fassler.thesis. appendix

8/13/2019 Fassler.thesis. Appendix

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Appendix

I have organized this appendix according to subject. I have abbreviated translations from

Long and Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers as LS followed by their section number. I have

done the same with Diogenes Laertius, The Lives of Eminent Philosophers. Unless otherwise

marked, I used the R. D. Hicks translation. For all passages, I first state the original author,(e.g. Stobaeus) and if I give multiple translations of a given passage I give the name in

parentheses, [e.g. (Frede; The Original Notion of Cause, p. 222)].

Metaphysics/Ontology

Seneca, Letters58.13-15

(LS 27A)

The Stoics want to place above this [the existent] yet another, more primary genusSome

Stoics consider something the first genus, and I shall add the reason why they do. In

nature, they say, some things exist, some do not exist. But nature includes even thosewhich do not exist things which enter the mind, such as Centaurs, giants, and whateverelse falsely formed by thought takes on some image despite lacking substance.

Alexander, On Aristotles Topics 201, 19-25

(LS 27B)

This is how you could show the impropriety of the Stoics making something the genus to

which the existent belongs: if it is something it is obviously also existent, and if existent it

would receive the definition of the existent. But they would escape the difficulty by

legislating for themselves that existent is said only of bodies; for on this round they say

that something is more generic than it, being dedicated not only of bodies but also ofincorporeals.

Sextus Empiricus,Against the Professors 10.218

(LS 27D)

They [the Stoics] say that of somethings some are bodies, others incorporeals, and they list

four species of incorporeals sayable (lekton), void, place, and time.

Stobaeus 1.136.21-1.136.6

(LS 30A)

(1) (Zenos doctrine) They say that concepts are neither somethings nor qualified, butfigments of the soul which are quasi-somethings and quasi-qualified. (2) These, they say,

are what the old philosophers called Ideas. For the Ideas are of the things which are

classified under the concepts, such as men, horses, and in general all the animals and other

things of which they say that there are Ideas. (3) The Stoic philosophers stay that there are

no Ideas, and that what we participate in is the concepts, while what we bear those caseswhich they call appellatives.


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Cicero,AcademicaI.39

(LS 45A)

Zeno also differed from the same philosophers [Platonists and Peripatetics in thining that it

was totally impossible that something incorporeal (to which genus Xenocrates and his

predecessors too had said the mind belonged) should be the agent of anything, and that

only a body was capable of acting or of being acted upon.

Sextus Empiricus,Against the Professors, 8.263

(LS 45 B)

According to them [the Stoics] the incorporeal is not of a nature either to act or to be acted

upon.

DL 7.135

According to Apollodorus in his Physics, body is what has threefold extension length,breadth and depth; this is also called solid body.

Cause

Stobaeus Ecl. 1.138.14-1.39.4

(LS 55A)

(1)Zeno says that a cause is that because of which, while that of which it is the cause is an

attribute; and that the cause is a body, while that of which it is a cause is a predicate. (2) He

says that it is impossible that the cause be present yet that of which it is the cause not

belong. (3) This thesis has the following force. A cause is that because of which something

occurs, as, for example, it is because of prudence that being prudent occurs, because of

should that being alive occurs, and because of temperance that being temperate occurs. For

it is impossible, when someone possesses temperance, for him not to be temperate, or,when he possesses soul, for him not to be alive, or, when he possesses prudence , for him

not to be prudent. (4) Chrysippus says that a cause is that because of which; and that thecause is an existent and a body, ; and that the cause is because, while that of which it is the cause is why? (5)

He says that an explanation [aitia] is the statement of a cause [aition], or statement

concerning the cause quacause.

(Frede; The Original Notion of Cause, p. 222)

But an aitia . . . is an account of the aition, or the account about the aition as aition"

Sextus Empiricus, Against the Professors 9.211

(LS 55B)

the Stoics state that every cause is a body that becomes a cause to a body of something

incorporeal. For instance the scalpel, a body, becomes a cause to the flesh, a body, of the

incorporeal predicate being cut.

Seneca, Letters. 65.2


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(LS 55E)

Our Stoic philosophers, as you know, say that there are two things in nature from which

everything is produced cause and matter. Matter lies inert, an entity ready for anything

but destined to lie idle if no one moves it. Cause, on the other hand, being the same as

reason, shapes matter and directs it wherever it wants, and from matter produces its

manifold creations. Hence a thing must be madefrom something, and by something. Thelatter is its cause, the former its matter.

Seneca, Letters 65.4

(Bobzien 202)

The Stoics hold that there is one cause, viz. that which does something."

Stobaeus, Ecl. I.79.5-12

(Bobzien p. 200)

Fate is the logos of the universe, or the reason of the things in the universe govemed by

providence...And instead of "reason" he uses "truth", aitia,"nature", and "necessity", and

adds other terms, which apply to the same substance from different perspectives.

(LS 55M)

Fate is the rationale of the world or the rationale of providences acts of government in

the world, or the rationale in accordance with which past events have happened, present

events are happening, and future events will happen. And as substitute for rationale heuses truth, explanation, nature, necessity, and further terms, taking these to apply tothe same substance from different points of view.

Sextus Empiricus,Against the professors8.409

(LS 27E)(I) For they [the Stoics] say, just as the trainer or drill-sergeant sometimes takes hold of the

boys hands to drill him and to teach him to make certain motions, but sometimes stands ata distance and moves to a certain drill, to provide himself as a model for the boy (2) so

too some impressers, touch, as it were, and make contact with the commanding-faculty to

make their printing in it, as do white and black, and body in general; whereas others have a

nature like that of the incorporeal sayables (lekta) and the commanding-faculty is

impressed in relation to them, not by them.

DL 7.55

For whatever produces an effect is body; and voice, as it proceeds from those who utter itto those who hear it, does produce an effect.

DL 7.149

That all things happen by fate or destiny is maintained by Chrysippus in his treatise De fato,

by Posidonius in his De fato, book ii, by Zeno and by Boethus in his De fato, book i. Fate is

defined as an endless chain of causation, whereby things are, or as the reason or formula by


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whichworld goes on.

Lekta/Sayables

DL 7.57There is a difference between voice and speech; because, while voice may include mere

noise, speech is always articulate. Speech again differs from a sentence or statement,

because the latter always signifies something, whereas a spoken word, as for example ,

blituri, may be unintelligible, which a sentence never is. And to frame a sentence is more

than mere utterance, for while vocal sounds are uttered, things are meant, that is, are

matters of discourse.

(LS 33 A)

Utterance and speech are different, because vocal sound is also an utterance but only

articulated sound is speech. And speech is different from language, because language is

always significant, but speech can lack significance, e.g. blituri, whereas language is not soat all. Furthermore, saying is different from voicing. For utterances are voiced but it is

states of affairs which are said they, after all, are actually sayables.

Sextus Empiricus,Against the Professors8.11-12

(LS 33B)

(1) There was another disagreement among philosophers [concerning what is true]: some

took the sphere of what is true and false to be the signification, others utterance and

others the process that constitutes thought. (2) The Stoics defended the first opinion,saying that three things are linked together, the signification, the signifier, and the name-

bearer. The signifier is an utterance, for instance Dion; the signification is the actual stateof affairs revealed by an utterance, and which we apprehend as it subsists in accordance

with our thought, whereas it is not understood by those whose language is different

althoughthey hear the utterance; the name-bearer is the external object, for instance, Dion

himself. (3) Of these, two are bodies- the utterance and the name- bearer; but one is

incorporealthe state of affairs signified and sayable, which is true or false.

Sextus Empiricus,Against the Professors 8.70

(LS 33C)

They [the Stoics] say that a sayableis what subsists in accordance with a rational

impression, and a rational impression is one in which the content of the impression can be

exhibited in language.

Seneca, Letters117.13

(LS 33E)

(1)There are [the Stoic says] bodily substances: for instance, this is a man, and this a horse.

These are accompanied by movements of thought which can make enunciations about

bodies. (2) These movements have a property peculiar to themselves, which is separate

from bodies. For example, I see Cato walking: sense-perception has revealed this, and my


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mind has believed it. What I see is a body, and it is to a body that I have directed my eyes

and my mind. then I say, Cato is walking.What I now utter (he says) is not a body, but a

certain enunciation about a body, which some call a proposition, others a thing enunciated,

and others a thing said. (3) So when we say wisdom, we understand something corporeal;when we say, He is wise, we are speaking about a body. Theres a very great difference

between naming it and speaking about it.

DL 7.63

(LS 33F)

(1) The topic which deals with states of affairs and significations includes that of sayables,

both those that are complete and propositions and syllogisms, and those which are

incomplete, and active and passive predicates. (2) They say that a sayable is what subsists

in accordance with a rational impression. (3) Sayables, the Stoics say, are divided into

complete and incomplete, the latter being ones whose linguistic expression is unfinished,

e.g. [Someone] writes, for we ask Who? In complete sayables the linguistic expression is

finished, e.g. Socrates writes. So incomplete sayables include predicates, whereas onesthat are compete include propositions, syllogisms, questions and enquiries.

Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism 2.81-3

(LS 33P)

(1) True is said [by the Stoics] to differ from truth in three ways, substance, structure and

function. (2) In substance, since what is true is incorporeal, for it is a proposition and

sayable,; but truth is a body, for it is scientific knowledge capable of stating everything true;

and scientific knowledge is the commanding-faculty disposed in a certain way, just as a fist

is the hand disposed in a certain way; and the commanding-faculty is a body, being a breath

in their view. (3) I structure, since what is true is something simple, e.g. I am conversing,but truth consists of the knowledge of many true things. (4) In function, since truth

pertains to scientific knowledge but what is true does not do so at all. Hence they say that

truth is only in a virtuous man, but what is true is also in an inferior man; for the inferior

man can say something true.

Human Thought/Action

DL 7.49

For presentation comes first; then thought, which is capable of expressing itself, puts into

the form of a proposition that which the subject receives from a presentation.

(LS 33D)

For the impression arises first, and then thought, which has the power of talking, expresses

in language what it experiences by the agency of the impression.

DL 7.50

There is a difference between the process and the outcome of presentation. The latter is a


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semblance in the mind such as may occur in sleep, while the former is the act of imprinting

something on the soul, that is a process of change, as is set forth by Chrysippus in the

second book of his treatise Of the Soul (De anima). For, says he, we must not take

"impression" in the literal sense of the stamp of a seal, because it is impossible to suppose

that a number of such impressions should be in one and the same spot at one and the same

time. The presentation meant is that which comes from a real object, agrees with thatobject, and has been stamped, imprinted, and pressed seal-fashion on the soul, as would

not be the case if it came from an unreal object.

DL 7.55-6

(LS 33H)

An animals utterance is air that has been struck by an impulse, but that of a man is

articulated and issues from thought, as Diogenes [of Babylon] says, and is perfected at the

age of fourteen. Also, according to the Stoics, utterance is a bodyfor everything that acts is

a body; and utterance acts when it travels from those who utter it to those who hear it.

Stobaeus 2.88.2-6

(LS 33I)

(1) They [the Stoics] say that all impulses are acts of assent, and the practical impulses also

contain motive power. (2) But acts of assent and impulses actually differ in their objects:

propositions are the objects of acts of assent, but impulses are directed toward predicates,

which are contained in a sense in the propositions.

DL 7.49-51

I will quote verbatim what Diocles the Magnesian says in his Synopsis of Philosophers.These are his words: "The Stoics agree to put in the forefront the doctrine of presentation

and sensation, inasmuch as the standard by which the truth of things is tested is generically

a presentation, and again the theory of assent and that of apprehension and thought,

which precedes all the rest, cannot be stated apart from presentation. For presentation

comes first ; then thought, which is capable of expressing itself, puts into the form of a

proposition that which the subject receives from a presentation.There is a differencebetween the process and the outcome of presentation. The latter is a semblance in the mind

such as may occur in sleep, while the former is the act of imprinting something on the soul,

that is a process of change, as is set forth by Chrysippus in the second book of his treatise

Of the Soul (De anima). For, says he, we must not take " impression " in the literal sense of

the stamp of a seal, because it is impossible to suppose that a number of such impressionsshould be in one and the same spot at one and the same time. The presentation meant is

that which comes from a real object, agrees with that object, and has been stamped,

imprinted, and pressed seal-fashion on the soul, as would not be the case if it came from

an unreal object. According to them some presentations are data of sense and others are

not : the former are the impressions conveyed through one or more sense-organs ; while

the latter, which are not data of sense, are those received through the mind itself, as is

the case with incorporeal things and all the other presentations which are received by


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reason. Of sensuous impressions some are from real objects and are accompanied by

yielding and assent on our part. But there are also presentations that are appearances and

no more, purporting, as it were, to come from real objects. Another division of

presentations is into rational and irrational, the former being those of rational creatures,

the latter those of the irrational. Those which are rational are processes of thought,

while those which are irrational have no name.

DL 7.52

The Stoics apply the term sense or sensation to three things: (I) the current passing

from the principal part of the soul to the senses, (2) apprehension by means of the senses,

(3) the apparatus of the sense-organs, in which some persons are deficient. Moreover, the

activity of the sense-organs is itself also called sensation. According to them it is by sense

that we apprehend black and white, rough and smooth, whereas it is by reason that

we apprehend the conclusions of demonstration, for instance the existence of gods and

their providence. General notions, indeed, are gained in the following ways: some by direct

contact, some by resemblance, some by analogy, some by transposition, some by

composition, and some by contrariety.

DL 7.89

By the nature with which our life ought to be in accord, Chrysippus understands both

universal nature and more particularly the nature of man, whereas Cleanthes takes the

nature of the universe alone as that which should be followed, without adding the nature of

the individual.

DL 7.110

Now from falsehood there results perversion, which extends to the mind ; and from this

perversion arise many passions or emotions, which are causes of instability . Passion, or

emotion, is defined by Zeno as an irrational and unnatural movement in the soul, or againas impulse in excess.

Aetius 4.12.1-5

(LS 39B)

(1) Chrysippus says that these four [i.e., impression (phantasia), impressor (phantaston),

imagination (phantastikon), figment (phantasma)] are all different. (2) An impression is an

affection occurring in the soul, which reveals itself an its cause. Thus, when through sight

we observe something white, the affection is what is engendered in the soul through vision;

and it is this affection which enables us to say that there is a white object which activates

us. Likewise when we perceive through touch and smell. (2) The word impression[phantasia] is derived from light [phos]; just as light reveals itself and whatever else itincludes in its range, so impression reveals itself and its cause. (4) The cause of an

impression is an impresser: e.g., something white or cod or everything capable of activating

the sou. (5) Imagination is an empty attraction, an affection in the should which arises

from no impresser, as when someone shadow-boxes and strikes his hands against thin air;

for an impression has some impresser as its object, but imagination has none. (6) A figment

is that to which we are attracted in the empty attraction of imagination; it occurs in people


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who are melancholic and mad.

Cicero, On Academic Scepticism 2.21

(Brittain)

Such are the things we claim are apprehended by the senses. The next set are just like

them, though we dont claim that these areapprehended by the senses themselves, but bythe senses in a certain respecte.g., That is white, This is sweet, That is melodious,

Thisis fine-scented, This is rough. Our apprehension of this set nowcomes from the mindrather than the senses. Next comes: That is ahorse, That is a dog. Then we get the rest of

the series, which connects more significant things and encapsulates what we might call

a filled-out apprehension of thingse.g., If something is human it is amortal animal

partaking in reason. Its from this set that our conceptions of things arestamped on our minds, and without them there can be no understanding, investigation, or

argument.

Cicero, On Academic Scepticism 2.24-5

(Brittain)Heres another obviouspoint: something must be determined as the initial thing forwisdom to follow when it begins to act, and that initial thing must be suited to our nature.

Otherwise our impulse (I mean this to translate horm)which stirs us to action, i.e., to

have an impulse towards the object of our impressioncant be moved.[25] But we mustfirst have an impression of what moves our impulse, and believe it, and that cant happen ifthe object of our impression cant be discriminated fromsomething false. So how can themind be moved to have an impulse if it doesnt apprehend whether the object of the

impression is suited to our nature or alien to it? Similarly, if no action strikes our mind

as appropriate, it will never act at all, never be stirred to do anything, never be moved. But

if were ever going to perform any action the impression

we have must strike us as true.

Cicero, On Academic Scepticism 2.30

(Brittain)

Still, it could be argued in detail that nature employed great artistry in constructing first

every animal and then humans in particular; and one could thus show the power the senses

have: how first impressions strike us, then impulse follows under their stimulus, with the

result that we then direct our senses towards the things we want

to apprehend. For the mind, which is the source of the senses and is even itself identical to

the senses, has a natural power it directs at the things by which it is moved. Thus it seizes

on some impressions for its immediate use, while storing away others as the source of

memory; but it organizes the rest of our impressions by their similaritiesand these giverise to our conceptions of things (which the Greeks sometimes call ennoiai and sometimes

prolpseis [pre-conceptions]).After the addition of reason, proof, and a wealth of

countless facts, ones apprehension of all those facts becomes apparent, and reason

itself, now perfected in these stages, achieves wisdom.


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Seneca,Letters113.17-19

(Inwood)

Every animal acts on its own; virtue, however, does nothing on its own, but in conjunction

with a human being. All animals are either rational, like human beings and gods, ; the virtues are certainly rational; but they are neitherhuman nor gods; therefore they are not animals. No rational animal acts unless it is first

stimulated by the appearance of something, then has an impulse, and then assent confirms

this impulse. I will tell you what assent is. It is fitting that I walk; I do not walk until I have

said this to myself and given my approval to this opinion. It is fitting that I sit; then alone do

I sit. This assent does not occur in a virtue. Suppose that the virtue is practical wisdom.

How can it assent that it is appropriate for me to walk? Nature does not allow this. For

practical wisdom looks out for the person to whom it belongs, not for itself; for it can

neither walk nor sit. Therefore it does not have assent, and what does not have assent is

not a rational animal. And virtue, if it is an animal, is rational. But it is not rational,

therefore it is not an animal.

Cicero, On duties1.132

(LS 53 J)

Souls movements are of two kinds: one belongs to thought, the other to impulse. The

sphere of thought is principally the investigation of truth, while impulse is the stimulus to

action. So we must take care to use thought for the best possible objects, and to make

impulse obedient to reason.

Philo,Allegories of the laws1.30

(LS 53 P)

(1) The animal is superior to the non-animal in two respects, impression and impulse. (2)

An impression is formed by the approach of an external object which strikes the mindthrough sensation. (3) Impulse, the close relation of impression, is formed by the tonic

power of the mind. By stretching out through sensation the mind grasps the object and

goes towards it, eager to seize and reach it.

Stobaeus 2.86.17-86.6

(LS 53Q)

(1) What activates impulse, they [the Stoics] say, is precisely an impression capable of

directly impelling a proper function. (2) In genus impulse is a movement of soul towards

something. (3) In species it is seen to include both the impulse which occurs in rational

animals and the one found in the non -rational; but these species have not been given this.

(4) One would correctly define rational impulse by saying that it is a movement of thoughttowards something in the sphere of action. The contrary of this is repulsion

DL 7.110

According to the Stoics there is an eight-fold division of the soul : the five senses, the faculty

of speech, the intellectual faculty , which is the mind itself, and the generative faculty, being


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all parts of the soul.

DL 7.159

By ruling part of the soul is meant that which is most truly soul proper, in whicharise presentations and impulses and from which issues rational speech.

Seneca, Letters 106.4-5

(Inwood)

4)The good does something, since it provides benefit. What does something is a body. The

good stimulates the mind and, in a way, gives it shape and cohesion; and these are

characteristics of body. The goods of the body are bodies, and so, therefore, are those of the

mind. For the mind too is a body.

5)The good of a human being must be a body, since he is himself bodily. And I miss my

mark if the things which nourish him and either preserve or restore his health are not also

bodies. Therefore his good is also a body.

Seneca,Letters124.9

(Inwood)

Some animals are non-rational; some are not yet rational; some are rational but still

incomplete. The good is in none of these; reason brings the good along with itself. So what

is the difference between the things I have listed? The good will never be in an animal

which is non-rational; the good cannot now exist in an animal which is not yet rational; the

good can now exist in an animal which is rational but still incomplete, but it is not actually

present.

Aetius 4.11.1-4(LS 39E)

(1) When a man is born, the Stoics say, he has the commanding-part of his should like a

sheet of paper ready for writing upon. On this he inscribes each one of his conceptions. (2)

The first method of inscription is through the senses. For by perceiving something, e.g.

white, they have a memory of it when it has departed. And when many memories of a

similar kind have occur, we then say we have experience. For the plurality of similar

impressions is experience. (3) Some conceptions arise naturally in the aforesaid ways and

undesignedly, others through our own instruction and attention. The latter are called

conceptions only, the former are called preconceptions as well. (4) Reason, for which we

are called rational, is said to be completed from our preconceptions during our first seven

years.

Plutarch, On common conceptions 1084F-1085A

(LS 39F)

Conception is a kind of impression, and impression is a printing in the soulThey [the

Stoics] define conceptions as a kind of stored thoughts, and memories as permanent and

static printings.


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Origen, On Principles3.1.2-3

(LS 53 A)

(5) A rational animal, however, in addition to its impressionistic nature, has reason, which

passes judgement on impressions, rejecting some of these and accepting others, in order

that the animal may be guided accordingly.

Aetius 4.21.1-4

(LS 53H)

(1) The Stoics say that the commanding-faculty is the souls highest part, which produces

impressions, assents, perceptions and impulses. They also call it the reasoning faculty. (2)

From the commanding-faculty there are seven parts of the should which grow out and

stretch out into the body like the tentacles of an octopus. (3) Five of these are the senses,

sight, smell, hearing, taste and tough. Sight is breath which extends from the commanding-

faculty to the eyes, hearing is breath which extends from the commanding-faculty to the

ears(4) Of the remainder, one is called seed, and this is breath extending from thecommanding-faculty to the genitals. (5) The other, which they also call utterance, is

breath extending from the commanding-faculty to the pharynx, tongue and kindred organs.

Aetius 4.23.1

(LS 53M)

The Stoics say that [bodily] affections occur in the affected regions, but sensations in the

commanding-faculty.


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Works Cited

Bobzien, Susanne. Topics in Stoic Philosophy. By Katerina Ierodiakonou. Oxford: Clarenden,

1999. 196-242. Print.

Cicero, Marcus Tullius. On Academic Scepticism. Trans. Charles Brittain. Indianapolis, IN:

Hackett Pub., 2006. Print.

Diogenes, Laertius.Diogenes Laertius: Lives of Eminent Philosophers. Trans. R. D. Hicks.

Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1980. Print.

Frede, Michael. "The Original Notion of Cause."Doubt and Dogmatism: Studies in Hellenistic

Epistemology. By Malcolm Schofield, Myles Burnyeat, and Jonathan Barnes. Oxford:

Clarendon, 1980. 217-49. Print.

Long, A. A., and D. N. Sedley. The Hellenistic Philosophers. Vol. 1. Cambridge

[Cambridgeshire: Cambridge UP, 1987. Print.

Seneca, Lucius Annaeus. Seneca: Selected Philosophical Letters. Trans. Brad Inwood. Oxford:

Oxford UP, 2007. Print.

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