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ORIGINAL RESEARCH ARTICLE published: 06 March 2015 doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00219 Explanations of a magic trick across the life span Jay A. Olson*, Irina Demacheva and Amir Raz Cognitive Neuroscience Laboratory, Psychiatry Department, McGill University, Montreal, QC, Canada Edited by: Gustav Kuhn, Goldsmiths, University of London, UK Reviewed by: Deena Skolnick Weisberg, University of Pennsylvania, USA Anthony S. Barnhart, Northern Arizona University, USA Eugene Subbotsky, Lancaster University, UK *Correspondence: Jay A. Olson, Cognitive Neuroscience Laboratory, Psychiatry Department, McGill University, Duff Medical Building Room 103, 3775 University Street, Montreal, QC H3A 2B4, Canada e-mail: [email protected] Studying how children and adults explain magic tricks can reveal developmental differences in cognition. We showed 167 children (aged 4–13 years) a video of a magician making a pen vanish and asked them to explain the trick. Although most tried to explain the secret, none of them correctly identified it. The younger children provided more supernatural interpretations and more often took the magician’s actions at face value. Combined with a similar study of adults (N = 1008), we found that both young children and older adults were particularly overconfident in their explanations of the trick. Our methodology demonstrates the feasibility of using magic to study cognitive development across the life span. Keywords: magic, magical beliefs, magical thinking, appearance–reality distinction, conjuring 1. INTRODUCTION Magic tricks depend on assumptions about the world. Magicians skillfully violate these assumptions to create mysteries (Rensink and Kuhn, 2014). Since assumptions change with age, magi- cians perform differently for children and adults. Children, for example, may prefer watching physical magic such as vanishing objects, while adults can understand psychological magic such as mind-reading. To keep performances suitable, magicians have developed intuitions about which tricks work best for which ages (e.g., Ginn, 2004; Kaye, 2005). Examining these intuitions could lead to new insights or methods in the study of cognitive development. Scientists have leveraged magic to explore other areas in psychology (Kuhn et al., 2008) including attention, perception, decision-making, and problem solving. Some have used both children and adults in their samples to compare cognitive devel- opment (e.g., Subbotsky, 2001). Few, however, have explored developmental differences with a large sample over a wide age span. Combined with previous research on adults (Demacheva et al., 2012), we present a feasibility study of 1175 participants aged 4–90 years. Due to their level of maturation, children have different expec- tations and assumptions than adults; magicians thus cater to them with a specific set of effects (Sharpe, 1988; Rissanen et al., 2014). Around 4 years of age, children begin to understand that other people have distinct beliefs and intentions—that is, they begin to form a Theory of Mind (Apperly et al., 2009). Around the same time, the distinction between appearance and reality becomes clearer (Flavell, 2000). When executive attention develops around 3–7 years of age, logical thinking and sustained attention improve (Posner and Rothbart, 2007). With these developments, children are better able to make assumptions about what is going to happen and thus become more receptive to magic tricks. Magical beliefs—such as beliefs about the existence of events which violate physical laws—also change with age (Subbotsky, 2014). Young children tend to believe in fantasy figures (such as fairies; Phelps and Woolley, 1994; Woolley, 1997) and many preschool children believe magicians have supernatural powers (Evans et al., 2002). During school age, children start to develop a more scientific perspective which can override magical beliefs (Subbotsky, 2010). Even so, these beliefs can persist into adult- hood. In one study, more than half of college students ascribed psychic abilities to someone performing tricks resembling clair- voyance and psychokinesis, even if he was introduced as an amateur conjurer (Benassi et al., 1980). In another study, adults who claimed not to believe in supernatural abilities were reluc- tant to let the experimenter cast a spell on their identification cards (Subbotsky, 2001). Though some magical beliefs decrease with age, they continue to play an important role throughout the life span (Subbotsky, 2014). In this paper we present a preliminary study of magical beliefs in children and adults. Participants watched a magician make a pen vanish then they tried to explain the trick. This “non- permanence magic” (Subbotsky, 2001) surprises most people over 4 years old (Rosengren and Rosengren, 2007). We had three hypotheses: 1. Confidence in one’s explanation of the secret will decrease with age. This is consistent with magicians’ observations and with studies showing that young children feel overconfident in their cognitive abilities (Shin et al., 2007; Lipko et al., 2009). 2. Younger children (aged 4–8 years), compared to older ones, will show more magical beliefs when explaining the trick (see Phelps and Woolley, 1994). 3. Younger children (aged 4–5 years) will more often take observed events at face value, since the appearance–reality www.frontiersin.org March 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 219 | 1

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ORIGINAL RESEARCH ARTICLEpublished: 06 March 2015

doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00219

Explanations of a magic trick across the life spanJay A. Olson*, Irina Demacheva and Amir Raz

Cognitive Neuroscience Laboratory, Psychiatry Department, McGill University, Montreal, QC, Canada

Edited by:

Gustav Kuhn, Goldsmiths,University of London, UK

Reviewed by:

Deena Skolnick Weisberg,University of Pennsylvania, USAAnthony S. Barnhart, NorthernArizona University, USAEugene Subbotsky, LancasterUniversity, UK

*Correspondence:

Jay A. Olson, CognitiveNeuroscience Laboratory, PsychiatryDepartment, McGill University, DuffMedical Building Room 103, 3775University Street, Montreal,QC H3A 2B4, Canadae-mail: [email protected]

Studying how children and adults explain magic tricks can reveal developmentaldifferences in cognition. We showed 167 children (aged 4–13 years) a video of a magicianmaking a pen vanish and asked them to explain the trick. Although most tried to explainthe secret, none of them correctly identified it. The younger children provided moresupernatural interpretations and more often took the magician’s actions at face value.Combined with a similar study of adults (N = 1008), we found that both young childrenand older adults were particularly overconfident in their explanations of the trick. Ourmethodology demonstrates the feasibility of using magic to study cognitive developmentacross the life span.

Keywords: magic, magical beliefs, magical thinking, appearance–reality distinction, conjuring

1. INTRODUCTIONMagic tricks depend on assumptions about the world. Magiciansskillfully violate these assumptions to create mysteries (Rensinkand Kuhn, 2014). Since assumptions change with age, magi-cians perform differently for children and adults. Children, forexample, may prefer watching physical magic such as vanishingobjects, while adults can understand psychological magic suchas mind-reading. To keep performances suitable, magicians havedeveloped intuitions about which tricks work best for whichages (e.g., Ginn, 2004; Kaye, 2005). Examining these intuitionscould lead to new insights or methods in the study of cognitivedevelopment.

Scientists have leveraged magic to explore other areas inpsychology (Kuhn et al., 2008) including attention, perception,decision-making, and problem solving. Some have used bothchildren and adults in their samples to compare cognitive devel-opment (e.g., Subbotsky, 2001). Few, however, have exploreddevelopmental differences with a large sample over a wide agespan. Combined with previous research on adults (Demachevaet al., 2012), we present a feasibility study of 1175 participantsaged 4–90 years.

Due to their level of maturation, children have different expec-tations and assumptions than adults; magicians thus cater to themwith a specific set of effects (Sharpe, 1988; Rissanen et al., 2014).Around 4 years of age, children begin to understand that otherpeople have distinct beliefs and intentions—that is, they begin toform a Theory of Mind (Apperly et al., 2009). Around the sametime, the distinction between appearance and reality becomesclearer (Flavell, 2000). When executive attention develops around3–7 years of age, logical thinking and sustained attention improve(Posner and Rothbart, 2007). With these developments, childrenare better able to make assumptions about what is going tohappen and thus become more receptive to magic tricks.

Magical beliefs—such as beliefs about the existence of eventswhich violate physical laws—also change with age (Subbotsky,2014). Young children tend to believe in fantasy figures (suchas fairies; Phelps and Woolley, 1994; Woolley, 1997) and manypreschool children believe magicians have supernatural powers(Evans et al., 2002). During school age, children start to developa more scientific perspective which can override magical beliefs(Subbotsky, 2010). Even so, these beliefs can persist into adult-hood. In one study, more than half of college students ascribedpsychic abilities to someone performing tricks resembling clair-voyance and psychokinesis, even if he was introduced as anamateur conjurer (Benassi et al., 1980). In another study, adultswho claimed not to believe in supernatural abilities were reluc-tant to let the experimenter cast a spell on their identificationcards (Subbotsky, 2001). Though some magical beliefs decreasewith age, they continue to play an important role throughout thelife span (Subbotsky, 2014).

In this paper we present a preliminary study of magical beliefsin children and adults. Participants watched a magician makea pen vanish then they tried to explain the trick. This “non-permanence magic” (Subbotsky, 2001) surprises most peopleover 4 years old (Rosengren and Rosengren, 2007). We had threehypotheses:

1. Confidence in one’s explanation of the secret will decrease withage. This is consistent with magicians’ observations and withstudies showing that young children feel overconfident in theircognitive abilities (Shin et al., 2007; Lipko et al., 2009).

2. Younger children (aged 4–8 years), compared to older ones,will show more magical beliefs when explaining the trick (seePhelps and Woolley, 1994).

3. Younger children (aged 4–5 years) will more often takeobserved events at face value, since the appearance–reality

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Olson et al. Explanations of magic

distinction is still developing (Flavell, 2000). Specifically, theywill more often believe that the pen broke or dissolved in themagician’s hands.

2. METHODSThe experimenter led participants to a testing room with individ-ual computers. The participants watched a recorded magic trick,tried to explain it, then rated their confidence in the explana-tion. Next, the experimenter prodded for alternative explanationsusing a questionnaire. Finally, participants explained the trickagain and re-rated their confidence level. The entire proceduretook under 30 min for each participant.

2.1. PARTICIPANTSWe recruited 167 children from a summer camp in Montreal,Canada. They were 8.8 ± 2.3 years old (mean ± SD, range 4–13)and around half (54%) were male. Each age group had at least tenparticipants (Table 1). The procedure conformed to the guide-lines of the Jewish General Hospital Research Ethics Committeeand we obtained parental consent.

Previously we recruited a sample of 1008 participants 22.3 ±6.6 years old (14–90, 31% male; see Table 1) which we used as acomparison group (Demacheva et al., 2012). They completed ananalogous questionnaire online.

2.2. MATERIALS2.2.1. Magic trickThe experimenter explained that we were studying how peoplethink about magic tricks. On a computer, a 15-s silent video clipshowed a magician making a pen vanish. In the video, the magi-cian begins by showing a pen then appears to break it. When hishands open, the pen has vanished (Figure 1; see SupplementaryMaterial for a video). We chose this minimal magic trick becauseit can fool both children and adults without needing patter, inter-action, or explicit social cues (Demacheva et al., 2012; cf. Joostenet al., 2014). Participants could watch the video as many times asthey wanted. Throughout the study, the experimenter referred tothe magic trick in the video as a trick and avoided mentioning“real magic.”

There are several methods of performing this trick. Here, thesecret involved the pen quickly moving inside the magician’sjacket. A small cue in the video of an object hitting the magician’sshirt hinted at this method. For a full description of the mecha-nism behind the trick, see Wilson (1988, p. 279, “The Vanish ofthe Handkerchief”).

2.2.2. QuestionnaireThe experimenter then led the children through a questionnaire(Appendix A in Supplementary Material); we used the same one

as Demacheva et al. (2012) after a developmental psychologistadapted the wording for children. Most children tried to explainthe secret of the trick. A magician who was unaware of ourhypotheses later rated these explanations on a scale from 1 (i.e.,completely wrong) to 5 (i.e., complete grasp of the method).Children rated their confidence in the explanations on a simi-lar 5-point scale (1: not at all, 2: a bit, 3: some, 4: a lot, 5: awhole lot). The questionnaire then probed for alternative expla-nations by asking about required materials and possible methodsto perform the trick. Some materials and methods were accurate(e.g., rubber bands, the pen moves quickly to a different location)and others were not (e.g., mirrors, the magician still holds thepen but it cannot be seen). Finally, children revised their initialexplanations and re-rated their confidence.

3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONConsistent with our hypotheses, younger children gave moresupernatural interpretations, more often took the magicians’actions at face value, and felt more confident in their explana-tions. Inconsistent with our hypotheses, confidence also increasedwith age among adults.

3.1. SECRETAlthough most children (62%, CI [54, 69%]1) tried to explain thesecret, none correctly identified it. The magician gave 96% [92,99%] of the initial explanations the lowest accuracy rating: com-pletely inaccurate. (We considered the explanation correct if themagician rated it 3 or more out of 5). Even after being probed foralternative explanations, participants performed only marginallybetter: 2% [0, 6%] guessed it correctly. Adults similarly had littlesuccess in guessing the secret (5% were correct in their first expla-nation and 9% in the second; Demacheva et al., 2012). The trickwas thus effective in that few people figured it out. We excludedthese few from the rest of the analyses.

3.2. EXPLANATIONSAttempts to explain the trick were broad. The 4–6-year-oldsusually remarked the pen “just disappears” or the magician“just breaks it.” Indeed, the younger children more oftentook the magician’s actions at face value. Specifically, theymore often believed that the pen broke or dissolved in themagician’s hands (Figure 2). Thus, age related to reports thatthe pen broke (χ2

(8) = 22.459, p = 0.004) or dissolved (χ2(8) =

25.54, p = 0.001)2. These reports largely flattened out after theteenage years (Figure 2).

1Square brackets denote 95% confidence intervals (see Cumming, 2014).2Statistical tests used data from participants 4–13 years old. Four and five-year-olds were combined due to their small sample sizes (see Table 1).

Table 1 | Sample sizes and gender proportions for each age group.

Age 4–5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14–17 18–19 20–29 30–39 40+

N 10 20 31 22 17 23 16 18 10 37 225 655 62 29

% Male 10 35 55 86 35 65 56 72 40 46 25 30 55 52

Participants aged 13 and under completed the child version of the questionnaire; the rest did the adult version (Demacheva et al., 2012).

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FIGURE 1 | Participants watched a silent video of a magician making a pen vanish. For the video, see Supplementary Material.

FIGURE 2 | Percent of participants believing that the pen broke or

dissolved. The vertical line separates those who took the child vs. adultversion of the questionnaire. Shaded areas show bootstrapped 95%confidence intervals.

The 7–9-year-olds began to develop possible yet implausi-ble explanations. Some suggested the magician hid the pen inhis sleeves (which were rolled up in the video) or hid it in hisskin. Others suggested the pen crumbled into smaller and smallerpieces until nothing remained. One suggested that the torso in thevideo was actually a mannequin and the magician hid the pen inthe empty torso. The 10-year-olds and older children started todevelop plausible explanations, such as a trick pen, camera tricks,or a hidden pocket. These progressive changes in the explanationspresumably reflect both increased verbal ability and cognitivedevelopment.

Consistent with previous studies (e.g., Evans et al., 2002),many of the younger children showed magical beliefs. Some sug-gested that the pen vanished simply because “the pen is magic.”When asked in the questionnaire, younger children more oftenbelieved the secret involved superpowers or a magic potion (e.g.,“there is secret invisible stuff on his hands that makes [the pen]disappear”; Figure 3). There were thus relationships betweenage and the frequency of beliefs that the trick used a potion(χ2

(8) = 24.008, p = 0.002) or superpowers (χ2(8) = 32.74, p <

0.001). The adult version of the questionnaire used differentwording (“chemical reaction” rather than “magic potion”) whichprevented a comparison to the children.

3.3. CONFIDENCEDespite their lack of accuracy, children felt confident in theirexplanations: 84% reported at or above the midpoint of

FIGURE 3 | Percent of participants believing that the magic trick

required a magic potion or superpowers. Shaded areas showbootstrapped 95% confidence intervals.

FIGURE 4 | Confidence in one’s inaccurate explanation of the magic

trick. Shaded areas show bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals.

confidence. The majority (73%) reported “some” or “a lot” ofconfidence in their explanation. Adults reported roughly similarlevels of confidence (57%).

Among children, confidence seemed to decrease withage (Figure 4); there was a relationship between age andconfidence in the explanation of the trick (first explana-tion: Kruskal-Wallis H(8) = 15.509, p = 0.05; second: H(8) =19.176, p = 0.014). This general pattern is consistent with thefinding that younger children are particularly overconfident(Lipko et al., 2009). Indeed, when presenting a deck of cards toyoung children, magicians (e.g., co-authors JO and AR) oftenhear, “Oh! I know that trick!.”

Among adults, confidence seemed to increase with age(Figure 4). This seems inconsistent with findings that younger

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Olson et al. Explanations of magic

FIGURE 5 | Confidence in one’s inaccurate explanation of the magic

trick by gender. Shaded areas show 95% bootstrapped confidenceintervals.

adults are generally more overconfident than older ones (Pliskeand Mutter, 1996; Zell and Alicke, 2011). In our sample, gen-der differences may have contributed to this effect. Some studieshave found that men are more overconfident in their abilitiesthan women (Barber and Odean, 2001; Bengtsson et al., 2005).Our sample included more men as age increased above 18 (seeTable 1) and overall males were more overconfident than females(Figure 5). The increase in males among older adults couldhave likewise increased confidence at older ages. Still, this couldonly explain part of the effect. Zell and Alicke (2011) foundan interaction between age and overconfidence depending onwhich dimension was measured. For example, older adults weremore confident about their sociability but less so about theirathleticism. Perhaps, then, explaining magic tricks is a dimen-sion showing more overconfidence with age. It remains unknownwhether similar results apply to other magic tricks or cognitivetasks among adults.

3.4. LIMITATIONSThis study had three potential limitations. First, the ques-tionnaires for children and adults differed slightly in wording(compare Appendix A in Supplementary Material here withDemacheva et al., 2012). Although we consulted a develop-mental psychologist to help ensure analogous wording, differ-ent results between children and adults could be partly due toinconsistencies in wording. To account for this, we minimizedcomparisons between those who took the child vs. adult ver-sion of the questionnaire. Second, the magic trick was recordedrather than performed live, which complicated the explanationsof the trick. When young children claimed that the pen dis-solved or vanished, they could have either intended that thepen actually vanished (in reality) or simply that it appearedto vanish (in the video); we could not differentiate these withcertainty. Third, our methodology was insensitive to differ-ent interpretations of other questionnaire items. For example,when asked whether the trick needed “superpowers,” perhapssome children thought of supernatural abilities while othersthought of specialized skills. One potential solution would beto perform the trick live each time followed by a more in-depth interview; in our case, this would have prevented such alarge sample.

3.5. IMPLICATIONSUsing magic tricks may have several advantages for studying cog-nitive development across the life span. Traditional illusions indevelopmental psychology often require props such as boxes,screens, or backdrops (e.g., Baillargeon, 2002). These illusions canmake the prop itself seem magical, such as when transformingobjects inside a special box (e.g., Subbotsky, 2004). Using magic,as in the current study, the experimenter can make a person lookmagical rather than a prop. Shifting the locus of magic from propsto people could help clarify differences in the development ofmagical beliefs regarding people vs. objects.

Further, unlike many of the illusions used to test phenomenalike object permanence, magic tricks are robust across age: theyamaze a large majority of people (here, 95%) over a wide agespan. Many tricks work in diverse environments (e.g., Kuhn andTatler, 2005) and can be translated for use in controlled experi-ments (Danek et al., 2014; Olson et al., 2015). Children and adultscan thus view the same stimuli, which allows researchers to makemore direct comparisons across different age groups. Such com-parisons may be particularly useful to examine phenomena likemagical beliefs or overconfidence which change their presenta-tion across the life span (Benassi et al., 1980; Woolley, 1997; Zelland Alicke, 2011; Subbotsky, 2014). Similarly, magic tricks workacross different cultures (Kiev and Frank, 1964) and thus couldshed light on intercultural differences in magical beliefs.

In sum, our feasibility study demonstrated a method to testdevelopmental hypotheses with large and diverse samples. Sucha method combining video stimuli and online surveys is par-ticularly useful to explore age-based changes in magical beliefsand overconfidence in children and adults. Magic may thus offera useful tool to gain new insights in developmental psychologyacross the life span.

AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONSJO wrote the manuscript and analyzed the data; ID designed theexperiment, collected the data, and helped with the writing; ARhelped with the design and manuscript revisions.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTSThe authors would like to thank Galina Pogossova and MartinLadouceur for help during experimentation, Ellis Steinberg andKarine Larouche for rating the explanations, and Tony Barnhart,Melanie Bolduc, Karine Larouche, Ronald Rensink, Julia Yudova,and the reviewers for comments on the manuscript.

SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALThe Supplementary Material for this article can be found onlineat: http://www.frontiersin.org/journal/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.

00219/abstract

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Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was con-ducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could beconstrued as a potential conflict of interest.

Received: 16 October 2014; accepted: 12 February 2015; published online: 06 March2015.Citation: Olson JA, Demacheva I and Raz A (2015) Explanations of a magic trickacross the life span. Front. Psychol. 6:219. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00219This article was submitted to Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, a section of thejournal Frontiers in Psychology.Copyright © 2015 Olson, Demacheva and Raz. This is an open-access article dis-tributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). Theuse, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the originalauthor(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this jour-nal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution orreproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.

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