Roksana

Gabidullina

December 14,

2015

Clientelism, patronage, and the indigenous democracy in the Kyrgyz

Republic

I have neither given nor received unauthorized aid on this

assignment.

Roksana Gabidullina

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Kyrgyzstan is the only country in Central Asia (here defined as

the post-Soviet Union states) that is going through the democratization

process. Indeed, it recently held parliamentary elections that were

corrupt still but less so due to the new technologies involved, such as

fingerprint scanning to minimize carousel voting. But it is also known

to have “clan” relationships, relationships that are very similar to

patronage or clientelism systems. While many consider these systems

to be a corrupting influence on the political process, Fukuyama argues

that clientelism rather than being a corruptive force can under some

circumstances be a sign of early democratic practice since this creates

a system of reciprocity between the elected officials and their

supporters/clients, thus creating a system of accountability and mass

mobilization (Fukuyama 2014, 91). Clientelism must not be discounted

in studies of democratization.

This paper’s research question is as follows: Does the clientelist

system in the Kyrgyz Republic generate democratic processes, such as

reciprocity, accountability, and mass mobilization and thus, be a form

of an early democracy? For Fukuyama, the clientelism entails a

reciprocal relationship between the patron and clients but it differs

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from a patronage system in its larger scale (Fukuyama 2014, 90). The

reason why it’s an early form of democracy is because it promotes

reciprocity, which can, in turn, become accountability for both sides

(Fukuyama 2014, 90). The patron is accountable to the client for

services promised and the client is responsible for supporting the

patron. If the patron fails in delivering promises, then he/she can be

replaced, thus ensuring accountability. Furthermore, this clientelist

system can mobilize voters during election time (Fukuyama 2014, 91).

By studying the system in Kyrgyzstan and its effects on constituency

mobilization, we can confirm or deny Fukuyama’s assertion that

clientelism is an early manifestation of a democracy.

When looking into clientelism and democratization, one must

focus on the patron and clients in the political arena. In this case, I will

focus on the relationship between government officials and their

supporters/clients. In exchange for client’s political support in the

elections, the patron gives jobs, scholarships, or invests in the

community. To find out whether reciprocity exists in Kyrgyzstan’s

clientelist system, I will focus on these exchanges between

government officials and their electorate. Accountability is understood

to mean that if the patron fails to deliver on goods, he/she may be

replaced. Thus, I will also focus on whether an official is punished for

failing to fulfill their end of the bargain by the community withholding

their votes or replacing him/her with someone else. I focus on these

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specifically because check on power, accountability, and elections are

used as markers of democratization.

Background & Theory

The Kyrgyz Republic was once a part of the Soviet Union. The

area that comprises the state was slowly conquered by the Russian

Imperial Army, remained under Imperial Russian rule, and then was

captured by Bolsheviks after sustained fighting by Central Asian rebels

called Basmachis until the 1920s (Roy 2000, 25,58-60). In the October

of 1936, the Autonomous Republic of Kyrgyzia, as it was called then,

became a Soviet Republic (Roy 2000, 61). Kyrgyzstan along with

Tajikistan was one of the more underdeveloped Soviet Republics since

most of the Moscow’s attention was fixated on Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan,

and Turkmenistan. Thus, after obtaining independence at the end of

1991, Kyrgyz Republic was the poorest and experienced a sharp

decline in standard of living and a tumultuous consolidation of power

(Rashid 2002, 68).

Various factions contested the elections in the 90s in the newly

established Kyrgyz Republic coming mostly from the north and south

divide of the country (Luong 2002, 80). The split started with the

Russian imperial invasion when the northern part of the republic came

under Russian rule in 1885. Twenty years later in 1870s did the

southern part of the country become incorporated into the Russian

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Empire after the fall of the Kokand Khanate (Luong 2002, 76). Scholars

write that this divide, which existed due to geographic differences,

solidified and became politicized during the Soviet Union (Luong 2002,

76; Gleason 1997, 98; Cooley 2012, 24-5). The Soviet administration

divided the two regions into oblasty (regions) and reinforced “a sense

of affiliation with a particular piece of territory among the nomadic

Kyrgyz…” and the region became a “surrogate” for the tribal unit

(Luong 2002, 78). After independence, this north south split continued

to affect politics (Roy 2000, 137). The Soviet administration had

divided the north and south with the former primarily industrial and

more educated and the latter more agricultural—a distinction that

continues to this day (Luong 2002, 79).

After the fall, the different factions coming from the different

regions agreed to choose Askar Akaev to be the first post-Soviet

President because he was a learned individual and was a politically

neutral figure (Rashid 2002, 68). Although, Akaev was elected

president, he faced northern and southern factions fighting not only

amongst each other for the resources but also with the president

(Gleason 1997, 98).

‘As a result, the southerners would win because they in the arithmetic majority. The northerners couldn’t accept that, since the capital is in the north’. (Gleason 1997, 98)

Due to the pressures coming from the different factions and from

international donors, the liberally minded Akaev, in turn, gave a lot of

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leeway to the regional government officials, who implemented policies

in the way they wanted to. For example, he wanted to privatize land

but the implementation was left to the local officials (Gleason 1997,

97). They did not follow all of president’s directives and this, along with

strings of natural disasters that marred progress in the country,

pushed Akaev to become more autocratic and eliminate competition

(Roy 2000, 137-8).

Some people attribute corruption and gradual slide of Kyrgyzstan

to authoritarianism (it is currently considered to be a semi-

authoritarian state) to patronage politics (Cooley 2012, 134). The

officials are corrupt once they take part in “illegal transaction[s] where

public and private actors exchange goods for their own enrichment at

the expense of society at large” (Manzetti and Wilson 2007, 952). Once

the corrupt officials become patrons and are “linked to those of lower

social status (clients) in personal ties of reciprocity…patronage and

corruption overlap” (Hutchcroft 1997, 645). Thus, they only take care

of themselves and their client’s needs and have little incentive to

change the system; rather they become vested in keeping

“government institutions cumbersome, corrupt, and ineffective

because this situation enhances their legitimacy status with poor

voters as the true problem solvers” (Manzetti and Wilson 2007, 955).

This hinders not only economic development but also democratization

because only patron’s supporters hold important positions, the

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opposition is pushed out, and patrons use the system to convince

people that only they can solve their problems (Reeves, Rasanayagam,

and Beyer 2014, 19; Cooley 2012, 153; Manzetti and Wilson 2007,

955). Corruption in the Kyrgyz Republic has worsened over the years

as shown by the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators. Since

corruption negatively impacts the ability of the government,

government effectiveness, rule of law, and regulatory quality have also

worsened (Manzetti and Wilson 2007, 955). In this system, fewer

people would want reform because they would not be able to pursue

their own interests. Accountability to the majority of people does not

exist and it is just a “division of spoils” system (Radnitz 2010, 212).

These are fair criticisms but as we will see later, clientelism can

play a dynamic role in Kyrgyzstan’s democratization process by

creating what Radnitz calls “subversive clientelism”, in which various

opposition forces can activate their networks and topple a president,

who no longer listens to their needs (Radnitz 2010, 80-2). Furthermore,

Kyrgyzstan’s regional divide and less powerful central state allow

officials to compete for scarce resources, thus keeping one faction

from becoming too powerful (Simons 2008, 36). During the Soviet

Union, the leaders of Kyrgyzstan would change between those coming

from the north or south and this pattern continued after the Kyrgyz

Republic obtained independence (Luong 2002, 79). Furthermore, the

different secretaries chosen from different regions used their “positions

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of power to bolster the political and economic position of their

respective oblasts, while maintaining a careful balance among regional

factions” (Luong 2002, 80). This ensured the representation of different

interests, the industrial North and agricultural South, which is

considered to be a good sign for democratization.

Although, government effectiveness, rule of law, and regulatory

quality have been negatively affected as control of corruption has

worsened, the voice and accountability has increased since 1996 in the

Kyrgyz Republic (Worldwide Governance Indicators).

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Because there are limited seats in Parliament, many people compete

for people’s votes on the ground. Those who seem to represent the

people’s needs will be more likely to be selected. Here the “political

contestation” is going to be organized through patron-client factions

and the patrons who will be able to attract the most votes will be

elected (Khan 2005, 705). Those who are patrons try to meet people’s

needs by providing certain goods and services, such as repairing

infrastructure, building schools and mosques, providing scholarships or

loans, or forgiving debts, to name a few (Radnitz 2010, 85). Table 1

shows a list of “clientelist investment” or the list of services patrons

make available for their clients. They can be material, symbolic,

collective, and private (Radnitz 2010, 85). They also campaign on the

promise that they will represent local concerns in the parliament and

all of these actions help to ensure that their clients will vote for them in

the elections (Ismailbekova 2014, 81). Clientelism enables competition

for political power and resources and, in turn, representation in

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Kyrgyzstan.

Fukuyama argues that clientelism is different from patronage in

one key aspect: scale. Clientelism is a larger system that requires

intermediaries between the patron and his/her clients because the

patron cannot meet face to face with every one of his/her clients.

Patronage is on a smaller scale and both the patron and client know

each other (Fukuyama 2014, 86). On the national level and, especially,

on the side of the president, clientelism occurs. The president’s clients

include his family, the region he is from, friends, party, and party’s

electorate. The president cannot meet with every single of his

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constituents, so he has intermediaries—his party—to deliver goods and

services to clients. The clients, in turn, support his party and by

extension, the president. Patronage networks take place within the

local context, such as in cities and villages. The patron here knows the

villagers and the villagers know the patron on a personal level; he can

be the village head’s son or local wealthy businessman. Both systems

as defined by Fukuyama exist in the Kyrgyz Republic.

Clientelism and the Tulip Revolution

In 2005, the opposition members, who took advantage of their

networks to mobilize 40, 000 people to come out and protest against

the president, ousted the president (Radnitz 2010, 131). Akaev was

trying to minimize the opposition by shutting down or buying off

opposition newspapers and enriching his own network (McGlinchey

2011, 92-94). Furthermore, he was enriching himself and his family

thorough the use of rents in return for U.S. access to the air base in

Manas and his family controlled businesses from cement plants,

television channel, newspaper, radio station, ski base, sanatoriums,

and numerous joint stock companies (McGlinchey 2011, 98-9). This

type of control existed since the beginning of the republic but, in terms

of reciprocity, Akaev was able to share and diffuse the vast amounts of

foreign aid he was receiving to his clients within and without the

government (McGlinchey 2011, 96). He delivered on his end by

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appointing supporters to the lucrative positions in the government and

by dispersing money to the regional elites and the NGOs he saw as his

clients and the clients rarely rebelled against him (McGlinchey 2011,

88, 96). He lost this accountability when his clients, especially the

elites, saw their patron (Akaev) disproportionately and directly benefit

from the American fuel contracts. He was not sharing these resources

and was jailing his opponents and former supporters, such as the

Prime Minister Roza Otumbaeva. They defected and activated their

own clientelist networks to mobilize and, ultimately, overthrow the

president.

The opposition tried to fight against him on charges of corruption

but only mobilized people when the president arrested prominent

members, who played the role of patrons to their clients, and many

were deprived of their seats in parliament, which can cut off access to

limited resources, thus decreasing their abilities to deliver what they

promised (Radnitz 2014, 134, 206).

The catalysts were autonomous elites (wealthy businessmen, former government officials, former or active parliamentarians) who were bound to ordinary citizens through the clientelist ties and linked to other elites through preexisting networks. When a number of embedded elites who were running for parliament failed to win in the first round of the elections, they contested the results outside institutional channels…mobilizing street demonstrations….The revolution highlighted the importance of the relatively permissive institutional context in Kyrgyzstan, in which elites independent of the regime were not only able to win the allegiance of the people in their communities but also managed to establish crucial cross-village and cross regional ties to other elites, which solved a

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problem posed by the absence of other cross-regional networks. (Radnitz 2010, 132)

In terms of reciprocity, majority of these elites were relatively wealthy

and thus, were patrons (Radnitz 2011, 137). For example, Jeenbekov,

who lost the first round of elections, and his son were the largest

employers in his village and in Russia and when compared to other

villages, the people in this one lived in “two-story houses, new

mosques, paved roads, and [] modern drainage system” (Radnitz 144).

This patronage was reciprocated when several villagers started

protests when asked to by his son (Radnitz 2011, 145). Then several

other parliamentary runners and their clients from neighboring villages

joined the protests. When national MPs joined, such as Otumbaeva and

Bakiev, the coalition of opposition members grew and became more

national. Then, they gathered, famously, at the Ala-Too square and in

front of the White House and overthrew the president. When asked

why people protested, they said because the arrested people were

theirs, in a sense that the patrons were part of the communities for

supporting them financially and representing their interests (Radnitz

2014, 158). The clients were mobilized to protest to protect their

patrons and protest against those they thought did not represent their

interests. Clientelism played a prominent role in the revolution (Radnitz

2014, 157). Although the mobilization of a network may not seem to be

democratic, it has allowed for a powerful opposition to develop and

vice versa, which checked the power of an authoritarian ruler, who was

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not sharing resources nor power. This, seems to be a case for patron-

clients relationship becoming Radnitz’s “subversive clientelism” that

can represent different interests coming from national and local

governments and even topple a ruler. This may force the leader to be

more accountable lest he be chased out of the country, as it happened

with Akaev.

Voting, clientelism, and the conditions for the foundations of

democracy

As for voting, the patronage network can be a force for

democratization. The relationship between the patronage system and

democracy in Kyrgyzstan is characterized by an “indigenized

understanding of democracy”, where the representative to the

government is the patron of the village and is expected to represent

the locals rather than the national interest but during election also

promotes supporters’ active participation in the political process

(Ismailbekova 2014, 78-80). The representative or “native son” is

“responsive to local sentiment, local norms and practices, and local

identity”—representation that is essential for a democracy

(Ismailbekova 2014, 81). The process for democratic involvement and

participation included the elderly mobilizing the youth and acquainting

the village with the voting rules in the belief that their “native son”,

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who, up to this point, has supported the villagers financially, will do so

on the national stage (Ismailbekova 2014, 87).

To make sure that their votes were not corrupted in the capital,

they would call other to make sure the results were not falsified

(Ismailbekova 2014, 88). The villagers mobilized and tried to promote

accountability by threatening to protest if the results were falsified. In

the end, their representative, their “native son”, and their patron was

elected as a Member of Parliament and later fulfilled the villagers

request for a local café (Ismailbekova 2014, 90, 92). In this one

example, the patronage system ensured political representation and

investment in the community (Ismailbekova 2014, 93-4). Similar

dynamics play out in other cities and villages as well, since these

patronage networks exist in both southern and northern regions.

Patronage politics not only helped with local economic development—

new cafes, roads, mosques, and employment--but also with promoting

democratic norms, namely representation and voice in government

once their patron was elected.

Conclusion

Clientelism and patronage networks are largely seen as forces

that keep the country from developing further and equitably—whether

economically or democratically. Yet, these two systems in the Kyrgyz

Republic were used for political mobilization and development. Since

the Kyrgyz Republic has a more robust opposition than in the

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surrounding countries, these oppositions can check the power of the

central government as demonstrated by the revolutions and can

mobilize people to vote, which are seen as signs of democratization.

Furthermore, it can ensure the representation of needs from those who

did not have their voices heard before. These people can then expect

to be rewarded by having their communities invested in. In the current

context of Kyrgyzstan, where resources are scarce and competition is

high, having a patron is the best way to ensure representation and

economic development, both of which are goals that people around the

world want. Furthermore, the democratic practices, such as reciprocity,

accountability, and mass mobilization are presented in societies with

patron-client relationships and rather than clientelism having a

thoroughly negative impact on the communities, it, as stated before,

allows for development and representation. It can also be a powerful

weapon for toppling an overly corrupt leader. Perhaps, this loyalty to a

patron can slowly turn into a loyalty for a party on a national scale and

allow for a full democratization to take place; the elders are, after all,

acquainting themselves and their villages with voting rules and

mobilization.

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