8/8/2019 Feud Cases

1/58

G.R. No. 124292 December 10, 1996

GREGORIO C. JAVELOSA,petitioner,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES CORAZON J. DE LEON & MELVIN DE

LEON, SPOUSES KRISTINE SOLINAP & ALFONSO SOLINAP, MARLINA J.BALLEZA, MYRNA J. SERVANDO, respondents.

PUNO, J.:p

The subject land, with an area of 2,061 square meters, situated in Jaro, IloiloCity, was originally owned by petitioner Gregorio Javelosa. Sometime in the 70's,petitioner mortgaged said land to Jesus Jalbuena to secure several loans.Petitioner failed to pay his loans and Jalbuena, as mortgagee, foreclosed on the

land and purchased it as highest bidder at the foreclosure sale.

During the one-year period of redemption, petitioner-mortgagor filed an actionagainst the mortgagee at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City to annul themortgage contracts and public auction sale (Civil Case No. 16460). 1 He claimedthat the mortgage contracts were illegal and the conduct of the foreclosure salewas irregular.

While the case was pending, the period of redemption prescribed. Consequently,the mortgagee consolidated title over the land, caused the cancellation of themortgagor's title and the issuance of a new title in his name. Thereafter,

petitioner obtained an Order2

from the RTC in Civil Case No. 16460 restrainingthe mortgagee from further effecting the foreclosure sale of the property.

In the early part of December 1986, the mortgagee divided the subject landamong his married daughters (private respondents herein). On December 27,1986, the mortgagee died. He was substituted by his heirs, private respondents,in the pending RTC case for annulment of mortgage and foreclosure sale. OnJanuary 19, 1987, title to the subject was issued in the names of privaterespondents.

In the meantime, the RTC case for annulment of mortgage and foreclosure sale

continued to drag on. On June 1, 1993, private respondents, as registeredowners, sent a letter to petitioner-mortgagor demanding that the vacate thesubject premises within ten (10) days from receipt thereof. Despite receipt of thedemand letter on June 4, 1993, petitioner-mortgagor refused to vacate said lot.Thus, on August 6, 1993, private respondents filed a complaint for illegal detainerbefore the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) in Cities, Iloilo City, and sought to ejectpetitioner from the premises.

8/8/2019 Feud Cases

2/58

Petitioner, in his Answer, 3 asserted his ownership over the disputed land. Heclaimed that he had a TCT in his name but that the mortgagee (father andpredecessor-in-interest of private respondents), in bad faith, was able to causehis title to be cancelled and a new title issued in his name despite the pendencyof the RTC case questioning the award of the subject land to the mortgagee in

the foreclosure proceedings. Thus, petitioner denied he was illegally occupyingthe land. He claimed that he was legally entitled to the continued possessionthereof by virtue of pending legal incidents in his RTC case for annulment ofmortgage and foreclosure sale, from which transactions the mortgagee(predecessor-in-interest of private respondents) derived his title.

The MTC decided the unlawful detainer case in favor of private respondents andordered petitioner to vacate the premises and pay reasonable rental. The MTCheld that the pendency of the case for annulment of mortgage in the RTC wouldnot abate the proceedings in the unlawful detainer case filed before it for theissues in these cases are distinct from each other. 4

Petitioner elevated the case to the RTC. He alleged that the ejectment case wasimproperly filed with the MTC for private respondents (plaintiffs therein) shouldhave prayed instead for the issuance of a writ of possession with the RTC wherethe case for annulment of mortgage and foreclosure sale was pending.

Without ruling on the propriety of the filing of the ejectment case before the MTC,the RTC reversed the MTC decision on a different ground. It held that thecomplaint was filed out of time for under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court,an unlawful detainer case must be filed within one year from the time title wasissued in private respondents' name, i.e., from January 19, 1987, and not from

the last demand to vacate made by private respondents (plaintiffs therein). Thus,the ejectment case initiated on August 6, 1993 was filed beyond the one-yearprescriptive period. The RTC dismissed the ejectment case. 5

In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, private respondents alleged that the RTCerred in holding that the complaint for unlawful detainer was filed out of time. TheCourt of Appeals reversed the RTC decision and reinstated the decision of theMTC. It held that the complaint for unlawful detainer was filed on time for theprescriptive period should be counted not from the issuance of title in the nameof plaintiffs (private respondents herein), but from the date of the last demand tovacate made against the defendant. Moreover, the fact that private respondentswere never in prior physical possession of the subject land is of no moment forprior physical possession is necessary only in forcible entry cases. The Court ofAppeals thus ordered the petitioner (defendant in the ejectment case) to vacatethe premises and pay reasonable rentals. 6

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

8/8/2019 Feud Cases

3/58

In this Court, petitioner does not raise the issue regarding the timeliness of thefiling of the ejectment case against him. For the first time, he puts in the issue thenature of the suit filed against him. He contends that the complaint filed beforethe MTC is not an unlawful detainer suit but one foraccion publiciana cognizableby the RTC. Petitioner argues that the reading of the complaint reveals there was

no allegation as to how entry on the land was made by petitioner-mortgagor orwhen the latter unlawfully took possession of said land. Citing the case ofSaronav. Villegas, 7 petitioner contends that the omission of these jurisdictional factsstripped the MTC of jurisdiction over the case.

The petition is devoid of merit.

It is settled that jurisdiction of courts over the subject matter of the litigation isdetermined by the allegations in the complaint. It is equally settled that an error in

jurisdiction can be raised at any time and even for the first time on appeal. 8

The issue of jurisdiction in the case at bar depends on the nature of the case filedby private respondents in the MTC. If it is an unlawful detainer case, the actionwas properly filed with the MTC. However, if the suit is one foraccion publiciana,

jurisdiction is with the RTC and the complaint should be dismissed. To resolvethe issue, we should examine the specific allegations made by privaterespondents in their complaint. The complaint for unlawful detainer9 containedthe following material allegations, viz:

xxx xxx xxx

2. Plaintiffs (private respondents) are the registered owners of a parcel ofland . . . covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.

T-74417 . . .;

3. Defendant (petitioner-mortgagor) has been illegally occupying the abovedescribed property without the consent of the herein plaintiffs, thus unlawfullywithholding possession of the same from them who are the owners and the onesentitled to the physical possession thereof;

4. On June 1, 1993, plaintiffs . . . sent a letter dated May 26, 1993 to thedefendant demanding that he vacate the premises within ten days from receipt ofthe said letter . . .;

xxx xxx xxx

6. The said letter was received by the defendant on June 4, 1993 . . .;

xxx xxx xxx

8. Having received the demand to vacate the property in question, defendant isnow unlawfully withholding possession of the . . . property from the plaintiffs whoare entitled to the physical possession thereof;

8/8/2019 Feud Cases

4/58

9. As a consequence of the refusal of the defendant to vacate the premises . . .the plaintiffs were constrained to file this action for illegal detainer against him inorder to take away the physical possession thereof from them and to place themin de facto possession of the said property;

xxx xxx xxx

Clearly, private respondents (as plaintiffs therein) alleged in their complaint thatthey are the registered owners of the subject land and therefore, entitled topossession thereof; that petitioners were illegally occupying the premises withouttheir consent and thus unlawfully withholding possession from them; and, despitereceipt of their demand to vacate the premises, petitioner refused to leave theproperty. On the face of the complaint, it also appears that private respondentswere seeking to recover merely the physical possession or possession de factoof the subject land. Private respondents did not allege the incidents respectingthe mortgage of the land and the pending RTC case questioning the mortgagecontract as the issue involved therein is ownership which has no place in an

ejectment case. In fine, the allagations in the complaint make out a case forunlawful detainer. We have ruled in a long line of cases 10 that "in an action forunlawful detainer, a simple allegation that defendant is unlawfully withholdingpossession from plaintiff is . . . sufficient for the words "unlawfully withholding"imply possession on the part of defendant, which was legal in the beginning,having no other source than a contract, express or implied, possession whichhas later expired as a right and is being withheld by defendant." Thus, in the caseat bar, private respondents' allegation in their complaint that petitioner wasunlawfully withholding possession of the land from them is sufficient to make outa case for unlawful detainer.

In Co Tiamco v. Diaz,11

the Court emphasized that "the principle underlying thebrevity and simplicity of pleadings in forcible entry and unlawful detainer casesrests upon considerations of public policy. Ejectment cases are summary innature for they involve perturbation of social order which must be restored aspromptly as possible and, accordingly, technicalities or details of procedureshould be carefully avoided."

The ruling in the Sarona case 12 cited by petitioneri.e., that a complaint forunlawful detainer should alleged when and how entry on the land was made bythe defendant, finds no application to the case at bar. In Sarona, the main issuewas the timeliness of the filing of the complaint before the MTC. In forcible entry

cases, the prescriptive period is counted from the date of defendant's actual entryon the land; in unlawful detainer, from the date of the last demand to vacate.Hence, to determine whether the case was filed on time, there was a necessity toascertain whether the complaint was one for forcible entry or for unlawfuldetainer. In light of these consideration, the Court ruled that since the maindistinction between the two actions is when and how defendant entered the land,the determinative facts should be alleged in the complaint. Thus, in Sarona, the

jurisdiction of the MTC over the complaint was never issue for whether the

8/8/2019 Feud Cases

5/58

complaint was one for forcible entry or unlawful detainer, the MTC hadjurisdiction over it. The case at bar is different for at issue is the jurisdiction of theMTC over the unlawful detainer case for petitioner (defendant therein) assertsthat the case is one foraccion publiciana cognizable by the RTC.

Petitioner likewise insists that he is entitled to the physical possession of theproperty since he has been in actual, continuous possession thereof as owner-mortgagor. He contends that private respondents have never been in actualphysical possession of the land since they have not prayed for the issuance of awrit of possession with the RTC where the case assailing the sale of the landwas pending and where the parties' adverse claims of ownership are beinglitigated.

We find petitioner's contentions untenable.

Again, it is settled that prior physical possession is indispensable only in actions

for forcible entry but not in unlawful detainer. Since we have ruled that the MTCcase filed against petitioner is one for unlawful detainer, petitioner's priorpossession of the land is of no moment. Private respondents are entitled to itspassession from the time title was issued in their favor as registered owners. Anaction for unlawful detainer may be filed when possession by a landlord, vendor,vendee or other person against whom the possession of any land or building isunlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of their right to holdpossession, by virtue of a contract, express or implied. 13

Under the Rules, if the mortgaged property is not redeemed within one year fromthe foreclosure sale, the purchaser at public auction is entitled to possession of

the property.

14

To obtain possession, the vendee or purchaser may either ask fora writ of possession or bring an appropriate independent action, such as a suitfor ejectment, which private respondents did. The RTC case assailing the publicauction sale of the property and seeking annulment of mortgages did notpreclude the filing of an ejectment case against petitioner. 15 We have consistentlyruled that the pendency of an action for annulment of sale and reconveyance(which necessarily involves the issue of ownership) may not be successfullypleaded in abatement of an action for ejectment, the issue in the latter beingmerely physical possession. 16 To be sure, private respondents' most effectiveremedy was to file a separate action for unlawful detainer against petitioner. 17They cannot ask for a writ of possession from the RTC where the case forannulment of mortgage and foreclosure sale is pending because after themortgagee was able to consolidate his title on the land and a new title issued inhis name, petitioner was able to obtain an Order18 from the RTC directing themortgagee, (predecessor-in-interest of private respondents) to desist from furtherenforcing the foreclosure proceedings.

The case ofJoven v. Court of Appeals19 cited by petitioner is not on all fours withthe case at bar. In Joven, DBP as mortgagee was not able to consolidate its title

8/8/2019 Feud Cases

6/58

over the foreclosed land nor cause the cancellation of title in the mortgagor'sname. Although the title was still in the name of the mortgagor, DBP sold the landto private respondents and the latter, without first securing a court order, took thelaw into their own hands and entered said land. Hence, it was the mortgagor whofiled and successfully maintained an action for forcible entry against private

respondents, the transferees of the mortgagee.

The factual mould of the case at bar is different. The mortgagee (predecessor-in-interest of private respondents) was able to consolidate his ownership over theforeclosed land, cause the cancellation of title in the name of petitioner-mortgagor and the issuance of a new title in his own name. It was this title that hepassed on to his daughters, private respondents herein. As aforestated, arestraining order was issued by the RTC where the case for annulment offoreclosure sale is pending after the mortgagee had consolidated his ownershipover the land, hence, private respondents were left with no choice but to file aseparate and independent action for unlawful detainer to recover physical

possession of the property. Unlike in the Joven case, private respondents did nottake the law into their own hands and entered the property without the benefit ofa court order. They sought the aid of the court precisely to settle the issue ofphysical possession or possession de facto of the land when they filed theejectment case with the MTC.

We find that private respondents have adequately proved that they are entitled topossess the subject land as the registered owners thereof. The age-old rule isthat the person who has a torrens title over a land is entitled to possessionthereof. 20 Except for the bare claim that the title of private respondents wasobtained in bad faith, petitioner has pointed to no right to justify his continued

possession of the subject property.

Be that as it may, we reiterate the rule that the award of possession de facto overthe subject land to private respondents would not constitute res judicata as to theissue of ownership thereof, which issue is still being litigated before the RTC ofIloilo City where the case for annulment of mortgages and foreclosureproceeding is pending.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitioner is DENIED. The Decision of the Court ofAppeals, dated January 17, 1996, is AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 118284 July 5, 1996

SPOUSES MAMERTO REFUGIA and FELIZA PAYAD-REFUGIA, RODOLFOREFUGIA, and CANDELARIA REFUGIA, petitioners,vs.

8/8/2019 Feud Cases

7/58

COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES ARTURO REFUGIA and AURORATIMBANG-REFUGIA, respondents.

REGALADO,J.:

p

This is an appeal by certiorarifrom the decision 1 of respondent Court of Appealsin CA-G.R. No. 34647 promulgated on December 9, 1994 which reversed andset aside the judgment 2dated April 29, 1994 of the Regional Trial Court ofValenzuela, Branch 172, in Civil Case No. 4347-V-94 affirming with somemodifications the decision 3 rendered by the Metropolitan Trial Court ofValenzuela, Branch 81, in Civil Case No. 6089 on March 4, 1994.

The records en blocof the aforesaid cases show that private respondent-spouses Arturo Refugia and Aurora Timbang-Refugia are the registered owners

of a parcel of land and a duplex apartment building constructed thereon locatedat No. 16 Meriales Street, Marulas, Valenzuela, as evidenced by TransferCertificate of Title No. 218979. Apparently, said title was issued pursuant to aDeed of Absolute Sale executed on September 11, 1975 in favor of respondentArturo Refugia, but the purchase price of P20,000.00 was reportedly advancedby his father, herein petitioner Mamerto Refugia. Thereafter, respondent ArturoRefugia obtained a housing loan from the Social Security System, using the landas collateral to secure payment thereof. In 1976, after the construction of theduplex apartment building, herein petitioners immediately began to occupy onedoor while respondents stayed in the other unit.

It appears, however, that things did not turn out well between petitioners andprivate respondents, especially between petitioner Feliza Refugia and herdaughter-in-law, Aurora, such that in February of 1993, petitioners were told byprivate respondents to vacate the unit that they were occupying because,according to private respondents, the family of one of their children who ismarried needed a place of their own. Petitioners refused to leave, claiming thatthey own the unit they are occupying by reason of the fact that it was actuallyMamerto Refugia who bought the lot on which the duplex apartment stood.Because of this, the matter was brought before the barangaycourt of conciliation.No amicable settlement having been reached between the parties, privaterespondents instituted an action for ejectment on October 20, 1993 in the

Metropolitan Trial Court of Valenzuela, Branch 81.

On March 4, 1994, the court a quo rendered judgment dismissing the complaintfor ejectment based on its finding that herein petitioners are the lawful occupantsof the premises. Thus, it held that:

Like in any other ejectment suit, the pivotal issue is whether the defendants areunlawfully with(h)olding possession of the premises in question. The questionthat perturbs the mind of the Court which is not fully explained by plaintiffs is

8/8/2019 Feud Cases

8/58

whether the stay of the defendants in the premises was indeed by plaintiffs'tolerance alone. From the evidence on hand the Court is more disposed tobelieve the position of the defendants that it was Mamerto who bought the lotwhere the duplex apartment was constructed by plaintiff Arturo Refugia. Asstated earlier, the amount of P20,000.00 was withdrawn on September 11, 1975,the date the Deed of Absolute Sale (Exhibits F and F-1) was executed. Theconsideration of the sale is for P20,000.00. The fact that a two-door apartmentwas indeed constructed likewise regenerates the claim of defendants that theyshall be co-owners of the lot and shall dwell in one of the doors of saidapartment. If the averment of plaintiffs that they exclusively own the property isnot to be trusted what have motivated them to construct a two-door apartmentinstead of a single and a larger house? These facts are small tributaries that leadus to the bigger lake of truth, that is, the stay of the defendants in the premises isnot on the basis of mere tolerance.

It may also be pointed out that the certification to file action (Exhibit E) issued bythe Barangay is forLand Dispute not for ejectment. (Emphasis ours) In thehandwritten transcripts of the proceedings in the barangay, it appears that thiscase is merely an off-shoot of a misunderstanding between plaintiff AuroraRefugia and her in-laws. It was admitted by Aurora that she offered to pay the amount of P20,000.00 but that the defendants refused to accept the same. Thenand there plaintiff Aurora said that she would prefer to sell the unit to another andthat out of the proceeds of the sale, she will pay the defendants. Thesecircumstances lead the Court to conclude that it is not true that plaintiffs'daughter is in need of the premises.

On appeal, the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Branch 172, in itsaforementioned decision, affirmed with modification the judgment of the lowercourt by declaring herein petitioners and private respondents co-owners of the lotand the two-door apartment. Their motion for reconsideration having beendenied, private respondents duly filed a petition for review before respondent

Court of Appeals.

On December 9, 1994, said respondent court rendered its questioned judgmentwhich reversed and set aside the aforestated decisions of the Metropolitan TrialCourt and the Regional Trial Court, and thereafter ordered petitioners and theirprivies to vacate the subject premises and to surrender possession thereof toprivate respondents. In so ruling, respondent court declared that the RegionalTrial Court, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over an ejectment case,had no authority to resolve the issue of ownership and to declare hereinpetitioners as co-owners because its power is limited only to a determination ofthe issue of possession, that petitioners' bare allegation of ownership cannotprevail over the transfer certificate of title and deed of sale in favor of privaterespondents; and that petitioners have been occupying the subject premises bymere tolerance.

Hence, this petition wherein petitioners aver that respondent Court of Appealserred: (a) in giving due course to respondents' appeal despite the fact that it wasfiled beyond the fifteen (15) day reglementary period to appeal; (b) indisregarding jurisprudence that factual findings of the trial court should not be

8/8/2019 Feud Cases

9/58

disturbed on appeal; (c) in holding that petitioners' claim of co-ownership of thesubject premises is a mere allegation unsupported by any concrete evidence; (d)in ruling that the issue of ownership, as raised by petitioners, is foreign to theissue of possession in an ejectment case; and (e) in reversing the decisions ofboth lower courts and ordering petitioners' eviction from the disputed premises.

Anent the first issue, petitioners contend that private respondents received acopy of the decision of the Regional Trial Court on May 4, 1994 and thus theyhad until May 19, 1994 within which to file a petition for review before the Courtof Appeals. However, private respondents filed instead a Motion forReconsideration which was denied by the Regional Trial Court in its Order datedJune 21, 1994. Petitioners argue that since the motion for reconsideration is aprohibited pleading under the Rule on Summary Procedure and that the filingthereof did not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period, the petition forreview which was filed by private respondents only on July 21, 1994 was alreadyway beyond the 15-day reglementary period and should not have been given due

course by respondent court.

In the case ofJakihaca vs.Aquino, et al., 4this Court categorically ruled that:

The Rule on Summary Procedure applies only in cases filed before theMetropolitan Trial Court and Municipal Trial Courts, pursuant to Section 36 ofBatas Pambansa Blg. 129. Summary procedures have no application to casesbefore the Regional Trial Courts. Hence, when the respondents appealed thedecision of the Municipal Trial Court to the Regional Trial Court, the applicablerules are those of the latter court.

It is thus settled that a motion for reconsideration may be filed from a decision of

the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over decisionsof the inferior courts in ejectment cases. Accordingly, this argument of petitionershas to be rejected.

There is nonetheless appreciable merit in their contention that the petition forreview was belatedly filed in the Court of Appeals. This is because in case of a

judgment or final order of the Regional Trial Court rendered in an appeal from thejudgment or final order of an inferior court, the former may be appealed to theCourt of Appeals through a petition for review within fifteen days from receipt ofsaid judgment or final order. If a motion for reconsideration is filed, the losingparty has only the remaining period within which to file that petition for review.

The filing, therefore, of a motion for reconsideration has the effect of onlysuspending the period to appeal. This rule has been clarified in the case ofLacsamana, et. al. vs. The Honorable Second Special Cases Division of theIntermediate Appellate Court, et. al.,5as follows:

3) APPEALS BY PETITION FOR REVIEW TO THE COURT OF APPEALS

The final judgment or order of a regional trial court in an appeal from the finaljudgment or order of a metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court and municipal

8/8/2019 Feud Cases

10/58

circuit trial court, may be appealed to the Court of Appeals through a petition forreview in accordance with Section 22 of BP No. 129 and Section 22 (b) of theInterim Rules, or to this Court through a petition for review on certiorariinaccordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and Section 25 of the InterimRules. The reason for extending the period for the filing of a record on appeal isalso applicable to the filing of a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. Theperiod for filing a petition for review is fifteen days. If a motion for reconsiderationis filed with and denied by a regional trial court, the movant has only theremaining period within which to file a petition for review. Hence, it maynecessary to file a motion with the Court of Appeals for extension of time to filesuch petition for review. (Emphasis supplied).

It is not disputed that private respondents received a copy of the decision of theRegional Trial Court of Valenzuela on May 4, 1994, and that their motion forreconsideration was filed with said court on the fifteenth day of the reglementaryperiod to appeal, that is, May 19, 1994. In such a case, the rule is that theaggrieved party has only one day from receipt of the order denying the motion forreconsideration within which to file a petition for review before the Court of

Appeals.6

In the case at bar, private respondents received a copy of the orderdenying their motion for reconsideration on July 6, 1994, and, without moving forextension of time, were able to file their petition for review only on July 21, 1994;hence their appeal was not seasonably perfected. Strictly speaking, therefore,the appeal should not have been given due course, following the pronouncementin the case ofMiranda vs. Guanzon, et al.7to the effect that the requirementregarding the perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period is not onlymandatory but jurisdictional.

This rule, however, has been relaxed in the latter case ofTijam, et al. vs.Sibonghanoy, et al.8where it was held that a party, after voluntarily submitting a

cause, is estopped from attacking the jurisdiction of the court simply because itthereafter obtained an adverse decision on the merits. The Court explainedtherein that the "party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment ororder of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reasonthat such a practice cannot be tolerated obviously for reasons of public policy."It will be noted that the jurisdictional issue involved in the instant case was raisedonly for the first time in the present petition for review on certiorari.The lack orabsence of appellate jurisdiction was never questioned by petitioners either intheir Comment 9submitted with respondent court or in their Motion to DismissAppeal 10which was grounded solely on the fact that the petition for review filedbefore said court was not verified.

Despite several opportunities to raise the issue of jurisdiction in the Court ofAppeals, petitioners did not challenge its appellate jurisdiction and did so onlyafter an adverse decision was rendered against them. To be more precise, theyraised the issue of jurisdiction, for the nullification of the decision of the Court ofAppeals, when the case was already on appeal before this Court. They are nowbarred from doing so under the doctrine of estoppel by laches. 11 Additionally,

8/8/2019 Feud Cases

11/58

having participated actively in the proceedings before the appellate court,petitioners can no longer question its authority. 12

The main issue in this case demands the determination of whether theMetropolitan Trial Court, as well as the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its

appellate jurisdiction, have jurisdiction to resolve the issue of ownership in anaction for unlawful detainer where the issue of possession cannot be resolvedwithout deciding the question of ownership. In the affirmative, it becomesnecessary to delineate the extent and legal effect of such adjudication.

Under Republic Act No. 296, or the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, thejurisdiction of the then municipal and city courts over actions for forcible entryand unlawful detainer was defined as follows:

Sec. 88. Original jurisdiction in civil cases. . . . In forcible entry and detainerproceedings, the municipal judge or judge of the city court shall have original

jurisdiction, but the said municipal judge or city judge may receive evidence upon

the question of title therein, whatever may be the value of the property, solely forthe purpose of determining the character and extent of possession and damagesfor detention. In forcible entry proceedings, he may grant preliminary injunctions,in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court, to prevent the defendantfrom committing further acts of dispossession against the plaintiff. (As amendedby Republic Acts Nos. 2613 and 3828).

The law was subsequently amended by Republic Act No. 5967 13which vested inthe city courts special jurisdiction to resolve the issue of ownership in conjunctionwith the issue of possession whenever the question of ownership is brought inissue by the pleadings, thus:

Sec. 3. Besides the civil cases over which the City Courts have jurisdiction underSection eighty-eight of Republic Act Numbered Two hundred ninety-six, asamended, it shall likewise have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of FirstInstance over the following:

xxx xxx xxx

(c) In ejection cases where the question of ownership is brought in issue in thepleadings. The issue of ownership shall therein be resolved in conjunction withthe issue of possession.

This special jurisdiction of city courts was differentiated from the power ordinary

accorded the inferior courts to receive evidence of title only for the purpose ofdetermining the character or extent of the possession in dispute. This Court hadthe occasion to apply and interpret the aforequoted statutory provision in Pelaezvs. Reyes, et al. 14which raised the issue of whether a decision of a city court inan ejectment case involving the question of ownership was appealable to theRegional Trial Court or to the Court of Appeals, in this wise:

8/8/2019 Feud Cases

12/58

In the light of these provisions, petitioner insists that respondents should haveappealed to the Court of First Instance. Specifically, his contention is that theinclusion of the issue of ownership in the pleadings did not change the characterof the proceeding as an action of unlawful detainer over which city and municipalcourts have original exclusive jurisdiction. He claims that his contention issupported by the very provision of Section 3, just quoted, to the effect that whenownership is brought in issue in the pleadings in an ejection case before the citycourts, said courts are to resolve the issue of ownership only "in conjunction withthe issue of possession." In other words, he posits that since the action is one ofunlawful detainer, the main issue to be settled by the city court remains to bepossession, and that to resolve the issue of ownership "in conjunction with theissue of possession" is not the same as resolving it in a judicial litigation where itis the sole issue.

We are not impressed. Regardless of the juridical value of the significancepetitioner is trying to thus draw from the rather peculiar language of the statute,We are of the considered opinion that the evident import of Section 3 above is toprecisely grant to the city courts concurrent original jurisdiction with the courts offirst instance over the cases enumerated therein, which include "ejection caseswhere the question of ownership is brought in issue in the pleading." To sustainpetitioner's contention about the meaning of the last phrase of paragraph (c) ofsaid section regarding the resolution of the issue of ownership "in conjunctionwith the issue of possession" is to disregard the very language of the main part ofthe section which denotes unmistakably a conferment upon the city courts ofconcurrent jurisdiction with the courts of first instance over ejection cases inwhich ownership is brought in issue in the pleadings. It is to Us quite clear thatthe fact that the issue of ownership is to be resolved "in conjunction with theissue of possession" simply means that both the issues of possession andownership are to be resolved by the city courts. And the jurisdiction is concurrentwith the Courts of First Instance precisely because usually questions of title aresupposed to be resolved by superior courts. In other words, this grant of special

jurisdiction to city courts is to be distinguished from the power ordinarily accordedto municipal courts to receive evidence of title only for the purpose of determining

the extent of the possession in dispute.

It being clear, therefore, that in the main ejection case, . . . , the issue ofownership is involved as shown by the pleadings therein filed by the parties, andthat under Section 3 of Republic Act 5967, said city court exercised original

jurisdiction over the same concurrently with the Court of First Instance of MisamisOriental, the appeal of respondents was rightly made by them to the Court ofAppeals (Emphasis ours.)

However, on August 14, 1981, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, or the JudiciaryReorganization Act of 1980, was approved and it redefined the jurisdiction of theCourt of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts and the inferior courts. Specifically,

the new law modified the power of inferior courts to resolve the issue ofownership in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, subject, however, to thequalification that a resolution thereof shall not be for the purpose of determiningthe issue of possession, to wit:

Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts andMunicipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts,Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise.

8/8/2019 Feud Cases

13/58

xxx xxx xxx

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawfuldetainer: Provided, That when in such cases, the defendant raises the questionof ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolvedwithout deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved

only to determine the issue of possession.

Subsequently, this Court promulgated its Interim Rules and Guidelines in theimplementation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, Section 10 of which provides:

10. Jurisdiction in ejectment cases. Metropolitan trial courts, municipal trialcourts, and municipal circuit trial courts, without distinction, may try cases offorcible entry and detainer even if the question of ownership is raised in thepleadings and the question of possession could not be resolved without decidingthe issue of ownership, but the question of ownership shall be resolved only todetermine the issue of possession.

These issuances changed the former rule under Republic Act No. 296 whichmerely allowed inferior courts to receive evidence upon the question of title solelyfor the purpose of determining the extentand characterof possession anddamages for detention, which thereby resulted in previous rulings of this Court tothe effect that if it appears during the trial that the principal issue relates to theownership of the property in dispute and any question of possession which maybe involved necessarily depends upon the result of the inquiry into the title, thenthe jurisdiction of the municipal or city courts is lost and the action should bedismissed. With the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the inferior courtsnow retain jurisdiction over an ejectment case even if the question of possessioncannot be resolved without passing upon the issue of ownership, with the

express qualification that such issue of ownership shall be resolved only for thepurpose of determining the issue of possession. In other words, the fact that theissues of ownership and possession de facto are intricately interwoven will notcause the dismissal of the case for forcible entry and unlawful detainer on

jurisdictional grounds.

The intendment of the law was reinforced by the revision of the former Rule onSummary Procedures involving special cases before the inferior courts, whichwas promulgated pursuant to Section 36 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. The oldRule, which took effect on August 1, 1983, stated that:

Sec. 1. Scope This Rule shall govern the procedure in the Metropolitan TrialCourts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in thefollowing cases:

A. Civil Cases

(1) Cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer, except where the question ofownership is involved, or where the damages or unpaid rentals sought to berecovered by the plaintiff exceed twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) at the timeof the filing of the complaint.

8/8/2019 Feud Cases

14/58

This Rule was revised pursuant to a resolution of the Court En Bancwhich tookeffect on November 15, 1991, and the aforequoted provision now reads asfollows:

Sec. 1. Scope. This rule shall govern the summary procedure in theMetropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal TrialCourts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases falling withintheir jurisdiction:

A. Civil Cases

(1) All cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer, irrespective of the amount ofdamages or unpaid rentals sought to be recovered. Where attorney's fees areawarded, the same shall not exceed twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00).

Under the original Rule, ejectment cases were covered by the summary rulesonly where the unpaid rentals do not exceed P20,000.00 and no question ofownership is involved. As presently formulated, however, all ejectment cases arenow unqualifiedly covered by the summary procedure, which necessarily impliesthat even if there is a need to resolve the issued of ownership, such fact will notdeprive the inferior courts of jurisdiction over these cases.

Subsequently, Republic Act No. 7691, entitled "An Act Expanding the Jurisdictionof the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal CircuitTrial Courts, Amending for the Purpose Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwiseknown as the 'Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980'", was passed and took effecton April 15, 1994. 15The jurisdiction of the inferior courts over forcible entry andunlawful detainer cases as defined under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 wasretained. In addition, they now exercise limited original jurisdiction over civil

actions involving title to, or possession of, real property or any interest thereindepending on the assessed value and location of the property.

Parenthetically, it might be argued that since inferior courts are anyway vestedwith jurisdiction over real actions, then it can very well resolve the issue ofownership raised in the ejectment case, under the conditions stated in Section32(3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691. Itmust not be overlooked, however, that proceedings in ejectment cases aresummary in nature, whereas actions for recovery of ownership require a full-blown trial on the merits. The difference in the procedure in special civil actions,like ejectment, and in ordinary civil actions, such as accion reinvindicatoria,

inveigh against the consolidation of said cases or the joinder of the differentcauses of action involved. It could also be violative under certain circumstancesof the rule on permissive joinder of causes of action since Section 6 of Rule 2requires inter alia due observance of the rules on jurisdiction and joinder ofparties, and that said causes of action arise out of the same contract, transactionor relation between the parties.

8/8/2019 Feud Cases

15/58

As the law on forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases now stands, even wherethe defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the questionof possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, theMetropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit TrialCourts nevertheless have the undoubted competence to resolve the issue of

ownership albeit only to determine the issue ofpossession. 16

On the bases of the foregoing disquisitions, it is clear that prior to the effectivity ofBatas Pambansa Blg. 129, the jurisdiction of inferior courts was confined toreceiving evidence of ownership in order to determine only the nature and extentof possession, by reason of which such jurisdiction was lost the moment itbecame apparent that the issue of possession was intricately interwoven withthat of ownership. The law, as revised, now provides instead that when thequestion of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue ofownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue

of possession. On its face, the new Rule on Summary Procedure was extendedto include within the jurisdiction of the inferior courts ejectment cases whichlikewise involve the issue of ownership. This does not mean, however, thatblanket authority to adjudicate the issue of ownership in ejectment suits has beenthus conferred on the inferior courts.

At the outset, it must here be stressed that the resolution of this particular issueconcerns and applies only to forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases wherethe issue of possession is intimately intertwined with the issue of ownership. Itfinds no proper application where it is otherwise, that is, where ownership is notin issue, or where the principal and main issue raised in the allegations of the

complaint as well as the relief prayed for make out not a case for ejectment butone for recovery of ownership.

In the case ofDe la Santa vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,17 this Court, in making adistinction between the reception of evidence and the resolution of the issue ofownership, held that the inferior court may look into the evidence of title orownership and possession de jure insofar as said evidence would indicate ordetermine the nature of possession. It cannot, however, resolve the issue ofownership, that is, by declaring who among the parties is the true and lawfulowner of the subject property, because the resolution of said issue would effectan adjudication on ownership which is not sanctioned in the summary action forunlawful detainer. With this as a premise and taking into consideration theamendment introduced by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, it may be suggested thatinferior courts are now conditionally vested with adjudicatory power over theissue of title or ownership raised by the parties in an ejectment suit.

Withal, it will be observed, that the passage of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 hasspawned seemingly conflicting jurisprudence on the proper interpretation andapplication thereof. Thus, in several cases decided by the Court after the

8/8/2019 Feud Cases

16/58

effectivity of this law, regardless of whether the complaint for ejectment was filedwith the inferior court prior thereto or otherwise, it was held that the jurisdiction ofthe inferior court is lost and the ejectment case should be dismissed where theissue of possession cannot be resolved without determining the issue ofownership. 18In all of these cases, the Court declared that inferior courts may

only admit evidence and proof of ownership but they cannot adjudicate on thequestion of ownership. Conversely, in also not a few instances, the jurisdiction ofthe inferior courts to resolve the issue of ownership in order to determine theissue of possession was upheld by this Court. 19Apparently, it could have beensome imprecision in language or a misperception of the statutory text whichgenerated the ostensible doctrinal variance.

After due deliberation, we find and so hold that by virtue of the express mandateset forth in Section 33(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, inferior courts have

jurisdiction to resolve the question of ownership raised as an incident in anejectment case where a determination thereof is necessary for a proper and

complete adjudication of the issue of possession. Certain guidelines, however,must be observed in the implementation of this legislative prescription, viz.:

1. The primal rule is that the principal issue must be that of possession, and thatownership is merely ancillary thereto, in which case the issue of ownership maybe resolved but only for the purpose of determining the issue of possession.Thus, as earlier stated, the legal provision under consideration applies onlywhere the inferior court believes and the preponderance of evidence shows thata resolution of the issue of possession is dependent upon the resolution of thequestion of ownership.

2. It must sufficiently appear from the allegations in the complaint that what theplaintiff really and primarily seeks is the restoration of possession. 20

Consequently, where the allegations of the complaint as well as the reliefsprayed for clearly establish a case for the recovery of ownership, and not merelyone for the recovery of possession de facto, or where the averments plead theclaim of material possession as a mere elemental attribute of such claim forownership, 21or where the issue of ownership is the principal question to beresolved, 22the action is not one for forcible entry but one for title to real property.

3. The inferior court cannot adjudicate on the nature of ownership where therelationship of lessor and lessee has been sufficiently established in theejectment case, 23unless it is sufficiently established that there has been asubsequent change in or termination of that relationship between the parties.This is because under Section 2(b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the tenant isnot permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement ofthe relation of landlord and tenant between them.

4. The rule in forcible entry cases, but not in those for unlawful detainer, is that aparty who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against

8/8/2019 Feud Cases

17/58

the owner himself. Regardless of the actual condition of the title to the propertyand whatever may be the character of his prior possession, if he has in his favorpriority in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the propertyuntil he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right through an accion

publiciana oraccion reivindicatoria.24 Corollarily, if prior possession may be

ascertained in some other way, then the inferior court cannot dwell upon orintrude into the issue of ownership.

5. Where the question of who has prior possession hinges on the question ofwho the real owner of the disputed portion is, the inferior court may resolve theissue of ownership and make a declaration as to who among the contendingparties is the real owner. 25In the same vein, where the resolution of the issue ofpossession hinges on a determination of the validity and interpretation of thedocument of title or any other contract on which the claim of possession ispremised, the inferior court may likewise pass upon these issues. This isbecause, and it must be so understood, that any such pronouncement made

affecting ownership of the disputed portion is to be regarded merely asprovisional, hence, does not bar nor prejudice an action between the sameparties involving title to the land. 26Moreover, Section 7, Rule 70 of the Rules ofCourt expressly provides that the judgment rendered in an action for forcibleentry or unlawful detainer shall be effective with respect to the possession onlyand in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building.

The interpretative rules we have herein adopted are not without justification. It isour considered opinion that they are more in keeping with the avowed objectiveof actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer which have purposely beenmade summary in nature so that there may be a peaceful, speedy and

expeditious means of preventing an alleged illegal possessor of property fromunjustly continuing his possession for a long time, thereby insuring themaintenance of peace and order in the community, as, otherwise, the partyillegally deprived of possession might feel the despair of long waiting and decide,as a measure of self-protection, to take the law into his hands and seize thesame by force and violence. 27 And since the law discourages continuedwrangling over possession of property for they involve perturbation of socialdisorder which must be restored as promptly as possible, technicalities or detailsof procedure which may cause unnecessary delays should accordingly andcarefully be avoided. 28

As a matter of judicial experience, there have been cases where persons whohave failed to adduce any legal ground for their continued stay on propertybelonging to another have nonetheless managed to stave off eviction for severalyears through the improper use of procedural technicalities. 29 Conformably, if wewere to allow the dismissal of an ejectment case for the reason that the questionof ownership is incidentally involved in determining the question of possession,we are in effect providing the defendants in ejectment cases with the opportunityto prolong their occupancy of premises, over which they have ceased to have

8/8/2019 Feud Cases

18/58

any valid possessory right, during the time that an action for recovery ofownership, which involves a more tedious and lengthy court proceeding, isactually pending in court.

It is indeed ironic that a forcible entry or unlawful detainer case which is intended

to be disposed of in summary fashion has oftentimes proved to be the mostcumbersome and difficult to decide. It is thus about time that this situation beremedied if only to contribute to the solution of the worsening problem of courtcongestion, by refusing to edify these cases by giving them a full-blown treatmentin all the courts in the judicial structure, and thereby save the courts theexpenditure of precious time and energy which could otherwise be devoted tomore significant and vital litigations. 30

With these considerations in mind, we now proceed to the merits of the presentcase. Petitioners claim to be co-owners of the subject premises on the basis ofan alleged verbal agreement between the parties to subdivide the property, as

well as the payment made by petitioner Mamerto Refugia for the purchase of thelot in the amount of P20,000.00. On the other hand, private respondents' propertyrights are supported by sufficient documents and muniments of ownership,namely, the deed of absolute sale, transfer certificate of title, and building permitin their names, the regularity in the issuance of which was never controverted norput in issue by petitioners.

The Metropolitan Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court are not in accord onwhether to treat the P20,000.00 as a loan or as payment for petitioners' share inthe subject premises, while respondent Court of Appeals believes that the sameis actually a loan. It bears significant notice that petitioners never refuted nor

denied, in any of their pleadings filed in this case from the court of origin and allthe way up to this Court, the allegation that private respondents gave P5,000.00as partial payment for the loan. No countervailing explanation was advanced bypetitioners why such payment was made to and accepted by them as such.

Furthermore, the allegation of petitioners that there was a verbal agreement tosubdivide the property between them and private respondents is self-serving andevidentiarily baseless at this stage. In addition, their theory of an "implied trust"was not raised in issue in the trial court and cannot therefore be raised for thefirst time in the present petition. 31At most, it was merely alluded to in petitioners'Rejoinder filed with the Court of Appeals, but petitioners never bothered toexpound on or substantiate the same. Consequently, it cannot now be raised asan assignment of error in the present petition.

In sum, and as held by respondent court, the Regional Trial Court "oversteppedits bounds" in ruling that petitioners and private respondents are co-owners of theproperty, which issue should be finally determined in the separate action forspecific performance reportedly pending between the parties. At this juncture,however, the evidence conduces to a finding that private respondents are in

8/8/2019 Feud Cases

19/58

possession of the premises in the concept of and consequent to their beingowners thereof. Even on such prima facie showing, therefore, privaterespondents can maintain the ejectment case involved.

While it may be argued that petitioners were able to prove prior possession,

such, however, is not the issue involved in this action for unlawful detainer. Anaction for unlawful detainer is different from a forcible entry case in that theformer involves an act of unlawfully withholding the possession of the land orbuilding against or from a landlord, vendor or vendee or other person after theexpiration or termination of the detainer's right to hold possession by virtue of acontract, express or implied, 32and neither is prior physical possession of theproperty by the plaintiff necessary; 33whereas in the latter, the main issue is oneof priority of possession. 34

In the case at bar, petitioners failed to show that they were legally entitled tocontinue occupying the unit in question. On the considerations hereinbefore

detailed, we agree with the position of respondent Court of Appeals thatpetitioners would in effect be occupying the premises by mere tolerance. Aperson who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission,without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promisethat he will vacate the same upon demand, failing which a summary action forejectment is the proper remedy against him. 35The status of petitioners isanalogous to that of a lessee or tenant whose term of lease has expired butwhose occupancy continued by tolerance of the owner. 36

It has further been held that such tolerance must be present right from the start ofpossession sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of

unlawful detainer.

3

7 Here, it cannot be gainsaid that petitioners' possession wasby mere tolerance of private respondents from the very beginning. At any rate, ithas likewise not been denied by herein petitioners that one of their sons alsoowns a residential house where they can live.

Notwithstanding the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, and the MetropolitanTrial Court for the matter, to qualifiedly resolve the issue of ownership raised inthe present ejectment suit, but their findings thereon being devoid of basis in factand in law, respondent Court of Appeals was fully justified in decreeing a reversalof their judgments.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

BABY ARLENE LARANO,

G.R. No. 158231

8/8/2019 Feud Cases

20/58

Petitioner,

Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO,J.,- versus - Chairperson,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CHICO-NAZARIO, andNACHURA,JJ.

SPS. ALFREDO CALENDACION

andRAFAELA T. CALENDACION,

*

Promulgated:

Respondents. June 19, 2007

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

D E C I S I O N

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

cralawBefore the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised

Rules of Court assailing the Decision1[1] dated May 13, 2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in

CA-G.R. SP No. 68272 which dismissed the complaint for unlawful detainer of Baby Arlene

Larao (petitioner) against Spouses Alfredo and Rafaela Calendacion (respondents).

The factual background of the case is as follows:

cralawPetitioner owns a parcel of riceland situated in Barangay Daniw, Municipality of

Victoria, Laguna covered by TCT No. 175241 of the Register of Deeds of Laguna. On September

*

*

1

8/8/2019 Feud Cases

21/58

14, 1998, petitioner and respondents executed a Contract to Sell whereby the latter agreed to buy

a 50,000-square meter portion of petitioner's riceland for P5Million, with P500,000.00 as down

payment and the balance payable in nine installments of P500,000.00 each, until September

2001.2[2]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

cralawPending full payment of the purchase price, possession of the riceland was

transferred to respondents under the condition that they shall account for and deliver the harvest

from said riceland to petitioner.Respondents, however, failed to pay the installments and to

account for and deliver the harvest from said riceland.3[3]

cralawOn March 7, 2000, petitioner sent respondents a demand letter4[4] to vacate the

riceland within 10 days from receipt thereof, but as her demand went unheeded, she filed on April

5, 2000 a Complaint5[5] against respondents for unlawful detainer before the Municipal Trial

Court (MTC), Victoria, Laguna, docketed as Civil Case No. 826, praying that respondents be

directed to vacate the riceland and to pay P400,000.00 per year from September 1998 until they

vacate, as reasonable compensation for the use of the property, P120,000.00 as attorneys fees, and

P50,000.00 as litigation expenses.6[6]

cralawIn their Answer7[7] dated April 26, 2000, respondents admit the execution of the

Contract to Sell but deny that it contains all the agreements of the parties. They allege that

petitioner has no cause of action against them because the three-year period within which to pay

the purchase price has not yet lapsed; that the MTC has no jurisdiction over the case because the

complaint failed to allege that a demand to pay and to vacate the riceland was made upon them. 8

[8]

23

4

56

7

8

8/8/2019 Feud Cases

22/58

cralawOn August 2, 2001, the MTC rendered a Decision,9[9] the dispositive portion of

which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendants, asfollows:

1.) To immediately vacate the premises in question;

2.) To pay the amount of THREE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND

(P365,000.00) PESOS as a reasonable compensation for the use andoccupation of the property;

3.) To pay TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00) PESOS for andattorney's fees; and

4.) To pay FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS as litigation expenses,

plus costs.

SO ORDERED.10[10]

cralawRespondents filed an appeal with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 26, Sta.

Cruz, Laguna, docketed as Civil Case No. SC-4141.11[11] On December 3, 2001, the RTC

rendered a Decision,12[12] the dispositive portion of which reads:

cralaw

cralawWHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court is herebyaffirmed subject to the modification that defendants are ordered to pay

plaintiff the amount of FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND (P400,000.00),

as yearly reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of saidriceland computed from 1999 until such time that defendants have actually

vacated the same.

SO ORDERED.13[13]

9

1011

12

13

8/8/2019 Feud Cases

23/58

cralawUndaunted, respondents filed a Petition for Review with the CA.14[14]For failure to

file her comment despite receipt of CA Resolution15[15] dated May 8, 2002 which required her

to file a comment, petitioner was deemed to have waived her right to file comment to the petitionin CA Resolution dated August 28, 2002.16[16]

cralawOn May 13, 2003, the CA rendered a Decision17[17] setting aside the Decision of

the RTC and dismissing the complaint for unlawful detainer. The CA nullified the proceedings

before the MTC for want of jurisdiction.It held that the issues in the case - whether or not there

was a violation of the Contract to Sell, whether or not such violation gives the petitioner the right

to terminate the contract and consequently, the right to recover possession and the value of the

harvest from the riceland- extend beyond those commonly involved in unlawful detainer suits

where only the issue of possession is involved; that the case is not a mere detainer suit but one

incapable of pecuniary estimation, placing it under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC,

not the MTC.

Dissatisfied, petitioner filed the present petition anchored on the following grounds:

1. The respondent Court of Appeals committed grave error in giving due

course to the private respondents' petition for review notwithstanding the

fact that said petition contains no verification to the effect that theallegations therein were read and understood by the private respondents

and that they are true and correct of their own or personal knowledge or

based on authentic records, as required by the rules.

2. The respondent Court of Appeals grievously erred in dismissing the

case on the ground that the Municipal Trial Court has no jurisdiction overthe case for unlawful detainer, and thus the Regional Trial Court likewisehas no jurisdiction on appeal to decide the case for unlawful detainer,

which allegedly involves a matter incapable of pecuniary estimation.

1415

16

17

8/8/2019 Feud Cases

24/58

3.The respondent Court of Appeals erred in not affirming the decision of

the Regional Trial Court dated December 3, 2001, modifying the decisionof the Municipal Trial Court dated August 2, 2000 both ordering the

eviction of private respondents from the subject property and payment of

the reasonable value of the use of the subject premises.18

[18]

Petitioner contends that the CA should have dismissed outright the petition for review filed

before it since it contains no verification as required by the Rules; and that the CA, in finding that

the complaint before the MTC was not one for unlawful detainer but for specific performance,

did not limit itself to the allegations in the complaint but resorted to unrestrained references,

deductions and/or conjectures, unduly influenced by the allegations in the answer.

Respondents, on the other hand, contend that verification is just a formal requirement; that

petitioner waived her right to question the defect when she failed to submit her comment; that the

CA correctly pointed out that the present case involves one that is incapable of pecuniary

estimation since the crux of the matter is the rights of the parties based on the Contract to Sell.

The petition is bereft of merit.

As to the contention of petitioner that the CA should not have taken cognizance of the petition for

review because it was not verified, as required by the Rules, this Court has held in a number of

instances that such a deficiency can be excused or dispensed with in meritorious cases, the defect

being neither jurisdictional nor always fatal.19[19] The requirement regarding verification of a

pleading is formal.20[20] Such requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of pleading,

the non-compliance with which does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective.21[21]

Verification is simply intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true

1819

20

21

8/8/2019 Feud Cases

25/58

and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the

pleading is filed in good faith.22[22] The court may order the correction of the pleading if

verification is lacking or act on the pleading although it is not verified, if the attending

circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rules may be dispensed with in order that

the ends of justice may thereby be served.23[23]

Besides, petitioner did not raise the issue of lack of verification before the CA.She did not file a

comment to the petition and it is too late in the day to assail such defect, as she is deemed to have

waived any objection to the formal flaws of the petition. Points of law, theories, issues and

arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court cannot be raised for the first time on

appeal.24[24]

The main issue being raised in the present petition is whether the complaint is one for unlawful

detainer.

cralawSettled is the rule that jurisdiction in ejectment cases is determined by the allegations

pleaded in the complaint.25[25] It cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the

answer or pleadings filed by the defendant.26[26] Neither can it be made to depend on the

exclusive characterization of the case by one of the parties .27[27] The test for determining the

sufficiency of those allegations is whether, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a

valid judgment in accordance with the prayer of the plaintiff.28[28]

2223

24

2526

27

28

8/8/2019 Feud Cases

26/58

cralawThe facts upon which an action for unlawful detainer can be brought are specially

mentioned in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides:

Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. Subject to the provisions of

the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land orbuilding by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor,

vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is

unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold

possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legalrepresentatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee or other person

may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or

withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court

against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession,

or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such

possession, together with damages and costs.(Emphasis supplied)

In unlawful detainer, the possession was originally lawful but became unlawful by the expiration

or termination of the right to possess; hence, the issue of rightful possession is decisive for, in

such action, the defendant is in actual possession and the plaintiffs cause of action is the

termination of the defendants right to continue in possession.29[29]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

cralawApplied to the present case, petitioner, as vendor, must comply with two requisites

for the purpose of bringing an ejectment suit: (a) there must be failure to pay the installment due

or comply with the conditions of the Contract to Sell; and (b) there must be demand both to pay

or to comply and vacate within the periods specified in Section 230[30] of Rule 70, namely: 15

days in case of land and 5 days in case of buildings.The first requisite refers to the existence of

the cause of action for unlawful detainer, while the second refers to the jurisdiction requirement

of demand in order that said cause of action may be pursued.31[31]

cralawBoth demands to pay installment due or adhere to the terms of the Contract to Sell

and to vacate are necessary to make the vendee deforciant in order that an ejectment suit may be

29

30

31

8/8/2019 Feud Cases

27/58

filed.32[32] It is the vendor's demand for the vendee to vacate the premises and the vendee's

refusal to do so which makes unlawful the withholding of the possession.33[33] Such refusal

violates the vendor's right of possession giving rise to an action for unlawful detainer.34[34]

However, prior to the institution of such action, a demand from the vendor to pay the installment

due or comply with the conditions of the Contract to Sell and to vacatethe premises is required

under the aforequoted rule.

cralawThus, mere failure to pay the installment due or violation of the terms of the Contract

to Sell does not automatically render a person's possession unlawful. Furthermore, the giving of

such demand must be alleged in the complaint; otherwise, the MTC cannot acquire jurisdiction

over the case.35[35]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

A review of the Complaint of petitioner discloses these pertinent allegations: petitioner owns the

subject riceland; she executed a Contract to Sell in favor of respondents; pending full payment of

the purchase price, possession of subject riceland was transferred to respondents subject to

accounting and delivery of the harvest to petitioner; respondents failed to pay the installments and

to account for and deliver the harvest; petitioner asked respondents to vacate the subject riceland,

but they failed to do so.Accordingly, petitioner prayed for judgment ordering respondents to

vacate the subject riceland and to pay P400,000.00 per year from September 1998 until they

vacate as reasonable compensation for the use of the property, P120,000.00 as attorney's fees, and

P50,000.00 as litigation expenses.

It is clear from the foregoing that the allegations in the Complaint failed to constitute a case of

unlawful detainer.What is clear is that in the Complaint, petitioner alleged that respondents had

violated the terms of the Contract to Sell.However, the Complaint failed to state that petitioner

made demands upon respondents to comply with the conditions of the contract the payment of the

3233

34

35

8/8/2019 Feud Cases

28/58

installments and the accounting and delivery of the harvests from the subject riceland. The 10-day

period granted respondents to vacate even fell short of the 15-day period mandated by law.When

the complaint does not satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of a valid cause for unlawful

detainer, the MTC does not have jurisdiction to hear the case.36[36]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

An allegation of a violation of a contract or agreement in a detainer suit may be proved by the

presentation of competent evidence, upon which an MTC judge might make a finding to that

effect, but certainly, that court cannot declare and hold that the contract is rescinded.The

rescission of contract is a power vested in the RTC.37[37]The rescission of the contract is the

basis of, and therefore a condition precedent for, the illegality of a party's possession of a piece of

realty.38[38] Without judicial intervention and determination, even a stipulation entitling one

party to take possession of the land and building, in case the other party violates the contract,

cannot confer upon the former the right to take possession thereof, if that move is objected to. 39

[39]

Clearly, the basic issue raised in the complaint of petitioner is not of possession but interpretation,

enforcement and/or rescission of the contract, a matter that is beyond the jurisdiction of the MTC

to hear and determine.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED.The Decision dated May 13, 2003 of the Court

of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 68272 is AFFIRMED.Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

SPS. CARLOS AND EULALIA RAYMUNDO

and SPS. ANGELITO AND JOCELYN

G.R. No. 171250

3637

38

39

8/8/2019 Feud Cases

29/58

BUENAOBRA,

Petitioners,

-versus-

SPS. DOMINADOR and ROSALIA

BANDONG,

Respondents.

Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,

Chairperson,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CHICO-NAZARIO, and

NACHURA,JJ.

Promulgated:

July 4, 2007

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

D E C I S I O N

CHICO-NAZARIO,J.:

cralawThis is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of

Court, filed by petitioners Spouses Carlos and Eulalia Raymundo and Spouses Angelito and

Jocelyn Buenaobra seeking the reversal and setting aside of the Decision40[1] of the Court of

40

8/8/2019 Feud Cases

30/58

Appeals dated 26 September 2005 and its Resolution41[2] dated 24 January 2006 in CA-G.R. CV

No. 59557.The Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision and Resolution, reversed the

Decision42[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) dated 28 January 1998, in Civil Case No. C-

14980, declaring the Deed of Sale executed by respondent Dominador Bandong (Dominador) in

favor of petitioner Eulalia Raymundo (Eulalia) as valid and binding.The dispositive portion of the

asailed Court of Appeals Decision reads:

cralawWHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby GRANT the

appeal.The January 28, 1998 decision of the RTC, Branch 126, Caloocan

City is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered:

1. cralawANNULLING the Deed of Absolute Sale dated

February 3, 1989 as a deed of sale, and consideringit instead as a real estate mortgage of the disputedproperty to secure the payment of the P70,000.00

the plaintiffs-appellants spouses Bandong owe the

defendants-appellees spouses Raymundo.Thespouses Bandong are given one (1) year from the

finality of this Decision within which to pay the

P70,000.00 owed to the spouses Raymundo, at 12%

interest per annum computed from July 17, 1991until its full payment.

2. cralawANNULLING the Deed of Absolute Sale datedSeptember 25, 1990, between the spouses

Raymundo as vendors and the spouses Buenaobra

as vendees.

3. cralawORDERING the Register of Deeds of

Caloocan City to issue a new Transfer Certificate ofTitle covering Lot 18, Block 2 of the subdivision

plan PSD 16599, a portion of Lot 1073 of the

Cadastral Survey of Caloocan, in the names of the

spouses Dominador and Rosalia Bandong, after the

cancellation pursuant to this Decision of TCT No.222871 currently in the names of the spouses

Angelito and Jocelyn Buenaobra; and FURTHER

ORDERING the said Register of Deeds to annotate

in the new Transfer Certificate of Title in the names

41

42

8/8/2019 Feud Cases

31/58

of the spouses Bandong a real estate mortgage in

favor of the spouses Carlos and Eulalia Raymundo

reflecting the terms of this Decision.

4. cralawAWARDING moral damages in the amount of

P50,000.00; exemplary damages of P20,000.00; andattorneys fees and expenses of litigation of

P20,000.00, plus P500.00 per proven appearance of

the plaintiffs-appellants counsel in court allsolidarily payable by the spouses Carlos and Eulalia

Raymundo and the spouses Angelito and Jocelyn

Buenaobra, to the spouses Dominador and Rosalia

Bandong.

5. cralawORDERING the payment of the costs of the

suit, payable by the spouses Carlos and Eulalia

Raymundo and the spouses Angelito and JocelynBuenaobra.43[4]

cralawThe factual and procedural backdrop of this case are as follows:

Eulalia was engaged in the business of buying and selling large cattle from different provinces

within the Philippines.For this purpose, she employed biyaheros whose primary task involved theprocuring of large cattle with the financial capital provided by Eulalia and delivering the procured

cattle to her for further disposal.In order to secure the financial capital she advanced for the

biyaheros, Eulalia required them to surrender the Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) of their

properties and to execute the corresponding Deeds of Sale in her favor.

Dominador had been working for Eulalia as one of herbiyaheros for three decades.Considering

his long years of service without any previous derogatory record, Eulalia no longer required

Dominador to post any security in the performance of his duties.44[5]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

43

44

8/8/2019 Feud Cases

32/58

However, in 1989, Eulalia found that Dominador incurred shortage in his cattle procurement

operation in the amount of P70,000.00.Dominador and his wife Rosalia Bandong (Rosalia) then

executed a Deed of Sale45[6] in favor of Eulalia on 3 February 1989, covering a parcel of land

with an area of 96 square meters, more or less, located at Caloocan City and registered under

TCT No. 1421 (subject property), in the name of the Spouses Bandong.On the strength of the

aforesaid deed, the subject property was registered in the names of Eulalia and her husband

Carlos Raymundo (Carlos). The subject property was thereafter sold by the Spouses Raymundo

to Eulalias grandniece and herein co-petitioner, Jocelyn Buenaobra (Jocelyn).Thus, the subject

property came to be registered in the name of Jocelyn and her husband Angelito Buenaobra

(Angelito).

After the TCT of the subject property was transferred to their names, the Spouses Buenaobra

instituted before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Caloocan City, an action for ejectment

against the Spouses Bandong, docketed as Civil Case No. 20053, seeking the eviction of the

latter from the subject property, which the Spouses Bandong opposed on the ground that they are

the rightful owners and possessors thereof.The MeTC ruled in favor of the Spouses Buenaobra

which, on appeal, was affirmed in toto by the RTC46[7] and subsequently, by the Court of

Appeals.47[8]Finally, when the case was raised on appeal before us in G.R. No. 109422, we

issued a Resolution48[9] dated 12 July 1993, finding that no substantial arguments were raised

therein to warrant the reversal of the appealed decision.

To assert their right to the subject property, the Spouses Bandong instituted an action for

annulment of sale before the RTC against Eulalia and Jocelyn on the ground that their consent to

the sale of the subject property was vitiated by Eulalia after they were served by Jocelyns counsel

with the demand to vacate.This was docketed as Civil Case No. C-14980.The Spouses Bandong

alleged that there was no sale intended but only equitable mortgage for the purpose of securingthe shortage incurred by Dominador in the amount of P70,000 while employed as biyahero by

Eulalia.

4546

47

48

8/8/2019 Feud Cases

33/58

Eulalia countered that Dominador received from her a significant sum of money, either as cash

advances for the purpose of procuring large cattle or as personal loan, and when he could no

longer pay his obligations, the Spouses Bandong voluntarily ceded the subject property to her byexecuting the corresponding deed of sale in her favor.Indeed, the Spouses Bandong personally

appeared before the Notary Public and manifested that the deed was their own voluntary act and

deed.

For her part, Jocelyn maintained that she was a buyer in good faith and for value for she

personally inquired from the Register of Deeds of the presence of any liens and encumbrances on

the TCT of the subject property and found that the same was completely free therefrom.While she

admitted that she had previous notice that Dominador and a certain Lourdes Santos (Lourdes)

were in possession of the subject property, Jocelyn claimed that the said possessors already

acknowledged her ownership thereof and even asked for time to vacate.In the end, though, they

refused to leave the premises.

On 28 June 1998, the RTC rendered a Decision49[10] in Civil Case No. C-14980 in favor of

Eulalia and Jocelyn by declaring that the Deed of Sale between Dominador and Eulalia was valid

and binding and, consequently, the subsequent sale between Eulalia and Jocelyn was also lawful

absent any showing that Jocelyn was a buyer in bad faith.The dispositive portion of the said

decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaintfiled by the [Spouses Bandong] and ordering said [Spouses Bandong] to

pay [herein petitioners] spouses Raymundo and Buenaobra the amount ofP50,000 and P30,000, respectively, as attorneys fees and costs of the suit.

49

8/8/2019 Feud Cases

34/58

On appeal in CA-G.R. SP No. 59557, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC Decision and found

that the transaction entered into by Dominador and Eulalia was not one of sale but an equitable

mortgage considering that the purchase price was grossly inadequate and the Spouses Bandong

remained as possessors of the subject property after Eulalias alleged purchase thereof.The

appellate court likewise charged Jocelyn with knowledge that the Spouses Raymundo were not

the absolute owners of the subject property negating the presumption that she was an innocent

purchaser for value.

The Court of Appeals found the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners unmeritorious

and denied the same in its Resolution50[11] dated 24 January 2006.

Hence, this instant Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by the petitioners assailing the

Decision dated 26 September 2005 and the Resolution dated 24 January 2006 rendered by the

Court of Appeals.For the resolution of this Court are the following issues:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE DEED OF SALE BETWEEN DOMINADOR

AND EULALIA IS VALID AND BINDING.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT JOCELYN IS A BUYER IN GOOD FAITH.

In arguing that the sale between Dominador and Eulalia is valid, petitioners posit that grossinadequacy of the price is not sufficient to invalidate the sale, and granting arguendothat

insufficient consideration may void a sale, it has not been proven that the consideration of sale

between Dominador and Eulalia was grossly inadequate.

50

8/8/2019 Feud Cases

35/58

Elaborating, petitioners maintain that the amount of P110,000.00 (which they claimed they have

given to Dominador), or even the sum of P70,000.00 (which respondents admitted receiving),

was a substantial consideration, sufficient to support a sale contract.Mere inadequacy of the priceis not sufficient to invalidate a sale; the price must be grossly inadequate or utterly shocking to

the conscience in order to avoid a contract of sale.

Petitioners further aver that the alleged market value of the subject property as submitted by the

appraiser, one of respondents witnesses, would not serve as an objective basis in determining the

actual value of the subject property, much less the supposed amount of its purchase price, in the

absence of any logical and valid basis for its determination.

Finally, petitioners contend that so long as the contract was voluntarily entered into by the parties

and in the absence of a clear showing that their consent thereto was vitiated by fraud, mistake,

violence or undue influence, such as in the case at bar, the said contract should be upheld.

cralawWe do not agree.

An equitable mortgage is one that - although lacking in some formality, forms and words, or

other requisites demanded by a statute - nevertheless reveals the intention of the parties to charge

a real property as security for a debt and contains nothing impossible or contrary to law. 51

[12]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The instances when a contract - regardless of its nomenclature - may be presumed to be an

equitable mortgage are enumerated in the Civil Code as follows:

51

8/8/2019 Feud Cases

36/58

Art. 1602. The contract shall be presumed to be an equitable mortgage, inany of the following cases:

(1) When the price of a sale with right to repurchase is unusually

inadequate;

(2) When the vendor remains in possession as lessee or otherwise;

(3) When upon or after the expiration of the right to repurchase another

instrument extending the period of redemption or granting a new period is

executed;

(4) When the purchaser retains for himself a part of the purchase

price;

(5) When the vendor binds himself to pay the taxes on the thing sold.

(6)In any other case where it may be fairly inferred that the real intention

of the parties is that the transaction shall secure the payment of a debt orthe performance of any other obligation.

Art. 1604. The provisions of Article 1602 shall also apply to a contract

purporting to be an absolute sale.

For Articles 1602 and 1604 to apply, two requisites must concur: one, the parties entered into a

contract denominated as a contract of sale; and two, their intention was to secure an existing debt

by way of an equitable mortgage.52[13]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

There is no question that Dominador and Eulalia entered into a contract of sale as evidenced by

the document denominated as Deed of Sale53[14] signed by them.As to whether the parties

intended to transfer ownership of the subject property or merely to constitute a security for an

existing debt is an issue that needs to be addressed by this Court.

52

53

8/8/2019 Feud Cases

37/58

In resolving this kind of controversy, the doctrine in Reyes v. Court of Appeals54[15] directs us

to give utmost consideration to the intention of the parties in light of the relative situation of each

and the circumstances surrounding the execution of the contract, thus:

In determining whether a deed absolute in form is a mortgage, the court is

not limited to the written memorials of the transaction.The decisive factorin evaluating such agr