for the sake of truth: a discussion of heidegger's thought

University of Rhode Island University of Rhode Island

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1995

For the Sake of Truth: A Discussion of Heidegger's Thought on Art For the Sake of Truth: A Discussion of Heidegger's Thought on Art

Mia Ruscetta University of Rhode Island

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FOR THE SAKE OF TRUTH:

A DISCUSSION OF HEIDEGGER'S THOUGHT ON ART

BY

MIA RUSCETT A

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE

REQUIREMENTSFORTHEDEGREEOF

MASTER OF ARTS

IN

PHILOSOPHY

UNIVERSITY OF RHODE ISLAND

1995

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ABSTRACT

Heidegger's essay "The Origin of the Work of Art" contains

difficult and often ambiguous concepts . This thesis attempts to

clarify Heidegger's thoughts on works of art. The discussion begins

with an examination of what Heidegger means by truth. The

determination is that a thin .g's meaning in relation to our existence

and what that meaning reveals about us constitutes Heideggerian

truth. The disclosure of truth requires an encounter which allows

things to direct us as to what they are . The possibility of our being

directed is dependent upon the establishing of certain conditions.

Equipment , science , technology, and language are investigated to

determine whether or not they are able to establish the conditions

which are necessary for the disclosure of truth. The conclusion is

that they are not because they fall victim to our directives when we

encounter them . Works of art are those things which are able to

establish the necessary conditions for a proper encounter with

things. Since things other than works of art are subject to our

directives, artworks have become the only things which are able to

disclose truth. This claim finds support through analysis of

Heidegger's works "The Origin of the Work of Art", "The Essence of

Truth" , and "The Question Concerning Technology" and through a

critical examination of commentaries on those works.

11

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I wish to thank Professors Ira Kuhn and Richard Bailey for their supportive participation in this endeavor.

I am particularly indebted to Professors Galen Johnson and Cheryl Foster for their patience, support, and . guidance. Their efforts have empowered me to create the work which has emerged. My most heartfelt thanks to them.

Finally , a note of affection to those family and friends who had to endure my Heidegger days and to Professors Billy Joe Lucas and Raymond Langley who ignited my passion for Philosophy.

Remembering you too my pink rose ! - XO

111

PREFACE

This text attempts to prove that Heidegger understands works

of art as being the only things which are able to disclose truth. Since

Heidegger's essay "The Origin of the Work of Art" is often ambiguous ,

his essays "On the Essence of Truth" and "The Question Concerning

Technology" are explored to help clarify his thought on works of art.

I attempt to explain Heideggerian truth in terms of existence ,

living. The discussion of truth then moves to an explanation of how

it is attainable during our encounters with things. Heidegger's

understanding of truth is not grounded in the leading interpretations

of truth which determine truth through observation , sensation, or

utility . Since Heideggerian truth requires that we be directed by the

object , it becomes necessary to establish the conditions under which

such an encounter becomes possible.

Before claiming that works of art are the only things which

provide for a proper encounter with things, an encounter in which

we are directed by the thing, it was necessary to explain why things

other than works of art do not provide a proper encounter .

Equipment, science, technology , and language are evaluated m terms

of the conditions necessary for the disclosure of truth . The result of

the examination is that each falls victim to our directives of will

during our common encounters with them.

Works of art, however , remove us from our common encounter

with things. Thus removed , we are free to be directed by things .

Works of art thereby become the only things which disclose truth.

IV

The discussion of the artwork includes an explanation of how works

are able to achieve the conditions necessary for the disclosure of

truth. Throughout my discussion , I have attempted to dissolve some

of the ambiguity of Heidegger's thought. I hope that I have been

successful in my attempts.

V

4

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Preface lV

Introduction 1

I. Truth 5

II. Thing, Equipment , Technology 1 3

III. The Work Of Art 27

Conclusion 52

Works Cited 54

Bibliograpgy 56

Vl

INTRODUCTION

Traditional attempts at defining art consider only what we

understand as works of fine art. The standards by which works of

art have been evaluated include , but are not limited to, the accuracy

with which the work represents its subject, the work 's ability to

display beauty through color combinations and line configurations ,

and the artist's originality of expression. In "The Origin of the Work

of Art" 1 Heidegger breaks with the tradition: his essay redefines art

in terms of truth. For Heidegger, works of art are those things that

reveal truth; in fact, artworks are the only things that are able to

bring forth truth. In order to understand Heidegger's thought on art ,

"The Origin of the Work of Art" should be read in conjunction with

his essays "On the Essence of Truth" 2 and "The Question Concerning

Technology" .3 Read as a trilogy , the essays clarify Heidegger's

understanding of truth and why this understanding is disclosed only

m works of art.

For Heidegger , truth is dependent upon our expenencmg it.

Experiencing truth requires that we move out of our everyday way

Martin Heidegger , "The Origin of the Work of Art ," in Martin Heidegger Basic Writing s, ed. by David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper & Row , Publishers , 1977) pp. 149-187. All future references to this essay will be cited within the text. 2 Martin Heidegger, "On the Essence of Truth ," in Martin Heidegger Basic Writings, ed . by David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper & Row , Publishers , 1977) pp . 117-141. All future references to this essay will be cited within the text. 3 Martin Heidegger , "The Heidegger Basic Writings, ed. Publishers, 1977) pp . 287-317. within the text .

Question Concerning Technology ," in Martin by David Farrell Krell (New York : Harper & Row , All future references to this essay will be cited

1

of v1ewmg things and into an open region of relatedness with them.

In this open relatedness we become directed by the thing instead of

forcing our directives upon it. In order to receive the thing's

directives, we must engage the object with a receptive and

responsive state of mind and move into its truth. Since the

encounter requires that we respond to the directives given, truth

becomes a co-respondence between things and ourselves. Our

response is actually a co-respondence because it is grounded in the

relatedness between ourselves and the thing. Thus, truth depends

on our letting the thing be the thing that it is, i.e. , viewing the thing

as something independent from us yet related to us. Part of what a

thing is includes how it exists or functions in relation to us.

Therefore, the truth that we experience is not just a truth of the

thing, but it is also a truth of ourselves .

Things , equipment, and technology disable us from meeting the

conditions necessary for experiencing truth. Our approach toward

each of these is preconditioned and predetermined by their utility

for us. Consequently, we are unable to enter into an open

relatedness with them where we might be directed by them.

Instead, things, equipment, and technology surrender to our

directives of controlling and utilizing. In such cases, we provide the

directives. The event of truth, therefore, cannot happen with things,

equipment, or technology.

Heidegger associates truth with language. For Heidegger ,

language is able to reveal truth when it reflects its origin. Language,

however, has fallen victim to the technicity and utility which lay

claim to things, equipment, and technology; we utilize language to

2

make clear our directives. Consequently , language is only able to

reveal truth when it is poetic, thereby making it an artwork. Thus ,

the artwork becomes the only thing in which truth happens.

Heidegger sees works of art as those created things which are

successful m bringing forth the event of truth through their

createdness. Such created things achieve this by removing us from

our everyday way of viewing things. Thus removed, we are able to

be directed by things. The artwork opens a region of open

relatedness, enabling us to meet the conditions necessary for the

happening of truth.

Heidegger's redefining of art calls for a re-evaluation of the

works which we have come to view as works of art. Heidegger does

not understand artworks as being restricted to the fine arts. In fact,

he may argue that some of the works which fall under this category

are not really works of art at all because they do not bring about the

event of truth. The theory's unwillingness to categorize artworks

neatly clouds discussion and evaluation of the theory itself.

For this reason, we need to explain Heidegger's views of truth

and to establish the conditions under which truth becomes accessible.

Our purpose is not to evaluate Heidegger's notion of truth but to

understand it so that we may determine what a true Heideggerian

artwork is. Next , we must examine why things other than works of

art , specifically equipment and technology, fail to meet the conditions

necessary for the event of truth. Finally, it is important that we

come to an understanding of how artworks are able to disclose truth

in order to distinguish them as works of art. Only after this

3

accomplishment can we understand why artworks are the only

means of disclosing truth.

4

I. TRUTH

At the closure of "On the Essence of Truth", Heidegger explains

that "the course of the questioning [of truth] is intrinsically the way

of a thinking which , instead of furnishing representations and

concepts, experiences and tries itself as a transformation of its

relatedness to Being."(Truth, 141) Truth therefore requires that we

transform our everyday relationship with things. Heidegger views

our common approach toward things as being insistent and

aggressive whereby we force our directives upon the things that we

encounter. Truth, by contrast, calls for a contemplative and

responsive encounter wherein we let the thing direct us as to what it

1s. Truth is experienced; it is our entering into a relatedness with the

thing we are encountering. The participation of the thing and of the

discoverer m this relatedness leads Heidegger to describe truth as an

event.

Truth depends upon our entering into agreement with the

thing . Heidegger explains the possibility of our bringing ourselves

into accordance with the thing in the following passage:

What is stated by the presentative statement 1s said of the presented thing in just such manner as that thing, as presented, is. The "such as" has to do with the presenting and its presented. Disregarding all "psychological" preconceptions as well as those of any "theory of consciousness ," to present here means to let the thing stand opposed as object. As thus placed , what stands opposed must traverse an open field of opposedness [Entgegen] and nevertheless must maintain its stand as a thing and show itself as something withstanding [ein Standiges]. This appearing of the thing in traversing a field of opposedness takes place within an open region, the openness of which is not first created by the presenting but rather is only

5

entered into and taken over as a domain of relatedness. The relation of the presentative statement to the thing is the accomplishment of that bearing [Verhaltnis] which originally and always comes to prevail as a comportment [Verhalten]. (Truth, 123 & 124)

It is not clear what is happening when the thing stands opposed as

object, traverses an open field of opposedness, and shows itself as

something withstanding. For Heidegger, everything is present or

exists within an open region. Therefore, we and the thing are

present in the open region. It is only in an open region that we are

able to encounter and engage with things. The open region is that

place where the object is able to stand as an independent thing, and

we are able to recognize it as such and consider our relationship with

it. It is a clearing in that we are removed from our everyday

perspective of the object; thus, the open region establishes the

possibility for the object to stand opposed as object.

To let the thing stand opposed as object is to acknowledge it as

something which exists independent of ourselves. In order to do

this, we must resist forcing ourselves upon the thing. This means

refraining from prejudgements, a preconditioned examination, ideas

of utility, and any other self-imposing disposition. The thing is then

able to traverse the open field of opposedness. This traversing is

twofold. It includes the thing projecting itself as object; yet, the

Heideggerian notion of truth involves relatedness or co-respondence

between us and the thing. The thing's traversing also entails a

frustrating of the field of opposedness. That is, the thing must stand

as an object which is independent of ourselves yet related to us.

6

These conditions establish the possibility of truth by

establishing the possibility of openness. Openness occurs when we

participate in and respond to the relatedness. Such involvement

requires that we reflect upon what is presented. Truth requires that

we respond according to the particular perspective which guides the

thing. Perspective cannot refer to our point of viewing the thing, for

that would be the perspective which guides us. So, our physical

positioning in relation to the thing is not the perspective to which

Heidegger is referring. Objects are unable to have a point of view, at

least, not in the sense that we understand it. The particular

perspective of the thing must refer to its relationship to us, but this

relationship is not constituted by its physical positioning during our

encounter with it, for physical positioning cannot guide the thing.

Thus, we must look for what guides the thing as it exists.

The physical properties of a thing seem secondary to making

something the thing that it is. If we take Heidegger's example of a

coin (Truth, 122 & 123), we can say that it is round and made of

metal. This description, however, can also be depictive of a metal

charm or a metal paper weight. So, what makes a coin a coin has to

be more than just its physical attributes. We must look toward that

which makes the coin distinct from the charm or the paper weight.

The distinction lies in what it means to be a coin; the coin has a

meamng which is distinct from that of the charm or the paper

weight. Thus, the coin's meaning is the perspective that guides it to

be the thing that it is, a coin. However, the coin's meaning is

dependent upon its relationship to us; therefore, what a thing 1s

encompasses what it means to us. The truth of the coin is thereby

7

not just a truth of the com but also a truth of humanity.

Encountering the coin in openness is experiencing it physically and

thinking about what it means to us and what that meaning says

about us. Such encountering is only possible if we refrain from

approaching the coin as an object of utility. Approaching the coin for

its use value forces our directives upon it thereby disabling it from

directing us.

The open reg10n 1s then that place where we discover the

thing's meaning in the context of historical humankind. Truth

resides in the experience of relatedness; the statement reflects the

co-respondence which occurs between ourselves and the thing.

However, what things are is that which is presenced in the open

region , the discoverer and the thing. What a thing is includes how it

relates to us and how we relate to it. Therefore , the truth discovered

1s a truth of the thing and also a truth of ourselves. The possibility of

this open relatedness depends upon what Heidegger calls freedom

and attunement.

Heidegger explains freedom's connection with truth m the

following passage:

Freedom, understood as letting beings be, is the fulfillment and consumation of the essence of truth in the sense of the disclosure of beings. "Truth" is not a feature of correct propositions which are asserted of an "object" by a human "subject" and then "are valid" somewhere, in what sphere we know not; rather, truth is disclosure of beings through which an openness essentially unfolds [west]. All human comportment and bearing are exposed in its open region. Therefore man is in the manner of ek-sistence. (Truth, 129)

Truth now becomes the revelation of what it means to exist.

Freedom is being able to look onto the interplay between things and

8

ourselves. In the open reg10n , comportment involves the thing and

ourselves. Freedom lets the thing be the thing that it is by

empowering it to direct us, but the thing only exists as the thing that

it is in relation to us. That is, the disclosure that we encounter when

we freely engage a thing in the openness of the open region 1s a

disclosure of the thing and of our own existence. However, the

disclosure depends upon the thing being free to stand opposed as the

thing that it is and our being free to receive it as the thing that it is.

If we freely engage the thing, we experience it in its meaning and

respond to that disclosure by reflecting upon it. Through this

reflection is disclosed a truth of our existence. This truth of existence

is brought forth in light of the meaning of the thing. In other words,

what the thing is tells a truth about our existence.

To be free means that we are open and responsive. This

requires that we not force our directives upon the thing. Approaches

of utility, systematizing, mastering, etc. are ways by which we force

our directives upon the thing. By so doing, we miss the meaning of

the thing and neglect to reflect upon what that meaning discloses.

Thus, we must bring ourselves into accord with the disclosure. This

accord is what Heidegger refers to as attunement. Letting beings be,

freedom, is an attuning. When we let beings be, we engage them

with a mind-set which brings us into accord with the disclosure.

Freedom allows us to engage openly and responsively; this is

a ttunemen t.

Letting being be, which is an attuning, a bringing into accord, prevails throughout and anticipates all the open comportment that flourishes in it. Man's comportment is brought into definite accord throughout by the openedness of being as a

9

whole. However, from the point of view of everyday calculations and preoccupations this "as a whole" appears to be incalculable and incomprehensible. (Truth, 131 & 132)

Hannah Arendt helps to clarify that this type of thinking

requires the thinker to withdraw from the object of thought. Direct

perception does not allow one to think of the being perceived, for if

this is what we are doing during a direct encounter then we are

really withdrawing from that encounter. 4 Thinking thus entails

"serenity, release, a state of relaxation , in brief, a disposition that

'lets be'." In order to attain such a disposition, we must release

ourselves from any form of willing. 5

Arendt seems to be suggesting distancing from the object, if not

physically then conceptually. This idea of distancing is connected to

that of willing. Willing entails our positing predetermined and/or

preconditioned ends onto the encounter. This occurs when our

approach toward things is motivated by a predetermined purpose. If

we refer back to the example of the coin, approaching the coin as

payment for a debt forces our directives upon the com. The

necessary distancing and release from willing are not achieved, so we

are unable to experience the coin as anything other than an object of

utility. Whenever we become the focus of our encounter with things ,

we force the thing to subordinate itself to our particular directive.

The result is our inability to encounter the thing as a whole and our

unwillingness to reflect upon the disclosure. Heidegger suggests that

this approach prevails with things which are familiar to us.

4 Hannah Arendt, "Martin Heidegger at Eighty," in Heidegger and Modern Philosophy Critical Essays , ed. by Michael Murray, (New Haven: Yale University Press , 1978) pp . 299 and 300. 5 Ibid ., p. 303.

1 0

Therefore, the less we know of a thing, the more readily we let it be

the thing that it is. Heidegger explains in the following passage:

. . . where beings are not very familiar to man and are scarcely and only roughly known by science, the openedness of beings as a whole can prevail more essentially than it can where the familiar and well known has become boundless, and nothing 1s any longer able to withstand the business of knowing, since technical mastery over things bears itself without limit. Precisely in the leveling and planning of this omniscience, this mere knowing, the openedness of beings gets flattened out into the apparent nothingness of what is no longer even a matter of indifference but rather is simply forgotten.(Truth, 131)

Since the coin is a familiar object of utility for us, the question

arises as to whether or not it is able to disclose truth. In his

discussion of the Greek temple (Origin, 168), Heidegger indicates that

it is possible for objects of utility to meet the conditions necessary

for the disclosure of truth. Certainly, the temple can be viewed for

its use value which lies in providing shelter for the gods and a place

in which to worship them. Yet, Heidegger discusses the temple's

ability to disclose truth. If there is a distinction between the coin

and the temple, it may rest m the fact that the temple is no longer a

familiar object of utility. It seems reasonable to suggest that the

ancient Greeks did not experience a disclosure of truth when they

went to temple because they approached with a predetermined

directive. It is possible that the temple only discloses the Greek

epoch to us because we do not utilize it and are thereby able to

freely engage it. Although Heidegger does not directly address this

issue , the preceding passage indicates that the coin may not be free

to disclose truth because we ordinarily approach it for its use value.

We thereby force our directives onto the coin and fail to achieve the

1 1

necessary distancing. It , therefore , seems to be uncommon for

familiar objects of utility to disclose truth.

Truth involves the thing being discovered and the discoverer.

What is discovered is a truth of existence , a truth of what the thing

means and of what that meaning reveals about ourselves. Things

only have meaning in the context of human existence , so Heidegger

recogmzes that their truth lies in their relatedness to that existence

and not merely in their use value . The revelation of truth requires

that we participate in the experience through reception and

reflection. Our willingness to receive and to respond is as essential to

the disclosure of truth as is the thing we are encountering. We ,

however, normally do not engage things on this level. Thus , we

frustrate the event of truth. Our everyday approach toward things IS

one of examination , utility , or mastery . This is why artworks are

essential to the revelation of truth. An artwork IS a thing which

enables us to look onto our existence because works of art enable us

to transcend our everyday approach toward things. Before

discussing how readily works of art hold fast to the condition s

necessary for truth , we need to examme why things other than

artworks are not successful in disclosing truth.

1 2

II. THING, EQUIPMENT, TECHNOLOGY

Things , equipment , and technology are able to reveal

observable and functional truth . That IS , we are able to make claims

about their ob servable propertie s and their usefulness. However , we

are not able to enter into a co-re sponding relationship with them.

For Heidegger , something exists with meanmg . The meaning of the

thing is derived from its relationship to us . So truth encompasses

more than the properties of a thing; it includes that thing's meanmg

in the context of historical humankind . Therefore , the truth of a

thing is a truth about that thing and about ourselves.

Observing alone cannot render meaning because it focuse s on

certain aspects of the thing thus excluding the rest of that which

makes the thing what it IS. Consequently , the thing is not

experienced as a whole . Moreover , we tend to approach thing s,

equipment, and technology with an eye on what each can do for us.

Such an approach does not consider the thing as a whole nor does it

reflect upon what the thing is as it exists. Instead , our common

approach toward things , equipment , and technology is one of

domination. We approach each with an eye on how we can control it

so that it may serve us . As a result , we miss the meaning that thing s,

equipment , and technology have in our existence , thereby missmg

the truth about them and a truth about ourselves.

"The Origin of the Work of Art" addresses the reasons why

things and equipment do not reveal truth . Heidegger maintains that

the three leading interpretations of the thing are an assault upon the

1 3

thing.(Origin, 160) The first interpretation considers the thing as the

bearer of traits (Origin, 155) and thereby keeps the thing too distant

from us.(Origin, 157) This interpretation focuses only on the external

properties of the thing , thereby removing the thing from its context ,

its place m human existence. If we employ our previous example of

the coin to this interpretation , we encounter the coin as metal , round,

small , and flat. We experience the coin in a purely observational and

thereby objective sense.

The second interpretation explains the thing as the unity of

what is presented to the senses (Origin, 156), which brings the thing

too close to us. This interpretation results in a preoccupation with

how the thing affects us in that specific encounter with it; thus , we as

individuals become the sole standard of the thing's truth . We now

encounter the coin as hard , smooth , and shiny. We experience the

coin in a purely sensational and thereby subjective sense. Heidegger

explains the result of these two interpretations in the following

passage:

In both interpretations the thing vanishes. It is therefore necessary to avoid the exaggerations of both. The thing itself must be allowed to remain in its self-containment. It must be accepted in its own constancy. This the third interpretation seems to do, .... (Truth, 157)

The third interpretation views the thing as formed

matter.(Origin , 157) Although this interpretation accepts things m

their own constancy, Heidegger cautions that the fact that it has been

taken as self-evident in modern investigation means that "it is an

encroachment upon the thing-being of the thing . "(Origin, 160) This

last interpretation results in a preconditioning of the expectations of

14

the encounter with the thing, thereby limiting our receptivity to it.

By this interpretation we encounter the coin as a means of

commerce. We experience the coin purely through its use value and

thereby in a utilitarian sense.

Heidegger's rejection of the leading interpretations of the thing

centers around their inability to receive the thing as the thing that it

1s. So , when Heidegger tells us that the three interpretations of the

thing and combinations thereof "preconceive all immediate

experience" and thereby "shackle reflection" (Origin , 160), he means

that these interpretations inhibit us from entering into the openness

of the open region; thus, the freedom and attunement necessary for

the disclosure of truth is not achieved . Being present in the openness

requires that we listen to what the thing has to reveal and reflect

upon what we have heard. The product of the thing's presentation

and our reflection is truth. Thus , attaining truth from the thing

reqmres our engagmg with its physical properties and the meaning

of its existence.

The problem 1s that we readily approach things with a

predetermined objective, thereby failing to bring ourselves into

accord with all that they are as they exist. We are even more

inclined to impose our directives onto equipment. This is because

equipment is brought into existence only to meet our specific needs .

Therefore, our approach toward equipment is one of utility; we

encounter equipment when we need to use it. As a result, we fail to

encounter what the equipment means m its usefulness.

Heidegger explains that equipment consists in controlling form

and matter according to the purpose of the thing.(Origin, 157) The

1 5

matter and form will vary depending on the equipment's intended

use. The equipmental quality of all equipment consists in its

usefulness.(Origin , 162) The essential Being of equipment lies m its

reliability.(Origin, 163) The question is, how is truth attained

through the piece of equipment? The problem of distancing which

resulted from the first two interpretations of the thing also applies

to equipment. Equipment can be approached by way of observation

or by way of use. In the former, description, explanation, and report

set us too far from the equipment to enter into the disclosure of

truth. (Origin, 164) Conversely, in utility the matter of the

equipment disappears into usefulness and serviceability .(Origin, 171)

The problem with merely describing, explaining, and reporting

on the equipment is the same problem as the first interpretation of

things. As we recall, that interpretation focused on the thing as the

bearer of traits which resulted in removing the thing from its

context. Observation alone also focuses on the external aspects of the

equipment, thereby missing the meaning it has in our lives. The

freedom which is necessary for the revelation of truth is not

accomplished because we have already determined the mode of

approach. For example, if we approached the equipment with the

intention of reporting on it, our approach would be prestructured

according to the information needed in the report. Consequently, we

are not free to engage the equipment nor reflect upon it , and it is

not free to present itself as the thing that it is. If we had to report

on an electric wheelchair, for example, we might look for the type of

metal used to construct it, the battery voltage necessary to operate it,

its maximum speed, weight capacity, etc.. However, this information

1 6

will not lead us to discover the meanmg that the wheelchair has, but

this meaning is as much a part of the wheelchair as are its external

components.

Approaching equipment for utility results in a problem which

IS similar to that of the third interpretation which views the thing as

formed matter. As with this interpretation, utility focuses on our

predetermined purpose for the encounter. Using the wheelchair fails

to lead us to its truth because in our using the chair we forget its

composition. That IS, we are focused on how well it accomplishes its

purpose of moving us from place to place. In addition to limiting the

freedom necessary for the openness of the open region, both

observation and utilization of the equipment neglect to reflect upon

it. If the truth of the wheelchair rests in its being the thing that it is

as it exists then its truth is not just compositional or functional; it is

also meaningful. The wheelchair means freedom of movement and a

sense of independence for the person who needs it, and this meaning

is accomplished through its structure and function. As observer and

user we are imposing and nonreflective; therefore, we miss the

whole of what the wheelchair is as it exists.

The two approaches toward equipment, observation and utility,

produce the same obstacle to truth as do the three interpretations of

thing as the bearer of traits, the unity of what is presented to the

senses, and formed matter. The obstacle rests in our imposing

directives upon the encounter instead of allowing the encounter to

direct us. Of course, equipment lends itself to subjective ends more

readily than do mere things. This preoccupation with

predetermining, preconditioning, and prescribing inhibits the

1 7

freedom which is essential to the disclosure of truth. Such a danger

peaks in the area of science and technology, where ordinary

preoccupations are easily heightened to a preoccupation with

mastering.

Harold Alderman points out that Heidegger's problem with

science and technology is that they are not Being-oriented. Our

mistake is that we take control, thereby bringing Being before

ourselves and relating it and beings to ourselves. 6 Scientific

projection determines the manner in which facts must conform to the

scientific investigation . Such projection serves to determine a sphere

of Being and force it into a definite realm of Being.7 Since

experiments are restricted to humanly imposed directives , modern

science has come to depend on our confirmation of the hypothesis ,

for we ourselves determine the conception of fact, the experiment,

and the conformation. The institutionalization of scientific

procedures explicitly grants the power and authority officially to

manage and objectify Being as an object of research. 8 In the final

analysis we see that the objectivity of Being in science implies the

subjectivity of human beings. 9

It is important to note that scientific thought is not being

attacked as such. Rather, it is our fidelity to it as disclosing the truth

that is dangerous. The measurable and explicable nature of beings is

but a part of their entirety. The scientific approach and its findings

6 Harold Alderman, "Heidegger's Critique of Science and Technology," in Heidegger and Modern Philosophy Critical Essays, ed . by Michael Murray (New York: Yale University Press, 1978) p. 37 . 7 Ibid., p. 38. 8 Ibid., p. 40. 9 Ibid., p. 41.

1 8

are valid only in so far as they are recognized as revealing a limited

aspect of the whole. When this is not the case, the freedom

necessary for the disclosure of truth is not accomplished and "only it

accomplishes for humanity that distinctive relatedness to being as a

whole. "(Truth, 129)

The scientist is blinded by his/her ability to fit the object of

his/her investigation neatly into an equation that is within his/her

control (i .e., posited by him/her , calculated by him/her , and resolved

by him/her). Consequently , the scientist empowers him/herself with

the determination of Being. This 1s a problem because "truth 1s

disclosure of beings through which an openness essentially

unfolds."(Truth , p. 129) The scientist , as scientist, is not in

attunement with the disclosure of truth; he/she is not open and

responsive so that he/she might bring him/herself into accord with

the disclosure. Such human insistence sets the ground for

errancy.(Truth, p. 135)

The scientific method's limitations on truth are slightly

different from those of the thing and of equipment. The reason for

the difference is that the scientific method explicitly concentrates on

a given aspect of the scientific object. The problem is that science

accepts its truths as the truth of the totality of the scientific object.

The scientific method necessitates a preconditioned approach toward

the object under investigation, and the directives of the approach

have been predetermined by the scientist , thus violating the

conditions necessary for a proper encounter. The freedom necessary

for the object to present itself as the thing that it is cannot be

established .

1 9

Likewise, the scientist 1s not free to be directed by the object.

The scientist is not in attunement with the disclosure of truth

because he/she is not of an open or reflective state of mind. Rather,

the scientist projects conditions and limitations onto the scientific

project, thereby restricting its ability to reveal its totality and

disabling the scientist's ability to encounter the object in its totality.

Since the scientist isolates aspects of the scientific object, establishes

him/herself as the standard of measure, and preconditions the

encounter, the scientific approach is exemplary of the inadequacies

of the three leading interpretations of the thing. Heidegger talks

about this type of approach toward things in the following passage:

... humanity replenishes its "world" on the basis of the latest needs and aims, and fills out that world by means of proposing and planning. From these man then takes his standards, forgetting being as a whole. .. . He is all the more mistaken the more exclusively ha takes himself, as subject, to be the standard for all beings.(Truth, 134 & 135)

Edward Ballard attempts to clarify the problem with science by

detailing the scientific method. He explains that the scientific

approach reqmres a "working over" of the object. Through this

working over the object is transformed by being removed from the

world in which it exists and by undergoing imposed sensitization.1 o

The transformation enables the scientist to employ a mathematically

objective method, thus unveiling objective nature. Ultimately, the

object is reduced to the directives willed by the scientist. 11 The

evaluation of the object is incomplete because there is no

IO Edward Ballard, "Heidegger's View and Evaluation of Nature and Natural Science," in Heidegger And The Path Of Thinking, ed . by John Sallis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1970) p. 42. 11 Ibid. , p. 43 .

20

consideration of the object as it exists as worked over. Thus, the

scientific process falls out of perspective in that it is not recognized

as a specified process but as a process which is capable of rendering

evaluation of the totality.12

The problem is not just that we do not consider the object as

"worked over" by the scientific approach. It is also that we never

consider the object before it is worked over. Thus, we neglect what

the object means . to our existence. The scientific approach also fails

to look onto itself. In other words, the scientist does not reflect on

the object to discover what it means to the scientist or to humanity

as worked over. The imposing nature of science along with its

vulnerability to human directives empowers the scientist as the

master of things. This is problematic in regard to the disclosure of

truth because revelation requires freedom to let the being reveal

itself and an open region in which the scientist and the object engage

m relatedness. Both criteria are overshadowed by the mere nature

of the scientific method. The open region requires that the object be

free to direct the encounter and the scientist be free to bring

him/herself into accord with those directives. The scientist must be

open and responsive in this encounter. Science, however, requires

that the scientist impose the directives of the encounter and force

the object into accord with those directives. A logical outgrowth of

the scientific approach is technology. Our desire to force our

directives onto things is never more tempted than in the area of

technology.

12 Ibid., pp. 44 and 45.

2 1

In "The Question Concerning Technology" Heidegger explains

that the revealing that rules in technology is a challenging of things

(Technology, 296) , the chief characteristics of which are to regulate

and to secure. Thus, objects come to be viewed as standing reserve,

things awaiting further ordering (enframing).(Technology, 298) The

ordering and regulating of objects is in direct opposition to the object

g1vmg directives, for the technician forces his directives onto the

object through his ordering. In technology, we are unable to

encounter the object as a whole because we come to pursue only that

which is revealed in ordering and derive all our standards on this

basis (destining) (Technology, 307), thus driving out every other

possibility of revealing.(Technology, 309)

Man stands so decisively in attendance on the challenging-forth of enframing that he does not grasp enframing as a claim, that he fails to see himself as the one spoken to, and hence also fails in every way to hear in what respect he ek-sists ..... Where . enframing holds sway, regulating and securing of the standingreserve mark all revealing. They no longer even let their own fundamental characteristics appear , namely, this revealing as such. Thus the challenging-enframing not only conceals a former way of revealing, bringing-forth, but it conceals revealing itself and with it that wherein unconcealment, i.e., truth, comes to pass. Enframing blocks the shining-forth and holding sway of truth.(Technology, 308 & 309)

Heidegger sees technology as inherently restricting the

revelation of truth. The problem with technology is similar to that of

the scientific method because technology also requires that we set

the directives of the encounter and force the object to meet our

predetermined objective. Truth, however, requires that we be free

from willing our directives onto the encounter so that the object is

free to direct us. The revelation of truth is not merely restricted

22

through technology, but it 1s transformed. The ordering and

regulating of things is not a truth present in them; it is wholly

posited onto them by our directives. More specifically , the nature of

technology requires that we encounter things with a predisposed

state of mind . This disposition re stricts any possible disclosure of

truth except for the thing's utilitarian value to us. Consequently , we

neglect to recognize the controlling nature of technology and are

unable to enter into the openness of the open reg10n. The nature of

technology heightens this approach toward things by enticing us to

strive for greater control over them.

Harold Alderman attempts to further explain the danger that

Heidegger sees as inherent in technology. He maintains that

technology is not responsive and contemplative but domineering and

challenging. 13 In modern technology we posit ourselves as a being

over nature instead of a being within nature; there is no mode of

letting things be .14 Technological thought "provokes man to be the

being who makes nature yield its resources to him and which places

man in a position to be the provacateur of nature." Thus , technology

holds sovereignty over beings and over all modes of uncovering

beings. 15

Through technology we have come to focus on the efficient

cause, thereby viewing cause as that which makes or produces an

13 Alderman , op . cit. , p. 44 . 14 Ibid ., p . 48 . Alderman illustrates by contrasting a motorboat with a sailboat. A motorboat uses energies to overcome the water. The currents and winds are seen as obstacles which must be surmounted . Motorboating attempts to dominate the water. In sailboating, however, one utilizes currents and winds in order to move across the water. The sailboat depends on the wind and current , and this dependency is recognized. Thus , the sailboat is a thing of the water.(p . 49) 15 Ibid ., p. 49 .

23

effect. Consequently, "man as the maker and producer occupies the

center of causality: cause signifies the instrumentality of man."

Through technology we have therefore come to view Being as either

ends or means. Technicians choose ends and develop techniques

which efficiently achieve their goals. In turn, these ends become

means to further humanly posited directives. The technological

doctrine of Being ultimately subordinates Being to the goals and

purposes of the technician. 16 Thus, he/she positions him/herself as

the determinant of the nature of Being by viewing beings as nothing

more than materials waiting to be utilized as he/she wills. The

danger in technology lies in our attitude towards it. 17 Through

technology we come to view things exclusively in terms of how we

can direct them to better serve us . This attitude leads us to believe

that a thing's use value is all that the thing is. The technological

object , like the scientific object, is not encountered as a whole

because it is not allowed to direct the encounter, so its truth is not

revealed. ·

We seek to control through manipulation and through utility.

Things, equipment, and technology readily fall into our service and

thus under our directives. The result is a shadowing of the openness

of the open region necessary for the disclosure of truth . In this

shadowing the thing, equipment , or technology is not allowed to

present itself as it exists but instead is viewed by way of our

subjective ends.

16

17 Ibid ., p. 45. Ibid ., pp . 47 and 48 .

24

Heidegger thinks that our everyday approach toward things ,

equipment , and technology reveals only objective or subjective

truths by focusing on how the thing appears to us, affects us, or

serves us. Neither of these, however, is reflective of his

understanding of truth because they are ways in which we force our

directives onto the thing thereby inhibiting the thing from directing

us as to what it is. For example, when we encounter things,

equipment, or technology in an examinatory way , we are only able to

discover factual aspects of their being. We are able to observe

construction, size , material consistency, and a multitude of other

objectified characteristics. The result is a failure to discover the

thing as it exists in our lives.

Similarly , when we encounter things , equipment, or technology

by way of utility , we are only able to discover the useful aspects of

each. Truth is then measured by how well the thing, equipment, or

technology serves us in its functioning . This subjective approach and

the former objective approach "preconceive all immediate

experience" (Origin, 160) which keeps us from entering into the

openness of the open region where things are free to direct us and

we are free to bring ourselves into accord with their directives .

Consequently, the disclosure of truth does not occur during our

encounter with things, equipment, or technology . The difficulty

involved in experiencing truth is displayed in the following passage:

. . . where beings are not very familiar to man and are scarcely and only roughly known by science , the openedness of beings as a whole can prevail more essentially than it can where the familiar and well-known has become boundless, and nothing 1s any longer able to withstand the business of knowing , since

25

technical mastery over things bears itself without limit.(Truth , 131)

At the close of "The Question Concerning Technology " Heidegger

suggests that the techne of art is a single manifold revealing which

yields to the holding sway and the safekeeping of truth. He asks ,

"Could it be that revealing lays claim to the arts most primally

... ?(Technology, 316) "The Origin of the Work of Art " answers thi s

question. Art is able to accomplish the freedom and attunement

required for the transcendence which is essential to the revelation of

truth. The work itself establishes the openness of the open region

necessary for the disclosure. Finally , art is not only able to disclose

truth, it preserves it.

26

III. THE WORK OF ART

Our discussion thus far has lead us to the idea that works of art

hold a privileged position in the bringing about of the event of truth.

Unlike things, equipment, and technology, the artwork holds open

the open region which is necessary for the event of truth. Thus

emerges the Heideggerian interpretation of a work of art. Artworks

are those things which bring forth the event of truth. According to

Heidegger , a work is only a work of art when it sets up a people's

historical existence, enables us to remove ourselves from our

commonplace routine and move into the disclosure of truth, and

finds its essence in poetry.

Heidegger understands poetry as the founding of truth as

bestowing, grounding, and beginning.(Origin, 186) Poetry is

privileged in the arts because it is language which first gives

presence to beings. Language first brings forth the historical world

of a people and preserves it and the earth by naming and

presencing.(Origin, 185 & 186) This is why language is often related

to the disclosure of truth in the Heideggerian sense. Walter Biemel

explains that meanings are not assigned to words; rather , words are

able to manifest meanings. 18 Our previous discussions have

concluded that meaning , rather than function, is what Heidegger

understands as truth. For example, when we approached the com m

terms of utility, we found that only its use value, or function, as a

l 8 Walter Biemel , "Poetry and Language in Heidegger," in On Heidegger and Language, ed. by Joseph Kockelmans (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972) . p . 70.

27

coin was revealed. Yet, the com 1s more than merely a means of

commerce. The possibility of our encountering the truth of the coin ,

however, depends upon our encountering the coin m an open reg10n

where it is free to direct us and we are free to be directed. In our

prev10us discussion of the coin, we found that we were unable to

encounter the coin freely when we imposed our directives of utility

upon it, because this approach brings us too close to the coin.

A.F. Lingis suggests that language gives birth to poetry and

technique by opening a region in which the clearing of Being is

brought to light. 19 There exists a distance between the speaker and

that about which he/she speaks. The latter undergoes a

manifestation through the discourse. The discourse is about the

world. 20 However, Heidegger tells us that although language

presences the lighting of beings, this goes unnoticed in

language .(Origin, 186) George Steiner helps to explain that "ordered

verbal discourse" is unable to overcome metaphysical constraints.

Art, however, is able to overcome such constraints because it "pierces

to the core of things". Hence, in works of art truth comes into being

and achieves realization and self-possession. 21 Heidegger explains

the need for art and its connection to poetry in the following passage:

19

for 20

21

132.

The essence of art is poetry. The essence of poetry, in turn, is the founding of truth. .. . Art lets truth originate. Art, founding preserving, is the spring that leaps to the truth of beings in the work.(Origin, 186)

A. F. Lingis, "On the Essence of Technique," in Heidegger and the Quest Truth, ed. by Manfred S. Frings (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1968) p. 134.

Ibid., p. 136. George Steiner, Martin Heidegger (New York: The Viking Press, 1978) p.

28

The shift IS thus made from language to poetry, or more

specifically the poetic. Heidegger understands the poetic in the

Greek sense of p01esis. Poiesis refers to occasioning and presencing, a

bringing-forth. Heidegger explains that "bringing-forth comes to

pass only insofar as something concealed comes into

unconcealment. "(Technology, 293) When the speaker's world

overshadows the world of the object of the disclosure, freedom and

attunement stray and language becomes susceptible to utilitarian

ends. Artworks, on the other hand, essentially and necessarily hold

fast to that which is presenced and are thereby able to entice a

perspective which draws us into a world other than our own.

Language is also susceptible to an evolutionary process. The

development of language often strays from its origin. Hence ,

language and the meaning conveyed by its use cannot be considered

constant. The artwork , however, is captivating. It captures a

meanmg and enables it to endure through time. The artist

receptively captures truth and expresses and guards it in and

through his/her creative production.

The fact that an artwork is created IS part of what Heidegger

calls the workly character of the work.(Origin, 178) This creation

requires mastery, craftsmanship or techne. Heidegger explains the

meanmg of techne in the following passage:

The word techne denotes rather a mode of knowing. To know means to have seen, in the widest sense of seeing, which means to apprehend what is present , as such. For Greek thought the essence of knowing consists in aletheia, that is, in the revealing of beings. It supports and guides all comportment toward beings. . . . to create is to let something emerge as a thing that has been brought forth. The work's becoming a work is a way

29

m which truth becomes and happens.(Origin, 180)

Heidegger concludes that truth has to happen in such a thing as

something created.(Origin, 180)

Walter Biemel explains that artists possess a kind of knowledge

which "looks toward something not yet present in such a way that it

makes it possible to give form to the work." It is this knowledge

which distinguishes the artist from the handworker and technician .22

To bring Biemel's explanation a step further, the artist's possession of

such knowledge is necessary but so too is the created product.

Jacques Taminaux offers that Heidegger rejects artworks being

approached in terms of matter and form because these are concepts

which are adjusted to utensils. An approach in terms of

representation is also rejected because "the present-at-hand of

everyday things operates as a standard. "23 Taminiaux's

interpretation 1s reminiscent of our discussion of equipment and

technology. The creative process surrounding equipment and

technology focuses on producing a thing of servicability or utility,

neither of which requires the apprehension of what is present. In

fact, the objective which usually guides the creation of equipment

and technology is how well the thing produced will meet our needs

or its utilitarian function. The need for the thing is known but this

knowledge does not necessitate a knowledge of what its usability or

utilization means.

22 Walter Biemel, "Elucidations of Heidegger's Lecture The Origin of Art and the Destination of Thinking," in Reading Heidegger Commemorations, ed . by John Sallis (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993) p. 372. 23 Jacques Taminiaux, "The Origin of The Origin of the Work of Art," in Reading Heidegger Commemorations, ed. by John Sallis (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993) p. 402.

30

According to Henri Birault, Heidegger, in discussing techne,

substitutes the duality of world and thing for matter and form. The

issue is one concerning the "operative" character of truth. 24 Birault's

idea of an operative character of truth is essential to understanding

Heidegger's idea of techne. The product of techne is a thing which

reveals truth. Since the disclosure of truth is dependent upon the

fulfillment of certain conditions, techne produces a thing which

enables the fulfillment of the conditions necessary for the disclosure

of truth. Birault's distinctions among matter and form and world and

thing are important ones. Matter refers to the raw material which is

already existent. Form refers to structure, shape, or construction, all

of which are secondary to the essential characteristic of techne,

which is the revelation of beings or the disclosure of truth. The

thing , however, is that which is brought into presence by the creating

process of techne. The produced thing is a thing which discloses

truth.

According to Heidegger, creation, m relation to techne, is the

bringing forth of the strife between earth and world (Origin , 181),

and this strife is essential to the disclosure of truth.(Origin, 177)

Earth and world are difficult concepts to establish mainly because

Heidegger does not understand them in terms of their ordinary

meanmg. Yet, he neglects to establish explicitly how earth and world

are to be understood. Since both earth and world are crucial to a

thing being an artwork, we need to attempt to come to an

understanding of what each refers to for Heidegger.

24 Henri Birault, "Thinking and Poetizing in Heidegger," in On Heidegger and Language, ed . by Joseph Kockelmans (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973) p. 162.

3 1

Heidegger describes earth as follows:

It [physis] illuminates also that on which and in which man bases his dwelling. We call this ground the earth. What this word says is not to be associated with the idea of a mass of matter deposited somewhere, or with the merely astronomical idea of planet. Earth is that whence the arising brings back and shelters everything that arises as such. In the things that arise, earth occurs essentially as the sheltering agent.(Origin, 169) Upon the earth and in it, historical man grounds his dwelling in the world.(Origin, 171)

R. Raj Singh interprets earth as the compamon to and ground of

the world. 25 However, Joseph Smith describes earth as being rooted

in untruth, a concealment, a withholding, 26 a principle opposing

world. 27 He explains that we are of the earth and not merely on the

earth. Therefore, earth is not merely a dwelling place; it is dwelling

itself. 28 Of course, earth is most easily understood as nature and all

that comes from it. However, none of these descriptions seems to

reflect completely Heidegger's understanding of earth.

Heidegger describes earth as that upon which and within which

we dwell; thus, earth seems to include nature and that which comes

from it. Yet, Heidegger also says that it is that upon which we

ground our dwelling in the world. In order for earth to provide a

ground for dwelling in the world, it must have a constant aspect, for

grounding requires a degree of stability, but nature is fluctuating.

That is, change is essential to nature. Consequently, Heidegger must

25 R. Raj Singh, "Heidegger and the World in an Artwork," in The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol. 48 no. 3, Summer 1990, p. 220. 26 Joseph Smith, "In-the-World and On-the-Earth: A Heideggerian Interpretation," in Heidegger and the Quest for Truth, ed. by Manfred S. Frings (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1968) p. 191. 27 Ibid., p. 187. 28 Ibid., p. 200.

32

mean more than nature itself when he speaks of earth. He hints at

the earth's constant aspect when he refers to the earth as the

"resolute foundation" upon which the world grounds itself.(Origin,

173) Earth thereby include s that stability through which nature's

changes and our establishing of a world are made possible.

Heidegger also describes earth as that which comes forth and

shelters. It seems that earth has the quality of presencing in the

sense of bringing forth into existence. Thus , part of what earth is

includes beings, but it must also include the Being which makes the

existence of beings possible. The coming forth of Being and beings is

made possible by and constitutes the earth. The beings that emerge

shelter in the sense of covering and in the sense of protecting Being.

Earth provides the possibility for world yet has no meaning without

world. Earth and world are co-dependent in that world needs the

grounding of earth and earth need s the acknowledgement of world .

Heidegger explains in the following passage:

The earth cannot dispense with the open region of the world if it itself is to appear as earth in the liberated surge of its selfseclusion. The world in turn cannot soar out of the earth's sight if , as the governing breadth and path of all essential destiny , it is to ground itself on a resolute foundation.(Origin , 173)

For Heidegger , world provides the context within which things

find meanmg . A thing's meaning is determined through our

relationship with it. This relationship is established through world.

Heidegger describes world as the following:

World is never an object that stands before us and can be seen . World is the ever-nonobjective to which we are subject as long as the paths of birth and death , blessing and curse keep us transported into Being. Wherever those decisions of our

33

history that relate to our essential being are made, are taken up and abandoned by us, go unrecognized and are rediscovered by new inquiry, there the world worlds.(Origin, 170)

Joseph Smith interprets world as not meaning existential living.

He claims that it is not our environment or nature, and it is not a

world of substance or essence. Also, world does not refer to the

subject region of a particular individual. 29 If we accept what world IS

not, assuming for now that we do , we must inquire as to what world

IS. Joseph Kockelmans suggests that world is the existential

dimension of humankind through which all relationships become

possible and within which we encounter beings. 30 This explanation

of world seems to be reflective of Heidegger's understanding.

The notion that world is a dimension is a helpful means of

understanding world. Heidegger tells us that we dwell in the world,

so world must include the scope of our existence. However, it is not

clear that existence is enough, for Heidegger says that objects do not

have a world and that world is nonobjective in character. Heidegger

tells us that the· peasant woman "has a world because she dwells in

the overtness of beings. "(Origin, 170) Objects, however, do not seem

to dwell at all; they cannot establish relationships or make decisions.

Therefore, objects do not have a world but must rely on belonging to

our world, and how we see them depends on how they are revealed

in world. Through our decision-making and living, we give things a

context, a meamng, a world in which they can exist. Thus, world

refers to the realm of existence in which human choices are made

possible and establish themselves. World becomes essential for the

29

30 Ibid., p. 185. Kockelmans, op. cit., p. 170.

34

disclosure of truth because the disclosure involves establishing a

relationship between ourselves and other beings.

Smith suggests that the worlding of the world 1s one of disorder

and chaos. 31 Although disorder and chaos may result from decision

making, tension seems more accurately to describe the worlding of

the world. The tension exists between the stability of earth and the

evolution of · world and between ourselves and other beings. The

result is not absolutely or necessarily chaos and disorder. Sing more

accurately points out that the world worlds in a distinct way during a

distinct historical era but that our relation with our world is

historically constant.32

If world creates or opens the possibility for decision-making

then that possibility must always exist, and as long as we make

decisions through that possibility, our world worlds. The worlding of

the world is distinct in that different peoples at different eras of

history engage in living differently. So, world has an evolving aspect

as well as a constant aspect . As peoples have worlds, so too do

individuals. For, it follows that if the criteria for the worlding of the

world is the grounding of earth, the possibility for deci~ion-making,

and the actual decisions of living, individuals as well as groups of

individuals have distinct worlds. It seems that part of Smith's

interpretation of what world is not is mistaken, for world can refer to

the subject region of a particular individual. Heidegger hints at the

collective and singular possibility of world in his discussions of the

historical world of the ancient Greeks set up by the Greek temple

31 32

Smith, op . cit., p. 186. Sing, op. cit., p. 219 .

35

(Origin, 169 & 170) and the world of the peasant woman set up m

the Van Gogh painting (Origin, 163). By setting up a world, the

artwork distances us from our everyday world in which we direct

things. The work draws us into the world that it sets up , thus freeing

us to be directed. As the worlding of the world evolves in the

context of world, so must the worlding of the individual's world

evolve within the context and against the backdrop of an historical

people.

The relationship of earth and world is one of interplay and co

dependence. Our emergence on the earth instigates the worlding of

world. World is dependent upon human existence. Earth is a source

for and grounding of existence and activity, but these are only

possible once we arrive on the scene. It is at that instant that the

worlding of a world begins . Although earth exists regardless of our

presence, it does so without being part of a world , without meanmg.

By setting up a world and setting forth the earth, the work of

art instigates and accomplishes this strife.(Origin, 173) By so doing,

the work holds the unconcealedness of beings as a whole.(Origin,

177) According to Heidegger, strife between earth and world is

essential to the disclosure of truth.(Origin, 177) In a state of strife

each struggles to surmount the other. In the strife between earth

and world each raises the other "into the self-assertion of their

essential natures. "(Origin, 173) Strife refers to the tension which

exists between earth and world. Things attempt to emerge as the

things that they are as we attempt to force our directives onto them.

In our world, we succeed in directing things, thus, eliminating the

strife. The work of art is able to bring forth the strife by setting up a

36

world in which we cannot actually force our directives onto things.

In doing this, the artwork distances us from things yet places them

m a context. This distancing enables us to enter into an open region

where things are free to direct us and we are free to bring ourselves

into accord with those directives . The artwork thereby accomplishes

the conditions necessary for the disclosure of truth.

Artworks create a medium (open region) through which truth

may freely reveal itself. In essence , a work , through its creation,

presences the truth of beings as they exist. The creative process

accomplishes the disclosure of truth by establishing an open reg10n

where the strife between earth and world occurs. The work itself

stands in openness and lights the strife, thus making it accessible to

us. Thus , Heidegger maintains that the two essential features of the

work-being of an artwork are the setting up of a world and the

setting forth of the earth; they are never separated.(Origin, 172)

Artistic creation is the bringing forth of the strife between

earth and world. The work is the being brought forth which

expressly brings forth the openness of beings.(Origin , 181) Where

the strife of earth and world happens, lighting and concealing move

apart thus opening a region for the conflict.(Origin, 180) Heidegger

explains lighting as the following:

This open center is therefore not surrounded by beings; rather , the lighting center itself encircles all that is, . .. Beings can be as beings only if they stand within and stand out within what is lighted in this lighting. Only this lighting grants and guarantees to us humans passage to those beings that we ourselves are not , and access to the being that we ourselves are. Thanks to this lighting, beings are unconcealed in certain changing degrees. And yet a being can be concealed, as well, only within the sphere of what is lighted. Each being we encounter and

37

which encounters us keeps to this curious opposition of presencing in that it always withholds itself at the same time m a concealedness .(Origin , 175)

Lighting happens as the double concealment of refusal and

dissembling. When presence only is known , the concealment 1s one

of refusal. However, when the being presents itself as other than it

1s, as semblance, the concealment is in the form of

dissembling.(Origin , 175 & 176) Unconcealment is the happening of

truth.(Origin, 176)

Joseph Kockelmans attempts to clarify Heidegger's thought by

suggesting that as a process of truth, Being only comes to pass in a

"there". This coming to pass is not dependent on us but on Being's

spontaneity in e-mitting itself among beings. The "there" of Being 1s

the domain in which Being illuminates beings as what they are.

Being therefore takes the initiative. Since Being itself is not a being,

it withdraws itself as it reveals beings . Hence, the only way in which

we can grasp Being itself is for us to understand Being as non-

Being. 33 · In relation to artwork, the work is the there, the place m

which things can direct us as to what they are. At the same time, we

lose sight of the work itself being a thing.

George Steiner adds that the essence of "thereness" and of

meaning which a work of art reveals is contained within the work. It

is embodied in the substance of the thing and therefore cannot be

externalized or extracted from the work. This is the concealing

nature of a work of art. Simultaneously, the work unconceals by its

articulate and radiant projection of the manifestation of Being. The

33 Kockelmans , op . cit. , 175.

38

work conserve s Being and gives it a dwelling and sanctuary- 34 The

eternal strife within the work is one between hiddenness and

exhibition . It occurs because of the absence of the actual object and

its intense presence in the work .3 s

Heidegger tells us that concealment refers to the not yet

experienced domain of Being.(Truth , 133) Thus understood,

Kockelmans' explanation of the nature of concealment is acceptable.

If Being brings forth the being as it 1s then Being itself must give

way to that which is brought forth. Although Steiner's explanation of

unconcealment is sensible and con sistent with the double

concealment of refusal and dissembling, it is not certain that this 1s

all that Heidegger means by concealment. When discussing the

Greek statue of the god , Heidegger claims that the statue become s the

god.(Origin , 170) This claim does not recognize a distinction between

the work and the actual being of its subject matter. The statue sets

up the world of the god and the people who worship him. In so

doing , the statue embodies the truth of the god. Although the statue

and the god are not the same being , the · truth of each is the same.

The statue itself as a thing , a being , has no distinct meaning . As a

work of art, its meaning as a thing gives way to the truth it

embodies. Hence , Steiner's explanation of concealment is less

adequate than Kockelman's.

An explanation of concealment which should be avoided

associates earth with concealment. C.D. Keyes offers that, in the

strife between earth and world , truth expresses itself through the

34 35

Steiner , op . cit. , p. 134. Ibid ., p. 135.

39

world-earth dialectic. In this dialectic earth's tendency 1s one of

concealment and world's tendency is one of openness. Through this

dialectic, the work expresses truth and allows truth to express

itself.36

Keyes' idea of the world-earth dialectic is acceptable until it

associates earth with concealment and world with unconcealment.

Both earth and world are essential to the strife. It is the tension

within the strife that instigates each to rise forth. We have

established that earth and world are co-dependent. If they cannot

be separated yet truth is able to emerge from their union , it is a

mistake to understand them in polarized terms of concealment and

unconcealment. Heidegger cautions that "the world is not simply the

open region that corresponds to lighting , and the earth is not simply

the closed region that corresponds to concealment. "(Origin , 177)

Truth emerges from the strife between earth and world ;

however , lighting and concealing are also m strife. World can conceal

earth , as we have seen in our discussion of technology and

equipment, by overshadowing the earth aspect. Likewise , earth can

conceal world , as we have seen in our discussion of the thing and

equipment , by overshadowing the world aspect. Therefore , earth

and world share in the lighting and concealing and are both essential

to the event of truth (unconcealment ). By instigating the strife

between lighting and concealing, the artwork is able to disclose truth

by disallowing either from overshadowing the other. Yet, the strife

causes both lighting and concealing to emerge, much in the same way

as it does with earth and world . The work thereby brings about the

36 Keye s, op . cit. , pp. 71 and 72.

40

revelation of the essence of a being (Origin, 178), where and how

world and earth interplay. The unconcealment is "a disclosure of a

particular being, disclosing what and how it is."(Origin, 164)

Steiner attempts to explain the world/earth interplay and how

it discloses truth. He explains that in the artwork the world of beings

IS envisioned on more absolute and nonpragmatic terms. The

presentness in things is nonutilitarian but has its own integral,

"ecstatic" authority. The mode of existentiality fundamental to the

presentness of things exists in and through a work of art. The work

of art is disinterested creativity, which is dependent upon matter

(wood, stone, pigment , etc.). In this sense, the world worlds in and

through works of art.3 7

Paul Schumacher and Wayne Owens explain why the disclosure

IS more accurately described as an event. Schumacher maintains

that the artwork is more accurately described as an event than as an

object because something new and significant IS being brought to

bear on the old and familiar.38 Through the artwork "the individual,

society, and the aesthetic object are brought together in a way that

elucidates existence" .39 The artwork expresses beings and

relationships among beings.40 Owens describes the event as

presencing, which is linked with emerging and living.41 The event

concerns "the historical relations between things, thoughts , and

37 Steiner, op . cit., p. 133. 38 Paul Schumacher, "Art for Existence's Sake : A Heideggerian Revision ," in Journal of Aesthetic Education, vol. 24 no . 2, Summer 1990, pp . 86 and 87. 39 Ibid., p. 84. 4o Ibid ., p. 85. 41 Wayne Owens , "Heidegger's Philosophy of Art," m British Journal of Aesthetics, vol. 29 no . 2, Spring 1989, p. 132.

4 1

acts. "42 The artwork removes us from the ordinary expenence or

view of things and into an extraordinary experience or view of

things.43 Heidegger terms the characteristic of the work talked about

by Steiner , Schumacher, and Owens as displacement.

The work's ability to "cut all ties to human beings" enables the

work to transport us out of the realm of the ordinary.(Origin, 183)

The work cuts all ties to human beings in that it does not fall subject

to our directives. The work's ability to direct us accomplishes what

we have been referring to as distancing . The work distances us by

transporting us out of our ordinary encounter with things in which

we Impose our directives and into a new encounter in which we are

directed. Heidegger explains that:

To submit to this displacement means to transform our accustomed ties to world and earth and henceforth to restrain all usual doing and prizing , knowing and looking, in order to stay within the truth that is happening in the work. Only the restraint of this staying lets what is created be the work that it is.(Origin, 183)

The artwork opens this possibility and opens the truth of beings .

Thus, openness occurs within and without the work, the openness IS

contained therein and the work is therein contained.

Owens explains that displacement requires a release of all

previously established standards of the way things are seen and

interpreted. A new perspective on things is thereby discovered.44

Walter Biemel adds that the artwork transposes us into a world or

opens up a world that is not determined by the absolute dominance

42 43 44

Ibid ., p . 135. Ibid., p . 137. Ibid. , p . 131.

42

of our subjective world.4s And Schumacher suggests that

displacement is made possible because the work keeps us from doing

what we usually do thus keeping us within the happening of the

work.46

These three interpretations are helpful but need expans10n.

Heidegger tells us that the work is able to transport us because it

cuts all ties with human beings. Truth , however , requues co

respondence between ourselves and the thing, so some relationship

needs to exi , t. Truth also requires that the thing be allowed to stand

opposed as object. We have concluded that to let the thing stand

opposed as object means to view the thing as something independent

of ourselves, yet related to us. So, a work of art's ability to cut all

ties with human beings can refer to its ability to repel our

inclinations of incorporating it into our world . The work itself sets

up a world, and this is the place to which we are transported. We

remain part of the encounter but not as the giver of directives;

instead, we are directed. Through the work we are removed from

our everyday manner of encountering things and drawn into a new

experiencing of things. By our transcending our world, the work is

empowered to disclose its truth because it disables us from forcing

our directives upon the disclosure, but instead forces us to let it

guide us into the disclosure. A thing is a work of art because it is

able to maintain an uninterrupted and steadfast being what it is

(self-subsistence).(Origin, 182) Therefore, it seems that the ability of

45 Biemel , "Elucidations of Heidegger 's Lecture the Origin of Art and the Destination of Thinking ," op. cit., p . 381 . 46 Schumacher, op. cit. , p. 85.

43

a work to let beings be the things that they are despite our insistence

1s inherent in all things which are works of art.

Heidegger employs Van Gogh's painting of shoes to illustrate

the happening of truth in an artwork . Heidegger describes the truth

disclosed by the painting in the following passage:

From the dark opening of the worn insides of the shoes the toilsome tread of the worker stares forth. In the stiffly rugged heaviness of the shoes there is the accumulated tenacity of her slow trudge through the far-spreading and ever-uniform furrows of the field swept by a raw wind. On the leather lie the dampness and richness of the soil. Under the soles slides the loneliness of the fieldpath as evening falls. In the shoes vibrates the silent call of the earth, its quiet gift of the ripening grain and its unexplained self-refusal in the fallow desolation of the wintry field. This equipment is pervaded by uncomplaining worry as to the certainty of bread, the worldless joy of having once more withstood want, the trembling before the impending childbed and shivering at the surrounding menace of death.(Origin, 163)

C.D. Keyes draws a definition of artwork from Heidegger's

discussion of the Van Gogh painting. The painting , according to

Keyes, is an artwork because it is "a truthful disclosure that reveals

what the shoes are in their function"; it reveals the Being of beings.

The thing character of the painting takes a secondary position to its

functional character.47 The work character of the painting

establishes a world which Keyes defines as "the ontological context m

which a functional-instrument is . 1148

It seems reasonable to assume that Heidegger would agree

with this definition. Although the thing character and the work

character of the painting are essential to its ability to bring forth the

47 48

Keyes, op . cit. , p. 68. Ibid., p. 69.

44

event of truth, it is · the event itself, our being transported into a new

world where we are able to experience things in their relationship

with us, which enjoys first position. As we discovered in our

discussion of truth, things have meanings only because they exist

within the context of a world. The painting establishes the shoes as

existent and as existing in a context , a world. By setting up a world

and setting forth the earth, the painting unconceals the truth of the

peasant shoes . The work distances us from the everyday context of

the shoes, thus enabling us to let them be what they are, yet, draws

us into the world to which they belong, a new context, the world of

the peasant woman. The result is the unconcealment of the truth of

the shoes as they exist. The painting projects an open region m

which we are able to transcend our world and enter into the world

set up in the painting.

This transcendence frees us from forcing our directives onto

the shoes because they carry no actual utilitarian value for us. We

encounter the shoes without focusing on their external properties,

how they affect us, or how they may be of use to us. The shoes are

thereby free to direct us and we are free to bring ourselves into

accord with their directives. Thus disposed, we are able to

experience the event which occurs in the painting, what the shoes

mean as they exist in the world of the peasant woman.

George Steiner explains that it is the actual presentation of the

shoes by the painting that makes it possible for us to experience the

innermost reality and meaning of the shoes. The insightful

knowledge of the shoes granted by the painting is not attainable by

45

scientific or logical investigation. 49 Only art lets beings be. "Only in

and through the painting does the pair of shoes achieve a total ,

autonomous being per se." The painting preserves and guards the

existential inscape and living presence of the shoes even after they

are no longer of scientific intere st or practical use. The shoes are

familiar to us, but through the work of art they are distanced from

their facticity and drawn into the essential truth of their being .so

Thus, through the painting we are able to transcend our world

and in so doing we are able to view the shoes in a fresh light. We no

longer see them as equipment awaiting our immediate use. The

painting moves us beyond the use and definition our needs and

conveniences have imposed and enables us to encounter the shoes as

independent , self-existent beings. The painting itself is a thing which

establishes and secures the conditions necessary for the disclosure of

truth . Through the painting the shoes are able to stand opposed as

the things that they are. The painting detaches the shoes from

ourselves . This distancing of the shoes helps to achieve our freedom

to let them be the thing that they are by removing them from the

context of our world. Since the painted shoes can be of no practical

use to us , we cannot approach them as equipment awaiting our

directives. We are , therefore , unable to force our directives upon

them. Consequently , we are free to be guided by their directives.

The meaning of the shoes is secured by the world which is set up in

the painting. Through their meaning the shoes also disclose a truth

about the peasant woman as she exists in her world.

49 50

Steiner , op . cit., p. 133. Ibid., p. 134.

46

However, Meyer Schapiro points out that the shoes in the

painting are not the shoes of a peasant woman but are in fact Van

Gogh's shoes , the shoes of a town and city man . He further suggests

that it is impossible to say properly that the painting expresses the

essence of the peasant woman's shoes and her relation to nature and

work .s t Therefore , Heidegger's associations are not sustained by the

painting itself but are grounded in Heidegger's subjective outlook .

Thus , Heidegger has projected images into the painting .s2

Schapiro raises a significant point. Assuming he is correct , we

must ask whether or not the individualized aspect of the shoes in the

world of the peasant woman can be universalized through

Heidegger's interpretation. In other words, we are mqmnng as to

whether or not the same truth of the shoes can emerge from their

existing in a different world. If we interpret the world set up in the

painting as a world of a town and city man, we can conclude that the

pnmary meaning that the shoes holds for him is the same as that

which they hold in the world of the peasant woman. Heidegger

explain s the truth disclosed in the painting as follows:

The peasant woman wears her shoes in the field . Only here are they what they are. They are all the more genuinely so, the less the peasant woman thinks about the shoes while she is at work , or looks at them at all , or is even aware of them . She stands and walks in them. Thi s is how shoes actually serve. It is in this process of the use of equipment that we must actually encounter the character of equipment.(Origin, 162)

51 Meyer Schapiro , "The Still Life as a Personal Object - A Note on Heidegger and Van Gogh ," in The Reach of Mind , ed. by M.L. Simmel (New York: Springer Publishing Company , 1968) p . 205 . 52 Ibid ., p. 206 .

47

The truth of the shoes rests in their usefulness. Heidegger

explains that the peasant woman stands and walks in them and that

is how they serve. The same is true of the town and city man, for

they mean the same to his existence as they do for that of the

peasant woman. The city man also stands and walks in his shoes;

thus , they serve him in the same primary manner as they serve the

peasant woman. All that Heidegger depicts in his imagery of the

peasant woman's world is easily adapted to the world of the city

man; yet, the meaning of the shoes remains the same. If we refer

back to the conditions necessary for the disclosure of truth , we find

that reflection is a necessary condition. Heidegger indicates the need

to reflect upon the painting in the following passage:

As long as we only imagine a pair of shoes in general, or simply look at the empty, unused shoes as they merely stand there in the picture, we shall never discover what the equipmental being of the equipment in truth is. From Van Gogh's painting we cannot even tell where these shoes stand. . . . And yet -(Origin , 163)

Here Heidegger IS acknowledging the need for reflection. Even

he realizes that the shoes alone are not disclosing truth. The event of

truth occurs because through the painting the openness of the open

reg10n IS held open. We are thereby able to achieve attunement with

the truth of the shoes because we are free to see them as something

more than a piece of equipment ready for our using. Instead, we are

able to reflect on what the shoes mean because there is no possibility

of our using them; and their meaning is universal. Thus, we engage

the truth of the piece of equipment and through that truth we also

engage a truth about ourselves, for the shoes only have meaning

because they are part of our world.

48

R. Raj Sing helps to explain that the painting does not only

reveal the earth and world of the peasant woman but also the earth

and world in general. Thus, the distinctive role of the painting "lies

in revealing the worldhood of the world and the earthine ss of the

earth , and not merely a specific world and a specific earth. "53 It

seems that we have to accept this universal aspect of earth and

world , for there needs to be something common between audience

and artwork in order for the audience to understand the revelation .

In relation to Schapiro's charge , this means that the universal aspect

of the shoes , what they are in relation to world, is the event of truth.

Thus , we are lead to the same conclusion that the localized

interpretation of the peasant woman 's world assists in conveying the

universal aspect.

The specifics of the localized interpretation do not seem

essential to the event which occurs in the painting , the truth of a pa1r

of shoes . The question is whether or not it is necessary for the work

of art to disclose accurately the world in which the shoes belong , or

whether it is enough that it discloses the truth of the shoes in their

relation to us as equipment. Although the answer is uncertain, it

seems at least possible that the accurate disclosure of a world is not

essential to all works of art. For example, the Greek temple disclo ses

the truth of the temple , and through its relationship with the Greeks ,

its meaning for them; it also disclose s their historical epoch. The

meaning of the temple depends on the world of the Greeks. The

shoes, however , may maintain the same meaning for different worlds

that utilize them as equipment. Although the shoes may reveal a

53 Sing , op. cit. , p. 216.

49

truth about an historical world , it is arguable that their truth as

equipment is the same in different worlds that utilize them.

Schapiro continues to charge that, even if Heidegger's

interpretation of the shoes was correct, it is a mistake to suppose

that the truth revealed in the painting could not be attained from the

actual shoes.54 He also charges that Heidegger is mistaken when he

claims that the user of equipment does not reflect on it and therefore

fails to encounter a truth about the world. Schapiro cites Van Gogh's

painting of his own shoes as an example.55 Heidegger would agree

with this example.

For Heidegger, art reqmres techne. Techne 1s not just bringing

forth; it is also knowledge. This is the gift of the artist. The world of

the artist is to listen to the telling of truth and to bring it to stand .

The artist is able to experience truth without having to be

transported from his world. Moreover, Heidegger admits that the

user of the equipment, the peasant woman , does know something

about the shoes. She knows of their reliability; and she knows of this

without noticing or reflecting.(Origin, 163) Reflection , however, is

needed for encountering meaning and all that it reveals. In fact,

Heidegger says that the peasant woman's shoes are all the more

genuinely the equipment that they are "the less the peasant woman

thinks about the shoes while she is working, or looks at them at all,

or is aware of them."(Origin, 162) Heidegger would disagree with

regard to the observation of the thing. Mere observation keeps us

54 Schapiro, op . cit., p. 206. 55 Ibid., p. 207. Schapiro also offers Knut Hamsun's description of his own shoes in his novel Hunger to illustrate that the user does reflect on the thing . However, the user in this example is also the artist; therefore, the argument which applies to Van Gogh also applies here.

50

too distant from the thing or fails to provoke us to transcend our

world of existence . Art, however , avoids both of these hinderances

to unconcealment and provokes us to reflect , something which is not

usually enticed by the mere observation or use of the thing , mostly

because we force our directives onto the thing during these

encounters. It is possible for truth to be disclosed in the actual

encounter of the shoes as long as the conditions necessary for the

disclosure are met.

5 1

CONCLUSION

For Heidegger, the disclosure of truth depends upon the

conditions of the encounter. Approaching things as objects

possessmg certain traits, having particular affects on us, or

performing specific functions for us inhibits our expenencmg truth .

Since things find meaning through our relationship with them, we

must be able to encounter that relationship when we approach

things. In order to accomplish this, we must be able to look onto that

relationship. This requires distancing. We must distance ourselves

from willing our directives onto things. By allowing the thing to

direct us , we discover the meaning that the thing holds for us. This

discovery discloses the truth of the thing, and by so doing , it also

discloses a truth about ourselves.

Heidegger recognizes that our everyday approach toward

things refuses to allow things to set the directives because our

everyday approach is predetermined by our immediate needs. . Truth

is, therefore, not attainable through our ordinary encounters with

things. Artworks, however, are things which are able to force

directives onto us by removing us from our ordinary encounter with

things. By establishing the conditions necessary for the disclosure of

truth, we are able to experience truth through works of art. Our

examination of Heidegger's thought has lead us to the conclusion that

artworks are the only things that are able to disclose truth.

For Heidegger , an artwork captures the truth of things and

makes that truth accessible to us. We see things in a different light

52

when we view them through works of art. Art almost allows us to

expenence things for the first time ; at least , works of art allow us to

expenence things m a new way. Art gives insight as to how things

are. We discover the truth of ourselves , how we live and interact m

relation to the things around us and in relation to each other. A

work of art provides a window through which we can view our

existence unhindered by preoccupations with the directives of will.

Heidegger is reminiscent of the ancient world , a world which listened

to hear the truth of beings and lived within their dictates. Art

reminds us that we need to listen. It enables us to step back and

look toward truth.

53

WORKS CITED

Heidegger, Martin, "The Origin of the Work of Art ," in Martin Heidegger Basic Writings , ed. by David Farrell Krell , Harper &

Row Publishers, New York , 1977, pp. 149-187.

Heidegger, Martin, "On the Essence of Truth ," in Martin Heidegger Basic Writings , ed . by David Farrell Krell , Harper & Row Publishers, New York, 1977 , pp. 117-141.

Heidegger, Martin , "The Question Concerning Technology," in Martin Heidegger Basic Writings, ed. by David Farrell Krell , Harper & Row Publishers, New York , 1977 , pp . 287-317.

Arendt, Hannah , "Martin Heidegger at Eighty ," in Heidegger and Modern Philosophy Critical Essays, ed. by Michael Murray, Yale University Press , New Haven , 1978, pp. 293-303.

Alderman , Harold , "Heidegger's Critique of Science and Technology ," in Heidegger and Modern Philosophy Critical Es says, ed . by Michael Murray , Yale University Press , 1978 ,pp . 35-50

Ballard, Edward, "Heidegger's View and Evaluation of Nature and Natural Science ," in Heidegger and the Path of Thinking ed. by John Sallis , Duquesne University Press , 1970 , pp . 37-65.

Lingis , A.F., "On the Essence of Technique," in Heidegger and the Que st forTruth, ed. by Manfred S. Frings, Quadrangle Books , Chicago , 1968, pp. 126-138.

Steiner , George , Martin Heidegger , The Viking Press , New York, 1978.

Biemel , Walter , "Elucidations of Heidegger's Lecture the Origin of Art and the Destination of Thinking ," in On Heidegger and Language, ed . by Joseph Kockelmans , Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1972 , pp . 370-382.

Taminiaux , Jacques, "The Origin of The Origin of the Work of Art," in Reading Heidegger Commemorations, ed . by John Sallis , Indiana University Press , Bloomington , 1993, pp. 392-404.

54

Birault, Henri, "Thinking and Poetizing in Heidegger," in On Heidegger and Language, ed. by Joseph Kockelmans, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1973, pp. 147-168.

Singh, R. Raj, "Heidegger and the World in an Artwork," in The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol. 48 no. 3, Summer 1990, pp. 215- 222.

Smith , Joseph, "In-the-World and On-the-Earth: A Heideggerian Interpretation," in Heidegger and the Quest for Truth, ed. by Manfred S. Frings, Quadrangle Books, Chicago , 1968, pp. 184-203.

Schumacher, Paul, "Art for Existence's Sake: A Heideggerian Revision," in Journal of Aesthetic Education, vol. 24 no. 2, Summer 1990, pp. 83-89 .

Owens, Wayne, "Heidegger's Philosophy of Art," in British Journal of Aesthetics, vol. 29 no. 2, Spring 1989, pp. 128-139.

Schapiro, Meyer, "The Still Life as a Personal Object - A Note on Heidegger and Van Gogh," in The Reach of Mind, ed. by M.L. Simmel Springer Publishing Company, 1968, pp . 203-209.

55

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Alderman, Harold, "Heidegger's Critique of Science and Technology ," in Heidegger and Modern Philosophy Critical Essays, ed. by Michael Murray, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1978, pp. 3 5-5 0.

Arendt, Hannah, "Martin Heidegger at Eighty," in Heidegger and Modern Philosophy Critical Essays, ed. by Michael Murray, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1978, pp. 293-303.

Ballard, Edward G., "Heidegger's View and Evaluation of Nature and Natural Science," in Heidegger and the Path of Thinking. ed. by John Sallis, Duquesne University Press, Pittsburgh, 1970, pp. 3 7-65.

Biemel, Walter, "Elucidations of Heidegger's Lecture the Origin of Art and the Destination of Thinking ," in Reading Heidegger

Commemorations, ed. by John Sallis, Indiana University Press, Bloomington , 1993, pp. 370-382.

Biemel, Walter, "Poetry and Language in Heidegger," in On Heidegger and Language, ed . by Joseph Kockelmans, Northwestern University Press , Evanston, 1972, pp. 65-105.

Birault, Henri, "Thinking and Poetizing in Heidegger," in On Heidegger and Language, ed. by Joseph Kockelmans, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1972, pp. 14 7-168.

Bloom, S. and Hill, E., "Borrowed Shoes ," in Artforum, vol. 26, April 1988, pp. 111-117.

Brogan, Walter, "The Battle between Art and Truth: A Reconsideration," in Philosophy Today. vol. 28, Winter 1984, pp. 349-357.

Goldman, Alan H., "Art Historical Value," in British Journal of Aesthetics, vol. 33 no . 1, January 1993, pp. 17-28.

Heidegger, Martin, "On the Essence of Truth," in Martin Heidegger Basic Writings, ed. by David Krell, Harper & Row Publishers,

56

1977, pp. 117-141.

Heidegger, Martin , "The Origin of the Work of Art," in Martin Heidegger Basic Writings, ed. by David Krell , Harper & Row Publishers, 1977 pp. 149-187.

Heidegger, Martin, "The Question Concerning Technology ," in Martin Heidegger Basic Writings, ed. by David Krell, Harper & Row Publishers , 1977, pp. 287-317.

Hoeller, Keith, "Role of the Early Greeks in Heidegger's Turning," m Philosophy Today, vol. 28 , Spring 1984 , pp. 44-51 .

Keyes, C.D., "Truth as Art: An Interpretation of Seit und Zeit (sec. 44) and Der Ursprung Des Kunstwerkes," in Heidegger and the Path of Thinking, ed. by John Sallis , Duquesne University Press , Pittsburgh, 1990, pp . 65-84.

Kockelmans, Joseph J ., "Thanks-giving: The Completion of Thought," m Heidegger and the Quest for Truth, ed. by Manfred S. Frings , Quadrangle Books , Chicago , 1968 , pp. 163-183.

Langan , Thomas, "Heidegger: The Problem of the Thing ," in Heidegger and the Path of Thinking, ed . by John Sallis , Duquesne University Press , Pittsburgh , 1970, pp . 105-115.

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Marx, Werner, "The World in Another Beginning : Poetic Dwelling and the Role of the Poet ," in On Heidegger and Language , ed. by Joseph Kockelmans , Northwestern University Press , Evanston , 1972, pp. 235-259.

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57

and the Language of Homecoming," in Heidegger and the Path of Thinking. ed. by John Sallis, Duquesne University Press, Pittsburgh, 1970, pp. 138-168.

Schapiro, Meyer, "The Still Life as a Personal Object - A Note on Heidegger and Van Gogh," in The Reach of Mind, ed. by M.L. Simmel, Springer Publishing Company, New York, 1968, pp. 203-209.

Schumacher, Paul, "Art for Existence Sake: A Heideggerian Revision," in Journal of Aesthetic Education, vol. 24 no. 2, Summer 1990, pp. 83-89.

Singh, R. Raj, "Heidegger and the World in an Artwork," in The Journal of Aesthetic and Art Criticism, vol. 48 no. 3, Summer 1990, pp. 215-222.

Smith, F. Joseph, "In-the-World and On-the-Earth: A Heideggerian Interpretation," in Heidegger and the Quest for Truth, ed. by Manfred S. Frings, Quadrangle Books, Chicago, 1968, pp . 184-203.

Steiner, George, Martin Heidegger, The Viking Press, New York, 1978.

Taminiaux, Jacques, "The Origin of 'The Origin of the Work of Art'," in Reading Heidegger Commemorations, ed. by John Sallis, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1993, pp. 392-404.

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for the sake of truth: a discussion of heidegger's thought

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