FMFRP 12-41

ProfessionalKnowledgeGainedfromOperationalExperiencein

Vietnam,1967

U.S. Marine Corps

PCN 140 124100 00

DEPARTMENTOF THE NAVYHeadquartersUnitedStatesMarineCorps

Washington,DC 20380-0001

8 August 1989FOREWORD

1. PURPOSE

FleetMarineForce ReferencePublication(FMFRP)12-41,Professional

Knowledge Gained from Operational Experience in Vietnam, 1967, is pub-lishedto ensuretheretentionanddisseminationof usefulinformationwhichisnot intendedto becomedoctrineor to bepublishedin FleetMarineForcemanuals.FMFRPsin the 12Seriesare a specialcategoryof publications:reprintsof historicalworkswhichwerepublishedcommerciallyor by theU.S. GovernmentPrintingOfficeand are no longerin print.

2. SCOPE

Thisreferencepublicationcomplementsexistingtrainingmanualson small-unit tactics,patrolling,weapons,minesand boobytraps,and leadership.Writtenby a multitudeof Marinesduringthe VietnamWar, this volumeisanexcellentcompendiumof lessonsto belearnedfromtheMarineCorps’experiencein 1967.It is enthusiasticallyrecommendedto all junior offi-cers, SNCOS,and NCOSwho willprofit fromthe principlespresented.

3. CERTIFICATION

Reviewedand approvedthis date.

BYDIRECTIONOF THECOMMANDANTOFTHEMARINECORPS

M. P; SULLIVANMajor General,U.S. MarineCorps

DeputyCommanderfor WarfightingMarineCorps CombatDevelopmentCommand

Quantico,Virginia

DISTRIBUTION:“TL7”

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter Page

I MARINES IN VIETNAM - 1967III MAF Balanced Canlpaign,,,,..,.. 1Operations in the DMZ Region . . . . . 4Operations in the Nui Loc Son

Basin, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8Amphibious Operations of 7th

Fleetts Special Landing Forces. 11Small Unit Counterguerrilla

Operations . . . . . . . . . . . ..o . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14Revolutionary Development and

Pacification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

H TACTICSRules of Engagement... o. . . . ..o . . . . . . . 21Of fense . . . . . . . . . . . . ..o . . . . . ..e. o. . . . . . . . . . . 30Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55Ambush Tactics . . . . . . . . . ...* . . . . . . . ...0 80Monsoon Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91Land Navigation and Movement . . . . 93Snipers . . . . . ..o . . ..o . . . . . . . ..o . . . . . ..o . . . . . 104Artillery . . . . . . . . . . . . . ● . . . . . . . . ...* ., . . . . . . 109Tracked Vehicles, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132Dogs in 111MA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141The Combined Action Company . . . . 146Kit Carson Scouts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152Riverine Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157Weapons and Munitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169U.S. Army Battalion Commander.. 184

Chapter

111 NATURE OF THE ENEMYThe Enemy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...* . ...*NVA/VC Registration Technique..Enemy Fortifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Enemy Employment of RPG-2

Antitank Rocket Launchers . . . . .Enemy Snipers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .VC Warning Device . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .VC Tricks . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...................VC Deception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .VC Attacks .................0.......0..0. .

VC Counterambush Technique . . . . . .Viet Cong River-Crossing Tech-

niques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Viet Cong Medicine ...............● *..*

Overt Viet Cong Meetings . . . . . . . . . . .Viet Cong Rice Ration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .VC Topographical and Military

Symbols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

IV AVIATIONThe Helicopterborne Assault . . . . . . .Helicopter Retraction . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . .Reconnaissance Party Insertion

and Extraction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Combat Resupply by Helicopter . . . .Medical Evacuation by Helicopter.Monsoon Weather Flying . . . . . . . . . . . . .Night Helicopter Operations . . . . . . . .Pilots Briefing on Emergency

Missions . . . . . . ... . . . . .*. ...*...*. ● ..*.

Page

189207208

209210212213214216217

218219225226

229

247257

262267275285288

290

ii

Chapter

IV AVIATION (Continued)Reaction Force Deployment by

Helicopter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Helicopter Limitations ● . ., . *.,**..,*Helo-Ground Communications ..,.Interference and Bogus Trans-

missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .,Helicopter Crew Protection . . . . . . .Helicopter Gunners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Ordnance Loading for Armed

UH-l E Helicopters . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Aircraft Bilge Drainholes.. . . . . . . .Visual Reconnaissance From

Helicopters . ..0..0..,,.. . . . . . . . . . . .Tip for Aircrew . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Prevention of Midair Collisions

in Low Visibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Increasing Helicopter Visibility..TACAN Maps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Monsoons and Map Changes . . . . . . .You Are Mr. Clean .0....0.,,.. . ...0.Use of SATS Loader and Univer-

sal Weapons Cradle WhenLoading Napalm and 2.75-Inch Rockets on the F-4 B......

RCPT-105 Dual Starting System .SERE Kits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0. . . . . . . . . . . . . .F-4 Drag Chute Door Latch . . . . . . .

Page

292293295

296297298

299300

301302

302303303304304

305307307308

iii

Chapter Page

IV AVIATION (Continued)Altitude Separation . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 309Night Air Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 310Keep a Clean Cockpit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 310Employment of A-6A Aircraft . . . . . . 311Airstrike Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 312NATOPS Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 313Pilot Frequency Cards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 314C-11 7D Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 314

V MINE WARFAREDefinitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Facts We Have Learned About Viet

Cong Manufacture and Useof Mines, Sabotage Devicesand Booby traps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Punji Pits ● . . . . . . . . . ...0. . . . . . . . ...0...0..Booby trapped Enemy Propaganda

Displays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .VC/NVA Mine Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Tricks Frequently Employed by

VC/NVA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Antitank Booby traps . *. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Defense Against Mines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Detection of Antitank Mines . . . . . . . . .Probe Culverts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Rough Rider Mine Sweep . . . . . . . . . . . . .Converging Mine Sweep Teams. . . .Mine and Explosive Device Pro-

tection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

315

317340

341342

345349350353353354355

357

iv

Chapter Page

V MINE WARFARE (Continued)VC Construction Block Mine . . . . . . . . 357

VC/NVA Utilization of Mines . . . . . . . 3sg

VI COMMUNICATIONSRadio Operators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .AN/PRC-25 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...*..... . . . . .AN/ PRC-25 Battery Installation . .AN/PRC-47 Radio . .*....**..***. ● .*,,.Antennas ● . . . . . . . ...*... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .,, ,Backup Communications . . . . . ...0....Record Friendly Frequencies . . . . . .Vehicular Radios . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . .Squad Level Radio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .External Power Source Telephone

TA-312 ● . . . . . ..*....*. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ,Ground Return Communications . . .Field Wire Line Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Switchboard Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . .SB-86 Switchboard Demagnetiza-

tion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...0..... . . . . . . . . .Protect Power and Communication

CaMes ● . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...*.. . .Protect Communication Compo-

nents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... .,0Security for Wire Teams . . . . . . . . . . .Communication Security . . . . . . . . . . . . .Checklist for Communications . . . . . .

35936036236336436736836937(J

372373373375

376

377

377378379381

v

Chapter Page

VII LOGISTICS

MILSTAMP and MILSTRIP . . . . . . . . . .Embarkation . . . . . . . . . . . . . ● . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Supply Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Field Expediency . . . . . ...*.... . . . ...*...Maintcnancc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Spare That Bridge ● . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Generators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...*.. ●

Sanitizing Food ServiceEcluipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...*..... .,.

Flak Jacket Repair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..*.*.Long llange Patrol Rations . . . . . . . . . .

VIII CIVIC ACTION - PSYCHOLOGICALOPERATIONS

Revolutionary Development . . . . . . . . .Civic Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Understanding the Vietnamese . . . . .Chieu Hoi Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .County Fair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Psychological Warfare in Vietnam .Population and Resources Control.

IX MEDICALPrevention, Not Treatment . . . . . . . . . .Acclimating Marines to Hot-Wet

Climate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Heat Casualties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Medical Problems in the Monsoon

Season . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ● ....

Tips From the Corpsmen .. . . . . . . . . . .

vi

383385389392398410411

413414414

417420427439443447460

465

466473

475478

Chapter Page

Ix MEDICAL (Continued)Night Medical Evacuation ...,...,.Malaria Preventive Treatment..Leech Bites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Plasma Expander . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ● ..*Field Ambulance Support . . . . . . . . .Mobile MEDCAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Intravenous-In jec~ion Supply

Chest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...0 . . . .Portable Stand for Intravenous

Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Poisonous Snakes of Vietnam ..,.

479480480481481482

483

483484

vii

Chapter I: MARINES INVIETNAM -1967

1. III MAF BALANCED CAMPAIGN

The focal point of the Vietnam war in 1967was in I Corps Tactical Zone. As the yearprogressed, the DMZ region of northern QuangTri Province and, to the south, the Nui Loc SonBasin, emerged as primary scenes of contention.It was in these areas that the enemy, seeking tostem exploitation of the HI MAF balanced cam-paign, marshaled major formations and re-sources.

The enemy’s motive for combat in the junglehighlands of the DMZ was clear. Protection ofhis guerrilla infrastructure, the key to his in-fluence among the population of the coastal low-lands, demanded a diversion of the U.S./GVN

1

forces involved in the lowland pacification effort.The enemy knew that invasion of South Vietnam,or the threat of invasion, would probably drawfriendly power into northern Quang Tri Province,thus drawing attention from the joint U. S./GVNPacification Program. The Nui Loc Son Basin,located between Danang and Chu Lai, was amajor source of the enemy’s rice, manpower,and intelligence. He could not afford to relinquishit to Free World forces ,without a fight. Thesetwo areas, the DMZ and the Nui Loc Son Basin,were therefore of critical importance to theenemy if he was to impede the Pacification Pro-gram by drawing allied forces into the hinterlandand at the same time retain a degree of controlover the rice rich Nui Loc Son Basin.

The 111 MAF balanced campaign consisted of:(1) large unit operations, (2) small unit counter-guerrilla operations and (3) Revolutionary De-velopment and Pacification.

Centered primarily in the DMZ region and,to the south, in the Nui Loc Son Basin, III MAFunits and the 7th Fleet’s Special Laqding Forcesconducted 116 battalion or larger size opera-tions. In this effort, the Marines defeated theenemy’s four major invasion attempts across theDMZ, inflicting heavy personnel losses on him.

The small unit counterguerrilla element ofIII MAF’s 1967 balanced campaign established arecord pace of operations, showing an increaseof 180 percent over the 1966 total.

2

In support of large unit and small unit counter-guerrilla operations, Marine fixed-wing andhelicopter operations also accelerated, keepingpace with the intensified operations of HI MAF,ARVN, and other Free World forces in I CTZ.

By mid-year, and after a period of regression,the Revolutionary Development Program beganto show signs of power and cohesion. Due in partto the increasing competence exhibited by ARVNforces assigned in support, the U. S./GVN pro-gram displayed modest progress during thelatter half of 1967. III MAF’s combat successes,coupled with the accomplishments of the ARVNin support of RD and the success of the Vietnam-ese national elections, created conditions in1967 which allowed 250,000 people to flee the

3

Viet Cong and find a refuge with the Govern-ment. These same conditions were a major factorin the record number of enemy defections,which was up 54 percent over the 1966 total.

#####

2. OPERATIONS IN THE DMZ REGION

Operations in the DMZ region during 1967were marked by four periods of intense combat:in lace February and early March, in late Apriland early May, in early July, and throughoutmost of September. Each period reflected amajor enemy combined arms effort toachieve a victory in northern I CTZ by means ofa trans-DMZ invasion. Each effort was defeatedby a combination of Marine ground/helibornemaneuver and the supporting fires of air, artil-lery, and naval gunfire.

The initial 1967 enemy invasion effort wassignaled. in February by aerial reconnaissancedetection of substantial troop and supply trainmovement north of the Ben Hai River. The enemyoffensive followed closely 111MAF’s initiation ofartillery attacks into the DMZ and North Vietnam.Authorized on 25 February by COMUSMACV,the artillery attacks were aimed at the destruc-tion of known and suspected enemy troop andsupply installations previously immune fromfriendly fires.

4

of Cam Lo by Operation PRAIRIE, conducted incoordination with the Special Landing Force ofthe 7th Fleet in Operation BEACON HILL, aheliborne/amphibious assault against the enemy’seast flank. NVA losses were 1,107 killed.

The second major enemy offensive occurredin late April and early May, when he advanced astrong force-- three NVA regiments--against KheSanh in the western DMZ area, and also attemptedconcurrently to overrun the outpost at Con Thienin the eastern sector of northern Quang TriProvince. In the Khe Sanh area, aggressivepatrolling detected the presence of the 325CNVA Division before the enemy could launch hisattack. This encounter triggered a powerfulMarine air/ground team counterattack, whichdefeated the enemy’s forces, during the firstweek of May, in the Hill 861-881 complex north-west of Khe Sanh. At Con Thien, meanwhile, anNVA two-battalion, mortar supported attack wasthrown back with heavy losses on 8 May.

Exploiting the defeat inflicted on the enemy,III MAF invaded the southern half of the DMZin mid-May. This combined operation, whichinvolved Marines of 111 MAI? and the SpecialLanding Forces, along with ARVN units, openedRoute 561 north from Cam Lo and forced theenemy’s retreat across the Ben Hai River intoNVN. NVA casualties in May were 1,880 dead--the largest monthly total in the DMZ area throughthe end of 1967.

6

In July, the enemy’s invasion effort wasmarked by increased heavy weapons fire supportfrom his NVN sanctuary. Long range Russianartillery weapons, introduced in April, delivereda heavy volume of fire against Marine installa-tions near the DMZ, as a five-battalion NVAinvasion force once again crossed the provi-sional military demarcation line. On 2 July, aMarine company engaged this enemy force twomiles north of Con Thien. HI MAF’s OperationBUFFALO, complemented by amphibious Opera-tions BEAR CLAW and BEAVER TRACK, maneu-vered to flank the NVA battalions, and by mid-July, the enemy had withdrawn to the north,suffering the loss of over 1,300 killed.

The enemy’s fourth invasion attempt, launchedin September and again directed at the Marinestrong point at Con Thien, was characterizedby the largest volume of heavy weapons fire yetfired on the Marines (over 9,000 rounds ofartillery, mortar, and rocket fire, of which 6,058rounds, or 87 percent fell on Con Thien). Theoperation was begun with the movement of the812th NVA Regiment into an attack position southof Con Thien. Detected in its early stages byMarine patrols, the enemy effort was defeatedby a combined arms counterattack.

At year’s end, the enemy was engaged in amajor buildup in the western DMZ area near KheSanh.

#####

7

3, OPEIiAr~lOl~!S IN THE NUI L(3C SON BASIN

The April m May arrival of Task Force

Oregon in Lhe southern sector of I CTZ freedcwo Marine battalions for deployment into theINui Loc Son Basin region, midway betweenOanang and Chu Lai. Prior to April 1967, al-~hough desirable, there had been little opportunitym conduct a nlajor offensive in this area.

In Apxil, a Marine patrol operating near NuiLoc Son ridge made contact with a large enemyforce and triggered the UNION series of opera-tions. For a period of 6 weeks, heavy fightingensued, with Marines of III MAF and the 7thFlee[’s Special Landing Forces combining heli-bolnc and ground maneuver to inflict a succes-sion of defeats on the 3d and 21st NVA Regiments.

By early June, hard results were evident, Atleast 1,747 enemy had been killed, with hundredsmore estimated to have died in bunkers andtunnels collapsed by artillery and air attacks.More important, however, was the reaction ofthe local Vietnamese population, which, encour-aged by the continuing presence of friendly forces,began to respond favorably to the U. S./GVNpacification effort.

The enemy’s reaction was violent. By mid-August, he had deployed lhe entire 2d NVA Divi-sion (the 3d and 21st NVA Regiments, and the1st VC Regiment), into the Nui Loc Son region,making it clear that he intended to contest theU. S./GVN presence. Subsequently, Marine Opera-tions ADAIR, PIKE, COCHISE, and SWIFT, coor-dinated with Special Landing Force amphibiousOperations BEACON TORCH and BEACON GATE

9

and U.S. Army Operations BENTON, WHEELERand WALLOWA, trapped the 2d NVA Divisionbetween the Marines on the north and the Armyon the south. ARVN units, which had made acommendable showing during UNION I and II,also make a significant contribution to the con-tinuing effort, accounting for a total of 418 enemykilled in LIEN KET, 112 and 116 in August andSeptember.

The enemy’s attempts to escape were unsuc-cessful. In August, his forces were driven southout of the basin by Marines in Operation COCHISE,only to be chased back to the north by the U.S.Army Operation BENTON. In September, two ofthe regiments, the 1st VC and 3d NVA, wereattacked in Operation SWIFT and lost 571 killedto the Marine air-ground team, as Marine airflew 535 attack sorties in support of the groundmaneuver. Operation WHEELER concluded theentrapment, as three U.S. Army battalions movedinto the area west of Tam Ky, cutting off theenemy’s escape route.

During the period 22 April - 30 September,friendly forces killed 4,222 enemy troops in theNui Loc Son Basin, the 2d NVA Division had beenreduced to only marginal combat effectiveness,and the enemy, at end-September, no longer

enjoyed free access to the population and re-sources of the Quang Nam-Quang Tin borderregion. In October, the arrival in I CTZ of the3d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division (Airmo-bile) freed two Marine battalions for deployment

10

out of the Nui Loc Son area of operations, north..ward to the DMZ region.

#####

Integrated with, and complementing the suc-cess of 111 MAF’s large unit operations in 1967were the Special Landing Forces of the 7thFleet.

Taking advantage of the flexibility inherent inexisting amphibious doctrine, the SLF’S opera-tions in 1967 were conducted under a specialarrangement established to meet the specificneeds of the Vietnam conflict.

Each of the two Special Landing Forces (thesecond SLF was activated on 1 Aprii 1967) con-sists of a Marine battalion landing team and aMarine helicopter squadron. Embarked in shipsof the 7th Fleet’s two Amphibious Ready Groups,the SLF’S are capable of projecting their powerashore either in an independent operation or insupport of combat maneuver already underwayby shore based ground units.

It is in this latter role that the most note-worthy results are achieved, employing the “ham-mer and anvil” technique to trap enemy forcesalready pinioned ashore, or to drive the enemyinto a prepositioned blocking force. Employedalmost exclusively in this manner to support andinfluence a scheme of maneuver ashore, theSpecial Landing Forces accounted for a total of2,134 enemy killed in 25 amphibious operationsin 1967.

However, the number of enemy killed by thelanding force does not reflect a true measureof the success of amphibious operations, sincethe landing force should also be credited withbeing the instrument which drives the enemy,in many cases, into the killing area of forcesashore, thus contributing materially to the suc-cess of the companion operation already estab-lished ashore.

In additicn to the amphibious operations by theSpecial Landing Forces to support operationsashore in the DMZ, the six operations discussed

12

below portray the contribution made to the war

by the amphibious arm during 1967.

In February, Special Landing Force Alfalanded against the exposed flank of enemy unitsengaged with Marines in southern 1 Corps.

In late April, Special Landing Force Alfa cut

off the retreat of elements of the 2d ~VA Divi-sion attempting to escape from Marine opera--tions in the Nui Loc Son Basin. Marines of 111MAF and the Special Landing Force combinedto kill 1,046 enemy troops in this effort.

In May, both Special Landing Forces executedheliborne assaults Into the DMZ, joining !,hcscheme of maneuver of Marine Qp?”r?.if)?k

HICKORY and ARVN Operation L:iiv; SON : ~ !rI

this, the first penetration of the DMZ, enemycasualties were counted at 837 dead.

In June and July, Special Landing ForcesAlfa and Bravo assaulted the beaches northwestof Hue and, in each case, drove an enemy battalioninto waiting ARVN forces. These two effortsaccounted for a total of 535 enemy killed.

In. August, Special Landing Force Alfa set ablocking position between, Thang Binh and TamKy, trapping elements of the 21st NVA Regimentin the Nui Loc Son Basin. III MAF and ARVNunits combined with the Special Landing Forceto kill 384 enemy.

If # # # /1

5. SMALL UNIT COUNTERGUERRILLAOPERATIONS

The major result of III MAF’s counterguer-rilla campaign has been the continued erosionof the guerrilla structure, to such an extent thatbasically qualified replacements for the VietCong forces, once drawn from the VC’S man-power pool of irregulars, now include increasingnumbers of NVA soldiers. In the spring of 1965,nearly all enemy forces in I CTZ were VietCong while, by the end of 1967, nearly 60 per-cent of the main force enemy was composed ofNorth Vietnamese Army regulars. The replace-ment NVA regular, operating in unfamiliar ter-rain and among peasants who both fear and dis-trust the soldiers of the north, is at a disadvantage.

14

15

His one advantage lies in the weapons carriedby his parent unit from North Vietnam. This wasthe source of the rockets, manpack flamethrowers,and tear gas first used against Free Worldforces in I CTZ in 1967. And, because of hispossession of the more modern NVA weaponry,the guerrilla enemy increased his rate of mortar,rocket and artillery attacks during the year.

#####

5. REVOLUTIONARY DEVIZLOPMENT AND

PACIFICATION

During 1967, the enemy accelerated his cam-paign to disrupt the Revolutionary DevelopmentProgram, but to little avail. Vietnamese civilians,seeking security and protection, continued theiralignment with the GVN in growing numbers.

16

The GVN/111 MAF Pacification Program begana resurgence in April, gained momentum in mid-summer, and reflected significant accomplish-ment by year’s end. The 1967 increase of nearly200,000 people considered by III MAF to be livingin secure areas is one indicator. A record num-ber of enemy defections (2,539), an increase from280,000 in January to 530,000 at end-December inthe number of civilians seeking refuge fromViet Cong domination, and an increase in theimpact of the Combined Action Program on theadvancing security of the Vietnamese country-side, all lent credence to the expanding in-fluence of the GVN in the I CTZ.

a. Elections

The most significant manifestation ofprogress during 1967 in the RD and Pacifica-tion Programs was the series of hamlet throughnational-level elections. Having begun in Septem-ber 1966 with the election of the national con-stitutional convention, the process of democraticselection culminated in October 1967, with theelection of a national constituent assembly. Thisvoting process entailed the selection of villageofficials in April, the hamlet elections in May,and the choosing of the national executive branchon 4 September.

The enemy, recognizing the threat theseelections posed to his objectives, launched an ICTZ-wide campaign of terror and intimidationagainst the voting populace. Aimed at discrediting

17

the entire process by limiting the voter turnoutto an insignificant sampling of the people, thiscampaign was a failure, as 82.3 percent and78.8 percent of the eligible voters in I CTZ wentto the polls during the village and hamlet elec-tions, respectively.

Following the failure of his earlier anti-electron efforts, the enemy vowed that the Septem-ber elections would not be held. A well-coordinatedsequence of murders, kidnappings and attacksagains~ government facilities and military in-stallations was initiated in early August, reach-ing a crescendo as election day, 4 September,approached. Despite the total of 673 innocentcivilians killed or kidnapped, and the 272 acts ofviolence aimed at the electorate, 86 percent ofthe eligible Vietnamese people in I CTZ, in

18

defiance of the enemy terrorists, voted for thecandidates of their choice.

The October elections were a reinforce-ment of the victories won earlier in 1967. TheViet Cong, realizing the free Vietnamese werenot to be kept from the polls, did not wage theirexpected campaign of terror. In consequence,there was very little anti-election activity through-out the five provinces. Again the people voted,with 77.9 percent of the eligible voters castingtheir ballots.

#f# ###

19

C]lapter II: TACTICS

1. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

The rules of engagement set forth below areused by one Marine unit in the densely populatedareas of Vietnam to minimize noncombatant

21

personnel and property losses which may occurin the execution of military operations.

a. General

The use of unnecessary force leading tononcombatant battle casualties in areas tempo-rarily controlled by the enemy wiil embitter thepopulation, drive them into the arms of theenemy and make the long range goal of RD moredifficult and costly. Accordingly, these circum-stances call for the exercise of restraints notnormally recluired on the battlefield. All unitcommanders must apply only that force neces-sary to accomplish their mission, giving dueregard to the safety of their command and theimportance of preventing injury to the noncom-batant populace.

Incidents of noncombatant casualties anddestruction of property by RVNAF and FreeWorld combat forces are exploited by the enemyto the fullest extent to enhance their objectives,to foster resentment against the GVN and toeffect the permanent alienation of the peoplefrom the Government.

A unit must establish the reputation ofbeing able to move at will throughout assignedarea of responsibility and to defeat any enemyforce encountered. Concurrently, units must con-stantly demonstrate their concern for the safetyof noncombatants, compassion for the injuredand willingness to aid and assist the sick, hungry,and dispossessed.

22

b. Application

All commanders are directed to plan andconduct operations in accordance with the follow-ing guidelines:

+ Both the military and psychologicalobjectives of each operation will be considered.Strikes in populated areas, reconnaissance byfire into hamlets, and poorly selected harassingand interdiction fires are examples of militarymeasures which will be counterproductive in thelong run,

-L Troop indoctrination briefings will beheld before each operation to emphasize boththe short and long range importance of minimiz-ing noncombatant battle casualties. These brief-ings will include the location of noncombatants

23

and friendly forces, measures to prevent mutualinterference, safety precautions for fire controlsupport, rules of engagement, identification andrecognition signals, emergency procedures andother appropriate matters.

+ Concurrent air/ground planning to en-sure dlat proper selection of helicopter landingzones and the proper employment and integrationof artillery, naval gunfire, and airstrikes willavoid unnecessary damage to lives and propertyof noncombatants.

-k-- All persons involved in the control andcoordination of supporting arms will be briefedon areas to be avoided due to the presence offriendly or potentially friendly populace. Suchinformation must be sought from local officialsat province and district levels.

4- Specified strike zones should be con-figured to eliminate populated areas except thosein accepted enemy bases.

+ Operations should be planned in coor-dination with province and distric~ chiefs withdue regard to security of plans. A liaison officerfrom Marine forces conducting operations in aparticular province should be positioned at thedistrict headquarters for coordination. The dis-trict advisors will perform this function in theabsence of a liaison officer.

+ With due regard to security and successof the mission, the people will be warned by

24

leaflets and broadcasts, whenever possible, ofimpending airstrikes oroperations. This warningshould emphasize that the enemy by his presencemakes the action necessary, further that theenemy is directly responsible for damages in-curred resulting from combat in populated areas.

+ Assignment 10 Marine forces of quali-fied RVNAF liaison officers from appropriateRVNAF commanders is essential and will bearranged between Marine commanders and ad-visors for each significant operation. Theseliaison officers, through their knowledge of thearea of operations and the population, can assistin identification of friend from foe and can helpensure close coordination with all RVN forces.

+ Each operation plan or order will in-clude a psychological warfare annex and a civilaffairs annex, and all persons concerned will befamiliar with them. Fragmentary orders will in-clude reference to these annexes and appropriateunit orders and SOP’s on psychological warfareoperations and civil affairs.

+ The participation of RVN forces in op-erations will be encouraged so that the war doesnot appear to be a U.S. action against the Vietnam-ese people. Regional and Popular Force participa-tion will be sought at Marine battalion or com-pany level so that they may assist in the searchof private dwellings, obtain information andcontribute to the desired effect of the cooperativewar effort.

25

+ In carrying out search and destroyoperations, take all practicable measures tominimize the destruction of indigenous privateproperty and to ensure proper control, disposi-tion, and safeguarding thereof. Plans will includeprocedures for the protection of private propertyand reporting, security and disposition of excesssupplies.

-> A civic action plan will support eachoperation even if the area has been controlled bythe enemy. As the situation dictates, operationplans will provide for utilization of all availableassets to include a program for dispensing ofmedical supplies; transportation and distributionof emergency rations; medical evacuation ofinjured or sick regardless of suspected or knownpolitical affiliation; and light engineering workwithin the capabilities of tactical units.

+ Established rules of good military con-duct and discipline will be enforced.

+ Nothing in the above shall be construedto inhibit the inherent right of a Marine unit orother U.S. unit to defend itself against hostileaction from any source.

26

c. Conduct of Operations

(1) General

-+ During hours of darkness the sequenceof engagement will be:

● Challenge.● If the person challenged makes an

overt attempt to avoid apprehension, opens fireor commits any other hostile act and therebyendangers the life of the challenger, the challengermay fire.

● Unit commanders may prescribe il-lumination prior to firing if local circumstancesallow.

● The requirement for challenge maybe waived by the local commander if required

27

by the tactical situation and no friendly forcesare known to be operating in the area.

+ Magazines will not be inserted in weap-ons in a camp area during daylight hours unlessunder attack.

+- Warning shots will not be employed oncontact with the enemy with the exception of day-time control of waterborne traffic. Craft failingto respond to challenge may be warned by fire.

+ Rounds will not be chambered in indi-vidual weapons unless contact with the enemy isimminent. The senior Marine present will de-termine if, in his judgment, the measure mustbe taken to preserve the lives of personnel. Initia-tion of any offensive or defensive formationimplies imminent contact with the enemy.

+ Within the TAOR, and during opera-tions in areas external thereto, the establishmentof a curfew is the responsibility of GVN officials.Assistance in enforcing the curfew will normallydevolve upon division units. In such instances,indigenous personnel will be informed of thetime limits involved and the reqtiirement forstrict adherence. It will be further explainedthat the curfew is to ensure that innocent civiliansare not mistaken for the enemy and shot.

28

d. Destruction of VN Property

+ Civilian dwellings will not be burned, norwill private property, including livestock, bedestroyed except as an unavoidable consequenceof combat actions.

+ Destruction of Vietnamese dwellings andlivestock as a measure of denying their use tothe enemy is left to RVNAF units. Requestsfrom Vietnamese authorities for employmentof Marine forces to perform such destruct~.onwill be referred to the III MAF headquarters.

e, Miscellaneous

USMC units do not have the authority toexercise police powers over the Vietnamesepeople; hence the majority of controls will have

29

to be established by the National Police, Armyof Victmam Military Police, or other RVNAITmilitary units and Regional and Popular Forceunits as appropriate. In the event of civil dis-turbance, the neares~ Vietnamese National Policeestablishment will be notified. 3cI MarDiv unitswill take no action other than to defend them-selves and the property of the U.S.

//////////

2. OFl~ENSE

a. Small Unit Tactics

Enemy long range small arms fire isoften used to slow troop movement and inflictcasualties. Utilization of the practices summa-rized I)C1OWwill assist in minimizing the effectsof such fire:

+ Avoid patterns of movement, diversifypatrol formations, times and routes.+ Use all available forms of conceal-ment.4- Wear your armored vest.* Establish a base of fire before crossingopen areas.+

fire.++

when

30

Use Marine snipers to counter enemy

Request aerial observers.Move on one or more approach routes,

possible.

+ 13e especially cautious at first light.+ Plan for and keep within supportingarms coverage.+ Practice march discipline at all times,including assigned sectors of observation andfire and established intervals between troops.+ When fire is received, return it andmaneuver quickly.

b. Rapid Reporting at Time of Contact

Once contact is established with the enemyand the firefight begins, the platoon leader andcompany commander have a multitude of tasksto perform. One of these tasks, and a very im-portant one, is the rapid and accurate reportingof the contact so that higher echelons can takethe necessary action in support of the encounter.IIowever, the importance of accurate and timely

31

reporting of contact is sometimes overlooked bysmall unit leaders because of other duties.

To make certain that reports of contactare relayed immediately it is a good idea totrain ,Marines, other than the unit leader, in theprocedures of accurate and timely reporting ofcontact. This will take some of the load off theunit leader and ensure that battalion is keptabreast of the situation. They can ‘t support youunless they have valid information. The III MAFhas found that such a system works well on thecompany, platoon and squad levels.

c. Control in Dense Jungle Areas

A combat reconnaissance patrol operatingin Viet Cong territory was moving with greateffort through dense brush in column formation.After a few hours of negotiating the rugged ter-rain, personnel became fatigued and the column

“V.” One member of theinadvertently became apoint, hearing noise and seeing obscure move-ment to his left rear, became alarmed and openedfire. Although the cease fire was given imme-diately, the damage was already done. Results:One Marine killed, two wounded.

This tragedy points out what can happen indense jungle areas where control and identifica-tion ~kcorne life and death matters. A definite:-J=. fGT o?=:.ing fire rr. ust be established and,.dLhGUSh positive idenLificaLion may not always

32

be possible, repeated emphasis must be placedon target identification prior to opening fire,

d. Organization of Command Group When onthe Move

The majority of command group personnelare armed with the .45 caliber pistol because ofthe type of duty they perform and the fact theyare not expected to engage in the firefight. How-ever, during operations in dense jungle terrain,flank security sometimes is inadequate and unitsalways face the possibility of becoming separatedfor short periods of time. If the command groupis attacked by the enemy under such circum-stances, it has extremely limited firepower torepel the assault unless it has been properlyorganized.

In view of this, always carefully considerthe organization of tactical command groups whendisposing firepower means within the unit. Ensurethat an adequate number of personnel armed withrifles and automatic weapons are in close proxim-ity to the command group at all times.

e. Sweep and Block Forces

Operations, whether of the search anddestroy, or search and clear types, normallyinvolve a sweep force and a blocking force. Thetechnique of sweep and block constitutes aneffecuve means of sweeping an area if executedcorrectly. Speaking in terms of company-size

33

operations of this nature, the following are sev-eral techniques that have spelled the differencebetween a successful operation and a long hot un-eventful walk:

-f- Rarcly, if ever, will any attempt to es-:ablish a block or cordon from a permanent patrolbase located within 2000 meters of the objectivearea be successful. As is generally the case, theblock or cordon is set prior to first light whichusually necessitates establishing an operatingbase near the objective area the previous evening.Nothing can spoil an operation faster than a forcemoving into close proximity of the objective areaand allowing the ever observant VC a 6- to 8-hourheadstart in fleeing the area.

+ Attempt wherever feasible to seal thearea off by approaching the blocking position from

34

as many different directions as possible. Not onlyis a certain degree of deception gained by utiliz-ing smaller sized units infiltrating from severaldirections, but it also denies the enemy severalroutes of egress. Essentially, the small units“block and sweep” against each other whilemoving into the blocking positions.

+ If armor is to beusedeitheras a part ofthe block force or the sweep force, do not allowthe tank commander to start his vehicles’ enginesany sooner than 5 minutes prior to moving out.The second of armor starting up early in themorning is just like ringing a loud warning bellfor all the VC within 3 miles of the objectivearea. Armor movement should be fast and directin order to gain maximum shock effect. It hasbeen found much better to give the infantry aheadstart on the approach march and have thetanks catch and pass the infantry approximatelythree-quarters of the way to the LOD.

+ Prep fires should be used judiciously andsparingly. If not absolutely necessary, they shouldbe avoided. They tend to broadcast the “operation”to everyone in the area.

+ Consider the use of fein[s and deceptionsas much as possible. It must be assumed thatevery move the operational force is making isbeing followed closely by the VC or their in-formants. The use of feints or similar deploy-ment may invoke a false sense of security among

35

the VC in the area and deprive them of preciousescape time once the sweep is commenced.

+ Use every means available to maintainthe momentum of the sweep force. Anticipatethose situations which might cause the sweep tolose its forward momentum (i.e., resupply, cas-ualties, darkness, demolitions work). Once thepressure is applied, keep it on steadily. Hesitationallows the VC the opportunity to escape or placemines and booby traps in the sweeping force’spath. There is no substitute for well-developedand all-encompassing plans at all levels.

+ Don’t allow operations to become ster-eotyped. Seize upon innovation. If theto anticipate our every move, ourlost and the results unsatisfactory.

VC are ableinitiative is

f. Blocking Position Security

Blocking forces are frequently harassedby sniper fire from the rear while in the blockingposition. To counter this type harassment, am-bushes should be placed covering likely avenuesof approach and/or sniper positions, 200 or 300meters to the rear of the blocking force. Thisprecaution provides the blocking force with se-curity from the rear and an early warning systemagainst VC attack.

g. Resupply for Recon

Resupply of small reconnaissance patrolsshould be avoided whenever possible. Generally

36

these units can be expected to operate up to 5days without resupply, provided water can beobtained in the area of operations. This typepatrol should normally be withdrawn when sup-plies carried into the field are expended.

.,,.‘%

.

.,, , “,

k.

$-”’. ,.f ,;, {:‘1”;!; :.: .1’

I,, ::,:

,!

Resupply can be made by helicopter, shouldoperational commitments dictate. In such situa-tions, if special consideration is given to: selec-tion of the resupply site and preflight briefing;preparation of supplies to be delivered; anddeceptive measures taken during delivery, thelikelihood of preserving the patrol’s clandestinenature can be increased materially. The follow-ing considerations of these three areas arepertinent:

-P- Selection of the resupply site and pre-flight briefing. In addition to the n o r m a 1

37

considerations for LZ selection; e.g., capable ofbeing locally secured and offering good ap-proaches for helicopters, the site selected forresupply should be positively secure from ob-servation at ground level. That is, there must beno observation by the enemy of activity in thesite when a helicopter is approaching the ground.Examples of such sites are hedge enclosed ricepaddies and depressions near the top of a dominat-ing, hill mass. Patrol leaders must be capable ofrecognizing these areas. When a site is selected,the coordinates should be radioed to the parentunit, using shackles or other secure means. Toreduce chance of compromise by further radiotransmission, the patrol locations should be givento the resupply helicopter flight leader in a face-to-face briefing by a member of the patrol’sparent unit. The briefing should include otherpertinent information such as radio frequenciesand alternates, ground signals to be used, patrolsize and uniform (for aircrew recognition ofpatrol as friendly), thrust points in use if any,etc. During this briefing a deception plan can beworked out with the flight leader. If possible, theMarine briefing the flight leader should accom-pany the resupply run.

+ Preparation of supplies to be delivered.Resupply will include mainly rations and radiobatteries. Handling these items can be facilitatedby preparing a “package” for each patrol mem-ber. All miscellaneous packaging material, whichif included would have to be hidden or buried by

38

the patrol, should be removed and the suppliesplaced in sandbags. These bags can be placednear the helicopter exit door and at the propertime can be pushed out in a matter of seconds.When delivery to the site is completed, thepatrolleader can have each of his men graba sandbagand the patrol can evacuate the area expeditiouslywithout stopping to open boxes, distribute loads,place rations in packs, or bury trash. Refine-ments of the packages could include labels toindicate special items such as radio batteries,rifle cleaning supplies or messages for thepatrol leader. If time permits, an improvisedcarrying sling may be placed on each sandbag.

+ Deceptive measures taken during de-livery. With a map plot of the patrol’s reportedlocation, the helicopter flight can approach thegeneral area at an altitude out of small armsrange. Remaining at altitude, the aircrew(s)should attempt to spot the patrol while flyinga random pattern over the general area. Thepatrol should mark the landing site with airpanels and may signal the aircraft with mirrorsor lights. If the site is properly selected, noneof these markers or signals will be visible to theenemy on the ground. If necessary, the aircraftcan enter the reconnaissance unit net to receivedirections from the patrol leader. Smoke shouldnot be used by the patrol to mark the site. Whenthe patrol is spotted, the flight leader shouldbegin a series of deceptive maneuvers which willeventually bring the supply carrying aircraft to

39

a landing or hover in the site occupied by thepatrol. If the flight includes two or more aircraft,only the supply-carrying helicopter need fly toground level; the remaining aircraft can maintainaltitude and provide support, if required. Thepilot” of the aircraft carrying the supplies canexecute a series of landings or near landings,one of which will be in the aciual resupply site.Deception can be increased during these maneu-vers by firing machineguns in some of the “land-ing “sites, ” dropping smoke grenades in somesites, and taking such other actions as may beconsidered appropriate to confuse any enemyobserver.

h. Basic Tactics Aaain

Almost without exception, combat reportsfrom Vietnam continue to underscore the needfor fundamental patrol training. Patrolling oc-cupies a major part of Marine operations and thefoUowing points are repeatedly emphasized:

+ Automatic weapons and radios shouldbe concealed as much as possible within forma-tions.

-+ Flankers and point men must be wellaway (100 meters) from the main body whenterrain permits.

+ All patrol members should bethoroughly briefed on patrol mission, objectivesand other details.

-+ Suspected enemy positions should bedesignated as concentrations for supporting artil-lery and mortar fires and personnel should knowhow to call for and adjust these fires,

i. Tunnel Denial

The use of a tunnel can be denied to theenemy effectively by the following method:

+ Pump smoke with a Mity Mite blower

into the tunnel to determine the location of tunnelexits.

+ Place sacks of CS several feet insidethe tunnel.

+ Dig one to three holes, 4 feet deep and5 feet back from and around each exit located.Place 5 pounds of tamped explosive in each hole.

41

+ Connect all charges (at all exits) andall sacks of CS with detonating cord.

+- Detonate all charges simultaneously.This will seal the tunnel, trapping the CS inside.

Thus the use of the tunnel is denied theenemy at a considerably less cost in explosivesthan would be required to completely destroy it.

j. Tunnel Clearing and Injuries

It is essential that all Marines handlingexplosives be familiar with their characteristicsincluding damage radius. Equally important is thenecessity for the small unit leader to properlysupervise the demolition of caves and tunnels.In a period of one month, recently, three Marinesfrom one unit received injuries from their ownexplosives while engaged in this type work. Allof the injuries were caused by a lack of knowledgeand awareness of the radius of injury associatedwith various types of explosives.

Also, remember to include a safety radiusfor possible secondary explosions.

k. Tactical Decisions

The close jungle and rugged terrain in manyareas of Vietnam have demonstrated the necessityfor quick tactical decisions on the part of smallunit leaders. Frequently, contact with the enemydevelops at ranges of less than 100 meters with

42

fleeting targets. A high volume of fire and rapid,well-controlled maneuvering are the decisivefactors in these meeting engagements. If contactcontinues, supporting arms should be deliveredon the target. This requires a positive com-munication channel to an airborne controllerand/or a supporting artillery unit,

Shoot, move, and communicate is still thebest policy for the small unit leader.

1. Preconvoy Liaison

There is no substitute for personal liaisonand extensive discussion between the man re-sponsibleprovidingproblems

for convoy vehicles and the unit leaderconvoy security. Many coordinationcan be solved such as the time and

43

place where the security elements join theconvoy, radio frequencies and call signs, andlocation of the security elements with the con-voy. Conduct this face-to-face meeting as farin advance of convoy departure time as possible.

m. Convoy Security

Experience with Rough Rider convoys usingengineer mine sweep support has demonstratedthat’ aerial observation of the routes of advanceand return is a prerequisite to effective securityfor the convoy proper and the engineer supportelement. While the convoy is staging for the re-turn, this observation often lapses along theintended return route. This enables enemy miningagents to plant mines unobserved. Continuousaerial observation of the convoy route should beconducted if possible. This will hinder or pre-vent enclmy mine activity along the convoy routethus providing more effective security.

n. Encirclement

The Viet Cong are quick to locate andexploit any weak points in our dispositions. Duringoperations to encircle a VC element, unit com-manders must quickly prepare to realign theirforces to provide a continuous band of offensivestrength around the guerrillas. When entrappedthe VC will make repeated attempts to probeencircling units, especially at night, to locatean escape route. Aggressive patrolling, illumina-tion, machinegun interdiction, artillery and

44

mortar concentrations, all will help to containthe encircled force. In such circumstances, theViet Cong sometimes attempt to cache theirweapons and exfiltrate as members of the localpopulace. In cases where this is suspected,Popular Forces and interpreters are useful,particularly if they are familiar with regionalaccents and local characteristics.

o. Moving Targets

Frequently a moving or fleeting target isobserved and the forward observer directs a firemission on it. In most instances there is a delayof several minutes between the initial requestand the first adjusting round. This delay, causedby the necessity for clearance and computation,can be negated if the forward observer willestimate the projected location of the movingtarget at the arrival time of the first round anduse this point as his target location for theinitial request.

p. Deception

The departure of patrols from a base areais often difficult to conceal if it is under ob-servation by local villagers, who can count thenumber of Marines, follow them, and determinetheir direction of travel. Suggested techniques

for patrols to employ, where movement under

observation is unavoidable, include:

+ Dispatching elements of a patrol atperiodic intervals, about every half hour indifferent directions. Later the patrol can rallyin a sccurc area and con~inue its mission.

46

+ Two patrols can pass as one by com-Mning and then separating when remote fromvisual observation. One element can detach itselfand remain in ambush for a brief period to seeif it is being followed.

+ Strict security procedures are essentialwhen employing these deception techniques sincesmall patrols are particularly susceptible toguerrilla ambush.

q. Two-Man Point

One battalion conducting search and destroyoperations in an area known to be heavily minedand booby trapped successfully employed the fol-lowing method to reduce casualties sustained bymines and boobytraps.

The procedure employs two Marines aspoint to reduce the possibility of detonatingcamouflaged mines and booby traps. The firstMarine surveys the immediate area beingtraversed for tripwires, lines, and punji pits,while the second Marine observes forward andto the sides as usual, This method proved mostsuccessful in detecting camouflaged devices, and,as a consequence, appreciably reduced friendlycasualties.

r. Spare the Point

When operating in a known mined area,there is a possibility that enemy explosive devices

47

can detonate the fragmentation or WP grenadescarried by the man closest to the blast. Thepoint is likely to be that man; his grenadesshould be temporarily carried by another patrolmember.

s. Searching and Clearing Populated Areasin RVN

Even though some USMC units becomeadept at searching villages, ethnic and environ-mental reasons make ARVN units exceptionallygood at searching and clearing populated areas.

Whenever possible, ARVN units should beused along with Marines when searching villages.Attaching a platoon of ARVN to a Marine riflecompany can be a successful arrangement. Thethree ARVN squads can then work directly withthree Marine rifle platoons. Thus, the individualMarine can learn useful techniques. After severalof these operations, the rifle companies shouldpossess the capability to train new men in thesearch techniques and procedures most success-ful in RVN.

t. Pomlar Force Scouts

Recently, one unit ina completely new area for

Vietnam operated inabout 3 weeks with

little success. After a month they establishedcontact with the village chief and Popular Forcepersonnel and began to build a rapport with them.

48

They suggested going on joint patrols and estab-lishing joint ambushes. After a few weeks thePF’s suggested an ambush site and three PF’sand the village chief led a Marine squad to thelocation. The result was 4 VC KIA and oneweapon captured. Since then over 50 percent ofthe unit’s kills have been on joint patrols. OnePF per fire team was found to be ideal for patrolorganization.

u. Use of Popular Forces

It is common practice for the Viet Cong tosend Vietnamese civilians from VC hamlets andvillages to government controlled areas to obtainsupplies. These people will usually possess valididentification cards, and will generally have nodifficulty in being cleared through a checkpointby Marines. One unit has achieved a greater

49

degree of success in preventing VC supplyprocurement by using Popular Force personnelwith Marines at checkpoints. The Marines pro-vide the necessary security while the PopularForces conduct the searches and check identifica-tion; The Popular Forces can readily detect thepresence of strangers which has resulted onmany occasions in intercepting foodstuffs andmedicine destined for enemy forces.

v. Patrols Entering Villages

In relatively close terrain, Marines havea tendency to select the easiest approach into avillage. They often use a trail or road and seldomdelay unless taken under fire. The VC are wellaware of this fact and frequently orient theirdefenses down the main roads and trails leadinginto the villages. A flank approach into villagesnot only lends the element of surprise to thepatrol, but also circumvents the main enemydefenses.

w. VC I-Iouses

Marine patrols in Vietnam have occasion-ally encountered deserted huts and houses sur-rounded by thorn and bramble fences. Theselocations are considered off-limits by the vil-lagers because they have been formerly occupiedby- thehousespits ascaution

50

Viet Cong. The area surrounding theis usually entrenched and contains punjiwell as signs with VC slogans. Exercisewhen approaching these areas.

x. Keep Going

If a patrol sustains a casualty from sniperfire, continue to seek out the sniper aggressively,Don’t let the entire patrol become involved intreating the wounded and securing a landing zoneonly to sustain another casualty from the samesniper when the patrol once again moves forward.

y. Look Up

During two actions between North Vietnam-ese and Marine forces, the enemy attempted anambush using a conventional U-shaped ambushwith one modification; enemy troops were posi-tioned in trees overlooking the zone of fire andwere armed with automatic weapons and grenades.Advance guards and point men must look upwardinto trees and brush as well asthe flanks.

z. Combat Ti~s

+ Ensure separation of

forward and to

communicationcapabilities so the probability of incoming roundsdestroying all communications is reduced to aminimum.

+ The second in command at all echelonsshould be prepared to assume command undermost adverse conditions; he should be positionedso the odds of his becoming a casualty day ornight at the same time as the commander areminimized.

51

+ Be continuously alert to enemy tacticsof trying to separate a unit, a point or a rearelement from the main force or body.

+ Rehearse every, repeat every, recon,combat patrol or contemplated offensive actionwhenever possible.

* Provide every patrol with the capa-bility of calling in supporting fire.

+ If taken under mortar or artillery fire,prepare to return fire within 30 seconds. Thiscapability requires at a minimum:

. Mortar positions that can becupied while under fire.

● All personneltermining direction from

52

being capable ofwhich mortars

oc-

de-are

being fired (crater analysis) and a reportingprocedure for passing on such information im-mediately.

+ Platoon commanders and company com-manders should always be in a position to controland maneuver all of their units and supportingarms, For example, a platoon commander whoacts as squad leader or a point, is not a platooncommander.

* When halted for any period of time, digin, improve holes, and cut into the sides of holesso VT can be called in on the position if suchaction becomes necessary.

+ When a Marine hits the deck, he shouldimmediately roll to either the left or right toconfuse the enemy as to his exact position.

+ When a unit halts at night, a change ofposition should be made during first hours ofdarkness.

+ When patrol bases are employed, pre-pare alternate positions. Avoid staying in oneposition more than one night.

+ Never occupy old positions (friendly orenemy).

+ Emphasize to Marines that stopping torender first aid while in the attack will only re-sult in more casualties through loss of firepowerand momentum.

+ No area, regardless of past activities,can be considered safe from possible enemyattack.

+ Communications have always been alucrative source of intelligence. No matter whatmethod of communication is used, except runners,we must assume that the enemy is listening.Don’t shackle known enemy locations. Don’t dis-close frequencies and call signs. Donft discuss/disclose friendly locations and scheme of maneu-ver. Conduct comprehensive communications se-curity training especially at the company level.

+- Learn all you can about the customs ofthe people.+ Never sacrifice security for speed.+ Practice fire discipline--shoot accu-rately and follow fire commands quickly. Fire atsuspected enemy positions but don’t squanderyour ammunition.+ Listen to suggestions from others andadopt them if they are sound.+ Use frag orders when the situationpermits.+ Don’t overwhelm men with the !lBig

Picture. ”+ Keep abreast of the tactical situationand keep your men informed.-+ Set the example.+ Protect ammunition from deterioration.Use radio battery plastic covers and fuze cansfor this purpose.

54

+ Move through jungle in multiple col-umns with all-around security using connectingfiles.+ Move on concealed routes wheneverpossible.+ Practice use of the compass, pacingand terrain orientation on all movements.+ Use arm and hand or any other silentsignals whenever possible.+ Practice fire discipline.-+ Keep weapons immediately availablefor use. Maintain contact with the enemy once itis gained.+ Test fire weapons before each opera-tion.+ Consider combat efficiency over per-sonal comfort.

####/i

3. DEFENSE

a. Tactical Security

Military history indicates that all success-ful commanders have been governed in theiractions and decisions by several fundamentalprinciples. These are now known as the principlesof war and apply to the leader of a fire team aswell as the battalion commander. The extent andmanner of application of these principles havealways determined the success or failure of mili-tary operations. While adherence to these

55

principles cannot guarantee success, failure toapply them almost always leads to disaster.

Failure of a leader to apply the principleof war called SECURITY in all his operations,both while engaged in offensive as well as de-fensive operations, will almost certainly lead to

56

complete and utter defeat. The majority of unitleaders in Vietnam today are well versed in theimportance of security. Reports are replete withinstances of American units foiling Viet Congattempts to infiltrate or surprise their positions.However, not all unit leaders have learned theirlesson in this respect. An examination of situa-tion reports and afteraction reports reveal thatsome American fighting men in Vietnam havebecome battle statistics because they or theirleaders didn’t understand the importance of se-curity.

All leaders in combat will normally incurcasualties at one time or another. The number ofcasualties sustained is in direct relation to thetempo of operations and the vagaries of combat.Casualties incurred under these circumstancesreflect neither credit nor discredit on a leader.They are the cold hard facts of war.

However, casualties suffered by a leaderwho has been surprised by the enemy while in adefensive position are normally unforgivable anda useless waste of lives. The enemy, on occasion,may outmaneuver you, may concentrate moretroops on the field of battle and may be moremobile. A leader, especially a small unit leader,might not have absolute control over such oc-currences. He does, however, have control overthe security of his unit and when it is surprisedby the enemy, particularly in a defensive position,he is guilty of committing an unpardonable crime

57

against his profession and the men who pay thesupreme price.

It is well to remember that security em-braces all the measures taken by a unit to pro-tect itself from observation, surprise, and an-noyance by the enemy. It includes those measuresnecessary to obtain early warning through theemployment of security detachments and to pre-

vent acts which might give information to theenemy. To guard against surprise requires anaccurate estimate of enemy capabilities, adequatesecurity measures, effective reconnaissance, andreadiness for action on the part of all units.

b. Review of Defensive Principles

While continuous emphasis must be placedon offensive operations if the war in Vietnam is

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to be successfully concluded, the fact remainsthat we must, of necessity, spend part of thetime in defensive positions. Whether we aredefending a large fixed installation such as theairfield at Chu Lai, or establishing a nightperimeter during a search and destroy opera-tion, certain basic principles and techniquesmust be adhered to if Marine lives are to besaved. The following principles and techniquesare not new but should be reviewed periodically:

+ The best defense is offensive action;a series of outposts and ambush sites should beestablished in depth at dusk or shortly after dark.During daylight, saturation patrolling as well asoutposts should be employed,

+ Defensive positions must provide all-around protection with the capability for rapidlymassing fires on any location around or withinthe perimeter. Always “fire in” defensive con-centrations, if possible. TIIis is important espe-cially in temporary perimeters.

+ For fixed and semifixed installations,barbed wire barriers (concertina, single- anddouble-apron fence, tanglefoot) should be con-structed around the perimeter of the installationand around sensitive locations inside the perim-eter. Although a good barrier plan is essential,the internal security cannot depend solely onthe physical barriers placed around the installa-tion.

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+ Trenches should be dug in a zigzagpattern between bunkers. Grenade sumps arc re-quired in trenches.

+ Bunkers, by the nature of their fixedpositions, are most vulnerable to infiltrationattack, or attack by direct fire weapons. Bunkersmust be located at least 50 meters behind theinner barrier wire to reduce the damage fromVC-emplaced Claymore mines and to preventhandgrenades from reaching them from posi-tions outside the wire. All bunkers should havereinforced overhead cover capable of withstand-ing the effects of mortar fire. They should becamouflaged, if possible, to increase the problemof identifying them at night. Bunkers should bemutually supporting whenever possible.

+ Claymore mines, emplaced inside thebarrier wire for command detonation, are mosteffective against personnel. Improvised flamedevices, such as the electrically detonated“fougasse,” also are effective.

+ The M79 grenade launcher is effectivein covering dead space in final protective firesclose to the edge of the defensive perimeter. Aclear field of fire must be obtained to avoidpremature detonation caused by rounds strikingbranches or limbs,

+ A well-coordinated illumination plantightly controlled by the commander must bedeveloped in order to prevent indiscriminate use

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of illumination. Improper illumination may revealfriendly forces and defensive positions to theenemy.

+ Locate guard or reserve f o r c es

throughout the internal area to combat small unitinfiltrations. A plan to utilize reserve forces toprevent or repel penetrations of the perimetermust be developed.

+ Establish multiple means of communi-cations within bunkers and internal securityposts.

+ There must be a minimum of movem-ent inside the perimeter after dark. If fi?.1.r]gof weapons or explosions of grenades OCC.VX~r~~$dethe perimeter (not from protec.!tve b~!r~k.x::. ~~:

61.

firing pits), all personnel not in protective posi-tions should “freeze” in a firing position. Anyonerunning or moving about should be consideredenemy. Signals must be used to identify friendlycounterattack forces. After firing ceases, con-duct a sweep inside the perimeter.

+ Disperse key personnel, weapons andequipment in order to avoid excessive losses.

+ The chain of command within all unitsmust be well defined to preclude confusion re-sulting from key personnel becoming casualties.

+ Emergency plans to restore communi-cations, to provide med’ical aid and to ensureuninterrupted defense of the area must be de-veloped and rehearsed.

* Search civilian workers upon theirdeparture from the installation to prevent re-moval of arms, ammunition or other property.Areas where personnel were working must beswept to remove marker signs emplaced to locatebunkers, automatic weapons sites, or other sensi-tive fixtures for unfriendly forces outside theinstallation.

+ Establishment of hasty defensive per-imeters during the conduct of other operationsrequires consideration of the following:

Provide for ambush patrols andearly warning d e v i c es to cover avenues of

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approach into the perimeter. Emplace the am-bushes while moving into the area.

c Stop before dark to set up camp forthe night.

● Halt on the most defensive terrainavailable. During rest stops, ensure that desig-nated guards are alert and outposts are placed.

● Consider the technique of stoppingan hour before last light, approximately 300-500meters from the intended night base camp. Estab-lish good local security, and then use this haltfor chow, minor first aid, weapons maintenanceor to accept a helicopter resupply. Send a patrolto reconnoiter your intended base. When thispatrol locates suitable, defensible terrain for abase and reconnoiters for defensive ambush andOP/LP sites, the patrol sends back guides to themain body, and also maintains surveillance of thebase area. After dark, the main body is guidedto the actual base, occupies assigned sectors ofthe perimeter by units, and digs in quietly.Ambushes and OP/LP’s are established in accord-ance with previous daylight reconnaissance, toinclude an ambush on the route used by the unitto reach the actual base. For normal indirectfire support planning for the actual base area,plan concentrations for the first (temporary)base, and likely approaches into that area.

+ The enemy will make every effort toremove all casualties, weapons and documentsfrom the battlefield in order to prevent accurate

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assessment of their losses. Use long rangeautomatic weapons fire combined with continuousillumination of the area to keep the enemy from“policing” the battlefield as they withdraw. Ca+ualties left behind by the enemy are often booby-trapped. Exercise extreme caution when searchingor moving enemy casualties.

+ Remove all trip flares and booby traps atfirst light.

4- Do no~ disclose automatic weapon posi-tions by firing when the enemy harasses withsniper fire.

c. Defense of Isolated Positions

Recently a 105mm howitzer battery, situ-ated in a relatively isolated location, was at-tacked by a well-trained and armed force of

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Viet Cong. The number of enemy has never beendetermined other than that it was in excess of50 men.

The attack started at 0155, during thedarkness of the moon with a mortar barrage onthe nearest unit. This unit was a 155mm howitzerbattery and was located about 1000 meters away.There was no attack on this position and as itwas later determined, the objective of the VietCong was to pin this unit down. Simultaneously,the Viet Cong attacked the 105mm battery fromthree directions. Two attacks came from thesouth utilizing bangalore torpedoes to breach theperimeter wire. Rocket launchers were used onthe bunkers near the breaches. The attack fromthe north was accomplished in a silent manner,breaching the wire with cutters. The attentionof the defenders was focused on the southernforces and the northern forces was inside thewire before it was discovered.

The northern force threw satchel chargesin the living quarters and sprayed the defenderswith automatic weapons fire. Both forces madefor the gun pits and succeeded in damaging twohowitzers plus destroying a ready ammunitionpit. It is estimated that as many as 40 Viet Congwere inside the perimeter.

The defenders were aided by continuousartillery illumination plus a flare ship. The 155mmbattery fired several rounds of direct fire. Thenearest infantry company had only a skeleton

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force in the company command post. The re-mainder of the company was deployed remotelyfrom the scene of the attack. A small force ofViet Cong pinned down the company commandpost with automatic weapons fire.

Contact was maintained with the Viet Conguntil daybreak (0555). Sixteen dead Viet Congwere left in the position. Numerous grenades andweapons were left behind. At approximately 0700,an engineer road grader struck a mine which wasplanted in the road between the battery positionand the nearest infantry battalion command post.All wire lines of communication had been cutduring the first few minutes of the attack. It waslater discovered that these lines were cut in asmany as three different locations.

The following are some of the lessonslearne@ from the above experience:

Significant Points

+ The entire area of the attack had beenwell reconnoitered. Specific locations of units,roads, bunkers and other defenses had been pin-pointed by the Viet Cong.

+ Wire lines of communication were cutat terminal strips located near the perimeterwire.

+

with nofrom the

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An attack was made from the southattempt to be quiet. The main attacknorth was extremely quiet.

+ Once the Viet Cong were inside thewire, there was nothing to impede freedom ofmovement throughout the entire battery area.They could run directly to the gun pits, ammuni-tion pits and other installations.

+ The best road available for use by acounterattacking force was mined.

Conclusions

+ Periodically and without setting a pat-tern, shift men on perimeter defenses from bunk-ers to fighting holes. This should be done afterdark.

+ Perimeter fences should be high enoughto prevent their being crossed by means ofmatting. Use a minimum of two fences aroundthe position so that the enemy must use at leasttwo demolition teams to effect a breach. Be sureto stake down concertina to prevent its beinglifted.

+ When an attack is made in one direc-tion and is detected, look to the rear for anotherattack. Do not focus the defenses in one direc-tion.

+ Compartmentalize the interior of posi-tions by a maze of three-strand cattle fences.Use ofiset entrances to gun pits and other vitalareas to slow down personnel trying to enter. Anattack similar to the one described was made ona combination artillery and tank position at CamLo in September 1966. The Viet Cong were able

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to breach the perimeter wire, but were com-pletely baffled by the compartmentation. As theybunched up, the tanks and defenders were ableto inflict severe casualties.

\;

+ Usc dummy communications trunklinesin the position to confuse the Viet Cong. Placeall terminal strips well within the positions.

+ After an attack, beware of mines onaccess roads to the position. Request a minesweep of all roads and trails.

+ Ensure that sufficient backup radiosare in position to ensure reliable communicationswhen the wire is cut.

+ Form a reaction force from personnellocated i.n the same area. Rehearse this forcefrequently.

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* Remember that any change in the de-fense will act as a deterrent to the Viet Cong asfar as their mounting an attack. It must be pre-sumed that the defenses have been scouted. Useof a tank or Ontos in the position at randomperiods is an excellent means of varying the de-fenses.

+ Cover all perimeter wire by fire.

-+ Make extensive use of Claymore mines,taking care to remove them at daybreak and tovary their positions. Do not set a pattern. Neverplace the Claymores beyond the perimeter wireand where possible keep them under observation.

d. Night Positions

Aggressive offensive action requires speedof maneuver, maximum utilization of available

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time, and economy of force. The speed and easewith which units can deploy into a nighttimedefensive perimeter are often hindered by the densefoliage found in many regions of Vietnam. Incertain instances it is more advisable to considerdeploying for night positions in ambush fashionrather than in perimeter form. An example ofan ambush which also fulfills the function of anight defensive position is the “Yankee Forma-tion” or “Y” ambush. Such a position employsthree legs running out from a central point witha strong point at the end of each leg. Each of thelegs is capable of firing in either direction andsupporting the other two. Such a deployment isone accomplished by having alternate individualswithin each leg cover sectors to the left or rightalong the long axis of the leg. The center of the“Y” where the three legs join is the controlpoint and the position of the unit leader. Fromsuch a position he can control and maneuver hisunit most advantageously.

This formation is highly effective as anambush and as a defense against attack from anydirection. Such a formation can be easily alteredto conform to the terrain requirements and canbe utilized by a slmall-sized unit.

Furthermore, its triangular concept iseasily adaptable to the Marine organization. Thereis a further advantage in such a formation. Inheavy foliage, units may deploy far more easilythan in a perimeter defense. Each ,leg is givena general direction of deployment and need only

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be tied in at the center. This curtails the prob-lems of shifting lines or clearing additional linesof communication to the center of a perimeter.There is also less movement involved in deploy-ing in such a manner.

e. Flash Observation Procedures

The increase in VC mortar, artillery androcket attacks has made it essential that all unitshave effective countermortar, counterartillery,and counterrocket plans. The success of counter-fire plans is dependent largely on two factors:the speed with which the enemy firing positionscan be located, and the speed with which this in-formation can be passed to the FSCC.

Speedy resolution of these factors hasbeen accomplished in one area in RVN by theestablishment of a system of flash observationposts. The observation posts are located on thehighest ground near the command bunker of eachperimeter section. Additional observation postsare maintained at combat outposts and in the air-strip control tower. Each OP is manned by asentry whose primary mission is to locate enemymortar, artillery and rocket positions. The loca-tion of all the OP’S are plotted on a commandmap in the battalion combat operations center.When enemy muzzle flashes are sighted, polarplots are reported to the COC by the reportingobservation posts. Once the enemy position ispinpointed by graphic intersection from two or

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more OP sightings, concentrated fire can heplaced on the target.

The following recommendations can assistin establishing an effective counterfire plan andare particularly valuable for units that defendIargc, semipermanent bases and installationsthat are prime targets for VC attack:

-+- Establish flash OP’S in each sector ofthe perimeter on high ground that commands thebest observation of the area. Observation towersare excellent for this purpose and may also beused for maintaining surveillance over the area,and adjusting artillery fire.

-+ Plot the location of all OP’S on a mapin the COC and/or FSCC.

+ Brief all personnel manning flash OP’S

in proper communications procedures, use ofthe lcnsatic compass, flash-bang method of rangeestimation, and artillery fire request procedures.

-+- Relieve OP sentries at least every2 hours and more often when the situation per-mits.

f. Natural Camouflage Will Save Lives

Are you, as a unit commander, making fulluse of individual and natural camouflage? Areyour men “making like a bush” in the field,blending with the natural foliage, and breakingtheir outlines against the sky? Give the matter

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a little serious thought. Do you camouflage yourhelmet and body?

Have you ever advised a Marine in winterservice uniform that if he had to walk on a high-way at night to hold a white handkerchief in hisoutboard hand so that car lights could spot andavoid killing him? The same Marine in the jungleor on patrol is going to present a white face,arms and hands unless he properly camouflagesthese parts with his green stain. His face, arms,and hands can gleam enough against a green back-ground to help the VC spot and kill him.

Marines are supposed to be pros but someof the pictures coming out of Vietnam must makeour old adversaries the Japanese shudder inhorror. The Japanese used camouflage to fulladvantage--leaves, vines or grass interwoven

73

on helmet and pack made the Japanese soldierextremely difficult to see, particularly in de-fensive positions. We must believe, however,that the Viet Cong welcome all the obvious lapsesin camouflage discipline.

Natural camouflage; i.e., grass, leavesor vines that will blend with the area in whichthe unit is operating, will take only minutes toapply and costs absolutely nothing. It is a battle-tested fact, however, that its judicious use willsave lives, for it is difficult to shoot and killwhat you cannot seel

Pictures and *rv reports from Vietnamstrongly indicate the need for strict enforcementof camouflage discipline at all echelons of com-mand. Vehicles, tanks, helicopters, boats canall be camouflaged; the variety and extent areonly limited by the intelligence and ingenuity ofthe commander. Above all, the individual Marinemust be trained in the use of natural camouflagewhich will save his life. It must become asinstinctive as wearing his dog tags.

Unit leader, ask yourself this question--Do my men know how to camouflage a helmet,or does the individual Marine keep his whitecigarette package up there for the Viet Cong todraw a bead on.

Perhaps, if time permits, a simple demon-stration might bring home the shocking truth. Puta few salvaged helmets out 200 yards and let thetroops draw a bead on them. Count the hits.

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Then use natural camouflage around the samehelmets, a la Japanese style, Mending with thearea. Now have the same troops fire and countthe hits. The results might be surprising!

There are those who advocate naturalcamouflage only in night or defensive positionson the assumption that “making like a bush”will lessen the aggressive spirit necessary toclose and destroy the enemy. A little reasoningand proper leadership should convince any Marinethat there is nothing ridiculous about usingnatural camouflage. In fact, once discovered andexperienced, natural camouflage provides addedconfidence that the individual is not sticking outlike a sore thumb for all to take a shot at!

Older Marines know that the battlefield isa terribly lonely place for the younger Marine,Natural camouflage properly utilized will helphim blend with his surroundings and make itmore difficult for the Viet Cong to shoot and killhim. Natural camouflage can save his life! Youmust do everything in your power as a Marineleader to see that he uses natural camouflageinstinctively.

The following basic tips can assist inmaking individual camouflage effective:

+ Break up the shape of the helmet withleaves or twigs.+ Tone down all visible skin areas withface paint, burnt cork, or charcoal.

7.5

+- Attaching vegetation to clothing willhelp if it blends with the background.+ Remove [he shine from metal objectswith mud or face paint.

Below are a few basic tips that can assistin camouflaging ecluiprnent and emplacements:

+ Avoid regular, geometric layouts ofvehicles, weapons and supplies.+ Avoid activity, such as continued move-ment of personnel and equipment over the sameroutes, that can change the original appearanceof an area.+- Conceal all vehicle tracks so that theground appears unmarked.+ Eliminate the shine on all vehicles andequipment.-+- Use shadows and ensure that the sil-houettes of emplacements and equipment arebroken.

g. Claymores for Night Defense

When employing the Claymore mine fordefense of night posi[ions, care must be taken toensure d~at the enemy does not have the opportunityto locate the Claymores and turn them aroundor remove them. Reconnoiter l~cations for theClaymores in daylight, but do not actually putthem in place until it is too dark for the enemyto observe your actions clearly. The wires ofthe Claymore should be run back to the friendlypositions in a zigzag fashion and not along easily

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discovered trails or open areas. By placing astrip of white adhesive tape on the back of themine, the mine can be more easily kept underobservation.

h. The Key to Success

The best defense is a good offense. With..out vigorous patrolling in a unit’s area of re-sponsibility, even the best defense is vulnerableto infiltration. Villagers who see Marines dailyfeel a greater sense of security. Viet Cong havedifficulty in massing any larger units than asquad, and night mass assaults are more vul-nerable to detection when Marines patrol in-cessantly.

‘7’7

i. You and Your Shadow

The enemy in Vietnam habitually shadowsU.S. Forces. They assign observers to watch andreport on every movement and activity. Thisis, why so much emphasis is placed upon varyingpatrol times, patterns, and routes. When theenemy perceives a pattern, he is afforded theopportunity to strike under conditions of his ownchoice. When your unit has been in a temporaryposition for more than a few days, be especiallyalert. Effective close-in patrolling will limit theenemy’s observation of your position and activi-ties. This will disrupt his habit of staying closeby for observation. Be aware of the fact thatwhatever your unit does is being observed andreported.

j. Fixed Illumination

Units in static defensive positions whereelectrical power is available can develop anexcellent illumination system using salvagedvehicle headlights. The silence and immediacyin reaction time of an electrical lighting systemgive no prior warning to the enemy. Lightingshould be directed towards possible avenues ofapproach and may be rigged for adjustment byguidewires from a bunker containing the on-and-off switch, Ordnance-type illumination should bekept available for emergency lighting situationsand as a positive backup for the electrical system.

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k. Bridge Security

Many of the bridges that have been de-stroyed by the VC have been blown by satchelcharges attached to the bridge pilings below thewaterline. To guard against this, divers arefrequently used to check the pilings for possibledemolitions, A unique method of underwaterillumination using flares has proven effective.A hand illumination flare (Signal Illuminating,Ground, White Star Parachute M127A1) firedstraight down into the water next to the pilingwill ignite at a depth of approximately 75 feet.As it burns it will start tosurface enabling the observerfor demolitions from 18 towaterline to the surface.

##//////

rise slowly to theto check the piling20 feet below the

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4. AMBUSI-I TACTICS

a. Ambush Preparation

Ambushes that are conducted with imagi-nation and skill are an effective means of inflict-ing casualties on the enemy. Successful ambushesrequire patience, endurance, perseverance, ag-gressiveness, and a high degree of self- disciplineon the ,part of ambush team members. Experiencedambush team leaders have noted a relationshipbetween the size of the ambush and the personalattitude of the personnel comprising the ambushunit. Members of a squad-size patrol usually arealert and vigilant en route to and within theambush site. However, the average Marine ap-pears to feel less responsibility and is morerelaxed when he is part of an ambush forcelarger than a squad. This false sense of securitycan result in carelessness and lax disciplinewhich may cause the ambush to fail. In additionto the personal requirements, certain other fac-tors are influential in [he success or failure ofam,bushes.

Most ambushes are set at night and duripgearly morning hours since dlese are the hoursduring which the enemy is most active. Carefulconsideration of intelligence information willindicate best times for intercepting enemy move-ment. The time factor also has counterintelligenceimplications. Departure from and reentry intofriendly lines should be planned for a period when

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the patrol will be least exposed to enemy surveil-lance. The proper moment to spring an ambushonce the enemy is sighted must be thoroughlyunderstood by all members of the patrol. Pre-maturely triggered ambushes yield fewer enemykills and can result in Marine casualties. Thefirst shot should be held until the patrol leaderis positive that the enemy is in the killing zone.

The assumption that the enemy will usethe obvious trails, roads and stream crossingsshould be avoided. All available intelligence in-formation should be collected on enemy routesof movement to aid in the choice of ambush sites.In many instances, the enemy avoids using obviousroutes in order to keep from walking throughlikely ambush positions.

Noise, light and camouflage discipline havean extremely important effect on the chances forsuccess of an ambush. A breach of any one ofthese will jeopardize the success of the mission.A noisy, careless Marine in an ambush site isthe only warning device the VC needs. The keyto a successful ambush is surprise.

The absence of stealth is a common errorand often leads to compromise of ambushes.Every precaution must be taken to avoid beingobserved by civilians, leaving signs, or givingany other indication of the patrol’s presencewhen moving to an ambush location. The siteshould be reconnoitered in such a manner thatthe intention to use the site for an ambush is not

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disclosed. If the enemy is aware of the move-ment to the ambush position, chances of successare negligible.

Thorough consideration of the factors abovewill increase the odds in favor of a successfulambush. Supervision and discipline are the keys.

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b. Ambush Techniques

All too frequently ambushes are well laid,properly planned, and correctly positioned, onlyto fail because of an oversight on the part of theambush leader or one of his men. Some of thecommon deficiencies are as follows:

+ Noise discipline--coughing, talking,shifting about, clattering of equipment, etc.+ Springing the ambush too early or witha poor signal.* Lack of sufficient firepower beingplaced in the killing zone,+ Failure to pursue by fire when theenemy moves into the jungle.+ Failure to quickly exploit and search theimmediate area for casualties.+ Failure to establish a preplanned searchof the area.+ Failure to boobytrap or block the op-posite side of the trail.+ Failure to block escape routes.+ Failure of ambush leaders to use sup-porting arms.

c. The SID Ambush

The seismic intrusion device (SID) isadaptable in a remote ambush position for usewith either the Claymore directional mine or the3.5-inch rocket. (See fig. 2-l.) When used in thismanner, the ambush site is chosen to take

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maximum effect of the shock of these weapons.A seismometer is positioned on the approachesto the ambush site and another is placed in thekilling zone. Through careful positioning, thissecond device will not be destroyed when themine or rocket explodes. The killing zone itselfcan be covered by a Claymore mine or anelectrically detonated 3.5-inch rocket; the card-board shipping tube makes an expedient rocketlauncher. Electrical ignition of the rocket is pos-sible by separating the two wires covered withwhite or clear colored plastic in the rocketnozzle, then stripping off about 2 inches of insula-tion and splicing them to the firing wire. A ten-cap blasting machine or a battery of appropriatevoltage can provide the necessary charge.

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Fi,gtre 2-1

The ambush party is alerted when theenemy passes either point A or B and enters thekilling zone. The ambush is triggered manuallywhen the enemy passes point C. Once the ambushhas been triggered, the ambush party can discon-nect the seismometers and withdraw, recoveringthe seismometers at a later time.

d. Ambush in or Around a Village

When an ambush is planned in the vicinity

of a village, units should consider making asweep prior to establishing the ambush. This will

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enable the unit leader to reconnoiter the area andat the same time leave the village with the im-pression that the searchers are satisfied thatall of the enemy have withdrawn.

Recently, one rifle company was moving

through a ricefield area to a preselected ambushsite when it was sighted by local villagers. Thecompany immediately countermarched and sweptthe.village. Villagers were questioned and housessearched before the unit moved on, giving theimpression that it was apparently satisfied thatthere were no VC in the area. After moving ap-proximately 500 meters beyond the village theunit stopped, deployed and waited. During thesweep the commander had selected an ambushsite adjacent to the village. At 1830 he movedan ambush patrol into the site and had them digpositions. At 2000, two VC walked down the trailfrom the village. The result was one confirmedVC KIA and one probable.

This is a good example of the use ofingenuity and imagination on the part of the com-pany commander. Stealth was employed in movingback to the ambush site and care was taken so noweapons were laid on azimuths that could en-danger the friendly villagers.

e. Watch the Rear

Frequently the Viet Cong follow a patrol,waiting for the unit to make a mistake or for a

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chance to ambush from the rear. There are threerecommended ways to counter this VC threat:

+ Drop a fire team or squad ambush on aprearranged signal.+ Circle back on the patrol route forcingthe VC to worry about his rear.+ Alter direction of movement every fewhundred meters to confuse the enemy as tolocation and direction of movement of the patrol.

f. The Point and Ambushes

The North Vietnamese Army’s tactic ofambushing the point unit of a rifle company isextremely effective, and unless immediate actionis taken by the friendly unit, heavy casualtiesmay result. If the enemy chooses to stand andfight after springing an ambush, supporting arms

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will usually be used by the Marines. If the enemyretrears, this is normally the end of the en-counter because of the extreme difficulty in con-ducting a pursuit in dense jungle. In any event,the point squad leader must be able to relay tothe company commander, via the platoon leader,an accurate estimate of the situation. Firesuperiority must be gained as soon as possibleby the point element. Though this may appeardifficult, small arms fire, LAW’s, M- 79’s, andhandgrenades fired in the direction of the enemywill usually do the job. By the time fire superiorityis gained, the platoon leader should be up frontcommunicating with the company commanderconcerning his estimate of the situation. As mos~ambushes of this nature take place at extremelyclose ranges, the leading elements will have towithdraw a considerable distance if supportingarms are used.

Before moving into an area where ambushis likely, it is a good idea to consider the follow-ing:

+ Brief the point in detail of what actionsare to be taken upon ambush. Include details onwhen you expect to commence the attack or with-drawal in countering the ambush.-+- Inform supporting arms of your routeand plan concentrations on likely trouble spots.+ Always know the location of the pointso no time is lost in adjusting supporting arms.+ H“ave a workable casualty evacuationsystem.

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+ Consider having the point reconnoiterdanger areas by fire. This usually causes NVAunits to flee or spring the ambush prematurely.

g. Vehicle Ambushes by the Viet Cong

In some areas the manner in which theViet Cong have conducted ambushes against smallvehicles has been fairly well standardized. Thefirst thing that the Viet Cong do is shoot at thepassenger side of the vehicle to hit the “shotgun.”The driver is too busy with the vehicle to offermuch resistance, thus giving the Viet Cong timeto fire at him next. It has been found that thewindshield on the passenger side of the vehiclehas generally been in a raised position.

It is felt that the windshield on these ve-hicles had been down, and the driver wearinggoggles, it would have minimized the chance ofambush. Even if one is prepared to fire and isalert in the vehicle, it is extremely difficult tofire to the front with the windshield up. It isawkward, and there is a natural tendency to be alittle hesitant about firing to the front directlythrough the windshield. With the windshield down,the ability to return fire to the front is nothampered.

h. Be Flexible

Patrol reports from Vietnam have drawnattention to a technique used by the Viet Cong todetermine the size and composition of patrols.

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Local villagers are used to count the number ofmen in a patrol both on departing and enteringfriendly positions; the direction of the patrol’smovement is also reported. When the patrol size

is reduced during the course of a patrol, the VCdeduce that an ambush party has been positionedsomewhere along their route.

A technique has been devised to make itmore difficult for the enemy to notice if patrolelements have been dropped off at some inter-mediate position. First, the ambush party isdispersed throughout the larger patrol; the ambushelement keeps its radio antenna detached and isequipped and armed similar to other patrol mem-bers. The party detaches itself covertly from thepatrol when in the desired ambush site. Sincemany ambushes are positioned after sundown, thedarkness and surrounding foliage hide theirmaneuver from enemy observation. The next dayanother patrol can drop off a different elementand pick up the other ambush party. Except forthe first time, the patrol size remains constant.The old ambush party may move to an OP, andthe pickup patrol can force the enemy into openground or toward the OP site where they can bebrought under fire.

#####

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5. MONSOON OPERATIONS

The effects of monsoon weather on combatoperations are so significant that they dominateall aspects of both planning and operations. Thesuccessful accomplishment of a mission willdepend upon the preparation of detailed primaryand alternate plans which are designed to ac-complish missions under the most unfavorableweather conditions and exploit short periods ofadvantageous weather.

Normally, the primary plan will be based oncourses of action which can accomplish the mis-sion in any weather. This should preclude relianceon air support in any form. With the limitationimposed by loss of a e r i a 1 lift, resupply,MEDEVAC, reconnaissance, and observation, the

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range and scope of the primary plan are reduced.The staying power of a deployed unit becomesan important consideration. The duration of anoperation is calculated on the unit’s ability tosustain itself without resupply, to care for andmove casualties without evacuation, and to ac-complish its mission without reinforcement. Thus,plans for monsoon operations must allow for in-creased combat loads and provide for the combatpower necessary to compensate for loss offlexibility.

Time-space factors vary widely. For example,a movement to the objective area may be madein 15 minutes by helicopter in good weather,5 hours by foot in marginal weather, and 24 hoursby foot in bad weather, which requires a circui-tous route to avoid impossible terrain and ex-tends the movement into darkness.

A more ambitious alternate plan must be pre-pared which will capitalize on the use of airsupport when weather conditions permit. De-ploying units must be prepared to exploit theadvantage of brief periods of good weather duringany phase of the operation. In dense canopy orother unfavorable terrain, ‘the location and availa-bility of helicopter landing zones become avital concern. Deployed units may use possiblelanding zones for tactical objectives, maintainingtheir readiness to increase the range and scopeof their operations by keeping “one foot in anLZ” a[ all timCS.

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In short, remember that planners of opera-tions down to the small patrol level must beconstantly aware of the sudden and drasticchanges in streams, rivers, watersheds, lakes,ditches, ricefields, and lowlands caused by theheavy rainfall of the Southeast Asia monsoons.The primary plan for combat operations duringthe monsoon season should provide for the ac-complishment of the mission under the limita-tions of the most adverse weather. An alternateplan should be available to provide for the ex-tension of operations during any phase wheneverfavorable weather permits.

#####

6. LAND NAVIGATION AND MOVEMENT

a. Maps in Vietnam

Units in Vietnam generally have excellent1:50,000 maps of operational areas; however, itmust be remembered that at this scale littledetail can be given and only major terrair:features are shown. Additionally, it is not un-common to find smaller villages and areaausing local names not agreeing with your map,Check with your interpreter or ARVN troops toavoid confusion. Map tips to remember include:

+ The G-M angle for Vietnam is not largeenough to be considered when planning a route.

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+ In populated areas, pagodas, churches,schools and bridges make good reference pointsfor checking location.+ The key to your map is contained inthe marginal information. Study it thoroughly.-+ Accuracy is essential when workingwith the 1:50,000-scale map. Remember a 1.27-inch square covers 1 square mile. Be correct.Map errors cost lives.

b. Be a Map Expert

The majority of operations in Vietnamare conducted by small units. Many of these op-erations involve long hours of patrolling to col-lect pieces of information which build a pictureof local guerrilla activities. It is essential thatthe patrol leader have the ability to locate ac-curately his position at any time, day or night.

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Inaccurate location means inaccurate reporting,possible disorientation of the unit, probabilityof inadequate fire support, and compromise ofthe unit’s mission.

Map reading and proficiency with thecompass are the bases for accurate location.Continual use of the compass on patrols shouldbe standard practice. Frequent cuts (azimuths)on known terrain features check the patrol’sdead reckoning. Elapsed time and rate of move-ment, combined with map inspection, can pro-vide the patrol leader with a known position atall times. Small units should make a practice oflocating themselves at least each half hour andalways when the unit halts. The assignment oftwo or more two-man teams for this task willallow a cross-check. Careful preplanned illumina-tion missions can assist in patrol location. Day-light reconnaissance of the patrol route, mapinspection, and close liaison with other patrolleaders and the unit S-2 are sound practices forpatrol preparation.

c. Land Navigation

In the generally flat terrain of the ConThien area south of the DMZ, the hedgerows andlack of reference points make it extremely dif-ficult to navigate and determine location. Two

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suggestions that may be employed in such areasCOlessen these difficulties are:

+ When possible conduct a helicopterreconnaissance prior to entry into an area. Thisshould include as many small unit leaders asfeasible.

+ Artillery and m o r t a r illuminatingrounds fired during daylight hours can be usedto locate one’s position on the ground. This isdone by plotting a back azimuth from the pointof detonation. The point at which back azimuths,from two widely separated rounds, intersectshould be one’s approximate location (illuminat-ing rounds should be fired at given coordinates).

d. Cross-Country Movement in Rough Terrain

“The terrain was the greatest single limit-ing factor in this operation. Ninety percent ofthe area consisted of dense secondary under-growth with a 60 to 100-foot canopy, the rest waselephant grass up to 15-feet high. Trails had tobe hacked out, and machetes were a must. ” Thatis a brief description of one Marine battalion’soperating area, which also included precipitousslopes and areas with drastic changes in eleva-tion. Formations for extended periods wererestricted to columns abreast. In this way, if onepoint element was taken under fire, there wasanother platoon abreast of it to assist.

96

In terrain and vegetation such as was en-countered above, it is of paramount importanceto know the exact location of other units to avoidfiring on friendly troops. Constant radio contactand a direction of’ march along a fixed azimuthreduces the probability of contact developingbetween friendly units. The point element shouldalways be well forward of the main body by about

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50 meters. The point will normally be the firstunit to be engaged and usually by ambush. If thepoint is well forward, the enemy may be forcedto engage prematurely.

e. Jungle Navigation

Many area maps are prepared primarilyfrom photos. Thick jungle canopy may hide manydeep and narrow ravines thus preventing theirappearance on maps. These hidden features caneasily cause lengthy delays and detours. Whenplanning for cross-country movement throughthe jungle, anticipate such delays and adjust yourtime frame accordingly.

f. Night Movement

Movement at night and during periods ofreduced visibility in areas covered by junglecanopy is extremely difficult. Direction is easilylost, physical exertion is increased, and maxi-mum small unit leadership is required to en-force noise and light discipline. The followingitems will aid in successful night movement:

-+ Personnel physically unable to com-plete a night march should be evacuated or leftbehind.

+ Night marches should be short andover previously scouted trails. Use clearly de-fined objectives and thoroughly brief all hands

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on routes to be taken, azimuths, alternate routes,and rendezvous areas.

+ Use guides at trail junctions to helpfollowing units stay on course.

+ Reflective tape, if available, or plainwhite adhesive tape worn on the rear of the helmetshould be used to help maintain contact. Lumi-nous vegetable decay found on the jungle floormakes a satisfactory substitute if tape is notavailable.

+ Use the noise created by rain, wind,or artillery to mask sounds of movement.

+ The period between moonrise and moon-set on bright clear nightsventional control methods.

g. March Discipline

Personnel recently

will often allow con-

arrived in a combatenvironment have a tendency to relax theirmarch discipline when crossing streams andduring daylight periods when the column halts.Strict control is necessary when a column crossesa stream to limit the number of personnel re-filling their canteens at any time. When columncontrol is lost, units become separated andvulnerable to ambush. Captured enemy person-nel have commented on the relatively slow reactionby U.S. troops when fired on during march stops.Security elements had not moved far enoughfrom

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the main body and searched adequately to ensuresecurity.

Do not let down your guard at any time.

h. Deceptive Terrain

What often appears to be flat hard groundin Vietnam often turns out to be just a hardcrust covering soft sand beneath. Vehicles ofall types will break through the crust and onoccasion will become mired. This situation existsusually in areas where the water table is high,Some indications of the existence of this condi-tion are pools of water with no apparent source,areas where patches of ground have sunk a footor two, and areas where streams appear tobegin.

Other points to remember are dlat softmarshy ground often exists at the entrance todraws tha~ lead toward high ground, and thatstreams that have hard gravel beds might havesoft, spongy sand below.

i. Cutting Trails Through Bamboo

In jungle terrain, bamboo tree lines canimpose a difficult barrier to the movement offoot troops. Experience has shown that the onlyway to overcome such obstacles is to cut thebamboo about 1 inch below or above the joint

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of the stem. A cut in any other location simplyshatters the stem and delays clearing.

j. Silent Movement

It is possible for patrols and small unitsto move through jungle and thickly vegetated

101

areas with comparative silence. Combat reportsemphasize the following points:

+ Move carefully and steadily--part theundergrowth whenever possible rather than crushit.+ Avoid stepping on rotten wood, dryleaves and sticks.+ Use silent hand-and-arm signals.+ Cut vegetation as a final resort. Ifyou decide to cut:

slash.

k.

● Use a sharp machete or knife.● Use a sawing motion rather than a

It is just as fast and less tiring and noisy.

Tactical Movement Tips

Some measures that have proven of valuein minimizing the effect of enemy small armsfire during tactical movement are listed below:

-+ Diversify patrol routes and formations;avoid setting a pattern of movement.+ Use covered routes of approach “whenpossible.+ When feasible, reconnoiter probablesniper positions by fire.+- Establish a covering base of fire beforecrossing an open area, then “leapfrog” elementsacross.+ Immediately return enemy fire. Do notallow the element to be pinned down.

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+ Use a sniper team for counterharassingfire and to hit long range targets of opportunity.+ Have supporting arms observers travelin close proximity to the unit commander.+ Maintain established intervals at alltimes.* Be particularly cautious at first light.+ Maintain assigned sectors of observa-tion and fire.+ When in full combat gear, ensure thatthe armored vest is zipped or buttoned to theneck.

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7. SNIPERS

a. Use Your Snipers

Infantry regiments and reconnaissance bat-talions now have a specially trained and equippedsniper unit capable of killlng enemy personnelwith single shots from concealed positions: Inthe regiments there are three squads of fivetwo-man teams. The reconnaissance battalionshave a similar organization with four squads ofthree two-man teams. Each platoon, in additionto the platoon leader and platoon sergeant, hasa rifle team ccluipment armorer capable ofsecond echelon maintenance. The basic unit is

a team consisting of two men trained as bothsnipers and observers. Each team is equippedwith one high-powered sniper rifle (Remington40x7.62 nlnl) with telescopic sight (Redfield 3x9)and a pair of wide-angled binoculars.

Team members are skilled in fieldcraftand are all expert riflemen with superior marks-manship qualities. Training qualifies them forsingle-shot kills at 800 meters. Such feats haveadverse psychological effects on the enemy outof proportion to the means used to attain them.

Contact the operations officer of the or-ganization having control of the sniper platoonfor the method of employment best suited toyour situation.

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b. Employment of Snipers——. —... ...-.-——r-—

Daily employment of snipers varies withthe unit to which attached. Sniper teams arenormally attached to the battalions for a periodof approximately 2 w-eeks and then rotated backto regiment to check weapon’s zero, to reze:roand to make any repairs or conduct maintenanceon the weapons and scopes which cannot be ac-complished at battalion level. During the periodof attachment, snipers are under operationalcontrol of the unit to which they are attached.Employment will vary depending upon the mis-sion of the ui~lt. Appropriate methods of em-ployment for scout sniper teama are:

4“ As part ef a blocking force.+ Outpost security (daylight hours).+ As part of daylight patrols.+ As part of daylight ambushes.+ Long range covering fire for advancingunits.

Employment ofoutpost security andforces constitute theemployment in RVN.

sniper teams for patrols,as members of Mockingmost prevalent types of

The main capabilities of the sniper teamsare:

-+ The ability to provide accurate longrange precision fire upon enemy snipers, troops

105

in the open, automatic weapon emplacementsand mortar positions.

+ In suitable terrain, the denial to theenemy of freedom of movement.

The principal limitations of sniper teamsarc:

+ The effectiveness of the sniper isgreatly reduced in heavy jungle growth, highgrass or during heavy rain.

-z- Snipers cannot react swiftly with ahigh volume of fire. This dictates that the snipernot be utilized in positions that require automaticweapons such as on a point or flank position in aunit.

-+ Snipers mustto observe the resultsable to quickly adjust

work in teams in orderof their shots and to besubsequent rounds. One

man observes and calls adjustments of subsequentrounds.

c. Extend Night Sniper Ranges

The sniper may find his night rangeslimited to 300 meters when using the infraredweapon sight with the self-contained light source.The same weapon and telescope assembly, whenused in coordination with the Xenon tank-mountedsearchlight, can extend the range to 800 meters.A technique which has been used effectively isto position the sniper in the loader’s seat in the

106

tank. The turret is traversed with the infraredlight turned on, allowing the sniper to keep hisweapon aligned with the light.

It takes just a short time to develop thenecessary coordination between tank commanderand sniper to illuminate possible targets, Witha properly zeroed rifle first-round hits are pos-sible at maximum ranges.

d. Immediate Action to Counter EnemySnipers

When taken under fire by a sniper, person-nel often fall to the ground and seek cover. Itcannot be overemphasized that the requirementto bring fire to bear on the suspected sniperlocation is as important as individual protection.Immediate action drills and directing immediate,rapid and accurate fire into the general locationof a sniper should be emphasized in training.This includes grenade, 3.5-inch rocket, M79 and60mm mortar fire.

e. Countering VC Sniper Tactics

One of the more common types of contactwith the VC is a sniping incident. The snipingvaries from a single sniper who fires a quickround or two and then disappears, to a squad ofVC firing heavily for several minutes. Incidentsusually take place at ranges of 200 to 300 metersor more. Snipers are well concealed and Marinesusually cannot see a target to engage. Large

107

search and destroy operations have HttlesuccessIn killing or capturing this type of VC guerrilla,but well-planned and executed small unit patrolscarried out as indicated below have proven ef-fWCiVe j,n coping with snipers:

-?J- An operational area is saturated withsqua.d.sized daylight combat patrols to becomef~mi]lar with the terrain and to make contact

with the enemy. Patrol leaders are thoroughlydebriefed and current information is kept on whenand. where patrols received fire. As soon asseveral contacts have been made in a specificarea, one or more squad-sized patrols are sentout during the hours of clarkness. They are posi-tioned in fire team-sized 0P’s or Mocking posi-tions where they will be able to cover thosepositions from where sniper fire was previouslyreceived.

-tw- After daylight, a combat patrol is sentout to patrol through the same area to engagethe enemy. The fire team OP’S then engage anyVC observed moving into their normal snipingpositions to snipe at the combat patrol. If thesnipers are not first seen from the OP’S, the01”s maintain their blocking positions while thepatrol physically pursues the snipers attemptingto maneuver them toward one of the OP’S orblocking positions until they can be engaged.

“+- Over a 2-week period, the above tacticsproduced several significant contacts resultingin confirmed VC kills and capture of VC weapons,

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including one with a high-power scope. To achievemaximum effectiveness, patrol members mustbe thoroughly familiar with the terrain andall details of the patrol plan must be known andunderstood by the OP/blocking positions and thecombat patrol. Patience, alertness, and firt=discipline on the part of each Marine are req-uisites.

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8. ARTILLERY

a. Artillery Support

The following information has been ext-racted from a U.S. Army report on the employ-ment of field artillery:

The mission assigned to artillery units, theammunition used, and the basic techniques of

employment are no different in Vietnam thanelsewhere in the world. Here, as in Korea,artillery accounts for a large percentage of theenemy casualties. Instances are known in whichthe enemy actually has called off attacks onfriendly installations because of his fear ofartillery. There arc, however, refinements inartillery techniques required by the specialcircumstances of the fight against this enemy.For example, special attention must be givenalways to the reduction of casualties amongnoncombatants who are often intermingled withthe enemy troops. Salient lessons learned en-compass many local variations in normal artil-lery employment procedures which increase theeffectiveness of fire support missions.

(1) Positioning of Artillery Units

+ Since the effectiveness of artilleryfire decreases as the number of firing elementsis reduced, artillery normally should not beemployed in less than battery-sized units. Threesuitable battery position layouts which may beused arc the “triang’dar,” “hexagonal,” and“star” formations. The advantage of such disposi-tions is that a good dispersion pattern is main-tained regardless of the direction of fire. Thelarge number of areas requiring artillery sup-port may reduce the number of units which canbe massed on a single target; however, each fireunit should have another fire unit within support-ing range for mutual defense against ground

110

attack. Artillery must be disposed to providesupport for all deploying units at all times. Adirect support artillery battalion’s capability tosupport multiple company/platoon-sized opera.tions can be enhanced considerably through theformation of a fourth, four-gun battery. Employ-ing three four-gun batteries and a six-gun battery,the battalion can provide adequate firepower tosupport several small operations while still re-taining the capability to mass the fires of two ormore batteries.

-+ Be prepared for the unexpected;never assume artillery will not be needed. Thethreat of an enemy attack from any direction isconstant. Artillery units should always be pre-pared to fire in any direction from the firingposition.

+ The requirement for all-round firesupport necessitates a change in the normalplotting chart procedures used in the FDC. Bat-tery positions frequently are plotted at the centerof the chart, and the size of the chart is increasedon one or all four sides to permit maximumrange measurements for the weapon being em-ployed. The 1: 50,000-scale firing chart normallyis used for medium and heavy artillery units.A larger scale would be too large for a 6400 milfiring capability.

+ Azimuth stakes should be positionedaround the gunpit revetment every 800 roils tofacilitate rapid change of direction and reduce the

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possibility of firing in the wrong direction (3200roils out). For the same reason, fire commandsinclude the desired azimuth of fire as their secondelement.

+ Artillery units should also be pre-pared for rapid movement to new areas by boats,helicopters, transport airplanes, Ml 13’s or con-ventional vehicles. Helicopter air movement hasthe advantage of increasing the number of ac-cessible firing positions while not requiringsecure ground routes.

+ The enemy considers artillery posi-tions prime targets for mortar and ground attack.Consistent with providing prompt fire support,defensive positions with overhead protectionshould be prepared and improved as time permits.The FDC and ammunition should be revetted firstand the position continuously improved whileoccupied. Defensive positions should be destroyedupon departure, since the enemy occupy abandonedpositions and attempt to prevent our return. Inmost cases, artillery security requires rein-forcement of artillery position area defensewith infantry.

(2) Observation and Adjustment of Fire

+ Ground observation of artillery fireis hampered by dense vegetation. To overcomethis limitation, units should take advantage of airobservers for adjustment of artillery fire. Theemployment of WP, smoke, or a high airburst

112

on the first round often will assist the observerii) bringing subsequent rounds rapidly on target.

+ Ground and aerial observers oftencan be employed effectively as a team. The groundobserver marks his position and gives directionsto the aerial observer, who subsequently adjuststhe fire.

+ A system has been developed forrapid location of target areas using an alpha-betical designation for each 1000-meter mapgrid square within a unit’s sector of responsi-bility. The system has been used to good ad-vantage by some units.

(3) Coordination and Communication

-+ There is a great volume of airtraffic throughout Vietnam. Consequently, theability for close, rapid coordination must bemaintained with operational flight elements atall times. In addition, each unit should have anindividual at the firing position watching” forfriendly aircraft along the gun-target line. Artil-lery can be fired safely over air columns if thefires are coordinated closely with the flightleaders. One effective method of coordination isto place an artillery forward observer with eachFAC to coordinate artillery firing during air-strikes. This technique ensures that all elementsare informed of firing inimmediate response forfires.

progress and provideslifting or shifting of

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+ Radio has been the primary meansof communication for the artillery. Experiencehas indicated that most artillery units are em-ployed beyond the normal rated range of theirFM radios. As a result, it is necessary frequentlyto rely on continuous employment of FM airborneradio relays and on use of AM radio communica-tions in order to control artillery fires.

+- During field operations, aircraft

control and coordination may be obtained byusing an artillery advisory broadcast on a pre-determined channel. The advisory consists ofessential information such as the artillery posi-tion, direction of fire and impact area.

(4) Special Considerations

+ In addition to delivering destructivefires on the enemy, artillery can be utilized toiHuminate critical areas at night, to orientfriendly combat forces in dense undergrowthareas, to flush the enemy from hidden locations,to deny him escape routes, to deceive him as toavenues of attack, to interdict suspected enemypositions and for numerous other missions,Harassing and interdiction (H&I) fires based onan understanding of the current intelligence situa-tion can be very effective in demoralizing theenemy both day and night.

+ The selection of fuze action cannotbe dictated by terrain alone, as might be ex-pected; rather, the fuze action that actually gives

114

the best results against each specific targetmust be determined and selected. For example,it has long been thought that the employment ofthe VT fuze in the dense jungle area would beineffective. The enemy positions numeroussnipers high in the trees of the jungle canopy.VT fuze action has been used to attack success-fully this type of target.

+ Several methods have been de-veloped for using artillery as navigational aidsto infantry units in dense jungle when the sky isovercast or cannot be seen through the junglecanopy. Two such methods are:

● To help a lost patrol generallylocate itself on a map, an artillery round is firedat a location such as a gridline intersection nearthe patrol. Several rounds may have to be firedand the patrol may have to shift rounds based onsound. When a round is, close enough to the patrolfor a definite sensing, the patrol can then de-termine its general location on a map relative tothe coordinates fired by the artillery.

● To help a unit maintain its di-rection of attack in heavy jungle, artillery maybe fired several hundred meters in front of theunit, shifting to new targets in the direction ofmarch. The unit then “follows” the artillery tothe objective. This system is preplanned andbased on the infantry scheme of maneuver. The

115

concentrations are preplanned so that the artil-lery forward observer with the infantry unit cancall for particular concentrations.

b. Revised Artillery Fire Request.-. —— . ..-. ——

The elements of the initial fire requestfor supporting artiHery/mortar fires have beenrevised, as have some of the terms used by theforward observer. FM 6-40 has been revised toincorporate these changes. The revisions are asfollows:

Terms

Direction AzimuthFinal protective fire Barrage

(FPF)Check firing Cease firing

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Terms

GridTargetConvergeCancel check firingCancel at my commandShotRepeatPlatoon (battery)

right (left)Adjust fire

CoordinatesConcentrationConverge sheafFire (cease fire)Fire when readyOn the wayRepeat fire for effectSalvo right (left)

Will adjust

“Initial Fire Request

Observer identifica~ion Observer identificationWarning order Warning orderLocation of target Location of targetDescription of target Nature of targetMethod of engagement Classification of fireMethod of fire and Type of adjustment

control Type of projectileFuze actionControl

Radiotelephone procedures h a v e beenchanged to reduce the use of the word “over” andto discontinue the use of the word “wait” as aterminating word. Call signs will continue to beeliminated after identities have been establishedand when no confusion will result. A sample fire

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mission illustrates the use of some of these newterms:

Observer:

FDC :

Observer:

FDC :

Observer:

FDC :

Observer:

Big Deal 15, this is Big Deal 25, FireMission, over.

(Acknowledges initial call. )

Grid 123456, direction 2500, machine-guns firing, time, adjust fire, over.

(All repeatbacks are terminated withOUT. ) After order is issued, FDCtransmits; Battalion, Bravo, 3 rounds,target BK 1035, over.

(Repeats FDC Transmission, termi-nates with OUT. )

Shot, over.

Shot, out.

c. Artillery Support

Artillery employment in Vietnam demandsrapid response, adaptability, and preparation forthe unexpected. One Marine field artillery batteryin RVN was required to demonstrate all of thesequalities in a recent multinational operation.

The support which this battery provided wascomparable to the support normally expectedfrom an artillery battalion. The battery had todeploy in three widely separated platoon ~sitions,each with its own fire direction center and com-munications system. Each howitzer was re-quired to maintain a firing capability of 360

118

degrees. The battery fire direction center coordi-nated all the reinforcing fires of both its ownplatoons and a nearby Vietnamese Special Forcesartillery platoon. The initial movement and sub-sequent resupply was accomplished on shortnotice, and required the breakdown of the howit-zers and ecluipment into helicopter transportablepackages.

This form of versatility is essential ifartillery units are to do their full share.

.1

Forward observers should be aware thatthe artillery team must be kept constantly in.formed of the tactical situation.

To lessen reaction time, the artillery for-ward observer should notify the fire direction

119

center that contact is imminent or occurring.This starts the wheels rolling for more timelydelivery of fires. The liaison officer, with thiswarning order, can initiate a SAV. A- PLANE whichis a safety measure designed to prevent friendlyaircraft from flying into the airspace of the ar-tillery projectiles. Without verification fromhigher !leadquartcrs of receipt of the SAV-A-PLANE. by friendly air, a fire mission cannotbe.” cleared unless the ground unit is heavily en-gaged. Many critical minutes have been savedin Vietnam by immediate FSCC clearance of a firemission due to the early submission of SAV-A-PLANE. If the forward observer notifies the firedirection center of a possible fire m@sion, a roughazimuth of fire can be established and relayed tothe firing battery which can then shift guns tosupport the infantry with a minimum of delay.

e. H&I Fires Are Effective

The daily thunder of artillery engaged inharassing and interdiction missions is not withoutits merits. Recent reports of extended patroloperations commented that althougli no VC hadbeen engaged in their operating areas duringthe patrolling, it was evident that they had re-cently displaced. Also noted was the effect thatH&I fires had on the enemy; campsites had re-ceived hits and near misses, supply caches weredestroyccl, trail systems and river crossing siteswere struck, forcing the VC to dislocate. Although

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enemy casualties from H&I fires are seldom clis-covered by friendly patrols, dried blood and dis-carded dressings have been located, andvillagersoccasionally have reported VC carrying partiesmoving their wounded to more secure locations.

Select target areas for H&I fires based onthe best intelligence of known and suspected enemyactivities.

f. Artillery Parapets

Artillery units have found that artilleryparapets should have at least a 60-degree slope.This slope enables the parapet to withstand theshock of heavy, continuous firing and does noterode as rapidly during heavy rains. One methodthat has worked satisfactorily is to build a step-like arrangement of earthfilled ammo boxes whichare in turn covered with a layer of sandbags. This

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provides a semipermanentmuch easier to maintain.

g. Artillery Tips

+ Bring supportingquickly as possible.

structure which is

arms to bear as

+ Positive contact with the enemy mustbe followed by fast’ and aggressive action.

+ Plans to shift radio frequencies if cir-cuits become inoperable must be made in advance.

+ Supply needs of an engaged unit must beanticipated by supporting supply activities topreclude unacceptable delays.

+ A subordinate who enjoys the confi-dence of his seniors will perform better when heknows about it.

+ The enemy knows and uses Englishphrases; be wary, make positive identifications.

+ A unit should not operate in enemyterritory without plotting oncall fires along itsroute or in defense of stationary positions. Thisprocedure enables the artillery to make a morerapid response to requests for fire support.

+ Whenever a unit makes contact withthe enemy, one of its first reactions should be tocall for supporting artillery fire. The enemyunder artillery fire tends to be less aggressiveand is preoccupied with seeking cover ratherthan fighting.

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+ In areas where map resection is dif-ficult, artillery can and should be used to get agood location; particularly for night positions.

+ Defensive fires, to be effective, must beplotted accurately and the unit the fires are toprotect must be sure of its location. If possible,fire in at least one concentration.+ All leaders must be capable of re-questing and adjusting artillery and mortar fires.

h. SAV-A-PLANE

On all artillery fire missions, it is the re-sponsibility of the battalion or regimental FSCCto initiate the SAV-A- PLANE system. This isaccomplished by sending the following five ele-ments to the Division FSCC:

+ Location of target

+ Location of unit firing123

+ Time firing commenced

+- Time firing ceased

+ Maximum ordinate of the trajectory

#t’l ###

9. TRACKED VEHICLES

a. Indirect Tank Fire

The use of tanks in both a direct and in-direct fire support role in Vietnam is not un-common. Tanks which are used in an indirectrole may be able to position themselves to takeadvantage of the fire direction capabilities of anartillery battery. Here is a technique used withsuccess. First, tank commanders and unit leadersshould be familiar with FM 17-12 (Tank Gun-nery). Inclined ramps arc constructed for eachtank; the artillery aiming circle is used to layeach tank. Close check must be maintained be-tween the tank azimuth indicator and a compassto ensure that the tank guns and, the artillerytubes are laid on the same azimuth. Compensa-tion for the difference in target and tank altitudeis made by computing the angle of site. Cant ofthe tank may be a problem since the vehicle isusually ramped in one direction. Large errorscan be introduced when the gun is traversed per-pendicular to the established direction of fire.A safety margin should be added when firing fromthis position in support of troop units.

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Tank gunners should be schooledon the im-portance of accurate settings for their indirectfire control systems,

b. Long Range Tank Fires

The Viet Cong do not normally move inlarge groups during daylight hours. Thus, whendiscovered, they are often able to disperse be-fore artillery fire can be adjusted. On occasion,the M-48A1 tank’s long range direct fire capabilityhas been used against the VC with excellent re-sults. Tanks have been able to achieve first- orsecond-round hits at ranges of 4000 meters.Commanders should be alert to this capability.

Position tanks so they can be employed aslong range direct fire weapons when they areavailable.

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c. Tank Operations

When tanks are operating in areas wheresmall streams and ricefields are found, eachtank should carry a dozen or more filled sand-bags for use as emergency dunnage material.

When a tank bogs down while attempting toclimb out of a soft streambed or ricefield, thefilled sandbags can be used in constructing aramp.

d. Verification of Range Card Firing Data

During the monsoon season when tanks arepositioned in static firing positions, indirectfiring is conducted by using range card firingdata. However, a point to remember is that eventhough the tank is not moved from its position,the range card firing data can change from dayto day. The weight of the vehicle coupled with therepeated recoil action of the main gun when firedwill cause the tank to shift position in the softground. When this occurs, the elevation andazimuth values obtained from the reference pointfor various targets become erroneous. Rememberthat the range card firing data must be verifiedat least once each day during daylight hours bylaying the gun on the reference point to check theestablished elevation and azimuth values. If anerror in either value is noted, a new range cardmust be prepared.

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e. Tank Xenon Searchlights and Infantry Snip-erscopes

Utilization of the tank xenon searchlighthas been recommended, but, so far, not utilizedto its fullest extent. Many positions maintainedby tank-infantry forces are necessarily static.During night defensive operations, a sniper teamtied in with the tank’s TI phone can obtain up to700 to 800 yards of visibility by using the snip-erscope (without the IR backpack) in conjunctionwith the tank’s xenon searchlight.

f. Tank Lights and A4 Skyhawk Aircraft

Searchlight beams from two Marine tanksmarked the ‘spot for two A4’s to successfully droptheir ordnance during a night mission in supportof a surrounded reconnaissance patrol in RVN.

The recon patrol was positioned in a smalldefensive perimeter on a mountain near DongI-Is. The enemy was so close to the Marine posi-tion that the airborne air controller had recom-mended against making flare drops.

At the base of the mountain, more than amile away, two Marine tanks with xenon search-lights cast steady beams on the NVA force posi-tion.

The two Skyhawk pilots, using the crossedbeams as an aiming point, dropped their rocketsand bombs on the illuminated enemy with excel-lent results. After several bombing runs the NVAwithdrew with their dead and wounded.

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The rccon personnel were lifted safely fromthe position and returned to their base camp byCH-46 helicopters.

Another example of the use of ingenuity,resourcefulness and getting the maximum fromall supporting agencies.

g. Tank Cables

It is useful to keep one tow cable attachedto a’ front tow hook and one attached to the reartow hook when operating on soft ground. Thistechnique eliminates the need to dig down to atow hook in order to attach a cable when thevehicle becomes mired. The length of the towcables normally allows the towing vehicle toremain on solid ground. It was also found thatwith a cable attached to a hook on each end of thevehicle, two more could be easily carried in thenormal cable storage location.

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h. Tank and Ontos Firing Positions

Alternate firing positions for tanks andOntos become increasingly important when themonsoon season restricts trafficability and de.fensive tactics are employed more frequently,Enemy recoilless rifle teams will often aim in ona target during daylight and then fire the missionat night. Movement of armor after dark to alter-nate positions effectively counters such enemytactics.

i. Sandbags Aboard Tanks

Tanks often operate in areas known or sus-pected to contain mines and/or boobytraps. Attimes, tank crewmen must dismount from thetank in such areas to repair or service the vehicleand to prepare firing positions. Visual recon-naissance of the ground area surrounding thetank for evidence of mines or booby traps is ex-tremely difficult from a position on the tank.Filled sandbags carried on the tank can bethrown to the ground by crewmen from the pro-tection of the turret. A “stepping stone” patcharound the tank can be formed. The impact of thesandbags might also detonate any mines or booby-traps surrounding the vehicle.

j. Flame Tanks

Flame tanks have been valuable in expos-ing and destroying VC caves, booby traps and forti-fications. Cave entrances hidden in undergrowth

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or hedgerows and camouflaged entrances to spidertraps have, on numerous occasions, beenexposeciby burning. Additionally, some booby trapped areashave been neutralized by burning. In one instance,11 explosions resulted from firing one flame tankload into a suspected booby trapped area.

k. LVTP

When using the LVTP - 5 for river opera-tions, little or no protection from sniper fire isafforded personnel riding on top of the vehicle.By piling sandbags three high on each side ofthe vehicle top, some protection is gained withoutimpairing the tactical response of the infantryaboard. Overcrowding should be avoided to pre-vent excessive casualties and allow adequatemaneuverability.

1. Protection for Ontos Drivers

Although the Ontos has the capability ofwithstanding the effects of most antipersonnelmines, it is extremely vulnerable to antitankmines. The left front of the vehicle has littlecapability to absorb the fragmentation and blastof an antitank mine. Since the driver sits in theleft front, his only protection is the engine com-partment immediately to his right. However,sandbags placed on the deck in the driver’s com-partment have proven to be an excellent expedi-ent for absorbing the effects of antitank mines.

Recently, an Ontosantitank mine consisting of

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was destroyed by anone 105mm HE round

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10. INTELLIGENCE

a. Combat Intelligence

In an environment such as Vietnam, whichis characterized by small unit actions againstdispersed enemy units, successful combat opera.tions are usually the result of responding quicklyto combat intelligence. Inherent in this quickresponse is a knowledge of the terrain, includingthe local villages, and the command and controlflexibility to exploit the knowledge gained. Thefollowing illustrates a highly successful operationbased on quick reaction to intelligence on theenemy’s movement.

An aerial observer spotted about 40 VC inan area of known VC activity. Within 1 hourof the initial report, elements of a nearby in-fantry company moved to the area and an alertforce was landed by helicopter to assist them.A VC returnee (Hoi Chanh) was instrumental inpointing out enemy hiding places. During the next4 hours, 19 VC were killed by Marine patrols. Aletter was recovered from one of the bodies whichannounced a meeting of VC village cadre 3 dayshence in a village about 5 miles from the initialengagement. A raiding force of an infantry com-pany was landed at the village at the scheduledmeeting time of noon. They were met by mortar,small arms, and machinegun fires in the LZ; thebattle raged throughout the village for severalhours. Result: 61 VC dead.

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b. Intelligence Notebooks

Inacounterguerrilla situation, theintelli-gence workbook, as described in FM 30-5, canbe modified to accommodate the short notice de-mands for a wide variety of information on alarge geographic area. One infantry battalionwhich had been operating in the same area forseveral months, found that by using a two-note-book system, intelligence was quickly availableto patrol leaders and unit commanders. One note-book contained information by subject (attacks,fortifications, mining, etc. ) and the second note-book cataloged information by subdivided areaswithin the battalion’s assigned zone. The battalionarea and the area immediately adjacent to itwere divided on the basis of natural terrain sub-divisions ~influenced by reported or experiencedenemy activity.

Such a system means -double bookkeepingfor the S-2 section but its worth far outweighsthe extra effort. The notebook organized by sub-ject is useful in analyzing enemy patterns ortrends, while the area notebook presents a com-plete picture of enemy activities within any par-ticular region. Together these two sources pro-vide the essentials of combat intelligence in anaccessible and usable form.

c. Retention of POW’s With a Sweeping Unit

While questioning a young, disillusioned VCduring an operation, an ITT unit realized that the

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individual would be helpful in revealing the loca-tion of booby traps, mines, and possible VC am-bush sites. During the balance of the operation,the VC revealed 30 booby traps and the locationof two, company-to-battalion-size VC ambushes.Appropriate action was taken in all cases saving

many casualties.

If immediate and on-the-spot interrogationshows a VC in willing to reveal information, hes“hould bc retained with a sweep unit, preferablyat the battalion S-2 level, to assist in locatingenemy installations.

d. Enemy Captives

There is a belief among the VC and NVAthat common soldiers will be mistreated andkilled upon capture, while officers will be givenpreferred treatment. For this reason, captives

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often claim to be officers during initial inter-rogation in order to avoid mistreatment.

While this type of deception becomes ob-vious during the interrogation, it is often toolate to prevent false information from being dis-seminated to higher headquarters in the form ofspot reports.

To avoid this, a quick evaluation of thecaptive’s general military knowledge combinedwith the interrogator’s estimate of his relativeintelligence will usually confirm his identity andavoid unnecessary confusion.

e. Documents Found on Prisoners

When a prisoner of any importance is cap-tured, documents are usually found on his personor with his equipment. These documents are nec-essary in checking a prisoner’s story and ascer-taining the truth of what he says. Many timesthese documents are inadvertently separated fromthe prisoner prior to his interrogation.

The interrogating officer should check withthe capturing unit prior to commencing his in-terrogation. If documents were not with the cap-tive, determine if documents were captured. ACOpy Of the translation of the documents shouldaccompany the prisoner through the evacuation/interrogation chain.

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f. Interrogation of Vietnamese Civilians

It has been noted that, although Vietnamesecivilians often possess information which couldbe of use to Marines, such information is some-times not freely offered. This does not neces-sarily mean that they will refuse to divulge theinformation when properly approached. Viet-namese civilians will often provide useful infor-mation when engaged in casual “conversation,but often will not respond to formal type inter-rogation. The “soft sell” approach, therefore, isoften best when seeking information from Viet-namese civilians.

g. Followup Interrogation of Wounded Captives

Several interrogators have noticed thatwounded captives, when questioned on their ad-mittance to a hospital, present false information

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or confusing stories. After about a 48-hour period,the subject becomes more cooperative. This situ-ation is probably due to the indoctrination the VCreceive in regard to U.S. treatment of captives.The captive expects harsh treatment or execution.He has been told to lie. After proper medicaltreatment, food, and humane care, the subject’sattitude often changes. When a wounded captivepresents a confusing story, it is often beneficialto reinterrogate the subject after a 48-hour delay.

h. Use of ITT and CI Teams

The use of ITT and CI teams with forwardunits, especially during search and destroy op-erations, often provides intelligence that can beused immediately by the supported unit.

During a recent operation one of the par-ticipating battalions attached its ITT and CI teamsto the forward companies where interrogationcould be accomplished immediately. Needlessto say, a great deal of valuable tactical intelli-gence was received.

i. VC Tax Collectors and Couriers

The VC have been known to take advantageof the average Marine’s tendency to be compas-sionate and sympathetic toward those he regardsas less fortunate than himself. They have usedcrippled children and other deformed individualsas tax collectors and couriers.

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When conducting searches, attention mustbe paid to cripples and deformed individuals aswell as to healthy persons.

j. Identification of Enemy Weapons

The correct identification and prompt,accurate reporting of enemy weapons which havebeen captured is valuable combat intelligence.This knowledge can assist a unit commander indetermining enemy strength and mission; with ithe can take prompt action to maneuver againstthe enemy. Learn the design features and thenames of the various items of enemy weaponsand equipment so that you can identify and reportthem accurately.

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k. Counterintelligence

After 2 years of counterintelligence opera-tions in South Vietnam, the following generalconclusions are considered valid for guidance infuture operations:

+ Counterintelligence teams must be in-tegrated into all tactical operations. Counterin-telligence is an essential ingredient in CountyFair, search and destroy, and sweep operations,and should not be considered a function separateand distinct from tactical operations.

+ A more aggressive and imaginativecollection effort can provide sound intelligenceon which to base tactical operations, Several re-cent operations conducted on the basis of intelli-gence collect ed through counterintelligencesources have resulted in the capture of key in-frastructure personnel. The counterintelligenceteam has proven to be the best source of intelli-gence on the VC infrastructure--the priority in-telligence target.

-+ The counterinsurgency environment re-quires an intensification of the normal counter-intelligence effort. Two additional teams havebeen provided III MAF to augment the normalcounterintelligence support capability.

+ The counterintelligence team has provento be a flexible and’ adaptable organization. Al-though normally organized into three-man sub-teams, the CI team has effectively employed two-man subteams in Vietnam. Additionally, each of

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the operating a r e as (TAOR’S) POs es uniquecounterintelligence/security problems. The in-herent flexibility of the CI team organization haspermitted rapid adaptation to the environmentand threat.

To exploit the counterintelligence potentialin the Vietnam environment, a reorientation ofcounterintelligence training is b e i n g accom-plished. The following comments are providedfor guidance in training CI personnel for Vietnamassignments:

+ Cross-training, or at least close famil-iarity with order of battle, combat intelligenceprocedures, and positive collection operationsis essential.

+ Increased interrogation training is rec-ommcndcd, both with and without an interpreter.

+ Coordination with other agencies, par-ticularly the IT teams, is essential. Counter-intelligence personnel must be familiar with theactivities and responsibilities of the IT teams,civil affairs units and RD teams.

+ Teams must be familiar with the nature,purpose, and modus operandi of the Viet Conginfrastructure. This is the priority counterin-telligence target.

+ Language training is highly desirable.

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1. Ralliers and the MEDCAP.— —.

MEDCAPS in secure areas provided ex.cellent points at which ralliers can make contactwith allied forces either in person or though anintermediary. They are also a good place to haveralliers stationed to point out the VC. MEDCAPactivities should be exploited by intelligence per-sonnel and used to disseminate Chieu Hoi infor-mation.

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11. DOGS IN 111MAF

a. Scout/Sentry Dogs

Scout dog teams and sentry dog teams havebeen employed in Vietnam by Marines sinceApril 1966. There is a basic difference in their

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employment. The scout dog alerts on scent andsound and usually does not attack; whereas thesentry dog, which also alerts by scent and sound,can be released to attack an intruder.

Scout dog teams are employed in opera-tions such as combat patrols and ambushes,search and clear operations, and to a limiteddegree, as listening posts. During patrolling ac-tions, the scout dog is usually employed withthe point element to detect enemy personnel,equipment, and tunnels. En route to an ambushsite, the scout dog assists in providing security,and, on arrival at the site, provides warning ofapproaching personnel. During village searches,the dog’s keen sense of smell has proven invalu-able.

Scout dogs should not be used during theinitial search of a village because they will bedistracted by normal village activity. After theinitial search, villagers should be removed to anarea downwind from the village, and the dogteam allowed to conduct a systematic search.When the dog alerts, the handler interprets thealert as to direction and distance and pa~ses thisinformation to the patrol leader. Dogs will tireafter several hours of activity. For this reason,two dog teams should be used, with one teamworking while the other rests. The team shouldbe rotated about every 2 hours.

Sentry dog teams are ideally suited formanning sentry posts, since detection of intruders

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is greatly increased by the dog’s sense of smelland hearing. Sentry dog team posts should beisolated, and traffic in and around the poststrictly controlled. This will keep the dog fromcontinually alerting and becoming unduly fatigued.Wheneither

b.

the sentry dog alerts, the handler canrelease the dog or request assistance.

Employment of Scout DOES. .

Scout dogs have proven to be a valuableasset when properly employed; however, it mustbe remembered that they lose their effectivenesswhen tired. Hot weather and rugged terrain re-quire the dogs to have frequent breaks and suffi-cient water. Additional guides for the employmentof scout dogs are:

+ The dogs’ keen sense of smell andhearing will often provide early warning of theenemy when employed with night ambush patrols.

+ Keep the dog and your interpretersseparated as the dog does not distinguish betweenfriendly and enemy Vietnamese.

+ If either dog or handler becomes acasualty, evacuate both on the same helicopter.

+ Use scout dogs to augment security:early warning; detect infiltrators, tunnels, anddevices.

+ Ensure dog smell every member ofpatrol.

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+ Use clog on point whenever possible.

+ Move dog to rear if speed is essential,if wind is blowing from the rear, or if dog is dis-interested.

+ Provide security for dog teams.

+ Keep dog behind assault elements inthe attack.

+ Brief patrols on proper utilization ofscout dog teams prior to operations.

C. Scout Dogs

During a recent operation in Vietnam, oneMarine unit used scout dogs with particular suc-cess. A combat patrol with a scout dog team at-tached fired at four Viet Cong who fled into anearby hamlet. The patrol pursued into the hamletand conducted a detailed search. During thesearch the scout dogs found two VC hiding in atunnel and flushed another from a nearby treeline. Results were two Viet Cong dead and onecaptured.

If employed properly with qualified han-dlers, scout dogs can be a real asset to manytypes of combat operations. Dogs have a keensense of smell and excellent hearing. However,when employing them it is well to remember thatthey become tired much faster than a Marine.

d. Scout Dogs Bite

Scout dog handlersrines to stay away from

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continually advise Ma-the valuable but highly

12. THE C0M131N13L) ACTION COMPANY

The information presented below has beenextracted from an FMF Pac order which presentsnot only a clear insight into the organization andfunctions of the combined action company, butalso the importance of this Marine innovation toultimate victory in Vietnam.

a. Background

By mutual agreement between the Com-manding General, III Marine Amphibious Forceand the Commanding General of I Corps TacticalZone, Marine units have been integrated withPopular Force units within certain villages andhamlets to assist in providing security and paci-fication measures.

The combined action company has beenorganized to provide a sufficient force to occupyand control areas uncovered by the forward move-ment of the U.S. Marfne and ARVN units and toassist in revolutionary development efforts withinthese areas. It has been found that Popular Forceunits native to the area, assisted by U.S. Marines,form a unit ideally suited to the task of providingsecurity co hamlets and villages in cleared orsemicleared areas. The CAC is afforded the aidof U.S. Marine Corps and ARVN supporting armsin the accomplishment of its mission. The coordi-nation of activities is the responsibility of thecommander of the area of responsibility in whichthe CAC is located.

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b. Organization

A combined action unit consists of twoelements, PF and USMC, integrated into a singleoperational entity. Organization follows the PFstructure in which the platoon normally is thelargest tactical unit. The combined action companyis organized to supervise a grouping of platoons,and is capable of supporting up to 12 platoons.The Marine element of a combined action pla-toon consists of one Marine rifle squad and oneU.S. Navy corpsman, which augments and rein-forces the PF platoon composed of three riflesquads and a platoon headquarters.

c. Concept of Operation

The combined ‘action units are used incleared and semicleared areas to provide securityin villages and hamlets and to provide trainingfor Popular Forces. Combined action platoonsare provided the capability to call for and adjustsupporting arms. Secondary missions are to con-duct civic action and gather intelligence for CACand other friendly forces operating in the area,and to provide other appropriate assistance toVietnamese and U.S. officials in furtherance ofRevolutionary development activities. With theadvent of the 1967 Revolutionary DevelopmentPlan, actions by U.S. civilian and military units,other than CAC, will extend into more and morehamlets. As the only U.S. representative physi-cally present on a continuing basis, and conver-sant with many facets of life in the hamlet, the

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USMC squad leader is in effect the U.S. repre-sentative for revolutionary development activitiesin his hamlet and is expected to so function. Thisrelationship has been agreed to by regional of-ficials of the Office of Civil Operations.

d. Location

Combined action platoons (CAP) are posi-tioned at critical locations determined by mutualagreement between the local Marine commander,as approved by the Commanding General con-cerned, and appropriate district chiefs.

e. Tasks

Appropriate tasks for the combined actioncompanies are as follows:

+ Motivate, instill pride, patriotism andaggressiveness in Popular Forces.

+ Conduct day and night patrols and am-bushes in assigned areas.

+ Conduct training in general militarysubjects, leadership and language for all personnelof the. combined action platoon to increase tileproficiency of PF elements so that Marine ele-ments may ultimately be withdrawn and PF ele-ments may continue to perform in a proficientmanner.

+ Conduct combined operations with ARVNand U.S. Marine Corps units in coordination withthe district chief and the Marine TAOR commanderwithin the CAC platoon area of responsibility.

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-P Marine squad leaders in individual CACplatoons function as U.S. revolutionary develop-ment representatives for the hamlet which theyserve.

-+ Establish an intelligence apparatus inand about the hamlet in which located, in con-junction with local indigenous, ARVN and civilianrepresentatives. Ensure that information gatheredis made available promptly and on a regularbasis to the intelligence center at district levelas well as to the headquarters to which respon-sible.

f. Command

Command of combined action companiesis the responsibility of the commanding generalof the command in whose area of operation theunit is located.

Operational control of each CAC unit isspecified by the commanding general/command-ing officer concerned if delegated below division/task force/FLC level.

Command, less OPCON, is exercised atdivision/task force command level, using the ad-ministrative subunit assets which have been pro-vided for this purpose. Certain administrativefunctions (e.g., provision of rations, transportation,and local supply of consumables) may be dele-gated to subordinate operational commanders,provided these responsibilities are specificallyset forth.

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Commanding generals ensure that a con-tinuing system of command monitoring and in-spection of CAC units is in force. Monthly reportsare submitted.

The III MAF Combined Action CompanyPrograms Officer, a member of the staff of theCommanding General, III MAF, conducts frequentand informal staff visits to various CAC unitsthroughout the I CT2, and keeps the commandinggeneral continually informed on all pertinentmatters pertaining to the status of the CAC pro-gram.

Command relationships within the CACplatoons are on a coordination and cooperationbasis. The USMC squad leader does not commandthe PF element of the platoon, nor does the PFplatoon leader command the Marines. Neither hasauthority to discipline members of the other com-ponent. Offenses by Marines will be handledthrough normal command channels, and incidentsinvolving PF soldiers will be reported to the dis-trict chief.

g. Administration and Supply

The Marine element of the CAC is admin-istered and supported through Marine channelsalthough it lives in conjunction with its PFcounterparts. Shelter and living accommodations,which are not available from village sources,are provided from Marine assets. Commandersprovide centralized administration and’ supply

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support in order to relieve tactical battalionsand regiments of this responsibility.

Personnel assigned to CAC units mustmeet the following criteria:

+ Preferably with 2 months in countryand a minimum of 6 months remaining on currenttour.

+ Be a mature, motivated Marine and behighly recommended by his commanding officerfor duty with CAC. Selection of the squad leaderreceives special attention because of the impor-tance of his function.

h. Nature of the Popular Force Soldier

The PF soldier is the lowest paid soldierin the ARVN. He must augment his pay by workingpart of the time in or near the hamlet/villagewhere he is located in order to provide the basicliving essentials for his family. This fact mustbe taken into account in assigning duties and con-ducting combined activities. Commanders canassist the PF soldier by ensuring the delivery ofthe PF food supplement (provided by USAID)through the district chiefs. This food supplementmay be further increased from Marine sourceswhere possible. In addition, when organic assetspermit, supplies such as cots, shelter and otherappropriate equipment can be shared with the PFplatoon.

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13. KIT CARSON SCOUTS

a. General—

In July 1966 former VC were first used toWOrk with Marine units on small unit tacticaloperations, County Fairs and psychological op-erations. It was soon recognized that theirknowledge of the VC “Modus Operandi’’ was in-valuable in assisting tactical units in identifyingVC with whom they formerly served. For example,one ex-VC identified over 30 enemy in 2 monthswhile employed in the role of a scout with a Ma.rine unit. In October a pilot group was hired (threeteams of two men each) on a permanet basis tolive and work with units of the First Marine Di-vision. These returnees were named “Kit Carsonscouts” by the Commanding General, 1st Marine

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Division, after the famous guide of the 19th cen-tury. The program proved so successful that theCC, 1st MarDiv immediately requested that it beexpanded to provide two scouts for each rifle com-pany.

The scouts have been most successful whenemployed in their former areas of operation. Theyare invaluable in identifying the enemy, a problemthat has always plagued commanders in a counter-insurgency environment. There is no substitute fortheir knowledge of the terrain and the tactics andtechniques employed by their former comrades.

The program has yielded substantial re-sults. The scouts have assisted Marine units inall types of operations ranging from major unitactions to the interrogation of Viet Cong suspects.

Thus far, there has not been a single in-stance in which a scout has turned against afriendly unit or attempted to lead it into an am.bush. However, as the program is expanded, thepossibility of the VC being able to insert an agentis increased. Caution, therefore, must alwaysbe used when employing the Kit Carson Scouts,and a highly selective screening process and adetailed training schedule must be established.

b. Method of Employing Kit Carson Scouts

The various methods of Kit Carson Scoutemployment available to the industrious unitcommander is limited only by his imagination.

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Experience has indicated that effective tech-niques of employment become more numerousas the scout becomes accustomed to the hostingunit. For this reason, the scout should be per-mitted to become as familiar as possible with aparticular unit when he is initially placed in thefield. As he begins to feel at home and growsmore accustomed to Marine living conditions,customs and equipment, his talents can be em-ployed with various units in a command.

A scout is normally assigned to a unitoperating in an area in which he is familiar withthe terrain, population and VC. Remember this:It is the key to getting an effective return fromthe scout. The information and knowledge that thenew scout brings to his first unit will be rela-tively fresh and may be the most important con-tribution that he will be able to make. It doesn’ttake long for enemy intelligence to determine thisman is helping the Marines and the scout’s in-formation must be exploited before the VC havetime to relocate hiding places and personnel tonew locations.

A scout should have a few days to getacquainted with his new unit, weapon, and per-sonal equipment. The Marine(s) assigned to lookafter the scouts play a very important part in thesuccess of future operations. They must be se-lected accordingly. It may be necessary for theMarine(s) to literally live with the scouts andtherefore it should be a voluntary assignment.

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The more the scouts fell a part of the unit, thebetter they will produce.

The scout should have a thorough briefingon the importance of his selection and new assign-ment.

As the scouts become familiar with theMarines assigned to work with them, along withthe interpreter (a most important individual),they should be put to work without delay in orderto take advantage of their knowledge of the enemywhile it is still current. Operations and patrolsshould be planned around this information. Acommon mistake observed regarding scout em-ployment in the past has been the tendency toplace the scouts on the routine patrols withoutconsidering the type of knowledge of the enemythey possess. Personnel should be constantlyaware of the language barrier and the scoutsoriental custom of being hesitant to criticize.A patrol leader may be making mistakes andpassing up excellent opportunities in the eyes ofthe scouts. In extreme cases, a new scout maysimply walk along with the patrol and remainsilent rather than make recommendations andhave the patrol leader lose face. This is fairlyeasy to guard against and can usually be overcomeby frequently questioning him about the area,trails and people encountered on patrols. He mustbe made to realize the importance of reportinginformation promptly and ~inting out mistakesof Marines when observed.

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The recommendations contained herein arenot meant to encourage Marines to become over-reliant on the scout although he must be listenedto and relied upon to be effectively utilized. Thepossibility always exists that a VC agent couldenter the program and eventually be selected asa Kit Carson Scout. Complacency could be costlyand discretion must be used at all times.

The following are recommendations for theutilization of Kit Carson Scouts which have proveneffective in the past:

+- Assist in search operations for the de-tection of VC by facial recognition. There is nosubstitution for this method of positive identifi-cation.

-&- Assist in search operations for VCequipment and supplies. The scouts know manytechniques used by the emeny to conceal theirsupplies and equipment.

-t- Assist in the control and identificationof the population. Returnees can be used to speakto the population to gain support of the GVN. Theirpersonal story of defecting will add considerablecredibility to what they are saying.

+ Assist in the location of caves and tun-nels.

+ Assist in the exploitation of other re-turnees. When a person rallies under the ChieuHoi program, it is important that a returneespeak to him as soon as possible to strengthen

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his decision of defecting. New returnees with“hot” information may be persuaded to accom-pany a scout into the field on short operations toseize an important objective.

+ Assist in guiding Marine units throughVC controlled areas or over rough terrain.

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14. RIVERINE OPERATION

The following is information taken from acombat afteraction report written by a Marineofficer serving as a battalion advisor with theVietnamese Marine Corps. The operation tookplace in the Rung Sat Special Zone (RSSZ), alarge mangrove swamp area, which is locatedastride the main shipping channel between Saigon

and the South China Sea. NHA BE, which is men-tioned several times in this report, is the loca-tion of the headcluarters of the special zone.

The Vietnamese Marine battalion was as-signed a TAOR of 200 square miles in the easternportion of the Rung Sat and included terrain westand south of the main shipping channel.

The RSSZ is an area of dense mangroveswamps ‘interspersed with nipa palm groves. In-numerable rivers, streams and small canalscrisscross the area. These are the principallines of communication for civilians, enemy andfriendly units. Some canals are manmade and areutilized to cross the Rung Sat. Normal elevationin the area is 1 meter or less above high water.The highest point in the TAOR is a 10-meter highhill or rock outcropping.

Until mid-June, vegetation in the TAOR wasdense and provided excellent concealment for in-dividuals, boats and positions. Defoliation in lateMay and early June provided excellent results andremoved foliage in areas of many bunker com-plexes and camp areas. In nipa palm groves, de-foliation had little effect except to whiten thepalm. In the mangrove areas, the leaves fellaway thus revealing campsites underneath. Es-pecially effective was the defoliation of the areawest of the main channel. Some 30 bunker andcamp complexes were discovered in an area of20 square kilometers and was undoubtedly a largeguerrilla base camp complex.

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The tidal range in the TAOR is approxi-mately 12 feet, with two highs and two lows eachday. At low tide many small streams are dry andlarger rivers and streams present high, steepbanks, The rapid currents during filling and re-ceding tides make small streams dangerous fortroop crossings and difficult for small boats. Athigh tide it is virtually impossible to move rapidlyby foot. Individuals in ambushes placed along thestreams often found themselves waist deep inwater for at least half of the ambush period. Thisconstant exposure of weapons to damp and wetconditions caused considerable corrosion and rustproblems.

The weather during the period varied fromlate dry season weather to early monsoon weather.During the dry season, many areas dried quicklywith a dry crust of several inches of firm terrain.A significant fact involved drying after the tidesreceded. The edges of trench lines, bunker topsand lips of [oxholes stood out dis~inctly from theair and contributed greatly to the discovery ofmany Viet Cong positions. With the advent of therainy season, the combination of tides and dailyrains inundated the area of all times, At the timethe battalion departed, the terrain remained satu-rated with the combination of rain and tidalactivity. Intelligence on VC units and positionswas available to the battalion from varioussources; but aerial observation provided theprimary information which was acted upon. Inmost cases accuracy was excellent and a largenumber of targets was identified.

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a. Intelligence

The Viet Cong units operating in the Rung

Sat Special Zone are under the command of amilitary and political headquarters, the T- 10. TheRung Sat is referred to as Military Region 10and was designated such in August 1966. Underdirect control of the Central Office of South Viet-nam (COSVN), the highest Viet Cong headquar-ters in South Vietnam, the T-10 directs the ac-tivities of some eight main force companies. Eachhas a heavy weapons platoon of .S0 calibermachincyyns and 57mm recoilless rifles. Inaddit{.on, the companies possess water mine,demolition, communication, and assorted smallarms capabilities. Mortar capability is unknownand no mortar activity took place during the op-eration. In support of the main force units, sevenlocal force guerrilla platoons and district and

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village infrastructure exist. Due to extensive op-erations in the Rung Sat by U.S. Army, Viet-namese Marine, Regional and Popular Forceunits, the Viet Cong operated in small, decen-tralized units of three to ten guerrillas, In addi-tion to these sapper squads, whose mission is tointerdict traffic on the main shipping channel(LONG TAU), tax collectors, food collectors, andlogistic elements were continuously operatingwithin the TAOR. The VC maintained the abilityto mass by using a system of tower stations whichwill be discussed in detail below,

(1) Tactics. In the Rung Sat, the VietCong attempt~ieve two missions: First,to interdict shipping and traffic on the main chan-nel and second, to ensure that at least threeFree World force battalions operate in the RungSat, thus denying their availability to other Corpszones, By utilizing small elements to harass andraid at opportune moments, a relatively smallforce is maintaining enough activity to requirethe battalions to operate in this area. However,interdiction of the main shipping channel has notbeen successful for sometime, though on severaloccasions river patrol boats (P BR’s) and mine-sweepers were attacked while carrying out theirsecurity missions. The Viet Cong ambush isusually a well-timed and coordinated attack ofshort duration (15 to 30 seconds) with escape bysampan and dispersion before sufficient reactionforces can be introduced. The ambush site gen-erally consists of four foxholes. The first fox-hole contains a recoilless rifle, the second an

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activator for a command-detonated mine,the third an automatic weapon, and thefourth a group of riflemen. Many of thesefour-foxhole positions were observedthroughout the Rung Sat during theoperation. The Viet Cong utilized asimple early warning system. Near eachactive camp located in the TAOR was atree platform or tower. on 10 occasionsVC were observed either in the towers ordropping from them and running into theneatiest dense area. These towers arelocated across the Rung Sat andundoubtedly serve to signal elementscrossing the Rung Sat between adjacentprovinces as well as providing earlywarning and unit massing capability.

b. Mission of the Vietnamese Marine Bat-

talion

+ To prevent interdiction of the main;hipping channel by continuous patrol and am-bush activity in areas adjacentto the river.

+ To conduct operations and search outguerrilla elements, and campsites located in theTAOR.

-k- To provide security for the villageofTam Tho Hiepand the battalion CP.

c. Execution

The Vietnamese Marines located theirCPat the village of Tam Tho Hiep. This village is on!ligh ground and supported the artillery positionsand boating requirements, as well asthebattalion

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command post. The central location of this villagegreatly facilitated artillery support for Viet-namese and U.S. units as well as providing an LZfor the medical evacuation of personnel.

During the 70-day operation, continuouscompany level operations involving saturationpatrolling and selective ambushes were conducted.

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These operations were highly successful in locat-ing guerrilla camps and bunker complexes. Inconjunction with the ground operations, extensiveaerial observation missions were also conducted.Supporting arms included air, naval gunfire andartillery.

Two companies were inserted by RiverAssault Group-22 (RAG) for 2 to 3 days into as-signeci. sectors, while the remaining two companiesestablished a reserve and provided CP and villagesecurity positions. Platoons operated from patrolbases with squad patrols and ambushes predomi-nating. Reaction platoons in each company hadswimmer support boats (SSB’S) available for rapidreaction. The operating companies assumed anarea of responsibility of approximately 10 to 12square kilometers. One helicopter was attachedto the battalion each day and was used extensivelyin air reconnaissance missions and for medicalevacuations.

This operation in the Rung Sat was es-sentially counterguerrilla in nature, and conductedon a decentralized basis with emphasis uponriverine capabilities. The lack of Viet Congmobility due to difficult terrain forced theirelements to disperse into small units until suchtimes as swift attacks could be planned and con-ducted. This factor made it possible for the bat-talion to decentralize and operate on platoon andsquad level. Former operations in which bat-talions or companies moved in one or two columnsthrough dense vegetation and deep water or mud,

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wasted considerable time and effort. Encircle-ment and block and sweep operations are stillvalid techniques and are used by nearly everyunit of company- or battalion-size. The followingpage describes a technique utilized by this bat-talion. Briefly the technique is based upon areasaturation and quick reaction. Companies areinserted by RAG units into two sectors, each of5 to 6 square kilometers. Platoons are decen-tralized into 6 or 8 subsectors with one platoondesignated a reaction force at the company CP.The platoons in patrol bases have two to threeSSB’S for use of their reaction forces. The addi-tional member of the battalion team, and probablymost important, is the air observer in the com-mand and control helicopter. Also available wasa VlqMC spotter and F/O (XO of the battalion)who directed the troop units to targets located bythe helicopter. By making a series of low-levelsearches of the sectors, actual camp and bunkercomplexes were located as well as suspectareas. Once located, the air observer and VNMCspotter mark the target continuously with smokewhile mobile squads in SSB’S move to the loca-tion. Reaction elements were used to block orassist in attacking the camps. In some caseshelicopter gunships were used to cover the C/Cship during low-level reconnaissance in partic.ularly difficult areas. The VNMC officer con-tinually directed the movement of the groundtroops by giving them compass azimuths fromtheir locations to the enemy, or by pointing outstreams to follow to the target area. With this

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technique, 16 active Vict Cong camps were dis-covered and destroyed. Each camp containedequipment and VC were usually obsertied runningfrom the area. It is virtually impossible to blockand contain VC in this terrain even on companylevel because of the early warning capabilitythey possess-- the towers and warning shots.Covering and marking the camp with the heli-copter forced VC to abandon the camp when itwas discovered, but ambushes established nearthe captured camps resulted in five VC KIA. Ineach case these were sapper teams moving backinto the area to set mines and booby traps as thecontents of the sampans proved. The great amountof time saved by ground units using the techniqueof reacting to aerial spotting was the prime rea-son for its use. For troop units to patrol the veryswampy areas with no actual objective except topatrol is unproductive. The air observer has ex-cellent surveillance at low level and virtuallyevery camp or bunker complex located was dis-covered after passes over the site. In some caseshighly suspect thickets or dense areas werepointed out to ground units for their patrols. Tosupport this technique, RAG boats with direct firecapability, helicopter gunships, and artilleryspotted by the A/O were available and utilized.Movement to and from company sectors offeredlittle difficulty and companies were inserted andextracted every 2 or 3 days in order to maintaintroop physical strength and endurance. In con-junction with the technique described, companysectors were varied in different areas of the

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TAOR and emphasis was placed upon patrollingand ambushing primary Viec Cong crossing areasand routes.

d. Summary

During the operation a total of 49 Viet Congharboring sites were located. Generally, the siteswere a camp with buildings (tin roof and framesides) and thatch shelters, a bunker or severalbunkers with foxholes and trench lines, or asmall peripheral campsite with a warning towerand one or two small shelters and a bunker, Onlythree camps were discovered by ground patrolswithout the assistance of an air observer. Theremainder were located as a result of aerialreconnaissance in and around the TAOR. Eightsuspected areas were searched out by the A/Obased upon intelligence information provided by avariety of intelligence sources. These were firedupon by artillery and naval gunfire. During theperiod seven VC were killed (2 probable) and 25suspects were detained and subsecluently released.A total of 21 active sites were destroyed witha total of 118 shelters, 18 bunkers and onemedical aid station being either burned or de-stroyed by ground units and supporting arms.Arms and equipment captured or destroyed in-cluded four rifles, 18 sampans, one outboardmotor, 73 booby traps, 23 grenades, 19 minesand in excess of 5000 rounds of assorted small-arms ammunition. Rice, sugar, salt, rubber

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boots, water jars and cooking utensils were alsoconfiscated during the operation.

e. Analysis

This riverine operation was characterizedby C1OSC cooperation and coordination betweenground, air, naval, and supporting arms units.This, coupled with excellent intelligence andrapid reaction to the information provided, enabledthe units to accomplish all three missions withthe minimum of forces. The results prove thevalidity of such techniques in the delta and providea basis for future operations in similar terrain.

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15. WEAPONS AND MUNITIONS

a. M-16 Rifle

The M-16 rifle has the following uniquefeatures:

-+- The simplicity of design and fewerfunctional parts than other shoulder weapons en-sure better reliability,

+ The straight-line construction coupledwith the 5. 56mm cartridge (cal. 223) reducesrecoil and increases controllability in automaticfire.

+ The weight of the weapon is noticeablyless than other service rifles (the M-16 weighs7 pounds loaded). Part of this reduction in weightis realized by the stamped aluminum of the lowerreceiver, the molded plastic stock which includesthe straight-line recoil system, and the moldedplastic handguards and pistol grip.

+ Another feature is the break-open shot-gun design which permits quick, easy access tothe receiver group.

-+ The feature which has the most dra-matic appeal is the muzzle velocity (3200 fps)which, translated into layman’s language, meanskilling power. As a comparison, the muzzlevelocity of the M-16 is 390 percent greater thanthe .45 caliber pistol (830 fps), and 12 percentgreater than the M-14 rifle (2750 fps).

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b. Care and Cleaning of the M-16 Rifle

+ Clean the chamber, locking lugs and lockingrecess with chamber brush and bore cleaner atthe earliest opportune moment after firing. If thecorrect chamber brush is not available, an M- 14,M-60, or .45 caliber pistol brush can be used asa field expedient. The chamber should be wipeddry with patches and given a light coat of oil forstorage or left dry for immediate firing.

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* Clean the bolt carrier key with a borebrush preferably a us e d one) and bore cleaneras soon as possible after firing. The carrierkey should be cleaned daily and lubricated insidewith one drop of oil (PL Special).

● Disassemble all bolt and carrier partsfrom the bolt carrier and clean and inspect assoon as possible after firing. Clean with borecleaner, wipe dry, and oil with two drops of semi-fluid lubricating oil (LSA) on the bolt rings.Add a light coat of oil (3 drops on a patch) to allsurfaces of the bolt and the bolt carrier.

NOTE: FOR FIELD USE, DO Norr APPLY OIL‘ro SURFACES OF THE BOLT AND CARRIER.MERELY APPLY LUBRIPLATE TO SLIDINGCONTACT SURFACES, HAMMER CAM SURFACE(ON BOTTOM OF CARRIER) AND BOLT CAMPIN,

+ Clean the end of the gas tube inside theupper receiver at the earliest opportunity afterfiring. Use bore cleaner and a worn bore brushattached to a section of cleaning rod.

-+ Clean the lower receiver as well as pos-sible without disassembling it; use bore cleaner,brush and patches. Wipe dry and apply light coatof oil.

NOTE: FOR FIELD USE, DO NOT APPLY OILINS[D13 LOWER RECEIVER: MERELY PUT ONEDROP OF OIL AT EACH END OF THE HAMMER,TRIGGER, TAKEDOWN AND PIVOT PINS. LU-BRICATE THE SELECTOR AS REQUIRED.

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+ Keep the outside of the weapon dry.

+ Clean and lightly lubricate the actionspring and guide when required.

+ Never pour oil into any part of the rifle.

+ Clean the magazines and loaded ammunitioneach time the rifle is cleaned but DO NOT OILTHE MAGAZINES OR AMMUNITION.

The most critical areas in cleaning theM-16 are:

-+ Chamber and locking recess.

4- Bolt and bolt carrier: Carrier key,bolt face, locking lugs, extractor claw, boltrings and shoulders,

+ Magazines and loaded ammunition.

Load a maximum of 18 rounds in themagazine.

Never leave a round chambered for longerthan necessary: Rounds left in the chamber forexcessive periods can fail to extract, particularlyif the weapon has been fired just prior’ to camb-ering the round.

Wipe magazines and ammunition as soonas possible after rains, river crossing, or ex-posure to dust and dirt.

Never tape magazines together.

Each man armed with the M-16A1 rifleshould carry his issue cleaning gear.

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COMMONMALFUNC’I’1ONS:[,[{EvENT1ON ANDC~R[~ECTION

REPORTEDMALFUNCTION CAUSES

Failure to Dirty chamber;extract* dirty or corroded

ammunition;faulty extractoror extractorspring

Failure tofeed

Failure tofire

Overloaded,dirty or un-serviceablemagazines

Buildup ofdirtor carbon on thefiring pinshoulders: im-proper assemblyof the bolt andbolt carrier;faulty ammuni-tion

Inoperative Lack of lubrica-tion

PREVENTION/CORRECTION

Clean the cham-ber and ammu-nition; replacedefective parts

Inspect maga-zines for clean-liness and serv-iceability; loadnot more than 18rounds

Check for properassembly of thebolt and carrier;clean the firingpin; replace am-munition

Lubricate as re-quired

*NOTE: Failure to extract is most often the result of adirty chamber or ammunition. Inspection of the cartridgecase, however, many indicate a faulty extractor or a weakextractor spring. A faulty extractor will often fail to graspthe cartridge rim concentrically and a weak spring willpermit the extractor claw to ride over the rim. In eitherinstance, the cartridge rim is usually marked by the ex-tractor claw in such a manner as to permit identificationof the problem.

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c. Added Firepower

Two powerful mobile and versat~le U.S.Army weapons are being employed in Marineareas in Vietnam. These are the twin 40mmcarriage-mounted cannon, and the four, caliber.50 machincguns mounted in a turret on a wheeledvehicle. These dual-purpose guns are employedin a ground support role and are available for airdefense should the requirement arise. In aground support role both weapons can be usedcffec[ively for convoy escort and perimeter de-fense. For convoy escort the weapons are usuallydispersed throughout the convoy with one nearthe front and another at the rear of the column.The convoy alert force will usually have weaponspositioned nearby in case of ambush.

These guns have proven effective for theprotection of command posts, engineer workingparties, and in defense of fixed installations.Their high rates of fire (40mm - 200 rds,/min.,cal. .50 - 2000 rds/min. ) provide an unparalleledshock effect. For air defense the guns can usefire control information employing the parentbattalion’s radar system. Direct and indirect firecan be employed.

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d. Machinegun Laying

The proper employment of one or a com-bination of several field expedient methods willensure more effective employment of the M-60machinegun in engaging preselected targets.

The notched stake or tree crotch techniqueis used with the biped-mounted MC to engagepreselected targets within a sector or to definethe sector limits. This method is effective in allconditions of visibility and requires a minimumof additional material. The horizontal log methodis used with either the biped- or tripod-mountedmachinegun to mark sector limits and provide asector of grazing fire.

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e. 3.5-Inch Rocket Launcher

In recent operations, close combat has beenfrequent and fierce. Utilization of supporting armswas not always feasible against enemy automaticweapon positions and strong points due to thecloseness of friendly troops. An immediatelyavailable and highly effective source of firepowerwas the 3.5-inch rocket launcher.

f. Rocket Safety—

Frequently in RVN, 3.5-inch rocket roundsare carried lashed to a packboard in such a man-ner that the bore-riding safety clip is apt to betorn off by a vine or branch. This clip should besecured to the round with a strip of adhesive-typetape to prevent its loss and the possible inadver-tent arming.

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g. Protection for 3.5-Inch Rockets

When operating in the rain or damp weather,the 3.5- inch rocket rounds should be kept in theircanisters until required for use. During the mon-soon season this is particularly important, as wasevidenced on a recent operation when it was nec-essary to destroy 17 rounds because dampnesshad rendered them unreliable. It is better to spenda few extra seconds preparing a round that can becounted on than having a number of unreliablerounds immediately available.

h. Secure Those Grenades

The explosive power of a fragmentationgrenade can generate great respect in the in-dividual Marine, particularly if he is on the re-ceiving end. This should be all the more reasonto carry grenades firmly affixed to the person.The grenade pouch is provided for just thisreason. Recently, while patrolling through asmall hamlet, a Vietnamese boy grabbed agrenade which was hanging by the safety leverfrom a Marine’s cartridge belt and attempted toescape with it. The child was quickly apprehendedalong with another boy. They stated that they hadbeen instructed by the local VC cadre to stealthe grenade. The two boys then led a patrol to anearby cave where a VC food cache was dis-covered.

Every possible source of enemy munitionsmust be strictly controlled.

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i. All-Around Mortar Fire

Mortar crews in Vietnam are frequentlyrequired to fire missions beyond the usual 3200roils covcragc. An additional set of aiming stakes3200 roils to the rear of the front set of stakeseasily accommodates this situation. All that isneeded to shift fires is to swing the tube andbiped legs to the rear, align the sight and beginfiring. Practice this technique during trainingand be proficient at it before you use it in com-bat.

]. All Purpose Demolition Kit

The continuing demand for a capability todestroy enemy explosive devices, caves, andfortified positions has led to the development ofa demolition kit for squad use.

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Demolition training for members of thesquad can be accomplished through the technicalservices of an engineer unit. Four men in additionto the squad !eader should be trained to use thesedemolitions.

The kit can be carried in a haversack or inthe cloth carrying bag in which plastic explosiveis packaged. There is sufficient room in the latterby removing one of the blocks of plastic explosive.These are the suggested components for the unitdemolition kit:

+ Seven 2+-pound blocks of composition 4.

+ One pair of blasting cap crimpers.

+ Ten to fifteen feet of time fuze.

+ Five to seven Ml fuze lighters.

+ Ten Ml nonelectric blasting caps withprotective container (carried separately).

+ Twenty to thirty feet of detonating cord.

k. Carrying 60mm Mortar Ammo

When a shortage of 60mm mortar pouchesexists, an empty M-37 demolition bag can be usedas a field expedient. Seven 60mm rounds anddemolition bag weigh approximately 35 pounds.One bag can be worn crosslmdy with the strapacross the right shoulder and the bag riding onthe left hip. When carrying two, they can be tiedtogether by the carrying straps and worn withstraps running across each shoulder with onebag on the chest and the other on the back.

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.,. ,

1. ~raccr Rounds

During periods of darkness or reducedvisibility, tracers are useful to mark targets

and adjust fires. Team leaders can carry one

full magazine of tracer rounds for markingpurposes. Individual accuracy is improved when

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a few tracer rounds are included in rifle maga.zincs to see the strike of the round in darkness.Remember, the long red finger of that tracerpoints right back to the place where it started,so use it wisely.

m. Starlight Scope Iiandling

The starlight scope increases the abilityof the individual Marine to accomplish night com-bat surveillance and enables him to direct aimedfire during night operations. The scope can behand held or mounted on the M-14, M-16, or M-60.Usable range and target detection is dependentupon terrain, vegetation, atmospheric conditions,and light levels existent at the time of employ-ment.

This scope can withstand rugged environ-mental conditions but, like other optical equip-ment, must be handled with care to avoid damageto the lenses, adjustment knobs, power switch,etc. Caution must be taken to prevent high in-tensity light from being shown directly into theobjective lens. High intensity light can seriouslydamage the scope. Always keep the lens cap onthe objective lens when operating in daylightconditions.

The starlight scope is an important pieceof your equipment. Take good care of it. Fororganizational and direct support maintenanceinstructions refer to TM 11-1090-268-13 datedJuly 1967.

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n. O-Chlorobenenealmalononitrile

More commonly known as tear gas or CSby Marines who have stumbled out of a gas cham-ber; the gas produces immediate, effective andvery incapacitating results. CS causes burning ofthe eyes, a heavy flow of tears, coughing, diffi-cult breathing, closing of the eyes, tightness in thechest, dizziness, and other uncomfortable sideeffects. Heavy concentrations may cause nauseaand vomiting. The immediate onset of the abovecan prevent affected personnel from taking appro-priate action to counteract these effects.

CS can bc dispensed by grenades, blowers,or launched cartridges. Descriptions of the vari-ous means available for disseminating CS areshown below:

+ Grenade, Hand, Riot, CN 1, M25A2.Normally used to control riots. The radius ofburst (visible cloud agent) is approximately 5meters, but fragments of the plastic grenadeoccasionally fly as far as 25 meters. Effectivequantities of the agent may be carried as far as70 to 9S meters downwind. The average Marinecan throw this grenade approximately 50 meters.

+ Grenade, Hand, CS, M7A2/M7A3.’ Thisgrenade is an irritant agent, special purposemunition used to control riots, mobs, and otherdisturbances. It may also be used to simulatecasualty agents during training of personnel. Theirritant is emitted from this grenade for 15 to 35seconds and provides a greater volume of agent

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than the M25A2. If persistent results are desired,this grenade is preferred over the M25A2.

+ Launcher, 35mm Ctg, 16-Tube E8. TheE8 launcher is capable of firing 64 E23 cartridgesutilizing 16 tubes. The launcher tubes are ar-ranged in a rectangular pattern with the tubespositioned to give a wide impact pattern on thetarget. The typical agent cloud generated whenfired from a firmly emplaced launcher at a 40-degree elevation will be rectangular in shapeand will cover 30 meters in the target area. Theduration of agent dissemination is 10 to 15 sec-onds after the cartridge lands in the target area.

-+ Mity Mite Blower. The Mity Mite is alightweight, gasoline-operated blower which canbe used in a variety of ways. When used withchemical agents it will:

● Force the evacuation of unmaskedpersonnel from a tunnel system by blowing riotcontrol agent into the tunnel. (Use the Grenade,Hand, CS, M7A2/M7A3. )

● Discourage reentry into a tunnel bycontaminating it with a powdered riot controlagent.

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16. U.S. ARMY BATTALION COMMANDER

The following observations concern the ex-periences of a U.S. Army battalion commanderoperating in the III Corps Tactical Zone of Viet-nam. They are published to acquaint Marineswith the problems encoun~crecl by one battalioncommander and to demonstrate his method ofoperating in the jungle terrain of War Zones Cand D.

a. Intelligence

“Good intelligence is the real key to suc-cess in Vietnam. This is particularly true at thebattalion level. There is no place in Vietnam thata U.S. infantry battalion cannot go, with almostcomplete freedom, as long as it is within rangeof its supporting weapons. The trick then is de-termining where to go in order to deal the VC a

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blow. This is the job of combat intelligence. InWW II or Korea (even though the destruction ofenemy forces was the primary mission) it wasvery closely tied to seizure of terrain. In Viet-nam, the VC very seldom place any importanceon terrain unless it contains a supply or basecomplex. The primary purpose of combat in-telligence therefore is to locate the enemy. Thiswe are doing with only a fair amount of success.There are many ways to improve upon this. Mostof these (agents , electronic means, etc. ) are notwithin the capability or scope of an infantry unit.The one thing which can be done at this level isto ensure rapid, free, and complete exchange ofinformation. This is not being done (sometimeseven within the battalions of a brigade) fastenough.

“If a battalion is on a pacification mission,the need for intelligence is paramount. Not onlymust they know where the VC units are, but theymust be able to identify, by name, the localguerrillas who are the members of the cadre orinfrastructure. In guerrilla warfare, it is almostimpossible to separate tactical military intelli-gence from political intelligence, but the problemis the same. Everyone (ARVN, National Policeand U. S.) must have access to all available in-formation. There is a risk of a security leakunder these conditions, but this risk is less seriousthan no exchange of information at all.

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“C)[iI intelligence personnel are surpris -ii~gl) WC1l trained considering the lack of em-pi]asis placed on combat intelligence in peace~irnem This does not present a real problem. TheprobleYII is that we don’t exchange informationup, down, and crosswise quickly enough to be-come useful to the recipient. ”

b. St~crvision.-. -———

“The big problem in the operation field isthe individual soldier. Our training centers do anexcellent job of training individual soldiers, how-Cvc!r, this same soldier will become lax, in-d~ffercnt, and slovenly unless he is forcefullyand skillfully led. ‘1’his leadership must be exer-cised constantly. Soldiers in combat tend to be-come lazy. ‘l’hey spend many hours waiting, orIi~erely doing nothing. “~his leads them to formbad habits which are fatal when under fire. Asoldier will fail to dig, disperse, or tu clean hisweapon unless l]e is required to do so; eventhough he knows such a failure could well lead tohis death.

“IL is not that soldiers don’t know what todo, or what is right or wrong. It is that they failco do these things unless made to do so. Ourjunior leaders, both officer and NCO, don’t prac-tice the military adage of checking on everything.%me of this is caused by the mistaken idea that!!x)kirlg after the men means to be easy on them.Allowing men to ride, when for safety’s sakethey should walk, and letting them dig prone

shelters rather than fighting holeq are but a fewexamples of this. In the main, a soldier will, (honly what is required of him. If junior leadersdon’t check, the men will not perform properly.It has been said, with a great deal of insight intothe problem, that if we could get every man to dothree things every day we would have no problems.The first of tl~ese is to djg. The second is mkeep clean-- not only himself, but his we’’pnn., andhis area. The third is to stay alert. This inclll:leskeeping spread out, keeping scouts or securitvout at all times, and staying off of well-used mails,Constant application of these three rules would.solve the vast majority of the troubles ini]lf~ntmyunits in Vietnam. ”

c. Health

“A major health problem that a unit com-mander, within a battalion, must concern himself

with is skin disease. Ringworm, skin rashes,immersion foot, and infections caused by thornor bamboo scratches cause loss of time and dis-ability if not treated at once. This is particularlytrue during the rainy season.

“Time lost due to skin disease can be keptto a minimum if the commanders are alert. Squadleaders and fire team leaders must check everyday to ensure that men wash and shave, that theychange their socks, dry their feet and that minorcuts and scratches are treated. If this is not done,infection is almost certain to set in, and a man islost for several days or weeks. ”

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Chapter III: NATURE OF THE ENEMY

1. THE ENEMY

a. The Individual

You will encounter a variety of enemytroops, ranging from the poorly trained and

1.89

equipped hamlet guerrilla to the well-trained,indoctrinated, and equipped North Vietnamesesoldier. In any case, he is an elusive and de-termined foe. He must endure many hardships,and he is often very dedicated. He is an expert inthe arts of camouflage, deception, and ambush.He is a hardy and ruthless fighter, but he is notinvincible.

The enemy is considered in three generalcategories:

+- The local hamlet, village, or districtguerrilla is poorly educated and trained. He maybe armed with a few grenades, an old French orGerman rifle, or a captured U.S. weapon. Al-though he may only be a part-time soldier, he isan important part of the VC effort, The localguerrilla knows the people and the terrain. Hecontrols the local populace and supports VCunits operating in his area. He may serve theVC as a porter, guide, or trail watcher; he maymaintain a local cache and prepare villagefortifications, or provide an early warning screenfor regular units; he may conduct acts of ter-rorism, harassment, or sabotage; and he may

serve as an intelligence agent.

+ The Main Force Viet Cong is a full-time soldier. He may have gained combat ex-perience against French, ARVN, or U.S. forces,or he may be a recent recruit from the localforces. I-Ie is usually well-trained and equipped.I-lc is outfitted with his weapon, a few grenades,a pack, a tubular shaped sack of rice which he

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slings across his shoulder, a hammock, a set ortwo of black pajamas, and a pair of rubbersandals. He carries a modern and effectiveChiCom copy of a Russian family of weapons(SKS carbine, AK-47 assault rifle, RDP LMG,and RPG-2 rocket launcher). The carbine, as-sault rifle and light machinegun all use a stand-ard 7.62mm cartridge.

+ The North Vietnamese soldier has, inmost cases, been carefully indoctrinated and.trained before his long march into South Vietnam.He has been provided a simple, but lightweightand well-adapted set of equipment, including khakiuniforms, a sun helmet, standard load bearingequipment, a plastic canteen, canvas rubber-soled shoes, and rubber sandals. He also carriesa modern and effective ChiCom copy of a Russianfamily of weapons (SKS carbine, AK-47 assaultrifle, RPD LMG, and RPG-2 rocket launcher).He has normally trained and infiltrated with hisunit into South Vietnam.

b. Military Organization

The highest enemy military headquarters inthe Republic of Vietnam is the Central Office,South Vietnam (COSVN), which receives instruc-tions from Hanoi. COSVN has overall respon-sibility for VC military operations in RVN andexercises direct control over certain units. SixVC military regions are subordinate to COSVN.The military region is a political headquarterswith a closely integrated military component

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which directs military operations of subordinateunits. At provincial and district levels, the VCpolitical and military structure closely parallelsthat of the Government of South Vietnam. Each VCpolitical headquarters at province, district, vil-lage, and hamlet levels includes a military com-ponent which exercises control over Viet Congmilitary units assigned to its area of jurisdic-tion. This organization technique subordinates themilitary to the political and promotes unity ofeffort. The VC organization is patterned after thatused in Vietnam.

North Vietnamese Army and Main ForceVC units are (organized into squads, platoons,companies, battalions, regiments and divisions.All these units follow the “triangular” concept;i.e., three squads per platoon, three platoons percompany, etc.

+ The squad includes 10 men orgaaizedinto three cells. The first cell consists of thesquad leader and three other men. The remain-ing six personnel are organized into two cells ofthree men each. The assistant squad leader isthe leader of one of these, and the senior mem-ber leads the third cell. The squad is armed withcarbines, assault rifles, and handgrenades.

+ The rifle platoon has three rifle squadsand a weapons squad. The weapons squad isequipped with light machineguns.

+ The rifle company has a strength of60 to 130 men and includes three rifle platoons

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and a weapons platoon. The weapons platoon isarmed with the 60mm mortar, 57mm RR, andlight machineguns.

+ Each battalion (300 to 600 men) hasthree or four rifle companies, a heavy weaponscompany, and special purpose platoons (signal,engineer, reconnaissance). The heavy weaponscompany employs the $lmm or 82mm mortar,the 57mm RR, and heavy machineguns.

+ A typical regiment (1400 to 2000 men).consists of two to four rifle battalions, a heavyweapons battalion, and special purpose com-panies (antiaircraft, signal, engineer, reconnais-sance, and medical). The heavy weapons baKalionemploys 81mm or 82mm mortars, 75mm recoil-less rifles, and heavy machineguns.

+ The enemy is beginning to use divisionlevel headquarters, conducting multiregimentaloperations.

+ The enemy is employing artilleryrockets (Soviet 122mm and 190mm) in attacks byfire in support of some ground operations.Limited use of artillery (up to 152mm) is beingmade in certain areas, normally along the DMZor from sanctuaries in Laos.

-+ Local force units are usually encoun-tered in squad and platoon strength. However,local force companies and battalions are knownto exist and operate in many areas.

-i- Military units vary considerably instrength and equipment, depending upon subordi-nation, location, health rate, availability of foodand recruits, degree of VC control and results ofrecent engagements with FWMAF forces.

c. Tactics and Techniques

(1) General

+ The basic tactical code of the VC is“When the enemy advances, withdraw; ‘when hedefends, harass; when he is tired, attack; whenhe withdraws, pursue. ” Emphasis is placed uponspeed, security, surprise, and deception. TheVC exhibit great skill in making the mostof theirenemy’s weaknesses.

+ Enemy operations are planned in de-tail and are based upon careful reconnaissanceand collection of intelligence. Troops are prepared

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for a mission with detailed rehearsals, includingthe use of mockups, sand tables, and similar ter-rain. Once a plan has been prepared and rehearsed,the VC seem reluctant to depart from it. A certaininflexibility is apparent in many VC operations,but on some occasions, VC forces have shownthemselves to be capable of improvisation.

+ The VC are very cautious and attemptto determine in detail the size, disposition, anddirection of movement of their opponents beforeengaging them. They would rather let an op-portunity slip by than act hastily without properintelligence and preparation. For this reason, ameeting engagement, which usually does not pro-vide a marked advantage to the VC, is avoidedat all costs, However, should such an actiontake place, they are taught to “Be the first todeploy troops to critical terrain, be the first toopen fire, be the first to assault. ” The purposeof this aggressive action is to seize the initiativeand to delay and disorganize the enemy by causinghim to deploy radidly under fire. During theresultant confusion, the VC break contact andwithdraw.

+ Local Viet Cong forces tend to operatenear roads and villages where they may controlthe local populace, and assist the regular unitswhich cannot so easily avoid detection. Mainforce and NVA units normally move and establishbases in more remote areas, usually alongnatural lines of drift, such as trails, streambeds,and valleys. They take maximum advantage of

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heavily vegetated terrain which provides themconcealment from aerial observation. They movedeep into difficult terrain, such as high moun-tain ranges, only when pressed by our forces.

+ The VC will normally make use ofevery opportunity to harass, to delay, and dis-organize our forces through the use of snipers,mines, boobytraps, probing attacks, etc. Theywill usually attempt to disengage and withdrawwhen faced with superior firepower, or when theyno longer enjoy an advantage. In contrast, NVAunits may defend tenaciously, or vigorously pressan attack, even in the face of overwhelming U.S.firepower. They frequently attempt to employ“close embrace” tactics, or engagements at veryclose range, to prevent our use of supportingfires. They often disengage and withdraw onlyafter suffering severe losses.

(2) Offensive Tactics

+ An important VC offensive tactic is theraid. It may be conducted by units from squadto regimental size, and is most often executedduring the hours of darkness. Two basic types ofVC raids have been noted. The surprise raid isthe most common. Security and speed are keyconsiderations in this type of action because theVC raiding party may have less numericalstrength than the defending force. The powerraid is one in which the VC employ overwhelmingstrength and firepower in order to annihilate adefending unit. The time the raid begins may be

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a clue to its nature. Raids begun after 0200hours are rarely power raids.

+ The ambush is one of the most effec-tive VC offensive tactics. Ambushes are normallyestablished along roads, trails, streams, andother natural routes of movement. Enemy forcepatterns are studied in detail, and then ambushesare established along regularly traveled routes.VC ambushes are usually short, violent actionsfollowed by a rapid withdrawal. Frequently theVC have established ambushes behind friendlypatrols after they left their patrol bases. Whenthe patrol retraced their routes, they were caughtin ambushes when patrol members were tiredand security was lax.

+ The “lure and ambush” is a commonlyused VC tactic. The basic principle is to drawthe attention of friendly forces and lure theminto prepared ambushes. Many variations of thistactic have been noted. Some of the variationsare as follows:

. The VC have attacked an outpost orvulnerable unit and then attempted to ambushrelief forces at nearby landing zones or alongprincipal avenues of approach,

● Withdrawing VC units have at-

tempted to lead friendly forces into the ambushesof other VC units.

● Snipers have drawn the attention offriendly units and enticed them into ambushes.

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. The VC have mortared friendly basecamps and then ambushed friendly forces insearch of mortar positions.

● The VC have used some of the abovemethods to entice friendly units into heavilybooby trapped or mined areas.

+ Harassment is a basic tactic of VCguerrillas. Sniper activity and probes are usedto demoralize, confuse, and mislead friendlyforces. Diversionary harassing attacks have beenused to draw friendly forces away from vulner-able VC installations.

+ The VC are experts at infiltration. Theyhave infiltrated friendly positions during periodsof reduced visibility and adverse weather, oftencombining the infiltration with a feint or ruse.Frequently they have infiltrated friendly posi-tions disguised as local civilians. Objects of VCinfiltration are sabotage, assassination, demoral-ization of friendly troops, collection of intelli-gence, and disorganization of friendly units.Rapid deterioration of organized defenses andmany accidental casualties have been caused bythese infiltration tactics.

+ The VC have been known to follow afriendly unit to a helicopter or truck pickuppoint. They then launch an attack as the last unitsare leaving, and when departing troops are mostvulnerable and least prepared mentally to reactquickly.

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(3) Defensive Techniques

The Viet Cong avoid defense becausethey cannot withstand friendly firepower. How-ever, they may defend vulnerable units, bases,and installations for short periods of time.

The Viet Cong prepare extensive de-fensive positions throughout their operationalareas, If surprised by friendly forces, they will,if possible, withdraw to a previously preparedposition and defend until they can break out, mostprobably during the hours of darkness. VC posi-tions are characterized by defense in depth,mutual support, overhead cover and maximumuse of natural cover and concealment. Defensesare oriented along trails and other obviousavenues of approach. Booby traps are often in-corporated in the defenses, particularly in VCbase areas.

As. a reaction to friendly heliborneoperations, the VC have prepared defensivepositions at the edges of prominent landing zonesin their operational areas. In some instancesthey have remained covered in a second line offortifications several hundred yards from thelanding zone while friendly artillery and T.ac Airprepared the landing zone. When the prepara-tion ended, the VC moved forward to defend atthe edge of the landing zone, and then with-drew to the second line of trenches when neces-sary.

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(4) Withdrawal Techniques—

The Viet Cong include a withdrawal planwith every offensive and defensive plan. As soonas the situation becomes unfavorable to theirforces, they withdraw rapidly along preplanned,concealed escape routes. They often break downinto small groups and withdraw along the sameroute they used in their approach.

During the withdrawal, the VC makeextensive use of rearguard personnel whosemission is to delay the pursuing friendly forceuntil withdrawal of the VC main force is ac-complished, Ambushes designed to slow friendlyforces are also frequently employed.

A typical withdrawal technique used bysmall VC forces in danger of an unfavorable,close-range contact is to drop their packs andrun. Friendly forces have been inclined to slowtheir pursuit in order to inspect the packs.

The VC may also evade capture byhiding or by blending in with the local populace.Hiding places used by the VC are almost linlit-lcss, although underground locations appear to bethe favorite. Underground means of hiding troopsand equipment range from simple “spider holes”to elaborate, reinforced rooms. From the sur-face, these underground installations are mostdifficult to detect. Critical points are entrancesand exits, which are usually concealed in gardens,animal pens, under piles of straw or clung, in orunder structures, and in riverbanks.

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Extensive and inge~liously constructedunderground tunnel systems are c}ne of the uniquefeatures of underground ]~iding places. Most areconstructed in such a manner thar they permitshort term underground ha bitatioi~. They areusually built in a zigzag, mlllti]. evel fOl”iN Withventilation holes at various inte~-va”ls. ~his typeof constructiotl may provide protection fromgrenades or disc~ve~y+ Wljcn cornered tinder-ground by f~ienclly forces, the VC w~ll often ejecta grenade from one of these holes and attemptto escape thruugll an<jtl;erexi[ during d]e resultingshock and smoke.

d. Booby traps and Mines—

Booby traps are favorite devices of the VC.Grenades, spike traps, poison arrows, unexplodedordnance (duds), and a variety of other means are

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employed to harass, slowdown, confuse, and killfriendly forces. The forms of these weapons arelimited only by the imagination of the designer.

1300bytraps have most often been usedalong trails, in moats and entrances to villages,in gaps. in fences or thick brush, at fording sites,at bypasses to obstacles, in doorways, and onabandoned bodies, weapons, and equipment.

Grenades are commonly used as booby-traps because they are lightweight, easy to carryand conceal, and readily adaptable. They arefrequently put in trees or bushes along trailsfriendly forces arc expected to use, with trip-wires strung across the pathway.

Spiked foot and mantraps are commontypes of booby traps found throughout Vietnam.The spikes may be sharpened bamboo sticks, orthey may be barbed wood or metal spikes em-placed in wooden, concrete or metal blocks. Thespiked devices are placed in holes along routesof movement, and carefully camouflaged to pre-vent detection, or they may be placed in rows ontop of the ground.

The VC also employ crude but effectivetripwire type devices along trails and paths whichrelease arrows, bamboo whips, and other ‘swing-ing, barbed, club-type objects. Barbs are oftendipped in poison to compound casualty effects.

Antipersonnel and antitank mines are usedextensively in VC operations. They may be of the

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crude homemade variety or they may be similarto those in the U.S. inventory. When AT minesare employed, they are used exclusively on roadsand trails capable of carrying vehicular traffic.The VC have not been known to mix AT and APmines in their minefield. However, AP minesare employed on defensive terrain nearby so thatpersonnel taking to the high ground to protect adisabled vehicle are then subjected to the APmines and booby traps. AP mines are used to de-fend entrances to VC underground hiding placesand along trails.

AT mines are placed in hollowed-outplaces on bridges or in holes which have beendug in roads. In order to make the hole difficultto discover, the VC may scatter dirt acrossthe road for several hundred meters or digseveral dummy holes for deception or for mineemployment at a later date. Water buffalo dunghas also been used for camouflage. Shouldersalong roads are often mined, and occasionally theVC tunnel in from the shoulders to plant elec-trically controlled mines directly in the center ofthe road. This latter practice permits “selectivetargeting” of vehicular traffic. On some occasionsthe VC have buried wire leading to a road, buthave not emplaced a mine. When friendly troopsfailed to discover the wire, the VC then emplacedthe mine and destroyed the next target of theirchoosing.

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e. Miscellaneous Observations.——- — ..—

The VC are very nonchalant in areas theybelieve are safe. They travel almost exclusivelyon trails, and security is very lax. When they

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-.

know enemy units have moved into an area, theyshift from the major trails to low terrain, stream-beds, etc.

Although the VC are accustomed to movingalong trails at night and conducting well-rehearsednight attacks or probes in familiar terrain, theyare not experienced in night combat and are oftensurprised and confused when engaged unexpectedlyby friendly forces at night,

Typical signs of enemy presence are deadfoliage which may be camouflage for a trap, tieddown brush which may be a firing lane for adefensive or ambush position and villages whichhave been recently abandoned by women andchildren.

Enemy caches are usually at convenientlocations, beside secondary trails, etc. Typicalhiding places for VC equipment are rafters,thatched roofs, rice or rice bags, haystacks,dung piles, and wells.

Local guerrillas prefer to live in villageswith their families at night. Movement of guer-rillas out of villages at dawn and into villagesat dark is a pattern in many areas.

The VC attempt to locate distinguishingfeatures of friendly forces when engaged. Theywill fire most often upon personnel distinguishedby radio antennas or back packs, insignia or rank,or automatic weapons with bipeds. They will con-

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centrate fires upon anyone who appears to be givingcommands.

In preparation for an engagement, the VCwill prestock the battle area and rally points withresupplies of ammunition, medical supplies andequipment.

The VC often prepare covert mortar firingpositions for use without a base plate, An angled(preaimecl). cylindrical hole is dug at the mortarposition. During the attack, the VC move forwardto the hole, emplace the mortar tube, fire thedesired number of rounds, and then hide the tube~t another location, or withdraw with the tube.

The VC often use a creeping pattern insupport of ground attacks. In other words, themortar rounds fall very closely in front of theadvancing troops.

The VC are experienced in breaching un-observed wire which has not been supplementedwith detection devices.

As an adjunct to their operations orders,the VC prepare elaborate plans to insure the re-covery of dead, wounded, weapons, ammunition,and equipment from the battlefield.

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2. NVA/VC REGISTRATION TECHNIQUE

It has been recently noted that NVA/VC havebeen registering their mortars prior to an in-fantry attack. The registration normally consistsof one round near a specific position. For example,on a recent date one round hit 50 meters from an81mm mortar position at 1700. This was fol-lowed at approximately 2400 by a combinedinfantry/mortar attack in which the 81mm mortarposition received 20 rounds of mortar fire.

If at all possible, friendly positions subjectedto this tactic should be moved prior to any pos-sible infantry/mortar attack. Where relocation isnot possible, the defensive posture should bestrengthened through the appropriate means.

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3. ENEMY I~ORTIFICATIONS

Recently discovered North Vietnamese Armybunker systems and field fortifications were char-acterized by their excellent concealment andnarrow fields of fire. Most of the bunkers couldnot be detected until Marines were within 10 to 30feet of the fortification. The lack of a wide fieldof fire from the bunkers was partially compen-sated for by numerous spider traps which werepositioned to protect the bunker systems:. Theprincipal direction of fire from the bunker wasinvariably along trails and avenues of approachthat would afford each movement to attackingMarine forces.

The avoidance of obvious avenues of approachcan negate planned enemy fires, achieve surprise,and render the fields less destructive.

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4. ENEMY EMPLOYMENT OF RPG-2ANTI-TANK ROCKET LAUNCHERS

Recent encounters between our tanks and theenemy armed with RPG-2 rocket launchers haveindicated an established pattern of employment.As the tank approaches a hidden antitank posi-tion, the crew’s attention is diverted by auto-matic weapons fire. The natural instinct of the tankcommander and gunner Is to traverse the turrettoward the automatic weapons and engage themwith the coaxial machinegun or main gun, With “the turret turned, for example, to 2 or 3 o’clock,the RI?G-2 antitank man inevitably will get off ashot from 10 to 11 o’clock on the turret’s flatside.

Tank commanders and gunners should bealert to this feint and not bring all weapons tobear on one area. It is recommended that thetank commander counter the small arms andautomatic fire with his .50 caliber machinegun.The gunner should remain alert to fire the coaxialmachinegun or main gun with canister in the otherdirection from ranges of 30 to 300 meters. In-fantry working in close support should be briefedon this problem and should be prepared to main-tain frontal fire for short range or long rangeprotection.

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The team (5 men) and the cell (3 men) aretrained as snipers by an organized unit with whichthey operate. Snipers have used the K-44 rifle(7.62mm Mosin Nayant) with scope attached.This is a bolt-action rifle with a 5-round maga-zine: Maximum effective range with the scope is1400 lmeters, and the maximum horizontal rangeis 3500 meters. Trained snipers employ minesand other explosive devices to cause casualties;to channel friendly troop movements and tofacilitate their own withdrawal. Snipers mayengage at distances between 50 to 600 metersdepending on the terrain. The snipers are usuallydeployed so as to permit the friendly force to beengaged initially from head on, and then from theflanks and rear. The initial fire is usually aimedat the point element in an effort to fix the friendlyunit’s attention toward its front.

Remaining snipers are concealed in pre-determined positions along the route of friendlyadvance. The flank and rear snipers’ principaltargets are the unit commander andmencarrylngautomatic weapons and radios. Enemy snipersusually do not fire more than about 5 rounds,with most casualties resulting from the first 2or 3 rounds. Trained snipers will normally main-tain contact with a target by withdrawing alongpreplanned routes paralleling the route of ad-vance of the friendly column. Firing is con-tinued from predetermined positions.

Much of the fire reported as sniper fire canbe attributed to local guerrillas. Such fire can be

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distinguished by its larger expenditure of am-munition and the shorter ranges invo~bed. It isalso usually less accurate. The local’ guerrillaoperates independently, with a sector of respon-sibility rather than as part of a team.

The basic tactic of enemy snipers should bestudied to determine the most effective means ofcountering them. Unit commanders should bear inmind that harassing or sniper fire can be ex-tremely effective, and can slow or even halt thefriendly advance,

# # # # #

6. VC WARNING DEVICE

The Viet Cong have devised many ways toprovide warning and protection from approachingpatrols. One method is to place large piles ofcut tree branches on trails approaching villages.These brush piles extend completely across thetrail, and are from 3 to 6 feet in width, withheights up to 4 feet. Removal of these obstaclesis difficult without creating noise which will alertthe enemy; movement around them is just asdifficult, The patrol leader must be prepared toexpend as much time as is necessary to movearound the branches or to quietly remove themto avoid detection,

The Viet Cong also have used a number ofwarning signals to alert their forces of the ap-proach of friendly patrols. Warning devices have

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included blinking lights, drumbeating and smallarms fire. In one area VC sympathizers wereinstructed to remove and wave their hats whenMarine patrols approached. All unit leaders shouldtake note of any unusual occurrences which couldalert the enemy of the presence of Marine patrols,

Marine security patrols in one hamlet areanoticed a marked lack of contact at night withthe Viet Cong. In discussing this with a hamletofficial, the Vietnamese attributed it to a warningsystem that certain viHagers use to advertisepatrol movements. A single light in a house windowmeant that patrols were in the area; two lightsmeant all clear, The houses displaying theselights are situated on the edge of the hamlet nearan open field where the signal could be seenfrom any of several paths leading toward thehamlet.

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7, VC TRICKS

Rock throwing can be harassing, and evendangerous, when it is used as a deception meas-ure. The VC have frequently thrown rocks atMarine positions at night to harass and distractthe sentries. The enemy has been known to in-clude a grenade in a barrage of stones. The bestprotection against such a tactic is to be alert andhave a well-preps red position including protec-tive wire beyond grenade range. Treat any suchincident as just what it is--potentially dangerous,

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The Viet Cong do not limit themsel’{es to theuse of explosive devices when attempting to harassu. s. troops. During a recent operation by aMarine unit, a discarded VC pack was cautiouslyexamined. It contained no explosives, but some-thing just as deadly -- a bamboo viper. The snakewas killed and that unit learned a new enemy in-vocation.

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8. VC DECEPTION

Deception in all forms is practiced by theViet Cong. The following example illustrates anattempt by the VC to halt naval gunfire bombard-ments. A naval gunfire airborne spotter had di-rected fire missions on a known VC base area;the missions had been properly cleared, and thegunfire was on target. The following morning a

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sampan approached the gunfire ship. Severalelderly Vietnamese were on board displayingnational flags and holding up papers. Two of themwere taken aboard the ship, and the local districtchief and advisory personnel were flown aboardto aid in interpreting. The papers were requeststo the ship not to fire on the hamlets near thecoast. This was an obvious deception as the twohamlets were known to be VC controlled andusedas enemy bases. Both hamlets had long been asource of trouble for patrols. The VC” forcedthe local village elders to present false com-plaints about civilian casualties due to gunfire,In this case, both hamlets had long been vacatedby those people who were not VC or VC sympa-thizers. The villagers were advised subsequentlyby the district chief that firing would not benecessary near these villages if the people madethe VC leave.

Deceptions are P commonplace tactic of theguerrilla. Each seemingly valid request must beinvestigated to determine whether some form ofdeception is being attempted and how best tocounter it.

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9. VC ATTACKS

An analysis of combat reports of Viet Congattacks against U.S. and other friendly fixed posi-tions shows the intensity and duration of the at-tacks have varied widely. As has been emphasizedbefore, the VC thoroughly prepare for such at-tacks. This preparation is not without indicatorsif you know where they are to be found. Forinstance, adult men rather than children haveherded cattle near friendly positions one or moredays prior to the attack. The familiar patterfis ofneighboring village routine are noticeably altered;fewer people attend market days; more or fewerpersons are observed riding the local bus;the general attitude of the villagers is less warmand conversations more circumspect; the villagechief is not available for daily liaison visits.

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Members of the local populace can be VCsympathizers and, although they appear to beengaged in routine activities, they can actuallybe supporting the Viet Cong with an action such ,as one noted by an alert Marine patrol. Duringmovement near a small hamlet, one patrol ob-served a group of villagers who all appeared tohave one stiff arm, while the other arm wasnormal. When the group was questioned andsearched, they were all found to have a weaponconcealed in their sleeve. All indicators such asthese can be arrows pointing to potential troublespots, Counterinsurgency, like good police work,means lots of routine legwork and continuousevaluation of evidence and circumstances.

“rhe intensity and short duration of attacksm,ean that every minute is critical in reducingcasualties. Reconnaissance and tight local secur-ity are good preventive measures; well dug inpositions save lives,

##tii#f/

10. VC COUNTER AMBUSH TECHNIQUE

One ambush technique utilized by the VC is topreposition an automatic weapon approximately100 to 150 meters from a known or probableUSMC ambush site, Prearranged left and rightlateral limits are then selected. These limitsare usually natural terrain features that are easilyidentified (trees, boulders or houses). Two en-veloping elements consisting of two or three VC,

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usually armed with grenades, are then dis-patched.

The enveloping element moves out and takespositions at the prearranged left and right laterallimits, at which time the VC automatic weapondelivers. well dispersed fire over the entireprobable ambush site or several sites. Marineswho immediately return fire give away theirpositions. The VC automatic weapon ceases fireat this. time enabling envelopment units to movein undetected and saturate the ambush site withgrenades.

It is, therefore, well to remember not to im-mediately return fire when a friendly ambushsite receives a large volume of fire from arelatively great distance. Keep under cover andstay alert to respond to the situation as it de-velops.

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11, VIET CONG RIVER-CROSSINGTECHNIQUES

Conversations with Popular Forces personnelreveal that the Viet Cong, in heavily patrolledareas, do not always use boats as a means ofcrossing rivers. In areas where rivers are ratherwide, the Viet Cong will tie or strap their weaponsacross their backs, inflate an easily obtainableplastic bag and float slowly across with only theirheads showing. To mark the point where the indi-vidual is to land, the Viet Cong have used the

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technique of placing a simple bicycle taillightreflector mounted on a bamboo stick at thedesired landing point. On moonlit nights, thereflector provides adequate light for navigationpurposes. Tinfoil has also been used as a meansof providing an unattended navigation light.

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12. VIET CONG MEDICINE

The following account of Viet Cong medicalpractices was written by Captain Arthur MasonAhearn, MC, USA, and first printed in the March1966 edition of Military Medicine. Captain Ahearnwas a member of the 5th Special Forces Group(ABN) in Vietnam and served as the surgeon to a“C” detachment in I Corps.

a. Introduction

Any discussion of Viet Cong facilities andactivities is subject to strict security control.Much of the documented information on Viet Congmedicine is at present classified and cannot beprinted. What follows is a combination of theauthor’s personal experience, informal reportsfrom colleagues, and information from unclas-sified reports. It is hoped that it will serve asan enlightening, if brief, introduction to some ofthe medical practices of our enemy in Vietnam.

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h. Personnel and Training

Physicians are, of course, quite scarce.Prior. to the Geneva Partition of 1954, the Frenchtrained many of the doctors now practicing withthe Communists in both North and South Vietnam.Now they must train their own, relying upon theirown resources and upon technical assistance fromnations sympathetic to them. The Viet Cong haveaugmented their shortage by establishing a 12-month ‘school for “medical officers” in a safearea hidden in the jungles. Candidates have com-pleted basic aid cycles and have served withtroops in the field. In the school they are taughtthe structure and function of the organ systems,basic diagnosis and treatment, and traumaticsurgery. The program is quite similar to thatstudied by the U.S. Army Special Forces Medic,It would appear that the instruction is largelydidactic with little emphasis upon practical workor student contribution.

Nurses, midwives, aids, cooks, and bearersalso fit into the medical organization. In additionto their professional training, these workers areso impressed with the patriotic aspects of tend-ing and comforting their fallen comrades thatthey bring an amazing zeal to the bedside.

c. Battlefield Practices

The guerrilla is quite concerned about hiswounded. Outnumbered as he is, he can less afford

his losses than can his conventional opponent.Moreover, wounded and dead constitute importantsources of intelligence which he little cares togive his enemy. Accordingly, the Viet Cong makeevery effort to retrieve their casualties. In manyareas they attack with one leg wrapped in alength of vine. This permits the soldier to bedragged hastily from the field should he fall. Ahook similar to that used by stevedores has alsobeen used on dead and seriously wounded soldiers.This is inserted under the chin and serves asanother dragging device. Viet Cong medics bravedefending fire during attack lulls to extricatewounded and dead from wire entanglements, Insome areas U.S, soldiers have been surprised tonote that when one Viet Cong is hit, his two adja-cent comrades quit the fight and assist him to therear. It must be remembered that the Viet Congusually attack in vastly superior force.

It is evident that some triage isperformedon the battlefield. Although no eyewitness accountsof dispatch have reached the author, there arenumerous reports of Viet Cong dead bearingserious body cavity wounds, who also have neatgunshot wounds of the head.

Individual aid kits usually contain adressing, chloroquine tablets, an antibioticpowder, and a handful of herbs for a stimulatingtea. Unit level aid kits contain surgical instru-ments, frequently Chinese, and assorted anti-biotics, vitamins, and stimulants, usually niketh-amide preparations, Medicines are almost always

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in parenteral form due to the Vietnamese pref-erence for the intravenous route. This preferencereflects the French influence.

Following a sustained attack, defendersalways find an area used by the Viet Cong as aforward aid station. Discarded items indicate thatthe treatment here is limited to dressings, life-saving procedures, and administration of anti-biotics. ”-No use of plasma expanders has beenreported,

d. Forward I-Iospitals

Specific information on numbers, locations,and organization of forward hospitals is, ofcourse, classified, However, it is safe to statethat many forward hospitals do exist in Viet Congsafe areas. Here definitive treatment must beadministered.

The patient is prepared for surgery with astimulant --again usually nikethamide. Anesthesiais by a combination of intravenous iaductionagents and local infiltration. The dripping ofprocaine on exposed tissue has been described.There is no cvidcncc of inhalation equipment, andonly rarely is the use of open-drop ether reported,

Descriptions of debridement indicate thatthe Viet Cong have a full knowledge of ballisticinjuries. Surgeons have described several tech-niques of intestinal anastomosis. Although thedanger of infection is great, some orthopedic

cases are handled with internal fixation devices.However, amputation is frequently the treatmentof choice.

Captured equipment indicates that routinelaboratory procedures on blood, urine, stool, andsmears are available at these hospitals.

It should be noted that some definitivetreatment is received by Viet Cong in hospitalsof the South Vietnamese civil government. Theguerrilla’s technique of blending in with thecivilian population makes it possible for him tofeign refugee status and to secure treatment inthe hospitals of his enemy.

e. Evacuation

Evacuation to the rear proceeds backwardsup the “Ho Chi Minh Trail. ” In the delta, thesampan affords easy transportation and readyconcealment, In flatlands, a favorite conveyanceis a litter mounted between two bicycles. In jungleand mountainous areas, transportation is viahuman and animal bearers. The trail is con-structed in a similar manner to the missionhighways of old with way stations spaced a day’sjourney apart. Members of the local population arefrecluently Impressed into service between twoof these way stations carrying supplies forwardand wounded backward. Doubtless, many a VietCong has enjoyed the dubious luxury of an elephantambulance.

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‘“ !2Q!EThe Viet Cong secure their pharmaceuti-

cals through several channels. Their own supplysystem is one of these. Another is the blackmarket in South Vietnam. In Danang, a 250 milli-gram tetracycline tablet sells for 28 piasters orabout 23’ cents. Another channel is that of thelegitimate South Vietnamese drug market, Mostitems sold by prescription only in the UnitedStates can- be purchased openly in Vietnamesedrug stores. Tifomycine (Chloramphenicol) isfeatured in display windows, and highway bill-boards sport advertisements of antihelminthicscomplete with attractive illustrations of theparasites. This ready access alarms officialswho are concerned with resources control.

In addition to western pharmaceuticals,the Viet Cong employ a battery of herbs andnative medicines. A medical missionary workingin a Montagnard area has reported that hesuspects the Viet Cong of using a crude digitalispreparation to poison their enemies, due to theslow pulse, vomiting, and cardiac irregularitiesof the victims.

g. Other Practices

The Viet Cong employ the same orientaltechniques as do their noncommunist country-men. Needles and bits of glass are used to prickthe skin in a pattern determined by the nature ofthe malady. Glass bottles are heated and appliedto the skin so that the suction generated as the

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contained air coolsfrom the body.

h. Conclusion

In summary,

may draw the evil agents

the tendency to downgradethe extent and effectiveness of the Viet Congmedical operation should be avoided. Although itis true that in many aspects Viet Cong medicineis at a level parallel with American medicineduring our Civil War, it is believed that if thefull truth were known, all would be amazed atthe quality of medical care they are able to givetheir sick and wounded.

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13. OVERT VIET CONG MEETINGS

Patrols operating in or around villages shouldbe particularly aware of any gatherings of Viet-namese males during day or night. These gather-ings should be thoroughly investigated and iffeasible, the group leader brought in for formalinterrogation.

Recent Viet Cong meetings have been heldduring broad daylight in villages by the use ofsimple card games or local village games.Americans, unfamiliar with the language, maywalk right by a group of Vietnamese supposedlyengaged in a friendly game, but who are actuallyplanning an attack on friendly positions.

#####

225

14. VIET CONG RICE RATION

Just how much rice do the VC need each dayto have enough strength to pull a trigger or topull some of his old harassing tricks? Did youever wonder how much rice he consumes perday? Some interesting figures have been providedrecently by II FFORCEV which provide a good

idea of how much we hurt the VC when we captureand extract his vital rice caches.

Recent military operations have had an impacton limiting VC capabilities. A newspaper articleindicated that the rice captured in OperationCedar Falls, which at that time amounted to3,170 tons, was “enough to feed a Viet Congbattalion for a year. ” This quantity of rice was infact enough to feed more than 20 battalions(500 hungry men each) for a year.

The VC rice ration varies according to thearea he is in and the type of work that he does.In certain areas where rice is abundant, his dailyration may amount to a full kilogram (2.2 Ibs),but this is unusual. From a review of numerouscaptured VC documents we find that a normal riceration per “man usually runs between 700 gramsin garrison to 750 gra]ms in combat. This riceration is augmented by fruit, vegetables, somefish or meat and a small amount of money forlocal food purchases. In remote mountain regions,the rice ration often is reduced. Manioc and otherrice substitutes are used to make up perhaps 50percent of the authorized ration.

The VC evidently do not appreciate how hardtheir administrative personnel work because theration of these personnel is only 600 grams ofrice per day. On the other hand, artillery troopsare authorized up to 875 grams in combat.

227

Here are a few figures on rice that will helpyou estimate how badly you hurt the Viet Congwhen you carted off his rice. The VC figure thatone ton of rice will feed 40.4 men for a month.We recommend that the figure of 1 1/2 pounds ofrice per man per day be used in computing theimpact of rice captured from the Viet Cong. Inestimating total weight of rice captured, unitsshould use the figures 50 pounds per cubic footfor milled rice and 35 pounds per cubic foot forpaddy (unmilled) rice.

/#####/#

228

15. VC TOPOGRAPHICAL AND MILITARY

SYMBOLS

The following is a listing ofViet Cong symbols as compiledports, interrogation reports andments which have been receivedand Vietnamese agencies:

BASIC SIGN

mElEl

UNITS

VARIATION

N IU30RNE

1NFANTRYUNIT

commonly usedfrom agent re-captured docu-from American

ENOINEERUNIT

MEANING

SIONN,UNIT

MILITARYMEDICALSERVICEUmT

JUNl(FORCE

MORTARUNIT

ILLMIBLC. PROBMLYARTILLERYUNIT

El -P31D UNIT

229

PERSONNEL

BASIC SIGN

o

A

A

A

6

(5

VARIATION MEANING

SQUAD MEMSER

SQUADLEADER

ASSISTANT SQUAD LSADER

MATDON LFADER

ASSISTANTPLATOON LEADER

COMPANYCOW.IANDER

CONPANYF.XSCUTIVEOFFICISR

COUPANY PE7TYOFFICER

DEPUTYCONPANYPE1’TV

BATTALIONCOHMANOSR

REGIMENTAL COM4ANDER

DIVIS1ONCIX44ANDCR

OFFICER

230

EQUIPMENT

BASIC SIGN VARIATION

CARGO TRUCK

oI

ANMORSD CAR

TANN

SHIP

HELICOPTER

MEANING

TACT ICAL SYMDOLS

PLATOON IN ATCACK POSITION

CONPANY1N A~ACK POSITXON

BATIXLIONINATTACKPOSITION

PLATOON IN TKE AWANCS

C@lPANYINml! AWAKE

231

13ASIC SIGN

1,II >

00

II IIo 0 >

00 —>

VARIATION MEANING

DATTALION IN IIIE AWANCE

PLA’lceN IIImm Awmms(mochanizod)

CWPANY IN TNE AWAJ4CS(mechanimd)

BATI’ALION IM TM* AWANCS(mmchmizod)

SQUAO CONSAT FORHATI ON

PLATOON COMSAT FORMATION

C(X.IPANYCONSAT FOPMATION

TRUCK COlL9AT FORMATION

CONVOY MWEJ4SNT

COWOY WITN ARTILLERY

COWOY WITN TANxS

232

BASIC SIGN VARIATION

BATTLS

4

-4-

+

MEANING

POSITION

PRONO 0? ATTACK

HALT

urnioMuAx.

ATTACK CJUCICSD

A17’ACKCHCCXSD AND POIUXtDmUsmomn

DXSSCTIDN0? WITUDSAUAL

W N AITAcK ?ORCS

SSCCNMRY AIYAu TO-

BASIC SIGN

-&oM,.

—— t —.

*——— _——— —_

VARIATION MEANING

MD TEAM

(II

RAIDUNIT

OBJECTIVE

IMMEMATEMISSION

PFUORXTYMISSION

MISSIONOF’” TNE IMY

RSASSWLYAREA

234

TRACKED VEHICLE SYMBOLS

BASIC SIGN VARIATION MEANING

aLIGHT TANK

o MEDIUMTANK

o● tlEAVYTANK

o&

●SELF-PROPSLLEDTANK

FLAW3TNRONSSTANK

FLAIL TANK

oANPHI81OUSTANx

6’

COMPANYCCWiANDSR,S TANK

BATTALIoN~DSRm S TAHX

RffiIY4ENTALCCUMXNDER1S TAtJX

DIVISION COWAN DER*S TANK

235

BASIC SIGN

v-o(Y-ov-o(x)w-ow)

VARIATION MEANING

COMBATFORMATION

PLATM)NINCLOSEFORMATION

PLATOONININITIALFORMATION

PLATOON1NCOMBATFOIWATION

CONPANYINCOt43ATFONJ4ATION

nAllhLIONINCOMIATFORMATIOR

LANDINGZONES

~@PARATRoQPDROPZONE

HELICO~ERLANoINGZONE

236

FORTIFICATIONS AND EMPLACEMENTS

BASIC SIGN VARIATION MEANING

@SOUARS INDIVI WAL SMPLACW~

la

19

WASNIM CELL

BUNKT,R

OUAPD ms’r

CCHUNICATION TRSNCNUNDCIW3ROUND~NICATIONTRSNCNCOM3ATTscNalEs

lNTIMRuPTkDCWgATT~sg

237

OBSTACLES

BASIC SIGN VARIATION

+-%,.

J- r-l n● .?..*LJ u 4

MEANING

BARKIERFENCE

nilOllm MMWD FENCE

CONCFJITINA

w 4- SINGLESTRANDBARSEDWISE

-x— DDUnLESTmNvLIARDED WIRE

TNRE~ ORNORESTRANDSOFLIARDEDWIRZ

MTEOROPENINGIN-l?

NOODPOLEFENCE

INTERLACEDTREEFCNCE

-

LATTICE NODOENFENCE

WOOEU FENCE

FORTIFIED HARLST

ANTIASSAIJLT ‘i’RENCNUI’lW SPIKSS

238

BASIC SIGN

0 Ill

VARIATION MEANING

SPIKE PIT

SPIKE FISLD

Pumn TRAP

0000:0

000●“*O :0. ~“.

Y

ANTITANKMINEFIELD

COMEINEDMINEFIELD

LANETHROUGHMINEFIELD

BASIC SIGN

<

L

AMK!L+

AA

TRAIL SYMBOLS

VARIAZ’ZC);: MEANING

---+ TOSTAST

● muon mls WAYQUICKLY

SLCM.Y

TumcLxn‘nJPMSIarr

(y& + moss W4STACLSWWJ1,WATEII

DIVIW. INTOTnlt-uecuPs

UNITEINTOOUROSWP

RlmJSNSACK ZUCMW

&-zL._ lluswAYYow

100METERSTOcutP

@

AA

CAMPlffiAREA

CAMFRICIITlIERSP*S ToENTERCAMP

MNGER (PRmMLY Urlm+sTO UYJIYCAM.)

BASIC SIGN

>>>

><

><

x

B

mI

m

VARIATION MEANING

SAPSTY

SNEMY IN AO/ANCC

SNCOIJNTSRSDOPPOSITIONHSRS

PROHIBITEDSOAD

WAITHEMFORTSW

TNISWAYTOTWCRWSR

LSTTER INTRSIZ

5 MfXCRSTOLEITCR

WATERFALLS100 MEIZRS

241

GROUP SYMBOLS

BASIC SIGN VARIATION MEANING

PRo.VCPEOPLE

AGEUI’S ANDCADRS

FARMERS ASSOCIATION

COt41UNISTPARTTM=EBS

EI,XMENTSINPflISONEDBY‘lliEVC

EL~TS UNDERSURVEILLANCE

FAMILIES WIO.CNNEED BRAINNAENINO

SUSPSCTS

242

BASIC SIGN

TERRAIN SYMBOLS

VARIATION

NIDNNxbL

HDuIrrNll

POSSST

DUISEPOSU3T

SPASSCPcRus?

JUWL.R

S2.--=s-x-t _-.-c

=-=.:=

E31-

0***

lllIN?ORESTNITWHKAVY~

DRYSICCPISLD

FlJ30DCDRICZFI~D

BUSH

BASIC SIGN VARIATION

—-

~.-. -.., ---

I

/__ e.-.->—. —-= - .0 .-”

‘!

\

4MEANING

ISOLATED TREE

LAJ7GERIVER

STREAN

LIRYSTREAM

FORMNGPLACE

RIVERWITl{RocKSONM)T’ToM

FERRY

SPEEO AND DIREcTIONOFF-

244

BASIC SIGN VARIATION MEANING

RIVER WI ‘Ill SN4~ SHOM9

RIVER 5* ltIOS AND 4)4 DEEP

#####

245

Chapter IV: AVIATION

The following operating procedures, tacticsand pilot techniques are currently being employedby Marine helicopter units in the Republic ofVietnam:

1. THE HELICOPTERBORNE ASSAULT

a. Planning and Coordination

The planning for a major helicopterborneassault should be detailed, timely and effectedconcurrently by all participating units. Failureto achieve positive coordination or to providefor the smallest detail or to commence earlyplanning will inevitablysuccess. While certainning and coordination

reduce the probability ofoverall aspects of plan-must, of necessity, be

247

accomplished at the Division/Wingresponsibility for detailed planningpassed as soon as possible to Lhemanders who will execute the assault.

b. The Loading Phase

level, theshould beunit com -

‘rhe size of the loading zone, in terms ofthe number of helicopters that can be landedsafely therein, is critical to t!le success of theentire operation, A single zone, free of obstaclesand with a large capacity for helicopters andtroops, is preferred and will greatly simplifyand facilitate the loading plan.

The key personnel in the loading zone arethe loadmasters from the helicopter unit and thetroop unit, all of whom must be thoroughlyknowledgeable concerning the loading plan. Theloading plan should be designed to provide theloading sequence that supports the ground schemeof maneuver, provide troop unit integrity, andmaintain or provide for the flight integrity of thehelicopter formations.

The loading zone will normally be or-ganized with loading spots for the number ofhelicopters which constitute one wave, with des-ignated points for formation of troops into heli-teams located abeam the helicopter spots, andwith specified areas for staged cargo, Someflexibility in setting up the zone must be al-lowed in the event of a major shift in wind di-rection.

248

A conference between the helicopter unitloadrnaster (an officer or senior SNCO) and thetroop loadmaster, one or more hours prior to thestart of the loading, is always advisable. Invari-ably, one of the biggest problems in maintain-ing the sequence in the loading plan is that thefinal troop count and amount of cargo may differconsiderably from the planning figures.

Many last minute problems in loading can beresolved by providing the loadmaster with an FMradio capability for communication with heli-copter flight leaders. This FM frequency shouldnot be the same frequency used in the landingzone (LZ). Use of this frequency by the heli-copter pilots to report discrepancies in loading,to report “loaded and ready” for takeoff, etc.,will expedite the loading operation.

c. The En Route Phase

If the loading zone will accommodate theentire flight of helicopters, the flight leader willusually remain in the loading zone until the pre-calculated takeoff time in order to arrive at theLZ precisely at “L” hour without making anydelaying turns or orbits. Frequently the loadingzone will be in an area within range of sniperfire. In this case, the helicopters will climbover known safe areas or execute a spiralingclimb over the loading zone and effect therendezvous at 1500 feet above ground level (AGL)or higher.

249

The en route flight formation is alwaysfree cruise, tactical, with at least two rotordiameters separation between aircraft in the samedivision. The cardinal rule is never to fly di-rectly behind another aircraft except momentarilywhile sliding ingunners are poortendency to aim

250

a turn. Many ofmarksmen; i.e.,directly at the.

the enemythey have a

helicopter;

therefore, if the wingman flies a position behindthe leader at a distance of one rotor diameter,he may receive ground fire aimed at the leader.Whether to use three plane formation or fourplane formation has been a matter of squadronpreference. The number of troops to be lifted,the size of the zones and other factors frequentlydictate the formation to be employed.

Weather permitting, the usual en routealtitude for transport helicopter flights in theVietnam environment where there is largely ,30caliber fire, is 2500 feet AGL. In locations whichare reported to offer .50 caliber opposing fire,the normal en route altitude is 5000 feet AGL. Inlocations which are reported to offer largercaliber antiaircraft weapons in opposition, thepreferred flight altitude is approximately 100feet AGL, in defilade whenever possible.

d, The Approach Phase

As soon as possible after the first wavehas effected a rendezvous, the flight leaderestablishes communications with the TAC(A)(Tactical Air Controller Airborne) or HC(A)(Helicopter Controller Airborne) who will providesuch pertinent information to the flight leaderas wind direction, weather, enemy situation, etc.,at the LZ. Based on the provided information,the flight leader will decide on the direction andtype of approach and will so inform the TAC(A).

At the predesignated initial point (1P), theflight leader will report his arrival to the (TAC(A).

251

If the gunships have not effected rendezvous priorto the arrival of the flight at the 1P, they shouldjoin up at this point in abeam positions on bothsides of the transports. At approximately 2000 to3000 meters from the LZ, the flight leadersshould request that the TAC(A) mark the LZwith a smoke rocket or grenade. Timely markingof the LZ is critical. A late mark, caused by theTAC(A) being out of position, can cause unneces-sary delay and orbits of large formations ofhelicopters at a most inopportune time. If theTAC(A) leads the flight into the LZ, the flightleader should stay well behind in order to planand fly his own approach.

In a helicopterborne assault, the preferredapproach to the LZ is a high speed letdown (formaximum rate of descent) and a right-hand turninto the LZ, which will allow the flight leader tokeep the LZ in full view during the entire ap-proach. A 900 right turn into the LZ makes iteasier for all helicopters in the flight to makethe approach without steep turns or radicalmaneuvers; however, a 180° right turn gives theflight leader a good look at the zone as he arrivesabeam the zone and commences the approach. Astraight-in approach is frequently used to effectthe initial landing in minimum space and time,although the descent is somewhat more difficult tojudge and wingmen have a tendency to hold theirstepped-up position which may cause them toland beyond the leader. A spiraling approach information is considered the least desirable foran

252

assault landing involving large helicopter forma-tions and should be used only if the flight arrivesover the zone and the leader is forced to set up anorbit because he cannot locate the exact area ofthe landing zone. A spiraling approach in forma-tion cannot be effectively supported by gun-ships; consequently, in this case the gunshipsestablish independent patterns around the LZ, Anapproach using a left-hand turn is employedwhen the enemy situation dictates or may beemployed on subsequent approaches to the sameLZ in order to introduce a variable into theflight pattern.

e. Suppressing Fire in the LZ

Scheduled helilift of troops into unsecureLZ’s carries with it the requirement for thoroughprep by fixed-wing aircraft or artillery bombard-ment. Experience has shown that in spite ofadequate prep, the transport helicopters inboundto the I.Z’s arc frequently fired on from locationsnearby. On scheduled strikes, helicopter gunnerstake under fire any enemy positions adjacent tothe LZ; i.e., tree lines, trenches, bunkers, etc.The helicopters land in an inverted ‘IV” forma-tion to permit the outboard gunners to fire attargets of opportunity. This tactic is permissibleonly on the first wave. Gunners must be thoroughlybriefed on the proximity of friendly troops andthe location of adjacent LZ’S into which simul-taneous landings may be taking place. (See fig.4-l. )

253

f. In the LZ

Frequently the LZ terrain will dictate theexact landing spots. If there are no terrain re-strictions, the helicopters norxmally land in regu-lar flight formation with comfortable lateralseparation.

Troop debarkation occurs quickly and allhelicopters are taking off within a few secondsin proper order. Only under the most unusualcircumstances would a helicopter take off priorto the aircraft ahead. Those circumstances arethat the aircraft ahead has been obviously de-layed and the LZ is receiving enemy fire.

It is highly advisable to arrange fordesignated troops landed in the first wave to placehigh visibility panels in the LZ as markings for

254

subsequent helicopter waves or, if one pre-designated aircraft from each division pops asmoke grenade in the landing zone as it departs,the zone will be continually marked for thesucceeding waves of helicopters.

HELICOPTERLANDINGDIAGRAM

/

//

Iiimoo?

M[MSNT

Figure 4-1

255

g. Departure From the LZ

Although the departure route is always pre-planned and prebriefed, frequently last secondchanges arc dictated by the enemy situation inthe vicinity of the zone. The flight leader shouldannounce via radio any changes to the briefeddeparture for the benefit of his flight, escortinggunships and the TAC(A). In order to reduce thelikelihood of a conflict between approach andclimbout patterns, the turn after takeoff normallyshould be opposite in direction to that of the ap-proach turn.

On the takeoff and high-power climbout,the flight will avoid, if possible, flying overvillages, riverbanks, tree lines and high terrainany of which could conceal enemy positions. Whilebelow 1000 feet AGL, the flight leader should

256

execute abrupt changes of heading (10° to 20°) atirregular intervals while climbing. Normally theflight will not be able to join up on climbout untila reasonably safe altitude (above 1000 feet AGL)is reached and the flight leader reduces powerand executes a rendezvous turn, although mem-bers of the flight will attempt to close in everyturn.

#####

2. HELICOPTER RETRACTION

a. Planning

The tentative plan for retraction of troopunits should be accomplished as a part of theplanning for the helicopterborne assault. Thefinal planning for a troop retraction should be asdetailed and as well coordinated as the planningfor the assault; too frequently this is notrealizedbecause of the exigencies of the battle situation,and inevitably the difficulties encountered in thetroop retraction will reflect the planning de-ficiencies.

The selection of a suitable large area forthe LZ is of paramount importance. It must nothave any avenues of approach such as villageswhich offer concealment; it must not be on ornear a river unless the other side of the riveris occupied by a friendly force; it must not benear dominating terrain unless that terrain is oc-cupied by a friendly force.

257

b. The Loading Phase

All aspects of the loading phase for ahclicopterborne assault also apply in the heli-copterborne retraction, the important differencebeing that the loading zone may be only tempo-rarily secure or perhaps never secure fromdirect enemy fire.

The major problem in a troop retractionis that of providing security for the LZ as thetroop units are withdrawn. Although this is theground commander’s responsibility, the heli-copter commander has a direct personal interestin the plan for an orderly withdrawal of the troopsfrom the 12. For this reason a personal con-ference between the ground commander and thehelicopter commander prior to commencing theretraction is advisable. In addition to LZ security,

258

two critical items which must be discussed duringthis brief conference are the provision for FMradio communications between the loadmastersand flight leaders and an accurate troop count.

c. The Final Wave

The crucial phase of the troop retractionis the formation and expeditious departure of thelast wave of helicopters. Keeping in mind thatthe enemy will recognize this moment as thegolden opportunity to strike a decisive blowagainst our reduced force, the number of heli-copters in the last wave must be tailored to liftout the sizable force required to secure the LZuntil the last minute, Conversely, the size of thesecurity force must be tailored to the helicopteravailability. In either case, the security forceis lifted out as a unit in the last wave. Duringthis crucial phase it is imperative that ade-quately armed helicopter and fixed wing supportbe on station.

d. The Emergency Evacuation

In all helicopter evacuations under emer-gency conditions, the possibility of PANIC exists.This possibility is greater when such an opera-tion is to be conducted under enemy fire and mustbe anticipated whenever possible. After the deci-sion has been made to conduct an emergencyevacuation, the planning must include an analysisto determine the likelihood of an uncontrolledsituation in the pickup zone and to determinecontrol measures in such an eventuality to prevent

259

swamping of the helicopters. If the emergencyevacuation involves Vietnamese personnel, civil-ian or military, the problem is compoundedseverely by the language barrier between pas-sengers and helicopter crews and by the lack ofpassenger indoctrination in helicopter operations.The loadmaster personnel usually furnished by ahelicopter unit to direct the loading of pas-sengers and cargo in a retraction will be quicklyoverwhelmed when a panic situation occurs.

Whenever an e m c rge nc y retraction/evacuation mission is assigned wherein the pos-sibility exists that a panic situation may developduring the loading phase, the helicopter com-mander will take the following action:

+ Analyze the known factors and anticipatethe likelihood of an uncontrollable situation.

260

* Provide increased numbers of load-masters organized and equipped as deemed ap-propriate.

+ Attempt to establish direct liaison and/or communications with the leaders of personnelto be evacuated.

+ Provide interpreters, if required.

+ Provide aircraft equipped with a loud-speaker system and Vietnamese speaking per-sonnel, if appropriate,

Instruct helicopter crews and load-masters in the application of tl]e following meas-ures to be taken progressively in a step-by-step manner commensurate with the degree ofseverity of the mob action encountered:

+ Control the number of passengers byblocking entrance to the helicopter.

+ Employment of physical force.

+ Hover the helicopter or takeoff andremain airborne until order has been restored.

+ Use of tear gas or other riot controlagents.

+ Use of rifle butts or riot clubs.

+ Fire over the heads of the mob or intothe ground in front of the mob.

261

+ ~hen all of the foregoing either havefailed or are impossible to execute, fire at theleaders of the mob aiming low in an effort tostop rather than kill them.

####if

3. RECC)NNAISSANCE PARTY INSERTION ANDEXTRACTION

a. Recon Insertion Procedures

A reconnaissance patrol or party insertionconsists of a one-wave troop landing in an isolatedarea from which the reconnaissance will beinitiated. The object is to introduce the patrolinto the area as surreptitiously as possible and tocomplete the insertion in the shortest time

262

possible before any enemy forces can react,Normally the flight leader bases his preflightplanning on the information given in the fragorder and the intelligence provided at the squadronlevel. A brief conference covering the followingpoints between the patrol leader and the flightleader at the pickup site is always beneficial infinalizing the flight leader’s plan of action:

Confirm FM frequency and call signsfor air-ground communications,

Confirm LZ location,

Gonfirm number of troops.

Emergency procedure in the event thepatrol receives fire immediately after landing--usually immediate extraction. The patrol leadershould ride in the flight leader’s helicopter incase further conferring becomes necessary.

If armed helicopter support has been ,pro-vided, it is advisable to have the gunships pre-cede the transport flight to the proposed LZby a few minutes, the purpose being to check theLZ for signs of enemy activity, and to estimateand relay the capacity of the LZ, After takeofffrom the LZ, empty helicopters will climb overthe zone in such a manner as to provide somefire support, if required, to landing aircraft.When the latter becomes airborne, the emptyhelicopters proceed to a designated “empty circle”and hold a safe altitude until the last helicopteris clear of the LZ.

263

If the patrol insertion is made in a moun-tainous area where wind ,direction and velocityare more critical and more difficult to estimatefrom natural indicators, the flight leader willnormally drop a smoke grenade prior to thefirst landing in the interest of flight safety eventhough it may increase the probability that thepatrol insertion will be detected by the enemy.

The most critical period for a helicopter-borne patrol is during and immediately after itsinsertion into the operating area. Because ofvoids in knowledge of the enemy situation, it isduring this time that the patrol is most likely toencounter unexpected enemy resistance. Fixed-wing aircraft assistance or emergency helicopterextraction may be necessary during this period.After departure from the LZ, the helicoptersshould remain on the patrol net frequency untilthey return to base,

b. Improving LZ’S

Effective operations require a positive LZimprovement program. Continuous efforts are re-quired to develop new LZ’S that can be utilizedfor reconnaissance insertions and extractions,communication sites, and observation posts. Onemethod of LZ improvement that htts proven suc-cessful is the use of daisy cutter bombs droppedfrom fixed-wing aircraft.

The daisy cutter utilizes an extender on thenormal fuze, which causes the bomb to detonateup to 36 inches from the ground, This, above-the-

264

ground detonation produces a shearing effectwhich aids in the clearing of LZ’S. Ivlultiplebombing runs over an area of medium vegetationwill normally clear an LZ large enough to ac-commodate one CH-46. In heavy canopy, the useof daisy cutters will not completely clear an LZ,but the fragments will cut away sufficient vegeta -tion to enable a support team to rappel in, Oncethe support team has landed, they can then pre-pare a zone that is adequate for helicopterlandings.

c. Extraction Procedures

A recon patrol or party extraction con-sists of a onewave helicopter recovery at thecompletion of the reconnaissance mission or insome instances when the patrol’s position hasbecome or is expected to become untenable.

265

Prior to commencing the extraction, it is im-portant to verify the number of troops involved.

With rare exceptions, the patrol to beextracted has FM radio communications and isexpecting the helicopters at the scheduled time;thercf ore, location of the patrol is seldom aproblem. The patrol normally pops a smokegrenacic as soon as the helicopters arrive in thegeneral area. If the landing zone will accommodatethe entire flight, all aircraft land, load, and de-part together. Otherwise, the land, load, and take-off cycle is repeated expeditiously while providingmutual fire support by flying low cover for eachother insofar as possible. Mutual fire supportwill be unnecessary if the extraction is beingsupported by gunships.

f# # {/ # #

266

4. COMBA-r RESUPPLY BY HELICOPTER

a. Forward Support Area Operations

The helicopter support team (HST)cept of employment set forth in FMFM

con-4-3,

section 8 is valid in the counterinsurgent en-vironment subject to some modifications. Pri-marily, the difference is in the location of theLZ at which the HST performs the shore partyfunction for the helicopterborne assault force. TheHST is not a part of the assault force butestablishes its support organization at a logisticsupport area (LSA) or at a beach support areanear the battle zone but in a relatively securearea. From this forward support area the heli -copterborne assault force receives its logisticalsupport by helicopter under positive control ofthe aviation element of the HST, which includesthe landing zone control team with appropriatecommunications and an aviation refueling section(TAFDS unit). Normally, helicopter maintenancesupport is not provided at the forward supportarea.

One of the major problems encountered inthe operation of helicopters at forward supportareas has been the ingestion of sand and dirtinto fuel and lubricating systems. In spite of ad-ditional precautions, such as more frequent filterchanges, this ingestion of fine particles of sandand dust has caused many engine failures and othermalfunctions. Occasionally, a grassy area can be

267

Since tile CH-53A helicopter began opera-tions in RVN, internal movement of cargo toforward combat. areas has been extensive. When

268

the external method of cargo movement was usedIn support of ground operations, results lndlcatedthat over relatively short distances (less than 50miles) external cargo movement is much moredesirable and efficient. Additionally:

Twice as much cargo per hour wasmoved externally as was move internally, or thesame a mount of cargo was moved twice thedistance when handled externally.

The average ground time lost in thepickup/drop zones was a minimum of 15 minutesfor each zone when loaded/off-loaded by handcompared to less than 2 minutes in either zonewhen externally loaded.

The efficiency of the aircrew and theloading/off-loading working party decreasesgreatly in proportion to the amount of cargo tobe handled. This results in increased ground timewhich can be relieved by using external viceinternal lift and by presaging cargo in cargonets,

It is apparent that when two or moreaircraft are used, external cargo movement willgreatly reduce pickup/drop zone congestion andvirtually eliminate the need for one aircraft toorbit, which is often the case, while the otherloads/unloads.

Due to the lack of adequate mechanizedloading equipment, it has been found that internallymoved cargo must often be hand-loaded/unloaded.“rhis usually requires a 20 to 25 man working

269

party per aircraft in both the pickup/drop zones.lZxternal cargo handling eliminates the need forlarge working parties for cargo handling, thusmaking more men available for other tasks.

c, Selecting Helo LZ’s

Field units often choose a small helicopterzone for resupply near their positions rather thana larger zone a slight distance away. The largerzones have the advantage of affording the re-supply helicopters a short roll-on landing, therebyincreasing the payload. Consult a Forward AirController when selecting these landing zones;he can assist in a choice which will satisfy theneeds of the supported unit and the helicopters.

d. Assignment Procedures

The technique of assigning specificallydesignated helicopters for logistic support ofinfantry units has proven itself to be highlysuccessful. Two variations are employed:

With a battalion in a fast-moving situa-tion, covering difficult terrain, two helicopterscan be assigned in direct support of the battalionfor medical evacuation, resupply, evacuation ofprisoners and equipment, and displacement ofMarine personnel, supplies and equipment.

For battalions in relatively static situa-tions, logistic support can be provided by assigningdirect support helicopters to the shore partygroup commander, there in providing the meansfor delivery and pickup.

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e. Internal and External Loads

Some cargo items have the weights clearlymarked or are familiar items which have knownweights. The weight in many instances must beestimated, as accurately as possible. The crewchief should keep pencil and pad handy so thatmistakes caused by mental arithmetic can beeliminated.

The procedures for external loads in thecombat environment are unchanged except that itis more important to join up the flight at leastin twos or threes for mutual safety on the enroute flight.

f. Outpost Resupply (ARVN)

This type of ARVN resupply mission isfrom a support base, which frequently is not assecure as one would prefer, to an ARVN outpostwhich is secure for a radius of 1000 meters orless, It usually involves transporting suppliesof rice, ammunition, fish oils, wheat, lumber, wireand/or soliders with wives, children, dogs, house-hold goods, etc. For this mission the helicopterunit always provides a loadmaster; nevertheless,if there is no American or Australian advisoror English speaking ARVN officer to help withcontrol and coordination, some difficulties mustbe anticipated.

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g. Pilot Procedures and Techniques

On combat resupply mission, either insupport of a ground operation or in support ofmountain outposts, a great variety of situationsand conditions can be encountered. Therefore,the Ilclicoptcr pilots must be flexible, versatile,and alert for the unexpected.

If a fixed-wing attack escort has beenpro-vidccl, the establishment of communications andthe rendezvous with the escort should be ef-fectecl at the time and place designated in thefrag order. En route to the I.’Z, the helicoptercommander will brief the flight leader of the at-tack escort on the pertinent aspects of the missionwhich will include the locations of known enemypositions from which fire may be expected. I)ur-ing critical periods of the flight, the helicopter

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commander should inform the attack escort leaderwhen the “assault wave pattern” is considered ap-propriate.

Although the normal en route altitude forresupply missions is 2500 or 3000 feet, when flyingover mountainous terrain the altitude should beincreased to provide an appropriate margin ofsafety from small arms fire. The flight leaderswill always endeavor to avoid known “hot” areaswhere enemy fire has been frequently received.In the counterinsurgent environment helicopterpilots should refrain from the stateside practicesof departing on course while climbing at lowaltitude and of commencing a letdown at somedistance from the destination, thereby placingthe aircraft in a low and slow condition well out-side of the field boundary. The safer proceduresare:

+ To effect a spiraling climb after take-off over the most secure area to an altitude above1000 feet AGL prior to proceeding on course.

+ To execute a spiraling approach singlyor in formation from en route altitude. Somepilots prefer to letdown en route to 1500 feetAGL over the point of intended landing, therebyalways flying the spiraling approach through thesame vertical airspace on every approach to re-duce the probability of errors in judgment. Theairspeed maintained in the spiraling approach

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may be varied as required to achieve the resultdesired; i.e., a slower airspeed of 60 knotsproduces a tighter spiral keeping the helicopteras close as possible to the secure landing area;whereas, a higher airspeed of 100 knots producesa substantial increase in rate of descent but alsoa much wider spiral.

Landings at mountaintop outpostsusually require a percision approach to a smallcleared area which rarely accommodate morethan two aircraft. Although personnel at the out-post are supposed to mark the landing spot with asmoke grenade, frecluently they do not, Since windinformation in a mountainous area is criticallyimportant to the landing of a helicopter, theflight leader will drop his own smoke grenade ona low pass over the site prior to approachingfor a landing if there is no other positive indica-tion of wind condition at the site. Pliots shouldbe aware that the wind direction at the base of amountain may be significantly different from thewind direction at the top of the mountain.

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5. MEDICAL EVACUATION BY HELICOPTER

a. General

Of’ the diverse missions performed byhelicopter, the evacuation of battlefield casualtiesranks in several aspects as the most significant.Such categorization is reflected in the fact thatregardless of demands upon helicopter avail-ability to perform other missions, there will al-ways be helicopters set aside for the sole pur-pose of responding to requests from casualtyevacuation. Further, the aviation elements con-cerned with the execution of ME DEVAC missionsregard suc!~ activities as the ultimate of thevarious categories of air support rendered. As aresult, cognizant command and control agenciesauthorize ME DEVAC missions under conditionswhich would normally cancel missions of anothernature.

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Under these circumstances it is inevitablethat attrition of helicopters and crews engaged inME DEVAC missions will be higher than associatedwith other missions. Current 1st MAW statisticsindicate that while ME DEVAC missions accountfor but 7.5 percent of total helicopter missions,such missions account for 32 percent of the totalcrew casualties resulting from enemy fire.

There is probably no action which may betaken to reduce the hazard level ~f MEDEVACmissions to the general level of overall heli-copter operations. It is necessary, however, thatevery effort he made to minimize the associatedattrition ratm. ‘1’his necessity touches directlyupon the ground commander for it is he WI]Odeclares the requirement for ME DEVAC and it ishe who does or does not undertake facilitatingpreparatory and supporting actions.

To this end, continuing command attentionis dirccred to tllc following Inal ters:

The determination as to whether theME DEVAC is to be classified and passed throughair request channels as routine, priority oremer-gency rests with the ground commander on thescene. The following general classificationcriteria are used:

Emergency. Critical wound, injuryor illness, judged to require immediate evacua-tion as a matter of life or death.

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Priority. Serious wound, injury or——illness judged to require early hospitalizationhut not requiring immediate evacuation as a matterof life or death.

Routine. Wound, injury or illness of aminor nature which requires the attention ofother than locally available medical resources.This classification will additionally be normallyapplied for evacuation of deceased personneland for transfer of patients between medicalfacilities.

Since the call foremergency MEDEVACmay cntall and/or inspire cxtraorclinary risk ac-ceptance on the part of dle participating helic-opter crew, full and continuing attention is di-rected to the following:

It is not practical to provide a com-plete listing of wouncls/injuries/a iln]ents which door do not cons~jtute cause for emergency evacua-tion. In general, aInbLIlatory patlcnts will posltlvclynot be so classified; personnel with penetratingwounds of the head and body cavities or who havesuffered loss of an extremity will be.

An emergency MEDEVAC takesprecedence over all others. The commandercalling an emergency must do so with full reali-zation that his action may cause a significant de-lay in the evacuation of other wounded Marines.

This consideration plus attendantrisk factors dictates that the determination to call

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for emergency evacuation be invariably derivedfrom a totally honest appraisal of that professional .or lay medical evaluation and advice which isavailable on the scene or through rapid com-munication channels.

Overall considerations and facilitatingactions to be taken by the ground commander:

It serves no purpose to call a heli-copter into an environment in which it cannotsufiive. The security of the LZ from which theevacuation is to be made must be evaluated and’if not secure:

The evacuation must be movedto a reasonably secure area or, if this is notfeasible:

+ The LZ must be made securewhile the evacuation is in progress by applica-tion of that suppressive fire available to theground commander in the immediate area or byartillery fire or by fixed-wing cover and/or by acombination of the three.

The medical evacuation helicopterwill normally be accompanied by armed heli-copter escort. Such escort is effective for sup-pressing localized small arms fire but cannotoutduel mulzisource automatic weapons fire and/or concentrations of small arms fire. Withpresent armament, and armed UH-l E maybe shotout of the sky by a .50 caliber machinegun be-fore it can bring its own weapons to hear. Within

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a hostile environment with which it can contend,the armed helo escort is most effective if thepilot is aware of the LZ situation and enemypositions prior to arrival. It is accordingly es-sentjal that the supported unit make every effortto establish radio contact and exchange pertinent

Linfo mation with the aircraft before it approachesthe LZ, ..The frequency for this purpose must bespecified in the MEDEVAC request.

An adequate and mutually acceptablelanding site should exist. In this matter, the sup-ported unit is expected to advise the pilot withrespect to prospective pickup point, but the ulti-mate choice must be made by the pilot who mustbase his decision not only on ground dispositionsand situation, but also on the capabilities of hisaircraft under the prevailing flight conditions.

If terrain or vegetation conditionsare such that an adequate landing site neitherexists nor can be cleared by reasonable effort andit is impossible to move the casualty overland to amore suitable area, then and only then will theevacuation be accomplished by hoist. This modeis particularly hazardous because:

The helicopter is totally vulner-able to any degree of enemy fire while main-taining the necessary stationary hover.

Any degree of pendulum motionmay result in fouling the hoist if the operation isbeing attempted through a jungle canopy. In thisregard, extreme care must be taken by personnel

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.Ml$aiib?ion the ground to ensure that the hoist cable ex-tends vertically (without deflection by treebranches, etc.) from the helicopter to the groundand that the evacuee is secured to the cable at thatpoint, Under no circumstance may the cable bepulled from the vertical. A potentially disastrouspendulum motion can be the only result. A truevertical lift must be set up by the’ personnel

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on the ground, by moving the evacuee to the verti-cal (free-hanging) cable preferably, or if this isphysically impossible, by instructing the pilot toadjust, his hover position to a point directly overthe evacuee as evidence by the ground contactpoint of the free-hanging cable.

The unit requesting a MEDEVACmust be prepared to assist the pilot in locatingthe casualty pickup point. Any available meansincluding voice radio and pyrotechnics may beused. If the evacuation is to be made at night,the supported unit must light the intended pickupzone utilizing flashlight or other light sourcesat the approximate four corners of the obstruc-tion-free area, If this is not feasible, inabilityto light the zone must be indicated on theMEDEVAC request and the requesting unit mustbe prepared to accept flare illumination.

Every effort must be taken to mini-mize the time that the evacuation helicopter mustremain on the ground. The stationary helicopterconstitutes an extremely lucrative target and thelonger it remains on the ground, the more intensethe enemy fire usually becomes. To this end, theevacuee should be prepared and positioned im-media tel y adj scent to the pickup point beforethe helicopter lands.

b. Pilot Procedures

If communications can be established withthe ground unit which requested the MEDEVAC, itis usually not difficult to locate the site except

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during a ccmdi[ion 0[ reduced vlsihi]ity causedby darkness or bad weather. ‘1’lwrc are severalmethods or navigational aids that can be utilizedto locate the pickup:

Obtain the TACAN bearing and distancefor the coordinates given from the DASC or TADC.

When the ground unit FAC has the air-craft in sight, he can clirect the pilot over thesite and/or mark the site with signal mirror,smoke grenade or flare, as appropriate.

Plot a course which follows rivers,coastline, highways or other prominent terrainfeatures co the pickup area even if the route is afew miles farther.

If the ground unit FAC can transmit onUIIF, home on his signal using the ARA-25direc-tion finder.

Although a MEDEVAC pickup site itselfmay be secure from enemy fire because of de-filade, frequently the areas over which the heli-copter must approach and depart may ~ besecure. Therefore, it is imperative that the pilotobtain from the ground unit FAC the best quadrant/direction for approach and retirement as well asthe location of nearby enemy positions. The gun-ship can be very effective on a mission of thistype. Even the presence of the gunship will, attimes, suppress enemy fire. Occasionally a pickupzone which has been declared “secure” and has,in fact, rcccivcd no enemy fire for sometime,

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suclcienly becomes “hot” when the helicopterpresents a lucrative, highly visible target thatdraws direct ancl indirect fire. While waitingin the landing zone the helicopter pilot can gainsome important knowledge of the local groundpicture by simple observation; e.g., if all or al-most all of the troops are in the prone positionbehind the dikes, etc., the zone must be “hot”;also if most of the troops appear to be facingand pointing rifles in the same direction, thatmust be the direction of the enemy, so do nottake off in that direction.

Night lighting for a MEDEVAC pickup is aserious problem which will not be solved untilground units are issued sets of portable, direc-tional lights (strobe lights preferred) with whichto mark the landing zone with a 100-foot squarepattern. Meanwhile, flashlights, gasoline fires inpits, and anything available will be used to mark asafe landing area. Although it may be necessaryat times because of enemy fire to make an ap-proach wit!~ lights “out,” pilots should be advisedto use aircraft lights as required to accomplisha safe landing. The vertical-hover light, paintedred, has been found to be quite effective for nightlanding under, these conditions.

There are a number of questions relatingto pilot judgment which are difficult to answer:

+ At what point does enemy fire becometoo heavy to continue mission? An answer whichmay he oversimplified is “When the enemy fire

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sounds heavy but is not hitting the helicopter, themission should be continued”; on the other hand,“When the enemy fire sounds heavy and is hittin~the helicopter, the mission should be aborteduntil the situation can be rectified. ”

+ At what point does the weather becometoo bad to continue the mission? Another over-simplified answer is “When the situation appearsto be making demands that exceed the capabilitiesof the ‘aircraft or the pilot, it is time to abort. ”The common tendency is to go too far or tohesitate too long.

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6. MONSOON WEATHER FLYING

a. Flight Problems Induced by the Monsoon

From October through March annually, theDanang/Chu Lai region is affected by the north-east monsoon which causes low cloud ceilingsand flight visibility on 15 to 20 days per month,I-Iowever, on the days of marginal weather, rarely

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will the helicopters be held on the ground becauseof weather itself. The first problem is that flyingaircraft at low altitude, below 1500 feet AGL,over an area infested with insurgents/guerrillasfrequently results in unacceptable battle damageand casualties. A second problem is that of theinherent difficulty in low-level navigation ag-gravated by a condition of reduced flight visi-bility. A third problem is that the inadvertentIFR procedure listed in the NATOPS Flighth4anual” (UH-34 ) becomes an inadequate solutionin the case of large flights of helicopters; and ifthe air traffic control system is already saturatedat the time, the NATOPS inadvertent IF R pro-cedure would be ill-advised.

b. Procedure

First Problem (low flight and enemy fire)-—----- . . . ---- ...... -—.——

If the mission calls for flight over anarea which has been quiet (no hit reports) for aconsiderable period of time, the flightleader mayelect to attempt the mission in spite of a lowcloud ceiling. The availability of UH- lE gun-ships for helo escort would be a factor itilu’encingthe flight leader’s decision.

If the mission has been assigned apriority of “mandatory,” there is no question thatevery effort will be made to accomplish themission in spite of weather and risk.

The mission may be delayed until theweather has improved to acceptable minimums.

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The mission may be canceled when thereappears to be no chance of weather improvementwithin the required time frame.

Even a mandatory mission may beaborted when the weather encountered creates asituation which, in the judgment of the flightleader, is beyond the capabilities of the pilots orthe aircraft.

Second Problem (low-altitude navigation)—.- . . .. .-—..-—.——.—.—.—

On a low-altitude flight in a conditionof low flight visibility, line-of-sight radio aidsto navigation are frequently unusable. Therefore,the flight leader must rely on dead reckoning(heading-time-distance) navigation or navigationby following prominent terrain features such ashighways, or rivers, etc., a combination of bothwhich is usually the case.

The preflight planning for a low alti-tude/low visibility flight must be done carefully.The route selected must provide the best terrainaids to navigation even if the distance is greaterthan a direct route; e.g., from A to B followHighway 1 (estimated time en route: 10 minutes);hold a magnetic heading of 260° for approxi-mately 3 minutes to intercept river at C; followriver in southerly direction to D.

Third Problem (inadvertent IFR proce-.—-..—-- ..-—------..-—--dures) ‘—

It is extremely difficult to fly forma-tion with helicopters in the dark, heavy clouds

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associated with monsoon weather. To enter heavyweather with a large formation of helicopters isto invite disaster. When confronted with the im-mediate prospect of taking a formation of heli-copters into IFR conditions and a 180° turn iselected as the course of action, the flight leadershould descend immediately to keep the surfacein sight and turn in the direction which appearsto offer the best horizon; e.g., if flying over thewater parallel to the beach line, turn toward theland. When confronted with the immediate pros-pect of taking a formation of helicopters into IFRconditions and the decision is to continue straightahead, the flight leader should descend immedi-ately from 100 to 200 feet AGL in order to keepthe surface in sight. If the visibility is extremelypoor, the airspeed should be reduced to approxi-mately 60 knots. The wingmen are still in visualcontact with the surface; therefore, comfortableformation flight is still feasible. The fore~oin~low altituclc/low visibility procedures for heli-copter formations are not recommended for nightflights.

7. NIGI-IT 11ELICOPT12R OPERATIONS

a, General Considerations

Night helicopterborne assault missions arefeasible and have been conducted regularly inVietnam. There are many special considerationsin the planning and. execution of such missions:

+ The planning must be more detailedwith the closest possible coordination betweenground and aviation units participating; there-fore, decentralized planning and execution undercentralized supervision and control become in-creasingly important.

The loading zone will be organized inthe same manner as for daytime. There is an ad-ditional requirement for portable lights with whi$hto mark aircraft spots and positions for heliteams.The portable lights are part of the helicoptersquadron’s T/E allowances.

The flight formations should be modifiedso that the basic formation is the two-plane sec-tion. The number of helicopters per flight shouldbe reduced to a comfortable number, perhapssix. The overall number of aircraft, fixed androtary wing, which occupy the same general air-space at the same time must be held to a con-trollable minimum,

Except for areas which are absolutelydevoid of obstacles, it is considered essentialto provide constant flare light for helicopterformation landings at night. Multiple flare dropsof millions of candlepower will provide a half-light or twilight condition entirely acceptable forvisual control of helicopters. However, it shouldbe expected that slender defoliated trees, wires,and other similar objects will not be readilyvisible in the subdued light.

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b. Night Lighting of Rough Area LZ’S

Satisfactory illumination of LZ’S is a majorfactor in the accomplishment of night missions.IUumination has been provided at the one timeor another by strobe lights, flashlights, cigarettelighters, jeep lights, tank lights and burningsmudge pots, to name a few. Each has advantagesand disadvantages depending upon the weather andthe tactical situation. Vehicle lights illuminate thezone too. brightly and disclose the zone to theenemy. Lights from a flame source are notbeamed, therefore are not readily visible underconditions of poor visibility.

Flashlight wands similar to those used byaircraft taxi directors are much superior toother methods of lighting in that they produce ahigh visible, but not harsh light.

8. PILOTS 13RIJZFING ON IZMERGENCYM1SS1ONS

Prompt and safe execution of emergency heli-copter missions is greatly expedited if the’ infor-mation required by the pilot upon arriving at thelanding zone is readily available.

As the urgency of the mission increases,the time factor for the exchange of information islessened, hence the readiness of the ground unitto pass desired information will greatly expediteexecution of the mission.

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A good mental checkoff list should be madeprior to a helicopter entering your LZ. Have thisinfo ready before the helo arrives.

Approximate size of the LZ.When was enemy fire last received and

from what direction?

Where are the nearest friendly troops? (Ifpossible mark their position if pilot requests it. )

Are there any obstacles in the approachpath of the helo?

Are there any obstacles on the ground inthe LZ?

From what direction would the helo mostlikely receive enemy fire?

From what direction should the helo ap-proach LZ?

Is pilot cleared to fire if he receivesenemy fire?

Have MEDEVACS ready at the LZ when heloarrives.

Pop smoke when pilot asks for it.Stay on your radio until the helo departs.

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9. REACTION FORCE DEPLOYMENT BYHELICOPTER

The troops to be deployed as a reaction forceand the requisite number of transport helicoptersand armed helicopter escort are placed on an alertstandby condition with a specified reaction time.If the troops of the reaction force are billetednear the helicopter parking area, the reactiontime can bc reduced by 10 to 15 minutes: Someunits attempt to react so quickly that they elimi-nate any time for briefing, a practice which canbc justified only in a truly emergency situation.The reaction time of the helicopters can be re-duced by the following:

+ Aircraft engines should be warmed upperiodically.

—

+ All pilots, crewmen, and troop leadersshould receive a common intelligence briefingonce or preferably twice daily during the periodof standby.

+ All troops should be organized into heli-teams and assigned to specific aircraft.

+ The flight leader should conduct a thoroughflight briefing u p o n assumption of standby,presenting a generalized plan of action designed tofit most situations and locations.

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10. HELICOPTER LIMITATIONS

Except for the individual Marine, the mostuseful all-purpose item in use in RVN is thehelicopter. Whet!ler utilized as a means ofevacuation, transport, observation, or as a gun-ship, the helicopter is always busy. Thoughextremely versatile, there are times when thehelicopter is unable to perform an assigned task,even though it- may appear that the task is withinaircraft capabilities. Most of these failures can beattributed to insufficient lift being available to en-able the helicopter to perform as required. Liftis the force that gives the helicopter its ‘~gopower. ” A certain amoum of lift is required tokeep the helicopter in the air; the remaining liftcan be utilized to carry an equivalent amount ofweight.

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Many personnel who are not familiar with thehelicopter’s flight characteristics do not fullyunderstand this relation of lift to load-carryingability; nor are they fully aware that the heli-copter’s performance is directly related to theoperating conditions in which it is performing.Many factors affect the amount of lift availableto the helicopter pilot. As a result, a load thatcan be carried easily under one set of conditionsmay not. even be lifted a foot off the ground underdifferent temperature and altitude conditions.

An increase in operating altitude, such as isencountered when flying over mountaintops, de-creases the efficiency of the helicopter anddecreases lift. An increase in temperature causesa loss of lift. Another factor that is extremely im-portant to maximize helicopter operating capa-bilities is LZ selection. Since the flight character-istics of the helicopter are such that availablelift is at a minimum up to approximately 20 knotsof airspeed, an LZ that has enough clear areafor the takeoff run should point into the wind.‘1’hc utilization of a landing zone surrounded byohstaclcs causes the capability of the helicopterto ciecrcase drastically. This type zone createsthe necessity for a vertical takeoff pattern withno forward airspeed. This decreased lift, due to alack of a clear area, reduces forward airspeedand limits maximum lift capability.

Selection of the best possible LZ by the usercan assist in maintaining the normal helicopterlift capability. Planners and pilots must give full

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weight to all lift limitation factors when makingmission assignments. Knowing and properlyweighing the factors affecting lift capability canassist in the successful completion of an assignedmission.

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11. I-IE3LC)-GROUND COMMUNICA’rIONS

I-helicopter commanders repeatedly have dif-ficulty reaching ground units on designated radiofrequencies, even though the helicopters havebeen requested by the ground units. Helicoptercommanders need to know information pertainingto wind direction, zone obstructions and zonesecurity prior to landing. Except in an emergency,pilots will not makewhere ground-to-airestablished. Ground

an initial landing in a zoneradio contact has not beenunits that have requested

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helicopters for their support should make everypossible effort to contact the helicopters by voicecommunications when the aircraft appear overtheir position. Common FM radio frequencies areusually available to the ground and helicoptercommanders. Requesting units should specify theFM frequency to be used for helo-ground com-munications when submitting their requests, Asecondary frequency should also be specified. Thiswill provide both the ground and helo command\vith the information needed to establish contact.

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12. IIWEllE’El<lZNCl? AND 130GUSTRANSMISS1ONS

Noise interference has frequently been notedon radio channels used by helicopters and fixed-wlng aircraft. In addition, bogus transmissionshave t)cen received which gave false turn and dropdirections to fixed-wing aircraft, and have at-tempted to lure helicopters into false landingzones. To reduce the effect of bogus transmissionsand ince.rference the following measures shouldbe taken:

+ Proper use of the authentication fre-quency+ Use of alternate frequency+ Change color codes frequently+ Occasional substitution of squadron callsigns instead of collective calls

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13. HELICOPTER CREW PROTECTION

The pilot’s and copilot’s compartment in theCH-46A, because of a wide expanse of glass, isvulnerable to enemy gunfire and shrapnel. Extraback plates (ARMOR AIRCREW SMALL ARMSPROTECTIVE BACK FSN 8470-926-1571) placedin the bottom glass area beneath the rudderpedals, on both the pilot’s and copilot’s side,provide good protection from enemy fire. Theseplates have been tested in one squadron and haveprevented injury to three pilots by stopping shellfragments. The plates do not unduly hinder visionbeneath the aircraft, are reasonably lightweightand have proven very successful in providingprotection for the aircraft and aircrew members.

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14. IIELICOPTL7R GUNNERS

TIIC side gunners provide the primary de-fense for Che transport helicopters; they usuallyare the first to spot a source of enemy fire; andthey provide the marking of the location of theenemy fire for the helo escort. In gunner trainingand in preflight hricfings, tlw gunners must beimpressed with Ihc importance of dropping redsmoke grenades at the first instant that enemyfire is detected.

The normal sequence of action< for a gunnerof a helicopter receiving enemy fire is con-sidered to be: drop red smoke grenades, shootif target identification of the enemy is reasonablycertain, and report the details (clock code, rangeand description of location) to the pilot. In theevent that the motion of the helicopter is aboutco mask the target from his view or from hiscone of fire, the gunner should ask the pilot for aturn in the appropriate direction to bring thetarget back into view or into the firing cone.Under certain circumstances the pilot may be un-able to comply with the request for a turn butmay bc able to yaw the helicopter to unmask thetarget for the gunner. The en route flight for-mation shoLdd be flown sufficiently wide so thatthe gunners are afforded complete coverage of theterrain below the helicopter flight.

Quick return fire by helicopter gunners isdcmoralizin~ to the enemy and has a definite sup-pressive effect if accurately delivered. The con-centrated tracer fire of several helicopter gunners

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can be great assistance to the helo escort inlocating the source of enelmy fire.

Aggressive, competent, alert helicopter gun-ners are those who have good eyesight, who havebeen conscientiously trained, and who have beenproperly briefed prior to the flight,

15, ORDNANCE LOADING FOR ARMEDIJH-l E }IELICOPTERS

At present, there are two types of 2. 75-inchrockets available for use of the UH-l E heli-copters; the white phosphorus (WP) warhead andthe high-explosive warhead. When the UH-l E isemployed in the helicopter escort role, the re-quirement is for the destructive IHE warhead.

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When employed in the TAC(A) role, the require-ment is for WP warhead to mark the target forthe attack aircraft. Experience has shown thatUH-l E aircraft are often required to deliverboth types of ordnance during the same flight.As a result, a standard ordnance load has evolved.The right rocket pod is loaded with WP rocketsand the left rocket pod is loaded with HE rockets.Although this somewhat reduces the destructivepower of the escort helicopter, it provides thepilot with the added capability of marking thetarget for attack aircraft. In addition, it giveshim the capability to generate a small WP screen-ing smoke cloud. This smokescreen has provento be an effective means of fire suppression.

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16. AIRCRAFT BILGE DRAINHOLES

Recently a CH-46 aircraft experienced troublewhen called upon to lift a load that was computedto be well within the aircraft’s performancecapability. When the CH-46 returned to its baseairfield, it was discovered that several hundredpounds of water was trapped in the bilge. Closeinspection of the bilge drainholes is necessaryto ensure that they do not become clogged withsand and debris. Ensure that the aircraftts basiccapabilities are not impaired,

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17. VISUAL RECONNAISSANCE FROMHELICOPTERS

Experience has proven that helicopters re-ceive more enemy fire and hits when they flybelow the normal 1500-foot minimum operatingaltitude to conduct visual reconnaissance. Binocu-lars should be used by air observers on allvisual aerial reconnaissance missions to betterobserve an area rather than make low passes.Low passes are considered appropriate only inchose instances where no other means is avail-able to adequately observe or identify the targetor friendly forces in question.

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18. TIP FOR AI RCREWS

On several occasions after carrying ARVNtroops, members of the crew have found ammuni-tion, grenades and various objects in the radiocompartment of the aircraft. On another occasion,a confirmed VC document was discovered whenthe aircraft was swept out. The document hadbeen folded to approximately the size of aquarter and sewn into a cloth jacket. It must berealized that some ARVN troops may be VCsympathizers.

All aircraft crew personnel must be alert toclosely obsenw actions of ARVN troops whilecml)arked, and upon departure of troops, the air-cral”t should be thoroughly inspected for looseammo, documents, or other items of possibleintelligence value.

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19. I~REVEN”rION 012 MIDAIR COLLISIONSIN LOW VISIBILITY

Since many helicopters fly regularly traveledroutes during marginal weather conditions withouttraffic control procedures, midair collisions are adistinct possibility. Pilots should illuminate theaircraft landing light and have it pointed ahead ofthe aircraft to permit the aircraft to be seen froma greater distance. This procedure has provento be beneficial in helping to prevent midaircollisions during daylight and darkness. Due con-sideration must be given to the enemy threat in

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the area being overflown so as not to provide abetter aircraft target for enemy fire.

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20. INCREASING HELICOPTER VISIBILITY

High-performance jet aircraft escorting heli-copters experience difficulty in maintaining visualcontact with camouflaged helicopters, particu-larly during haze conditions,

As a field expedient the tops of one or twomain rotor blades may be painted a contrastinglight color, thus making these aircraft mucheasier to see,

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21, TACAN MAPS

Aircrews in Vietnam have found that they canarrive at their target with the least amount ofnavigational delay by using the following tech-nique. When using a map for operations in thevicinity of a TACAN station, 10° radials and 10-mile distances are marked on the map, It is thencovered with a piece of lightweight clear plasticon which grease pencil annotations may be madeand erased quickly. This provides for fastertarget acquisition and reduces the number ofmarked maps which have to be discarded.

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~z. MONSOONS AND MAP cl-IAN(_J~s

Frequently, the heavy rains associated witha monsoon season cause changes in the ap-pearance of depressions, streams, small bodiesof water, and the surrounding terrain. This ismore apparent to an aerial observer than to aman on the ground. These changes can delayneeded C1OSCair support, and cause aircraft to beexposed to enemy observation and fire for anunnecessary period of time due to delays inidentifying target areas. Changes can even resultin selection of the wrong target. Apparent changesto terrain features should be reported during pilotdebriefings. Maps and aerial photographs mustreflect these changes. There will be a con-sequent savings of aircraft airborne time andan increase in the accuracy of air-deliveredweapons.

#####

23. YOU ARE MR. CLEAN

Equipment maintained in a high state ofcleanliness has consistently proven to be the mostdependable. A problem in the ‘preventive main-tenance of multiple ejection racks (MER) andtriple ejection racks (TER), used on tactical air-craft, has been the removal of carbon depositsfrom the breech mechanisms. A simple and effec-tive cleaning solution for the breech mechanismsis hot soapy water; use immersion burners toheat the water, and alkaline soap. Trichlorethe-lene or acetone can be used to clean the breech

304

caps and reduce the incidence of broken firingpins. The reliability of MERs and TERs can beincreased by regular cleaning and periodic test-ing and repair.

#####

24. USE OF SATS LOADER AND UNIVERSALWEAPONS CRADLE WHEN LOADINGNAPALM AND 2.75 -INC1-I ROCKETS ONTHE F-4B

The use of the SATS loader during combatoperations has proven most satisfactory as anexpedient method of loading ordnance on theF-4B. It also provides a safety factor againstphysical fatigue,operations. Only

particularly during hot weatherl-inch horizontal clearance is

305

available between the SATS loader boom and theexternal wing tanks when “soft” ordnance is tobe attached to the outboard shoulder stations ofthe TER. The boom, approaching from forwardof the aircraft, has to be turned 90 degrees forordnance. alignment. This is a critical phasesince the clearance is such that any careless-ness may allow the external wing tanks to bedamaged by the boom.

When the “Weapons Cradle Universal, Small,MAV-63E” is utilized, the distance between theboom assembly of the SATS loader and theexternal wing fuel tanks increases from 1 to 4inches. The bomb or p’od is placed on the cradlewhich is lifted by the SATS loader. The additionalheight provided by the cradle lowers the boomelevation requirements which results in the ad-ditional clearance. This cradle also providesprotection against loading damages to the “soft”ordnance itself.

Here are some do’s and donot’s for SATSweapon loader operators:

+ Do check oil levels daily and alwaysbefore operation. Add oil if necessary.

+ Do ensure that all wheel lug nuts aretight before operating. Replace missing nuts.

+ Do check hydraulic lines for leakage andfrayed sections. Replace frayed sections and addhydraulic fluid as required.

306

Don’t ride the clutch.

Don’t use the loader like a hotrod.

#####

25. RCPT-105 DUAL STARTING SYSTEM

In order to reduce the starting times formultiple aircraft launches, especially the ground-to-air alert, the RCPT-105 starting system maybe modified to allow dual aircraft starts. Byattaching an additional 10 feet of air hose to theRCPT-105, two F-4’s placed side by side withwings folded can be started without having to movethe starting unit. (The AC power cable is of suf-ficient length to each the external p o we r re-ceptacles of both aircraft and requires no cableextension. ) This. simple modification saves timeand manpower and efficiently utilizes equipment.

###i/#

26. SERE KITS

Inspect pilots’ SERE (survival, escape, res-cue, evasion) kits frequently for serviceability.Recent spot checks have revealed that throughnormal wear and tear the morphine syrettes hadbecome cracked or punctured and were completelyunsemiceable.

# i)it//#

307

27. F-4 DRAG CHUTE DOOR LATCH

Reports have been received concerning in-stances where the drag chute door of the F-4Bhas “popped” open during taxi and takeoff opera-tions. The drag chute has fallen out during theseincidents and caused serious material and safetyproblems. The primary cause of these occur-rences has been the failure to properly securethe drag chute door when the parachute was in-stalled.

The manufacturer’s “Product Support Digest”has recently recommended the following simpleprocedure that will enable personnel to ensurethat the drag chute door is properly secured:First, ensure that the drag chute door is properlylatched in the closed position. File a small notchin the “over center latching handle” close to thefuselage skin. This notch can be inspected visuallyin the daytime and can be touched in the dark. Ifthe notch can he seen or felt, the door will bein the properly latched position. If the notch isnot visible or cannot be felt, the chute door isnot properly secured and the latching proceduresmust be repeated.

308

28. ALTITUDE SEPARATION

During the conduct of close air support anddirect air support missions, more than one flightof aircraft may be required to orbit over aspecific area. When these occasions occur, theaircraft controller will usually be occupied pri-marily with the execution of the assigned mission.Also, the pilots of the orbiting aircraft are oc-cupied with attempting to identify the targetvisually. In this situation, when all personnel aredevoting maximum attention to the accomplish-ment of the tactical mission, a potentially danger-ous situation exists due to themidair collisions. To avoid suchis of the utmosttitude separation

importance thatbetween flights

possibility ofan accident, itthe proper al-be maintained.

309

When entering an area where flights maybe “stacked,” or where other flights can be ex-pected, flight leaders should identify themselvesby call sign, state the flights assigned/intendedorbit altitude, and receive acknowledgment fromother fljght leaders in the area.

#####

29. NIGHT AIR ATTACKS

Controlled close air support attacks andarmed helicopter operations have been success-fully conducted under flares. These operationsrequire a high order of pilot proficiency andjudgment. Pilots should be alert to avoid burn-out flares descending in parachutes. Prior tonight operations, each flight should be briefedon the altitude and heading of the flare dropaircraft and the burning time and rate of descentof the type flares employed. Training programsshould include practice in this technique of nightclose support.

#####

30. KEEP A CLEAN COCKPIT

Dust and sand can cause major aircraftmaintenance problems. Dust and sand have causedmany spring-loaded pushbutton-type controls tostick. A dangerous situation would exist, forexample, if the boost pump test button were tostick in the “in” position, unnoticed, after the

310

pump check. This would render the boost pumpinoperative.

Canopies must be kept closed wheneverpossible

All dust covers must be installed.Vacuum the cockpit periodically.A thin clear plastic, placed over push-

buttons, keeps foreign matter out while per-mitting free movement of controls.

#####

,,

.!’ ‘i

,,2

,. ‘\

31. EMPLOYMENT OF A-6A AIRCRAFT

Extensive experience in employing systemsdelivery of ordnance has resulted in increasedeffectiveness in this new area of warfare.

311

Offsets for preplanned targets should becomputed trigonometrically to gain the best ac-curacy.

Whenever possible, the offset bearingshould be used as a run-in heading to eliminateazimuth error. “rhis procedure keeps the targetbetween the aircraft and the aiming point so thatthe aiming point remains on the scope throughoutthe run. If the computer fails during the run, theattack may often be completed by using preplannedmanual range.

Bombardier/navigators should practiceacquiring moving targets on secondary and dirtroads, in all types of terrain.

#####

32. AIRSTRIKE TACTICS

The enemy often withdraws rapidly fromareas marked with smoke in order to avoid thefollowing airstrike. To obtain maximum strikeeffectiveness, attack aircraft should be prebriefedprior to arrival over the target and prior tomarking the target with smoke. Once the’target ismarked, the strike should follow as rapidly aspossible to obtain maximum surprise and ef-fectiveness. When visual contact has been madewith the enemy, intensive surveillance must bemaintained to discover enemy withdrawal routes.

312

Followup attacks should be directed, first againstobservable targets, and then on likely avenues ofescape.

#####

33. NATOPS PROGRAM

To ensure the safest possible operation ofaircraft, the Naval Air Training and Operations

Procedures System philosophy must be stressedat all levels, as the tempo of combat increases.

Too often, particularly during periods ofheavy operations, aircraft accidents/incidents aredirectly attributable to laxity in adherence toestablished procedures. In the interest of expedit-ing mission accomplishment, pilots tend to dis-regard the solid philosophy of the NATOPS pro-gram. In some cases, even supervisory personnelregard the increased tempo of combat operationsas a license to shelve vital NATOPS functions.

Times of crisis can point out deficiencies ina system that are not readily apparent duringnormal operational periods. If it can be estab-lished that NATOPS procedure is unduly hamper-ing operations, it is the obligation of the indi-vidual or unit to recommend changes. Until changesare recommended and approved, basic NATOPSprocedures should be closely followed.

#####

313

34. PILOT FREQUENCY CARDS

Communication security in combat requiresthe use of many color-coded frequencies to pre-vent compromise. The normal practice is toindiscriminately list the colors and frequencies inno particular order. This requires a momentarysearch Of the pilot’s kneeboard card to matchthe color given with the correct frequency. Byalphabetizing the color codes of the frequencycards, the given color can be rapidly located byscanning directly to its alphabetical precedence.This is a simple procedure to adopt and has beenfound to be extremely useful.

#i/ ###

35. C-117D MAINTENANCE

Aviation mechanics in Vietnam have learnedthat timely and adequate preventive maintenancewill increase the usability of the R-1820-80Aengine for the C-117D. The practice of changingthe oil on each 60-hour check, changing theplugs ever 200 hours and frecluent changing ofthe carburetor air filter will substantially lengthenengine life.

## f/ ###

314

Chapter V: MINE WARFARE

1. DEFINITIONS

A mine is an explosive device designedto destroy or damage vehicles, ships or air-craft or to wound or kill personnel. It may be

315

clctonated by the action of its victim, by the

passage of time, or by controlled means.There are land and water mines. Land minesare usually classified as antipersonnel orantivehicular.

A boobytrapa person wholess object oract.

is a device that will injuredisturbs an apparently harm-

Performs a presumably safe

(3

316

2. FACTS WE HAVE LEARNED ABOUT VIETCONG MANUFACTURE AND USE OF MINES,SABOTAGE DEVICES, AND BOOBYTRAPS

a. General

The Viet Cong, being very resourceful,make maximum use of all explosive ordnance attheir disposal. The Viet Cong search the battlearea for unexploded munitions (duds) and modifythem for use as mines, sabotage devices orbooby traps. They also use the explosive fillerfor locally manufactured munitions.

The Viet Cong use all the standard initiat-ing methods for fuzing various types of devices;i.e., pressure, pressure-release, pull-release,pull-friction, chemical delay, mechanical delay,initiation by tidal water rise, and command con-trolled detonation. The complexity of these fuzingsystems, their construction, and their intendeduse are limited only by the materials available,the knowledge, and training of the individual whoconstructs them. One or more fuzing system maybe found in each type of explosive device. Almostany type of container may be used to fabricatemines and sabotage devices; e.g., US AID soy beanoil cans of 1- to 5-gallon capacity, pieces ofbamboo, etc. The VC recently smuggled plasticexplosives into a Bachelor Enlisted Quarters.The explosives, with a time delay device, wereplaced in a pair of combat boots that were seldomused by the owner. The occupant of the room was

317

seriously injured upon detonation of the explo-sives. This was a new approach to VC terroristactivities. The VC addressed booby trapped pack-ages to U.S. officers working in sensitive posi-tions. Some of these packages contained suchitems as exploding fountain pens and cigarettelighters. These devices were meant to maimrather than kill. Homemade grenades and smallbangalore torpedoes concealed in loaves of bread,briefcases, baskets of fruit, radios, and coconutshave also been used as booby traps. Directionalmines and shaped charges have been hidden inmotorcycle saddle bags or on bicycles. On num-erous occasions bicycle frames have been com-pletely filled with explosives. Automobiles andpanel trucks have been made into large bombsby filling the enclosed sections of the hood,fenders, and body paneling with explosives. Thesetypes of bombs need not be in close proximity tothe target to cause death or destruction.

b. l_+zes

(1) Pressure-Type Fuzes

Pressure-type fuzes are probably thesimplest fuzes to produce locally. The basiccomponents are a firing pin, a cartridge primer,and a detonator. A pressure-type fuze can bemade from a nail, a small arms cartridge, and ablock of wood (fig. 5-1). They may be of moresophisticated design having a firing pin retainedin a cocked position by a key slot which, when

318

NAIL

vkr WOODBODY

TAPERED TOWEDGEINFUZE WELL

CASE FILLEDWITH PLTN

BASIC COMPONENTSOF A PRESSURE TYPE FUZE

Figure 5-1

depressed, releases the firing pin under springpressure, detonating the device (fig. 5-2). The VCalso use modified mortar and artillery fuzes aspressure firing devices (fig. 5-3).

(2) Pressure-Release Type Fuzes

Pressure-release type firing devices,normally called “mouse traps, ” can be easilymade by using the design of commercial-type

319

,omHm#3L’:%. P.su.-

FUZEBYLIGHT

FUZEWEDGEDINFUZEWILL

J

I

IMPROVISEDMINE

SIHPLEPRESSURETYPE

Figure 5-2

mouse traps. With innovations applied to utilizethe munitions that are on hand, the Vc employthis device primarily in modified booby traps suchas bomblets, dud artillery rounds, and U.S.aerial bomb duds. The device shown in figure 5-4is activated by the removal of the weight whichreleases the mouse trap device, thus detonatingthe mine or booby trap. The VC sometimes use astandard grenade fuze with the safety pin removedand with sufficient weight on the handle to holdthe firing pin in the cocked position. When theweight is removed from the handle the springloaded firing pin strikes the primer explodingthe booby trap.

u?STRIKER

%= LIGHT ANTI CREEP

+-F&W

~ DETONATOR

MODIFIED PRESSURE TYPE FIRING DEVICE

Figure 5-3

d?● ,$\.TENSIONSPRING

ANCHORPLATE \—

140DIFIEDPRESSURE-RELEASE

Figure 5-4

FIRINGDEVICE

321

(3) Pull-Type Firing Devices

The most common pull-type firing de-vice used by the VC is the pull-friction fuzesimilar to those encountered in the VC andChinese Communist stick grenades (fig. 5-5).When used as a mine or boobytrap fuze, the delayfiring train is usually removed and replaced withan explosive detonator which instantaneouslydetonates upon ignition of the fuze. As with allpull-type firing devices, the mechanical pull-typefiring device is characterized by a slack tripwire.The mechanical pull-type firing device has notbeen used as commonly as the pull-type frictiondevice; however, an increasing number of thistype of locally manufactured VC initiating devicehas recently been recovered (fig. 5-6). Many

STICKGRENADE

\ —

STICK GRENADERIGGEDhTTH TRIPWIRE

Figure 5-5

322

DETMAT~

mu FUT.X

WICK MATCHCCMFWITIDN

FIRXNODJWICE

STRING

PULL FRXCTIDM FIRING DEvICE BOX CONTAXNINr3HICN EXPU61VE9

Figure 5.6

devices of the type shown in figure 5-5 were usedagainst the French. A Chinese Communist or VCcopy of the Russian MUV firing device is morelikely to be used in the Republic of Vietnam. TheMUV fuze was widely used in Korea during theChinese Communist intervention.

(4) Pull-Release Type Firing Devices

Pull-release firing devices are de-signed for activation by either an increase (pull)or decrease (release) in tension on a taut wireor vine (fig. 5-7). Pull-release firing devices arealso called tension release devices. Extremecaution must be observed when encountering ataut wire or vine, as a cocked striker is alwaysused in this method of initiation; thus any move-ment of the wire, vine, or explosive item mayactivate the striker detonating the device. Torender safe a pull-release device, the strikermust be blocked with a positive safety betweenthe striker and primer. Many pull- type firing

323

PULL RING

SAFETY PIN ~

RETA.ININcRcr

SPLITENDOF—.SrRIKERSH~

RETAININGROO

STRIKERSPRING

SPRING

I

STRIKER

PENCUSSICNCAP 1 llli!!L<8

Ij

FUSEADAPTSROR,DmOMTCRPULL RELEASETTPSFIRINGDEVICE

Figure 5-7

devices can be used as a pull-release device byattaching the tripwire or vine to the striker. Pull-type devices rigged for pull-release action nor-mally activate when the tripwire is broken.

(5) Tilt-Rod Mine Firing Devices

The VC have constructed this type ofdevice from a small arms cartridge, a threaderbase, and a spring-loaded striker. The cartridgecase is modified by removal of the primer cap,and the base is slotted to accept the spring-loadedstriker. A primer detonator is placed on the

324

threaded base and a length of bamboo or treebranch is inserted in the other end of the car-tridge case. There is usually a hole in the threadedbase for inserting a safety or nail thus preventingthe spring-loaded striker from impacting on theprimer during fuzing installation. The assemblyis then screwed into the mine and the safetyremoved. This device is activated by moving therod approximately 20° from the vertical, whichwill release the spring-loaded striker and de-tonate the mine. The VC utilize this device mostcommonly by installing it in landing zones as anantihelicopter mine, in paths of foot troops, andin areas being cleared by tanks and bulldozers.They have been used in various types of VC minesincluding the Nuoc Mom pot - shaped mine, andhomemade VC cylindrical mines (figs. 5-8 and5-9).

TILT~X ~IIUl10DSVICI —

— SPRINO

w

‘ ‘/1 ‘-’:— 911UIIM

foEronAIoa I

&—m —

VC HUOCIK21POITILTR~NIUE

Figure 5-8

TILT ROD AWIHELICOPTEIIMAJITIWUCULLRIumx

Figure 5-9

325

(6)Systems

command

Control of Command Fired Fuzing

All the firing devices mentioned can bedetonated by a person lying in wait for

a prime target. The fuzing system can be activatedby a VC observer from a distance when a suitabletarget presents itself. The most common method ofcontrolled firing practiced by the VC is by electri-cal means. This is accomplished by placing anelec-trical blasting cap in the mine or boobytrap fuzewell, leading a firing cable to a concealed position,and connecting a battery or electrical blasting ma-chine when the target comes into range. The VCuse this type of initiation for all types of muni-tions, including water mines (figs. 5-10 and 5-11).

@

.,<~;~’,> ~/“,.... . +

-<bLITIU5U PR13JDXILS

CcmSTOPPES

ss.lDcs

HEATSSNSITIVEDP7CUATOR

COMXO+ELSCTRZCALFIRINGSr$nn SXPFDIFXTEKCTRICAJ,FUZE

CCM4ANDFIMzIFUZINGSE3’TbMS

Figure 5-10

CH.INDNICN,A.T. NINE

&COMCN4TE BX3KE1’AP MINE

CONCNETE TUNTI.SAP NINB

e-ANTIF’EN91xNELDINscTIGHAL

FNACNEX’TATIIMMINS

-a....CCNICAL SIIAPSUCHARGS A.T. NINE

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Figure 5-II

327

(7) Time-Delay Firing Devices

Mechanical delay and chemical delay-type firing devices have been encountered through-out South Vietnam. The mechanical delay is themost common. One type of VC mechanical delayfiring device is made from commercial watcheswith two electrical contacts being added. One issoldered to the case of the watch and the other iswired through the crystal of the watch. At thedesired time of detonation, the moving hand makescontact with the wire projecting through the watchcrystal completing the electrical circuit, and ini-tiating an electrical blasting cap which detonatesthe explosives (fig. 5-12). Small alarm clockshave been used utilizing the clocks alarm systemto complete the circuit. Chemical delay firingdevices used by the French have also been

JACKI’LUC

-e

,..

‘r- .>

+

VC )IM21ANICALDU.AT/~rUC FIRINGDKVICE

Figure 5-12

328

encountered in scattered incidents. These aresimilar to the U.S. chemical delay firing devicetype M-1.

c. Main Charges

(1) Grenades

Many small explosive items, resembl-ing grenades and normally used as such, are alsoemployed extensively by the VC as antipersonnelmines and booby traps. Both percussion-type andpull-friction type fuzes with the delay element areused in these items.

(a) As a Boobytrap

A grenade was placed under a bagof rice in a VC base area. The weight of the bagof rice held the grenade handle in the cockedposition. Upon removal of the rice by friendlyforces, the grenade exploded (fig. 5-13).

(b) As an Antipersonnel Mine

A grenade with a safety pin removedwas placed in a hollow length of bamboo. A trip-wire was attached to the grenade. Pressure onthe tripwire would have pulled the grenade fromthe bamboo releasing the handle and allowing thestriker to initiate the action detonating thegrenade. This device was discovered before itcould inflict any damage (fig. 5-14).

329

IJAGOF III(X

\

llol,LzJdBAXEOJ

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... .... ...

GHENADEUY~ AS A WOUITU1’

Figure 5-13

ofwNADETYPE mmmw

Figure 5-14

(2) Artillery Projectiles, Aerial Bombs,Mortar Ammunition and Explosives

All sizes of dud artillery projectiles,aerial bombs, rockets, and mortar projectiles areused by the VC as mines or boobytrap devices.They use the smaller ammunition as antiperson-nel mines or boobytrap devices and the largertype as antitank and antivehicular mines. Bothcategories may be equipped with any of the pre-viously mentioned firing devices. Various exam-ples are:

(a) As an Antipersonnel Mine

A VC modified U.S. BLU-3/B bomb-let was wired to the side of a tree with a tripwireacross the trail. The tripwire was a monofilamentcord resembling fish line leader and difficult to

330

see (fig. 5-15). A patrol, not seeing the tripwire,suffered heavy casualties.

(b) As an Antipersonnel Mine

A tilt-rod firing device was placedin a Nuoc Mom pot filled with explosives (fig.5-16). The mine was emplaced in a heavily foliagedpath leading to a VC bunker complex. The rodassembly resembled the surrounding vegetation,but the lack of camouflage around the fuze assem-bly revealed the mine. This mine was recoveredintact and no casualties were experienced.

(c) As a Boobytrap

The VC placed the tail fins of a 250-pound bomb on the ground, giving the appearanceof a dud bomb. Explosive ordnance personnel werecalled to investigate, and discovered that a VC

UU-3/B USSU AS A SCX3SITRAP

Figure .5-15

TILT Rrmmo

TILT R(3)FUZ~ IN IIUCCKU F07

Figure 5-16

331

modificcl U.S. i3LU-3/B antipersonnel bomblet,using a mouse trap device, had been placed andcamouflaged beneath the bomb fins (fig. 5- 17).Disturbance of the bomb tail fins by inexperiencedpersonnel would have resulted in casualties.

(d) As an Antitank/Antivehicle Mine

A 105mm artillery projectile wasburied in a dirt road and rigged to be fired elec-trically (fig. 5-18). The charge was detonatedunder a 3/4-ton vehicle. Many incidents haveoccurred involving artillery projectiles emplacedin roads and command detonated when a primetarget presented itself.

DNICE

MODIFIED US BLU-3/B WITH MOUSEW+AF ANTILIFT BENEATH US AERIAL Bf.MBFINS

Figure 5-17

332

. .AETIIJ,CRTPRWECTIIXBURID UNDFJiIIWD

Figure 5-18

(e) As an Antipersonnel Mine

A large number of artillery rounds,75mm, 155mm, and 20-pound aerial fragmentationbombs were suspended from treed (fig. 5-19).Some were command detonated, while others wererigged with tripwires. The controlled mines weredetonated when’ friendly forces came within range.Those rigged with tripwires were set off byfriendly forces looking up in trees for mines andunsuspectingly tripping the wires on the ground.The VC also consider the 20-pound fragmentationaerial bomb to be an excellent antipersonnel mine.The larger bombs (100 to 1000 lbs) will destroyany type vehicle. The VC are now using bombs asmines more frequently than in the past and areknown to use excessive amounts of explosives tocomplete their mission. Bombs are also used nearVC safe havens, preplanted on likely avenues ofapproach, and are either command detonated orset off by any of the other mentioned methods ofactivation.

333

. \

--4Ai5\+—ASIIIALIK)MQUSEDASANTIPSRSCtJNSLBCOBYTRAP

Figure 5-19

(f) As an Antitank/ Antivehicle Mine

The VC have used 15 to 20 pounds ofplastic explosives wrapped in plastic ground clothor placed in a wooden box. The VC attach a con-ventional type nonelectrical blasting cap to apressure-fuze. The blasting cap is attached to alength of detonating cord and used as a primerfor the explosives. The VC then emplace thiscrude, but effective, mine in the road as an anti-vehicular mine. A ceramic cup used on rubberplantations for collection of latex is placed in theinverted position over the fuze for protection (fig.5-20). When mine clearing parties clear the road,metallic type detectors do not detect the fuze.Consequently, mine clearing crews have missed

334

.PnE9surw TTP8Puzls

USE OF PLA9TIC XPIAISIVISA9 AT MINE

Figure 5-20

this recent adaptation by the VC resulting in dam-age to equipment and loss of personnel.

d. Viet Cong Locally Manufactured Mines

The homemade or locally manufacturedmines come in many sizes, shapes, and forms(fig. 5-21). They may be constructed of lightmetal, cast iron, or explosives packed into bambootubes, boxes, wrapping paper or plastic groundcloth. The intended use for a mine normally governsits size, shape, and construction.

The most infamous and widely used locallyproduced mine is the direction-type mine com-monly referred to as the “Claymore.” Theseitems have been found in sizes ranging from 5 to

335

URE

TOPvu

wooou PIIz9surllPUTIS

\

iE5aVC tlCMD!ADEANTITAUKBOXMINE

Figure 5-21

8 inches in diameter. There is also a type pro-duced which resembles the U.S. M18A1 “Clay-more” directional mine, being similar in con-figuration. The principle of directional mines isthat a large number of fragments are propelledin a given direction by an explosive force. Themaximum effective range is approximately 200meters with a dispersion pattern of approximately16 to 20 lmc!tcrs wide at the maximum range.VC directional mines have been used againstlight vehicles, armored personnel carriers,troops, billets, bus stops, helicopters in landingzones, in breacning barbed wire barriers, andas a dispersant for CS gas, accomplished bymounting a satchel of CS wrapped in plastic tothe front of the mine and detonating the mine.The VC have also used 10 to 12 grenadesor modified U.S. BLU-3/B bomblets mounted ona wooden plank as an antihelicopter and anti-personnel mine. This mine is a modified “Fou-gasse, ” consisting of approximately 5 to 10pounds of explosives, which is laid in the bottom

336

of a hole with the opening toward the enemy. Thehole is at a 450 to 90° vertical angle dependingon the type of employment. The charge is coveredwith a layer of earth and the board containing thegrenades or modified U.S. BLU-3/B is placed inthe hole and camouflaged. The grenades or U.S.BLU-3/B bomblets are modified with standardVC grenade fuzes which may or may not incorpo-rate a delay train of 3 to 5 seconds dependingupon employment. Nails are driven into the boardforming a holder for each device. One nail is oneach handle to hold the handle in place and thesafety pin is removed. When a suitable target pre-sents itself, the explosive charge is commanddetonated hurling the board containing the gre-nades into the air. Three to five seconds after theinitial blast, the grenades, having become dis-lodged from the. board, explode in the air hurlingfragments for approximately 200 meters in alldirections (fig. 5-22).

e. Detonation bv Tidal Action

This type of firing device was recently re-covered by Republic of Vietnam troops after theVC had destroyed a bridge. The device was of theelectrical type and placed in the main streamunder the bridge. The device consisted of a stake,hollow bamboo, a sealed “C” ration can, and twoelectrical wires attached to the “C’ I ration can.As the rising tidal water enters the water inletof the firing device the “C” ration can, is floatedupward until contact is made completing the cir-cuit and detonating the explosives (fig. 5-23).

337

HJSXI1lCMIOUTICU U111S9

+ \,

BOASDccmAInIffiGREXADE0+7I(ODIFIRI

U.U7FU1CALLYlIbTLYAATKl “Usmo ScwMPUMIVX CIIAMM

IAHR 0? .EAmIi

Vc MWIF1Su :s ulsl-3/11FluuOoMtl Vc IICMFXADXl,lNoG,wm&g

\ \. .

‘/ “‘“’ ‘

ILUJSTIUTICNW ALIOVEDOAROCCNTAININOEKMUMXSANDMANDCW~~

VC HOOIFICIIFOJCASSEANII-HSUCOPTES/)MH.PENWMU,OLVICK

Figure 5-22

f. Chinese Communist Antipersonnel MineCamured in South Vietnam

A Chinese Communist copy of a SovietPOMZ- 2 antipersonnel mine equipped with anelectric blasting cap for command detonation wasrecently captured for the first time in SouthVietnam (fig. 5-24). This mine is normally

338

INSUIJTKZITWO WIRE9LIEIWSENllATTLiiIANODLTfflATOR

AIR VM

W?TAL —. ..—CONTACT

-i#i(-

IN HOIJ.W BAiSDO

‘-L

L

>>

ldATsRINLET

TIDAL ACTION TYPE FUZ%

Figure 5-23

— DNICE ATTACHFXlTO POST UNOSRBRIOOE IN STREAN

TIOAL WATDl

4–

soviet POMZ-2Antipersonnel Mine

Figure 5-24

339

detonated by a tripwire attached to the firing pinretainer. It weighs only 4.4 pounds and is easilyemplaced. These features plus the command-detonation capability make it appropriate for usein ambushes.

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3. PUNJI PITS

The VC frequently construct punji pits insandy areas by placing a wicker basket in ahole 4 to 5 feet deep, emplacing the punjisticks, and then concealing the pit with a thinwicker mat covered by sand. The sand-coveredtops are sometimes darker than the surrounding

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sand, and are particularly obvious in wet sand.Marines should be alert for such signs andcheck suspected areas by probing. Rememberpunji pits may be boobytrapped, so always re-move the cover with the help of a long ropeor cord;

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4. BOOBYTRAPPED ENEMY PROPAGANDADISPLAYS

Beware of enemy flags and displays of enemypropaganda materials. VC flags and eye-catchingdisplays of enemy propaganda materials areoften booby trapped to inflict casualties on un-suspecting trophy seekers. When enemy dis-plays are discovered, extreme caution mustbe exhibited by all personnel. The surroundingarea should be searched for Claymore-typemines directed at the display. A search shouldbe made for wires that could lead to a command-detonated mine. The display itself must be ap-proached with extreme caution due to the pos-sibility of pressure-type mines in the area,or the presence of an explosive device riggedto explode when the display is disturbed. Don’tlet souvenir hunting cause casualties in yourunit.

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.-

5. VC/NVA MINE

VC/NVA mine

TACTICS

warfare doctrine closely par-allels that of the Chinese Communist Army,although it is heavily influenced by past guer-rilla warfare in the Republic of Vietnam aswell as that acquired during the French Viet-narncsc War.

Present practice of the VC/NVA is tomake use of numerous isolated mines andgroups of mines for their nuisance value andto create casualties, fear, and overcautious-ness.

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Generally mines are used wherever troopsare expected to bunch up, slow down, or presenta good target. Such areas are bridges, curvesin roads, single track roads or trails, junctions,hillsides, huts, and likely rest areas. Any placethat is a good ambush site is usually a goodmine site, and mines are often employed withambushes.

The VC/NVA often use command detonatedmines. One method requires a man to be con-cealed some distance from the explosive with abattery pack or hand held generator which isconnected by wires to the mine. When troops orvehicles are in a position where the mine will dothe most damage, the VC detonates it. It is im-portant to check trees, bushes and the edges ofroads for wires.

The pull wire is another command deto-nation device that is commonly used. A pullwire is connected to a pull - release deviceor to a friction igniter, and a VC concealshimself at the other encl. When the target isin position, the VC pulls the wire and detonatesthe mine.

The soft earth shoulders of surfaced roadsare often mined. This tactic is easily accom-plished and provides an effective trap for

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unwary troops. This method is not limited tohard surfaced roads but also may be used ondirt roads and trails. Roadside mining is usedmost often in ambush sites where the vehiclesand men are to be driven off the road by fire.Heavy casualties have resulted in this type ofoperation.

,The VC employ mines above the groundalong land and water routes used by the enemy.This is a particularly favored and effectivemethod of using mines improvised from ar-tillery or mortar ammunition. The mines maybe placed in rotten tree trunks, on sticks, nextto or in termite mounts, at the base of or in thebranches of trees, in bush~s, or in any conceal-ment that affords a “sweeping” action for thefragments. In high grass areas the VC may justlay the mines on the ground with no othercamouflage.

Mines may be laid on t h e bottom ofstreambeds for tripwire initiation, pressureinitiation or command detonation. These ,minesmay be placed at fords or wherever troopscould be expected to wade through the water.

##//##

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6. TRICKS FREQUENTLY EMPLOYED BYVC/NVA

Dirt roads and trails are easily mined, sincethe traces normally can be completely eliminated.In instances where traces cannot be eliminated,the VC use a number of tricks in addition

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to the normal mine laying mchniqucs used byboth sides.

One unusual technique takes advantage of themine detection personnel’s carelessness. The VCdig up the. road and leave--a normal method ofcutting Uncs of communications. Friendly troopsfill in the dug up sections and the VC return tolay mines in the refilled areas. These areas mustbe checked, day after day even though nothing isfound. The VC expect you to assume an area isclean after it has been checked and to becomecareless and not recheck it. The VC may digholes in the road, lay mines in a few of them,and refill them with dirt. After the mine detect-ing teams check dozens of holes and find nothing,the next hole may be expected to be empty andmay not be checked.

Another method is emplacing mines in a roadand then surrounding the area with pieces ofmetal to negate the use of a mine detector. Somemines may be emplaced and then covered withstraw, grass, dung or any natural looking sub-stance. Employment of mines on hard suffacedroads presents more of a problem than do dirtroads. The VC tunnels under the road from theshoulder and emplaces a mine. The VC preparethe mine for command detonation, usually elec-trical, and carefully fills the tunnel. Traces ofthis burrowing activity can be eliminated be-cause of the dirt shoulder. The leads to themine are concealed and generally terminate in

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a place where a VC can hide while waiting forhis victim. This setup is a very difficult oneto detect and requires careful inspection of theshoulders of the road for wires or traces ofdigging.

Tricks are employed which are similar tothose used on dirt roads. One of these includesdigging up sections of the road. After these areasare filled in, the VC return and lay mines in afew of them. This is the same tactic used on dirtroads and is countered by constant checking.

The VC smear the road with mud. This con-dition forces a mine detecting team to check thearea carefully. The smearing may go on forseveral days until one day the VC emplacemines in the muddied sections. The mine de-tecting teams having checked the areas beforewith no results, may become a little carelessand miss these mines. Agah this carelessnessis what the VC expect. The smearecl areas mustbe carefully checked each time troops mustcross them.

Another trick is to dig up the road, emplacethe mine, and refill the hole with asphalt. A spotusually remains that contrasts with the surround-ing asphalt. To avoid detection, the VC use atire to mark across the patch and blend it in withthe road surface. To counter this tactic, the de-tection team must be alert for any signs of roadrepair. Each spot must be carefully checkedwith a detector and a probe.

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A 13-year-old Vietnamese boy recentlyclaimed that dle VC had forced him to recon-noiter helicopter landing zones and routes usedby U.S. and ARVN forces. The boy was in-structed by the VC to place handgrenades inhelicopter landing zones which would detonatewhen the troops disembarked. This was to beaccomplished by pulling the pin and wrappinga piece of string around the spoon to hold it inplace temporarily. The free end of the string isthen tied to a piece of heavy paper or cardboard,which in turn is laid over the grenade in thelanding zone. Rotor wash from a landing heli-copter blows the paper, thereby unwrapping thestring, and releasing the safety lever.

Beware of debris in LZ’S!

The VC continue to demonstrate their adept-ness at modifying all types of discarded or dudmunitions for use as simple mine devices. AMarine patrol discovered a pressure-type anti-personnel device which had been made from anM-79 round. The head of the M-79 cartridge wasremoved and the centrifugal arming device ro-tated until the round was armed. A triggeringdevice was the detonating contact. The devicewas then buried along a trail with the camouflagedtrigger device above ground, where the pressurefrom the weight of a man would be sufficient tocause detonation.

This illustrates the importance of caring andaccounting for all ordnance” or explosive devices.

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Recent instances have revealed the VC use ofbandoleers as tripwires for mines/boobytraps.The bandoleers are torn into thin strips which,because of the color, allow the tripwire to blendin with the natural foliage making it extremelydifficult to detect. All units should be advised ofthe VC use of discarded bandoleers, and stepsshould be taken to ensure used bandoleers areproperly destroyed.

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7. ANTITANK BOOBYTRAPS

A recent search and destroy operation con-ducted in I Corps revealed the enemy’s use ofRPG2 rocket rounds as antitank boobytraps.Lengths of bamboo had been emplaced at 45°angles along the shoulders and banks of the roadon the route of advance. The empty bamboo poleswere seen during the approach march but werenot removed. That night when the Marine forcereturned through the same area, the enemy hadinserted RPG-2 rockets on the stakes, wired themfor command detonation and effected a hit on onetank.

Advancing troops must be alert to unusualsigns and apparently harmless objects, They mayhave a lethal mission.

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8. DEFENSE AGAINST MINES

-B- Reinforce with sandbags or armor platethe bottom of the driver and passenger-carryingcompartments of all vehicles that frequent ,roadsoutside protected areas.

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+ Completely destroy/mutilate all discardedbatteries of any size or type, since batteries areused as initiators in improvised mines.

-+ Enforce strict accountability for all gre-nades, trip flares, demolition materials, smokegrenades, ordnance items, etc. These itemscomprise the largest number of mines and/orinitiating devices discovered.

+ Maintain constant surveillance/control ofall known minefield, since unattended minesare a source of supply for the VC.

+ If possible, recover and destroy all ex-pended trip flares, LAW’s, smoke and illuminationgrenades, and 40mm clips. These items can allbe used as components of a mine.

+ Whenever possible, recover, cut and/ormultilate all abandoned communication wires.This wire may. be used in command-detonatedmines.

+ Avoid establishing any pattern of movement ‘-in time and route.

.+ Report all duds immediately. If possible,surveillance should be maintained until destruc-tion is accomplished. Duds are a prime sourceof VC mines.

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* Destroy, crush or turn in all containersincluding “C” ration cans, beer and soda cansand ammunition boxes since these are usedextensively as improvised mines.

+ Avoid driving over potholes, road shoul-ders, boxes, cans, grass matting, loose boardsor other foreign items in the road. These itemsmay conceal a hastily emplaced mine.

+ Adhere strictly to combat convoy inter-vals. Doing so can prevent damage to two ve-hicles.

-+ Observe civilian activities. A lack oflocal people along a route that is normallywell traveled often indicates the presence ofmines.

+- During hot weather, avoid stopping ve-hicles in shaded areas or near a stream, sincethese are prime mining targets.

+ Reemphasize limiting vehicular traffic toessentials. Numerous casualties have occurredon “sightseeing” trips.

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9. DETECTION OF ANTITANK MINES

Pressure detonated AT mines are sometimesplaced under large flat stones and usually in themost heavily traveled tracks in the road.

Vehicle crews should be alert for stones orother suspicious objects in the road, and minesweep teams should be especially attentive towell-traveled tracks in the road.

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10. PROBE CULVERTS

Pressure-type road mines have been de-tonated where the road has recently been sweptby engineers. Investigation showed that the mines

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were laid in close proximity to a metal drainculvert; consequently the mine detectors couldnot distinguish the mine from the culvert.

Those parts of roads in the vicinity of metalculverts should be probed by hand after theshoulders and culvert have been inspected forwires leading to a command-detonated mine.

##/’##t/

11. ROUGH RIDER MINE SWEEP

Excellent results have been obtained onconvoy mine sweeps by using the followingsystem:

An engineer sweep team was placed on ahardened 6 x 6 truck accompanied by a squad(rein) of infantry for security. On an additionalhardened 6 x 6 truck, one U.S. Army M-55 (Quad-50) was mounted for additional security. Theconcept of operation provided for the sweep teamand security vehicle to cross the 1P 30 minutesprior to the lead elements of the convoy, andmaintain radio contact with the convoy commanderon the convoy control net. When the sweep teamreached the first checkpoint, they waited untilthe lead elements of the convoy crossed the 1Pbefore proceeding to the next checkpoint. Beforethe leading element of the convoy crossed the 1P,air support in the form of gunships, air observer,and fixed wing was on station and could providesupport to the sweep team as well as the convoy

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itself. This procedure enabled the sweep teamto clear the highway without causing delay to theconvoy.

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12. CONVERGING MINE SWEEP TEAMS

When sweep teams consistently start atseparate points on a given route and sweeptoward each other, there is a tendency for theVC to install a mine or boobytrap device at thepoint where the teams usually meet. The ap-parent reason for this is the opportunity to in-flict heavier casualties. If teams sweep to apredetermined point, but do not physically meet,there is a danger that one team will complete itssweep and be secured, thus opening the route totraffic from one direction before the road iscompletely swept.

One solution is for the sweep teams to con-verge at a point which is close to a friendlyposition. This denies the VC the opportunity ofmining or booby trapping the area. An alternatesolution is for the sweep teams to establish asystem of converging at different points onsuccessive days. Extreme caution must be ex-ercised to ensure that no traffic is allowed overthe road until all teams have completed theirsweep.

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355

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13. MINE AND EXPLOSIVE DEVICE PROTEC-TION

The danger from mines and explosive devicesis ever present in Vietnam. The enemy does notplant explosives at ground level only. Frequently,explosive devices are hidden in trees or overheadin existing structures. These antipersonnel de-vices are usually command detonated to causemaximum casualties to personnel. Crewmen intanks, LVT’S, Ontos, and other vehicles areparticularly susceptible to this danger. Crewmenshould wear protective clothing and take positionsthat afford minimum exposure to overhead ex-plosions. Be alert for mines and explosive de-vices at all times.

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14. VC CONSTRUC”I’ION BLOCK MINE

The Viet Cong have devised a new mine foruse against construction projects. This new de-vice is prepared by filling a hollow cement build-ing block with explosive. This mine can be em-ployed by itself or in series and is detonatedelectronically prior to, during, or after con-struction is completed. The advantages of utiliz-ing such a mine are obvious, since it is relativelyeasy to smuggle these explosives into pacifiedareas when they are disguised as building mate-rial. To guard against this new sabotage tech-nique, security forces should check all building

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material entering populated areas and inspectall buildings and construction projects for ex-posed wires associated with demolitions.

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15. VC/NVA UTILIZATION OF MINES

Marines in northern I Corps discovered aminefield 1500 meters long, adjacent and par-allel to Route #9. Thirty ChiCom DH-10 mineswere emplaced approximately 50 meters apart.The majority of these were about 10 metersfrom the road. It appeared that the enemy hademplaced the mines as part of a planned ambush.The mines were emplaced in an upright positionon stumps, about 1 foot above the ground, withtripwires 5 feet long attached. At several loca-

tions, two mines were placed about 8 feet apartwiuh one tripwirc between them and were posi-tioned where troops were likely to debark fromvehicles. Several mine locations were markedby stones placed in an arrow pattern on the roadpointing toward the mines; others were markedby a series of 10 stones in a row.

Unusually placed rocks, logs, bamboo andother irregularities in terrain along lines ofcommunications often identify VC minefield,punji traps and other obstacles. Personnel mustbe alert at all times for indicators of enemyminefield.

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Chapter VI: COMMUNICATIONS

1. RADIO OPERATORS

Units in Vietnam rely almost exclusively onradio communications during field operations.Highly trained radio operators are essential toavoid confusion and delay, and to ensure thatorders and reports are transmitted quickly andclearly. Transmissions should be brief, yetcomplete. Operators must be highly motivatedand imbued with a sense of responsibility forthe importance of their contribution to the suc-cessful accomplishment of the mission.

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2. AN/ PRc-25

Since the battery compartment of the PRC-25radio is not waterproof, operators must ensurethat the battery case is drained and dried aftereach immersion or exposure to rain. Whenprolonged exposure is anticipated, a waterproof-type tape should be used to seal the battery boxand the radio telephone unit.

Ensure that connector covers are used on theAN/PRC-25. If excessive moisture or water getsinto the connector, the radio will short circuitwhen the handset is keyed. If the covers becomelost, tape can bc used as a field expedient.

The electrical equipment harness used tocarry the PRC-25 radio can cause discomfortto operators of short-stature by digging into thesmall of the back. To cure this, the lowerframe is bent backward about 3 inches. Oncebent, no attempt should be made to straightenthe frame. Operators of slim stature may findit more comfortable to cross the lower harnessstraps over the chest.

In dense underbrush PRC-25 antenmis andbases may become detached and lost. Chancesof this happening can be reduced by tying a shortpiece of nylon cord securely to the PRC-25carrying handle on one end and to the coiledportion of the antenna base on the other end. Inthe event the antenna and base are lost, placinga rifle (barrel end), bayonet, or one’s indexfinger at the point the antenna base screws into

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the radio will permit transmissions for shortdistances. The use of a radio frequency ampli-fier, AM-306 /P RC-25, with the PRC-25 radiogreatly increases its range.

In hot weather the radio set should be pro-tected from as much heat as possible. Extremeheat affects the components of the frequencysynthesizing system to the extent that a changeof frequency rating may occur. Radio operatorsand unit leaders should attempt to keep theradio in the shade when tactically feasible.

Some AN/ PRC-25 models do not contain adiode in the module A3 to protect it from highfrequency signals. Even though the PRC-25 hasbeen turned off, the receive circuit of theRT- 505/ PRC-25 can be damaged if the radio isin the immediate vicinity of a higher poweredtransmitter, as may be found in an AN/ VRC-12or VRC-43-49. Antennas mounted on PRC-25’Swhich do not contain the protective diode shouldbe kept a minimum of 10 feet from high-powerradio sets.

To provide more protection for the H- 138/PRC-25 handset, a simple lanyard may beattached. This will not only protect the handsetby securing it to the operator when not in usebut will permit the operator free use of bothhands. Without the handset, the radio is useless--protect it!

The life of the BA-386 battery for the AN/PRC-25 radio can be prolonged by rotating it

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with another battery every 6 to 8 hours. Whenradio operators in a base location assume theradio watch, they should rotate batteries. Duringfield operation, carrying at least one spare bat-tery will permit accomplishing the desired rota-tion.

Used BA-386 batteries will provide flashlightbatteries when broken apart. Each BA-386 willprovide four BA-30’s and six 13A-58’s which canbe used in flashlights to provide an average of2 days’ power. This practice also ensures totaldestruction of the batteries and prevents theiruse by the VC as a power source for detonatingmines and booby traps.

3. AN/ PRC-25 BATTERY INSTALLA”I’ION

‘1’hc battery DA-386 for the AN/l] l{C-25 radiohas been redesigned with a “floating” batteryterminal to preclude damage to either the batteryor the radio set while changing or installing thebattery. Terminal damage can occur as a directresult of improper battery installation ‘proce-dures. TM-11-5820-398- 12 should be checkedfor the correct procedure. It should be notedthat throughout the installation, the radio re-mains on its side and not in an upright position.

Battery installation in the AN/PRC-25 is acontinuing problem” because of the fragile natureof the connector plate on the battery. Certain

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precautions are necessary when both removingand replacing the battery. A recommended pro-cedure is described below:

+ Stand the radio on level surface with frontpanel facing upward.

+ Release the battery case clamps by push-ing the upper part of each clamp down and awayfrom the radio.

+ Lift the radio upward and away from thebattery and place it on its side.

+ Slide the new battery into the radio caseso that the connector mates with the batteryplug.

+ Slide the battery cover over the batteryuntil it meets the radio case.

+ Refasten both clamps at the same time.

Install the battery only when the radio islying on its Bide. Don’t cause a radio to becomeunserviceable by improperly connecting a bat-tery,

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4. AN/PRC-47 RADIO

The AN/ PRC-47 radio has a tendency tooverheat if the c y c 1e (2 minutes transmit;9 minutes receive) is exceeded. A built-inthermal cutoff switch will automatically cut theradio off when the heat exceeds a certain level,

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thus preventing internal damage to the equip-ment. However, if the thermal cutoff switch isoverridden by depressing the battery test buttonwhile continuing to talk, permanent damage can,and probably will, result. This procedure shouldbe followed only under extreme emergency con-ditions.

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5. ANTENNAS

The AS- 1320/ PRC-47 antenna is extremelyunwieldy when fully assembled. If the fully as-sembled antenna is screwed into the radiochassis, permanent damage can result to thethreads of both the antenna base and the radio

364

connection. To avoid this damage, attach thebase section of the antenna to the radio chassisfirst, then assemble the remaining sections andattach them to the base section.

The proper antenna selection can improvethe efficiency of the AN/ PRC-47 radio. Whenoperating between 2 and 9 megacycles, the longwire antenna is more efficient than the whipantenna. In the frequency range from 9 to 12megacycles, the whip antenna is comparable tothe long wire and the ease with which it can beemployed makes it preferable. When erecting along wire antenna, it should be elevated as highas possible. The table below offers a guide tothe antenna length.

Frequency (me) Length (ft)

2-5 452-9 252-12 15

Radio transmissions can be improved bycounterpoising (grounding) the whip antenna whenthe radio is used from a fixed position. Laywires along the ground radially from the radio;WD- l/TT can be used effectively. These wiresprovide a better reflection of the transmittedsignal. Without this counterpoise, the signalenergy would be absorbed in the ground. Notethat the wires are not attached to the antennabase but should be grounded to the radio case.

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The length of the wires should behalf to one wavelength.

Counterpoise Length(AN/PRC-25)

between one-

Frequency (me) Length (ft)

30 16-3240 12-2450 10-2060 8-1670 7-14

VERTICAL HALF RHOMBIC

The Wave and Vertical Half Rhombic an-tennas are two field-expedient methods that canbe used with FM radio sets. These antennascan be constructed using field wire with lancepoles or trees for support. The antennas willtransmit and receive in the direction of theresistor terminated ends. They will normallydouble or triple the rated operating range of

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the FM radio sets. The antennas are terminatedwith one 400 or 700 ohm carbon resistor. Whenno resistor is available, the antenna will stillincrease the ,range of FM sets. However, it willnot be as great an increase because the antennawill be radiating in two directions rather thanone. The antenna is connected to the auxiliaryantenna connector.

The range of most FM radio equipment issubstantially reduced when operating in densevegetation. Much of the radio energy is absorbedby the surrounding foliage thereby reducing radiorange. To compensate for this loss, the RC-292antenna should be elevated to the limit of theantenna cable.

Units employing the RC-292 antenna in semi-fixed positions can counter the effects of rustand corrosion by using brake fluid on the endsof the sections and then taping the joint withplastic electrical tape. The antenna elements canbe protected from moisture by spraying withHumis eal Protective Coating, type 1A27.

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6. BACKUP COMMUNICATIONS

The enemy has frequently attempted to isolatea unit by cutting its wir.q lines prior to an attack.This tactic can prove particularly effective atnight and adds to the confusion during a nightattack. To avoid being isolated, it is imperative

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that a backup communication capability be main-tained at all times. As wire is extremely vulner-able to cutting, or destruction by mortar andartillery fire, radio equipment should be readilyavailable to provide a backup means. Ensure thatfrequencies on’ backup equipment are preset,antennas are assembled and the equipment isready for instant use.

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.

7. RECORD FRIENDLY FREQUENCIES

Unit operations officers should maintain alisting of the radio frequencies of U.S. and aIliedagencies in the zone of operations. Frequentliaison visits by command and staff personnelare a means of keeping the frequencies current.

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The following incident illustrates the value ofsuch a listing.

During the course of a combined opera-tion, a friendly allied battalion in motor convoywas attacked in daylight along a road. A Marineoperations officer, observing this attack, at-tempted unsuccessfully to contact a friendly unitby radio. Seeing a U.S. observation plane circlingthe area, he gained radio contact with the ob-server because he remembered the observationfrequencies used a month earlier. In a matter ofminutes artillery fire was directed on the enemy.The operations officer also contacted a localU.S. advisor on another net who directed addit-ional fires on the now-withdrawing VC. Withina half hour of the first radio contact, air andground supporting fires had been delivered onthe enemy ambush force.

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8. VEHICULAR RADIOS

The basic units of the FM vehicular radio,AN/MRC- 109-110, are watertight when issued.However, accessories, connectors, and recep-tacles require additional waterproofing prior tofording operations.

The operator/driver must be cautioned thatthe AN/MRC- 109-110 radio vehicle is less stablethan the AN/MRC-38. This is particularly truesince the installed radio equipment has a higher

369

center of gravity, and is more susceptible tooverturning while executing sharp turns at rela-tively high speeds. The suspension system ofthe new AN/M RC - 109-110 provides a compara-tively easy ride, thus reducing driver awarenessof the necessity to maintain a safe speed for theexisting driving conditions. Observe safe drivingprecautions at all times with this vehicularradio. Keep it upright and operating.

The” M-151 Jeep (AN/M RC- 109-110) vehicledoes not have an aluminum alloy body and there-fore is extremely vulnerable to one of theenemies encountered constantly in RVN--RUST.One problem area to watch closely on thesevehicles is the battery compartment. The eightdrainholes beneath the battery tray can easilybecome plugged with dirt and foreign matter.Supervisors should continually spot check thesevehicles to ensure that operators are keepingthe battery tray area clean.

9. SQUAD LEVEL RADIO

The squad level radio, AN/ PRT-4 transmitterand AN/ PRR-fJ receiver, to be employed by rifleplatoon leaders, platoon sergeants, squad leadersand fire team leaders, is currently being pro-cured by the Marine Corps. This radio willprovide an interim commuk~tion capability at

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the platoon level, pending development of asingle-unit transceiver. First deliveries to fieldunits are expected by the first part of 1968.

The radio transmitter, AN/ PRT-4, is a dualchannel transmitter capable of transmitting voiceor internally generated tone signals. The micro-phone is contained in the front of the case. Acollapsible antenna, which is approximately 24inches long when extended, slides down along theside of the transmitter housing when collapsed.This unit can be carried in the shirt or flakvest pocket; can be clipped to clothing; or can becarried in the hand.

The radio receiver, AN/PRR-9, is a self-contained, single-channel receiver designed tobe attached to a standard combat helmet, clippedto a harness, or placed in a shirt or flak vestpocket, A lanyard is provided as a retainer toprevent loss. An 18-inch stainless steel whipantenna is provided and may be utilized in eitherof two positions; perpendicular to the receiverhousing or parallel to the housing.

Both transmitter and receiver are dry batterypowered, with a normal battery life of 30 to 40hours. Normal communication r a n g e underoptimum conditions, is approximately 500 meters.

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,

10. EXTERNAL POWER SOURCE TELEPHONETA-312

On the face of the TA-312 telephone thereare two chrome screws marked “Bat.” Thesescrews are to be used as a field expedientmethod of connecting an external 3-volt powersource, such as two BA-23 batteries shown inthe opposite sketch. When BA-30 batteries nor-mally used with this field telephone are notavailable, there are some other batteries with‘ -volt sections which may be used. These are:.—2

+ BA-386 (PRC-25 batteries)

+ BA-279 (PRC-1O batteries)

+ BA-270 (PRC-6 batteries)

# # /{ # //

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Sln.al@Str-!!dOfwireI

Tebphono Yolophono

\

Ground return——

—— —

11, GROUND RETURN COMMUNICATIONS

If the wire on your field telephone suddenlyfails, take both pieces of wire and place them inthe same terminal post. From the other postrun a piece of wire to a ground stake. The samething must be done at the other end of the line.If both positions follow this procedure, com-munications may be restored.

If wire is temporarily in short supply, layone strand of wire, connect it to one terminal,ground the other terminal, and continue withdependable communications.

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12. FIELD WIRE LINE TESTS

Field wire line defects can cause variousdegrees of trouble by intermittent or total failureof the field wire system or its components.

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Testing the field wire sys!em can Lsolate prob-lem areas and enable repair personnel to elimi-nate trouble cluickly. The below listing indicatescommon wire system problems, probable causes,methods of testing with the field telephone, andthe symptom.

TROUBLE

Short

Ground

cross

Open

_

TWO conductors ofONE pair in elec-trical contact.

ONIJ or NW?{ =0”-

ductors aro inelectrical cOn -tact with theground or agrounded object.

A conductor of apair is in elec-trical contactwith a conductorof a DIFFERENTpair.

ONE or LIOTH con-ductors of apair broken.

METHOD OF TESTING sY?4PmM

Connect DOTH conduc. If thetors of the pair to generatorbe tested to the line crank turnsterminals of the test HARD thetelephone. Turn the circuit iargeneretor crank SHORTED.rapidly.

Connect ONE conduc- If thet.or of the pair to generatorbe tested to ONE crank turneliru terminal of the HARD that con-test telephone. Con- ductor lanect the 2ND line GROUNDED.terminal of the testtelephone to a groundstake. Turn the gen-erator crank rapidly.

Connect BOTH conduc- If the gen-tors of one pair to erator crankONE line terminal of does notthe test telephone turn FRESLYand BOTli conductors there in aof the 2ND pair to CROSS.

the 2ND line termi-nal of the test tele-phone. Turn thegenerator crankrapidly.

Connect BOTN donduc- If thetors of the pair to generator

be tested to the crank turnsline terminals of FrWSLY thethe test tclept’me. circuit isTurn the

7enerator OPEN.

crank rap ally.

/i##i#i/

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13. SWITCHBOARD OPERATIONS

Several adverse effects associated withswitchboard operations have been noted in Viet-nam during the monsoon season, One of the mostcommon and more troublesome of these prob-lems is “cross talk.” This results when the wireconductors connected to the terminals in therear of the switchboard become moist or wet,thus allowing transmission current to cross chan-nels through the moisture around the terminals.When a switchboard is established in a forwardarea, the tactical situation requires the locationof the equipment to be underground or at leastcompletely sandbagged. This situation adds to themoisture problem which in turn increases“crosstalk.”

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To counter this, the back cover of theswitchboard should be removed and all terminalsexposed to a strong light; e.g., a !500-wattsearchlight (type ADR14), in order to dry moistureand eliminate “crosstalk.”

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14. SB-86 SWITCHBOARD DEMAGNETIZATION

After a period of use, line signals andsupervisory signals in the SB-96 switchboardbecome magnetized in the operate (white) posi-tion. The normal solution is replacement of thesignal at a cost of approximately $9.50.

It was discovered that the use of a taperecorder head demagnetizer will restore thesignal to normal (black) position with no damage.A head demagnetizer, with a switch, is pluggedinto a 110v 60-HrZ outlet and located within easyreach of all the signals on the switch150ard.When one of the signals fails to restore to thenormal position after the plug is inserted, thedemagnetizer is touched to the lens of the ‘signaland switched on. A second or two is all that isrequired to restore the signal to normal. Thecost of the head demagnetizer is approximately$3.50.

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15. PROTECT POWER AND COMMUNICATIONCABLES

Unprotected cables linking permanent fixedcommand or communication facilities with re-mote equipment are extremely vulnerable dur-ing enemy attacks. Flying debris and shellfragments can easily slice unprotected cables,causing a loss of comniunications with the com-mand and control agencies. The resulting prob-lems are far out of proportion to the physicaldamage received. Scrupulous attention to propersafeguarding of cables by burying or shieldingwill enable command and control agencies tocontinue vital operations during attacks.

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16. PROTECT CO MM UN ICATIONCOMPO-NENTS

The high heat and humidity of Vietnam ac-celerate the deterioration of the rubber com-ponents on communication-electronics equipment.To prevent this drying-out process, apply athin coat of llC4 lubricant to these parts daily,Components such as push-to-talk switch coverswill last longer.

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17. SECURITY FOR WIRE TEAMS

Certain dangers are inherent in trouble-shooting wire lines because the lines are sta-tionary and the enemy can predict routes thewire teams will be using. An adequate numberof personnel should accompany the wire team toprovide protection and should be equipped with

-—.—.——c

a radio. When checking the wire lines, the wireteam must not establish a pattern, but vary theirroutine each time. Walk varying distances fromthe ~ wire and approach wire at right angles.Check the wire carefully for boobytraps beforetesting. Only one man should approach the wireto trouble shoot. All except the inspecting wire-man keep spread out and alert. The same cautionshould ‘be exercised on the return trip as thearea should never be considered safe.

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18. COMMUNICATION SECURITY

The communication equipment available tofield units includes the most advanced and ex-tensive airay ever provided. Yet, without propersecurity measures, the use of this equipmentcan be more harmful than useful.

The enemy in Vietnam possesses the abilityto intercept friendly radio transmissions. Anyinformation passed in the clear must be as-sumed to have been subject to intercept. Opera-tors and supervisory personnel must ensure thatadequate security measures are employed withall transmissions. The correct use of shacklingand the use of call signs is a must,

Attempts by the enemy to intercept com-munications are not limited to radio equipment.U.S. forces have detected numerous attempts todisrupt telephone communications and even enter

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these conversations in attempts to deceive anddisrupt them. On one occasion, just prior to anattack on a U.S. installation, the Vlet Cong en-tered the telephone communications system in-side the installation perimeter and conversedin fluent English, free of any trace of accent.Detailed conversations were carried on until theU.S. personnel became suspicious of the type ofquestions that were asked by the unidentifiedparty. Later, investigation revealed the locationof the line tapping. Security measures must bedeveloped to counter such a possibility and con-stant attention must be paid to limiting tele-phone and r a dio conversations to essentialinformation properly protected b y securitymeasures.

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19. CHECKLIST FOR COMMUNICATIONS

+ Plan for primary, alternate, and emer-gency means of communication.

+ Keep communication equipment clean,dry and as cool as possible.

+ Adhere to proper radio procedures.

+ Reduce radio traffic by establishing sig-nals (key handset).

-+ Tie both the mounted and the extra an-tennas to the radio or backpack.

-+ Move radio a few meters if reception ispoor.

+ Use RC - 292 or field-expedient antennasto increase communications range.

+ Disperse radios.

+ Camouflage communication equipment.

* Ensure all leaders know operational fre-quencies.

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Chapter VII: LOGISTICS

a. Trans~rtation and Movement Doctrine

MILSTAMP represents the title, “MilitaryStandard Transportation and Movement Proce-dures. ” The final work concerning MILSTAMPis the D e p a r t m e n t of Defense Regulation4500.32-R. This manual provides guidance, regu-lations, and code designators and establishes theprocedures to be followed by shipping and re-ceiving activities. When processing, handling, ormoving material from one location to another,these regulations should be adl]ered to closely.The work of handling and moving materdal may

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sometimes seem dull and routine to the trans-porters and movers. However, to the Marine incombat who is anxiously awaiting the arrival ofthe right box of gear, very few, if any, shipmentsare routine. All personnel involved in the handlingand movement of material must be thoroughlyfamiliar with the provisions of MILSTAMP--theright gear, at the right place, at the right timedepends on it.

b. Attention Supply Personnel

Some difficulty is being experienced withthe MILSTRIP coding now being used in the sup-ply system. To make the system work efficiently,the codes must be understood and used properly.Remember:

+ The document identifier code (DIC)provides ready identification of each type ofMILSTRIP transaction, such as requisition,passing action, status request, receipt or adjust-ment. The DIC is found in the first three positions(card columns 1-3) in the MILSTRIP format. Bythis code, ready identification is available, on thedata and action that is required to be performedon the requisition. The document identifier code(DIC) is a mandatory entry on all MILSTRIPdocuments. Commonly used DIC’S are publishedin the current edition of MCO P4400. 15, OrganicProperty Control Procedures Manual. Correctutilization of these codes will speed supply re-sponse.

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-+ Pending modification at the inventorycontrol points, document identifiers in the RM(requisition modifier) series will not process inthe current program. Requisitioning activitiesare reminded that a priority can only be up.graded by canceling the original requisition andsubmitting a new requisition stating the appro-priate priority designator, quantity, and therequired delivery date (RDD).

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2. EMBARKATION

a. Embarkation Readiness

Success or failure of embarkation opera-tions is dependent upon proper embarkationplanning. To ensure rapid and orderly

385

deployment, it is mandatory that units maintaina high state of embarkation readiness at alltimes. Experience has shown that units whichhave encountered difficulty during embarkationfor deployment have not planned nor trainedproperly. Some of the major errors of omissionarc:

+ Embarkation personnel responsible forloading ships are not thoroughly familiar withembarkation procedures.

-* Accurate embarkation data are notreadily available. As a result, shipping require-ments cannot be rapidly and accurately esti-mated for unit lifts.

-* Cargo and equipment are not properlyboxed, crated and/or palletized.

In order for any unit to be preparedfor a rapid and orderly deployment, the followingmeasures arc rccluircd:

4- Up-to-date embarkation SOP.

-> Complete, accurate a n d up-to-datecargo manifests.

+ Trained embarkation personnel onhand.

4- Complete and accurate tactical mark-ings displayed where required.

-?- Sufficient packing and crating materialonhand.

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+ Periodic embarkation inspections ofsubordinate units.

+ Initiation of timely followup embarka-tion actions and assistance, when indicated, toensure maximum readiness.

Embarkation procedures can be improvedby following the points below:

+ Take advantage of embarkation schoolquotas. The unit embarkation officer and hisassistant should be school-trained wheneverpossible.

+ Embarkation should be an all-handseffort. Complete, accurate data from all sectionsare necessary in order to prepare effective plans.

+ Use standard-sized pallets with string-ers running the shorter length of the pallet.

,,, ..., 387. ?..,-,,A.W*,,,,. *, .<

Ensure that loads do not protrude beyond thepallet edge. Usc the widest banding available andreinforce it with lumber if there is any doubtthat the package can withstand rough handling.

+ When packaging lumber, do not rely onbanding alone. Reinforce the package with lengthsof wood under the banding and perpendicular tothe lumber.

+- Plan for embarking items of equipmentor supplies which are on requisition but not yetonhand.

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3. SUPPLY ECONOMY

One of the biggest problems unit leaders atall levels are faced with in a combat situation issupply economy. Personnel serving in a combatarea for the first time have a tendency to feelthat any item lost or damaged can automaticallybe written off as a combat loss. Stress to all newpersonnel that resupply in a combat situation isat times extremely limited and that each indi.vidual is directly responsible for each item ofindividual equipment in his possession. Shouldthis item be lost or damaged through negligence,the individual may be punished. More importantly,the item may be needed later when a replace-ment cannot be obtained.

During the monsoons in the I Corps area,proper handling and distribution of all suppliesbecome even more necessary. Unit shortages onsome critical items such as boots, utilities and782 gear can sometimes be traced directly frompoor supervision by unit leaders to the trashdump. Inundated roads and low cloud cover re-strict distribution, so each item must be con-served and utilized to the fullest extent possible.However, too much conservation can be as badas too little. Stockpiling supplies not immedi-ately required by a using unit may depriveanother Marine unit of urgently needed gear.

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I Economy of Fuel Filtersc.

Replacement of fuel filters for the TD-18tractor can be reduced by transferring theauxiliary filter to the primary position andplacing the new filter in the auxiliary position.This method may also be applied to the dual-oilfilters used on multifuel engine trucks. Theestimated reduction of filter usage is approxi-mately one-third.

b. Prolong Battery Life

‘1’hc life of a 11A-386 battery for tileAN/ PI{C-25 radio can be prolonged by rotatingit with another battery every 6 to 8 hours. Whenradio operators in a base location assume theradio watch, they should rotate batteries. Duringfield operation, carrying at least one spare bat-tery can accomplish the same thing.

c. Class V Management

The indiscriminate expenditure of ammuni-tion and practices contributing to its deteriorationin storage have no place in combat operations.Commanders at all levels must be alert toeliminate undesirable ammunition handling prac-tices such as are outlined below:

390

* Carrying linked machinegun ammuni-tion wrapped around the shoulders and upperbody. This removes the ammunition from itsprotective packaging and permits the accumulat-ion of moisture, sand, and dirt on the exposedrounds. Any of these conditions could cause aweapon malfunction. Inside each bandolier of7. 62mm machinegun ammunition (100 rounds) isa cardboard container protecting it. If theammunition is removed from its packaging,leave it inside the bandolier until just prior tofiring.

-E Frequently, ammunition beyond the im-mediate requirement is removed from its con-tainer. Mortar propellants in particular aresusceptible to moisture, and prolonged exposurecan result in short rounds or misfires.

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+ Improper and inadequate field storageprac~iccs contril.mtc to ammunition dcterloratlonoCheck the appropriate publication for the ac-cepted methods.

4. F[];l.1) liX1’liDIENCY

Do you need an idea for an expedient meansof bridging a small stream? How much sand,mortar and water make a good batch of con-crete? What size culverts will support tanksand how much fill should cover the culvert?IHOW many pounds in 1100 kilos of rice? Whatare the dimensions of an M51 dump truck? Needa winch for some heavy hauling? --use truckwheels.

All this information and more is contained inthe recently revised Engineer Field Data Manual(FM 5-34). Keep a copy handy. It will quicklyprovide you with the correct solution to many ofyour minor engineering problems.

a. Ficlcl-Expedient Cleaning “rank

A field-expedient cleaning tank for tele-phone components can be constructed by using a55-gallon steel drum, or a similar container,cut down to a 36-inch height; a 10-foot lengthof 5/ 16-inch-copper tubing; and a vacuumclcancr. This cleaning tank is particularly useful

392

Figure 7-1

for cleaning components that have a heavy ac-cumulation of dust and grease. (See fig. 7-l. )

The construction is simple. This aeratedbath of cleaning solvent is very effective andcan be used to clean any mechanical part that isnormally cleaned with solvent. The article to becleaned should be suspended to allow sedimentto settle to the bottom of the tank. (CAUTION: Donot house apparatus indoors. )

b. Battery Salvage

If your penlightBA-386 battery can be

battery is worn out, thethe source for a replace-

ment. The BA-386 of a certain manufacturecontains six small AA (penlight) batteries. When

393

the 13A-386 has been expended for normal radiouse, it can be cut open and the smaller compo-nents removed. This prevents its reuse by theenemy and provides a possible additional batterysupply for a small penlight.

c. Emergency Vehicle Repairs

+ To repair a small hole in a puncturedfuel tank, remove a self-tapping screw and washerfrom the body or cab of the vehicle. Then cut asmall piece of leather from a tarpaulin strap.Punch a hole through the leather and work thescrew with the washer attached through theleather. Insert the self-tapping screw in the holein the fuel tank and tighten it to the point wherethe leather expands slightly.

+ When a fan belt breaks and a replace-ment is not immediately available, a fiber ropefrom the vehicle tarpaulin or a length of field tele-phone wire may serve as a substitute. The gene-rator mounting blocks should be loosened andthe generator pus hed toward the engine block.The rope or wire should then be looped aroundthe pulleys two or three times and securely tied;trim the loose ends to prevent them from dam-aging the radiator. Push the generator gentlyback into position until the rope is reasonablytaut and tighten the generator mounting blocks.

4- Broken fuel or oil line--Breaks on theselines are under low pressure or a vacuum andmay be temporarily spliced by forcing a piece of

394

hose over the broken ends of the line. A piece ofhose cut from the windshield wiper may beused,

+ Broken brake line--Crimp the cut brakeline, thus allowing the remaining vehicle wheelsto continue functioning without loss of the brakefluid.

+ Cracked distributor cap--Cracked dis-tributor caps have a tendency to fill with moisture.Sparks running along this moisture can causethe cap to burn, creating carbon deposits. Scrapea notch in the cap or rotor deep enough to re-move all the carbon from the crack, then fill thecrack with tar from the top of the battery.

+ Vapor lock-- This is common in hotclimates or when the operating temperature ofthe engine becomes too high. The fuel vaporizesin the pump, which will not pump vapor alone.Wrap the fuel pump with a piece of cloth that hasbeen soaked in water. This will lower the fueltemperature enough to keep the fuel in a liquidstate.

d. Substitute V-Belt

The generator belt used on the M-422Mity Mite may be used as an interim substitutefor the drivebelts found on the AN/MRC-109radio jeep. Both belts must be replaced on theMRC-109 since the M-422 V-belt is approximately3/8 inch smaller in diameter. The FSN of thesubstitute belt is 3030-528-4446.

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~% Round Solid Stock

Figure 7-2

e. M38 Axle Puller

A Victnarn-basml maintenance unit hasdevised an axle puller for M38 l/4-ton vehiclesthat has consistently removed rear axles whenthe old slapstick method has failed. Utilizing thedevised axle puller (see fig. 7-2), two Marineswere able to remove rear axles which requiredrepair even when other methods such as heatingthe axle housing failed. The damage to the coneand rollers usually associated with other methodsis eliminated. All the parts used to fabricatethese devices are found around vehicle mainte-nance shops; scrap material can be used for allmetal parts.

396

Figure 7-3

f. Ditch Crossing

The use of five logs will permit a convoyof mixed vehicles to cross ditches that are toodeep to drive through. The logs should be about10 inches in diameter and 3 to 4 feet longer thanthe width of the ditch. To prevent the logs fromspreading apart, drive stakes into the ground onboth sides and lash them together with rope,chain or communications wire. Only two logsare needed to pass a dual-wheeled vehicle acrossa ditch by allowing the dual wheels to straddlethe log as the vehicle crosses. Single front wheelscan be converted to duals by using the spare wheeland by removing the outer wheel of one of thesets of rear duals. Four logs are necessary to

397

pass a vehicle equipped with single wheels. Bylashing the logs together in pairs, the wheelsride between the logs. Guides must be providedto ensure that the vehicles and the logs arealigned properly. (See fig. 7-3. )

a. Preventive Maintenance Indicators

The human body and items of equipmentcan both show certain indications of poor healthor ill use. However, equipment is unlike the bodyin that it does not have built-in mechanisms toward off disease once infection sets in. It doesnot take a highly skilled mechanic to practicesound preventive maintenance procedures. It

398

takes goods eyes, common sense, an oilcan,perhaps a wrench, a willingness to inspectequipment, and a realization that without in-spections the equipment will get “sick.”

Rust, loose connections, s p 1i t rubbergaskets, bent couplings and condensation arejust a few indicators that mean further inspectionis needed. Each item in the table of equipmenthas certain preventive maintenance procedures.Learn them, follow them and tell the men withwhom you work what they are.

b. Effect of Monsoon Conditions on the MityMite

During periods of heavy rain, mud, anddeteriorating road surfaces, the M-422 MityMite experiences excessive wear to the idlerpulley, brakes hoes, and brakedrums on roughroads. Frequent inspections, thorough d r i v e rmaintenance, and an intensified training pro-gram to ensure that drivers exercise necessarycaution while driving on rough roads are essen-tial. Undercarriages of all vehicles must becleaned as often as possible to preclude bearing,brake and universal joint wear, engine clogging,and to aid in visual inspection to detect dis-orders before they render the vehicle useless.

c. Brake and Clutch Free Travel

Drivers and mechanics should be awareof the proper clutch and brake free travel

399

distance on the vehicles which they operate andrepair. Free travel distance takes on added im-portance when the vehicle is operating in sandand laterite, and over rough terrain. When theclutch is not properly adjusted, pressure on thedisk, pressure plate and throwout bearing causesexcessive wear on the whole assembly. Improperfree travel of the brake pedal can cause partialengagement of the brakes while the vehicle ismoving. This condition wears out the brakeshoesand builds up pressure in the brake systemwhich could result in system failure. The correctfree travel adjustments are integral to a soundpreventive maintenance program. Consult the ap-propriate technical publication for specific in-formation.

d. Fuel Tanker Condensation

Wide differences between day and nighttemperatures and humidity can lead to increasedcondensation in fuel tanks. Continued use of con-taminated fuel can cause engine damage. Thisproblem can be reduced if fuel tankers are keptfull at night, leaving 1i t t 1e or no space formoisture-laden air in the tanker. In addition, aweekly check with water-finding paste can re-duce contamination problems.

400

e. Tightening Vehicle Hardware

A continuing problem exists for vehicleoperators and mechanics in attempting to keepvehicle hardware tight. Once boltholes or matingsurfaces become elongated or warped, it isalmost impossible to tighten hardware securely.The secret in preventing the development ofloose hardware is to take corrective action be-fore the nuts and bolts become loose. Indicationsthat hardward is loose are: mud and dirt notcollecting on a nut or lockwasher; shiny metalsurfaces around the bolt; or red streaks stainingthe painted surface adjacent to mating surfaces,Some of the pertinent areas to watch closely are:wheel lug nuts; door, cab, and bed mountingbolts; subassembly and unit mounting bolts;spring “U” bolts; drive shafts and axle flange

401

bolts; battery holddown clamps; fuel tank mount-ing straps and supports; and all steering mecha-nism bolts.

Particular attention to the above problemareas by drivers will prolong the life of allequipment and will result in fewer vehiclesbecoming deadlined.

f. Vehicle Washing

The lack of adequate vehicle washing facil-ities in RVN makes local self-help programs amust. However, when utilizing a nearby river orstream to wash a vehicle, do not “dunk” thevehicle all the way up to the vehicle bed. Whenwater flows over the top of the wheels, systemcomponents such as seals, bearing and brakesare subject to excessive deterioration caused bythe water. A good rule of thumb to follow is thatwhen the depth of the water reaches the bottomof the wheel rim, stop. Accidental submersionbeyond this point should be reported to unitmaintenance personnel.

g. Multifuel Drivers

Keep vehicles out of 2(I or 3d echelonmaintenance by performing a simple weekly checkon engine mounting bolts and the steering gear-box mounting bolts. If either of these work loose,they will cut into the injection pump hose andfuel will wind up in places other than in theengine.

402

h. Maintenance Procedures on the M52A2tMultifuel Tractor

The exhaust from this vehicle is directedtoward the ground and stirs up dust and dirtwhich are picked up by the air intake on thesupercharger. To remedy this, install the ex-haust extension of the short deepwater fordingkit. The amount of dust and dirt entering the airintake is considerably reduced.

i. Overheating Problems

The multifuel engines in the 2~-ton and5-ton trucks are designed to operate between170° and 200° F.; however, when the tempera-ture goes above 90°, the coolant temperature cango as high as 2200 without damage to the engine,providing the radiator pressure cap is function-ing properly. If these engine temperatures areexceeded, the following action should be taken:

+ Check water level; do not rely on visualinspection as water can be in the filler neck andgive a false indication of level. Check waterlevel by filling radiator until it overflows.

+ Check fan belt tdnsion.

+ Check radiator core for dirt plugging.+

Check for headgasket leaks by observ-ing radiator water for bubbling or appearanceof oil.

403

+ Check radiator pressure cap for loose-ness in the normal position. Can pressure beheard escaping when cap is loosened on a hotengine? CAUTION SHOULD BE USED TO PRE-VENT SCALDING WHEN LOOSENING THE CAP:

If the above checks do not solve the over-heating, replace the thermostat. If a new thermo-stat is not available, the engine may be operatedwithout one. providing the bypass to the waterpump is “blocked. This is the 2-inch diameterpipe that extends from the bottom of the thermo-stat housing and is connected to the water pumpby a short hose section. A tapered wooden plugis recommended in the rubber hose section be-tween the thermostat housing and the water pump.Care should be taken to ensure that the plugdoes not protrude beyond the diameter of thepipe and does not have sharp edges. When op-erating without the thermostat, the engine willtend to remain cooler than usual under normalconditions. I-lowever, in weather above 90°, theengine will reach a maximum of 220°. Underemergency conditions when operating the enginewithout the thermostat and without blocking, thebypass, extreme caution must be taken to avoidoverheating the engine. It is recommended thata coolant temperature limit .of 200° be estab-lished to ensure a safety margin. Loads andspeeds should be reduced to prevent exceedingthe coolant temperature limit.

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j. Jeep Battery Compartment

The M-151 Jeep (AN/MRC-109-110) ve-hicle does not have an aluminum alloy body andtherefore is extremely vulnerable to one of theenemies encountered constantly in RVN--RUST.One problem area to watch closely on thesevehicles is the battery compartment. The eightdrainholes beneath the battery tray can easilybecome plugged with dirt and foreign matter.Supervisors should continually spot check thesevehicles to ensure that operators are keepingthe battery tray area clean.

k. 24- and 5-Tori Truck Air Reservoir Tanks

Recent inspections of 2~-ton and 5-tontrucks have disclosed t h a t the inboard airreservoir tanks are not being properly drained.Moisture that accumulates in air reservoir tankscan cause brake failures and damage to allcomponents of the vehicle’s brake system.TM 11240-15/1A specifies that the driver hasthe responsibility to drain the air reservoirtanks daily. Draining the tanks should be anormal portion of the vehicle operator’s after-operation services. Deadlined vehicles should bechecked daily to ‘prevent the accumulation ofmoisture in the air reservoir tanks.

1.

heavy

Vehicle Rivets

Operating vehicles over rough terrain withloads can cause the rivets securing the

405

crossmembers of the vehicle frame to break orcrack. This has happened to several 2~-ton and5-ton vehicles in Vietnam. This situation ispre-dominant on the extended beds of the M-36andM-49 Fuel Tanker, and the M-50 Water Tanker.Rivets most often break on the second and thirdcrossmembers. The twisting action of the framecaused by the engagement of the sprag unitsmay be the cause of this. Vehicles should beinspected weekly for signs of broken or crackedrivets and, when discovered, must be reported

~ for appropriate corrective measures.

m. Xenon Searchlight Preventive Maintenance

It has been discovered that a green moldwill develop on the inside of the protective glassshield and on the reflector of the tank-mountedXenon searchlight. This mold develops rapidly

406

during the monsoon season. The illuminationcapability of the light is reduced considerably,especially as the mo~d accumulates on the re-flector.

During the monsoon season, on a weeklybasis, tank crewmen should clean the protectiveglass shield and the reflector with medicalalcohol and a clean, soft cloth.

n. Rough Terrain Forklifts

The rough terrain forklift needs much thesame preventive maintenance and driver trainingas a heavy truck. Daily operator checks beforeand after operation are necessary for such itemsas lubrication, oil, water and component adjust-ments. The forklift technical manuals and lubri-cation charts are based on normal operationconditions. More frequent servicing may benecessary. Driver training should emphasize theproper use of the clutch cutoff control and thenecessity to bring the vehicle to a complete haltbefore reversing directions.

o. Maintenance of Gasoline- 13ngine-Driven——Chain Saws

The gasoline-engine-driven chain saw is arugged tool, and it will tolerate a limited amountof abuse without being rendered unserviceable;however, for optimum performance it is abso-lutely necessary that routine and unscheduled

407

maintenance be performed when prescribed orwhen necessary.

Operator abuse is a major factor in chainsaw failures. Improper lubrication is one of themost frequent causes of inability to start. Lubri-cating oil of the prescribed weight and type mustbe mixed with gasoline in the correct propor-tions, no more, no less, if the saw is expectedto operate properly. Too little oil will causeexcessive engine wear. All preventive mainte-nance services must be performed before at-tempting to start the engine.

A clogged muffler or exhaust port maybc the cause of failure to start, hard starting,or loss of power. The muffler and exhaust portshould be cleaned of carbon periodically. Re-move and scrape carbon from the muffler. Scrapecarbon from the exhaust port. CAUTION: Beforeattempting to clean the exhaust port, the pistonmust be moved to the bottom of the cylinder toavoid damage to the piston and piston rings. Ifthe exhaust port is divided, care must be exer-cis ed not to break out the divider. After theexhaust port has been cleaned, the engine shouldbe cranked over rapidly by hand several timeswith the muffler removed in order to blow outany carbon remaining in the cylinder.

While operating the saw, it should bestopped immediately if unusual noises are heardor erratic operation is observed. The troubleshould be located and corrected before again

408

starting the saw. The cutter bar and chain mustbe lubricated at intervals while the saw is inoperation, The chain must be sharp and properlyadjusted.

After use, the engine should be stopped byshutting off the fuel supply at the tank. Thisprocedure will minimize the possibility of flood-ing when the engine is restarted. If it is foundthat failure to start is caused by flooding, theengine should be cranked with the fuel shut offand spark plug removed until the excess fuelmixture has been purged from the cylinder andcrankcase. The spark plug should be thoroughlydried or replaced with a new one, and the start-ing procedure repeated. CAUTION: The sparkplug cable should be firmly grounded to the en-gine when the engine is cranked with the sparkplug removed.

When the saw is not being used, and whileit is stored, it should be treated with the samecare as any ot!]cr precision tool or piece ofmachinery. It should not be carelessly thrown onthe ground or tossed into the body of a truck.Above all, it should not be laid on rock, concrete,or gravel surfaces. In summary, if supervisorsand operators ensure that chain saws are properlymaintained and handled with care they will beready for the big job where required.

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6. SPARE THAT BRIDGE

Many bridges in Vietnam are not capable ofsupporting the heavy engineer and tracked equip-ment which U.S. forces employ. Engineer unitsare replacing or reinforcing many of thesebridges. During this rework, the new or im-proved bridges are marked on the approachesand on the bridge itself to show a classificationnumber representing the safe load carryingcapability. Bridge classification numb~s rangefrom 4 to 100. All vehicles and items of heavyequipment with a gross weight of over 3 tons,and all trailers with a payload over a ton and ahalf are similarly assigned classification num-bers ranging from 4 to 150. The planned move-ment of heavy equipment and loaded vehiclesmust include a route reconnaissance to include

410

the classification number of each bridge. Unlessthe bridge capacity (classification) and the classi-fication number of the load is known, crossinga bridge could be hazardous. Two recent bridgefailures illustrate this hazard. A tank retrievertowing M-48 Tank attempted to cross a triple-single Bailey bridge, The combined load (class100) caused the bridge (class 55 normal, class65 risk) to collapse at the center. A wreckertowing a 2+-ton truck attempted to cross anEiffel bridge. Again the combined load (class 32)exceeded the bridge capacity (class 9). FM 5-34,Engineer Field Data Manual, provides detailedinformation on the marking of bridges and theclassification of both bridges and vehicles. Useit and spare the bridge.

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7. GENERATORS

+ Cold generators should be run for at least10 minutes before applying a load. The circula-tion of air around the stator windings ‘will tendto remove the accumulated moisture inside theequipment, which is the cause of most generatorbreakdowns.

+ Proper protective measures must be takento keep generators free of excessive water andsand. Sandbags placed 4 feet from the generatorat a minimum height of 2 feet, with a protectivecovering (such as a tarp or tent) placed over

411

the generator, will cut down unnecessary ex-posure of the generator to weather elements.

+ Centralization of 45-kilowatt generatormaintenance results in significantly lower dead-line rates and improves responsiveness whengenerator troubles occur.

+ The elevation of generators a few feet offthe ground will reduce the amount of sand drawninto the stators while the generators are inciperatioti.

+ When a unit is deployed under field con-ditions for sustained operations, suitable down-time should be scheduled in order to accomplishrequired maintenance on each electrical powergenerator. When scheduling downtime, considera-tion should be given to the electrical powerrequirement for operating the electrical equip-ment usually powered by each generator. Forcontinuous operations, at least one generatorshould be maintained on a standby basis at alltimes.

+ Generators damaged by rats or other smallrodents can be repaired and/or protected fromfurther damage by ordinary plastic insulatingtape and fungus proofing spray. The damagedwires or insluation should be sprayed with fungusspray, then wrapped with plastic tape, and givena final coating of the fungus spray.

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8, SANITIZING FOOD SERVICE EQUIPMENT

Galley floors and walls, as well as all equip-ment used in food preparation such as canopeners, ice cream s c 00 ps, glass cleaningbrushes, etc., must all be kept scrupulouslycleaned and sanitized. Heat and chemicalsare the two means used to sanitize.

Dishes and utensils may be washed by handor by machine depending upon the equipmentavailable and the tactical situation, Whatever themethod, satisfactory results depend upon con-scientious use by the personnel concerned of theequipment and materials provided.

Dishwashing and sanitizing equipment, dish-washing methods (including improved methodsfor use in the field), dishwashing compounds,sanitizing agents, drying, storing and handlingof u t ens i 1s are all thoroughly described inNAVMED P501O-1, Manual of Naval PreventiveMedicine, Chapter 1, Food Sanitation, The prin-ciples set forth therein must be strictly followedto prevent galley casualties.

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9. FLAK JACKET REPAIR

Flak jackets in Vietnam receive rough treat-ment and arc easily torn. To prolong their life,repairs should bc made immediately. Six-inchwide communication tape is an excellent expedientwhen sewing is not possible. This tape is str~ngand waterproof and, if available, will serve thepurpose until permanent repairs can be made.

10. LONG RANGE PATROL RATIONS

The lightweight patrol rations used in Viet-nam have been praised for their taste, compact-ness and variety of menu. Although these rationswere not intended to be used for extended periods

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of time, long patrols, up to company-size, haveused them for periods of 6 days. Each menu con-sists of a precooked, dehydrated combination itemwhich requires reconstitution by the addition ofwater. A confection, a cereal or fruitcake bar,and coffee, cream and sugar complete the menu.A total of eight menus are included in the rationcarton, three of each menu, The packaging weight~nd configuration of the packets is such that a3-day supply can readily be carried in a lightmarching pack; four packets could also be car-ried in utility jacket pockets. An available supplyof water is required for reconstitution in the foillined packet itself. A combination of cannedrations, patrol packets and rice can make mealswholesome and appetizing with a minimum ofeffort. Keep in mind food requirements foroperations and tailor them to meet the mission.

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Chapter VIII: CIVIC ACT ION -PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

1. REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT

a. RD Coordination

The rapidly expanding Revolutionary De.velopment Program involves the participation ofan increasing number of organizations and agen.ties which assist the GVN at all levels of govern-ment (hamlet, village, district, province). Theeffort of all these organizations must be coordi-nated to ensure that the success of the programis realized. The distribution of supplies byMarines must be coordinated with and accom-plished through the local officials, to ensure thatthe refugeerecipientsassistance

camps, orphanages and other selectedare not already programmed forfrom the GVN, USAID or another

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organization. The same is true for constructionprojects, MEDCAP and any other civic actionproject.

There are important additional benefitsfrom this coordination. The personal prestige ofthe local Vietnamese officials is considerablyenhanced by deferring to them. Consequently,their respect for us is increased, and they areencouraged to improve their performance.

b. The Resettlement of Villagers

One of the byproducts of RevolutionaryDevelopment programs is the resettlement oflocal villagers from VC dominated and ter-rorized areas to areas where government andU.S. troops can provide protection for them. Ini-tial contact with these people should point out thatresettlement of other villages has been successful.The village and district chiefs, as well as selectedvillage elders, should accompany the party makingthis first contact. The villager will be assuredthat he will be provided with land to farm, aninitial allowance of money and materials for foodand shelter, medical treatment and, in general, afar better prospect for a secure life.

The conduct of resettlement operationscan make a good impression on the Vietnamese.If the troops are helpful and friendly, and exhibitrespect for elders; the people will be impressed.

If the local tactical situation permits,villagers who are evacuated for medical reasons

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should be tagged in a manner similar to medicallyevacuated military personnel. Tags should bemade in duplicate. The original should be attachedto the patient and the duplicate delivered to thecivil affairs officer. All reasonable steps shouldbe taken to ensure that children are accompaniedby an adult, preferably a parent or a member ofthe immediate family.

This method can eliminate problems whichcould arise later during followup visitsaffairs officers.

c. Psyops Support for R13 Operations

by civil

The mission of psychological operations inthe I Corps Tactical Zone is to support the GVNintegrated military and civilian program to re-store, consolidate, and expand governmental con-trol as a part of nation building. During theclearing phase of Revolutionary Development,psyops support is provicled by means of groundcombat loud-speaker teams, leaflet operations andaerial broadcasts, with emphasis on Chieu Hoiappeals for defector inducement. In the securingphase of RD, propaganda is directed at the entirepopulation of the area, utilizing newspapers, radio,audiovisual teams, and cultural team perform-ances. This phase of propaganda is mainly inform-ative in nature, and explains government programsand goals. The psyops effort is directed atinfluencing VC families to develop ralliers.

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2. CIVIC ACTION

a. The Importance of Civic Action

The presence of a legally operating,friendly government in South Vietnam makesmilitary civic action conducted hy U. S./ FWMAFforces unique, as compared with similar action inprevious wars. Our efforts are directed at

strengthening and expanding the authority of the~overnmcnt 01 Vlctnam (GVN) which, in turn, isresponsive to the needs and desires of the people.In this effort, we must work through the Viet-namese governmental system and help it work.Working through local GVN officials improvestheir image in the eyes of the people and encour-ages them to do a better job. These officialsshould be encouraged to submit requests throughthe proper channels of their government for ham-let improvement projects and materials forimprovements that the GVN can provide. Effortsshould then be made, with the help of sector andsubsector advisors, to ensure that such requestsare filled. This will foster the people’s confidencein and support for their government. The fulfill-ment of such requests by the GVN also willencourage local officials to submit other requeststo improve the way of life of their constituentsand further their support for their government.

All civic action projects conducted by Ma-rines must meet the needs of the people. ‘I’hepeople must have a sense of participation in theproject and must feel that the project is theirown and not the Marines’. If the people do not helpbuild a project, they will probably not protect ormaintain it. The VC will hesitate to destroy proj-ects that the people have worked on because theyknow that such an act will turn the people againstthem. This makes self-help-type projects a keyelement in civic action.

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Of primary importance in civic action isthorough coordination of all civic action projects;not only with local GVN officials, but with allpersonnel (MACV subsector advisors, CORDSofficials, Marine Corps civic action personnel,etc. ) who might be concerned with the project.This will ensure maximum support for the proj-ect and will prevent the duplication of projectsthat are already planned and budgeted for by theGVN.

Remember that the projects should be highimpact, low cost, and as short term as possiblefrom conception to completion.

Remember too, that the people must becapable of supporting and running the projectwhen the Marines leave. Schools without teachers

or dispensaries without trained medical workersare of little value.

b. Civic Action Coordination

Two potential problems in a civil affairsprogram are coordination and cooperation amongmilitary units and the Vietnamese. There willfrequently be more than one military unit con-ducting civic action in a particular area. This cancause duplication of effort, confusion, and mis-understandings. The other potential problem re-lates to finding out what civic action programs arewanted and needed by the Vietnamese. OftenVietnamese and Americans differ on the value ofcivic action projects.

Both problems can be minimized by organi-zing a village civic action coordination committee.This committee should include both Vietnameseofficials (village chief, hamlet chiefs, policechief, etc. ), and military officials (all units havingeither civic action responsibility or tacticalresponsibility in the area). A good interpretershould be used. The village chief should be thechairman of the committee. The Vietnameseshould be encouraged to bring up their problems,and discussions should be held regularly and areport should be made of all activity since thelast meeting. This committee strengthens the localgovernment by giving the officials more recogni-tion and assuring coordination. The committee canalso be used as an instrument to strengthendistrict-village relations by having a districtrepresentative present at each meeting.

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c. Project Submittal Sheet

Civil affairs officers are frequentlybesieged with requests for material aid. Prob-lems exist as to whether the project is justified,how much material is needed, whether the projecthas been coordinated with the local officials, andwho will coordinate the Vietnamese action onthe project.

A bilingual project submittal sheet can bereproduced at the unit level. This sheet can befilled out in duplicate by the Vietnamese projectcoordinator. It provides a space for a descriptionof the project, the material, and quantity re-quested, the location of the project, the name ofthe project coordinator, and provides a space forthe signature, and an endorsement of both hamletand village chiefs. The use of this sheet requiresthe project to be planned and coordinated.

d. Security and Civic Action

A basic requirement for a successful civicaction program is security. When adequates ccurit y cannot be provided, any civic, actionendeavor presents an open invitation to’ ‘enemyattack. Civic action programs pursued in areaswhere security is inadequate often result inadditional hardships rather than benefits for thepeople. The Vietnamese who participate activelyin our civic action programs are frequentlysingled out by the Viet Cong for severe pressureand intimidation. If this occurs, future civicaction efforts can be hampered. due to fear by the

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people that participation will result in reprisalsby the Viet Cong. Security and Successful civicaction programs go hand-in-hand.

e. Civic Action Checklist

The following questions, arranged as achecklist, can be used to assist in analyzingprospective civic action projects and to check therate of progress of current projects. Thesequestions contribute to individual awareness of themany facets of civic action projects.

(1) Agriculture

Whatthe basis of the

Whatfactors assistgrowth?

crops, animals, vegetables formlocal food supply?

weather, climate and topographicor restrict plant and animal

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Which plants and animals could bestadjust to local conditions and benefit the localfood SU@y?

What animal/vegetable raising projectscan be initiated to improve local economicconditions?

What source of seed, fertilizers, andanimals is available?

What production methods which exist inadjacent areas could be introduced?

Is there a potential and an outlet for alocal cash crop?

What local customs or other possiblerestrictions could handicap local economic im-provement?

Are there plans for agricultural im-provement? If so, what are they?

(2) Home Industries

What industries already exist? (Brickmaking, basket weaving, etc. )

What GVN plans exist for local homeindustries?

Can local villagers now produce thebasic items needed?

What machinery would assist villagersin providing more of their basic needs? (Ex-amples: brick presses and kilns, hand forges,weaving looms. )

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Do the villagers have certain basicskills?

What financing arrangements are avail-able?

Is there a potential for cash income fromthe sale of home manufactured items?

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3. UNDERSTANDING THE VIETNAMESE

a. The Vietnamese Peasant: His Value System

The following is an excerpt from an Octo-ber 1965 research report by the United States

427

Information Agency Research and Reference Serv-ice (it is not a statement of agency policy):

● “The Vietnamese peasant lives in asmall world limited by the bamboo hedge aroundhis village. He is aware of his traditional history,but his first loyalty is to his family. The peasant’sspiritual world is large and alive with the spiritsof nature and of all creatures who lived before,particularly his ancestors. These must be propi-tiated at his family and village altars with the aidof spirit specialists who guide him through life’scrises. Most peasants are also at least nominallyCatholic, Cao Dai, Hoa I-lao or, more usually,13ucldhist. While many, rcsortlng occasionally tothe 13uddllist pagoda, have not always consideredthemselves Buddhists, Buddhist awareness hasgrown.

“Face is all important, but face con-cerns appcaranccs, not truth or morality. Thepeasant is not a moralist and considers flexibilitymore important than fixed principles. Peasantaspirations have risen because of many promisesmade by both the Viet Cong and the Government.The peasant now expects change and wants abetter life.

“Vietnamese life is oriented to thefamily, which is the religious, social, economicand political unit and provides security for itsmembers. The Vietnamese woman is very influ-ential both in the family and in the marketplace.

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“The Viet Cong have devoted enormousefforts to winning’ the peasants, who provide thebulk of their economic support and manpower.Communist propaganda is tailored to meet indi-vidual and local wants. The Viet Cong first usedterrorism to create a ‘Robin Hood’ image byeliminating corrupt officials. More recently ter-rorism has become less discriminating, andharsh Viet Cong methods are increasingly alien-ating the peasants.

“Peasants rarely see newspapers ormagazines and few have radios, consequentlyword-of-mouth communications are important.The leading village opinion- moulders are teachersand local officials. Because his life is dull, thepeasant can most easily be reached by meeting hisdesire for entertainment, but he prefers tradi-tional types. He is most responsive to communica-tions he can understand in local and personalterms. . .“

b. IZlder/Adult Friendships

Successful operations in Vietnam areheavily dependent on achieving the friendship andunderstanding of the Vietnamese adult population.Due to the important status of the village eldersin their villagesand the older people in thefamilies, their influence on the remainder of thepopulation is great. As a result, effort should bedirected toward the elders and older people infurthering Vietnamese/Marine friendship and un-derstanding. A Vietnames Province Chief has

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rcccntly stressed the importance of parties forthe elders in furthering this effort. Parties andother exhibitions of friendship should be empha-sized for adults in general. These face-to-facedisplays of respect will help reduce suspicionsas to our purpose, and influential friendshipswill bc gcncratcd.

To date, much of our effort in achiev-ing Vietnamese friendship has been concentratedon the children. The primary benefit of ‘theseefforts will be realized in the future when thechildren become better educated adults. Cur-rently, however, adverse effects may result ifour generosity toward children undermines theauthority and status of parents and elders, andencourages beggarism. Gifts to children shouldalways be offered through responsible adults.This will foster confidence by both child and adult.

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c. Social Attitudes/Rcllgious 13ellefs

The social attitudes of oriental peopleshave been developed from concepts which west-erners sometimes do not understand. For example,the concept of time to a man raised in Americacan be represented as a straight line. That is,the period from 1000 B.C. to A.D. 1967 runs in aline in which no year repeats itself. The orientalconcept can be represented as being circular orrepeating. For example, the Buddhist cycle of12 years in a circular concept. The Year of theGoat (1967) will come again (1979) and again(1991). This concept stems from a religiousbelief that a person will live many lives. Timeis considered plentiful by an oriental so there isno need to rush headlong into a project. Suddenactions or split-second decisions are lookedupon by the “Vietnamese with disapproval, Theyconsider it good taste to proceed cautiously, andthey carefully consider their problems beforemaking a decision.

Death and sickness are common experi-ences in Vietnam. The various religious observ-ances affecting death and illness should be studiedso that they may be better understood. Forinstance, many Vietnamese homes will have amirror and red ribbon placed near the doorway toward off any spirits which may carry sickness.The family is constantly reminded of theirancestors through the ancestor shelf, which hasa prominent place in most Vietnamese homes.The respect of a family for a deceased member

431

is evident by the number of mourners and theamount of food, music and drink at the funeral,consistent with the family’s income. The reflec-tion of these beliefs by the Vietnamese is evidencedin a kind of fatalism about death.

‘-%- b--f - :~.%%~ ,*, WI,

Probably no other act creates such indig-nation and resentment among the Vietnamese asan apparent lack of regard for Vietnameseancestor worship and disrespect for their graves.The VC are exploiting this aspect as an effectivepropaganda wedge against the Free World forces.Marines must remember that deliberate orthoughtless acts of disrespect provide readypropaganda for the VC in the war for the heartsof the people.

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e. The Symbol of the Republic of Vietnam

The symbol of the Republic of Vietnam hasas its central theme the flexible bamboo; sym-bolizing consistency, faithfulness, and vitality.The bamboo is flanked by a writing brush, thesymbol of culture; and a sword, representingstrength and determination.

Bamboo is typical of the Vietnamese coun-tryside. Thick hedges of the woody plant form aprotective wall around almost every village inthe central coastal plains. For many Vietnamese,bamboo is associated closely with their ruralHfe, which to them is a happy image of home andtraditions rooted in a time-honored past.

The inner strength of the bamboo, coupledwith its flexibility and modest appearance, isconsidered as representing the virtues of agentleman. An ancient proverb says, “the tallerthe bamboo grows, the lower it bends”; meaningthat a great man is humble, modest, and tolerant.A fierce storm may uproot proud, stately, andseemingly indestructible trees; but after thestorm subsides, the flexible bamboo emergesstraight and as verdant as before. This reflectsthe Vietnamese approach to life.

f. Be Courteous to the Vietnamese

(1) DO.

+ Respect the people of Vietnam. Im-proper conduct toward Vietnamese women canhurt our cause as much as any other mistake

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that might be committed. It is well to rememberthat commanders at all levels are responsible fortheir men’s behavior.

+ Encourage local officials to participatefully in all Revolutionary l)cvclopment programs,underscoring and praising their contributions tosuch programs.

+ Practice speaking and writing simpleVietnamese words and pharases regularly. Askassistance from a villager. He will be flattered byyour interest.

+ Learn the local festival clays and howthey are celebrated. Plan to participate in theseevents, if invited.

+ Greet passing villagers in their ownlanguage or try the silent greeting with the righthand in a fashion similar to the thumbs upgesture.

+ Rccogntizc the wooden structures onstakes that resemble houses. These structuresare spirit houses erected as a religious gesturefor wandering spirits. They usually ,,contain asmall pot or cup filled with earth in w’hich a fewincense sticks are placed, and sometimes acandle or a small dish of food. Remember yrespect them.

+ Pay respect to GVN officials (province,district, hamlet chiefs, RVNAF officers) bysaluting and addressing them as “Sir.”

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+ Observe these simple actions whenspeaking with Vietnamese elders:

. Stand on slightly lower ground.

. Stand close to the person beingaddressed.

● Speak softly.

● Smile.

● Fold your arms or keep them atyour side. Hands on hips mean the individualis about to strike the person being addressed.

(2) DON’T

+ Display wealth and privilege,

+ Consume alcohol with or around theVietnamese. It is an invitation to trouble.

+ Be impatient. Vietnamese habituallyexercise caution, and this process often takesmore time than Americans might wish.

+ Exhibit intolerance or anger. These areattitudes that exhibit no real understanding.

+ Pay more than the agreed price forservices.

+ Permit another Marine to act undigni-fied or disrespectful in his relations with theVietnamese. If the Marine acts through ignorance,square him away.

+ Violate the symbols of the local religiouscreed any more than you would your own. The

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five virtues and five commandments of Buddhismare worth practicing by everyone.

+ March indiscriminately through localgardens or ricefields. They represent the people’sfood Supply.

+ Discuss politics with local officials.

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g. Winning and Maintaining Civilian Support

Winning and maintaining the friendshipand cooperation of the Vietnamese civiliansliving within the operational area is an essentialstep in reducing the effectiveness of the localViet Cong guerrillas --they cannot operateeffectively without civilian support. The two mainaspects of our military presence which contributetoward good civil-military relations are theindividual Marine’s positive attitude in his deal-ings with local civilians, and the planned civicactions of military units.

The Viet Cong attempt to separate oursoldiers from the local civilians by showing thatwe are cruel, unthinking, and not concerned withthe welfare of the local peoples. The VC can bedefeated in these efforts by the strength andgenerosity we show in our daily life. The “NineRules” for the military man in Vietnam providethe guide for doing this. Study them and governyour conduct accordingly. The “Nine Rules” areas follows:

REMEMBER WE ARE GUESTS HERE:WE MAKE NO DEMANDS AND SEEK NO SPECIALTREATMENT.

JOIN WITH THE PEOPLE: UNDER-STAND THEIR LIFE, USE PHRASES FROMTHEIR LANGUAGE AND HONOR THEIR CUS-TOMS AND LAWS.

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TREAT WOMEN WITH POLITENESSAND RESPECT.

MAKE FRIENDS AMONG THE SOL-DIERS AND COMMON PEOPLE.

ALWAYS GIVE THE VIETNAMESE THERIGHT-O F-WAY.

BE ALERT TO SECURITY AND READYTO REACT WITH YOUR MILITARY SKILL.

DO NOT ATTRACT ATTENTION BYLOUD, RUDE OR UNUSUAL BEHAVIOR.

AVOID SEPARATING OURSELVESFROM THE PEOPLE BY A DISPLAY OF WEALTHOR PRIVILEGE.

ABOVE ALL ELSE, WE ARE MEMBERSOF THE U.S. MILITARY FORCES ON A DIF-FIcuI.T MISSION, RESPONSIM.E FOR ALL OUROFFICIAL AND PERSONAL ACTIONS. REFLECTI-1ONOR UPON OURSELVES AND T}lE UNITEDSTATES OF AMERICA.

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4. CHIEU HOI PROGRAM

a. Chieu Hoi Success

III MAF contribution to the Republic ofVietnam Chieu Hoi Program is illustrated by thesucess Marines have enjoyed in applying revolu-tionary development techniques to one particularhamlet.

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The llamlct, known as “Chicu Iloi, ” ispopulated by five hundred Vietnamese who haverallied to the Republic of Vietnam from unpacifiedI Corps areas in response to the Chieu Hoi (OpenArms) amnesty program. In May ’66, 111MAFassumccl sponsorship of the hamlet and directedinitial efforts at providing badly needed medicaltreatment for the inhabitants. Only 15 townspeopleresponded to the first sick call. Others displayedanxiety and even fear and hostility at the Marinepresence. Slowly, however, the work of the NavyMedical Team, together with Marine donations oftools, lumber and other aid, produced confidencein the people.

Today, a little more than 6 months later,the villagers are working and planning together inopen cooperation. Wells have been dug, roadsbuilt, programs of animal husbandry started andan eighty acre project for vegetable farminginitiated. A temporary school has been built andis operating, while planning continues for botha permanent school and a church. Further, thetime-honored Marine practice of weekly “fielddays” has been adopted by the villa~ers as aroutine sanitation measure.

A final indicator of the progress of thevillagers is found in their willingness to help theRepublic of Vietnam amnesty program expand.With GVN and 111MAF support, they now providehomes for the families of new defectors duringtheir first days in the hamlet.

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b. New Chieu I-loi Leaflet.—. ——

The tempo of the allied program in Vietnamto encourage the VC and NVA to defect is on theincrease. One of the means to reach the guerrillaforces is by the distribution of Chieu Hoi leaflets.All allied forces in Vietnam must be informed ofthe procedures for rallying by the enemy to thegovernment’s cause. A new leaflet explaining therallying procedure has been published. The in-structions printed on both sides in Vietnamesetell the rallier that he will be treated kindly andthat his family will be treated kindly and will bewell protected. He is instructed to hide hisw capon, present himself to the friendly forces Inthe daytime, with raised hands and bearing thisleaflet or a surrender pass. Even if he has noleaflet, he is advised to seek the friendly forcesand present hires elf with raised hands; theallied soldiers will understand this gesture. As aninducement, a reward will be paid to him forleading allied troops to any weapon caches.

c. Refugees

Unit operations in areas controlled by theViet Cong usually generate a large number ofrefugees. Prior to the commencement of anoperation, and if feasible, close liaison should beestablished with local U.S. and GVN agencies toensure that maximum assistance is given to theserefugees. Planning must include details on themeans of evacuation, medical assistance, tem-porary settlement locations, shelter, food and

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clothing, Planning will serve to reduce the hard-ship and suffering on the part of the refugees,and will minimize their interference with combatoperations. Well-planned and humanely executedevacuation operations will also illustrate thevalue ‘placed by the GVN and U.S. on the welfareof the Vietnamese people.

Refugees offer an important means ofcommunication with the enemy. Many refugeescome from enemy controlled areas and some haverelatives and friends in the enemy camp. Somerefugees may eventually return to insecure areaswhere their villagers are located. If they areknowledgeable of and impressed by the Chieu HoiProgram, they can become effective salesmen.SomeChieuliver

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can persuade relatives to rally under theagreement; others might be willing to de-safe conduct passes and other leaflets to

enemy guerrillas. Armed propaganda teams andformer guerrillas who have rallied to the Govern-ment (Hoi Chanhs ) should be encouraged to workin the refugee camps making speeches, contactingguerrilla relatives, and recording broadcasts.Leaflets and other printed material should bedisseminated in these resettlement camps.

Every possible means of using the refugeesin local psychological operations should be re-viewed, and the people convinced of the value ofthe Chieu Hoi Program.

# # # ii //

5. COUNTY FAIR

Part of the coordinated military and govern-ment program for ferreting out the Viet Congand gaining the trust, confidence and active co-operation of the people of Vietnam is calledCOUNTY FAIR. These operations comprise acombination of military, local government, andpsychological warfare action designed to re-establish government control. County Fair isdesigned to separate the VC from the loyalvillagers while refraining from actions whichalienate the populace. At the same time, opera-tions capitalize on the opportunity to convincethe villagers, through vigorous civic action andpsyops, of the merits of the Government. The roleof local civil and police authorities is stressed,and m i 1i t a r y participation is restricted to

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temporarily isolating the objective and combat-ing enemy military actions if they should develop.The size of the military force involved is limitedto that necessary to conduct searches and cordonthe village. A careful use of this force will preventthe people from openly resenting its presence.The presence of local officials and police denythe Viet Cong the opportunity later to propagandizethat National Forces did not support the operation.The eyident participation by local officials, civil-ian and military, assist in developing governmentleadership down to the hamlet level. Theseofficials become more dedicated to preventinginfiltration and more skilled in those civil andmilitary activities necessary for national unity.

In general, the operation follows a patternonce the hamlet has been selected. Isolation andsearch is the initial military action. A Marineforce is employed for the cordoning operation,while clearing and searching is best accomplishedby local police or civil authorities supported bygovernment security forces. In both planning andexecution, it is necessary to stress to both U.S. andGVN participants the mutual advantages of usingonly. the degree of force required. Interrogation,segregation and the psyops actions involved arebest left to direct participation by the Governmentand civil authorities. Local customs, traditionsand the language all present potential stumblingblocks for direct participation by U.S. forces. Sup-port by U.S. can be in the form of loudspeakerequipment, leaflet printing, taping messages from

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local officials, propaganda films and equipment,medical assistance, tents, and kitchens includingfoods. While each County Fair possesses indi-vidual characteristics, operations are relativelyfrequent and minimum advance warning is com-mon.

The basic logistic support for each County Faircan be reduced to a standard package which canbe maintained for required operations. Such apackage could include:

5242

1215

Fly tentsLister bagsBattery powered hand speakersMalletsMetal stakesPair wire cuttersWooden collapsible tables

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10 Folding stools1 Plywood bulletin board1 Immersion burner1 Trash can (24 gal)1 Water trailer

16 Water cansSufficient rope or engineer tape fordelineating restricted areas

As a result of the search operations, a portion

of the villagers will be dislocated temporarilyand will not have access to their homes. Thoseunable to provide or prepare their own mealswill have to be fed. Remember that villageeconomy is marginal, and if a villager is deniedaccess to his cropland for even a day it meanshis family goes without food. The U.S. forceassigned to support a County Fair can greatlyassist in providing and preparing meals for thesevillagers. Frequently, it will be necessary toprovide and prepare up to 1200 meals per day.Based on that figure, foods can be obtained throughUSAID and civil affairs channels. The followingamounts will support an average of one CountyFair operation per week (1200 meals peY day).

600 lbs - Milled rice100 cans - Assorted foods (vegetables,

meat, etc.)8 cans - Soup base (100 rations)

There is much detailed planning and prepara-tion involved in successful County Fair operations.

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It is important to emphasize this detailed plan-ning and close coordination at all levels to bothU.S. and GVN participants. The measure ofsuccess of each operation lies in this coordina-tion and cooperation.

6.

/#//##//

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN VIETNAM

a. Handling of Noncombatants in the ObjectiveArea

A major problem facing U.S. forces whenengaged with the Viet Cong is the handling ofnoncombatants in the objective area. The VC usepopulated areas as hiding places and as areasto regroup their forces after contact has beenmade with the enemy. Firing on aircraft andground forces from the villages is a favoritetactic of the Viet Cong. When the fire is returnedby friendly air the probability of noncombatantsbeing killed or wounded runs high, especially whenno attempt is made to control the movement ofthe people. Should noncombatants be injured insuch a situation, the VC exploit it by saying theAmericans are indiscriminately killing and maim-ing innocent people.

Recently, an American infantry divisionwas conducting sweep operations in Vietnam withthe objective of clearing Xom La Ran, a VChamlet, and the wooded area adjacent to the hamlet.

447

Planning for the operation included the require-ment to separate combatants from noncombatantsin the hamlet.

After receiving a thorough briefing on thetactical operation, personnel of a Psyops Com-pany, supporting the divisionj designed and pro-duced two warning leaflets and a number ofloudspeaker tapes in support of the operation. Thetapes were recorded by the ARVN District Chiefof Tan Uyen District. These messages warnedthe people of the impending attack and advisedthem to remain calm and await instructions onwhat to do and where to go to avoid the engage-ment.

As the operation progressed, friendly ele-ments swept the wooded area adjacent to Xom LaRan. Prior to the ground force advancing on thehamlet, loudspeaker and leaflet missions wereflown over the hamlet advising the people to re-main calm and instructing them to assemble atthe school house and await further instructionsfrom the district chief. Some 20,000 leafletswere dropped in the hamlet and in the immediatevicinity.

:,

As the sweeping elements were securingthe area, the district chief entered the hamlet andwent directly to the schoolhouse to meet with thepeople. He separated the men and women into twogroups. All the men between the ages of 16 and30 were checked for identification and draft cards.Seven suspected draft dodgers were found amongthe group and taken into custody.

448

The district chief then spoke to both groupsexplaining that the Americans were in theirhamlet to secure it from the VC and that theultimate goal of the Americans in Vietnam wasto bring a lasting peace to the country, Throughouthis talk the people remained apathetic. Althoughmany persons clutched one of the leaflets whichhad been dropped earlier, the impression gainedwas that the villagers believed as long as theyheld on to the leaflet they would not be harmed bythe Americans.

While the district chief was talking to thepeople, two 2~-ton trucks, loaded with approxi-mately 10 tons of rice taken from a nearby VCcache, passed by the schoolhouse. The districtchief immediately took advantage of the situationexplaining to the people that the rice loaded onthe trucks was their rice; that the Governmentwas going to redistribute it; and, the VC wereexploiting them by taking the rice away from them.He pointed out that the Government was workinghard to put a stop to VC rice requisitions. Healso pointed out that without the support of thepeople, the VC would no longer be able to wagewar, causing innocent people to be killed.

A question and answer period was held inwhich the villagers complained about the slowbureaucratic process of the Government. Thedistrict chief fielded the questions admirablyand seemed pleased with the results of the ses-sion. The villagers expressed interest in what

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could bc done to rid the area of t+c VC and werewitnessing the first steps at doing that very thing.

The most significant aspect of this opera-tion was the success achieved by the closecoordination between the psyop element and thecomment clement of the unit conducting the sweepthrough the hamlet. In this case both elementswere coordinated by the battalion S-3 whichresulted in excellent timing of psyops missionswith the tactical maneuvers. The end result wasthat not a shot was fired during the sweep of thehamlet and the villagers were unclel control atall times. Experience has shown that in similarsituations where psyop was not employed thevillagers will panic in the face of advancingtroops resulting in unnecessary casualties amongnoncombatants.

Through the effective use of face-to-facetcchniclues, the district chief was able to convincethe people that the Government with the help ofits allies was in a position to free the peoplefrom the demands of the VC and to take positivesteps toward improving the conditions under whichthe people live.

This operation is a goocl example of usingpsyops to minimize noncombatant casualties.The target was the peasant who had lived underVC control; had been filled with suspicion, fearan(l doubt toward the GVN ancl the Americans;and who could, if uncontrolled, end up as aninadvertent combat victim. The objectives were

450

to solicit their cooperation, to control theirmovements during the operation and to minimizethe chance of innocent people being injured orkilled. The results; no one was injured and thefirst steps were taken to remove the suspicions,doubts and fears of the peasants. This is thekind of integrated psychological and combatoperation that will ultimately win the battle formen’s minds in Vietnam. Without psyops, a

successful sweep could have left the people withsuch hate and misery that any military successwould have been negated.

b. Psychological Support of Tactical Opera-

tions

The 244th Psychological Operations Com-

pany (USA ) has been providing support to 111MAF in the psyops field. This support consists of

451

combat speaker teams, audiovisual teams, liaisonteams, leaflets, tape recordings, and Joint U.S,Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) newspapers.Psyops support of tactical operations has in-creased with the recent Marine augmentation ofthe psyop company and, as additional enemyvulncrabilities have been discovered, intensivepsyop support of tactical operations has resultedin a sharp increase in returnees. The followingexample demonstrates the effective use of psyopson the battlefield.

Early on the morning of 11 November 1966,an Army psychological warfare team was airliftedfrom its C P to an LZ close to the point where abattalion was engaged in a fire fight. Thepsywar team moved to the forward positions andplaced speakers in a nearby tree. The latestenemy intelligence was obtained and molded intoan appeal to fit the existing situation by deliber-ately capitalizing on the enemy’s weak positionand low morale. After approximately 20 minutes,the first NVA soldier walked directly to thespeakers, following instructions explicitly, andsurrendered with his weapon. After th,e prisonerwas fed, the psychological warfare team convincedhim that the Government of Vietnam and itsAmerican allies did not want to harm him, andthat his comrades’ senseless struggle could onlyend in death. An appeal was devised with theconcurrence of the prisoner to urge his fellowsoldiers to surrender. Current intelligence wasacquired from the prisoner and used to make the

452

basic appeal more personalized and meaningful.

Shortly thereafter, fivemore NVAsoldierswalkedin. At this time, it was learned that the executiveofficer of the opposing enemy battalion waskilled. This information was immediately in-corporated into the appeals and more soldierschose ltto rally to the GVN with honor than tocontinue to fight and be killed and buried in anunknown grave. ” Approximately 1 hour later, theAmerican battalion commander directed the teamto move to his vantage point, a tall tree locatedon the crest of the hill, and continue the mission.From this location appeals were broadcasted andseveral more NVA soldiers surrendered.

It was during these broadcasts that anintense fire fight broke out in one company area.The psychological warfare team was immediatelydisplaced forward to this position, the speakerswere set up during the first lull in the fire fightand broadcasting was begun “face-to-face” withthe enemy. The team emphasize! that the “soldiersof the Screaming Eagle were everywhere, thatthe NVA cause was lost and that death was soon tobe their only honor. ” Greater impact was gainedby using a wounded NVA soldier lying nearby.Five more “hard core” soldiers chose life ratherthan death.

By 1800, the enemy’s position had beenoverrun, and the psywar team returned to bat-talion CP. During the day’s action eighteen pris-oners were used in live broadcasts, four specialpersonalized appeals were made and a total of 9

453

hours of speaker time was recorded. Theseappeals were modified as fresh intelligence andchanging battle conditions dictated.

It should be pointed out that it is mostlikely that the results achieved would not havebeen possible had it not been for the constantpressure placed cm the surrounded enemy by theAmerican infantry. In this case, psychologicalwarfare had the unique advantage of being in theright place, at. the right time, with the right ap-peals. The enemy was under great pressure fromthe infantry, and psychological warfare offeredan “honorable” way out. The choice was theirs ---life or death.

Many critical lessons were learned whichstress the fact that psychological warfare is mosteffectively utilized on the ground in direct supportof the ground troops. Briefly they are:

In jungle terrain, the enemy often findsit easy to detach himself from air appeals sincethe aircraft is often hidden from view by the thickfoliage and the message is sometimes garbled byaircraft and atmospheric conditions., However,when made on the ground, the appeal is’direct andpersonal and is not distorted by the jungle canopy.The sound appears to reverberate off the groundand the jungle canopy achieving a surprisingrange.

On the ground the appeal can be instantlymolded to fit everchanging battle conditions, andit can employ spontaneous prisoner appeals.

454

A loudspeaker appeal on the groundduring lulls in intense fire fights helps to stressthe magnitude of American technology and has adefinite demoralizing effect on the enemy.

It was also noted that although leafletswere on the ground, many were inaccessible dueto thick vegetation. Trails seem to be the mostprofitable target for leaflet dissemination.

During lulls in ground contact, psycho-logical warfare is most effectively employed byusing aircraft for broadcasts and leaflet dis-semination. However, once significant contactwith the enemy is made, the psychological warfareeffort should be on the ground with the units incontact.

A well-planned psychological operationmay include the use of printed leaflets droppedfrom an aircraft. In friendly areas, aircraftleaflet drops can cause local hamlets to becomeunnecessarily littered. This may not be in the bestcivic interest and could cause an adverse reactionto the leaflets.

When possible, leaflets should be passedout by hand during the course of small unitoperations. This serves to reduce the litteringproblem and to permit those passing out the leaf-lets to observe the reaction and overhear thecomments of the villagers.

455

c. Psyops Leaflet and Poster Writing

If the message is to be effective, the wordingin psychological operation leaflets and postersmust be in language that the target audience canunderstand. A verbatim translation of English toVietnamese does not normally result in thephraseology that would commonly be used by theVietnamese. When the message is written first inEnglish and then translated, almost invariably thefact that the material originated in English isevident. As a result, the message does not com-municate WC1l. This can cause the people toattribute portions of the information to Americansources with a resulting failure to believe in thetruth of the information. When preparing psyopsmaterial, the thoughts, ideas, and facts to be pre-sented should be explained to a Vietnamese writerwho can express the information in proper Viet-namese. U the material must originate in English,a Vietnamese writer/translator should study thematerial until he understands the intended meaningbefore writing it in original Vietnamese. When thematerial is intended for use in a newspaper, itshould be wriltcn in the Vietnamese journalisticstyle. A psyops message designed to influencepeople must bc presented in the people’s language.

d. Example of Special Appeals

(1) Soldiers of the 5th Bn, 95th NVA Regi-ment

The GVN and its allies are your friendsand do not want to harm you. We give you a

456

choice--life or death. If you come in now, you willhave life--is it not better to rally now to the GVNwith honor than to continue to fight and be killedand buried in an unknown grave (and have yoursoul wander the earth forever) ? This choice isyours-- life or death. Your family and your lovedones want no harm to come to you. They needyou. The choice is yours. Life or death.

(2) Soldiers of the 5th Bn, 95th NVA Regi-ment

Do you want to be buried in an un-marked grave ? That is the only honor you willhave if you continue your senseless fight. Doyou think that’s right ? The soldiers of the StrikeForce Airborne Division are everywhere. Ap-proach the Americans with your hands above yourhead. Wave something white. Have your weaponmuzzle down and you will not be harmed. Wavesomething white. This is your last chance andonly hope. Life or death--the choice is yours.

(3) Soldiers of the 5th Bn, 95th NVA ReRi-ment

Your life is about to end! Are youready to die? The soldiers with the eagle ontheir shoulders are everywhere. They are nowclosing in. This is your last chance, this is yourlast chance. If you do not come in now, you willbe killed without mercy. Wave something white,have your hands up. Bring your weapon withyou, muzzle down. This is your last chance.“This is your last chance.

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e. Aerial Broadcasts

Experience in Vietnam has shown thataerial broadcasts are one of the more effectivepsychological operations medias. Broadcastscan be rapidly employed to exploit a particularsituation and can be heard over a large area.Messages should be short and repeated con-tinuously to ensure that the intended target au-diencq gets the entire message. Broadcasts con-ducted in the early evening hours have providedthe best results. At that time, wind conditionsarc usualiy suitable for aerial broadcasting andthe Vietnamese family is together.

Family influence has proven to be one ofthe most important factors in influencing enemydefections. When possible, broadcasts should bedirected at particular groups, units, or individ-uals and should mention such target audiencesby name in order to counteract the tendency ofmany Vietnamese to disassociate themselves fromthe broadcasts. Also, broadcasts of tape record-ings made by enemy defectors and the use ofenemy defectors to make live broadcasts haveproven highly effective. The use of these per-sonnel discredits the enemy’s claim that de-fectors are killed and helps to instill confidencein the GVN Chieu Hoi Program.

f. Use of the Vietnamese National Flag inPropaganda

The Vietnamese feel that excessive repro-duction of the National flag or any indiscriminate

458

VILTNAWiSE CWESNflENT SAFE-CONDUCT PASS

● D&l ng~ ttidng xdng

(?

. . ,....1

-, 1;

., ‘~’\ ..... ,:- %-+ ~ 9-. .

(Back)

use of the flag in propaganda is distasteful anddisrespectful. Use of the national flag should belimited to propaganda of significant national im-portance. Safe conduct passes are an example ofitems that are of national significance. The Viet-namese flag or reproductions of the flag should be

459

used with cxtrcmc care and discrimination andonly after consultation with Vietnamese officials.

#####

7. POPULATION AND RESOURCES CONTROL

The objective of a population and resourcescontrol program is to deprive the VC of the sup-port of the population and the material resourcesneede~ to engage in continuous warfare. The ex-tensive effort of the GVN to win over the populationhas resulted in the following procedures beingestablished for population and resources control:

a. Population Control

The Vietnamese have been using individualidentification cards since 1939. Today, all personsover the age of 18 must be in possession of an IDcard. The present card is laminated and containsa photograph and prints of the left and right indexfinger of the bearer.

Curfews are imposed only as necessaryand primarily in areas where the VC or:VC sup-porters are active. Any person having a legitimateneed to be outside his area during curfew hoursmust be issued a special curfew pass. Curfewviolators are assumed to be insurgents or sup-porters until proven otherwise.

Travel permits in most areas are requiredfor any travel outside an individual’s village orarea. These permits may be issued to individuals

460

or groups, either on a one-time basis or amultiple-day basis, usually not to exceed 90 days.

b. Enforcement

To enforce the controls imposed on thepopulation, a system of checkpoints is establishedon roads and highways, railroads and bus termi-nals and airlines. Along the 2,500 miles of water-ways in the delta region, rivercraft and assaultboats provide control. Mobile checkpoints, bothland and water, are established on an irregularbasis to apprehend personnel attempting to avoidor bypass fixed checkpoints.

Civil police are suited, by training and ex-perience, to conduct this type of operation. Theirnormal police operation, in their own specificarea, provides them with a familiarity of thearea, and its people. Police may require supportfrom the military when insurgents or sym-pathizers are actively belligerent, but generally,the military is called in for support only in caseswhere superiority in manpower and armament isrequired for effective enforcement.

U.S. forces do not have authority or juris-diction over Vietnamese nationals. On joint op-erations, U.S. military police check only U,S.vehicles and personnel while civil police checkVietnamese vehicles and personnel.

c. Resources Control

It is imperative that the populace be con-trolled if basic resources are to be denied the VC.

461

Resources required by the VC to continue opera-tions are the same as those required by insur-gents everywhere. Critical items are:

Food. This includes anything fit forhuman consumption. Most of the food obtained bythe VC is procured locally, either by “taxation”

462

of the local population or from sympathizers andsupporters, or in some cases, is grown by the VCin remote areas.

Medicines and medical supplies.

Arms, ammunition and explosives.

Clothing and textile materials.

Money.

Transportation of all types.

Various control procedures have been es-tablished to deny the VC access to the resourceshe needs. Among these are inventories of materialmanufactured and shipped from processors andimporters, ancl maintenance of formal records ofthe amounts of material being shipped and thedestination. Upon arrival at the final destination,the goods are inventoried again to ensure thatdlere has been no loss or pilferage.

Foodstuffs and clothing are rationed toprevent delivery of these items to the VC by localsupporters. Police also guard supply depots andstorage areas where such items are stored.

463

The lnost cffcctivc method of resourcecontrol employed by the civil police is the searchof land and water vehicles. Critical items requiredby the VC are hidden by sympathizers and sup-porters in every imaginable place in an attemptto pass inspection at checkpoints. Thorough in-spections by land and river police are a tediousand painstaking process but are necessary if theresources control operation is co succeed.

#####

464

Chapter IX: MEDICAL

1. PREVENTION, NOT TREATMENT

The following comment is taken from a combatoperation after action report:

“It was apparent that many of the medicalproblems encountered could have been preventedby more aggressive instruction of the individualMarine by corpsmen and Marine staff NCO ‘s, Footinspections, supervision of water purification,and stressing of individual hygiene responsibil-ities could have prevented a high percentage ofcasualties on this opera tion. ”

Prevention, not treatment, is the objective.Casualties due to carelessness in personal hy-giene have just as great an impact on a unit’seffectiveness as those caused by enemy action.Ensure that all possible health-saving mea-sures are employed at all times. Instruct, im-plement, inspect and supervise.

#//{###

465

2. ACCLIMA’rING MARINES TO HOT-WETCI.IMATE

During and shortly after World War II, Amer.ican and British Armed Forces were confrontedwith the pro blelm of acclinlatizing troops forservice in llOL-dry c]imates such as North

At’rica, Kuwait, and Adcn. As a result, ,a largebody of information was accumulated dealingwith the problems encountered under such en-vironrncnral conditions. More recently, however,the scene of the action has shifted to hot-wetclimates, such as Vietnam. Experience has shownthat adaptation to hot-dry conditions is similarbut not identical to that for hot-wet conditions,and that data collected under the first situation

466

are not neccssa.riiy applicahlc to the second. Ina hot-dry climate the evaporation of sweat pro-vides a cooling mechanism which assists the bodyin keeping its temperature stable; in a hot-wetclimate ‘the air may be so humid that the sweatdoes not evaporate and the body temperaturecontinues to rise.

In spite of this difference, acclimatization toa hot-dry environment increases the ability ofmen to work well under hot-wet conditions, andvice versa, suggesting that certain underlyingmechanisms are common to both conditions.Among them are the following:

+ Merely resting in the heat develops onlya limited degree of acclimatization; full accli-matization can be achieved only by working inthe heat.

+ Men in good physical condition generallyacclimatize to heat faster than do men in poorcondition, but excellent physical condition doesnot confer automatic acclimatization.

+ The acclimatized individual is cl]arac-terized by a markedly increased sweat rate, adecreased heart rate, and lower body temperatureon exposure to heat stress as compared with theunacclimatized man.

+ The increased sweating capacity is a re-sult of sweat gland conditioning and is not de-pendent on elevated body temperature.

Many of these same adjustments appear to betypical of the trained atlllcte. l{cg:lrdlcss of tllcoutside temperature, his strenuous workouts insweat suits or other heavy clothing surround himwith a hot-humid microclimate, His body becomesaccustomed to repeated elevations of body tem-perature and stimulations of his sweating mech-anism. As he becomes well conditioned, there isa lower production of heat relative to his bodysurface area; more effective cardiovascular func-tioning, resulting in improved heat dissipation;and a greater sensitivity of his sweating re-sponse, resulting in more effective cooling. As aresult of these bodily adjustments, the trainedathlete demonstrates a greater ability to with-statld heat stress than do nonathletcs.

British scientists have conducted a long seriesof ingenious experiments in attempting to artifi-cially acclimatize men by having them exercisein heat chambers before sending them to hotclimates. The results were reasonably good andthey concluded that his general technique “isprobably the most practical for large-scale usein the Army. ” Such techniques do not appear tobe of great potential value to the U. S.’ MarineCorps. In event of an emergency, the Marinesare required to respond immediately. It is highlyunlikely that they would ever have time for con-ditioning in heat chambers, even if chambers suf-ficiently large for the purpose were available.

A more promising approach may be found inthe fact that a Marine infantrynlan is regularly

468

exposed to vigorous physical training. By use ofn field jacket, poncho, or other garment duringthis training, he could surround himself with apersonal hot-humid climate, just as does theathlete, and thereby achieve a degree of heat ac-climatization. This could be done ashore orafloat, as it requires neither special equipmentnor special training areas.

Commanders in Vietnam have commentedthat it takes about a month for newcomers tobecome acclimatized to that area, and that someunits have had difficulty in combat becauseof numerous cases of heat prostration. Obviously,a practical systcm of acclimatizing Marines toheat before their arrival would be of greatpotential value. To determine whether the methodsuggested above was of any measurable value,the Naval Medical Field Research Laboratoryundertook a practical experiment with a militarypolice battalion in the spring of 1966.

Two companies, Alfa and Bravo, were assignedto participate in this investigation. The MP’shad been formed at Camp Pendleton, California,in the early spring and had been training in themoderately cool weather characteristic of thearea at that time of the year. In the opinion ofthe two commanding officers, both companieswere in above-average condition, with Bravocompany perhaps a bit more accustomed to hardwork. In order to eliminate any possibility thatthis might bias the results, Alfa company was

469

designated the experimental unit and Bravo com-pany the control group.

l%e battalion ernbarkccl in the USNSUPS1lURatSan f)icgo, (California, on 7 May 1966. Bravo corn-pany was asked [-o establish its exercise programas if no slLidy were being undertaken, with the pro-vision that it should last for 45 minutes, shouldtake place on deck, and the men should be lightlyclothed, weather permitting. Short rest pauseswere scheduled at frequent intervals so that themcn would be engaged in vigorous activity but,so far as possibl.c, without stimulating the sweatglands into activity. Alfa com]jany was permittedto usc a vacant hold in the afterpart of the ship.‘i’hc ventilating equipment was shut off andhatches and doors were kept closed during theexercise period in order to raise the internaltemperature as much as possible. Under theseconditions the mcn could not tolerate an exerciseprogram as vigorous as tl~at used by the mcn ondeck. It was found necessary LO start thcm at asomewhat lower level of exertion and to continueexercsing for only 30 minutes if a number of sub-jects were not to become incapacitate by nauseaand dizziness. This effect was probably augmentedby the ncjrrnal movement of a VCXSC1at sea. Ac-cordingly, it was ncccssary Ior 13ravo companyto reduce its work stress and time to agree withthat of Alfa. As the latter becarnc able to toleratelonger and more vigorous activity, the stress onboth companies was increased simultaneously.Within a fcw days both were exercising vigorouslyfor 45 minutes.

470

Alfa company wore sweat shirts and sweatpants. Ilalf of them exercised 8 to 10 minutes.They then sat down and removed their sweat shirtsto permit their bodies to cool while the otherhalf of the company exercised. This afforded anopportunity for repeated stimulation of the sweatglands, rather than bringing them to the point ofsweating and keeping them there. There is someevidence that after a long period of perspiring,sweat gland fatigue results. On the basis of thisanalogy, it was reasoned that the most effectiveway to improve the functional performance of thesweat glands might be use of methods similar tothose which weight trainers employ to improvethe functional performance of muscles; that is,periods of vigorous activity separated by restpauses.

On 30 “May 1966 the ship arrived at Danangand on the following clay the men made a jointforced march. .l”hc two companies walked in file,onc on each side of the road in urdcr to providecomparable conditions of terrain, breeze, sun-shine, etc. The surface was graded dirt and rea-sonably smooth, but with occasional grades andheavy dust. There were no trees or other shadeanywhere along the route. Atmospheric temper-atures were recorded at intervals by means of asling psychrometer. Extra water was carried andmade available at the rest stops; there were no”restrictions on tl]e amount consumed. Salt tabletswere available and were issued prior to the startof the march. During the march, the troops

471

carried arms, cartridge belts with two canteens,and light marching packs, and wore helmets andutilities.

Heat casualties in Alfa company amounted to7.5 percent, while those in Bravo companyreached 25.3 percent. Statistically, there is lessthan onc chance in a hundred that a difference ofthis magnitude could be due to chance.

The results strongly support the theory thatmen designated for duty in a hot-humid climatecan bc preacclimatized by the use of clothingand exercise programs which enable each manto create his own hot-wet climate for about anhour a day. It must be appreciated that menengaged in such a training program can sufferheat trauma. Troops engaged in such condition-ing programs should be under the close obser-vation of a medical officer or an experiencedphysical fitness instructor.

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3. HEAT CASUALTIES

Most Marines are familiar with the effects ofstrenuous physical activity under conditions ofhigh temperature and humidity. Three kinds ofheat injuries can result; cramps, exhaustion(prostration), and heat (sun) stroke. Severalfactors influence the susceptibility of individualsto heat injury. The person who is overweight isparticularly susceptible. The length of exposureand the degree of physical activity play impor.tant parts. Acclimatization time varies with eachindividual, but 1 month is the accepted period tobecome adequately acclimatized.

473

SummarMcd below are the prinei]ml symptoms,prcvcntivc measures, and treatment for heatinjuries:

PatientnotIces

othersnotice

!,1<.V*.,,1$!]t ly

,TIL.atmt.nt

w~

Mildto Severepain .

1. Spawns, rigid-ity of muscles.2. Normal temp.

I. :;.,11 or :;:,11I ,,1,1,.1!; ,,,1,1!.1Lo Wi,t<:t .

1. (;LV,S saltedwaLcr and/or:;a]tIal,l<.ts.2. M,-IS.;.,(Wmu:x-1 t.:. .

E20LAUST ION

Exhaust ion,faintness.

1. Pro fu:,csweat ing.2. Normal t.mpor slightlyelevated.3. Unconscious-ness on rareoccasions.

1. 1,4.:::; ,. X,.,

11*11,0,, 1“>1d:, y!, .2. U:*V or ::tua d-,,:,11t nnd w:,t.,0.

Feelinq.of extraneheat, weakness, no!:wcalinq, confusion,posslMC unc.3l1-sclousncns.

1. not, dry skin .2. Elevated tanpf102’3-11XV.3. Flushed skin;strong. rapid pulse.If akin becomespale and grey withweak pulse, criticalcondition exists.4. Possible uncon-scica”sncssandConvulSions.

]. Avoid I V,*Dnvcr-,.”0, I In” m, Ilt-11 (3, ”!,.2. U: It! 01 ::lmlk,m 11 fmd wal w.

1. Rest on I,aek 1. Ideally. sub-in shade. mcrqe patient in2. Loosen cln(hinq cool water to3. <hoi w<tlcr lower body tcinpto‘xx,,,>,0,,s.-!:I0 100Q: when t cm,) isf >.:4?. normal (chock t.vel y4. salt 1.ll>l(.(c, 10mlns) start sallnc

:;olut. inn hy vcln. or2.. Flap alcoholml St?-11.4nl,vl-tR Ovt’tn.tkcwlImnly.

###ii Af

474

‘,

4. MEDICAL PRC)13LEMS IN T1lE MONSOONSEASON

IJast Cxpcrlcnccs have slmwn that certainmedical problems are presented by the monsoonseason. Items deserving special consideration are:

+ Immersion Foot, Considerable research hasbeen directed toward the use of a silicone footprotective ointment as a preventive for immersion --foot. To date, the results have been promising.The cooperation of all hands in using the footprotective ointment, as directed by competent

authority, and complying with other instructionsrelated to foot care will result in healthier feetand fewer casualties due to immersion foot.

475

+ Care of Nlcdical Gear in Small Units. One.—of the major problems encountered during themonsoon season is keeping medical gear dry.The extent to which we may control this situationvaries directly in proportion to the dry housingarea available. The proper care of medical gearduring the wet season entails medical personnelusing their own ingenuity in planning and schedul-ing routine work, in devising protective coversfor the various medical items, and paying specialattention to see that all protective covers areused properly. In addition, it should be re-membered that one must always take advantageof a dry period, however short, in which to airand dry out medical gear to the extent possible.

+ Evacuation of Patients. J)uring bad weather,additional precautions will be required to ensurepatient safety and comfort. In a combat environ-ment, limitations are necessarily imposed bythe tactical situation. However, proper planningfor evacuation of patients can ensure that thepatient is moved in reasonable comfort, regard-less of the weather. Such things as adequateclothing, properly prepared litters, and a trans-portation schedule to preclude undue waiting inan uncovered area will help eliminate manyproblems.

#il ###

476

477

5. TI1°S FROM THE CORPSMEN

Patients SI1OUMbc loaded on helicopters headfirst and not feet first. Occasionally, in haste orunder fire, stretchers are dropped. This canresult in further injuries to the already woundedMarine. Loading the patient head first,will tendto minimize any injury to the patient caused bydropping the stretcher. Stretcher bearers should,if possible, stand by until an evacuation helicopterarrives so they can be of assistance in loadingthe patient aboard. There have been instances inwhich one corpsman was left alone to load litter

478

patients into a helicopter. This requires a crew-mcmher to leave his position aboard the heli-copter and assist in loading the patient.

/#####

6. NIGHT MEDICAL EVACUATION

Medical evacuation during the hours of dark-ness can be very difficult and hazardous. Ade-quate landing zones are extremely scarce. Land-ing zones are frecluently masked by either hillyterrain or jungle canopy, making identificationand approaches extremely difficult and time con-suming.

13ach patrol or unit operating independentlyshould carry a minimum of five flashlights andthree hand illumination grenades. The flashlightsshould be placed at the perimeter of the LZ toform a square. ‘L’he hand illumination should beused to orient the’ helo pilot and silhouette thesurrounding terrain and canopy. Hand illumina-tion grenades should not be used when the air-craft is within 300 meters of the LZ unlessspecifically recluestcd by the pilot. The otherflashlight should be used to identify the location,of personnel adjacent to or on the LZ. To be mosteffective, the perimeter marking lights should bevertical. This can easily be accomplished bytying the marking lights to the handle of a K-bar/bayonet and driving the blade into the ground.

479

7. MALARIA 1’REVENTIVE ‘~l{EATMEN’I’

Modern science has dcvcloImd varluus medi-cations to help prevent malaria. The one whichmost Marines are familiar with is the Chloro-quine-Prinlaquine tablet. On occasion, some per-sons may experience a case of upset stomachdue to the side effects from this tablet. If thisshould happen, the unit medical officer can de-termine the cause and a substitute preventivemedicine may be prescribed.

By all means, if you are supposed to takethese pills periodically, don’t neglect it. An upsetstomach and a trip to the local dispensary for asubstitute medicine is far better than the seriouseffects of malaria.

80 I_J{EC1l D[’1’llS

There are times and circumstances whenMarines in the field cannot stop to have leechesremoved by corpsmen. Several hasty removalmethods can be used:

+ A lighted cigarcttc appliml to the lbcc.1] willcause it to release.

+ Salt from a C-ration packet sprinkled onthe leech near its attac!~ment to the skin willcause its release.

+ Spraying insect repellant on the leech isthe most successful method.

#####

480

9. PLASMA EXPANDER

Reports frotn infantry battalion medical of-ficers cite the value of Dextran as a plasma ex-pander in the treatment of battle injuries. Dextranexpands the blood volume three times and thesolution has an osmotic effect. Plastic cathetershave advantages not realized by the use ofstraight needles. They are self-contained andeasy to use with a minimum of instruction.Dextran and threadable plastic catheter intracathsshould be part of the unit’s medical supplies:Two bottles of Dextran, plus the regular amountof serum albumin and an assortment of largeand medium intracaths, should be carried by thebattalion aid station for use in treating battleinjuries.

/# # // // #

10. FIELD AMBULANCE SUI’PORT

The casualty evacuation system in Vietnamis being supplemented in some Marine units bythe use of M-43 Field Ambulances. Assigning thisvchiclc to a regimental aid station on a tem-porary basis greatly assists in evacuating menwho have minor wounds or who are ill and re-quire treatment. The unit’s organic jeep ambu-lance is then used for local emergencies, andthe medical evacuation helicopters can concen-trate on emergency missions. Field ambulanceshave also been used effectively in resupply convoy

481

operations to carry persons who are incapacitatedbut may not require emergency evacuation.

11. MOBILE MEDCAP

A new concept, termed h~obile MEl)CAP, isbeing used to provide meclical treatment to Viet-namese villages. ‘f’raveling medical teams visitthe villages within their area to provide treat-ment. The most notable feature of the MobileM13DCAP is the specially configured and ecluippedvehicle trailer. The concept makes limited medi-cal facilities and treatment available to thosewho are unable to travel to a fixed location;enables a medical team to be seen throughout awider area while engaged in humanitarian as wellas military missions; and increases the aware-ness of villagers to the presence of medical as-sistance.

Some villagers who live within 500 metersof the regular MEDCAP and did not know of itsexistence, are now being treated by the mobileunit. Other villagers who had been bedridden arenow receiving attention. In one area, the hostileattitude of the people toward the h4arines notablyimproved when the Mobile MEDCAP effortsshowed the villagers that the Marines and medicalpersonnel were genuinely interested in their wel-fare.

It // // if //

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12. INTRAVENOUS-INJECTION SUPPLY CHEST

81mnl mortar boxes are ideal for use asportable containers for the resupply of intrave-nous solutions. With minor modifications theseboxes can be used to carry four intravenous-solution bottles, four intravenous-injection sets,two cans of human-serum albumin and needlesor accessories. These boxes, which are readilyavailable, are particularly useful when sturdycontainers are needed.

13. 130RTADI.13 STAND FOR INTRAVENOUSSOLUTIONS

Portable stands to hold bottles while admin-istering intravenous solutions can be easily con-structed from the end sections and metal rod ofa 105mm howitzer box. The end section with therod still inserted is utilized by nailing a shortpiece of lumber crosswise to keep the rod fromfalling out. TMs also acts to steady the standand prevent it from collapsing. A piece of heavywire is bent over the top of the rod and taped.The free end of the wire is then bent to form adurable hook from which the solution bottles canbe suspended.

All materials used are readily available inthe field, and the stands may be utilized in thesickbay, operating room, or while patients areawaiting transportation for further treatment.

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14. POISONOUS SNAKES OF VIETNAM

“Yes, those green bamboo snakes are theworst, ” says the oldtimer to the newly arrivedMarine. “The natives call them the ‘five-stepsnake,’ you know. That’s because you only livelong enough to take five steps after it bites you:”

This kind of information (or misinformation)is common in Vietnam these days, and unfortu-nately much of it is believed.

The “oldtimcr” relating the tale probably!Ias been in the country for less than 2 monthshimself; and, most likely, he has yet to see hisfirst snake of any kind. Snakes arc not highlyvisible in any tropical country. Yet, lurid talesare the usual cover for ignorance and, so far,there is still no “Field Guide to the Snakes ofVietnam” available at the local bookstore or PostExchange.

It is still a considerable struggle to try todetermine what snakes are found in Vietnam, andtheir geographic distribution within the countryis almost unknown. A list of the land snakes thathas been compiled from various sources totals115 species-- about the same number as arefound in the United States. Seventeen are venomousand some of these are extremely dangerous. Be-sides the land snakes there are 15 or more kindsof sea snakes that are found in the South ChinaSea and the Gulf of Tonkin just offshore, and allof these have highly toxic venom. A list of morethan 30 venomous snakes for an area as small as

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Vietnam is rather impressive and it is difficultin the face of this to convince a newly arrivedMarine that he is not in imminent danger ofbecoming a snakebite casualty. Yet death fromsnakeb’it is a rare occurrence in Vietnam. Howcan this be?

a. Seasonal Occurrence

For one thing, snakes are not equallyabundant in all seasons. If the situaton in neigh-boring Thailand (which is better known) can betaken as a guide, you can expect the snakes inthe Saigon region to disappear underground duringthe “summer” months of March to May and tobe rare during the dry season, “winter” monthsof December to February. The young snakes areborn or hatched in February and may make abrief appearance before the beginning of the hotsummer.

Snakes would be expected to appear in somenumbers with the onset of the rainy season inJune and would build up in numbers during theseason to give a maximum snakebit danger inSeptember or October. They become less active,and thus less a menace, at the end of the rainyseason in November.

The seasons are not all in identical monthsin the various regions of Vietnam, but the cor-relations of snake abundance with season wouldbe expected to hold throughout. Thus for about halfthe year the danger of snakebite is minimal.

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b. The Geographic Base

Vietnam is often thought of as a smallcountry. This is true when compared with therest of Asia, and it is relatively small in area.However, it is as far from the southern tip ofVietnam to the Chinese border as it is from KeyWest to New York. It is a long and mountainouscountry and, except for the huge Mekong and RedRiver deltas near Saigon and Hanoi, it has a verynarrow coastal plain. Most of the countryside ismade up of high mountains (many over 8,000 feet),upland plateaus and narrow river valleys.

Due to its elongated shape and the natureof the terrain, few kinds of snakes are foundthroughout the country. Just as in the UnitedStates, a species is likely to be restricted tothe north or to the south, to the uplands or tothe lowlands. The change in reptile fauna, dueto the number of species invo]vcd, is much moreimpressive than the differences that occur alongthe eastern seaboard of the United States.

c. The Problem of Identification

The countries of Southeast Asia have agreater variety of snakes than any region inthe world, and many of them appear strange,even bizarre, to the eyes of an American.There are tree snakes with projecting snouts,water snakes with flaplike “tentacles” on theirnoses, sea snakes with a flat, oarlike tail, andof course cobras with a hood. The whole idea of

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snakes (some of them venomous) living in treesis foreign; the cold winters discourage such habitsin temperate regions. And how about that 15-footsnake in the path? Is it a python (nonvenomous)or king cobra?

None of the venomous snakes of Vietnamwears the “rattle” that characterizes 14 of the19 venomous snakes in the United States. Abouthalf of the venomous land snakes are pit vipers,with the broad, distinct head, “cat-eyes” and deeppit in the side of the face that characterize these”snakes. However, many of the nonvenomous snakeshave some of the same features. Pythons, forexample, have eyes with elliptical pupils and thereappear to be whole groups of harmless snakesthat “mimic” the venomous species--some lookinglike cobras (even like king cobras) and otherslike vipers. The identification of such snakes maybe puzzling even to the expert.

Furthermore, the cobras, kraits, andAsian coral snakes which make up the other halfof the venomous snake fauna have no suchdistinctive features. They possess relatively in-distinct, narrow heads, round-pupilled eyes, andhave i~othhg like a loreal pit. As distinctivelooking a snake as a cobra looks pretty muchlike any other snake when it is minding its ownbusiness; the hood is spread only if the cobrais threatened or thinks it is.

Fortunately, it is not necessary to dis-tinguish all the venomous snakes from all the

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nonvenomous kinds. There are relatively fewvenomous kinds in any one region and they areeasy to distinguish as individual species.

d. T!~e Southern Vipers

There are only three kinds of vipersknown in South Vietnam and none of these areparticularly dangerous.

(1) White-Lipped Bamboo Viper

In the Mekong River Delta regionaround Saigon and along the narrow coastal plainto the norlh, the most coiIIinonly cncountcrmlvenomous snake is the white-lipped bamboo viper,the “green bamboo snake” of the “oldtimer’s”tale. This small pit viper (adults average about2 feet) is active mainly at night, when it crawlsabout on the ground and in the trees in search ofthe lizards and mice that make up its diet. Dur-ing the day it remains coiled about smnc low-hanging branch or bush, from which it is reluctantto be dislodged. Rather than retreating in theface of disturbance, it is likely to stay put andto strike out at an aggressor--even if the “ag-gressor” is just some Vietnamese or M’arine whois trying to make his way through the thickbrush.

This sedentary but militantly defen-

sive habit has made the green bamboo vipers themain source of snakebite accidents in such well-studied areas as Hong Kong and Taiwan (Formosa).Fortunately, their venom is but weakly toxic toman and bites by these snakes seldo]n’ result in

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more than a sore and swollen area at the site ofthe bite. Death from the bite of green bambooviper is, in contrast to the “old-timer’s” story,almost unknown.

(2) Malayan Pit Viper

A somewhat more dangerous snake thatinhabits the same southern lowlands is theMalayan pit viper. It apparently does not range asfar north as Hanoi. It is a gound-dwelling snakesomewhat like the American copperhead in habits.

With its irregularly patterned, brownc.oloralion, it is difficult to sce on the forestfloor, and the Malayan pit viper is the mainsource of snakebite accidents in Malaya. Likethe bites of the bamboo vipers, that of theMalayan pit viper is seldom fatal. However, itmay result in the destruction of considerabletissue in the affected area and sometimes causesserious damage to other parts of the body.

(3) Mountain Viper

The white-lipped bamboo viper and theMalayan pit viper are absent from the AnnamMountain Range that makes up the westernborder of central Vietnam. Their place is takenby the dark, brown-blotched mountain viper. Thisis another of the militantly defensive vipers. It islikely to stand its ground and strike out ratherthan retreat. Fortunately, it is a relatively smallsnake, which averages less than 2 feet in length,

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and its Mlc M pninful ralhc’r IllmI lethal. It ap-parently does not bite enough people to proviclca statis~ical record of the effect of the bite.

All three of the pit vipers that occur inthe south are small and relatively innocuous.The vipers of North Vietnam are another story.13esides tl]ose of the south, there are severallarger and more dangerous vipers in the regionnorth of Hanoi.

e. Northern ViDers

There is a rare horned tree viper thatis known from the Fan Si Pan Mountains nearthe Chinese border and from nowhere else.Another very rare viper, Feats viper, is known

only from a few mountain localities in north-eastern Vietnam and adjacent China.

(1) Sharp-Nosed Pit. Viper

There, however, are some dangerousvipers that range over the northern and easternborders into Vietnam. Undoubtedly the mostdangcruus is the sharp-nosed pi[ viper, anotherrelative of lllC copperhead and cottonmouth of theUnited States. It is known as the “five-pacesnake” or dlc “hundred-pace sllakc” in Taiwan,and it much more nearly deserves the name thandoes the relatively innocuous bamboo viper. Thesharp-nosed pit viper attains a length of about 5feet and it has long fangs with which to inject itsample supply of toxic venom. It is considered adangerous snake wherever it occurs.

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(2) Ilal)us

“lhe two other large northern vipersbelong to the same group as the habus of Okinawaand Taiwan. They are large snakes, attaininglengths of nearly 6 feet, and have long fangs.However, their venom does not appear to behighly toxic to man. One, the Chinese habu, isfound through the hills and lowlands of north-eastern North Vietnam. The other, Jerdon’sviper, is found in the high mountain regions ofthe northwest. The Chinese habu is responsiblefor a number of snakebite cases and some deathsin Taiwan and Jerdon’s viper holds a similarrecord in Burma and northern India.

Fortunately, none of these large vipersappear to be common enough to be a major con-cern. The Chinese bamboo viper, which is sosimilar to the white-lipped viper that it takesan expert to distinguish thcm, has also beenreported in the northern highlands. It, like itssouthern relative, is responsible for many bitesbut no adult deaths.

‘l%us, the common vipers appear to of-fer little danger and the dangerous vipers arerestricted to the far north and are relativelyuncommon. This is not true of the other groupof dangerous snakes, the elapids. They arewidely distributed in both North and South Vietnam,and some of the most dangerous kinds have thebroadest distribution.

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f. Elapid Snakes

The elapid snakes of Viclnam are rep-resented by cobras, kraits, coral snakes and seasnakes.

(1) Asian Cobra

The Asian cobra probably provides thegreatest danger of any snake in Vicmam. It is asnake of only moderate size, with an adult lengththat averages less than 5 feet. Yet the venomglands of such an average individual may con-tain sufficient venom to kill three or four men. InVietnam the cobras appear to be restricted tothe heavily populated deltas and coastal plain.

Through the centuries cobras haveadapted to life with dense populations ofmen so that they may be found commonly atthe very edges of villages, or perhaps evenunder a house in the village. Though they arenormally active during the day, in such heavilypopulated regions they tend to emerge at duskto search for mice and rats. The combination ofabundance, proximity to large h... nan populations,and their habit of hunting at dusk make them aprime cause of snakebite throughout Asia andthe major reported cause of serious snakebitecases in Vietnam during the French administra-tion of that country. The three deaths that werereported (all from Asian cobras) for the period1948 FO 1952 makes one wonder how good thereporting systcm was, however.

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Cobras almost always raise their headand spread tic I]ood when disturbed, making themeasy to identify. Also, their short (quarter tohalf-inch) fangs make them less dangerous topeople in western clothing than they are to thebarelegged native population. It is also com-forting to know that the cobra’s strike is notthe short speedy thrust of n viper but a long,sweeping arc from the raised position ,of thehead, forward and down. It is, therefore, a mucheasier strike to avoid than that of the rattle-snake or copperhead. Asian snake charmershave learned to guage the distance and path of acobra’s strike to within fractions of an inch andmanage to remain just outside of effective range.This is not recommended for the amateur.

(2) King Cobra

The most impressive venomous snakein Vietnam, and probably the most impressiveof all dangerous snakes, is the king cobra. At-taining a reported length of more than 18 feet,and with an average adult Icngth of 12 to 14 feet,it has a very large supply of toxic venom--enough,reportedly, to kill an adult elephant. Withoutquestion the king cobra is potentially one of themost dangerous snakes in the world.

It is a snake-eating snake that is notdrawn to the mouse-and-rat-infested towns and itis generally found far from civilization. Nowhereis it common and nowhere does it constitute animportant source of snakel)ite accidents. The“king cobras” pointed out by native guides often

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are harmless Asian rat snakes that also attainlengths in excess of 12 feet. 130th of these snakeshave daylight habits, are brown and Mg. Like

other cobras the king cobra raises its head andspreads a hood when distrubed; perhaps its con-spicuous appearance keeps it from being a seriousthreat. There appear to be no records of asnakebite by this species in Vietnam. IIowever,it should be pointed out that elsewhere few of theking cobra’s victims have survived for more thanhalf an hour.

(3) Kraits

The banded krait is found throughoutVietnam. It grows to a length of more than 6feet and has an exceedingly toxic venom. But it isso sluggish during the day that many nativepeople believe it to be a harmless snake. It isfar from aggressive during its nighttime ac-tivities, too, and would appear to be a danger onlyto persons who step on it or pick it up.

Such cannot be said for the Malayankrait of the southern coastal plain or its closerelative the many-banded krait of ~the north.Although they are active mainly at night and re-latively sluggish during the day, occasional in-dividuals will strike out unexpectedly with littleprovocation. They have short fangs (about one-quarter inch) so that western clothing offersconsiderable protection. I iowever, an effectivebite by either of these kraits is almost invariablyfatal without prompt treatment.

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(4) Asian Coral Snakes

One kind of coral snake or anotheroccurs in every part of Vietnam. There is onespecies in the mountains, another in the southernlowlands and still another in the northern low-lands. These are all brightly colored, slender,semiburrowing snakes that give little indicationof their venomous nature except in their red“warning color. ” They, like their American re-latives, are seldom seen except when they areexposed by removal of the rock or log underwhich they are hiding. They would appear to offerno danger except to persons that pick them up inthe belief that they are harmless. Like theAmerican coral snakes and their cobra rela-tives the Asian coral snakes have a highly toxicvenom.

(5) Sea Snakes

A special word should be said aboutsea snakes, which are unknown to most Ameri-cans. They, too, are cobra relatives, or better,krait relatives that have become adapted foraquatic life. With their flattened, oarlike tail andvalvular nostrils, they are a characteristic partof the Western Pacific fauna. About 15 speciesare found in the waters off Vietnam. In any onearea, however, there is usually one commonspecies with several others making up the re-mainder.

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In the Saigon region and southward,I-Iardwick’s sea snake, one of the more dangerousspecies, makes up 75 percent of the sea snakefauna. This would suggest care in swimming offthe beaches of this area. North of Nha Trang, thebanded smallheaded sea snake makes up the mainpopulation. This sea snake is specialized forfeeding on small or elongated fishbs and, as itsname suggests, has a very small head. It is notconsidered a danger in other parts of its range.No sea snake of any kind appears to have beenexplicitly reported in North Vietnam, but somekinds are found in nearby Hainan and probablyalso off the Vietnam coast.

During the rainy season between Julyand November sea snakes invade the rivermouths and estuaries along the coast, perhaps tofeed on the fishes that are concentrated there atthat time. They are practically helpless on landand never leave the water voluntarily, but duringthe wet season may be found far frcm their usualcoastal habitat.

‘1’here are conflicting reports on thedanger of sea snakes to people in the water. Onthe one hand native fishermen pull them out oftheir nets with little thought of danger, while onthe other there are reports of swimmers beingbitten and killed. A part of the reasons for thedifferent stories is the different species of seasnakes, which vary in temperament and in the ef-fectiveness with which they can deliver a bite.Thus, both the Beaked and Hardwick’s sea snakes

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are large and largeheaded species that may lashout unexpectedly. These are the two kinds thatcause the majority of bites throughout SoutheastAsia. The other smallheaded kinds “seem to havemore gentle dispositions and with their smallmouths might have difficulty in biting an arm orleg if they tried.

In any case, only two incidents ofswimmers being attacked by sea snakes (inMalaya) have been reported recently.’ Most seasnake bites are inflicted on the fishermen thathandle them often. Nowhere in the area that seasnakes are commonly found--from the PersianGulf to Japan and Australia-- are they considereda major hazard.

g. Summary. Bites by bamboo vipers, themountain viper and the Malayan pit viper arelikely to be more painful than serious, thoughlarge individuals of the latter two are capable ofcausing dangerous bites. Only the Asian cobraand the Malayan and many-banded kraits appear tobe sufficiently common, sufficiently venomous andsufficiently aggressive to provide a snakebitehazard. Even so, the few statistics available sug-gest that death from snakebite was a rarity inprewar Vietnam and that a man who has the op-portunity to watch where he puts his hands andfeet is most unlikely to be bitten.

Vietnam has a large snake fauna, about115 species of land snakes, of which 17 are

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venomous. l%e United States also has about 115species of snakes-- of which 19 are venomous.The danger of snakebite in most areas of Vietnamdoes not appear to be appreciably greater thanit is in our own southern states, but a reasonableamount of care is desirable in both places.

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498 *U.S. GOVERNMENTPRINTINGOFFICE: 1991--298–053/40621