FM 90-12FMFRP 2-73TACP 50-50

PACAFP 50-50USAFEP 50-50

AACP 50-502 OCTOBER 1989

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

CARL E. VUONOGeneral, United States Army

Chief of Staff

Official:

WILLIAM J. MEEHAN IIBrigadier General, United States Army

The Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION

Active Army, USAR, and ARNG: To be distributed in accordance with DA Form 12-11 E,requirements for FM 90-12, Joint Base Defense (Qty rqr block no. 4377); FM 90-14, Rear Battle(Qty rqr block no. 1235); FM 100-16, Support Operations: Echelons Above Corps (Qty rqr blockno. 1241); FM 3-3, NBC Contamination Avoidance (Qty rqr block no. 3829); FM 100-20, LowIntensity Conflict (Qty rqr block no. 513).

FM 90- 12/FMFRP 2-73/TACP 50-50/PACAFP 50-50/USAFEP 50-50/AACP 50-50

FOREWORDThis publication may be used by the Army, Marine Corps, and Tactical

Air Forces during training, exercises, and contingency operations.

M.R. THURMAN W. R. ETNYREGeneral, USA Lieutenant General, USMCCommanding Commanding GeneralTraining and Doctrine Command Marine Corps Combat Development Command

ROBERT D. RUSSGeneral, USAFCommanderTactical Air Command

TACTICAL AIR FORCES AUTHORIZATIONThe procedures contained in this publication are authorized for use throughout the Tactical Air Forces as indicated below. For

overseas theaters, the procedures set forth in this publication are applicable only in US unilateral operations. Forcombineci operations,applicable multinational procedures apply.

The Air Force distribution symbol for TAC is “X” (stocked and issued by TAC/DAPD); PACAF, USAFE, and AAC distribution is “X.”Additional copies or new requirements should be requested through TAC/XPJA. Reprints are not authorized. Send requests toTAC/DAPD, Langley Air Force Base, VA 23665-5583.

US Air Forces Europe

GERALD N. GUNTERColonel, USAF

MICHAEL J. DUGANGeneral, USAF

Director of Administration Commander in Chief

Pacfic Air Forces

DAVID N. THOMPSON MERRILL A. McPEAKColonel, USAF General, USAFDirector of Administration Commander in Chief

Alaskan Air Command

OFFICIAL

HUGH M. McAWEENEY, JR.Major, USAFDirector of Administration

THOMAS G. McINERNEYLieutenant General, USAFCommander

ARMY DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION AND DESTRUCTION NOTICEARMY DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Distribution authorized to DOD components only to protect technical or operational information fromautomatic dissemination under the International Exchange Program or by other means. This determination was made on 21 January 1988.Other requests for this document will be referred to HQ TRADOC, A_fTN: ATDO-J, Fort Monroe, VA 23651-5000 or HQ TAC, AlTN: XPJ,Langley Air Force Base, VA 23665-5001.ARMY DESTRUCTION NOTICE: Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document.

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Army, Marine Corps, Tactical Air Forces

FM 90-12/FMFRP 2-73/TACP 50-50/PACAFP 50-50/USAFEP 50-50/AACP 50-50

B a s e D e f e n s e

Multi-Service Procedures for Defense of a Joint Base

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This publication provides doctrinal guidelines commanders and staffsmay use to establish the defense and security of joint bases. The joint basedefense coordination requirements and basic principles described hereinshould remain relatively constant, although variations in size and type ofUS forces, host-nation agreements, and unique command relationshipsmay require modification of selected procedures.

OPERATIONAL CONCEPTSJoint bases could be setup almost anywhere in the world to support a wide

variety of missions and national objectives. The threats to such bases canrange from terrorism to large conventional forces. For purposes of defenseplanning, these threats are divided into three levels. A thorough knowledgeof types of conflict and levels of threat are fundamental to base defense.

ANALYSIS AND PLANNINGBase defense includes all active and passive measures that commanders

can take to secure their facilities, equipment, and personnel. They mustanalyze, organize, and plan their defenses using the same tenets of anysuccessful military operation. They must use the terrain effectively, positionfacilities and equipment advantageously, create an effectual in-depthdefense, and provide defense forces with clear areas of responsibility. Theymust assess such concerns as enemy avenues of approach, fields of fire,entrance control, and fire support.

COMMAND AND CONTROLCommanders and staffs must understand the command relationships for

base defense precisely. They must organize their available forces in the mosteffective manner possible for defense. They must outline and transmitdefense missions and responsibilities for all elements assigned to ortransiting the base. Because of the special threat that terrorism poses,commanders must make it a particular concern. From commanders ondown, personnel should be familiar with the legal aspects of base defensederiving from international laws, US laws, and host-nation laws, as well asfrom treaties and agreements.

INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNICATIONSSuccess in countering the threat depends on the ability of intelligence

activities to collect, analyze, produce, and disseminate user-specific threatinformation as quickly as possible. Commanders of bases must use all

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available assets to develop viable intelligence programs for defense. Theymust develop reliable and redundant communications systems flexibleenough to support the overall security scheme.

HOST-NATION SUPPORTIntegrating US base defense assets and HNS is vital to a successful base

defense. HNS will help relieve US assets for other missions and complementthe overall base security program. Planning for HNS must occur within theframework of established nation-to-nation agreements; however, HNS muststill function as an effective component of a sound defense.

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FM 90-12

FMFRP 2-73

TACP 50-50

PACAFP 50-50

USAFEP 50-50

AACP 50-50

US Army Training and Doctrine CommandFort Monroe, Virginia

US Marine Corps Combat Development CommandQuantico, Virginia

Tactical Air CommandLangley Air Force Base, Virginia

Pacific Air ForcesHickam Air Force Base, Hawaii

US Air Forces EuropeRamstein Air Base, Germany

Alaskan Air CommandElmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska

2 October 1989

B a s e D e f e n s e

Multi-Service Procedures for Defense of a Joint Base

PREFACE

PURPOSEThis publication provides operating procedures and security precautions

for the defense of joint bases outside the continental United States(OCONUS).

SCOPEThis publication describes the actions required to defend joint bases in an

area of operations and contains information that will assist staff officersand subordinate commanders in carrying out their commanders’ guidance.

APPLICABILITYThis publication is for use by tactical operating forces of the Army, Air

Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. Although the Navy is not signatory to thisdocument, naval information has been coordinated with Headquarters,Atlantic Fleet. Generic in nature, it provides multi-service commandcoordinated and approved information. It can serve either as a sourcedocument for developing multi-service and service manuals, publications,and curricula or as a stand-alone document. It has been developed for four-service planning and war-fighting personnel at all echelons. Although itaddresses host-nation support (HNS), it is a US unilateral-only document,and it may have to be modified for use in combined operations.

IMPLEMENTATION PLANThe offices of primary responsibility (OPRs) of participating major

commands will review this publication for multi-service proceduralinformation. Once they validate the information, OPRs should referenceand incorporate it in the following manner:

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ArmyThe doctrine and procedures contained in this document will be

incorporated in US Army doctrinal and training publications as directed bythe Commander of the Training and Doctrine Command.

Marine CorpsThe doctrine and procedures contained in this document will be

incorporated in US Marine Corps doctrinal and training publications asdirected by the Commandant of the Marine Corps (OPR: MAGTF,Warfighting Center).

Tactical Air CommandTAC will incorporate procedures according to AFR 5-8 and HQTAC OI5-1

(OPR: TAC/XPJ). USAFE, PACAF, and AAC will validate and incorporateappropriate procedures in accordance with applicable MAJCOM and othergoverning directives.

USER INFORMATIONThe TAC-TRADOC Air Land Forces Application (ALFA) Agency

developed this publication with the joint participation of the approvingservice commands. ALFA will review and update this publication asnecessary. We encourage you to recommend changes for improving thispublication. Key your comments to the specific page and paragraph, andprovide a rationale for each recommendation. Send changes or comments to—

Army:

Marine Corps:

Air Force:

HQ TRADOCATTN: ATDO-JFort Monroe, VA 23651-5000HQ MCCDCATTN: WF12EQuantico, VA 22134-5001HQ TACATTN: XPJLangley AFB, VA 23665-5576

Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine pronouns do notrefer exclusively to men.

CHAPTER 1OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS

A joint base could be established in support of treaties andagreements between the US and a friendly country or insupport of a military mission. US bases present lucrativetargets because friendly forces and equipment performingmission-essential functions concentrate there. To disruptsuch operations, the enemy will devote a high degree ofeffort, ranging from conventional military attacks torandom terrorism. Joint base defense prevents degradationof base functions by detecting, engaging, and destroyingenemy forces before they can succeed in accomplishingtheir mission. In most parts of the world this objective willbe met not only by joint operations but also by combinedoperations that depend heavily on host-nation support(HNS) assets and coordination. Due to the uniqueenvironment of low-intensity conflict (LIC) and the specialchallenges it represents, considerations peculiar to LIC arehighlighted throughout. For purposes of base defenseoperations, significant definitions are shown in Figure 1-1.

TYPES OF CONFLICTAn in-depth understanding of the threat to the

joint base is vital in the overall development of adefensive plan.Therefore, both military andcivilian intelligence and security forces mustcoordinate closely when planning the base defenseand when they carry it out.

Mid- and High-Intensity ConflictsDuring full-scale war, nations will use

conventional forces to seek a satisfactoryconclusion of hostilities. Forces will conduct large-scale operations.Joint bases that support USoperations will likely be prime targets for attack.During mid- and high-intensity conflicts, basescould be subjected to large-scale air attacks;

nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC) attacks; ormajor ground attacks. Such attacks intend todisrupt base operations, discredit US forces, anddisplay enemy prowess. The enemy may also try tosway US public opinion against the conflict byinflicting heavy losses on US personnel andequipment.

DEEP OPERATIONSSoviet doctrine stresses the concept of deep

operations. So do many Warsaw Pact nationswhose leaders are trained in Soviet doctrine,whose equipment follows Soviet design, andwhose forces are generally configured after theSoviet model. Soviet doctrine stresses a

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combination of massed fires on key objectives andrapid concentration of maneuver forces to seize theoffense after opening a breach in order to conducthigh-speed, deep attacks into the opponent’s reararea. These operations are executed in closecoordination with airborne, heliborne, andamphibious assault landings, tactical missileemployment, and high-speed, deep groundpenetrations. These operations may useconventional and nuclear arms, chemical fires,and deep recon. The purpose of such operations isto disrupt our rear area, reducing our efficiencyand ability to support close and deep operations.

RECON AND SABOTAGESpecial purpose forces, such as Soviet spetsnaz

or North Korean commando-rangers, arespecifically trained for recon and sabotage. Theymay secretly try to enter and disrupt a joint base.They may also activate sleeper agents and cellnetworks to develop and control partisanoperations in the rear area.

Low-Intensity ConflictsLow-intensity conflicts (LICs) are political-

military confrontations between contendingstates or groups below conventional war andabove the routine, peaceful competition amongstates. They frequently involve protractedstruggles of competing principles and ideologies.LICs range from subversion to the use of armedforces. They are waged by a combination of meansemploying political, economic, informational, andmilitary instruments. LICs are often localized,generally in the third world, but contain regionaland global security implications.1

LIC involves the actual or contemplated use ofmilitary capabilities up to, but not including,sustained combat between regular forces. Thefactors which lead to LIC are complex. Often,short-term actions cannot resolve them. Success ina LIC environment depends upon applying allelements of national power effectively anddefining goals and objectives clearly. Politicalobjectives establish the limits and constraints formilitary operations and for social, political, andeconomic programs.

LIC is not a new form of aggression. Throughouthistory, groups have sought to achieve their goalsthrough various limited actions: embargoes,blockades, demonstrations of militarycapabilities, incitement of and support for

1DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, JCS Pub 1-02.

insurgents, harassment at borders, incursions,and intimidation. Conflict remains at the LIClevel when at least one of the belligerents haslimited resources or when both want to avoideither the greater cost or greater risk involved in amore intense effort, LICs may arise as an integralpart of East-West worldwide rivalry or maydevelop independently of US-USSR competition.

In LIC, US military forces may have fourgeneral kinds of missions: peacekeepingoperations, combating terrorism,peacetimecontingency operations, and insurgency-counterinsurgency (see Glossary). Forces mayhave to conduct several of these missions at thesame time and in the same area of operations (AO).

During several LICs, US resolve has beenhighlighted in all parts of the world. For futureLICs, the US will probably use a joint forceincorporating elements from all the services. Tosupport such a force, the US may need to establisha base from which to conduct operations.

The US could establish a joint base in a passiveor potentially hostile HN. In such a case, thepolitical environment in the US, HN, and theworld could generate low-intensity conflicts thatwould adversely affect joint base defenseoperations. Restrictions and constraints on ourability to reinforce, buildup, or enhance security ata joint base could result. Therefore, the entirechain of command, including State Departmentrepresentatives, constantly needs to know aboutany possible situations which may adverselyaffect our ability to safeguard US personnel andequipment.

LEVELS OF THREATDefense is normally an incremental response to

perceived threats. As the threat increases, so doesthe level of defense. Defenders hope that threatincreases will occur well ahead of an actual attack.Dividing enemy actions into three levels serves toguide base defense planning. All three levels thatcould confront a joint base are discussed below.

Level ILevel I threats are those which can be defeated

by base or base cluster self-defense measures.

Level IILevel II threats are those which are beyond base

or base cluster self-defense capabilities but whichcan be defeated by response forces, normallymilitary police with supporting fires.

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Level IIIConcentrate at Critical Times

and PlacesLevel III threats are those which necessitate the

command decision to commit a combined armstactical combat force (TCF) to defeat the threat.

THE FUNDAMENTALS OFBASE DEFENSE

Understand the EnemyDefenders must be thoroughly familiar with the

capabilities and limitations of enemy weaponsand equipment. They should know enemy forceorganization, deployment, and tactics.Ultimately, the US commander must determinethe intent of enemy activity.

See the BattlefieldPrior to the battle, defending commanders must

organize to defeat any type of attack from allpossible directions.During the intelligence-preparation-of-the-battlefield (IPB) process,commanders acquire knowledge of the enemy andterrain. Using this knowledge, they predict threatoperations. They must then conduct operationsto learn enemy location, organization, directionof movement, and strength. Commandersmust have a continuous flow of information onwhich to base decisions. They must also haveeffective operations security (OPSEC) to denysimilar friendly information to the enemy (seeAppendix B, Section III).

Use the Defenders’ AdvantagesDefenders’ advantages are numerous and could

permit a numerically inferior force to defeat amuch larger one. Defenders must become totallyfamiliar with the terrain before battle. If possible,they must prepare the ground in advance bybuilding obstacles, firing positions, and routesbetween positions. Defenders can— • • • •

Fight from cover.Fire from stationary platforms or positions.Shift forces among prepared positions.Plan communications, control measures, fires,and logistical support to fit any predictablesituation.

Defenders must force attackers to canalize theirforces and minimize their chances to maneuver.Attackers must be forced to adhere to their initialplans or risk annihilation. Attackers may alsohave to alter plans as the situation develops andrisk an uncoordinated effort. Defenders can alsocamouflage their positions and use deceptivemeasures.

Commanders who understand the enemy see thesituation and the developing battle better than theenemy and use the defenders’ advantages to shiftforces quickly. Commanders must concentrateforces at critical points so that locally engagedforces can generate combat power to defeat enemyattacks. Locally engaged forces must then shift toother positions to concentrate combat poweragainst other threats during the battle.

Coordinate Available Defense AssetsIndirect fire systems, air defense artillery,

tactical aircraft, engineers, dismounted troops,armored vehicles, and helicopters can each make avital contribution to overall base security. Butnone by itself is the answer to a successful basedefense. They must combine with one another inorder to maximize their strengths and minimizetheir vulnerabilities.

Balance Base Security withPolitical Constraints

In LIC, base security measures must balancewith political constraints. This fundamental canbe the most frustrating but the most critical injoint base defense during a LIC. Base security willhave to be designed around numerous politicalconstraints and often under the scrutiny of thepress. For example, constraints could involverestrictions on defensive construction, limitationson the number of security personnel, or stringentrules of engagement (ROE). Coordination betweenUS State Department officials and the staff of thearea commander in chief (CINC) will be essentialto ensure that base defense is within US strategicobjective guidelines.Finally, the presence offriendly civilians in the area requires commandersto use minimum force against the enemy.Unintentional harm to local civilians couldenhance support for the enemy and adverselyaffect the success of military operations.

Know the Law and Rulesof Engagement

US commanders an senior advisors and theirsubordinates must be familiar with the legal basisfor their presence in a foreign country in order toassist its government and armed forces. USpersonnel should understand the basics ofinternational and domestic law that authorizebase defense operations and the restrictions thelaw imposes upon personnel (see Chapter 3).Further, the theater CINC will develop clearlystated, specific ROE for all US forces.

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CHAPTER 2

ANALYSIS AND PLANNING

Commanders at all levels must continuously monitorlocal threat indicators and essential elements of enemyinformation. They must ensure that their intelligenceofficers develop realistic priority intelligence requirements(PIRs) (see Chapter 4). Timely receipt and proper analysis ofsuch information enable commanders to tailor their activedefense plans while maintaining their primary missions.Local commanders must set up both active and passiveplans to defend bases against conventional operations andvarious LIC threats.2

•

•

ANALYSISAfter carefully reviewing the threat against the

base, commanders and leaders at all levels mustorganize their defenses using active and passivemeasures, such as—

Establishing guard posts in the immediatevicinity of vital areas.Deploying forward patrols to prevent insur-gents from closing vital areas.

This defense should be based on mission, enemy,terrain, troops, and time available (METT-T).

•

•

•

• • • • •

MissionThe unit mission statement should specify—

Who will defend.Where the unit will defend.When it will be prepared to defend.Why it will defend.What it will defend.

The unit mission or other missions on base mayseem more important to US efforts than the basedefense mission.However, base defense isfundamental to the success of missions thatsupport the overall operation. Therefore,commanders must stress the importance of basedefense to all personnel and ensure their directinvolvement.

The five essential actions of the base defensemission are—

• Detect. An enemy attempt must be detected inits earliest stages.

Warn. The detected attempt must result in analarm. The base must be warned that an attackis imminent or under way, and all US forcesmust report to their assigned base defensepositions.Deny. Allowing the enemy to damage its targetjeopardizes the defense mission. The defendersmust minimize the damage and deny theenemy’s attempt at the target.Destroy. To prevent future attempts by thesame force, defenders must destroy the enemybefore it can withdraw. In LIC, the enemy maybe hard to identify and may blend into thepopulation. Thus, collateral civilian casualtiesare possible in LIC and could adversely affectthe overall success of military operations. De-fenders must take great care to identify theenemy and to point combat efforts directly at it.Delay. If the initial defenders cannot deny or

•destroy the enemy alone, they must delay ituntil adequate combat power arrives.

EnemyCommanders consider how their defenses will—

•

•

•

•2This chapter describes an ideal security posture. Political andmilitary situations may dictate more austere and restrictedmeasures. Use this chapter as the basis for a viable security plan.See also the sample base defense plan in Appendix A and theadditional unit tactical security precautions in Appendix B.

Identify and counter the location, direction,size, and method of attack.Anticipate enemy ground and aerial avenuesof approach.Counter the effects of enemy firepower, mo-bility, and electronic warfare (EW).Negate the enemy’s strengths such as speed ofattack and numerical superiority.Exploit the enemy’scommandscheme of

and controlmaneuver.

weaknesses such asdifficulties and rigid

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TerrainThe US could establish a base almost anywhere,

from an existing HN airfield or port to a jungleclearing. The choice of terrain may be moresignificant than subsequent improvements ordecisions.

When selecting a base location, commandersshould consider elevation.Occupying orcontrolling high ground is especially important todeny an enemy direct observation or fire into thebase. Commanders should also consider theeconomic, political, and psychological impact onthe local area as well as on the HN in general. HNagreements and considerations may restrict baseconstruction and security enhancements. Beforesite selection and construction, defenders shouldconduct an extensive IPB analysis. Such ananalysis will prevent construction in major threatareas and place the base in defensible, trafficableterrain. A list of specialized base defenseequipment and materiel is at Appendix C.

Terrain forms the natural structure of thebattlefield. Joint base defense force commandersmust recognize terrain limitations andpossibilities, using them to protect base operationsand to put the enemy at a disadvantage. To do so,they and commanders at all levels must personallyexamine the terrain, starting with map recon,reinforced by terrain walks and, if possible, aerialsurveys. Commanders analyzing terrain mustconsider all military aspects, includingobservation and fields of fire, cover andconcealment, obstacles and movement, keyterrain, and avenues of approach (OCOKA).

• •

•

OBSERVATION AND FIELDS OF FIREContour and vegetation affect observation and

fire. Our direct-fire weapons are less effective, andthe enemy can move with less risk where visibilityis limited by— • • • •

Large forests.Jungles.Built-up areas.Tracts of broken ground.

Commanders increase the defensive posture oftheir bases by having vegetation cleared, byproperly siting observation posts and direct-fireweapons, and by compensating with indirect fireand aerial observation. For example, hilltops andthe tops of buildings make excellent observationposts or radar sites but are rarely satisfactorypositions for direct-fire weapons. Tanks, direct-firemissiles, and machine guns must be sited wherethey have the best fields of fire and their effects are

greatest. Indirect fire can cover areas not directlyobservable. Remote sensors can detect enemymovement and cue artillery. Aircraft can provideoverwatch from flanking positions in woods andvalleys inaccessible to ground troops.

COVER AND CONCEALMENTCover is protection from observation and fire.

Whether maneuvering on the ground or in the air,forces should seek the best protection of coveringterrain. Slopes, folds, and depressions can protecta unit from observation and fire or hide forces,serving to preserve the strength of the force.Covered positions are as important to commandposts, indirect fire units, reserves, combat support(CS) units, and combat service support (CSS) unitsas they are to close combat units. Dispersing unitsamong multiple covered positions can provideconsiderable cover.

Concealment is protection from observation.Urbanized terrain, broken hills, high ground, andforests can be used to hide forces, but terrain alonecannot conceal a force or facility in operationsagainst sophisticated forces. To conceal units andheadquarters, commanders must also—

Limit electronic and thermal emissions.Use camouflage to conceal personnel andequipment.Use covert relocation to help prevent the de-tection of hidden units.

Even in fluid conditions, forces will be able tofind concealment for short periods. Concealing aforce can be a great tactical advantage. Defenderscan use concealment to draw the enemy deep intoprepared defensive areas. Attackers can use it toavoid being detected or engaged as they approachdefended positions. Deceptive measures such asdecoys or simulated forces also give a significanttactical advantage.

OBSTACLES AND MOVEMENTFew areas are truly impassable. Thus,

commanders should protect difficult approachesinto their positions against surprise enemyattacks. Roads, ridgelines, river valleys, andplains are high-speed approaches on which fluidbattles may develop rapidly. Combat elementsmove slowly on soft sand and through swamps,thick forests, and broken or mountainous terraintraversable only through defiles or by dismountedforces. Urban areas also can constitute formidableobstacles.

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Season and weather can affect trafficability.Snow and ice on hills can slow a mountedmovement considerably. Thaws or rains canquickly change plains to quagmires. Fog and snownot only adversely affect trafficability but can beexcellent concealment for a terrorist attack.

Normally, an AO will contain a mixture ofobstructing terrain and avenues suitable for airassault, mounted movement, or dismountedmovement. Terrain that canalizes movementallows defenders to economize in difficult groundand to concentrate on the dangerous approaches.If the terrain is open, the attacker will be able tochoose among many different approaches, anddefenders may have to fight a mobile battle in-depth.

Natural or man-made obstacles parallel to thedirection of movement can protect the flanks ofattacking or counterattacking forces. Obstaclesacross an avenue of approach form lines ofresistance for the defenders. Rail lines, smallstreams, and villages along roads do notsignificantly impede dismounted forces but cansignificantly slow mounted ones. Adequatelyguarded forests and marshes are difficult forunassisted armored forces to penetrate, butdismounted infantry can traverse them and airassault forces can envelope them.

The best approaches are often those whichappear unlikely. Forces can often gain access to ahigh-speed ridge approach by crossing difficultterrain immediately to its front. Old roadbeds alsooffer good movement potential because they followsolid ground and are usually not as well defendedas improved routes.KEY TERRAIN

Key terrain is any feature, locality, or area thataffords a marked advantage to the controllingforce. Since such an advantage is situational, thecommander designates key terrain only afteranalyzing the mission. The commander maydesignate certain key terrain as decisive terrain ifthe mission depends on retaining it. Thecommander designates decisive terrain in theconcept of operation to communicate itsimportance to the staff and subordinatecommanders. Many areas will not have decisiveterrain.AVENUES OF APPROACH

Defenders must determine the main approachesto the base that attackers might use, as well asinternal avenues that permit maneuver against

attackers. Defenders must evaluate avenues ofapproach in terms of— • •

•

• • • •

Speed of movement along their entire length.Potential to accommodate enemy forces of aspecified number and type.Access to important areas and adjacentavenues.Degree of canalization.Cover and concealment.Effect on line-of-sight communications.Obstacles.

Defenders must also consider likely drop zones(DZs) and landing zones (LZs) for threat airborneor heliborne insertions.

TroopsDEFENDING AGAINSTLEVEL I THREATS

Each base must defend itself against low-levelthreats. Base defense forces should be organized,trained, and equipped to defeat Level I threats.They must also maintain a limited capability todetect, delay, and disrupt Level II and III forcesuntil friendly response or tactical combat forces(TCFs) arrive.

Many rear-area personnel do not have thetraining or resources to conduct sustaineddefensive operations against threat Levels II andIII. Conducting such operations could disrupt vitalsupport functions and, in effect, permit threatforces to accomplish their goals. However, basesmust provide their own self-defense until friendlyresponse forces arrive.

Defeating enemy incursions in rear areas couldbe a US command responsibility, or HNagreements may place primary responsibilityupon the HN. Such agreements, however, do notnegate or lessen the responsibilities of UScommanders to defend their bases against Level Ithreats and to respond to Level II and III threats.

DEFENDING AGAINST LEVEL IIAND III THREATS

Designated area response forces will be calledupon to defeat Level II threats directed againstbases. These response forces could be militarypolice or combat forces located in the area. A TCFis required to defeat a Level III force whosecapabilities exceed organic base defense forces orarea security assets.As a combined armsorganization assigned to fight a specific threat, a

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TCF may contain its own organic artillery orattack helicopters.The appropriate echeloncommander task-organizes the TCF throughoperational channels.

The TCF commander is assigned an AO andnormally assumes operational control (OPCON)of all external base defense forces in the AO untilthe threat is neutralized. The commander of thebase may need to retain control of sufficient assetsto maintain security of critical resources. Suchneeds will be closely coordinated with the areasecurity force, the commander of the base and TCFcommanders. Once the threat is neutralized,control of external base defense forces will revertto the established command channels.EVALUATING THE DEFENSE

Commanders of bases must evaluate how thedefense will— •

•

• •

•

•

Use organic and HN or other US service- supporting indirect fires to maximumadvantage.Use organic and supporting direct-fire weaponsto maximum advantage.Provide for its own low-altitude air defense.Be affected by the mobility of its own combatand CS elements.Use supporting engineers in countermobility and survivability roles.Use a reserve, considering its location, type offorce, and size.Employ counterattacks. Be affected by soldiers’ training, discipline, physical condition, and morale.Be affected by the state of maintenance andthe effectiveness of logistics to sustain combatoperations.

• Request additional assets. • Avoid, detect, protect, and recover from enemy

use of chemical or biological weapons.

Time AvailableCommanders of bases consider how the time

available will affect—• Planning (recon, coordination, task

organizing, planning of fires, issuance oforders down to squad level).

• Preparation (movement to positions, occu-pation and preparation of positions, coord-dination between units, logistics support).

For specific LIC security precautions during thepredeployment, deployment, and redeploymentphases of an operation, see Appendix B, Section II.For estimating base vulnerability to terroristattacks, see Appendix D.

PLANNINGAfter considering the factors of METT-T, joint

base defense force commanders develop a defenseplan that they and leaders at all levels should usein organizing a defense.

Employing Forces inBase Defense Areas

• •

•

Successful defense of a base depends on anaggressive, all-around, in-depth defense. The basedefense operations center (BDOC) normally planssuch a defense. (For specific details on BDOCresponsibilities, see Chapter 3.) To provide an in-depth defense, commanders of bases establishdefense forces within a series of defensive rings:the screening force area (SFA), the main defensearea (MDA), and the close defense area (CDA). SeeFigure 2-1. They also establish a mobile reserve

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(MR) or reaction force in reinforce any of theseareas. Defense forces in each area must developfields of fire and no-fire areas and use other controlmeasures, keeping in mind the locations of otherfriendly elements.Doing so prevents friendlycasualties and ensures that fires overlap to createan in-depth layered defense.

SCREENING FORCE AREAThe screening force area is the outer defense

ring, extending from the MDA far enough to keepattackers from surprising base defense forces.SFA forces provide early warning to theremaining base defense forces. Screening forces(SFs) maintain surveillance over the entire front of

• • •

the defensive perimeter. Screening forces— • •

• •

Provide timely warning of enemy approach.Gain and maintain visual contact withattackers and report their movement.Destroy or repel small enemy forces.Impede the advance of larger enemy forces byen-gaging them with long-range organic and

supporting fire.Screening forces use a series of dismounted

observation posts (OPs), listening posts (LPs), andmounted and dismounted patrols in front of theperimeter line. OPs and LPs detect the enemy asfar out from the perimeter as possible, reportsightings to the commander, and, where rules ofengagement allow, engage with organic weaponsor call for indirect fire on the enemy.

Whenever possible, OPs and LPs will beequipped with remote sensors, ground surveillanceradar (GSR), forward-looking infrared radar(FLIR), night-vision goggles (NVG), night-observation devices (NOD), trip flares, and otheritems that will aid in establishing a continuousdetection capability across the front.

To be effective, OPs and LPs must havesufficient personnel to operate for sustainedperiods and good radio and telephonecommunications. OPs and LPs should report totheir sector command post at predeterminedintervals, taking care not to reveal or highlighttheir locations.

For maximum observation, OPs and LPs shouldbe positioned in front of the perimeter line. Thedistance from the line should be determined by—

The terrain.The mobility of the OPs and LPs.The availability of fire support.

The availability of communications.The location and mobility of the enemy.HN agreements.

Patrols will cover areas that stationary elementscannot observe and the areas between OPs andLPs.

The SF usually consists of elements from, orattached to, the main defense force (MDF).Depending on METT-T, the commander may electto use elements from the MR to perform all or partof the SF mission. In such a case, the commandershould task-organize the forces to place the SFelements from the MR under the operationalcontrol of the security elements who have beentasked to perform the MDF mission. Unit integrityshould be maintained to the maximum extentpossible.

When available, aviation assets can addflexibility, response, and extended observation tothe SF. For the most effective employment andintegration of aviation assets into the SF,commanders must coordinate with the BDOC torequest aviation assets early enough to permitproper coordination and mission planning. Onceintegrated into the plan, such assets normallycoordinate directly with the leadership of the SF toensure unity of effort.

Where possible and where nation-to-nationagreements exist, HN forces should be used as theSF. When HN forces are the SF, they must be inconstant touch with the BDOC for early warningand overall defense coordination. To ensureeffective coordination, US liaison officers andNCOs should be attached to the HN force.

MAIN DEFENSE AREAThe MDA extends from the CDA to form the

background of the base defense. Forces in theMDA, referred to as the MDF, usually comprise thebulk of the defense force. The MDF depends onMETT-T, but normally it deploys in an area from1.5 to 3 kilometers past the base perimeter. Thesedistances are representative and based on thetypical effective range of most man-carriedweapons. Main defense forces— •

• • • •

Detect enemy forces and warn the defenseforce and the base command post of impendingattack.Destroy the enemy when possible or delay,disorganize, and canalize the enemy intoareas suitable for counterattack by the MR.

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Portions of the MDF may reinforce the MR to In any case, MDFs must use surprise to theircounter direct landings on the base by airborne,advantage. To optimize the capabilities of theirairmobile, airlanded, or sealanded forces. weapon systems and to be most effective against

MDFs are assigned to defend specific portions or the enemy, they must select blocking and fixedfighting positions carefully and clear fields of firesectors of the perimeter. The width and depth of

these sectors are determined by— out as far as possible. By doing so, they can—

•

• •

• •

The terrain to be held to keep the enemy fromcurtailing or terminating friendly operations.The size, location, and type of enemy force.

The likely avenues of approach into theperimeter.The key terrain within the perimeter.Concealment and cover from direct andindirect fire that the perimeter area providesfor the MDF and priority resources.

MDFs deploy so as to provide mutual support.Doing so keeps the enemy from penetrating theperimeter or bypassing forward elementsundetected. Figure 2-2 suggests how to divide aperimeter into sectors of operation.

Commanders may defend from a series ofsupplementary positions along key avenues ofapproach or from well prepared, mutuallysupporting fixed fighting positions. Choices

• Restrict enemy freedom of movement.• Disrupt enemy leadership. • Engage the enemy in a series of small actions

that sap its strength and impair its ability tocarry out its mission.

Essential to the MDA defense plan, fire supportplanning includes mortar, field artillery, navalgunfire, EW, and tactical aircraft (TACAIR)assets. Defenders plan fires on likely avenues ofapproach, as well as in front of, on top of, andbehind likely objectives. Defenders also need toplan indirect fires to cover and take advantage ofall natural and man-made barriers and obstacles.In-depth coordination with fire support assetsfrom each service must occur during planning. TheBDOC has overall responsibility for base defensefire support. Fire support planners must makecollateral damage and possible civilian casualtiesprimary considerations. Fire support plannersmust consider countermortar and counterbatteryassets. Their radar can provide quick response toenemy indirect fires.

depend on the—Aviation assets could be integral to the MDF.• Size and mobility of the MDF. Both fixed- and rotary-wing assets can extend

• Type, size, and mobility of the enemy. observation and give immediate combat response• Terrain in the MDA. in the outer areas of base defense. Planned for and

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requested early, aviation assets add flexibility andcombat power to the defense.

Where possible and where nation-to-nationagreements exist, HN forces may serve as theMDF.CLOSE DEFENSE AREA

The CDA is the innermost ring. It contains allelements essential for day-to-day base operations.Unless a legal base boundary exists, commandersdetermine the base perimeter on a case-by-casebasis to accommodate local conditions. Regardlessof the legal base boundary, the perimeter alongwhich the defense is prepared and conductedshould be determined by the terrain and the forcesavailable to conduct the defense. The CDAperimeter is usually within the base perimeter. TheCDA may be adjusted along the most defensibleterrain and the terrain from which best to detectthe enemy. Forces assigned to defend in the CDAprotect the most critical base elements.

Forces in the CDA are the close defense force(CDF). Its soldiers occupy positions on theperimeter and perform internal security missionsagainst sabotage and covert threat. To increaseobservation and security, the CDA can be sectoredaccording to base dimensions and internalsecurity missions. Mobile patrols in the CDA alsoenhance overall security. CDF may occupy— •

•

Entry control posts, boundary sentry posts,and base entry control posts.Static defense positions around fuel depots,ammunition depots, communication centers,supply facilities, medical facilities, and otherhigh-value targets and along likely avenues ofapproach into the CDA.

They also provide a security response force foraircraft parking areas or other restricted orsensitive areas, as well as a mobile patrolthroughout the CDA.

Also, the CDF must help the MR to preventhostile forces from landing aircraft, helicopters,amphibious craft, or troops directly on the base. Ifthe base is an airfield, the CDF will perform arunway denial mission by positioning forces atcovered and concealed, mutually supportingpositions around active runways. On navalinstallations the CDF will be positioned aroundships and vital harbor facilities. These combatelements engage any attacker that may havesurvived engagements with the MDF and MR.

Heavy weapons teams will support the CDA.Antiarmor teams will occupy strong points along

likely avenues of approach for vehicles attemptingto crash through the defensive perimeter. Machinegun teams will augment critical positions, strongpoints throughout the CDA, and static positionsaround the perimeter.

An HN force on a base should be directlyintegrated in the CDA in sector or around its ownrestricted or sensitive resource areas. Its organicindirect fire weapons must be integrated into thecommander’s defense plans. Except in specialcases, its chain of command should be used topreserve unit integrity and unique logistical andadministrative systems.

Employing the Mobile ReserveForces penetrating the MDA will be met by

additional vehicle-mounted forces performing asthe MR. Its main mission is to block anypenetration of the base or any direct landing on ituntil the enemy can be repelled or destroyed. TheMR must concentrate enough firepower to destroythe enemy force. To function as a blocking force,the MR must be positioned where it can bestrespond to the most likely avenues of approachinto the CDA and other critical areas. Itscomposition should be based on METT-T; forexample, on flat, open terrain, an MR in lightlyarmored vehicles could be the most effective.

The MR will counterattack to regain criticalbattle positions or terrain or to reestablish the baseperimeter. Counterattacks can restore integrity tothe defense when penetration or disintegrationthreaten it or when the enemy gains terrain fromwhich it can place direct weapons fire on the base.The MR should launch counterattacksimmediately to eliminate small penetrations orinfiltrations while the enemy is weak,disorganized, and susceptible to isolation.

Part of the MR may also reinforce a forwardMDA when heavy enemy pressure or casualtiesreduce its relative combat power. The MR may alsoperform part or all of the SF mission. Thecommander prescribes what SF responsibilitiesthe MR will have and the command and controlrelationship between the MR and the MDF. TheMR may be moved by helicopters to increase itsflexibility and responsiveness.

HN forces on US bases may be directlyintegrated by unit into the MR. Agreements spellout the command relationships for such units, MRplanners should consider having them reinforce orcounterattack in their own sectors or areas of

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responsibility to avoid language problems. US andHN forces of the MR should exchange personnel toprovide language translation ability anddisseminate orders and information. Such liaisonmust start as early as possible and be availablefrom then on. If HN forces are not integrated intoUS operations, the tendency may be toAmericanize LIC, especially during acounterinsurgency.This tendency may becounterproductive. In most cases, therefore, USforces cannot operate unilaterally in LIC.

Employing Antiarmor WeaponsTo employ antiarmor weapons, defenders

should— •

•

•

•

•

Identify avenues of approach that enemyarmored vehicles could use.Cover the approaches by assigning positionsand sectors of fire for antiarmor weapons.Select primary, alternate, and supplementarypositions.Select routes to and from all the positions sothat crews can occupy and vacate them quicklywithout unnecessary exposure.Plan obstacles that force the enemy into openareas where antiarmor and antipersonnel firescan target them. The obstacles, too, must becovered by fire.

Alternate positions,located to the rear ofprimary positions, provide depth to the antiarmordefense. Likewise,supplementary positionsprotect against an armored attack not coveredfrom primary positions. These positions providefor all-around security.

Positions should use all the cover andconcealment advantages that the terrain canprovide. Fields of fire should be unobstructed out tothe maximum effective range of the weapon. Crewmembers may have to clear them.

Employing Mortars andOther Indirect Fire Systems

Mortar, field artillery, and naval gunfire couldsupport the MDF. To ensure immediate firesupport and complete coverage, defenders mustpreplan indirect fires on likely targets throughoutthe SFA and MDA. Such targets include enemyavenues of approach and areas in front of, on, andbehind friendly blocking and fixed fightingpositions in the MDA. Defenders planning indirectfire must consider minimizing collateral damageand possible civilian casualties.

FIRE SUPPORT PLANNINGDefenders will plan targets—• On likely LZs and DZs near their bases.• On avenues of approach from such zones to the

base.• In support of man-made and natural obstacles.• On critical terrain features.• On possible enemy positions. • For support of the perimeters.The BDOC is the focal point for defense of the

base. It coordinates and executes all actionnecessary to secure the base and its supportfacilities. A BDOC maybe responsible for severalsubordinate bases in the area. In such case, itwould be in charge of all the bases in what is calleda base cluster. The BDOC reviews andincorporates the target lists and fire plans ofsurrounding bases into an overall fire plan. Thebase forwards a copy of the target list and fireplans to the command post of the commanderresponsible for the commitment of response forces.Response or TCF commanders and the supportingfire support element must have a copy of the targetlist and fire plans before the forces are committed.

Fire support planners must consider and publishany restrictions on the type of munitions. Some,though excellent for destroying an attacker, couldinhibit or prevent continuation or resumption ofthe base mission. If such munitions are to be usedas a last resort, the approving authority andcommand channels must be clearly delineated.Generally, indirect fire should not be used againstLevel I threats since they are usually individual orsmall-unit operations, limited in scope andduration, and too fleeting to be engagedsuccessfully. Larger enemy forces could be Level IIor III threats. They have the size, combat power,and identifiability which might require firesupport assets.

Response forces and TCFs used to counter Level IIand III threats maybe tailored to include attachedor direct support (DS) artillery. They will includeobservers and may have fire support elements(FSEs) with communication equipment. They mayalso include Air Force tactical air control parties(TACPs) with associated maneuver units of theTCF. The TACPs will perform their primarymission of directing offensive air power against anenemy force.

FIRE SUPPORTCOORDINATION MEASURES

Fire support coordination measures permit orrestrict fires in and around bases. Where HN

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support is used, these measures can restrict fireswithout revealing the functions of classifiedsections of the base not accessible to HN forces.For all bases, and especially those in or nearpopulated areas, US and HN commanders willhave to coordinate—

• The types of fires authorized into surrounding areas.

• The severity of fires.• The circumstances that permit return fires. Permissive fire support coordination measures

can increase the response to requests for indirectfires.

Employing AviationAssets

When available, aviation assets should beintegral to base defense. Both fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft can extend the range of observationin the SFA and give immediate combat response inthe outer areas of base defense. Specially designedaircraft, such as those equipped with FLIR or theAir Force AC-130 gunship, are particularly wellsuited for supporting base defense. Planned forand requested early, aviation assets can addflexibility and combat power to the base defense.

Using Mines andObstacles

Antitank and antipersonnel mines complementobstacles and indirect fires. Defenders shouldemplace them on all enemy avenues of approach tobreak up assault formations and inflict heavycasualties. Mines and obstacles such as barbedwire canalize and slow the enemy to increaseexposure to defensive fire. Defenders shouldemploy obstacles in depth, reinforce them toincrease their effectiveness, and cover them byobservation and fire. The commander exercisingcontrol over response forces and the TCF mustobtain obstacle overlays and obstacle target listsbefore committing a response force in an area ofdangerous obstacles.

• • • • • •

Establishing SecurityMeasures

The commander of the joint base defense forcesets up a security system to prevent observationand surprise.The SF should provide earlywarning. However, security measures must be inforce throughout the entire area of operations.Identifying and setting priorities for critical baseassets will emphasize likely targets and helpeconomize defense force efforts.

ACTIVEActive security measures include OPs, LPs,

patrols, and stand-to alerts. The defense forcecommander may direct a set number of OPs andLPs or let subordinate commands decide theirneeds. OPs and LPs must be placed strategically.However, careful random positioning of them willhelp to confuse enemy recon forces and frustratean attacking force. In terrain that restricts fields offire and during periods of limited visibility, moreOPs and LPs are necessary.

Security requires aggressive patrolling. Patrolsreconnoiter dead space in sectors and gapsbetween sectors.

Stand-to alerts, held both morning and evening,ensure that all soldiers in the defense force—

• Adjust to the changing light and noise. • Are awake, dressed, and equipped. • Check their weapons and are ready for combat.

Morning alerts should start before first light;evening alerts should continue until after dark.The starting and ending times should vary toprevent establishing a pattern, but each alert mustlast long enough to serve its purpose.

The commander may also specify a set numberof troops to be on security at all times. The numberwill vary with the enemy situation, terrain, andvisibility. When an attack is expected, the entiredefense force should be on security. Such highsecurity should not continue for long periodsbecause troops need rest in order to function.Security, however, cannot be sacrificed for rest.

PASSIVEPassive security measures include—

Camouflage.Concealment.Movement control.Light and noise discipline.Proper radiotelephone procedures.Ground surveillance radars and groundsensors.

Establishing Work PrioritiesThe commander must set priorities for the many

tasks involved in base defense. Work may occur onseveral tasks at the same time. See the sample thatfollows in Figure 2-3.

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Developing a Counterattack PlanReserves or lightly committed forward elements

conduct counterattacks. Counterattacks beginafter the enemy’s main effort has been identifiedand an assailable flank has been created. Theirtiming is especially important because they mustsynchronize with the overall defensive effort. Likespoiling attacks, they usually revert to the defenseafter local exploitation rather than turn into fullexploitation and pursuit. In some cases, they maybe the first step in resuming offensive operationsby the larger defending force. Counterattacks maybe counterattacks by fire only. Such tacticalactions position a force so it can bring flanking orrear fires against the enemy, but it does not assaultenemy positions.

Establishing Area Damage ControlMeasures

Area damage control (ADC) includes themeasures taken before, during, and after hostileaction or natural disasters to reduce theprobability of damage, minimize its effects, andaid in the continuation or reestablishment ofnormal operations. Engineers perform most ofthese tasks. Other forces and assets contributingto ADC include ordnance, policy, NBC, civilaffairs, maintenance, medical, signal, supply,transportation, and transiting units.

Establishing Air DefenseMeasures

Air defense nullifies or reduces the effectivenessof attack or surveillance by hostile aircraft ormissiles after they are airborne.3 Air defenseassets on or near a base will be integrated into theoverall defense plan for the theater. Thecommander of the joint base should set up acommunications link with the air defense net forearl y warning of impending air attack. If the jointbase is also an air base, local air defense units andthe air base operations center must coordinate andestablish return-to-force and identification, friendor foe (IFF) procedures.

Establishing NBC DefenseMeasures

Commanders of bases must ensure that theirfacilities can operate with maximum individualand unit effectiveness in an NBC environment.They must understand the NBC threat, includinglikely weapon systems and threat tactics, and theymust ensure all soldiers know precisely how to usetheir own NBC equipment.

They must enforce strict OPSEC procedures toreduce the enemy’s ability to acquire lucrativetargets against which it may use NBC munitions.

All personnel and units must be prepared andtrained to operate under the worst possiblebattlefield conditions. Training must be realistic,continually reinforced, and fully integrated intounit exercises.To survive, personnel mustmaintain their equipment properly and use it.Training in the use of detectors and mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP) ensembles andprocedures is the key to protecting the force.Operating with suits,masks, detectors, andalarms is a necessary part of base NBC defense.

Defenders look for both enemy activity andcontamination when they establish an NBCdefense plan.Personnel should be assignedadditional duties of various chemical detectionand radiological monitoring or survey. The datathey collect gives the BDOC a picture of NBCactivity in the area. They mark and report detectedcontamination so others will not encounter it.

Nuclear weapons will cause heavy casualties,materiel damage, and obstacles to movement.They will restrict the use of critical facilities,communications, and terrain. The effects of initialnuclear radiation can range from temporary mildradiation sickness to immediate incapacitation3Joint Doctrine for Air Defense, .ICS Pub 3-01.3; Joint Doctrinefor Theater Counterair Operations, JCS Pub 2-01.2.

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and early death. Thermal radiation can severelyburn exposed personnel. Enhanced radiationweapons dramatically increase radiationcasualties without corresponding increases inmateriel destruction. Fallout and neutron-inducedcontamination will require defenders to expendtime and resources for monitoring and survey,radiation exposure control, and decontaminationoperations.

The primary means of protecting US forcesagainst biological weapons is maintaining currentinoculation status as they process for overseasdeployment. Once deployed, they counterbiological threats through—

• A rigorous field sanitation program incor-porating water and food inspection byqualified personnel.

• A certification program for hiring localnationals.

• Medical programs to closely monitor thehealth of the command.

Medical personnel must be alert to anysignificant increase in infectious disease rates andkeep the commander informed as they occur.Medical observation continues to be the primarywarning method because reliable field detectorsfor biological agents are not widely available.

Protective measures against chemical attackfall into two categories: sanitary inspection andphysical protection. A thorough food and watersanitation program greatly reduces the chances ofcovert chemical assaults achieving their goal. Tocounter overt chemical attacks or indirectexposure, base commanders have readilyavailable physical protection measures andsupporting equipment for detection, protection,and decontamination.

Developing a Threat ResponseContingency Plan

Combating TerrorismThe threat response contingency plan outlines

specific duties and responsibilities to combatterrorism. It describes the— • • • • • •

•

Circumstances for its implementation.Notification procedures.Concept of operations.Mission priorities.Options for using forces.Decision making parameters (local and higherlevels).Resource requirements.

It provides checklists of actions to be taken byemergency operations center (EOC) members,crisis management team (CMT) members, and thethreat management force (TMF). (See Appendix D.)The defense force commander normally developsthe plan in coordination with the installationstaff, including the staff judge advocate. The G3 ordeputy chief of staff for operations and plans(DCSOPS) normally implements, trains, tests, andrevises the plan. All concerned, including allpotential response agencies, must understand andcoordinate the plan.

Determining the Physical Layoutof the Base

The physical layout and placement ofequipment on a base can be as significant to itsdefense as the size of the force guarding itsperimeter. Commanders must always stresscontinuous upgrading for base physical security.Surveys of the defense, including intruder drillsand mock attacks, must be part of defense trainingand serve to identify any shortcomings of basedefense. Defenders, especially those in high-threatareas, must be cautious not to confuse a drill withan actual attack.

Plans for base construction must consider ADC.Defenders need to use fire fighting equipment andpractice proceduresoften to maintain ADCproficiency should an attack occur.

INTRUSION DETECTIONDefenders can emplace sensors on likely

avenues of approach, locating them as far forwardas the SFA. Directed GSR and airborne FLIRsystems can improve the chances of detectingintrusions early. Remotely monitored sensors, tripflares, and other nonlethal warning devices canalso be useful. Depending on the threat situationand ROE, antipersonnel and antivehicle minesmay also be emplaced. Noncombatants nearbymay restrict their use.

OBSERVATIONTo improve observation, defenders should clear

the ground to the front of the CDA and from nearthe base perimeter fences by cutting foliage orapplying defoliant. Using defoliant or cuttingfoliage can expose the base to aerial observation.Balancing the needs of ground defense and aerialdefense is best. Defoliant must be used only onareas immediately around the defensive perimeterbecause it can affect large areas and destroy foodproduction.

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Bromacil is the defoliant of choice inmost cases.Presidential approval is mandatory prior to usingherbicides (Executive Order 11850). Perimeterroads on either side of the base fence improveobservation. A combination of concrete barriers,concertina wire, lighting, surveillance cameras,and intrusion sensors should be used to form asolid, mutually supporting defense (see Figure 2-4).Observation sites in guard towers or atopbuildings can increase the surveillancecapabilities of perimeter guards.

COMMUNICATIONSDefenders should install a reliable and

• Some type of duress or general alarm signal(fire alarm or loud speaker) to alert the entirebase and activate the MR.

The base should also have alarms for NBC and airattacks.

ENTRANCESThe base should have as few entrances as

possible. Offset concrete barriers at the entrancewill prevent vehicles from accelerating. Acounterbalance beam should be used as a gate. Inaddition, a heavy vehicle, bus, or dump truckshould be stationed nearby to be driven in front ofthe entrance as an additional barrier.

redundant communications system at all guardlocations. It should consist of— Hydraulic barriers can improve entrance

security. Entrance guards can use telescoping• A land line. poles with mirrors attached to check under• A telephone hookup to a central switch in the vehicles. Dogs trained in explosive detection are

base operations center. also useful. Dogs must be tested often, especially inextreme weather conditions when their abilities

• Radio links to the BDOC. may be severely degraded.

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Personnel on foot should have a separateentrance. An encased turnstyle would provideeffective control, especially where foot traffic isheavy. A badge system of identification should beestablished, and personnel need to be time-loggedin and out. Security personnel must constantlyguard against complacency in such a system andbe alert for any paperwork mistakes. An area forsearching personnel should be established andequipped with portable metal detectors.

Buildings housing personnel and sensitiveequipment should be out of grenade-throwingrange from the exterior fence and, if possible, awayfrom direct sight.

Protecting the BaseWORKING AND LIVING AREAS

Bunkers with reinforced and sandbagged roofsshould be near all working and living areas. Theyshould not only provide protection but also serveas fighting positions. Trenches between bunkerswould increase safety. The bunkers should beequipped with communications and first aid kits.The defense of on-base dependent housing areasand other nonmilitary facilities could requireextraordinary security precautions.

PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENTIn a LIC environment the defense must protect

both US and allied personnel and equipmentwithout degrading the overall objective. Givenpolitical constraints such as limits on securitypersonnel or restrictions on building defenses,commanders will probably have to translate broadstrategic guidance into definitive operationalobjectives and viable security plans.

Terrorists and other dissidents who wish toembarrass the HN or the US may target USmilitary personnel for attack or incite behaviordiscrediting to the US. Commanders mustconsider the following in defending deployedunits: • •

•

•

•

The potential threat for terrorist attack.HN agreements on responsibilities andprocedures for protecting personnel on leave,liberty, or pass.Coordination between HN civil authoritiesand military law enforcement agencies.Actions expected of officers and NCOs in adeveloping situation.Advance training in personal defensetechniques for deploying units.

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• Organization of those on leave, liberty, or passinto two- or four-person teams with eachmember responsible for the well-being of theothers.

INTERNAL AND EXTERNALTERRITORIES

Defenders must retain or deny terrain, facilities,and activities and preserve forces essential to basefunctions while minimizing the impact of securityefforts on local politics. Area security forces, whichdefend territory outside the base and base defensearea, could consist of US or HN personnel. Theyrespond to requests for assistance in base defense.They could be placed under OPCON or attached tothe base.

MEDICAL FACILITIESMedical facilities should be well marked and

placed away from possible lucrative targets. Thesefacilities must have their own means of securitysince they could be primary terrorist targets. Theymust have backup energy sources ready to use incase of a power failure. The backup system must beat a separate site from the primary source.

PORT AND HARBOR FACILITIESPort and harbor facilities can be attractive

targets. Because access is so varied and activity isnormally so heavy, defense is difficult. Developingmutually supporting elements to control accessand to defend against air, land, and surface orsubsurface waterborne attacks requires in-depthplanning. The area commander coordinates withthe commander of the base to plan, organize, andequip resources for port security and availablenaval and special operations forces (SOF) assets.Because port and harbor facilities are inherentlycomplex, no single set of defensive measures canapply to all of them. Defenders integrating portand harbor security with land-based security mustpay close attention to the concerns in Figure 2-5.

Protection for Choke PointsSecurity forces should be placed where an

entering or exiting vessel’s maneuvering isrestricted, making it susceptible to a shore-basedattack.

Protection Against Attack from High GroundSecurity forces need to identify high ground and

protect against attacks from such sites.

Protection of StructuresStructures, especially if they could be effective

sniper locations, must be secured or manned bysecurity forces.

Protection of Fuel SuppliesFuel supplies should have remote closure valves

for cutting off the flow of fuel in case of an attack.

Tides and CurrentsLocal tides and currents must be studied. Their

effects on swimmers and floating explosivedevices must be handled by the overall defenseplan.

Water Clarity and DepthTo plan the use of antiswimmer devices or nets,

security forces should be familiar with the clarityof the water and consider the chances of swimmer-delivered attacks.

Pier ClearanceIf the pier’s clearance above the water and piling

configuration is such that a small boat orswimmers could operate under it, it must bebarricaded or patrolled.

LightingLighting must be adequate and positioned so as

to illuminate incoming personnel but shadowsecurity forces.

Vehicle Control PointsSecurity forces should set up such points at all

roads into or out of the facility.

Use of Patrol BoatsDefenders must have patrol boats equipped with

searchlights, radios, appropriate weapons, andconcussion grenades. The number of boats willvary based on facility size and level of threat.Picket or patrol boats must guard vessels atanchor. Defenders must establish a securityperimeter on the water and patrol it to keep allunauthorized boating clear of the security zone.For deployment checks, see Figure 2-6.

Communications NetAll elements of the security forces should have

access to a common communications net.

Check for Explosive DevicesSwimmers and divers should be available and

trained to check the hulls of vessels for explosive

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devices when they arrive and periodically duringtheir stay in port. For port checks, see Figure 2-7.

Inspection Station CheckpointsCheckpoints should be established to inspect

incoming and outgoing cargo.

Rail and Highway Entrances SecurityClear lines of demarcation must separate port

areas. They should be fenced and patrolled.

Air Defense MeasuresIf an air attack is probable or anticipated,

defenders should establish defensive positionsand point air defense weapons.

Security for Individual VesselsMaintain the engineering plant so the vessel can

get under way as quickly as possible. Each unitshould have an internal security force, and thefacility security officer should be informed of itssize and capabilities. The commanding officer ormaster of each vessel should inform the facilitycommander of the support it can provide toexisting security forces.

The facility should be aware of what weapons, ifany, a vessel can employ in support of security

forces. The commanding officer or master of eachvessel must be briefed on actions to be taken in theevent of an attack. All crew members must begiven an up-to-date briefing on terrorismawareness and personal security. For individualvessel checks, see Figure 2-8.

Using Tactical DeceptionThe use of deception is a proven force multiplier

that can improve base security. Deceptionoperations should include visual, sonic, olfactory,and electronic measures. The measures must bemutually supporting and believable.

Dummy minefield can be integrated withactual minefield. Sonic simulators can imitatearmor convincingly if tanks can periodicallydeploy in the MDA. Olfactory, electronic, sonic,and visual measures can simulate defenses indepth. These measures are especially effective atnight.

To degrade enemy intelligence, defendersshould— • • •

•

Vary guard rotations.Vary internal patrol times and routes.Move high value items such as aircraft todifferent locations on an unscheduled basis.Use camouflage for sensitive areas.

Mockups of living areas, weapons, and fuelstorage tanks and deception operations canfurther degrade the enemy’s ability to successfullyattack base assets. Tactical deception is alsocritical within the CDA and must be integratedwith the overall deception plan as directed by thecommander of the base.

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CHAPTER 3

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Defending a joint base involves normal command andcontrol responsibilities. However, commanders of bases inforeign countries must be familiar with the legalconstraints imposed by international and domestic law.

SECTION I

RESPONSIBILITIESThe potential complications of the presence of multi-

service bases in an area must be overcome by effectivecommunications, responsive reporting, and timely reactionif base defense is to be successful. A situation whichincludes base defense will probably also place otherconcurrent, high priority requirements upon militaryforces. The base defense task organization can incorporateavailable regular force units and provisional unitsorganized from base resources to provide maximumdefense. A sample defense organization of a joint base isshown on the next page in Figure 3-1.

THEATER COMMANDThe following are the normal country and

command responsibilities and relationships for atheater of operations.

National Security CouncilThe National Security Council advises the

president on all national security matters andcritical foreign policy issues.

Secretary of StateThe president’s representative in supervising,

directing, and coordinating US foreign policyaffairs is the secretary of state. The Department ofState is the lead agency responsible for developingpolicy and operational guidelines for dealing withterrorist incidents involving US citizens and USinterests abroad.

Ambassador and Country TeamThe president’s representative in each country is

a US ambassador.The president gives theambassador full responsibility for directing andcoordinating the activities of all elements of theUS diplomatic mission. The ambassador promotespositive program direction by ensuring that all US

government activities in the HN are efficientlyand economically administered and effectivelyinterrelated so that they will contribute fully to USinterests in that country, as well as to our regionaland international objectives.

The ambassador’s overall authority (Title 22,US Code, Section 3927) must be recognized unlessthe military commander’s troops are actually incombat. The ambassador is responsible forinitiation of noncombatant evacuationoperations; however,he does not have theauthority to direct US military forces under thecommand of a US area military commander.

The term country team describes in-countryinterdepartmental coordination among keymembers of the US diplomatic mission. Inpractice, the composition of country teams varieswidely, depending on the—

• Desires of the chief of the diplomatic mission.

• Local situation.• US departments and agencies represented in-

country.• Problems that the team has to consider.

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An appointed contact officer, who is usually theChief, Security Assistance Organization (SAO), or,in some cases, the defense attache, represents theunified commander on the country team.

Chief, Security Assistance OrganizationSAOs manage security assistance functions in

foreign countries. SAOs are responsible for foreignmilitary sales and other forms of materielassistance. The SAO chief is under the command ofthe CINC. As a member of the country team,however, the SAO chief is under the direction andcontrol of the ambassador. The CINC normallyappoints the SAO chief as his point of contact to theambassador. In certain countries, the defenseattache may have security assistance manage-ment responsibilities as an extra mission. TheSAO may be known as the office of defensecooperation (ODC), the military assistance advisorygroup (MAAG), or another name mutuallyacceptable to the US and HN governments.

Joint Chiefs of StaffThe JCS assists the secretary of defense by

developing joint plans to guide unified commands.Also, program recommendations coming from the

SAOs and unified commands are fully coordinatedthrough the JCS to ensure consistency with USglobal security plans. Only the national commandauthority (NCA), representing the executivebranch of government, has the authority tocommit US military forces. Combat forcesassigned to a geographic area are usually underthe operational command of the appropriateunified CINC.

Commanders in ChiefThe CINCs of various unified commands are

critical in committing US forces. They advise theJCS on significant events in their areas ofresponsibility. CINCs have operational andregional responsibility. The exception is the CINC,United States Special Operations Command, whohas a global responsibility. CINCs must identifyand apply the necessary resources for achievingUS national strategic goals. CINCs have theresponsibility and authority to communicate withthe chiefs of the military services, the JCS, and thesecretary of defenseon all military-relatedmatters. CINCs have an established linkage withthe ambassadors in their AO through theirappointed contact officers, and close coordinationthrough them is essential (see Figure 3-2).

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Joint Task Force CommanderCINCs will normally delegate authority and

responsibility for a particular operation to a jointtask force (JTF) commander. If the JTF needs abase, a single commander for security andoperations will normally be placed in charge.Regardless of the level of service involvement at aparticular base,a clearly defined chain ofcommand for controlling operations must beestablished to ensure unity of effort.

To provide for the effective defense of a basewithin his command or for joint planning within

•

•

•

• •

his area of responsibility, the JTF commander—Assigns the responsibility for local defense ofthe base.Establishes the method of command orcoordination to be used by the local basedefense commander.Ensures that appropriate command relation-ships between subordinate area and local basedefense commanders are established.Ensures that local defense areas are delineated.Ensures that defense plans are published.

AREA COMMANDAn area command consists of the organized

elements of one or more armed services, designedto operate in a specific geographic area, that areplaced under a single commander such as thecommander of a unified command. Smaller areasmay be assigned as necessary to commanderssubordinate to the commander of a unified orspecified command. The purposes for such areaassignments are—

• To secure unity of effort for assignedoperations.

• To coordinate defense, CSS, and availablefacilities.

The commander of an area or subarea withnumerous US bases must ensure their defenses areadequate and complement applicable HN securityplans. The commander may be responsible foroverall security of the area outside US bases,depending on local HN agreements andcapabilities. The commander must ensure US basedefense plans are properly focused against enemyforces, including distant forces that interfere withthe operation or security of the bases.

JOINT BASE COMMANDThe designation of a commander of a joint base

is influenced in part by the purpose of the base andits geographic relationship with other commandsand bases. Overall command responsibilities for

joint base defense are specifically defined in thedirectives activating the base. (In some cases acommander of a base may also be an areacommander.)

The commander of the base establishes thedefense organization as well as the planning,preparation, and execution of all defensemeasures. The base may support or protect theoperations of two or more services atnoncontiguous facilities within the base. As basedefense coordinating authority, the commander ofthe base plansand directs the use ofnoncontiguous facility forces in base defense roles.

The primary mission of base support elementsusually conflicts with planning and training forits secondary role in ground defense. Thecommander of the base coordinates both, thusensuring that time and effort are equitablyallocated. The current threat against the baseinfluences this decision, necessitating greateremphasis upon accurate intelligence.

The base command can consist of a single baseor a cluster of bases organized under onecommander. It may be a land mass, an island, anisland group, or combinations of them. Acommander of a joint base who is also designatedas a cluster commander must coordinate thedefense of all bases within the cluster.

Base HeadquartersThe base headquarters exercises command,

control, and administration of the base and thenecessary control of resident and transient unitsnot part of the base command. It does so through acentralized BDOC.BASE DEFENSE OPERATIONSCENTER

The commander of the base creates a BDOCfrom available base assets. It is the base’s tacticaloperations center and focal point for security anddefense. It frees the senior unit staff to concentrateon primary support missions. The BDOC may becomposed of elements of the senior commander’sheadquarters (HQ) alone, elements from each ofthe tenant units, or both. Each tenant will providean appropriate share of the staff needed to run afunctional operations cell around the clock.

The BDOC plans, directs, coordinates,integrates, and controls all base defense efforts. Ithas three critical functions: operations,intelligence-gathering and analysis, andcommunication.

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Operations.The operations section is primarily concerned

with planning and coordinating current andfuture operations. It prepares and implementsbase defense plans and serves as the central pointof contact for coordination with— • • •

• • •

Higher echelon area defense counterparts.Other bases.Area security and response by military police(MP) forces.TCFs.HNS.ADC teams.

Large bases occupying critical sites orperforming sensitive missions may receivepermanently stationed liaison teams. Such teamshelp coordinate defensive efforts with adjacentbases, HNS, and area security elements. Theoperations section—

• Maintains defensive status boards.• Prepares overlays.• Develops and/or coordinates response force

plans.• Prepares fire support plans and requests. It requests response forces or a TCF from higher

echelons when attacks exceed the capability ofbase forces. The operations section is the interfacefor the commanders of the TCF and the baseduring combat operations against sustained LevelII and Level III threats.

Intelligence-Gathering and Analysis.The BDOC intelligence cell may or may not be

distinct from the operations section, depending onthe size of the BDOC. This cell serves as theconduit through which the commander of the basereceives and transmits intelligence informationabout the AO. It develops information throughexploitation of— • • • • • • •

All indigenous sources.Area security patrols (MP).Convoys.Adjacent bases.Theater intelligence.Communications.Higher echelon sources.

It also serves as a focal point for the base’scontamination control effort.

If bases are near population centers, transpor-tation routes, communication links, their intel-ligence assets can provide higher echelons with

early warning and real-time assessment of localNBC conditions. Such information enables theoverall rear area commander to discern potentialproblems and develop responses to minimize theimpact of threat NBC operations in the rear area.Intelligence is then analyzed to give thecommander the best advantage possible over theenemy.

Communications.Dedicated communications assets must closely

link all base defense activities. Thecommunications system among the BDOC, higherechelons, and base defense elements must besecure, robust, redundant, and highly efficient. Anautomated battlefield communication system thatincludes inter- and intracommunications links isessential to base defense operations.Communication systems of HN and US responseforces must interface for a coordinated response.

ALTERNATE BASE DEFENSEOPERATIONS CENTER

Defenders should set up an alternate BDOC ifpossible. If the base does not have the resources tosupport this requirement, headquarters elementsof units OPCON to the base for defense may bedesignated for this purpose. The alternate BDOCcan be located on or off the base, but command,control, and communications (C3) of base defenseshould be the main factor in decisions about thealternate BDOC.

EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTERThe commander of the base has operational

control of base resources during a terroristincident. Counterterrorism actions, however, aretypically planned, coordinated, and directed by anEOC, which is activated immediately whenterrorist incidents occur. JCS has defined fourterrorist threat conditions (THREATCONs) incombating terrorism. As progressive levels, theyplace units in increased postures of defense toreduce the vulnerability of US military personnel,their dependents, facilities, and equipment. Forspecific information on the THREATCONs andEOC, refer to Appendix D.

Base Defense ForcesBase defense forces are those specifically

charged with the security of the base. They areunder operational control of or attached to theBDOC. They include the SF, MDF, CDF, MR, andany other immediate response forces that are part

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of the base defense plan. Base defense forcesmust—

• Detect an impending attack as soon as possible. • Repulse or disorganize all forms of ground

attack.• Contain enemy forces that have established a

lodgment in the base area.• Repulse or destroy the enemy by counterattack.The responsibilities of the base defense force

include—• Preparation of ground defense plans.• Organization of defensive elements.• Execution of security tasks.• Execution of ground defense plans.• Preparation and execution of local air defense

plans and tasks.A defense force commander is normally

appointed by the commander of the base tosupervise the preparation of ground defense plans,conduct the required training, provide for CSS,and conduct and control ground defenseoperations. As a special staff officer of thecommander of the base, during planning hecoordinates the efforts of all elements scheduled todefend the base, and during the defense, exercisesoperational control of them. Commanders of baseelements may be given responsibility for defensetraining of their force or for making their forcesavailable to the commander of the base fortraining. They may be given additionalrequirements such as—

• Procurement and storage of essential supplies.• Construction of defense installations. • Medical care.• Communication assistance. If a terrorist situation develops, special

considerations, tactics, and coordination arenecessary. Given the unique threat that terrorismposes and the worldwide attention it brings, USforces require specific handling, For specificinformation, see Appendix D.

SCREENING AND MAIN DEFENSE FORCESThe defense force commander normally

exercises decentralized operational control of theSF and the MDF. Doing so permits SF and MDFleaders to exercise their own command and controlin their sectors to carry out their missions. The SFand the MDF in sector are task-organized to meetthe needs of the mission and generally operatesemiautonomously by engaging the enemy with

available firepower and reasonable tactics. In-depth coordination and control measures areessential, however,to ensure that adjacentelements do not receive friendly fires. Dependingon the situation and ROE, each subelement of theSF and the MDF can engage the enemy withoutprior permission of the defense force commander.The subelement must make an immediate report ofthe engagement.

CLOSE DEFENSE FORCESThe defense force commander exercises

operational control of the CDFs during operations,thus ensuring they can respond quickly,efficiently, and effectively to enemy attacks butavoid firing on the SF, the MDF, and the MR.

MOBILE RESERVEThe defense force commander should exercise

centralized operational control and decentralizedexecution of the MR. The commander keeps closecontrol over when and where the MR deploys,preventing premature use of the reserve caused byan enemy feint. Once the MR is deployed to itsdesignated sector, it is free to engage enemy forceswithin that sector without prior approval from thedefense force commander. Such decentralizedexecution allows the MR force leader to use propertactics to defeat the enemy.

Naval ForcesNaval local defense forces are comprised of units

having local naval tasks in base defense. Thesetasks include harbor defense, offshore patrolling,explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), search andrescue operations,and additional tasks asrequired. Navy security forces, mobileconstruction battalions (Seabees), andadministrative, maintenance, and supply unitsand personnel are expected to perform grounddefense force duties. Certain related operationsaffecting base defense such as strike forceoperations, submarine and antisubmarineactivities, and the control and protection ofshipping are normally outside the responsibility ofthe commander of the base and are not usuallydirectly connected with local naval defenseoperations. However, the commander of the basemay be authorized to employ such elements inemergencies.

Air ForcesAir force elements stationed in the base area

could augment base defenses. Security police,supply and maintenance units, and personnelstationed on the base can also augment base

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defenses. USAF security police normally act aspart of the CDF. As such, they have primaryresponsibility for providing entry control,boundary sentries, and security response forces inand around USAF resources.

Disaster Control ForcesDisaster control consists of measures taken to

minimize the effects of damage caused by hostileaction. The disaster control forces include— • • • • • •

Fire fighting units.NBC defensive units.Engineer units.Medical units.4

EOD units.Other units capable of satisfying disastercontrol requirements.

Further, all units initiate passive defensivemeasures such as the employment of shelters,dispersion, camouflage, and blackout. These sameunits can help minimize the effects of damagecaused by natural disasters.

Base Service ForcesBase service forces support the active defense.

They furnish food, water, ammunition, and othersupplies of common demand. The major elementsof the industrial and maintenance forces areassigned to the ground defense force. Storagepoints should be hardened and guarded dependingon the threat.

Base Engineer ForcesBase engineer forces consist of construction

units and civilian engineer operations. Theseforces perform construction and destruction tasks,prepare the base demolition plan, and supervisethe installation of demolitions. Their support inbuilding firing positions and clearing fields of firesaves critical time for the defense force.

Civil Affairs AuthoritiesCivil affairs includes all interactions between

the military and civil authorities or people in thearea. Such interactions may range from military-civic action projects to the exercise of authoritythat normally belongs to the local government (seeChapter 5). PSYOP assets and units may augmentcivil affairs personnel.4In the defense, medical personnel should protect their patients,themselves, and the medical facilities and provide medical supportto defense forces.

Host-Nation ForcesDiplomatic agreements between the US and

HNs determine whether HN forces will support thedefense. They may be totally integrated in the basedefense force or in any part of the defense. Theymay have total authority and man the SF, MDF, orMR. They could be responsible for the perimeterwith US forces sharing control of internal security.

The relationships and authority that thecommander of the joint base has with HN forcesare decided at the NCA level. For a totallyintegrated security plan, the commander of thebase must coordinate closely with the HN.

The HN is responsible for responding to terroristactivities. Status-of-forces agreements, however,may grant to US forces the right-not theresponsibility—to do anything necessary tomaintain order and security on the base. USresponse procedures to terrorist activity on thebase are set up according to US and HN law andstatus-of-forces agreements and in coordinationwith HN governmental agencies.

Psychological Operations ForcesDefenders must plan and coordinate PSYOP

with appropriate US diplomatic mission and HNpersonnel to ensure a unified approach to ourtactical and strategic objectives, PSYOP missionsinclude— •

•

•

•

•

Developing campaigns to provide positiveexplanation of the goodwill intent of ongoingUS activities.Providing assistance to HNs to gain thesupport of their people through various localprograms and incentives.Identifying local sensitivities to US occupationactivities; identifying local key leaders, tribes,clans, religions, population and politicalgroupings, and their susceptibilities to hostileor US propaganda efforts.Positively exploiting the temporary nature ofUS involvement and maximizing publicity ofplans for and execution of US rapid with-drawal of forces.Projecting an image of the US as a neutralthird party between hostile groups duringpeacekeeping operations.

Transient ForcesTransient forces, or other forces not a part of the

base command, may be assigned to theoperational control of the commander of the basefor emergency defense. These forces may beassigned missions using their organic capability;

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they may be assigned as elements of the grounddefense force. The authority, mutualresponsibility, and command relationships forusing such forces during an attack or under threatof an attack are covered in JCS Publication 0-2.

Adjacent Bases and BaseClusters

A totally integrated security plan requires allbases and base clusters in an area to coordinatetheir defense efforts. Area commanders willnormally establish command and control forbases within their area. Liaison between basesand base clusters will be essential in developing anoverall security plan.

SECTION II

Tactical Combat ForcesTCFs will normally assume OPCON of any

forces outside the base perimeter in sustainedcombat operations against Level II and IIIthreats. Once the threat has been defeated, basedefense forces revert to base control.

A TCF near a base maybe used for base defenseeven if the threat is only Level I. Normally it wouldbe given a separate AO, such as the SFA or sector,and retain control of its own forces. Closecoordination and integration of the TCF’s C3Isystem would have to take place with the BDOC.The base and TCF headquarters must exchangel iaison personnel and set up directcommunications links. They must also coordinatethe TCF’s movement in and out of the base defensestructure to ensure continuity of security.

Legal ConstraintsTreaties agreements, and national interests determinerelationships-and support among allies and friendly nationsand provide a basis for specific ROE issued by competentmilitary authority. ROE must be clearly stated and dis-seminated to all US forces.

Commanders at all levels must be very concerned aboutthe legal aspects of base defense. Three types of law relevantto base defense are international agreements, US law, andHN law. Together, these laws regulate the status andactivities of the forces in all levels of conflict. Should legalquestions arise, defenders should consult the staff judgeadvocate or other official legal advisor.

INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTSInternational agreements are the most

important source of rules of international lawapplicable to US, allied, and HN forces. Theyprescribe most of the reciprocal rights, powers,duties, privileges, and immunities of the US forcesstationed abroad and of the governments of thehost and allied nations and their respective armedforces. They also regulate, to some extent, therelationship between the opposing parties ininternal conflicts.

The four relevant types of agreements are thoseconcerning the law of war, SAO agreements,stationing agreements, and HN supportagreements. US armed forces are committed toconducting foreign internal defense operationsaccording to the applicable provisions of the law of

war, including those of the Geneva Convention of1949 and others set forth in FM 27-10 and DA Pam27-1.5

UNITED STATES LAWSUS forces in an HN follow US law as expressed

in statutes, executive orders, DOD directives andinstructions, military regulations, and directivesissued by the unified command and by theseparate component commands subject toapplicable status-of-forces agreements (SOFAs).US domestic law regulates such areas as militaryjustice, control of public funds, procurement ofsupplies, and disposition of property. Copies of5Legal Guide for Commanders; Treaties Governing Land Warfare.

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publications containing applicable US laws andSOFA should be on file at the headquarters of theSAO in the HN or with the command judgeadvocate.

HOST-NATION LAWSHN laws control the conduct of counter-

insurgency operations. Such laws emanate fromthe various levels of government and from theagencies functioning at each echelon. USadvisors, commanders, and staff officers mustunderstand these critical HN laws andresponsibilities. Other HN laws that apply includethose governing— • • • • • • • •

The use of labor.Currency.Foreign exchange transactions.Separation of powers.Local purchases.Judicial procedures.Control of the populace and resources.Emergency legislation.

The command must adhere to and publicizeappropriate agreements between the US and theHN. Detailed guidance on HN law is normallyavailable from the local US consul, a legal advisoror local attorney employed by the US diplomaticmission, or judge advocate. The laws of asovereign HN apply to all US forces stationed inthat country unless modified by international orbilateral agreements.

LAWS OF WARTreatment of Belligerents

During a conventional war, the treatment ofbelligerents is governed by the laws of war andrelevant HN and US domestic laws. Enemypersonnel acting in accordance with the laws ofwar will be accorded prisoner-of-war (PW) statusand afforded all the considerations thereof.

Treatment of InsurgentsInsurgency occurs within a particular state

when people band together to displace theestablished government by force. Under inter-national laws, another country is not permitted toassist the insurgents inside the threatenedcountry’s territory.

For insurgents held in US military custodyduring counterinsurgency operations, US policyrequires and directs humane care and treatmentfrom the moment they are detained until they are

released or repatriated. This policy is fully andequally binding upon US personnel whetherserving as the capturing troops, as the custodialpersonnel, or in some other capacity.

This policy also applies to all detained or in-terned personnel. It applies whether they areknown or suspected to have committed acts of es-pionage, sabotage, terrorism, or other war crimes.Their punishment is adjudicated and admin-istered only under due process of law and bylegally constituted authority. Inhumane treat-ment, even under stress of combat and with deepprovocation, is a serious and punishable violationunder international law and the US Uniform Codeof Military Justice.

In combating an insurgency, defenders must ac-cord humane treatment to any civilians involvedand scrupulously observe the laws to demonstrategovernment concern for individuals. Impropertreatment of these people serves the enemy’scause. For conditions that may suggest a potentialfor politically motivated violence, see Appendix D.

Treatment of PrisonersThe treatment of PWs is outlined in the 1949

Geneva Convention. However, PW status isgranted to insurgents on a case-by-case basis. Thestatus of prisoners and the interpretation of thelaw will be made in close coordination with legaladvisors. Should PW status be accorded capturedpersonnel, Article III of the 1949 Geneva Conven-tion protects them by prohibiting—

• Violence to life and person, in particular,murder of all kinds, mutilation, crueltreatment, and torture.

• Hostage-taking. • Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular,

humiliating and degrading treatment.• Sentences and executions without previous

judgment pronounced by a regularlyconstituted court that affords all the judicialguarantees considered indispensable bycivilized peoples.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENTROE are directives issued by competent military

authority. They delineate the circumstances andlimitations under which US forces may initiate orcontinue combat engagement with other forcesencountered (JCS Pub 1-02). Theater commandersestablish ROE in coordination with USDepartment of State representatives. ROE mustconform to HN laws concerning defense of others,self-defense, and protection of military facilities.

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CHAPTER 4

INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS

Intelligence is the cornerstone for base defense in anytheater. Communications, and the numerous challenges itinvolves, is also fundamental to base defense.

SECTION I

Intelligence

Joint base intelligence activities are conducted incoordination with lead US agencies and HN intelligenceactivities. Intelligence agencies comply with federal laws,presidential executive orders, status-of-forces agreements,memorandums of understanding, and applicable USmilitary regulations.

IPB, the primary responsibility of the intelligenceorganization, is a continuous process that should beginbefore combat operations do. IPB enables the commander ofthe base to determine vulnerable areas, analyze the threat,upgrade facilities and procedures, and prepare contingencyplans. For a detailed discussion of IPB, see FMs 34-3and 34-130.6

RESPONSIBILITIESIntelligence Officer (J2 or C2)

Intelligence officers who support a deployingunit need to carefully consider the information inFigure 4-1 when developing PIRs. At theater level,intelligence officers—

• Direct, coordinate, and control all theaterintelligence collection operations targetedagainst the threat.

• Collect, receive, process, and disseminate all- source intelligence on the threat.

• Perform liaison and coordination as required with national law enforcement, intelligence,and other government agencies.

Intelligence RepresentativeThe intelligence representative on the base staff

and crisis management team—• Facilitates the flow of threat-related

information.• Normally forms the BDOC intelligence cell.

6Intelligence Analysis; Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield.

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• Conducts liaison with local and HN law enforcement.

• Provides on-scene intelligence support to the commander of the base in coordination withlaw enforcement elements.

• Maintains contact, provides information, and receives information from higher levelcommands.

• Arranges and provides threat information andintelligence training to other members of thejoint base and to supported units.

• Expeditiously provides locally developedinformation to higher commands.

• Warns the supported commander of all threats to the command.

• Provides for realistic intelligence play duringperiodic exercises.

Tactical Unit Intelligence StaffIn wartime, the tactical unit intelligence staff

collects and processes information according tocurrent joint doctrine.

SUPPORTTrained intelligence personnel provide a variety

of services, including— •

•

•

•

Presenting threat awareness training tomilitary personnel and their families.Processing information into intelligence anddisseminating it to users.

Collecting intelligence information andanalyzing it in support of counterterroristoperations.

Providing the support detailed below.

Threat BriefingsBriefings about specific regional threats make

personnel aware of enemy activity in the area ofassignment or travel. Such briefings preparepersonnel to observe and report unusual activityand may include measures they can take to reducetheir vulnerability to attack.

Translation and InterrogationLinguists and interrogators translate important

documents, interpret or participate innegotiations, and interrogate captured anddetained personnel.

Use of SpecializedEquipment and Collection

MethodsSpecialized equipment and methods of

obtaining information are employed in strictcompliance with federal law, US militaryregulations. status-of-forces agreements, and theapplicable US-HN agreements. For example,when authorized, personnel may use technicalsurveillance countermeasures, providing the areacommander with the ability to detect the activitiesof hostile intelligence services in the target area.The requirement for monitoring, however, must beconsistent with the appropriate regulations. onlyservice-level departments can authorize suchmethods.

OPERATIONSTo counter the threat, intelligence agencies

collect, analyze, produce, and disseminate user-specific threat information quickly. The resourcesand methods used to do so divide into fourdisciplines: counterintelligence (CI), humanintelligence (HUMINT), imagery intelligence(IMINT), and signal intelligence (SIGINT). Eachprovides pieces for completing an all-sourceintelligence picture. Integrating them withinformation from other civilian, military, andgovernment agencies may produce a composite sothe commander can see what is happening or whatis about to happen and plan accordingly.

Collecting and Storing InformationTo provide critical and timely information, the

intelligence system must not only collect andprocess information efficiently but also organize,store, and retrieve information rapidly. Coupledwith early warning, careful observation, andeffective analysis, these functions enhance theintelligence officer’s ability to predict the typesand timing of strikes at the base.

Order-of-battle factors can be a logical startingpoint to guide information collection and toorganize intelligence files. They includecomposition, disposition, strength, objectives,tactics, training, logistics, and personality.

The collection process is dynamic andconstantly modified as intelligence accumulates.

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As intelligence improves in depth and detail,collection management efforts are refined in focusand orientation, files are constantly reviewed andupdated, and information is quickly disseminatedto users.

Exchanging InformationIntelligence activities are a team effort. For

instance, many US federal agencies activelyinvolved in combating terrorism are sources fortechnical support, evaluation, and sharedinformation. Controlled liaison with civilian andHN police and intelligence agencies is essential toexchange information, prevent duplication ofeffort, and reduce the likelihood of compromisingongoing collection efforts. Air defense units, airrecon assets, the provost marshal, and securitypolice also have intelligence-gatheringcapabilities. The intelligence section at the BDOCmust establish close and constant liaison withthese and other activities to develop the mostaccurate intelligence information possible for basedefense.

CRIMINAL INFORMATIONCivilian and military agencies maintain

information on known criminal incidents in theirjurisdictions. This data is of vital interest tomilitary intelligence. Military law enforcement,criminal investigators, military intelligence, andcivilian police agencies must coordinate with oneanother. Outside the US, the first three elements

SECTION II

conduct liaison with HN and allied lawenforcement and intelligence agencies accordingto status-of-forces agreements. The localcommander must be briefed about any exchange ofinformation and intelligence.

OPEN-SOURCE INFORMATIONThe news media maintains the world’s most

extensive information collection system. Relevantthreat-related open-source material isdisseminated through intelligence channels to thetheater J2 or C2 and appropriate law enforcementagencies. Personnel assigned to conduct PSYOPand civil affairs activities will routinely contactcivilian personnel such as local officials, clergy,farmers, and police. These sources can oftenprovide useful information.

LOCAL HUMAN INTELLIGENCELocal HUMINT can be one of the most effective

sources of information. Such information cancome from friendly locals and those sympatheticto the US presence. Base intelligence may have topay for such information and organize thesympathizers into a local HUMINT network.Normally, such networks have a few key localfigures who recruit other sympathizers,developing a system to gather local information insupport of base intelligence efforts. These effortsmust be in line with theater level J2 or C2intelligence collection operations which reimburseand ultimately approve them.

CommunicationsBase communications is similar to that of any fixed

administrative unit of equal size and scope. It involvescentralized communication agencies that furnish servicesfor all users from available resources. Some tacticalcommunications, such as those for offshore or aviationpatrols, may operate through or in conjunction with thebase operational communication system. Other tacticalcommunications should not be integrated into the basecommunication system, although physical facilities maycollocate with base communications.

Communications for joint base defense presents numerouschallenges such as the inability to net different service radiosand a lack of secure radios which must be resolved. TheBDOC, as the central point for base defense C2, is normallythe hub for the base defense communications system. SeeFigure 4-2 for a sample BDOC communications net.

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PLANNING AND CONSTRUCTIONCONSIDERATIONS

Defenders must plan, coordinate, and constructfixed-base communications facilities to not onlyprovide for base defense communications but alsofor other necessary communications.Considerations include—

• Organization and integration of communications capabilities and resources.

• Compatibility of equipment and systems.• Selection and preparation of locations for

communication installations and facilities,including hardening plans for communicationsurvivability.

•

•

• •

•

•• Determination of sources and types of communication augmentation available tobase defense forces.

• Coordination and control of air support operations and communications requirementsamong controlling agencies.

• Communication systems and responsibilities pertaining to defense sectors, areas, andmobile defense plans;command and

communication responsibilities for counter-terrorist actions. Ability to operate in an electronic counter-measure (ECM) environment. Frequency management to coordinate HN and augmented forces. Secure voice communications. Communications links to the country teamand US federal agencies.Entry to the defense communications system, when necessary.Development of communication-electronic operation instructions (CEOI) by the theatercommander responsible for each base, toinclude all units committed to base defense,tenants units, and sufficient spare CEOIs tofacilitate an ingress and egress of transientunits during a fluid situation.Coordination and exchange of communications information with HN, TCF, and transientunits.

•

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CAPABILITIESPlans provide for using base communications

facilities to the maximum extent practicable.Plans also set up any alternate means ofcommunication and cover their maintenance anduse.

Augmentation forces will rarely have thepersonnel or equipment for their tacticalcommunications. Normally, the basecommunications officer or J6 is responsible formeeting these needs.

The base defense communications systemshould be extended and improved to the maximumcapability of the personnel and materiel available.The success of communications will reflect the

effort expended between the initiation ofcommunications planning and the onset of hostileactivity.

The primary carrier of internal communicationsis wire. Wire lines should be laid to primary andalternate defensive positions. A duress signalsystem, such as a buzzer or alarm, should beinstalled among all posts and linked to the nexthigher command post to give instantaneous noticeof attack. The base should have a loudspeaker orsiren system to notify all personnel of ground, air,or NBC attack. The base should use differentsignals for air and ground attacks so thatpersonnel can differentiate between the two andknow how to respond.

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CHAPTER 5

HOST-NATION SUPPORT

HNS is normally based on agreements that commit theHN to provide specific support in prescribed conditions.Agreements occur at various levels: nation, componentcommand, major command, service, and unit. Althoughformal agreements are the preferred means of obtainingand documenting HNS, they are not absolutely necessary.Overall, HNS will depend on the situation. For example, USbases could be located in countries whose governments fullysupport US policies. In other cases, the HN may show littleinterest in commiting forces to meet the threat.

In the vast majority of cases, US bases locate in friendlyHNs. Treaties, agreements, or any of the four LIC missionscould be the reasons for US involvement. US bases may alsolocate in friendly states adjoining the AO.

Once a joint base is established, close cooperation withthe HN and special considerations for its people, culture,and territory could be vital in attaining strategic USmilitary goals. The proper use of HNS is a key in conductingjoint base defense.

PLANNING FACTORSThe primary purposes of US involvement are to

fulfill treaty agreements in support of US nationalinterests. Thus, commanders must not destroy theimage of HN political control. Providing HNSgives credibility to the HN and enhances theabilities of US forces to perform their missions.HNS can reduce requirements for US personnel,materiel, and services, allowing flexibility inassigning forces to other missions or othertheaters. Diplomatic agreements, politicalsituations, or the mission itself may restrict thenumber of US military personnel allowed at a jointbase. In such a case, HNS would be necessary tosupplement US security forces. US forces shouldexpect HNS where the HN has total sovereignty,for example, within the communications zone(COMMZ) during wartime.

Factors to evaluate or consider in determiningwhether to use HNS for specific missions andfunctions include—

• Capability, dependability, and willingness of the HN to provide and sustain resources.

• Shortfalls in US forces supplemented by HNSand reductions in US forces made possible byusing HNS.

• •

•

•

•

•

Effects of HNS on the morale of US soldiers.Effects of HNS on the political structure withinthe HN.Reliability of support and effects on security,including OPSEC. US intelligence andsecurity personnel, in conjunction with HNauthorities, must develop a system to checkthe background and loyalty of HN personnelemployed on the base. Qualified personnel toinspect for quality and to ensure that goodshave not been tampered with may be required.HN agreements and treaties that specify USinvolvement in the AO.Capability of US forces to accept and manageHNS.Availability of HNS in the type and quantityagreed even if the level of threat should change.

FACILITIES AND SYSTEMSHN government agencies build, operate, and

maintain facilities and systems, such as utilitiesand telephone networks, and provide their servicesin support of US forces. Police, fire companies, andborder patrols may be available to support USforces.

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US forces use HN facilities for hospitals, head-quarters, billets, and maintenance shops. Thefacilities may be owned by the HN, controlled bythe HN, or provided by a contract.

SUPPLIES, SERVICES, ANDEQUIPMENT

Bases may acquire supplies and services such aslaundry, bath, bakery, transportation from US,HN, or third-country contractors. Located in thetheater, such contractors use HN or third-countrypersonnel.

Bases need such support personnel as laborers,stevedores, truck drivers, supply handlers,equipment operators, mechanics, linguists,medical aides, computer operators, and highlyskilled managers. Many will be available from theHN labor pool. OPSEC certification for suchworkers should be coordinated and prescribed innation-to-nation status-of-forces agreements. HNmilitary or paramilitary units support US forceswith functions such as traffic control, convoyescort, base security,and cargo and trooptransport.

HNS may be for a special function in adesignated area or for particular organizationswithin national boundaries.Rail operations,convoy scheduling, air traffic control, and harborpilot services are examples. Certain services maycome under host-government control by authorityof national power acts. To avoid shipping suppliesand equipment from the US, bases may acquirethem locally.

COMMAND AND CONTROLUS and HN personnel command their respective

units and normally work in cooperation with butnot under OPCON of each other. However,OPCON relationships between US and HNcommanders may occur whenappropriateagreements are negotiated to address specificcircumstances.

The degree of command and control that USforces exercise over HNS depends on the type ofHNS involved; the location, tactical situation, andpolitical environment; and any agreements.Personnel who know the languages provide theinterface between US and HNS elements.Implementing plans must include requestprocedures and legal restrictions imposed by theHN.

The US coordinates its control of HN resourcesthrough local officials, when possible, and defines

control through treaties or HNS agreements. Civilaffairs personnel nurture this civil-militarycooperation by providing an interface with HNauthorities or military forces.

Depending on the agreements, the HN mayprovide both exterior and interior security to USbases or share the responsibility for base securitywith US forces. Such situations require closecoordination, common communications, and acredible base defense plan.

NBC DEFENSEWhen required, HN military, paramilitary, and

civilians and third-country civilians providingsupport are equipped and trained to operate in anNBC environment. Provisions for training andequipping are negotiated rather than unilaterallyimposed by US forces.

TRAININGUS personnel at all levels should be trained in

HNS functions. All of them should get orientationson HN government regulations, businesspractices, social customs, and military procedures.Proficiency in the HN language is vital tocoordinating HNS. Defenders should integrateHNS into training exercises whenever possible.

INTELLIGENCEFriendly nations normally operate separate

intelligence systems in support of their own policeand military forces. However, the products ofnational collection that affect operations shouldbe shared (within limits of national security), andearly coordination of the intelligence operations ofallies should be assured. Specific provisions forcombined intelligence operations and the use ofnational systems are generally arranged at thehighest levels.

For operational and tactical purposes, defendersmust arrange to disseminate military intelligencerapidly and to make intelligence assets availableto all partners in the operation. Doing so usuallyrequires— •

•

•

Formatting a combined intelligence staff attheater level.Establishing an intelligence network withdedicated communications and liaison officersto link allied headquarters.Assigning tactical intelligence units through-out the force so as to optimize their use.

5-2

Technical intelligence collectors such as drones,direction finders, radars, and EW assets of thepartners will differ. The combined intelligencestaff should consider their capabilities and, ifadvantageous,distribute them throughout theforce to ensure the command’s full potential forintelligence collection. HNS will be particularlyvital for data collection from the HN’s ownHUMINT sources.

Commanders of joint bases must ensure that theintelligence sections link closely to the theaterintelligence staff and to local HN assets such aspolice and paramilitary units. Current andaccurate intelligence from those sources helpsprovide the best base security against the threat.

PSYOP forces can identify—• Key local leaders.• Significant tribes, clans, and religions. • Important local sensitivities. PSYOP can develop and conduct information

and education programs to project a positiveimage to HN citizens as to why US forces are in thearea. In so doing, PSYOP forces can collectintelligence while in contact with the localpopulace.

CIVIL AFFAIRSCommanders at all levels can expect to be

involved in civil affairs (CA) operations. Theseinclude any activity involving relationshipsbetween the military forces and HN civilauthorities or local population. Activities mayrange from a military civic action project to theexercise of authority normally belonging to thelocal government.

The type of local government and the legal basisfor US presence influence the scope of CAoperations as do the economic, social, and politicalbackground of the country and people.

CA personnel monitor and assist efforts ofPSYOP, engineer, medical, logistics, MP or SPforces, base defense forces, and administrativeelements as these elements work—

• To restore stability. • To coordinate security operations. • To contribute to national development. • To promote support for the government.CA efforts coordinate closely with and directly

support civilian efforts. They supplement civilianefforts with activities such as construction in

remote areas and extension of the lines ofcommunications (LOCs).

CA operations require good relationships withthe population. Troop discipline, courtesy, andhonesty are essential to good relationships. Inthird world countries, US soldiers want to handout food or money, especially to children. Anorganized CA program should do this, notindividual soldiers. Indiscriminate giving caninterfere with operations and harm relations withthe host government. Where sound rapport hasbeen established between HN forces and thepopulation, properly administered CA operationswill materially enhance base security. PSYOPassets such as loudspeakers and media productionfacilities can assist in actively promoting CAprograms.

PUBLIC AFFAIRSPublic affairs (PA) are closely linked to civil

affairs. PA are not directly relevant to basedefense, but they are very important in alloperations because of their effects on publicopinion.

US adversaries seek to exploit public opinion vianews media. When they succeed, their results mayfar exceed their investment in time, resources, andpersonnel. They use propaganda anddisinformation to intimidate and dishearten thosethey attack. They try to shape public opinion tooppose the national policies that they oppose.Because a fixed US base can attract a lot ofpublicity, the commander has to be particularlyconcerned about PA.

ResponsibilitiesCOMMANDERS

Commanders are directly responsible for PAand often seek counsel from the public affairsofficer (PAO). A member of the personal staff, thePAO has direct access to the commander. Thecommander should include the PAO in allplanning. The commander and his staff should bereadily available for media queries and interviewswhenever such requests do not infringe on themission, security, or safety. When they deal withthe news media, all members of the commandshould be friendly and professional, notadversarial.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICERPAOs counsel commanders and staff on the

positive or negative impact of actions proposed tocarry out the mission. In LIC environments, they

5-3

assess the capacity of the insurgent or terrorist toexploit situations through news media andpropaganda. Where such exploitation alreadyexists, PAOs advise commanders and staff on thebest way to counter it, PAOs plan flexible internal,external, and community relations programs thatsupport the mission in a dynamic threatenvironment. PAOs advise commanders and staffon PA-related matters across a wide range ofpossible threats and disasters.

STAFFThe staff must coordinate with the PAO on all

significant matters that may impact on internal orexternal policies.Along with other key staffmembers, thePAO should be notified of seriousincidents and casualities.

ConsiderationsHigh levels of insurgent or terrorist activity may

justify requests for augmenting public affairs at ahigher level than normally provided by tables oforganization.

Before their units deploy, PAOs may needbriefings on extremely sensitive missions byspecial staffs at Departments of the Army, Navy,and Air Force; Headquarters, Marine Corps(HQMC); and Department of Defense (DOD).

All news media contact and requests forinterviews or information should be routedthrough the PAO. Responses to media queriesshould be accurate and timely. They should bestaffed through appropriate staff sections. Certaininformation may be delayed or withheld only forsecurity reasons, accuracy, propriety, or policy.

The advance party should contact the host-country team at the American embassy orconsulate to determine local sensitivities andpolitical concerns. The host-country team should

5-4

help evaluate proposed civic action andcommunity relations projects.

HN media should be categorized by politicalreligious, and ethnic beliefs.

PAOs must consider these beliefs when grantingaccess or agreeing to interviews.

A joint information bureau may improvedissemination and simplify news media control.The prevailing situation should determine bureaulocation and staffing. In no instance should thebureau be adjacent to the BDOC. Whencircumstances permit, a joint information bureauannex may be located near media concentrationsand away from tactical units in order to reduceunit profile and accessibility.

Base personnel should always escort newsmedia and control their access sensibly andtactfully. Media visits are opportunities—

• To support the unit’s mission.• To increase public awareness and support. • To thwart terrorist initiatives and propaganda.Being forthright, open, and ethical is the best

way to establish credibility with the public whilecountering insurgent or terrorist propaganda.

Defenders redeploying to a familiar area shouldmake every effort to exploit previous contactsbetween members of the command and friendlymedia and community leaders.

The commander’s priority of public affairsconcerns should be as follows:

National security.Mission.Unit safety.Internal and external information (public’s right to know).Countering propaganda and disinformation.Community relations and civic action.

• • • •

• •

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A-2

A-3

A-4

A-5

A-6

A-7

A-8

A-9

A-10

A-11

A-12

A-13

A-14

A-15

APPENDIX B

SECURITY

This appendix provides information on how units canprotect themselves from attack when they have beendeployed to either an urban or suburban environment. Italso includes guidance on maintaining operations security.The security measures discussed here are not all inclusive.They are included only as a reference. For more detailedguidance, commanders and staffs should refer to theirindividual service publications.

SECTION I

Tactical SecurityUnits deployed to an area of operations must be

constantly aware of the threat and take protective measuresto minimize the danger of attack.

PATROLSPatrolling may be necessary outside the base to

provide additional base security. The patrol’smain mission may be to show US presence. Otherpossible tasks may include— • •

• •

• •

Supporting police operations.Gathering information on local terroristgroups.Checking clubs and restaurants.Coordinating planned apprehensions withlocal law enforcement agencies.Conducting hasty searches.Deploying hasty roadblocks with local lawenforcement agencies.

Patrolling urban areas involves different risksand considerations than patrolling open or cleareduninhabited areas. The security operation mayrequire the use of patrol dogs. Patrol dogs are themost versatile security dogs. They are trained toassist the handler, attack on command, and tracksuspects. The two types of patrols are the footpatrol and the vehicle patrol.

Foot PatrolsFoot patrols are normally carried out by fire

teams. Multiple teams usually remain within 100yards of one another. Patrol members should walkwith relaxed confidence and be ready to talk tolocals. However, they should also be prepared to

take up proper firing positions, keeping riflesconstantly ready, which is known as hardtargeting. Hard targeting is appropriate under thefollowing circumstances: when crossing obstacles;when reacting to a possible enemy intrusion; whenleaving or entering a static base, observation post,or area with a history of high-threat contact; andwhen breaking up movement patterns.

Vehicle PatrolsVehicle patrols normally consist of two vehicles

moving within sight of each other but not presentinga double target. Vehicles should travel at no morethan 10-15 MPH. Vehicle crews should dismountat every stop to provide security and employappropriate dismount tactics. In order to reducethe risk of assault, vehicle patrols should avoidestablishing patterns.Defensive precautionsinclude— •

• • • •

•

Being particularly alert for strange people,vehicles, or incidents close to the beginning orend of the patrol route.Avoiding the same daily routes and times.Avoiding isolated routes and stops.Locking the doors.Stopping short of any unusual object orincident.Detouring around suspicious cars andobstacles.

B-O

•

•

•

Continually checking to ensure nobody isfollowing.Being aware of the vehicle’s dimensions andability to sustain damage.Being able to make full use of the vehicle’s

• • •

•

acceleration and turning capacity.

ROAD BLOCKSRoadblocks may be constructed of permanent or

semipermanent materials (deliberate) or rapidlyout of materials at hand (hasty). Roadblocks maybe used—

To check identification. To obstruct passage. To perform spot-checks, with or without priorintelligence.To achieve surprise.

Sentries should be assigned to protectroadblocks. They should stop cars well short of themain search area to minimize the effects ofpossible car bombs. The commander should assignan appropriate number of troops to meet the threatand effectively handle the expected volume oftraffic. Local police, females for searchingfemales, interpreters, and EOD experts may alsobe employed. Troops protecting roadblocks mustbe aware of their legal authority and their dutiesand limitations regarding search, seizure, arrest,and use of force, Roadblocks require directcommunication with the BDOC and anysupporting defense forces in the area.

Roadblocks should not unnecessarily hamperthe movement of civilians. Troops employed onroadblocks will enhance public relations if theyknow their jobs thoroughly and act quickly andmethodically. They must be polite and considerateat all times and hand suspects over to the civilpolice quickly and efficiently. When stopping avehicle for search at a roadblock, sentries shoulduse the following procedure:

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

Move occupants away from the vehicle andsearch the driver, passengers, and loosebaggage. Once the personal search incomplete,hold the occupants under guard nearby withinsight of the roadblock commander whilesearching the vehicle.Direct the driver to open the trunk and identifyits contents. Look under and around the sparewheel, tool boxes, luggage, partitions, sparewheel housing, and spare tire (check inflation).Direct the driver to open the hood. Look foritems taped to the bulkhead or hood. Examine

all containers and look behind the sound-proofing, front grill, and heater.When searching the interior, be suspicious ofstrong odors such as perfume or deodorant.Check methodically. Look behind the dash,radio, and cassette fittings; look in the glovecompartment; look behind panels, under floormats, and between seats and cushions; look inopen windows, in toys, and in decorativeanimals and ashtrays.When searching the exterior, look in wheelwells and fenders, behind bumpers, aroundheadlights, and in hubcaps.When searching commercial vehicles, look inthe following additional hiding places: driver’scab, space between body and cab, externalstorage bins, wooden bodies, false floors andsides, rear double wheels, and wheel chocksthat can be hollowed.If possible, use explosive detectors or dogs tosearch vehicles.

URBAN DEFENSEBase forces may be employed in urban areas for

security operations or for other tasks short ofconventional combat, for example, protection offacilities or equipment required for baseoperations. Masonry structures and other urbanfeatures can be adapted to provide protection.

Security PrecautionsWhen employed in urban areas, commanders

must estimate the threat (see Chapter 1) and planfor the defense (see Chapter 2). In addition, theyshould consider the following securityprecautions: •

•

•

Wire fences or barriers for additionalprotection.Screens made of canvas or corrugated iron foruse outside buildings or inside windows. Meshor chain-link barriers placed in front ofbunkers or above ground fighting positionsaid in premature detonation of rocket-propelled grenades and other similar shaped,charged explosive devices.Canopies of chain link, weld mesh, orcorrugated iron will protect roofs if they areplaced at least 1 meter above the roofs.Sandbags placed directly on roofs will absorbshrapnel.Obstacles in the approaches will slow or stopvehicles and personnel approaching thedefended area. However, the entrance gate

•

B-1

design must allow access to those authorized,deny access to others, and provide protectionto those who must have access. If possible,illuminate fences, entrance gates, andobstacles. Cover with observation and fire.

• Sentry posts for round-the-clock security. Iffield fortifications are required, dig fightingpositions rather than build towers. Ordinarily,sentry posts are doubled during darkness orpoor visibility. Sentries should report atirregular intervals within a specified timeperiod and be posted at—

• • • • • • •

- Entrances, in order to check entry permits.- Observation posts or rooftops, in order toobserve all avenues of approach anddominate buildings and grounds.

- Perimeter sites.

Employment of SentriesSentries must be properly trained and equipped.

They must pay particular attention to ROE andappropriate use of force. They must always havean MR on which they can call for immediateassistance. Sentries employed in urban areas must—

• Detect and deter anyone seeking to gainunauthorized access to the secured area.

• Prevent damage, arson, and looting within thesecured area.

• Ensure maintenance of essential services. • Remain on post until properly relieved.The duties and conduct of sentries are detailed in

FM 22-6, AFR 125-3, and FMFM 6-4.7

Some security operations may require the use ofsentry dogs. Sentry dogs are extremely aggressiveand may work without a handler. They are bestassigned to critical areas to prevent unauthorizedpenetration. (Although no longer available inDOD inventory, sentry dogs may be available as apart of HNS.)

CONVOY DEFENSEDepending on route classification, convoys are

arranged for control and protection usingarmored, organic vehicles and military policeescort, if available. Road movement is alwaysvulnerable in high-threat areas. The convoycommander should plan convoy movements andpractice using hardened vehicles if support fromother units such as infantry and armor is not

•

• • • • • • •

7Guard Duty; Security Police Handbook; Marine RifleCompany/Platoon.

available. Convoys are organized into an advanceparty, main body, and trail party.

The convoy commander estimates the situationand develops a plan. The plan must include athorough predeparture briefing for all convoymembers. The briefing must include—

Composition and order of march. Chain of command. General posture. Communications and special signals. Objectives. Routes and schedules. Emergency actions and actions to be taken athalts.

Convoy orders follow a conventional sixparagraph format as shown in Figure B-1.

SEARCHESPersonnel

Many times, personnel searches will be requiredto ensure the safety and security of operations.When performing a personnel search—

• Extend proper respect to the person detained. The aim is to provide security without creatinganimosities which can be exploited in the future.

• Immobilize the person detained in a position of disadvantage.

• Always work from behind the detainee. • Employ two searchers, one to cover while the

other searches.The quick-body search, or frisk, and the detailed

body search are the two types of personnelsearches.

QUICK-BODY SEARCH OR FRISKThis type of search is used most often by base

defenders. The quick-body search is a preliminarysearch to detect weapons in low threat areas.Follow the logical sequence from top to toe. Ifpossible, use a metal detection system. Be sure tocarefully check—

Hair.Armpits.Inside legs.Half-clenched hands.Medical dressings.Bags or cases.Walking sticks,Shoes, boots.

umbrellas, crutches.

B-2

DETAILED BODY SEARCHThis type of body search is best left to law

enforcement officials. A special room or areashould be set aside. A medic and a female should beavailable to assist with the searches.

BuildingsPlanning for search operations should include—

• • • • • •

The reason for the search.Team composition.Order of priority.Team tasking and specialist tasking.Damage limitation.Expected assistance and guards or escorts.

When preparing to search buildings, use radios(search net and command net) and call signs forteams and specialists. Use grid references forlocation of teams, control points, andheadquarters.In addition, consider electroniccountermeasure constraints.

Assume that any unoccupied house or buildingis booby-trapped. Visually scan the exterior forsuspicious signs. Set up a command post outsideand detail one pair of searchers to make the initialentry. Avoid the obvious entryways. If possible,use holes in walls or roofs as entryways. If youmust use doors and windows, check for boobytraps before entering. Traps can be activated inmany ways. Clearly mark with white tape theroutes through the building which have beencleared of traps. Once the building is cleared oftraps, the team leader will make a plan andallocate pairs of searchers to make detailed roomsearches. Figure B-2, shown on the next page, listscommon booby traps.

Explosive detector dogs can be used to search forarms, ammunition, explosive caches in buildings,vehicles, open areas, and routes to be cleared.However, dog teams do not work in buildings thathave not been cleared of booby traps. Handlersmust never touch materials the dogs haveindicated are explosive. Figure B-3, shown on thenext page, is a list of do’s and don’ts for troopsdiscovering unexploded devices or arriving at thescene of an explosion.

AMBUSHESLike patrolling, setting ambushes demands

patience, skill, and outstanding soldiering ability.Planned ambushes are primarily defensive.

B-3

Urban ambushes are intended to arrest a wantedperson or persons,not to kill them. Urbanambushes are always more difficult than combatambushes because of the concentration ofcivilians.

It may not be possible to site an ambush in atactically sound position. Sites such as houseswhere wanted people are gathering may have to beused. Information about enemy movements isessential. Planners must know the routinemovement patterns of local inhabitants and havean intimate knowledge of area terrain.

Terrorist bombings or bomb threats may beintended to draw security forces away fromprotected assets into an area as targets for ashooting ambush. Therefore, security forces mustalways be cautious.

RESPONSE TO ATTACKSWhen responding to an attack from an urban

area, defenders must try to kill or captureassailants while keeping the base secure. Inaddition, they must consider local use-of-forcerequirements. During immediate follow-up, theymust also consider— • •

•

• • • • • •

Returning fire according to ROE.Submitting a contact report, including thelocation, number of casualties, and estimate ofopposition.Dispatching a fire team to engage theopposition force.Estimating the civilian situation.Establishing roadblocks on likely escape routes.Deploying cordon sentries as necessary.Alerting local authorities.Recovering and aiding hostages, if necessary.Securing the scene for collection of evidence ifyou can--establish a firing point.

CROWD CONTROLCrowd violence may be a spontaneous emotional

eruption, or it may be a planned event. In the lattercase, the purpose may be to draw attention awayfrom something else or to draw people to a locationwhere attack is easier. Crowd violence mayinvolve civilian group interaction. Mob violence ishighly contagious. The aim of riot control is torestore order as quickly as possible with aminimum of force and return control to civilianauthorities as quickly as possible. HN policeagencies should assume principal responsibility

B-4

for countering actions of indigenous personnel. USforces should come into direct conflict withindigenous personnel only in emergencysituations when HN police or military personnelare not present.

The best way to disperse rioters is to make keyarrests and make it clear that further rioting willresult in physical discomfort to lawbreakers.Leave an escape route open to allow rioters to

SECTION II

disperse. The HN police force must assist. Once thecrowd has dispersed and all is quiet, return thetroops to the assembly or base area. Exert cautionnot to escalate the violence by misuse of force. Useof chemical agents such as tear gas for riot controlmust follow stated national policy and HNagreements. Close coordination with legal counseland US diplomatic missions is vital to thesuccessful conclusion of such hostilities.

Uni t Secur i t y

The threat to unit security exists throughout adeployment whether personnel are on liberty, leave, or pass;in transit; on training exercises; or on operations.Commanders must include security in their guidance anddeter or create an obvious risk for terrorists througheffective security programs. The operations section shouldcoordinate al l securi ty act ions. The fol lowingpredeployment, deployment, and redeploymentconsiderations are relevant factors in ensuring unitsecurity.

PREDEPLOYMENTFit, alert, and well-trained soldiers are the best

protection against the threat in any conflict.Expand tactical thinking to include securityagainst terrorism.Include security againstinsurgency and terrorism in all orders, plans, andtraining. The following predeploymentconsiderations are relevant factors inimplementing unit security.

PlanningEnsure all personnel are prepared for overseas

movement—verify immunizationsand giveinstruction on the appropriate preventivemedicine tasks.

MISSION ANALYSISTo perform a mission analysis, ask the following

questions:• How can the mission be adversely affected by

insurgent or terrorist attack?• What are the security aspects of both specified

and implied tasks?Continue to review unit vulnerability throughoutpredeployment, deployment, and redeployment(see Appendix D).

THREAT ASSESSMENTIdentify insurgent and terrorist groups

operating in the deployment area. Develop a list ofPIRs (see Chapter 4), to include—

• Methods of operation. • Attack methodology. • Preattack indicators. Identify sources of information on insurgent

and terrorist groups. Know how to access thesesources quickly and routinely. Include threatassessment in intelligence estimates as acontinuing process.

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORTCONSIDERATIONS

To implement unit security, consider the CSSa r e a s b e l o w.

SupplyProcure special security equipment such as

detectors, portable barriers, and intrusion devices(see Appendix C). Protect storage and distributionareas.

B-5

MaintenanceMaintain special equipment and provide

security of maintenance unit if separate from themain body.

TransportationProvide security during movement and in

staging areas and provide liaison with securityagencies such as MP movement control centers.

EngineerProvide security and ADC measures (strong

points, barriers, obstacles, reinforcement, clearingconstruction) and special engineer equipment (seeAppendix C).

Base Military or Security PoliceCheck, inspect, and improve unit physical

security. Identifying what is wrong is not enough;doing something about it is the key. Provideliaison with local police and security personnel, asource of intelligence that must be tapped. Assistin security planning and training. Ensure allpersonnel know what to do and why. Screencivilian employees. Be continuously cautious ofHN employees, no matter how loyal they appear tobe.

Civilian EmployeesIf possible, avoid employing civilians. If they are

employed, establish special security procedures forscreening and monitoring them.

Fiscal NeedsIn some environments, inconspicuous rental

cars may be an operational necessity. Fundingshould be a planning consideration. Considerrandom exchanges the rental agency is not awareof. Do not take what they offer you. Randomlyselect from their fleet of vehicles. Also in manycountries, a fee for information is expected whencollecting intelligence data.

Health Services SupportEnsure security of medical facilities, secure

supplies and equipment, and safeguard patientsduring movement.

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONSTo implement unit security, consider the

operational areas below.

Unit PlansInclude security in every plan and standing

operating procedures (SOP), operations orders(OPORDs), movement orders.

Security PlansPrepare and continuously review and update

specific security plans such as physical securityplans and individual security plans.

ProgramsDevelop specific security programs: threat

awareness,OPSEC (see Section III of thisappendix).

Special SkillsTo counter the terrorist threat, special skills not

normally found in the unit may be required:linguists, foreign area specialists, EOD specialists,and PA specialists. Some of these will need to beincluded in advanced parties. See Figure D-9.

Special TeamsThe terrorist threat may require a task

organization that would not normally beconsidered (search teams, special reaction teams,protective service teams). See Figure D-10.

Command RelationshipsCommand relationships (State Department,

host nation, country team) may differ from theroutine relationships.Command relationshipsbetween the advance party and other agenciesneed to be resolved before deployment.

TrainingConsider the following training:• Institutional training (specialized skills

instructor qualification, evasive driving,physical security, protective services).

• Individual training (threat awareness,additional weapon familiarization, searchtechniques, roadblocks, sentry duties, refresh-ment of basic soldier skills).

• Collective training (include terrorist play in allexercises, Marine Corps Combat and ReadinessEvaluation System [MCCRES], Army Trainingand Evaluation Program mission trainingplan [AMTP], and USAF major command[MAJCOM] or local operation readinessinspections [ORIs]).

• Training support (training tapes, war games,correspondence courses, tactical exerciseswithout troops).

B-6

Transit to Deployment AreaConsider the following overall security of the

unit throughout the entire movement: • • • •

•

Command, control, and communication.Emergency action procedures.Alternative routes or diversions.Organic protection parties with eachmovement element.En route planning and training. Includesecurity briefings and training in normal enroute procedures.Immediately update theintelligence threat assessment prior to arrival.

DEPLOYMENTAdvance Parties

COMPOSITIONConsider additional personnel necessary for

security or liaison with HN security agencies suchas military or security police protective serviceteams, public affairs officer, foreign areaspecialists, linguists, additional intelligence forterrorism. For advance party deployment,consider whether it should be standard or lowprofile (uniform or plain clothes, military or civiltransport, reception party or not).

PRIORITY INTELLIGENCEREQUIREMENTS

Validate mission and PIRs by asking if theterrorist threat seen from in country affects ourability to accomplish our mission and if thecountry team perceives our mission as we do. Afterthe PIRs are validated, review them and verifyplanned ROE.

OPERATIONS SECURITYIf possible, avoid advertising the time and place

of main body arrival; if unavoidable, increasesecurity. Avoid establishing patterns of behavioror operation for advance party and main body.Establish secure communications with main body.

Liberty, Leave, and PassMaintain a low profile, both unit and individual.

Coordinate with local authorities on securitymeasures in the liberty and leave area. Providetroop information and threat briefings to militarypersonnel before they depart on liberty and leave.Establish individual security measures forpersonnel on liberty and leave. Provide security forbilleting or assembly areas (ships in port, hotels,HN accommodations, aircraft). Provide security

during transit to liberty and leave areas. Do notforget security for morale support activities.

Training ExercisesDetermine the threat assessment to the exercise

or training area. Coordinate with security forcesdesignated to protect exercise forces (militarypolice, HN forces,exercise-directing staffs). Ifnecessary, dedicate part of the unit to security viceexercise participation (counterintelligence team,guards, sentries, traffic controller). If possibleavoid likely target areas (populated areas, heavilyused routes). Avoid creating lucrative targets(troop concentrations, motor pools, large staticlogistics installations). Remain alert duringnontactical phases. Consider separate securitycommunications. Emphasize terrorist threatsbefore and during the exercise.

Transit Within the Deployment AreaPerform continuous threat assessments along

routes for each movement. Include security in allmovement orders (rail, road convoy, sea, air).Provide security at departure and arrival points(ports, airfields, assembly areas, railway stations).Employ security forces with quick-reactioncapabilities during transit. Establish liaison andcoordinate with all security agencies along theroute.

Operational ContingenciesFACTORS WHICH CAN DEGRADESECURITY

The following factors can degrade security: •

•

•

•

•

Required access to VIPs, media representatives(see Chapter 5), and drain on the commander’stime.An established routine or pattern of life (changeof guards, formation, time of reveille, meals).Inability to restrict access (main roads passingthrough the position).Inability to choose unit location based onsecurity considerations.Restrictions on the employment of securityforces (inability to patrol or establish obser-vation posts, intelligence collection).Required presence of nonunit personnel(civilian employees, vendors, contractors).Inadequate coordination or liaison (intelligencesharing, disclosure of security measures, localpolice and armed forces).

B-7

•

MEASURES THAT CAN ENHANCESECURITY

The following measures can enhance security: •

•

•

•

•

Continually reassessing the mission, changein national policy, threat, attitude of the locals.Using table of organization and equipment(TOE) and specialized security equipmentsuch as closed circuit TV, detection devices,sensors, lighting, barriers, and barricades (seeAppendix C).Assigning physical security responsibilities tospecial staff personnel who are trainedphysical security officers.Knowing applicable regulations (guard orders,ROE, local restrictions).Being aware of training and the troop infor-mation program.Organizing unit positions by providing gooddefensive and barrier plans, dispersing highvalue targets (HVTs) away from access roadsand perimeter fences.Maintaining a low profile (restricting libertyand leave parties).Restricting access of unassigned personnel(media, visitors) to the unit location, permittinga minimum number of vehicles within theperimeters, parking away from buildings, andrequiring stringent identification checks.Exhibiting an image of professionalism and

•

•

•

•readiness.

REDEPLOYMENTAdvance Parties

Maintain security alert and awareness until allof the unit has returned to base. Develop PIRs forreturn to home base.

SECTION III

Reverse DeploymentConsider the security of the port of entry and

lines of communication for the return trip.Consider whether the mission has changed thesituation at home. An unpopular political decisionmay expose the unit to a threat upon its return tothe US. Adopt the same type of security measuresused during transit to, and movement within, thedeployment area (movement orders, security ofports, airfields, railway stations). Coordinatereaction capabilities with security agencies alongthe route.

Public Affairs PolicyRelease a maximum amount of information to

the media with a minimum amount of delay.Information released should fall within thelimitations of OPSEC. Brief troops regardingrelease of information to outside agencies. Stressthat release is to be made by authorized publicaffairs personnel only.

Trainer’s DebriefingBrief personnel to reorient them for the return to

the US. Do not overlook inspection proceduresaimed at recovering maps, souvenirs, ordnance,weapons, or other contraband.

After-Action ReportProvide lessons learned on security to

appropriate authorities as part of the report.Remember to include terrorism counteractionitems in the report.

Operations SecurityThroughout base defense planning, preparation, and

execution, defenders must make every effort to maintainsecurity. OPSEC is an integral part of planning andconducting base defense training and day-to-dayoperations at all levels of command.

The OPSEC program is designed to deny access tointelligence and information which the threat can use tolearn about plans and operations. The program consistsof—

• Continuous estimation of the threat.• Training in measures to deny an enemy information.• Supervision, evaluation, and corrective action.

B-8

OBJECTIVESOPSEC objectives are—• To avoid stereotyped operations. • To understand methods threat forces use to

collect intelligence.• To deny intelligence and information to the

enemy.• To integrate OPSEC into physical and

personnel security and protection programs.OPSEC requires close coordination between the

operations officer, who provides staff cognizance,and the intelligence officer, who—

•

• Estimates the threat.• Is responsible for counterintelligence. • Determines unit vulnerabilities (see Figure B-4).• Identifies exploitable sources of information. • Recommends countermeasures.

MEASURESDefenders must—• Develop essential elements of friendly infor-

mation (EEFI) on those items and activities ofplanning and operations that terrorists canuse.

• Develop a counterrecon plan by determining the assets that the threat is likely to reconnoiter,their locations, and their physical destruction.

• Vary locations such as patrol routes, checkpoints, and sentry or guard positions; varyschedules for activities such as patrols,meetings, meals, religious services, sentryrelief, and resupply. -

• •

•

•

Use perimeter and internal protective barriers.Check the identification of everyone enteringor leaving the base or perimeter.Use additional security for restricted areassuch as communication posts, communicationcenters, motor parks, high-density troop areas.Control itineraries and schedules of VIPs andhigh-risk personnel.Locate dismount points and parking areasaway from buildings, preferably at sites wherethey cannot be observed from outside the base.

INTELLIGENCE INDICATORSInsurgents or terrorists might use indicators

such as those below to gather intelligence on a unit.Operational indicators could include—• Troops restricted to the post before a move or

an operation.• Increased patrolling and air recon. • No patrolling at all.• Increased movement between locations

caused by task organizations prior to anoperation.

• Special requisitions to increase rations,transport, ammunition.

HUMINT indicators could include—• Newspaper or other media coverage. • Farewells and last-minute visits by VIPs or

senior officers.• Church services the night before an operation.

B-9

•

•

•

Bulletins announcing that enforced rest isrequired or that dispensary hours are changed.Public signs announcing changes in proceduressuch as restricting civilian travel or access.Photographs developed by local contractorsshowing in-camp scenes and preparations.

•

•

B-10

Communication indicators could include—Changed call signs and frequencies prior to anoperation.New aerials that suggest repositioned auxiliarycommunication equipment.

APPENDIX C

SPECIALIZED EQUIPMENT AND MATERIEL

The following lists of equipment and materiel specific tojoint base defense are not all inclusive. Base mission, threat,and environment may dictate other requirements.

Pyrotechnic pistolsRiot gunsTear gas launchersTear gas grenades (exploding

rather than canister)Hand-held flashlightsRiot helmetsShields (3 feet 6 inches)Police batonsHandcuffs and flexicuffsBody armorLeg armorBinocularsMarshaling wandsTelescopes and tripodsInfrared devicesListening devicesLoudspeakersFire extinguishersCameras with flash

attachments and tripodsTelescopic sightsPhotographic filtersPolaroid camerasWhistles

Portable lamps, lightsTraffic signsLightweight barriersSteel cableConcertina wire

GENERALHand-held radios (for use in

urban areas)DefoliantGrass cutting equipmentTactical deception equipment

(camouflage nets, falsestructures and equipment,false fencing)

Vehicle intrusion alarmsManuals on threat and

personal protectionManuals on locale, people,

and customsMedical equipment (to

include litters andequipment for combatlifesavers)

Tactical maps: If 1:50,000standard maps are notavailable. The DefenseMapping Agency must betasked to develop tacticalmaps from the base centerout to 35 kilometers atminimum. Procedures formap development must becoordinated to be done assoon as possible, if notimmediately.

Ground surveillanceequipment

Forward looking infraredradar (available in someaircraft)

Trip flaresNight vision devicesIR spotlights and gogglesFire fighting equipmentHigh pressure hoses and

equipmentClosed circuit television

(CCTV) cameraLow light level CCTV

camera

ROADBLOCKS AND GATESMarker lights Traffic conesVisor sleeves Tire puncture chainsMirrors Portable and stationaryBadge system at all metal detectors

entry points

C-1

LaddersWrecking barsTelescopic mirrorsMine markersWhite tapeMeasuring tapeKnives

Explosive detectorsRemote light unitsRemote controlled

EOD devicesVideo periscopesEndoscopesEngineer heavy

equipment

Portable sensorsPortable alarmsPortable lighting systemsBarriers (drop arm, swing

arm, and counterbalance)Roadblock equipment for exit

and entry controlCCTVShot direction indicatorWire (barbed, concertina)

Mine sweeping equipmentDiving equipmentUnderwater demolition

equipment

SEARCHESSafety harnesses Picks, shovelsFlashlights MagnetsHand tools (hammers, pliers, Axes

screwdrivers) HelmetsMine detectors Eye shieldsMetal cutting tools ChiselsSaws Mine probes

SPECIALISTSConcrete mixers EOD equipmentPortable compressors Guard dogsHydraulic platform Patrol dogsEngineer tractors EOD dogsPlatform hoistsCommand destruct

munitions—(thermite grenades)8

STATIC DEFENSE (ENGINEERS)Wire nettingCorrugated ironFencingSteel girdersScaffoldingMines (antivehicle,

antipersonnel)Piping for personnel turnstileVideo monitoring system

PORTSPercussion grenadesSpecial warfare swimmer

qualified personnelPatrol boats (Zodiac, F-470)

Duress signal systems atguard stations at EOC(doorbell, radio)

Call to arms system (firealarm, loudspeakers)

SandbagsTelephone system and switch

backup energy sources (thatis, generators)

Water purification systemPSP matting

Sonar buoysAntisubmarine netsAntiswimmer netsMines

To obtain Navy ammunition for defense ortraining, bases need to submit requests for anallowance list consistent with armamentavailable. NAVSEAINST C8011.3A andNAVSEAINST 8011.2 apply.

8 Equipment under static defense applies.

C-2

APPENDIX D

TERRORISM

Terrorism is the unlawful use or threatened use of forceagainst individuals or property to coerce or intimidategovernments or societies, often to achieve political,religious, or ideological objectives. Terrorism involves acriminal act that is often symbolic and intended to influencean audience beyond the immediate victims. Combatingterrorism consists of taking actions to counter the terroristthreat both offensively and defensively.

UNIT VULNERABILITYCommanders should evaluate how vulnerable The questionions in Figure D-1 are not all-inclusive.

their units are to terrorist attack during Rather, they serve to suggest whether units aredeployment. Vulnerability changes as units susceptible. All negative answers do not guaranteechange locations, activities, and quarters and asthat the unit is safe from terrorist attacks.reinforcements are available or VIPs conductvisits. Thus, commanders need to update theirevaluations continually.

D–1

THREAT CONDITIONSAND RESPONSES

Warnings of terrorist activity against US baseswill normally come from US security authorities orthrough the security agencies of the HN. Warningsmay come from local police or even from terroristorganizations themselves. In combating terrorism,bases should use common terroristTHREATENS, each with its measures andrequired responses.

Assessment FactorsCommanders of bases may declare a

THREATCON and take implementationmeasures upon receiving intelligence throughofficial sources or anonymous messages.THREATCONs are disseminated laterally andvertically to ensure all potentially affected areasare warned. To assess the nature of the threat,defenders use the factors in Figure D-2.

Many of the indicators in Figure D-3 may appearto be normal rights until put in context with otheractivities. They may then become indicators ofpotential violence.

Threat LevelsPositive evidence for any or all of the assessment

factors above requires an appropriateTHREATCON.

The following guidelines apply only in assessingterrorist threats against US or DOD interests.Each service may translate the THREATCONSinto a code applicable to its own forces. Localorders will include specific instructions on issuingweapons and live ammunition. These orders mustcomply with the policy of the US command oragency concerned. The detailed measures to be

D-2

D-3

adopted by US headquarters sharing facilitieswith HN organizations must be coordinated withthose organizations.For the measures andrequired actions for each THREATCON, seeFigure D-4.

THREATCON ALPHA: LOWExistence and capability are factors.

THREATCON Alpha applies if bases andpersonnel are subject to a general terrorist threat,the nature and extent of which are unpredictable.Such possibilities do not justify fullimplementation of the measures of THREATCONBravo. However, defenders may have toimplement selected measures from THREATCONBravo in response to intelligence received or as adeterrent. Defenders must be able to maintain themeasures in this THREATCON indefinitely.

THREATCON BRAVO: MEDIUMExistence and capability are factors. History or

trends must also be evident. Targeting of US orDOD interests is not evident. THREATCONBravo applies when an increased and morepredictable threat of terrorist activity exists.Defenders must be able to maintain the measures

in this THREATCON for weeks without causingundue hardship, without affecting operationalcapability, and without aggravating relationswith local authorities.

THREATCON CHARLIE: HIGHExistence, capability, trends, and targeting are

factors. Targeting is not specific or immediate.History may be a factor. THREATCON Charlieapplies when anincident occurs or whenintelligence indicates an imminent terrorist actionagainst bases and personnel. Implementationmeasures for more than a short period willprobably create hardship and will affect thepeacetime activities of the unit and its personnel.

THREATCON DELTA: IMMINENTExistence, capability, immediate and specific

targeting of US or DOD interests, and trends arefactors. History may be a factor. THREATCONDelta applies in the immediate area after aterrorist attack or when intelligence indicates alikely threat against a specific location or person.THREATCON Delta is a rare assessment,normally issued as a localized warning.

D-4

D-5

BASE TERRORISM RESPONSEThe commander of the base has operationalSee the base terrorism response model for

control of base resources during a- terroristincident. Necessary actions, however, aretypically planned, coordinated, and directed by anEOC, which is activated immediately whenterrorist incidents occur.

Emergency Operations CenterThe EOC is subordinate to the BDOC. The EOC

is an on-scene command post for the BDOC. TheEOC exerts operating control over the forces

command and control in Figure D-5. It shows therelationship of the EOC to subordinate threatresponse activities.

Once the BDOC is established, then itcoordinates with higher, lower, and adjacentmilitary headquarters and organizations. Forplanning considerations and measures forcombating terrorism on military bases,commanders and staffs must refer to their

assigned to it and directs the military response.individual service publications.

D-6

Crisis Management Team. THREAT MANAGEMENT FORCE.The crisis management team (CMT) is composed The threat management force (TMF) is the

of selected representatives from the base staff.tactical element of the EOC. The TMF commanderThis team assists the commander in controllinghas operational control of all base military forcesthe incident. The CMT consists of the— at the incident site. The TMF is composed of-

• Provost marshal (PM), senior MP, or securitypolice (SP) commander.

• G1 (personnel).• G2 (intelligence).• G3 (operations). • G4 (logistics).• Staff judge advocate.• Public affairs officer.• Psychological operations officer. • Civil affairs officer.• Engineer. • Country team representative. • Medical staff officer.• Communications officer.

• Special reaction teams which isolate andcontain the incident, report information,rescue hostages and nonparticipants, andassault terrorist positions (see Figures D-9 andD-10). Teams perform rescue and assaultmissions only under special circumstances orwhen a more qualified force is not available.

• Inner and outer perimeter elements that secure the incident site, control access to the area,and provide security to the remainder of theinstallation (Figure D-6).

• Hostage negotiation teams trained to conduct direct communication with the terrorists.Negotiations are conducted to further developthe situation for key decision makers.

D-7

The typical military response on bases outside • Phase III, the highest level of response bythe US consists of three phases: specially trained forces.

• Phase I, the initial response by base law Figure D-7 shows a special threat decision modelenforcement, other military resources, and HN for these three response phases to terroristlaw enforcement agencies. incidents. Figure D-8 shows the alert notification

• Phase II, an enhanced response by other in-process for terrorist incidents on overseas bases.country US military forces or HN forces.

D-8

D-9

Special Skills and Special TeamsOnce a terrorist situation has developed, specialpage D-6 on Emergency Operations Center).

considerations, tactics, and coordination areFigures D-9 and D-10 list additional special skillsnecessary. Given the unique threat that terrorismand special teams that may be needed to react toposes and the worldwide attention it brings, USterrorist incidents.forces require specific handling (see paragraph on

D-10

GLOSSARYACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AADCABGD

ADCAFMAFR

AMTP

AO

BDOC

C2

C2

C3

C3I

CACCD

CCTVCDACDF

CEOI

CGSC

CICINCCMCCMT

COMMZCONUS

CSS

DADCSOPS

DODDOJ

DSDZ

area air defense commanderair base ground defensearea damage controlAir Force manualAir Force regulationArmy Training and EvaluationProgram mission training planarea of operation

base defense operations center

command and controlintelligence officer at acombined headquarterscommand, control, andcommunicationscommand, control,communications, andintelligencecivil affairscamouflage, concealment, anddeceptionclosed circuit televisionclose defense areaclose defense forcecommunications-electronicsoperation instructionsCommand and General StaffCollegecounterintelligencecommander in chiefcommandant, Marine Corpscrisis management teamcommunications zonecontinental United Statescombat service support

Department of the Armydeputy chief of staff foroperations and plans, G5Department of DefenseDepartment of Justicedirect supportdrop zone

ECMEEFI

EOCEODESTEW

FBIFLIR

FMFMFM

FORSCOMFOUO

FSE

G1

G2

G3

G4GO

GSR

HEATHN

HNSHQ

HQMCHUMINT

HVT

IFFIMINT

IPB

IR

J2

J3

electronic countermeasureessential elements of friendlyinformationemergency operations centerexplosive ordnance disposalemergency service teamelectronic warfare

Federal Bureau of Investigationforward-looking infrared radarfield manualfleet marine force manualLJS Army Forces Commandfor official use onlyfire support element

assistant chief of staff,personnelassistant chief of staff,intelligenceassistant chief of staff,operations and plansassistant chief of staff, logisticsgeneral officerground surveillance radar

high explosive, antitankhost nationhost-nation supportheadquartersHeadquarters, Marine Corpshuman intelligencehigh value targets

identification, friend or foeimagery intelligenceintelligence preparation of thebattlefieldinfrared

intelligence directorate at ajoint headquartersoperations directorate at a jointheadquarters

Glossary-1

J4 logistics directorate at ajointheadquartersplans and policy directorate atajoint headquarterscommunications-electronicsdirectorate ata jointheadquarters

ODCOH

OIC

office of defense cooperationoperational handbookofficer in charge OP observationpostoperational controloperation planoperation orderoperational reportoperations securityoperation readiness inspectionpublic affairspamphletpublic affairs officerpriority intelligence requirementprovost marshalpoint of contactperforated steel platepsychological operationspublicationprisoner of war

J5

J6 OPCONOPLANOPORDOPREPOPSEC

ORIPA

pamPAOPIRPM

POCPSP

PSYOPpubPW

joint base defenseJoint Chiefs of Staffjoint task force

JBDJCSJTF

kilometerkmland amphibious vehiclelow-intensity conflict

LAVLIC

LOCLPLZ

line of communicationlistening postlanding zone

military assistance advisorygroupMarine Corps Combat andReadiness Evaluation System

MAAG

MCCRES

main defense areaMDAMDF

METT-TRADC regional air defense commanderROE rules of engagement

main defense forcemission, enemy, terrain, troops,and time available

SAOSF

SFASIGINT

SOFSOFA

SOPSP

SRT

security assistance organizationscreening forcescreening force areasignal intelligencespecial operations forcesstatus-of-forces agreementstanding operating proceduresecurity policespecial reaction team

mission-oriented protectiveposture

MOPP

military occupational specialityMOSMPH

MPMR

miles per hourmilitary policemobile reserve

naval sea instructionnuclear, biological, chemicalnational command authoritynoncommissioned officernoncommissioned officer inchargenet control stationnight observation devicenight vision goggles

NAVSEAINSTNBCNCANCO

NCOICTAC US Air Force Tactical Air

Commandtactical aircraftTACAIR

TACPTC

TCFTHREATCON

TMFTOE

NCSNODNVG

tactical air control partytraining circulartactical combat forcethreat conditionobservation and fields of fire,

cover and concealment,obstacles and movement, keyterrain, and avenues ofapproachoutside continental UnitedStates

OCOKAthreat management forcetable of organization andequipmentUS Army Training andDoctrine Command

TRADOCOCONUS

Glossary-2

TV televisionTVT television tape

UNAAF Unified Action Armed ForcesUS United States

USA US ArmyUSAF US Air Force

TERMSbase command

An area containing a military base or group of suchbases organized under one commander (JCSPub 1-02).

civil affairsThose activities conducted during peace and warthat facilitate relationships between US forces, civilauthorities, and people of the nation in which theUS military forces are operating (TRADOCPam 525-44).

civil warAn internal conflict which meets the followingcriteria:1.2.3.

4.

5.

The insurgents occupy and control territory.The insurgents have a functioning government.Other states offer some type of recognition to theinsurgent government and define their attitudetoward the conflict.The insurgents have armed forces which arecommanded by a person responsible for theiractions, carry their arms openly, wear adistinctive emblem, and conduct their operationsin accordance with the laws of war.A state of general hostilities accompanied by amilitary confrontation of major proportions istaking place. (FM 100-20)

combating terrorismActions, including antiterrorism (defensivemeasures taken to reduce vulnerability to terroristacts) and counterterrorism (offensive measurestaken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism),taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entirethreat spectrum (JCS Pub 1-02).

command1. The authority that a commander in the military

service lawfully exercises over subordinates byvirtue of rank or assignment. Command includesthe authority and responsibility for effectivelyusing available resources and for planning theemployment of, organizing, directing,coordinating, and controlling military forces for

USMC US Marine CorpsUSN US Navy

USSR Union of Soviet SocialistRepublics

VIP very important personVP vulnerable point

2.

3.

4.

the accomplishment of assigned missions. It alsoincludes responsibility for health, welfare,morale, and discipline of assigned personnel.An order given by a commander; that is, the willof the commander expressed for the purpose ofbringing about a particular action.A unit or units, an organization, or an area underthe command of one individual.To dominate by a field of weapon fire or byobservation from a superior position (JCSPub 1-02).

counterguerrilla warfareOperations and activities conducted by armedforces, paramilitary forces, or nonmilitary agenciesagainst guerrillas (JCS Pub 1-02).

counterinsurgencyThose military, paramilitary, political, economic,psychological, and civic actions taken by agovernment to defeat insurgency (JCS Pub 1-02).

counterintelligenceThose activities which are concerned withidentifying and counteracting the threat to securityposed by hostile intelligence services ororganizations or by individuals engaged inespionage, sabotage, or subversion (JCS Pub 1-02).

crisis management teamA team found at a major command or installationlevel concerned with plans, procedures, techniques,policies, and controls for dealing with terrorism,special threats, or other major disruptions occurringon government installations or facilities. The teamconsiders the local, national, and internationalimplications of major disruptions and establishescontact with the appropriate operations center asthe situation escalates, requiring higher levelinvolvement and guidance.Normally atinstallation level, the CMT is established at or inproximity to the designated emergency operationscenter.

Glossary-3

defenseDefense is normally an incremental response toperceived threats. As the threat increases, so doesthe level of defense. Hopefully, increases occur wellahead of an actual attack. Defense is a balanced andcoordinated effort by all forces assigned to a site todefeat an attacker and prevent it from achieving itsobjectives.

developing nationSometimes referred to as a less developed country, adeveloping nation is a nation that is progressingbeyond a traditional society and is experiencing theturbulent process of economic, social, military,political, and psychological change (FM 100-20).

foreign internal defenseParticipation by civilian and military agencies of agovernment in any of the action programs taken byanother government to free and protect its societyfrom subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency (JCSPub 1-02).

foreign military salesThat portion of United States security assistanceauthorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, asamended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976,as amended. This assistance differs from theMilitary Assistance Program and the InternationalMilitary Education and Training Program in thatthe recipient provides reimbursement for defensearticles and services transferred (JCS Pub 1-02).

guerrilla warfareMilitary and paramilitary operations conducted inenemy held or hostile territory by irregular,predominantly indigenous forces (JCS Pub 1-02).

host nationA nation in which representatives or organizationsof another state are present because of governmentinvitation or international agreement.

human intelligenceA category of intelligence derived from informationcollected and provided by human sources. Alsocalled HUMINT (JCS Pub 1-02).

insurgencyAn organized movement aimed at the overthrow ofa constituted government through use of subversionand armed conflict (JCS Pub 1-02).

intelligenceThe product resulting from the collection,processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, andinterpretation of available information concerningforeign countries or areas (JCS Pub 1-02).

internal defenseThe full range of measures taken by a governmentto free and protect its society from subversion,lawlessness, and insurgency (JCS Pub 1-02).

internal developmentActions taken by a nation to promote its growth bybuilding viable institutions (political, military,economic, and social) that respond to the needs of itssociety (JCS Pub 1-02).

joint baseA locality from which operations of two or more ofthe armed forces of the Department of Defense areprojected or supported and which is manned bysignificant elements of two or more services or inwhich significant elements of two or more servicesare located (JCS Pub 1-02).

low-intensity conflictA limited politico-military struggle to achievepolitical, social, economic, or psychologicalobjectives. It is often protracted and ranges fromdiplomatic, economic, and psychosocial pressuresthrough terrorism and insurgency. Low-intensityconflict is generally confined to a geographic areaand is often characterized by constraints on theweaponry, tactics, and level of violence. Also calledLIC (approved definition for JCS Pub 1-02).

military assistance advisory groupA joint service group, normally under the militarycommand of a commander of a unified commandand representing the Secretary of Defense, whichprimarily administers the US military assistanceplanning and programming in the host country.Also called MAAG (JCS Pub 1-02).

Military Assistance ProgramThat portion of the US security assistanceauthorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, asamended, which provides defense articles andservices to recipients on a nonreimbursable (grant)basis (JCS Pub 1-02).

military civic actionThe use of preponderantly indigenous militaryforces on projects useful to the local population at alllevels in such fields as education, training, publicworks, agriculture, transportation, communica-tions, health, sanitation, and others contributing toeconomic and social development, which would alsoserve to improve the standing of the military forceswith the population (US forces may at times adviseor engage in military civic actions in overseas areas)(JCS Pub 1-02).

national command authorities (NCA)The president and the secretary of defense or theirduly deputized alternates or successors. Commonlyreferred to as NCA (JCS Pub 1-02).

operational controlOperational control includes directive authority forjoint training. Operational control should beexercised through the commanders of assigned

Glossary-4

normal organizational units or through thecommanders of subordinate forces established bythe commander exercising operational control.Operational control normally provides fullauthority to organize forces as the operationalcommander deems necessary to accomplishassigned missions and to retain or delegateoperational control or tactical control as necessary.Operational control may be limited by function,time, or location. It does not, of itself, include suchmatters as administration, discipline, internalorganization, and unit training. Also calledOPCOM (JCS Pub 1-02).

operations securityThe protection of military operations and activitiesresulting from the identification and subsequentelimination or control of intelligence indicators(vulnerabilities) which are susceptible to hostileexploitation. The principal elements of an OPSECprogram are physical security, informationsecurity, signal security, and military deception.

paramilitary forcesForces or groups which are distinct from the regulararmed forces of any country, but resembling them inorganization, equipment, training, or mission (JCSPub 1-02).

peacekeeping operationsMilitary operations conducted in support ofdiplomatic efforts to achieve, restore, or maintainpeace in areas of potential or actual conflict(TRADOC Pam 525-44).

peacetime contingency operationsPolitically sensitive military operations normallycharacterized by the short term rapid projection oremployment of forces in conditions short ofconventional war, for example, strike, raid, rescue,recovery, demonstration, show of force, unconven-tional warfare, and intelligence operations(TRADOC Pam 525-44).

propagandaAny form of communication in support of nationalobjectives designed to influence the opinions,emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group inorder to benefit the sponsor, either directly orindirectly (JCS Pub 1-02).

psychological operationsPlanned psychological activities in peace and wardirected to enemy, friendly, and neutral audiencesin order to influence attitudes and behavioraffecting the achievement of political and militaryobjectives. They include strategic psychologicalactivities, consolidation, psychological operationsand battlefield psychological activities (JCSPub 1-02).

sabotageAn actor acts with intent to injure, interfere with, orobstruct the national defense of a country bywillfully injuring or destroying, or attempting toinjure or destroy, any national defense or warmaterial, premises, or utilities, to include humanand natural resources (JCS Pub 1-02).

security assistanceGroup of programs authorized by the ForeignAssistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the ArmsExport Control Act of 1976, as amended, or otherrelated statutes by which the United States providesdefense articles, military training, and otherdefense-related services by grant, credit, or cashsales in furtherance of national policies andobjectives (JCS Pub 1-02).

security assistance organizationThis term encompasses all DOD elements located ina foreign country with assigned responsibilities forcarrying out security assistance managementfunctions. For instance, it includes militaryassistance advisory groups, military missions andgroups, offices of defense/military cooperation,liaison groups, and defense attache personneldesignated to perform security assistance functions(TRADOC Pam 525-44).

SeabeeA member of one of the US Navy constructionbattalions for building naval shore facilities incombat zones.

special reaction teamA specially trained team of military or securitypersonnel armed and equipped to isolate, contain,gather information for, and, if necessary, neutralizea specific threat.

spetsnazSoviet special operations forces.

status-of-forces agreementAn international agreement which determines thestatus of an armed force while serving on theterritory of another sovereign country also a partyto that agreement, gives these forces a standardlegal treatment wherever they happen to be, andsolves practically all of the legal problems raised bythe presence of foreign forces abroad.

subversive activityAnyone lending aid, comfort, and moral support toindividuals, groups, or organizations that advocatethe overthrow of incumbent governments by forceand violence is subversive and is engaged insubversive activity. All willful acts that areintended to be detrimental to the best interests of thegovernment and that do not fall into the categories

Glossary-5

of treason, sedition, sabotage, or espionage will beplaced in the category of subversive activity (JCSPub 1-02).

strategic intelligenceIntelligence that is required for the formation ofpolicy and military plans at national andinternational levels. Strategic intelligence andtactical intelligence differ primarily in level ofapplication but also vary in terms of scope anddetail (JCS Pub 1-02).

tactical intelligenceIntelligence which is required for the planning andconduct of tactical operations. Tactical intelligenceand strategic intelligence differ primarily in level ofapplication but may also vary in terms of scope anddetail (JCS Pub 1-02).

terrorismThe unlawful use or threatened use of force orviolence against individuals or property to coerce orintimidate governments or societies, often toachieve political, religious or ideological objectives(approved definition for JCS Pub 1-02).

unconventional warfareA broad spectrum of military and paramilitaryoperations conducted in enemy-held, enemy-controlled, or politically sensitive territory.Unconventional warfare includes, but is not limitedto, the interrelated fields of guerrilla warfare,evasion and escape,subversion, sabotage, andother operations of a low visibility, covert, orclandestine nature. These interrelated aspects ofunconventional warfare may be prosecuted singlyor collectively by predominantly indigenouspersonnel, usually supported and directed invarying degrees by (an) external source(s) during allconditions of war or peace (JCS Pub 1-02).

United States country teamThe senior, in-country, United States coordinatingand supervising body, headed by the chief of theUnited States diplomatic mission, usually anambassador, and composed of the senior member ofeach represented United States department oragency (JCS Pub 1-02).

Glossary-6

REFERENCES

ARMY PUBLICATIONSArmored and Mechanized Division Operations. FM 71-100.

20 September 1978.Camouflage. FM 5-20, 20 May 1968.Civil Disturbances. FM 19-15. 25 November 1985.Counterguerrilla Operations. FM 90-8. 29 August 1986.Countering Terrorism on US Army Installations, TC 19-16. 25 April 1983.Guard Duty. FM 22-6. 17 September 1971.An Infantryman’s Guide to Urban Combat. FM 90-10-1.

30 September 1982.The Infantry Platoon and Squad. FM 7-8. 31 December 1980.The Infantry Rifle Company. FM 7-10. 8 January 1982.Joint Operational Concept for Air Base Ground Defense. DA Pam 525-14.

15 July 1986.Larger Unit Operations. FM 100-15. 15 March 1974.Legal Guide for Commanders. FM 27-10. 12 June 1987.Low-Intensity Conflict. FM 100-20. 16 January 1981.Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT). FM 90-10.

15 August 1979.Military Police Support for the AirLand Battle. FM 19-1. 23 May 1988.Operations. FM 100-5. 5 May 1986.Physical Security. FM 19-30.1 March 1979.Rear Battle. FM 90-14. 10 June 1985.Survivability. FM 5-103. 10 June 1985.Terrorism Counteraction. FM 100-37. 24 July 1987.Treaties Governing Land Warfare. DA Pam 27-1. 7 December 1956.US Army Formal Schools Catalog. DA Pam 351-4. 23 October 1987.US Army Operational Concept for Low-Intensity Conflict. TRADOC

Pam 525-44. 10 February 1986.

MARINE CORPS PUBLICATIONSAdvanced Naval Base Defense. FMFM 8-3. 5 December 1978.Counterinsurgency Operations. FMFM 8-2. January 1980.Marine Rifle Company/Platoon. FMFM 6-4. February 1978.Terrorism Counteraction. OH 7-14. November 1985.

NAVY PUBLICATIONSAmmunition Allowance for Naval Ships, Ship-to-Shore Rotational Units

in Shore Stations. NAVSEAINST 8011.2. 11 July 1985.Physicsl Security and Loss Prevention Manual. OPNAVINST 5530.

14 Series. 16 September 1985.

References-1

Protection of Department of Navy Personnel and Resources AgainstTerrorist Attacks. OPNAVINST 3850.4 Series. 23 March 1984.

Small Arms Service Ammunition Allowance for Civilian and MilitarySecurity and Police Guards, Couriers, and Agents. NAVSEAINSTC8011.3A. 27 April 1984.

AIR FORCE PUBLICATIONSAir Base Camouflage Techniques. AFSC, AD/YQ. November 1984.Emergency Service Team Operations. AFM 125-7. October 1987.Executive Handbook on Terrorism, Security, Survival. November 1987.

May be ordered from HQ, USAF, Office of Special Investigations,Boiling AFB, Washington DC 20332.

Ground Defense of Main Operating Bases, Installations, and Activities.Volume 1. AFR 206-2. September 1983.

Installation Resources Protection Program. AFM 125-37. October 1987.Operations- Tactical Deception Program. AFR 55-49. September 1987.Security Police Handbook. AFR 125-3. January 1988.USAF Antiterrorism Program. AFR 208-1. January 1986.

JOINT AND MULTI-SERVICEPUBLICATIONS

Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.JCS Pub 1-02. 1 January 1986.

Joint Doctrine for Air Defense. JCS Pub 3-01.3. 23 May 1964.Joint Doctrine for Theater Counterair Operations. JCS Pub 3-01.2.

1 April 1986.Tactical Force Protection in LIC Operational Conflict. Center for Low

Intensity Conflict. 1 June 1988.10 United States Code, Uniform Code of Military Justice.Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF). JCS Pub 0-2. 1 December 1986.

References-2