fiskalna integracija u evropskoj uniji
TRANSCRIPT
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FISKALNA INTEGRACIJA U
EVROPSKOJ UNIJI
Rezime
Predmet ovog rada je proces fiskalne integracije koji se odvija u Evropskoj uniji. U radu se polazi od hipoteze da je fiskalna integracija u EU prvenstveno u funkciji monetarne integracije i očuvanja stabilnosti jedinstvene evropske valute. Cilj rada je da se analizom relevantne regulative EU objasni geneza jačanja njenog nadnacionalnog fiskalnog suvereniteta nad zemljama članicama, naročito u vreme globalne finansijske i ekonomske krize. Ukazuje se na činjenicu da je u sadašnjoj fazi, opsežna reforma fiskalnog upravljanja u EU prvenstveno usmerena na zemlje članice zone evra.
Ključne reči: fiskalna integracija, Evropska unija, zona evra, budžetski deficit, javni dug
JEL: E62, F36, H77, H87
UDK 339.923:061.1EU(4):336.02 ; 336.1/.5 ; 336.14
originalni naučni
rad
Rad primljen: 02.10.2013.
Odobren za štampu: 29.10.2013.
Prof. dr Dragana GnjatovićUniverzitet u Kragujevcu
Rad je deo istraživanja na projektu 47004 Ministarstva prosvete, nauke i tehnološkog razvoja Republike Srbije „Unapređenje javnih politika u Srbiji u funkciji poboljšanja socijalne sigurnosti građana i održivog privrednog rasta“
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FISCAL INTEGRATION IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION
Summary
The paper deals with the process of fiscal integration taking place in the European Union. It is based on the hypothesis that fiscal integration in the EU is principally in the function of monetary integration and the preservation of stability of the single European currency. The objective of this paper is to analyze the relevant EU regulations in order to explain the genesis of the strengthened supranational fiscal sovereignty over the EU member states, especially during the global financial and economic crisis. It underlines the fact that, in the current stage, the comprehensive reform of the EU fiscal governance is primarily directed at the Eurozone countries.
Keywords: fiscal integration, European Union, Eurozone, budget deficit, public debt
JEL: E62, F36, H77, H87
UDC 339.923:061.1EU(4):336.02 ; 336.1/.5 ; 336.14
original scientific paper
Paper received: 02.10.2013
Approved for publishing: 29.10.2013
Prof Dragana Gnjatović, PhDUniversity of [email protected]
This paper has been written as part of the project of the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia (No. 47004): “Improvement of public policies in Serbia in the function of higher social safety of citizens and sustainable economic growth”.
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Uvod
Temelji fiskalne integracije u Evropskoj uniji postavljeni su tokom 1990-ih godina, u vreme priprema za uvođenje jedinstvene valute - evra. Tada je konstatovano da će stabilnost evra u značajnoj meri zavisiti od uspostavljanja fiskalne discipline zemalja članica Ekonomske i monetarne unije (EMU). Fiskalno disciplinovanje zemalja članica podrazumevalo je uravnoteženje njihovih budžeta u srednjem roku i njihovu obavezu da se pridržavaju referentnih vrednosti, utvrđenih za budžetski deficit i javni dug [Gnjatović, 2001: 364]. Bilo je određeno da gornja granica za budžetski deficit bude 3% bruto domaćeg proizvodu (BDP), a za javni dug 60% BDP. Pri tome se pod budžetskim deficitom podrazumeva potreba za neto javnim kreditom, u skladu sa definicijom Evropskog sistema objedinjenih privrednih računa. Javnim dugom smatra se, pak, bruto zaduženje zemlje članice izraženo u nominalnoj vrednosti na kraju fiskalne odnosno kalendarske godine. Javni dug zemalja članica EU utvrđuje se po sektorima javnih organa zbog čega se on sastoji iz zaduženja centralnih organa vlasti, regionalnih i lokalnih organa uprave i fondova za socijalno osiguranje. Referentne vrednosti do 3% učešća budžetskog deficita i 60% učešća javnog duga u BDP zemalja članica odabrane su zato što je utvrđeno da ove vrednosti realno omogućavaju održavanje stabilnosti cena u dužem roku, pod pretpostavkom prosečnog rasta BDP od 3% i stope inflacije od 2% na godišnjem nivou [Lipinska, 2008: 32]. Ovih referentnih vrednosti danas su dužne da se pridržavaju kako zemlje koje pretenduju da uvedu evro tako i one koje se već nalaze u evro zoni. Ako se radi o zemljama koje su na putu da uvedu evro, ove referentne vrednosti su poznate pod imenom fiskalnih kriterijuma konvergencije, a za zemlje u zoni evra, ove referentne vrednosti nazivaju se fiskalni kriterijumi stabilizacije.
Kriterijumi fiskalne discipline zemalja članica zone evra
Da bi Evropska komisija i Savet ministara EU mogli da nadgledaju fiskalnu politiku zemalja članica EMU, 1997. godine je usvojen Pakt za stabilnost i rast [EU Council, 1997].
Pravni osnov Pakta za stabilnost i rast su članovi 121 i 126 Ugovora o funkcionisanju EU [EU, 2010]. Protokol 12 ovog Ugovora govori o postupku utvrđivanja prekomernog deficita budžeta zemlje članice, uključujući i referentne vrednosti za budžetski deficit i javni dug. Takođe, član 136 Ugovora o funkcionisanju EU predviđa donošenje posebnih odredbi, vezanih za fiskalnu disciplinu zemalja članica, koje treba da važe isključivo za zonu evra.
Pakt za stabilnost i rast je dobio zakonsku formu usvajanjem EU regulativa koje sadrže preventivne i korektivne mere za slučaj da se neka zemlja članica, koja je pretendovala da uđe u evro zonu, ne pridržava referentnih vrednosti za budžetski deficit i javni dug [EU Council, 1466/97; EU Council, 1467/97]. Kada je 2000. godine evro pušten u opticaj, Pakt za stabilnost i rast postao je osnova fiskalnog upravljanja u Evropskoj uniji. Formulacijom njegovih preventivnih mera, u evropsko pravo uvedena je zajednička fiskalna kontrola koja ima zadatak da deluje u slučaju pojave prekomernog budžetskog deficita u nekoj od zemalja članica evro zone. Formulacijom korektivnih mera, pak, stvoren je mehanizam koji bi trebalo da se automatski aktivira ukoliko zemlja članica evro zone ne bi otklonila prekomerni budžetski deficit u propisanom roku.
Oštrica mehanizma nadgledanja fiskalnih politika zemalja članica evro zone unekoliko je ublažena 2005. godine, inoviranjem Pakta za stabilnost i rast, u vreme kada su budžeti Nemačke i Francuske uporno beležili deficite veće od 3% BDP. Pod pritiskom dve najmoćnije zemlje EU koje su na svaki način želele da izbegnu primenu mehanizma korektivnih mera, Savet ministara EU tada je doneo odluku da, prilikom utvrđivanja da li postoji prekomerni budžetski deficit u konkretnoj zemlji članici evro zone, treba uzeti u obzir ne samo referentne vrednosti za budžetski deficit i javni dug, već i pokazatelje o ekonomskoj situaciji u toј zemlji [EU Council, 2005]. U tom smislu, u sistem fiskalnog upravljanja EU uvedena je kategorija specifičnih makroekonomskih uslova u kojima se vodi budžetska politika svake konkretne zemlje članice. Ovi specifični makroekonomski uslovi mogu da posluže kao osnov za utvrđivanje tzv. izuzetnih okolnosti koje su van domašaja odluka fiskalnih vlasti
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Introduction
The foundations of fiscal integration in the European Union were set in the 1990s, during the preparations for the introduction of a single currency – the euro. It was recognized back then that the stability of the euro would largely depend on the institution of fiscal discipline in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) member states. Introducing fiscal discipline in the member states implied the balancing of their budgets in the medium term, and their obligation to adhere to the benchmark values, determined for budget deficit and public debt [Gnjatović, 2001: 364]. The ceiling for budget deficit was set at 3% of gross domestic product (GDP), and for public debt at 60% of GDP. Budget deficit refers to the public sector net borrowing, in line with the definition of the European System of Accounts. Public debt, on the other hand, refers to the gross indebtedness of a member state, expressed in nominal terms at the end of a fiscal or calendar year. The public debt of the EU member states is determined by public sector bodies, and therefore, includes the debts of central authorities, regional and local administration bodies, and social insurance funds. The benchmark values of up to 3% of GDP for budget deficit and 60% of GDP for public debt in the member states have been selected because it was determined that these values realistically enable the maintenance of long-term price stability, under the assumption of average GDP growth by 3%, and 2% inflation rate at the annual level [Lipinska, 2008: 32]. These benchmark values are bound to be adhered to both by countries aspiring to introduce the euro, and by those that are already in the Eurozone. In case of the countries on their way to introducing the euro, these benchmark values are known as fiscal
convergence criteria, whereas in case of the Eurozone countries, these benchmark values are referred to as fiscal stabilization criteria.
Fiscal Discipline Criteria in the Eurozone Countries
With a view to enabling the European Commission and the EU Council of Ministers to supervise the fiscal policies of the EMU member states, in 1997 the Stability and Growth Pact was adopted [EU Council, 1997]. The legal basis for the Stability and Growth Pact were Articles 121 and 126 of the Treaty on the Functioning
of the EU [EU, 2010]. The Protocol 12 of this Treaty prescribes the procedure
of determining excessive budget deficit of a member state, including the benchmark valued for budget deficit and public debt. Likewise, Article 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning
of the EU prescribes the adoption of special provisions, related to the fiscal discipline of the member states, which should be exclusively referring
to the Eurozone.The Stability and Growth
Pact was given its legal form following the adoption of EU regulations containing
both preventive and corrective measures in case that a member
state, aspiring to enter the Eurozone, fails to adhere to the benchmark values for
budget deficit and public debt [EU Council, 1466/97; EU Council, 1467/97]. In 2000, when the euro was put in circulation, the Stability and Growth Pact became the basis of fiscal governance in the European Union. The formulation of its preventive measures introduced into the EU acquis joint fiscal control, whose aim was to respond in case of excessive budget deficit in any of the Eurozone member countries. The formulation of corrective measures, on the other hand, created a mechanism that should automatically activate if the concerned Eurozone member country fails to solve the issue of excessive budget deficit within the prescribed deadline.
The edge of the Eurozone fiscal policy
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konkretne zemlje. Naime, smatra se da su izuzetne okolnosti rezultat opštih nepovoljnih uslova privređivanja u Evropskoj Uniji a ne odluka nosilaca ekonomske politike u konkretnoj zemlji. U tom smislu, pod izuzetnim okolnostima podrazumeva se teška ekonomska kriza u evro zoni odnosno EU u celini ili neuobičajen događaj, sa velikim negativnim finansijskim posledicama.
Dakle, u inoviranom Paktu za stabilnost i rast poseban značaj je dat razdvajanju ciklične i strukturne komponente budžetskog deficita. Ciklična komponenta budžetskog deficita se od tada tretira u EU kao egzogena varijabla koja nije prouzrokovana merama diskrecione ekonomske politike konkretne zemlje. Istovremeno, strukturna komponenta budžetskog deficita smatra se rezultatom odluka nosilaca ekonomske politike te zemlje. Zbog toga se od 2005. godine ocena o prekomernom budžetskom deficitu u konkretnoj zemlji članici svodi, u suštini, na ocenu o veličini strukturne komponente njenog budžetskog deficita.
Fiskalna disciplina zemalja članica zone evra u praksi
Do izbijanja globalne finansijske i ekonomske krize, zemlje članice evro zone uspevale su da se pridržavaju upostavljenih fiskalnih kriterijuma stabilizacije. Međutim, kada je 2008. godine izbila kriza, većina zemalja članica EU suočila se sa problemom održavanja fiskalne discipline. Jako dejstvo automatskih stabilizatora, opsežni programi fiskalne stimulacije i pomoći finansijskom sektoru uticali su na drastično pogoršanje javnih finansija, a u mnogim zemljama evro zone i na pojavu krize javnog duga [Lane, 2012: 60]. U periodu od 2008. do 2012. godine, budžetski deficit znad 3%BDP identifikovan je u 23 od 27 zemalja članica EU, odnosno u 14 od 17 zemalja evro zone: Austriji, Belgiji, Francuskoj, Grčkoj, Holandiji, Irskoj, Italiji, Kipru, Malti, Nemačkoj, Portugalu, Slovačkoj, Sloveniji i Španiji. Do kraja posmatranog perioda, samo četiri zemlje: Belgija, Italija, Malta i Nemačka uspele su da vrate budžetski deficit u okvire referentne vrednosti. Posmatrano na nivou evro zone, budžetska disciplina je kontinuirano narušena počev od 2009. godine (Tabela br. 1).
Tabela br. 1 Učešće budžetskog deficita u BDP zemalja članica evro zone 2007-2012, u %
Zemlja 2007. 2008. 2009. 2010. 2011. 2012.
Austrija -0,9 -0,9 -4,1 -4,5 -2,5 -3,2Belgija -0,1 -1,0 -5,5 -3,8 -3,7 -3,0Estonija 2,4 -2,9 -2,0 0,2 1,1 -1,1Finska 5,3 4,4 -2,5 -2,5 -0,6 -1,8Francuska -2,7 -3,3 -7,5 -7,1 -5,2 -4,5Grčka -6,5 -9,8 -15,6 -10,7 -9,4 -6,8Holandija 0,2 0,5 -5,6 -5,1 -4,5 -3,7Irska 0,1 -7,4 -13,9 -30,9 -13,4 -8,4Italija -1,6 -2,7 -5,4 -4,5 -3,9 -2,9Kipar 3,5 0,9 -6,1 -5,3 -6,3 -5,3Luksemburg 3,7 3,2 -0,8 -0,8 -0,3 -1,9Malta -2,3 -4,6 -3,9 -3,6 -2,7 -2,6Nemačka 0,2 -0,1 -3,1 -4,1 -0,8 -0,2Portugal -3,1 -3,6 -10,2 -9,8 -4,4 -5,0Slovačka -1,8 -2,1 -2,0 -7,7 -4,9 -4,9Slovenija 0,0 -1,9 -6,0 -5,7 -6,4 -4,4Španija 1,9 -4,5 -11,2 -9,7 -9,4 -8,0Evro zona -0,7 -2,1 -6,3 -6,2 -4,1 -3,3
Izvor: EUROSTAT
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supervision mechanism was somewhat taken off in 2005, through the amendments to the Stability and Growth Pact, at the time when the budget deficits of Germany and France kept exceeding 3% of GDP. Under the pressure of two most powerful EU countries, wishing to, by all means, avoid the implementation of corrective measures mechanism, the EU Council of Ministers passed the decision that, when determining whether the budget deficit in a concerned Eurozone member country is excessive or not, one should take into account not only the benchmark values for budget deficit and public debt, but also the indicators of that country’s economic position [EU Council, 2005]. To this end, the EU fiscal governance system was amended to include a category of specific macroeconomic conditions in which every member state conducts its budget policy. These specific macroeconomic conditions may serve as the basis for determining the so-called extraordinary circumstances that are outside the jurisdiction of the decisions passed by the concrete country’s fiscal authorities. Namely, it is considered that extraordinary circumstances are the result of generally unfavorable business conditions in the European Union, and not of the decisions made by economic policymakers in the concerned country. In this context, extraordinary circumstances refer to the severe economic crisis in the Eurozone, and in the EU overall, or to an atypical event with extremely negative financial consequences.
Thus, the amended Stability and Growth Pact places special importance on the division of the cyclical and structural components of budget deficit. The cyclical component of budget deficit has, since then, been treated in the EU as an exogenous variable, which was
not caused by the measures of the concerned country’s discretionary economic policy. At the same time, the structural component of budget deficit has been considered the result of the decisions made by economic policymakers in the concerned country. Therefore, since 2005, the assessment of potentially excessive budget deficit in a member state has, basically, been reduced to the assessment of the size of its budget deficit’s structural component.
Fiscal Discipline of the Eurozone Countries in Practice
Until the outbreak of the global financial and economic crisis, the Eurozone member countries managed to adhere to the established fiscal stabilization criteria. However, when the crisis broke out in 2008, most EU member states faced the problem of maintaining fiscal discipline. The powerful effects of automatic stabilizers, along with the comprehensive fiscal stimulation and financial sector aid programs, led to the drastic deterioration of public finance, and in many Eurozone countries even to the public debt crisis [Lane, 2012: 60]. In the period between 2008 and 2012, the budget deficit over 3% of GDP was identified in 23 out of the 27 EU member states, i.e. in 14 out of the 17 Eurozone countries: Austria, Belgium, France, Greece, the Netherlands, Ireland, Italy, Cyprus, Malta, Germany, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain. By the end of the observed period, only four countries: Belgium, Italy, Malta and Germany, managed to restore their budget deficits to the levels below the benchmark values. Viewed at the Eurozone level, budgetary discipline has been continuously compromised since 2009 (Table 1).
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Deficitno finansiranje javnih rashoda zemalja članica evro zone uticalo je na permanentno održavanje javnog duga iznad referentne vrednosti 60% BDP u slučaju čak 11 od 17 zemalja evro zone. To su: Austrija, Belgija, Francuska, Grčka, Holandija, Irska, Italija, Kipar, Malta, Nemačka i Portugal. Zbog toga, u posmatranom periodu evro zona kao celina stalno beleži javni dug iznad referentne vrednosti (Tabela br. 2).
Da bi sprečila krah evra, Evropska unija je 2011. godine pristupila novim izmenama Pakta za stabilnost i rast. Ove izmene su ozakonjene usvajanjem paketa šest novih EU regulativa, poznatim kao „paket šest“ [ECB, 2011]. „Paket šest“ predstavlja, u suštini, početak opsežnih reformi fiskalnog upravljanja u Evropskoj uniji. Glavna intencija ovih reformi je da se jačanjem nadnacionalnog fiskalnog suvereniteta EU doprinese budžetskoj disciplini zemalja članica [Eriksson, Hjeds Löfmark, 2013: 36]. „Paket šest“ je stupio na snagu 13. decembra 2011. godine.
Reforma fiskalnog upravljanja u EU
Osnovni elementi reforme fiskalnog upravljanja u EU, sankcionisani „paketom šest“, su jačanje nadzora nad budžetskim pozicijama zemalja članica i uvođenje efikasnijeg mehanizma finansijskih sankcija protiv zemalja sa prekomernim budžetskim deficitom koje se ne bi pridržavale plana fiskalnog prilagođavanja.
Jačanje nadzora nad budžetskim pozicijama zemalja članica
Prema slovu Pakta za stabilnost i rast, sve zemlje članice evro zone su dužne da se pridržavaju pravila uravnoteženog budžeta. Ovo pravilo iziskuje da državni budžet bude stalno blizu ravnoteže odnosno da strukturni deficit ne prelazi 1% BDP. Ako recesiona faza privrednog ciklusa izazove rast javnih rashoda u određenoj zemlji članici, budžetski deficit ne sme da pređe 3% BDP. Ukoliko je budžetski deficit iznad 3% BDP, Evropska komisija ceni da li se konkretna zemlja nalazi u situaciji prekomernog budžetskog deficita. Prema „paketu šest“, situacija prekomernog budžetskog deficita postoji u konkretnoj
Tabela br. 2 Učešće javnog duga u BDP zemalja članica evro zone, 2007-2012, u %
Zemlja 2007. 2008. 2009. 2010. 2011. 2012. Austrija 60,7 63,8 69,2 72,0 72,4 74,6Belgija 84,0 89,2 95,7 95,5 99,8 99,9Estonija 3,7 4,5 7,2 6,7 6,1 10,5Finska 35,2 33,9 43,5 48,6 49,0 53,1Francuska 64,2 68,2 79,2 82,3 86,0 90,0Grčka 107,2 112,9 129,7 148,3 170,6 176,7Holandija 45,3 58,5 60,8 63,1 68,5 68,8Irska 25,0 44,5 64,9 92,2 106,4 117,6Italija 103,3 106,1 116,4 119,2 120,7 126,5Kipar 58,8 48,9 58,5 69,3 71,1 89,7Luksemburg 6,7 14,4 15,3 19,2 18,3 21,3Malta 61,9 68,0 67,6 68,3 70,9 72,3Nemačka 65,2 66,8 74,5 82,5 80,5 81,7Portugal 68,4 71,7 83,2 93,5 108,1 119,1Slovačka 29,6 27,9 25,6 41,0 43,3 57,1Slovenija 23,1 22,0 35,0 38,6 46,9 54,0Španija 36,3 46,2 53,9 61,5 69,3 86,1Evro zona 66,4 70,2 80,0 85,6 88,1 92,0
Izvor: EUROSTAT
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The deficits in the financing of public expenditures in the Eurozone countries influenced the permanent maintenance of public debt above the benchmark value of 60% of GDP in the following 11 out of the 17 Eurozone countries: Austria, Belgium, France,
Greece, the Netherlands, Ireland, Italy, Cyprus, Malta, Germany and Portugal. As a result, in the observed period the Eurozone as a whole constantly recorded the public debt exceeding the benchmark values (Table 2).
Table 2. Share of public debt in GDP in the Eurozone countries, 2007-2012, in %
Country 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012Austria 60.7 63.8 69.2 72.0 72.4 74.6Belgium 84.0 89.2 95.7 95.5 99.8 99.9Estonia 3.7 4.5 7.2 6.7 6.1 10.5Finland 35.2 33.9 43.5 48.6 49.0 53.1France 64.2 68.2 79.2 82.3 86.0 90.0Greece 107.2 112.9 129.7 148.3 170.6 176.7Netherlands 45.3 58.5 60.8 63.1 68.5 68.8Ireland 25.0 44.5 64.9 92.2 106.4 117.6Italy 103.3 106.1 116.4 119.2 120.7 126.5Cyprus 58.8 48.9 58.5 69.3 71.1 89.7Luksembourg 6.7 14.4 15.3 19.2 18.3 21.3Malta 61.9 68.0 67.6 68.3 70.9 72.3Germany 65.2 66.8 74.5 82.5 80.5 81.7Portugal 68.4 71.7 83.2 93.5 108.1 119.1Slovakia 29.6 27.9 25.6 41.0 43.3 57.1Slovenia 23.1 22.0 35.0 38.6 46.9 54.0Spain 36.3 46.2 53.9 61.5 69.3 86.1Eurozone 66.4 70.2 80.0 85.6 88.1 92.0
Source: EUROSTAT
Table 1. Share of budget deficit in GDP in the Eurozone countries, 2007-2012, in %
Country 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Austria -0.9 -0.9 -4.1 -4.5 -2.5 -3.2Belgium -0.1 -1.0 -5.5 -3.8 -3.7 -3.0Estonia 2.4 -2.9 -2.0 0.2 1.1 -1.1Finland 5.3 4.4 -2.5 -2.5 -0.6 -1.8France -2.7 -3.3 -7.5 -7.1 -5.2 -4.5Greece -6.5 -9.8 -15.6 -10.7 -9.4 -6.8Netherlands 0.2 0.5 -5.6 -5.1 -4.5 -3.7Ireland 0.1 -7.4 -13.9 -30.9 -13.4 -8.4Italy -1.6 -2.7 -5.4 -4.5 -3.9 -2.9Cyprus 3.5 0.9 -6.1 -5.3 -6.3 -5.3Luksembourg 3.7 3.2 -0.8 -0.8 -0.3 -1.9Malta -2.3 -4.6 -3.9 -3.6 -2.7 -2.6Germany 0.2 -0.1 -3.1 -4.1 -0.8 -0.2Portugal -3.1 -3.6 -10.2 -9.8 -4.4 -5.0Slovakia -1.8 -2.1 -2.0 -7.7 -4.9 -4.9Slovenia 0.0 -1.9 -6.0 -5.7 -6.4 -4.4Spain 1.9 -4.5 -11.2 -9.7 -9.4 -8.0Eurozone -0.7 -2.1 -6.3 -6.2 -4.1 -3.3
Source: EUROSTAT
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zemlji članici evro zone ako je istovremeno: učešće budžetskog deficita u BDP veće od 3%, učešće javnog duga u BDP veće od 60% i ako su faktori relevantni za njenu ukupnu ekonomsku situaciju nepovoljni. Ukoliko se utvrdi da se konkretna zemlja članica nalazi u situaciji prekomernog budžetskog deficita, ona mora da usvoji i u zadatom roku sprovede plan fiskalnog prilagođavanja.
U cilju jačanja nadzora nad budžetskim pozicijama zemalja članica evro zone koje sprovode plan fiskalnog prilagođavanja, „paket šest“ uvodi niz preventivnih mera, među kojima su najvažnije sledeće:a. Ex ante upozorenje zemlji članici da se
disciplinuje u pridržavanju plana fiskalnog prilagođavanja.
Savet ministara više ne mora da čeka godišnje izveštaje zemalja članica o relevantnim makroekonomskim indikatorima, već može da reaguje na osnovu relevantnih podataka koje kvartalno objavljuje EUROSTAT.
b. Utvrđivanje kvantitativnog kriterijuma za merenje sukcesivne godišnje obaveze smanjivanja budžetskog deficita.
Prema inoviranom Paktu za stabilnost i rast iz 2005. godine, zemlja članica evro zone čiji je budžetski deficit prelazio 3% BDP, imala je obavezu da ga svede u dozvoljene okvire u srednjem roku. Kada su usled globalne ekonomske krize deficiti budžeta zemalja članica evro zone daleko prevazišli dozvoljene okvire, uvedena je mera obaveze njihovog smanjivanja za 0,5% BDP sukcesivno godišnje, do ostvarenja referentne vrednosti.
c. Uvođenje pravila rashoda, prema kojem, u srednjem roku, javni rashodi treba da rastu sporije od potencijalnog BDP.
Zahtev da javni rashodi rastu sporije od BDP, ranije je samo samo deklarativno figurirao kao preporuka u izveštajima Evropske komisije o fiskalnoj situaciji pojedinih zemalja [Hauptmeier et al. 2010: s. 44]. Usvajanjem „paketa šest“, ovaj zahtev postao je deo evropske regulative Samo ako bi zemlja članica evro zone pre utvrđenog roka postigla ciljeve fiskalnog prilagođavanja, dopušteno joj je da privremeno uveća javne rashode po stopi koja je iznad stope potencijalnog rasta BDP.
d. Utvrđivanje kvantitativnog kriterijuma za
značajno odstupanje od plana fiskalnog prilagođavanja.
Značajno odstupanje od plana fiskalnog prilagođavanja smatra se da postoji ako je budžetski deficit veći od planiranog za 0,5% BDP na godišnjem nivou, odnosno u proseku 0,25% BDP godišnje tokom dve uzastopne godine.Zemlja članica koja se nađe u situaciji
prekomernog budžetskog deficita, dužna je da u toku trogodišnjeg tranzitornog perioda sprovede plan smanjivanja javnog duga. Za ocenu kretanja javnog duga u tom tranzitornom periodu „paketom šest“ uvedena su nova kvantitativna merila:a. Stopa dozvoljenog odstupanja od utvrđenog
plana smanjivanja javnog duga. U tranzitornom periodu, dozvoljeno je
da smanjivanje javnog duga odstupa od utvrđenog plana najviše ¼% BDP.
b. Odnos ciklične i strukturne komponente u eventualnom nedovoljnom obimu smanjivanja javnog duga.
Ukoliko se u tranzitornom periodu javni dug ne smanjuje u skladu sa utvrđenim planom, ispituje se da li je njegovo nedovoljno smanjivanje izazvano cikličnim ili strukturnim činiocem. Ako je u pitanju strukturni činilac, nedovoljno smanjenje javnog duga je posledica neodgovarajućih diskrecionih odluka nosilaca ekonomske politike.
c. Procena o mogućoj stopi smanjivanja javnog duga u svakoj narednoj godini tranzitornog perioda.
Ako je uzrok nedovoljnog smanjivanja javnog duga strukturne prirode, loši su izgledi da se u narednoj godini tranzitornog perioda javni dug smanjuje planiranom dinamikom, pa se stvara osnov za uvođenje finansijskih sankcija.
Pooštravanje finansijskih sankcija protiv zemalja članica evro zone koje se ne pridržavaju plana fiskalnog prilagođavanja
U cilju efikasnijeg sprovođenja mehanizma sankcija protiv zemalja članica koje se ne pridržavaju plana fiskalnog prilagođavanja, „paketom šest“ predviđeno je niz korektivnih mera. Ove korektivne mere stupaju na snagu kada Savet ministara EU utvrdi da se konkretna
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In order to prevent the collapse of the euro, in 2011 the European Union started to work on new amendments to the Stability and Growth Pact. These amendments came into force through the adoption of a package of six new EU regulations, better known as the “Sixpack” [ECB, 2011]. The Sixpack essentially marks the launch of comprehensive fiscal governance reforms in the European Union. The main intention of these reforms is to strengthen the supranational fiscal sovereignty of the EU, thereby facilitating the budgetary discipline of its member states [Eriksson, Hjeds Löfmark, 2013: 36]. The Sixpack came into effect on 13 December 2011.
Fiscal Governance Reform in the EU
The main elements of the EU fiscal governance reforms, sanctioned by means of the Sixpack, are the strengthening of surveillance of the member states’ budgetary positions, and the introduction of a more efficient mechanism of financial sanctions against the countries recording excessive budget deficit and non-complying with the fiscal adjustment plan.
Strengthening Surveillance of the Member States’ Budgetary Positions
According to the Stability and Growth Pact, all Eurozone member states are obliged to adhere to the balanced budget rule. This rule prescribes that a state budget should constantly be maintained at the near-balance level, meaning that the structural deficit should stay below 1% of GDP. If a recession stage of the economic cycle triggers a growth in public expenditures in a certain member state, its budget deficit must not exceed 3% of GDP. In case that the budget deficit does exceed 3% of GDP, the European Commission assesses whether the concerned state is in the position of excessive budget deficit. According to the Sixpack, the position of excessive budget deficit is recorded in the concerned Eurozone member state if, at the same time: the budget deficit exceeds 3% of GDP, the public debt exceeds 60% of GDP, and the factors relevant for the overall economic situation are generally unfavorable. If it is determined that the concerned member state has recorded excessive budget deficit, it must
adopt and, within the set deadline, implement the fiscal adjustment plan.
With a view to strengthening surveillance of budgetary positions of the Eurozone member states implementing the fiscal adjustment plan, the Sixpack has introduced a series of preventive measures, the most important of which are the following:a. Ex ante warning to the member state to
be disciplined in adhering to the fiscal adjustment plan.
The EU Council of Ministers no longer has to wait for the member states’ annual reports on relevant macroeconomic indicators, but can respond based on the relevant data published by EUROSTAT on a quarterly basis.
b. Determining the quantitative criterion for measuring the successive annual obligation to reduce budget deficit.
According to the amended Stability and Growth Pact from 2005, a Eurozone member state whose budget deficit exceeded 3% of GDP was obliged to reduce it to the prescribed level in the medium term. When the Eurozone member states’ budget deficits, due to the global economic crisis, rose way above the permitted limits, a new measure was introduced, obliging them to successively reduce their deficits by 0.5% of GDP annually, until they reach the benchmark value.
c. Introducing the expenditure rule, according to which, in the medium term, public expenditures should grow at a slower rate than prospective GDP.
The request for public expenditures to grow at a slower rate than GDP previously was just a formal declaration in the form of a recommendation in the European Commission’s reports on fiscal position in certain countries [Hauptmeier et al., 2010: 44]. The adoption of the Sixpack made this request an integral part of the EU regulations. Only if a Eurozone member state met the fiscal adjustment objectives before the prescribed deadline, it would be allowed to temporarily increase its public expenditures at a rate higher than the potential GDP’s growth rate.
d. Determining the quantitative criterion for considerable divergence from the fiscal adjustment plan.
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zemlja članica evro zone ne pridržava plana fiskalnog prilagođavanja. Jačina sankcija zavisi od stepena nepridržavanja plana fiskalnog prilagođavanja.a. Obaveza polaganja kamatonosnog depozita
u visini 0,2% BDP Prema „paketu šest“, primena finansijskih
sankcija protiv zemlje članice evro zone koja se ne bi pridržavala utvrđenog plana fiskalnog prilagođavanja počela bi već u fazi implementacije preventivnih mera. Četiri meseca posle upozorenja o značajnom odstupanju od utvrđenog plana fiskalnog prilagođavanja, uvele bi se finansijske sankcije u vidu kamatonosnog depozita u visini 0,2% BDP, koji bi zemlja članica bila dužna da položi na svoj račun u EIB.
b. Obaveza polaganja nekamatonosnog depozita u visini 0,2% BDP
Ukoliko ni sedam meseci posle upozorenja ne bi bilo napretka u smanjivanju odstupanja od utvrđenog plana fiskalnog prilagođavanja, uvele bi se nove finansijske sankcije u vidu nekamatonosnog depozita u visini 0,2% BDP, koji bi zemlja članica morala da položi na svoj račun u EIB. Radi se, dakle, o pooštravanju procedure uvođenja sankcija jer je prema rešenjima iz 2005. godine bilo predviđeno da se nekamatonosni depozit može uvesti zemlji članici evro zone ako se 16 meseci ne pridržava utvrđenog plana fiskalnog prilagođavanja.
c. Pretvaranje nekamatonosnog depozita u novčanu kaznu
Novina koja je uvedena „paketom šest“ sastoji se u tome da se nekamatonosni depozit može pretvoriti u novčanu kaznu u slučaju odstupanja od plana fiskalnog prilagođavanja, ako ovo odstupanje traje znatno duže od sedam meseci. Pri tome, novčana kazna bi imala dve komponente: fiksnu i varijabilnu. Fiksni deo kazne bio bi 0,2% BDP, a varijabilni deo iznosio bi 10% apsolutne veličine razlike između stvarne veličine budžetskog deficita iz prethodne godine i njegove referentne vrednosti, utvrđene planom fiskalnog prilagođavanja.
d. Odluka o dodatnoj novčanoj kazni. Svake godine u kojoj bi se primenile sankcije
u obliku novčane kazne, Savet ministara EU bio bi u obavezi da procenjuje da li kažnjena
zemlja članica evro zone preduzima aktivnosti u pravcu primene utvrđenog plana fiskalnog prilagođavanja. Ukoliko to ne bi bio slučaj, Savet ministara EU bi mogao da donese odluku o dodatnoj novčanoj kazni. Visina dodatne novčane kazne bi bila utvrđena na isti način kao i varijabilni deo primarne novčane kazne.
Jačanje fiskalnog suvereniteta EU
Sa produbljivanjem globalne finansijske i ekonomske krize povećavala se fiskalna nedisciplina zemalja članica EU. Jedna za drugom, zemlje članice evro zone našle su se u situaciji prekomernog budžetskog deficita. Očekivalo se da one prihvate i sprovedu plan fiskalnog prilagođavanja. Međutim, iako je „paketom šest“ za ove zemlje bio predviđen mehanizam korektivnih mera koji bi se aktivirao u slučaju nepridržavanja ovog plana, te mere nisu ni u jednom slučaju bile primenjene. Kao razlog za to navodi se način odlučivanja koji je karakterisalo „previše diskrecionih prava i premalo automatizma“ [Schaechter, 2012]. Zbog toga su šefovi država ili vlada zemalja članica Evropske unije postigli 26. oktobra 2011. godine dogovor o daljem jačanju fiskalnog okvira upravljanja. Na osnovu ovog dogovora, 2. marta 2012. godine sve zemlje EU, osim Velike Britanije i Češke Republike, potpisale su Sporazum o stabilizaciji, koordinaciji i upravljanju u ekonomskoj i monetarnoj uniji [TSCG, 2012]. Sastavni deo ovog međudržavnog sporazuma je Fiskalni sporazum kojim se ojačava koordinacija i konvergencija ekonomskih politika zemalja članica kao i mera koje se odnose na upravljanje evro zonom [Craig, 2012]. Fiskalni sporazum stupio je na snagu 1. januara 2013. godine.
Zemlje članice EU koje su potpisale Fiskalni sporazum odrekle su se dela svog fiskalnog suvereniteta i prenele ga na nadnacionalni nivo EU. Naime, uz potpisivanje ovog međudržavnog sporazuma, ove zemlje su prihvatile obavezu da njegov sadržaj postane deo njihovih Ustava ili drugih nacionalnih pravnih akata sličnog ranga [„Dogradnja EMU“, 2012: 108-113]. Intencija EU je da u narednom petogodišnjem periodu Fiskalni sporazum preraste u regulativu Evropskog prava.
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Significant deviation from the fiscal adjustment plan is considered to have occurred if the budget deficit is higher than planned by 0.5% of GDP at the annual level, i.e. on average by 0.25% of GDP per annum in two successive years.A member state which finds itself in the
position of excessive budget deficit is obliged to, within the three-year transition period, implement the public debt reduction plan. For the purpose of assessing the public debt trends throughout this transitory period, the Sixpack has introduced new quantitative measures:a. The rate of allowed deviation from the
defined public debt reduction plan. During the transitory period, it is allowed
for the public debt reduction to diverge from the plan by no more than ¼% of GDP.
b. The correlation of the cyclical and structural component in the potentially insufficient volume of public debt reduction.
If the public debt does not get reduced within the transitory period according to the defined plan, it is to be examined whether its insufficient reduction was caused by a cyclical or a structural factor. If it was due to a structural factor, the insufficient public debt reduction was a consequence of the inappropriate discretionary decisions of the economic policymakers.
c. Assessment of the potential public debt reduction rate in each subsequent year of the transitory period.
If the cause of insufficient public debt reduction is structural in nature, it is rather unlikely that in the subsequent year of the transitory period the public debt will decrease according to the planned dynamics, which generates the precondition for introducing financial sanctions.
Stricter Financial Sanctions for the Eurozone Countries Non-Compliant with the Fiscal Adjustment Plan
With a view to achieving a more efficient implementation of the mechanism of sanctions against the member states non-compliant with the fiscal adjustment plan, the Sixpack prescribes a series of corrective measures. These corrective measures come into
effect when the EU Council of Ministers determines that a certain Eurozone member state does not adhere to the fiscal adjustment plan. The severity of sanctions depends on the extent of non-compliance to the fiscal adjustment plan.a. Obligation to make an interest-bearing
deposit in the amount of 0.2% of GDP. According to the Sixpack, the implementation
of financial sanctions against a Eurozone member state non-compliant with the prescribed fiscal adjustment plan would commence already in the preventive measures’ implementation stage. Four months after the warning about the considerable deviation from the prescribed fiscal adjustment plan, financial sanctions are to be introduced in the form of an interest-bearing deposit amounting to 0.2% of GDP, which the concerned member state will be obliged to pay into its account at the EIB.
b. Obligation to make an interest-free deposit in the amount of 0.2% of GDP.
If there were no improvement whatsoever in alleviating the deviation from the prescribed fiscal adjustment plan even after seven months after the warning, new financial sanctions are to be introduced in the form of an interest-free deposit amounting to 0.2% of GDP, which the concerned member state will be obliged to pay into its account at the EIB. This is, hence, a stricter sanctions-related procedure, given that, according to the solutions as of 2005, it was only possible to impose an interest-free deposit to a Eurozone member state, if it failed to comply with the prescribed fiscal adjustment plan for 16 months.
c. Conversion of the interest-free deposit into a fine.
The innovation introduced by the Sixpack
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U okviru preventivnih mera Fiskalnog sporazuma, vidljivo je striktnije tumačenje pravila budžetske ravnoteže. Dok je „paketom šest“ bilo dopušteno da strukturni deficit u uslovima budžetske ravnoteže iznosi do 1%BDP, dotle je Fiskalnim sporazumom postavljena niža granica strukturnog deficita na maksimalno 0,5%BDP. U konkretnom slučaju, ova granica može se pomeriti do 1%BDP samo ako je u posmatranoj zemlji članici odnos javnog duga i BDP znatno ispod maksimalnih 60%. U svim ostalim aspektima vezanim za preventivne mere, Fiskalni sporazum ne odstupa u značajnijoj meri od „paketa šest“. Naročito treba istaći činjenicu da je i dalje ostavljeno relativno mnogo prostora za tumačenje tzv. izuzetnih okolnosti koje mogu biti proglašene uzrokom visokih budžetskih deficita i naglog povećanja javnog duga zemlje članice.
Kada je reč o korektivnim merama u Fiskalnom sporazumu, njihov sadržaj nije pretrpeo izmene, ali bi njihova primena ovoga puta trebalo da postane obavezujuća. Naime, kada zemlja članica evro zone bude sankcionisala korektivne mere Fiskalnog sporazuma svojim najvišim pravnim aktima, ona više neće moći da izbegne njihovu primenu. U tom smislu, može se zaključiti da je mehanizam korektivnih mera razvijen u pravcu većeg automatizma delovanja.
Još jedan, novi reformski zahvat u pravcu jačanja fiskalnog suvereniteta EU, i to nad zemljama članicama evro zone, učinjen je 27. maja 2013. godine. Tada su stupile na snagu dve nove regulative EU koje omogućavaju Evropskoj komisiji ne samo da neposredno nadgleda već i da koriguje budžete zemalja članica evro zone [EU, 2013]. Kako ove dve regulative dopunjavaju „paket šest“ regulativa kojima je bio uveden pojačan nadzor nad budžetskim pozicijama zemalja članica EU, one su postale poznate pod imenom „paket dva“.
Ključna novina „paketa dva“ sastoji se u tome što je Evropska komisija dobila zakonsko pravo da analizira, daje mišljenje i sugeriše eventualne izmene predloga budžeta svake zemlje članice evro zone. Sve zemlje članice evro zone su dužne da objave predloge budžeta za narednu fiskalnu godinu najkasnije do 15.
oktobra tekuće godine, a Evropska komisija da se o njima izjasni do 30. novembra te godine. Ukoliko bi Evropska komisija ustanovila da je neka zemlja članica evro zone značajno odstupila od obaveza formulisanim Paktom za stabilnost i rast, ona bi toj zemlji naložila da joj dostavi revidiranu verziju budžeta. Bez obzira na to da li se nekoj zemlji članici evro zone traže izmene budžeta, sve zemlje članice su dužne da usvoje budžete za narednu fiskalnu godinu najkasnije do 31. decembra tekuće godine. Evropska komisija, sa svoje strane, u obavezi je da do tada objavi sveobuhvatnu procenu izgleda za realizaciju budžeta zemalja članica evro zone u narednoj fiskalnoj godini. „Paket dva“ primenjivaće se već od 1. januara 2014. godine. Smatra se da će ovakav vid fiskalne integracije doprineti boljoj konvergenciji ekonomskih politika zemalja članica evro zone, pa samim tim i stabilnosti zajedničke evropske valute [Klasens, 2012: 41].
Zaključak
U formalno pravnom smislu, Evropska unija se kreće u pravcu fiskalne unije. Fiskalna integracija koja je u toku, nalazi se u fazi jačanja nadnacionalnog fiskalnog suvereniteta EU nad zemljama članicama. Reformisano fiskalno upravljanje EU, koje je u primeni od 1. januara 2013. godine, u značajnoj meri ograničava samostalnost zemalja članica u vođenju fiskalne politike. Stroga načela fiskalne discipline postala su integralni deo nacionalnih zakonodavstava velike većine zemalja članica EU. One su Evropskom sudu pravde dale u nadležnost da odlučuje o tome da li se pridržavaju ovih načela i da predlaže primenu preventivnih i korektivnih mera. Da li će nova regulativa EU u oblasti fiskalnog upravljanja biti primenjivana u praksi i kakve će efekte imati na privredni rast zemalja članica ostaje tek da se vidi. Funkcionalna zavisnost fiskalne integracije od monetarne integracije nedvosmisleno navodi na zaključak da će mera uspešnosti primene reformisanog sistema fiskalnog upravljanja u EU biti pre stabilnost zajedničke evropske valute nego privredne performanse zemalja članica.
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enables the interest-free deposit to be converted into a fine in case of a non-compliance with the fiscal adjustment plan, provided that this non-compliance has lasted for more than seven months. In this case, the concerned fine would have two components: a fixed and a variable one. The fixed part of the fine would amount to 0.2% of GDP, whereas the variable part would amount to 10% of the absolute difference between the real size of the budget deficit from the year before and its benchmark value, defined by the fiscal adjustment plan.
d. Decision on an additional fine. Every year, in which the cash penalty
sanctions are imposed, the EU Council of Ministers is obliged to assess whether the published Eurozone member state has been undertaking the appropriate activities in order to implement the prescribed fiscal adjustment plan. If this is not the case, the EU Council of Ministers could pass a decision on additional fines. The amount of such fines would be determined in the same way as for the variable part of the primary fine.
Strengthening the EU Fiscal Sovereignty
In parallel with the deepening of the global financial and economic crisis, the lack of fiscal discipline in the EU member states has been on the increase. One by one, the Eurozone member states found themselves facing excessive budget deficits. They were expected to accept and implement the fiscal adjustment plan. However, although the Sixpack prescribed a mechanism of corrective measures for these countries, which were supposed to be activated in case of
non-compliance with this plan, these measures were not applied in any of the cases. The reason behind this was stated to be the manner of decision-making, characterized by “undue discretionary rights and lacking automatism” [Schaechter, 2012]. Thus, the chiefs of EU member states, on 26 October 2011, reached an agreement on further strengthening of the fiscal governance framework. Based on this agreement, on 2 March 2012, all EU countries, apart from Great Britain and Czech Republic, signed the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union [TSCG, 2012]. The integral part of this inter-governmental agreement is the Fiscal Compact, strengthening the coordination and convergence of economic policies of the EU member states, and the measures related to the Eurozone governance [Craig, 2012]. The Fiscal Compact came into effect on 1 January 2013.
The EU member states which signed the Fiscal Compact waived a section of their fiscal sovereignty and transferred it to the supranational level of the EU. Namely, having signed this inter-governmental agreement, the concerned countries committed to its content becoming a part of their Constitutions or other national legal acts of similar ranking [“Dogradnja EMU”, 2012: 108-113]. The intention of the EU is for the Fiscal Compact to grow into the European acquis within the next five years.
The preventive measures of the Fiscal Compact introduce a visibly stricter interpretation of the balanced budget rule. While the Sixpack allowed for the structural deficit in the conditions of budgetary balance to amount to 1% of GDP, the Fiscal Compact prescribes a lower limit for the structural deficit at maximum 0.5% of GDP. In a concrete case, this limit may be upped to 1% of GDP
on condition that the concerned member state records the ratio of public debt and GDP considerably lower than the maximum 60%. In all other aspects related to preventive measures, the Fiscal Compact does not significantly deviate from the Sixpack. What has to be particularly underlined is the fact that there is still relatively abundant room left for the interpretation of the so-
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Literatura / References
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13. EU Council: Council Regulation (EC) on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies, No. 1466/97, 7 July 1997, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31997R1466 (EU Council 1466/1997)
14. EU Council: Council Regulation (EC) on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure, No 1467/97, 7 July 1997, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31997R14667 (EU Council 1467/1997)
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called extraordinary circumstances that may be proclaimed the cause of a member state’s high budget deficit and sudden increase in public debt.
When it comes to the corrective measures in the Fiscal Compact, their content has undergone no changes, but their implementation should this time become mandatory. Namely, when a Eurozone member state sanctions the corrective measures of the Fiscal Compact by means of its supreme legal acts, it may no longer avoid their implementation. Therefore, it may be concluded that the corrective measures mechanism has been developed towards a higher automatism of action.
Another new reformative action towards the strengthening of the EU fiscal sovereignty, concerning the Eurozone member states, was performed on 27 May 2013. It was then that the two new EU regulations came into effect, empowering the European Commission not only to indirectly supervise, but also to intervene with the Eurozone member states’ budgets [EU, 2013]. Given that these two regulations have supplemented the Sixpack regulations, which introduced stricter surveillance over the EU member states’ budgetary positions, they have become known as the “Two-pack”.
The key innovation introduced by the Two-pack is that the European Commission was granted legal right to analyze, express its opinion of and suggest potential amendments to the proposed budgets of each Eurozone member state. All Eurozone member states are obliged to disclose their proposed budgets for the forthcoming fiscal year by 15 October of the current year at the latest, and the European Commission can comment upon them by 30 November of the same year. If the European Commission establishes that a certain Eurozone member state has considerably diverged from the obligations formulated in the Stability and Growth Pact, it will instruct the concerned state to submit a revised version of the budget. Regardless of whether any Eurozone member states were asked to amend their budgets,
all member states are obliged to adopt their budgets for the forthcoming fiscal year by 31 December of the current year at the latest. The European Commission, on its part, is obliged to conduct, by that time, a comprehensive assessment of prospects for the realization of the Eurozone member states’ budgets in the forthcoming fiscal year. The Two-pack will be implemented already as of 1 January 2014. It is considered that this form of fiscal integration would contribute to a higher convergence of the Eurozone member states’ economic policies, and consequently, to the stability of the single European currency [Klasens, 2012: 41].
Conclusion
In formal legal terms, the European Union has been moving towards a fiscal union. The ongoing fiscal integration is in the stage of strengthening the supranational fiscal sovereignty of the EU over its member states. The reformed EU fiscal governance, in effect since 1 January 2013, considerably limits the member states’ independence in conducting their fiscal policies. The strict rules of fiscal discipline have become an integral part of the national legislation in the vast majority of the EU member states. They have empowered the European Court of Justice to decide on whether they adhere to these rules and to propose the implementation of preventive and corrective measures. It remains to be seen whether the new EU regulations in the field of fiscal governance will actually be applied in practice, and what kind of effects they will produce on the member states’ economic growth. The functional dependence of fiscal integration from monetary integration unmistakably leads to the conclusion that the measure of successfulness of the reformed EU fiscal governance system will rather be the stability of the single European currency than the economic performance of the EU member states.