forced migration - class 3: procedure; persecution...
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Forced MigrationClass 3: Procedure; Persecution I
John Palmer
Brooklyn Law School
August 27, 2012
U.S. Asylum ProcedureWell-Founded Fear Follow-upProcedural Roadmap
PersecutionIllegitimacy
U.S. Asylum ProcedureRoadmap: Affirmative Claims
Asylum Officer interview
Immigration Judge hearing
BIA review
Court of Appeals review
Supreme Court review
Referral
Appeal
ReferralPetition for Review
Petition for cert.
Petition for Review
Attorney General review
I589
U.S. Asylum ProcedureRoadmap: Defensive Claims
Immigration Judge hearing
BIA review
Court of Appeals review
Supreme Court review
Appeal
ReferralPetition for Review
Petition for cert.
Petition for Review
Attorney General review
I589
U.S. Asylum ProcedureRoadmap: Expedited Claims
Immigration Judge hearing
BIA review
Court of Appeals review
Supreme Court review
Appeal
ReferralPetition for Review
Petition for cert.
Petition for Review
Attorney General review
I589Cred. Fear Int.Airport Int.
PersecutionIllegitimacy: China’s Population Policy
173 SUSAN GREENHALGH
economic development, ruining the environment, and preventing China from achieving its rightful place in the world.
Population increase brings economic and environmental peril
Writers seeking to emphasize the perils of the rapid rise in human numbers stressed its historically unprecedented nature. Although the numbers were presented as unquestionable facts, those facts were humanly created through the choice of time period long or short and the choice of measure of popu- lation growth aggregate numbers versus, say, natural growth rates. One vivid graph showed China's population remaining low for 3,750 years, ris- ing worryingly in the next 200 years, and then spiking up to 1 billion in the final few decades before 2000 (Figure 1). The tone of the author's com- mentary on these trends conveyed the alarm readers were supposed to feel. He wrote: "Facing the rapid increase in population, countries everywhere are watching developments with grave concern" (Song 1981: 25-26). Had the author instead shown trends in population growth in the 1970s, the alarm would have been more muted; indeed, the tone would have been upbeat. According to figures available at the time, the years 1971-79 saw the crude birth rate and natural growth rate fall by a striking 50 percent (from 30.7 to 17.9 per 1,000 and from 23.4 to 11.7 per 1,000, respectively
PIGURE 1 Estimated historical trend of Chinese population, 2000 BC-AD I980
1,000
900-
800- _ e
I * <o 700- _
g 600- -
.° 500-
, /
= 400- /
I 300- /
200- /
100- / 70- , , - ; /
2000 BC 1000 500 0 AD 500 1000 1500 2000
SOURCE: Song, Tuan, and Yu 1985: 2. Susan Greenhalgh, Science, Modernity, and the Making of China’s One-Child Policy, 29 Population andDevelopment Review 163, 173 ( 2003) (reprinting figure from Song Jian, Chi-Hsien Tuan, & Jing-Yuan Yu,Population Control in China: Theory and Applications (1985)).
PersecutionIllegitimacy: China’s Population Policy
“Carry out family planning, implement the basic national policy.” 1986. From chineseposters.net.
PersecutionIllegitimacy: China’s Population Policy
“Clever and pretty, healthy and lovely.” 1986. From chineseposters.net.
PersecutionIllegitimacy: China’s Population Policy
“Less births, better births, to develop China vigorously.” 1987. From chineseposters.net.
PersecutionIllegitimacy: China’s Population Policy
ing current age-specific birth rates)fell from around six children perwoman to just over two children perwoman (see Figure 3). Other Asiancountries—including Thailand andSouth Korea—have also seen dra-matic fertility declines, but stretchedover some 40 years. The decline iseven more astonishing given China’srelatively low gross national product(GNP) and a low level of urbaniza-tion. Among all countries with a TFRbelow 2.5, China has the lowest GNPand second-lowest level of urbaniza-tion (behind Thailand).15
Fertility began to decline in the1950s and 1960s, probably because theChinese government began to payattention to urban fertility rates, andbecause couples began to want fewerchildren.16 Fertility declines acceler-ated in the 1970s and early 1980s,influenced by government birth plan-ning policies that began in the 1970sand became more restrictive by 1980.Although the number of annual birthscontinued to increase because ever-larger cohorts of young women wereentering childbearing ages duringthese years, the average number ofchildren per woman has remained lowfor more than a decade. In 2001, theaverage was estimated at 1.98 in ruralareas and 1.22 in urban areas.17
Birth Planning PoliciesChina’s fertility decline has been sup-ported by some of the world’s mostrestrictive national birth planningpolicies. The most strict and contro-versial policy (the “one-child cam-paign”) began in 1979, but theChinese government was involved inbirth planning beginning in the1950s. In the early days of the PRC,the government argued that Chinaneeded a large population to bolsterits political strength and providelabor for economic development. Inthe mid-1950s, fears that excessivegrowth would hinder economic devel-opment and a desire to improvematernal and child health led thegovernment to reverse its position
and look for ways to control popula-tion growth.
The first birth planning campaign,in the 1950s, extolled fertility controlin the name of maternal and infantwell-being.18 During the second familyplanning campaign, which began in1962 and lasted until the start of theCultural Revolution in 1966, the gov-ernment sought to lower fertility,especially in rural areas. Much of thiscampaign was educational; itattempted to teach rural familiesabout the benefits of smaller families.The government encouraged latermarriage, longer intervals betweenbirths, and smaller families. To thisend, the government tried to increaseaccess to contraceptives and abortions.Fertility in some urban areas declinedremarkably during this period, but thecampaign had little effect on mostrural areas, which were ill-equipped toprovide family planning services tolarge numbers of women.
By the end of the 1960s, few peo-ple in the central governmentdoubted the importance of birthplanning and population control foreconomic development. China began
11
Children per woman
1949 1959 1969 1979 1989 19991
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Figure 3Total Fertility Rate for China, 1949 to 2001
Note: Total fertility rate is the total average number of children a woman would have, given currentbirth rates.
Sources: China Population Information and Research Center (www.cpirc.org.cn,accessed May 13, 2003); and U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base (www.census.gov/ipc/www/idbnew.html, accessed April 7, 2004).
Nancy E. Riley, Chinas Population: New Trends and Challenges, Population Bulletin, Vol. 59, No. 2, at 11 (June2004).
PersecutionIllegitimacy: China’s Population Policy
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell with Chen Guangcheng at the U.S.Embassy in Beijing, China, on May 1, 2012. U.S. Ambassador to China Gary Locke is also pictured. Photo: U.S.State Department.
PersecutionIllegitimacy: China’s Population Policy
Feng Jianmei after forced abortion. Photo: Rex Features.Tania Branigan, Photograph of woman with aborted foetus sparks fury in China, Guardian, June 15, 2012.
PersecutionIllegitimacy: El Salvador’s Military
On 10 December 1981, in the village of El Mozote . . .,units of the Atlacatl Battalion detained, withoutresistance, all the men, women and children who were inthe place. The following day, 11 December, afterspending the night locked in their homes, they weredeliberately and systematically executed in groups. First,the men were tortured and executed, then the womenwere executed and, lastly, the children, in the place wherethey had been locked up. The number of victimsidentified was over 200. The figure is higher if otherunidentified victims are taken into account.
From Madness to Hope, Report of the Commission on the Truthfor El Salvador, UN Soc. S/25500, 1 April 1993.
PersecutionIllegitimacy: El Salvador’s Military
El Mozote survivor Rufina Amaya in 1982. Photo: MAGNUM/Susan Meiselas.
PersecutionIllegitimacy: El Salvador’s Military
El Mozote, January 1982. Photo: MAGNUM/Susan Meiselas.
PersecutionIllegitimacy: El Salvador’s Military
El Mozote memorial. “ELLOS NO HAN MUERTO. ESTAN CON NOSOTROS, CON USTEDES Y CON LAHUMANIDAD ENTERA.” (Photo from Wikimedia Commons.)
PersecutionIllegitimacy: El Salvador’s Military
Family members carrying coffins of El Mozote massacre victims in 2001. Photo: MAGNUM/Susan Meiselas.
PersecutionIllegitimacy: El Salvador’s Military
U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstracts (1991).
PersecutionIllegitimacy: El Salvador’s Military
[T]wo hundred forty-five cartridge cases recovered fromthe El Mozote site were studied. Of these, 184 haddiscernible headstamps, identifying the ammunition ashaving been manufactured for the United StatesGovernment at Lake City, Missouri. Thirty-four cartridgeswere sufficiently well preserved to analyze for individualas well as class characteristics. All of the projectilesexcept one appear to have been fired from UnitedStates-manufactured M-16 rifles.
Forensic report of El Mozote investigation, quoted in FromMadness to Hope, Report of the Commission on the Truth for ElSalvador, UN Soc. S/25500, 1 April 1993.