falsification (cases)

8/9/2019 Falsification (cases)

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Falsification People v. Romualdez, 57 Phil. 148Beradio v. CA, 103 SCRA 567Luague v. CA, 112 SCRA 97Cabigas v. People, 152 SCRA 18People v. Sandaydiego, 81 SCRA 120Siquian v. People, 171 SCRA 223People v. Villalon, 192 SCRA 521

Use of falsified documentsPeople v. Dava, 202 SCRA 62

G.R. No. 31012 September 10, 1932

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,vs.

ESTELA ROMUALDEZ and LUIS MABUNAY, defendants-appellants.

Courtney Whitney, Vicente Nepomuceno and Julio Llorente for appellant Romualdez.Vicente J. Francisco and Claro M. Recto for appellant Mabunay.

Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.

VICKERS, J.:

This is an appeal from the following decision of the Honorable E. P. Revilla, Judge of the Court ofFirst Instance of Manila:

Estela Romualdez and Luis Mabunay are charged with the crime of falsification of public andofficial documents, committed, according to the information, as follows:

That in or about the month of February, 1927, in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands,the accused Estela Romualdez, who, by appointment of the Supreme Court of thePhilippine Islands, was then taking part in the discharge of public functions as secretaryto the Honorable Norberto Romualdez, one of the Justices of the Supreme Court, andby reason of said duty had under her care the compositions and other papers anddocuments having reference to the examinations for the admission of candidates to thebar held in the months of August and September, 1926, which were then kept in thearchives of the said court, confabulating with her coaccused, Luis Mabunay, and acting

in common accord with him, who was then one of the candidates who took the said BarExaminations, willfully, illegally, and criminally extracted from the said archives of theSupreme Court certain public and official documents, to wit: the compositions, whichwere written, prepared and submitted by the accused, Luis Mabunay in thatexamination. Once in possession of the same, the said accused Estela Romualdez andLuis Mabunay, conspiring together and acting in common accord, willfully, illegally, andcriminally erased the grade of fifty-eight (58%) given by the correctors Alfonso Felix andM. Guevara to the composition in Remedial Law, which was written and prepared by theaccused Luis Mabunay, and in its place wrote sixty-four (64%); and also erased thegrade of sixty-three (63%) given by correctors Jeronimo Samson and Amado de



Rosario to the composition in Civil Law written and prepared by the said Luis Mabunay,and in its place wrote seventy-three (73%), and by means of these alterations the saidaccused Estela Romualdez and Luis Mabunay were able to change the relative meritsof those compositions, thereby attributing to the said correctors, statements anddeclarations contrary to what they really made, and the accused Estela Romualdez andLuis Mabunay thus succeeded by means of falsifications made by them in theaforesaid public and official documents in making it appear that Luis Mabunay obtainedthe general average required by the rules of the Supreme Court, and in securing the

latter's admission to the practice of law, as in fact he was admitted, to the greatprejudice of the public.

Upon arraignment the accused pleaded not guilty.

Both the prosecution and the defense produced an abundance of evidence, oral anddocumentary, the presentation of which consumed considerable of the court's time.

UNDISPUTED FACTS

There is no question whatsoever as to the following facts which are not disputed either by the

prosecution or by the defense:

The accused Estela Romualdez was appointed upon the recommendation of Justice NorbertoRomualdez of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands as his secretary on November 1,1921, and continued as such until September 15, 1928.

The accused Luis Mabunay was one of the candidates duly admitted to the bar examinationsheld in 1926.

The clerk of the Supreme Court, Mr. Vicente Albert, who was appointed to that office on July11, 1912, acts every year as the secretary ex oficio of the examination committee for

admission to the bar.

The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands designated Justice Norberto Romualdez aschairman of the examination committee for admission to the bar in the year 1926, and uponrecommendation of Clerk Vicente Albert, he appointed the following as members of theexamination committee, with their respective subjects: Attorney Francisco Ortigas, Civil LawJudge Vicente Nepomuceno, Mercantile Law; Attorney Godofredo Reyes, Criminal Law; JudgeJose Abreu, Remedial Law; Attorney C. A. DeWitt, International Law; Attorney-General DelfinJaranilla, Political Law; and Attorney Carlos Ledesma, Legal Ethics.

Upon recommendation also of clerk of court Mr. Vicente Albert, a committee of correctors was

appointed, composed of the following attorneys: Amado del Rosario, Assistant Director of CiviService, and Jeronimo Samson, deputy clerk of the Supreme Court, as correctors in Civil Law;Rafael Amparo, Secretary of Justice Johnson, and Fulgencio Vega, Secretary of JusticeMalcolm, as correctors in Mercantile Law; Cecilio Apostol, Assistant City Fiscal, and Remo, ofthe Bureau of Audits, as correctors in Penal Law; Marciano Guevara, of the Bureau of Auditsand Alfonso Felix, Assistant City Fiscal, as correctors in Remedial law; Juan Lantin, of theExecutive Bureau, and the accused Estela Romualdez, as correctors in Political Law; RufinoLuna, of the Executive Bureau, and Zoilo Castrillo, of the Bureau of Lands, as correctors inInternational Law; and Anatalio Mañalac, of the Bureau of Lands, and Jeronimo Samson ascorrectors in Legal Ethics. On account of illness, Mr. Remo was substituted by Jeronimo



Samson as corrector in Penal Law. All said correctors were designated by clerk of court Albertwith the approval of the chairman of the examination committee.

The work of the members of the examination committee was limited to the preparation of thequestions in their respective subjects and of a memorandum or note of the articles, legaprovisions and jurisprudence showing the sources from which the questions were taken. Thework of reviewing and grading the compositions was entrusted to the correctors designated foreach subject. Each corrector was furnished with this note or memorandum, and a set of rules,

patterned after those of the Civil Service, was prepared by corrector Amado del Rosario toguide the correctors in grading the examination papers.

The correctors worked separately in reviewing and grading the papers on the subject assignedto them, noting the grades given to each answer, not on the composition, but in a separatenote book, which were later checked with the grades given by the other corrector in the samesubject, for the purpose of determining the general average to be given to the composition.

The report of the examination committee on the final result of the bar examination for the year1926 was submitted, under date of March 2, 1927, to the Supreme Court and was publishedon the fifth of said month. In the list of successful candidates (Exhibit C-5) there appeared the

name of candidate Luis Mabunay with a general average of 75%. The grades of Mabunay ineach subject, according to the list Exhibit C-2, which was prepared after the publication of theresult of the examination, are: 73 in Civil Law, 77 in Mercantile Law, 69 in Penal Law, 76 inPolitical Law, 86 in International Law, 64 in Remedial Law, 80 in Legal Ethics and PracticalExercises. However, a later revision of the composition of Luis Mabunay showed that thegrades of seventy-three (73 in Civil Law (Exhibit B-1), and sixty-four (64) in Remedial Law(Exhibit B-2) had been written on the first page of said compositions after striking out thegrades of sixty-three (63) therefore given to the composition in Civil Law, Exhibit B-1, and fifty-eight (58) theretofore given to the composition in Remedial Law, Exhibit B-2. The investigationof this irregularity by the City Fiscal of Manila led to the filing of the information in this case.

Admission of the accused Estela Romualdez

Before the prosecuting attorney had finished presenting his evidence tending to show theidentity of the person who altered the grades appearing on the first pages of the compositionsExhibits-B-1 and B-2, the accused Estela Romualdez spontaneously and with the conformity ofher attorneys made of record an admission as follows (p. 395, s. n.):

"In Exhibit B-1 the words seventy-three and the figures 73% inclosed in parenthesis arein my regular handwriting, and in Exhibit B-2 the words sixty-four and the figures 64%inclosed in parenthesis appearing in said composition are also in my regularhandwriting."

Authority of the accused Estela Romualdez to alter or change the grades

In view of the admission made by the accused Estela Romualdez that she was the person whowrote on the compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 the words and figures alleged to have beenfalsified, it now appears that the burden of establishing the authority under which saidchanges and alterations were made is on the accused. On this point the evidence for thedefense tended to show that the accused Estela Romualdez, both in her capacity as privatesecretary of the chairman of the examination committee and as corrector and at the same timesupervisor of the correctors, was authorized by said chairman to revise the compositionsalready reviewed by the other correctors and to change the grades given by them.



Justice Romualdez, testifying as a witness for the defense, said that he considered theaccused Estela Romualdez and Deputy Clerk Samson as supervisors of the correctors; andexplaining the powers of the former he said (page 721, s. n.):

"As such supervisor I think there was on occasion when I gave her to understand that inorder to do justice to the compositions, she could review the compositions alreadygraded by the other correctors; provided, I want to add, that the new revision was donein order to do justice to the compositions and before the names of the candidates were

known."

Referring to the alterations made by the accused Estela Romualdez to the grades given by thecorresponding correctors to compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2, this same witness testified thatsaid alterations were made within the limits of the powers he had given to said accused (pages723, 726, s. n.).

For her part the accused Estela Romualdez, testifying as a witness in her own behalf, said thatthe chairman of the examining committee, gave her to understand that she "was authorized tocorrect any composition in any subject" in the bar examinations of the year 1926 and that shehad never corrected any composition after the name of the corresponding candidate was

identified (pages 782, 783, s. n.). She denied having known Luis Mabunay, and said that thefirst time she saw him was on the first day of the trial of this case (page 783, s. n.).

Contention of the Prosecuting Attorney

The contention of the prosecuting attorney with respect to the accused Estela Romualdez maybe summarized in two following propositions: 1st — that Justice Romualdez, as chairman ofthe examination committee, did not have authority to delegate to his secretary, the accusedEstela Romualdez, the power to revise compositions in subjects in which she was not acorrector and which had already been graded by the other correctors, and much less thepower to alter or change the grades given to and written on said compositions; 2nd — tha

granting that the chairman of the examination committee had such authority, the accusedEstela Romualdez did not exercise the same in the manner prescribed by said chairmannamely, in order to do justice to the compositions and on the condition that the revision and thechanges of grades should be made before the names of the candidates, to whom thecompositions belonged, were known.

In support of the first proposition, the prosecuting attorneys maintains that Justice Romualdezwas appointed by the Supreme Court as chairman of the bar examination committee of theyear 1926, so that he would supervise the examinations in accordance with law and the rules,and that precisely, in accordance with the rules the chairman can not by himself exercise theindividual powers of the committee, among which were the powers to review, and to change or

alter the grades given to the compositions.

As to the second proposition, the prosecuting attorney maintains that the evidence adduced bythe prosecution, specially the testimony of the Deputy Clerk Samson, shows that the accusedEstela Romualdez made the changes in the grades given by the correctors to compositionsExhibits B-1 and B-2, in order to favor the accused Luis Mabunay, to whom she knew saidcompositions belonged, thus violating the conditions imposed upon her by the chairman of theexamination committee when she was given said authority.

As to the accused Luis Mabunay, the prosecuting attorney also maintains that the evidence fothe prosecution shows that he was in connivance with the accused Estela Romualdez in the



alteration by the latter of his grades in Civil Law and Remedial Law for the purpose of raising to75% the general average of 72.8 which he had obtained.

Theory of the Defense

In reply to the contention of the prosecuting attorney, the defense argues that the power ofsupervision given by Justice Romualdez to his secretary, the accused Estela Romualdez, isnot contrary to law, rules or precedents. This assertion is based on the testimony of said

Justice that the appointment of a committee of attorneys in accordance with section 2 of therules had not been followed by the Supreme Court for a number of years prior to 1926, andthat when said court designated Justice Romualdez as chairman of the examination committeewithout designating the examiners, it left that function to said chairman, and conferred uponhim ample powers to do what in his judgment was most in line with justice and the law, andthat no Court of First Instance has jurisdiction to determine the propriety or illegality of theprocedure employed by the chairman of the examination committee, or of the powersconferred by him upon his secretary, inasmuch as said chairman was responsible only to theSupreme Court for his acts.

The defense also claims that the accused Estela Romualdez could not have known to whom

compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 belonged at the time of making the alteration of the gradesappearing on the first pages thereof, because, according to the testimony of said accused,corroborated by that of Catalina Pons, who was one of those who helped in the preparation ofthe list of candidates Exhibit C-1, the envelopes containing the names and the identificationnumbers of the candidates were opened just one day before the publication of the result of theexamination, and that in order to finish this work and to place the names of the candidates onsaid list, they had to work continuously from 8 o'clock in the morning until 8 o'clock in theevening on the day prior to the publication of the result of the examinations.

Considerations on the evidence and contentions of both parties

Upon an examination of the testimony of Justice Romualdez, as a witness for the defense, thecourt finds that the accused Estela Romualdez, as secretary of the chairman of theexamination committee, and Jeronimo Samson, as deputy clerk of the Supreme Court wereconsidered by said chairman not only as correctors in the subjects assigned to them but alsoas supervisors of the correctors (page 721, s. n.), both of them with equal powers and authorityso that neither could consider himself superior to the other (page 727, s. n.). It appearshowever, that while the chairman of the committee gave his secretary, the accused EstelaRomualdez, to understand that she "was authorized to revise the compositions already gradedby the other correctors provided the new revisions were made for the purpose of doing justiceto the compositions and that the same were mad before the names of the candidates wereknown" (pages 721, 722, s. n.), he did not do the same with respect to Deputy Clerk Jeronimo

Samson, to whom he said nothing about this matter (page 768, s. n.). It also appears that theaccused Estela Romualdez had never informed the chairman of the committee about thecorrections or alterations made by her in compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2; neither did thelatter examine said compositions to determine whether or not their merits justified the changesso made, and he only knew of said changes upon the filing of the information against his saidsecretary (page 728, s. n.). For her part, she made no report to the chairman of theexamination committee of any error or injustice committed by any corrector, and she only toldhim during the progress of the work of grading the papers that they were being graded verystrictly and that "she feared that some injustice might be committed" (page 729, s. n.), and forthat reason Justice Romualdez told his secretary, Estela Romualdez, that "should a case ofthe kind come to her knowledge, she should take special notice of the same in order to do



justice," that is to say, if any person should bring to her attention any such case in which, in heopinion, some injustice had been committed, she was authorized to put things in order (page781, s. n.), and the revision in such cases was left to the judgment of his secretary (page 780,s. n.).

The powers conferred in the manner above stated, by Justice Romualdez as chairman of theexamination committee upon his secretary, Estela Romualdez, gave her so ample adiscretionary power of supervision that in its exercise she should act independently, not only of

the correctors and of her cosupervisor Jeronimo Samson, but also of the examinationcommittee. Now, granting that Justice Romualdez, as a chairman of the committee appointedby the Supreme Court to conduct the bar examinations of 1926, was authorized to confer suchpower of supervision upon his secretary Estela Romualdez, in what manner did she exercisethat power when she made the changes in the compositions in question?

The accused Estela Romualdez who, according to her own admission, made the alterations ofthe grades originally given by the correctors to compositions of Exhibits B-1 and B-2, is theonly person who could give an account of and explain the circumstances under which saidalterations were made. But said accused, testifying as a witness in her own behalf, was notable to explain how and under what circumstances she made those alterations. When pressed

by the fiscal during the cross-examination to state the circumstances under which she cameacross those compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 the accused Estela Romualdez said: "If I wereto make any statement with reference to the circumstances under which I came across thesecompositions, you would compel me to tell a lie, because I do not really remember" (page 823,s. n.). Neither does the accused remember why she did not put her initials under or at the sideof those alterations she made on compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2, limiting herself to say,when she saw the other compositions (Exhibits 3-1, X, X-1 and X-2) bearing her initials whichwere exhibited to her by the fiscal, that she placed her initials on said compositions becauseshe graded them as corrector, and she did not put her initials on compositions Exhibits B-1 andB-2 because she revised them in her capacity as supervisor (pages 824- 832, s. n.). She alsosaid, that, as corrector, she had instructions to put her initials when writing the original grade

on any composition, but as supervisor "she was under no obligation" to put her initials (page830, s. n.) and that the chairman of the examination committee "has not gone into such minordetails" (page 831, s. n.). Upon being questioned by the fiscal as to why she wrote the alteredgrade on composition Exhibit B-2 on the same line and immediately before the initials of thecorrectors she said: "Because on that occasion it pleased me to do so" (page 836, s. n.)Neither does the accused remember whether or not she exercised her supervisory authoritywith respect to the other five compositions forming part of those marked as Exhibits B-1 and B-2 (page 840, s. n.); and when asked by the fiscal for an explanation as to why the increasegiven by her to the grades originally given to said compositions had the effect of raising thegeneral average of the compositions of the same candidate to 75%, the accused answeredthat "the fiscal ought to know that in this life there are happy coincidences" (page 848, s. n.).

With these answers and others appearing in her testimony, the accused instead of giving asatisfactory explanation of her conduct, has demonstrated that with the encouragement givenby Justice Romualdez to the effect that the new revision of the compositions was left to herdiscretion (page 780, s. n.) she assumed that the powers exercised by her in the barexaminations of 1926 were such that she could revise any composition in any subject alreadygraded and increase or decrease the grades given by the correctors; in other words, that shecould, at her pleasure, do or undo the work done by the correctors without the necessity ofaccounting to anybody for it (page 834, s. n.), or of keeping a note or memorandum of thecompositions so revised and the alteration of the grades.



The evidence, however, shows that Justice Romualdez himself in reviewing, in his capacity aschairman of the examination committee, the compositions of the candidates who filed motionsfor reconsideration of the grades given them, after the publication of the result of theexaminations, performed his work with such diligence and zeal that he noted in amemorandum book (Exhibit F) not only the grades given to each answer of the candidate, butalso the total grade obtained by the candidate in the revision, together with such other datawhich would explain the increase of the grades of this or that candidate.

The court is loath to believe that Justice Romualdez had given his secretary to understand thatshe had such unlimited powers, or that the Supreme Court in designating said Justice aschairman of the bar examination committee of the year 1926, authorizing him to confer suchpowers upon his secretary, because it is an undisputed fact that his designation was made sothat he should conduct the examinations in accordance with law and the rules.

But, even granting that when the accused Estela Romualdez altered the grades given by thecorrectors to compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 she acted in the exercise of the powersconferred upon her by the chairman of the examination committee, is there any ground insupport of her claim that she made those alterations only to do justice to the compositions, andwithout knowing the name of the candidate to whom they belonged?

Without giving any weight to the testimony of the witness for the prosecution, Juan Villaflor,which, according to the defense is not worthy of credit because of the contradictions andinconsistencies therein noted, the record contains other evidence establishing certain factsfrom which such knowledge can be inferred.

It has been proved that after the revision and grading of all the compositions numbering over8,000, a list, Exhibit C-1, was prepared in pencil. This list was prepared with the intervention ofthe said Jeronimo Samson and Josephine Stevens, assisted by Catalina Pons, Juan Villaflorand the accused Estela Romualdez. However, before the preparation of this list, sometimeduring the first day of February, 1927, the sealed envelopes containing the identification

numbers attached to each composition were opened. Said numbers were written either on theupper part of each envelope or on the first page of the composition, and that work lastedseveral days (pages 162, 163, s. n.). In the list Exhibit C-1 the numbers of the candidatescontained in the envelopes attached to the compositions were first written (page 166, s. n.),and then the grades in each subject, followed by the general average (pages 71, 184, s. n.),leaving in the blank the space intended for the names (page 166, s. n.). Deputy Clerk Samsonwrote on an adding machine the grades in each composition as they were read out by one ofthe helpers, and then the corresponding general average as computed by him (page 71, s. n.),and, at the same time, Josephine Stevens wrote said grades in the space corresponding toeach subject (page 188, s. n.). The roll of paper used by Deputy Clerk Samson on the addingmachine was presented as Exhibit C-6.

After the list Exhibit C-1 containing the grades in each subject and the general average of eachcandidate, who was theretofore known by his identification number only, was prepared, theenvelopes containing the names corresponding to the identification numbers written on said listwere taken from the safe of the office of the clerk, and the names of the candidates wereinserted in said list by those who assisted in the preparation thereof (pages 166, 167, s. n.)among whom was the accused Estela Romualdez, who admitted, upon cross-examinationhaving written many of the names appearing on several pages of said list (pages 859-861, sn.). After said list Exhibit C-1 was prepared the examination committee submitted to theSupreme Court a report recommending the admission to the bar and not only for thosecandidates with a general average of 75% or more, but also of those who had obtained a



general average of 70 or more but below 75%, and said automatic increase was ordered notedon said list Exhibit C-1. However, this recommendation was not approved by the SupremeCourt on the ground that said automatic increase was arbitrary (pages 73, 74, s. n.), and forthat reason the clerk of court, Mr. Albert, instructed his deputy, Mr. Samson, to prepareanother list containing only the names of the candidates who had originally obtained a generaaverage of 75% without having obtained less than 60% in any subject, and in pursuancethereof the typewritten list Exhibit C-5 was prepared (page 77, s. n.), which was approved bythe Supreme Court and published on March 5, 1927. In this list Luis Mabunay is included with

an average of 75%.

Eight or ten days after the publication of the result of the examinations the list Exhibit C-2 wasprepared in the same form as Exhibit C-1 taking the grades directly from the compositionswhile one of the helpers read them, Deputy Clerk Samson listed them on the adding machineand computed the general average of each candidate. The roll of paper used by DeputySamson on this occasion was also presented and marked as Exhibit C-7.

Both rolls, Exhibits C-6 and C-7, as well as the lists Exhibits C-1 and C-2, were kept in theoffice of Justice Romualdez and were only taken out when the investigation of the irregularitiesin the examinations of 1926 was commenced (page 81, s. n.). And only in the course of that

investigation it was discovered that the grades of candidate Luis Mabunay, identified withnumber 898 in roll Exhibit C-6 and in the list Exhibit C-1, which had been preparedsimultaneously, did not agree, because, while roll Exhibit C-6 shows that the grade in Civil Lawof candidate No. 898 is 63, the list Exhibit C-1 shows that the grade of the same candidate is73; and while roll Exhibit C-6 shows that the grade of candidate No. 898 was 58 (in RemedialLaw), his grade in the list Exhibit C-1 is 64 (in the same subject), a difference also being notedbetween the general average of candidate No. 898 in Exhibit C-6, which is 72.8%, and hisgeneral average on Exhibit C-1, which is 75% (pages 73, 74, s. n.). This discovery led to therevision of the compositions of Luis Mabunay in the examinations of 1926, which were unitedto his personal record (Exhibit B), which showed that the grades given to, and written by therespective correctors on the compositions of said candidate in Civil Law Exhibit B-1 and

Remedial Law Exhibit B-2 had been altered, and further, that the grades that appeared on saidcompositions before the alterations were identical with those that appeared on the roll, ExhibitC-6. An ocular inspection of page 29 of said Exhibit C-1 shows at first glance that the numbers73, 64, and 75 in the columns corresponding to Civil Law, Remedial Law and Genera

Average, respectively, were written after erasing with rubber what was there originally writtenIt may also be noted, upon an examination of the alterations appearing on the first pages ofcompositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2, that the grades originally written by the correctors,authenticated by their initials, had been stricken out in such a way that it is difficult to make outsaid original grades, leaving, however, intact, the initials of the correctors.

From these facts it is inferred: First, that the person who erased and altered the grades written

by the correctors on the first pages of compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 wished to make itappear that said alterations had been made by the correctors themselves; second, that saidalterations were made after the grades written by the correctors had been noted on the addingmachine in roll Exhibit C-6 and on the list Exhibit C-1 which were prepared simultaneously;third, that after said alterations had been made, and in order that the grades so altered shouldagree with the grades already written on the list Exhibit C-1, the grades in Civil Law andRemedial Law were erased with rubber, and in place thereof were written the grades nowappearing in said compositions. The accused Estela Romualdez having admitted that she wasthe author of such alterations, the only logical inference from her admission and the factsabove set out, is that she was also the person who erased not only the grades originally writtenby the correctors on the compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 but also those appearing in the



columns corresponding to Civil Law and Remedial Law on the list Exhibit C-1, and the sameperson who wrote the grades now appearing in said columns, and which agree with thosewritten by her on compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2. Now, if the accused Estela Romualdezerased in the manner stated the grades originally written, and substituted for them the gradesnow appearing in said compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 as well as in the columnscorresponding to Civil Law and Remedial Law in the list Exhibit C-1, it cannot be doubted thatin making such erasures and alterations she not only acted with the intent of concealing heridentity, but she also knew the number and the name of the candidate to whom said

composition belonged, because at that time the numbers and the names of the candidateswere already written on the list Exhibit C-1, and that list was kept in the office of JusticeRomualdez (page 83, s. n.), were she had complete and absolute control as private secretaryand supervisor of the examinations.

Participation of the accused Luis Mabunay

Discarding the testimony of witness Juan Villaflor in which he says that one Luis Mabunaycalled up the accused Estela Romualdez on the telephone a few days before the publication ofthe results of the examinations, there is, indeed, no direct proof in the record showing theparticipation of the accused Luis Mabunay. However, there is other evidence for the

prosecution establishing certain facts which show strong indications that he operated in the actbefore or at the time of its execution by his coaccused. It has been proved beyond areasonable doubt that the accused Luis Mabunay was one of the candidates who took the barexaminations in 1926; that the general average obtained by him, according to the computationappearing on the roll Exhibit C-6 of the adding machine and that originally written in the listExhibit C-1 was 72.8%; that after the Supreme Court denied the recommendation of theexamination committee that all grades from and between 70% and 75% be automaticallyraised to 75%, his name, nevertheless, appeared in the list of successful candidates whichwas published on March 5, 1927 (Exhibit C-5), and that said inclusion was due to the increaseof these grades in Civil Law (Exhibit B-1) and Remedial Law (Exhibit B-2), which was made byhis coaccused by erasing and altering the grades theretofore given by the correctors.

It is true that the accused Estela Romualdez, in her desire to show that she had no motivewhatsoever for favoring his coaccused Luis Mabunay, testified that she did not know him andthat the first time she saw him was on the first day of the trial of this case. However, in view ofher inability to explain why precisely the compositions of said Luis Mabunay had beenbenefited by the revision, and in view of the admission of Justice Romualdez that the power torevise conferred upon Estela Romualdez could be exercised by her in the compositionsalready graded by the correctors in all cases of injustice which came to her knowledge, orwhich might be brought to her attention (page 781, s. n.), her testimony lacks foundation,because it is absurd to believe that her revision of the compositions of her coaccused LuisMabunay was due only and solely to a happy coincidence.

Furthermore, the accused Mabunay made no effort to contradict the evidence for theprosecution with reference to his withdrawal of the amount of P600 from his savings account inthe Philippine Trust Company on the second day of March, 1927, or three days before thepublication of the result of the examinations (Exhibit I) which, when correlated with the depositof the sum of P400 made by the accused Estela Romualdez in her current account (Exhibit H)with the Bank of the Philippine Islands on the seventh day of said March, 1927, may, perhaps,give an explanation of the motive of said accused for increasing the grades of Mabunay with

just the necessary points to reach the lowest passing general average. It is also true thaEstela Romualdez testified that said amount had been sent to her by her cousin named PriscaMagpayo Redona from the province for the purchase of merchandise for sale at the latter's



store (page 791, s. n.), but the testimony in that respect was not corroborated either by hersaid cousin, or by any other persons mentioned by her as the bearers of said amount, or bythe corresponding check or postal money order, as she had done when referring otherdeposits in the bank.

Conclusion

In view of the foregoing considerations, the court finds that the allegations of the information

are sufficiently supported by the evidence and that the accused, Estela Romualdez and LuisMabunay are guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; the former as principal and the latter asaccomplice, of the crime of falsification of official documents with which they are chargedand, therefore, a judgment is rendered sentencing Estela Romualdez, who was a Governmentemployee at the time of the commission of the crime, to suffer, in accordance with article 300of the Penal Code, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 2712, six years and one day of prisionmayor with the accessory penalties of the law, to pay a fine of 1,000 pesetas, withoutsubsidiary imprisonment in view of the nature of the penalty, and also to suffer the penalty ofperpetual disqualification from public office; and her coaccused Luis Mabunay, who was aprivate individual with respect to said examination, to suffer, under the provisions of article 301as amended by section 2 of Act No. 2712 and article 67 of the Penal Code, the penalty of four

months and one day of arresto mayor, with the accessory penalties of the law, and to pay afine of 250 pesetas, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and each to pay one-half part of the costs.

The appellant Estela Romualdez through her attorneys makes the following assignments of error:

I. The trial court erred in finding the accused, Estela Romualdez, guilty of the crime of"falsification of public and official documents" and in sentencing her to suffer imprisonmentwithout due process of law, contrary to section 3, Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, entitled"An Act to Declare the Purpose of the People of the United States as to the future PoliticalStatus of the People of the Philippine Islands, and to Provide a More Autonomous Government

for those Islands".

II. The trial court erred in not finding, that the accused, Estela Romualdez, was fully authorizedto make the alterations she in fact made on the composition papers of Luis Mabunay, ExhibitsB-1 and B-2 of the Government, and in denying full credit to the uncontradicted testimony ofMr. Justice Norberto Romualdez, chairman of the bar examining committee for the year 1926,concerning the authority granted her.

III. The trial court erred in failing to extend to the accused Estela Romualdez a fair andimpartial trial.

The attorneys for the appellant Luis Mabunay allege that the trial court committed the following errors:

I. The trial court erred in not crediting the uncontradicted testimony of Justice Romualdez withreference to his authority as chairman of the bar examination committee of the year 1926, toconfer upon the accused Estela Romualdez, the powers he in fact conferred upon her, inconnection with said examination.

II. It also erred in not crediting the uncontradicted testimony of Justice Romualdez as to thefact that he, as chairman of the bar examination committee of 1926, really and truly conferredupon the accused Estela Romualdez the powers which she exercised in that examination.



III. It also erred in concluding that the accused Estela Romualdez did not exercise the powersconferred upon her by the chairman of the bar examination committee of 1926, within the limitsfixed by said chairman, to wit: that the new revision and grading of the compositions be madein order to do justice thereto, and before the names of the corresponding candidates wereknown.

IV. It likewise erred in concluding that the accused Estela Romualdez changed the generalaverage and the grades of candidate Luis Mabunay in Civil Law and Remedial law on the list

Exhibit C-1.

V. The lower court erred in not admitting the expert testimony of Wm. J. Rhode, FelicisimoFeria, and Claro M. Recto, as well as Exhibits 26 and 27, containing the opinion of saidlawyers as to the grades to which said compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 were justly entitled.

VI. It also erred in not concluding that Jeronimo Samson used the same powers exercised bythe accused in the bar examination of 1926.

VII. Granting that the accused Estela Romualdez knew that compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2belonged to her coaccused Luis Mabunay when she reviewed and regraded them, the court

erred in concluding that said act constitutes the offense charged in the information.

VIII. Granting that Justice Romualdez, as chairman of the bar examination committee of 1926,was not authorized by the Supreme Court to confer upon Estela Romualdez the powers whichshe exercised in that examination, the court erred in concluding that she altered the grades ofsaid compositions willfully and feloniously.

IX. The lower court also erred in concluding that Estela Romualdez intended to conceal heridentity when she revised and regraded compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2.

X. It also erred in concluding that the accused Estela Romualdez, in exercising her powers as

supervisor of the correctors in said bar examinations, revised compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 only, in order to regrade them.

XI. It also erred in suggesting that her motive, in revising and regrading said compositionsExhibits B-1 and B-2, was the fact that she had received from her coaccused Luis Mabunaythe sum of P400.

XII. Granting that the accused Estela Romualdez committed the offense of falsification withwhich she is charged, the lower court erred in concluding that Luis Mabunay participated in itscommission.

In addition to the usual brief for each of the accused, the attorneys for the appellants filed a jointmemorandum on July 10, 1929. The Attorney-General filed a brief on behalf of the People of thePhilippine Islands and a reply to the memorandum for the defense.

The court at that time consisted of nine members, one of whom, Justice Romualdez, was disqualifiedto sit in this case. Upon a consideration of the case on its merits, four justices were in favor ofaffirming the decision of the trial court and the same number were in favor of acquitting thedefendants. The court being unable to reach a decision in the usual course, an attempt was made onFebruary 11, 1930 to break the deadlock, as is evidenced by the following resolution:



The court having under consideration again the case of People vs. Romualdez, et al., No31012, those participating being all the members of the court, except Mr. Justice Romualdez,who was disqualified, it was moved that following precedents elsewhere, particularly in theUnited States Supreme Court, to the effect that when there is an equal division in the court andthere is no prospect of a change in the vote the judgment appealed from stand affirmed, and inaccordance with the action taken in the case of Nacionalista Party vs. Municipal Board ofManila, No. 21265 — the judgment in the case at bar be affirmed. Mr. Chief Justice Avanceñaand Messrs. Justices Malcolm, Ostrand, and Johns voted in favor of the motion. Messrs.

Justices Johnson, Street, Villamor, and Villa-Real voted against the motion. Mr. JusticeJohnson based his dissent on the peculiar statutory provisions in force in the PhilippineIslands. For want of a majority, the motion was lost.

The court thereupon directed that the clerk retain the record in the case until the further orderof the court.

On January 12, 1931 Luis Mabunay filed a motion praying that the case against him be consideredseparately and he be absolved from the complaint. This motion was denied by the court. He renewedhis motion on August 1, 1931. This motion was also denied on the ground that no severance hadbeen asked for in the lower court, and for the further reason that there was a prospect that the

membership of the court would soon be increased.

The membership of the court was finally increased to eleven, and due to the death or retirement ofthree justices only six of the former members remained. On June 23, 1932 Courtney Whitney asattorney for Estela Romualdez filed a petition praying that this case be set for a rehearing before thecourt as newly constituted. This motion was granted. On July 2, 1932 he filed a motion for thedismissal of the information, alleging that because of the inability of the court to reach a determinationfrom the facts as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant-appellant Estela Romualdez, she hadbeen denied her right to a speedy trial. This motion was denied.

After a reargument of the case, the attorney for Estela Romualdez filed an additional memorandum

to which the Attorney-General filed a reply.

Under the first assignment of error, the attorneys for Estela Romualdez maintain that even if the lowercourt's findings of fact be justified by the evidence of record, "they fail to sustain that any criminaoffense, recognized under the laws of the Philippine Islands, has been committed." They contend thatthe appointment of the committee of attorneys by Justice Romualdez to read and grade theexamination papers was not warranted by law, and that therefore the alteration by the defendantEstela Romualdez, under the circumstances alleged in the information, of the grades in question didnot constitute a crime.

The testimony of Justice Romualdez, who was a witness for the defense, completely refutes this

contention. He testified that the bar examining committee was composed of two groups of attorneys:Those that were appointed to prepare the questions, and those that were appointed to grade thepapers. He further testified that the court was informed of the way in which the examination wasconducted and that it approved thereof. There were more than a thousand candidates and some eightthousand papers. According to the contention of appellant's attorneys only the seven attorneysappointed to prepare the questions or the court itself could lawfully grade these papers. Such acontention is clearly untenable. The attorneys that prepared the questions did not intervene in thegrading of the papers, but they prepared a key to the questions, which served the other group ofattorneys, the readers or "correctors", as a guide in grading the papers. The intervention of the"correctors" was just as legal as that of the attorneys that prepared the questions, and theintervention of the two groups of attorneys was perfectly regular and valid.



It is also contended that the examination papers which the defendant Estela Romualdez altered werenot public or official documents. That contention is likewise without merit. As stated by her attorneys,the examination of candidates for admission to the bar is a judicial function. It cannot therefore bemaintained with any show of reason that the papers submitted by the candidates in the course of theexamination were not public and official documents, or that the alteration, under the circumstancesalleged in the information, of the grades given to such papers by the "correctors" was not a crime. ( Inre Del Rosario, 52 Phil., 399, where this court refers to the falsification of his examination papers as"falsification of public documents"; People vs. Castro and Doe, 54 Phil., 41, where the conviction of

Castro for the falsification of his examination papers was affirmed.)

In accordance with the established practice of the court to have one of its members each year makeall the necessary arrangements for the bar examination, the Chief Justice in 1926 designated JusticeRomualdez for that purpose, and in pursuance thereof he appointed one group of attorneys toprepare the questions and another group to grade the papers. If any of these attorneys weredesignated by the clerk of the court, it was with the advice and consent and on the authority of JusticeRomualdez.

The phrase "falsification of a document" is not used in articles 300 and 301 of the Penal code in theordinary acceptation of the words. It has a technical meaning, and according to article 300 may be

committed in the following eight ways:

1. By counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature, or rubric.

2. By causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when theydid not in fact so participate.

3. By attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements otherthan those in fact made by them.

4. By making untruthful statements in a narration of facts.

5. By altering true dates.

6. By making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes itsmeaning.

7. By issuing in authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an originadocument when no such original exists, or by including in such a copy a statement contraryto, or different from, that of the genuine original.

8. By intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a protocol, registry

or official book.

The acts of the accused are covered by paragraphs 2, 3, and 6. She made the alterations in thegrades in such a way as to make it appear that the "correctors" had participated therein, because sheblotted out the grades of the "correctors" and wrote new and increased grades opposite their initials,without indicating by her own initials that she had made the alterations. She in that way attributed tothe "correctors" statements other than those in fact made by them. Her only explanation of why shealtered the grades in that way was that it pleased her to do so.

A decision in point has just come to hand. It is reported in 180 N. E., 725, and is referred to in the American Bar Association Journal for August, 1932, p. 497. A bill was presented in the



Massachusetts Senate prohibiting the marking of the examination papers of applicants for admissionto the bar by any person not a member of the board of bar examiners. The Senate wished to knowwhether such a bill, if enacted, would be an unconstitutional interference with the functions of theJudicial Department, and asked the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court for an advisory opinion.They replied that such a law would be unconstitutional. In the course of the opinion they said: "If the

judicial department decides that the marking of the written examinations may be performed bycompetent persons not members of the board but acting under the direction of such members, thatpertains directly to the ascertainment of the qualifications of applicants. It is a definite attribute of the

judicial department and not an immaterial incident." It was also stated that the plan of employingassistants to aid the bar examiners in marking the papers had been approved by the SupremeJudicial Court.

In the second assignment of error, the attorney for Estela Romualdez maintains that the trial courterred in not finding that she was fully authorized to make the alterations she in fact made on theexamination papers of Luis Mabunay, Exhibits B-1 and B-2, and in denying full credit to theuncontradicted testimony of Justice Norberto Romualdez, chairman of the bar examining committeefor the year 1926, concerning the authority granted her.

In the first place, we find it difficult to believe that Justice Romualdez ever gave the accused the

authority which she claims to have received; and in the second place, even if it be assumed that hegave her the alleged authority, she did not exercise it in accordance with the terms thereof.

The defense would have us believe that Justice Romualdez regarded his secretary, EstelaRomualdez, and the deputy clerk, Jeronimo Samson, who were themselves "correctors" assupervisors of the other "correctors", and that he authorized Estela Romualdez to revise any grade tocorrect an injustice, without consulting or notifying the other supervisor, Samson, or the "correctorswho had graded the paper, without requiring her to initial the alteration, or to make any record thereofor any report to him or to anybody else.

Justice Romualdez was designated by the Chief Justice to conduct the examination in accordance

with the law and the Rules of Court. He himself had no such authority as he is alleged to have givenhis secretary. He is presumed to have discharged his duties in accordance with the law, and it isinconceivable that he would without any warrant of law give or attempt to give his secretary theunlimited authority which she claims to have received, thereby enabling her to alter at will any gradeor any paper, without making any record thereof or any report to anybody. The mere statement ofsuch a claim shows that it is preposterous.

No such authority was given to Samson, who according to Justice Romualdez was regarded by himas a supervisor of equal rank with Estela Romualdez. Samson was never notified that he wasregarded as a supervisor, and he never acted in that capacity.

Let us notice how this unlimited authority is alleged to have been granted to the accused EstelaRomualdez.

It was not in writing or evidenced by any memorandum. It was not even a positive statement. JusticeRomualdez testified that he believed that on a certain occasion he gave his secretary to understandthat if a case should be brought to her attention she might revise any grade to prevent an injustice, solong as she did not know the name of the candidate to whom the paper belonged. When asked whereshe was when the pretended authority was given to her, the accused could not remember.



There was according to the theory of the defense nothing to prevent Samson from revising therevision of Estela Romualdez, because she did not initial the changes made by her, and he wassupposed to be a supervisor of equal rank.

If it be admitted for the sake of argument that the accused Estela Romualdez was given the authoritywhich she claims to have received, nevertheless she was not authorized to change the grades now inquestion, because when she made the changes she already knew that the papers belonged to hercoaccused Luis Mabunay. The evidence fully sustaining that conclusion is carefully set forth by the

trial court, and it is unnecessary for us to review it. The testimony of Justice Romualdez to the effectthat the accused acted within the authority granted her in changing the grades in question was amere expression of opinion. It was clearly inadmissible and not binding on the court. The accusedEstela Romualdez did not even attempt to explain under what circumstances she raised the grades ofher coaccused so as to enable him to obtain the necessary general average of 75 per cent. She didnot confer with the "correctors" who had graded the papers in question. She di not attempt to explainhow she arrived at the increased grades, or how she came to revise the grades in question, how shehappened to pick these two papers out of eight thousand. She could not point to any other gradesthat had been altered by her.

Under the second assignment of error the attorney for Estela Romualdez also alleges that she freely

and voluntarily admitted from the start of the trial of her case that the alterations had been made byher, and concludes therefrom that she acted in good faith. We cannot agree either with the statementof fact or the conclusion. The accused Estela Romualdez did not admit that the alterations were madeby her until after the prosecuting attorney had presented three hundred and fifty pages of testimonyand announced his readiness to prove by three handwriting experts that the alterations were in thehandwriting of the accused. The evidence shows that before the trial defendant's attorney from thefiscal's office a photograph that had been made for the purpose of comparing a specimen ofdefendant's handwriting and that of the altered grades. The fact that the defendant Estela Romualdezmade the alterations under the circumstances which we have mentioned, when she already knew thatthe papers belonged to Mabunay, disproves any contention that she acted in good faith.

In the case of the United States vs. Ballesteros (25 Phil., 634), this court said:

When the unlawful acts charged against an accused are established by competent evidencecriminal intent may be and will be presumed, unless such intent is rebutted by the introductionof evidence sufficient to overcome this presumption, and satisfactorily disclosing the absenceof such criminal intent.

The third assignment of error made by the appellant Estela Romualdez is that the trial court erred infailing to extend to her a fair and impartial trial. We shall not waste much time on this assignment oferror, which is utterly without merit. The record itself completely refutes any such contention. If thelearned trial judge erred, it was in permitting the attorneys for the defendants too great latitude in

arguing their objections. Arguments four and five pages long were incorporated into the stenographicrecord of the evidence. The record shows a most unjustifiable attack on the good faith of the fiscaland a persistent effort to embarrass him in presenting his evidence against the accused.

The appellant Luis Mabunay makes twelve assignments of error. They are for the most partembraced in the assignments of error of his coaccused which we have already considered. Theseremain only his fifth, eleventh, and twelfth assignments of error. In his fifth assignment of error it isalleged that the lower court erred in not admitting the expert testimony of attorneys Wm. J. RhodeFelicisimo Feria, and Claro M. Recto, and in rejecting Exhibits 26 and 27, which contain the opinion ofsaid attorneys as to the correct grades which the examination papers Exhibits B-1 and B-2 deserved.



The lower court sustained the objection to the admission of the testimony of these three attorneys onthe ground that it was not the best evidence, and suggested that the defense might call the membersof the examining committee that prepared the questions in Remedial Law and Civil Law and the keythereto. The attorneys for the defense did not see fit to adopt the suggestion of the court. It is not truetherefore that the lower court deprived the accused of an opportunity of showing that the examinationpapers in question deserved the increased grades which the defendant Estela Romualdez gavethem. The attorneys that prepared the questions and the key to the answers were certainly thepersons best qualified to decide whether or not the questions were correctly answered. The opinion of

other attorneys, who had nothing to do with the examination, would only lead to confusion. We find nomerit in this assignment of error.

The eleventh assignment of error is that the trial court erred in insinuating that the motive of theaccused Estela Romualdez in reviewing and regrading the examination papers Exhibits B-1 and B-2was the fact that she had received four hundred pesos from her co-accused Luis Mabunay.

The twelfth assignment of error is that if it be assumed that the accused Estela Romualdez committedthe crime of falsification imputed to her in the information, the court erred in concluding that theaccused Luis Mabunay participated in its commission.

For the sake of convenience we shall consider these two assignments of error together.

In the first place we should like to say that there is no evidence to show that Estela Romualdez everreviewed the examination papers of her coaccused. So far as the evidence shows, she merely raisedhis grades in two subjects, thus giving him by "a happy coincidence", to use her own words, apassing mark. She could not or would not enlighten the court as to why she raised the grades of LuisMabunay so as to enable him to be admitted to the bar. As already stated, the record does not showthat she raised the grades of any other candidate.

The evidence shows that Luis Mabunay had failed in two previous examinations, and that he failed inthe examination in question, receiving a general average of only 72.8%. The bar examining

committee recommended that not only those having the required general average of 75 per cent beadmitted, but also that those who had received between 70 and 75 per cent. This is referred to in therecord as "an automatic increase". It was not automatic but arbitrary, and was disapproved by theSupreme Court, and the committee was directed to prepare a new list and to include therein onlythose who had obtained a general average of 75 per cent. The name of Luis Mabunay was includedin the new list submitted three days later, notwithstanding the fact that he had obtained a generalaverage of only 72.8 per cent, precisely because Estela Romualdez had in the meantime raised thegrades now in question so that he appeared to have obtained the general average required foradmission to the bar.

The evidence shows that on March 2, 1927 Luis Mabunay withdrew P600 from the Philippine Trust

Co., and that on March 7, 1927 Estela Romualdez deposited P510 in the Bank of the PhilippineIslands. Luis Mabunay did not testify, and he did not present any evidence to show for what purposehe withdrew P600 from the bank immediately after the first list was disapproved.

In the case of United States vs. Tria (17 Phil., 303, 307), Justice Moreland speaking for the court said

An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the State. If he does notperform that duty he may not always expect the State to perform it for him. If he fails to meetthe obligation which he owes to himself, when to meet it is the easiest of easy things, he ishardy indeed if he demand and expect the same full and wide consideration which the Statevoluntarily gives to those who by reasonable effort seek to help themselves. This is particularly



so when he not only declines to help himself but actively conceals from the State the verymeans by which it may assist him.

In the famous case of the Commonwealth vs. Webster (5 Cushing, 295, 316), Chief Justice Shaw laiddown the following rule:

When pretty stringent proof of circumstances is produced, tending to support the charge, and itis apparent that the accused is so situated that he could offer evidence of all the facts and

circumstances as they existed, and show, if such was the truth, that the suspiciouscircumstances can be accounted for consistency with his innocence, and he fails to offer suchproof, the natural conclusion is, that the proof, if produced, instead of rebutting, would tend tosustain the charge. But this is to be cautiously applied, and only in cases where it is manifestthat proofs are in the power of the accused, not accessible to the prosecution.

Estela Romualdez showed that of the sum of P510 P100 was paid to her by her mother and only P10by her brother, but she could not satisfactorily prove where the remaining P400 came from. She saidit was sent to her by her cousin, Prisca Magpayo Redona, for the purchase of goods, but she couldnot name the person that brought the money to her, or explain why she deposited it in the bank. Shedid not attempt to show that she had paid it out by means of checks for the purchase of goods for her

cousin. She did not call her cousin as a witness.

An accused person runs the risk of an inference against him because of failure to produceevidence. The inference, unless the failure to produce evidence is explained away, is that thetenor of the specific unproduced evidence would not support the party's case. (U.S. vs. Sarikala, 37 Phil., 486.)

In the case just cited the court quoted with approval the following rules as stated by Dean Wigmore inhis work on Evidence, Vol. IV, p. 3148:

The failure to produce evidence, in general, other than his own testimony, is open to inference

against a party accused, with the same limitations applicable to civil parties. Here the effect ofthe burden of proof has sometimes tended to confuse. It is true that the burden is on theprosecution, and that the accused is not required by any rule of law to produce evidence; bunevertheless he runs the risk of an inference from nonproduction. This seeming paradox,which has been already sufficiently noticed in treating of the general principle, has misled afew courts to deny that any inference may be drawn.

The alterations in the grades made by Estela Romualdez were made for the sole use and benefit ofher coaccused Luis Mabunay. They were made willfully and illegally, and after the Supreme Courthad rejected those candidates that had received less than 75 per cent. The alterations were thereforemade after Mabunay had failed, and he withdrew the money after he had time to learn from his

coaccused that he had failed. It was under those circumstances incumbent upon the accusedMabunay to present evidence to show for what purpose he withdrew the six hundred pesos from thebank. As this court said in the case of Worcester vs. Ocampo (22 Phil., 42):

When the circumstances in proof tend to fix the liability on a party who has it in his power tooffer evidence of all the facts as they existed and rebut the inferences which the circumstancesin proof tend to establish, and he fails to offer such proof, the natural conclusion is that theproof, if produced, instead of rebutting would support the inferences against him, and the courtis justified in acting upon that conclusion.



The case of In re Del Rosario (52 Phil., 399), is directly on point. Felipe del Rosario failed for the thirdtime in the bar examination of 1926. He then filed a motion for the revision of his grades, based on analleged mistake in computation. This motion was granted, and he was admitted to the bar. It wassubsequently found that alterations had been made in his examination papers, and he and JuanVillaflor were prosecuted for the falsification of a public document. Villaflor assumed fulresponsibility for the commission of the crime, and testified that Del Rosario did not know anythingabout the making of the alterations. The trial court acquitted Del Rosario, but upon a view of the casefor the purpose of taking disciplinary actin against him Justice Malcolm, speaking for the court in

banc , said:

It is asking a great deal of the members of the court to have them believe that Felipe deRosario was totally unaware of the illegal machinations culminating in the falsification opublic documents, of which he was the sole beneficiary.

The attorney's certificate of Felipe del Rosario was cancelled.

In the case of People vs. Bella Bautista (53 Phil., 158), the accused was charged with thefalsification of a public document. The evidence showed that in the Register of Attorneys the nameof an attorney had been erased, and that the accused had written his own name in that space,

although he had not admitted to the bar. The accused contended that he wrote his name in theregister under the direction of an employee of the court, and that he acted in good faith. He wasconvicted, and on appeal the decision was affirmed. This court in its decision said: "The trial courtsuggests in the opinion that the offense committed required the participation of some unfaithfulemployee of the court. But this fact, as the court found, did not lessen the criminal responsibility of theappellant."

It is alleged in the information that the accused conspired together and acted in common accord inthe commission of the crime. As the Attorney-General says, a conspiracy can seldom be provedexcept by circumstantial evidence, but once it is proved, the acts of one of the conspirators are theacts of all. (U. S. vs. Ipil., 27 Phil., 530.)

The existence of the assent of minds which is involved in a conspiracy may be, and, from thesecrecy of the crime, usually must be, inferred by the jury from proof of facts andcircumstances which, taken together, apparently indicate that they are merely parts of somecomplete whole. If it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards theaccomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their acts, thoughapparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness ofpersonal association and a concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred though noactual meeting among them to concert means is proved. Evidence of actual participationrather than of passive acquiescence, is desirable. But proof of acquiescence in, or consent to,the actions of others is relevant to show the criminal intention of the passive party, and

generally the smallest degree of consent or collusion among parties lets in the act or words ofone against the others. (Underhill on Criminal Evidence, pp. 795, 796.)

For the foregoing reasons, we find that the conclusions of the trial court are fully justified by theevidence.

As the accused Estela Romualdez took advantage of her official position in committing the crime, thetrial court found her guilty of a violation of article 300 of the Penal Code, as amended by Act No.2712, and sentenced her to suffer six years and one day of prision mayor, and the accessorypenalties provided by law, to pay a fine of 1,000 pesetas, and to suffer perpetual disqualification tohold any public office.



The penalty provided by the Penal Code is prision mayor in full extent, or from six years and one dayto twelve years, and the penalty under the Revised Penal Code being the same, and there being noaggravating or mitigating circumstance present in the commission of the crime, the penalty should beimposed in the medium degree, which is from eight years and one day to ten years. The penaltyimposed on the appellant Estela Romualdez is therefore increased to eight years and one dayof prision mayor .

The trial court found the defendant Luis Mabunay guilty as an accomplice under article 301 of the

Penal Code, the crime not being connected with the performance of his duties as an employee of theGovernment, and sentenced him to suffer four months and one day of arresto mayor , and theaccessory penalties provided by law, and to pay a fine of 250 pesetas, with subsidiary imprisonmentin case of insolvency. The defendants were each sentenced to pay one-half of the costs.

We find that the lower court erred in holding that Luis Mabunay was merely an accomplice. He was aconspirator and coprincipal of Estela Romualdez. The penalty provided by article 301 of the PenalCode, as amended by Act No. 2712, is prision correccional in the maximum degree, but that hasbeen changed by the Revised Penal Code to prision correccional in the medium and maximumdegrees, and the medium degree of that penalty is from three years, six months, and twenty-one daysto four years, nine months and ten days. The prison sentence of Luis Mabunay is therefore increased

to three years, six months, and twenty- one days of prision correccional .

The decision of the trial court is modified as hereinabove stated. In all other respects it is affirmed,with the costs against the appellants.

G.R. Nos. L-49483-86 March 30, 1981

SALUD P. BERADIO, petitioner,vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DE CASTRO, J .:

By petition for review on certiorari, Salud P. Beradio, an election registrar of the COMELEC inRosales, Pangasinan, who was convicted on four (4) counts of the crime of falsification of public orofficial documents of the seven (7) separate informations filed against her for making false entries inher daily time records, elevates to the Court, the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. No20319 to 20322 promulgated on September 18, 1978, affirming in toto the judgment of convictionrendered on July 30, 1976 by the Circuit Criminal Court, Third Judicial District, Dagupan City. Thedispositive portion of the decision of the lower court reads as follows:

FOR THE FOREGOING DISCUSSION, and with the prosecution not having establishedby proof beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the herein accused and for insufficiencyof evidence or the lack of it, the Court hereby finds. as it so holds, accussed Salud P.Beradio NOT GUILTY of the charges in Criminal cases Nos. CCC-0258, CCC-0259,and CCC-0263; consequently, she is hereby acquitted therefrom with costs de oficio;and decreeing the bail bonds posted for her provisional release in these casescancelled and discharged.

On the other hand, however, the Court so finds and holds accused Salud P. BeradioGUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification of public or officia



document as charged in Criminal Case No. CCC-0260 as to entry on July 13, 1973only, Criminal Case No. CCC-0261; Criminal Case No. CCC-0262 as to entry on May28, 1973 only, and Criminal Case No. CCC-0264, defined and penalized under Article17 1, paragraph 4, of the Revised Penal Code, and absent any aggravating or mitigatingcircumstance and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Act, hereby accordinglysentences said Salud P. Beradio to serve an indeterminate prison term in the followingmanner, to wit:

a) In Criminal Case No. CCC-0260—

a prison term of from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4)MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional as minimum, to EIGHT (8) YEARSand ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as maximum, with the accessories of the law, to paya fine of TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000) but without subsidiary imprisonment incase of insolvency and, to pay the cost;

b) In Criminal Case No. CCC-0261 — a prison term of from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4)MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional as minimum, to EIGHT (8) YEARSof prision mayor , as maximum, with the accessories of the law, to pay a fine of TWOTHOUSAND PESOS (P2,000) without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,and to pay the cost;

c) In Criminal Case No. CCC-0262 - a prison term of from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4)MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correcional , as minimum, to EIGHT (8) YEARSand ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor , as maximum, with the accessories of the law, to paya fine of TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000) without subsidiary imprisonment in case ofinsolvency, and to pay the cost.

d) In Criminal Case No. CCC-026-1— a prison term of from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR(4MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional as minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARSand 0NE (1) DAY of prision mayor , as maximum, with the accessories of the law, to payfine of TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2.000) without subsidiary imprisonment in case of

insolvency, and to pay the cost.

The penalties herein imposed shall be served successively with the maximum durationof the sentences not to exceed threefold the length of tune corresponding to one penaltyimposed upon tier in accordance with Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code.

As to charges of falsification on July 12, 1973 in Criminal Case No. CCC-0260, and onMay 30, 1973, the Court finds no sufficient Evidence to hold the accused liableConsequently, the accused is hereby absolved therefrom.

The facts pertinent to the specified dates of falsification as found by the Court of Appeals are as

follows:

... On the following particular dates, as reflected in her daily time records (Exhs. "D" to"H"), BERADIO reported her attendance in office and actual hours of work performedas:

On

)March

7:35a.m.

12:00n.;



15,1973

1:00p.m.to

5:00p.m.

2)

March23,1973

7:30

a.m.

12:00

n ;

1:00p.m.to

5:00p.m.

3) May28,1973

7:45a.m.

12:00n;

1:00p.m.to

5:00p.m.

4) June6, 1973

7:30a.m.

12:00n ;

1:00p.m.to

5:00p.m.

5) June22,1973

7:35a.m.

12:00n ;

1:00p.m.to

5:00p.m.

6) July13,1973

8:00a.m.

12:00n ;

1:00

p.m.to

5:00

p.m.

The veracity of the foregoing reports were negated by the following:

1) On March l5, 1973, BERADIO appeared as counsel for the applicants at the initialhearing and reception of evidence in land Registration Case No. 19-R before the Courtof First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch XIV, Rosales, in both morning and afternoonsessions (Exhs. "K", "K-1" and "K-2").



2) In the morning of March 23, 1973, BERADIO appeared as counsel for the petitionerin the hearing of Special Proceedings No. 24-R (summary settlement of the estate ofVicente Oria, Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch XIV, at Resales, which wascalled first in open court and later, in chambers (Exhs. "M" and M-1 ").

3) On May 28, 1973, in the same case, Sp. Proc. No. 24-R, BERADIO again appearedas counsel for the petitioner in the same court which held sessions from 8:45 to 11:45(Exh. "M").

4) In the morning of June 6, 1973, BERADIO appeared as counsel for the defendant inCAR Case No. 19882-.TP '73, entitled "Pepito Felipe vs. Ismael Pontes and CamiloTamce before CAR Branch 11 in Tayug, Pangasinan (Exh. "J"). Minutes of the pre-triaconference which the appellant attended are manifest in the pre-trial order that wasdictated in open court (Exh. "J-1").

5) In the morning of June 22, 1973, Beradio appeared in Sp. Proc. No. 24-R before theCourt of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch XIV at Rosales (Exh. "M").

6) In the morning of July 13, 1973, Beradio appeared as counsel for plaintiff at the pre-

trial conference of Civil Case No. 137R, "Venancia Diaz vs. Armando Ordonio" beforeBranch XIV of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan (Exhs. "L" to "I-3").

It is thus clear that while in the six abovementioned dates, BERADIO made it appear inher daily time records that she was in her office and performed her work on the datesand hours she specified, the facts were that she was elsewhere attending courtsessions.

2

From the said decision of the Court of Appeals and the denial of her motion for reconsideration onNovember 28, 1978, Salud Beradio filed the instant petition for review on certiorari to the Court. Weasked the Solicitor General to comment on the petition and thereafter, We resolved to give due

course to said petition it appearing that the issues raised are, in the main questions of law renderednovel by the peculiar circumstances of the case. Thus, he raised the following legal issues:

I

WHETHER THE CONVICTION OF THE PETITIONER TAKEN IN THE LIGHT OF THEPROVISION OF ARTICLE 171, PARAGRAPH 4, OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE ISLEGAL AND PROPER.

II

WHETHER THE PETITIONER COULD STILL BE LEGALLY AND PROPERLYPROSECUTED FOR AN OFFENSE WHERE SHE WAS NO LONGER A PUBLICOFFICIAL

III

WHETHER PETITIONER !S UNDER LEGAL OBLIGATION TO FILL UP AND SUBMITTIME RECORD.

IV



ASSUMING THAT SHE IS, DO THE STATEMENTS THEREIN REFLECTED IN HERTIME RECORD BEAR ANY' COLOR OF TRUTH'.

V

WHETHER DAMAGE TO THE GOVERNMENT IN FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC OROFFICIAL DOCUMENT IS TOTALLY OF NO MOMENT.

VI

IT FAILED TO HOLD THAT. UNDER THE ESTABLISHED FACTS, THECONSTITUTION, THE LAW AND WELL-SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE, PETITIONERIS ENTITLED TO ACQUITTAL ON THE GROUND OF REASONABLE DOUBT.

Salud P. Beradio, petitioner, is a lady-lawyer appointed as an election registrar of the Commission onElections (COMELEC) on February 1, 1964 (Exhibits A and A-1). In 1972 and 1973, she wasstationed in Resales, Pangasinan, as Chief of Office, Office of the Election Registrar, COMELECholding office beside the municipal building from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon and from 1:00 o'clock to5:00 o'clock in the afternoon. As the nature of her job was field work, she was required to fill up and

submit to the COMELEC's main office in Manila her daily time records after having been counter-signed by her provincial supervisor. 3

On March 29, 1973, the COMELEC by resolution (Exhibits 1 and 1-A, CCC-0261) granted herrequest for permission to appear as counsel for her cousins and cousins-in-law in the case before theCourt of Agrarian Relations in Rosales, Pangasinan.

4

During her assignment as Election Registrar of Rosales, Pangasinan, one Raymundo Valdez filedwith the COMELEC, sometime in September, 1973, an administrative complaint charging her ofunauthorized practice of law. On the other hand, Salud Beradio tendered her resignation as ElectionRegistrar of Rosales, Pangasinan, which, by COMELEC resolution (Exhibit B) of October 25, 1973,

was accepted and made to retroact on the close of office hours on September 30, 1973. She wasduly granted clearance by all the offices of the COMELEC, and she received her retirement benefitsunder the law.

Raymundo Valdez made an inquiry with the COMELEC on the status of his administrative caseagainst Salud P. Beradio, and upon being informed of her separation from the service, he initiated thefiling of criminal charges against Salud Beradio on grounds of falsification of daily time recordsdefined and penalized under Article 17 1, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code as falsification ofpublic documents. In the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan where he lodged the criminalcharges, Jose Peralta, and his wife Paz de Guzman-Peralta, trial attorney of Agrarian Lega

Assistance (DAR) submitted affidavits in support of the charges against Salud P. Beradio.

On August 4, 1975, the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan filed seven (7) separate informations all datedJuly 7, 1975 with the Circuit Criminal Court, Third Judicial District, Dagupan City, charging Salud P.Beradio with falsification of public or official documents for making false entries in her daily time.records on: 1) October 12, 1972 in Criminal Case CCC-0258; 2) September 4, 1973 in Criminal CaseCCC-0259; 3) July 12 and 13, 1973 in Criminal Case CCC-0260; 4) June 6 and 22, 1973 in CriminalCase CCC-0261; 5) May 28 and 30, 1973 in Criminal Case CCC-0262; 6) April 3, 1973 in CriminalCase CCC-0263; and 7) March 15 and 23, 1973 in Criminal Case CCC-0264 that she submitted tothe Commission on Election in Manila.

5 The separate informations allege that petitioner was absent

the whole day on the days mentioned therein but to the "damage and prejudice of the NationalGovernment," she made it appear in her time records that she was not so absent from the office,



when in fact she well knew that on such date or time she was in the Court of First Instance ofPangasinan, Branch XIV, Resales, Pangasinan, appearing in her cases .

While petitioner raised the above-quoted legal issues which, to Us, point to the more basic issuesinherent in actsmala in se as contra distinguished from mala prohibita, We narrowed down theseissues, for proper disposition of the instant case, into whether or not the alleged acts of falsificationof public documents imputed against the petitioner were tainted with criminal intent (dolo), andwhether or not the act of alleged false narration of facts in the daily time record bears, under the law,

some semblance of colorable truth. This We did in full considerations of the peculiar circumstanceswhich render the instant case novel in some respects, worthy of pronouncements from this Court.

At the outset, it must be emphasized that for a conviction of the offense of falsification of public orofficial documents, defined and penalized under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code,the requisite elements thereof must be clearly established, namely: 1) the offender makes in adocument false statements in a narration of facts; 2) he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth ofthe facts narrated by him; 3) the facts narrated by him are absolutely false, and 4) the perversion oftruth in the narration of facts was made with the wrongful intent of injuring a third person.

6

Of weight in Our criminal justice system is the principle that the essence of an offense is the wrongful

intent (dolo), without which it cannot exist. 7 Actus non facit reum nisi mens set rea, the act itself doesnot make a man guilty unless his intentions were so. Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code clearlyindicates that malice or criminal intent (dolo) in some form is an essential requisite of all crimes andoffenses defined in the Code, except in those cases where the element required is negligence(culpa).

On one point, however, the claim of the petitioner that she is not under strict obligation to keep andsubmit a time record is not at all empty with justification. While it is true, as held by the respondentcourt, 8 that the obligation to disclose the literal truth in filling up the daily time record is required of alofficers and employees in the civil service of the government in accordance with Civil Service RuleXV, Executive Order No. 5, Series of 1909, this vague provision, however, is rendered clear by

Section 4, Rule XV of the Civil Service Rule, dated December 3, 1962, later Memorandum CircularNo. II, Series of 1965 which exempt from requirements of keeping and submitting the daily timerecords three categories of public officers, namely: 1) Presidential appointees; 2) chiefs and assistantchiefs of agencies; and 3) officers in the three branches of the government. Clearly thus, petitioner asChief of theOffice, Office ofElection Registrar, COMELEC in the municipality of Rosales, Pangasinanexercising supervision over four (4) subordinate employess, would fall under the third categoryaforementioned. An Election Registrar of the municipality performing the powers, dutied ,responsibilities of the COMELEC, a constitutional body, in the conduct of national or local election,referenda, and plebiscites, in aparticular voting district may be regarded as an officer who rank higherthab such chiefs or assistant chiefs of agencies although he may not be a presidential appointee.Notwithstan ding such an exemption, if the election registrars of the various municipalities al

throughout the country, who occassionaly work more than ordinary eight-hours on the last day of theregistration or on lection day, are keeping and submitting the daily time records to the main office inManila, it may be only to the sake of adminstrative procedural convenience or as a matter of practice,but by reason of strict legal obligation.

On the main point, assuming, however, that petitioner is under strict legal obligation to keep andsubmit the daily time records, We are definitely inclined to the view that the alleged false entriesmade in the time records on the specified dates contained in the information do not constitutefalsification for having been made with no malice or deliberate intent. Noteworthy is the fact thatpetitioner consistently did not dispute, but admitted in all candor her appearances in six (6) differentways, on March 15, March 23, May 28, June 22, July 13,, all in 1973 before the Court of First



Instance, Branch XIV, Rosales, Pangasinan, in the aforementiones cases, claiming that she did notreflect this absences in her daily time records because they were for few minute-duration, the longestwas on March 15, 1973 being for forty-five (45) minutes; they could be absorbed within the allowedcoffee breaks of 30 minutes in the morning and in the afternoon; that as Chief of Office, and allElection Registrars of the COMELEC for that matter, she is allowed to have one (1) day leave duringweek days provided she worked on a Saturday: and that her brief absences did not in any wayinterfere with or interrupt her official duties as an Election Registrar. Above all, petitioner categoricallyemphasized that her appearances in court were duly authorized by the COMELEC, which in certain

instances were as counsel de oficio, and no remuneration whatsoever from her clients was receivedby her,

Finding that the justifications claimed by Beradio as unavailing, the Court of Appeals ruled that hervarious appearances in court were not on official business, and the permission granted her by theCOMELEC was to appear in behalf of her relatives, and she was still obligated to reflect in her dailytime records only the hours when she was actually in the office. 9

We are not convinced. The Court of First Instance, Branch XIV, in Rosales, Pangasinan, is only two(2) meters from her own office as Election Registrar in the said municipality. She had standingauthority to act as de oficio counsel given by the COMELEC evidently in furtherance of the free legal

aid service program of the Integrated Bar, and an Identical policy of the Governmentitself,

10 especially as COMELEC lawyers, before any election had been held during the regime of

martial law, did not have much office work to keep them busy. This state of virtual absence ofelectoral activities is what prompted COMELEC to authorize its lawyers to take active part in the freelegal aid program above adverted to, if to do so would not unduly interfere with their work. Inrecognition of the long standing policy of the COMELEC in response to the legal aid program of theGovernment 11 and the "free access to the courts" provision of the 1973 Constitution, 12 theCOMELEC, by Resolution No. 1401,

13 formally created the Legal Assistance Office thereby

constituting all COMELEC lawyers with rank of division chief and below as COMELEC Legal Assistance Officers. Even prior to the formal creation of the Legal Assistance Office, the liberal policyof the COMELEC in allowing its Election Registrars to act as counsel in areas where there are no

lawyers available is, indeed, laudable.

Under the attendant facts and circumstances in the instant case, no criminal intent to commit thecrime with which she is charged can be imputed against the petitioner. In the information, it wasalleged that the petitioner was not in her office for the full office hours from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 noonand from 1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. on the specified dates therein as she was then busy attending hercases in court. On the contrary, the evidence of the prosecution belies its allegation of the wholedayabsence in office as Election Registrar. Records reveal that petitioner had stayed in court for only 5,30, 40 or 45 minutes a day for her appearances therein, at no instance exceeding one (1) hours.

If petitioner filled up her daily time record for the six days in question making it appear that she

attended her office from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon and from 1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. there is more thancolor of truth in the entry made. It is not shown that she did not report first to her office as ElectionRegistrar of Rosales, Pangasinan, before going to the courtroom just two (2) meters away. Petitionerthus likened her appearance to going out for the usual coffee breaks. The comparison is not even aptfor during the while she appeared in court, she was rendering service more, if not wholly, for thepublic good, than just for her own well-being as when she goes out for snack during the coffee-breakperiod. The court being only two (2) meters away from her office, she did not even have to go so faras when one goes out for snack. What is more, everytime she appeared in court, she surely musthave made this fact officially of record in the court proceedings, something which is not done withleaving the office room for coffee breaks. In fine, the entries in petitioner's daily time records were notabsolutely false. The alleged false entry may be said to have a color of truth, not a downright and



willful falsehood which alone would constitute falsification as a crime.14 As Cuello Calon stated: "La

mera inexacted tio es bastante para integrar este delito (Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal 6th Ed. Vol11, p. 216, cited in People vs. Villena, et al., 51 O.G. 5691; People vs. La Corte, CA-G. R. No. 05818-CR; U.S. vs. Bayot, 10 Phil. 518)."

In thus preparing her daily time record the way she did, it was evidently in her belief in her belief thatshe was just making of record the fact that, as was her honest opinion, she was entitled to receive herfull pay even for those days she appeared in court, rendering what she felt was no less a public

service, being in furtherance of a public policy on free legal assistance. As a lawyer, and as in officerof the court, she, for one, aids in the administration of justice, oathbound servant of society whoseduty is not solely for the benefit of her clients but for the public, particularly in the administration of

justice. The court a quo itself recognize, that the COMELEC registrars, at that time, are directed toappear as counsel de oficio when there are no lawyers to represent the parties in litigation. 15Ipetitioner is not at all appointed as counsel de oficio strictly in accordance with the Revised Rules ofCourt, Rule 138, it is an undisputed fact, as reflected in court records, that petitioner, true to her oath,acted as counsel in certain cases. On this point, if one fills up his daily time record in the belief that,on the basis of the time so indicated therein, she is merely making an honest claim for the paycorresponding to the time so indicated, no intent to commit the crime of falsification of publicdocument can be ascribed to her. In the case of the herein petitioner, she was only submitting a time

record she knew would be the basis for computing the pay she honestly felt she deserved for theperiod indicated. Indeed, the time record is required primarily, if not solely, for the purpose of servingas basis for the determination of the amount of pay an employee is entitled to receive for a givenperiod.

Further, on the issue of malus animus or criminal intent, it was ruled by the court a quo, confirmed bythe respondent Court of Appeals, that in falsification of public document, in contradistinction toprivate document, the Idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person is unnecessary, for, what ispenalized is the undermining or infringement of the public faith and the violation of the truth as thereinsolemnly proclaimed, invoking the case of People vs. Po Giok Te, 96 Phil. 918. Arguing against thisruling, petitioner cited the case of People us. Pacana, 47 Phil. 48, which the ponente in the instan

case upheld in the case of People vs. Motus, CA-G.R. No. 18267-CR when he was in the Court of Appeals, that although the Idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person is unnecessary, htis Courtemphasized that "it must, nevertheless, be borne in mind that the change in th epublic documentmust be such as to affect the integrity of the same or change in the public document must be suchas to affect the integrity of the same or change the effects which it would otherwise produce; for,unless that happens, there could not exist the essential element of the intention to commit the crimewhich is required by Article 1 (now Article 3) of the Penal Code.

We find the petitioner's stand tenable. the evident purpose of requiring government employees tokeep time record is to show their attendance in office to work and to be paid accordingly. Closelyadhering tot he policy of no work no pay, a daily time record is primarily, if not solely, intended to

prevent damage or loss tot he government as would result in instances where it pays an employee forno work done. The integrity of the daily time record as an official document, however, remainsuntarnished if the damages sought to be prevented has not been produced. As this ponente observedin the case of People v. Motus, supra while it is true that a time record is an official document, it isnot criminally falsified if it does not pervert its avowed purpose as when it does not cause damage tothe government. It may be different in the case of a public document with continuing interestaffecting the public welfare which is naturally damaged if that document is falsified where the truth isnecessary for the safeguard and protection of that general interest. In the instant case, the timerecords have already served their purpose. They have not caused any damage to the government orthird person because under the facts duly proven, petitioner may be said to have rendered service inthe interest of the public, with proper permission from her superiors. They may now even be



condemned as having no more use to require their continued safekeeping. Public interest has notbeen harmed by their contents, and continuing faith in their verity is not affected.

As pointed out, the obligation to make entries in the daily time records of officers and employees inthe Government service is a matter of administrative procedural convenience in the computation ofsalary for a given period, characteristically, not an outright and strict measure of professionaldiscipline, efficiency, dedication, honestly and competence.

Under the proven and admitted facts, petitioner-appellant surely is entitled to receive the pay as if shehad stayed in her office the whole period covered by the official hours prescribed. ,She had perhapsmade herself even more useful in the general benefit of the public than if she had remainedpractically Idle in her office as Election Registrar with perhaps no work at all to attend to, its isgenerally the case long before elections take place, specially during the martial law regime. TheCOMELEC must have been fully cognizant of the legal implications of the peculiar facts andcircumstances that obtained in this case, when it gave petitioner full clearance after she presentedher resignation when an administrative charge was filed against her by the same complainant as inthe criminal charge. The courts, in the present criminal prosecution, should do no less. It would be tooharsh and cruel for the courts to punish petitioner not only with imprisonment but with generaldisqualification and possible disbarment, for an act or omission which she performed or failed to

perform without any criminal intent. Such an insignificant transgression, if ever it is one, would notbeam the scales of justice against the petitioner, for courts must always be, as they are, therepositories of fairness and justice. It is inconceivable that a person who, without any attempt toconceal her appearances in court for this is a matter always made officially of record in the courtproceedings, emphatically, not for his own private gain, but animated by the zeal of service notwanting in public benefit, and as an officer of the court, petitioner could have acted with a deliberatecriminal intent. Moreover, what she stated in her daily time record, as earlier observed, had more thana mere color of truth to exclude such act from the pale of the criminal offense of falsification of publicdocument with which she is charged.

WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of petitioner not to have been established beyond reasonable doubt,

the judgment of conviction rendered by respondent court in affirming that of the trial court is herebyreversed, and petitioner, acquitted of the crime charged, with costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. L-55683 & 55903-04 February 22, 1982

PILAR S. LUAGUE, petitioner,vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

Certiorari to review a decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. Nos. 22414-16 CR which affirmedthe decision of The Court of First Instance of Samar, Branch X, convicting the petitioner of threecounts of falsification of commercial documents in Criminal Cases Nos. 599, 600 and 601.

The facts are stated in the poorly written decision of the Court of Appeals thus:



Iluminado Luague, a teacher clerk in the district office of Laoang II, Northern Samar,died at the G.B. Tan Memorial Hospital at around 7:00 o'clock in the evening of January24, 1972 after he was confined in said hospital since January 3, 1972.

Thereafter, the then Bureau of Public Schools sent the deceased's salary warrants[Exhibits A (599), A (600) and A (601)] to the Superintendent of schools at CatarmanNorthern Samar who in turn forwarded them to the District Supervisor, FlorencioGuillermo. A payroll-warrant register accompanied the checks.

The paychecks delivered, Florencio Guillermo signed the payroll-warrant registerscertifying that on his official oath, each employee whose name appeared on the rollshad received the salary warrant indicated opposite his name on February 7, 1972,February 17, 1972 and February 25, 1972, respectively, and returned the same to JoseFigueroa, the District Administrative Officer of Northern Samar.

Exhibit A (599) was personally received by Pilar S. Luague, while Exhibit A (600) wasreceived by Glen S. Luague. Exhibit A (601) was received by Edmundo Echano, arelative of Iliuminado Luague and who claimed to be employed in the Office of theDistrict Supervisor.

Florencio Guillermo claimed that upon discovering his mistake, he asked appellant toreturn the treasury warrants issued in the name of her husband Iluminado Luaguefurther claiming that appellant promised to do so, but actually did not. Upon the receiptof the xerox copies from the IBM Section of the Bureau of Public Schools, Guillermodiscovered that the treasury warrants in question had been encashed by appellant andGlen Luague with different local stores at Laoang. Exhibit A (599) was cleared onFebruary 22, 1972, while Exhibit A (600) was deposited to the account of a certain Leeand/or Nicol Chu, Jr. at Philippine Bank of Communications; and Exhibit A (601) wasdeposited to the account of Colgate-Palmolive Philippines, Inc. Appellant admittedhaving endorsed the treasury warrants by means of which she was able to encash the

same.

For signing the name of her husband Iluminado Luague as payee on three treasurywarrants for purposes of endorsement, appellant stands charged with the crime ofEstafa thru Falsification of Commercial Document. [Note: The appellant was chargedwith three counts of estafa thru falsification of commercial document but wasconvicted of falsification only.]

It is the petitioner's contention before Us as well as in the Court of Appeals that she acted in goodfaith or had no criminal intent when she cashed her deceased husband's paychecks. As stated in thedecision of the Court of Appeals:

Appellant puts up the defense of good faith in signing theme of her deceased husbandin the treasury warrants in question.

Her version: The late Iluminado Luague was on leave from January 3 to February 9,1972, as evidenced by his approved application for sick leave. On January 23, 1972the Principal, Jose Infante, while visiting Iluminado Luague in the hospital, handed toLuague a check representing his differentials. Luague in turn handed over the check tohis wife, the herein appellant, who was then present. Before Infante left, he informed theLuague spouses that Luague's pay check for the second half of January 1972 had



arrived and advised Mrs. Luague to get the same from Florencio Guillermo so that shecould use it to pay for medicine and hospital expenses of her husband.

Iluminado Luague instructed her [his (sic)] wife to get the check from FlorencioGuillermo. Appellant went to the house of Guillermo in the afternoon of January 23,1972. Guillermo asked her to sign the name of her husband on the payroll warrantregister and counter-sign with her initials. Guillermo then handed her the treasurywarrant [Exhibit A (599)].

Iluminado Luague died on January 24, 1972. From the proceeds of the warrants theyreceived were paid the amount the Luague family owed the drugstores owned by AmorCarandang, Purisima Saba and Luz Tan. A treasury warrant was also paid to EdwardKam from whom they bought construction materials for the tomb of the deceased and toOng Kiat store for the payment of materials used for the coffin of the late IluminadoLuague which were purchased on credit.

Upon the instruction of Amor Carandang and on her belief and upon suggestion ofFlorencio Guillermo himself that the warrants could be used to settle their financiaobligations incurred by the hospitalization and death of her late husband, appellant

indorsed the said treasury warrants by signing the name of Iluminado Luague.

Heirs of deceased government employees are entitled to whatever unpaid salaries thedeceased employee failed to receive. Appellant claims that it was upon this honestbelief that she endorsed the treasury warrants of her late husband to defray for thenecessary expenses incurred due to the latter's hospitalization, funeral and burial.

The Court of Appeals did not reject the petitioner's version, except in respect of the date when thefirst paycheck was delivered. In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals followedthe simplistic procedure of applying literally the letter of the law, namely: there was falsificationbecause the petitioner "signed her husband's name in indorsing the treasury warrants in question."

The Court of Appeals failed to take into account the following facts: That the petitioner signed herhusband's name to the checks because they were delivered to her by no less than her husband'sdistrict supervisor long after the husband's death which was known to the supervisor; that she usedthe proceeds of the checks to pay for the expenses of her husband's last illness and his burial; andthat she believed that she was entitled to the money as an advance payment for her husband'svacation and sick leave credits the money value of which exceeded the value of the checks. In thefight of these circumstances, We cannot ascribe criminal intent to the petitioner. We sustain her claimthat she acted in good faith.

During the hearing, it was brought out that the government did not sustain any financial loss due tothe encashment of the checks because the petitioner's husband had accumulated vacation and sick

leaves the money value of which exceeded the value of the three paychecks and the value of thechecks was simply deducted from the money value of the leaves. This explains why the petitionerwas not convicted of estafa but of falsification only. While we do not mean to imply that if there is nodamage there can be no falsification, We do say that the absence of damage is an element to beconsidered to determine whether or not there is criminal intent.

We notice here the lack of compassion on the part of the prosecuting fiscal, the trial judge, and theCourt of Appeals. Even the Solicitor General who is alert in seeking to correct improper convictions bytrial courts has somehow misappreciated the evidence in this case.



The accused is a poor widow who was obviously in a state of bewilderment due to the recent death ofher husband when she cashed the paychecks. She was also in dire need of money to settle theexpenses for her husband's last illness and his burial. A compassionate attitude repeatedly urged bythe First Lady, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, would have been highly in order under the circumstances.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted; the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed; thepetitioner is acquitted of the charges against her. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Manila

EN BANC

DARIO CABIGAS y CACHO,

Petit ioner,

G. R. No. L-67472

July 3, 1987-versus-

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

PARAS, J .:

Under separate Informations both dated September 20, 1982, the Office of the Tanodbayan charges

Dario Cabigas y Cacho and Benedicto Reynes y Lopez on two [2] counts with the crime of

falsification of official documents allegedly committed in the following manner:

[1] Criminal Case No. 6529

That on or about March 29, 1982, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, and within the

jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Dario Cabigas y Cacho and Benedicto Reynes y Lopez

both public officers being then employed as Securities Custodian and Securities Receiving Clerk

respectively, of the Land Bank of the Philippines, Makati Branch, a government-owned and/or

controlled corporation, conspiring together, taking advantage of their official position and committingthe crime herein charged in relation to their Office, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and

feloniously falsify Securities Delivery Receipt dated March 9, 1982 evidencing, among others, receipt

by them in their official capacity of Treasury Bills bearing Serial No. A-000064 up to A000082 of the

795th series, by then and there making alterations and/or intercalations thereon to the effect that only

Treasury Bills bearing SN-A-000064 to A-000076 were received by them on March 9, 1982, for the

purpose of hiding or concealing the loss, while in their custody, of six [6] Treasury Bills bearing SN-A-

000077 to A-000082 of the 795th series, thereby changing the meaning of said Securities Delivery

Receipt.cralaw



[2] Criminal Case No. 6938

That on or about March 30, 1982 in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, and within the

jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Dario Cabigas y Cacho and Benedicto Reynes y Lopez

both public officers, being then employed as Securities Custodian and Securities Receiving Clerk

respectively, of the Land Bank of the Philippines, Makati Branch, a government-owned and/or

controlled corporation, conspiring together and taking advantage of their official positions and

committing the crime herein charged in relation to their office, did then and there willfully, unlawfully

and feloniously falsify the Daily Report of Securities/Documents under custody dated March 30

1982, which is an official document evidencing the securities transactions and/or operations of the

Makati Branch of the aforenamed bank, and which it was their official duty to prepare and submit to

their superiors, by then and there indicating in said document, for the purpose of hiding the loss or

disappearance while in their custody of six [6] Treasury Bills of the 795th series, with face value of

P500,000.00 each, that the beginning balance of securities under their custody as to volume was

1,533 pieces, when the ending balance as to volume in the previous day's report was 1,539 pieces

and that the beginning balance as to face value in the previous day's report was P610,095,000.00

and thereafter falsely stating in the footnote of the same document that the reduction was due to

"Adjustment on Erroneous Entry [incoming] dated 3/09/82" the truth being that the six [6] pieces of

Treasury Bills with aggregate face value of P3,000,000.00 were not erroneously entered in either the

Securities Delivery Receipt or the Daily Report of Securities/ Documents under Custody, both dated

March 9, 1982, but were discovered to have been missing after an inventory conducted by accused

on March 20, 1982, thereby making an untruthful statement in a narration of facts in violation of par. 4

of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code.cralaw

After arraignment and trial, the Sandiganbayan rendered its decision in both cases, the dispositive

portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. In Criminal Case No. 6529, acquitting the accused Dario Cabigas y Cacho and Benedicto Reynesy Lopez, with costs de officio and ordering their bail bonds in the said case cancelled.

2. In Criminal Case No. 6938:

[a] Finding the accused Dario Cabigas y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the

crime of Falsification of a Public or Official Document defined and penalized under Article 171

paragraph No. 6 of the Revised Penal Code, without any mitigating or aggravating circumstances;

and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty

ranging from two [2] years, four [4] months and one [1] day of prision correccional as minimum, to

eight [8] years and one [1] day of prision mayor , as maximum, to pay a fine of P2,000.00 without

subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.[b] Acquitting accused Benedicto Reynes y Lopez, with costs de officio, and ordering his bail bond

cancelled.

SO ORDERED.

The instant petition is an appeal interposed by herein petitioner Dario Cabigas y Cacho from the

foregoing decision in Criminal Case No. 6938. The following pertinent facts are not disputed

Petitioner Dario Cabigas is the Securities Custodian of the Securities Section of the Land Bank of the

Philippines assigned to its branch at Makati, Metro Manila. Assisting him in his work is Benedicto



Reynes, the Securities Receiving Clerk. The Fund Management Department [FMD] of the Land Bank

of the Philippines is engaged in money market and securities trading transactions. The securities

which are in the form of treasury notes and bills are in turn deposited with the Securities Section of

the Land Bank of the Philippines, Makati Branch.

On March 9, 1982, the Fund Management Department delivered to the Securities Section, Makati

Branch of the Land Bank of the Philippines, for safekeeping, 112 pieces of treasury notes and

treasury bills worth P46,000,000.00 and for which a copy of the Securities Delivery Receipt (SDR)

Exh. "D", was issued to the Fund Management Dept. while the original of the same was retained by

the Securities Section. Included in the securities received on March 9, 1982 are 19 pieces of treasury

bills with Serial Nos. A-000064 to A-000082, 795th series, in the denomination of P500,000.00 each

or a total amount of P9,500,000.00. After receiving the securities, the accused would prepare the

Daily Report on Securities/Documents Under Custody [DR SDUC] evidencing the securities

transactions and operations of the Makati Branch of the Land Bank of the Philippines. This has been

the routine procedure being adopted by the accused in the performance of his duty as a Securities

Custodian.cralaw

On March 29, 1982, in the course of their inventory of treasury notes and bills deposited with them,

Cabigas and Reynes discovered the loss of six [6] treasury bills of the 795th series with a total value

of P3,000,000.00. Upon verification that Securities Delivery Receipt [SDR] dated March 9, 1982,

Exhibit "C", was the source document of the missing securities which were delivered to them for

safekeeping, accused Reynes crossed out with a red ink in the said document the last two digits "82"

and the addition after them of the figure "76" on the serial numbers A-000064 to A-000082 of the 19

treasury bills of the 795th series with a total maturity value of P9,500,000.00. Then at the bottom of

the SDR Cabigas placed the notation "For Adjustment" and below it the date "3/29/82." Then, upon

Cabigas' suggestion, Reynes reported the incident to their branch manager, Aurora Pigram. When

the DR SDUC for March 29, 1982 was prepared, the number of treasury bills of the 795th series

stood at 1,539 pieces with a total face value of P610,095,000.00.cralawThe following day, Reynes prepared a draft report for March 30, 1982 by carrying forward the ending

balance of the treasury bills of the 795th series reflected in the DR SDUC dated March 29, 1982

However, instead of following the draft prepared by Reynes, Cabigas prepared his own report DR

SDUC [Exh. "G "] dated March 30, 1982 wherein he indicated 1,533 pieces of treasury bills of the

795th series with a total amount of P607,095,000.00, which the latter claimed to be the number of

securities of the 795th series in his possession at the time of the preparation of said report. At the

bottom of DR SDUC (Exh. "G") Cabigas placed the notation "Adjustment on Erroneous Entry

[incoming] dated March 9, 1982" as legend of the asterisk [*] sign which appears after the figure

"1,533."On May 20, 1982, a certain Rosie Chua was found to be authenticating with the Central Bank of the

Philippines a Treasury Bill of the 795th series with Serial No. A-000082 in the amount of

P500,000.00. Upon investigation by NBI agents, it was discovered that the Land Bank of the

Philippines, Makati Branch Manager, Aurora Pigram was the one who negotiated the said treasury bill

with the Gainsbo Commodities. Further investigation revealed that the five [5] missing Treasury Bills

with series numbers A-000077 to A-000081 were negotiated by Pigram with the Home Savings Bank

to secure a loan. The Land Bank immediately sought the assistance of the NBI in investigating the

case. On May 24, 1982, Cabigas and Reynes were investigated by NBI agents. After the



investigation, Cabigas and Reynes were arrested for having allegedly conspired together in falsifying

the Securities Delivery Receipt [SDR] dated March 9, 1982 [Exh. "C"] and the Daily Report on

Securities/Documents under custody [DR SDUC] Exh. "G" dated March 30, 1982 and for which the

corresponding Informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan. Both accused were acquitted in

Criminal Case No. 6529. However, accused Dario Cabigas y Cacho was convicted in Criminal Case

No. 6938, while his co-accused was acquitted therein.cralaw

In convicting accused Dario Cabigas y Cacho, the Sandiganbayan stated in its now assailed Decision

that:

In the case of Exhibit "G", the Daily Report on Securities/Documents Under Custody [DR SDUC] for

March 30, 1982, the alleged falsification consists of the following entries [figures] pertaining to

Treasury Bills: "1,533", "607,095,000.00", "1,533 and 607,095,000.00 "marked on the document as

Exhibit "G-1", and the legend of the asterisk [*] sign at the bottom portion reading, "Adjustment on

Erroneous Entry [incoming] dated 3/09/82" marked as Exhibit "G-2". The numbers "1,533" and

"607,095,000.00" represent the volume and the total face/maturity value, respectively, of the Treasury

Bills supposedly in the custody of the Securities Section as of March 30, 1982. Those entries were

falsifications, the prosecution maintains, because the correct number of Treasury Bills deposited

with the Securities Section as of that date was 1,539 valued at P610,095,000.00; that the said figures

were altered to "1,533 and 607,095,000.00," respectively, to conceal the loss or disappearance of 6

Treasury Bills worth P3,000,000.00, and that the footnote at the bottom portion of the document

[Exh. "G-2"] was written to attribute the reduction in the number of Treasury Bills from "1,539" to

"1,533" to mistake or error in the entries in the Securities Delivery Receipt of March 9, 1982 [Exh.

"C"].

The discrepancy in the figures is indeed apparent. In the DR SDUC for March 29, 1982 [Exh. "F"], the

ending balance on the number of Treasury Bills at the close of office hours on that day was 1,539

pieces with a total face/maturity value of P610,095,000.00 [Exh. "F-1"]. Accordingly, the beginning

balance on the number of the same treasury bills on the following day, March 30, 1982, must also be1,539 pieces with a total face/maturity value of P610,095,000.00. But as it was made to appear in the

DR SDUC for March 30, 1982 [Exhs. "G" and "G-1"], the beginning and ending balances on the

number and value of Treasury Bills for that date were 1,533 pieces and P607,095,000.00 maturity

value.

The question now is, who caused the alterations and what caused the alteration and what was the

purpose behind them.

xxx xxx xxx

By changing the original figures in the draft of the DR SDUC from "1,539" and "610" to "1,533" and

"607", respectively, and causing Reynes to type the final copy of the DR SDUC on the basis of thecorrected draft, Cabigas caused the document to show that the Treasury Bills in their custody as of

March 30, 1982 were 1,533 pieces with a total face/maturity value of P607,095,000.00. By placing,

likewise, an asterisk [*] sign after the figure "1,533" and writing the words "Adjustment on Erroneous

Entry [incoming] dated 3/09/82" as legend of the asterisk [*] sign, Cabigas caused to make it appear

that the discrepancy of 6 Treasury Bills valued at P3,000,000.00 was due to error in the entries in the

Securities Delivery Receipt of March 9, 1982 [Exh. "C"]. Considering that the said SDR of March 9,

1982 [Exh. "C"] did not contain any error but reflected the number of securities received by them on

that day, it is obvious that Cabigas made the alterations in Exhibit "G" and the misleading footnote



[Exh. "G-2"] in order to suppress, hide or conceal the fact that the 6 Treasury Bills comprising the

discrepancy were lost while in their custody.

The alterations amounted to falsification of Exhibit "G", a public or official document, unde

paragraph No. 4, Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, by making untruthful statements in a

narration of facts. As Securities Custodian, Cabigas was under obligation to disclose in the said

document, the correct number and total maturity value of the securities under his official custody as

of March 30, 1982.

It is a settled doctrine that in falsification by an employee under par. No. 4 of Article 171, which

reads "by making untruthful statements in a narration of facts", the following elements must concur:

[a] That the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in a narration of facts;

[b] That he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him;

[c] That the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false; and

[d] That the perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with the wrongful intent of injuring a

third person.

Herein petitioner contends that the foregoing elements are not present in the case at bar. The

correction of the figure from 1,539 to 1,533 pieces to conform to the actual number of Treasury Bills

under custody is not falsification because it was made to speak the truth [US vs. Mateo, 25 Phil

324]. The placing of an asterisk [*] sign after the figure "1,533" and writing the words, "Adjustment on

Erroneous Entry [incoming] dated 3/09/82" as legend of the asterisk sign, contrary to the ruling of the

respondent court, was not effected to hide or conceal the fact that the missing 6 treasury bills were

lost. It would be far more difficult to detect or discover the loss if there was no asterisk or footnote in

the DR SDUC Exh. "G". In fact, the evidence discloses that immediately upon discovery of the loss

on March 29, 1982, petitioner reported the matter to his immediate supervisor, Estela L. Espiritu and

Branch Manager of the Securities Section, Aurora Pigram. This shows good faith and lack of motive

on the part of petitioner to conceal the said loss.Petitioner further argues that the Daily Report on Securities/Documents Under Custody [DR SDUC]

is a form purely devised and adopted by him. This form was never required, neither was it introduced

nor prescribed by the Land Bank. Petitioner, therefore, was not under "legal obligation" to disclose in

the DR SDUC or SDR, the correct number and total maturity value of the securities under their officia

custody as of a given date. It is purely optional on the part of petitioner to use the said forms.cralaw

The Honorable Solicitor General recommends that the accused be acquitted because:

There is nothing to show the DR SDUC dated March 30, 1982, Exh. "G", for the alleged falsification

of which petitioner was convicted in Criminal Case No. 6938 is a form the submission of which was or

is required by law. In the Petition for Review, petitioner points out that as testified by him, the formwas not an official form of the Land Bank. The form was his own initiative adopted "for our own

convenience and also for reference purposes." Petitioner, therefore, was not under legal obligation to

disclose or reveal the truth by said DR SDUC. In the absence of such obligation and of the alleged

wrongful intent, defendant cannot be legally convicted of the crime of falsification of public

document with which he is charged. [People vs. Quasha, 93 Phil. 333].

WHEREFORE, on ground of reasonable doubt, the decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case



No. 6938 is hereby reversed and another one rendered acquitting the petitioner, Dario Cabigas y

Cacho. Cost de officio.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-33254 & G.R. No. L-33253 January 20, 1978

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs.LICERIO P. SENDAYDIEGO, JUAN SAMSON and ANASTACIO QUIRIMIT, defendants. JUANSAMSON anddefendant-appellant.

PROVINCE OF PANGASINAN, offended party-appellee,vs.HEIRS OF LICERIO P. SENDAYDIEGO, defendants-appellants. *

Norberto J. Quisumbing for appellant Sendaydiego.

Donato & Rillera for appellant Samson.

Office of the Solicitor General for appellee.

AQUINO, J .:

In these three cases of malversation through falsification, the prosecution's theory is that in 1969Licerio P. Sendaydiego, the provincial treasurer of Pangasinan, in conspiracy with Juan Samson yGalvan, an employee of a lumber and hardware store in Dagupan City, and with Anastacio Quirimit,

the provincial auditor, as an accomplice, used six (6) forged provincial vouchers in order to embezzlefrom the road and bridge fund the total sum of P57,048.23.

The provincial voucher in these cases has several parts. In the upper part with the legend "ARTICLEOR SERVICE" the nature of the obligation incurred is indicated. That part is supposed to be signedby two officials of the provincial engineer's office and by the governor's representative.

The middle part of the voucher contains five numbered printed paragraphs. Paragraph 1 is acertificate to be signed by the creditor. It is stated therein that the creditor vouches that the expenses"were actually and necessarily incurred". In the instant cases paragraph 1 was not signed presumablybecause it is not relevant to the purchase of materials for public works projects.

Paragraph 2 is a certification that the expenses are correct and have been lawfully incurred. It issigned by the provincial engineer.

Paragraph 3 contains these words: "Approved for pre-audit and payment, appropriations and fundsbeing available therefore." This is signed by the provincial treasurer.

Paragraph 4 is a certification which, as filed up in Exhibit K, Voucher No. 10724 dated February 28,1969, reads:



I certify that this voucher has been pre-audited and same may be paid in the amount ofsixteen thought seven hundred twenty-seven and 52/100 (P16,727.52) in cash or incheck, provided there is sufficient fund cover the payment.

This is signed by the auditor.

Paragraph 5 is a certification signed by the provincial treasurer that the account mentioned in theprovincial engineer's certification "was paid in the amount and on the date shown below and is

chargeable as shown in the summary hereof. ... ." It may be noted that the provincial treasurer signstwo part of the voucher.

Following paragraph 5, and as referred to therein, is the receipt of the signed by the creditor. Asaccomplished in Exhibit K, the receipt reads (it was signed according to the prosecution by JuanSamson, a point which is disputed by him):

Received this 31st day of March, 1969, from L P. Sendaydiego, Province of Pangasinanthe sum of seven hundred twenty-seven pesos & 52/100 (16,727.52) in full payment ofthe above stated account, which I hereby certify to be correct. Paid by Check No.................................

CARRIED CONSTR. SUPPLY CO. By: (Sgd.) JUAN SAMSON

According to the prosecution, Samson also signed on the left margin of the six vouchers below thestamped words: "Presented to Prov. Treasurer. By Juan Samson."

Voucher No. 10724 (Exh. K). — This Provincial voucher, dated February 28, 1969, evidences thepayment of PI 6,727.52 to the Carried Construction Supply Co. of Dagupan City for lumber andhardware materials supposedly used in the repair of the bridge in Barrio Libertad at the Umingan-Tayug road in Pangasinan along the Nueva Ecija boundary (Exh. K). The voucher makes reference toinvoice No. 3327 and other supporting papers.

The falsity of that provincial voucher is proven by the following intances:

(a) That there was no project for the repair of the bridge at Barrio Libertad (P. 1; Exh. Z).

(b) That the amount of P16,727.52 was never received by the Carried Construction Supply Co Thealleged official receipt No. 3025 of the company dated March, 1969 (Exh. K-6) is forged.

(c) That the lumber and materials mentioned in Exhibit K were never delivered by the company to theprovincial government

(d) That in the provincial voucher, Exhibit K, and in the supporting requisition and issue voucher (RIV)No. 2206 dated January 29, 1969 (Exh. A), covering the same lumber and hardware ma thesignatures of the following office were forged: Salvador F. Oropilla senior civil engineer; Rodolfo P.Mencias, supervising civil engineer Victoriano M. Sevilleja, acting provincial engineer, and Ricardo B.Probincias, chief of equipment of the governor's office. These four office denied that their signaturesin the two vouchers, Exhibits A and B, are their genuine signatures.

(e) That the imprint of the rubber stamp on Exhibits A and B, containing the words "Approved: Forand By Authority of the Governor (signed ) Ricardo B. Primicias, Chief of Equipment", is not theimprint of the genuine rubber stamp used in Primicias office.



cancelled invoices issued to the Mountain Agricultural College. The projected repairs of the bridgeswere fictitious.

The company's cashier testified that the company never received the payments for the lumber andhardware materials. The receipts evidencing payments (Exh. K-6, KK to KK-4 are fake officiareceipts. The cashier produced in court the genuine official receipts (Exh. LL to LL-7) bearing theserial numbers of the fake receipts. The genuine receipts do not refer to transactions with theprovincial government.

Samson played a stellar role in the processing of the six vouchers. He used to be an employee of thepro treasurer's office. He resigned and worked with several firms doing business with the provincialgovernment. In 1969 he was the collector of the Carried Construction Supply Co. He represented thatfirm in its dealings with the offices of the governor, provincial auditor, provincial engineer andprovincial treasurer. He was personally known to those provincial officials and the employees of theiroffices (21-22 Sendaydiego's brief).

The six (6) forged provincial vouchers, with their respective supporting papers, were hand-carried bySamson. He delivered the papers to Carmencita Castillo, the ledger clerk in the provincial engineer'soffice, for recording and for her signature (Ekh. DD).

Thereafter, Samson brought the papers to the provincial treasurer's office. Marcelo Crusade, alaborer in that office who performed the chore of recording the vouchers and payrolls, recordedVouchers Nos. 11869, 11871 and 11872 (Exh. P, R and S). Crusadas initials appear on the upperlefthand corner of the said vouchers with the date 4/17/69.

Samson signed on the left margin of the vouchers to indicate that he presented them to the provincialt r's office. Crusade said that after Samson had presented the said papers to him, Samson broughtthem to Ricardo Baraan, the book-keeper of the provincial treasurer's office for processing and for thelatter's signature (Exh. WW).

From Baraan's office, Samson hand-carried the vouchers to the provincial auditor's office. He askedVirginia Cruz, a clerk to record the same (Exh. CC).

Afterwards, Samson asked Donato Rosete the assistant provincial treasurer, to initialled the vouche After Rosete had initialled the vouchers, Samson went to the provincial treasurer's office where theamounts covered by the voucher were paid by Sendaydiego to him in cash (instead of by check) asrepresentative of the Carried Construction Supply Co. (Exh. EE). He received the payments on March31 and April 29 and 28 (four payments on that date) as shown on the face of the vouchers.

The signature of Sendaydiego and Quirimit, the auditor, on the said six vouchers are admittedlyauthentic. Sendaydiego signed the vouchers ahead of Rosete, his assistant. Sendaydiego's defense

is that he signed the vouchers in the honest belief that the signatures therein of the provincial officeconcerned were genuine because the voucher had been pre-audited and approved by the auditor.

Samson denied the authenticity of his two signatures on each of the six vouchers showing that hereceived from Sendaydiego the amounts covered thereby as representative of the lumber andhardware firm (Exh. OO to TT) and that he presented the vouchers to the provincial s treasurer 'soffice (Exh. 6-12— Samson). Sendaydiego testified that Samson's signatures are genuine.

In connection with the six vouchers, Sendaydiego, Samson and Quirimit were charged withmalversation through falsification in three docketed as follows:



1. Criminal Case No. 23349 involving provincial voucher No. 10724 dated February 281969 in the sum of P16,7Z7.52 (Exh. X), L-33252.

2. Criminal Case No. 23350 involving provincial vouchers Nos. 11869, 11870, 11871dated April 15 (two dates) 28 and 15, 1969 for the respective amounts of P5,187.28P6,290.60, P9,769-64 and P4,501.38 (four vouchers, Exh. P, Q, R and S), now L-33253.

3. Criminal Case No. 23351 involving provincial voucher No. 11955 dated April 29, 1969in the sum of P14,571.81 (Exh. O), now L-33254.

After trial the lower court acquitted the auditor, Quirimit and found Sendaydiego and Samnson guiltyof malversation through falsification of public or official documents imposing each of the followingpenalties:

(1) In Criminal Case No. 23349, an indeterminate sentence of twelve years, ten monthsand twenty-one-days, as minimum, to eighteen years, two months and twenty-one daysof reclusion temporal , as maximum, and a fine of P16,727.52 and to indemnify solidaritythe provincial government of Pangasinan in the same amount;

(2) In Criminal Case No. 23350, the penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine ofP29,748.90 and to indemnify solidarily the provincial government of Pangasinan in thesame amount; and

(3) In Criminal Case No. 23351, an indeterminate sentence of twelve years, ten monthsand twenty-one days, as minimum, to eighteen year two months and twenty-one daysof reclusion temporal as maximum , and a fine of P14,571.81 and to indemnify solidaritythe provincial government of Pangasinan in the same amount.

Sendaydiego and Samson appealed to this Court.

Sendaydiego died on October 5, 1976. His appeal as to his criminal liability was dismissed. Deathextinguished his criminal liability remained. The resolution of July 8, 1977 dismissing Sendaydiego'sappeal read s follows:

The death of appellant Sendaydiego during the pendency of his appeal or before the judgment of conviction rendered against him by the lower court became final andexecutory extinguished hiscriminal liability meaning his obligation to serve the personaor imprisonment penalties and his liability to pay the fines or pecuniary penalties (Art.89[1], Revised Penal Code; 1 Viada, Codigo Penal, 4th Ed., 565).

The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the civil liability survivedSendaydiego because his death occurred after final judgment was rendered by theCourt of First Instance of Pangasinan, which convicted him of three complex crimes ofmalversation through falsification and ordered him to indemnify the Province in thetotal sum of P61,048.23 (should be P57,048.23).

The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal actionin the absence of express waiver or its reservation in a separate action (Sec. 1, Rule111 of the Rules of court). The civil action for the civil liability is separate and distinctfrom the criminal action (People and Manuel vs. Coloma, 105 Phil. 1287; Roa vs. De laCruz, 107 Phil. 8).



When the action is for the recovery of money and the defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in themanner especially provided' in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of theRules of Court).

The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had been renderedagainst him by the Court of First Instance, the action survives him. It may be continuedon appeal (Torrijos vs. Court of Appeals, L-40336, October 24, 1975; 67 SCRA 394).

The accountable public officer may still be civilly liable for the funds improperlydisbursed although he has no criminal liability (U S. vs. Elvina, 24 Phil. 230; PhilippineNational Bank vs. Tugab, 66 Phil. 583).

In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the dismissal of the appeal of the deceasedSendaydiego insofar as his criminal liability is concerned, the Court Resolved tocontinue exercising appellate jurisdiction over his possible civil liability for the moneyclaims of the Province of Pangasinan arising from the alleged criminal acts complainedof, as if no criminal case had been instituted against him, thus making applicable, indetermining his civil liability, Article 30 of the Civil Code (Note: The lower court had

issued an order of attachment against him on January 13, 1970 for the sum of P36,487and in the brief for said appellant, there is no specific assignment of error affecting thecivil liability fixed by the trial court.) and, for that purpose, his counsel is directed toinform this Court within ten (10) days of the names and addresses of the decedent'sheirs or whether or not his estate is under administration and has a duly appointed

judicial administrator. Said heirs or administrator will be substituted for the deceasedinsofar as the civil action for the civil liability is concerned (Secs. 16 and 17, Rule 3,Rules of Court). According to Sendaydiego's brief, he had a wife and ten childrennamed Arturo, Licerio, Jr., Prospero, Regulo, Eduardo, Cesar, Nola, Aida, Wilfredo andManolo (deceased).

The title of this case should be amended to show its civil aspect by adding thereto thefollowing.Province of Pangasinan vs. Heirs of Licerio P. Sendaydiego.

Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of showing his criminal liability which isthe basis of the civil liability for which his estate would be liable for which his estate would be liable.

Sendaydiedo's appeal; civil liability of his estate. — In view of Sendaydiego's death, it is notnecessary to resolve his first two assignments of error, wherein he assails the imposition of reclusion

perpetua as a cruel and unusual penalty and wherein it is argued that there is no complex crime ofmalversation through falsification committed by negligence.

In the third assignment of error, it is contended that the trial court erred in allowing private prosecutorsMillora and Urbiztondo to prosecute the case thereby allegledly subjecting the accused toproceedings marked by undue publicity, pre-judgment, bias and political self-interest.

Atty. Vicente D. Millora, a senior member of the provincial board actually handled the prosecution ofthe case from the preliminary investigation, which started on June 5, 1969, up to the termination ofthe trial on July 29, 1970.

At the commencement of the preliminary investigation, the counsel for the accused auditor inquiredwhether Atty. Millora was authorized by the provincial board to act as private prosecutor in



representation of the province of Pangasinan, the offended party. Atty. Millora replied that there was aboard resolution designating him as a private prosecutor.

The acting provincial commander, who filed the complaints manifested to the trial court that he hadauthorized Atty. Millora to act as private prosecutor (4-8 tsn June 5, 1969).

Another defense counsel filed a written motion to inhibit Millora and the others as private prosecutorsThe lower court denied the motion in its order of June 18, 1969 (p. 40, Record of Criminal Case No.

23350).

After the termination of the p investigation conducted by the lower court, the provincial fiscal ofPangasinan and the city final of Dagupan City filed three informations against the accused all datedNovember 4, 1969.

At the commencement of the trial on February 23, 1970 the city fiscal, an assistant provincial fiscaand Atty. Millora, the private prosecutor, appeared for the prosecution. The city fiscal moved "that theprivate prosecutor (Millora) be authorized to conduct the examination subject to our (the fiscal's)control and supervision". The trial court granted the motion (7 tsn).

At the hearing on April 23, 1970 the same city fiscal moved that Atty. Urbiztondo be authorized toexamine the prosecution witnesses under his supervision and control The trial court granted themotion (155 tsn).

The record shows that at every hearing the provincial fiscal, the city fiscal or an assistant fiscal werepresent together with the private prosecutor.

Under the foregoing circumstances, we believe that there was substantial compliance with the rulethat the criminal action should be "prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal" and that"the provincial fiscal shall represent the province" in any court (Sec.4, Rule 110, Rules of Court; sec.1683, Revised Administrative Code).

The observation of Sendaydiego's counsel, that the imposition of reclusion perpetua "could havebeen the result of the undue publicity, prejudgment, bias and political interest which attended theproceedings ", is not well-founded. The trial court's decision dispels any doubt as to its impartiality.The evidence in the three cases is mainly documentary. The unassailable probative value of thedocuments involved rather than bias and prejudice, was the decisive factor on which the trial courtanchored the judgment of conviction.

Moreover, as already adverted to, Sendaydiego's death had rendered moot the issue as to thepropriety of the imposition of reclusion perpetua. And, as will be shown later, reclusion

perpetua cannot be imposed in these cases because the crimes committed were not complex.

The other seven assigmments of error made by Sendaydiego's counsel refer to the trial court'sconclusion that Sendaydiego and Samson are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of malversationthrough falsification or, specifically, that the provincial treasurer, in signing the six vouchers, evinced"malice or fraud and that there must have been connivance between" the two.

Several lances indicate that Sendaydiego conspired with Samson. Donato N. Rosete, the assistantprovincial treasurer, testified that, contrary to the usual procedure, he affixed his initial to paragraph 3of the vouchers after Sendaydiego had signed it. Rosete adhered to that unusual procedure becausethe interested party, Samson who hand-carried the vouchers, approached Rosete after he (Samson)had conferred with the provincial treasurer and Samson told Rosete to initial the voucher because it



show that he had a tieup with Samson and that he acted maliciously in signing the six questionedvouchers.

The last contention put forward for Sendaydiego is that, because the trial court acquitted the auditor,then the treasurer's exoneration follows as a matter of course. We see no merit in that contentionbecause the evidence for the prosecution against Sendaydiego is not the same as its evidenceagainst the auditor. For that reason the auditor was charged only as an accomplice, whereas, thetreasurer was charged as a principal. The auditor based his defense on the undeniable fact that the

treasurer had approved the six vouchers "for pre-audit and payment" before they were passed uponby the auditor. In short, the auditor was misled by the treasurer's certification which the auditorapparently assumed to have been made in good faith when in truth it was made in bad faith.

We are convinced after a minutiose examination of the documentary and oral evidence and anunprejudiced consideration of the arguments of Sendaydiego's counsel that his criminal liability wasestablished beyond reasonable doubt and, therefore, the civil liability fo his estate for the amountsmalversed was duly substantial.

Samson's appeal . — Samson's brief has no statement of facts. He contends that the trial court erredin disregarding the expert testimony that his signatures on the vouchers are not his signature; in

finding that he forged the vouchers and received the proceeds thereof, and in relying oncircumstantial evidence as proof of conspiracy.

As a preliminary issue, Samson argues that Judge Eloy B. Bello should have inhibited himself "infairness to the accused, in the interest of justice, and as a gesture of delivadeza" because he hadconducted the preliminary investigation.

Our searching study of the recrod fails to sustain Samson's insinuation that he was prejudiced by thefact that Judge, who conducted the preliminary investigation, was the one who tried the case andconvicted him. Judge Bello tried the case fairly. His conduct of the trial does not show that he hadalready prejudged their guilt.

Section 13, Rule 112 of the Rules of court, in allowing a Court of First Instance to conduct apreliminary investigation, does not disqualify it from trying the case after it had found probable causeand after the fiscal, as directed by the Court, had filed the corresponding information. The ruleassumes that the Judge, who conducted the preliminary investigation, could impartially try the caseon the merits.

We cannot assume that judges as a rule are opinionated and narrow-minded insomuch that theywould invariably be iron-bound by their findings at the preliminary investigation.

The case of a Judge of the Court of First Instance, who conducts a preliminary investigation and then

tries the case on the merits, is similar to a situation where an inferior court conducts a preliminaryinvestigation of a grave or less grave offense falling within the concurrent jurisdiction of the Court ofFirst Instance and tghe inferior court. In such a case, the inferior court after terminating thepreliminary investigation is not obligated ( por delivadeza) to remand the case to the Court of FirstInstance for trial. The inferior court has the option to try the case on the merits (People vs. Palmon,86 Phil. 350; Natividad vs. Robles, 87 Phil. 834; People vsw. Colicio, 88 Phil. 196). The assumption isthat the inferior court can try the case without any ingrained bias or undue prejudice.

Samson sought to prove, through Lieutenant Colonel Jose G. Fernandez, retired chief of theConstabulary crime laboratory, a handwriting expert, that his signatures on the vouchers are not hissignatures.



Fernandez found that the questioned signatures and the alleged genuine signatures (exemplars) ofSamson have fundamental differences. The expert concluded that the questioned signatures and theexemplar signatures of Samson were not written by one and the same person (Exh. 20).

After examining the questioned and genuine signatures and analysing the evidence and contentionsof the parties, we find that the expert is correct in declaring that (as admitted by the trial court) thereare radical differences between the questioned and authentic signatures.

But the expert is in error in concluding that Samson did not forge the questioned signatures or inimplying that Samson had no hand in the writing thereof.

The truth is that Samson used two forms of signature. His supposed genuine signatures found in hisresidence certificates, income tax returns and the genuine office receipt of the Carried ConstructionSupply Co. are "in an arcade form or rounded form of writing". The surname Samson is encircled.

On the other hand, the questioned signatures used in Samson's transactions with the provincialgovernment are in angular form; his surname is not encircled, and the questioned signaturesterminate in angular and horizontal strokes.

Samson was consistent in his fakeries. Knowing that the six vouchers evidenced fictitioustransactions, he used therein his fake signature, or the signature which is different from his signaturein genuine documents. He used his forged signatures in the six fake official receipts of the CarriedConstruction Supply Co., stating that the amounts covered by the six vouchers were received by him(Exh. K-6, KK to KK-4). the expert admitted that a person may have two forms of signature (186 tsnJuly 16, 1970).

Signatures may be deliberately disguised with the dishonest intention of denying the same as andwhen necessary (Mehta, Identification of Handwriting and Cross Examination of Experts, pp. 4th Ed.,1970, p. 224; Harrison, Suspect Documents 418-419).

Sendaydiego himself testified that the questioned signatures of Samson in the six vouchers wereSamson's signatures (94-99 tsn July 31, 1969).

Fernandez, the handwriting expert, declared that the questioned signatures of Samson in thevouchers were written by only one person (264-265 tsn July 16, 1970).

The evidence conclusively proves that Samson, as the representative or collector of the supposedcreditor, Carried Construction Supply Co., hand-carried the vouchers in question to the offices of theprovincial engineer, treasurer and auditor and then back to the treasurer's office for payment. Heactually received the cash payments. Under those circumstances, Samson is presumed to be theforger of the vouchers.

The rule is that if a person had in his possession a falsified document and be made use of it (utteredit), taking advantage of it and profiting thereby, the presumption is that he is the material author of thefalsification. This is especially true if the use or uttering of the forged documents was so closelyconnected in time with the forgery that the user or possessor may be proven to have the capacity ofcommitting the forgery, or to have close connection with the forgers, and therefore, had complicity inthe forgery. (U.S. vs. Castillo, 6 Phil., 453; People vs. De Lara, 45 Phil. 754; People vs. Domingo, 49Phil. 28; People vs. Astudillo, 60 Phil. 338 People vs. Manansala, 105 Phil. 1253).



In the absence of a satisfactory explanation, one who is found in possession of a forged documentand who used or uttered it is presumed to be the forger (Alarcon vs. Court of Appeals, L-21846,March 31, 1967, 19 SCRA 688; People vs.Caragao, L-28258, December 27, 1969, 30 SCRA 993).

Samson's use of one form of signature for his crooked transactions with the provincial governmentand another form of signatures of his valid transactions or papers shows the deviousness of thefalsifications perpetrated in these cases. (Note that Sendaydiego signed the certification in the firstvoucher, Exhibit K, stating that proceeds thereof were paid to

Samson but Sendaydiego did not sign the same certification in the other five forged vouchers,Exhibits O, P, Q, R and S).

As to the question of conspiracy, the statement of Samson's on page 19 of his brief, that "the triacourt made absolutely no finding of any supposed conspiracy' between Samson and Sendaydiego, isnot correct.

We have already noted that the trial court explicitly stated that the circumstance that Sendaydiegosigned the six vouchers ahead of his assistant shows that there was "malice or fraud" on the part ofSendaydiego and that there was conivance between Samson and Sendaydiego when the proceeds

of the vouchers were paid to Samson in Sendaydiego's inner office, instead of in the cashier's office(p. 23, 26, Decision, Appendix to Samson's brief). The trial court said that the fact that Sendaydiegoallowed payment in cash shows "his collission with Samson (Ibid , p. 26).

Samson's contention that the trial court merely conjectured that he had received the proceeds of thevouchers is not well taken. The trial court's finding on that point is based on very strong circumstantiaevidence (assuming that it was not proven that Samson signed the vouchers).

Samson vehemently argues that there is no evidence that the total sum of P57,048. 23 paid under thesix vouchers "was really misappropriated". He asserts that the six vouchers are genuine (although hecontends that his signatures thereon are forgeries) and that there is no proof that the amounts

covered thereby were not paid for the construction materials shown in the six vouchers were neverdelivered by the company (Exh. HH).

These contentions appear to be untenable in thelight of the declaration of Jabanes, the assistantmanager of Carried Construction Supply Co., the alleged supplier, that the materials shown in the sixvouchers were never delivered by the company (Exh. HH).

And Leticia Sevilleja (wife of the provincial engineer), who was employed as cashier of the carriedConstruction Supply Co., denied that Samson turned over to the company the proceeds of the sixvouchers which he was supposed to have collected for the company from Sendaydiego. The sixvouchers appear to be fake principally because they evidence fictitious sales of construction

materials.

Under the said circumstances, it cannot be contended that there was no malversation afterSendaydiego admtte that Samson acknowledged in the six vouchers that he received from TreasurerSendaydiego the total sum of P57,048.23.

The assertion of Samson's counsel on pgae 29 of his brief, that the finding as to his guilt is based ona shaky foundation or is predicated on circumstances which wre not proven, is not correct.

Recapitulations. — In resume, it appears that the provincial treasurer wants to base his exculpationon his belief that in the six vouchers the signatures of Samson and the officials in the provincia



engineer's office appeared to be genuine and on the fact that the auditor had approved the vouchers.The tresurer claimed that he acted in good faith in approving the payments of the proceeds of thevouchers to Samson as the representative of the supplier, Carried Construction Co.

On the other hand, Samson, by impugning his signatures in the vouchers, denied that he received thesaid amounts from the cashier of the treasurer's office.

These conflicting versions of the treasurer and Samson have to be resolved in the light of the

inexpugnable fact that Samson had hand-carried the voucehrs and followed up their processing in theoffices of the provicial government the construction materials described in the six vouchers anddenied having received from Samson the prices of the alleged sales.

The result is the Samson's denial of his signatures in the six vouchers and in the six receipts (Exh. K-6 and KK to KK-4) and the provicial treasurer's pretension of having acted in good faith or havingcommitted an honest mistake have to be disbelieved.

The unavoidable conclusion is that Sendaydiego and Samson were in cahoots to defraud theprovincial government and to camouflage the defraudation by means of the six vouchers which havesome genuine features and which appear to be extrinsically authentic but which were intrinsically

fake.

Penalties. — The trial court and the assumed that three complex crimes of malversation throughfalsification of public documents were committed in this case. That assumption is wrong.

The crimes committed in these three cases are not complex. Separate crimes of falsification andmalversation were committed. These are not cases where the execution of a single act constitutestwo grave or less grave felonies or where the falsification was used as a means to commitmalversation.

In the six vouchers the falsification was used to conceal the malversation. It is settled that if the

falsification was resorted to for the purpose of hiding the malversation, the falsification andmalversation are separate offenses (People vs. Cid, 66 Phil 354; People vs. Villanueva, 58 Phil. 671People vs. Geralde 52 Phil. 1000; People vs. Regis, 67 Phil. 43).

In the Regis case, supra where the modus operandi is similar to the instant cases, the municipatreasurer made it appear in two official payrolls dated April .30 and May 2, 1931 that some personsworked as laborers in a certain street project at Pinamungahan, Cebu. In that way, the two amountscovered by the payrolls, P473.70 and P271.60, were appropriated and taken from the municipalfunds. As a matter of fact, no such work was done in the said street project and the personsmentioned in both payrolls had not performed any labor.

It was held in the Regis case, that the falsification and malversation did not constitute a complexcrime because the falsifications were not necessary means for the co on of the malversations. Eachfalsification and each malversation constituted independent offenses which must be punishedseparately.

The municipal treasurer was convicted of two falsifications and two malversations. Four distinctpenalties were imposed.

In the instant cases, the provincial , as the custodian than of the money forming part of the road andbridge could have malversed or misappropriated it without falsifiying any voucher. The falsificationwas used as a device to prevent detection of the malversation.



For each of the six falsification of the vouchers (Exh. K, O, P, Q, R and S), Samson is sentenced toan indeterminate penalty of two (2) years of prison correccional minimum, as minimum, to four (4)years of prision correccional medium, as maximum, and to pay a fine of three thousand pesos.

For the malversation of the sum of P16,727.52 covered by voucher No. 10724 (Exh. K), Samson issentenced to an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor maximum, as minimumto seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum; to pay a fine in the amount ofP16,727.52, and to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case NO.

23349, L-33252).

For the malversation of the sum of P14,571.81 covered by voucher No. 11995 (Exh. O), Samson issentenced to an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor maximum, as minimumto seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum; to pay a fine in the sum ofP14,571.81, and to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No.23351, L-33254).

For the malversation of the sum of P6,290.60 covered by voucher No. 11870 (Exh. Q), Samson issentenced to an indertiminate penalty of nine (9) years of prision mayor medium, as minimum, tothirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal minimum, as maximum; to pay a fine of P6,290.60, and to

indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No. 23350, L-33253).

For the malversation of the sum of P9,769.64 covered by voucher No. 11871 (Exh. R), Samson issentenced to an indeterminate penalty of nine (9) years of prision mayor medium, as minimum, tothirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal minimum, as maximum; to pay a fine of P9,769.64, and toindemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No. 23350, L-33253).

For the malversation of the sum of P5,187.28, covered by voucher No. 11869 (Exh. P), Samson issentenced to an indeterminate penalty of five (5) years of prision correccional maximum, as minimumto eight (8) of prision mayor minimum, as maximum; to pay a fine of P5,187.28, and to indemnify theprovince of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No. 23350, L-33253).

For the malversation of the sum of P4,501.38 covered by voucher no. 11872 (Exh. S), Samson issentenced to an indeterminate penalty of five (5) years of prision correccional maximum, as minimum,to eight (8) years of prision mayor minimum, as maximum; to pay a fine of P4,501.38, and toindemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No. 23350, L-33253).

In the service of the twelve penalties meted to Samson, the threefold limit provided for in article 70 ofthe Revised Penal Code should be observed (People vs. Escares, 102 Phil. 677), meaning that themaximum penalty that he should serve is three times the indeterminate sentence of twelve (12) yearsto seventeen (17) years, the severest penalty imposed on him, or thirty-six (36) years to fifty-one (51)years (see People vs. Peñas, 68 Phil. 533).

The maximum duration of his sentences should not exceed forty (40) years (Penultimate par. of art.70; People vs. Alisub, 69 Phil. 362; People vs. Concepcion, 59 Phil. 518, 68 Phil. 530 and 69 Phil.58).

The estate of the late Licerio P. Sendaydiego is ordered to indemnify the province of Pangasinan inthe sum of P57,048.23.

Samson and the said estate are sojidarily liable for the said indemnity (Art. 110, Revised PenalCode). Samson should pay one-half of the costs.



SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 82197 March 13, 1989

MANUEL L. SIQUIAN petitioner,vs.THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

Cortes & Reyna Law Firm for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

CORTES, J .:

The information charging petitioner Manuel L. Siquian, the then municipal mayor of Angadanan,Isabela, of the crime of falsification of public document under Art. 171, p. 4 of the Revised PenaCode filed by Second Assistant Provincial Fiscal before Branch XX of the Regional Trial Court of

Cauayan, Isabela reads as follows:

That on or about the lst day of July, 1975, in the Municipality of Angadanan, Province of Isabela, andwithin the preliminary jurisdiction of this Honorable court, the accused Manuel L. Siquian, being thenthe Municipal Mayor of Angadanan, Isabela, taking advantage of his position as such MunicipaMayor did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously prepare and, sign a false documentknowing it to be false, to wit. An official communication to the Civil Service Commissioner, dated July1, 1975, which is required by law in order to support the appointment of a certain Jesusa B. Carreonto the position of clerk in the Office of the Municipal Secretary which (sic) he appointed as such bystating and making it appear in said document that there was such a position existing and that fundstherefore were available. When in truth and in fact, as said accused well-know (sic), there was no

such position or item and no funds were available for said position in the Fiscal Budget of Angadananfor 1975-76, nor was there any special ordinance creating said position and appropriating thenecessary funds therefor.

x x x

[Rollo, pp. 23-24.]

Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the offense charged and the trial of the caseensued. The facts as found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) are as follows:

It appears from the evidence that sometime in June 1975, Jesusa Carreon, 20 years old, single and aresident of Ilagan, Isabela, went to the accused Manuel L. Siquian, Mayor of the Municipality of

Angadanan, Province of Isabela, to apply for employment in the office of the Mayor. Earlier, she andher friends went to the Municipal Hall of Angadanan to ask information if there was any vacancyWhen she was informed that there was, she went to see the accused in his house.

The accused must have agreed to appoint her because he accompanied her to the office of theMunicipal Secretary, Emilio Valenzuela. The latter, however, was not there. Even so, the accused toldJesusa Carreon to report for work the following day and that she should be included in the budget



The accused then accompanied her to the Office of the Municipal Treasurer, Calo Battung thetreasurer agreed that she could report for work.

One week after, Jesusa Carreon went alone to the Office of the Municipal Secretary. He was there.When she went to the accused, she was told to go back to the Municipal Secretary to work for herappointment papers.

She was appointed clerk to the Municipal Secretary in the Office of the Municipal Secretary, on July

1, 1975 by the accused.

x x x

Accompanying her appointment is the certification, among others, of the availability of funds CS FormNo. 203) dated July 1, 1975, issued by the accused Manuel L. Siquian, pursuant to the requirementsof Memorandum Circular No. 5, Series of 1975, addressed to the Commissioner of Civil Service,Manila (Exh. "C").

x x x

Jesusa Carreon took her oath of Office (Exh. "A-l") on July 1, 1975, and promptly began to work onthe same day. Her monthly salary was P 120.00. She rendered services for the months of July,

August, September, October, November and December 1975 (Exhibits "B", "B-l" to "B-5"). She wasnot, however, paid. As early as October 1975, she went to the Municipal Treasurer to receive hersalary, but she was told that there was no money yet. In November 1975, she went to see theaccused, but the latter told her to see the treasurer. She went to the treasurer who told her that therewas no money. because of this, she went to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan at the Provincial Capitoin Ilagan, Isabela, to ask (sic) information regarding her unpaid salaries. She was interviewed by Atty.Efren Ambrosia Provincial Administrator. Atty. Ambrosio asked her if she had complete appointmentpapers. hereafter, she filed her verified complaint dated April 20, 1976, against the accused. Hercomplaint is addressed to Governor Faustino N. Dy (Exhibit "G" and "G-1").

It also appears from the evidence that the Municipal council of Angadanan, Isabela, failed to enactthe annual budget for the municipality for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976 (Exhs. "H", "H-l", and "H-2").

Accordingly, and pursuant to PD No. 477, the annual budget for the previous Fiscal Year 1974-1975was deemed re-enacted (Exh. "H- l"). Thus, the Municipal Plantilla of Personnel for the Fiscal Year1975-1976 is the same as the Plantilla of Personnel for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976. No supplementalbudget was enacted by the municipal council of Angadanan.

In the Plantilla of Personnel for 1974-1975, which was deemed re-enacted for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976, there was no new item or appropriation for the position of clerk in the Office of the MunicipaSecretary of Angadanan, Isabela. The new position of clerk in the office of the Municipal Counci

appearing in the Municipal Plantilla for Personnel (Exhibit "H-2") for 1974- 1975, was filled up as earlyas October 16, 1974 by the accused when he appointed Clarita G. Ramirez to that position (Exhibits"J" and "J-2"). With respect to the new position of a Clerk to the office of the Municipal Mayor in thePlantilla for 1974-1975, it was already filled-up by the appointment of Miss Marivic A. Tallod on June16, 1975, by the accused (Exhibits "K" and "K-4"). As early as June 28, 1974, the same position washeld by Miss Felicidad Visitacion who was appointed by the accused, but she resigned (Exhs. "K"and "K-l").

x x x

[Rollo, pp. 26, 28, 29-30.]



After trial, the Court found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged anddecreed:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused Manuel L. Siquian guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime offalsification of public document as charged in the information, the Court hereby sentences saidaccused to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from FIVE (5) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE(1) DAY of prision correctional (sic) as minimum to SEVEN YEARS of prision mayor as maximum andto pay a fine of THREE THOUSAND (P 3,000.00) PESOS.

SO ORDERED. [Rollo, p. 35.]

On appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals ruled as follows:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is in accordance with law and the evidence and is herebytherefore affirmed. Costs against the accused- appellant.

SO ORDERED. [Rollo, p. 42.]

Hence, this petition for review seeking reversal of the CA decision and the acquittal of petitioner

Manuel L. Siquian. Petitioner contends that the respondent court has decided a question ofsubstance not in accord with law and jurisprudence when it affirmed the decision of the trial courtconvicting him of the crime of falsification despite the following

A. The evidence on record which consists of the testimony of the prosecution's principal witnessshows the absence of criminal intent on the part of the accused.

B. There is no evidence that the accused took advantage of his position as Municipal Mayor when hemade the allegedly falsified certification.

C. The statement that "Funds for the position are available" is not a narration of facts but a conclusion

of law.

D. The petitioner was deprived of his right to due process of law when the trial court proceeded withthe trial in his absence despite a pending petition for change of venue with the Supreme Court. [Rollo,p. 13.]

Petitioner's arguments, however, are bereft of any merit.

The offense of falsification by a public officer under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code iscommitted by "any public officer, employee or notary who, taking advantage of his official position,shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts: . . . 4. Making untruthful statements

in a narration of fact; . . .' It is settled that in this fourth kind of falsification, the following requisitesmust concur:

(a) That the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in a narration of facts;

(b) hat he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and

(c) That the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false Cabigas v. People, G.R. No. 67472July 3, 1987, 152 SCRA 18.



All these requisites had been fully met in the case at bar. Petitioner, a public officer, being then themayor of the municipality of Angadanan, Isabela, made an untruthful statement in the narration offacts contained in the certification which he issued in connection with the appointment of complainantJesusa Carreon. The certification, having been issued by a public official in the exercise of thefunction of his office is a public document [U.S. v. Asensi, 34 Phil. 765 (1915)]. It is immateriawhether or not the Civil Service Commissioner to whom the certification was addressed received thedocument issued by petitioner. Since the certification was prepared by petitioner in accordance withthe standard forms prescribed by the government (specifically the Civil Service Commission)

pursuant to law, the certification was invested with the character of a public document [People v Asensi, supra citing U.S. v. Vy Guico, 12 Phil. 209 (1908)] falsification of which is punishable under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. Here, falsification of such document was committed whenthe petitioner stated that funds were available for the position to which Jesusa Carreon was appointedwhen he knew that, in reality, the position itself did not even exist and no funds had beenappropriated therefor.

Petitioner's stance that the certification which he issued contained no narration of facts but rather aconclusion of law is not meritorious. The respondent court, upholding the Solicitor General'sarguments, correctly ruled as follows:

Conclusion of law" is defined as a proposition not arrived at by any process of natural reasoning froma fact or combination of facts stated but by the application of the artificial rules of law to the factspleaded [Levins v. Rovegno, 71 Cal. 273, 12 p. 161; Black's Law Dict., p. 362].

From the above-cited definition, it can be deduced that the certification by the appellant that 'funds forthe position are available' does not require the application of the artificial rules of law. To certify thafunds are available for the position what one should do was (sic) to refer to the budget and plantilla of

personnel of the applicable fiscal year and ascertain if such item exists and funds are allocatedtherefor.

In the present case, despite the presence of the records which shows that there is no position and

funds therefor referred to in the certification, the appellant, fully aware of the data provided by therecords, certified falsely that "funds for the position are available" [Rollo, p. 41).

It is undisputed that the Municipal Council of Angadanan failed to enact the annual budget of themunicipality for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976 and therefore, the annual budget for the last fiscal year1974-1975, was deemed re-enacted under P.D. No. 477. In the Municipal Plantilla of Personnel (Exh."B-2") accompanying the Annual Budget for the Municipality of Angadanan, Isabela for the FiscalYear 1974-1975, there is no such position as Clerk to the Municipal Secretary in the Office of theMunicipal Secretary, the position to which Jesusa Carreon was appointed. Accordingly, there is noappropriation made in the Annual Budget for the Fiscal Year 1974-1975 for such position, thusrendering petitioner's statement in his certification utterly false. The requisite of absolute falsity of the

statement made in the document is met when there exists not even an iota of colorable truth in whatis declared in the narration of facts [U.S. v. Bayot, 10 Phil. 518 (1908)], as in this case. From theforegoing, it can be seen that the first and third requirements laid down inthe Cabigas case, supra, are fully satisfied.

The second element of the offense is likewise present. Under the civil service rules and regulationsspecifically the Guidelines in the Preparation of Appointment for Original Appointment (Exhs. "D" and"D-3"), a certification of the availability of funds for the position to be filled up is required to be signedby the head of office or any officer who has been delegated the authority to sign. As an officerauthorized by law to issue this certification which is designated as Civil Service Form No. 203, asrevised, the petitioner has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him in said



(1911)]. Abuse of public office is considered present when the offender falsifies a document inconnection with the duties of his office which consist of either making or preparing or otherwiseintervening in the preparation of a document [U.S. v. Inosanto 20 Phil. 376 (1911); People v.Santiago Uy, 101 Phil. 159 (1957)], as in the case of petitioner who was charged with the duty ofissuing the certification necessary for the appointment of Jesusa Carreon.

Finally, the alleged denial of due process of law committed by the trial court when it proceeded withthe trial of the case in the absence of the petitioner despite a pending petition for change of venue

with the Supreme Court is totally unfounded. A careful and thorough review of the record reveals thatpetitioner had been afforded due process when the trial court, in view of the absence of petitioner,granted continuances to enable the defense to present its evidence although the prosecution hadrested its case as early as December 7, 1978. [See Original Records, p. 253, et seq.]

It is a basic postulate in law that what is repugnant to due process is not lack of previous notice butabsolute lack of opportunity to be heard [Tajonera v. Lamaroza, G.R. Nos. L-48097 & 49035,December 19, 1981, 110 SCRA 438]. Hence, this Court laid down this criterion to determine whetheran accused in a criminal case has been properly accorded due process of law:

. . . (I)f an accused has been heard in a court of competent jurisdiction and proceeded

against under the orderly processes of law, and only punished after inquiry andinvestigation, upon notice to him,with an opportunity to be heard, and a judgmentawarded within the authority of a constitutional law, then he has had due process of law. . . [People v. Muit G.R. No. L-48875, October 21, 1982, 117 SCRA 696 citing People v.Castillo, 776 Phil. 73 (1946); Emphasis supplied.]

Thus, there is no denial of due process when an accused is afforded the chance to present evidenceon his behalf but due to his repeated, unjustifiable failure to appear at the hearings, the trial courtordered the case to be deemed submitted upon the evidence presented by the prosecution. Forunder such circumstances, he will be deemed to have waived his right to be present during the trial[Section 1 (c), Rule 115 of the Revised Rules of Court] and his right to adduce evidence on his behalf

[People v. Angco, 103 Phil. 33 (1958).]

It is true that he filed a petition for change of venue with the Supreme Court. However, on the date setfor the hearing of the petitioner's urgent motion to suspend the proceedings in the trial court due tothe pendency of the petition for change of venue, he also failed to appear [See Order dated January18, 1985, Original Records, p. 428]. In fact, Atty. Romeo Calixto, one of the counsel for the petitioner,manifested before the trial court that he was - withdrawing as counsel for his client for the reason thathe has lost contact with the latter who already went abroad [ See Original Records, p. 435]. Hencethe trial court cannot be faulted for rendering its decision on the basis solely of the evidencepresented by the prosecution.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision being in conformity with law and settled jurisprudence, thesame is AFFIRMED and the instant petition is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 43659 : December 21, 1990.]

192 SCRA 521



PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Peti t ioner, vs. HON. FELICIDAD CARANDANG VILLALON andFEDERICO DE GUZMAN, Respond ents.

D E C I S I O N

REGALADO, J .:

Assailed in this special civil action for Certiorari is the order rendered by Judge Manuel Castañeda onJanuary 28, 1976 dismissing Criminal Case No. D-868 of the former Court of First Instance ofPangasinan, and the order rendered in the same case on March 22, 1976 by his successor, theherein public respondent, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order ofdismissal.

Culled from the records, 1 it appears that complainant Mariano Carrera and his brother, SeveroCarrera, are co-owners of a parcel of land located at Barrio Buenlag, Binmaley, Pangasinan,registered in their names under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 47682.

On February 5, 1964, complainant allegedly executed a special power of attorney before NotaryPublic Jaime B. Arzadon, Jr., naming private respondent Federico de Guzman as his lawful attorney-in-fact. On February 13, 1964, private respondent mortgaged the parcel of land with the People'sBank and Trust Company in Dagupan City using the said special power of attorney, and was able toobtain the amount of P8,500.00 as a loan from the mortgagee bank. Both the special power ofattorney and the mortgage contract were duly registered in the Registry of Deeds of Pangasinan onFebruary 13, 1964.:- nad

After the expiration of the term of the mortgage, and the mortgage account not having been paid, themortgagee bank foreclosed said mortgage and the land was sold to one Ramon Serafica and ViletaQuinto who were issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. 85181 for said property. In January, 1972,complainant allegedly discovered that their property was already registered in the name of said

Ramon Serafica when the latter filed on said date an action for the ejectment of the former from thepremises.

On March 29, 1974, Criminal Case No. D-868 for estafa thru falsification of a public document wasfiled against private respondent in the then Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, the informationreading as follows:

"That on or about the 15th day of February, 1964, in the City of Dagupan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the abovenamed accused FEDERICO DE GUZMAN, being then a privateindividual, after having in his possession Transfer Certificate of Title No. 47682, did then and there,wilfully, unlawfully and criminally falsify and forge the signature of one MARIANO F. CARRERA, in aPower of Attorney, causing and making it appear that the said MARIANO F. CARRERA, signed and

affixed his signature in the said Power of Attorney, which is a public document, when as a matter offact and in truth, said MARIANO F. CARRERA, did not in anyway (sic) participate in any acts thereof,nor gave his permission, and in order to make good the acts of falsification, with intent of gain andby means of fraud and other deceits, the said accused FEDERICO DE GUZMAN, thru the saidfalsified public document (Power of Attorney) did succeed in securing the loan from the People'sBank and Trust Company in the amount of EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS(P8,500.00) Philippine currency, without the knowledge and consent of said MARIANO F. CARRERA,to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the amount of P4,250.00, and other consequentialdamages." 2



After arraignment where private respondent pleaded not guilty, the case proceeded to trial and theprosecution presented complainant Mariano F. Carrera and one Melanio Esguig from the Office of theRegister of Deeds for the Province of Pangasinan. Another witness, Col. Jose G. Fernandez, ahandwriting expert, gave his partial testimony but the same was not continued as counsel for privaterespondent moved for and was granted leave to file a motion to dismiss.

On December 16, 1975, the motion to dismiss 3 was filed, wherein it was alleged that the crimecharged would not lie due to the partial testimony of complainant allegedly to the effect that heauthorized private respondent to mortgage the said one-half portion of the land owned by him and hisbrother. Said partial testimony of complainant was quoted, with the emphasized portions, as follows:

"Q Mr. Carrera, do you know what happened to the title of your property at present?

A Yes, sir, I know.

Q Could you tell us what happened to your title?

A It was foreclosed by the Bank, sir.

Q Now, you said that it was foreclosed by the Bank. Do you know the reason why it was foreclosedby the Bank?

A Yes, sir.

Q Could you tell this Honorable Court how it was foreclosed by the Bank?

A Yes, sir. On February 10, 1964, my brother Severo Carrera went to Manila and he asked me to signa document as a witness and I asked him he interpreted that this is an authorization to Federico deGuzman to get a loan from the Bank on the half portion of the land which belongs to me, my brothersaid.

Q So sometime in 1964, your older brother Severo Carrera went to you in Manila and asked you tosign a power of attorney authorizing de Guzman to mortgage the one-half portion of that land ownedby you and your brother. Do you have any document to show that?

x x x

ATTY. DIAZ:

Q Can you recognize that document which you signed in 1964 if shown to you?

A Yes, sir.

Q Now I am asking . . . I am showing here a document which is, your Honor, for the purpose ofidentification, and may we request that it be marked as Exhibit B for the prosecution. This documentconsist (sic) of two pages, your Honor, and the first page be marked as Exhibit B and the secondpage be marked as Exhibit B-1, page two. Will you tell this Honorable Court what is this?

A This is the document brought by my brother to Manila for me to sign, sir.

x x x

(Hearing of June 18, 1974, pp. 8-10; Emphasis supplied)" 4

Based on the aforequoted testimony, private respondent contends that there is no sufficient basis forthe charge and this fact warrants the dismissal of the case.

Private respondent also claims that the crime has prescribed since more than ten (10) years hadelapsed from the time the crime was committed. Since the information charges the complex crime ofestafa thru falsification of a public document, then the penalty shall be that for the more seriouscrime which shall be applied in its maximum period, as provided for by Article 48 of the Penal Code.The more serious crime in the present case is the falsification of the public document which is



punishable with prision correccional in its medium and maximum period and a fine not exceedingP5,000.00. Prision correccional being a correctional penalty, the same prescribes in ten (10) years.

It was noted in said motion to dismiss that the information filed in the case merely alleged the date ofthe commission of the crime which was February 5, 1964 and the information was filed only on March29, 1974. This being the case, private respondent claims that more than ten (10) years has passedfrom the commission of the crime to the filing of the information. No other allegation having beenmade as to the discovery of the alleged crime, private respondent claimed that the period ofprescription commenced on the day on which the crime was committed. He asserts that, from thedate appearing in the transfer certificate of title covering the land mortgaged with the bank, themortgage documents were duly registered with the Registry of Deeds of Dagupan City on February13, 1984, hence the alleged crime became public knowledge on the same date. To support histheory, private respondent made the following citation:

"The period of prescription commences to run from the date of the commission of the crime if it isknown at the time of its commission.:-cralaw

"Thus, if there is nothing that was concealed or needed to be discovered, because the entire series oftransactions was by public instruments, duly recorded, the crime of estafa committed in connectionwith said transaction was known to the offended party when it was committed and the period ofprescription commenced to run from the date of its commission. People v. Dinsay, C.A. 40 O.G. 12th

Supp. 50 (The Revised Penal Code by Justice Luis B. Reyes, Revised Edition 1967, Vol. I, pp. 711-712)." 5

The prosecution countered that the testimony of Mariano Carrera shows that what was intended wasan authority to mortgage only the one-half portion pertaining to his brother and he was only quotingwhat his brother told him when he said that ". . . this is an authority to Federico de Guzman to get aloan from the bank on the half portion of the land which belongs to me, my brother said." 6

It further submitted that the information was not filed out of time since the date to be consideredshould not be the date of registration of the alleged power of attorney on February 13, 1964. It arguedthat the crime was actually discovered only in January, 1972 when Ramon S. Serafica filed an actionto eject complainant from the premises, which fact was not alleged in the information because it was

considered by the prosecution as a mere evidentiary matter which would not be in accord with thelegal truism that an "information must allege only ultimate facts and not evidentiary matters." 7

With regard to the case of People vs. Dinsay cited by private respondent, petitioner submits that"(t)he same has only a persuasive effect and not to be considered as an interpretation of Article 91 ofthe Revised Penal Code as the same is the sole prerogative of the Supreme Court." 8

As earlier noted, then Presiding Judge Manuel Castañeda of the Court of First Instance ofPangasinan, Branch III, dismissed the case on January 28, 1976 on the ground that the crime hadprescribed. The People's motion for reconsideration was denied by the succeeding Presiding JudgeFelicidad Carandang Villalon.

On March 25, 1976, the prosecution filed a notice of appeal from both orders of the trial court. In a

resolution dated May 13, 1976, this Court required the prosecution to file a petition for reviewon Certiorari in accordance with Republic Act No. 5440. 9 Thereafter, said petition for review and thecorresponding comment and reply of the parties having been filed, on February 21, 1977 the Courtresolved to treat said petition as a special civil action and required petitioner and private respondentto submit their respective memoranda. 10

From the memoranda submitted, the Court is tasked with the resolution of the following issues:

1. Whether the People could appeal from the order of dismissal because the private respondentwould thereby be placed in double jeopardy;



2. Whether the charge of estafa thru falsification of a public document filed against the privaterespondent has sufficient ground to exist in law and in fact; and,

3. Whether the offense charged in the aforementioned criminal case is already extinguished byprescription. 11

The bar of double jeopardy is not involved in the present recourse. As enunciated in People vs. CityCourt of Manila, etc., et al.:

"As a general rule, the dismissal or termination of the case after arraignment and plea of thedefendant to a valid information shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or forany attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includesor is necessarily included in the complaint or information (Section 9, Rule 113). However, an appeaby the prosecution from the order of dismissal (of the criminal case) by the trial court shall notconstitute double jeopardy if (1) the dismissal is made upon motion, or with the express consent, ofthe defendant, and (2) the dismissal is not an acquittal or based upon consideration of the evidenceor of the merits of the case; and (3) the question to be passed upon by the appellate court is purelylegal so that should the dismissal be found incorrect, the case would have to be remanded to thecourt of origin for further proceedings, to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant." 12

On the issue of whether the charge of estafa thru falsification of a public document has sufficien

basis to exist in fact and in law, we hold in the affirmative. The falsification of a public documentmay be a means of committing estafa because before the falsified document is actually utilized todefraud another, the crime of falsification has already been consummated, damage or intent tocause damage not being an element of the crime of falsification of public, official or commerciadocuments. The damage to another is caused by the commission of estafa, not by the falsificationof the document, hence, the falsification of the public, official or commercial document is only anecessary means to commit the estafa. 13

Petitioner posits that the offense charged is supported by the fact that what was intended to bemortgaged was the one-half portion pertaining to Severo Carrera, not the portion pertaining tocomplainant, otherwise complainant would not have quoted his brother's words. The theory ofpetitioner and the findings of public respondent are substantially the same. We agree that the offense

charged does exist in fact and in law, as explained in the findings of the court below:

"In the light of the circumstances revealed by the partial testimony of complainant Mariano Carreraand of the record, as regards the first ground, the court finds that the contention of the defense thatthe authorization given to him to mortgage the whole property is not sustained by the evidencebecause a cursory study of the answer made by the witness complainant clearly shows that what wasintended to be mortgaged was the one-half (1/2) portion pertaining only to Severo Carrera, excludingthat portion pertaining to said complainant. (T.S.N.. pp. 8-10, hearing on June 18, 1974). In othewords, the alleged authorization given to Federico de Guzman to get a loan from the Bank on the halfportion of the land referred to the share of Severo Carrera only. This finding is based on the followingquoted answer:

'A . . . and when I asked him he interpreted that this is an authorization to Federico de Guzman to geta loan from the bank on the half portion of the land which belongs to me, my brother said.'

Mariano Carrera on June 18, 1974, gave the above-quoted testimony. He merely quoted his brotherSevero Carrera to whom the half portion of the land belongs. Severo Carrera, as quoted by MarianoCarrera, did not use the phrase `which belongs to you.'" 14

Notwithstanding the foregoing disquisition on the sufficiency of the charge of estafa thru falsificationof a public document, the resolution of the issue on prescription is, however, determinative of thevalidity of the impugned orders of public respondent.: nad



Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty for a complex crime is that for themost serious component offense, the same to be applied in its maximum period. In the crime ofestafa thru falsification of a public document, the more serious crime is the falsification whichcarries with it the correctional penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods anda fine not more than P5,000.00 imposed by Article 172 of the Code. Crimes punishable bycorrectional penalties prescribe in ten (10) years pursuant to Article 90 of the Code, and Article 91thereof states that the prescriptive period commences to run "from the day on which the crime isdiscovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents . . ."

The document which was allegedly falsified was a notarized special power of attorney registered inthe Registry of Deeds of Dagupan City on February 13, 1964 authorizing private respondent tomortgage a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 47682 in order to secure a loanof P8,500.00 from the People's Bank and Trust Company. The information for estafa thrufalsification of a public document was filed only on March 29, 1974. We reject petitioner's claim thatthe ten-year period commenced when complainant supposedly discovered the crime in January, 1972by reason of the ejectment suit against him.

People vs. Reyes 15 cites authorities on the well established rule that registration in a public registryis a notice to the whole world. The record is constructive notice of its contents as well as all interestslegal and equitable, included therein. All persons are charged with knowledge of what it contains. On

these considerations, it holds that the prior ruling in Cabral vs. Puno, etc., et al., 16 to the effect thatin the crime of falsification of a public document the prescriptive period commences from the timethe offended party had constructive notice of the alleged forgery after the document was registeredwith the Register of Deeds is not without legal basis.

It was also noted that in Armentia vs. Patriarca, et al., 17 in interpreting the phrase "from thediscovery" found in Article 1391 of the Civil Code which authorizes annulment, in case of mistake orfraud, within four years from the time of the discovery of the same, the Court also held that thediscovery must be reckoned to have taken place from the time the document was registered in theRegister of Deeds, for the familiar rule is that registration is a notice to the whole world and thisshould apply to both criminal and civil cases.: nad

We are further in accord with the conclusion in Reyes that the application of said rule on constructivenotice in the interpretation of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code would most certainly be favorableto private respondent herein, since the prescriptive period of the crime shall have to be reckoned withearlier, that is, from the time the questioned documents were recorded in the Registry of Deeds.

In the instant case, the special power of attorney involved was registered on February 13, 1964. Thecriminal information against private respondent having been filed only on March 29, 1974, or morethan ten (10) years thereafter, the crime with which private respondent was charged has indubitablyprescribed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the challenged orders ofpublic respondent are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 73905 September 30, 1991

MICHAEL T. DAVA, petitioner,vs.THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and the INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents.

KV. Faylona & Associates for petitioner.



FERNAN, C.J.:p

On October 19, 1975, while driving a car along Shaw Boulevard, Mandaluyong, Rizal, petitionerMichael T. Dava, then holder of non-professional driver's license No. 1474427

1 with official receipt

No. 7023037, 2 bumped pedestrians Bernadette Roxas Clamor and Dolores E. Roxas, causing deathto former and physical injuries to the latter.

As a consequence of said incident, Dava was brought to Mandaluyong Police headquarters where hisdriver's license was confiscated by Cpl. Daniel Severino who later submitted Dava's driver's license tothe fiscal's office in Pasig, Rizal. license was thereafter presented as prosecution evidence in criminalcase for homicide and serious physical injuries reckless imprudence filed against Dava in the thenCourt First Instance of Rizal in Pasig. 3

On April 12, 1978, Antonio Roxas, the brother of Bernadette and the father of Dolores, saw Davadriving a maroon Volkswagen (beetle-type) car with plate No. AD-902 B. Knowing that Dava's driver'slicense was used as an exhibit in court and that no traffic violation receipt had been issued to DavaRoxas sought the help of then Minister of Defense Juan Ponce Enrile in apprehending Dava for

driving without a license. 4 The Ministry of Defense later indorsed Roxas' request for assistance to theConstabulary Highway Patrol Group (CHPG).

At around 7:30 in the evening of July 21, 1978, M/Sgt. Domingo Lising and S/Sgt. Arturo Viduya ofthe CHPG saw the maroon Volkswagen car described by Roxas parked in front of the UniwideDepartment Store near the then Nation theater in Cubao, Quezon City. When the driver and hiscompanion arrived, Lising and Viduya confronted them and asked the driver for his license. Theywere shown non-professional driver's license No. 2706887 5 with official receipt No. 0605870 6 issuedby Agency 2L Pampanga in the name of Michael T. Dava. When asked about the source of hislicense, Dava informed them that his officemate had secured it for him.

Lising and Viduya invited Dava to the CHPG office in Camp Crame, Quezon City for questioningDava refused to give a statement upon the advice of his lawyer. Lising then submitted a spot report toCol. Maristela stating therein that "subject had violated Section 31 of RA 4136 for false representationin the application of a driver's license intended to be used as a legal license." 7 In his affidavit ofapprehension dated November 16, 1978, Lising stated that he was 'about to book him for violation ofSection 31 of Rep. Act 4136, when subsequent investigation revealed that the Driver's Licenseabove-mentioned is a Fake and a Falsity' and therefore a case for falsification and use of falsifieddocuments under Section 172 of the Revised Penal Code should be filed against Dava.

8 Lising

concluded that Dava's driver's license was fake because when he compared it with the xerox copy ofDava's license which was attached to the record of the criminal case in Pasig, the signatures and thedates of birth indicated in the two licenses did "not tally." 9

Accordingly, an information for falsification of a public document was filed against Dava in the thenCourt of First Instance of Rizal, Branch V at Quezon City. 10 One of the prosecution witnesses wasCaroline Vinluan of the Angeles City branch of the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT). He testifiedthat hen was then the registrar of the said office when Dava's driver' license was brought to him bylawyer Jose Francisco who was interested in knowing whether it was genuine or fake and if wasissued by the Angeles City agency of the BLT. He examine it and found out that it was "fake orillegally issued" because form No. 2706887 was one of the fifty (50) forms which had been reportedmissing from their office sometime in November, 1976 and that it was never issued to any applicantfor a license. 11 He added that any license that was not included their office index card wasconsidered as "coming from illegal source' and "not legally issued by any agency."

12



Vinluan stated that although the form used for the license was genuine,13 the signature of the issuing

official was fake. 14 He "believed" certain persons had been apprehended for "plasticization" oflicenses outside their office 15 and that sometime November, 1976, agents of the National Bureau ofInvestigation raided the house of a certain person who had in his possession some of the forms whichhad been missing from office.

16 He concluded that the license was fake because the form was issued

by the central office to the Angeles agency, the license appeared on its face to have been issued theSan Fernando, Pampanga agency. 17

Dava was convicted of the crime charged. He appealed to then Court of Appeals 18 which affirmed thelower court's decision on January 29, 1982. Dava filed a motion for reconsideration of the saiddecision contending that the lower court had no jurisdiction to try the case. On April 27, 1982, theCourt of Appeals reversed and set aside its decision and issued a resolution the dispositive portion ofwhich reads:

WHEREFORE, as prayed for, our decision is hereby reconsidered and set aside, andanother judgment shall be entered annulling the proceedings in the court a quo withouprejudice to the refiling of the charges with the proper court. (Rollo, pp. 35-36.)

Consequently, the case was refiled with the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch 47 at San

Fernando as Criminal Case No. 2422. The information for falsification of a public document readsas follows:

That on or about the 12th day of April, 1978, and for sometime prior thereto, in themunicipality of San Fernando, province of Pampanga, Philippines, and within the

jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused MICHAEL T. DAVA, aprivate individual, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify or causeto be falsified, a Non-Professional Driver's license with Serial No. 2706887 covered byOfficial Receipt No. 0605870, dated January 24, 1978, a public document, by making itappear that the signatories therein who are officials of the Pampanga LTC Agencyparticipated in the preparation thereof, when in truth and in fact they did not so

participate and the accused made use of the same knowing it to be falsified.

ALL CONTRARY TO LAW.

At the trial, the prosecution presented Antonio Roxas who testified on how he saw Dava driving a carand that, knowing that Dava's license had been confiscated as a result of the filing of the homicideand serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence case, he thereafter sought the assistanceof then Minister Enrile in apprehending Dava for driving without a license.

19 For his part, Domingo

Lising, who apprehended Dava, narrated in court how he first saw Daya driving a car along Banahawand N. Domingo Sts. in Quezon City until he finally confronted Dava at the vicinity of the AranetaColiseum and confiscated his driver's license. As earlier stated, he conclude that the driver's license

shown to him by Dava was fake because he noticed that, when compared with the license attached torecord of the criminal case filed against Dava, the license confiscated bore a different signature anddate of birth. 20

Daniel Severino, a sergeant of the Mandaluyong police, testified that he investigated the trafficincident along Shaw Boulevard on October 19, 1975 which involved Dava and the two relatives of

Antonio Roxas. He himself confiscated Dava's no professional driver's license No. 1474427 which helater turn over to the fiscal's office.

21

In the course of Severino's testimony, the defense counsel informed the court that, upon a resolutionof the Court of Appeals, Dava was allowed by the lower court having jurisdiction over Criminal Case



No. 16474 to withdraw his driver's license 1474427 from the records of said case.22 When confronted

by the court, Dava volunteered that he withdrew said license in December, 1982 and surrendered it tothe BLT Western District Office so that he could renew his license. 23 Hence, the evidence presentedbefore the Court was a mere xerox copy of said license

24 which also bears a notation that Davareceived original driver's license and its receipt on December 15, 1982.

25

Victor Martin, who had been the head of the San Fernando Pampanga branch of the BLT and whosename appears registrar thereof in official receipt No. 0605870 which was supposed to be attached to

Dava's driver's license No. 270688 admitted that the form of the said license was genuine althoughhe could not tell whether its contents were likewise genuine because it was "opened" and"spliced."

26 He asserted, however, that since the said form "did not emanate" from his office and "afacsimile was not printed" over his name, said license was "not OK". 27

Martin said that he was informed by the property section of the BLT regional office that the number inthe license was one of "the numbers requisitioned by (the) Angeles City agency." 28 He affirmed thatdrivers license No. 2706887 "was not issued by (their) agency" 29 although when recalled to thestand, he admitted that the "2L" filled in the space for "Agency Code No." on the face of license No.2706887 referred to the San Fernando agency.

30 Martin also confirmed the genuineness of officia

receipt No. 0605870 although it was his assistant who signed it for him 31 and affirmed that the

amount of P10.00 indicated therein had been collected and received by his office. 32

Lawyer Jose Francisco testified that he went to the Angeles City office of the BLT to see its chief andinquire about the number of driver's license issued to Dava and whether said office had indeed issuedthem. According to him, the head of the office, Caroline Vinluan, advised him to verify from the indexcard in the possession of the License Division head whether the Angeles City agency had indeedissued Dava's license. 33 Thereafter, the officer-in-charge of the License Division of the BLT in East

Avenue, Quezon City, Leonardo R. Medina, issued a certification dated December 24, 1979 to theeffect that non-professional drivers license No. 2706887 in the name of Dava was "not registered in(their) Index Card." 34

Francisco also informed the court that Carolino Vinluan, the former head of the Angeles City BLTagency, had died on May 12, 1980. 35 He offered in evidence Vinluan's death certificate as Exh. J.

Another evidence presented by the prosecution was the transcript of stenographic notes of thetestimony of Carolino Vinluan which was taken on January 8, 1980 at the trial of Criminal Case NoQ-10759 before the then Court of First Instance Rizal, Branch V at Quezon City. It was marked asExh. K said exhibit was part of the record of Criminal Case No. 10759 which was transmitted to theRegional Trial Court Pampanga. 36

The defense presented only one witness: Felizardo Manalili. A friend of Dava and his former co-trainee at the Sandoz Philippines, a pharmaceutical firm, Manalili testified that Dava quested him to

secure a driver's license for him because he had none. Manalili went to the San Fernando office ofthe Land Transportation Commission (LTC) where he used to secure own license. At the LTC branchoffice, he was "approached" 37 the fixers who roamed around the compound. When he as them howmuch it would cost to secure a driver's license, he told that it would amount to P70 .00. 38 He agreedto pay amount and gave the fixers the personal data of Dava.

39

After an hour, the fixers gave Manalili the license which was inside a plastic jacket. (Manalili identifiedthe license as Exh. B.) He examined it and found out that it looked "like a genuine and authenticdriver's license" to him. The license, which opened and unsealed, bore a signature in the portionwhich showed the name Romeo Edu and contained all the personal data of Dava. Because it did not



bear the signature of Dava Manalili immediately gave the license to Dava and told him to sign itimmediately. Dava did so in Manalili's presence. 40

On March 22, 1984, the lower court rendered a decision41

finding that the license in question was"fake or spurious", that was not duly issued by any proper government licensing age and that theaccused directly participated in the commission of the falsification or caused said falsification. Thecourt took into account the facts that Dava was "in dire need' of a license because of his work as adetailman; that he received his genuine license from the court only on December 15, 1982, and that

Dava himself personally requested his friend, Manalili, to secure the license for him. It arrived at theconclusion that since Dava was the possessor or user of the fake license, he himself was the forgeror the one who caused its forgery or falsification. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court finds the accused Michael T. Dava guiltybeyond reasonable doubt, as principal of the came of Falsification of a PublicDocument, as defined and penalized under the provisions of Article 172 of the RevisedPenal Code, and considering the absence of any mitigating or aggravatingcircumstance, hereby sentences him under the Indeterminate Sentence Law to sufferan indeterminate imprisonment of one (1) year and eight (8) months of prisioncorreecional as minimum, to four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days of prision

correccional as maximum; and to pay a fine of Two Thousand Five Hundred(P2,500.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, plus the costs of this suit.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dava appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court, 42 which on September 30, 1985 affirmedin in toto the decision of the trial court. On February 27, 1986, the appellate court denied Dava'smotion for the reconsideration of said decision finding that no new grounds had been raised therein.Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari .

Petitioner assails herein the reliance of the courts below on the testimony of Carolino Vinluan on the

ground that being a part of the annulled proceedings in Criminal Case No. Q-10759, it may not beconsidered as admissible in evidence as it cannot qualify as a "testimony at a former trial" under theprovisions of Section 41, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

We find petitioner's contention to be meritorious. The resolution of the then Intermediate AppellateCourt in CA-G.R. No. 24312-CR, expressly annulled the proceedings had in Criminal Case No. Q-10759 for lack of jurisdiction of the Quezon City court over the case. That ruling is founded on solid

jurisprudence. We had time and again held that in the absence of proof that the party raising theissue of lack of jurisdiction is barred by estoppel,

43 a decision rendered by a court without jurisdictionis a total nullity. 44 Being worthless in itself, all the proceedings founded upon it are equallyworthless. 45 Hence, the testimony of Vinluan is not only inadmissible in evidence but may well be

considered as totally nonexistent.

With the testimony of the late Carolino Vinluan out of the way, is there sufficient evidence to warrantthe conviction of petitioner for the crime charged?

The information specifically charges the petitioner with having made it appear in his driver's licenseNo. 2706887 that "officials of the Pampanga LTC agency participated" in in-preparation and withhaving used the said driver's license knowing that it was falsified. The charges therefore are foundon the provisions of Article 172 (1) of the Revised Penal Code which punishes any private individualwho shall commit any the falsification enumerated in Article 171 specifically paragraph 2 thereofwhich penalizes the act of causing it to appear that persons (public officials) have participated in any



act proceeding when they did not in fact so participate. The information also charges Dava withhaving knowingly used a false document under the last paragraph of Article 172.

The evidence at hand proves that petitioner, misrepresenting that he had no driver's license, askedhis friend, Manalili, to secure one for him. Sometime in November, 1976, Manalili, who used to get hisown driver's license in San Fernando, Pampanga, was able to secure petitioner's driver's license No.2706887 through fixers at the Land Transportation Commission (LTC) agency in said locality.

46 On

January 24, 1978, petitioner renewed his license at the said office by paying the amount of P10.00 for

which he was issued official receipt No. 0605870. 47

In the renewal of drivers' license, the practice then was simply to present an official receipt showingthat at the previous year the licensee had paid for his driver's license to any agency of the LTC, andto pay the renewal fee. As long as the transaction did not involve the issuance of "another form," adriver did not have to fill up an application form for the renewal of a license. The said agency wouldthen issue an official receipt evidencing the renewal of the license but the driver's license itself wouldnot be changed. 48

Thus. on January 24,1978, when driver's license No. 2706887 together with official receipt No864321 49 were presented to the San Fernando LTC agency, the personnel therein issued official-

receipt No. 0605870 in the name of petitioner. Although the receipt was not personally signed byoffice registrar Victor Martin but by his assistant, the receipt 50was genuine and the amount indicatedtherein was actually paid to and collected by the San Fernando agency. 51 The driver's license itselfmay not have been issued by said agency

52 but its form was likewise genuine. However, accordingto Martin, it was 'not OK' because it "did not emanate" from his office and "a facsimile was not printedover" his name therein.53 Moreover, according to the officer-in-charge of the license Division of theBureau of Land Transportation in East Avenue, Quezon City, non-professional driver's license No2706887 in the name of Michael Dava Tolosa "is not registered" in their index card.

54

Hence, while there is no doubt that driver's license No. 2706887 was a spurious one, the evidence donot pinpoint the petition as the actual falsifier. Unfortunately, however, there are pieces of evidence

which prove beyond reasonable doubt at he caused the falsification and made use of the falsifieddriver's license knowing it to be so.

The elements of the crime of using a falsified document in transaction (other than as evidence in a judicial proceed penalized under the last paragraph of Article 172 are following: (a) the offender knewthat a document was falsified by another person; (b) the false document is embraced in Article 171or in any of subdivisions Nos. 1 and 2 of Article 172; (c he used such document (not in judiciaproceedings), and (d) the use of the false document caused damage to another or at last it was usedwith intent to cause such damage.

55 Except for last, all of these elements have been proven beyond

reason doubt in this case.

It is not disputed that it was petitioner himself who requested Manalili to get him a license. Hemisrepresented to Manalili that he has not at any time been issued a driver's license.

56 Through this

misrepresentation and capitalizing on Manalili awareness of the dire necessity of obtaining a driver'slicense the shortest time possible to enable petitioner to perform duties as detailman, petitioner wasable, in a very subtle clever manner, to induce Manalili to deal with "fixers" in securing the subjectdriver's license. For indeed, there was no way Manalili could obtain a drivers license in so short awithout having to deal with "fixers." Thus, as petitioner calculated, Manalili, who appeared to havebeen motivated by a sincere desire to help a friend, did not hesitate to deal with three fixers whom heknew were not employees of the LTC to whom he paid P70.00 for the license even if the legal feethen was only P15.00. 57 As it was in truth petitioner who induced and left Manalili with no choice butto seek the aid of fixers, the fact that it was Manalili and not petitioner who dealt directly with said



fixers cannot exculpate petitioner from the charge of falsification. He is, beyond reasonable doubt, aprincipal by inducement in the commission of said crime.

Petitioner cannot feign ignorance of the spurious character of his second driver's license No.2706887. Having already obtained a driver's license, he knew that it was not legally possible for himto secure another one. Otherwise, there would have been no need for him to misrepresent to hisfriend Manalili that he was not then a holder of a driver's license. But even with thismisrepresentation, petitioner cannot even begin to believe that Manalili would be able to secure a

driver's license through legal means in about an hour's time. 58 The patent irregularity in obtainingdriver's license No. 2706887 was more than sufficient to arouse the suspicion of an ordinary cautiousand prudent man as to its genuineness and authenticity. In fact, Manalili testified that he himself wassurprised when the fixer handed to him the plastic jacket of the driver's license of Michael Dava onNovember 4, 1976, a few hours after he had sought the fixer's assistance. 59 In those days, all plastic

jackets emanated from the LTC Central Office, which accounted for the delay in the release of thelicense applied for. Under these circumstances, no "reasonable and fairminded man" would say thatpetitioner did not know that his license was a fake. 60

A driver's license is a public document within the purview of Articles 171 and 172. The blank form ofthe drivers license becomes a public document the moment it is accomplished. 61 Thus, when

driver's license No. 2706887 was filled up with petitioner's personal data and the signature of theregion of the San Fernando LTC agency was affixed therein, even if the same was simulated, thedriver's license became a public document.

The third element of use of the falsified document is proven by the fact that when petitioner wasapprehended by Lising on April 12, 1978 it was in his possession and it was what he presented Lisingto show that he had a license. Because he was a detailman who did his job with the use of a car, it isprobable that from November 4, 1976 (its date of issuance) until April 12, 1978, petitioner useddriver's license No. 2706887.

The driver's license being a public document, proof of the fourth element of damage caused to

another person or at least an intent to cause such damage has become immaterial. In falsification opublic or official documents, the principal thing being punished is the violation of the public faith andthe destruction of the truth proclaimed therein.

62

In his attempt at exculpation, petitioner asserts that the following ruling in People vsSendaydiego,

63 should be applied in his favor:

The rule is that if a person had in his possession a falsified document and he madeuse of it (uttered it), taking advantage of it and profiting thereby, the presumption is thathe is the material author of the falsification. This is especially true if the use or utteringof the forged documents was so closely connected in time with the forgery that the user

or possessor may be proven to have the capacity of committing the forgery, or to haveclose connection with the forgers, and therefore, had complicity in the forgery (U.S. vs.Castillo, 6 Phil. 453; People vs. De Lara, 45 PMI. 754; People vs. Domingo, 49 Phil. 28:People vs. Astudillo, 60 Phil. 338; People vs. Manansala, 105 Phil. 1253). In theabsence of a satisfactory explanation, one who is found in possession of a forgeddocument and who used or uttered it is presumed to be the forger (Alarcon vs. Court of

Appeals, L-21846, March 31, 1967, 19 SCRA 688; People vs. Caragao,L-28258, December 27, 1969, 30 SCRA 993). (Emphasis supplied.)

We agree with the petitioner that the presumption enunciated in the Sendaydiego case is not absoluteas it is subject to the exception that the accused should have a satisfactory explanation why he is in



possession of a false document.64 His explanation, however, is unsatisfactory as it consists mainly

in passing the buck to his friend, Manalili. As stated above, Manalili himself could not have acted onhis own accord without the prodding of petitioner.

We cannot help but comment on petitioner's allegations on the role of fixers in government agenciesTo him, a fixer is a "necessary evil" who could do things fast for the right amount. He is "notnecessarily involved in the commission of forgery or falsification of official documents" and heshares his fees with "insiders."

65

Fixers indeed appear as undetachable fixtures in government licensing agencies. Why theyproliferate is a sad commentary not only on our bureaucracy but also on our own people. While not alfixers are engaged in illegal activities for some simple serve as "facilitators," they nonetheless providesources for exploitation of the unknowing common people who transact business with the governmentand for corruption of the gullible government employees. Their unwanted presence must be dealt withaccordingly and the soonest this is undertaken by our government agencies the better for all of us.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent appellate court is hereby affirmed. Let a copy of thisdecision be served on that Department of Transportation and Communication. Cost against thepetitioner.

SO ORDERED.