kind of Zemskii Sobor, an idea quite popular among some conservatives. One of the particulars emphasized by Liubimov was the idea that an auto- crat should not trust anyone; even the nobility could become a dangerous subversive force. Here, the Congress of Notables, born in 1787, on the very eve of the Revolution, served as his proof.

Why should notables attack the monarchy, protector of their own vested interests? The historians put forth several reasons. First, some of the aristocrats really believed that some kind of constitution would appease the people. Second, they sought to curb the king's power in order to turn the autocracy into an oligarchy--through which they would rule the country. With this goal in mind, states Liubimov, they used various kinds of pressure--petitions, complaints, speculative rumors about mass discontent, even provocation of the armed forces to mutiny.

Thus, the king convened the Congress of Notables under pressure from the elite. The participants did not wish to destroy the autocracy, just to diminish the powers of the king. But the logic of history has its own laws, Liubimov said. Any social body created under pressure from the opposition, especially at a time when the government was not firm enough, would in- evitably herald revolution. Liubimov write, "In such an epoch, any social force, any corporative institution is going to be an opposition, so strong that it is going to forget about its own interests [my emphasis]. The assembly

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of representatives, whether it is convened or elected, will be its primary task."36

The summoning of the Congress of Notables had destabilized the political situation in the country and made it possible for the liberal opposition to begin the actual undermining of the very foundation of the regime. Simi- lar to liberal bureaucrats, members of the liberal opposition stemmed from the elite. Yet these were the worst type of French elite. They were involved in political activity only because they desired fame or perhaps revenge on the monarchy for restraining their indulgences They were also politically naive, and their plugging into the political process was, according to Liu- bimov, implicitly the beginning of the "free fall" toward radicalization of the revolutionary process. Liubimov devoted much effort to discrediting liberal oppositionists as individuals with low moral standing.

Having described with irony the so-called sentimentality of intellectuals during the time of Louis XVI, Liubimov wrote, "One might be affected when he saw the lamb who grazed on the field or walked in the herd . . . . And this affection at the time of the walk would not prevent the consumption of the flesh in this lamb at dinner time. ''37

According to Liubimov, French philosophers and writers were ready to scorn the greed, arrogance and other vanities of the world in their books and public speeches. At the same time, however, they were frantically com- peting for money, government positions, and offices. The wit of French intellectuals was drenched in cynicism. For example, a priest was con- demned to death for the forgery of bank notes. He lacked the courage to approach the gallows, so the executioner told him: "Come, come, Monsieur Abbot, do not play the child (ne faites pas l'enfant)." All of Paris repeated this cruel anecdote, and when Damiens was executed, one of the members of the Academy pushed himself through the crowd to see the torture. The chief of the executioners saw this and told the others: "Let this man pass-- he is a fan (of our work)." This phrase was often used in the salons, as

The representatives of the Enlightenment were not only hypocritical and cruel, but debauched as well. Then, having generally described the mood of the liberal intellectuals, Liubimov turned to the participants and initiators of the revolution. According to him, those who initiated and participated in the Revolution epitomized the cynicism, corruption, and debauchery of the intellectuals of the Enlightenment, factors which induced them to attack the ancient regime. An example here is Mirabeau. Liubimov wrote a long article-review based on L. Lomenie's Mirabeu's (family) New Studies on the French Society of XVIII Century ("Les Mirabeau: Novelles studies sur la soviete francaise au XVIII siegle, par Louis de Lomeuie"). 39 The author of this article had begun his narration by characterizing the morality of Mirabeau's father, who advertised the notion of humanity in


his books and pointed out that a person should work for the well-being of the human race. Yet this concern for the suffering of mankind did not prevent him from furthering his career. His main concern was money, which he spent extensively. The great dream of his life was to make a fortune. In order to solve his financial problems, the elder Mirabeau decided to marry. He was sufficiently interested in the dowry that he did not feel a need to interest himself in how the bride looked. In fact, the wife had no money, but according to the marriage contract, her husband was to get money and property after the death of her parents. His wife was unfaithful to him and Mirabeau treated her in kind. The unhappy "wife and husband spent twenty years together," for one reason. 4°

The reason for his patience was obvious--he dreamt of the money and estates promised him. Yet, the death of one of his wife's parents became a great disappointment to the elder Mirabean, for by now his wife hated him so much that she decided he was not to have a penny. The self-styled "friend of the people" initiated a legal battle with his wife. The children were drawn into a conflict between their parents, with most taking their mother's side as she had promised them more than their father. The third daughter was the first of the children to take the side of the mother; she was followed by the "future tribune. "41

At the commencement of the war with his father, "the future tribune" had been living a dissolute life. Using this as a pretext, the father had the son put into prison. Prison did not prevent the young Mirabeau from having love affairs. He charmed the prison commandant into letting him out for a while, on which occasion, he seduced Sophie, the wife of a nobleman. He borrowed money which he was unable to repay. Finally, he escaped to Holland where he spent his time writing pamphlets against his father and against the entire social system, blaming it for the excessive power which his father had over him. Thus, Mirabeau became the enemy of the ancien regime.

According to Liubimov, liberal intellectuals and politicians were not only people of low moral standards, but politically blind. Liubimov claimed that the entire French middle class was marked by political stupidity. Their approach to the radicals and Jacobins demonstrated this. On August 10, 1792, the monarchy collapsed and the liberals took absolute power. Now they say that it was the revolutionaries, their recent allies, who strove for their annihilation. Yet, even the liberals were reluctant to crush them by force.

They tried to use argumentation rather than coercion. "Instead of the gun," they used the "full editions of the works of Rousseau, Montesquieu and Diderot. "42 The Girondists' obsession with liberal ideas doomed them. The Girondists' reluctance to use force was reinforced by the carelessness

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and submissiveness of the middle-class. Liubimov cites a memoir of one of the witnesses to the Revolution quoted by Taine. This witness wrote that few people realized what a great danger the Jacobins presented, so they were inadequately prepared for resistance. He told how, on the very day that the Jacobins came into power and were already making speeches about organized terror, prosperous bourgeois, merchants and "young men dressed smartly" strolled happily, full of laughter, in the streets and parks of Paris enjoying their lives--"only I did not laugh. "43 Liubimov agreed with "lhine that the French middle class was a flock of sheep which could be led to the slaughterhouse at any time. 44

The liberals' attachment to democracy also demonstrated their political stupidity and naivete. According to Liubimov it was Rousseau who in- culcated the eighteenth century oppositionists with the ideas of democracy, and he attacked him accordingly.

According to Liubimov, Rousseau's philosophy lacked even an elemen- tary logic. Attempting to discredit the democracy preached by Rousseau, he pointed out that democracy had two main flaws. The first was the as- sumption that everyone should have equal rights.

All people have equal fights. Does this mean that the pupil has the same rights as the master, that he has the same right to rule the master and to punish him as the master punishes the pupil? . . . . Does the idea of "equal rights" mean that the same relationship should be established between father and baby, between guardian and the person under his w a r d s h i p . . . t h a t the idiot has the same right to rule over his family as his family has to rule over the idiot?". 45

The second difficulty with democracy was how to integrate the volition of millions of electors into a united "common will." This problem, said Liubimov, could not be solved "even if an angel descended from the sky and was able to read the free volition of every citizen and then applied arithmetic, statistical or other scientific methods to investigate a table of such volition, he would never succeed, because of the confusion of volitions and aspirations. "~ He would never be able to come to any conclusion, or would come only to a conclusion which would horrify the "reasonable man."

Liubimov develops his notion of the "reasonable man" as a counterbalance to the majority; he indicates that very often the majority should not be relied on because it has neither the experience nor the necessary knowledge to make a proper decision--only a minority, the selecIed elite, has all of the qualities so essential for the governing of society. The primary historical duty of the rulers is not to succumb to the majority, but to control it, suppress it, in the name of the higher interests of the society. "Society demands not only the suppression of the volition of the individual, but fre- quently of the volition of the collective, so the wills of the masses should


be controlled and their passions subdued. This could only be done by the power which is above them (Liubimov's emphasis) and which is not de- pendent in its actions on the same volitions ad passions which it should control and suppress. ''47

At the collapse of the monarchy in 1792, the last restraint preventing the flee fall of radicalization was removed. In Linbimov's view this radicalization was brought about not by a change in the political and economic structure of the society (as a matter of fact Liubimov did not touch upon this subject at all), but simply the result of the rise in the level of violence in the society. Radicalization also led to certain changes in the moral caliber of the elite. Whereas the liberal stage of the revolution (1789 and 1792) was a time of domination by corrupted libertines (Mirabeau), 1793 marked the beginning of the reign of brutes. The major manifestation of the changes was an additional fall in the moral caliber of the revolution's participants.

Consequently Jacobins were presented as cynical political adventurers or good-for-nothing losers who craved power to satisfy their base desires, albeit without the political naivete and illusions of the liberals. Liubimov evidenced the case of the Jacobins in an article/review called "Jacobins' Victory," written just after the assassination of Alexander II. In this article, he extracts from Taine's descriptions a picture of the Jacobins in which they resemble a band of criminals. These Jacobins were a group of losers, people without abilities or talents who desperately wanted success. One such degenerate was Saint-Just, whom "l~ine compared with Sella. Saint- Just was notorious for his "brutal instincts "48 and was also a thief who stole all his mother's jewelry and silver. To top this, he was a profligate who spent much of his time with prostitutes. ~ i n e suggests that it was his ex- travagances which inspired him to write an obscene poem, "borrowing from Voltaire's 'Pucelle. ' '49

Danton was another example: Liubimov characterized him in an article that dealt with the September Days. According to Liubimov, it was Danton who was directly responsible for the start of the September massacres--the Parisians would never have become involved in such programs without his encouragement. 5° This line of argument was taken even further by a writer from Russian Messenger who said that Parisians had nothing to do with the massacre. It was the revolutionaries who were responsible for it; they hired criminals to do the dirty work, 51 and the massacre of the political enemies of Jacobins had nothing to do with the threat of foreign invasion and sal- vation of the motherland. According to Liubimov, Sybel and other historians proved it was not other European countries, but France herself who initiated the war. No one from outside threatened to conquer France or

72 Shlapentokh

to completely restore her ancien regime, s2 The threat of foreign invasion was simply an excuse for the wholesale butchery of potential rivals at home.

The Jacobins were a highly organized criminal band carrying out a bloody massacre. They resembled an organization of masons, who traditionally had been quite an influential group in France. 53 As one might assume, Liubimov had no appreciation for any revolutionary, either male or female. He subscribed to the characteristics given to the revolutionary female students by the conservative poet Shcherbin, who directly compared Russian leftist females to French ones, such as the revolutionary courtesan Theroigne de Mericourt:

"Theroigne de Mericourt Opened schools for females In order to turn our idiots Into Nihilists. "54

The Thermidorians, who replaced the Jacobins, were not treated much better by Katkov's and Liubimov's Russian Messenger. The corruption of the Thermidorians ruined the country. 55 Liubimov had no appreciation for Na- poleon either. 56

Summing up, Liubimov and other rightists publicists from Russian Mes- senger came to the conclusion that since the Revolution, a time when France was ruled by vicious brutes, the country had not been able to es- tablish a stable political order. 57 According to Liubimov, the French Revo- lution perpetuated the worst characteristics of the French political system throughout French history. 58

THE HISTORICAL PERSPECHVE OF VI.ADIMIR GER'E

Like Liubimov, Vladimir Ger'e (1837-1919) turned to the French Revolution to stigmatize opponents of the Russian monarchy. There was, however, a difference between his approach and Liubimov's: Ger'e tended to attack radicals more than liberals. He also paid more attention to the political theories which led to the excesses of the revolutionaries. In fact, Ger'e's elaboration of the role the ideological paradigms of the Enlighten- ment played in the French Revolution was quite in tune with the ideas of contemporary "revisionists" who also dwell on ideology as one of the major forces in forging the French Revolution and, to some degree, the entire modern political culture.

Born in 1837, Ger'e (Wladimir Guerrier is the French transcription of his name) was a descendant of the Hugenot family who emigrated to Rus- sia, and later converted to Catholicism. 59


Ger'e earned his master's degree at Moscow University, spent three years in Germany by attending lectures of prominent scholars--including Ranke--and returned to Moscow for his Ph.D. He went to teach at Moscow University and, at the same time, pioneered in the field of women's education. After Stepan V. Eshevskii's death in 1865, Ger'e replaced him as leading professor of European history at Moscow University. In 1872, he founded Vysshie Zhenskie Kursy (Upper Women's Courses). The courses were closed in 1888 and once again opened in 1900, 6o and leading intellectuals taught the courses in Moscow. 61 They were later followed by the Women's Courses in St. Petersburg founded by Konstantin N. Bestuzhev Riumin which "became famous. "62

As a teacher and a scholar, Ger'e was a pioneer in several fields of scholarship. He organized the first seminars on Western European history. Along with Liubimov and Nikolai I. Kareev, he opened up new areas of historical investigation in the French Revolution. He was also the first to inaugurate regular courses on the history of the French Revolution in a Russian university. 63

Ger'e's concentration on an area of history fraught with oppositionist implications that might have the power to incite, coupled with his political leanings, did not exactly arouse the approbation of the authorities. Com- plaints were lodged against him for narrowly focusing on the Revolution, rather than retaining the traditional approach of teaching general courses on the history of Western Europe and civilization in toto. The liberal flavor of his lectures also antagonized conservative and right-wing sentiments. 64

Ger'e was also politically active. 65 He was elected to the Moscow Duma in 1876. A student of Petr N. Kudriavtsev (1816-1858), Timofei N. Granovskii (1813-1855), Pavel M. Leont'ev (1822-1874), and Sergei M. Solov'ev (1820-1879), Ger'e was, by his own confession, a radical during his student years 66 and began his academic career as a liberal. During the early reign of Alexander II, he sided with Moscow University's liberal professors, protesting government encroachment on academic freedom. 67 His sharp criticism of Liubimov's '~gainst the Current" stands out as more proof of his liberalism. 68

After March 1, 1881, Ger'e's liberalism soured, however, and he became a conservative. Ger'e was a conservative-liberal Westemizer, though this did not prevent Liubimov from viewing him as a revolutionary figure even in 1887. In 1905 Ger'e became on Oktiabrist and in 1907, a member of the State Council. In his public speeches, he elaborated on the idea that the October Manifesto was not a break with Russian historical tradition, but rather a continuation. He came not only to compare Social-democrats to members of various medieval sects, 69 but also Kadets to Jacobins. 7° Ger'e died in 1919, a venerable octogenarian. 71

74 Shlapentokh

Like Liubimov, Ger'e turned to Western historians of the French Revo- lution such as Michelet, de TocqueviUe, and "lhine. His approach, though, depended on his political evolution. At the beginning of his academic career, Ger'e was critical of ~ ine and was ready to uphold the authority of de Tocqueville and even Michelet. But Ger'e's approach to these historians changed drasticaly after 1881. At that time, de TocqueviUe and Michelet became erroneous historians with glamorous visions of the Revolution and revolutionaries.

Soon after the publication of Taine's Origine, Ger'e reviewed the work in several articles in Messenger of Europe. 7z Ger'e provided positive remarks about "lhine's work and disagreed with those accusing Taine of falsifying sources. 73 Ger'e, however, generally approached ~ ine critically. Sounding like de Tocqueville, 74 Ger'e criticized Taine for not understanding the deep roots of the Revolution. According to Ger'e, Taine found the roots of the Revolution in the wishful thinking of Enlightenment philosophers and their pernicious influence on society. 75 Contrary to qhine, Ger'e stated that the Revolution was deeply rooted in French history and spurred by the ex- ploited populace. 76 Only timely reform could have saved the monarchy.

Ger'e approached many of the actions of the revolutionary government, such as its confiscation of church property, in the same manner as de Tocquevile. According to Ger'e, the idea that church property belonged to the nation was deeply rooted in the political mentality of pre-revolution France. 77 Ger'e also disagreed with Taine's approach to the revolutionary terror. Sounding like Michelet now, Ger'e justified the terror as a proper response for a hundred years of populace' misery. 78 The frantic resistance of the counter-revolution made terror unavoidable.

After 1881, Ger'e became a conservative and changed his approach to de Tocqueville, Michelet, and "lhine. Ger'e lost confidence in Michelet and de Tocqueville as reliable historians. In his article on Michelet, published in Messenger of Europe in 1896, Ger'e felt that Michelet's presentation of the populace in the French Revolution was romantic and naive. 79 Young Pavel N. Miliukov (I859-1943), at that time a Ger'e student who attempted to challenge Taine's work by using examples from Michelet and de TocqueviUe, experienced Ger'es "hidden anger. ''8°

Now, contrary to the leftist Michelet, Ger'e began to approach Taine quite differently. Demonstrating 'Ihine's scholarly objectivity and praising his research methods, Ger'e implied that "Ihine's stigmatizing image of the revolution and revolutionaries was absolutely right.

Was Taine subjective in his research? No, even though it was true, as Ger'e pointed out, that "lhine genuinely enjoyed reading speculative philosophy. He was enchanted by Hegel, who elaborated on the idea of his- torieal law in his works. But did this enchantment necessarily make "lhine


a speculative philosopher him~lf? Not at all. As Ger'e points out, "lhine was actually among the first historians to decisively attack this speculative approach to history. Facts were not to serve a particular theory, but facts were to serve as the foundation of historical theory, sl

According to Ger'e, Taine's objectivism is consistent with his emotional involvement in the process of studying. One might think that emotions led Taine to a biased selection of facts. This was not the case. Emotional involvement does not imply any subjectivity; on the contrary, it simply sharp- ened "Paine's analysis, and, according to Ger'e, helped him to clarify his arguments. An emotionally involved approach as a historical tool simply allowed Taine to present facts colorfully. Thus, this approach, as Ger'e pointed out, actually helped "lhine support the factual validity of his theoretical conclusion, s2

Ger'e indicated another technique used by Taine--his underlining certain facts, making them more colorful and predominant, while allocating less space to other facts. However, this disproportion in the presentation of facts does not represent a shortcoming in ~ine 's presentation of historical events, of the French Revolution, for example, since it made it easier for the reader to focus on Taine's main idea in the historical narration, s3

Ger'e believed that Taine was a real historian, who based his work on a solid, factual foundation and whose picture of revolutionaries and revolution was accurate. Like Liubimov, Ger'e also dug out of ~ ine ' s work a depiction of the French oppositionists. However, their was a difference between his approach to the oppositionists and that of Liubimov. Contrary to Liubimov, Ger'e began his academic career as a liberal and was not a right-wing extremist who tried to find subversives even among high-posi- tioned tsarist bureaucrats. Therefore, contrary to Liubimov, Ger'e did not attack French liberal oppositionists and the liberal bureaucracy of the ancien regime.

He limited his criticism to a few remarks, such as that the summoning of the State General was a mistake of the king and his advisors. 84 He also found excuses for the king and his advisors for not carrying out any reforms at all, even those which were necessary. According to Ger'e, reforms were not an easy task for the French monarchy, which in contrast to the German monarchy, did not enjoy enough power to influence policy. He also stated military defeats had seriously damaged the king's reputation.

Ger'e's main target was the Jacobins, whom he associated with Russian radicals. Ger'e always "used history to give lessons to his contemporaries, to encourage some of them and threaten others. ''s5 Attacking Jacobins, Ger'e presented them as people of low moral standards or as people guided in their actions by erroneous political theories.

76 Shlapentokh

"lhrning to Taine for support, Ger'e presented Jacobins as a collection of dissatisfied youngsters disappointed with their place in French society. "Even in very liberal societies where the upper echelons of power are open to all, for every hundred thousand would-be rulers, five to six would attain a position of power. It might be anticipated that each recruit would find a marshall's baton in his knapsack. Yet, if searched, there would be no baton found in the future of nine hundred ninety-nine out of a thousand recruits. ''s6 Evidently, the young were upset about this situation, angry with society, hating the status quo, ready to crush the establishment and to create a new one in which they could find themselves a "place in the sun." Thus, Taine came to the conclusion that the majority of young people, especially those seeking jobs, were "more or less Jacobins. ''sT

In any normal circumstances, their frustration would not be dangerous. The great majority of them could find employment to which they could reconcile themselves. Society would crush the more rebellious, and as they grew older the majority of the youngsters would suppress their violent urges and their appetites for success. However, in a situation where the government was weak, their wild desires were not suppressed, and the entire social order collapsed, allowing these ambitious people to come into power. Their maniacal desires and impulses soon resulted in blood, and a bloodthirsty mania dominated France at the time of the Jacobins' rule.

According to Taine, wrote Ger'e, these men were driven by two impulses. The first was their yearning to enjoy the unlimited power they found in their hands. In this, they were equaled only by "the pagan Roman empire in the depth of its moral decline. "s8 Human beings became animals. The entire rule of the Jacobin Commissary over France was an endless chain of debauchery, robbery, and murder.

The second impulse was their fear of their colleagues in Paris. A messenger with an inordinate amount of power could have a commissar carried off to Paris. Ger'e implies that usually the commissar never returned. This constant fear of execution as punishment for negligence or indulgence to- wards the "counter-revolution" gave additional impetus for a commissar to shed as much blood as he could.

The plots and deeds of these maniacs led the country to self-extermination. Some of the terrorists planned to exterminate up to fifteen million French citizens, s9 The terror of the Revolution was to be the "start of a grandiose and systematical extermination. ''9° The Jacobins had made a good start in the accomplishment of their goals. Ger'e quotes "Paine to the effect that "in only eleven western areas, they had liquidated up to half a million people. "91

Terror was planned by the Jacobins as a permanent system, having nothing whatsoever to do with protecting the homeland against foreign in-


vaders. Taine, stressed Ger'e, proved that the danger of foreign invasion was only a pretext used by the proponents of terror to maintain their unlimited power over society. The crushing victory of the republican army over invaders did not evoke any humanism among the rank and file, and the terror continued. 92

So, Ger'e found base desire as an impetus for the Jacobin's activity. However, contrary to Liubimov, he did not reduce his explanation of the excesses of the revolution of the low morality of its participants. He acknowledged that some of the revolutionaries, both in France and Russia, were not foreign to altruism and would often forego personal gain. 93 In this respect Ger'e's approach to the revolutionaries was similar to that of Taine. 94 Following this line of thought, Ger'e acknowledged that some revolutionaries were guided by noble principles; in general, Ger'e assumed that "ideas played a very important role in the fate of nations and the history of human civilization in general. ''95 As to the French revolutionaries, may of them were inspired by Rousseau and Mably. Ger'e acknowledged the good intentions of these philosophers. However, their political programs were erroneous and tempted the French revolutionaries into excess. In teaching the French philosophers, Ger'e also easily recognized the similarity in their teaching to theories popular among the Russian radicals. 96

Like Rousseau, Peter L. Laurov's followers idealized the populace and preached its omnipotence. Contrary to them, Peter N. Tkachev's followers put all their hope on a strong revolutionary government. This sounded exactly like Mably's theory. Being fully aware of these similarities, Ger'e lev- eled an attack against Rousseau and Mably in his university lectures.

Ger'e taught a course on "political and social theories of the eighteenth century. "97 One could assume these lectures became the nucleus of two articles on Rousseau and Mably. 9s Ger'e's relationship with his students also induced him to give his lectures political implications.

Ger'e was a conscientious and good lecturer. 99 He always appeared at the rostrum "vivacious and fresh with no grey hair on his fair head." His lectures always had a historiographical introduction which helped freshmen to understand the development of historical science. He was not a harsh examiner and those who knew little more than average could always expect a good grade. Ger'e always expressed himself clearly and was able to present everything in a way understandable for students.

Ger'e launched many prominent historians on their careers. However, Ger'e's relationship with students was often quite tense. Poor students en- vied Ger'e's affluence, 1°° and some despised him for his arrogance, 1°~ despotic character , dislike of " independent ly-minded people, ''1°2 and conservative views. Radical students several times even planned "hostile demonstrations against him. ''1°3

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Ger'e approached students in the same manner. He was the "terror of the students." He locked students in the lecture hall when he was angry with them, 1°4 humiliated them during exams and seminars and was prone to demonstrate to his mostly radical students their ignorance and political naivete. 1°5 The lectures on Rousseau and Mably gave Ger'e the opportunity to subtly attack the students and demonstrate that their leftist political paradigms were naive.

In his presentation of Rousseau's political program, Ger'e criticized Rousseau's idealization of the populace and stigmatization of the ruling elite. Ger'e pointed out that Rousseau's approach to the elite derived from his vision of society. For Rousseau, there was no direct relationship between personal interest and the well-being of society. There were cases where the interests of society and the individual were different from one another, if not in complete opposition. Would a representative of the elite, the intellectual, sacrifice his interests or life for his fellow citizen? It is true that, as Rousseau pointed out, the behavior of the rich intellectual was guided by reason. But this reason would guide him to first protect his own interest, and concern himself with the interest of society only if it did not clash with his personal interest. Where there was no concordance between personal interest and the interest of society, the intellectual would abandon the interest of society. But how could one explain why people do sacrifice their interests and even their lives for others? Rousseau answers that in such people's souls, reason is overruled by the irrational force of life for their fellow citizens. "Moral sense in the human being, or 'conscience' as Rous- seau called it, was sharply demarcated from reason and even set in opposition to it. This is an instinct [Ger'e emphasis] which acts independent of the commands of reason and remains above it. ''1°6

Thus for Rousseau, Ger'e asserted, reason was the mortal enemy of altruism. It was the elite who were, for the most part, possessed by rationalism, thus intellectuals could not spare a thought for their fellow citizens. At the same time, the populace, who lived according to "instinct," was imbued with altruism and must rule over society. Rousseau's noble populace, Ger'e implied, was to lead France toward a harmonious society.

As for Mably, Ger'e criticized the idealization of a strong revolutionary government. 1°7 Ger'e pointed out that, unlike Rousseau, Mably did not put his hope in the moral instincts of the populace, but rather in a dictatorship of wise and moral philosophers. They were to restructure a corrupted society into a moral one.

According to Ger'e, both Rousseau and Mably contributed to the collapse of the ancien regime and to the creation of a Jacobin dictatorship. However, Ger'e implied, French political reality did not fit either Rous-


seau's nor Mably's scheme. The supposedly noble populace, who were to replace the "egoistic elite," instead of creating a harmonious society began the wholesale slaughter of its political opponents. At the same time, the revolutionary elite, instead of being wise philosophers became a cruel gang of criminals. Russian leftists should expect the same disappointment in case of a victory in the Russian Revolution.

Thus Ger'e's and Liubimov's works demonstrated that the political paradigms of the Russian right in their approach to the French Revolution were strikingly similar to the views of present-day "revisionists." The most important similarity can be seen in the delegitimization of the French Revolution as an inevitable stage in European and, collaterally in world history.

The French Revolution, in the context of the paradigms of the representatives of both of these schools, was actually a result not so much of the ancien regime's reactionary stubbornness, but rather owing to the French monarch's recklessness in slackening control over society. The idealization of the populace as a political player was certainly another factor. In their vision of a strong executive power, a monarchy in the case of eighteenth century France, as an important counterbalance to the power of the citizens, the "revisionists" might be seen as following the classical formula of the division of power, one of the major elements of liberalism. There are, of course, basic differences between an American president and a French king as chief executives. Indeed, while the power of the first is still rooted in the power of the electorate, the king rules by divine grace and indeed has power above the populace. The stress on the importance of the monarchy in the context of eighteenth century France had implicitly authoritarian implications, or at least it is possible to see it as having such. And from this perspective one could see the link between the "revisionists" and the Russian conservative historians of the French Revolution.

While often presenting both the revolutionary populace and the revolutionary leaders in a negative light, both "revisionists" and the Russian right and conservative historians of the French Revolution sound quite simi- lax to Taine and other conservative historians of the Revolution in nineteenth century Europe. The difference here is that while Russian historians had openly acknowledged their indebtedness to "lhine and other European historians of the same political views, the "revisionists" did not emphasize their indebtedness to their predecessors. In short, the work of the "revisionists" has a common ground not only with Western European conservatives of the nineteenth century (e.g., Taine), but with the Russian conservative historians of this period as well. These similarities make possible speculation about the more deeply rooted cultural paradigms.

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REVISIONIST HISTORIOGRAPHY AFTER THE COLD WAR: A DILEMMA

The observers of present day cultural development should be quite cautious in asserting the regional differences in the present day world. The political and intellectual developments are in many respects global. This is especially the case with the social sciences. Indeed, publications in major scholarly magazines have been internationalized. Yet, cultural and intellectual development cannot be totally universalistic in nature and escape na- tional tradition. One might also add that integration is not the only trend in the present day world, as witnessed by the powerful forces behind today's political and, to some degree, ideological fragmentation. Indeed, from this perspective, the "revisionist's" similarities to the Russian conservative historians of the French Revolution might imply an important intellectual trend.

While some "revisionist" historians of the French Revolution have been teaching in American universities, most of them were trained in Europe and, in general, "revisionism" emerged in Europe. It could be also added that it was in Soviet studies where American scholars launched their own "revisionism," which is quite opposed in its political implications to that of the European "revisionism" dealing with the French Revolution. While European "revisionism" has gravitated to the right, American "revisionism" is closer to the left. American conservatives also would not be fascinated with the idea of a strong power independent, to a large degree, from the constituency, and even more so would they hardly accept a de- rogatory image of a populace even engaged in revolutionary upheaval. The respect for the populace and grass-roots democracy is shared (and deeply internalized) not only by the American left, but also by the American right. Indeed, the battle cry of Reagan conservatism was the idea of reducing the role of liberal government and providing more power to the constituency below.

The way "revisionists" present their findings is also often implicitly European. Indeed, "revisionists" widely use the free flow of narrative which makes their work almost indistinguishable from belles-letters, e.g., Schama's Citizen. While this form of narration is not unusual in the work of American scholars, it is still rarely the case in the study of political and social history. Here, work written in free narrative is usually regarded as being popular work rather than scholarly work (in the narrow sense of the term).

Thus one could assert that "revisionism" is more of a European rather than American phenomenon and, in general, despite all ideological and cultural unification, there is still a distinctive difference between American and Western European cultures.


While "revisionism," as a set of political and cultural values, could hardly be adjusted to the basic values of American culture, it fits well with the basic premises of Russian conservative thought. Indeed the similarities between the "revisionist" vision of the French Revolution and that of the Russian conservative historians of the late nineteenth century represent more than just similarities between two conservative visions of the revolution. They represent deep-seated cultural affinities.

Indeed, the Russian and Eastern European right that emerged after the end of communism in what was recently the USSR and Eastern Europe could hardly intellectually befriend the American right. Even more so, Rus- sian politicians and intellectuals, who externally profess their adherence to Americanism, have actually exhibited quite an opposite stance.

Although it goes without saying that, similar to American conservative intellectuals, Russian conservatives have lambasted both revolutions, both Russian and French, any discussion on the nature of the American Revo- lution has been prudently avoided. Yet, present Russian conservative intellectuals' (and it is they who dominate the intellectual milieu) vision of the current revolutionary upheaval would certainly be different from that of Americans. The Russians do not mince words in describing the revolutionary populace as a brutish beast, and in general they have little belief in the political wisdom of grass-roots constituencies. They espouse political alternatives to the revolutionary upheaval quite different from that of the American right. The Russians would not praise Pavel Milinkov, the leader of the liberals in late imperial Russian who could be compared with leaders of the French Girondists, or Alexander Kerensky, the ill-fated leader of the Provisional Government; but rather they would praise Peter A. Stolypin or even Augusto Pinochet, the recent Chilean dictator. The highly polemic presentation of both past and present which dominates intellectual and political discourse, and the general penchant Of the present day Russian intellectual to present the political and social process as a free flow of narrative, also do not fit well with the traditions of American academics.

At the same time this presentation of both present and past is not only in tune with the presentation of the French Revolution by the conservative Russian historians of late nineteenth century, but also with the statements of some "revisionists," e.g., the image of the revolutionary populace in Schama's Citizen.

This similarity in the political attitude between the Western and East- ern European fight has certain implications. First of all, the rise of authoritarian conservatism in Europe (both East and West) indicates that the idea of the "end of history" with its implicit vision of global Americanization is rather far-fetched. Secondly, and this is the point of the article, Western Europe's political alliance with the USA is due to confrontations between

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the superpowers. Somehow the alliance has been translated into the notion of '9,tlantic Revolutions," i.e., the similarity between the American and French Revolution underlies the deep ideological affinity between Western Europe and the USA.

This notion however, ignores the deep-set cultural differences between the two political/cultural regions, e.g., Western Europe and the USA. The emergence of "revisionism" in dealing with the French Revolution reveals not only the rise of intellectual and, to some degree, political conservatism, but also implicitly the fractioning of the notion of Western ideological ho- mogeneity.

Thus, one can see the beginning of ideological estrangement between Western Europeans and the USA, an estrangement that reveals their different cultural/political paradigms. The difference between the American and Western European right might serve as a good example here. Yet at the same time Western Europeans, at least their conservative intellectuals, could find a common ground with Eastern Europeans. Paradoxically enough, the end of communism, which led to the disintegration of the USSR and could possibly lead to the disintegration of Russian proper, has led to more intellectual integration of Eastern Europeans with Western Europeans. The Russians' approach to the Revolutions (both Russian and French) reveals this and indicates the deep similarities between conservative European ideologies of both East and West. The political implications of this ideological readjustment remain to be seen.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Grants from IU, IUSB and Hoover Institution provided funding for this manuscript. The author also would like to express gratitude to the members of Hoover Institution, Russian Research Center (Harvard Uni- versity) and the members of Department of History, IUSB. The stimulating conversation with them germinated the ideas which were incorporated in the article.

ENDNOTES

1. Francois Furet, French Revolution (New York: Macmillan, 1978); ibid., Interpreting the French Revolution (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press; paris: Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l'Home, 1981).

2. Richard Cobb, Paris and its Provinces 1792/1802 (London~ew York: Oxford University Press, 1975); ibid., Tour de France (London: Duckworth, 1986); ibid., Death in Paris (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 1978); ibid., Beyond the Terror


(Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983); ibid., Reaction to the French Revolution (London/New York: Oxford University Press, 1979).

3. Simon Schama, Citizens: A Chronicle of the French Revolution (New York: Knopf, 1989). 4. This age is calculated on the basis of the phrase: "By 1877 Professor Liubimov had spent

twenty-five years as a teacher, which secured for him a full pension." (K P. Pobedonostsev i ego korespondenty, Petrograd: Gosudarstevene izdaterstvo, 2 vols, 1923, 1:252.)

5. Nicholas Riasanovsky, The Image of Peter the Great in Russian History and Thought (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 133.

6. Liubimov occasionally praised liberal historians of the French Revolution such as Toequeville. Russian Messenger published Toequeville's memoirs.

7. Liubimov (R), "Blestiashchii period predstavitel'nogo pravleniia vo Frantsii," Russ/d/ Vestnik, June 1880.

8. N. A. Liubimov, Krushenie Monarchii vo Frantsii: Ocherki i epizody pervoi epokhi frantsuzskoi revoliutsiL" 1787-1790 (Moscow: Universitetskala Tipografia, 1893), p. XIX.

9. G. de Molinari, "Pamiatniki Parizha," Russkii Vestnik, May 1871, p. 270. 10. Anonimouse, "Posmertnoe soehinenie Mishle," Russkii Vestnik, July 1879. 11. V.P. Bezobrazov, "Voina i Revoliutsiia," Russkii Vestnik, Sept. 1873, p. 318. 12. G. de Molinari, "Balans Frantsuzskoi revoliutsii," Russkii Vestnik, May 1874, p. 275. 13. The credibility of Mortimer-Ternaux as a historian is acknowledged by modern scholars.

M. Ben Israel, for example, points out that it was Mortimer-Ternaux who was the "first to systematically study the Parisian archives." (M. Ben Israel, English Historians on the French Revolution, Cambridge: At the University Press, 1968, p. 217.)

14. Russian translation of H. Sybers History appeared as early as in 1863. (ICE. Dzhedzhula, Rossiia i Vetikaia Frantsuzskaia Burzhuaznaia Revoliutsiia, Kiev: Izdatel'stvo Kievskogo Universiteta, 1972, p. 98. See also B. G. Veber, lston'ograficheskie Problemy, Moscow: Nauka, 1974, p. 213.)

15. R. (Liubimov), "Istoricheskaia Literatura," Russkii Vestnik, No. 1869, p. 318. 16. Ibid. 17. Ibid., p. 319. One could also add that not only conservative and fight-wing intellectuals

gave credence to the historian, but radicals as well. (Veber, Istoriograficheskie Problemy, 1974, p. 228.)

18. For the examination of Taine's philosophy see Barzelioti, La Philosophic de H. Taine, Paris: Aneierme Librarie Germer Bailliere etc. 1900.

19. M. Biddes, Father of Racist Ideology: The Social and Political Thought of Count Gobineau: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970, p. 219.

20. De Molinari, "Balans Frantsuzskoi Revoliutsii," Russkii Vestnik, May 1874. 2t. R. (Liubimov), "Ten o Frantsuzskoi revoliutsii, (Russkii Vestnik, April 1878, p. 751.) All

of Taine's work, including his "Origins," gave rise to sharp polemic in the French society. While one writer would praise Taine's objectivity, another would accuse him of bias. (Colin Evans, Taine: Essai de Biographic Interiere, Pads: Librade Mizet, 1975, p. 488.)

22. Anonymous, "Emil' Fage a Tene," Russkii Vestnik, September 1899. 23. R. (Liubimov), "Ten o Frantsuzskoi revoliutsii: Les Origines de France contemporaine;

par H. Taine, Tome II, la Revolution," Russkii Vestnik, April 1878, p. 75. 24. Ibid., p. 758. 25. Boris L'vovich Mozdalevsky, "Dostoevsky o Brat'iakh Karamazovykh: Neuzdannye

pis'ma." Byloe, 15 (1919): 130-131. 26. R. (Liubimov), "Pobeda lakobintsev," Russkii Vestnik, July 1881, p. 95. 27. Ibid., p. 92. 28. Liubiov, Kntshenie Monarchii, p. 567. 29. N.A. Liubimov (R), "Gertsog Sen-Simon i ego memuary," Russlai Vestnik, August 1880. 30. The other contributors to Russian Messenger espoused similar ideas. See for example: B.

V. "Graf D'Artua: K neizdannym pis'man imperatritsy Ekateriny II i grafa d'Artua: 1792 i 1793," Russkii Vestnik, September 1893.

31. Liubimov, Krushenie Monarkhii vo Frantsii, p. 172. 32. Ibid., p. 173. 33. Ibid., p. 172.

84 Shlapentokh

34. R., "Pobeda iakobintsev," p. 79. 35. K.P. Pobedonostsev i ego korrespondenty, 1(1):15-19, 26, 261-262. 36. Liubimov, IOushenie monamhii, p. 125. 37. Ibid., p. 13. 38. Ibid., p. 37. 39. R. (Liubimov), "Istoriia odnogo semeistva nakanune revoliutsii, Russkii Vestnik, February

1879. 40. Ibid., p. 820. 41. Ibid., p. 825. 42. R. (Liubimov), "Pobeda iakobintsev," p. 95. 43. Ibid., p. 92. 44. Liubimov, IOushenie monarchii, p. 567. 45. Ibid. 46. Ibid., p. 496. 47. Ibid., p. 323. 48. R. (Liubimov), "Pobcda iakobintsev," Russkii Vestnik, p. 97. 49. Ibid. 50. N .A. Liubimov, "Sentiabr'skie dni v Parizhe," Russkii Vestnik, Jan. 1891, pp. 231-232. 51. V.P . Bezobrazov, "Voina i Revoliutsiia, Russkii Vestnik, Sept. 1873, p. 339. 52. R. (Liubimov), "Pobeda iakohintsev," p. 88. 53. S. Burnashov, "Masonstro vo Frantsii," Russkii Vestnik, Nov. 1902. 54. G . O . Sokol'nikova (Sercbir'akova), Nine Women Drawn from the Epoch of the French

Revolution, (Freeport: Book of Libraries Press, 1969). 55. G. de Molinari, "Balans Frantsuzskoi revoliutsii," Russkii Vestnik, May 1874, pp. 280-285. 56. R. (Liubimov), "Zapiski gospozhi Remiuza," Russkii Vestnik, April 1878. 57. R. "Ten o Frantsuzskoi revoliutzii. Les Origines de France Contemporaine, par H.

Taine," Russkii Vestnik, April 1878, p. 808. 58. R. (Liubimov), "Zapiski gospozhi Remiuza," Russkii Vestnik, Dec. 1879. 59. Hans Hccker, Russische Universal gesehichtsschreiburg von den, 'ff/ierziger Jahre," des 19,

Jahrhunderts bis zur Sowjetischen "Weltgeschichte'/1944-1965 (Munchen: R. Oldenbourg, 1983), p. 117.

60. Anonymous, "Vysshie Zhenskie Kursy v Moskve," Mir Bozhii, Aug. 1900. 61. Pavel Novgorotsev could here be an example. (Mark V. Vishniak, Dan' Proshlomu, New

York: Izdatel'stvo imcni Chekhova, 1954, p. 50.) 62. E .V. Ross, Russia in Upheaval (New York: The Century Co., 1918), p. 249. 63. It might also be added that Russia was not far behind France in Teaching the French

Revolution in the university. According to F. Furet, in France the revolution was "legitlmized academically" only at the end of the nineteenth century. (Francois Furet, Penser la Revolution Francaise, Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1978, p. 19.)

64. Pobedonostsev i ego korrespondenty vols. 1(2):678. 65. Russkii Vedomost~ 29 November 1898. 66. Sergei Mel'gunov, Vospominaniia i Dnevniki, 2 vols, (Paris: N.P., 1964) 1:66. 67. N. K~reev, "Pamiati dvukh istorikov," Annaly: Zhurnal vseobshchei istorii Rossiiskoi

Akademii Nauk, V. 1, 1922, p. 158. 68. Ibid., p. 159. 69. GBL Fond, 384, kar 10, ed. khr. 4, p. 48. 70. Pobedonostev i ego korrespondenty 1(2):678, 747. 71. Kareev, "Pamiati dvukh istorikov," p. 162. 72. V. Ger'e, "Ippolit Ten kak istorik Frantsii," Vestnik Europy, March/April 1878. 73. Ibid., Sept./Oct. 1878. 74. Kareev, "Pamiati dvukh istorikov," p. 159. 75. V. Ger'e, "Ippolit Ten kak istorik Frantskii," Vestnik Europy, May/June 1878, p. 139. 76. Ibid., Nov./Dec. 1878, p. 559. 77. Ibid., May/June 1878, p. 550. 78. Ibid., p. 251. 79. V. Ger'e, "Narodnik vo Frantsuzskoi literature," Vestnik Europy, March/April 1896.


80. P. N. Miliukov, Vospominaniia (1850-1917) 2 vols., New York: Izdatel'stro Imeni Chekhova, 1955, 1:80.

81. Russkie Vedomosti, March 16, 23, 1893. 82. V. Get'e, "Ippolit Ten kak istorik iakobintsev," Vestnik Europy, May 1894. 83. V. Ger'e, "Demokxaticheskii tsezarizm," Vestnik Europy, July 1895, p. 71. 84. V. Ger'e, Novaia lstoriia: Lektsii (n.p.), 1883-1884, p. 266. 85. Russkie Vedomosti, 29 November, 1989. 86. V. Get'e, "Ippolit Ten v istorii iakobintsev," Vestnik Europy, November 1894, p. 119. 87. Ibid. 88. Ibid., p. 133. 89. V. Get'e, "Demokraticheskii tsezarizm," Vestnik Europy, July 1895, p. 95. 90. Ibid., p. 61. 91. Ibid. 92. Ibid., p. 88. 93. Ibid. 94. The latter, despite his pervasive hatred of the revolutionaries, acknowledged that they

were motivated in their actions not only by the desire to get power, but by noble ideas as well. Robespierre serves as example here. He is presented by Talne as being a person of modest ambition, who might have been an honest and respectable lawyer in his home town. (V. Get'e, "Demokraticheskii tsezarizm," Vestnik Europy, July 1895, pp. 91-92.)

95. Hecker, Russische Universalgeschichtsschreiburg, p. 121. 96. The comparisons with Rousseau's political doctrine were understandable, not only for

Get'e, but for government officials as well. As a result they sometimes discouraged professors from presenting Rousseau's political ideas in the classroom. (GBL, Fond Kareeva, p. 44, ed. khr. 6, p. 324.)

97. Mel'gunov, Vospomiananiia i Dnevniki, 1:79. 98. V. Ger'e, "Poniatie o narode u Russo," Russkaia Mysl', No. 5, 8, 1882; Ibid., "Frantsuzskii

etik sotsialist XVIII veka," Russkaia Mysl', October 1883. 99. A. Kizevetter, Nu rubezhe stoletii (Prague: "Orbis," 1929), pp. 63-65, 69; Russkie

Vedomosti, 29 Nov. 1898; Ger'e often gave his lectures an historiographical introduction which helped the students to understand the development of historical science. About Ger'e's interest in historiography, see: V. Get'e, "Ocherki razvitiia istoricheskoi nauki," Russkii Vestnik, April 1865.

100. Russkoe Slovo, 16 July, 1909. 101. Miliukov, Vospominaniia, 1:80. 102. V. V. Rozanov, Kogda nachal'stvo ushlo, 1905-1906 (St. Petersburg: 1910), p. 210. 103. Mel'gunov, Vospominaniia i Dnevniki, 1:67. 104. Kizevetter, Na rubezhe stoletii, p. 68. 105. Ger'e could criticize populists only in indirect ways. According to Russian academic

tradition at the end of the nineteenth century, serious scholars were not supposed to read lectures or write on subjects of recent history. It was regarded only as a subject of publicists. (Mergunov, Vospominaniia i Dnevniki, 1:79.)

106. V. Ger'e, "Poniatie o narode u Russo," Russkaia Mysl', No. 5 (1882), p. 139. 107. V. Ger'e, Novaia Istoriia, p. 169.

forgotten predecessors: the russian conservative historians of the french revolution

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