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For a Global Environmental Tax System:

New ToolsDecember 2019

Presented at COP 25 by Brigitte Alepin with the collaboration of Louise Otis and Lyne Latulippe

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ABSTRACT

We can no longer ignore the difficulties of implementing carbon pricing as proposed by the international community for some years now. Faced with the environmental emergency, it is now time to develop new tax solutions that are complementary to those currently proposed. The modernization of international taxation and new technologies allow new options for global environmental taxation that are important to explore. In this article, new solutions are presented:

• Coordinated tax and environmental approach: Within the framework of the BEPS reform, the OECD published in Fall 2019 a Work Program comprising two main measures: a pillar 1 which allocates additional tax rights to market countries; and a pillar 2 which proposes a global minimum tax to stop the transfer of profits to low-tax jurisdictions. Considering that international tax reform and carbon pricing require the consensus of all countries in the short term, it would be wiser and perhaps even necessary to coordinate the two issues - international tax reform and climate - in a complementary approach or, at least, to assess the possibility of doing so.

Pillar 1: Distribution of tax among countries: Pillar 1 will allow additional tax rights to a so-called market country according to variables such as the company’s turnover in the market country. Would it be possible to also consider a GHG variable? In particular, if a multinational company’s GHG emissions exceed the objectives set by a market country, a tax at the rate of 1% could be levied on it in favour of the climate.

Pillar 2: A global minimum tax of the Global Anti-Base Erosion (GloBE) type: The objective of Pillar 2 is to impose a tax on multinationals that manage to pay a tax burden below a certain minimum. If countries can agree on a 15% rate as an example, would they agree to allocate 1% of it for climate change?

• Taxing individuals themselves: Carbon pricing initiatives currently in place or being discussed in several jurisdictions are mainly aimed at GHG-emitting companies. However, it is estimated that 65% of global emissions come more from the consumption of individuals themselves, with a concentration of emissions among the better-off. No country has yet set a target for individuals. With new technologies, it is now easy to calculate your carbon footprint and taxing individuals themselves is becoming an option to consider. A GHG tax on individuals would have several merits: respect for the polluter pays principle, progressiveness, the possibility of targeting the very rich (who are, in reality, the biggest emitters), resistance to international tax competition and an awareness-raising tool.

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Table of Contents

About TaxCOOP 1

About – Brigitte Alepin 1

Acknowledgements 1

Introduction 2

1. Summary portrait and costs related to GHG emissions 3

2. Carbon pricing 3

1. Advances 3

2. Frequent errors 3

1. Underestimating the importance of wealth transfers 3

2 Implementation of specific measures in an uncoordinated manner 5

3. Overestimating the ecological virtue of citizens 7

3. New global tax tools to fight climate change 7

1. Taxing individuals themselves 7

2. The case for a coordinated tax and environmental approach 9

Pillar 1: Distribution of tax between countries 10

Pillar 2: A global minimum tax of the Global Anti-Base Erosion (GloBE) type 10

Why 1%? 11

Conclusion 12

End notes 13

Bibliography 14

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ABOUT TAXCOOP

Unique – TaxCOOP is an international annual event dedicated to tax competition and cooperation. It aims to foster the broadest possible collaboration, which is essential to building an effective and fair tax system to meet the major challenges of our world. Since 2015, TaxCOOP events have been held successively at the World Bank, the United Nations, and the OECD, with prestigious dignitaries.

Inclusive, neutral and non-partisan – TaxCOOP is an event where a wide range of perspectives are expressed, supported by politicians, tax administrations, ministries of finance, experts, tax advisors, international organisations, NGOs, civil society, and the academic and business community.

Recognized – More than 15,000 people have already attended one or more of these conferences, whether in person or online. TaxCOOP has risen at a blistering pace among major international tax events, and is included in the Global Tax 50 ranking of the International Tax Review (ITR), which lists the world’s 50 most influential public figures and organizations in the field. This is the only public conference it mentions.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR – BRIGITTE ALEPIN, FCPA,FCA,MPA,M.FISC

Brigitte Alepin is a Harvard-trained Canadian tax expert who has worked in the field for 30 years, and is now a professor of taxation at the Université of Québec in Outaouais. Brigitte Alepin is a specialist in tax planning and policy, and is included in the ITR’s list of the 50 most influential tax professionals in the world. She is a Fellow of the Ordre des CPA du Québec, and has won a Gemeaux Award for Best Screenplay for the film The Price to Pay. She also acts as an expert in tax policy and public finance for governments, and major Canadian and international organizations. She has testified more than 12 times before Committees of the Senate and House of Commons of Canada, as well as the National Assembly of France. Brigitte Alepin is a co-founder of TaxCOOP.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 

The author would like to thank the Honourable Louise Otis and Lyne Latulippe, PhD, for their valuable comments on this research project.

The author also wishes to thank the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, COP25 and TaxCOOP for the research, presentation and dissemination opportunities.

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INTRODUCTION

The scientific community widely recognizes that greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, caused by human activity, directly affect climate change and the resulting costs are significant. In addition, economists agree on setting a price for these emissions, and/or the establishment of a carbon emissions trading system. International organizations also embrace this transformation of the world and the underlying economy. For several years, the OECD has supported the creation of a carbon tax, and Secretary General Angel Gurría has even proposed the establishment of a “big fat carbon tax.”1

However, the pricing of greenhouse gas emissions is still receiving a mixed reception in the political sphere, which is largely linked to the world of business and finance. Moreover, pressure groups do not agree on its full effectiveness, and taxpayers are reluctant to additional taxes, even green ones.

Meanwhile, the global situation is deteriorating. Global warming has become a reality that we are already having to deal with. In several countries, populations will soon have to be displaced. This will result in urgent relocation, which will generate major costs in the immediate future.

This text aims to explore complementary tax solutions to the ones currently proposed. The modernization of international taxation now allows other options. Thus, it is now possible to consider a global minimum tax, which was previously considered utopian. To great evils, great remedies! In these times of peril for humanity, the time has come to design and rapidly implement fiscal measures to respond to climate change that could change the face of the Earth.

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SUMMARY PORTRAIT AND COSTS RELATED TO GHG EMISSIONS

The report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) predicts that global warming could reach 1.5°C between 2030 and 2052 if it continues to increase at the current rate. The advent of this probability would have harmful consequences on the environment, the economy and people’s social lives.2

The World Health Organization (WHO) expects that between 2030 and 2050, climate change could lead to nearly 250,000 additional deaths annually due to malnutrition, malaria, diarrhoea and heat stress.

WHO also estimates that the cost of direct health damage (excluding those in key sectors such as agriculture, water and sanitation) is estimated to be between $2 billion and $4 billion (US$) per year by 2030.3

CARBON PRICING

1. Advances

There are currently 57 carbon pricing initiatives implemented or planned worldwide; 46 national and 30 sub-national jurisdictions are affected by these initiatives, which would cover 11Gt of CO2e by 2019, or 20.1% of global GHG emissions.4

In terms of GHG pricing, several initiatives have been implemented or announced in recent years: France and Mexico in 2014, South Korea and Portugal in 2015, Canada in 2016, Chile, China and Colombia in 2017. The Trump administration is still making little effort to address the problem and the Presidency prefers to protect its energy industry at the expense of the GHG control measures in place.5-6

Emissions trading and taxes are effective ways to charge for emissions, provided that permit prices are stable and kept at a realistic level. However, in 42 OECD and G20 countries (accounting for about 80% of global emissions), the carbon pricing deficit (which compares the real price of carbon and the real costs of climate change, estimated at EUR 30 per tonne of CO2) was 76.5% in 2018,7 suggesting the need for much more vigorous action.8

Some say that pricing as implemented or being explored by several jurisdictions is an insufficient means of countering the acceleration of climate change. Others explain that to be fully effective, this pricing requires the collaboration of all countries, which is unrealistic in the short term. There is also concern that this tax may be regressive and that ultimately at-risk socio-economic groups and low-income households will carry the burden. Nonetheless, it is said that the ultimate purpose of this form of taxation is to serve public finances and subsidy programs.

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2. Frequent errors 9

1. Underestimating the importance of wealth transfers

All over the world, individuals, households, industries, and countries subject to carbon pricing will generally have an economic advantage if they emit fewer GHGs than their competitors.

Thus, the Americans who are the largest emitters of GHGs per capita are likely to lose out from carbon pricing compared to the Chinese who arrive at the seventh rank. To reduce the impact of transfers of wealth related to this pricing, the tax system can provide for the redistribution of tax revenues to households themselves.

At the business and industry level, pricing emissions will also have a different impact depending on their GHG profile.

Micro-economic analysis: At the microeconomic level, each country could see a weakening of the competitive position of some of its companies, in its domestic or export markets, in favour of their foreign competitors.

In economic terms, the current balance of supply and demand curves will be shifted and will result in wealth transfers between different market participants.

The consequences of such movements correspond to the cost of carbon pricing that each company will have to pay. In some cases, this cost will be exponential, especially for companies operating in a green market such as heavy industry or those that are highly dependent on transportation or energy. In addition, new successful companies will emerge, while others will improve their positioning. For example, under an ecological regime, two steel companies will no longer necessarily be on an equal footing in their market if one supplies its furnaces with coal while the other uses biogas.10

To assess the impact of a green shift on a company, it is necessary to determine how its market may react in a greener world, including how the products in the following table may affect its competitive position at the time of transition.

United StatesAustraliaCanada

NetherlandsJapan

GermanyChina

United KingdomSpain

FranceSweden

BrazilIndia

UgandaRwanda

ChadSomalia

16.515.4

15.19.9

9.58.9

7.56.5

5.04.64.5

2.61.7

0.10.10.10.0

CO2 Emissions per capita

www.economicshelp.org Source: World Bank –

EN.ATM.CO2e,PC – Accessed 27 Oct. 2017

Metric tonnes per capita

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Macroeconomic analysis: Countries must carry out the same analysis in relation to their entire economy. The effects of the carbon pricing on the competitive positioning of local products in both domestic and export markets must be assessed.

If a more environmentally friendly alternative product comes from the country where it is produced, there will not be a negative impact on its respective economy. Otherwise, there will be a combined effect on local companies, which will be penalized in both the domestic and export markets. This phenomenon will cause a shift of wealth abroad. The effect could be more or less significant on the domestic economy depending on the country of origin of the competing product.

The economic consequences of such movements (positive and negative) in markets represent, in fact, the real cost of going green for all companies.

To these elements must be added the additional management costs (private and public) imposed by this shift. This detailed analysis must be done at all levels: local, regional, provincial, national and international.

The economic, political and ecological stakes of this transition are considerable and a significant redistribution of wealth could result.

In order to preserve the competitiveness of companies, new trade barriers – consisting of a carbon customs adjustment system – could be put in place.

2. Implementation of specific measures in an uncoordinated manner

For the green shift to be effective, it must be implemented in a coordinated manner and tax measures must be implemented at the optimal time. Analysis of tax systems

Carbon PricingProducts that may affect a company’s competitive position

International markets

Identical product or replacement subject to less stringent environmental rules

Identical products or less polluting substitutes

National marketsIdentical products or less polluting replacements

Analogy of Plastic Bags

Suppose a government adopts the following bag policy of plastic:

• Quota : 1 bag / week for each household

• Excess bags are available at $1/bag. This price will increase until the national target is reached.

• Households that consume less bags than their quota will be able to resell them on the market.

Who are the winners? The environment and households that consume less than their quota.

Who are the losers? Households that consume more than their quota.

Transfer of wealth : The plastic bag analogy illustrates the transfer of wealth that occurs between groups when the ecological virtue is integrated in the markets. Countries and individuals that are polluting will become poorer as long as they do not change their polluting habits.

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shows that this time-optimization factor is sometimes overlooked and that adverse consequences may result.

The timing of implementing a tax measure to reduce GHGs is primarily dictated by the urgency of environmental issues. To keep temperatures below 2°C, the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) explains that, by 2030, countries must triple the overall level of their commitment compared to the promises made at COP21 in 2015.

During this period, carbon pricing and a range of green tax measures must be implemented in a timely manner, respecting the coordination of supply and demand for green products to ensure that companies go green before consumers do.

If green tax measures are put in place to encourage the consumption of a product from an external country (because domestic companies have not been prepared for the shift), the tax system will become the cause of capital flight abroad.

The Canadian EcoAuto program illustrates the capital flight that can result from import-promoting measures. This program was introduced into the tax systems in the 2007 budget speech for the period from March 20, 2007 to December 31, 2008.

During this period, the Canadian government encouraged the acquisition of 170,000 environmentally friendly motor vehicles manufactured almost exclusively in Asia. Thus, while the North American automotive industry was in technical bankruptcy, EcoAuto was causing:

• A $4 billion capital flight, while in 2008, the government agreed to a similar amount for the Canadian automotive industry;

• A public expenditure of $200 million.

How and why was such a decision made? Clearly, without prior experience of a complete green shift, countries do not control the optimal cycle of its implementation.

If the market is prepared to receive a demand for green products, the government must act quickly. Undue delay may have the following negative effects:

• Under the impetus of social responsibility, companies will feel free to claim the role that the state has abrogated and grab the revenue of green taxes that consumers are ready to pay.

• The weakening of the efficiency of measures adopted to force companies to go green.

• Reducing the return on investment for companies that have gone green.

Order of implementation of a complete green shift

Stage I Stage II Stage III

Tax measures to promote / encourage a green shift

by companies

Tax measures to promote / encourage a green shift

by consumers

Running-in

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3. Overestimating the ecological virtue of citizens

In a democratic society, citizens, voters and taxpayers have the power of the final decision. However, even if they say they are ready, in principle, to tax carbon, the fervour of their commitment is often insufficient to make a real green shift possible.

The carbon tax has the disadvantage of being regressive. First, it affects the cost of consuming energy regardless of the income of users. As a result, it is the less well-off who bear the highest proportional cost. Moreover, when this tax results from a tax system where the personal benefits for individuals are less and less tangible and where the fiscal imbalance leads to growing inequality, it is reasonable to expect massive opposition from taxpayers, as was the case in France with the yellow vest movement.

While consumers claim to prefer the purchase of durable goods, we can see that their purchasing habits have yet to be aligned with this desire. In Quebec, 86% of consumers are in favour of purchasing durable goods, while only 68% have chosen this type of product in the last 12 months. 11

Today, we live with the acceptance that our children will face the consequences of global warming. Although logic suggests that they will do everything in their power to protect their descendants, it seems that today’s parents are willing to take a risk with the climate. Thus, a population survey in the United Kingdom assessed how family formation can alter individual environmental attitudes and behaviours. The results showed that having a child is associated with a slight decrease in environmental behaviour and that only parents who are already concerned about the environment will behave as eco-responsible citizens12. The Brundtland Report13 points out that governments are the guardians of the sustainability of national resources. However, protecting future generations is a moral and non-legal obligation since there is no sanction for offenders.

NEW TOOLS FOR GLOBAL TAXATION TO COMBAT CLIMATE CHANGE

We cannot ignore the difficulties of implementing carbon pricing to fight climate change, as the international community has been proposing for years. Faced with the environmental emergency, the time has now come to develop new tools, inspired by the solutions proposed by international tax actors. Some of these tools are ambitious, such as the alliance of global tax reform with the environment, but they must be presented in order to allow constituents to assess their acceptability.

1. Taxing individuals themselves

Carbon pricing initiatives currently in place or being discussed in several jurisdictions are mainly aimed at polluting companies. However, it is estimated that 65% of global emissions come from individual consumption.14

It should be noted, however, that GHG emissions are much higher for Individuals of higher socio-economic status. According to an Oxfam 15 study, the average carbon footprint of the richest 1% is 175 times higher than that of the poorest 10%. Similarly, the richest 10%

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would be responsible for about half of global CO2 emissions while, on the other hand, the poorest half of the population would be responsible for only 10% of emissions. And, according to the study “Carbon and Inequality: from Kyoto to Paris,”16 disparities in CO2 emissions are increasingly attributable to socio-economic inequalities.

This global trend is reflected, in different proportions, both in terms of developed and emerging countries. For example, the richest households contribute 48% of emissions and the poorest only 6%.17 In Germany, the households with the highest income emit four times more CO2 than the poorest.18 In Canada, the carbon footprint of the richest households is 2.2 times higher than that of the poorest. This difference is nearly 6-fold if we compare emissions from the wealthiest 1% with those of households whose income is in the lowest decile.19

Individuals, and particularly the most affluent, are therefore the main contributors to GHG emissions. But at present, no country has yet set a target for them. It is therefore appropriate to start looking at progressive tax approaches based on emissions generated by the individuals themselves.

When climate change negotiations began, the policies targeting large polluting companies were initially discussed on a global scale; the current technological means did not then exist. Consequently, it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to consider a tax directly linked to carbon footprints of individuals.

Today, it is relatively easy to measure the carbon footprint using various new technologies. Thus, the taxation of individuals is now an avenue to be carefully examined. Several digital platforms allow this calculation to be done; these tools are well designed and even apply to children. States could provide models and forms that taxpayers should be required to use in order to establish their annual self-assessment. In the same way that they currently use the forms for their tax returns. The system is simple and would allow everyone to better understand and measure the effect of their consumption on GHGs.

A GHG tax applicable to individuals would provide several tax benefits. First, the

Source: Oxfam

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affirmation of the “polluter pays” principle, since everyone would be taxed according to their GHG emissions. Then, an affirmation of the principle of “fair remuneration,” ensuring equitable tax progressivity as wealthier taxpayers emit more GHGs. This progressivity could even be accentuated, if necessary, by progressive rates of taxation.

Finally, unlike companies, individual carbon pricing has the advantage of partially or totally counteracting the threat of international tax competition. Indeed, there is little risk that individuals would change countries or export their income to another country that does not apply individual carbon pricing.

Let us look at the case of Canada, which recently introduced a carbon tax at a price of 20$/ton. This pricing, at the individual level, would result in a cost of about $600/year for the richest households and $120/year for the poorest households.

To promote its acceptability, this tax could be implemented in a phased approach with lower tax rates, which could increase over time. It could be accompanied by tax credits to reduce its impact on the less fortunate. It would also be possible to reduce individuals’ apprehension about the additional complexity that the introduction of this new tax would represent for them, by limiting the self-assessment process to a few very simple questions.

However, a tax on individuals would have the disadvantage of being more complex to administer than a tax on businesses. Also, the carbon footprint remains an estimate and some consumption elements are difficult to verify in a context of self-assessment. Finally, such a tax could be considered intrusive in the personal lives of individuals.

2. The case for a coordinated tax and environmental approach

To counter multinational companies that succeed in paying little or no tax, the OECD has been working since 2014 on an international tax reform called Base Erosion Profit Shifting (BEPS). As part of this reform, in autumn 2019 it published a Work Programme comprising two main measures: a pillar 1 which allocates additional tax rights to market countries; a pillar 2 which proposes a global minimum tax to stop the transfer of profits to low tax jurisdictions. The G20 countries have endorsed this programme and the OECD has set a deadline at the end of 2020 for international consensus, an essential premise for the system to work properly.

Considering that international tax reform and carbon pricing requires the consensus of all countries in the short term, it would be wiser and perhaps even necessary to coordinate the two issues international tax reform and climate – in a complementary approach or, at least, to examine the possibility of doing so.

The environment is often the pretext for promoting the acceptability of certain taxes and some countries have even used it to encourage citizens to consent to tax reform.

In Denmark, for example, the ecological tax reform (ETR) introduced from 1993 to 2002 had environmental objectives but they were diluted within economic and financial objectives. In fact, the 1993 reform, the first and most significant, was not perceived by the Danes as a real WXN. The country was in recession and unemployment was very high. As a result, tax cuts became necessary to stimulate the economy while citizens wanted to maintain their public services. But where can we find the financing? A new form of taxation was becoming necessary and, in Denmark, the environmental cause was sufficiently mobilizing

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to justify it. Over the years, the specific objectives of the various Danish WXRs have been:

WXRYear (reporting period)

Objectives to be achieved

1993 (1994-1998) 1. Reduction of household tax rates (applicable to all income groups)

2. The gradual transfer of the tax burden from workers to polluting activities

3. The imposition of a tax on non-renewable energy

1995 (1996-2000) Contributing to a reduction in CO2 and SO2 emissions in 2000, while avoiding imposing an excessive burden on energy-intensive companies

1998 (1999-2002) Reducing household tax rates (low and middle income)

In Germany, the idea of a WXN was born in 1990, when the country set the following objectives for the first time, national GHG emission reduction targets. However, it was not until April 1, 1999 that the WXR was adopted. Its implementation took place over a period of four years before being partially modified in 2003. Supporters explained that the WXR was an effective tool to combat the jobs crisis;20 to promote employment, the German WXR has increased taxes on oil, created an energy tax and promoted alternative renewable energies. The resulting government revenues were used to reduce employment-related payroll taxes. This approach has resulted in the creation of many jobs, more than 250,000 in 1999, without reducing government revenues.21

The environment can therefore become an ally for international tax reform. In fact, where tax reform is at its limit, the environment could serve as a persuasive element, and vice versa. For example, none of these three countries, Burma, Guinea Bissau and Mozambique, have joined the automatic information exchange. A coordinated approach, encompassing international taxation and climate, could perhaps persuade them to participate in international tax reform.

However, in the current context, this coordinated approach may well deter a country like the United States from collaborating on international tax reform. Or, and this is the bet, it could encourage the majority to act.

Pillar 1: Distribution of tax among countries

With regard to Pillar 1, the Work Programme allows a market court to have the right to tax the following three types of amounts:

• Amount A: the portion of the deemed residual profit (i.e., all group profits, less a return on routine activities) that is allocated to a market jurisdiction.

• Amount B: a fixed return (which may vary by industry or region) on certain routine marketing and distribution activities carried out in the market jurisdiction.

• Amount C: a profit attributable to activities that, in a market jurisdiction, go beyond routine marketing and distribution activities, calculated on the basis of the arm’s length principle, and which must not duplicate amount A above.

Several questions are pending. In particular, according to which variable will the amount in question be allocated to a jurisdiction? The OECD discusses turnover, but would it be possible to also consider a GHG variable? More particularly, with regard to GHGs emitted by a multinational company in a market country, if these emissions exceeded

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the objectives set by that jurisdiction, could a tax at the rate of 1% be levied in favour of climate change?

Pillar 2: A global minimum tax of the Global Anti-Base Erosion (GloBE) type

The objective of Pillar 2 is to impose a tax on multinationals that manage to pay a tax burden below a certain minimum. This would provide jurisdictions with the necessary means to protect their tax base and prevent companies from shifting their profits to complacent jurisdictions. In practical terms, countries would be equipped to act in the face of these companies, mainly through the implementation of the following two complementary rules:

• An income inclusion rule that ensures that shareholders pay a minimum tax;

• A rule providing for a tax on payments made to countries with low tax rates bypreventing treaty deductions or reliefs

To achieve the desired objective, there must be common rules applied in a uniform manner at the international level. Consensus is therefore an essential prerequisite.

Several issues still need to be resolved, such as the calculation of the tax base and the minimum tax rate. Also, will this tax rate be determined for each country, by groupings or for all of them?

The OECD’s reflections are moving in the direction of a rate for all countries and, in this context, it would be appropriate to bring forward the idea of the GHG factor that could be added to Pillar 2. For example, if countries agree on a minimum rate of 15%, could an amount equivalent to 1% be allocated for climate change?

WHY 1%?

Any other form of taxation could be considered as a means of coordinating an alliance of the stakes involved in an international tax reform with those of the climate. A1% tax is proposed here as an example because the idea of allocating such a percentage of resources, profits, budgets or others to a specific cause is known and has already proven its worth.

In France, for example, with the desire to support artistic creation and raise awareness among its citizens, there is an obligation to devote 1% of the sums spent by the State on each public construction to the financing of works of art. Since 1951, this system has given rise to more than 12,400 projects, covering the entire country and involving more than 4,000 artists22. A similar policy also exists in Quebec. The idea of the 1% has been taken up in the environment by American entrepreneurs with the popular 1% for the planet project, whose objective is to bring together companies willing to allocate 1% of their sales to the environment. Since its creation in 2002, 1% for the planet has raised hundreds of millions of dollars.

By implanting the notion of 1% for the climate directly to the international tax reform, it would undoubtedly be possible to provide the necessary funds to allow developed and emerging countries to go green by accepting the premise that we must now allocate 1% for the climate.

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CONCLUSION

Climate change is a global problem. Tax reforms must now be considered at the dawn of global collaboration: that of states and also that of the world’s populations.

All efforts must be combined to curb the effects of the climate crisis, which is accelerating due to a lack of effective and concerted effort. The suffering that will be generated by the displacement of populations, food crises and the destruction of essential goods will, according to scientists, be indescribable.

Global transformations in the way we live in our “one home, the Earth” are urgently needed. The assessment of and proportional contribution to the costs of our ecological footprint constitutes an essential factor of heightened awareness and redress in wealthy societies.

Safeguarding the environment, repairing damage and relocating millions of Earth’s citizens will require enormous resources that will have to be met.

That is why tax reform must now be considered in a global context, bearing in mind that we are all members of the same human family as stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Solidarity and humanity will have to transcend fiscal competition to engage in a viable and necessary alliance.

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END NOTES1 http://econews.com.au/39522/oecd-says-world-needs-big-fat-carbon-tax/2 Page 22 : https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/ar4_syr_fr.pdf 3 https://www.who.int/fr/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/climate-change-and-health 4 World Bank: https://carbonpricingdashboard.worldbank.org5 https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-trump-paris-climate-accord/6 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-10-23/trump-sues-california-over-its-carbon-cutting-pact-with-quebec 7 Effective Carbon Rates 2018 : Pricing Carbon Emissions through Taxes and Emissions Trading8 http://www.oecd.org/fr/environnement/peu-de-pays-font-payer-le-carbone-assez-cher-pour-que-les-objectifs-climatiques-puissent-etre-atteints.htm9 Section based on the book La Crise fiscale by Brigitte Alepin (VLB Éditeur, 2011) and the report On the road to green taxation.10 Assuming that this is possible.11 Barometer of responsible consumption, 2017 Edition, Observatoire de la consommation responsable de l’ESG, UQAM, https://ocresponsable.com/barometre-de-la-consommation-responsable-edition-2017/ 12 https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11111-017-0291-1 13 https://fr.wikisource.org/wiki/Notre_avenir_à_tous_-_Rapport_Brundtland14 Chancel, L., Piketty, T. (2015). Carbon and Inequality: from Kyoto to Paris. Paris, France : Paris School of Economics. 15 Oxfam (2015). Extreme inequalities and CO2 emissions.16 Chancel, L., Piketty, T. (2015). Op. cit.17 Irfany, M. I., Klasen, S. (2016). “Inequality in emissions: evidence from Indonesian household”. Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, 18(4), 459–483.18 Miehe, R., Scheumann, R., Jones, C. M., Kammen, D. M., Finkbeiner, M. (2016). Regional carbon footprints of households : a German case study. 19 Kennedy, E. H., Krahn, H., Krogman, N. T. (2014). Egregious Emitters. Environment and Behavior, 46(5), 535–555; Lee, M., & Card, A. (2012). Peddling GHGs: What is the Carbon Footprint of Canada’s Fossil Fuel Exports?. Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives. 20 www.oecd.org/dataoecd/13/23/20008655.pdf. In 2000, the government and the German nuclear industry agreed to phase out all nuclear installations before 2021.21 www.delaplanete.org/Allemagne-une-reforme-fiscale.html.22 https://www.culture.gouv.fr/Aides-demarches/Dispositifs-specifiques/Le-1-artistique

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McKibben, Bill, “Why We Need a Carbon Tax, And Why It Won’t Be Enough”, Yale E360, September 12, 2016. https://e360.yale.edu/features/why_we_need_a_carbon_tax_and_why_it_won_be_enough

Nordhaus, William D., “Projections and Uncertainties About Climate Change in an Era of Minimal Climate Policies”, The National Bureau of Economic Research, December 2016. https://www.nber.org/papers/w22933.pdf

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Roberts, David, “Climate Change Policy Can Be Overwhelming. Here’s a Guide to the Policies That Work”, Vox, January 24, 2019.

Thomas et al., “The impact of parenthood on environmental attitudes and behavior : a longitudinal investigation of the legacy hypothesis” Population and Environment, March 2018, Volume 39, Issue 3, pp. 261-276. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11111-017-0291-1

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World Bank Group, State and Trends of Carbon Pricing, Washington DC, June 2019. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/31755