foreign observers challenge election legitimacy

8/9/2019 Foreign Observers Challenge Election Legitimacy

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GLOBAL FILIPINO NATION

Empowering Filipinos onshore and overseas

Change agent for effective governance

27 May 2010

FOREIGN OBSERVERS CHALLENGE ELECTION LEGITIMACY

1. THE ELECTION RESULTS TRANSMITTED FROM THE PRECINCTS DO NOT HAVE DIGITAL SIGNATURES OF THE BOARD OF

ELECTION INSPECTORS.

Based on industry standards, the digital signature on the precinct Election Return (ER) is a summary (hash value) of the ER encrypted

using the BEIs secret key. The digital signature serves two purposes:

a. It identifies the BEI personnel and the precinct number from which the ER came; and

b. It ensures that the precinct ER is not modified in any way by dagdag-bawas (immutability of precinct data).

Because of the importance of digital signatures in maintaining data integrity and security, REPUBLIC ACT 9369 states in SEC. 19 A. In

the election of president, vice-president, senators and party-list system; and B. In the election of local officials and members of the

House of Representatives:

"Within one hour after the printing of the election returns, the chairman of the board of election inspectors or any official

authorized by the Commission shall, in the presence of watchers and representatives of the accredited citizens' arm, political

parties/candidates, if any, electronically transmit the precinct results to the respective levels of board of canvassers, to the

dominant majority and minority party, to the accredited citizen's arm, and to the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas

(KBP).

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INTERIM REPORT

[This is the Interim Report of a 2010 Election Observers Team of Global Filipino Nation (GFN), a non-partisan international organization of offshore andonshore Filipinos in 30 countries committed to "Building the Global Filipino Nation for Good Governance." This report does not necessarily reflect the

views of the GFN Convenors. Questions about this Interim Report may be directed to [email protected].]


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SECOND ISSUE: Comelec Resolution 8786, dated March 4, 2010, no longer required the use of digital signatures. The Resolution

stated:

"WHEREAS, there is a need to amend or revise portions of Resolution No. 8739 in order to fine tune the process and address

procedural gaps;

x x x x x x x x

SEC. 40. Counting of ballots and transmission of results

f) Thereafter, the PCOS shall automatically count the votes and immediately display a message WOULD YOU LIKETO DIGITALLY SIGN THE TRANSMISSION FILES WlTH A BEI SIGNATURE KEY?, with a YES or 'NO option;

g) Press NO option. The PCOS will display ARE YOU SURE YOU DO NOT WANT TO APPLY A DIGlTAL SIGNATURE?

with a YES and NO option;

h) Press YES option.

WHY WOULD COMELEC SUDDENLY REMOVE THIS VERY IMPORTANT FEATURE OF THE SYSTEM?

1. The Bid Bulletin Specifications required Digital Signatures to be available by 11 November 2009 to Comelec personnel,

from BEIs to the Board of Canvassers to the Operators of the Comelec Server, its back-up and to the Servers of the

dominant majority, minority, accredited citizens arm and KBP- for lab and field test, mock election test, testing and

sealing, and on election day.

2. The Technical Specifications in the same Bid Bulletin required:

" Component 1A- Election Management System (EMS)

2. The system shall require authorization and authentication of all users, such as, but not limited to,

usernames and passwords, with multiple user access levels. (For customization)"

"Component 1B- Precinct-Count Optical Scan (PCOS)

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7. The system shall require authorization and authentication of all operators, such as, but not limited to,

usernames and passwords, with multiple user access levels."

"Component 1C- Consolidation/Canvassing System (CCS)

The consolidation/canvassing system (CCS) shall be secure, fast, accurate, reliable and auditable, and able to:

1.12 Allow the BOCs to digitally sign all electronic results and reports before transmission;"

3. Makati Rep. Teodoro Locsin said on 26 May that he was wrong in his position on the absence of the digital signatures of

the Boards of Election Inspectors on the election returns. Locsin, at the hearing of the House committee on suffrage andelectoral reforms, said the digital signatures of the precinct count optical scan machines were enough compliance with

the law. He had said earlier that the BEIs should have encoded their own signatures on the electronically transmitted

results. "I admit I was wrong. There is a real reason why a PCOS signature is a practical equivalent of a digital signature,"

he said.

RA 9369 AND RA 8792 RECOGNIZED PEOPLE, NOT MACHINES, AS AUTHENTICATORS THROUGH DIGITAL SIGNATURES.

COMELEC HAD THE SAME PRESCRIPTION IN ITS BID BULLETIN AND ITS PRONOUNCEMENTS until that issuance of

Comelec Resolution 8786.

4. Observers are at a loss as to the valid operational justification to remove the digital signatures of the BEIs.

The Comelec was quoted as saying "the move [not using the digital signatures] was aimed at removing one step in the

transmission process to minimize human intervention and protect the results of the balloting.

Will three keys to be entered prior to transmitting significantly delay the transmission process, given that the

transmission has been observed to take several minutes?

Was the intent to protect the results and provide comforting assurance? Indeed what happened in minds of objective

observers is the REVERSE. No assurance can be made that the transmitted results are the same as the actual votes.

5. The Philippine Computer Society (PCS) disclosed that Comelec considered the i-button key of the BEI Chairman and the

PINs of the two BEI members as sufficient equivalents for a digital signature.

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The PCS members did not agree that the i-button and PIN features were sufficient to protect the authenticity, integrity,

confidentiality and veracity of the transmission of the ERs. It was their consensus that these features were not the

security features contemplated by RA 9369.

MAJOR IMPLICATIONS:

1. There was a significant divergence from the law, including non-compliance with the provisions of the Bid and the

Automation Contract.

2. There is now a dark cloud on the authenticity, integrity, confidentiality, veracity and accuracy of the vote counts in the

ERs.

3. The process prejudices the entire electoral process. Several voting result irregularities, discrepancies in printouts vs.

transmitted results, malfunctioning of PCOS machines, slowdown in transmission, and worse, reports of unauthorized

vote shaving and changing for a fee, have come into light.

2. THE NUMBER OF DISENFRANCHISED VOTERS IS SUFFICIENT TO AFFECT GREATLY THE RESULTS OF THE ELECTIONS.

Voters Lists were posted on the walls outside the clustered precincts (with a maximum of 1000 registered voters) only on voting day.

Although precinct assignments were mailed to individual voters by barangay captains, most received theirs late in the voting day or not

at all. Voters have great difficulty in locating and identifying their clustered precincts. Long queues developed with voters waiting

several (from one to six) hours before voting. As a result, many, especially women and the elderly, decided to forego voting.

Comelec's consultant on queue management estimates the number of disenfranchised voters to range from 2 million to 8 million.

This number can easily affect the results in the presidential, vice presidential and senatorial race especially the close ones.

3. THE AUTOMATED ELECTION SYSTEM (AES) WAS IMPLEMENTED LIVE WITHOUT THE APPROPRIATE FIELD TESTING, AND

LAW-SPECIFIED TESTING IN ACTUAL ELECTIONS.

RA 9369 SEC. 6 states "for the regular national and local election, which shall be held immediately after effectivity of this Act (in 2007),

the AES shall be used in at least two highly urbanized cities and two provinces each in Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao ..."

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5. NO AUDIT WAS DONE ON THE AES PRIOR TO THE ELECTIONS. THERE WAS ONLY A MANDATED RANDOM MANUAL AUDIT

THAT, UP TO THIS WRITING, HAS NOT BEEN COMPLETED.

RA 9369 Sec. 24 Random Manual Audit states "Where the AES is used, there shall be a random manual audit in one precinct per

congressional district randomly chosen by the Commission in each province and city. Any difference between the automated and

manual count will result in the determination of root cause and initiate a manual count for those precincts affected by the computer or

procedural error."

A Random Manual Audit (RMA) was conducted for 5 precincts for each congressional district or a total of 1,145 of the 76,340 precincts

nationwide.

The RMA precincts were raffled 12 noon of election day but the choice of the RMA precincts was made public only after the close of

voting. As observed in Pampanga, the RMA in one precinct in Telabastagan was started at 8pm election day and the results were not

disclosed to the observers.

The results of 30 RMA precincts were released and announced as of 15 May 2010. Last 20 May, Comelec announced results of about

300 RMA precincts were completed with few discrepancies.

PPCRV and Comelec announced some .07% discrepancies in about 400 ERs audited as of 21 May. No target completion was announced.

This should be compared to the Bid Bulletin Specifications "Component 1B- PCOS Machine -

10. The system shall count the voters vote as marked on the ballot with an accuracy rating of at least 99.995 %."

If in 400 ERs audited, .07% discrepancy is noted, how much more discrepancy can be expected for the rest of the 76,340 ERs?

6. SEVERAL VOTER AND SECURITY FEATURES WERE DISABLED PRIOR TO THE ELECTIONS.

5.1 RA 9369, SEC. 7. requires "Minimum System Capabilities ... (e) Provision for voter verified paper audit trail;"so the voter can

verify whether his votes were the same as those read and counted by the PCOS machine. The AES disabled this feature. The

voter was only notified that his vote was read through the word "CONGRATULATIONS" shown in the PCOS LCD.

5.2 The same section requires "(k) Data retention provision;"

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A memory card and Compact Flash Card designed to maintain the copy of the vote data and precinct, candidates data per PCOS.

Comelec was reported to have started destroying the CFC cards 15 May.

5.3 The AES disabled the Ultra Violet scanning capability (to detect fake and unauthorized ballots) of the PCOS when Comelec

discovered that the ink used in printing the ballots were not sufficiently dense to be read by this UV scanner.

Instead, Comelec procured 76,340 UV handheld scanners to take the PCOS UV feature. However, during the elections, the UV

lamps were not used.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

There has been a noticeable improvement in the peace and order aspects of the elections compared to past national elections. There was initial

satisfaction with the early voting results. BUT later events put to question the authenticity, integrity, confidentiality, veracity and accuracy of the

vote counts in the ERs. The dark cloud rose from disabling critical, legally specified security features, particularly relating to the digital

signatures. Thus, no one (both perceived winners and losers) can be sure whether the vote results are true and correct, and reflect the real will

of the Filipino people.

Accordingly, the Election Observers Team of Global Filipino Nation challenges the legitimacy of the election results.

To resolve this very critical issue, GFN recommends the following:

1. In the short-term, impound PCOS machines, the memory and CF cards, and perform forensics on these using the actual ballots.

2. Comelec would promptly comply with Supreme Court directing the Comelec to make public the documents requested by

Petitioner about Comelec's preparation and compliance with the requirements of the law.

3. An independent, non-partisan qualified party would conduct a full-blown audit of the Automated System (including

recommended improvements to include automated registration, purging of voters lists, precinct mapping, and Internet Voting)

as inputs to the Advisory Council. The audit should cover:

a. Compliance with RA9369 and other related legal issuances covering national and local elections;

b. Compliance with the Terms of Reference and Project Specifications of the Bid;

c. Reasonableness of Pricing and Expenses involved in the Project vs. Contract, and approved changes;

d. Evaluation of the Technology used;

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e. Evaluation of Internal Controls of the System; and

f. Evaluation of Performance by Comelec and Smartmatic management and project staff.

4. With the lessons learned in the automation of 2010, the following projects should be pursued in time for the 2013

elections:

a. As a priority, complete the computerization of the Automated Fingerprint Information System (AFIS), started by Comelec

several years ago, to complete and purge the Registered Voters List.

b. Complete the computerization of the Voters Registration Information System (VRIS) and that of the Project of Precincts

(POP) in order to prevent disenfranchisement, "flying and ghost" voters, and "ghost" precincts.

c. Finalize the amendments and corresponding Implementation Rules and Regulations for RA 9369.

GLOBAL FILIPINO NATION is a non-partisan international organization of offshore and onshore Filipinos in 30 countries committed to "Building

the Global Filipino Nation for Good Governance." It has been active for more than eight years in major governance issues such as The Overseas

Absentee Voting Law, the Dual Citizenship Law, economic initiatives, and social issues and programs for migrant workers.

GFN 2010 ELECTIONS OBSERVERS TEAM

The GFN Team covered municipalities and cities in Pampanga, Quezon and Iloilo.

1. Victor S. Barrios is an international banker and economist. He has served as Sr. Adviser to initiatives of multilateral financial

institutions in over a dozen countries in Eastern Europe and Asia. He is a Convenor of Global Filipino Nation.

2. Jun S. Aguilar, an OFW entrepreneur, is an engineer by profession who has served various international companies in the Middle

East for 13 years. He is CEO-President FMW Group Holdings Inc., Chair of the Filipino Migrant Workers Group and Convenor ofGlobal Filipino Nation.

3. Theodore B. M. Aquino, a California Registered Civil Engineer and a Global Filipino Nation Convenor, is a strong advocate for

Filipino Dual Citizenship rights and good governance. He has his own consulting engineering practice in California and in several

occasions providedpro bono consulting services to the Republic of the Philippines through the UNDP TOKTEN (Transfer of

Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals) Programme.

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4. Elsa A. Bayani served as an RN from U.K. and U.S.; Arkansas State Chair of National Federation of Filipino American Association;

and TV host Fox Network Asian American Focus, Little Rock Arkansas. An advocate for children in prison, youth and the elderly,

she serves as Chairman of Our Barangay Inc. to connect 42,000 barangays to the Internet and a Convenor of Global FilipinoNation.

5. Tim C. Bayani, a registered criminologist, served the Arkansas State Dept. of Correction and Phil. National Police Commission. He

was the Dean of Criminology Manila College. He is a member of the FBI-Law Enforcement Executive Dev. Association.

6. Robert Ceralvos company provides wifi products/services to projects in the US, notably Google. He has been in the IT industry

for almost thirty-years and founded several start-ups. He has been actively involved with IT organizations and a Global Filipino

Nation Convenor. His motto is: Technology to the People.

7. Romeo Z. Cayabyab is a Sydney-based audit consultant and university lecturer specializing in treasury operations, risk

management, systems and operations control. He is also the founder and publisher of the emanila.com group of websites

including TheFilipinoAustralian.com.

8. Hermenegildo R. Estrella, Jr. is a Management Systems Advisor for public and private consulting projects. He held senior

management positions in IBM Philippines, Ayala Investment and Development, and Citibank. He is currently a Board Member

and Officer of My Wellness City and SIETAR Philippines. He served as the IT/Election Specialist/Consultant of the Global FilipinoNation Foreign/ Election Observers Group.

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ANNEX 1. INTERIM DETAILED ASSESSMENT

This Interim Assessment of the 2010 national elections can be divided into two areas:

1. Performance of Comelec and its deputized agencies vis-a-vis their roles, and in comparison with their performances in the 2004

national and 2007 local elections.

2. Performance of Comelec's Automated Voting, Consolidating and Canvassing System (referred to as the Automated Election

System or AES) procured from Smartmatic-TIM compared to the actual live System implementation, provisions of RA9369

governing such automation, System contract between Comelec and Smartmatic-TIM, System Project Management, and the

System deliverables.

TABLE I. PERFORMANCE OF COMELEC AND ITS DEPUTIZED AGENCIES

CRITERIA ACTUAL 2010 2004 /2007 2010 ASSESSMENT

1. Comelec

1.1 Registration of Voters

Purging of Lists

Regular procedures with

automated registration using

biometrics.

Comelec claims purging of

some 70,000 of voters in

current voter list

Regular procedures with

automated registration using

biometrics.

Comelec claims purging of a

similar number of voters in

that year's voter list

No significant improvement

vs. 2004/2007

1.2 Voter Verification / Checking of

Names in Comelec Lists and Precinct

Assignments

Voters Lists were posted on

the walls outside the

clustered precincts (several

established precincts intoone clustered precinct for a

maximum of 1000 registered

voters) only on voting day.

Precinct assignments were

mailed to individual voters by

barangay (but mostly

Voters lists were posted on

the walls outside of each

established precinct (up to

300 voters per precinct) priorto the voting day.

No mailing of precinct

assignments.

Voters have great difficulty in

locating and identifying their

clustered precincts.

Long queues developed with

voters waiting several hours

before voting.

The estimated number of

disenfranchised voters in the

election may range from 2

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received during voting day

only)

Comelec website provides

finder capability for precinct

assignment per voter.

million to 8 million, according

to Comelec's consultant on

queue management.

This number may have

affected the results in the

presidential, vice presidential

and senatorial results.

1.3 Voting and Canvassing (please see

Table II)

1.4 Release of Results (time) 80% of precinct votesreported by 13 May

Several winning local officials

proclaimed starting 13 May

90% reported by 17 May

9 senators proclaimed 17

May.

Voting results completedafter more than a month

Faster results at precinct andmunicipal/city level than

2004/2007

1.5 Accuracy of Results Most of declared winners

follow the general trend ofpre and post election

surveys.

Contract specified 99.99%

accuracy.

Two days after elections,

several incidents of potential

fraud and irregularities were

reported, documented andprotests filed (starting 17

May)

2004 national results

questioned withinvestigations ending up with

"Hello Garci" investigations in

2005 to 2006. (No resolution

yet.)

2007 (12th position)

senatorial results questioned

and pending resolution.

In suspense following

announcement of RandomManual Audits and resolution

of filed cases.

With the assessments in

Table 2, and awaiting a full

blown audit, this criterion

awaits resolution.

2. Department of Education

2.1 Performance as Board of Election

Inspectors

Performed their assigned

jobs despite procedural

difficulties and long voter

Performed their assigned

jobs despite incidents of

violence and related electoral

BEIs have shown their best

under pressure

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queues to serve pressures

3. Philippine National Police3.1 Maintenance of Peace and Order Very few incidents of

reported electoral violence.

Has a high level of reported

of electoral related incidents,

especially in Mindanao in the

2007 elections

More peaceful and orderly

than 2004/2007

4. Armed Forces of the Philippines

4.1 Maintenance of Peace and Order No reported incidents

4.2 Involvement in the elections No reported involvement inelection fraud.

Claimed involvement in 2004elections,

Better performance in 2010

TABLE II. PERFORMANCE OF THE COMELEC AES

MAJOR CRITERIA REQUIREMENT COMELEC PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT

1. Republic Act 9369

1.1 Sec 3 and 5. IT-capable person Trained and certified by

DOST; at least one member

of the BEI, and to assist the

BOC

In the observed Pampanga

voting centers, only one IT

person (no certification

shown) covered one voting

center consisting of several

clustered precincts

1.2 Sec 6. Use of AES "for the regular national and

local election, which shall be

held immediately after

effectivity of this Act, the AES

shall be used in at least two

highly urbanized cities and

two provinces each in Luzon,

Visayas and Mindanao ..."

There was no use of the AES

contracted in July 2009 in

two urbanized cities and two

provinces each in Luzon,

Visayas and Mindanao. The

AES was IMPLEMENTED LIVE

NATIONWIDE in the 2010

elections.

This is dangerous as

Comelec's non compliance

means an untested and

unaudited system will be

implemented LIVE. May lead

to unforeseen difficulties and

erroneous results.

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"In succeeding regular

national or local elections,

the AES shall beimplemented nationwide."

1.3 Sec 7. Minimum System

Capabilities

(a) Adequate security against

unauthorized access

(b) Accuracy in recording and

reading of votes as well as in

the tabulation,

consolidation/canvassing,

electronic transmission, andstorage of results;

Passwords for the BEI were

provided. No observed

passwords for the IT

personnel.

Digital signatures were

required but within twomonths before the elections,

these were not used.

Use of encryption in

transmission announced but

an incompletely secure

transmission scheme is made

available, but not utilized inthe elections.

UV reading by PCOS earlier

provided but later was

disabled when ink density of

the ballot was found

inadequate. An external,

handheld UV lamp wasprocured to check on the

authenticity of a ballot.

Tests using 10 sample ballots

were made after the May 3

erroneous Compact Flash

cards (CFC) field tests. Not all

This is leading to a Legal

standoff as to theauthenticity, reliability and

accuracy of the vote results.

The UV lamps were not

provided nor used in the

Pampanga precincts.

There were reports that

stated some ERs contain

votes of 10 voters, meaning

that the votes transmitted

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(c) Error recovery in case of

non-catastrophic failure of

device;

(d) System integrity which

ensures physical stability and

functioning of the voterecording and counting

process ;

(e) Provision for voter

verified paper audit trail;

tests in 76,340 precincts

where supposedly all CFC

were reconfigured andreplaced, were completed

and announced.

Transmission tests were not

conducted as stated by

Provincial Election

Supervisor, Regional Election

Officer and his Deputy.

Back up PCOS machines are

used within a province.

Only a UPS is provided to

ensure the PCOS will not lose

power.

Voter only notified in the

PCOS screen that his vote is

read.

The announced capability forthe voter to verify that his

vote choices were recorded

by the PCOS was disabled.

Only the word

"CONGRATULATIONS" was

shown in the PCOS LCD.

were the test votes.

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(f) System auditability which

provides supporting

documentation for verifying

the correctness of reported

election results;

(g) An election managementsystem for preparing ballots

and programs for use in the

casting and counting of votes

and to consolidate, report

and display election result in

the shortest time possible;

(h) Accessibility to illiteratesand disabled voters;

(i) Vote tabulating program

for election, referendum or

plebiscite;

(j) Accurate ballot counters;

NO VOTE RECEIPT WAS

PROVIDED FOR.

Only a printed Election

Return tape was prepared

after the counting.

A Random Manual Audit was

conducted for 5 precincts for

each congressional district ora total of 1,145 of the 76,340

precincts nationwide.

An Election ManagementSystem module was

provided.

No prior tests were made

instead implemented LIVE

immediately.

No specific tests were made.

Election Return tapes were

printed out (see item f

above)

Tested under item b above.

30 copies of the ER were

printed for each precinct and

distributed to authorized

parties.

The results of 30 RMA

precincts were released and

announced as of 15 May2010.

Last 20 May, Comelec

announced results of about

300 RMA precincts were

completed with few

discrepancies.

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(k) Data retention provision;

(l) Provide for the

safekeeping, storing and

archiving of physical or paper

resource used in the electionprocess;

(m) Utilize or generate

official ballots as herein

defined;

(n) Provide the voter a

system of verification to findout whether or not the

machine has registered his

choice; and

(o) Configure access control

for sensitive system data and

function.

"In the procurement of this

system, the Commission shall

develop and adopt an

evaluation system to

ascertain that the above

minimum system capabilities

are met. This evaluation

A memory card and CFC card

designed to maintain thecopy of the vote data and

precinct, candidates data per

PCOS.

Comelec provided facilities

for storing their copies of the

paper tapes, and the used

ballots, unused ballots andother paper paraphernalia.

Printed official ballots at the

National Printing Office.

Same as item e above.

See item a above.

An evaluation system was

provided but not announced

nor released.

Comelec was reported to

have started destroying theCFC cards 15 May.

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system shall be developed

with the assistance of an

advisory council."

1.4 Sec 8. Communication Channels

for Electronic Transmissions

all electronic transmissions

by and among the EAS and its

related components shall

utilize secure communication

channels ... to ensure

authentication and integrity

of transmission."

4,690 polling centers have no

cell phone signal from

telecommunication firms

affecting about 5 million

registered voters.

5,600 Broadband Global Area

Network (BGAN) equipmentand 680 Very Small Aperture

Terminals have been

assigned to these areas.

See item 1.3 b above.

No specific authentication

and integrity check werereleased and announced

regarding the public telecom

facilities and facilities

utilized.

Only 40,000 modems were

contracted to allow

No announced results of

testing these facilities.Slowdown in transmission

was noticed three days after

elections.

As observed in Pampanga,

there was only one modem

used by several precincts in a

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transmissions. voting center, thus delaying

transmission.

Transmission in observed

precincts in Pampanga took

about 30 minutes per ER.

1.5 Sec 9. Technical Evaluation

Committee

The Committee shall certify,

through an established

international certification

entity to be chosen by the

Commission from the

recommendations of theAdvisory Council, not later

than three months before

the date of the electoral

exercises, categorically

stating that the AES,

including its hardware and

software components, is

operating properly, securely,and accurately, in accordance

with the provisions of this Act

based, among others, on the

following documented

results:

1. The successful conduct of a

field testing process followed

by a mock election event in

one or more

cities/municipalities;

Comelec commissioned

SysTest Lab of the USA to

review the source code.

Comelec also opened up to

political and other interestedparties the review of the

source codes.

The source code copy was

put in escrow at the Central

Bank.

Bid Specifications "Annex E"

stated that "There shall be as

many field tests as may be

necessary until the

requirements for the tests

SysTest Lab submitted a

report with some 4,000

comments for action by

Comelec. No official

announcement by Comelec

whether these SysTestcomments were addressed.

The lack of transparency by

the Comelec led the Supreme

Court to order Comelec to

produce the relevant

documentation on these

items.

This action of Comelec led to

suspicions and worries by

citizen watchdogs that

insufficient testing and

checking are happening, that

may lead to irregularities and

possibly manipulation of thevote results.

Tests were conducted only at

precinct level.

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2. The successful completion

of audit on the accuracy,

functionally and security

controls of the AES software;

3. The successful completion

of a source code review;

4. A certification that the

source code is kept in escrow

with the Bangko Sentral ng

Pilipinas;

5. A certification that the

source code reviewed is one

and the same as that used by

the equipment; and

6. The development,

have been satisfied provided

that the tests shall not go

beyond December 5, 2009.

All systems shall be tested on

site, i.e. in selected locations

nationwide covering different

test voting centers, test

consolidation sites, and test

canvassing sites. The test

shall also include live

transmission of precinct

results. COMELEC personnel

shall operate all systems in

the test.

No certification issued.

See above comment re

SysTest.

Announcement made.

No certification announced.

No announcement.

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provisioning, and

operationalization of a

continuity plan to cover risks

to the AES at all points in the

process such that a failure of

elections, whether at voting,

counting or consolidation,

may be avoided.

"If the Commission decides

to proceed with the use of

the AES without the

Committee's certification, it

must submit its reason in

writing, to the Oversight

Committee , no less than

thirty (30) days prior to the

electoral exercise where the

AES will be used.

No announcement.

1.6 Sec 10. Procurement of

Equipment and Materials

With respect to the May 10,

2010 election and succeeding

electoral exercises, the

system procured must have

demonstrated capability and

been successfully used in a

prior electoral exercise here

or board. Participation in the

2007 pilot exercise shall not

be conclusive of the system's

fitness.

The PCOS machine was not

used in the ARMM and 2007

elections. In ARMM, two

voting machines, the DRE and

CCOS were used by two

different contractors.

1.7 Sec 11. Continuity Plan Activation of such continuity

and contingency measures

shall be undertaken in the

Not done. Although a

Comelec Resolution was

issued to cover these.

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presence of representatives

of political parties and

citizen's arm of the

Commission who shall be

notified by the election

officer of such activation.

"All political parties and

party-lists shall be furnished

copies of said continuity plan

at their official addresses as

submitted to the

Commission.

The list shall be published in

at least two newspaper of

national of circulation and

shall be posted at the

website of the Commission at

least fifteen (15) days prior to

the electoral activity

concerned."

Not know whether these

were furnished.

No copy published.

1.8 Sec 12. "Examination and Testing

of Equipment or Device of the AES and

Opening of the Source Code for

Review"

The Commission shall allow

the political parties and

candidates or their

representatives, citizens'

arm or their representatives

to examine and test.

"The equipment or device to

be used in the voting and

counting on the day of the

electoral exercise, before

voting start. Test ballots and

test forms shall be provided

by the Commission.

No test by the parties were

made prior to the voting on

election day. The only test

made was after the

reconfiguration of the CFCs

using 10 sample ballots.

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"Immediately after the

examination and testing of

the equipment or device,

parties and candidates or

their representatives,

citizen's arms or their

representatives, may submit

a written comment to the

election officer who shall

immediately transmit it to

the Commission for

appropriate action.

"The election officer shall

keep minutes of the testing,

a copy of which shall be

submitted to the Commission

together with the minute of

voting."

"Once an AES technology is

selected for implementation,

the Commission shall

promptly make the source

code of that technology

available and open to any

interested political party or

groups which may conduct

their own review thereof."

No such minutes were made.

1.9 Sec 13. Official Ballot The Commission shall Comelec first made the list of

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prescribe the format of the

electronic display and/or the

size and form of the official

ballot, which shall contain

the titles of the position to be

filled and/or the proposition

to be voted upon in an

initiative, referendum or

plebiscite.

candidates on a vertical list

format but later shifted to a

horizontal list per position.

1.10 Sec 17. Notice of Designation of

Counting Centers

The election officer shall post

prominently in his/her office,

in the bulletin boards at the

city/municipal hall and in

three other conspicuous

places in the

city/municipality, the notice

on the designated counting

center(s) for at least three

weeks prior to election day.

The notice shall specify the

precincts covered by each

counting center and the

number of registered voters

in each of said precincts . The

election officer shall also

furnish a copy of the notice

to the headquarters or

official address of the

political parties or

independent candidates

within the same period. The

election officer shall post in

the Commission website

concerned the said notice

No such lists were posted in

the city/municipal halls, nor

provided the political parties.

Such lists were not also

posted in the Comelec

website nor published in the

local newspapers.

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and publish the notice in the

local newspaper. Where the

polling place or voting center

is also the designated

counting center, such

information shall be

contained in the notice.

1.11 Sec 18 and 19 Election returns The Commission shall

prescribe the manner and

procedure of counting the

votes under the automated

system: Provided, that apart

from the electronically stored

result, thirty (30) copies of

the election return are

printed."

Comelec provided these in

the BEI General Instructions;

and printed 30 copies of the

ERs.

Some protestors have shown

ERs with "Citibank

Mastercard" marks and had

prior dates to elections, and

several post dates marked.

A. Distribution of ER copies (as above) (as above)

B. Electronic Transmission "Within one hour after the

printing of the election

returns, the chairman of the

board of election inspectors

or any official authorized by

the Commission shall, in the

presence of watchers and

representatives of the

accredited citizens' arm,

political parties/candidates, if

any, electronically transmit

the precinct results to the

respective levels of board of

canvassers, to the dominant

majority and minority party,

to the accredited citizen's

arm, and to the Kapisanan ng

The BEI, in the observed

voting centers of Pampanga,

transmitted the vote results

to the Comelec server, the

PPCRV and KBP.

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mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas

(KBP).

"The election results at the

city/municipality canvassing

centers shall be transmitted

in the same manner by the

election officer or any official

authorized by the

commission to the district or

provincial canvassing centers.

"The election returns

transmitted electronically

and digitally signed shall be

considered as official election

results and shall be used as

the basis for the canvassing

of votes and the

proclamation of a candidate."

The canvassed election

results were transmitted to

the Comelec server.

This transmission step of

precinct to Comelec Server

was not provided for by RA

9369. The problem would be

that anyone in control of the

Comelec Server would

already know the trend of the

voting prior to the precinct

results going to the

municipal/city as mandated.

This is now the legal subject

in the National Canvassing as

digital signatures as required

by RA 9369 were not

purposely utilized upon

orders of the Comelec.

1.12 Sec. 20 Canvassing by Provincial,

City, District and Municipal Boards of

Canvassers

"Within one hour after the

canvassing, the Chairman of

the district or provincial

Board of Canvassers or the

city board of canvassers of

those cities which comprise

one or more legislative

districts shall electronically

transmit the certificate of

canvass to the commission

sitting as the national board

of canvassers for senators

and party-list representatives

and to the Congress as the

The canvassed election

results were transmitted first

to the Comelec server, then

to the various canvassing

centers.

In the first hours of

canvassing in the City of San

Fernando, what was shown in

the projected canvass, after

the election, were only the

number of precincts

reporting without vote

results.

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National Board of Canvassers

for the president and vice

president, directed to the

President of the Senate.

"The Commission shall adopt

adequate and effective

measures to preserve the

integrity of the certificates of

canvass transmitted

electronically and the results

in the storage devices at the

various levels of the boards

of canvassers.

"The certificates of canvass

transmitted electronically

and digitally signed shall be

considered as official election

results and shall be used as

the basis for the

proclamation of a winning

candidate."

No such measures were

released nor announced.

Comelec Resolution 8786

instructed the BEIs not to

indicate their digital

signatures for the

transmission.

See 1.11 B above assessment.

1.13 Sec. 24 Random Manual Audit Where the AES is used, there

shall be a random manual

audit in one precinct per

congressional district

randomly chosen by the

Commission in each province

and city. Any difference

between the automated and

manual count will result in

the determination of root

cause and initiate a manual

count for those precincts

affected by the computer or

Same as item 1.3 f above.

The RMA precincts were

raffled 12 noon of election

day. As observed in

Pampanga, the RMA in one

precinct in Telabastagan was

started at 8pm election day.

Same as item 1.3 f above.

PPCRV and Comelec

announced some .07%

discrepancies in about 400

ERs audited as of 21 May. No

target completion was

announced.

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procedural error."

1.14 Sec. 26 Stakeholder education

and training

The Commission shall, not

later than six months before

the actual automated

election exercise, undertake

a widespread stakeholder

education and training

program, through newspaper

of general circulation, radio,

television and other media

forms, as well as through

seminars, symposia, fora and

other nontraditional means,

to educate the public and

fully inform the electorate

about the AES and inculcate

values on honest, peaceful,

orderly and informed

elections.

Comelec initiated the

stakeholder education and

training program together

with concerned peoples'

groups and organizations

through print, radio and TV

media.

1.15 Sec. 30 Rules and Regulations The Commission shall

promulgate rules and

regulation for the

implementation and

enforcement of this Act.

No implementing rules and

regulations were provided for

the implementation and

enforcement of this Act.

2. Contract Between Comelec and

Smartmatic-TIM

2.1 Compliance to RA9369 provisions Contract indicated provisions

and attachments that comply

with RA 9369, the Terms of

Reference and Project

Specifications of the Bid.

As stated in the various items

in this column, there were

many required specifications

that were disregarded,

disabled and not provided for

in the actual implementation.

2.2 Reasonableness of Pricing Total Smartmatic Contract is Comelec agreed to all these Although this pricing is below

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P7,191.4 million

10%: Project Initialization,

Set up Project Management

Team and Project Systems

including all SW licenses and

firmware- P719 million

5%: Delivery of Development

Set (20 PCOS units)- P359

million

5%: Report on Transmission

and Logistics- P359 million

5%: Delivery of Functional

System and Software- P359

million

Project Management- P99.9

million

82,200 PCOS machines

(lease) P3,346 million

pricing provisions. the P11,230 million budget,

there are certain items that

are way above industry price

levels.

This will be difficult to justify

considering it is only

initialization and set-up, and

considering the main

software is only P42 million.

The cost of 20 PCOS units is

about P1.0 million. The

balance of P358 million

would be difficult to justify.

The actual services and

equipment for transmission is

only P199.9 million, logistics

is P916 m, so it would again

be difficult to justify such as

report.

The Project is for a year, and

certainly this amount is

extravagant as no such

Project team would justify

such an amount for their

services.

One PCOS is leased for

P45,419, which is almost the

purchase price of one

available in the market,

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Total software P42 million

Electronic Transmission

P199.9 m

Logistics P916 million

further should be lower as a

big volume is ordered.

2.3 Compliance to contract provisions See items 3 and 4 below. See items 3 and 4 below. See items 3 and 4 below.

3. Project Management

3.1 Project Manager Requirement for the Project

Manager:

Minimum fifteen (15)

years relevant IT

experience;

At least ten (10) years

experience in managing

large-scale multi-site IT

development and

implementation projects

involving relational

databases and wide area

networks;

With actual experience in

assisting in the bid

processes of anygovernment agency

following RA 9184

Philippine government

procurement rules,

regulations and processes

No Project Manager of

Smartmatic has been

identified, shown nor quoted

during the entire election

period, up to the present.

Questions arising from the IT

community have been raised

whether the Smartmatic and

Comelec Project Managers

are really qualified and

experienced to perform the

required work, as shown by

project delays and non-

compliance to key and critical

aspects of the automation.

3.2 Completion of planned activities A time schedule was posted There had been delays in the These delays led to

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in the Comelec website. deliveries of the PCOS

machines and completion of

activities.

Light penalties were charged

to Smartmatic.

insufficient testing, to note

particularly the one that led

to the Monday May 3

episode that rushed the Final

Testing and Sealing of the

PCOS machines and

reconfigured CF cards.

Such delays are now being

considered as critical to the

resolution of protests

regarding irregularities found

out in the voting results.

4. Deliverables

4.1 Compliance to quality of project

specifications

Several certifications were

required and specified.

Only the certification by

SysTest was announced but

not published.

Lack of transparency by

Comelec and Smartmatic on

these requirements puts to

doubt the test quality and

implementation results of the

whole system.

4.2 Adherence to timetables See item 3.2 above See item 3.2 above See item 3.2 above

Canvass and proclamation of

winners

As provided for in the Project

Timetable: Finish by

05.13.10

Canvass about 90% by 17

May

Proclamation of 9 of 12

senators made 17 May.

31

foreign observers challenge election legitimacy

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