focus on the mediterranean: threats to the southern flank

YOUTH ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION (Supported by ATA)

Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 09 1

- Flora Pidoux

The volatility of some of NATO’s closer neighbors has increasingly been having

security implications for the Alliance. Due to its rapprochement with the West, Ukraine has captured most of the media

attention, with the Alliance’s Southern Flank being pushed to the sidelines. Equally concerning, the North Coast of Africa has

been going through particular turmoil, from the Arab spring to the ongoing Syrian war, which have directly affected the Euro-Atlantic with migration and terrorism.

Despite all these threats, NATO has been indirectly involved in countering them by giving more opportunity to individual

countries and by backing partners of the Mediterranean Dialogue through capability building. NATO has thus been paying more

attention to the South, responding to the ever growing threat of terrorism and modernization necessity. Operation Active

Endeavour, the Alliance’s patrolling mission in the Mediterranean will soon be replaced by Sea Guardian, further explained in the

first article. The Libyan crisis will be the object of the

second article, which aims at explaining the Alliance’s lack of involvement, despite the

dramatic consequences it has for regional security.

Focus on the Mediterranean: Threats to the Southern Flank

Volume 6 - Issue 09 September 2016

Contents:

Fifteen Years of Active Endeavour: Evaluation of NATO’s

Mission

Mr. Nicholas A. Glavin analyzes the results of Operation Active Endeavour

in the Mediterranean. After 15 years of service, Operation Sea Guardian will

supersede in an effort to secure the Alliance’s Southern maritime front.

Libya, 5 Years Later

Mr. John G.L.J. Jacobs assesses the current situation of Libya five years after

the destitution of the Qadhafi regime. Five years after the NATO-led Opera-

tion Unified Protector the Alliance is unlikely to deploy again, preferring capac-

ity building rather than direct involvement in the civil war.

Under Operation Active Endeavour, NATO ships are patrolling the Mediterranean and monitoring shipping to help deter, defend, disrupt and protect against terrorist activity. (Photo: NATO)


throughout the course of Active Endeavour’s first

decade. From escorting commercial ships through the

Straits of Gibraltar to providing maritime security

operations in the entirety of the Mediterranean Sea,

NATO’s area of responsibility drastically increased. The

monitoring of vessels increased by 400 per cent in the

first nine years of the operation as more resources

through national contributions became available to the

Alliance.

Since 2001, NATO vessels have hailed ships over

128,000 times and NATO forces have boarded over 170

suspected vessels. OAE has played a critical role in

protecting choke points, key passages, and harbors

within the Mediterranean Sea from irregular threats in

the maritime domain. This has provided a secure and

stable environment for economic activity transiting in a

domain used by nearly 90% of the world’s international

commerce. NATO has deterred terrorists from

attacking international shipping by protecting maritime

energy infrastructure and sea lines of communication,

which has helped improve overall perceptions of security

in the region.

Interoperability With Partners

Active Endeavour has enabled NATO with an

unprecedented opportunity to build strong relations

with non-NATO navies, international and regional

organizations, and civilian sectors in the Mediterranean

and Middle East. The Alliance has increased its

cooperation with Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan,

Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia through the

Mediterranean Dialogue, a partnership inaugurated in

1994 to increase regional security and stability to

NATO’s South. The mission has even seen deployments

Fifteen Years of Active Endeavour: Evaluation of NATO’s Mission

By Nicholas A. Glavin

O peration Active Endeavour (OAE)

began in October 2001 as the

Alliance’s first Article V operation in

the immediate aftermath of September 11, 2001

attacks. Since then, the operation has helped to protect

one of the busiest trade routes in the world: NATO

ships have been patrolling the Mediterranean Sea with

a mandate to deter, defend, disrupt, and protect

against terrorist activity. While it has achieved much

success since the beginning of the operation, the type

of threats in the maritime domain have undergone

drastic changes since the moment OAE was first

implemented. As the Alliance now transitions OAE

into Operation Sea Guardian (OSG), a non-Article V

mission focused on broader maritime security

operations, is seems like a pivotal moment to evaluate

the changing security dynamic at NATO’s southern

periphery and the Alliance’s response fifteen years

after the implementation of the operation.

Strengths at Sea

Maintaining a fifteen-year-long presence in a

maritime highway covering 2,500,000 km2 is no easy

task. Nearly one-third of the world’s commercial

shipping transits the area each year, yet the

Mediterranean represents only 0.8 percent of the

world’s total ocean area. By keeping critical sea lines

of communication open in this international waterway,

NATO’s anti-terrorism operation in the

Mediterranean Sea has indirectly led to favorable

economic conditions by safeguarding freedom of the

seas and international access to the global commons. In

what started as an Alliance operation in the Eastern

Mediterranean, NATO expanded its mandate


from the Russian Federation twice between 2006 and

2007, and from Ukraine six times since 2007.

The high cost of maintaining a continued presence in

the Mediterranean Sea favors a collective response that

shares the economic burden and brings to bear the assets

of navies outside of that of NATO. To ensure the

comprehensiveness, efficiency, and success of the

mission, the maritime security challenges arising from

the South not only need to be addressed by NATO’s

southern coastal Allies but also the whole of the Alliance

and its partners of the Mediterranean Dialogue. The past

fifteen years have given NATO unparalleled expertise in

deterring maritime terrorist activity in the

Mediterranean, with particular emphasis on the

proliferation and smuggling of weapons of mass

destruction and cooperation with non-NATO partners

and civilian agencies.

Network-based Approach to Irregular Threats

Dependence on naval assets like frigates and

destroyers, which are originally designed to deter and

engage with state adversaries and used today to

discourage sea-based terrorist activities are costly for

navies. Permanently deploying large arsenal are also

difficult to justify for national governments as it proved

hard for Active Endeavour to tangibly define its metrics

for success (i.e. did deterring a terrorist attack mean

seizing a weapon of mass destruction on a vessel or was a

maritime show of force enough for a deterrent?). Thus,

in January 2010 NATO transitioned its maritime

deployments in the Mediterranean to a network-based

operation through a mix of on-call units and surge

operations instead of permanently deployed forces,

transitioning to a more cost-effective approach. The

Standing NATO Maritime Groups (SNMGs) rotate in

providing periodic support to OAE, and SNMG2 is

currently supporting the Alliance’s operations to

counter irregular migration in the Aegean Sea.

However, frigates and destroyers are not the ideal

vessels to spearhead migration missions at sea. Their

high deck complicates the rescuing of migrants, and the

ships’ poor of manoeuvrability may even capsize the

migrant vessels.

In light of current security challenges in the

Mediterranean, after the Warsaw Summit in July 2016,

the Allies agreed to transition from the Active

Endeavour counter-terrorism mission to a broader

maritime security operation, Sea Guardian. This mission

continues OAE’s current tasks of maritime situational

awareness, support to maritime counter-terrorism, and

support to capacity building. The new non-Article V

mission will focus on countering trafficking and

terrorism, upholding freedom of navigation, and

contributing to regional capacity building, in addition to

working closely with the European Union Naval Force

Mediterranean’s (EUNAVFOR MED) Operation Sophia

to counter human smuggling networks. It could also

perform other tasks if decided by Allies, including

upholding freedom of navigation, conducting

interdiction tasks, and protection of critical

infrastructure. According to a NATO official, the

transition from a very specific mission to a far broader

mission “means we have a flexible operation to conduct

a variety of maritime security tasks, in response to the

challenges we face.”

Seams and Gaps

The failures of the Arab Spring, Islamic State-related

violence, porous borders and lawlessness in Libya, and

the crackdown on migrant land routes into Europe are

simultaneously fuelling the refugee and migrant crisis

through the Mediterranean, directly impacting NATO’s

southern Allies with the greatest burden. The Central

Mediterranean has become a route that is high-risk for

migrants and high-reward to smugglers as individuals are

left with no choice but to attempt the deadly journey.

The route has accounted for 85% of migrant deaths, yet

it comprised just over a quarter of all arrivals from 2014

to mid-2016. The annual revenue of migrant smuggling

in 2015 was worth an estimated USD $5-6 billion, with


90% of the migrants’ travel being facilitated by

members of criminal networks. Due to tightened

border controls and international actions to counter

irregular migration, migrants are subsequently

exploring more dangerous and costly routes to reach

Europe by land or sea.

Given the reality of how smugglers and migrants

change their tactics, it would be a strategic error to

counter this phenomenon with a greater show of

force at sea. Operation Sea Guardian and any

potential expansion into Libyan territorial waters may

paradoxically increase the levels of smugglers’

activities. Because all vessels are required by

international law to rescue individuals in distress at

sea, smugglers will respond by launching crowded

vessels with just enough fuel to be within the range of

multinational, charity, and commercial vessels for

rescue. Any expanded mandate into Libyan waters by

NATO’s Sea Guardian or the EUNAVFOR MED’s

Operation Sophia must be cognizant of these second-

and third-order effects.

Outdated Alliance Maritime Strategy

The Alliance Maritime Strategy (AMS) of 2011

was written in an effort to integrate and streamline

NATO’s maritime operations. The AMS identifies the

four roles of NATO’s maritime forces in deterrence

and collective defense, crisis management,

cooperative security, and maritime security. While

NATO’s maritime forces have fostered enduring

relationships with relevant national, international,

non-governmental, and law enforcement actors in the

maritime domain, the security challenges have

increasingly become more diverse with repercussions

felt through all of Europe. An updated AMS is

necessary to examine how NATO can bring its assets

to bear against criminal activity in the maritime

environment, including the illegal trafficking of

humans, weapons, and narcotics – areas outlined as

core challenges to maritime security in 2011. A

transition to Sea Guardian must be partnered with a

revised AMS that outlines how it will influence and

shape the operational environment at sea to protect

NATO’s interests in the maritime domain.

New Tactics, Technologies, and Incentives

New contraband routes through the Mediterranean

Sea are exploiting Libya’s lawlessness by criminals

docking ships in its port cities and smuggling drugs by

land through the Middle East into the Balkans, taking

advantage of the international community’s attention

being focused on small boat trafficking and not enough

on other criminal activities. Pirates off the coasts of

West Africa are using hackers to steal ships and sell them

on the dark web, in addition to using drones to scout

busy sea lanes for unguarded ships. It is integral to

understand how non-state actors are responding and

how any scaling back of NATO’s maritime security

operations in the Mediterranean would open up

opportunities for this new generation of maritime

marauders to operate.

Political Stalemates Within NATO

Arriving at a 28-member consensus on how to

manage the largest refugee and migrant crisis on

Europe’s doorstep in seventy years is a monumental

task. Political rifts within the North Atlantic Council

(NAC) may hamper Alliance-wide action to fully address

NATO’s challenges to the South as it repositions the

Alliance to conventional deterrence towards the East

after a decade of an expeditionary contingency in

Afghanistan. Although the NAC agreed to deploy

Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 (SNMG2) to

counter irregular migration in the Aegean Sea, this came

with low political risk as SNMG2 is operating in Allied

and international waters in support of Greece, Turkey,

and the European Union’s border agency FRONTEX.

How the NAC chooses to respond to the humanitarian

crisis on its southern shores will be a defining factor in


the overall success of Sea Guardian.

Ways Forward

In sum, NATO’s maritime counterterrorism

operations over the past fifteen years have yielded

unprecedented success in fostering interoperability and

safeguarding one of the world’s busiest areas for global

shipping from terrorist activity. As the security

environment changes at sea, NATO will be better

equipped to deploy its assets to counter maritime-based

terrorism, while also playing an enabling role in

managing piracy, migration, and transnational crime.

NATO can leverage its lessons learned through Active

Endeavour towards future maritime security missions

working with Allies and partners across multinational,

interagency, and civilian sectors, and Sea Guardian.

However, the turbulent repercussions of the Arab

Spring have given rise to transregional instability and

the proliferation of non-state actors just beyond

NATO’s southern flank over the course of Active

Endeavour’s mandate. The sea lines of communication

in the Mediterranean are still vulnerable to exploitation

by nefarious non-state actors and although transnational

criminal enterprises are currently using the

Mediterranean to pursue the economic incentives

through human smuggling, the threat from maritime-

based terrorism remains nascent yet plausible. NATO

has an invaluable opportunity to bring the lessons

learned over the past fifteen years to bear in a more

complex maritime security environment which has

proven to have significant repercussions for the security

of the Alliance as a whole.

Nicholas A. Glavin is a senior research associate at

the U.S. Naval War College’s Center on Irregular

Warfare and Armed Groups (CIWAG). The views

expressed here are the author’s own and do not

represent the Department of Defense, Department of

the Navy, Naval War College, or any part of the U.S.

Government. Nicholas tweets in a personal capacity

@nickglavin.

“Alliance Maritime Strategy.” NATO. March 18, 2011. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_75615.htm.

Belton, Padraig. “’Do you have an AK-47 and can you swim?’” BBC, September 9, 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/business-37257236.

Callimachi, Rukmini and Lorenzo Tondo. “Scaling Up a Drug Trade, Straight Through ISIS Turf,” New York Times, September 13, 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/14/world/europe/italy-morocco-isis-drug-trade.html.

Cosgrave, John, Karen Hargrave, Marta Foresti, and Isabella Massa with Justin Beresford, Helen Dempster, and Joanna Rea. “Europe’s refugees and migrants: Hidden flows, tightened borders and spiralling costs.” ODI. September 2016. https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/10870.pdf.

Cusumano, Eugenio. “Emptying the Sea with a Spoon? Non-governmental Providers of Migrants’ Search and Rescue in the Mediterranean,” 2016. 16.

E-mail between author and NATO Headquarters Public Affairs. 18 September 2016.

Europol. “Europol and INTERPOL Issue Comprehensive Review of Migrant Smuggling Networks.” May 17, 2016. https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/europol-and-interpol-issue-comprehensive-review-migrant-smuggling-networks.

Glavin, Nicholas A., “Tackling the Problem of Irregular Migration on Land And At Sea in the Mediterranean,” The National Interest, September 15, 2016. http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/tackling-the-problem-irregular-migration-land-sea-the-17718.

Horrell, Steven, Magnus Nordenman, and Walter B. Slocombe, “Updating NATO’s Maritime Strategy,” Atlantic Council, July 2016. http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Updating_NATO_Maritime_Strategy_0705_web.pdf.

“NATO’s Deployment in the Aegean Sea.” NATO. May 2016. http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_05/20160519_1605-factsheet-aegean-sea.pdf.

“Operation Active Endeavour.” NATO. July 12, 2016. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_7932.htm.

“The Central Mediterranean route: Deadlier than ever.” Global Migration Data Analysis Centre Data Briefing Series No. 3. June 2016. https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/gmdac_data_briefing_series_issue3.pdf.

“The God’s eye view: Operation Active Endeavour.” NATO Review. 2010. http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2010/Maritime_Security/Active-Endeavour/EN/index.htm.

About the author

Bibliography


By John G.L.J. Jacobs *

ctober will mark the death of

Moammar al-Qadhafi, who was

deposed in a popular revolution in

2011. Five years later Libya remains trapped in a spiral

of economic trouble, deteriorating security, and a

political deadlock. The nation's government has

suffered under a political elite who is unable to agree

on anything remotely close to a basic structure as

renewed violence raged the country since 2014.

Though, currently at an unstable peace accord, a new,

internationally recognized Government of National

Accord—the product of a two-year, United Nations-

led process—continues its struggle to establish

legitimacy and a measure of territorial control beyond

the capital. The NATO-led intervention of 2011 that

brought an end to the first war has put the

Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine back on the

shelf, leaving Libya to its own devices (as well as

preventing an intervention in the ongoing conflict in

Syria). Thus with conflict at the maritime borders of

two NATO members and three Mediterranean

Dialogue (MD) partners, it is challenging for NATO

to maintain its interest in the region and project

stability in the southern flank. With Libya being

mentioned 16 times in the Warsaw Communiqué the

situation remains high on NATO’s priority list.

Since 2014 a second civil war has been raging in

Libya. An ongoing conflict among rival groups seeking

control of the national territory, mostly between the

sovereign, internationally recognized 'Tobruk

government' and its rival de facto General National

Congress (GNC), based in the capital Tripoli.

Between these two power holders, an increasing number

of rebel groups have been acting in what might best be

described as a "war against all". Contemporary ideas on

sovereignty might provide with an argument for a new

intervention and an end to the renewed civil war, which

would be a great contribution to regional and Euro-

Atlantic security.

The Sovereignty Debate

In order to discuss sovereignty in the NATO context,

it becomes important first to analyze what is intended

when using the term sovereignty. In the constructivist

view sovereignty is “constantly undergoing change and

transformation” and can consequently be defined “in

terms of the interactions and practices of states”. Rather

than seeing the increased interventionism as a violation of

sovereignty, it is to be seen as a change in the nature and

understanding of sovereignty.

Robert Jackson, however, makes a distinction

between "negative sovereignty"; the normative

framework that upholds sovereign statehood

internationally, in juxtaposition with "positive

sovereignty" that emerged along with the modern state.

Based on Jackson’s definition, Libya, the former

Italian colony falls in the first category, while the

European states bordering the Mediterranean and its

NATO allies constitute the second category. In practice,

this means that positive sovereign state is accountable and

responsible to protect its citizens, whereas the negative

sovereign does not necessarily do so.

A catalyst for the concept of 'sovereignty as

responsibility' is Francis Deng. Appointed as the UN

Libya, 5 Years Later


Secretary General’s Special Representative on internally

displaced persons (IDPs) in 1993, he was confronted

with the dilemma between protecting human rights and

respecting state sovereignty. Deng came up with a new

notion of sovereignty: sovereignty as responsibility

which recognizes that “sovereignty carries with it

responsibilities for the population” and, in case it fails to

take on such responsibility, that “a government that

allows its citizens to suffer… cannot claim sovereignty in

an effort to keep the outside world from stepping in”.

Like its forerunner, R2P makes the same conditionality

claims to sovereignty as Deng's earlier concept. As

Bellamy notes: “only those states that…fulfill their

sovereign responsibilities are entitled to the full panoply

of sovereign rights”.

Therefore, “living up to

the responsibilities of

sovereignty becomes in

effect the best guarantee

of sovereignty”.

The challenge posed

to sovereignty stems

from international

human rights obligations.

The regimes of

sovereignty and human rights, which often find

themselves juxtaposed or contradicting one another, are

irreconcilable or are seen in zero-sum terms - “the

stronger the principle of sovereignty, the weaker norms

of human rights, and vice versa”. In response to the

discussion on human rights obligations and sovereignty,

the United Nations endorsed global political

commitment to prevent human rights abuses coined as

the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). The R2P doctrine

served as a corner stone for resolution 1973, that

allowed for the multi-state NATO-led military

intervention in Libya, in response to the 2011 Libyan

Civil War.

Intervention of 2011

The first Libyan intervention was based on the

discourse of 'sovereignty as responsibility'. It was this

responsibility, or the lack thereof, that justified,

NATO's intervention against the government of

Moammar al-Qadhafi, and coming to the aid of the

Libyan population. by As we see in the preambles of

resolution 1970 and 1973 there is a strong emphasis on

defending the civilian population in Libya against the use

of force by its own government. The same discourse

comes back in the statement of the conference Chair

Foreign Secretary William Hague following the London

Conference on Libya of March 2011: "UNSCR 1973

(2011) authorizes all

necessary measures to

protect civilians and

civilian populated areas

under threat of attack"

and "So far, the action

we have taken has been

successful in protecting

countless civilians from

Qadhafi’s forces" After

initial hesitations,

NATO, acting under a mandate from the United

Nations, launched Operation Unified Protector (OUP)

started in March 2011, combining the imposition of an

arms embardgo, the enforcement of a no-fly zone and

the protection of civilians. By August 2011, Tripoli fell,

and in October, Qaddafi was captured and killed by

rebel forces, putting an end to the operation.

Fast forward to late 2011, the basis for the R2P

doctrine became muddier as the intervention

progressed, as it ultimately resulted in regime change

and the death of Moammar al-Qadhafi although the

Libyans celebrating the end of the Qadhafi regime at Martyrs Square in Tripoli .

(Photo: NATO)


intended goal was to stop the civil war. One may argue

that Libya was both the first and the last implementation

of the R2P doctrine, as this principle has neither been

invoked in Syria nor Libya today despite the large number

of civilian casualties in both cases. Supporters of R2P

point to unethical postures by the Russian Federation and

the People's Republic of China, the two non-Western

powers that used their veto power to block Security

Council resolutions on the matter.

Critics, however, argue that R2P was used to change

the regime of Libya, and

question the real intent

of the intervention. In

his address to the people

of the United States in

advance of the bombing

campaign that was to

take place a few weeks

later, President Obama

stressed that the

protection of civilians

was the intent and

purpose of the

intervention.

Furthermore, Obama

went on to add that

'regime change', while it was desirable to have Qaddafi

out of power, was not part of the mission. However,

ordinary citizens were indeed killed, though

unintentionally, by allied bombing; regime change did

occur; and, more importantly, the norm of the

responsibility to protect was compromised by an

overstretching of sovereignty by the Allies themselves.

Resurgence of Civil War in 2014

Between the fall of Qaddafi and 2014, Libya had a

decent outlook compared with many other post-conflict

regions. The rebels group that, although fragmented,

banded together to oust the dictator had largely been

unified; neighboring Tunisia and Egypt which were

transitioning well along democratic and political lines, had

a positive influence in Libya's transition to peace.

Looking back, one had little doubt that a pro-regime

insurgency would arise, unlike what had happened in Iraq

in 2003, as Libya stood in a much more favorable position

as Iraq, being more wealthy and less populated, thus with

a better propensity for stability.

Because Libya's

outlook was so

positive post-

intervention, the

strategy applied

to stabilize the

conflict differed

greatly from

NATO's prior

interventions.

There were no

peacekeeping, no

stabilization forces

deployed. The

footprint was by

historical standards very limited, or at least that was

supposed to be the idea. While foreign diplomats were

sent to help with the transition, under the coordination of

a limited UN presence, Libyans were largely left to their

own devices.

The situation escalated again in 2014 when the Islamist

government of the General National Congress (GNC), the

rival of the internationally recognized "Tobruk

government" or "Libyan Government", rejected the

results of the 2014 election. The GNC, which at the time

controlled most of western Libya, was led by the Muslim

Crew members from the Spanish frigate Mendez Nunez board a vessel for inspection as part of NATO's

Operation Unified Protector, which includes the enforcement of the arms embargo under UNSCR 1973.

(Photo: NATO)


Brotherhood and backed by a wider Islamist coalition

under the name of "Libya Dawn" with the aid of Qatar,

Sudan and Turkey. Although the Liberals and Centrists

composed the majority in the GNC, in May 2014 the

Islamists lobbied for a law "banning virtually everyone

who had participated in Qaddafi’s government from

holding public office". To enforce this ruling, "Armed

militiamen" stormed government ministries.

In December 2015 a United Nations brokered cease

-fire was established and in March 2016, the leaders of a

new UN-supported "unity government" arrived in

Tripoli. The GNC announced in April that it suspended

its operations and handed power to the new

government named

"Government of National

Accord". However, with

most members of the

parliament voting for a

motion of no-confidence,

the unity government still

has not received the approval of the House of

Representatives, leaving Libya in a very vulnerable and

unstable position.

Implications for Instability for NATO

The reason for concern for NATO is made vividly

clear in the speech of NATO Secretary General Jens

Stoltenberg to the Atlantic Council in April 2016. In

this speech, Stoltenberg stressed "homeland defense is

not just about what we do at home. It is as much about

what happens beyond our borders. Where we see

fragile and failing states struggling to keep control over

large portions of their territory." Indeed, Libya without

a functioning government that keeps control over its

sovereign territory is a security risk for the Alliance.

Take for example the jihadist groups, such as the ones

linked to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM),

who made use of the security vacuum to establish a

foothold. Libya is in a precarious situation - as are

conditions in the broader Sahel and Maghreb region

and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region

as a whole. Libya’s neighboring countries face the same

problems with Jihadist activities in Mali, Tunisia,

Algeria and Egypt. Projecting stability and building

defense capacity in the region is key when it comes to

preventing that Libya becomes the kind of buildup area

for ISIL like Syria has.

NATO Will Not Deploy to Libya

When in February of this year a faction with

allegiance to ISIL made advances to Libya, Italian

Foreign Minister

Paolo Gentiloni stated

that "Italy backed

efforts by United

Nations special envoy

Bernardino Leon to

bring warring factions

to the table to try to broker a ceasefire". He added

"should talks fail, Italy is ready to fight naturally in the

context of an international mission". Such a mission

might be deemed desirable in light of the securitization

of migration issues that is currently burdening Europe,

and in particular the Southern countries like Italy. It is

within this securitization, potentially linked with the

ideas of 'network theory’, that extension of sovereignty

might be used to justify a new mission for NATO.

It is questionable, however, if such an international

mission might happen in light of the disability of the

United Nations Security Council thus far with regards

to the matter of Syria. It can be expected that, because

R2P was rejected for Syria, the same might occur with

Libya. And indeed from NATO's side there does not

seem to be any intention to intervene in Libya again, or

“Homeland defense is not just about what we do at home. It is as much about what happens

beyond our borders. Where we see fragile and failing states struggling to keep control over

large portions of their territory."

- Jens Stoltenberg


at least no mention was made of such intentions at the

Warsaw Summit in July earlier this year.

Nevertheless, NATO is committed to doing what

it can and is willing to play its role in the Central

Mediterranean. The Warsaw Declaration stresses the

commitment to act outside of the sovereign territory

in order to safeguard security for both NATO and its

partners. To achieve these, the Declaration outlines

NATO's stands to complement and support the EU-

led Operation Sophia

should the European

Union request to do

so, by means of

Intelligence and

Surveillance

capabilities and a

Defense Capability

Building (DCB)

initiative if requested

by the legitimate Libya

authorities, and in the

context of the

implementation of UNSCR 2292 on the situation in

Libya, in close coordination with the EU.

Additionally, in accordance with the decisions reached

in Wales in 2014, NATO is ready to provide Libya

with advice in the field of defense and security

institution building. This building of a long-term

partnership could then potentially lead to

membership in the Mediterranean Dialogue, thus

building a strong foothold for NATO in North Africa

alongside Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt this would be a

natural framework for further cooperation in the

region. In light of our earlier discussions on

sovereignty, the Warsaw Declaration further stresses

Libyan ownership of any action taken. Furthermore,

NATO puts emphasizes on the need for close

coordination with international efforts such as those of

the European Union and the United Nations. These last

two remarks stress again how important it is that either

Libya or the EU/UN invites NATO to join in on their

activities in Libya.

Conclusion

No new intervention is planned to stabilize Libya -

should such a mission be planned it would require a

different argumentation than the one used to justify the

2011 intervention for

otherwise it would

find opposition in the

UN Security Council.

Such different

argumentation might

be found in new ideas

on sovereignty as

proposed by Hardt

and Negri who argue

that national borders

are becoming

increasingly

irrelevant. Furthermore, an increase of securitization of

immigration might be used to justify an intervention

outside of NATO territory. Either way, the regime of

sovereignty remains under pressure of contemporary

conflict and will continue to develop and adjust

accordingly. For both the Libyan population and for

NATO it is to be hoped that action can be taken sooner

than later, least the ongoing civil war claims more

unnecessary victims and further destabilizes the region,

increasing the chance of its potentially spillover effects

on the MENA region as a whole.

On 26 March 2011 ETNA rescued a stricken boat off the Libya coast with 300 migrants, and

carried out 2 medvac to Lampedusa. (Photo: NATO)


John Jacobs is a non-commissioned officer in the

Netherlands Armed Forces. He joined the Dutch military

in 2012 and is currently a board member of Jonge

Atlantici (YATA Netherlands). John is also affiliated with

the Netherlands Society for International Affairs. He is

currently pursuing a Master’s Degree in Human

Geography and Political Science at Radboud University's

Centre for International Conflict-Analysis and

Management (CICAM). John tweets at

@warandpeaceorg.

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—. "Collective Defence and Common Security, Twin Pillars of the Atlantic Alliance, Group of Policy Experts report to the NATO Secretary General." June 2014.

—. "Statement from the conference Chair Foreign Secretary William Hague following." Brussels, March 29, 2011.

—. "UN Resolution 1970 (2011) adopted by the Security Council at its 6491st meeting, on 26 February 2011." Brussels, February 26, 2011.

—. "UN Resolution 1973 (2011) adopted by the Security

Council at its 6498th meeting, on 17 March 2011." Brussels, March 17, 2011.

—. "Warsaw Summit Communiqué." Brussels, July 9, 2016.

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*This article is an abridged version of a paper

written under supervision of Prof. Costas M.

Constantinou, Professor of International Relations at

the University of Cyprus, Nicosia (CYP) during the

'Third International Summer School in Peace &

Conflict Studies' held between 10 and 22 July 2016.

About the author

Bibliography

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