fiction no original (stanford encyclopedia of philosophy)
DESCRIPTION
Philosophical issues surrounding fiction have attracted increasing attention from philosophers over the past fewdecades. What follows is a discussion of one familiar and quite fundamental topic in this area: fictional entities (both the issue of what such entities might be like and whether there really aresuch entities). The discussion will form the second part of a projected twopartentry on Fiction, with the first part to cover such topics as the nature of fiction, the notion of truth in fiction,and the character of our emotional responses to fiction.TRANSCRIPT
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Stanford Encyclopedia of PhilosophyFictionFirstpublishedWedJul20,2011
Philosophicalissuessurroundingfictionhaveattractedincreasingattentionfromphilosophersoverthepastfewdecades.Whatfollowsisadiscussionofonefamiliarandquitefundamentaltopicinthisarea:fictionalentities(boththeissueofwhatsuchentitiesmightbelikeandwhethertherereallyaresuchentities).ThediscussionwillformthesecondpartofaprojectedtwopartentryonFiction,withthefirstparttocoversuchtopicsasthenatureoffiction,thenotionoftruthinfiction,andthecharacterofouremotionalresponsestofiction.
Afamiliarcharacteristicofworksoffictionisthattheyfeaturefictionalcharacters:individualswhoseexploitsarewrittenaboutinworksoffictionandwhomaketheirfirstappearanceinaworkoffiction.Shakespeare'sHamlet,forexample,featuresthefictionalcharacterHamlet,Doyle'sTheHoundoftheBaskervillesfeaturesSherlockHolmes,Tolstoy'sAnnaKareninafeaturesAnnaKarenina,andsoon.Alloftheseworksfeaturenumerousotherfictionalcharacters,ofcourse(OpheliaandDrWatson,forexample)indeed,someworksoffictionarecharacterizedbythesheerabundanceoftheircharacters(Russiannovelsareoftensaidtohavethischaracteristic).Fictionalcharactersbelongtotheclassofentitiesvariouslyknownasfictionalentitiesorfictionalobjectsorficta,aclassthatincludesnotjustanimateobjectsoffiction(fictionalpersons,animals,monsters,andsoon)butalsoinanimateobjectsoffictionsuchasfictionalplaces(AnthonyTrollope'scathedraltownofBarchesterandTolkien'shomeoftheelves,Rivendell,forexample).Asstated,however,itdoesn'tincludeentitieslocatedintherealworld,althoughrealentitiesdohaveanimportantroletoplayinworksoffiction.Thus,neitherLondonnorNapoleonarefictionalentities,althoughthefirstisthequiteessentialbackdroptowhatgoesonintheHolmesstorieswhilethesecondplaysanimportantroleintheeventsdescribedinWarandPeace.(WhileLondonandNapoleonarenotfictionalentities,somehavethoughtthattheLondonoftheHolmesstoriesandtheNapoleonofWarandPeacearefictionalentities.)
Theabovecharacterizationsuggeststhatfictionalentitiesconstituteaspecialtypeofentity.Notsurprisingly,then,onefundamentalphilosophicalquestionwecanaskaboutfictionalentitiesisaquestionabouttheirnature:whatkindofthingisafictionalentity?Thisquestionisseparatefromwhatseemsanevenmorefundamentalquestion:whysupposethatthereareanyfictionalentitiesinthefirstplace?Afterall,ourworldnevercontainedaSherlockHolmesoraRivendelltheseallegedentitiesmaketheirappearanceinworksoffiction,notworksoffact.FollowingthedivisioninThomasson(1999),weshallcallthefirstquestionthemetaphysicalquestion,andthesecondtheontologicalquestion.
1.Themetaphysicsoffictionalentities1.1Possibilism1.2MeinongandneoMeinongianism1.3Creationism
2.Theontologyoffictionalentities2.1Semanticalargumentsforandagainstrealism2.2Ontologicalargumentsforandagainstrealism
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1.Themetaphysicsoffictionalentities
AsThomasson(1999:5)putsit,thefirstquestionamountstoasking:whatwouldfictionalentitiesbe,iftherewereany?Tothisquestiondifferentanswershavebeenproposed.Buthowevermuchtheydiffer,theyalltrytoaccommodatewhatseemstobeanintuitivedatumfacingphilosopherswhotheorizeaboutfictionalentities:theseentitieslackexistence,oratleastexistenceasordinaryphysicalobjects.AccordingtothisdatumcallitthenonexistencedatumparadigmaticobjectsoffictionlikeHamletandHolmesdonotexist.Wealsoappealtononexistenceinthissensewhenwewanttodisputetheviewthatsomeallegedindividualisagenuinehistoricalfigure,therebyunderliningourviewthatasearchforsuchentitieswouldbeinvain:wemightsay,forexample,thatKingArthurdoesnotexist.
Thosewhodonotbelievethatthereareanyfictionalentities(fictionalantirealists,asweshallcallthem)willclaimthatthenonexistencedatumhasanontologicalreadingonly:tosaythatfictionalentitiesdonotexistamountstosayingthatintheoveralldomainofwhatthereistherearenosuchthingsasfictionalentities.Astheyseeit,fictionalrealists(thosewhodobelievethattherearefictionalentities)aretheonlyonestogivethedatumacertainmetaphysicalreading,namelythatfictionalentitieshavethepropertyofnotexisting.Theymightalsoinsistthatfictionalrealistsaretheonlyonestothinkthatthenonexistenceoffictionalentitiesisdeterminedbytheirnatureasfictionalentities.Butthisoverstatesthecase.Becausetheyholdthattherearenosuchthingsasfictionalentities,evenantirealistsarelikelytoadmitthatthefactthatthereisnosuchthingassomeallegedentityXfollowsfromthefactthatXhasbeenshowntobefictional.ThatiswhathappenedinthecaseofKingArthurandmanyotherlegendaryormythologicalentities(fictionalentitiesinthebroadsense).Peopleoriginallysupposed(cf.GeoffreyofMonmouth'sHistoriaRegumBritanniae)thatKingArthurwasarealperson,aBritishleaderwhoruledEnglandafterthedepartureoftheRomans,untilitwasdiscoveredthatKingArthurismerelyafigureoflegend,afictionalentity.ItwasthisdiscoverythatlicensedtheconclusionthatKingArthurdoesn'texist.SoitseemsthatevenantirealistshaveastakeintheanswertothemetaphysicalquestionWhatwouldittakeforsomethingtobeafictionalentity?
Onefurthercommentaboutthenonexistencedatumbeforeweturntovariousaccountsoffictionalobjectsandthewaysinwhichsuchaccountscopewiththedatum.Aswehavealreadyseen,itisnaturalwhendiscussingthedatumtousequantifierssuchasSomethingsare(Therearethingsthatare),andEverythingis,whosedomainappearstoincludebothexistentandnonexistentobjects.Wedosowhenwesay,forexample,thatthereareobjects,suchasfictionalobjects,thatdon'texist.Fictionalantirealistswilltakesuchtalkwithagrainofsalt,sincetheydonotacknowledgeasenseinwhichtherereallyareanyfictionalobjects.Fictionalrealists,ontheotherhand,willthinkthatitisliterallytruethatthereareobjectslikeHamletandHolmesthatdon'texist.Theytypicallyacknowledgeadistinctionbetweenunrestrictedquantifiers,whosedomainincludesevennonexistentobjects,andrestrictedquantifiers,whosedomainincludesonlyexistentobjects.
1.1Possibilism
Onewaytoaccountforthenonexistencedatumisthepossibilisttheoryoffictionalentities,whichholdsthatfictionalentitiesdonotexistintheactualworldbutonlyinsomeotherpossibleworlds.Inthisrespect,fictionalentitiesarethoughttobelikeothermerelypossibleentitiessuchastalkingdonkeys.Accordingtostandardversionsofthepossibleworldsframework,somethingsnotpresentattheactualworldexistastalkingdonkeysatsomemerelypossibleworlds.Similarly,thepossibilisttheoryholdsthatSherlockHolmesdoesnotexistintheactualworld,althoughhedoesexistatsome
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merelypossibleworlds:worldsinwhichtheHolmesstoriesarefact.
Suchapossibilisttheoryisfacedwithaproblemofontologicalindeterminacy.ForthereismorethanonepossibleworldinwhichConanDoyle'sHolmesstoriesarefact,andinwhichthereisawitty,cocaineaddicteddetectivecalledHolmeswholivesat221BBakerSt.,hasafriendcalledWatson,anddoesthethingsrecordedofhimintheHolmesstories.NotalloftheseHolmescandidatesarethesamewhiletheyallmatcheachotherintermsofwhatthestoriessayaboutHolmes,theymaybeverydifferentinothercrucialwaystheymayhavehadverydifferentchildhoods,includingdifferentparents,andsoon.(Indeed,whencharactersareunderdescribedinastory,asinglepossibleworldmaycontainmanyindividualswhofitexactlywhatthestorysaysaboutthecharacter.)Wecannowask:whichofthesedifferentwitty,cocaineaddicteddetectivesisHolmes?(Cf.Kaplan(1973:5056),Kripke(1972/1980:1568).)Thereseemstobenoprincipledwayofdeciding.
KripkesuggeststhatthisindeterminacyshowsthatnoneofthesepossibleentitiesisHolmes,[f]orifso,whichone?(Kripke(1972/1980:1578).Butsuppose,forargument'ssake,thatthisindeterminacycouldsomehowberesolved,perhapsbythestoryincludingdetailsofcertainpropertiesthat,arguably,onlyHolmescouldhave,suchashisbeingtheonlypersontohaveoriginatedfromcertaingametes.Eveninthatcase,therewouldbestrongreasonnottoidentifyHolmeswithamerelypossibleentity.Takeadifferentcase,thatofthemythicalswordExcaliburextractedfromarockbyKingArthur.Aseveryoneknows,thissworddoesnotexist.Itsnonexistencewouldnotbethreatenedbysomeone'sdiscoveringanobjectwithallthepropertiesthattheBretoncycleascribestoExcalibur.Nomatterhowsimilar,anactualobjectthatresemblesafictionalobjectwouldnotbethatfictionalobject(Kripke(1972/1980:1578)).Now,movingfromtheactualworldtomerelypossibleworldsdoesnotchangethings:whyshouldExcaliburbeidentifiedevenwithamerelypossibleentity?HadamerelypossibleentityexactlymatchingExcaliburinitspropertiesbeenactual,itwouldnothavebeenthefictionalExcalibur,bytheKripkeanargumentrehearsedabove.SohowarethingsdifferentifthismerelypossibleExcaliburlikeswordremainsmerelypossible?Inanutshell,ifthereisagapbetweenfictionandreality,thereisalsoagapbetweenfictionandpossibility.
Thesedifficultiesforpossibilismdonotequallyaffectallversionsofthedoctrine.ConsiderDavidLewis'sversionofthedoctrine,whichisembeddedinhisrealistaccountofpossibleobjects(Lewis(1986)).Roughlyspeaking,LewistakesapossibleindividualtobeaHolmescandidateifithasHolmes'spropertiesinapossibleworldinwhichtheHolmesstoriesaretoldasknownfact(Lewis(1978)).ForLewis,eachsuchindividualisapartofoneworldandnotpartofanyotherworld(possibleindividualsareinasenseworldboundonLewis'sview)noHolmescandidateisthereforeidenticaltoanyotherHolmescandidate.Butunlikemoredoctrinairepossibilists,Lewiscanusehiscounterparttheory(Lewis(1986))toofferaprincipledwayofcountingeachsuchHolmescandidateasbeingHolmes.SupposeyouareareaderoftheHolmesstories.EachHolmescandidateisacounterpartforyouofeveryotherHolmescandidate.Foreveniftheyshoulddiffersubstantiallyintermsofoverallqualitativesimilarity,thevariousHolmescandidatesareallcounterpartsbyacquaintanceforyou(or,asLewisseemstohavethought,foryourcommunityoffellowreaders)theyareall,intheirrespectiveworlds,thepersoncalledHolmeswhomyouoryourcommunity(orrather,yourcounterparts)learnaboutbyreadingtheHolmesstories,toldasknownfact.(Cf.Lewis(1983)Currie(1990:1379)Kroon(1994).)Inshort,thefactthattherearesomanydistinctHolmescandidatesislessembarrassingforLewisthanitisforotherpossibilists.(SeealsothesuggestioninSainsbury(2010:823)thatLewiscouldhaveaccommodatedapluralityofpossibleHolmescandidatesbyrefusingtoidentifyHolmeswithanyofthem,insteadmodelingtherelationbetweentalkofHolmesandtalkofthesepossibleHolmescandidatesonthemodelofthenotionofprecisificationusedinLewis'ssemanticsofvagueness.)
Lewis'scounterparttheoryisnotwidelyaccepted,however.Ingeneral,Kripkeanobjectionsagainstpossibilismaboutfictionalentitieshavebeenmoreinfluential.Somehaveargued,however,thatsuchobjectionsonlysucceedifweuseavariabledomainconceptionofwhatthereistoquantifyoverat
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anyparticularworld,aconceptionthatallowsthesetofobjectsavailableatoneworldtodifferfromthesetofobjectsavailableatanotherworld(Kripke'spreferredsemanticsformodallogicisofthiskind.)Supposeinsteadthatoneadoptsaversionofafixeddomainconceptionofquantificationonwhichonehasafictionalindividualatone'sdisposalasanonexistententityintheactualworldandasanexistententityinotherpossibleworlds(Priest(2005),Berto(2011)).Ifso,theindeterminacyproblemmaynotarise.AsPriest(2005:11920)putsit,wefirstofallhaveDoyle'sconceptionofSherlockHolmesthisSherlockHolmestheHolmesthatDoyleconceivesofisanindividualintheactualworldbutitdoesnotexistthereitexistsonlyinotherworlds.ForPriest,then,Doyledoesn'tarbitrarilypickoneHolmescandidatefromamongallpossibleHolmescandidates,eachlocatedinitsownpossibleworld.Rather,DoyleintendsaparticularindividualthatdoesnotexistintheactualworldbutwhichinsteadrealizestheHolmesstoriesinsomeotherpossibleworlds.Trivially,thisindividualisHolmes.(Doylemanagesthiseventhoughtheactualworldcontainsmanyotherpossibleindividualsthatdon'texisttherebutrealizetheHolmesstoriesinotherpossibleworlds(Priest2005:934).)Ofcourse,onemightstillwonderhowitisthatDoyleisacquaintedwiththisindividualviatheintentionalityofhisthought,asPriestclaims,ratherthanwithanyoftheotherHolmescandidates.Isauthorialintendingacreativeact,perhaps,onethatfirstbringsitaboutthatthereisanobjectoftherightkind,asThomasson(1999:90)suggests?AlltheindicationsarethatPriestrejectssuchaview:anactofpureintentioncanintendanobjectevenwhenthereareotherindiscriminableobjects(2005:142).
Suchapossibilismalsofacesanotherproblem.ForPriest,asforotherpossibilists,fictionalentitiesdonotactuallypossessthepropertiesintermsofwhichtheyarecharacterizedintherelevantstoriestheyonlyhavethesepropertiesin(someof)theworldsinwhichtheyexist.SherlockHolmes,forinstance,isnotactuallyadetectivesincehedoesnotexist.Rather,Holmesisonlypossiblyadetectiveheisonlyadetectiveinpossibleworldsinwhichheexists.(Notethatheisnotadetectiveinalltheworldsinwhichheexists,sinceitispresumablyatruthaboutHolmesthathemightnothavehadthecareerthatheendedupwithinsomepossibleworlds,Holmesthereforeexistswithoutbeingadetective.)Now,itisadmittedlystrangetosaythatafictionalobjectlikeHolmesisadetectiveintheverysamesenseinwhich,say,acertainactualmemberoftheNewYorkpoliceforceisadetective.ButretreatingtothepossibilistviewthatHolmeshassuchpropertiesonlyinmerelypossibleworldscarriesitsowncostsforonething,itseemstounderestimatetheroleoftheactualworldinvariousfamiliarrelationalclaimswecanmakeaboutfictionalobjects.Considercasesinwhichwecomparesuchobjectswithactualconcreteindividuals.Supposewesay:
(1)Holmesisclevererthananyactualdetective.
WeseemtobesayingthatHolmesactuallyhassuchcomparativefeatures,thatis,hasthemintheactualworld,notmerelyinsomepossibleworldorother.Supposethatweread(1)insteadassaying,laPriest:
(1P)Holmesispossiblyclevererthananyactualdetective.
(Moreprecisely,relativetoworldsinwhichHolmesisasheisdescribedtobeintheHolmesstories,Holmeshasagreaterdegreeofclevernessthanthatpossessedbyanydetectiveintheactualworldcf.Priest(2005:123).)Butnosuchcrossworldwayofreading(1)matchesthewaywewouldreadanyothersentenceinvolvingacomparisonbetweenindividuals.Take:
(2)Stalinwascruelerthananyotheractualdictator.
Itwouldclearlybeincorrecttoread(2)as:
(2P)Stalinwaspossiblycruelerthananyotheractualdictator
(say,inthesensethat,relativetoworldsinwhichStalinfitstheorthodoxaccountofhisactivities,Staliniscruelerthananyotherdictatorintheactualworld).(2)isintendedtobeasubstantiveclaim
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abouthowStalinactuallywas,notaclaimabouthowhemighthavebeen.(Inaddition,apossibilistreadinglike(1P)makesithardtomakesenseoftheattitudesweholdtowardsfictionalcharacters.OurbeliefinHolmes'sgreatclevernessexplainsouradmirationforHolmes,justasourbeliefinAnnaKarenina'ssufferingexplainsourpityforAnnaKarenina.ItishardtoseehowourbeliefinHolmes'spossibleintelligencecoulddothis.Surelywedonotgettobeadmirablemerelybybeingthoughttohaveadmirationevokingfeaturesinsomeotherpossibleworld?)
Thenextapproachtofictionalentitiestobediscussed(the(neo)Meinongianapproach)isabletoavoidsuchproblems.Butbeforewedescribethisapproach,weshouldnotethatPriesthimselfsubscribestoabroadertheorythanpossibilism.Asmanyphilosophershavenoted,fictionalnarrativesareofteninconsistent.TheHolmesstories,forexample,characterizeDrWatsonashavingawarwoundonasingleshoulder,variouslygivenashisleftandhisrightshoulder.Lewis(1983a:2778)suggeststhat,typically,impossiblefictionscanbedealtwithbyinvokingonlypossibleworlds(onLewis'spreferredview,bothandnotcanbetrueinsuchanimpossiblefiction,butnottheirconjunction).Buttherearedifficultieswiththissuggestionwhenextendedtocertaindeeplyentrenchedcontradictions.Thusconsidercertaintimetravelstories.Priesthimselfconcoctsastorythatwouldn'tmakesenseunlessaparticularfictionalboxSylvan'sboxwasanimpossibleobject(Priest(2005:125ff.)).PhilosopherslikePriestinvokeimpossibleworldstodealwithsuchstories,andarguethatsomefictionalobjectsareimpossibleobjectstotheextentthattheonlyworldsinwhichthestoriesthatcharacterizethemaretrueareimpossibleworlds.
1.2MeinongandneoMeinongianism
Accordingtopossibilism(perhapsextendedtoallowsomefictionalobjectstobeimpossibleobjects),fictionalobjectsarejustlikeactualobjects,exceptthattheyexistonlyinvariousnonactualworlds.Likeactualobjects,theyaredeterminatedowntothelastdetailinworldsinwhichtheyexist(solongasthestoriesthatcharacterizethemrepresenttheworldasbeingdeterminatedowntothelastdetail).Thisissoevenifthestoriesdonotthemselvesfillinthesedetails.Forexample,inworldsinwhichtheHolmesstoriesaretrue,Holmesislefthanded,righthanded,orambidextrous,eventhoughthestoriesthemselvesdonottelluswhich(allthatistrueintheHolmesstoriesisthat,havinghands,heisoneofthese).
1.2.1Meinong'stheoryofobjects
TheviewthatfictionalobjectsareMeinongianobjectsconstitutesaverydifferentmetaphysicaloption.Meinong(1904)thoughtthatoverandabovetheconcreteentitiesthatexistspatiotemporallyandtheidealorabstractentitiesthatexistnonspatiotemporally,thereareentitiesthatneitherexistspatiotemporallynorexistnonspatiotemporally:thesearetheparadigmaticMeinongianobjectsthatlackanykindofbeing.Meinonghimselfused[mere]subsistence(Bestehen)forthenonspatiotemporalkindofbeing,reservingexistence(Existenz)forthespatiotemporalkind.Seinwashiswordforthemostgeneralkindofbeing,whichincludesbothsubsistenceandexistence.Wewillcontinuetouseexistsforthemostgeneralmodeofbeing,i.e.,Meinong'sSein.
EventhoughMeinongianobjectsdonotexist,theydohaveproperties.Inparticular,Meinongthoughtthattheirbeingsuchandso(theirSosein)isindependentoftheirbeingorSein.TheseSoseinspecifyingproperties,moreover,arepreciselythepropertiesintermsofwhichtheobjectsaredescriptivelygiven.ThisclaimiscapturedbythesocalledCharacterizationPrinciple,whoseexplicitformulationisduetoRoutley(1980:46)butwhichisalreadyimplicitinMeinong(1904:82).AccordingtothisPrinciple,objects,whethertheyexistornot,havethepropertiesintermsofwhichtheyaregivenorcharacterizedschematically,thethingthatischaracterizedasbeingFisinfactF.Take,forinstance,thegoldenmountainortheroundsquare.Thegoldenmountaindoesnotexist,yetwecansaythatitisbothgoldenandamountainsincethesearethepropertiesintermsofwhichtheobjectischaracterizedsimilarly,theroundsquareisbothroundandsquare,eventhoughitcannotexist.
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ItiscommonlyassumedthatforMeinongfictionalobjectsarejustasubsetofhisMeinongianobjectstheyareMeinongianobjectsthataregivenintermsofthepropertiestheyhaveinthestoriesthatfeaturethem.Notethattheproblemforpossibilismmentionedtowardstheendofthelastsectiondisappearsonthisaccount.For,soconceived,fictionalentitiesdoinfactpossessthepropertiesintermsofwhichtheyarecharacterizedintherelevantnarratives:Holmesreallydoeshaveahighdegreeofcleverness,higher,perhaps,thanthatpossessedbyanyactualdetective,andso(1)mightwellbetrue.Notealsothatfictionalentitiessoconceivedarenotcompletelydeterminedwithrespecttotheirproperties,unlikefictionalentitiesconceivedonthemodelofpossibilism.BecauseConanDoyle'sstoriesarequietonthesematters,HolmesontheMeinongianmodelisnotrighthandednorishelefthandednorisheambidextrous.Hedoes,however,havethepropertyofbeingoneofthese.(Onecaution.AlthoughthisistheusualunderstandingofMeinong'sconceptionoffictionalobjects,Meinongmaynothaveendorseditinpreciselythisform:hismostcompleteaccountoffictionalobjectssuggeststhattheyarehigherorderentities,thatis,entitiesthatareconstructedoutofsimplerentities,inthesamesenseinwhich,forinstance,amelodyisanentityconstructedoutofitsconstituentsounds.Cf.Raspa(2001)andMarek(2009).)
1.2.2OrthodoxandunorthodoxneoMeinongianism
ModernversionsofMeinongianismacceptmuchofwhatMeinonghastosayonthetopicofnonexistentobjects,butdepartfromhisaccountatvariouspoints.Supposewerestrictourattentiontopropertiesappropriatetophysical,spatiotemporalobjects(forexample,beingamountainoradetective).WhatwemightcallorthodoxneoMeinongians(Parsons(1980),Routley(1980),Jacquette(1996))maintainthatMeinongianobjectscharacterizedintermsofsuchpropertiesareconcretecorrelatesofsetsofsuchproperties(concreteinthesensethattheobjectshavethepropertiesinexactlythesamesenseasordinaryobjectshavetheproperties).CorrespondingtoasetSofsuchproperties,thereisaconcreteobjectthathas(atleast)thepropertiescontainedinS.Correspondingto{beinggolden,beingamountain},forexample,thereisthegoldenmountain,whichhasthepropertiesofbeingamountainandbeinggolden(aswell,perhaps,asallpropertiesPsuchthatnecessarily,whateverisagoldenmountainisP).Thesepropertiesconstitutethenatureoressenceofthegoldenmountain.Butthegoldenmountainalsohasotherproperties,inparticularpropertiesthatreflectitsrelationshiptoactualobjectsintheworld(beingoftenthoughtaboutbyMeinong,forexample).
Fictionalobjectscansimilarlyberegardedasconcretecorrelatesofsetsofpropertiesonsuchaview.ConsiderHolmes,acocaineaddicteddetectivewholives(lived)inLondonat221BBakerStreet,solvesmanybafflingcrimes,hasafriendcalledWatson,andsoon(wheretheandsoonincludesallthepropertiesPsuchthatitistrueintheHolmesstoriesthatHolmeshasP).FororthodoxneoMeinongians,Holmesisaconcrete,albeitnonexistent,correlateofthesethavingthosepropertiesasmembers.(AninterestingvariantoftheseneoMeinongianviewsisCastaeda'sguisetheory,accordingtowhichanexistentindividualisabundleofguisesparticularsformedfromsetsofpropertiesbyaspecialconcretizingoperationrelatedbyarelationofconsubstantiation.Anobjectlikethegoldenmountainisaguisethatisnotconsubstantiatedwithanyguise,notevenitself,andsodoesn'texist.CastaedatakesfictionalobjectstobebundlesofguisesrelatedbyaspecialrelationofconsociationseeCastaeda(1989:ch.11).)
WhileagreeingthatfictionalobjectsformasubsetofMeinongianobjects,unorthodoxneoMeinongians(seeespeciallyZalta(1983))maintainthatMeinongianobjectsingeneralshouldbeconceivedofasobjectsthathaveanonspatiotemporalmodeofexistence,andhenceasabstractratherthanconcreteobjects.Andwhiletheyagreewiththeideathatforanycollectionofpropertiesthereisanindividualthathasalltheseproperties,theydonottakeMeinongianobjectstobecorrelatesofsetsofpropertiesinanythinglikethewaydescribedbyorthodoxneoMeinongians.Instead,theytakethemtobesomethinglikegenericobjectsorroles,alongthemodelofPlatonicattributes.(Indeed,Zaltaandothershaveusedhistheorytomodelarangeofphilosophicalnotions,includingPlatonicformsseeZalta(1983:417),andPelletierandZalta(2000).)Considerthegoldenmountainagain.
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ForunorthodoxneoMeinongians,thisobjectisnotamountaininthesamesensethatMtTaranaki,forexample,isamountain.Thegoldenmountainisanabstractobject,afterall,andmountainsarenotabstractobjects.ItismoreakintotheobjectreferredtoastheU.S.Presidentinthefollowingstatement:
(3)TheUSPresidentfacesanelectioneveryfouryears,
wherethesubjectisnotaparticularUSPresidentlikeGeorgeW.BushorBarackObama,butrathertheroleorofficeofUSPresident.(WhileZaltaistheclearestexampleofanunorthodoxneoMeinongianinoursense,otherscomeclose.Forexample,Rapaport(1978)considersMobjects(hisversionsofMeinongianobjects)tobeakintoplansratherthanconcreteindividuals,althoughunlikeZaltahedoesnotexplicitlytakethemtobeabstract,nonspatiotemporalobjects.)
1.2.3Twokindsofpropertiesvs.twomodesofpredication
ThedistinctionbetweenorthodoxandunorthodoxneoMeinongiansisdrawnatthemetaphysicallevel.ItiscloselylinkedtoanotherdistinctionrelevanttoMeinongianobjects,andsotofictionalobjectsconceivedofasMeinongianobjects:thedistinctionbetweenkindsofpropertiesandmodesofpredication.Recallthatontheonehanditseemsnaturaltosaythatfictionalobjectshavethepropertiesintermsofwhichstoriescharacterizethem(forinstance,AnnaKareninawasawomandriventosuicidebyherfailedaffair,andSherlockHolmesacocaineaddicteddetectivelivinginLondon),andontheotherhandnotintheleastnatural(AnnaKareninamayhavecommittedsuicide,butitisnouselookingfornewsofhersuicideinthenewspapersoftheday).Now,allneoMeinongiansacceptMeinong'sviewthataMeinongianobjectpossessesthepropertiesintermsofwhichitischaracterized.FollowingwhatMeinong(1972[1916])himselfcametosayonthebasisofasuggestionbyhisstudentErnstMally,someneoMeinongians(forexample,Parsons(1980),Jacquette(1996))takethesepropertiestobetheobject'snuclearproperties,where,ingeneral,ifMistheMeinongianobjectcorrelatedwithasetofpropertiesS,themembersofSaretheobject'snuclearproperties.Onthisview,beingadetective,forexample,isanuclearpropertyofHolmes,whilebeingakingisanuclearpropertyofKingArthur.(Routleysimilarlytalksofanobject'scharacterizingpropertiescf.Routley(1980:50710).)ButaMeinongianobjectalsohasotherpropertiesonthisview:itsextranuclearpropertiesarethoseofitspropertiesthatarenotamongitsnuclearorcharacterizingproperties.Inthecaseoffictionalobjects,thesearethepropertiesthatafictionalobjecthasoutsidethescopeofthestoryinwhichitappearsproperties,wemightsay,thatithasinvirtueofthewaytheworldreallyis,notpropertiesthatithasfromthepointofviewofthatstory.Consider,forexample,thefollowingtwosentences:
(4)MickeyMouseisapopcultureicon
(5)AnnaKareninaisafictionalcharacter.
Thesesentencesinvolvepropertiesbeingapopcultureicon,beingafictionalcharacterthatarebeingascribedtoMickeyMouseandAnnaKareninaeventhoughthepropertiesdonotcharacterizethesecharactersinthestoriesinwhichtheyappear.MickeyMousehasthefirstpropertybecauseoftheeffectsofhisenormouspopularityonpopculture,notbecauseheisdepictedasapopcultureiconintheMickeyMousestories.AnnaKareninahasthesecondpropertybecauseofherstatusastheproductofcreativefiction,notbecauseofwhatTolstoy'sstorysaysabouther(accordingtoTolstoy'sstorysheisawoman,notafictionalcharacter).Thesetwopropertiesaretypicalinstancesofextranuclearproperties.
(Acautionarycomment.Inlightofwhatwehavejustsaid,theclaimthatthepropertiestrueofafictionalobjectinaworkcountastheobject'snuclearpropertiesneedsqualification.ItistrueintheHolmesstories,forexample,thatHolmesreallyexisted,thathewasafleshandbloodpersonandnotafictionalcharacter.Clearly,however,wecan'ttakeHolmes'snuclearpropertiestoincludehisbeing
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apersonwhoreallyexistedandwhoisnotafictionalcharacter.ThatwouldmakeHolmesanimpossibleobject,sincehealsohassuchextranuclearpropertiesasbeingnonexistent,andbeingafictionalcharacter.Forbelieversinextranuclearproperties,acommonwayofdealingwiththisproblemistoinsistthatHolmesdoeshavepropertieslikebeingexistentandbeingafleshandbloodindividualratherthanafictionalcharacter,butthatthesepropertiesshouldbeunderstoodasweaker,watereddown,versionsoftheirextranuclearcounterparts,anotionfirstadvancedbyMeinong(cf.Parsons(1980:44,1846)).Wereturntothenotionofwatereddownversionsofextranuclearpropertiesbelow.)
SomeotherneoMeinongiansclaiminsteadthatfictionalandotherMeinongianobjectspossesstheverysamekindofpropertiesthatordinaryindividualspossess,butpossesstheminaverydifferentway.(ThissuggestionwasfirstmadebyMally(1912),butnotadoptedbyMeinong.)When,forexample,wesaythatAnnaKareninawasawomanandHolmesaninhabitantofLondon,weuseadifferentmodeofpredicationfromtheoneweusewhenwesaythatMarilynMonroewasawomanorTonyBlairaninhabitantofLondon.OnZalta'sfamiliarformulationofthisidea(Zalta(1983)),fictionalentitiesencodesuchpropertieswhileordinaryindividualssimplyexemplifythem.Similarly,Castaeda(1989)appealstoaninternalaswellasexternalmodeofpredicationofproperties,whileRapaport(1978)talksofpropertiesthatareconstituentsofobjectsandpropertiesthatareexemplifiedbyobjects.BothAnnaKareninaandMarilynMonroe,wemightsay,havethepropertyofbeingawoman,buttheformerencodestheproperty(thepropertyispredicatedofherinternally,orshehasitasaconstituent),whilethelatterexemplifiestheproperty(shehasitexternally).
Butfictionalobjectsalsoexemplifyproperties,perhapssomeoftheverysamepropertiestheyencodeorhaveinternally(thishappenswheneverthesepropertiesarepredicatedoftheobjectsinthestoriesinwhichtheyappear).Thus,whatmakesboth(4)and(5)trueisthatthepropertiesofbeingapopcultureiconandbeingafictionalcharacterareexemplified,orpossessedexternally,byMickeyMouseandAnnaKareninarespectively.AnnaKareninathereforeturnsouttobeinternallynonfictional(sinceitistrueinthenovelthatsheisawoman,notafictionalcharacter),andexternallyfictional.
Thatsaid,notethatthereareimportantdifferencesbetweenthewaysinwhichZalta,ontheonehand,andCastaedaandRapaport,ontheother,formulatethesedistinctions.ForZalta(1983:12),encodingisaprimitivenotionwhichheembedsinarigoroushigherordermodaltheorythatisthenusedtoprovetheexistence,andderivetheproperties,ofabstractobjects,includingfictionalobjects.ForbothCastaeda(1989:200)andRapaport(1978:162),ontheotherhand,internalpredicationappliestosetcorrelates,andsothismodeofpredicationcanbedefinedintermsofsetmembership:a(fictional)entityFhasPinternally(or:hasPasaconstituent)ifandonlyifPbelongstothepropertysetthatiscorrelatedwithF.
Onthesurface,themodesofpredicationdistinctionappearstobeinabetterpositiontohandlethedatathanthekindsofpropertiesdistinction(formoreonthesedistinctions,seetheexchangebetweenJacquette(1989)andZalta(1992)).Foronething,thereseemstobenoworkablecriterionfordistinguishingnuclearandextranuclearproperties:somepropertiesseemtobeboth.Considerthepropertyofbeingafictionalcharacter.Beingafictionalcharactermayseemtobetheprototypicalcandidateofanextranuclearproperty,asthecaseof(5)abovetestifies,buttheremaywellbemetafictionalnarrativeswhoseprotagonistsarenotcharacterizedintheusualwayasfleshandbloodindividuals,butinsteadasfictionalcharacters.(ThefictionalcharacterTheFatherinPirandello'sSixCharactersinSearchofanAuthorisafamouscaseinpoint.)Sobeingafictionalcharacterseemstoqualifyasbothanuclearandanextranuclearproperty.Defendersofthemodesofpredicationdistinctionhavenoproblemhere:theyholdthatwecanexternallypredicatebeingafictionalcharacterofbothAnnaKareninaandPirandello'sTheFather,whilewecanalsointernallypredicatethispropertyofTheFather.(Itshouldbepointedoutthatdefendersofthekindsofpropertiesdistinctionhavetheirownwayofrespondingtothisproblem:theysaythatinsuchcasesthenuclearpropertyinquestionisthewatereddowncounterpartofthecorrespondingextranuclearproperty.On
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thisview,Pirandello'sTheFatherhastheextranuclearpropertyofbeingafictionalcharacteraswellasitsnuclearwatereddowncorrelate.Butapartfromtheseeminglyadhoccharacterofthisresponse,itisfacedbyamoreseriousproblem:itthreatenstoexposethedistinctiontoanendlessregressofevermorewatereddownnuclearproperties(cf.Voltolini2006).)
Itisprobablyfairtosaythatatthecurrentstageofthedebatethemodesofpredicationdistinctionismorewidelyaccepted.Weshouldremember,however,thatthisdebateisinternaltoneoMeinongianism,andthatneoMeinongianismasatheoryoffictionalobjectshasimportantvirtuesthatowenothingtotheoutcomeofthisdebate.Onesuchvirtueisthatthetheorycanaccountfortheideathatfictionalentitiesnecessarilyhavethepropertiesthattheyarecharacterizedashavingintherelevantstories.ItishardtoseehowHolmescouldnothavebeenadetective,forexample.Ofcourse,DoylemighthavewrittenastoryinwhichsomeonecalledHolmeswasafilmdirector,butitishardnottointerpretthisthoughtassimplymeaningthatDoylemighthavecreatedanothercharacterwiththesamename.Atthesametime,itisaplaintruthoftheHolmesstoriesthatHolmesmightneverhavebecomeadetective,thatthiswasapurelycontingentchoiceonHolmes'spart.Nomatterhowitisformulated,neoMeinongianismhasawayofcapturingboththeseintuitions.OnZalta'sformulationofthemodesofpredicationdistinction,forexample,Holmesexemplifiesthepropertyofbeingnecessarilysuchthatheencodesbothbeingadetectiveandbeingsomeonewhomightnothavebeenadetective.AneoMeinongianadvocatingthetypesofpropertydistinctionwouldsaythatHolmeshastheextranuclearpropertyofbeingnecessarilysuchthathehasthe(nuclear)propertyofbeingadetective,butthathealsohasthe(watereddown)nuclearpropertyofbeingsomeonewhomightnothavebeenadetective.
Onthebasisoftheessentialistideathatfictionalobjectsnecessarilyhavethepropertiesthattheyarecharacterizedashavingintherelevantstories,neoMeinongianshavesuggestedasimplecriterionfortheidentityoffictionalentities,onewhichcanbetracedbacktothecriterionfortheidentityofMeinongianobjectsingeneral:Ifxhasallthesamenuclearpropertiesasy(alternatively,ifxandyinternallypossessthesameproperties),thenx=y(cf.,forexample,Parsons(1980:28,188)).
Despitetheapparentattractionsofsuchaview,thereisanevidentproblemfacingtheunderlyingthoughtthatonceyouhaveacertaincollectionofpropertiesyouipsofactohaveafictionalentity.(Notethat(most)neoMeinongiansacceptthisthought,sincetheytakefictionalobjectstobeasubsetoftheclassofobjectsgeneratedonthebasisofsomethinglikeMeinong'sPrincipleoftheFreedomofAssumption(cf.Meinong(1972[1916]:282)),theprinciplethatforanycollectionof(nuclear)propertiesthereisaMeinongianobjectthathasthoseproperties.)Butgeneratingfictionalentitiesissurelynotquitethateasy.Takeanarbitrarycollectionofproperties,say{weighingmorethan10kgs,bearingthenameOscar,havingapassionforgardengloves,beingadevoteeofthenumber17}.Themereexistenceofthissetofpropertiesisnotenoughtogenerateafictionalobject,Oscar,withtheseproperties.Morehastohappen.(Inunpublishedwork,Kripke(1973)mentionsthehistoricalcaseoftheBiblicaltermMoloch,whichinterpretersoftheBibletooktobeanameforamythicalpagangod,whereasmodernphilologysuggestsitwasinfactusedasacommonnouneitherforkingsorforhumansacrifices.IfmodernphilologyisrightandBibleinterpreterswereconfused,thereisnomythicalgodMoloch.ThisissoeventhoughwecanagreethatthereisacollectionofpropertiesthatpastinterpretersmistakenlyunderstoodtheBibletoassigntosuchagod.)
NeoMeinongianshavetriedtocircumventthisproblembystressingthatMeinongianobjects,includingfictionalobjects,arenotsetsofproperties,butcorrelatesofsuchsets.WhetherthismoveenablesneoMeinongianstoavoidadmittingobjectslikeOscarandMolochintotheoveralldomainoffictionalobjectswilldependonhowthismoveisunderstood.(InCastaeda'svariantofneoMeinongianism,fictionalobjectsaresystemsofsetcorrelates,builtup,orputtogether,byafictionmaker(cf.Castaeda(1989:ch.11)).Butifthisimpliesthattheactivityoffictionmakingisessentialtotheidentityoffictionalobjects,wenolongerhaveapureneoMeinongianismbutaviewthatisclosertothecreationistviewdescribedinthenextsection.)
Eveniftheideaofasetcorrelatehelpstosolvethisparticularproblem,itseemsthatnoneo
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Meinongiantheoryisabletoblockanotherproblemthatstemsfromlettingtheidentityofsuchanobjectdependonthepropertiesintermsofwhichitischaracterized.TakeJorgeLuisBorges'sfamousstoryofamancalledPierreMenardwhohappenstowriteatextthatiswordforwordidenticalwithMiguelCervantes'sDonQuixote.Assume,inthisvariantofBorges'sstory,thatMenardandCervantesareunknowntoeachother,eventhoughtheyliveintheverysametownonecanevensupposethattheyareneighbors.Inthatcase,theBorgesstorydescribesasituationinwhichoneandthesamesetofpropertiescorrespondstodifferentfictionalobjects:Cervantes'sDonQuixoteandPierreMenard'sDonQuixotearetwodistinctfictionalcharacterswho,nonetheless,shareallthepropertiestheyhaveintherespectiveworks.(TheMenardcasewasfirstmentionedinthiscontextbyLewis(1978:39).Asaproblemfortheidentityoffictionalobjects,itwasthenexploitedbyFine(1982:107)seealsoThomasson(1999:7,56)).Inthiscase,claimingthatfictionalobjectsaresetcorrelatesratherthanmerepropertysetsdoesnotsolvetheproblem,forwehaveonlyonesetcorrelate,yettwodistinctobjects.
Intuitivelyspeaking,theproblemisclear.NeoMeinongianisminallitsvarietiestendstosketchaPlatonisticpictureofafictionalentity,eitherassomethingakintoaPlatonicattribute,orasacorrelateofsomethingelsethatwetendtodescribeinPlatonictermsasetofproperties.NeoMeinongianismthusseesafictionalobjectassomethingthatpredatesthestorytellingactivitiesthatintuitivelybringfictionalobjectsintobeing.Toseethetensionbetweentheseconceptions,notethatweoftenspeakoffictionalobjectsasthecreationsofstorytellersorofthehumanmindmoregenerally.NeoMeinongianism,soitseems,leavesnosuchroomforstorytellers.
1.3Creationism
Theintuitionthatstorytellershavesomekindofcreativeroletoplayisaccountedforbysocalledartifactualist,orcreationist,accountsoffictionalentities(seeSearle(1979),Salmon(1998),Thomasson(1999),Voltolini(2006)thepositionwasalsodefendedinKripke'sunpublishedJohnLockeLectures(1973),andelementsofthepositionarefoundinvanInwagen's(1979)theoryoffictionalobjectsaspositsofliterarycriticismIngarden(1931)isasignificanthistoricalforerunner).Accordingtosuchaccounts,fictionalobjectsareartifactssincetheycomeintobeingoncetheyareconceivedbytheirauthorstothatextent,theyareauthorialcreations.Moreover,theyareabstractentities,justasunorthodoxneoMeinongiansbelieve.UnlikePlatonicabstracta,however,theynotonlyhavehaveabeginningintime,buttheyarealsodependententitiessincetheydependonotherentitiesfortheirexistence.(Roughlyspeaking,anentityOexistentiallydependsonanotherentityOjustifOcouldn'texistwithoutOexisting(cf.Thomasson(1999)).Foramorediscriminatingaccount,onethatavoidstheconsequencethateverythingexistentiallydependsonnecessaryexistentslikenaturalnumbers,seeFine(1994).)Morespecifically,fictionalobjectsdependhistoricallyrigidlyontheauthorswhocreatethem(necessarily,ifOcomesintobeingatt,thentheauthor(s)whocreatesOexistsatsometimetbeforet)andconstantlygenericallyontheliteraryworksthatfeaturethem(necessarily,ifOgoesonexisting,thensomeliteraryworkWorotherfeaturingOexistsduringO'stimeofexistence)(seeThomasson(1999)foranextendeddiscussionofsuchdependencies).Whilehistoricalrigiddependenceaccountsforafictionalobject'scomingintobeing,constantgenericdependenceaccountsforitscontinuedexistenceorpersistence.Suchanaccountofthepersistenceoffictionalobjectsseemsasintuitiveastheaccountoftheirgeneration.Notonlydowesaythatsomegivenfictionalobjectwascreatedatacertainpointoftime,butwemightalsodescribeitashavingacertainage(Hamlet,wemightpointout,isnowover400yearsold).
Notethatcreationismthuscharacterizedearnsitskeepfromtheobviousnessofthethoughtthatauthorssomehowcreatefictionalcharactersthroughthecreationoffictionalworksinwhichtheyappear.Languageseemstosupportthisthought:weroutinelyhearstatementslikeHamletisoneofShakespeare'smostcomplexcreations.Itisonthebasisofthisthoughtthatcreationiststhenhypothesizethatfictionalobjectsliterallyarethecreationsoftheirauthors:notconcretecreations,clearly,sothereforenonconcrete,abstractcreations.Butthismoveisfarfrominnocent.Yagisawa(2001),forexample,arguesthatcreationismconflictssharplywithotherseeminglyobviousthoughts,
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forexamplethenonexistencedatumthatfictionalcharacterslikeHamletdon'texist.(Foraresponse,seeGoodman(2004).)Atanevenmorefundamentallevel,Brock(2010)arguesthatthecreationist'sappealtocreationisexplanatorilyvoid,leavingmorequestionsthananswers.
Creationiststhemselvesclaimthattheappealtocreationdoessolveanumberofsignificantproblemsthatafflictothermetaphysicaltheories.Thereis,forexample,nomythicalgodMoloch,fornobodyhascreatedsuchanobjectbygatheringvariouspropertiesandembeddingtheminacertainnarrative.AndalthoughtheyshareallthepropertiesattributedtothemintherespectiverenditionsofDonQuixote,therearetwoDonQuixotes,Cervantes'sandMenard's,notjustone,becausethereweretwoutterlyindependentactsofauthorialgeneration(cf.Voltolini(2006:32ff.)).Itisnotclear,however,howcreationistscandealwitharelatedproblemthataffectstheirtheory,theproblemofindiscriminablefictionalobjects.Intuitively,therewerethousandsoffictionaldwarveswhotookpartinTolkien'sWarbetweentheDwarvesandOrcs,withoutTolkien'sengaginginthousandsofactsofdwarfcreation.(Inresponsetothisworry,somecreationistshavedeniedthattherearesuchcharacterssee,forexample,Voltolini(2006:2345).)
Itisevident,then,thatcreationismisnotwithoutitsproblems.Perhapsthemostsignificantoneshavetodowiththenatureofthecreativeprocessandtherelationbetweenthecreativeprocessandtheidentityoffictionalobjects.Itseems,forexample,thatwhatcomesintoexistenceontheaboveaccountofthegeneratingprocess(whichtalksofauthorsconceivingoftheirliterarycreations)isnotafictionalobjectassuch,butrathera(mere)intentionalobject,thetargetofacertainauthorialthought.Amereintentionalobjectisnotyetafictionalobject,asThomasson(1999:89)agrees,sowhatmakesitone?Doesitbecomeonebybeingabletobesharedbymorethanonepersonthroughappearinginatext(maybenotaphysicalcopybutonestoredinmemory)?Oristhereamorediscriminatingcriteriontosingleoutwhichintentionalobjectsarefictionalobjects?
Thisquestionisperhapsbestansweredbygivingasomewhatdifferentaccountofthegeneratingprocess.Thus,somecreationists(Schiffer(1996,2003)Thomasson(2003a,b))saythatafictionalobjectcomesintobeingasanabstractartifactnotwhenanauthorfirstconceivesofit,butonlyonceacertainmakebelieveprocesshascometoanend,namely,theprocessinwhichsomeonetypically,astorytellerpretendsthatthereisanindividualwhoissuchandsuchanddoessoandso.Butanotherquestionremains:evenifweagreeonthenatureoftheprocesstypethatgivesrisetoafictionalobject,whatisthethingthatispurportedlygeneratedinthisway?Whataretheidentityconditionsforfictionalobjects?Creationiststypicallydonotthinkthatafictionalobjectpossessesthepropertiesthatcharacterizeitinthestoryinwhichitappears.Afictionalobjectsimplyhasthosepropertiesaccordingtothestory.ItisnottrueofHolmes,forinstance,thathe(orit)isadetectiveonlyphysicalobjects,notanabstractartifact,canbeadetective.WhatistrueofHolmesisthatheisadetectiveaccordingtotheHolmesstories(equally,Holmesismaleaccordingtothosestories,andsodeservingofthemasculinepronounhe).Ingeneral,forcreationiststheonlypropertiesthatfictionalobjectsgenuinelypossessarethepropertiesthatneoMeinongianswouldcallextranuclearortaketobeexternallypredicated:propertieslikebeingafictionaldetectiveorbeingDoyle'screationorevenbeingadetectiveaccordingtotheHolmesstories(cf.Thomasson(1999)).Theapproachthusfailstoaccountfortheidea,mentionedearlier,thattheremustbeasenseinwhichfictionalobjectsactuallyhavethepropertiesthatcharacterizethemintherelevantstories.
Inaddition,therestrictednatureofsuchpropertiesmakesithardtoseehowtoindividuateafictionalentity.Thomassongivessufficientidentityconditionsforfictionalentitieswithinaliterarywork:xandyarethesamefictionalobjectFifxandyareascribedexactlythesamepropertiesinthework(1999:63).Butwhatdowesayinthecaseoffictionalobjectsthatappearindifferentworks?Thomassonadmitsthatinthiscaseonecanonlyprovideanecessarycondition:xandyarethesamefictionalobjectonlyiftheauthorofthesecondworkWiscompetentlyacquaintedwithxofthepreviousworkW,andintendstoimportxintoWasy(1999:67).Thereasonwhyshethinksthiscannotbeasufficientconditionisthat,nomatterwhattheauthor'sintentionsare,hedoesnotsucceedinimportingx(anentitythatappearsinW)intoWasyifheattributespropertiestoythataretoo
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radicallydifferentfromthepropertiesthatwereattributedtoxinW(1999:68).(Thereareothercasesthatshowevenmoreclearlyhowauthorialintentioncanbethwarted.Thus,consideracaseofafusionofcharacters,inwhichanauthorintendstoimportintoWtwocharactersxandyfromapreviousworkWasasinglecharacterz.Clearly,giventhetransitivityofidentity,zisnotidenticalwitheitherxory,sotheauthorfailsinherattempt.)
Toconcludethisdiscussionofthemetaphysicsoffictionalobjects,itisworthnotingthatneoMeinongianandcreationisttheoriesseemtosufferfromcomplementarydefects.Ontheonehand,neoMeinongiansprovideexactidentitycriteriaforfictionalobjects,butthesecriteriaareclearlyinsufficientinthattheydonottakeintoaccountthefactthatsuchobjectsareproductsofthehumanmind.Ontheotherhand,creationistsdoaccountforthisfact,buttheyonlyproviderelativelynonspecificidentitycriteriaforsuchentities.Thosetheoriesarenormallytakentobeincompatible,fortheyappealtodifferentmetaphysicalmodelsbroadlyspeaking,aPlatonicmodelasopposedtoaconstructivistone.Thisclaimofincompatibilityshouldnotbetakenasdefinitive,howevertheremaywellbewaysinwhichthetwotheories,orperhapsthemostpromisingelementsofeachtheory,cansomehowbecombined(forrecentattemptstogoinsuchadirection,cf.Zalta(2000),Voltolini(2006)).
2.Theontologyoffictionalentities
Themetaphysicalquestionaboutfictionalentitiesaskedwhatsuchentitiesarelike,shouldtherebeany.Wenowturntotheontologicalquestion,whichsimplyaskswhetherthereareanysuchentities.
2.1Semanticalargumentsforandagainstrealism
Obviouslytheimportantdivisionattheontologicallevelliesbetweenthosewhobelievethattherearefictionalentitiesfictionalrealistsandthosewhobelievethattherenosuchentitiesfictionalantirealists.Foralongtime,thebattlefieldbetweenthosetwopartieshasbeenordinarylanguage.Realistshavealwaysbeenfascinatedbythefactthattherearesentencesinlanguagethatseemtocommitonetofictionalentities.Antirealistshaveinsteadinsistedthatsuchappearancesaredeceptive:wheneverasentenceseemstocommitonetofictionalentities,onecanalwaysprovideaparaphrasewhichhasthesametruthconditionsastheoriginalsentencebutisnotsocommitted.Realistsinturntrytoshoweitherthatthoseparaphrasesareinadequateorthattherearestillfurthersentencesforwhichnoadequateparaphrasescanbefound.Antirealistswillreplythat,despiteappearances,thesesentencescanalsobeparaphrasedinnoncommittaltermsandsothegamegoeson.
2.1.1Russell'santirealism
Frege(1892)isoftentakentobethefirstchampionoffictionalantirealismwithinanalyticphilosophy,insofarasheheldthatindirect(gerade)contextssuchasOdysseuscameashoreafictionalnamehasasensebutnoreference.ButFregealsoheldthatinoblique(ungerade)contextssuchasJohnbelievedthatOdysseuscameashoreandTheauthoroftheOdysseysaysthatOdysseuscameashorethissensebecomesthenewreferentofthefictionalname.Ifsensesofthistypecanmodelthenotionofafictionalentity,thenFregecanbeconstruedasakindoffictionalrealistotherwise,hecan't.(Parsons(1982)isdoubtfulZaltamaybemoresympathetic,sincehethinkshisabstractobjectscanmodelboththenotionofsense(Zalta(2001))andtheideaofafictionalobject.)
Themodernformoftherealismantirealismdebate,however,didnotoriginatewithanythingFregesaidonthematter,butwithadisputebetweenMeinong(1904)andRussell(1905a).Considerasentencelike:
(6)Apolloisyoung.
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AccordingtoMeinong,consideredhereastheparadigmaticrealist,theverymeaningfulnessofthisstatementcommitsonetoa(broadly)fictionalentitythedeityoftheGreekmythsonthegrounds,roughly,thatthethoughtexpressedbythestatementisdirectedatthisentity,andsorequirestheretobesuchanentity.Thestatementitselfexpressesatruthratherthanafalsehoodaboutthisentity.ForRussell,however,appearancesinthiscaseweredeceptive.Firstofall,hethoughtthatApollo,likeanyotherordinarypropername,isshorthandforadefinitedescriptionsay,thesungod.Secondly,followinghisdiscoveryofthetheoryofdefinitedescriptionsRussellheldthatasentencecontainingadefinitedescriptionhastobeanalyzedintermsofanothersentenceinwhichthedescriptioniseliminatedinfavourofquantifiers,predicates,logicalconnectives,andgenuinepropernames.What(6)saysonthisaccountisgivenbyaparaphraseinwhichthedefinitedescriptionforwhichApolloisshorthand,namelythesungod,hasdisappearedonanalysis:
(6R)Thereisatleastonesungodandatmostonesungodandeverysungodisyoung.
(Putmoresimply:Thereisauniquesungod,andheisyoung.)
Thirdly,thereisnolongereventheappearanceofasingularterm(Apollo)thatmustdesignatesomethingfortheparaphrasetobemeaningful.Infact,Russellsawthatthisresultshowedtheoriginalstatementtobebothmeaningful(becauseabletobeanalyzedinthisway)andfalse(givenobviousfacts).SaythatadefinitedescriptionhasaRusselliandenotationwhentheRussellianconditionsforthedescriptiontohaveadenotationarefulfilledthatis,whenthereisatleastoneindividualsatisfyingtherelevantpredicate,butnomorethanone.ThenwecansaythatthedefinitedescriptionforwhichApolloisshorthanddoesnothaveaRusselliandenotationsince(6R)'sfirstconjunct,namely:
(7)Thereisatleastonesungod
isfalse.Farfrommaking(6)meaningless,theabsenceofadenotationinthisRusselliansensewhentakeninconjunctionwithRussell'seliminativestrategyshows(6)tobefalse.Russellthoughtthathistheoryofdefinitedescriptionsallowedhimtoshowthatallfictionalnameslackeddenotationinthisway,andthatsentencescontainingfictionalnameswerethereforetrueorfalseratherthanmeaningless.
2.1.2Metafictionalsentencesandinthefictionoperators
Letusaccept,forargument'ssake,thattheadoptionofRussell'stheoryofdescriptionsallowsustoavoidontologicalcommitmenttosuchbizarreentitiesasnonexistentfictionalandmythologicalentities.(Althoughthisisawidelyacceptedview,thereisinfactreasontodoubtit:DavidKaplanarguesthatitisoneof[the]virtuesofRussell'stheorythatthetheoryisessentiallyneutralwithrespecttoontologicalcommitment,thatitpermitsdescriptionstodenotenonexistententitiesiftherearesuchentities(Kaplan(2005:9756))cf.alsoVoltolini(2006:139ff.).)EvenifRussell'stheoryisontologicallypotentinthisway,however,thetheoryasformulatedfacesasimpleandseeminglydevastatingobjection:manyintuitivelytruesentencescomeoutasfalseontheirRussellianparaphrases.Considersentence(6)again.IfweuseRussell'stheorytodispensewithanentitylikeApollo,itfollowsthat(6)isfalse,insofarasitsRussellianparaphraseisfalse.Thisiswidelyacknowledgedtobecounterintuitive.Presentedwith(6),mostwouldsaythatitisintuitivelytrue,unlike,say:
(8)Apolloisarockstar.
Asitturnsout,theantirealistwhofollowsRussellhasaneasywayofcircumventingthisproblem.Shewillpointoutthatthereasonwhy(6),butnot(8),seemstobetrueisthatintheGreekmyththingsareexactlyas(6)says.Theimpressionthat(6)istruecantheneasilybeaccommodatedbytaking(6)tobeellipticalforalongersentence,namely:
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(6I)AccordingtotheGreekmyth,Apolloisyoung.
HerethelocutionaccordingtotheGreekmythworksasanintensionaloperator,whereasthesentencefollowingthatoperator,whichisnothingbut(6)itself,hastobeanalyzedinRussellianfashion:
(6IR)AccordingtotheGreekmyth,thereisauniquesungodandheisyoung.
(Acaveat.Itwouldbemorepropertosaythatitisauseof(6)thatistakentobeellipticalfor(6IR),ratherthan(6)itself.For(6)isacaseofafictionalsentence,namelyasentencethatcouldeasilyoccurinthebodyofanarrative(amyth,inthiscase).Suchsentenceshaveauseonwhichtheyhavemerelyfictionaltruthconditions,thatis,truthconditionsfromthestandpointofthenarrativeorworkoffiction,andonthiskindofuseeventheirtruthvaluesaremerelyfictional.FollowingEvans(1982),wemaycallthistheconnivinguseofsuchsentences:theuseonwhichtheuttererisengagedinpretenseormakebelieve.ButthereisanotheruseofthesamesentenceswhatEvanscallsthenonconnivinguseonwhichwetakethemtohaverealtruthconditions,hencerealtruthvalues:thekindofuseonwhichwetake(8),unlike(6),toexpressarealfalsehood.Acaseinpointwouldbeanutteranceof(8)inresponsetoarequestforinformationaboutApolloinanexamonGreekmythology.Weshallcallsentencesoftheform(6I),evenreshapedas(6IR),internalmetafictionalsentences,fortheypurporttosayhowthingsstandin,oraccordingto,acertainfiction.Theyaremeantassentencesthatcapturethenonconnivinguseoffictionalsentenceslike(6).)
LetusnowgobacktotheamendmenttoRussellianismwewereconsidering.Ontheviewbeingdiscussed,anexpressionlikeaccordingtotheGreekmythis,quaintensionaloperator,acircumstanceshiftingoperator,onethatshiftsthecircumstanceofevaluationofthesentencefollowingit.Suppose,forthesakeofargument,thatasentenceoftheformAccordingtostoryS,pistrueintheactualworldifandonlyifpistrueattheclosestpossibleworldstotheactualworldinwhichSistrue(cf.Lewis(1978)).Now,anysentencethatthisoperatorembedshastobeanalyzedinRusselliantermsifitcontainsasingularterm.Inthatcase,asentencelike(6I)istrueintheactualworldifandonlyif(6),i.e.(6R),istrueattheclosestpossibleworldsinwhichtheApollomythistrue.Insofaras(6R)isindeedtrueatsuchworlds,thesingularterminquestionApollo,thatis,thesungodhasa(Russellian)denotationinthoseworlds,eventhoughitlacksadenotationintheactualworld.Hence,weagaingettheresultRusselldesired:thewholesentenceistruealthoughtherelevantsingulartermhasnoactualdenotationbutonlyapossibleone.Thus,nocommitmenttofictionalentitiesarisesoutofthetruthofthatsentence.
Orrather,nosuchcommitmentarisesfromRussell'stheoryonitsown.IfweassumeLewis'smodalrealism,thensayingaswedidthatadescriptionhasapossibledenotationentailsanontologicalcommitmenttofictionalobjectsaspossibilia.Normally,however,thisintensionalistapproachistakeninanantirealistsense(cf.,e.g.LamarqueOlsen(1994),Orenstein(2003),Rorty(1982)).FortheRussellian,centraltothisantirealistunderstandingisthefactthatasentencelike(6I)shouldbegivenadedicto,notadere,reading:whatissaidtobetrueinthefictionisacertaindictumorproposition,nottheclaim,aboutsomegiventhingorresx,thatxhasacertainproperty.OnRussell'swayofunderstandingthisdistinction,thedescriptionthesungodforwhichApolloisshorthandshouldbeinterpretedashavingasecondary,notaprimary,occurrenceinthesentence,or,whichisthesame,theexistentialquantifieroccurringintheRussellianparaphraseofthesentenceshouldbeassignednarrow,notwide,scope.(6I),thatis,shouldbereadas:AccordingtotheApollomyth,thereisexactlyonesungod,andheisyoungratherthanasThereisauniquesungod,andaccordingtothemythheisyoung.Thereasonforthisisevident.Ifweadoptthewidescopereadingofthequantifier,thesentenceturnsouttobefalse,nottrue(giventhatthereisnosungod)anditisthetruthofasentencelike(6I)thattheRussellianaimstocapture.
SupposethattheRussellianamendmentworksforfictionalsentencesontheirnonconnivinguse.Intuitively,however,therearemanysentencesthattalkoffictionalcharacterseventhoughtheydonotevenimplicitlymentionstories.Letuscalltheseexternalmetafictionalsentences(someother
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commentatorstalkofextrafictiveorcriticalsentences).(4)and(5)abovearetypicalexamples.Clearly,(4)and(5)cannotbetakenasellipticalforinternalmetafictionalsentencessuchas:
(4I)AccordingtotheDisneystories,MickeyMouseisapopcultureicon
(5I)AccordingtoAnnaKarenina,AnnaKareninaisafictionalcharacter.
Forunlike(4)and(5),thelattersentencesaresimplyfalseevenontheirdedictoreading(apointalreadystressedbyLewis(1978:38)):MickeyMousehasthestatusofapopcultureiconintheactualworld,notintheDisneystoriesandaccordingtoAnnaKarenina,Annaisawoman,notafictionalcharacter.Manyrealists,especiallycreationists,haveconcludedthatsentencesofthiskindreallydoestablishthatwearecommittedtofictionalcharacters.Theyarguethateventhoughfictionalsentencesontheirnonconnivingusecanbeparaphrasedasinternalmetafictionalsentencesontheirdedictoreadingandthusdonotcommitustofictionalcharacters,externalmetafictionalsentencescannotbeparaphrasedinthisway,andtheirtruthreallydoescommitustofictionalcharacters(see,forexample,Schiffer(1996)andThomasson(2003b)).
OnepossibleantirealistsolutiontothisproblemalthoughnotonethatRusselliansthemselveshavepromotedistoinvokeakindoffictionalismaboutfictionalcharacters.Onthisstrategy,sentenceslike(4)and(5)shouldbethoughtofasimplicitlyprefixedbyanotherintensionalinthefictionoperator,sothateveninthiscasetheimpressionofreferencetoafictionalentitywouldturnouttobebaseless.Incasesofthistype,theoperatorwouldappealnottoastorybutrathertotherealistpresumptionthatsuchanimpressionseemstosupport.Thesuggestion,then,isthatexternalmetafictionalsentencesaretobereadasimplicitlyprefixedbyanoperatorlikeaccordingtothefictionofrealismoraccordingtotherealist'shypothesis:
(4F)Accordingtotherealist'shypothesis,MickeyMouseisapopcultureicon.
(5F)Accordingtotherealist'shypothesis,AnnaKareninaisafictionalcharacter.
Onceexternalmetafictionalsentencesarereadthisway,anyapparentcommitmenttofictionalentitiesseemstodisappear,providedonceagainthattheresultingcomplexsentencesarereaddedicto.(Forsuchamove,seeBrock(2002),Phillips(2000).)
2.1.3Thedescriptivistproblemfortheoriesoffictionalnames
Theappealtointensionalinthefictionoperatorsisawellknownstrategyfordealingwiththeapparenttruthofstatementslike(6),andbecauseitisavailabletoRussellthismayseemlikegoodnewsforRussell'santirealism,especiallygiventhewaythestrategymightbeextendedtoexternalmetafictionalstatementslike(4)and(5).ButsuchanamendedversionofRussellianismfacesaproblemalreadyfacedbytheunamendedversionofRussell'sview.IfsuchaRussellianismistoprovidethecorrectanalysisofsentenceslike(6),onehastoassumethatpropernamesaresynonymouswithdefinitedescriptions.Thisisbecausethestrategyusedinarrivingatasentencelike(6IR)involvesreplacingapropername(Apollo)withanequivalentdefinitedescription(thesungod).Buttherearewellknown,andwidelyaccepted,argumentsagainstsuchadescriptivistviewofpropernames(Donnellan(1972),Kripke(1972/1980)).Inparticular,descriptionsofthesortthatspeakersorcommunitiesstandardlyassociatewithanamemightsimplyfailtofitwhatthenamereallyrefersto(intheactualworldandrelativetootherpossibleworlds).OneresponsetothisobjectionasfarasfictionalnameslikeApollo,Holmes,etc.,areconcernedistorejectdescriptivismaboutordinarynamesbutendorseitforfictionalnames(see,forexample,Currie(1990:15862).Onthesurface,however,thislookslikeanunpromisingmove:foronething,itispossibletoattempttoengageinconversationaboutApollo,believingheisreal,beforecomingtotherealizationthatheismerelyamythologicalfigure,apossibilitythatishardtoexplainifordinarynamesandfictionalnameshaveentirelydifferentsortsofmeanings.
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Thisdescriptivistproblempresentsitselfasapotentialchallengetoanyantirealistviewthatendorsesadedictoreadingofsentenceslike(6I)and(4F)/(5F).Forhowelse,ifnotintermsofsomekindofdescriptivistviewofnameslikeRussell's,arewetounderstandsuchdedictoreadings?Ifnamesareinsteadtakentobedirectlyreferentialthatis,iftheyaretakentobetermsthatdonotsecuretheirreferencebymeansofdescriptivemeaningsthereseemstobenoroomleftforadedictoasopposedtoaderereadingofsuchsentences,and,consequently,noroomforthethoughtthatsentencescontaining(allegedly)emptynameslikeApolloevenhavetruthconditions.
AparticularlystarkformofthisdilemmaisfacedbywhatisperhapsthemostwidelyacceptedpostKripkeanalternativetodescriptivism,namelyMillianism,whichholdsthatwhatanamecontributessemanticallytothepropositionsexpressedthroughtheuseofsentencescontainingthenameisjustthename'sreferent.ThecombinationofMillianismandtheantirealistviewthatfictionalnameslikeApollolackreference(andsomakenocontributiontotheexpressionofpropositions)appearstoimplythatsentenceslike(6I)don'texpressanyproposition,letalonetruepropositions.ThereisnowalivelyindustrydevotedtofindingMillianismfriendlysolutionstothisquandary.SomeMilliansarguethatwhatweseeasmeaningfulandeventrueconcernswhatisimplicatedratherthansemanticallyexpressedbysuchsentences(e.g.,Taylor(2000)).Othersappealtogappyorunfilledpropositions.Thesearepropositionlikeen
MilliansarenottheonlyonestohavegrappledwiththeimplicationsthattheKripkeDonnellanattackondescriptivismhasforthesemanticsoffictionalnames.MichaelDevitt,forexample,anotherearlycriticofdescriptivism,hasusedtheproblemoffictionalandotheremptynamestoargueagainstMillianismandinfavourofhisversionofacausalhistoricaltheoryofreference(cf.Devitt(1989)).AndMarkSainsburyarguesinSainsbury(2005)thatnames,includingfictionalnames,havesingularbutnondescriptivemeaningsthatcanbespecifiedinaDavidsonstyletruththeorywhosebackgroundlogicisaNegativeFreeLogic(thatis,alogicthatcountssimpleoratomicsentencescontainingemptynamesasfalse).GiventheroleassignedtoNegativeFreeLogic,itisscarcelysurprisingthatthegreatestchallengeforsuchaframeworkisagaintheproblemofexternalmetafictionalsentencessuchas(4):
(4)MickeyMouseisapopcultureicon.
Thelatterhastheappearanceofanatomicsentenceandsoshouldcountasfalseonsuchalogic.InSainsbury(2009,2010),Sainsburyusestheideaofpresupposition/acceptancerelativetruthtodealwithsuchproblems,anideathatisrelatedtoideasfoundinthepopularpretensetheoreticapproachtofictionalnames.Thatistheapproachweturntonext.
2.1.4PretenseTheory
Fortheantirealist,thesemanticsofnamespresentsanimportanthurdletoattemptstoaccommodatethetruthofinternalandexternalmetafictionalsentencesfeaturingfictionalnames.Suchdifficultieshavesuggestedtheneedtolookinacompletelydifferentdirection.Aswesawbefore,itisimportanttoacknowledgetheroleofpretenseinfictionaltalkandwriting.Afictionalsentencehasaconnivingusewhenitisutteredwithinthecontextofacertainpretenseinvolvingthetellingofastory.Callsuchacontextafictionalcontext.Notethatasentenceconsideredasutteredinsuchacontextdoesinasensecarryontologicalcommitments:itcarriespretendontologicalcommitments.Forwithinthecontextoftherelevantpretense,thesingulartermsinvolveddorefertothings.Forinstance,toutter(6)inthecontextoftellingtheGreekmythistoutterasentenceinwhich,fromtheperspectiveoftherelevantpretense,thenameApolloreferstoagod.Consequently,thesentencehasfictionaltruthconditionsinthatcontext(thesentenceistrueintheworldofthatcontextjustiftheentityreferredtoasApollointhatcontextisyounginthatworld)andhasalsoafictionaltruthvalue(consideredasutteredinthatcontext,thesentenceistrue,forintheworldofthatcontexttheworldoftheGreekmyththereisagod,Apollo,whoisindeedyoung).Outsidethatcontext,howeverthatis,inarealcontextwherethereisnopretensethattheGreekmythisfactanamelikeApollorefersto
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nothing.Noendorsementofdescriptivismishererequired.Quitesimply,ifthesingulartermsinquestionaredirectlyreferential(currentlythemostpopularviewofnames),thenasentencecontainingafictionalpropernamewillhavenorealtruthconditions,hencenorealtruthvalue,sinceanysuchtermisreallyempty.TakethecaseofApollo,whichonthisviewhasnoreferentwhenutteredinareal,nonfictionalcontextofutterance.Assumingitisadirectlyreferentialterm,itmakesnotruthconditionalcontributiontosentencesthatcontainit.Hence,whenutteredinarealcontext(6)willhavenotruthconditions,hencenotruthvalue.(ThekernelofthisproposalisinWalton(1990)seeRecanati(2000)forrefinements.)
Sofar,sogood.Remember,however,thattheintuitionthatasentencelike(6)isreally,notjustfictionally,truehence,thatithasreal,notjustfictional,truthconditionsisapowerfulone.Howcanapretenseantirealistaccountforthisintuition?
Asafirstattempt,apretenseantirealistmaytrytocombinethevirtuesofthepretenseaccountwiththevirtuesoftheintensionalistapproach.Thatis,shemayfirststicktotheideathatonitsnonconnivinguseasentencelike(6)hastobetakenasellipticalforaninternalmetafictionalsentencelike(6I).Butshemayalsoinsistthattheaccordingtothestoryoperatorshouldbetakenasacontextshiftingoperator,notsimply(likethefamiliarintensionaloperatorItisnecessarythat)asacircumstanceshiftingoperator.Thatis,shemayinsistthatitisanoperatorthatshiftsnotonlythecircumstancesofevaluationofthesentenceitembeds,butalsothecontextrelevantfortheinterpretationofsuchsentencetypically,thecontextofitsutterance.Moreprecisely,ifwetakeafictionalsentenceponitsnonconnivinguseasellipticalforAccordingtothestoryS,p,thenpsounderstoodistrueintheactualworldifandonlyifp,takenasutteredinthecontextofthestoryS(thatis,afictionalcontext),istrueintheworldofthatcontext.
Theantirealistmeritsofthisaccountareclear.ItallowsapropernamelikeApollotobebothgenuinelyempty,carryingnocommitmenttoanyfictionalentity,butalsogenuinelynondescriptive.Theembeddedsentencecontainingthename((6),say)isunderstoodasbeingutteredinafictionalcontext,andinthatcontextthenamedirectlyreferstoanindividual,theindividualexistingintheworldoftherelevantpretense.Sincethisreferenceoccursonlyinthatfictionalcontext,notinarealcontext,thenamereallydoesremainempty.(ThisproposalcanbetracedbacktoWalton(1990)seeagainRecanati(2000)Adamsetal.(1997).)
Despitethesevirtues,thesuggestionfacesawellknowncriticism.Kaplancallssuchcontextshiftingoperatorsmonsters,andclaimsthatnonecanbeexpressedinEnglish(withoutsneakinginaquotationdevice)(1989a:511).Inthecaseofindexicals,forexample,nooperatorcancontroltheindexicalswithinitsscope,becausetheywillsimplyleapoutofitsscopetothefrontoftheoperator(1989a:510).Toseehowthisworryappliestoafictionalsentencecontaininganindexical,considerthefamousfirstlineofProust'sInSearchofLostTime:
(9)ForalongtimeIusedtogotobedearly.
WithinthefictionalcontextmobilizedbyProust'stellinghisstory,thefirstpersonpronounIreferstothepersonnarratingtheeventsthatconstitutetheimaginaryworldofProust'sRechercheanindividualwhoexistsonlyinthatworld,nottheactualworld.Now,supposewewanttocapturethesenseinwhich(9)isreallytruebyreportingthattheclaimexpressedby(9)istrueaccordingtoInSearchofLostTime.Ontheabovepretenseintensionalistapproach,wemightformulatethissuggestionas:
(9PI)AccordingtoInSearchofLostTime,foralongtimeIusedtogotobedearly.
However,thisequivalenceclearlydoesnotwork.Assumingthatyouarethepersonwhoutters(9PI),thesentencesaysthatyouusedtogotobedearlyforalongtimeintheimaginaryworldofProust'sRecherche.Butthisisfalse,sinceyouarenotaninhabitantofthisworld.
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ItmaybepossibletoobviateKaplan'sprobleminsomewayortheproblemmayturnouttoberestrictedtothecaseofembeddedindexicals,orevencertaintypesofindexicals.Predelli,forexample,hasarguedthatthereareexamplesofdiscourseaboutfictionusingmodalandtemporalindexicalsthatarebestanalyzedintermsofsuchcontextshiftingKaplanesquemonsters(Predelli(2008)).
Bethatasitmay,onemighttrytosimplifythepretensetheoreticalproposalbyreversingtheorderofexplanation.Ratherthantakingthefictionalsentenceonitsnonconnivinguseasellipticalforaninternalmetafictionalsentence,wemighttaketheinternalmetafictionalsentencetobereallytruejustwhenthefictionalsentence(onitsnonconnivinguse)isreallytrue.Wemight,thatis,followWaltonintreatingthefictionalsentenceasprimarycf.(1990:4012)).Itisinfactrelativelyeasytodiscernthesenseinwhichthefictionalsentenceonitsnonconnivinguseisreallytrue.Itisreallytruejustincasethereisapretenseofacertainkindre
Oneadvantageofsuchanantirealistmoveisthatitcanbeusedforbothfictionalsentencesandexternalmetafictionalsentences.ForWalton,whatdistinguishesthetwocasesissimplythekindofpretensethatmakestherelevantsentencefictionallytrue.Intheformercase,thegameofmakebelievethattherelevantfictionalcontextsinglesoutisanauthorizedonethatis,itisagameauthorizedbywhatservesasapropinthatgame(inthecaseofaliterarygameofmakebelieve,thetextwrittenornarratedbythestoryteller)thepropdictateshowthingsgointheworldofthatgame.Inthelattercase,therelevantgameofmakebelieveisanunofficialoneinthiscase,theremaybenoconstraintsnone,atleast,providedbythepropthatdictatehowthingsstandintheworldofthatgame(cf.Walton(1990:51,406,409)).
Take(6)again.Inorderfor(6)tobefictionallytrue,andhenceforittobereallytrueonitsnonconnivinguse,theworldoftheGreekmythmustcontainagod(Apollo)whoisyoung.Thisisaconsequenceofthefactthatthisisthewaythemythistold.ThemythtellingfunctionsasapropconstraininghowtheApollogameofmakebelievehastobeplayedapersonwhomakesbelievethatApolloisarockstarisnotplayingthegamecorrectly,orisperhapsplayinganothergame.Butnowconsider(4).Inorderforanutteranceof(4)tobefictionallytrue,henceforittobereallytrueonitsnonconnivinguse,itmustalludetoagameinwhichthereisafictionalcharacternamedMickeyMousewhohasthespecialpropertyofbeingapopcultureiconaMeinongianpretense,asRecanati(2000)callsit.Now,suchagameisnotconstrainedbyanytextthereisnoMickeyMousestorythatdescribesMickeyMouseintheseterms.ThegameinquestionisinsteadonewherefactsabouttheimportantplaceoccupiedinpopularculturebytheMickeyMousestoriesarewhatmakeitfictionallytrueinthegamethatMickeyMousehasthespecialpropertyofbeingapopcultureicon.Tothatextentthegameisanunofficialone.
Onthisaccount,then,externalmetafictionalsentencesenjoynospecialstatusinparticular,theydon'tprovideuswithareasonforassumingtheexistenceoffictionalentities.OurfinalexamplereturnsustoPirandello'sSixCharactersinSearchofanAuthor.Consideranutteranceof:
(10)TheFatherisafictionalcharacter.
Ontheonehand,thisisanexternalmetafictionalsentenceoftheverysamekindas(5),asentencethatthespeakerusestodescribethemetaphysicalstatusofoneoftheprotagonistsofPirandello'swork.Ontheotherhand,(10)mayalsobetakenasafictionalsentence,sincePirandello'splayischaracterizedbythefactthatitsprotagonistsarenotordinaryconcreteindividualsbutfictionalcharacters.Insuchacase,thesentencehastwodistinctnonconnivinguses.Onitsuseasafictionalsentenceitisallegedlyequivalentto:
(10)AccordingtoSixCharactersinSearchofanAuthor,theFatherisafictionalcharacter.
Inthiscase,(10)isreallytrueinsofarasitisfictionallytruerelativetoagameauthorizedbythe
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workSixCharactersinSearchofanAuthor.Intheothercase,itisreallytrueinsofarasitisfictionallytruerelativetoanunofficialgameinwhichsomeentitiescountasrealpeopleandsomeasfictionalcharacters,withtheFathercorrectlysingledoutasoneofthelatterbecauseheoriginatedinaworkoffiction.
Walton'spretensebasedversionofantirealismhasbeenveryinfluential,butithasalsoattractedagreatdealofcriticism.Somehavedoubtedthatasentence'sfictionaltruthonitsconnivingusecangroundasenseinwhichitisreallytrueonitsnonconnivinguse(cf.Voltolini(2006)),amovethatiscrucialtohisantirealism.OthershavedoubtedthatWalton'sappealtounofficialgamesofmakebelievecanyieldappropriateantirealistparaphrasesformetafictionalsentencesingeneral,perhapsbecausethesecriticsdenythatsuchsentencesinvolveeitherexplicitorimplicitappealstopretense(Thomasson(1999),vanInwagen(2003)).
2.1.5Quantificationalargumentsforrealism
Ofcourse,toshowthatsomeantirealistparaphrasesoffictionalsentencesdonotworkdoesnotmeanthatnosuchparaphraseswillwork.Perhapsitisalwayspossibletofindnewparaphrasesthatdonotraiseanyoftheproblemshithertopointedout,whethersuchparaphrasesarebasedonanewversionofthepretensetheoreticapproachoronsomeotherapproach.Totakethispointintoaccount,somerealistshavepursuedadifferentlinguisticallybasedstrategy.Tobe,asQuinesaid,istobethevalueofavariable(Quine(1948)).Henceifwecanlocateexistentiallyquantifieddiscourseinvolvingquantificationoverfictionalentitieseitherdirectly,asexternalmetafictionalsentencesthatcanthemselvesbeusedaspremisestoderiveothermetafictionalsentences,orindirectly,asaresultofavalidinferencefromexternalmetafictionalsentencesthenitseemsthatsuchontologicalcommitmentisunavoidable.Inthisconnection,considerthesentence:
(11)Thereisafictionalcharacterwho,foreverynovel,eitherappearsinthatnovelorisamodelforacharacterwhodoes.
Notonlycansuchasentencebeinferredfrom,say:
(12)SanchoPanzaisamodelforatleastonecharacterineverynovel,apartfromthenovelDonQuixote,inwhichhehimselfappears,
butitalsolegitimizesaninferenceto:
(13)Ifnocharacterappearsineverynovel,thensomecharacterismodelledonanothercharacter
(cf.vanInwagen(2000:2434)).
Now,itiscertainlytruethatinsistingontheneedtopreservethevalidityoftheaboveinferencesinanyaccountofexternalmetafictionalsentencesisagoodantidotetotheantirealistparaphrasestrategy.Forthereisnoguaranteethatvalidityispreservedoncetheabovesentencesareparaphrased(say,inapretensetheoreticmannerlaWalton).Thissuggeststhatsuchantirealistparaphrasesmaynotcapturethemeibid.)forWalton'sresponse,seeWalton(1990:416ff.)).
Still,thismaynotbeenoughtoshowthatantirealismshouldberejected.Forwhileexistentialsentenceslike(11)thatquantifyoverfictionalcharactersarecommonenough,thereareotherexistentialclaimswiththesamelogicalfeaturesas(11)thatphilosophersarefarlesslikelytotakeasevidenceofrealism.Thusconsider:
(14)WhilethereisanimaginaryemperorwhoNathanSalmonimaginedtookoverFrance,therecertainlyisnoimaginaryemperorwhoNathanSalmonimaginedtookoverCanada.
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ThissentenceissuggestedbyNathanSalmon'saccountofallegedlyemptynamesinSalmon(1998).Salmonsuggeststhatwhilefictionalnamesingeneralstandforabstractcreatedfictionalentities,certainothertermsarethoroughlynonreferringorempty.Inthisconnection,hecontemplatesthepossibilityoftherebeinganarmedfanaticwhohasjusttakenoverthegovernmentofFrancebydeclaringhimselfemperor,andthenstipulatesthatthenameNappyistorefertowhoeveristhepresentemperorofFranceifthereissuchaperson(astherewouldbeifthisimaginativescenariowereactual),andtonothingifthereisn't.Suchaname,hethinks,isclearlyempty.Note,however,thatinSalmon'simaginativescenario,
(15)NappyisaFrenchemperor
istrue,butthatthereisnosimilarscenarioinvolvingapresentemperorofCanada.Asentencelike(14)isanaturalwayofrecordingthisfact.Butnowwefaceaproblem.AsCaplan(2004)pointsout,taking(11)asanevidenceforthegenuineexistenceofwhatvanInwagencallscreaturesoffictionsuggeststhatweshould,byparityofreasoning,take(14)asevidenceforthegenuineexistenceofsuigeneriscreaturesoftheimagination.Or,toputthepointtheotherwayround,ifwedon'tthinkthatlinguisticallybasedreasonssuchastheavailabilityofan(apparently)truequantifiedsentencelike(14)commitustobizarreentitieslikeNappy,weshouldnotthinkthatsuchreasonscommitustofictionalentitieseither.
Notethatwedonotevenneedquantificationallocutionstoseetheproblem.Ifonethinksthatthetruthoftheexternalmetafictionalsentence(5)commitsustotheexistenceofafictionalcharacter,AnnaKarenina,thenitishardtoresistthethoughtthatthetruthofthenonquantifiedsentence:
(16)Thatlittlegreenmanisjustatrickofthelight
utteredbysomeonewhowantstodescribethemistakemadebythosearoundhimwhothinkthattheyseealittlegreenman,similarlycommitsustotheexistenceofacertaincreatureoftheimagination,onewhohasthepropertyofbeingatrickofthelight(cf.Kroon(1996:186)).Manywouldresistsuchaneasyroadtorealismaboutcreaturesoftheimagination.
2.2Ontologicalargumentsforandagainstrealism
Theproblemsthatonethusencountersintryingtoletsemanticlinguisticargumentsgroundacommitmenttofictionalobjectsgiveonereasontothinkthatthereisnosemanticalshortcutavailabletotherealist.Thatistosay,ifarealistwantstoclaimthatourprimafaciecommitmenttofictionalentitiesisjustified,shehastoprovideagenuineontologicalargumenttothateffect.
Inher(1999),Thomassontriedtoprovidejustsuchanargument.Herargumentclaimsthatwecannotrejectfictionalobjectsifweadmitfictionalworks:giventhatfictionalobjectsandfictionalworksbelongtothesamegenusofentities(thegenusofcreated,artifactualobjects)itwouldbefalseparsimonytoaccepttheoneandrejecttheother.
Thisargumenthasseveralproblems.Foronething,itpostulatesanidentityofkindbetweenfictionalworksandfictionalentitiesthatisfarfromintuitivelyclear.AsThomassonherselfseemstoadmit(1999:65),fictionalworksaresyntacticalsemanticentities,unlikefictionalentities.Butthereisasimilarargumentthatdoesnotrelyonaparallelismbetweenfictionalworksandfictionalcharacters,butonthefactthattheidentityconditionsofthefictionalworksrefertofictionalcharacters.Inbrief:Ifweadmitacertainkindofentity,wecannotbutadmitalltheotherkindsofentitiesthatfigureintheidentityconditionsofsuchanentityweadmitfictionalworkssowecannotbutalsoadmitfictionalobjectsbecausetheyfigureintheidentityconditionsoffictionalworks.(Cf.Voltolini(2003,2006).)
Iftheantirealistwantstochallengetherealistondirectlyontologicalgrounds,shehastodiscreditsucharguments,and,betterstill,provideanargumentfortheconclusionthattherecannotbeany
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fictionalentities.Curiouslyenough,Russell,whoisusuallyrememberedforhavingoriginatedtheparaphrasestrategyforeliminatingapparentreferencetononexistententities(see2.11above),alsousednonlinguisticallybasedontologicalargumentsagainstadmittingsuchentities.Infact,thereisgoodreasontobelievethathetookhismainargumentagainstMeinongtobethatMeinongianentitiesareapttoviolatethelawofnoncontradiction(cf.Russell(1905a,b)).Inhis(2005),EverettreprisesandextendsRussell'sontologicalcriticismssothattheybecomeacritiqueoffictionalentitiesinparticular.Heprovidesanumberofargumentsthatareintendedtoshowthat,first,suchentitiesmayviolatesomebasiclogicallawsnotonlythelawofnoncontradiction,butalsothesymmetryofidentityand,second,theymaybeproblematicallyindeterminatewithrespecttoboththeirexistenceandidentity.Theseargumentsarebasedonoddbutintelligiblestoriesinwhich,forexample,oneindividualisbothidenticaltoanddistinctfromanother,orinwhichitisindeterminatewhetheracertainindividualexists.Thelinktofictionalcharactersisprovidedthroughthebridgingprinciples:
(P1)Iftheworldofastoryconcernsacreaturea,andifaisnotarealthing,thenaisafictionalcharacter.
(P2)Ifastoryconcernsaandb,andifaandbarenotrealthings,thenaandbareidenticalintheworldofthestoryifandonlyifthefictionalcharacterofaisidenticaltothefictionalcharacterofb.
Everett'slineofattackisinterestingandinnovative,and(giventheworriesexpressedaboutlanguagefocusedarguments)insomewaysamodelofhowanantirealistshouldreallypursuethebattleagainstwhatshebelievesareontologicalillusions.Butthedebateisnotlikelytoendthere.Althoughatleastoneinfluential(erstwhile)realisthasconcededthepowerofEverett'sargument,proposinganantirealistnotionofassumptionrelativetruth(Howell(2010))inplaceoftherealistabsolutenotionhechampionedearlier(Howell(1979)),otherrealistsarelikelytothinkthatEverettunderestimatestheconceptualresourcesavailabletothem.Forinstance,adistinctionbetweenonticindeterminacyinastoryandonticindeterminacywithrespectto,oroutof,astorymayallowonetorebuttheindeterminacypartofthecritique(cf.Schneider&vonSolodkoff(2009)andVoltolini(2010)),whilemoreorlessfamiliarneoMeinongiandistinctionsbetweeni)predicativeandpropositionalnegationandii)modesofpredication(alternatively,kindsofproperty)mayallowonetorebutthecritiqueinitsentirety(cf.Voltolini(2010)).Ofcourse,antirealiststakesuchdistinctionstobepoorlyunderstood,andpartofwhatmakesrealismanunattractiveoptioninthefirstplace,soevenifsuchrebuttalsaresuccessfulontheirowntermsthisisnotlikelytosettletherealismantirealismdebate.
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Acknowledgments
ManythankstoGideonRosenforusefulcommentsonanearlierdraftofthisentry.WeareespeciallygratefultoPaulOppenheimerforhisunstintinghelpandsupport.
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