forecasts supported by bumper stickers

Anadarko: Red Hot and Closely Followed nadarko Petroleum Corporation (NYSE-APC), a corporation that the public has traded for only a little more than six months, was for many years the exploration and development arm of Panhandle Eastern Corporation, of Houston. In mid-1986 Panhandle Eastern was a p proached by Star Partners, associates of T. Boone Pickens, who wanted to buy out the corpora-

Hugoton Gas Field Texas-Oklahoma-Kansas

Anadarko Acreage I L / Kansas

I I natural gas may 1987 13

tion. With rumors circulating that Pickens also had an interest, in Anadarko, Panhandle Eastern spun off Anadarko, a move that also had been rumored for a year and a half.

Thus on October 1,1986, Anadarko became independent. It has remained so and it knows of no efforts yet to take it over, by Pickens or any other party. In the words of Anadarko president James T. Rodgers, “We haveno knowledge of any moves on our stock.”

Ripe for the Pickens’? But the story may not be over. Anadarko produces 975 Bcfof its 1,600 Bcfof gas from one area, the

Hugoton Field in the Anadarko Basin (see map). According to one commentator, this area and other Midcontinent areas nearby frequently have been central to the attempts of Pickens to expand his holdings. Making Pickens and Anadarko even closer, the Hugoton Field gave birth to both Anadarko and Mesa Petroleum, the company that Pickens operates, in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Said Rodgers: “We were formed in the mid-1950s in the Anadarko Basin, in Liberal, Kansas, which is still our largest operations office. Mesa was formed just a little later, from the old Hugoton Production Company, part of the same original properties.” But Rodgers and others did not anticipate imminent takeover moves.

Thus a raid is not much of a worry at Anadarko. Added A. Paul ’Bylor, vice president, corporate communications: “We are a takeover candidate in the sense that every company on the New York Stock Exchange is a takeover candidate. Although when we became an independent company we passed some standard takeover measures-a poison pill, a staggered board, and a prohibition of 2-tier stock- holding-we did these primarily to satisfy the lawyers and ensure that the stockholders would get a good price if a buyout ever should happen. We believe our best takeover defense is a good stock price.”

Plans to Forge Ahead A good stock price m a y be what Anadarko already has, and with good reason. The company plans to grow rapidly by combining its considerable advantages:

Reserve replacement-Last year it replaced 317 percent of the amount it produced (chart 1). Com- rnenting on this increase, mylor said: “Basically, it breaks down into thirds. We revised our reserves for 11 1 B d . We acquired 102 Bcf and discovered the remainder, 108 Bcf. Our 5-year average has been 380 percent.’’

Chart 1

Anadarko Petroleum Corporation Reserve Replacement (EEB%)

144%

1982

114%

1983

Reserve Adds.

133%

1984

317%

193%

1985 1986

1-1 Production

14 natural gas may 1987

Chart 2

$/EEB

Anadarko Petroleum Corporation Finding Costs

15

10

5

0

11.93 r 8.42 I

1982 1983

Anadarko

7.73 7.72 -

1984

8.45 r 4.09 I

2.09

1985 1986

0 Industry Average

Finding costs-Of all of the independents, the company has the lowest jinding costs. In 1986 its new gas reserves cost only $2.09 an energy-equivalent barrel (chart 2). These reserves costs differ greatly, depending upon their source: -0ne-third of these reserves were merely adjustments upward of the reserves the company had

-A second third was reserves that the company bought very cheaply, at 30 cents an Mcfor about

-The last third was reserves that the company discovered and developed, and these cost $4.21 an

already, so they cost nothing.

$1.80 an EEB.

EEB, an amount which is still the industry’s lowest for reserves of this kind. “In looking at either reserve replacement or cost of finding, I like to point out that you really should look at 3- or 5-year averages,” said Rodgers. “The yearly amount will vary with things like the cost of an offshore lease sale, which in one year will run your costs up when it hasn’t done you a thing.” Thus what matters is long-term performance. Long-term performance (table 1) is very good for Anadarko and has given the company a number of benefits. Except for the problems of 1981, costs would be by far the lowest of any of the companies

’Eible 1

Domestic Implied Finding Costs

1979 Anadarko Petroleum COT. $6.30 Apache Corporation (a) Neg. Louisiana Land & Expl. Co. Neg. Pennzoil Company 9.38 Noble Affiliates Inc. 6.46 Sabine Corporation 12.15

1980 1981 1982 $11.80 $49.74 $ 8.45

10.72 14.00 7.02 29.96 14.98 12,14 9.54 9.93 . 5.06 6.98 15.77 11.21 7.36 13.67 28.06

__ 1983 $10.93 36.23 7.67

11.38 10.81 10.69

1984 $ 7.33

7.37 15.57 15.80 7.16

13.93

___- 1985

Weighted Average

1979-1985 $ 4.21

6.83 10.56 10.04 8.77 7.69

$ 9.14 11.63 21.91

8.91 9.04

12.04 Mesa Limited Partnership (b) 12.60 6.75 20.32 10.52

6) Excluding capitalized costs of transfers of offshore properties. &I) It includes Canadian reserves.

Source: caldman Smhs

natural gas may 1987 15

covered. Since 1982, these costs have been lower than the industry average (chart 31, according to data from John S. Herold, a consulting f r m that the industry recognizes as one of the best sources for such

Chart 3

U.S. Finding Costs - Anadarko Petroleum Corp. (Dollars Per EEB)

15

Anadarko 11.93

Industry Average

1982

5

1983 1984 1985

2.09

1986

10

5

data. “Our average for the five years probably is going to be half of the industry average, once we get the 1986 data,” said Rodgers. Fi- nally, the costs have given the company reserves that could lever it to some very profitable times, with the help of Federal Energy Regula- tory Commission rulings 451 and 436.

Regulatory Help: FERC orders 451 and 436 and a recent ruling by the Kansas Corporation Commis- sion should benefit the company greatly. -Order 451 eflectively deregulates “old”gas, which accounts for about 40 percent of the corporation’s production and 72 percent of its reserves. The order is the subject of litigation and requires possibly lengthy “good faith negotiations” with pipelines (in Anadarko’s case,

largely Panhandle Eastern, the former parent). Nevertheless, “We have triggered 451,” said Rodgers. “We have triggered the one-time good faith negotiation ability with Panhandle Eastern for the major- ity of our Hugoton properties.” Anadarko thus could obtain prices that at today’s spot market rates almost will triple what it can get for this large amount of gas. --Order 436 will allow the company to sell its gas to a wide range of customers. -Last year the Kansas Corporation Commission reduced the spacing it requires between wells in its portion of the Hugoton basin, from one well in 640 acres to one well in 320 acres. The commission is permitting the new wells over a 4-year period. In the first year the commission will enable Anadarko to drill 94 new wells to add to the 400 the company already has in this field, new wells that are only 2,500 to3,000 feet deep,with an 8Cbyear life. The 94 wells are expected to average one MMdd each. Thus the wells will increase Anadarko’s total deliverability, now 540 MMcfd, by almost 20 percent-and these wells are only thejirst year of a 4- year program in Kansas , and Oklahoma rnay soon follow suit. All of these wells will produce gas that can be sold at a higher price than the rest of the company’s Hugoton gas. -Matagorda program: Offshore, in the Gulf of Mexico, the company owns 37.5 percent of properties on Matagorda blocks 622 and 623 that will have deliverability of more than 425 MMcfd. The company’s portion could be up to 160 MMcfd, another 30-percent increase in deliverability, which will be available for most of 1987.

The better prices from Order 451 could snowball upward with the increased deliverability from the programs above. Using oil price forecasts that start at $14$22 a barrel for 1987 and increase to $17- $25 a barrel by 1991, the company forecasts cashJlow (equal to its exploration budget, chart 4) that compounds quite rapidly: the low case yields a 25 percent compound annual increase; the base case, 30 percent; and the high case, 43 percent. Thus the company has prospects that generally please the financial analysts.

May be fully valued In most cases, the financial analysts have been informed of this growth, have taken it into account and have recommended that the stock be bought. They have stated repeatedly that Anadarko should become the premier trading vehicle for those who want to trade oil and gas stocks. But some have estuhlished “buy” levels at around $20 u share-much less than the close on May4 of 2a3/4. On the high side, the raging bull of the analysts whose reports I inspected was Terry Smith of Howard, Weil, Labouisse, Friederichs, a New Orleans brokerage. Smith, in a February 17 report, appraised the stock at $31 a share, some 8 percent higher than it sold for on May 4. At any rate, the analysts have paid quite a bit of attention to a stock that only has been traded for six months.


Chart 4

Anadarko Petroleum Corporation Capital Expenditures

$/Mil I ions

1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990

Thus, Anadarko has hit the ground running and seems to have made its very good prospects known and valued somewhat appropriately. The company seems to have had this high profile as a strategy Said Dylor, “If we were not fairly priced, we might indeed be a buyout candidate.” 4

ANADARKO PETROLEUM CORf? Summary Financial Data*

(Millions-except per share amounts)

1986 1985 %Change 1904 1983 1982 Revenues $ 206 $ 297 (31) $ 307 $ 261 $ 290 Operating Income 50 110 (55) 130 95 126

(78) 55.7 41.4 54.2 Net Income 10.1 46.9 Earnings per Share 0.21 1.06 (80) 1.30 0.99 1.32 Average Shares Outstanding* * 48.9 44.1 11 43.0 41.9 41.0 Capital Expenditures 125 162 (23) 174 184 259 Long-Term Debt 485 417 16 388 383 363 Stockholders’ Equity 432 444 (3) 416 370 338 Total Assets $1,376 $1,337 3 $1,263 $1,152 $1,079

*Consolidated for Anadarko Petroleum Corporation (referred to herein as Anadarko) and its principal subsidiaries Pan Eastern Exploration Company, Panhandle Western Gas Company, Antioch Gathering Company, Anadarko Petroleum of Canada, Ltd., Anadarko Oil and Gas Company, Matagorda Island Development Corporation and Matagorda Island Exploration Corporation. The 1986 results of operations reflect a change in the method of accounting for pensions. See Note 13 of the Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements in the company’s 1986 annual report.

* *Average shares outstanding for periods prior to the spin-off are based on the number of PEC’s outstanding shares.


Forecasts Supported by Bumper Stickers ccording to Vinod K. Dar, senior vice president of Hadson Petroleum Corp., of Washington, recent economic history in the natural gas business can be reduced to a series of Southwest- ern bumper stickers.

In the late 1970s, Freeze a Yankee in the Dark was merely a summary of DOE and other forecasts: “The theme of these forecasts was ‘It’s all over’,” he said, at the March meeting of the Natural Gas Men of Houston. He said, “This was the time when the white-wine-and-brie set in the Northeast was cuddling up to the doom-and-gloom best sellers.” In the energy industry, these forecasts of shortages led to the boom of the early 1980s.

Oil and gas fields developed rapidly and activity reached a crescendo by 1981, with many anticipat- ing gas at $10 an Mcf. Thus Fat and Free In ’83 bedecked many a new 1981 Mercedes. Said Dar, “Field returns were then a nominal 30 or 40 percent and the outlook was accordingly bright.” But market forces had begun to work and the amount of gas available had begun to increase.

So when 1983 actually arrived, prices had skidded and dnlling was falling fast. Bumper stickers changed to Stay Alive ’ti1 ’85. “At this time, people believed that OPEC would recover its senses and that prices soon would rise again,” said Dar. But the troubles were not over by 1985 and the bumper stickers began to read Chapter Eleven by ’87 on those few, still-1981 Mercedeses that had not been repossessed. Which brings us to the current year.

“’Ibday the bumper stickers no longer state forecasts,” said Dar. The industry may have given up forecasts as it shed as much overhead as it could. AAer the ups and downs of the past ten years, it may have created a work force that is, in the words of the latest bumper sticker, The Few, the Proud, the Employed.

Eight Major Questions for the Gas Industry:

five concern the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and three, the state regulators. The Employed can watch eight areas to gain an idea of the direction of the industry. Of these areas,

FERC trends will have an immediate impact:

1. In the regulatory environment, said Dar, “FERC will concentrate on the gross abuse of insider information by pipelines and shadow pipelines.”

2. ”kinsportation and rate design will receive a great deal of attention. Said Dar: “The stakes are so high that decisions will continue to be made on a case-by-case basis. These cases are so important that gas companies are spending more than $100 million annually on legal fees for FERC questions, according to one estimate.” In comparison, the 1987 budget for the FERC itself is only $104 million.

3. We-or-pay, another important area, “is now acknowledged, at least, as an issue,” said Dar. 4. On producer abandonments, “?tYo-year abandonments will become routine and can be expected

5. Capacity abandonment will surface as an issue. %-ends on the state level will be at least as important as FERC trends, although slower in their

1. Ti-ansportation and transportation costs by local distribution compaies will be an area to watch. 2. The amounts must be defined that the LDCs are obliged to serve core vs. non-core customers. 3. The “service area” concept will be eliminated as certain LDCs emerge as winners in a shakedown

that will eliminate many of today’s LDCs, which now number 1,300. The outcome will be new “super-LDCs.”

to increase to 3-year, 5-year and ultimately final abandonment,” said Dar.

impact. States to watch will be California, Illinois, Iowa, Pennsylvania and Ohio:

U.S. Production Dropping to 13.5 Tcf, Overbuilding Dar is willing to make a number of predictions that cover part or all of the period between now and

the turn of the century. He said, “Pipeline capacity brokers will become common, in spite of FERC. FERC is merely the scribe of change.”

Gas demand will change also. Dar said “Demand will go to 15 Tcfand stay, reflecting a change in the civilization. Our population will continue its gradual migration south, energy-efficiency will continue to improve, and the number of heavy gas-using industries like ammonia plants will continue to diminish. Additionally, the Canadians will come in with about 1.5 Tcf, making U.S. production as little as 13.5 Tcf.”

lb ship this 15 Td, according to Dar, the industry is on its way to having pipelines that will be able to ship up to 25 Td. Thus the pipeline industry will have overbuilt, and this overcapacity will lead to heavy competition and more mergers. “But most of the bloodbath should be over by 1990,” said Dar.


Continued Low Prices Also in the near future, Dar sees continued low prices and a marketing revolution. He said “Assum-

ing that oil remains in the $15-$18 a barrel range, natural gas prices should go not much higher than $3 a million Btu’s at the wellhead, even by the turn of the century. These prices will be affected by electricity, which should become competitive for the first time ever, because of overcapacity in that industry and because the U.S. could begin to import Canadian hydroelectricity.”

Gas Marketed as a Commodity, 30-Day Prices Contracts as well as prices will change, according to Dar. Like other analysts, he anticipates gas

futures in the very near future. He said, “There should be limited trading in these futures within a year and heavy volumes within three years. The natural gas market will become more and more a commodity market. This part of the market will move very little gas on long-term contracts. This part will move gas on spot or 3May prices, which will be the sole decision factor: loyalty will be zero.

“In this market, the shippers will be large. The super-LDCs and organizations like the marketing arms of pipelines will move increasing amounts of gas.

“Tb survive in this kind of market, many organizations must completely change their corporate culture. The survivors will be firms that are intensely customer-driven.” 4

PCB Complaints Have Little or No Effect on Stock of Texas Eastern

exas Eastern Corporation, of Houston, recently has received a great deal of publicity, largely in the Northeast, surrounding PCBs, chemicals that have been linked to cancer. The company may have PCBs in many parts of its pipeline (see map following page) and for 15 years has been working to clean them up. The company has had no problems yet on the

Although as early as 1958 the company used a product with PCBs, the current history of the stock market f?om this problem.

problem began in 1981.

PCBs Possibly Spread throughout System In 1981 a housewife in Long Island was having trouble receiving enough gas. She complained to her

local distribution company. The company came out and found sludge in her gas meter. The company tested the sludge and found it full of PCBs. The company had received the gas from Rxas Eastern, which had transmitted it using Rxas Eastern’s pipeline and compressors.

For 19 years, from 1958 to 1977, many of these compressors used a Monsanto Corporation product to lubricate the compressor engines from their crankcases. In 1972 Monsanto notified Rxas Eastern that the product contained PCBs, and ’Ikxas Eastern began to phase out the product. By 1977 Rxas Eastern thought the product was eliminated from its compressors, but apparently some of it had slipped from the compressors into the pipeline itselfand was pushed and spread throughout the system and into the LDC’s pipeZines and all the way to the consumer, a situation that led to the problem at the house in Long Island.

After this 1981 incident, ’Exas Eastern drained and flushed all of its compressors and replaced the oil, to get rid of any PCBs remaining in the engines. Additionally, the company realized that some of the PCBs may have found their way into disposal pits near the company’s compressor stations, so it shut them down and replaced them with more modern equipment. It completed this effort in 1984. But it continued to have problems.

In 1985 it hired the engineering firm of Roy F. Weston Inc., of Westchester, Pennsylvania, to survey independently the extent that PCBs still remained in the system. Weston chose eight pit sites that represented the scope of the ’Exas Eastern system. It found PCBs in seven.

Company Contacts EPA: ”Ikxas Eastern notified the Environmental Protection Agency of this data. The company worked

with the EPA on a study that it completed in December 1986. On February 21,1987, the company found fame through the Washington Post, which broke the story. That was on a Saturday.

“Unfortunately, that weekend is the only weekend of the year that our office building is closed completely, to maintain the elevators,” said James R. Young, manager media relations. “So we attempted to answer press inquiries from a makeshift office across the street.’’


Texas &istern Corp. NATURAL GAS PIPELINE SYSTEMS - Texas Eastern Gas Pipeline System - - - Algonquin Gas Transmission System a Storage Field

After that weekend ’lkxas Eastern has been very willing to cooperate with the media-1 called the company on an unrelated matter and got four calls back in five hours. But the initial silence set the tone for most of the publicity surrounding the problem, of the “why didn’t anybody tell us?” variety, from state regulators and others. ’Ib this publicity, ’Ikxas Eastern has responded that the EPA has the responsi- bility to communicate and coordinate with state agencies and the public. A company spokesman agreed, however, that a wise public relations alternative may have been to “go public” with the information earlier and to a wider audience and avoid the furor from the unpleasant surprise.

Wall Street Unimpressed: So far, Wall Street has fleeted the PCB problems at 2xa.s Eastern with a yawn. Said John E. Olson,

first vice president of research at Drexel Burnham Lambert, in Houston: The damage has been con- trolled, and the problem has been considered a non event. The problem is 10 years old and was not hidden. It has been taken in stride by the markets. ‘Exas Eastern is not the only company that is vulnerable from this problem. But possibly it will haunt the company later.’’ 4

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93

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19

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187

77

14

51

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2.39

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1.66

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65

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~

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1.42

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27 3/4

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118

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13

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28

26

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37

3i8

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