february 18 2014
TRANSCRIPT
FEBRUARY 18 2014
GROUNDS FOR NEW TRIAL:
- FAME: Fraud, accident, mistake and excusable negligence- Fraud—to be a ground for new trial, fraud must be extrinsic fraud. Use fo falsified
documents is NOT a ground. o RIVERA V. CA (june 26, 2003)—generally, this talks about that point that
the acts of the lawyer binds the client. The theory of the old lawyer here was wrong.
o They allege that during the trial of the case, their former counsel, Atty. Darum, deliberately disregarded said document in favor of his own erroneous theory of the case — that their title to the land was based on prescription. Darum overlooked the fact that the said mode of acquiring ownership cannot prevail over titled property as in the case at bar. Branding Atty. Darum’s action as gross negligence, petitioners invoke the ruling of this Court in Legarda vs. Court of Appeals[11] rendered on March 18, 1991 where we held that losing the case because of the gross negligence of counsel was tantamount to depriving the client of the latter’s property without due process of law.
o HELD: We deny the petition.o Assuming arguendo that petitioners are allowed to appeal said resolution,
we find no excusable negligence to merit the grant of a new trial. Petitioners consider as gross negligence their previous counsel’s failure to present Assignment of Sales Certificate No. 668 dated May 25, 1909 issued in favor of their grandmother, and his erroneous reliance on the theory that petitioners owned the subject lot by virtue of acquisitive prescription. However, as a general rule, the client is bound by the action of his counsel in the conduct of his case and he cannot therefore complain that the result of the litigation might have been otherwise had his counsel proceeded differently. It has been held time and again that blunders and mistakes made in the conduct of the proceedings in the trial court as a result of the ignorance, inexperience or incompetence of counsel do not qualify as a ground for new trial. If such were to be admitted as valid reasons for re-opening cases, there would never be an end to litigation so long as a new counsel could be employed to allege and show that the prior counsel had not been sufficiently diligent, experienced or learned. This will put a premium on the willful and intentional commission of errors by counsel, with a view to securing new trials in the event of conviction.
o In the case at bar, the acts of Atty. Darum could not even qualify as gross negligence. Petitioners were duly represented by and heard through Atty. Darum, petitioners’ previous counsel, who filed the necessary pleadings and actively participated in the trial. Although he advocated an erroneous legal position, the effects thereof, which did not amount to a deprivation of their right to be heard, must bind petitioners. The question is not whether petitioners succeeded in defending their interests, but whether petitioners had the opportunity to present their side.
NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE
Newly discovered evidence is evidence which was discovered after trial, or cannot be discovered during trial given the exercise of reasonable diligence, and if admitted, such evidence would probably alter the result of the case.
Requisites
1. That the evidence was discovered after trial;2. That it could not have been discovered during trial even with exercise of
reasonable diligence; and3. That if admitted, such evidence would probably alter the result.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Grounds1. The damages awarded are excessive;2. The evidence is insufficient to justify the decision or final order;3. The decision or order is contrary to law.
Note: YOU have to be able to convince the judge for that your MR be given to consideration.
Action upon motion for new trial or reconsiderationThe trial court may:
a. set aside the judgment or final order and grant a new trial; b. deny the motion; orc. amend such judgment or final order if it finds that excessive damages have
been awarded or that the judgment or final order is contrary to the evidence or law.
Effects when motion is granteda. the original judgment or final order shall be vacated; andb. the action shall stand for trial de novo; c. but the recorded evidence taken upon the former trial, insofar as the same is
material and competent to establish the issues, shall be used at the new trial without retaking the same.
Can you file a 2 nd motion for new trial?
Second motion for new trialA motion for new trial shall include all grounds then available and those not so included shall be deemed waived. A second motion for new trial, based on a ground not existing nor available when the first motion was made, may be filed within the time herein provided excluding the time during which the first motion had been pending.
A second motion for new trial on a ground available to the party when the first motion was filed is a PRO-FORMA motion. It will not interrupt the remaining balance of the period to appeal after the first motion was denied.
Second motion for reconsiderationNo party shall be allowed a second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final order.
Y is that? If you check the grounds for MR, all the grounds there exists already when the 1 st
motion was filed. So if you filed a 2nd MR, it will not interrupt the period to appeal. Hence, the judgment shall become final and executory.
PARTIAL NEW TRIAL OR RECONSIDERATION (section 7) Effects of a partial new trial
a. The court will enter judgment on the undisputed facts; orb. It will stay the enforcement until after the new trial.
NOTE: A lot of people take this for granted that a partial motion for reconsideration is allowed. There are consequences. Because if you file that, it means that you are amiable to the rest.
RULE 38PETITION FOR RELIEF from judgments, orders or other proceedings
THINGS TO REMEMBER:
SECTION 11. A petition for relief from judgment is not filed separate from the original case. It is
filed in the SAME COURT and same case. It will not be filed separately!2. Take note also that grounds of FAME are grounds for, under rule 9, also grounds for
lifting of order of default, for New trial or MR and for relief from judgment. 3. “when a judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken
against a party in ANY COURT”…(before, that used to be CFI/RTC.)
so what’s the effect of that short change? It means that petition for relief from judgment may now be filed with the MTC. This means that judgments of MTC may now be subject of Petitions for relief.
SPOUSE DELA CRUZ V. Spouses Andres (april 7, 2007)—nagfile ng petition for relief sa CA. may decision ang CA then dun ng file ng petition for relief. They used this argument na “any court”. Does this rule apply to CA?Held: NO. The CA does not fall under the term, “any court”. It went on to explain that the amendment was never intended to cover the court of appeals. It refers only to MTC and RTC. So you have to disti
4. A petition for relief can also be filed in relation to a denial of an appeal (see section 2)
SECTION 2- What we are talking about are judgments that have already attained finality. And we
want it vacated and one relief is to file petition for relief. Or when a person is prevented from taking an appeal, he may file a petition for relief from a denial of appeal so that they may be allowed to appeal
- But in all cases, judgment is already final.
- Pinakamadugong part: WHEN TO FILE (see section 3)
SECTION 3- File within 60 days after learning of the judgment/final order and not more than 6
months after such judgment/final order was entered- 6 months is your outside maximum (so pag 6mos and 1 day ka nagfile, hindi nay an
pwede kahit na before pa lang ng6os alam mo na but hindi ka ngfile)- 60 days—must be within the 6months period- petition for relief must be VERIFIED and accompanied by affidavits showing FAME
and the facts constituting the petitioner’s good and substantial cause of action
SECTION 4- If petition is sufficient in form and substance—court will issue and ORDER requiring
the adverse parties to answer the same within 15 days from receipt thereof.
SECTION 5- PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION PENDING PROCEEDINGS- Remember: when judgment becomes final and executory, execution becomes a
matter of course. But here, if petition for relief of judgment is filed, court can grant a preliminary injunction as may be necessary. It is ALLOWED TO BE ENJOINED. This is one of the very few instances where a final and executory judgment is allowed to be enjoyed.
SECTION 6- After you file the petition HEARING then after, the court will decide. - If the courts find allegations not true—petition shall be dismissed- If true set aside the judgment or final order
RULE 39EXECUTION, SATISFACITON AND EFFECT OF JUDGMENTS
This is one of the most important rules. If there is no execution, it seems that whatever we do in litigation is useless.
2 kinds:1. Compulsory execution2. Discretionary execution
COMPULSORY EXECUTION When:
1. upon expiration of the period to appeal or if no appeal has been duly perfected2. if appeal has been perfected and finally resolved, the execution becomes a matter of
right
One important amendment: the fact that you can already file a motion for execution by attaching to your motion certified true copies of the judgment and of the entruy of judgment. Why is that important? Because under the old rules, you have to forward the
records pa before you can file a motion for execution. And that takes a long time. Now, there is no more need to wait. You can already file a motion for execution by simply attaching certified true copies of the judgment or final order as well as entry of judgment.
Can you file a motion for execution in the court of appeals?- You CANNOT file. But what you CAN file is a motion to DIRECT THE COURT OF
ORIGIN to issue the writ of execution. - Because it is only the court of origin who can execute the judgment. - The CA can only DIRECT.
DISCRETIONARY EXECUTION- This is execution pending appeal.- Can judgment be executed pending appeal? When will you file the motion?- YES. BUT YOU have to be able to show GOOD REASONS.- When do you file it?
o File with the trial court if it has jurisdiction over the case and it is in possession of the original records.
o After court has lost jurisdiction—motion for execution pending appeals should be filed with the appellate court.
- do not forget: existence of good reasons that have to be stated in a special order after due hearing
Requisites:1. There must be a motion filed by the prevailing party;2. There must be a notice of the motion given to the adverse party; and3. There must be good reasons to execute to be stated in a special order after
due hearing.
In case judgment is executed pending appeal, and upon appeal the judgment is reversed, the remedy is MUTUAL RESTITUTION.
- What are the good reasons? o As a general rule, the execution of a judgment should not be had until and
unless the judgment has become final and executory, i.e., the period of appeal has lapsed without an appeal having been taken, or appeal having been taken, the appeal has been resolved and the records of the case have been returned to the court of origin, in which event, execution "shall issue as a matter of right." Execution pending appeal in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court is, therefore, the exception.13
o Execution pending appeal requires the observance of the following requisites: (a) there must be a motion therefor by the prevailing party; (b) there must be a good reason for issuing the writ of execution; and (c) the good reason must be stated in a special order.14
o Since the execution of a judgment pending appeal is an exception to the general rule, the existence of "good reasons" is essential.15
o "Good reasons " has been held to consist of compelling circumstances justifying the immediate execution lest judgment becomes illusory. Such reasons must constitute superior circumstances demanding urgency which will outweigh the injury or damages should the losing party secure a
reversal of the judgment.16 The rules do not specify the "good reasons" to justify execution pending appeal, thus, it is the discretion of the court to determine what may be considered as such.
- INTRAMUROS TENNIS CLUB V. PHILIPPINE TOURISM AUTHORITY o Good reasons consist of compelling circumstances justifying immediate
execution lest judgment becomes illusory, or the prevailing party after the lapse of time be unable to enjoy it, considering the tactics of the adverse party who may have apparently no case but to delay.32 There must be superior circumstances demanding urgency which will outweigh the injury or damages should the losing party secure a reversal of the judgment.33
Were it otherwise, execution pending appeal may well become a tool of oppression and inequity instead of an instrument of solicitude and justice.
o In light of these considerations, the Court has been very discriminating in the allowance of such exceptional execution. Thus, mere allegations that the appeal is dilatory,35 or that the bond for the early execution has been duly paid,36 or that the corporation seeking execution is in financial distress37 --- were held insufficient grounds to merit execution pending appeal. On the other hand, where the goods subject of the judgment stand to perish or deteriorate during the pendency of the appeal,38 or the award of actual damages is for an amount which is fixed and certain,39 the Court found that "good reasons" existed for execution pending appeal to prosper.
o At the same time, it must also be remembered that the determination of the existence of "good reasons" is also a discretionary power, and the reviewing court will not interfere with the exercise of this discretion absent a showing of grave abuse thereof.40
o In the present case, we find that respondent court was well within its discretion in issuing its questioned resolutions, which clearly set out the reasons for granting private respondents’ motion for execution pending appeal. The observation on the deteriorating and unsanitary conditions of the Victoria Tennis Courts came from tennis players who regularly use the said courts, and there is no indication that the letter was contrived or fabricated simply to procure for private respondents the restoration of possession of the Victoria Tennis Courts. We find no merit to petitioners’ contention that the letter is inadmissible because it was not among those formally offered in evidence during trial at the RTC --- the letter was dated November 10, 1997 and it could not have formed part of the evidence in trial at the time the parties formally rested their cases on June 11, 1996.41 Verily, it could only have been submitted in evidence before respondent court, while the case was on appeal therewith.
o More importantly, PHILTA no longer had any legal right to the possession and management of the Victoria Tennis Courts because the lease agreement between PTA and PHILTA had already expired on June 15, 1997. Obviously, PTA as the lessor and owner of the tennis courts had every right to regain possession thereof --- and it also had every reason to be alarmed at the complaint filed by the tennis players with the Department of Tourism because it would be held accountable as owner and administrator of the tennis courts for the ill conditions of the said tennis courts. As also observed by respondent court, "after all, upon the expiration of the lease agreement,
the plaintiffs-appellants (petitioners herein) were no longer obliged to properly maintain the property."
o Clearly, the restoration of PTA into the possession and management of Victoria Tennis Courts is in order, being a necessary consequence of the lifting of the preliminary injunction and the termination of the MOA or lease agreement, and does not prejudice in any way the resolution of the other issues in petitioners’ pending appeal with respondent court such as their claim for damages from PTA which petitioners admit to be independent of the terms of the MOA. Thus, we find that respondent court did not gravely abuse its discretion in finding "good reasons" for allowing private respondents’ motion for execution pending appeal.
o Moreover, judgments in actions for injunction are not stayed by the pendency of an appeal taken therefrom.43 This rule has been held to extend to judgments decreeing the dissolution of a writ of preliminary injunction, which are immediately executory.
o However, we modify respondent court’s findings to the extent that it held petitioners’ appeal pending therewith to be clearly dilatory, and cited this as one of the reasons for allowing execution pending appeal. This assumption prematurely judges the merits of the main case on appeal,45 and except in cases where the appeal is patently or unquestionably intended to delay it must not be made the basis of execution pending appeal if only to protect and preserve a duly exercised right to appeal.
Note: DIESEL V. JOLIBEE The execution of a judgment pending appeal is an exception to the general rule that
only a final judgment may be executed. An exceptional execution must be founded on "good reason," which rests on sound judicial discretion. The alleged financial distress of the prevailing juridical entity is not, by itself, a "good reason."
Petitioner's allegedly precarious financial condition, however, is not by itself a jurisprudentially compelling circumstance warranting immediate execution. The financial distress of a juridical entity is not comparable to a case involving a natural person -- such as a very old and sickly one without any means of livelihood,[39] an heir seeking an order for support and monthly allowance for subsistence,[40] or one who dies.
Indeed, the alleged financial distress of a corporation does not outweigh the long standing general policy of enforcing only final and executory judgments. Certainly, a juridical entity like petitioner corporation has, other than extraordinary execution, alternative remedies like loans, advances, internal cash generation and the like to address its precarious financial condition.
Having come to the conclusion that extraordinary execution is not proper, the Court finds no more need to determine whether the filing of a supersedeas bond is, by itself, sufficient reason to stay the execution of a judgment pending appeal, because such issue has become moot. As a rule, "courts will not determine a moot question or abstract proposition or express an opinion in a case in which no practical relief can be granted."[41] While there are exceptions to this general principle, none exists in the factual milieu of the present controversy.
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL V. CA (1999)Ruling: you cannot grant execution pending appeal on the ground that the appeal is frivolous and dilatory. The determianton of whether an appeals is frivolous is to be determined by
appellate court and not the trial court. (see exception in case of Iligan v. Principal Management)
This brings us now to the question on the validity of the appellate court’s ruling upholding the writ of execution pending appeal.
It must be stressed that private respondents-spouses’ motion/application for an execution pending appeal was premised on the following reasons: that the appeal was being taken for purpose of delay and that they are filing a bond. In granting the motion for the exceptional writ over the strong opposition of the ISM, the trial court adopted by reference the said grounds adduced by the spouses Torralba in their motion in the first order dated June 19, 1996;[21] and expressly reiterated the same grounds in the order denying the motion for reconsideration dated August 27, 1996.[22]
In upholding the writ of execution pending appeal, the Court of Appeals observed that the lower court had, prior to its issuance, duly noted the presence of the circumstances laid down by Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court,[23] allowing execution as an exception, or pending appeal, even before final judgment, to wit:
(a) There must be a motion by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party;
(b) There must be good reasons for issuing the execution; and
(c) The good reasons must be stated in a special order.[24]
Likewise, the Court of Appeals accepted as `good reasons’ that ISM’s appeal appears to be dilatory in view of its virtual admission of fault when it adopted the project “Code Red” only after the death of plaintiffs-spouses Torralba’s son, and the delay of the case which already affected plaintiffs spouses Torralbas financially.
This Court has ruled in Ong vs. Court of Appeals[25] that:
“where the reason given is that an appeal is frivolous and dilatory, execution pending appeal cannot be justified. It is not proper for the trial court to find that an appeal is frivolous and consequently to disapprove it since the disallowance of an appeal by said court constitutes a deprivation of the right to appeal. The authority to disapprove an appeal rightfully pertains to the appellate court
For purposes only of determining the correctness of the writ of execution pending appeal, we cannot see how the lower courts came upon the conclusion of virtual admission of fault or negligence by ISM based on the above-quoted exchange where ISM’s swimming coach admitted that he read the school paper article introducing “Code Red”. As correctly pointed out by ISM, the article was not an official statement of the school, but merely an opinion of its author. Moreover, we cannot see how the statement of Mr. Noli Reloj that he read the article on “Code Red” can be construed as an admission of liability by the school. Clearly then, the conclusion of the lower courts that the appeal is dilatory based solely on the foregoing exchange rests on shaky ground.
The next question to be resolved is whether or not the filing of a bond can be considered a good reason to justify immediate execution under Section 2, Rule 39.
In the case of Roxas vs. Court of Appeals,[28] this Court had occasion to address this issue directly, as follows:
“xxx to consider the mere posting of a bond a `good reason’ would precisely make immediate execution of a judgment pending appeal routinary, the rule rather than the exception. Judgments would be executed immediately, as a matter of course, once rendered, if all that the prevailing party needed to do was to post a bond to answer for damages that might result therefrom. This is a situation, to repeat, neither contemplated nor intended by law.”[29]
In fine, the rule is now settled that the mere filing of a bond by the successful party is not a good reason for ordering execution pending appeal, as “a combination of circumstances is the dominant consideration which impels the grant of immediate execution, the requirement of a bond is imposed merely as an additional factor, no doubt for the protection of the defendant’s creditor.”[30] Since we have already ruled that the reason that an appeal is dilatory does not justify execution pending appeal, neither does the filing of a bond, without anything more, justify the same. Moreover, ISM could not be faulted for its withdrawal of its supersedeas bond inasmuch as the lower court granted the execution pending appeal and rejected its offer of supersedeas bond.
ILIGAN V. PRINCIPAL MANAGEMENT Ruling: in this case, the motion was granted because the appeal was clearly dilatory. Appeal was made on undisputed facts. Since there were undisputed facts, the trial court is allowed to make that determination. (but still, general rule is kahit frivolous ang appeal, no execution parin)
In the present case, the good reason relied upon by both the trial and the appellate courts was that the partial adjudication of the case was based on petitioner’s own admission; hence, any appeal based on that point would be unmeritorious and merely dilatory. Indeed, both courts ruled that an appeal by petitioner would only serve as "a good and sufficient reason upon which to issue execution."1
The ascertainment of good reasons for execution pending appeal lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the appellate court will not normally disturb such finding. Intervention by the latter may be proper, if it is shown that there has been an abuse of discretion.1
Like the CA, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s grant of execution pending appeal. Indeed, this Court has held that a good and sufficient reason upon which to authorize immediate execution is when an appeal is clearly dilatory.17
Normally, the trial court is not allowed to assess its own judgment and to hold that an appeal may not prosper, or that it would merely be dilatory. In the present case, however, there are circumstances that undisputedly serve as cogent bases for arriving at such a conclusion.
the trial court committed no abuse of discretion in granting execution pending appeal. Its conclusion was upheld by the CA, which found that "the appeal filed by the petitioner was a dilatory tactic and was not allowed in the first place." Consequently, the appellate court did not err in refusing to attribute grave abuse of discretion to the trial court’s Order granting execution pending appeal.
ATTY: like I said, if a party has alrady filed a notice of appeal, does this mean that the trial court hindi na pwede mag-rule on motion for execution pending appeal? NO. the court may still file for as long as court has still not lost jurisdiction of the case and it still has the records.
Question: what if the court directs execution pending appeals but the writ of execution was not issued before court lost jurisdiction over the case?
- After the perfection of the appeal and the transmittal of the records, the trial court loses jurisdiction over the case. Henceforth, it may no longer grant a motion for, or issue a writ of immediate execution; to do so would be an abuse of discretion.
JUDGMENTS NOT STAYED BY APPEAL (Sec. 4)
Gen. Rule : If there is an appeal, the judgment will be stayed.Exceptions:
1. Judgments in actions for:a. injunction;b. receivership;c. accounting;d. support; and
2. judgments declared to be immediately executory.
MODES OF ENFORCING EXECUTION
1. Execution by Motion – within 5 years from the date of its entry; and2. Execution by Independent Action – within 5 to 10 years. (this is your action to revive)
Hanggang kalian xa pwede ituloy2x? so long as hindi pa lumampas ng 10 years. If lumampas ang 10 years, then it becomes a stale judgment which cannot be executed anymore.
General rule: A writ of execution issued after five (5) years is void, and failure to object thereto does not validate it, for the reason that jurisdiction of courts is solely conferred by law and not by express or implied will of the parties.
Important exception to the 5 year rule: CENTRAL SURETY V. PLANTERS PRODUCT (2007) (Rule does not apply if delay was due to the fault of judgment obligor)
- The only relevant issue for our resolution is whether the execution of a final judgment may be made by mere motion despite the lapse of five years.
- In this case, we answer in the affirmative.- Under Rule 39, Section 6,15 the rule is that a final judgment may be executed by mere
motion within five years from the date of entry of judgment. However, the rule is not absolute and admits one notable exception and that is when the delay in enforcing the judgment is caused by the party assailing the filing of the motion.
- In Republic v. Court of Appeals,16 we declared that, on meritorious grounds, execution of final judgment by mere motion may be allowed even after the lapse of five years
when delay in the execution is caused or occasioned by the actions of the judgment debtor and/or is incurred for his benefit.
- Similarly, in Camacho v. Court of Appeals,17 we ruled that the five-year period allowed for enforcement of judgment by mere action is deemed effectively interrupted or suspended when the delay in the execution is occasioned by the oppositor’s own initiatives in order to gain an undue advantage.
- Based on the attendant facts, the present case falls within the exception. Petitioner triggered the series of delays in the execution of the RTC’s final decision by filing numerous motions and appeals in the appellate courts, even causing the CA’s issuance of the TRO enjoining the enforcement of said decision. It cannot now debunk the filing of the motion just so it can delay once more the payment of its obligation to respondent. It is obvious that petitioner is merely resorting to dilatory maneuvers to skirt its legal obligation.
- Lastly, in Republic and Camacho, we ruled that the purpose of the law in prescribing time limitations for enforcing a judgment or action is to prevent a party from sleeping on his rights. Far from sleeping on its rights, respondent pursued its claim by persistently seeking the execution of the RTC’s final judgment of November 6, 1991. It would be unjust to frustrate respondent’s effort to collect payment from petitioner on sheer technicality. While strict compliance to the rules of procedure is desired, liberal interpretation is warranted in cases where a strict enforcement of the rules will not serve the ends of justice.
REPUBLIC V. LOURDES NILLAS (ruling: (5)-year prescriptive period for execution of judgments, is NOT applicable to land registration cases)
rule 39, as invoked by the Republic, applies only to ordinary civil actions, not to other or extraordinary proceedings not expressly governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure but by some other specific law or legal modality such as land registration cases. Unlike in ordinary civil actions governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure, the intent of land registration proceedings is to establish ownership by a person of a parcel of land, consistent with the purpose of such extraordinary proceedings to declare by judicial fiat a status, condition or fact. Hence, upon the finality of a decision adjudicating such ownership, no further step is required to effectuate the decision and a ministerial duty exists alike on the part of the land registration court to order the issuance of, and the LRA to issue, the decree of registration.
The Republic observes that the Property Registration Decree (PD No. 1529) does not contain any provision on execution of final judgments; hence, the application of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in suppletory fashion. Quite the contrary, it is precisely because PD No. 1529 does not specifically provide for execution of judgments in the sense ordinarily understood and applied in civil cases, the reason being there is no need for the prevailing party to apply for a writ of execution in order to obtain the title, that Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is not applicable to land registration cases in the first place
The provision lays down the procedure that interposes between the rendition of the judgment and the issuance of the certificate of title. No obligation whatsoever is imposed by Section 39 on the prevailing applicant or oppositor even as a precondition to the issuance of the title. The obligations provided in the Section are levied on the land court (that is to issue an order directing the Land Registration
Commissioner to issue in turn the corresponding decree of registration), its clerk of court (that is to transmit copies of the judgment and the order to the Commissioner), and the Land Registration Commissioner (that is to cause the preparation of the decree of registration and the transmittal thereof to the Register of Deeds). All these obligations are ministerial on the officers charged with their performance and thus generally beyond discretion of amendment or review
The failure on the part of the administrative authorities to do their part in the issuance of the decree of registration cannot oust the prevailing party from ownership of the land. Neither the failure of such applicant to follow up with said authorities can. The ultimate goal of our land registration system is geared towards the final and definitive determination of real property ownership in the country, and the imposition of an additional burden on the owner after the judgment in the land registration case had attained finality would simply frustrate such goal.
Clearly, the peculiar procedure provided in the Property Registration Law from the time decisions in land registration cases become final is complete in itself and does not need to be filled in. From another perspective, the judgment does not have to be executed by motion or enforced by action within the purview of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Following these premises, it can even be posited that in theory, there would have been no need for Nillas, or others under similar circumstances, to file a petition for revival of judgment, since revival of judgments is a procedure derived from civil procedure and proceeds from the assumption that the judgment is susceptible to prescription. The primary recourse need not be with the courts, but with the LRA, with whom the duty to issue the decree of registration remains. If it is sufficiently established before that body that there is an authentic standing judgment or order from a land registration court that remains unimplemented, then there should be no impediment to the issuance of the decree of registration. However, the Court sees the practical value of necessitating judicial recourse if a significant number of years has passed since the promulgation of the land court's unimplemented decision or order, as in this case. Even though prescription should not be a cause to bar the issuance of the decree of registration, a judicial evaluation would allow for a thorough examination of the veracity of the judgment or order sought to be effected, or a determination of causes other than prescription or laches that might preclude the issuance of the decree of registration.
INFANTE V. ARAN BUILDERS
Petitioner claims that the CA erred in finding that the complaint for revival of judgment is an action in rem which was correctly filed with the RTC of the place where the disputed real property is located
The petition is unmeritorious. Petitioner insists that the action for revival of judgment is an action in personam;
therefore, the complaint should be filed with the RTC of the place where either petitioner or private respondent resides. Petitioner then concludes that the filing of the action for revival of judgment with the RTC of Muntinlupa City, the place where the disputed property is located, should be dismissed on the ground of improper venue.
Private respondent is of the opinion that the judgment it is seeking to revive
involves interest over real property. As such, the present action for revival is a real action, and venue was properly laid with the court of the place where the realty is located.
Thus, the question that must be answered is: where is the proper venue of the present action for revival of judgment?
Section 6, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that after the lapse of five (5) years from entry of judgment and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a final and executory judgment or order may be enforced by action. The Rule does not specify in which court the action for revival of judgment should be filed.
Thus, the proper venue depends on the determination of whether the present action for revival of judgment is a real action or a personal action. Applying the afore-quoted rules on venue, if the action for revival of judgment affects title to or possession of real property, or interest therein, then it is a real action that must be filed with the court of the place where the real property is located. If such action does not fall under the category of real actions, it is then a personal action that may be filed with the court of the place where the plaintiff or defendant resides.
The present case for revival of judgment being a real action, the complaint should indeed be filed with the Regional Trial Court of the place where the realty is located.
SECTION 7: EXECUTION IN CASE OF DEATH OF PARTY EFFECTS OF DEATH OF A PARTY ON THE EXECUTION OF THE JUDGMENT:
1. If it is the obligee (the creditor) who dies after he wins the case, his executor or administrator, his legal representative or his heirs and successors-in-interest can enforce the judgment. They will be the one to collect.
2. If it is the obligor (the defendant) who dies and there is final judgment which is recovery of real or personal property, the judgment is executed against the administrator or executor because this is an action which survives.
3. If the obligor dies and the case involves money claim and there is already a levy, the auction sale will proceed as scheduled. There is no more substitution here.
SECTION 8. ISSUANCE, FORM, CONTENTS OF A WRIT OF EXECUTION - Just go over it- Take note of paragraph (e)—eto ang usual problema. The lawyer will file motion for
execution. What will he put? He will just copy the dispositive portion of judgment. - Sa motion for execution, dapat SPECIFICIED na lahat what is due to the obligee. If
clerk of court finds the computation correct, then the latter will issue the writ. The sheriff should NOT be the one who will have to compute what is due
EXECUTION OF MONEY JUDGMENT
STEPS (immediate payment on demand)1. The sheriff must demand payment from the judgment obligor;2. The obligor can pay in cash, certified bank check payable to the judgment
obligee (creditor) or any other form of payment acceptable to the latter;
3. The payment shall go to the obligee; (sheriff is NOT the one who will receive! Ung wala ang judgment obligee, pwede ibigay sa sheriff pero dapat iturn over nya agad)
4. The lawful fees shall be paid to the executing sheriff who shall turn over the said amount within the same day to the clerk of court of the court that issued the writ.
Note: that is in case of IMMEDIATE PAYMENT. If magbayad kaagad ung obligor. What hindi magbayad kaagad? Then there will be SATISFACITON BY LEVY.
SATISFACITON BY LEVY- LEVY is the act whereby a sheriff sets apart or appropriates, for the purpose of
satisfying the command of the writ, a part or the whole of the judgment-debtor’s property.
- It is the seizure of either real or personal property of the obligor, sufficient to satisfy the judgment from the proceeds of the sale
- Unahin supposedly is personal before real properties. But if judgment obligor is there, he has the right o say na unahin mo eto or unhain mo iyan. He can choose the property ung anu unahin i-levy. But the advise to say that levy is already enough, does not belong to the obligor. Ang sheriff ang mag-determine kung taman na or not. Sheriff must always be conscious that he could be administratively liable for over-execution.
- The same goes for instances where the amount of judgment amounts to million pesos, tpos pagdemand sa payment, hindi makabayad ng cas h or check. Then pagdating sa bahay, may kotse sa garahe. Same thing, the obligor if nandun pwede magsabi sa sheriff kung anu pwede unahin. Pero ang sheriff parin dapat magsabi if tama naba yung naexecute nya.
- What about REAL PROPERTY? Same thing. Intangible properties such as shares of stocks, debts, or credits may be levied upon.
GARNISHMENT OF DEBTS AND CREDITS- If wala kang real or personal property pero nalaman na may bank account ka, punta
ang sheriff sa bank to serve the notice of garnishment. The garnishee will be required to make a written report to court within 5 days from service of notice.
- Can the bank say na magkano ang pera ng tao? Hindi coz that would be violation of bank secrecy law. Ang pwede lang if meron or sufficient. Kung kulang, dun pa pwede sabihin kung magkano pa ang nanduon sa kanya.
- The garnished amount shall be delivered directly to the udgment obligee within 10 working days.
- In the event there are 2 or more garnishees—choice is made by the obligee. (pila nalang xa alin dun)
EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT FOR A SPECIFIC ACT- CONVEYANCE, DELIVERY OF DEEDS: For example ang judgment kay ipaexecute ka
ng deed of conveyance and party fails to comply, the court may direct the act to be done at the cost of the disobedienct party by some oehter person.
- If real or personal property is within the Philippines, the court in lieu of directing aconveyance thereof, may by an order ivest the title of any party and vest it in others
- SALES OF REAL/PERSONAL PROPERTY
- DELIVERY OF RESTITUTION OF REAL PROPERTY—Serve mo ung notice of execution—dapat the obligor must vacate the property within 3 working days. (see provision) what is important here is to the fact that sheriff is NOT ALLOWED to remove improvements or property on the basis of the writ of execution or on the notice to vacate alone. Dapat na mangyari is that maghingi pa xa ng order sa court nyan.
- REMOVAL OF IMPROMENTS ON PROPERTY SUBJECT OF EXECUTION—So over and above ng writ of execution and notice to vacate, they must file a motion for the issuance of a SPECIAL ORDER OF DEMOLITION. Ung motion na yan is filed by judgment obligee and the judge will give party reasonable time to remove those improvements. The sheriff does not have the right to destroy the improvements. Dapat may order of demolition. (KATIPUNAN V. JUDGE (August 17, 2007)
- DELIVERY OF PERSONAL PROPERTY
EXECUTION OF SPECIAL JUDGMENTS (Section 11)- SPECIAL JUDGMENT requires the defendant to perform an act other than payment
of money or delivery of property, taking into consideration his personal qualifications and the circumstances surrounding the case. e.g. Quo Warranto case
- A special judgment may be enforced by contempt if the defendant refuses to comply with the judgment. But if it is an ordinary judgment and the defendant refuses, it is not a ground for contempt.
SECTION 12: EFFECT OF LEVY ON EXECUTION AS TO THIRD PERSONS- judgment cannot be superior to a prior lien
PROPERTIES EXEMPT FROM EXECUTION
a. the judgment obligor’s family home or the homestead in which he resides;
b. ordinary tools and implements personally used by him in his trade, employment, or livelihood;- available only to natural persons; not applicable to properties used in
business.
c. three horses, three cows, or three carabaos, or other beasts of burden, such as the judgment obligor may select necessarily used by him in his ordinary occupation.
d. his necessary clothing and articles for ordinary personal use, excluding jewelry;
e. household furniture ad utensils necessary for housekeeping, of a value not exceeding P100, 000;
f. provisions for individual or family use sufficient for four months;
g. the professional libraries and equipment of judges, lawyers, physicians, pharmacists, dentists, engineers, etc. not exceeding P300,000 in value;
h. one fishing boat and accessories not exceeding P100,000 owned by a fisherman and by the lawful use of which he earns his livelihood;
i. salaries, wages, or earnings of the judgment obligor for his personal services within the four months preceding the levy as are necessary for the support of his family;
j. lettered gravestones;
k. monies, benefits, privileges, or annuities accruing or in any manner growing out of any life insurance;
l. the right to receive legal support, or money or property obtained as such support, or any pension or gratuity from the Government;
m. properties specially exemption by law.
The properties mentioned above (Sec. 13) are exempt, EXCEPT when a debt arose out of the same property.
PENTAGON SECURITY V. JIMENEZ Security agency ang subject of execution. Eh diba mahal ung mga baril. Un ag na-
execute. Sabi ng agency, hindi pwede un kasi “tools and implement”. HELD: SC held that it is not covered. The law refers to artisan. The term "tools and implements" refers to instruments of husbandry or manual
labor needed by an artisan craftsman or laborer to obtain his living. Here petitioner is a business enterprise. It does not use the firearms personally, but they are used by its employees. Not being a natural person, petitioner cannot claim that the firearms are necessary for its livelihood. Private respondent invites the Court to take judicial notice of the fact that there are security guards rendering service without firearms.
Petitioner without filing any reply moves for the resolution of the petition. There is no question, in our mind, that a security agency without firearms to equip
its guards is useless.: rd However, it would appear that the exemption contemplated by the provision
involved is personal, available only to a natural person, such as a dentist's dental chair and electric fan (Belen v. de Leon, G.R. No. L-16412, 30 Nov. 1962). As pointed out by the Solicitor General, if properties used in business are exempt from execution, there can hardly be an instance when a judgment claim can be enforced against the business entity.
FAMILY HOME- exemption is only up to a certain amount.- Family home is constituted by merely the fact htat family lives there and that
it is owned by either of spouses, or owned by head of family. - No need for judicial declaration if it existed under the family code.
Examples of properties exempt from execution under special law:
1. Under CA 141 – Public Land Law, property obtained pursuant to a free patent application, HOMESTEAD. The same is not subject to any claim within 5 years;
2. Under Social Legislation, SSS and GSIS benefits are also exempt from execution;3. Under the CARP law, the property acquired by tenant cannot be levied.