firewall fingerprinting amir r. khakpour 1, joshua w. hulst 1, zhihui ge 2, alex x. liu 1, dan pei...

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Firewall Fingerprinting Amir R. Khakpour 1 , Joshua W. Hulst 1 , Zhihui Ge 2 , Alex X. Liu 1 , Dan Pei 2 , Jia Wang 2 1 Michigan State University 2 AT&T Labs - Research IEEE INFOCOM 2012 左左左 Seminar @ ADLab, NCU

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Page 1: Firewall Fingerprinting Amir R. Khakpour 1, Joshua W. Hulst 1, Zhihui Ge 2, Alex X. Liu 1, Dan Pei 2, Jia Wang 2 1 Michigan State University 2 AT&T Labs

Firewall FingerprintingAmir R. Khakpour1, Joshua W. Hulst1, Zhihui Ge2, Alex X. Liu1, Dan Pei2, Jia Wang2

1Michigan State University2AT&T Labs - Research

IEEE INFOCOM 2012

左昌國Seminar @ ADLab, NCU

Page 2: Firewall Fingerprinting Amir R. Khakpour 1, Joshua W. Hulst 1, Zhihui Ge 2, Alex X. Liu 1, Dan Pei 2, Jia Wang 2 1 Michigan State University 2 AT&T Labs

• Introduction• Related Work• Background• Overview• Firewall Characteristics• Firewall Inference• Conclusion and Future Work

Outline

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Page 3: Firewall Fingerprinting Amir R. Khakpour 1, Joshua W. Hulst 1, Zhihui Ge 2, Alex X. Liu 1, Dan Pei 2, Jia Wang 2 1 Michigan State University 2 AT&T Labs

• Motivation• Firewalls are the first line of defense in network traffic• Firewalls also have vulnerabilities• The first step of attacks is to do firewall fingerprinting

• Previous Limitation• Mostly OS fingerprinting• Bridge mode makes firewalls not directly accessible

• Packet header analysis is useless in firewall fingerprinting

• Challenges• Closed source• Parameters and configuration details• Not remote accessible

• Difficult to infer firewall types

Introduction

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Page 4: Firewall Fingerprinting Amir R. Khakpour 1, Joshua W. Hulst 1, Zhihui Ge 2, Alex X. Liu 1, Dan Pei 2, Jia Wang 2 1 Michigan State University 2 AT&T Labs

• This paper …• Propose a set techniques that can collect information about

firewalls• Identify characteristics

• Packet classification algorithms• Performance in different traffic load

• Identify firewalls

Introduction

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Page 5: Firewall Fingerprinting Amir R. Khakpour 1, Joshua W. Hulst 1, Zhihui Ge 2, Alex X. Liu 1, Dan Pei 2, Jia Wang 2 1 Michigan State University 2 AT&T Labs

• OS fingerprinting tools• NMAP• xprobe2++• p0f

• OS fingerprinting research• Medeiros et al.• Snacktime

• Firewall performance• Lyu and Lau• Funke et al.

Related Work

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Page 6: Firewall Fingerprinting Amir R. Khakpour 1, Joshua W. Hulst 1, Zhihui Ge 2, Alex X. Liu 1, Dan Pei 2, Jia Wang 2 1 Michigan State University 2 AT&T Labs

• Firewall policies

• Caching• Rule caching:

• 4-tuple: source IP, dest. IP, dest. port, and protocol type

• Flow caching:• 5-tuple: +source port

Background

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Page 7: Firewall Fingerprinting Amir R. Khakpour 1, Joshua W. Hulst 1, Zhihui Ge 2, Alex X. Liu 1, Dan Pei 2, Jia Wang 2 1 Michigan State University 2 AT&T Labs

• Statefulness• A stateful firewall tracks TCP sessions in a state table by examining

the TCP flags of incoming TCP packets

• Packet Classification Solutions• Software based solutions

• Sequential search• Complex data structures

• Ternary Content Addressable Memory (TCAM)

Background

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Page 8: Firewall Fingerprinting Amir R. Khakpour 1, Joshua W. Hulst 1, Zhihui Ge 2, Alex X. Liu 1, Dan Pei 2, Jia Wang 2 1 Michigan State University 2 AT&T Labs

• Measurements based on probe packet processing time

Overview

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Page 9: Firewall Fingerprinting Amir R. Khakpour 1, Joshua W. Hulst 1, Zhihui Ge 2, Alex X. Liu 1, Dan Pei 2, Jia Wang 2 1 Michigan State University 2 AT&T Labs

• Probe packets• TCP Fix: A sequence of TCP packets with the same packet header• TCP Vary: A sequence of TCP packets with the same packet

header except the source port which is chosen randomly for each packet

• UDP Fix: A sequence of UDP packets with the same packet header

• UDP Vary: A sequence of UDP packets with the same packet header except the source port which is chosen randomly for each probe packet

Firewall Characteristics

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Page 10: Firewall Fingerprinting Amir R. Khakpour 1, Joshua W. Hulst 1, Zhihui Ge 2, Alex X. Liu 1, Dan Pei 2, Jia Wang 2 1 Michigan State University 2 AT&T Labs

• Background traffic load

• Measuring PPT• Local measurement• Remote measurement

• Packet Classification Algorithm• Whether a firewall adopts a sequential search based algorithm• Whether the performance of a firewall is sensitive to traffic load• How a firewall performs in terms of the PPT

Firewall Characteristics

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Page 11: Firewall Fingerprinting Amir R. Khakpour 1, Joshua W. Hulst 1, Zhihui Ge 2, Alex X. Liu 1, Dan Pei 2, Jia Wang 2 1 Michigan State University 2 AT&T Labs

• Generating a sequence of probe packets where each packet matches exactly one of the rules in the policy

• PPT measurement• Linear: probably sequential search• Different pattern (or lack of change) : not sequential search

Firewall Characteristics – Sequential Search

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Page 12: Firewall Fingerprinting Amir R. Khakpour 1, Joshua W. Hulst 1, Zhihui Ge 2, Alex X. Liu 1, Dan Pei 2, Jia Wang 2 1 Michigan State University 2 AT&T Labs

Firewall Characteristics – Sequential Search

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0.1176

0.1645

0.1411

-0.0317

Page 13: Firewall Fingerprinting Amir R. Khakpour 1, Joshua W. Hulst 1, Zhihui Ge 2, Alex X. Liu 1, Dan Pei 2, Jia Wang 2 1 Michigan State University 2 AT&T Labs

Firewall Characteristics – Sequential Search

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0.1339

0.0208

0.3809

-0.0073

Page 14: Firewall Fingerprinting Amir R. Khakpour 1, Joshua W. Hulst 1, Zhihui Ge 2, Alex X. Liu 1, Dan Pei 2, Jia Wang 2 1 Michigan State University 2 AT&T Labs

Firewall Characteristics – Sequential Search

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0.0033

0.0082

Page 15: Firewall Fingerprinting Amir R. Khakpour 1, Joshua W. Hulst 1, Zhihui Ge 2, Alex X. Liu 1, Dan Pei 2, Jia Wang 2 1 Michigan State University 2 AT&T Labs

60.3360

77.5470

151.7891

Firewall Characteristics – Sensitivity to Traffic Load

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4.6034 2.7385

0.9874

Page 16: Firewall Fingerprinting Amir R. Khakpour 1, Joshua W. Hulst 1, Zhihui Ge 2, Alex X. Liu 1, Dan Pei 2, Jia Wang 2 1 Michigan State University 2 AT&T Labs

Firewall Characteristics – Sensitivity to Traffic Load

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50.3710

49.7796

126.735292.8078

Page 17: Firewall Fingerprinting Amir R. Khakpour 1, Joshua W. Hulst 1, Zhihui Ge 2, Alex X. Liu 1, Dan Pei 2, Jia Wang 2 1 Michigan State University 2 AT&T Labs

• Cache effectiveness (C) : the ratio of the PPT for the first probe packet to the median PPT of the rest in the same sequence• C > 1: effective caching• C ~= 1: no caching or not effective

• Effective in TCP Fix and UDP Fix• Caching 5 fields in header flow caching

• Effective in TCP Vary and UDP Vary• Caching 4 fields (no source port) rule caching

Firewall Characteristics – Caching and Statefulness

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Page 18: Firewall Fingerprinting Amir R. Khakpour 1, Joshua W. Hulst 1, Zhihui Ge 2, Alex X. Liu 1, Dan Pei 2, Jia Wang 2 1 Michigan State University 2 AT&T Labs

Firewall Characteristics – Caching and Statefulness

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Page 19: Firewall Fingerprinting Amir R. Khakpour 1, Joshua W. Hulst 1, Zhihui Ge 2, Alex X. Liu 1, Dan Pei 2, Jia Wang 2 1 Michigan State University 2 AT&T Labs

Firewall Characteristics – Packet Protocol and Payload Size

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Page 20: Firewall Fingerprinting Amir R. Khakpour 1, Joshua W. Hulst 1, Zhihui Ge 2, Alex X. Liu 1, Dan Pei 2, Jia Wang 2 1 Michigan State University 2 AT&T Labs

Firewall Characteristics – Packet Protocol and Payload Size

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Page 21: Firewall Fingerprinting Amir R. Khakpour 1, Joshua W. Hulst 1, Zhihui Ge 2, Alex X. Liu 1, Dan Pei 2, Jia Wang 2 1 Michigan State University 2 AT&T Labs

• 2 consecutive probe packets• Each: TCP SYN flag set, and another TCP flag set

Firewall Inference – TCP Probe Packets

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Page 22: Firewall Fingerprinting Amir R. Khakpour 1, Joshua W. Hulst 1, Zhihui Ge 2, Alex X. Liu 1, Dan Pei 2, Jia Wang 2 1 Michigan State University 2 AT&T Labs

• A dataset• 3600 data points• Each point: 11 consecutive probe packets in 4 modes(TCP Fix,…)

with and w/o payload (total 8 times)• Packets collected in 3 load level: no load, medium load, full load• Point: x = <x1, x2 … x24> (24 features)

• x3i-2 : median

• x3i-1 : STD

• x3i : cache effectiveness

• Labels• Y1 = {‘FW1’, ‘FW2’, ‘FW3’}• Y2 = {‘stateful’, ‘stateless’}• Y3 = {‘FW1-SF’, ‘FW2-SF’, ‘FW3-SF’, ‘FW1-SL’, ‘FW2-SL’, ‘FW3-SL’}

Firewall Inference – Packet Processing Time

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Page 23: Firewall Fingerprinting Amir R. Khakpour 1, Joshua W. Hulst 1, Zhihui Ge 2, Alex X. Liu 1, Dan Pei 2, Jia Wang 2 1 Michigan State University 2 AT&T Labs

• SVM

Firewall Inference – Packet Processing Time

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Page 24: Firewall Fingerprinting Amir R. Khakpour 1, Joshua W. Hulst 1, Zhihui Ge 2, Alex X. Liu 1, Dan Pei 2, Jia Wang 2 1 Michigan State University 2 AT&T Labs

Firewall Inference – Packet Processing Time

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Page 25: Firewall Fingerprinting Amir R. Khakpour 1, Joshua W. Hulst 1, Zhihui Ge 2, Alex X. Liu 1, Dan Pei 2, Jia Wang 2 1 Michigan State University 2 AT&T Labs

Firewall Inference – Packet Processing Time

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Page 26: Firewall Fingerprinting Amir R. Khakpour 1, Joshua W. Hulst 1, Zhihui Ge 2, Alex X. Liu 1, Dan Pei 2, Jia Wang 2 1 Michigan State University 2 AT&T Labs

• A methods for finding the firewall characteristics• Using these characteristics, this paper show 2 methods

for inferring firewall implementation

• Future work• Defense mechanisms

Conclusion and Future Work

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