feature as urban disaster of the 1999 kocaeli …feature as urban disaster of the 1999 kocaeli...

中林:トルコ・コジャエリ地震の都市災害としての特徴と震災対策の課題

Feature as Urban Disaster of the 1999 Kocaeli Earthquake in Turkey and Some Lessons

Itsuki Nakabayashi*

キGraduateSchool of Urban Science， Tokyo Metropolitan University

Comprehensive Urban Studies， No.72， 2000， pp.5-22

1. Regional Characteristics of the Affected Areas

17

The Kocaeli Earthquake hitted many cities amoung five Prefectures such as Istanbul，

Kocaeli， Sakarya， Bolu and Yalova， where 20% of national population are living. The epicenter

of this earthquake is located in Izmit Bay between Izmit city and Go1cuk city in Kocaeli

Prefecture. Izmit， one of the heavily damaged cities， is not only a capital city of prefecture but a

very important industrial city in Turkey. The biggest bases of oil and natural gas industries are

lacated in and around Izmit. Golcuk is also important city， in which there is the Turkish Navy Base. Adapazan， which is a capital city of Sakarya Prefecture， is also a severely damaged city.

In Sakarya， there are also important industrial facilities such as a biggest automobile factory of

Toyota. Yalova and its suburban areas are recently growing as a summer resort region along

Marmara seacoast near Istanbul， that is the biggest world-city in Turkey(see Fig. 1).

In such affected areas of five prefectures， 30% of General Domestic Products(GDP) are shared in 1997， in spite of 20% of national population. In addition， the growing rates of GDP

are more than ten percentage especially in Kocaeli， Yalova and Istanbul. The per capita amount

of GDP in such prefectures are also the highest in Turkey(see Table 1). This earthquake hitted

not only the most advanced industrial region but also the richest areas.

Table 1 Socio-economic Condition of A仔ectedPrefectures in 1997

Istanbul Kocaeli Sakarya Bolu Yalova Total

Population (thousand) 9，058 1，171 734 554 164 11，680

GDP (billion TL) 25，330 5，225 1，254 938 589 33，336

Share of GDP (%) 22.5 4.6 1.1 0.8 0.5 30.0

Growing rate of GDP (%) 10.9 13.7 4.7 1.7 13.2

Per capita amount of GDP($) 4，749 7，882 2，719 3，078 4，980

2. Urban Structure of Turkish Cities and Caracteristics of Affected Districts

Three kinds of typical urban districts are generally identified in Turkish city from the

viewpoint of intemal urban structure(see Fig. 2). The first is an old town that consists of a core

18 総合都市研究第72号 2000

of the city. This old town(“eski ~ehir " in Turkish) was bui1t in the Ottoman Empire or the

previous period. However， in many cities， such old town as a city-core district is modemised or

redeveloped after the Wor1d War 11 according to the modemAuropean city planning manner.

The main streets were widenned and straightened. The bui1dings along these streets were rebui1t

as RC bui1dings of 6必 stories，transformed from the traditional 2-3 stories houses.

The second is a squatting district， called “gece-kondu" in Turkish that means “house bui1t

during one night". Especially in the period between 1950s and 1960s， many pepole were

coming from rural regions to urban areas. In this period， many self-bui1t and self-dwelling

houses of detached sty le were constructed without permits on the large scale of waste areas

around cities， which are commonly sharply-slopping areas of mountain/hi11-side. There are no

infrastructures of streets， water services and other public facilities. However， the scene of these

districts is very unique view of a Turkish city for foreigners. Since the latter half of 1970s， not only leased apartments but condominiums of “gece-kondu" style were developed in and around

bui1t-up areas of every city.

On the other hand， the planned urban developments have been implemented accordng to the city planning system. In these new suburbs and new towns， the infrastructure such as streets，

parks， water service and other facilities， are arranged. The third is these plannedly developed

suburbs and new towns， ca11ed "yeni ~ehir" in Turkish. In spite of the arrangement of urban

faci1ities and infrastructures， not so few bui1dings of houses and business faci1ities have been

constructed in an illegal manner or as a scamped work.

In spite of endeavors of planned urban development， the bui1dings damaged heavi1y by this

earthquake are mainly distributed in the new suburban districts and the redeveloped city-core

area. An typical feature of the heavi1y damagaed or collapsed buildings is a new complex

building of 6-8 stories with shops/offices of the ground f100r and multiple dwelling units of

upper f100rs and a11 of damaged bui1dings are structured by RC(reinforced concrete) frame with

light bricks.

3. Damages by Prefectural Region

According to official report of November， this earthquake col1apsed 77，342 units of houses and moderately destroyed 77，169 units of houses. It also ki11ed 17，262 persons and injured

43，953 persons. According to newspapers， about 30，000 persons are missing .

Table 2 shows the assessed damages by prefectural region in the date of 12th September of

1999. According to this， more than a half of the ki11ed occured in Kocaeli Prefecture， which

shares one thirds of heavily damaged or col1apsed houses. The total amount of damages is the

biggest in Kocaeli Prefecture. However， from a viewpoint of damage intensity per 10，000

persons， Yalova Prefecture is the most severely damaged region. It is one of the reasons that

Yalova is smal1est prefecture of only coast area of the Marmara sea. The damage in seacoast

area is severer than in inland areas. Sakarya prefecture is the second-severely damaged region.

In its capital city， Adapazan， the city mayer said that approximately 70% of houses were lost in

a whole city. The damage intensity of Kocaeli Prefecture is thirdly severe in spite of the most

中林:トルコ・コジャエリ地震の都市災害としての特徴と震災対策の課題 19

massive amount of damages(see Table 3). If the scale of population means one of the

autonomous index， this damage intensity means possibility/easibility of recovery and

reconstruction by local autonomy.

Table 2 Amount of Damage by Prefecture

Istanbul Kocaeli Sakarya Bolu

Killed persons 978 8，644 2，627 264

Injured persons 3，547 9，211 5，084 1，163

Heavily damaged/collapsed 3，614 23，254 20，104 3，226

Moderately damaged 12，370 21，316 11，381 4，782

Slightly/partly Damaged 10，630 21，481 17，953 3，233

Total of damaged house units 26，614 66，051 49，438 11，241

“Total" includes the number of the other affected prefectures. (Reported in 12th of Sept.)

Table 3 “Damage Intensity" by Prefecture

Istanbul Kocaeli Sakarya Bolu

Killed persons 1.08 73.85 35.77 4.77

Injured persons 3.92 78.69 69.23 21.00

Heavily damaged/collapsed 3.99 198.66 273.74 58.25

Moderately damaged 13.66 182.10 154.97 86.34

Slightly/partly Damaged 11.74 183.51 244.45 58.37

Total of damaged house units 29.38 564.28 673.16 202.96

“Damage intensity" means amount of damages per 10，000 persons. (Reported in 12th of Sept.)

4. Feature as Urban Disaster

Yalova Total

2，501 15，466

4，472 23，954

10，134 60，434

8，870 58，860

14，459 68，391

33，363 187，685

Yalova Total

152.58 13.24

272.82 20.51

618.24 51.74

541.13 50.39

882.10 58.55

2035.37 160.68

After the earthquake， every services of water and power supply were stopped. There is no

piped gas in every city. Many people were confined to collapsed houses. In addition of much

amount of damaged houses， many aftershocks made people afraid to stay in a building even if

their houses are not dameged. Almost of people are staying in the open spaces， such as pedestrian roads， parks and other private spaces， near their houses during several days or a

longer period after the earthquake.

After then， many tent-cities were bui1t and managed by the local administration， volanteer

groups and the military. People were coming to these managed tent-cities day by day， because they could receive various services in them. The number of tent-cities reached 156 camps in

12th of September， the capacity of which tent-cities is more than one hundred thousand tents. On the other hand， there are many and various self-bui1t tents/temporary lodges in and


around a city. Nobody knows how many tents/temporary lodges were made by selves of

victims. However， many people were living in them at least in a month after the earthquake.

The removal of large amount of disaster debris and rubbish is a very serious problem， because most part of rubbish was due to damaged/collapsed buildings of RC structure of multi

stories. It needed many machinary powers， but there were a severe shortage of them. These

machinary powers were also necessary for recovery works of lifeline facilities and

reconstruction works of infrastructure. On the other hand， it is necessary for urban

reconstruction and recovery to remove the rubbish as quickly as possible. It seemed to be late to

remove the massive rubbish of collapsed buildings. One year after， the rubbish could not be found in each city.

Under such social condition of affected regions in the period of several months， many

factories and other offices which are not severely damaged were c1osed， because the employees were afraid to work in buildings in the periods of continueing aftershocks. It seemed also that

many factories and offices are not easy to be re-opened. Additionally， many employees may

lose their jobs， because a number of factories， offices and shops were damaged. More than 10，000 building units of business facilities were heavily damaged or collapsed， and the same number were moderately damaged.

In 13th of September， every school in affected regions was re-opened. In the aftemoon of that day， the biggest aftershock which hitted these regions made eight persons killed and several hundreds persons i吋ured.Many schools were again c1osed.

5. Outline of Govermental Responses and Administration-In Case of Kocaeli

Prefecture -

Interview with the govemor of Kocaeli Mr.Ozel Kelem， on 10 Sept. 1999 is as follows;

(l)How was the crisis management administration prepared? How was the crisis

management center estalished? how is the crisis management center ongoing?

In Turkey， crisis management and earthquake administration are different. Earthquake

administration is under the natural disaster management law 7269. This law explains what

should be done after a natural disaster. In addition to law 7269， each city has its own civil defense emergency plan， which is prepared parallel to the national disaster management law 7269. According to the emergency plan， govemor is the head of the natural disaster emergency

management. Under the head of govemor， the other members of natural disaster emergency

management committee inc1udes both the city general directors of Public Works and

Settlement， Public Health， Rural Affairs， Land Registration Office， Police and Gendarme and mayors. These officials meet immediately after the natural disaster. In this eartquake， all of the

officials came together in half an hour.

There are also sub-committees:

1. Emergency and Ambulance services

2. Services to c1ear away the debris and rubbish

3. Lodging and food services.

中林:トルコ・コジャエリ地震の都市災害としての特徴と震災対策の課題 21

There are already appointed staff for each service. Their names are also written in the

emergency plan. During the emergency， govemor communicates with these appointed people via radio， police team or whatever available at that time.

Crisis management， on the other hand， is a new concept in Turkey and is not operated only

for natural disasters. Under the extraordinary situations， each public organization constitutes its own crisis management center in addition to one general crisis management center at the

govemor's office. Govemor is ， again， the head of this general crisis management center. At the govemor's office， six logistics support coordination centers are established. At these

centers， earthquake relief aids， in the form of food， medicine， etc.， are loaded， unloaded and

classified by the help of military. Distribution is done by the govemor' s 0旺ice.

(2)How is Kocaeli Prefecture damaged?

Damage situation is reported， in which the figures are up to Sept 10.

1. Casualties: 9000 persons

2. Homeless: 400，000 persons

3. Earthquake-demolished buildings: 50，000 units

4. Buildings to be fixed: 40，000 units

5. Establishment of 32 tent cities in different areas

6. 23，000 tents are used.

7. In addition to them， 10，000 people live in their personel tents (not in tent cities)

8. Target is 50，000 tents in tent cities.

9. 26 mobile hospitals are available.

10. Infrastructure: All infrastructure facilities are damaged. Electricity and water supply are

mostly restored. The others are still being restored by municipalities and govemorship.

The additonal comments are as below. There is a need for fast transition from temporary

housing to permanent housing areas. The permanent housing sites for 50，000 units were identified. Each house will be 70-80 sqm and can be habitable for 40-50 years. The construction

of houses will be finished in 6 months.

(3)What lessons do you leam from this earthquake?

We can leam many lessons. Especially two main lessons are as below;

1. Soil and ground investigation is essential for urban development and building construction.

2. Organization and coordination between institutions are basic for search， rescue and other

services. This is one of the weaknesses in this earthquake.

6. Issues of Urban Reconstruction

It seems that there are two ways of urban reconstruction. One is rebuilding or

reconstruction in original sites in which houses and facilities were damaged. On this way， it is

necessary to remove the massive building rubbish quickly. In addition to it， it is also necessary

that the ground condition of its site is investigated and revised enough to be rebuilt if needs.

And it is the most important issue that new buildings must be reconstructed with as

earthquake-proofing structural design as possible， and in a legal manner at least.


On the other hand， it is unnecessary for urban reconstruction to arrange urban facilities

such as street and parks， in contrast with the urban reconstruction projects in J apanese crowding

built-up areas without urban facilities in a typical case of urban reconstruction after the

Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake of 1995. However， in this case of Kocaeli earthquake， it must be

regulated to be rebuilt on the zones near the fault. These zones must be changed into parks or

green belt.

The other way is the development of new town in the other districts outside of the original

city. After the 1939 Ercincan Earthquake， old Ercincan which was severely collapsed was wasted， whole of new city was reconstructed on a neighboring district， of a low table-land， from

such lowland as a bottle of the basin. In this earthquake， it seems to be necessary that several quaters must be reconstructed as a new suburbs or new towns onto the inland districts from the

coastal districts where were shunk into the sea and from the solty ground where most parts of

buildings were collapsed. In the latter case， it is heared to be one of reasons that a massive

rubbish is impossible to be removed quickly. We heard that new town developments for urban

reconstruction projects are thinking and planning in Adapazan， Kocaeli and Yalova.

Comprehensive Urban Studies NO.72 2000

Report on Damage of Industrial Facilities

in the 1999 Kocaeli Earthquake， Turkey

Kohei Suzuki'

Abstract

The author got a chance to visit Turkey for investigating the damage of

industria1 faci1ities in the 1999 Kocaeli Earthquake which occurred on 17， August

1999 in the Kocaeli province of Turkey.

This report provides a brief investigation obtained through the seismic damage

survey， particu1ar1y， focused on the damages to industria1 faci1ities. The epicentra1

area in the Kocaeli province is the most industria1 region of Turkey. Severe

excitation attacked this region and industria1 p1ants and structures got more or 1ess

damages. Since the author cou1d on1y visit a few sites， the report main1y describes

the damages of two p1ants; TUPRAS oi1 refinery where big fire occurred and

TOYOTA-SA car manufacturing factory where no significant damage appeared.

1. Introduction

23

A great earthquake with a magnitude of Mw=7.4 occurred at 3:02 a.m. on 17， August 1999 in the Kocaeli Province of Turkey. Fig.1 shows an attacked area around the epicenter. This

area is called “Marmara Region" from the name of Marmara Sea. A part of the right-1atera1

strike slipped a10ng the North曲 AnatolianFault in east-west direction for about 100 km. This

earthquake is officially called Kocaeli Earthquake. The earthquake caused disastrous damage to

a huge number of bui1dings resulting in significant casua1ties in the provinces such as Istanbu1，

Kocae1i， Sakarya， B01u， Bursa and Ya10va. According to a preliminary report， the earthquake

caused the 10ss of more than 17，000 lives and injured more than 30，000 peop1e and collapsed

about 34，000 bui1dings and houses totally. A1so， this earthquake caused significant structura1

damages in Go1cuk， Izmit， Gebze， Ya10va， Adapazari and the suburbs of Istanbu1， whose

10cation are shown in Fig.l. Estimated economic 10st due to on1y structura1 damages is about 6

bi11ion US dollars.

The joint investigation mission organized by 3 teams from Japan Society of Civi1

Engineers (JSCE)， Architectura1 Institute of Japan (AIJ) and Japan Geotechnica1 Society (JGS)

* Graduate School of Engineering， Tokyo Metropolitan University

24 Compr巴hensiveUrban Studies No.72 2000

conducted a field investigation in the damage area from September 5 to 12. The author joined

the JSCE team as a special participant from Japan Society of Mechanical Engineers (JSME).

This report provides a preliminary investigation obtained through the damage survey，

particularly， focused on the damages to industrial facilities. The epicentral area in the Kocaeli province is the most industrialized region of Turkey and industrial facilities inc1ude

petrochemical plants， pharmaceutical firms， car manufactures， tire companies， paper mi11s， steel

fabrication plants and so on. A1though these plants or finns got more or less damages to some

of facilities， the author could only visit a few sites inc1uding TUPRAS oil refinery and

TOYOTA-SA car manufacturing factory. Therefore， this report mainly describes the damages

to both plants and gives a brief survey on the damage to other industrial facilities.

λ1armαra Sea

v

BlackSea

む詰ー

Fig.1 Damaged Area in Marmara Region

2. Damage to TUPRAS Refinery

。 50km

The most widely publicised and spectacular damage occurred at the massive TUPRAS

refinery in Yarymca. This refinery is the largest one accounting for about 1/3 of Turkey's oil，

and is a major supplier to much of the industry in the area. The annual refined petroleum is

270，000 m3 and it is the 7th largest plant in Europe. The plant was designed and constructed in

1961 by the US firm called CALTEX (now defunct). Fig.2 shows an aerial view of the refinery.

The refinery is located along the shore at Tutunciftlik of the western Kocaeli province as

shown in Fig.l. The ground was firm and no significant ground failure occurred except some

liquefaction at re-c1aimed land during the earthquake.

Suzuki : Report on Damage of lndustrial Facilities in th巴 1999Kocaeli Earthquake， Turkey 25

The refinery has three crude oil- and three vacuum distillation units， three

hydrodesulphurisation (kero-diesel) units， one hydrocracker， two unifer/reformer units， two

FCC units， one isomerization unit， one asphalt unit， one sulphur recovery unit， one isopentane

Fig.2 Aerial View of TUPRAS Izmit Refinery

Pipings FalJed Down

Izmit Bay

Damaged Tanks ;

⑧ Completely Fired

@ E汗ectedby Fire

。FloatingRoof Damaged

Fig.3 Plan View of Izmit Refinery and Location of Damaged Facilities

26 Comprehensive Urban Studies No.72 2000

unit， one naphtha sweetening unit and related uti1ity units. The products are naphtha， gasoline，

jet-oi1 and kerosene and others. The 860，000-ton crude oi1 is stored in 14 large cylindrical tanks

and 840，000・tonsemi-products are stored in 86 middle and small size cylindrical tanks. Fig.3

shows an outline of the refinery in which location of the fired and damaged tanks are described.

2. 1 Damage State of Refinery

(1) Fire at Tanks with Floating Roofs

6 cylindrical tanks having floating roofs caught fire immediately after the earthquake. Out

of 6 tanks， 4 middle size tanks has a diameter of 20-25 m and 2 small size tanks has a diameter

of about 10 m. Naphtha in the middle size tanks were completely burned. Tanks were damaged

as a result of thermal deformation. The estimated naphtha is about 36，000 ton. Fig.4 and 5

show the deformed state of burned tanks.

The fire in a naphtha tank farm was considered to be initiated by sparks created by

bouncing of the floating roof against the inner walls of the tank during the earthquake. Sparks

ignited the naphtha. There were 46 tanks with floating roofs and among them those of 30 tanks

were damaged independent of the size of tanks. Most of tanks were constructed in the ear1y

1960s according to the earthquake design code of California for a Level 4 ground shaking. In

addition to cylindrical tanks， there were some spherical tanks in the plant. None of these was

damaged. As seen in Fig.6， the piers and bracing of these spherical tanks shows no visible

damage. Therefore， they should have had enough resistance strength against the ground

shaking during the earthquake.

As seen in Fig.7， the upper part of a tank with a fixed roof near a burned tank was

deformed as a result of thermal pressure caused by fire rather than sloshing.

The fire at the tank farm was completely extinguished on August 20， 4 days after the

earthquake.

(2) Fire due to Collapsed Stack

The collapse of one of stacks in the crude oi1 distil1ation unit caused fire also just after the

earthquake. One of the collapsed stack parts direct1y hit an upper super heater unit having high

temperature of more than 500 oC. The height of 5 stacks which were bui1t in 1981 ranges from

90 m to 115 m. Fig.8 shows a collapsed stack together with undamaged stacks. Crumbled stack

shown as Fig.9 was initially 105 m high. However， it is difficult to estimate that the main cause

of the col1apse of the stack is only resonant response to ground shaking since other stacks

having simi1ar height were undamaged. Investigators at TUPRAS explained the main reason of

col1apse might be associated with material degradation of inner wal1 of the stuck as a result of

corrosion due to alkali gases such as hydrogen sulfide gas. Fig.10 shows fired heater unit by

getting the hit of collapsed stack. The fire of this unit extinguished at the night of August 17.

While extinguishing the fire at this unit， the fire in the tank farm became very strong and unmanageable. Another part of collapsed stack hit the pipe-rack which was arranged near the

damaged unit. Fig.11 demonstrates the damaged pipe and pipe-rack.

Suzuki : Report on Damage of lndustrial Facilities in the 1999 Kocaeli Earthquake， Turkey 27

Fig.4 Burned Cylindrical Tank (1)

Fig.5 Burned Cylindrical Tank (2)

Fig.6 Undamaged Spherical Tank

Fig.7 Deformation of Cylindrical Tank with Fixed Roof

Fig.8 Collapsed Stack and Undamaged Stacks

Fig.9 Crumbled Stack

28 Compr巴hensiveUrban Studies NO.72 2000

Fig.10 Damaged Oil Furnace Hit by

the Collapsed Stack Part

Fig.11 Damaged Piping and Pipe-support Structures Hit by the Collapsed Stack Part

Fig.12 Piping Falling from the Embankment Wall

Fig.13 Tilted Pipe Support on the

Embankment Wali

Fig.14 Damaged Pipings by the Tank Fire

Fig.15 Completely Undamaged Pipings

Suzuki : Report on Damage of Industrial Facilities in the 1999 Kocaeli Earthquake. Turkey 29

(3) Other Damages

Another fire started at the tele-communication room. However， this fire was quickly

extinguished. Several concrete pipe supporting structures were broken. However， piping had

no damage and the damaged concrete structures were reinforced by steel elements.

The pipes having a diameter of about 700 mm installed over a concrete embankment were

fallen towards the sea-side as seen in Fig.12 for a length of 150 m due to the tilting of

supporting device as in Fig.13. Nevertheless， the pipes got no serious failure such as breakage

and rupture. As shown in Fig.14， there was no severe damage to pipings around the area near oil

refineries except to those damaged by the fire shown as in Fig.15. However， some failures were observed at pipe joints in the area of sea side where the supporting structure somehow moved

due to the earthquake as shown in Fig.16.

The officials of the TUPRAS stated that the total damage was about 500 million US

dol1ars. Within one year， it was said that the plant would ful1y recover.

2. 2 A 8ack Analvsis of Tank Fire

As explained in 2.1， the fire in a tank was presumed to be resulted from an ignition of

naphtha caused by sparking as a result of bouncing of the floating roof with the inner side of the

tank wall. The fire occurred in tanks having a diameter of about 20 m while no fire occurred in

tanks having a long diameter like 100 m. The natural period of first mode of sloshing can be caluculated referring to the liquid

height H and tank diameter D by the following formula

T=2πl誌 coth(竿) ....(1)

The units of D and H are m and the unit of gravitational acceleration g is m/s2. This formula is

used in No.515(1981) earthquake design code of Japan Ministry of International Trade and

Industry (MITI) for high pressurized gas facilities to estimate the sloshing natural periods of

cylindrical tanks during seismic excitations (The code was revised after the Kobe Earthquake

(1995) as NO.143 which include design code for piping. ).

Table 1 shows the fundamental sloshing periods of tanks whose diameter ranges between

10 m to 100 m. The sloshing period of the tanks with a diameter of 20 m is about 4-5 seconds.

Fig.17 shows the acceleration record at Izmit site and integrated velocity and displacement of

NS component. Fig.18 shows computed acceleration， velocity and displacement response

spectra of the record. In the displacement response spectra， dominant peaks can be observed between 3-5 seconds. Therefore， the tanks with a diameter of about 20 m are the most likely

ones to be subjected to violent sloshing.

Fig.19 shows a rough description of cross section of cylindrical tank with floating roof.

Some kinds of sealing devices are installed between outer edge of the floating roof and inner

wall of the tank. In Fig.20， typical examples of metallic seal and rubber envelope seal are illustrated. Currently， for almost al1 tanks rubber envelope type of sea1ing are introduced in


Table 1 Sloshing Periods of Cylindrical Tank Calculated by eq.(1)

Diameter Liquid Height Period T (m) (m)

3.0

10.0 5.0 8.0 10.0

5.0

20.0 10.0 15.0 20.0

Fig.16 Damaged Pipe Joint due to

the Axial Movement

AcccJtration (cmJS2) : max"，163.'km/s2

~ ~，~ !品ニ:)十一~， -J 川 vvr'~ WV TIV' '

ro ~川同問ロ…~どい'-./~ ~

3.69 3.39 3.32 3.31

5.49 4.80 4.70 4.68

Fig.17 Acceleration Record at Izmit and

Integrated Velocity and Displacement

of NS Component (Courtesy of Dr. S

Horikoshi， Kajima Construction Co.)

Diameter Liquid Height (m) (m)

10.0

50.0 20.0 30.0

20.0

100.0 30.0 50.0

1500 Accclcratjon (cm/:、')

1200

900

600

o

Period T

9.34 7.80 7.49

13.22 I 11.68 10.73

ーーー一一ー-h"，O.Ol 0.02

一一一一一一 0.03-一一ー 0.05一一一一一 0.1

0.02 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.5

ξ=

Period ;穴s)

10

100

80

60

4Q

20

o 0.02 0.05 0.5

Period : T(s)

50，.:: Displacernent (cm)

h=O.Ol 0.02 0.03 0.05

40

-一一 0.1

30

20

10

o -0.02 0.05 0.1

Period ; T(s)

Fig.18 Computed Acceleration-， Velocity-and Displacement Response

Spectra of Izmit Record (Courtesy of Dr. S. Horikoshi)

10

10

Suzuki : Report on Damage of lndustrial Facilities in the 1999 Kocaeli Earthquake. Turkey 31

Fig.19 Cross Section of Cylindrical Tank with Floating Roof

oil

weather shield

(1) metallic seal

weather shield

elastic foam

ーでLで~.- oil

(2) rubber envelope seal

Fig.20 Mechanism of Metallic Seal and Rubber Envelope Seal

order to avoid the spark due to the roof bouncing against the tank wal1. However， in 1960s

when the tanks in the Izmit firm were constructed， metallic sealings were stil1 introduced.

Therefore， it is expected that big sloshing behavior could ignite the naphtha by sparks resulting

from the bouncing of the roofs against the walls caused by the seismic excitation.

3. Damages to TOYOTA-SA Car Manufacturing Factory

The name TOYOTA-SA is a combination of the Japanese car maker TOYOTA and

Turkish SABANCI Holding， which is a big financIal group in Turkey. This factory was

constructed in 1994 at the south of Adapazari city and it is c10se to the Sakarya-Kocaeli

province boundary.

Initially， the factory was considered to be built at Gebze where a maximum horizontal

seismic acceleration of 264 Gal was recorded at the earthquake. Since 1，000，000 m2 space was


necessary， the plant was eventually moved to the present site. The plant is close to the collapsed Arifiye ove中assand the fau1t crosses the plant site. The maximum acceleration at this plant

should be larger than 400 Gal. A1though it is not certain， it seems that the fau1t bifurcates and

several ground breaks were observed in the north-east comer of the plant. The plan of the plant

locations are shown in Fig.21. In southem area ground breaks appeared described as thick lines.

The top 12 m layer of the site consists of soft and hard si1ty sediments. This layer is under1aid

by a gravelly layer (SPT value is greater than 50) and si1t layer (SPT value is more than 18).

The buildings were designed by considering a M 8 class earthquake with a base shear of O.4g.

The allowed displacement was set to 10 mm. This value is considered to be vertical relative

displacement between adjacent columns. The bui1dings were founded on pi1es. The number of

14 m long RC precast pi1es with a square cross section was 3800. Each column is supported by

4 pi1es and each pile has a H type pure steel column. The flange thickness ranges between 50

mm to 125 mm. The layout of pipes were designed to have a truss type structure.

① Press Shop ②Welding Shop ③ Paint Shop④Assembly Shop

⑤ Switch Yard ⑥Cont副nerYard⑦Car Pool Yard③Pipe Buried Area

Fig.21 Plan View of TOYATA-SA Automobile Factory

3. 1 Damage State

(1) Damage to Bui1ding and Piping

Since the ground breaks due to fau1ting pass through the north-east part of the plant， the floor and side-walls of press shop and welding shop① in Fig.21， and welding shop② were

deformed. Nevertheless， this damage could not cause any obstruction to the production. Pipes

for water， electricity and fire extinguishing were broken or damaged as a resu1t of ground

breaks. Water pipes had a diameter of 400 mm and made of concrete. Fire extinguishing pipes

are steel and had a diameter of 200 mm. The pipes were ruptured at connections or valves in the


area⑧. Fig.22 and 23 show a mended pipe connection and damaged valves， respectively. The

boiler for car drying after painting uses natural gas. No damage to the natural gas pipeline was

reported. Among 30 buildings， two buildings with concrete roofs were only damaged. The damage was concentrated at the bottom and top connections of the columns. The roof was

displaced about 10 cm. The side-wal1s of the factory is made of poly-uretan sheets and no brick

clad wal1s are used. Some of windows in roof were fallen and plastering in walls were peeled

off. In addition， some slight damage to steel structures was observed.

(2) Damage to Facilities and Machinery

Out of 2 transformers located in⑤， one transformer was fallen as a result of the failure of

its supports. Another one was not fallen， however， damaged at the leg as seen in Fig.24. Both

transformers are put on rails. Anchors were used to restrain the movements of transformers

during ground shaking. These anchors were pulled out of their concrete foundations and the

transformers were displaced. 3 cylindrical tanks put horizontally were undamaged. On the

Fig.22 Repaired Embedded Piping Damaged at the Joint

Fig.23 Broken Valves

Fig.24 Damaged Transformer (Another one fallen off the supporting rail)

Fig.25 Sliding of Pump and Pipe

34 Comprehensive Urban Studies NO.72 2000

other hand， the cooling water tank installed horizontal1y slided 1 m and pipe connections were

broken. Also， small pump with piping slided as shown in Fig.25. The ventilator (8ωn) in a 9

m high building ③ was fallen as a resu1t of breakage of the pin of vibration-proof coilsprings

as seen in Fig.26. The guide-rails of roof cranes (10-30 ton) with a 20 m span become 1-2 cm

narrower. The parts on the racks were fal1en. In addition， the hen-machine was displaced from

its rails. In welding shop， the robot for welding was not damaged. However， some kinds of

auto-manufacturing machines got tilting as shown in Fig.27.

(3) Other Damages

Since the TOYOTA-SA factory was on summer holiday at the time of the earthquake， the

farm was not in operation. Furthermore， no car was suspended during the earthquake. About

80 % of the 658 workers were living in Adapazari and the rest in Izmit. The houses of 139

workers were completely collapsed. The houses of 110 workers were damaged. It was

expected that the plant would be in operation at the end of October， 1999 due to the check-up of

machineries， control units and finished products. About 1，000 cars in the car-pool yard⑦ were

slightly damaged as a resu1t of bumper-collisions.

4. Damages to Other Industrial Facilities

The author got a chance to visit a petro-chemical plant， PETKIM， which is located at the

western side of TUPRAS. This plant was constructed in 1965 and it produces petro-chemical

products such as plastics of various kind， high-polymer fibers， LP gas and benzen. Fortunately，

the damage to the plant is said to be very limited. Distinctive damages could be summarized as

follows;

(1) Wooden cooling tower structure was totally collapsed and several structure parts of the

reinforced concrete cooling towers were damaged.

(2) The jetty of loading-unloading facility of this plant was damaged due to the movement of

wharf.

(3) Embedded pipes along the seashore were damaged.

Fig.28 shows the damaged state of wooden cooling tower. Fig.29 shows the damaged

columns of the reinforced concrete cooling tower. Pipes suspended to the jetty were fallen for

several centimeters. However， they were already repaired at the time of the visit. The officials of

this plant said they were more concerned with the housing of their workers since the damage to

the plant was quite limited.

In Kosekoi near Izmit， a liquefied gas supplying company called HABAS is located. In this

plant， there were cylindrical tanks for liquefied oxigen and nitrogen. These tanks were

supported by reinforced concrete columns. Out of three tanks， the columns of the two tanks

were collapsed due to earthquake and the tanks sank and inclined. These tanks were storing

great amount of liquefied gas while the undamaged one was almost empty at the time of

excitation. Fig.30 and 31 show the damaged state of the tanks.


Fig目26 Fall of Large Blower due to the Breakage Fig.29 Damaged Support Column of Reinforced of Vibration-proof Springs Concrete Structure for Colllimg Towers

Fig.27 Tilting of Auto-manufacturing Machine Fig.30 Damaged Liquefied Gas Tanks(left and

middle) and Undamaged Tank(right)

Fig目28 Collapsed Wooden Cooling Tower Structure Fig.31 Close-up View of Broken Support Columns

of Vertical Tank


Acknowledgement

The author expresses to his sincere thanks to Prof. M. Hamada who was in charge of head

of the JSCE investigation team and kindly to invite him as a member of the team. He also

extends to his thanks to all of the members， in particular， Dr. R. Isoyama and Dr. Y. Shiba who

collaborated with him for the damage investigation. Suggestions provided by Prof. K.

Kawashima， Dr. S. Igarashi and Dr. J. Tohma are deeply appreciated.

The author would like to thank also staff of TOYOTA-SA， especially， Mr. O. Obata and

Mr. N. Kitagawa for the detailed information of the seismic damage. Owing to the invitation by

Prof. P. Gulkan of the Middle East Technical University of Ankara， the author was able to visit

TUPRAS again for getting detailed information about the damage to oil refineries. He express

his thanks to Prof. Gulkan.

He also acknowledges Dr. Omer Aydan who kindly translated my part into English in the

ASCE report relating to the Kocaeli Earthquake. Finally， he appreciates Dr. S. Horikoshi and

Dr. Nihat Aksu， for their help in the preparation of this report.

References

1)K. Kawashima， T. Hashimoto and T. Suzuki， Damage ollnf同structurein the 1999 Kocaeli， Turkey

Earthquake， Earthquak巴 EngineeringResearch Group， Tokyo Institut巴 ofTechnology， November，

1999.

2)M.Hamada etc.， The 1999 Kocaeli Ear幼quake，Turkey-lnvestigation into Damage ωCivil Engineering

Structures， Earthquake Engineering Committee， Japan Society of Civil Engineers， December， 1999.

Key Words (キー・ワード)

1999 IくocaeliEarthquake， Turkey (1999年トルココジャエリ地震)， Oil Refinery

(石油精製工場)， Fire (火事)， Seismic Design (耐震設計)， Sloshing (スロッシン

グ)， Oil Tank (石油タンク入 CarManufacturing Factory (自動車工場)

Suzuki : R巴porton Damage of lndustrial Facilities in th巴 1999Kocaeli Earthquake， Turkey 37

1999年トルコ・コジャエリ地震における産業施設の被害

鈴木浩平

東京都立大学大学院工学研究科

総合都市研究第72号 2000 p.23 -37

1999年トルコ・コジャエリ地震は、トルコにおいて最も工業施設や生産プラントが多い Izmit地域を

襲った。いくつかの工場やプラントが多大の被害を受けたがその詳細は明らかではない。

著者は、土木学会の被害調査団に加わり、代表的な施設の被害状況を調べることができたのでその概

要を報告する。

まず、 Izmitにある TUPRASという、国営の石油精製プラントで大規模なタンク火災が生じたのでそ

の概要を述べる。火災は 3ケ所で生じたが直径が 20m規模の中型平底円筒タンクが数基、ほぼ完全に

燃焼した。浮屋根のスロッシングによる振動により、タンク内壁と衝突して、着火したとされている。

また、硫化水素ガス等により、材料劣化していた煙突が破断し、高温の反応炉を打撃したことによる火

災も生じた。

一方、トヨタ自動車との合併会社である TOYOTA-SA工場は、震源近傍の地域に建設されていたがレ

ベルの高い耐震設計、耐震工法が採られていたため、被害を最小限に止めることができた。

本報告では、多くの写真や図を用いて、産業施設の被害状況と、その事後考察を英文で説明している。

feature as urban disaster of the 1999 kocaeli …feature as urban disaster of the 1999 kocaeli...

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