existential and marxism: a critical study of the philosophy of jean-paul sartre and maurice...

EXISTENTIALIý'-i')Il AITI) TIARXIST. I

A Critical Study of the Political

of Jean-Paul Sartre and 'j..,! au-rice Ilerlea,, --Fonty

" ARCHARD DAVID

Submitted for the degree o-" I'l-L. D. 1976

ABSTRACT

The thesis critically examinies the relationship between the political philosophies of Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. It details the background of new ideas, which developed in France before the Second World War, and assesses the role of Alexandre Kojeve and Jean Hyppolite especially, in promoting a Hegelian revival.

The thesis shows the impact of the War and Occupation upon the two thinkers, and records the founding of Les. Te_mps modernes immediately after the War. The thesis explores the guiding ideas of this journal against the background of French political developments.

The thesis shows how the political optimism after 1945

gives way to the disillusion and disapOointments of the -L 1950's. It contrasts the later politi cal work of

Merleau-Ponty with the search by Sartre for a rejuvenated Marxism. The thesis concludes by closely examining Sartre's 1960 Critique de la raison dialectique.

The thesis hopes to show how two political thinkers

with similar intellectual backgrounds and who pursued

parallel careers came to draw such divergent conclusions by 1960. And it is hoped that such an approach will

provide a valuable insight into the relationship between

marxism and existentialism.

ii

ACKNO'71LEDGEME

This thesis was undertaken at the London Scnool of Economics and Political Science, under the suT)ervi-sion of Professor Maurice Cranston. My sincere thanlý: s are offered to Professor Cranston for the helP, advice and encouragement he gave me throughout my three years at the School. I would also like to thank Dr. Charvet

and Dr. Rosen of the L. S. E. for their helP at other times.

It was Dr. Brian Harrison of Corpus Christi College, Oxford, who, as my tutor at Oxford, first convinced me of the value of academic research, and I would like here to express ruy deep gratitude for the encouragement and advio e he gave me.

During the writing of this thesis many people offered advice, criticism and suggestions. I am grateful to

all of them for their help, and I would like to especially thank Chris Powell for many hours of fruitful discussion

and Sonia Kruks for her comments on the work of Merleau-Ponty.

Despite all the advice and suggestions given, I take

full responsibility for all of the ideas expressed in

the thesis.

The thesis was finally completed after I had taken up the post of Lecturer in Philosophy at the Northern Ireland

Polytechnic. lAy thanks are due to all my colleagues for

their encouragement, and especially to 11r. Tony 1,11orris

for his enthusiastic support of my work.

The arduous task of typing this thesis was undertaken by

Margaret and Maire and I thank them both for the

efficiency and speed with which they completecLthe task.

My family have always given me their full support and 0

iii

encouragement, and my mother wave useful adv*ce on some aspects of translation.

Lastly, I give affectionate thanks to Heather for keeping me sane throughout the time this thesis wc -ýs being written.

I owe all the above a deep debt, but I am sure they

will understand when I acknowledge, above all others, my father, Dr. J. F. Archard, whose career as an intellectual and as a teacher has never ceased to be

for me an inspiration and an outstanding example.

iv

CORRIGENDA

hroughout

Being and Nothingness should read LOEtre et le Niant

Phonomö nologie de la porceptioi Phenomenology of Perception should read

Transcendanceof Ego should read

Structure of Behaviour should read

Temps modernes should read

What is Literature? should road

La Transcondance de-VE-Ko

La Structure du comportement

Los Temps mod*rn*s

QuIest-ce quo la-Litteratur*?

iTHER MATERIAL REFERRED TO (P-323 to P-327) should app*ar after P-333.

COITTEHITS

Chapter e

I. "The Golden Age" - the 1920's and 1930's

II. FounaaUons 37

III. "The Mandarins" : History, -1.1eaning CD and Freedom 69

IV. "The Mandarirls" : Organisation, Praxis 120

V. Conversion and the End of Dialogue 151

VI. Search for a ýIethod 185

VII. Introduction to 'Critique de la Raison Dialectiquel 222

Conclusion 257

Footnotes 271

Bibliography 328

V

I rý --jCTIOl,! N LROý),

AND "EXIS'-i'-'-! 'TIkL! S-,

"The social function of what Sartre has -ý,;, ritten can only be that of a -peculiar 'Trojan horse left by reaction in the camp of the progressive forces. At present reaction most urgently needs a subtle, sophistical 'philosophy' which may help to infect a number of people who are drear. Qinlg about justic1. f. % and a better life, with a disbelief in their own powers, indifference to progressive ideas, lack of fait-', -i in a progressive party, doubts as to the fruitfulness of the collective efforts of the working people and all progressive humanity, with defeatist words and illusions that nothing is possible but adventurist action which is doomed to failure. 11(l)

These remarks, by a 'well-known soviet literary critic', typify the vilification to which existentialism was subjected by orthodox Imarxist' comment in the years of the former's greatest prominence after the second world war. Yet in these very same years Sartre himself was forced to declare:

"Most people who use the word existentialism would be embarrassed if they had to explain it, since, now the word is all the rage, even the work of a musician or painter is being called existentialist. A gossip columnist ... signs himself The Existentialist, so that by this time the word has been so stretched and has taken on so broad a meaning that it no longer means anything at all. "(2)

Thusy although Raymond Aron is prepared to use linsanities'

like the one cited above as a convenient point of depart - ure for a considered study of the Imarxism-existentialism'

dialogue. (3), it co uld be argued that even the supposition that existentialism is a well-defined movement of thought

is false. Sartre is certainly prepared to adopt the

nomenclature and act as a protagonist of existentialism,

but as Merleau-Ponty suggests:

I'Sartre at first protested when the journalists labelled him an 'existentialist'. Then one day he said to himself that he had no right to refuse the label, which is what others see of him, and he valiantly took existentialism's side. "(4)

and Simone de Beauvoir wrote of the publication of her

second novel:

vi

"It was labeled not only a 'resistance novel' but also an 'Existentialist novel'. Henceforth t--iis label was to be affixed automatically to any work by Sartre or myself. During a discussion organised during the summer by the Cerf publishing house - in other words, by the Dominicans - Sartre had refused to allow Gabriel Marcel to apply this adjective to him: 111"y philosophy is a philosophy of existence; I don't even know what Existentialism is". I shared his irritation. I had written my novel before I had even encountered the term Existentialist; my inspiration came from my own experience, not from a system. But our protests were in vain. In the end, we took the epithet that everyone used for us and used it for our own purposes. "(5) (my emphasisT

In Questions de methode(6) Sartre specifically argues for

a reconciliation of Imarxism' and 'existentialism' - at a time when 'existentialism' had lost its original notoreity and when, indeed, it could be said to be indexed only by the continuity of Sartre's own work. ', Terleau-Ponty would, much later, in the course of a talk re I ject the appellation 'existentialist' in the following terms:

"I have preferred to talk to you of the philosophy of existence rather than existentialism, for a reas, on. you'll probably guess. The term existentialism ended up by designating almost exclusively the philosophical movement which was produced in France after la45, principally under the impulsion of Sartre''.

And he concludes this same lecture:

"It can thus seem yet again that there is very little of that heroic epoch of existentialism which I regret having participated in, far from that, to which, it must be said, I owe a lot....

.... what has been written in that period represents all the same a school of thought even if at the present time we consider that the formal conclusions we arrived at at the time are no longer ours. "(7)

Merleau-Ponty's restriction of existentialism to a 'heroic

epoch' just after 1945 doesn't do full credit to the

continuing spirit of Sartre's work; even if it does complete

his own separation in the 1950's from the project of

Les Temps modernes. 1.11oreover despite the personal split

between Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, their respective life

work can be seen as a continuing interrogation by the one

of the other. Jean Hyppolite remarked after the deat-la of

Merleau-Ponty:

Vil

n we must f Sist u-pon t--., Le livin-- ar, ýL never rupted dialogue with Jea-, i-? aul Sarire. They have-, the one and the other, been counted as existent- -sts, either to criticise them together, or to oppose L--, e one to the other. It's very much a question of a, dialogue between them in which at one and the sa-le time they oppose and complete one another, in which sometimes they exchanýe their positions in a reciprocal action. t'(8)

The title 'existentialism and r. qarxism' constitutes then no more than a convenient prefix for a critical exam-JLnation of this dialogue as it reveals itself on the level of political philosophy. We thus follow 1: 11ichel-Antoine Burnier

when he states in the foreword to his Les Existentialistes

et la politique :

"Our intention is thus to speak of the men whose philosophy initially found its two fundamental expressions in

, LIPtre et le Nelant and the

Phenomenol_ogie de la PercepHon. These men were rediscoverýdd in 1945 in the review

A Les Temps modern e s19' With a 'common spirit' they hoped to 'disengage, in the long term, a general line' on the social and political problems of our time. "(9)

If a definition of existentialism is implied within this thesis it stands in contradistinction to the more obvious 'literary' interpretations of it as a life-style, or as some ill-defined reaction to the 'absurdity' of existence. Aron Gurwitsch points out :

t'Far from being a philosophy of emotionalism of sorts, it (existentialism) represents a reflection on the conditions of philosophical and, generally, cognitive C) endeavours . "(10)

Existentialism has been concerned with a concrete interr-

ogation of situated human experience. Philip Thody

explains the theme which links Sartre's autobio(c-7-c'-phy, Les Mots, with Llýtre et le Neant as the recognition triat

Ifman's most fundamental need is to mak-e sense of his o-,,,,, r

experience. 11 (11) The claim to a political philoso'Dhy of

existentialism is thus not as unfounded assert--i-on but

'onty rather its inevitable extension. Sartre and Ferleau,

share the intention of explicating their eT, )oc-'n- t-'irou-c-7ý, I t-"Ie

common human experiences of that epoch. There are,

unfortunately) those who give lexistent: Lalisml an inord-nate

voracity for ancestors - ranging from Doestoevs-Ir-y to

viii

Nietszche - and who then support their claim that existentialism is non- or anti-political by pointing to the exclusively philosophical preoccupations of such writers. (12) Once again it is worth stressing that such claims of lineage are not in question here and that the term 'existentialism' is throughout applied solely to the work of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty.

Unfortunately 'Marxism' enjoys an ambiguity which is just as misleading as that which pertains to 'existentialism'. 'Marxism' can be taken as exclusively defined by the

corpus of Marx's own texts, or the philosophical tradition

which draws its inspiration from such a body of work, or yet again the historical practice which has been designated, for a variety of reasons and by widely differing figures,

as 'Marxist-' The ambiguity is, as will be seen, not entirely absent from the writings of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty: especially given the formidable role played by the Parti Communiste FranQais in setting the terms for

any debate in France about Marxism.

The Marxist critics of existentialism have ranged from the

crass polemicists of the sort already cited to the more

sophisticated analyses of George Lukacs. (13) But it is

fair to comment that the vast majority of such work is

inspired by the belief that 'existentialism' and Imarxism'

represent, as in the title of George Novack's collection, tloonflicting views on humani-sm. "(14) Thus Adam Schaff, a Polish Marxist who has particularly concerned himself with this problem, writes :

"As compared with Marxism, existentialism n6t only involves a different set of problems, a different vocabulary, or a different world outlook; it also represents a completely different world of thoughts and emotions. " "Between the Sartre who remains loyal to the existentialist tradition and the Sartre who accepts the philosophical position of j'arxism there is a contradiction that can only be overcome through the repudiation of one of the antagonistic positions now observed in his views. "(15)

And this assumption of a mutual exclusivity of the tvio

'ideologies' is shared by non-111arxist critics i%, ho recrar. -I. C ix

Saxtre's reconciliation of marxism and existentialisni as a contradiction in terms) or as producing an im ossible ýD

p

hybrid creature. Such critics talk thus of an incongruous 'Imarxisme existentialise"'11(16) or of a I'desPerate and forced union. "(17)

Sidney Finkelstein, who as a TTarxist himself falls prey to this style of abstract gene--, -al---'Lsation, does at least point to the anti-Ilarxist assumptions of commentators upon the later Sartre. (18) Thus Walter Odaj nyk cites Engels

0 to support a crude materialist interpretation of It'larxism(19) T and Wilfred Desan writes:

"It is almost a commonple., oe to say that aocording to Marx, man is entirely determined by anterior

conditions, economic in nature, in other words, that he is merely a passive element which is subject to o ondi ti oning. 11 (2 0)

Such 'commonplaces' that Marxism is materialist, historicist, necessitarian, etc. prejudice any critical study of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. Or rather, even if

only introduced as debatable hypotheses, they incline one to believe that the confrontation is between an unmoving and rigidly def ined Marxism, on the one hand, and the diametrically opposed views of existentialism, subjectivist individualist, anti-historicist, anti-determinist - on the

other hand. This is precisely the spirit of nominalism in political philosophy which Merleau-Ponty so trenchantly

attacked. (21)

For the assumption of central cores of thought which define respectively Marxism and Existentialism and which

are seen in comparision as contradictory, iN-, unfounded. This thesis approaches 'Marxism' thus only in so far as Sartre and Merleau-Ponty undoubtedly address themselves to

it and take it up for critical consideration.

Merleau-Ponty was, perhaps, never a T. arxist though philo-

sophically sympathetic to Marxism. Sartre has however

claimed to be a Marxist. The attempt of some critics to

dispute uuch a claim seems misplaced: it is enough surely

that the claim itself defines the movement of ir. 'As tý_ought

and that some Imarxist' critics have evaluated his worl, - by

x

accepting the personal honesty of the claim. If th'e scone of this present work promises less now than was suggested by the grandeur of the title, it does offer a spec. -fic comparative analysis of two thinkers, where previously such titles as Imarxism and existentialism' provided only abstract polemics marked solely by the ideological preferences of their authors. (22)

"There is notlaing to be concluded except that this long friendship, neither done nor undone, obliterated when it was about to be -reborn or broken, remains inside me, an ever open wound. "(23)

So , Sartre concludes his extraordinarily fine remembrance

of Merleau-Ponty, published after the latter's death in 1961. For Sartre and 1,, erleau-Ponty enjoyed not only a long and close personal friendship but also a. fruitful

philosophical dialogue which left its mark upon each thinker. Both had grounded themselves in the same philosophical heritage, both sought an anchorage for reflection in the real world and one which could account for the

reality of others, both saw politics and history as the

necessary tension within philosophy seeking to realise itself, both perceived the need to deepen their own thought by confronting it with marxism and both, finally, tried to discover an action within their Time at the same time as they sought to make this Time give expression to itself.

Their career3 are parallel and yet, also, paradoxically

out of phase. Just after the second world war, whilst Sartre still struggled to give meaning to his initial

commitment and to understand history, it was I. Terleau-Ponty,

already initiated into a non-dogmatic ! ", arxism, who explored

the problems of historical action and who assumed the

political editorship of Les Temp modernes. And when the

events of 1950-1954 led Merleau-Ponty to a radical

reappraisal of his previous political position and a.

subsequent reticence, it was Sartre at this time who was

finally provoked into taking up an uncompromising politicC-11

stance, and who, from 1952-1956 was a virtual 11-iL'ellov: -

traveller" of the French Communist Party. In 1953 one

small incident at Les Temp modernes had provoked the 'inal

xi

quarrel between the two: Merleau-Ponty resigned from Les Temps modernes and they were never fully reconciled thereafter. Each considered the other to have in some sense betrayed himself and yet as Sartre su&7ests: Cý

"The truth is that we were recruited accord-ing to our aptitudes: Allerleau when it was the time of, subtleties and I, when the time of assassins had come. "(24)

Symmetrical not only in their aptitudes and development but also in their personal qualities: Sartre the publici-st, polemicist and activist, perhaps a populariser of philosophy; Irlerleau-Ponty, silent, restrained, ironic, his philosophy a dense and subtle interrogation of the world. And yet:

".. with ou't qualities) and our gaps, with the published violence of the one, the secret excesses of the other we were not so badly adapted. " (25)

If the major emphasis of this thesis is upon the work of Sartre. it. is for the following reasons: Sartre's commitment to Marxism from 1952 onward has been both consistent and persistent. His 1960 Critique de la raison dialectique represents the central text of any 'existentialist' reading of Marxism and its themes are pursued elsewhere in numerous other studies. 1-1-erleau-Ponty, on the other hand,

consciously distanced himself from Marxism and his two

essential texts of political philosophy - Humanisme et Terreur (1947) and Les Aventures de la diale (1955) - stand in sharp contrast. The first takes up the problems of historical responsibility and historical rationality whereas the second offers a sweeping -rejection of 'Marxism'. Yet despite the comparative paucity of his political work, Merleau-Ponty's entire output constitutes a pivotal

critique of Sartre, even if not always fully articulated: the dialogue, as Hyppolite remarked, is living and CD uninterrupted.

It must equally be noted that both - though i'llerleau-Ponty less so - were public figures. Sartre has taken overtand

well publicised stands on a series of contemporary

political issues - from Gaullism after 1945 to the eve--ts

of May 1968. T,, Terleau-Ponty's participation in

xii

Temps modernes was a conscious political undertakincr and even af ter 1952 he lent his public support to the ca7,, paicn of Mend*bs-France. In respect of this 'public face' Simone de Beauvoir's role is exceptional. A re-, ý-iarkable writer in her own right, her prominence as 'la grande Sartreusel is well-known (and well-satirised). . 11-ore importantly the four volumes of her autobiography(26) constitute a massively documented insight into the private and public life of Sartre.

Unfortunately far less is known biographically of Merleau-Ponty. Yet at the end of an essay on Claudel, Merleau-Ponty himself discerns the following contradictions C)

as the lot of all "professional truth-seekers": that

which "makes it impossible for any man to be equivalent to

what he writes". He continues:

"The writer himself well k-4ows that there is no common measure between his rumination of his life and the clearest most readable thing it has been able to produce; that the comedy here would consist in playing the oracle; that after all, if those who take a fancy to him want to meet him, he has already made a rendezvous with them in his books; that the shortest way towards then, leads through them; and finally that he is a man who works at living and can give no one a dispensation from the work of reading and the labour of living. "(27)

Sartre records this conversation with Merleau-Ponty:

"I would like, ' he said to me one day, 'to write a novel on myself. ' - 'Why not an autobiography, ' I asked? - 'There are too many questions without answers. In a novel, I could give them imaginary solutions. "(28)

The meditation upon his own life was, for TTerleau-Ponty,

irremediably bound up with the continuing and o en CD p

interrogation of the world and history. If this questioning yields only signs, we must read in these themselves,

the further 'signs' of a more personal reflection by

Merleau-Ponty upon his own history. Nevertheless the

facts of Sartre's biography stand, and the public

character of his philosophical career provides yet

striking complement to the somewhat obscured igure of

1,. 'erleau-Ponty.

xiii

of

Sartre has himself written only of his e, -, rly l-, -e, and Les Mots is a brilliantly acerbic and sel-f-critical renunciation of his upbringing: "I loathe my c--iildhood and all that remains of it. "(29)

11erleau-Ponty, on the other hand, told Sartre in 1047 that he had never recovered from an incomparable childhood. Sartre adds:

it our capacity for happiness Js dependent upon a ce*r*iain equilibit; (4m between what we refuse and concede to ouT childhood. Completel de-, I-rý-ved or completely endowed, we are lost. 11(30ý

For Sartre, 1, ferleau-Ponty's choice of life was the pursuit of the golden age which evoked his lost childhood; S-)artre, for his part, rejected a stifling and precocious childhood.

. And lest this contrast seem too obviously sartrean, Merleau-Ponty himself writes:

"Some are fascinated by their childhood; it possesses them, holding them enchanted in a realm of privileged possibilities. Others, it casts out toward adult life; they believe they have no past and are equally near to all possibilities. Sartre was one of the second

, ýype. Thus it was not easy to be his

f ri end. 11 (31)

Sartre's rejection of his childhood also entailed a

repudiation of the 'religious' choice of literature i,, Thich had been grounded in this childhood, But as he writes at the end of his autobiography: "I have renounced my

vocation, but I have not unfrocked myself. I still write.

What else can I do? "(32)

The massive project of Flaubert bears even now witness to

this continuing and apparently insatiable desire to write.

Ilerleau-Ponty's choice was sligHtly different but no less

irrevocable:

"To the biographical question, I reply that da., ýr I entered philosophy class I understood t', -. E. -t it was philosophy I wanted to do. Neither then nor s nce,

t hesýtEAion, f) have I ever had the slightes on tl-at. 11(33)

Merleau-Ponty's choice of philosophy stands cleexly

against Sartre's choice of writing: and if any conclusion

xiv

is drawn at this stage, it is to sugoest that CD le d4'-'. erence reveals itself further in a contrast beti,., een !! erleau-. --'3n'L, -'-'s search for meaninc, and Sartre's sea " -rc' for se7f Z-ý - -expression.

Such in brief are the two lives w. -. ich cross pat'ýs at t', -e Ecole Hormalc(34) and which thereafter find themselves intertwined personally and philosa-t)hically. Given t-'rie important interrelation of -personal experience and any philosophical reflection, and given further the preceding CD w, arnings against hypostasising 'I'arxism' , it is worth adding that those who hold the distinction between

philosophy and politics to be a necesI-: SC-_, ry or desir-ible division of responsibility will have little or no sympFthy

N for the undertakings of Sartre and I`erleau-_ýontý/-. They

consistently held to the Tarxist idea that all 'truths'

must remain conscious of themselves as social and cultural productions; and equally they maintained that authentic philosophy realises itself in history. They would consequently hold the disjunction of philosophy and -politics as entailing an impoverishment of politics, and a failure

of philosophy. Their approach, is, as lAerleau-Ponty

argues:

"the exact opposite of a philosophy of God-Like survey. It plunges into the perceptible, into time and history, towards their articulations. "(35)

Certainly those who have no sympathy f or the undertaking

of Marxism and those who dismiss a priori the necessity to

give depth to one's owh thought by confronting it with Marxism will not appreciate the significance of Herleau-

Ponty's reticence - Sartre terms it 'silence' - in the face

of his failure to affirm a true politics. Nor will they

fully understand the ongoing attempt by Sartre to under-

stand his own actions, to clarify his role as an intellect-

ual and a writer, given that:

"For us) I'Tarxism is not merely a philoso,: )hy: it is the very climate of our ideas the environment t-'--i!,, t

nourishes them. "(36)

Merleau-Ponty pointed out that:

xv

"The history of thought does not sur. ýme-x-Lly pronounce: This is true, this is false"

and he added that some thought-sendure because: Cm) "as obligatory steps for t. aose who want to go furt. they retain an expressive power ,,, rhich exceeds tneir

.L statements and proposition. "(37)

It was in this spirit that the existentialists approached Marxism, and it is in this spirit also that this thesis treats of their- work.

Thi s thesis covers in full only that period from the first writings of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty until the latter's tragically early death in 1961.

The conclusion will argue t-at, despite Sartre's continuing

productivity after that date, this thesis retains its

integrity by concentrating on Sartre's work up until 1961.

1960 saw the publication of Sartre's Critique de la raison dialectique, which represents the fullest expression of an "existential Marxism. " It can also be best interpreted in

the light of Sartre's political and philosophical develop-

ment up until that point.

The thesis also tries to preserve the sense of dialogue

between Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. Concentration on

Sartre's work after Merleau-Ponty's death would not only

obscure this dialogue, but would also detract from its

importance as an illumination of Sartre's work.

This is not to deny the immense importance of Sartre's

subsequent work, but to point to the fruitfulness of

treating Sartre's and Ilerleau-Ponty's work as pursuinc-

parallel and complementary paths. The two can and should

be seen as protagonists of a common heritage: the ambi- CD

guities of this heritage can then explain the divero-ent

and ultimately opposed viewpoints of the two writers.

However certain remarks can, at tnis sta, ýýe, be use-)-illy

made about Sartre's develoPment after 1961.

XVI

Firstly his criticism of the PCF has evolved from a hesitant and qualified reserve into a -17-'ierce and principled objection. If the events of 1956 provoked the first reconsideration, the events of 1968 finally crystallised Sartre's doubts into complete antagonism. The invasion of Czechoslovakia could not be interpreted with the same toleration or critical understanding as had t-',, ý-e crus1--)ing CD

of the Budapest rising.

ay 1968 But, above all, it was the events in France of 1.

which unmasked, for Sartre, the Party's essential "fear of revolution, "; in Sartre's view, the politics of the French Communist Party were finally revealed as reforlAst and legalist, and, in the last instance, tot. 51.11y, opposed to any radical political change. (38)

Sartre gave his full public support to the "new ideal' of the May events(39). He saw, contained within the new

political ideas and the new forms of political organisation,

a previously untapped and unnoticed reservoir of force and

commitment(40). The politics of 1968, in contradistinction to the rigid dogma and hermetic organisation of the PCF,

was that of imaginative possibility(41).

But, equally importantly, Sartre felt himself person

challenged by the events of 1968. He was obliged to

reconsider the whole role of the "classical intellectual" -

one which he had diligently fulfilled up until then. 1968

thus provoked in Sartre, not only trenchant criticism of

traditional academic practice(42), but also a revision of

his own intellectual assumptions. The "classical intellect-

ual" was, for Sartre, defined in terms of the contrad4 ction

between his universal claims and the particular situation

from which he writes. (43) There is, perhaps, in his

autocritique a belated attempt to resolve the problems o-P

those, who, in the thesis, will be termed the"Ilandarins"

those philosophers of action who seek to act on events at

the distance of theoretical reflection.

xvii

Sartre has in his later years committed himself more publicly and more actively to the organised politics of the new French Left. His recent alliance with the Frencn Maoists and his support for their newspaper La Cause du peuple was a striking example. Editorship of Liberation supen <'eded that of Les Temps modernes as Sartre tried to explore means of expressing his new ideas.

Nevertheless, ýSartre has never abandoned the theoretical framework defined by his Critique de la raison dialectique. He has, to a certain extent, been obliged to respond to the emergent challenge of a structuralist 11arxism :a cor-pus of work which has f ound its main f ocus in the writiný, s of Louis Althusser. Sartre has conceded the importance of the new theoretical work(44), but he has never engaged in

an open public debate on its full significance for his own ideas. In similar fashion, the important work by Levi-Strauss, Foucault, and Lacan among ot-l-iers, has been CD

dealt with by Sartre only in summary fashion. (45) Sartre's

11arxism in the 1960's found expression in support for

various political practices. Sartre thus gave his critical

acclaim to the achievements of Castro's Cuba, after a

visit there in 1960. (46)

And his famous (to many infamous) preface to Fanon's

Les Damnes de la Terre(47) announced an apparent trans-

ference of Sartre's political sympathies from the French

working class toward the underprivileged of the Third World.

Sartre's preoccupation with the problems of colonialism

and the relationship between the colonial elite and tý-Le

colonised is reflected in much of Sartre's work during the

1960's(48). Yet again, though, this interest has a source

in many striking passages of the Critique. Sartre has

himself declared that if he has Changed over the years, it

has been within a fundamental permanence(49). The Sc-. --, --tre

who refused, in 1964, to accept the 1ý-obel irize(50), who

took such a preminent part in the Russell Tribunal's

investigation of the 'war crimes' of Vietnam(51) and vi-i-lo ' the banned invited arrest by publicly selling copies oI

xviii

La Cause dlu -peu-ple, is essentially same Sý3, rt--, -e w'-c

assisted in the abortive experlment o-I - 'ý-e and V:.. 'Io

tcok an enthusiastic Part in the 1952 Vienna Con-ýý---ress.

The nature of his theoretical work a-7ter 1960 does not

obsc=, e the dee unde-rlying consistency o--OL Sartre's p tj

attitudes to politics and philosophy.

It is the sense of this consistenc-T ,:, -nich the '-,. es--*s tries

to explain and make more explicit by contrast', wi ti--- the

-1 philosophy of 1"aurice 1.1lerleau-Ponty. poli tica, L

Y, I-IX

Chapter 1

"THE GOLDEN AGE" - the 1920's and 1930's

"'We are as free as you like, but helpless... For tLe rest the will to power, action, and life axe only useless ideologies. 11 (1) So, in response to an 'Investigation' carried out amongst University students by Les Nouvell-ea litteraires in 1929, did Sartre characterise his 'unhappy

generation'. Helpless to act collectively before the rise of Fascism and the onset of the Second World War, free

nevertheless to make of the 1920's and 1930's a period of immense and significant intellectual discovery, which would lay the foundations for the emergence after 1945 of an existentialism which was anything but another 'useless ideology'.

"We felt that we were already living in that Golden Age

which f or us constituted the secret truth of History, and the revelation of which remained HistoryLs final and

exclusive objeotive"(2). Up until the events of 1939-40

the lives of Simone de Beauvoir and Sartre were, in their

own confession "unreal", centred upon the preservation of

an impossible peace, blind to or impatient with political

events, their enmity to society only nominal and carrying

anyway "an implication of robust optimism. "(3) They

believed the period to be an era of social stability,

harmony, and above all of peace; -, Merleau-Ponty was to write

in 1945 "Why did we so disregard facts about the coming

of war even after Munich?

We had secretely resolved to know nothing of violence and unhappiness as elements of history because we were living in a country too happy and weak to envisage

What makes our landscape of 1939 inconceivable thefh. to us is the fact that we were not conscious of it as

a landscape. "(4)

Simone de Beauvoir writes of her discussions with Sartre

in the late 19201 s:

"the most important aspect of these conversations- was not so much what we said as what we took for cranted and what in fact was not so at all. We were wron; - about almost everything. "(5)

1

Only this 'thin and frozen' voice of Paul Nizan - 'I was twenty years old. I won't stand for anyone tellincý me that this is the best time in your life 1 (6) - ruptured the silence. Nizan, Sartre's contemporary and close friend, was the 'spoilsport': his was the clarion call to class hatred, the desperate search for an affirmation and a comitment(7), his the anger which Sartre at the time found an eccentricity. (8)

For Sartre the opposition within sock ty lay not between two classes, but rather between the social order itself, the bourgeois ethic, and an individualism, proud and listless, anarchist rather than revolutionary, anti- capitalist but by no means Marxist. Sartre's and de Beauvoir's ideals were rooted in a Cartesian rationalism, universalist individualism and a notion of pure freedom. Sartre's Mathieu doesn't sincerely desire the abolition of. capitalism because he would thereby lose the sources of a ipuch-enjoyed indignation. As Michel-Antoine Burnier points out, Sartre is not Mathiuu but the latter well expresses the attitude of the former to politics before 1939 :

"a 'sympathy of principle' for the proletariat, a distant admiration for the Soviet Revolution, a certain attraction to the P. C., but a total inaction and freedom for nothing, abstract sentiments, at bottom a disinterest. 11(9)

Theirs was an 'aesthetic of opposition', a philanthropic

politics of fundamentally disengaged intellectuals:

"We would not set our own shoulders to the wheel of history, but we wanted to believe it was turning in the right direction; otherwise we would have had too many problems to rethink. "(10)

Moreover a real and successful revolution would have

destroyed such privileges of disinterested observation:

"We wanted the defeat of capitalism, but not the accession of a socialist society which, we thought, would have deprived us of our liberty. "(11)

In any case it was literature and writing which vvas

conceived of as the absolute. Sartre saw his ov, rn writing in terms of a specific mission to be fulfi lled: the isolated

2

and solitary author, unrecognised in his own li-l-etime would yet attain a posthumous glory, an immortality, for it was the sanctified activity of writing itself which would guarantee his election to grace : "I thought I was giving myself to Literature, when I was in fact taking holy orders. "(12) The nominal emnity which Sartre felt towards the social order could best be expressed by and in books : "I wanted this order to exist in order to be able to throw bombs at it : my words. "(13)

These attitudes characterised the 'neurosis' which Sartre describes so vividly in his autbbiography and which he felt himself cured of, 'converted', by the events of the 19501s. It certainly marks his early literary productions: the exploration of morbidity(14) and the Legende de la veritg. (15)

But despite this blithe ignorance of any political or historical responsibility, the period before 1939 is

nevertheless one of tremendous philosophical and literary

challenge. There was of course in the first instance the impact of Surrealism: "I don't think surrealism had any direct influence on us but it had impregnated the very air we breathed. "(16) The Surrealists' revolt against both

bourgeois society and the artificial constrictions of

contemporary rationalism accorded well with Sartre's and de Beauvoir's predispositions. Surrealism had in addition formulated a strong political opposition to capitalism Aragon notably was to subsequently become a prominent

member of the P. C. (17). Surrealism's conscious onslaught

upon language itself and other modes of artistic expression

certainly figures in a limited reflection by Sartre on the

function of words and the nature of expression. Thus in

. 10chot, Camus, Bataille, Parain, and Ponge, (18) pieces on Blk

there is a consideration of how far words can serve to

destroy themselves, express something beyond language and

meaning itself. The Surrealists' image of the linu)olation

of words' recur,, -s in such pieces, alongside the analagous t

and then contemporary preoccupation with the employment o-"ý'

3

language to ex ress silence. In all th i it p s4is the moment of expression which predominates.

If, as Sartre says, the "function of the critic is to criticise, ie. to commit himself for and against, and to situate himself in situating"(19) then Sartre's essays from this period - in the main, literary criticism - are attempts to explore his own -role as a writer and as an intellectual through the critical review of contemporary work. Importantly, Sartre saw in this period a 'return to the human' in literature. Thus Blanchot, a writer comparable in style to Kafka, began writing in the post-war era of disillusion : now with a return to a literary humanism, the genre of the fantastic limits itself to transcribing and mirroring the human world and the human condition. (20) Equally in the progress of Parain can be discerned the archetype of all post-1918 literature: "Men

had been filled with great and inhuman ambitions. They had wanted to get at nature, both within man and outside him and to do so unassisted.... And then, in the thirties.... there was a general return to the human, a return to order. "(21)

This 'return to man' was not a reversion to the permanent human passions of classical authors but a rediscovery of the human individual the exile from his own race and his

own society, like Camus' 'Outsiderl(22); dissolved into a

collective and historical anonymity like the 'heroes' of Dos Passos(23); or implicated in the futile 'conspiracy'

of generational revolt. (24)

It was indeed the American influence which predominated:

"The greatest literary development in France between 1929 and 1939 was the discovery of Faulkner, Dos Passos, Hemingway, Caldwell-, Steinbeck... To

writers of my generation, the publication of The 42nd Paralle , Light in August, A Farewell to

, evoked a revolution similar to the one produced fifteen years earlier in Europe by the Ulysses of James Joyce. "(25)

This striking impact was, as Sartre himself iescribes it,

primarily technical : "a veritable revolution in the art

of telling a story. " From Dos Passos and Faulkner thus

4

was taken a new form of narrative: from Dos Passos came the techniques adopted by Sartre in his novel Le Sursis: and from Hemingway the attempt to depict "without commentaries, without explanation, without moral judgem. entý---,, the actions of our characters. 11(26)

In addition, Sartre makes use of attacks upon contemporary fashionable authors to draw out a broader analysis of the composition of the novel and the situation of its writer: "God is not an artist. Nor is M. 11auriac"(27). Novels, Sartre claims, are written by and for man, and the novelist cannot partake of a divine lucidity in constructing his characters as freedom-less things. Nor, as does T1. Giradou:,. -, can he make of his literary inventions mere archetypes, Aristotelean forms which develop only insofar as they come to conform to essences. (28) And yet Sartre sees the danger of self-conscious stylising in which the novel becomes no more than a reflection upon the very tools of the novelist. (29) Importantly Sartre burdens literature with a philosophical task : and this in the specific context of the personal effort to self-expression. Even though he was prepared to

accept at this time that certain things necessarily demanded

a purely philosophical and technical vocabulary, he adds III see myself obliged to double, so to speak, each novel

with an essay. "(30) La Nausee thus stands beside the

proposed treatise on the 'Psyche'; philosophy and literature are coextensive in the fundamental task of

expressing -reality, and it is in this light that other

writers are measured. Thus Russerl has : "reinstated

horror and charm in things. He has restored to us the

world of artists and of the prophets : terrifying, hosti-le,

dangerous, with its harbours of grace and love. "(31)

And at the same time Faulkner and Dos Passos give us an

insight into temporality and the meaning of human action

which is deeply philosophical. (32)

'The actual work of Sartre himself reveals this immanent

duality. Thus in the two pieces from Verve of 1939 -

5

"Visages" and "Portraits officiels" -a forri of -, neno,,. --en- oligical analysis combines with, or rather inheres in, an essentially literary style. The first of the tv., o piecels includes hence:

"The meaning of the face is visible transcendence. "

and

"Anger and joy dwell in the face as the April wind dwells in the leaves" (33)

Again a fragment : "Nourritures"(34) : of the unpublished novel 'De-paysment' explores the very physiognomy of food and the essential nature of eating.

The chef d1auvre of this period is La llausie(35) :a work whose sub-title 'novel' some have suý-,, c-, ested was merely ihcluded to improve its sales. It is indeed a work contemporary with and complementary to the work on the 'Imagination' and the germination of LIEtre et le lleant: a work which uses a literary form - the diary of one Antoine Roquentin - to explore philosophical themes.

These themes were the product of Sartre's assimilation of the whole new tradition which superseded the traditional French teachings of the 1920's and 1930's :a period which

was a 'Golden Age' indeed in the terms of the intellectual

renaissance which took place.

Sartre and TJerleau-Ponty have conventionally been accredited

with inspiring the generation in France of the Hegelian,

phenomenological and 1-,, arxist movements which assumed such

importance after 1945. Although their role is indeed

significant and the originality of their work is undisputed,

it is necessary to point out tile many other important

personalities who figure during this time. This helps one

to understand that, as Herbert Dieckman points out:

. "there existed, immediately before Sartre, a group of thinkers, who not only studied, translated and interpreted Husserl, F-11'eidegger and Jaspers but

sources of Existential-sm and went back to the verv- above all created in"France a vocabulc-r, -ý- for the new mode of thinking. 1- "(36

6

Thus in 1931 was founded 1ýechercnes Dii--, ilosophioueD, a periodical which for six years publislaed a series o.., - translations, reviews and original a. rt--*Lcles wfich almost by themselves a histor. -, T of -L,, xistentialist tji-ink-Mg. "(37) Its first volume contains a tra-:, ýslation of z--. -Leia-egger's Vom Wessen des Grundes; subsequent volumes included articles on Heidegger, essays b, ' reviews ,-

Gabriel "arcel, of Kierkegaard b Jean "3ahl. The sixth volume publishe hd Sartre's own Transcendance de__l'Ego. (36",,

Equally the issue of Rifur a periodical in wnich Paul Nizan collaborated - in which Sartre's Le; --ende de

.e verite' appeared, also published the translation of a fragment of Heidegger's Was ist Fetaphysik? (39)

In 1938 1-1. Corbin published his translation of the wl-iole of Was ist Metaphysik? as (-*: uIest-ce que la metaph, -, Tsir, ýue? (40)

and the volume also included extracts from 'Deing and Time, Kant and the problem of Tletaphysics, Vom 'Jessen des Grundes

and Holderlin and the essence of Poetr Although Georges

Gurvitch had already given at the Sorbonne in 1928-1930 a

series of lectures on contemporary german philosophy, including Heidegger, the importance of Corbin's translation

was its establishment of part of the vocabulary of French

existentialism. Spiegelberg comments:

"Thus it seerýs that not only such equivalences as Dasein and realite' humaine. were established by Corbin, but also tkýat the expressions lauthenticit, 71 and linauthenticityl go back to his renderin-, c-, - of Heideg, aer's Eigentlichkeit and Uneigentlic! -i"--eit. II(4l)

The work of Gurvitch(42) and Emmanuel Levinas acquainted

the French intellectual public with the worl,,: of German

phenomenology. Scheler visited France as early as 1924,

and Husserl's Me'ditations cartesiennes .,. 'rere the development

of his lectures at the Sorbonne in 1929. (43) "orleover, at

this time, several young Frenchmen, visited Germany in

order to study phenomenology at its source: Levinas,

Ca-vailles, Berger and Sartre hii---iself w1io spent of

1933-34 in Berlin. (44) There was also the establishment of

7

Husserl Archives at Louvain under H. L. Van 3reda : arc-l-Li-ves which Ilerleau-Ponty was to visit in 1939. (45)

It was Sartre, who, prompted by Raymond i',. ron in the ----., -st place to vi, ýit Germany, returned to -r.! resent the .,., ork of Husserl as e'ssential reading for 1;, Terleau-Ponty. (46)

As f or the study of Hegel, Alexandre Koyre, in a 1930 'report on the state of hegelian studies in France', could only remark with dismay that, as against events in Germany, England and Italy :

"a hegelian school has never been able to f orm itself in France, Hegel has never possessed in France an authentic disciple. ... and neo-hegelianism itself which ha's played.. a role of the first importance in the evolution of philosophic thought

1? . in Italy and the anglo-saxon countries has had in France one representative onlY. 11(47)

The only existing French translations of Hegel at that time had in the main been done by an Italian, Veram, and academic philosoPhy remained rooted within the Cartesian tradition, with its rejection of sPeculative idealism and what were seen as absolutist theories of History. Lacn'Qlier, Brunschvit, '-ý, and others t1ref erred themselves ceaslessly to

Kant, but distrusted the post-kantians and Hegel more than

any other. "(48)

Yet within a decade or so the position had fundamentally

changed, so much so that existentialism must be considered

as having one of its foundations in the french re-discovery

of Hegel. There was Lucien Herr's seminal article which

was one of the first to reject the traditional prejudiced

interpretations of Hegel. (49) And in 1929 was published

Jean Wahl's work on the "unhappy -consciousness" in Hegel:

an effort to grasp behind and beneath the abstract formulas

of the system, the life and blood which I. Vahl argued

nourished it: "The dialectic before being a method is an CD experience. 11(50) Wahl did two things : firstly he found

the key to the hegelian intuition in the early works and

particularly the Phenomenology of 11ind; secondly he

8

situated the unahppy consciousness as the ver,, -,, 7- ex, )ress-on, sign and sYMbol of a rupture and a disequilibrium at the heart of Being. Jean Hyppolite comments: Viahl's study

"was for us staggering. It revealed to us a romantic Hegel - when we imagrined Hegal as a systein-builder - P the Hegel of the unhappy consciousness and not that of the triumphant Church. "(51)

At the same time Wahl's other work on Kierkeo-aard, also undiscovered up until then, allowed Hyppolite's generation to make the seemingly impossible reconciliation of Hegel and the proclaimed anti-hegelian Kierkegaard:

"Thus we found sometimes that Hegel was already Kierkegaardian before becoming systematic and that Kierkegaard was still hegelian..., and we even asked ourselves if Kierkegaard. didn't have his place in the hegelian itinerary. "(52)

Equally, if Jean Wahl led the French public back to the

romantic Hegel at the same time as he made them know Kierkegaard, the works of the young I\Aarx were discovered

and revealed as a commentary on Hegel : this joint dis-

covery allowed French thought to conjoin Hegelian phenomenology with Marx's 'historical materialism' without apparent contradiction. (53)

"The originality of french hegelianism was precisely that being a latecomer, it came at a time when it met new movements which had been first presented as anti-hegelian and when it could thus tie together these movements at their source and interpret them in relation to itself. These two movements were existentialism.... and marxism. "(54)

This dramatic re-birth of french hegelianism owes much to

Jean Hyppolite himself but ab-ove all to Alexandre Kojeve,

whose lectures of 1933-39, finally collected together and

published in 1947(55), have undoubtedly been of profound

influence on a whole generation. This influence has however

been cynically viewed: Stuart Hampshire remarks that:

"Kojeve lead his bewitched public back to the early young Hegelian Marx and then left it to stru gle back along the paths of history on its own. 11ý56)

and George Lichteim dismissed Ko'jeve as "Hegelian enough

to treat politics as unimportant"(57 ). In fact th-voup ,h

9

Koieve's commentary is indeed and disputable it is equally, a number of central themes.

personal, idiosyncractic,

richly original, providing C)

Firstly there is Kojeve's insistence that Hie-crel's r_- Phenomenol2f, y of j-,., Tind is a philosophical anthropology, a

philosophy of humanity:

"It's theme is man, insofar as human, the real befii-- in history.... This anthropology is thus neither a'ýý' psychology nor an ontology. i It w*shes to describe the integral 'essence' of man , that is to say all the human possibilities (cognitive, affective, aotive)". (58)

This anthropological reading is reinforced by what Kojeve takes to be in Hegel the 'death of God'. Thus Hegel's philosophy is :

"radically athes'istic and non-religious. For the only and the unique reality of the Christian notion of God for this philosophy is Man, taken in the totality of his historical evolution accomplished in the midst of nature, this totality being completed (=perfect) through the Wise Man (Hegel) who reveals it itself to itself in*and through the absolute knowl which he has of it. "(59)

and

"For Hegel the real object of religious thought is Man himself every theology is necessarily

I I\ anthr2jDology... 11(60j

The revelation of the perf ect Yan b, ý, 7- absolute knowledge :

"has the same content as christian theology, less the notion of transcendence.... it is sufficient to say of Ilan everything that the Christian says of his God to pass from the abeolute or Christian theology to the absolute philosophy or Science of Hegel. "(61)

For Kojeve, Hegel is atheistic to the extent that the

Phenomenology reveals the transformation from christian

theism to hegelian anthropotheism once the transcendent

form of the first is suppressed.

And this transformation is nothing less than the task and

accomplishment of the Phenomenologýy the achiever,,, ent of

full human self-consciousness for :

10

"Universal history is in the f inal analysis t. -ýe history of self-consciousness. " "The histor-i- humanity reduces itself in the last analys s tC e history of ? hilosophy. 11 (62)

The Philosophy of History is the History of 1Ihiloso-,, -,. 'h_y in the description of the various stages by wnich consciousness becomes self-consciousness and consciousness of the whole which is Absolute Knowledge.

For Kojeve; the crucial stage in this --)rooress is the famous dialectic of Recognition through the struggle of Master and Slave:

"The evolution of Hegel's thought is completed at the very moment at which he discovers the dialectic of Recognition... Having discovered the notion of Recognition, Hegel finds himself in possession of the key notion of his whole philosophy. Therefore it is through the analysis of this fundamental notion. that one understands the arrangement of the different aspects and elements of the Hegelian Ziialectic as well as the mutual relations between C:, Hegel's philosophical writings. "(63)

The master-slave dialectic is central to the existentialist reading of Hegel and indeed serves 'In Place of am Introduction' to Kojevels lectures. However there are three further remarks which need to be made about Kojevels interpretation of Hegelian consciousness. First

consciousness is negativity. Action nihilates the world through work and struggle. And it is in this characteristic that is to be found the ideal of Hegelian freedom;

"Negativity is' freedom... the possibility that man has of transcending his nature; it is what is properly human in

Man. "

"Man is negating Action which transforms the given Being and which transforms itself in transforming Be ing. Man is, not what he is only to t'. ie extent that he becomes. "(64)

i

Second it is only man as self-consciousness which

becomes, which nihilates. Being merely is it rema-ins

identical to itself. It does not change in itself and it

is only through the Action of Man in vrork that the wGrlU

receives empit-ical existence. It is thus a-human realit, -. -

11

that one takes consciousness of in taking consciousness of the World. In both these definitions can be Sartre's dualism of the pour-soi and en-soi.

Third : it is because man is Time Being can be said to be there, to accuses Hegel of a vacillation in admitting the existence of a cosm C) and remaining consistent with the C-)

Phenomeno : namely Man is Time

and Time is ! 'an that be. In this Kojeve his other works between

ic, ie. natural, Time

pivotal theme of the is the Concept.

Now if this latter is the case, and human existence is necessarily historical existence, the achievement of I'U11 human existence - the satisfaction of univocal self- consciousness with itself - is equivalent to the cessation of time, the end of History.

"This Absolute Ymowledge being the last moment of Time, that is to say a moment without Future, is no longer a temporal moment. If absolute knowledge becomes in Time, or better still in so far as Time or History, 4nowledge become is no longer temporal or historical ; it is eternal, or if one wants, it is Eternit revealed itself to itself. "(65)

In the universal, homogenous State which Kojeve's Hegel foretold under Napoleon - wherein man is fully reconciled

with himself, with the Other and with Nature - thereis no longer any History and the future is a past which has

already been.

"Time is History but History is essentially f inished. 11 (66)

History being nothing other than the History of Philosophy,

philosophy is at the end of History merely the eternal

discourse of the Wise Man.

It is this ultimate reduction of historical being at the

end of History to the timeless monologue of , ',. bsolute

Knowledge which is contrasted with Jean Hyppolite's

insistence upon the maintenance of temporality and dual-isE,

Thus he challenges Kojeve's radical atheistic Hegel W t-'-A.

C--

his own view of the heroic - rather than successful - effort

12

to reduce the vertical transcendence to a horizontal transcendence. (67) By leav---'Lng undeiotermined the existence or non-existence of God in Hegel, Hyppolite ca, - insert t, -le continuance of dialogue and transition into even the achievement of Absolute Knowledge. Indedd he argues tnat for Hegel the total reduction of transcendence to immanence, of the divine to the human leads to a devaluat- ion of humanity. (68)

Equally, despite the centrality of the 71'aster-Slave dialectic to Kojeve's interpretation, the latter reinains attached to what might be called the notion of a he7emonic consciousness. Consciousness is irreducibly personal the III is central. Consciousness is above all consciousness of self and the being man reveals himself to be is the III, the 'Mel. (69) Thus whilst the 1-, e of the Idise Ilan

remains universal it is still "a personal T'e, the I'le of a oontrete man nameA, Georg Wilhelm Hegel. "(70)

For Hyppolite the oo nsciousness which knows itself to be

achieved is a 'we' and the

"Dialectic manifests itself by the plurality and relation of particular self-consciousnesses .... The Phenome presents the access to truth in the sense of the experience of History by the study of dialogues of self-consciousnesses. "(71)

Dialectic is, for Hyppolite, dialogue. It is the need for

universal recognition which is the very condition of the

existence of our self -cons ciousnesses and recognition which

is the very milieu and motor of History. (72)

Again Hyppolite, by stressing the 'Cunning of Reason' in

Hegel, maintains the ambiguity between Ilan interpreting

Being - Kojevels reading and, on the contrar. -, -, Being

expressing itself in man

"Man is not the absolute or supreme end; he Js a

cross-roads, he only exists authentically in so far as by him being comprehends itself and manifests itself . 11(73)

In all this, as Henri Niel points out(74), Hynpolite

13

maintains a dialof gue immanent even to Absolute i_,! no,, 1,, ledE-_e, whereas Kojevels commentary tends to collapse _--e

, 7els progress of self-consciousness into the monologue of the Wise Man : all the more obtuse an interpretation as in trying to cope with the philosophical singula-rity of the Phenomeno Kojeve gives i-t the historical specificit, -ý

to TTEpol of a paeon of anticipatory praise -eon - 'the World Spirit on Horseback. '

Moreover, where Kojeve is dogmatic and inflexible2 Hyppolite is open-minded and tolerant. Jo? )-n Heckman notes:

"Throughout his writings Hyppolite refuses to adopt unequivocably either an interpretation of ICII-egel which privileges the Logic and the kbsolute, and hence leads in the direction of a religious interpretation of Hegel; or one which privile 'ges

the Ph@nomenolog , the Master-Slave dialectic of recognition, and hence leads closer to Illarxism. "(75)

Of course Hyppolite's very choice of the Phenomenology for translation and commentary indicates he favoured the latter, and yet his role is different from Koejevels. Hyppolite's "modesty" meants he limited himsell to the

role of translator and commentator; his interpretations

are implicit and not fully developed. Tloreover the bulk

of his Hegelian studies were published after 1945 -a period when the original fruits of the French Hegel revival

were already appearing. Indeed in his teaching Hyppolite

was to introduce the post-Sartre generation to Hegel :

Michel Foucaulty Gilles Deleuze and JacqLes Derrida(76).

Hyppolite's work remains the reflection of current

intellectual preoccupations - "La Conscience de notre

temps"(77) - rather than their innovation.

Sartre and Merleau-Ponty are frequently credited with the

attempt to liberate Ilarxism after 1945 from the stre, ný-71ý_

hold of prevailing Stalinist orthodoxy. But this should

not detract from the efforts - albeit somewhat incohate -

in the 1930's to formulate a humanised 7arxism. ý"_-)inone de

Beauvoir recounts her first meeting at the ')orbonne vi-t-a

"left-wing intellectuals" in the form of the 111hilosophes'

14

group to which belonged li --i Le--"ebvre 'ohrange, Friedmann, -en- Guterman, Nizan and Georges folitzer

"According to them, philosophy could not be d stin- guished from revolution, in-I, 'iHich lay n'umanit: vfs f inal hope ... they were interested above all in the manifestations of the Spirit; economy and politics to their mind could only play subordinate roles. They condemned capitalism because it had ý-Jestroyed 'the sense of beinPI in man. "(78)

Theirs was thus a rudimentary "arxist humanism but all the more significant in its -marked contrast with the contemporary positivist spirit of eC dogma, and the nature of the work subsequently completed by individual members of the group. Politzer in the fields of philosopny F_-..: id psychology, Lefebvre on theory. Lefebvre, himself, continued throughout his life to reflect the tension foreshadowed in that early group between Ilarxism and Existentialism. (79)

Sartre's close friendship with Paul Nizan who joined the PC as early as 1927 is well dboumented(80) and Sartre was) as well, on friendly terms with Politzer : Simone de Beauvoir reports an early "fierce quarrel" between the two

over the relation between Ilarxism and the petit-bourgeois intelIB ctual. (81) As Caute makes clear the period is far

from being deprived of original developments in TTarxism:

he cites the Cercle de la IýIussie neuve, as well as the

significant radical tradition of the Ecole Normale

Superieure. (82) Given the clear association of the re-dis

covery of a young Hegel and the formulation of an 'existent-

ialised' Marxism, it is significant that the period saw the

publication of important texts: in 1934 there appeared bot-'q

Lefebvre and Guterman's Karl Tiarx, --_I,.

I-. orceaux choisis, and

Auguste Cornuls Karl Narx, sa vie et son oeuvre. (83)

Though Sartre's knowledge o-F TTarxism at this ti-me ý,, -as

limited and not entirely sympathetic and t1iough he and o" 1'2. =: -st Simone de Beauvoir now complain of the lac L

teaching at the Sorbonne, there is no doubt thus t-'Iil--, t there

was an atmosphere of creative Marxist discuss on v,, 'i i c,

cannot but have affected Sartre. Indeed it was at tl, ýiis

15

time that Merleau-Ponty began to seriously study "arx's thought. Sartre comments :

"From a few conversations w-'rlich we had late.., :: as left with the feeling t-', qat before 1939, _: ae had b e, ý -a closer to I. Jarxism tha'ýýn he was ever to be subsequentil, (84)

and it was probably, Sartre' adds, the impact of tlae Noscow trials which distan'ced It -'erleau-Ponty from ! 'arxisý: i. For Spxtre, 1.1arxism even if not assimilated, remained-a presence, a challenge, and a possi He was to write bility. later :

"ýJen of my age are well aware of this fact even CD more than the two world wars, the all important thing in their lives has been a perpetual confrontation with the

' working class which afforded tn'em an irrefutable vision of the world and of themselves.

For us, Marxism is not merely a philosophy : it is the climate of our ideas, the anvironment that nourishes them, it is the movement of what Heael calls the Objective Spirit. "(85)

It was of course this challenge of the working class Vlitýý heavy weight on the horizon" - not the itself

academic explorations which would finally 'convert' Sartre, but nevertheless the seeds of both Sartre's and T, Lerleau- Ponty's subsequent attitudes to 1,,! arxism were laid in the

1920's and 1930's with the "existential reading" of Hegel

and the beginnings of a Hegelianised reading of 11arx.

The motivation for the assimilation of these new currents - phenomenology, Ilarxism, the existentialist heritage, and

Hegel - lay largely in a generational revolt against the

established philosophical conservatiem : namely the

teachings of Bergson, Lalande and Tleyerson teachings which

were predominantly neo-Kantian and . -, ý,. -)olitically ratIonalist.

The most strident rhetoric of this 'revolt' Droceded from

Paul Nizan(86) but the search for expression beyond the

established teachings was common to both Sartre -., --d I"erleau-Ponty. Sartre expressed it thus later :

"Futile and serious, our teachers were icrnorant of 17i 11istory. They replied that these were questions which shouldn't be asked orthat they .,, ere býýally

expressed or (and this a tic of everýr teacher at

16

that time) that the answers ,,,, iere to be found in the questions'. To think is to weigh, sai`- one of U iem, who did neither. And all of thcejm saidu: man E, nd nature form the objects of universal concepts. 11(87,,

Merleau-Ponty too could not accept the premi , -_;; e of a geMmetric nature, nor the assumption that society constituted an ensemble of rational individuals but the e; itent of his 'revolt' is more limited. He assigned, in 1959, an important role to the personalit-T and teachinýcs of Leon Brunschvicg who "transmitted to us the heritage of CD

idealism such as Kant had understood it, " and who restricteýi philosophy to a- Cartesian return to self-consciousness. (88) But in this same piece 1, -Terleau-Ponty regrets that the influence of Bergson was not at this sar: ie tiii-le more r, -1-rked

"It is ver, -, ý, certain.... that Bergson, if we hý, d read him closer, would have taught us things vi, iicii-i have been considered 10 or 14 years later as discoveries of the philosophy of existence. 11(89)

In his review of Sartre's L'Imagination) TTerleau-Ponty

suggested that Sartre's criticisms of Ber, -: -, -son were not fully

justified, (90) and this early respect for Bergson's work

remained throughout his life. (91)

Nevertheless both Sartre and Merleau-Ponty disputed the

le prevailing pensee de survol - over-seeing thought - and

challenged the ability of the accepted modes of reason and

cognition to provide an adequate comprehension of man and

the world. Both sought an 'anchorage' ard as Sartre says

"Each of us was trying to understand the wo2ld in so far as he could, and wit-'a the means at ',, is disposal. And we had the same means then called Husser! and Heidegger - since we were s-L. milarly dis-posed. 11(92)

Sartre's assimilation of Husserl, Scheler and Heidegger CD

during his 1933-34 sojourn. in Germany lei to the publication

a- work sianificant in 1936 of his La Transcendance de

because it, as Spiegelberg points out

tinot only linked the new French phenomenolo-ý: _-, -,., v, -, C11-

l's enterprise but at the same time E- --r ke a' Husser the beginnin s of Sartre's independeiýt career. "(P-3)

The text thus r. -epresents a prolegemona to -')artre's future

17

work and its stated intention is to show that : "the ego is neither formally nor materiý? Jly in consciousness '-i e

1- it is outside in t -orld. -t is a being of the world, like the e, -cro of another" `4) Ibis intent is grounded in the ontological unity of consciousness:

"I shall use here the term consciousness to translate the German word Bewusstsein, w. o-ich signifies CD both the whole of consciousness. ... and each moment of th---Ls consciousness. "(95)

It is a definition which is repea in, -ced in i iý e 19 4,0, where consciousness is

flnot only the unity of its psychical structures but each of these structures in its concrete particuler nature. 11 (96)

and it is a definition which founds the whole sartrean enterprise.

This ontological ur), ity of consciousness is compromised, as the treatise on emotions argues, by any notion of an unconscious(97) and equally, as the present worIc argues, by the Husserlian notion of 'ego' which would st, ýid in or behind consciousness and act as its unification for if

consciousness can be limited only by itself, so it can be

unified only by itself :

"The phenomenological conception of consciousness renders the unifying and individualising role of the I totally useless. It is consciousness, on the contrary, which makes possible the unity and personality of my I. The transcendental I therefore has no raison d19tre... (it) is the 7eath of consciousness. 11 (98)

And at the same time consciousness is intentio it

is dir ected outward to the objects it is not :

I'Consciousness is aware of itself in so far as it is consciousness of a transcendent-object ...

-rely and simply consciousness o- consciousness is Pu being consciousness of that pbject. This is the law of its existence. "(99)

Thus when; for instance, I run after a bus, there is no

I: there is simPly consciousness of the bus-ha-, T4-. n, --t,: )-be-

18

overtaken and non-positional consciousness of consciousness: and it is they - the objects - v. rhich constitute the unity of my consciousness. The absence of a me on this unreflective level is because of the very structure of consciousness.

Precisely what distinguished, at first, for S)artre t-', -ie Husserlian from the Cartesian cogito was this original consciousness, this "all translucence, this all lightness. " But to introduce, as Husserl did, into this original consciousness an I, an 'ego', is to load down consciousness, to render it heavy and ponderable.

Furthermore, such an ego-object, such an I, assumes the spontaneity which is in fact of consciousness, but it does

so in a hypostasised form. The ego hence becomes that

profoundly contradictory notion: passive object and yet active spontaneity, interiority of consciousness and yet its transcendence in unification.

Husserl's ego, for Sartre, consequently, yields everything

and nothing. It does this to the precise extent that it

is posited as a real totality : object, content and

producer of consciousness. Whereas, in fact, the phen-

omenological reduction performed by Sartre delivers up to

us an apprehension of pure impersonal consciousness : if

the I is posited it can only be as the ideal unity of all

cons ciousnesses , as appearing on the horizon of the I think

and it cannot be given as the producer of consciousness :

"Consciousness produces itself facing the I, and goes to rejoin it. That is all one can say. "(1-110)

The conclusions that Sartre himself draws from this initial

examination of consciousness are crucial for all his

subsequent work. In the first instance the sartrean

conception of ego liberates and purifies the Transcendental

Field, that is the Field to which consciousness directs

, ical itself) to which it transcends. Without an egolog

structure) this Field is nothing for it is purged of all

physical, psychical and psycho-physical objects, all truths,

19

and all values. And yet this field is ever. -,, rt.,, iin,, 7, since it is consciousness of all these objects There is no solitude, no 'inner' Or 'Spiritual' life: rather r, -, y

emotions are open to the intuitive apprehension of the Other, whereas with an ego such emotions would be drawn down into the inaccessible interiority of a particular consciousness. (101)

Our consciousness is thus not unified by a permanent I but is a pure spontaneity overflowing itself. And if consciousness is unable to turn back upon itself and determine this spontaneity as will, then it will sense that vertigo of possibility which is freedom. The ego's practical function, in effect, would be to mask consciousness from itself: but it will be with anguish and dread that consciousness realises itself to be an inescapable

spontaneity. (102)

As a second conclusion the sartrean conception of ego is the refutation of solipsism. For as long as the I remains the structure of consciousness it is always possible to

oppose consciousness with its I to all other existeiits. But the I stripped of its privileged status, become a transcendent, out in the world is now no more certain for

consciousness than the I of other men. (103)

Thirdly this phenomenology cannot be idealist : on the

contrary the, me is an existent, contemporaneous with the

World, its existence having the same essential character-

istics as the World :

"And the relation of interdependence established between the me and the World is sufficient for the me to appear as 'endangered' before the World,

and for the me... to draw the whole of its content from the World. No more is needed in the way of a philosophical foundation for an ethics and a politics which are absolutely positive. 11(104)

So Sartre concludes the La Transcendence de 11E o and this

tontological phenomenology' that is phenomenology CD

criticised immanently to educe the Beinp, of consciousness: CD

20

provides a programme f or his future work.

In the first instance Sartre rejects categorically what he takes to be the classic problem of episteý-'. ology. the me, the ego, is contemporaneous as existent wit-ri the World then :

"the subject-object duality, which is purely logical, definitively disappears from -philosophical preoccupations. "(105)

Consciousness purified of the I no longer has anything of the subject with which to confront Both the me and the world are objects for andconnected by the absolute impersonal consciousness.

In LlLre et le Neant Sartre specifically rejects an epistem-ology characterised as alimentary: that is a, process of absorption, nutrition, unification, identification, devouring. For instance :

"In knowing consciousness attracts the object to itself and incorporates it in itself. Knowledge is assimilation.... There is a movement of dissolution which -passes from the object to the knowing subject. The Known is transformed into me; it becomes my thought and thereby consents to receive its existence from me alone. "(lQ6)

In the essay on Husserl, Sartre expresses this theme even more acerBically in linking it to an attack on the traditional teachings on philosophy:

"He devoured her with his eyes! This phrase and many other signs show sufficiently the illusion common to realism and idealism, according to which to know is to devour. French philosophy, after a hundred years of academicism, is still under it. We've all read Brunschvig, Lzlande, I. Teyerson, velve all believed that the Spider-Mind (Esprit-Araignee) lured things into its web, covered them with a white spittle and slowly devoured them, reduced them to its own substance. What is a table, a, rook, a house? A certain collection of 'contents' of consciousness; an order of these contents. Oh! alimentary philosophy! "(107)

Philosophy then for Sartre demands what could be terrned

an ontological project: the "Pursuit of Being" and not the establishment of relations between subject and object, knower and known. Further, this ontology must be a

21

-pe "Manent revelation of Being : as Williams and Kirkpatrick point out in their introduction to the translation of La Transcendance de 1 if the Being of objects is not constructed by a transcendent ego out of t-h-e contents of consciousness, then the Being of objects must be discovered to every act of consciousness or the ontological project - and hence philosophy itself - is impossible. (108)

Moreover Sartre has established that consciousness has no contents: consciousness is simply a pure spontaneity transcending itself toward objects. Consciousness :

"has been purified, it is clear like a great wind, there is no longer anything in it, except a movement to flee itself. "(109)

$o consciousness is a nothingness: and equally as -)artre showed in L'Imaginaire consciousness is

' nihilating: that

is, by positing the imagined object consciousness can negate the world in its synthetic totality.

But if for Sartre philosophy is an ontological project it

is also what can be termed a synthetic project: that is

Being is revealed in each moment as a whole. If there is

no privileged act of consciousness and consciousness is

unitary, then man must be a total synthetic presence to

Being. And it is this synthetic unity which must traverse

itself, that is, come back across itself, in order to

illuminate the first moment of ontology: free, critical,

self-consciousness. Here it is circularit which, as in

Hegel provides the criterion of Truth for the unified and

completed whole. But, precisely against Hegel, Sartre

denies any "ontological optimism", which could place

consciousness at the vantage point of the truth, the whole,

the absolute.

Consciousness cannot give itself this whole a. t the outset

it rnust discover, reveal the Truth which will in turn

reconfirr-I free consciousness as the ori, ý, in and condJition

of philosophy. Thus, for Sartre, it is not epistemolo, >v, free, fixed subject encountering object - which yields an

2

OrItology, but, on the contrary, it is ontology, - the Pursuit and revelation of Being - which discovers the conditions of experiencing Being. In this Gilbert Varet takes Sartre to be pursuing the Kantian enterprise, i,. r_-. ich he describes as follows :

"In the critical idea, every question about beinf- calls forth the examination of the conditions for knowing it... This must hence forth be t]ae distinctiva character of every philosophy, to include in its own problem the philosophic enterprise in its total-ýty, and therefore the philosopher himself. 11(lMO)

In other words : Are there problems pefuliar to the philosophic enterprise which are reflexive upon the critical consciousness be it as philosopher, writer or intellectual? And more centrally: does the free consciousness guarantedd by the success of the synthetic project secure or entail the freedom of all? The obverse of this

problem may be simply stated as : is the ontological, synthetic project also universalisable? What binds all these concerns together - the ontological project, the

synthetic project, universality and reflexivity - is the

unconditional awareness that consciousness is freedom, the

vertigo of possibilities, and that the free cogito, is, in

the words of La Transendance de 11

"the first condition and absolute source of existence" (111)

and in the words of LIEtre dt le Ne'ant: "the sole point

of departure is the interiority of the cogito"(112). The

task of Being and Nothingness is indeed to yield the

philosophic whole and a confirmation of the conditions of

its existence: and it will be considered thus as the final

product and fruit of Sartre's reflections during this

period. But it is worth first confirming how far the

fundamental themes outlinecl in the early philosophical

texts are reflected in. all his other writings. Thus, as

to the priority of the Cartesian cogito, Sartre gives an

almost literary description of presence to self. From the

essay on Farain :

I'The effectiveness, the eternity of the cogito, lies in the fact that it reveals a type of essence

23

described as that state of being present to oneself without intermediary. The word is interpolated between my love and myself, between my coura-ae or cowardice and myself, not between my understac: nding and my consciousness of understanding. For t? -e consciousness of understandin is the law of being 9 C) of understanding. I shall call this the silence of consciousnesS. "(113)

The project of expression poses a problem at an essentially different level :

"Language may resist and mislead me but I s''all never be taken in by it unless I want to for I can always come back to what I am, to the emptiness and silence that I am, through which, nevertheless there is a language and there is a world. "(114)

The strange paradox of a 'me' 'endangered before the world' 'drawing its content from the world'(115) and a 'met as silence and emptiness, not vulnerable to the viorld, and through which there is a world, is a tension ývhich is internal to Sartre's cogito itself: as such it will be considered in the context of LIEtre et le Neant later (chapter two). This elucidation of the free cogito is

strongly bound to the theme of a pursuit of Being. Consciousness is a presence to the World, and Being, after Kant, reveals itself as being there, solid and stable: Being is. And there is in Sartre at this time a search for the very 'being of Being'. It reveals itself in a

piece like 'Nourrituresl(116) which seeks to describe the

very nature of food. Again it is, for Sartre, Melville in

lJoby Dick who succeeds in providing the readers with the

image - 'whiteness' - of pure existence, simple being. (117)

And'of course there are the recurrent images in Nausea of

the manner in which existence overflows its categories:

the things we categorise as a tree, a. bench and thereby

reveals all such existents as superfluous. (118) It is a

presence which makes of consciousness a mere adjunct, an

anxious silence, and a presence which overflows the

instrumentality of things. The world is undoubtedly

human in that it is occupied b-,, T man, its contents mearked

by their activities but before the 'silence of conscious-

f 1ý 4

ness ) the certainty of the cogito, it is a world can

2a

in an instant - as f or Roquentin in the park - reveal itself as pure naked Being. And yet t-aere is also manifest in Sartre an attempt to grasp man: not as a predetermined , c, ssence of human nature, but in the actions of concrete individuals. S)imone de Beauvoir writes:

"What interested him above all was people. III e wanted to replace the dry as dust psychology taught by the Sorbonne with a concrete, hence IT synthetic apprehension of individuals. '-I e had

stumbled on this notion in Jaspers, whotýewonograph Ps, ycho-patholoZy(1913) had been translated incio F-re-nic, -H in 1927 : he and Nizan had corrected the proofs of the French edition. "(119)

Even before his introdt. iction into German phenomenology, Sartre had made serious studies of psychology, and he had dedicated his 1926 diploma of higher studies to an inve. Qt- igation into the imagination. (120) If we add to the notion of apprehension, the emphasis upon the concrete - the opaý_ng article of the first volume of Recherches

philo_sophi_ques consisted of Jean Wahl's preface to his Vers le concret: "a title which expressed the spirit of the period particularly well"(121) - we can grasp both

the sense of the revolt against the universalising tendency of pens6e de survol, and a foreshadowing of Sartre's celebrated 'passion to understand man' which would

reveal itself fully in the later studies of Genet,

Tintoretto) Baudelairey Flaubert etc. At this time,

however, Sartre rejected the claimed theoretical advances

of psychoanalysis. (122) If Sartre talks in 1943 of psycho-

analysis he openly admits that : "I'm not thinking here

of the crass and suspect methods (methodes grossi'eres et

suspeotes) of Freud) Adler and Jung; there are other

psychoanalyses"(123) The complementary to the effort of

understanding man is that of inventing man: that is

freedom, founded philosophically in the certainty of the

cogito) becomes problematic at the social and political

levels, at the level of action and of other people. The

conclusion of La Transcendance de 1 cited abovey

indicated that Sartre felt his assumption of t---e new

traditions to be sufficient foundation for any ethics and

25

Politics. Yet in the works of the 1930's such a continuation is only suggested, and the problem is often 0 rather that of adequate expression with the implicit rejection of the classic antii-ý"o els of idealism and realism. (124) But an anchorage had been sought and found. Such is also the case for Merleau-Ponty, although his output during this period is far less noticeable than Sartrels: before the publication of the Phenom, enologie de la Perception in 1945 a mere four reviews and the one major work: the La Structure du comportement. Yet tj',,. ere is evidence of a cautious and far deeper immersion in the new traditions. The work of this time thus shows both an unmistakeably original style and a methodic overthroýv of the traditional doctrines.

From as early as 1931 Ilerleau-Ponty had in mind the

preparation of a thesis upon the nature of perception; and reports from 1933 and 1934 on this work give explicit reference to the prevailing works of Gestalttheorie, but

without any allusion to phenomenology and the work of Husserl. (125) As is clearly evidenced in the many footnotes

to La Structure du Comp rtement he worked, from their

publication, upon Koffka's Principles of Gestalt Psychology (1935) and Goldstein's Der Aufbau des Organismus(1934')(126)

Indeed 1.1erleau-Ponty, as a result of such studies, iuas

able to assist A. Gurwitsch in the preparation for publi-

cation of a long article by the latter. (127)

Bef ore this, Merleau-Ponty had published three reviews.

The first of these, on Scheler's Christianisme et

ressentiment2 makes an early and striking joint attack C) upon empiricism and subjective idealism which both

"interpret consciousness as a composition of impressions"

"These 'pathetic' philosophies deny that a content could naturally have a meaning; consciousness is

C) rpade up of states which receive, secondaril. 7r, a, for instance2 spatial, signification, by means of the association of ideas. "(128)

Merleau-Ponty equally rejects any definition of trut-,: i

26

which rests upon the transparency of intelligence : "To give as essential to philosophy a definition of intelligence which closes it in upon itself is perhaps to assure it a sort of transparency and protected atmosphere but it is also I%-, o renounce knowing what is'1(129ý

The review reveals as well a surprising religiosity and CD ' preoccupation with the problem of Christianity, which will significantly mark. 1". erleau-Ponty's later reflections.

In his second review of -11,,. 'erleau-Ponty surve,,, Ted the work of Gabriel 11arcells: Ptre et Avoir. TTerleau-Ponty would later in his life accredit T-1-arcel ,,, Tith a decisive role in initially raising three central themes for a. ? philosophy of existence': incarnation; philosophy as 'mystery' rather than problems; and the problem of Others. (130) In this early review there is a refusal to accept an intellectualist theory of perception :

"The man who is tresent to me, he to whom I address myself, and who is truly before me a second person, this you () is not reducible to an ensemble of charac teris tics of which I would calmly make an inventory. "(131)

Equally the review contains a rejection of the 'spectator

attitude' which deprives "the object of its human aspect, of its holds on us"(132) and, with respect to Sartre and indee, &Merleau-Pontyls own future work, there is a significant refusal of the priority of the cogito :

"To grasp oneself as pure unattached I, the philosopher had to treat himself as an object, he had to adopt towards himself that spectator attit-ide which we learn first of all to take in the face of others. In this sense the Cogito is very far from being the first truth, the condition of all valid certainty. The root of the simple affirmation is rather the consciousness of my body which perhaps sup-dorts every affirmation of existence concerning things. "(133)

T,,, Ierleau-POntY recognises that with regard to th*nI-----, ng

existence "all the work remains to be done"(134' - ý, d ti -i e

article concludes upon the affirmed need for 'a

dialectic and critical interrog-ation of intuition. CD

27

The final review treated of '--')artre's first published phenomenological investi-gation into the Merleau-Ponty would later separate his own ap: ý, roac-', ). to a phenomenological psychology from Sartre's. If t-l-, e former's commitment was to the intuitions of the later Husserl, then

"the first works of Sartre on imagination and emotion illustrate very well Husserl's conception as it was presented in the middle period of his career"(136)

that is with an emphasis upon eidetic analysis. Em-, -)ir-Jcal psychological investigation for Sartre) takes the psychic

state as simple fact divested of any sicnific; r-,. tion and can never approach a definition of the essential nature o_. L man and human reality. The phenomenologist, on the other hand, interrogates, for instance, emotion about consciousness or about man. Sartre states : "We are thus takin7,, up a position opposite to that of the psychologists, since we start from the synthetic totality that man is, and establish the essence of man before beginning our psychology. 11 (137)

Phenomenology does not seek to replace psychology but the

empirical investigations of the latter can only be clari- fied and giveiimeaning by an eidetic analysis of the sort that Sartre conducts in both L'Imaginaire and the work on

Emotions. Thus the latter is not a phenomenological study

of emotions but rather "an experiment in phenomenolof)-ical

psychology. We shall try to place ourselves upon the

terrain of signification, and to treat emotions as a

phenomenon. "(138)

ty, immersed in the late Husserl, argues for Merleau-Pon C)

an intqr2, ent-t-L! -ti2'-I of phenomenology and psychology:

"Sartre writes here as if phenomenological, or eidetic psychology ought to come first and ou7ht to rule over all the fundamental questions. after we have learned something about all possible processes in general, experience may shov., us the

actual facts. But in the basic intention of TJUSserl the relation of these two approaches --s

28

not merely one of simple successý on, as if one could see essences without any factual experience or could come to the facts without 2, -rnplying, in his very approach, a certain vision o--C' essence. 11(1-5-) For Ilerleau-Ponty,

13artrets misunderstanding of -H usserlts project leads him either to betray his o,.,., n formulations

0- by accepting that the basically experir. rental studies say, Janet, Lewin and others reveal in part the essence of what they are concerned with, or to introduce artiLJcal distinctions. Thus in 1ý'Imaginaire Sartre separates the "certain" - the phenomenological analysis of the essence of the image - from the "probable" - the data of experience - but, as M r Terleau-Ponty shov, s, Sartre intro duces such data in the second part as serve in fact to call in question the essential definition contained in the first. To Sartre's first work, IIerleau-Ponty would object simply that it is impossible to understand a mode of consciousness by an examination of the pure possibility of that mode - be it affective, or imaginary - in general, and by a definition which we' then merely apply to the

analagous empirical examples. This gulf between essence

and fact, pure reflective consciousness and experience in

the world and in Other is a trait of Sartre's which Merleau-Ponty by no means limits to just these attempts at

a-phenomenological psychology. Even from Aventures de la

-d iale (1955)

I'Sartre has not changed since L'Imaginaire where he

rigidly distinguished between the 'certain', the

mean ings of pure consciousness, and the, 'probable that which emerges from the phenomenological experience; or, if he has changed, it is in the

sense that he expects even less of the probable. 11(140)

I This clearly fundamental diaagreement between the t,, o whicli

Merleau-Ponty takes as extending into the area of political

philosophy must serve now as me-rely an introduction to

Merl eau-_ýonty Is own early attempt to construct F, method-

ology. In his review of Scheler he had noted the new

'mode of knowledge' which would follow u-Don Husserl's

phenomenological reduction

29

"For henceforth, if we no longer give any unreflected priority to things, to the states'-'of consciousness engaged in space and time, and to the casu,,:: kl explanations they admit, if we follow the F-rticul- ations of 'phenomena' in the livinc:,, consciousness, the properties, the connections they manifest v, !i tý-i clarity - it is new laws, which appear to us, it is a necessity no longer physical but essential" (141)

Yet in the review of Sartre's L'Imaginaire he makes it clear that

"neither eidetic psychology nor transcendental phenomenology claim to substitute themselves 'or experimental or inductive psychology... eidetic psychology is in no ways a pretext to neglect C) experience, but on the contrary the means of comprehending its meaning. "(142)

The promise of phenomenology lay in its attenipt to flind a unity between systematic philosophy and progressive knowledge or science. ITerleau-Ponty's P,, oal is consequently in La Strikoture du Comport_ement to understand the

C

relations of consciousness and nature given that

"among contemporary thinkers in France, there exists side by side a philosophy on the one hand, which makes of every nature an objective unity constituted viS ), vis consciousness, and, on the other, sciences which treat the organism and consciousness as two orders of reality, and in their reciprocal relation, as leffects' and as Icausesl. "(143)

Sartre in his work on imagination and emotions, started,

as it were from 'above' by the assumption of the inadequacy

of empirical investigation and the positing of a phenomen-

ologioally determined essence, be it of image or emotion.

Merleau-Ponty, on the other hand, proposes to commence

from 'below' by using science as his point ol. departure,

methodically exploring its inadequacies and only then

proposing a phenomenology of behaviour which alone can do

justice to the problem Posed.

Yet if the later writings of Merleav, -Ponty set out

definitively the gap between their respective a-pproaches

-r U -Of Behaviouris nevertheless very much a C turLe

o -C transitional work, or rather it is the very ý,,, or. -

transition. If the works of Sartre from th-'s period

30

constitute a conscious laying-doilm of founda-t4 ons, the first major text of 1., 'erleau-Ponty's

- and ,,. erleau-. L It -T Pont. - deliberately notes in the text the date of -ts dr-L ýlw 'ti 1938 - far from being definitive, is the reflection o--" a philosophical passage. One which is indexed by t'-, e f-u-nda. - mental problem Merleau-Ponty himself described in 1952:

"It is - jp, question of the discordance between the vievi ., ch whichl', ""L' n take of himself by reflection or by

consciousness, and that which he obtains in binding his conducts to exterior conditions on which they manifestly depend. "(144)

It is the discordance between the 'reflective point of view' which takes man to be absolute freedom and source of meaning, and the 'objective point of view' which treat, -;, man as the result of exterior forces, a thing in the midst of things. It is, as noted above, the confrontation off philosophy and the developing sciences, and it is the case that both contain an element of truth:

"If the testimony of consciousness were rejected, the subject would be up-rooted from all certainty and even from those it could seek in the exterior knowledge of man. Even to construct a positive knowledge I must assure myself of having access to my own thoughts and being able to appreciate their intrinsic validity. If I am only a product of the milieu and of history, I assist in the unfolding of my events without being capable of discerning their meaning or of distinguishing in myself the true from the false. "(145)

Man must be understood simultaneously as subject and

object, first and third person, in seeking to comprehend

the relationship between these two opposed perspectives.

Merleau-Ponty's first two books can be seen in the light

of -this attempt and it is moreover Theodore Geraets'

contention that the first of these - La Structure du

co ip rtement adopts 'la pensee du spectateur etranger'. (146)

Thus Merleau-Ponty begins by examining the most objectivist

and mechanistic explanation of human behaviour: the

classical theory of the reflex, wherein the object o.. '-

science is defined by the mutual exteriority o--'L paxts and

processes. Yet, he goes on to say

31

"tile description of known facts shoý, js t. 'LiaL-1. .. the

relations between the or -a asm8, nd it eu a, re not relations of 1- f, ýear causality but o-P--- causality. " (147' ) 1- c1rc,, i 1 ar

Lý

-Lavlovian reflexology developed ý_ý. s extension 0, re-]_ýx theory remains in fact a "construct-*on inspi-,, --ed by "otomistic p ostulates of realis tic anal -sis" (148), anl-_ý

the correction of any `F'orme-, - atomism does not -', --'e in t-ILe employment of equivocal notions such as linte--rat-J-on' and 'coordination' of ment,, _ý-,,

l and physiological For in the aTeas of spati, -: --, -l or chromatic percept-*-on, and the phys-*ology of language, the notions of coo-rdMation and integration appear as compromises rather true solutions to the problem. (150)

Again learning could never be interpreted as an essociation of mutually external nerve events. Io7hat iis dec'sive is the organic framework in which Itrilals and errors' are given a meaning and efficacy. Thus beh,

_--viour should be

classified no longer into elementary and complex but

"according to whether the structure ben-! ývlo,,. i-r is submerged in the content or, on the contrary emerges from it to become, at the limj-t, the

C) proper theme of activity. "(151)

From this point of view Ilerleý-ý,, u-Fon ty distin,,, -uishes tsyncretic forms' - behaviour is imprisoned in the frý,,, Fte

work of its natural conditions; lamov: ý-ble forms' - in

which signals appear; and finally the 'symbol-, c forms'

wherein aonduct appears open to truth and to the ý-)roper

value of Here be-ýiaviour no longer h, -, s only one

s-L, gnif i cation; it is itself signification.

1,11erleau-- , L'onty's consideration of the conventional physi(, -

logical and psychological responses to the problem. of, -'oresIiadowed at the outset behaviour has thus revealed, as I

t1i e of t1ie work, the tension between t,. -. -o orders: t'PYIt o.

lower oi, mechanical reactions, unfolding L-1 ob, _ect-ve ti_M. e

alad SpC---ýce, trL-, iasparent to the mode of th-`, -il-ing in physics

and like the external order i-n which events go-vern each

other fi-om the outside; and the higher order, that o--. -' the

32

-3 trans-ý i

Pour-so " )arent "or reflective conscfousness a-qd like the internal order J---i t-, -ict jjjjjcý, t .L akes p1ace always depends upon an intentJon

"Behaviour, inasmuch as it has a structure, is not situated in either of these two orders. j t) detached from the order of t? ie -*ý-L-i-itself and becomes the projection outside t-', ie orý7ýý111SM of a P ', 3 t) - -1, ý-ld -2ssýbilitv which in te --2E -1 to -ý "

-, -ie wo-- inasm -uc-h- -a" js- it harbours livino- beins-s, ce--ý, ses to rý- -- be a material plenum consisting of I '-ýuxtaposed CD parts; it opens up -,,,

t the place where behav--*cur appears. 11 (152)

Behaviour is neither a thing nor an ide-a: "it is not the envelope of a pure consciousness and, as 1. -ritness of behaviour, I am not a pure consciousness. " (153)

The notion of 'form', developed from Gestalt theory, has thus apparently saved behaviour from the classical antitheses and Ilerleau-Ponty undertakes to examine it in itself. Form is hence applicable to three fields: physical, ph, %, -siological and mental :

"matter, lif e and mind in the nature of form; degrees of integration a hierarchy in v,! hich i achieved. 11 (154)

must participr! te unequally they must represent d--, f-. L'erent and f-Inally must constitute

ndividua, lity is pro,,, ---essively

The form of malfter is not an element of ti'-ie world but

rather a limit towards which hysical ý: '. nowledue tends: p form is not a physical reality but an object oi perception, defined in terms of knowledge, not a. s thing o the p. Ilysicl--l

world but as a perceived whole. Laýv is included in

structure and structure is included in lav!. (155

"Vital structures obtain ý,., --Lth -respect to condit-ons that

are only virtual and which tne system itself biings into

existence. "erleau-Ponty argues the beipg of the organism

a, s its meaning: botlh mechanism and vitalism consider t-ie

organism to be a real -. ý-)roduct of an e-ý7ternal n, -ýture wHereas

it is in fact a unity of si, ýinificatfon. (156)

As to the human order the relc--:, tion between vv,. 'Llat, exists and

the fact of existence, betv! een the consc 'ousness of co, te,, -. ts

')

and the consciousness of ý-:, ction wh4-c-, -L roots them i-, -- being rei.: ains for psycholo--y and phf-'1. osopIriy -, -iecessar-"v external. Whereas

"Perception is a moment of the lJ--V---*Lri-, - dialecti-c of a concrete subject; it participates i-ri --*, t-s total structure and, correlýýAively, it i-ies as its original object, not the lunorý: -anised mass' but the actions of other human sublects. "(157)

Ii In sum, once behaviour is considered in its un, Ly, we J are no lonzer dealing with a mate-, -"al o-- mental realit-. - CLI ` but with a significative whole, a structure w-l-Lich properly belongs neither to the external nor internal . (158) fe Introspection is simply

"one of the -possible perspectives on structure and the immanent meaning oý conduct which is L_ the sole psychic 'reality"(159)

Yet in this conclusion to his third chapter, Merleau-Ponty notes :

"We have in the preceding chapters considered tlie birth of a behaviour in the physical wo--t-Id and in an organism, that is to say i,,, ie have pretended to ]-ý-now nothing of man by reflection and we have limited ourselves to developing what was -! mpl--I-ed in the scientific represent, --tion of his behaviour. " (160)

As Geraets argues2 what is naturally implied in th*s

Irepresentation' is the consciousness o-, -' the forei.,, -, L

s,, )ectator-(161), and Merleau-Ponty himself asks

I'Must the point of view of the I-Zoreign spectator' profit of he abandoned as illegitimate to the

unconditioned reflection? "(162)

, 'I Jý',; u-Ponty can, in pursuing such questions, final-17-F ,. erlea U

-raise the argument to the level of philosophy: and to the

classical problems of soul and body and the problem of

. I- I perceptual consciousness. For L-, -ie problem of the latter

er the-r vE-,, -* OUS is the const,, -ý, ncy of perceived things un'-

perspectival aspects. For II. Terleau-Ponty "I" ýie rad ic al J t-i--*n

originality of Cartesianism is to sitir., te itself

perception itself. "(163) The cogito gives both the

certv, intY of my existence and --, ccess to P-, whole field oi

Icnowledge b, -.,,,, providing a general metl'-od. Ye t, for

3L: L

Descart-s . --led to

__-_-Leg-_, ate the c-. -led. _e of trutý'-_, to the experience o-,, -, real4-ty. C -_, " it __* c a!

T)

osophy resolves its problems in an intellectua-24 ' -, t theory

of perception: consciousness is the r, -- iil*eu of- the universe, presupposed by every affirý--, -_tion of a v,., orld- the body is integrated into the objective world, every form of consciousness presupposes its completed f, 31ý, -,. q. I How against critical philosophy for jTjhicq consciousness constitutes its own existence to reconcile conscJousness in its very existence with those subo2dinate diCalectics of the physical and vital:

"the alleged conditions of existence alre indis- cernible in the whole wit-'a which they collaborate and reciprocally the essence of the wý, iole cannot be concretely conceptuallised without them and without its constitutive histor .... for us consciousness experiences its inherence in an organism at each moment : not inherence 'n material apparati but presence to consciousness of its proper his. tory and of dialectical stages it has trave-rsed. "(164)

Structure renders comprehensible both the distinctlon

and union of soul and body; yet there is a disjunction

between knowing about the world and my perception oL this

or that segment of the world. Thus I could never make an

actually present experience of my body adequately corres-

ponding to the signification 'hur-, ian body' as it is given

-1 witnesses; and more generally men to me by science ank-L CD

see things I don't and can't see. (165' But th's implied

antinomy between consciousness as part of the -ýTorld E-,. nd as

coextensive with it disappears at the level o-L re-Flexive

thought. 'Objects I do not see' are logical siI_7-,, -i_*, J_'ic. -_. t-_, ons

which get the index of real existence fror: i r: ýy actual

perception

,, Ail the sciences sit-uate themselves in a 'complete'

and, -real world -ýý,,, ithout --, ý--ealising that -Perce-otu-? l

e-xperience is constitut-1-ng with respec! to this

world. "(166. `

The solution is not that of ref-lism - encrendea: --ng CD

perception from the v,, orld - nor thLF. t 0-IL Cl-itLC'? l thoucht -

which sees in perception only a comi,, -iencement of scJ-ence

35

Of the vrorld but a return to -., )erce, )t-'-on as to a L7pe of Orig 1 nal e-,: p erie nc e in whi, ch the real i.,. -o ---ld is c ons t. L k, tut ed in its specificity.

But in the li, ý7;, iit of this origln! 7ý1 naturýý, ted experJence CD- the world, what the chF; -racter of a true reflection about this experience:

7.11

-Is the reflexive Passage to an intellectual consciousness an adequation of our knojý, ý---, -q to our being or only a way for consciousness to

-C, - create for itself a sel p(irate existence? " (167" I.. 1ý

In the f inal phrase of the -ext there is an ind-cation

of the incomp F __leteness of the word: the 'comprehension' i, ý, Thich gives us access to the natur, ---ý, l 'thing', t-',,,. e organism, niy behaviour and that of others is not yet an intellection. (168. )

La Structure du comportement, does thus reflect

TvIerleau-Ponty's inability to develop a transcendental

philosophy, given his rejection of the idea o -F' Eý

constituting consciousness, and a dissatis-iact'l. on the objectivism of the sciences of human behaviour. Yet

its merit- was to situate perception as a crucial index of this problem, the assumption of anti-cartesianism, and the

rejection of both an idealist and -realist solution.

If Sart-re's work throughout this per-. Lod is assured, and

programmatic, T-Terleau-Ponty's is cautious, exploiý'ato--rv CD

and ai-, qbiguous: the final -products of their early

reflections take the impressive c.,, n. -I definitive form of

the contrasting 1j''EAre et le Neant(1943) and

2he-nomenolo. fie de la -perception 45). (19

36

Ch Pap te FND I\ TI

kjartre's LILtre et le -`J6g-nt(1943) e,. -na "erleP-.,

----Por-t " --Is "h "' enomenologie de T. )erce-ption(1945', ref

., - --lect bot-', -i ttiie -i in t'ý-ie ti-ro philosophers' ca-eers, and also -LL--Ie

--ri, c)-ly different conclusions ea strik-L- On 7TaS a 11-2- '7 ! 7, t (Z)

Both writers, as has been seen, i: ýImersed tiiem. sel-,,, -es -'-n the same traditions - Hee-gel as interpreted by Yo-*eve -, nd ify-, -Tolite, phenomenology, 161assic' exi qaL. '-I e -ste-nt4al J- s nd gestc-: ýti0n. of a hegeliv. -nisec! 17arxism. -3 othI ecually. C) 5

produced works i; vhich reflected the assimilat- on o -7 "1 ese currents of thought and which also were pr--*1-ýP. --, --*, ý---, co-, ý- structed around the problem of the relý?, -t: *, --)nsh-'Ip bet%.,. -een philosophy/phenomenology and psychology. it is interest Lng to note that although 11erleai)-Ponty's L?. "tructure du Comportement is distinctly influenced by hils readJ*ng o- U CD Gestalt t,, Ieory, Sartre had -Iso lleageiýly devoured early popularisations of the i., estalt theory"(1), yet nowhere in his life's work does he ever develop a critical ste,, -, Ice towards it.

Yet despite this , -,, pparent parallelism there ivas mental divergence and it enerýýes more fully in comparison Cý of the two early central texts. It even reveals -*. tself in

a contrast between the respective contexts of the wý='. -, "

inceptions.

L'iAre et le '-'; ", T6ant,, although published after t-'-ýe de-L'eat

and occupation of Fremce, was -, principally t',. Le product o-7

) -utre r-fter 1933: it the researc-', a, ý,. i under t, -, 1--en by -'a -ý sa

..., 2y oi continuation of these, a surri, -I-, f tlýiese, and yet also an CD

-A-on in so open project in its own right. A continuat,

as the problem of the Other is -., mtijrP-lly raised by the

1'although I am still persi-t, -, ded t'. iat critique of Husserl -" CD

the hypothesis of a tr. -, --, nscendental subject -*Ls uzeless ý7ýnd

disastrous) --b,. -ndoning it does not help one bit solv- CD - CD

TD the question o' the existence of Others"(2); i-nso-, ----r as

'. m-tion is broadened Uo the nihilating potentiý-,, l of im-, -, i -1

encor,, iý, ýass t)e Inot., Lingness' of con-sciousness; continuatIon,

37

in general, because the ontolo7ical phenomenolog, -- of t. 'ae 1930's worl,,: demanded a --, '_: 'ull-blown -, )_'n_enomenoýo, ýýical ontology this earlier ---esearch reveF. -! ed the need for k-nowledge of man to be a totalit, -1(3). 1"he wor! __ o-L f 1943 is nevertheless a summary of t-lie -orevious texts:

-t is grounded in the same sources, altLaoug'ri there is clearly CD

ly

more Heidegger than Husserl in treetIe _"q Eý_ nd

Et

tak-es up these first works -ithout cý-_, allenýina the-j-r t) CD A

premisses. Thus despite its size LIIý-,,, -e et le__ : ý:: P irvras drafted and completed in the com-para-tively s1lort ti-me of two years, and this during a period when Sartre not only Cý V. Tr ote Le Sursis and Les_',, Iouches but was E, lso teaciiiný; at the lYcee Condorcet. (4)

I _. -11) -!, II, ) But B, _Ijr ý, d Nothingness is in ii, iportant respects open-

ended -and doesn't represent the pfiJlosophical dogmatism

many of Sartre's critics ins'i-st it is. The need -or an 'existential psychoanalYsJsl is thus demonstrated, but its possible nature is only thematised: "it me-tters little to us whether it now exists; the important thJ

-- is that it is possible"(5); the quest for an e, -/, -; -s

tent ial mor, -! ýty

remains perhaps its most famous unviiýiften chapte--, -: IýAll these questions iýýihich refer us to a -pure and not an L accesory reflection, c, --, ii ind t"ieir reply only on the

ethical plane. We shall devote to tI-_,. em. a, further vroril-. 11(6);

f the possibility of a and tile work itself admits oL 'radical conversion. 1(7)

Illerleau-Ponty's Phenomenckgie de la Perce tion, on the

other hand, is far more of a projected conti-nuation: the

first part of the cert, -inly contains a, summary oJ! ' tile

worl, - 0-l' -tructure of Behavioa-ýý: 'Introduction: ! Tad--*tional

i-'rejudices and the --': `, etur, ýl- to Phenomena' , but t1, Le

work is marl-, -ed by what Geraets considers a de2initiv e

break from _-), ievious pos-*: -tions, and what, can certainlY be

described as the conscious assumption of a s, -,,, )eciif4l- c

phenomenology. (8) Phenomencý---ie de la P? ----cent-on

was the

first orig-7nal worl-- LýL Lýrance to carr the wo- i4

-Li-l its IP-efacel lphenomenology' in its tAle(c)), a ýi

38

constitutes a sir, -. Iif icamt orla, n; iestol o-': ' p-aenor. re--. olo, -J-cal theiýies.

In January 1939 the Revue Intern-ý. - tion-, -7-j e %-'L e -) --, -* - %- --s o -o h j- e

had published a special numbe--r- dedicated to Husserl, and it iTj L -* - . cluded a text o-f -'usserl's: quest-on de 1'ori,

-, -c, *ne I de la geometrie comme probleme ln, --stor-4 co-intentio-n, -Lel" :

together with a, pre'Lace and long ýýrt cle irom --1,3, gene Fiii'-. --. CD - These pieces clearly influenced Eer1eP-. u---, -)ontY who, charged

by A..,. oyre wit--i. v.,, ifiting an a--rticle for a --,, ), -oec--al -usserl

___philoso; -,; 1 issue of liecherches , 'Juues, and still pursuinE

his own studies, requested from van L-. redeL in "arch 1939 per,,! ýiission to visit the Louvain archives. (10) Dur-nrr his CD

first visit to the archives in ,,; )ril of 1939 "erleau-±1ont,

was able to read, amongst other i -. iýuscri ts ti 'ne un-, ub- CD p

lished part of the E'risis and a part of Ideen 1-. -. (11)

, This first acquaintance witý--L t',, e late worý, - ol T-11usserl

gave Merl eau-1--onty an insight into a movement o' thou-ýýIit

within Husserl. - away from the certaint, ý of the -'ý, cci-e-, and the 'transcendental ego', towards a concern ýljith the Lebenswelt and the prim(, -cy of perception. Gerce, -, s comments:

the as -- "From tile recading of t,,. -iese articles, ,, e ýi received hesitant thought of T. 'erleau-Pon,,

decisive impulse as viell as certc-,, in elemen ts of formulCI-Aion fo the nei, -,! trEnscendental : )I-ii1osophy which he was looking for. "(12)

In other words, T,.,, erleau-Ponty found ii, ý , 7.1he late ý',: usserl

his Husserl: one ivhJ-nh prompted hi, -, both to undertake t. 'O,. e

project of the Phenomenol=, to ---ead and Lr-tterpret

th -ic L--r--tuit-on of Husserl in the light of this sympa el.

movement.

f 1,,,! erl ea--, -Ponty, Thus althou(-ý, -!, -, - t'-ýe f-, rst tvro workm ol

of peiýcept-'-onll(13) souý ýI 'sy ý ýht to restore the worl' his OVTn worýý C) in the 2henornenolo, ---,, - of 2ercent-on:

it piýesent , -., t the ene--,, -, gence o-L v, Te are no longer

L--- 111 ins"all ourseIves , L,! erwe p erc ep tuý-, l b ehc,, vJ ours rýý -L in tiiem o_-ý-der to pursue til-'e anal, -ý, sis Of th__S exceptiomýl re-1-a-Lion between t; ie sub-*&. ct cand its body and

its ý, ', Tor-; _d.

11 (14)

39

La Strudture du c-oý-'-, o-rtement aut-io2ý ise--' a-rid made Possli-Itle a study of perception, buk. its mplic't ep- terc-illoý: --f- st cal C-ý attitude

0 to be cleaaýly d-i, 3t-*-n,, _: ý' gui-shed Iia .

-Ljhenom. enologie

"the 31tructure - of 'Rehaviour, consý_de----`np, from the exterior the iriEH vIT-o p -_ý -n - to erceives an. -,, - see'. ----, - disengage the val-. d sense o__ the experimen'--I resech ýýs )i,. Th 2

-Loh approach him -rom, t-', --e -oo--*n'k o' view of the fore--*Lgn spectator, the ?neno D_ eno1o of -eerception placing itself at the interio-L, u_L th, e subject in order to show `Ln-*tially ! "low acouired knowledge L-vý_tes us-to cciaceive his

relations with his body and n--s world, and finally to sketch out a theory oi consciousness and of reflection which renders possible tl': ý_ese relations. 11 (15)

The fundamentEd problematic of La Struct. - ur ede -1- E, com-portement had been-,

"the discordancy between the view that man c. ' take of himself by refJe ction or by consciousness, and that which he obtains in relinkL-,.,

-ý- his

conducts to exterior conditions on which tf', -ey manifestly depend. " (16)

The intu.. --*-. tion t, --ken from a readJn. -)- ,, of. late Husserl was that the 'true trans c endental is neither the absolute I, the pure

titU. L

cons Uing conscilousness, CD nor the absolute unity of the world, nature in itself, but ratner I

_2=q2Ll eno eI:

"we have the experience of a v,. Forld, nolt, understood as a system oJL relations which wholly deter,,

_r-i-_Lne each event, but as an open totality t-lie z,, -nthes_S of which is inexhaustible. , Ve have the experience of an I not in the sense of an absolute subjectivity, but indivisibly demo'

- shed E_iid remade by tir-le course of time. The unity of e--*Lther the subject or the object is not a real un--'ty, but presumptive unity on the horizon of- experie. ýice. -,, v, Ve irriuýtt rediscover, as anterio_-ý- to the ideas

subject-'v-*ty subject and object, the ,! -P. ct o. V-)

_L r .1

layer and the nascent object, t.., -. t primc which both things e-nd ideas come into bein, -. 11ý17)

Philosoph7r is not thus --.

deq, --uati on of ,ý -L - The tpsi- o-l'-2

truth to being, but the ambiguous labour of e--, cpression:

'? Iiie phenomenolocic--. 2 v., crlk-' iýý3 not t, L-, e to explicit expression off -pre-existin, ý-: being, but

_, o 1ý1ailoso-ol-iy is not tlie the laying down ot Lng be

40

reflection of a pre-existing truth, but, li'tý--e art, the act of bringing truth -into being. 11(18) As such phenomenology bears comparison with other undertakings :

"It is as ainstakinf7 as the works of Balzac, Proust, Valery or Cezanne - by reason oC the same kind of attentiveness and wonder, the same demand for awareness, the same will to seize the meaning of the world or of history as that meaning comes into being. In this way it meiýges into the general effort of modern thought. "(19)

Truth does not adequate to being, rather expression is faithful to experience. Thus it is Husserl's celebrated dictum from the Cartesian mediations: 'It is the pure and, so to speak, still mute experience which it is a question of bringing to the expression o-, f its own sensel(20): which Merleau-Ponty follows when he declares

"Experience anticipates a philosophy and philosophy is merely an elucidated experience. (21)

ý'Establishing this matrix of experience has important implications for the very notion of subjectivity :

ttThe core of philosophy is no longer an autonomous transcendental subjectivity to be found everTvhere and nowhere: it lies in the perpetual beginning of reflection; at the point where the individual life begins to reflect on itself....

as thinking subject we are never the un-reflec- ive subject we seek to know; but neither can we

become wholly consciousness, or make ourselves into the transcendental consciousness. "(22)

The III is an experience, that is a communication with the world and others: it is being with them rather than

being in or behind them. Thus Aron Gurwitsch points out that "presence au monde" should be rendered as 'at',

not 'in' :

t'It is not a relationship between container and contained that is meant, but rather directedness, projection, access, opening oneself up to and the like. "(23)

'The cogito) the I is not the transcendental subjectivity

of classical idealism but is inseperable from worldly

incarnation :

41

"My freedom, the fundamental power v. T, -i_ch I enjoy of being the subject of all my experiences is not N distinct from my insertion into the

. -, -o-. -I1d. II(24) In this sense too, 'It am with others: li. lerleau-Ponty attacking the subjectivist bias of cartesianism:

"Hithertoo the Cogito depreciated the perception of others, teaching me as it did that ! he I is accessible only to itself, since it defined me as the thought which I have of myself, and which clearly I am alone in having, at least in this ultimate senrve. For the 'other' to be more than an empty word, it is necessary that my existence should never he reduced to my bare av. iareness of existing, but that it should also take in the awareness that one may have of it, and thus include my incarnation in some nature and the possibility, at least, of a historical situation. 'The ito must reveal me in a situation, and it is on this condition alone that transcendental subjectivity can, as Husserl puts it, be an intersubjectivity. "(25)

Moreover the unity of the III is not to be found in the IIIthin1II but rather in the 'I can'(26), for the III is

not merely 'in situation' but is the very 'possibility

of situation'(27). The 'intentionality of consciousness' must be taken up in this light :

"It is a question of recognising consciousness itself as a project of the world, meant for a world which it neither embraces nor possesses, but towards which it is perpetually directed - and the world as this pre-objective individual whoSe imperious unity decrees what knowledge shall take as its goal. This is why Husserl distinguishes between intentionality of act, which is that of our judgements and of those occasions when we voluntarily take up a position - the only intentionality discussed in the Critique of Pure Reason - and operative intentionality (fungierende Intentionalitat), or that 1vhich produces the natural and antepredicq)2-ive unity of the world and of our life.... 11(28)

This distinct notion of 'operative intentionality' is A finds restated by Merleau-Ponty in other places(29): -L

it most direct manifestation in the field of -r)erce-. )tion;

it grounds the living unity of the body-subject, and, in

so doing, it provides a contentious foundation for

Merl eau-Ponty Is I existential analysis I: as such it , i, rill

42

be discussed later.

If the III is not a constituting subjectivity, neither is there an absolute unity of Being: rather the

' Lebenswelt)

the lived-world, already-always-there, presupposed by and the ground of all scientific reflection. And the living unity of the world is not the product of an objectification, of a synthesis of understanding :

"I experience the unity of the 1, irorld as T recognise a style ... The world remains the same world throughout my life, because it is that permanent being within which I make all corrections to my knowledge, a world which in its unity remains unaffected by these corrections, and the self- evidence of which attracts my activity towards the truth through appearance and error. "(30)

# Again :

"The natural world is the horizon of all horizons, the style of all possible styles, which guarantees for my experiences a given, not a, willed unity underlying all the disruptions of my personal and historical life. A(31)

This ante-predicative unity of the world - "the native abode of all rationality" (32) - completes the circle of intentional body-subject and world, which, in toto,

refuses any dualism of consciousness and Being, pour-soi

and en-soi :

"The world is inseparable from t1ae subject, but from a subject which is nothing but a project of the world, and the subject is inseparable from the world, but from a world which it projects itself. The subject is a being-in-the-world and the world remains 'subjective' since its texture and articulations are indicated by the subject's movement of transcendence. " (33)

The nexus of philosophy

of 'being-to-the-world'

in the french word sens

the true transcendental

an tininterrupted and im

Garaets conclude. -ýý :

is this projective experience

and the implication of Idirection'

reveals once again the location of, for 1.1erleau-Ponty. Philosophy is

exhaustible inter-rogation, and as a-

IlThe expression of this interrogation will be j articulated around the notion of sense (sens"

43

and it will proceed - through the stud, -7 of perception, expression and the dialectic of sense, and in an irremediable tension between expression and experience - towards what could be called an 'ontology' of sense"(34)

IJerleau-Ponty is a "fundamental ontolo 'gist"(35), but,

unlike Sartre's 'pursuit of Being', Tlerleau-Ponty's ontology is the elucidation of the meaning to wfiich we are 'condemned' by our inherence in the world. (36)

If the word 'phenomenology' in the title of Perl eau -Pont 7-r's work disguises a fundamental ontology, the subtitle of Sartre's work reveals his full intent: "An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology. " As Merleau-Ponty concerned himself with the relation of consciousness and nature, equally Being and Nothingness orients itself around the

question :

"Is there any conduct which can reveal to me the relation of man with the world"(37)

Sartre discovers that Being is eveiphere and yet reveals V itself as haunted by non-being as its perpetual presence: "Nothingness lies coiled in the heart of being - like a

worm" (38), Having previously shown consciousness to be

nihilating nothingness we can see the origin of this

nothingness: Man is the

"being who causes Nothingness to arise in the

world, in asmuch as he is affected with non-being to this end. "(39)

Man is a double nihilation: that being which is in the

mode, firstly, of being what it is not-consciousne3S intends

a world of objects which it is not and this world is

CD through consciousness not being - and, secondly, being what

it is not - consciousness nihilates itself in its very

being.

Hence the primary ontological relation: consciousnesS I -eli which is in the mode of not being, that is ý-or itS

as presence to being which is, as simple full

p ositive Being: the plenum of the in-itself" (en-soi). '-'11. e

44

Conduct which thus reveals the relation of man to the world is freedom: for the nothingness is the for-itsel-': ' is freedom. As there is only nothingness in t1iee CD

world through a being which is its own nothingness, as there is only lack in the world through a beinp, which is CD its own lack, there is only poscibility in the world through a being-man-which is its ovm possibility: freedoT-n But the f or-itself is not this possibility in the passive mode of being: it is not in the mode of becoming. The for-itself is temporalis possibility. The past is the in-itself, the being I am, but I am this in-itself as surpassed towards a future I am not yet. The present is thus a perpetual flight in the face of being and, once again, the for-itself is not what it is (past) an' is what it is not (future).

Throughout such analysis Sartre warns against fixing freedom within a permanent subject, or hyposta sising the Future into a fixed becoming. The for-itself is precisely ungraspable flight and temporality is temporalised as refusal of the instant. It is this temporalising unity of the for-itself wb-ich gives us consciousness as freedom: that negative power -w. i+, h respect to the world and itself. Action is the present nihilating of the past in the light

of a future to be achieved. Hence : a

"the ind(tspensable and fundamental condition of all action is the freedom of the acting being. "(40)

CD As a result of this, Sartre can point to what is lacking

in those "tedious discussions" between determinists and the proponents of free-will. The latter seek a decision

without a prior determining cause and the determinists

reply for the necessity of all action to have a cause or

motive. Sartre does not deny that such is the case :

"each action must, in fact, have an end, and the end is in turn referred to a cause. Such indeed is the unity of the three temporal ekstases (past,

present and future): the end or temporalication of my -future

implies a cause (or motive); that is, it points toward my past, and the present is the upsurge of the act. "

45

But it is precisely :

tIonly because I escape the in---4Ltself by nihilatingr myself toward my possibilities that this in-itself can take on value as cause or motive"(41)

Cause, motive, end, intuition, act only have meanin, 7 in the ensemble which is the for-itself temporalising itself in its possibilities :

"Past, motive, past causes, present motives and causes, future ends, all are organised in an indissoluble unity by the very upsurge of E,, freedom which is beyond cause, motives and ends. -'(42'ý

C,

Equally, if freedom is one in the ontological unity of consciousness, free will proponents cannot have resource to any notion of conflict beti,;,, reen passions and autonomous will, or between a psychic given and an uncondit4loned freedom, or between the unconsciousness and a conscious censor: such divided poles in a unitary consciousness

would necessarily remain, each of them, homogenous and

maintained in incommunicable solitude. --, onsequently is wholly determined (which is inadmissible, because a determined consciousness ceases to be consciousness' or

else man is wholly free. (43)

Neither can freedom, in the manner of Leibniz, be the

free development of an essence, for freedom is not a

being: it is the being of man, ie. , his nothingness of

being. If man is conceived of as a pure being, as a

plenum of positive existence, it is absurd to try and

find in him afterwards moments or psychic regions in

which he would be free :

"Man cannot be sometimes a slave and sometimes free;

he is wholly and forever free or he is not free at

all - 11 (44)

nd this freedom is one and the same thing as choice, a CD

nihilation and temporalisation. (45) But , iven this

summary Of consciousness as freedom, two important areas

of unresolved doubt remain. Firstly, the common sense

argument against freedom will remind us that freedom, ý-'ar

from being total and unlimited encounters obstacles: c, -. n

46

the slave in chains truly be said to be free? "S e- --r- treIs

I reply is simple: if there is borrowing -33, acliele-rdls expression -a 'coefficient of adversity' in thincýs

C: I i. e. the extent to which they hinder or facilitate the successful accomplishment of our projected actiýons, it is nevertheless that this coefficient a-rises :

"Without picks and piolets, paths already worn, axid a technique bf climbing, the crag would be heither easy nor dif-t-icult to climb ... it is our freedom itself which must first constitute the framework, technique, and the ends in relation to which they (brute things) will manifest themselves as limits ... it is therefore our freedom which constitutes the limits which it will subsequently encounter. "(46)

Again :

"Freedom is total and infinite, which does not mean that it has no limits but that it never encounters th22ý' The only limits which freedom bumps up against at each moment are those which it imposes on itself. "(47)

Such limits are external, in that freedom is necessarily in situation, and internal, in that freedom possibilises its own possibilities: i. e. by the surpassing in flight

of its facticity, the. contingency of its freedom. And as

"There is freedom only in a situation, and there 0, \ is a situation only through freedom"(48)

so too: "Freedom can be truly free only by constituting facticity as its own restriction"(49). Sartre is hence

at pains to make precise the nature of this freedom: it

does not entail the common sense 'to obtain what one has

wished' but rather 'by oneself to determine oneself to

Msh'-, "In other words success is not important to freedom",

and Sartre seperates an 'empirical, and popular concept

of freedom' produced by historical political and moral

circumstances which is equivalent to 'the ability to

obtain the ends chosen' from a technical and philosophical

concept of freedom which is strictly equiv. --lent to the

autonomy of choice. This distinction i: ý. rill be considered

again.

47

The second fundamental obstacle to this freedom of consciousness is. the Other: for Sartre accepts that human reality is not merely a being-for-itself but a being-for- itself -f or-others. (50) And yet as Sartre admits(51) although he regards the transcendental ego as a useless and disastrous hypothesis he is not prepared to say that it's demise secures an escape from the problem. of solipsism: for the affirmation of the Other demands and requires the existence 'beyond the world' of a transc, -nd, ental field similar to my own. In this sense the Other escapes me: i. e. in transcending myself toward a world as a whole, I cannot establish myself in this Whole so as to contemplate myself and Other.

"No logical or epistemological optimism can cover the scandal of the *rality of consciousness es. 11 (52)

Since philosophy has given itself under Sartre an ontological task, the Other can be neither epistemologically constructed nor logically constituted. The Other is then

encountered: and encountered precisely as a freedom, as a transcendence which transcends my transcending: as I feel

myself to be object for a freedom in the "look" of the

Other.

The Other is thus a scandal which ontology reveals, but

which it is powerless to overcome. I am the death of the

Other's possibilities as he is the death of mine: the

Other is the possible objectification of my freedom for

his, as I am of his for mine. Hence:

"Conflict is the original meaning of being-for- others"(55)

and it is this conflict as pluralised in -Lie unstable

conducts of love, masochism, desire, indif-c-'erence, hate

and sadism, which Sartre devotes time to exploring in

detail.

The only alternative to this conflict: open, pluralised or "itsein: a v., e-subject suppressed: is the possibility of 1ý..

experiencing the freedom of an 'us'. But this is, Sartre

48

claims, not given as an ontclogical relation but as ali experience of the psychological order. Furth el-1-c--e It presupposes the prior ontological relationshic-) of Cý L irreduciable individualising freedoms, whose o----, c--nal (Z) meaning is conflict

"One must either transcend t-'L-ie Cther or alio-ý, oneself to be transcended by him. The esse--, --ce of the relations between consciousness is not Kitsein; it is conflict"(54)

We have thus a freedom which is ontologica-1-y unitary, irreducible, individual ising: a freedon. which is flight orre a freedom which we4but which we do not choose to be: we are condemned to freedom. A freedom which is powerless before the scandal of the Other and a freedom whicl-i -u, r. ques the impossible synthesis of the for-itself and in-itself

in the ideal unity of God. We have a freedom. whic-'-11 is thus, in a word, non-synthetic: which can neither realise the community of human beings nor secure the unity o-I Being.

Ontology alone for S4rtre could apprehend being-in-the-

world because it had its place in the perspective of the

cogito.: consciousness as freedom: but ontology has C)

apparently realised. its limits in a human re, -. lity whose fundamental possibilities and values haunt it as an

incom leteness : "Man is a useless passion"(55) and

again : "Human reality therefore is by nature an unhap-, jy

consciousness with no possJbility of surpassing its

unhappy state". (56) Sartre consequently speculates, in

, as to t the final section of Being and_ Nothingne hose

ethical precepts which ontology cannot of itself formulate

but which could guarantee the ho-peless passion a moral

efficacy* Yet the tone is sceptical and some of the more

notorious remarks seem tovindicate the accusation of

irrationalism. For instance :

tiThus it amounts to the same thing výhether one

gets drunk alone or is a leader o-C nations. one of these activities takes precede. --ce over the other, this will not be because of its eý, l

/

/

goal but because of the degree of cons c iou,,. -)ness which it poss , esses of it,

-ý ideal goal; and in this case it will be the quietismc: ' of the

solitary drunkard w-Jqich will take precedence over the vain agitation of the leader o., nations. "(57)

Equally Sartre talks of the possibility of a 'radical conversion I: in the context of the 'circle I of att4-tudes

-which the for-itself is forced to adopt towards thle Other he notes :

"These considerations do not exclude the possibility o-IL 2' an ethics o-f deliverance a, nd salvation. But this can be achieved only after a radical conversion which we can not discuss here. "(58)

But it is unclear whether this radical conversion is situated within the philosophic enterprise as a whole, or more specifically in the character of the cogito itself. The ambiguity of a putative morals reflects a broader indecision in Sartre's intentions: the 'idea of freedom' which Sartre is concerned to establish in Being and Nothingness is not a content of his philosophy but rather the origin of all philosophising. Transcendance

of th has established that the cogito is "the first

condition and absolute source of existence"(59) and this

premises is reiterated in Being and Nothingness :

11 , the sole point of departure is the interiority

of the cogito. "(60)

and

"Hegel's failure has shown us that the only point of departure is the Cartesian Cogito"(61)

This priority Of the individualising free consciousness

does, for Sartre, alone guarantee the possibility of

self-reflectýon which itself in turn validates the

philosophic enterprise. The freedom which Sartre succeeds

in establishing is thus the technical and philoso,, Iiical lempir'

concept which is clearly sep:; 3t. rated from, the i-cal

and popular concept of freedom' produced by historical,

I political and social circumstances. The deeper ai-. bi7uity

hence at the heart of Sartre's activity is that between

50

the permanence of and the realisation of pnilosophy: the former resting precisely on a philosophic freedom, t-, --)e cOgito; the latter demanding the secur--*LnZ of those CL unspecified and quite distinct historical polýtical, social and moral freedoms, in a word 'freedom' is not problematic for Sartre: what is problematic is the relation between the philosophic enterprise and the liberation of humanity.

Sartre himself was latter to admit : "Beipg and Nothingness retraces an interior experience without any relation to the exterior experience... of the petit-bourgeois intellectual which I then was... in Being and NothinIgness what you could call 'subjectivity' is not il, ýhat it would be for me today. "(62)

Sartre sought to make freedom inhere in situation and entail the freedoms of Others but on its own - ontolo, -Tical - terms it remains rooted in a subjectivist perspective. Thus, although Sartre accepts the Other's existence as 'scandalous' and non-demonstrable, he still concludes too

much. Alfred Sketz writes

I'Sartre has correctly criticised Hegel for not having taken one particular concrete consciousness as the starting-point and system of reference. But Sartre himself becomes a victim of such toptmisml. As a starting-point of his analysis he takes it tacitly for granted that my experiencing the Other and the Other's experiencing me are simply interchangeable. "(63)

The assumption of the Other's subjectivity in his

objectification of my subjectivity is unjustified.

Moreover this relationship is never realised as between

an I-subject and an Other-subject. -F-ither I am the

subject and the Other is subject or vice versa. Sartre's

analysis cannot admit, consequently, of a plurality of

coexistent transcendent subjects :

"His attempt to overcome epistemological solipsism leads to an unrealistic construction which involves, so to speak, a practical sol; psism.

i, 7, r F, ither the Other looks at me and alienates 'I.,, liberty or I assimilate and seize the liberty

of the Other. Thus mutual interaction in

51

freedom has no place within Sartre's P---'-Jlosophy. 'I(64) As noted before, Sartre specifically rejects any no-Ition Of 'mitsein'

"Vie would hope in vain for a human 'we' in i,, ', -;, Lc h the intersubjective totality would obtain conscious -., uss of itself as a unified subjectivity. Suc I-L an jideol could be only a dream produced by a passage to t, ýe limit and to the absolute on the basis of fragmentar5,, Cý, strictly psychological experiences. "(65) CD

And Sartre goes so far as to declare that the huiuan race is merely "the ensemble of abstract relations sustained by the free individual choice. "(66)

, and Again, although Being Nothingness confirms the for- itself in its temporalising activity, it does not give the for-itself the ability to disengage any historical meaning from its action: the historian is himself historical, in that he historicises himself(67) and hence the question 'Does history have a meaning? ' or 'Is history completed or only terminated? ' are perhaps insoluble, "since all answers which can be made to it... are themselves historical. 11 (68)

We have seen equally that ontology cannot formulate

ethical precepts, and finally it must be admitted that Being and Nothingness does not adequately resolve the

problem of , materialism. For Sartre the fallacious illusion

of materialism arises at the level of epistemology: that is

in the form of what Transcendence of Ego terms 'metaphysical

materialism') for which object precedFg3 subject. But

Being-and Nothingness is a 'fundamental ontology' wh--'Lch

takes up the problem of knowledge on the level of being

and non-being. (69. ) Properly for Sartre, epistemolojý7-y is C)

a sub-category of ontology and knowing is an ontological

relation between two regions of being. And Van de .., itte

points out :

"His ontology establishes the radical disti, -alctness I of being-in-itself and being-for-itself. ,, is

epistemology (ontology of knowing) asserts t-'-, eir union. "(70)

52

However at the ontological level, wiiich is primary, the dualism is insurmountable. Ilaurice Katanson remar-Iý: s: "the validity, consistency, and significance of Sartre's ontology require the unresolvable dualism of en-soi and Pour-soi"(71)

Yet this ontological dualism only pushes further back the problem of how consciousness is engaged in the real and the material: Alphonse de Waelhens expresses it thus :

I'Sartre has clearly seen in his phenomenology and forgotten in his ontology that it was possible to think man as an incarnated consciousness, intrinsically oriented and bound to facticity. "(72)

It is this problematic, further, which marks so distinctly the distance from Merleau-Ponty who himself summarised the gap thus in his Les Aventures de la dialectinue :

"The question is to know whether, as Sartre says, there are only men and or whether there is also the interworld, which we call history, symbolism, truth to-lbe-made"(73)

The problem will moreover rparise throughout 4 comparison

of the two: indeed in this general form it constitutes the major index of their difference.

For Sartrej

"ontology alone in fact can take its place on the plane of transcendence and from a single viewpoint apprehend being-in-the-world with its two terms, because ontology alone has its

place originally in the perspective of the

cogito. 11 (74)

And yet the very limits of Sartre's ontology lie within

this perspective which guarantees certain reflection:

the movement of interiority towards self -exteriorisation

at the levels of history, morality, others and materiality -

is necessarily checked and thrown back onto the mere

solipsistic certitude of the individual cogito.

I-- For Merleau-Ponty, on the other hand, t, -)e location c"

53

'existential analysis in experience throws a, bridge CD across the abyss of the pour-soi and en-soi(75) e-nd

equally defines the 'interiority' of the subject a-s a perpetual projection out into the world :

"the question is always to know how T can be o-pen to phenomena which transcend me and wIllich, nevertheless, exist only to the extent that I apprehend and live them; the question is how the presence to myself (Urprasenz) which defines me and conditions every alien p resence is at the same time a de-presentation ( t;! ýegenwartig-u "?

_e outside myself. 'IT-7-6-T- ang) a,, n,, - throws M

Importantly for Ilerleau-Ponty consciousness cannot, as with Sartre, withdraw reflectively from its ov,. rn lived experience: indeed self-reflection is but one --iode or expression of being-to-the-world (ftre-au-monde) ýýnd cannot thus isolate or individualise itself as a specific cognitive act of apprehension. P"eflective consciousness is confused with consciousness which is reflected on. (77. ') Hence the significance which Merleau-2onty attaches to the impossibility of a 'complete reduction' :

"All the misunderstandings with his (. Husserlls) interpreters, with the existentialist 'dissidents' and finally with himself, have arisen from the fact that in order to see the world and grasp it as paradoxical, we must break with our familiar acceptance of it and, also, from the fact that from this break we can learn nothing but the unmotivated upsurge of the world. The most important lesson which the reduction teaches us is the impossibility of a co niplete reduction. .. If we were absolute mind, the reduction would present no problem. But since, on the contrary, we are in the world, since indeed our reflections are carried out in the temporal flux on to i7,1ic-'a we are trying to seize ... there is no thought which embraces all our thought. "(78)

'Absolute mind' is a straw-man insofar as Tlerleal., -J-Ponty

Vi conscious- has already interpreted the intentionality o

ness as being either, I operative or I of -, ct' (79'. 1 the

latter pertaining to the synthetic activity of jud-i_-i-

reflective consciousness; the former de-_Cininc- the

activity Of the body-proper. This disti-nction does in

fact establish 'operative intentionallityl c--_s a.

54

intentionality, which connects the 1ý 1i ved I world v.

body rather than consciousness. -r"is L, -- chard 27, aner points Out2 tý-! is is an illegitimate identificalu-Jon off consciotýs- ness with body, of body with non-theriatisin, -, consciousness. Zaner quotes Aron Curwitsch to the effect tliEý t, , 7: 11-

-J 1st fIvC4sEd. nj ""U" C"'; LL' 1-, g) "It: 15 consciousness of corporeal existence is no necesserl/- for tj us to emphasise that a pre-,,

_)redicative, -! )re--, )osJ-tJ-o-n, -ý. -!, and non-thematising consciousness is a consciousness all the same. "(80)

Consequently for 1.11'erleau-Ponty v,,, he-t is to be -,

i, ded - _,:

i: ý c- ii e- " (for exam. ple: the body-as-lived) is itself the aiý

- oi2 eh e-, -iJ -', ng

(the body-a, s-lived)(81), and he is le d to a notion of the body as 'latent knowledge' of the V, Torld. ((". '2) Thus :

"What is rfe ant by saying this (corooreC, 1) ýD - intentionality is not a thought is t-'L-L(-:, t it', does C1 not come into being through the transpaiency of any consciousness but takes for granted all the latent Imowledge of itself that my body C: ý, possesses"(83)

Again, the act of perception :

11 takes advantage of work already done, of a general synthesis constituted once and for all since my body and my senses are precisely that familiarity with the world born of habit, that implicit or sedimentary body of knowledge" (84)

The latent, sedimentary, implicit knowledge the body has

is of thus a pre-logical unity of the world: always-already- there: "The world is not what I think, but what I live

through"(85). The unreflective subject (1'irreflechi)

which we seek as thinking subjects to know but which we

can never be2 is already thus a sedimented and im-plicit

knowledge of a primordial and unified world.

"Experience anticipates a philosophy and philosophy is

merely an elucidated experience" Merleau-Ponty had

declared, following Husserl: but does this describe a

philosophical positivism or, on the contrary, an 'il, Lealism

of signification' superimposed on a realism of brute

existence? (86) The philosopher is a "perpetual

beginner"(87) but is this so only within a closed circle

55

of possible meanings? Such comments as t-. ese a. Teall the more important in that T-Ierleau-Ponty --ives to the interworld of significant experience the comprehension ol history: that there can be situations, a direct-'Lon/ meaning(sens) of history, and a historical trut-'a are but "three ways of saying the same thing"(88". Yet just as the world is inexhaustible, is not history also so: is the 'truth of history' merely the recognition that tiere is a sense of history, that as historic,,

_-, l beinc-s

.,,, e are 'condemned' to historical meaning. T. erleau-Pont employs a teleology of reason but his uses of "truth" and "end of history" must be subsequently considered against thie background of this fundamental ambi guity-, philosophy is anticipated by our pre-philosophical experience of body and world and is 'merely' this experience elucidf_ýted; yet philosophy is equally a 'perpetual beginning' r.,, nd an open interrogation of our experience. Thus De ', v', 'Iaelhens writes :

11 ... the fundamental thesis of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy: all knowledge is rooted in perception, is itself ambiguous. If it signifies that all human knowledge originates in the concrete and follows the explication of it, everything said in his work seems to be established. If on the contrary one understands by that thesis that in no way whatsoever can we ever leave the immediate and that to render this immediate concrete explicit- simply means to live it, one cannot doubt that the enterprise of philoso. )h, -,, becomes forthwith contradictory. Now, that's an opinion to which the author seems at times to make concessions"(89)

Such 'concessions' are in fact, the ver7F s ign of the 2j

fundamental ambiguity which will itself re-emerge in C; I

Merleau-Ponty's post-war work: precisely on the notions

of a meaning of history and of historical action.

However T. I. erleau-Ponty's primary insistence upon our

inherence in the world does at least pose more in7mediEAely

and more convincingly2 than does Sartre's analysis the

problem of committed freedom. Thus from the ccncludin, 7,

paragraphs of the 2henomenol2LL,, :

56

A

"We are true through and through, and have wý th us, by the mere fact of belonging to the world, and not merely being in the v: orld in the way that things are, all that we need to transcend ourselves. We need have no fear t-, -ie, t our choices and actions restrict our liberty, since choice and action alone cut us loose i'mm our anchorage .... (freedom) fails to realise that, without the roots which it thrusts into the world, it would not be freedom at all. "(90)

But in response to those questions about specific c-ýioices of free action, Merleau-Ponty's comme.: its seem to i-eveal an ambiguity similar to that displayed in Sartre :

"Whether it is a question of things or of historical situations, philosophy has no function other than to teach us once more to see them clearly, and it is true ýo say td, --t it comes into being by destroyinga, itself as sep6rate philosophy. But what is here required is silence, f or only the hero lives out his relation to men and the world. 11 (91)

The notion of hiloso hy's realisation through its pp CD abolition as separate betrays an indecision on Ilerleau- Ponty's part. The project of explicating lived

experience from within implies that philosophy for

Merleau-Ponty, in Zaner. Is words :

"seeks to develop, at the level of theoretical thought (theoria; for, after all, a philosophic, -. 1 work is a product of cognition) ! "That is lived concretely at the praotical-acting-existing level (that of -praxis). Philosophy, for him, is experience transmuted in thought as it is for Marcel as well as for Hegel. 11(92ý

Yet philosophy, for Merleau-Ponty, hesitates to inform

what is concretely acted out on a moral or political

level: or at least what is hinted at is _. I, '_erleau-Fonty's

willingness to accept the self-sufficiency of the

philosophic interrogation itself, and the limited dutz)-

it I of clarifying what is, the philoso-, pilaer bein-- a . %io Cý

works at living and c, -ýn give no-one a dispensation from

the work of reading and the labour of living. "(93')

"Then, suddenly History burst over me, -. nd i dissolved into fragments. I woke to find

V scattered over the four quarters oi` Lhe globe, linked by ever, -y- nerve in me to each as-id ever. -,, -

57

ind I I- Lý -'de,:::. s and vel-,, z-: s 1-e-re ivi , ual. -11 my - -, - Z; tuiýned upside down. "(94)

r'llaese e2-e the te: oms ii., whi c-',, - . ý-.., o_rie de D'eau-,, Fo--r desci. fbes t-Lie drama of t-', -., e secc,, i--'L woild w-, --, r. !, To Jc,,,

e and the P,. er. opriengj2Zy of iýerce ticn were botýi published durifig the

_- years, th ey _ema_'_-_ eve--, so e products of pre-war reflectioi-Is an d th e _*L r,, i -P) ac -LL 0 ar occupation v,; Es decisive in radicali, --ing the resDect-*ve political philosophies oT' Sartre and IerleaL. -ýýonty.

! ý., Tobilised frorin L)epterriber 1939, '-'--. rtre 1-., -s talren -, ý-ý-Jsoner in June 1940 without hav-,

: E-eleased as a, c-vilian at Februar-vr 1940 on le, -., ve in U noticed a 'radical CIL-lange CD

seen . i, r e, a, nd the end of

or, 4 Paris, , )., -. mone de

' had taken plac

fi nal -Y

1941. Even n Be! l,, uvo r

e in I'Sartre was t'ainkinPI CE,,, rrood deal about ti, e C:: ý' C.: ) post-war per-, od; he had firiiily made up his i, _iind

to hold aloof from politics no lo; ý , -. ger. His new morality v, as based on the notion o.. Igenuineness', and he i,,, o. s dete1-L., i_*I_ned to i-_, icý: e

7 practical a_, )plicLA-on of, it to himself. it reo

, uired every man tc shoulder t-loe respon-

sibility of his sittuation in life; and t-',, ie only way in 1:,, hicii he could do so ý! ,, Lý_ ,ýto transcend that situatilon b eng, ý-, ging upon some course of action. "(955

. Lfter hi, c-- -, --eturn from iniprisonme--r-t, , --)irr. one de Beau-,, ro-jr

-f? 1, - further notes the marked nev-, I'str*ngency of i-rioral tD I-

standards". (96) Sartre himself has enough

times, upon the new commitments i,, hich t'; ie v, a, r "orcy-ed. CD

Thus f or ins t, --ý, nc e

Th e opened miy eyes ... ý-s to 'L, -, -e very L

-L --oroper beautiful little aucýi I bel--*-eved m, sel'i 'Iote.

-nd to be, powerf-ý,. l forces --r, --bbed

ho. \-, -4

sent it to the front wi,, h the ot, --ers, wt',. out

CD -1 ' the 1;. -ar -u-id askin7, - its viev!... '-me o. - the captivity in

';, er- -e above all that o--L' lar we

n, - subri-., er-Q--', on --n the occasion --IL'or me O-L a 2-, -st-: . the fasses, ý-',., I-iich T bel--, eved I left L----nd v! h-'-c-'. q jn fr--Xt I've never -ot out

o. -Ac-' TH e n, ----, z

L u. -: -, on aand put to victo-y tL"revi me -. -ito con-P flight all ideý-, s i, -,,, hich still drew the*r

Lon fa-oiri iberL insp t--1 sr-q - 11 (C-1 7

For Sartre -LJie outbreak of hostilf ties c-;.,. lone was a

revelation: "we had beli L eved, without -1 proof, L, k, thet

58

peace was the natural state and substance o-ýý' t-'ae Universe. "(98" Merleau-Ponty interprets ", ui-e shocI, - oi- war as the violent irruption of 'history' i-nto life :

I'Sartre who had believed in 'Li'^-e peace, discovereO '. 1 a nameless adversity of v,, fiic,, it was necessE, ýi,, to take account. A lesson he won't fo-get. 'I' t is at the origin of his politicEl pra-, r: iatism. . I-D The allestion in a bew u- world is n'Ot to L itche-I

know who's right, who's doing iýýight-, but -,. ý.; ho C) has the measure of the Great Dece---Lver, action will be su i,, le enough, haxd enou, --h to put it righteff(99ý

Yet Merleau-Ponty was himself a member of tha tgeIaer, -!. - L,, -J on which had "-secretly resolved to know nothing of violence and unhappiness as elements of history"(100). 1,1oreoveiý there are other themes in the response to tiie ch, -. llenge of war than an immediate recourse to pragmatic POlitiCc--ý-l ac ti on.

Merleau-Ponty, as well as Sartre, perceived thus 'the impossibility of detached observation and an im, _-,.; -, ined Cl nautrality with respect to historical events. Actions

are marked not only by the - albeit well-meaning - intentions of their authors but the external consequences they produce. To the intellectual who imagines that the fact of war does not necessarily impinge upon his

philosophic reflection, Merleau-Ponty replies :

"So this solitary Cartesian thinks - but he does not see his shadow behind him projected onto history as onto a wall, that meaning, that appearance which his actions assume, on the outside, that Objective Spirit which is himself"(101. )

But, even given this understanding, the individual is

not his historical and social meaning without ambiguity

"The si-tuation irreproachable clean. I,, V e hav learned a kind healthy. tI (102)

' no which we were in admitted o. conduct... 1 To-one's hands e. iýe

e unlearned 'pure morality' and I of vulgar immorc-lism v. rhicý-i is

As Sartre observes each act during tlae occupation , -, -as

59

ambiguous, all acts implicitly constituted a form of collaboration, insofar as those not ective r-, ie--, bei-s of the Resistance survived the occupation, in maintaining the French economy, society and culture :

"From one end to the other of the v, ar, we didn't recognise our acts, we weren't able to assume their consequences. C-- Evil was everý, Pvher., every choice was bad, and yet it was necessary to choose and we were responsible. " (103'. )

Responsibility was nevertheless assumed and s -, D ec ce. l ly against the realist presumption that maýor ýIistor4ca' events must be accepted as fait accompli wJLth the fe. lse implication that they must equally be morally approved of. Such a realism, was, Sartre argues, the failure o--', " tho, -je) who whilst not perhaps active collaborators, sal:: the German occupation as simply having taken place and as CD presenting the lesser evil. (104)

Merleau-Ponty is correct against Sartre in that he already took freedom to be compromised by its very inherence in the world :

"Only the heroes really were outwardly what t-, --)ey inwardly wished to be; only they became one with history at the moment when it claimed thei r lives. "(105)

And certainly Sartre's insistence upon the priority of

free consciousness; even in the face of the crushing

'force of circumstance', lead him into apparant paradox

"We were never more free than under the §erman Occupation. "(106)

and also into a political idealism he was later to

regret. Speaking in 1970 :

i'The other day, I re-read the preface I'd

Written for an edition of these plays - Lew Mouches., Huis clos and others - and I

was really scandalised. that I'd written t-', ais: 'Whatever the circumstances, whatever the

place, a man is always free to choose willether or not he will be a traitor'. When I read that I said to myself: 'It's unbelievable: I

really thought that! "(107'

60

Indeed Sartre's wartime plays do com-, rjrise a 'theatre Of freedom' which reflect his belief t-,,, P-t the possjbil-*-t-, - of freedom was preserved even during the . -,. rar. or C> Merleau-Ponty, on the other hand, the very pol,. Verless: Dness of the french deprived them of a genuine freedom :

"No effective freedom exists :! -Jthout sorne power. "(108)

But for Sartre the extremity of the situation did necessarily produce an authentic morality :

I "And the choice which each made of him; selt"' was authentic since it was made in the -,, -,, i-ese--qce or' death, since it could always have been expressed under the form: 'Rather death ta,, -I-i.

(109)

In the limit situation of torture vvith its ins-1, Aent

question 'Will I talk? ' and the enormous implications o, '

any such disclosure, lay the nature of our fundamental

choice :

"This total responsibility in total solitude, isn't this the very revelati on of our freedom? "(110)

For Sartre, as for Simone de Beauvoir, the war also

awakened the individual to the links he held to each

and every other individual. The experience of imprison-

ment was for Sartre fundamentally an experience of

solidarity, the sharing in common of the shame of def eat.

In captivity, Sartre organised prison activities and

mobilised the whole camp into staging at Christmas --.. n

anti-German play, Bariona2 (111) written by Sartre for

the occasion :

"Henceforth, instead of setting individualism in opposition to collectivity, he conceived of them only as linked to each other. "(112)

If responsibility was assumed in solitude, it neverthele3S

was itself total and extended to all. In occunied --'rance

thus

"Each of its citizens knew t`iat lae owed himsel

to everyone and that he could only count on

himself - Each o-f them, a-p-inst the oppres-sors: z,

undertook to be himself, irremed'-, --bl,,, and . *n

' in his freedom, chose t',, le ohoosing himself

61

1,4? i-reedoi. i of

The virorld in ý:;, hich v, re J, ----, ýeely c', Icose and act -'-s moreover necessarily social and humian, ir-larkAed by the actions of others. reading, in 1940, o- Illefde, ýge--, - and ; '--)',, --int-Exupei: ýy convinced h-*m- "that rqe, --n--4-, s c, ,eI on - -0 L, "e world only by the activit-i/ of rnen. "(114) Illerlea: U-2or-t-, -, too, emphasises the --ectiv-ty new ai, ý, rareness o inte-sub. '

"We sensed -that one is not free alone and became aware of t1aat 'genera. 1 mil--', -eu n wýi`ch each consciousness comr. qunicates wit. 1-i every

other"(115)

If Sartre glimlosed now the hiistori-c-*, t'y of his actions, I

he nevertheless gave this a specif-Ically personal content. The new Stringency of his moral standards and the urgently felt need for a radica-1 political init-aA-live owed mucli to

a realisation of his previous -. ttý--chment to the establ-ished order, whatever the pre-vfar epithets of opý, osltion seemed to suggest. ý'Jot for this first tif., -le in his ccifýeer, . 3artre 3

C) became concerned with the role his -, eneration had played.

"One's generation forms part of one's situation, like one's soci, ý. l clý?, ss 0- nationalit,, 01 (116)

and it was his generation ý-,! ho as the accor, -, lplices of a false peace had a duty to the rising yout. a of the post-viar

p eri od. Paul Nizan, the so-litary angi-y voice o-,, -' the

Junkirll- 1930's had been tragically killed at in 1940. Of

ýte - his generation S"artre was to v. -r Ln 1945

"This end of the war is also a little t",, ' e end

of ours, or, at least, it is the end o- our youth. "(117')

4 'lad IDlayed Merleau-PontY saw as well t', iat h. S generct'on

their part in the events of 1939, and t', lere is bot-ri

Sartre and ",. Terl--eau-Po--, -lty the emergda, ý-ý desire to comreliel-: TIC91- the historical lessons of the , -, rar, v,, rhilst 11ea--n--

history, themselves. The elimir-at-4on of past t-r-aumes

would, for M-erleau-Ponty, contr--bute to the seci-ir-n, - o2.

an efi-"ective dialogue and it 1.,, roula' hei-O ý, round

(1, conditions of a re., -I -'-'reedor. q. Thus -i-- considerin, ý,, Lie

62

P-r, oblem of anti-semitisim, T. "erleau-Ponty considers it false to conceive of it as "a war machine set up by a few Ilachiavellis and serviced by the obedience of others". Such a Iflicistel conception of history is ultimately a naive attribution of too much awareness to leaders and toc little to the led :

"'The Germans in fach made us understand that leaders are mystified by their own myths and that the troops are their hal-f-knowing accomplicest'

Moreover Marxism oversimplifies in makinp, anti-semitisim 'the transference of anguish of a convulsed society wj, -iich

C

dreads revolution'. A social passion such as anti-semitisim possesses its own momentum conditioned by irrationality and choice; it creates itself apart from its motivations. For Merleau-Ponty the pre-war presumption was precisely that of men as consciousnesses, each choosing his being

"But in co-existence each of us is presented to the others agrainst a historical background. 11(118)

Sartre, however, f or his part depicts a comparable phenomenon like collaboration as "in all cases an individual decision, not a class position"(119) Thus, whilst almost all collaborators originated in the bourgeoisie it would be unjust to term the bourgeois a 'class' of collabor-

ation. (120) Sartre's concern is consequently with a

critical assessment of the contradictions of a collabor-

ationist idealogy and with the psychology of the

individual collaborators. He accepts collaboration is a

'normal' phenomenon like crime or suicide(121) but his ity whose principal concern is with the atypical personal-L

motives for collaboration derive from an individual

project: the example of Drieu la Rochelle and his "hatred

of self" thus predominates. (122) The lessons which

Sartre drawý'fOr the political collectivity from the

example of collaboration thus appear strangrel, -, - tangential

to the brilliant psychoanalytic illumination of the

I and its individual prota-onJsts. 'ideology

63

Ilerleau-Ponty's charge that history presented itself to ri I Sartre only as a 'nameless adversity' consequently -,. ar'-I-s some merit in that the passion to apprehend an individual life history and the priority of the solitary freedom take precedence over a fuller comprehension of histor--i-cal and social forces. Yet Sartre had,

. LI --J th "erleau-Ponty, clearly assimilated the themes of intersubjectivity, collective responsibility, and the ambiguity of the historical act, which the war and occupation so stri`inýý--ly presented. 111oreover the im-I-)erative to committed action was manifested in Saxtre's first attempt at political action, in the form of an intellectual resistance 7rouP. On his return from captivity, Sartre contacted Tlerleau-

It-T Ponty and various philosophy students at t-ie Lcole I-ormale in particular Cuzin and Dominique Desanti: eventually a first meeting was organised which included Cuzin, Desanti, Bost, Jean Pouillon, ý'erleau-Fonty, Sartre and '-)'imone de Beauvoir. Their immediate stated objective was limited to the compiling of information and the circulation of F-, - news bulletin. But beyond that, in the VTords of Simone de Beauvoir :

"We believed it was vital to make preparation for the future. If the democracies vion, it would be essential for the Left to have a new programme; it was our job, by pooling our ideas and discussion and research, to bring such a programme into being. Its basic aims could be summed up in two words - though their reconciliation posed vast problems - which also served as a watchword for our movement: 'Socialism and Liberty'. But the possibility of eventual defeat also had to be envisaged, and in his

CD first news bulletin Sartre showed that if Germany won the war, our task would be to see that she lost the peace. "(123)

Sart-re wrote two or three pieces for the group's

clandestine journal, but this latter appears now to have

been definitively lost. (124) However Contat and

cite the remembrance of Dominique Desanti who notes 'L. UA

the group comprised both marxists, including herself2 and

non-marxists2 and that Sartre accepted that the ed2-tori-r--ls

of the group's bulletin should be successivly drC-fted b, -t; -,

64

representatives of the two tendencies. (125, ' In t-'ae summer of 1941 ')artre bicycled through the . ree Zone ,* n an attempt to establish liaisons between '. '-)ocialis, ---:, e et Liberte" and other groups. (126) The results were not encouraging; the group saw increasing defections, and members of similar g--r-oups were being arrested or denorted CD by the Gestapo. 3'artre came to see the continued existence of the group as constitutin -7 an unwp. rranted ris': for its members, and in October he made tlie decision to abandon the project and disband the group :

"Then he obstinately settled doi,,. rn to the 1 he had begun (Les

- 'Jouches", : Thic-',: i represe-ited

the one form of resistance worlr-, - still o-,, _, en

to him. "(127') - There is no doubt that the original intention of the

group was optimistic: its members were, as both ')artre and Simone de Beauvoir would now admit, Ipetit-bourgeois intellectuals' with little or no experience of underground activity. (128') But more importantly the ambition to form

such a group was frustrated by the role which the

adopted in the French Resistance. The adva-ri. tages .,., I-iich

the Party possessed in terms of internal cohesion, discipline, as well as a well-defined and a, ýposite ideology, enabled it to secure a strong position v, rithin the underground. During the war the C. 2 successfully

penetrated the Resistance movement and its clandest-ine

press: this role was made all the more prominent after t1iae

USSR's entry into the war. (129) Given the PCIF's predom-

inanoe it was essential for 'Socialisme et Liberte/I to

establish a successful relationship i, ý: ith it. Hoy-, iever

the PCF

I'distrusted any group formed outside the

auspices of the Party, and in particular those

of the 'Petit-bourgeois intellectuals"'(130)

In addition the Party deliberately spread the ru-iou2 tliat

the German's release of Sartre from prison could only ne7, -ý- that he was in their employ as an agent-provocateur :

oThis mistrust of the conrii-iunists sic! --. ened us T-Ild made us see the extent of our impotence. "(131", J

65

The decision to dissolve was taken shortly

As a meeting of committed intellectuals, the experience of the group was certainly valuable. It was tAe occasion, of a decisive philosophical meeting between S)artre a-na- 1,, -Terleau-Ponty :

"The key words were spoken : phenomenology, existence. Vie discovered our aýeal concern... To my mind this was the purest moment in our f ri end sh ip. 11 (132)

But on the political level inexperience and the isolation imposed by the PCF condemned the group to failure. Ironically despite those unfounded accusations and the failure of 'Socialisme et Liberte", when S)artre returned to political activity after 18 months, it v. ra: s in response to an invitation to join the communist Comite

-National des Ecrivains (C. N. E.

"It was thus at the beginning of 43 that my first common enterprise with the PC began. "(133'

Sartre thereafter regularly attended C. N. E. meetings C: )

(although he regarded them as a 'great borel(134))and

contributed to the C. N. E. 's clandestine journal Les Lett-res franQaises. He had also been approached by Herve" and Courtade to write in Action, yet both these journals whilst publishing his articles also contained polemical attacks upon his philosophy. (135) In one article for Les Lettres francaises he developed the

embryonic themes of QuIest ce que clest la litterature?: "to write is to claim freedom for all men. "(136)

But this very view reflected once again a resigned

acceptance of writing as 'the one form of resistance ý,,,. rork

still open to him. ' Apart from his articles and plays Sartre remained politically inactive for the rest of t-', Ie

war -

Moreover the central preoccupation of Les Fouches(137)

the heroic assumption in total solitude and in totC-. 1

freedom of responsibility for an unjustifiable act(1ý3)

66

reveals much of Sartre's essential answer to the problem Of political action during the war. Thus as Francis Jeanson argues :

"Isn't it that the Resistance initially appeared to him as the Personal adventure of each resistant and that he didn't yet envisage any other response to this test of freedom than a sort of hero's Qm of conscience? " '130`

Indeed Sartre does argue that :

"the Resistance was oni an individual solution and we always knew It had above all, in our eyes, a symbolic value. "(140"i

I Such a perspective does forcefully demonstrate once more the limits of Sartre's apparent reconciliation of individualism and collectivity.

But even whilst the lessons of the war were being digested, the tasks of the peace demanded formulation, , -nd in

respeotiveeýeays from 1945 - striL-ingly similar in title - Sartre and Merleau-Ponty undertake such a tasl, -: "La fin de la guerre" and I'La guerre a eu lieu". As Sartre argues Peace and War are not two distinct species like Black and White. The war may have ended but nevertheless: "This is

not the Peace. Peace is a beginning"(141) Neither can the

Peace be a simple return to the ydars before 1339: it must

necessarily incorporate the lessons of both the pre-war failures and the agony of war and occu-p[,, tion. (l42"

L

And ITerleau-Ponty in a striking passage himself urges the

need to go beyond a merely irnmediate reaction to the

cessation of hostilities :

"To sum it all up, we have learned history, and we claim that it must not be

. 2'orgotten-

But are , -,,, e not here the dupes of our ernotion-)

Like a bereaved man who doesn't want to go beyond Iiis loss

and thus preserves his house in the state it vras in, and

whos e familar objects in fading and decaying, come -ý. o C) cruelly date the moment of his loved one's de-f-t--, so tco

perhaps the remeinbrance of dead comrades mic--'at 1Lý-er onaRve

67 0

the war years and the moment of Libei-e. tion. 3ut sue-':, memories must

"mingle with what they miý-ht have done the direction of 'their lives. 'ý-i'e have no LL, of course gotten to this point, but since t concerns us here is Writing, not recountiýn our griefs, should we not go beyond our feelings to find what they may contain oJ-' durable truth? "(143)

The ending of the ,,, Tar did not piovide a co-, --ývenient historical hiatus in which a single balance sheet of'

--- '. -I things learned and tasks to be fulfille, '_,. could be

up: in 1945 things had once again begun to moVe. CertL CD

the process of Liberation had been a dramatic revelation of the courageous self-assertion of the french reople(14-, ".,

cea -r) -- e! 7, ed c" the unity and strength of the Resist, -i, L L-1 - foundation for some post-v,,! ar revolution. Lid the

humanism of 1939 - the desire for truth, liberty,

happiness, and transparent relations between riien - could "ect, 'vely perhaps only now after the trial of war be ef L

pursued: "It is a question not of givinc, up our values o-C

1939 but of realising them". (145)

The pursuit of these questions, the search for a 'durable

truth, beyond the immediate emotions of peace but on

the path of a continuing and changing history was the

essential Project of Les Temps modernes.

68

Chapter III

"THE 11ANDARINE HISTORY, FL -, I- Pl . 4, -li _G

"Les Temps modernes didn't suddenly --rise, completely armed for political combat, from the minds of a certain number of" intellectuals. The process of gestation which lead to its foundation and orientation -,, 7,. -as slow. To only see the relations of Sartre or ýilerleau-_E-'onty with political life at the moment these relations becarne public is in large part tc mask a fundamental intention. For it wes L- reaction against the errors of the pre-war period, against, their own errors that ý.. )'artre and Merleau-Ponty founded the review and committed themselves to political action. "(1)

In their respective researches of the pre-war era - and particularly in the two essential statements of this work: - Being and Nothingness and the

' Phenomeno1o, 2,,:; of

Perc - Sartre and Merleau-Ponty incarnated t-, -e ver, -ý- ambiguity of French phenomenology. (2) But the pursuit of these researches had been at the expense of any d-irect involvement in or serious consideration of the political events of these years. The impact of war and occupation had provoked a radical review of the relationship betý,., een

philosophy and politics, with the result that Sartre and Merleau-Ponty found themselves conjoined, after the

Liberation, in the undertaking of Tem-p_s modernes. L_

Its first editorial committee was formed in Sej-)tember 1944

and was made up of Raymond Aron, L"ichel Leiris, Ilerlea-

Ponty, Albert Ollivier, Jean Paulhan, Sartre and Simone de

Beauvoir: I.. 'alraux had refused to join, and Camus was too

occupied with his work at Combat to participate. The

title -a reference to the Chaplin film - ýý, ýcs-s intended to

"convey our positive commitment to the present. "(3)

Such a comitment to the present involved a 1. -., JLll to

disengage the meaning of events as tý-ese very eve-ýts

unfolded. For as 1,11erleati-Ponty argues one cE. -anot seperate CD the progress of actual events from some c-Ilistinct

69

Constructed order - History - w-. ich betr, --,,,,,, s or L-riu'-ý-plls tj over them

"There are not two histories, one true and other empirical: only one in which ever.,,, 7' thing that happens plays a part, if only one how to interpret it. tf(4)

And for Sartre as well Temps modernes -point o' depa2tuare was the belief :

""that all social facts reflect equally, although at different levels, the'structure of the society in which they ale produced and that, in this respect, a news item is as significant as a properly political ýac t.

Sartre repeated this fundamental intention in Iiis 1961 essay on Merleau-Ponty :

"We had dreamed of this review since 1943. If the Truth is one, I thought, vie mus t, as Gide said of God, seek it not elsewhere, but everywhere. Each social product and each attitude - from the most private to the most public - are its allusive incarnations. Ail anecdote reflects an entire era as much as the substance of a political constitution. ', 'i'e would be hunters of meaning, we would speak the truth about the world and about our lives. "(6)

Yet in the same essay Sartre admits that "in order to

learn what he (Merleau-Ponty) already knew, I still needed five years"(7). Sartre and I. Terleau-Ponty "were both

motivated by the same desire: to emerge from the tunnel

and see clearly"(8) but the difference lay in political

maturity. As Sartre says :

"Since he had learned History, I was no longer his equal. Whilst I still hung back, questioning the facts, he was already trying to make the events speak. "(9)

Since Sartre's political thinking was 'confused', his

ideas 'dangerous' (10), it was 1,11erleau-Ponty, e1ready . veil-

familiar with a non-dogmatic 11"exxism and friendly wit. -.

various leading PCF intellectuals - Courtade, Desý? _nti,

Herve - who assumed the political editorshi-p of

modernes.

But for I'lerleau-ponty in 1945 the class struggle ,, ý-; s m,, -s. 1, %-e.. A.

70

and the historical moment itself vras equivoc! ý:; ]. C'n the one hand) practical politics viere those ojl-' realism, Opportunism and cynicism. (11': the Resistance experience of historical action which remained perso. -rial had proved ephe. meral; 1945 witnessed a return to the time oJF institutions in which once again thele appears a distance between laws and those to whom they a-3-ply. (12) On the other hand, in the realm of ideas a spirit of nominýýj sr:, reigned: only the "ideolo, ical tatters" of the ni-neteent L g 2 century survived. Neither the PCF nor the Social-ist 2arty seemed to incorporate the ideals of so.. ialism and liberty: the CP sacrificing the ambiguous truths of '-'arxisrfi to C) dogmatic defense of the Soviet Union and offering only "dissenting support" whilst conu-iitted to a role in government(13); the Socialist Party playing a double g. -, -ie C) which consisted in 'Icontinuinýc, to style itself

while living under the surveillance of the bours::, -eoisie. "(14) The Soviet Union itself in its economy seemed to bel'op- its ideology; and could one be certain that the US did indeed

guarantee any of the freedoms it claimed. TIoreover any historical truth which LITIarxism might claim of o-f-fer this

epoch could not be dogmatically adhered to) but had to be

revealed within the very course of events :

"Do we know whether a dialectic still exists and whether history will in the end be rational? If Marxism is still true then we will rediscover it on the path of prevailing truth and in the analysis of our time. "(15)

In the meantime the task of the French intellectual :

"is not to maintain the devotionary, hysterical atmosphere or -the vague fervours and terrors which impart a mythical and almost puerile chaxacter to French politics, but is rather to take stock of this century and the ambiguous forms it offers to us. If this ambiZuity came to be understood then our politicc-1 life i. -ii-ght cease to be haunted b hantoms c-ýiqd might recover a little. 'T(165

p C)

The struggle against the alternative imposed b, v a

realist politics and nominalist ideology - tifaEt betv., ee-, -L

being a knave or a cynic - was the very locus of

71

Temps modernes' existence.

The manif e'sto published on the back of an early collection of T11 work edited by Sartre and lerleau-Ponty admirably sums up the general political intentions of this new committed intellectualism :

"This collection, like the -review whose name it carries, proposes to struggle against the pathetic and prophetic spirit, more extensive each day, which demands of our contemporaries blind choices and tortured commitments. "(17)

If History does not as yet offer any simple choice of politics or idea, nevertheless we are not -prevented from discerning a 'clear enough action'

"provided only that one is concerned to .: now

what is going on rather than nourishing phantoms, provided one distinguishes anguish from anxiety and commitment from fanatacism. "(18)

Certainly truth is not given directly and immediately to the historical actor, neither can he passively awC-'-it its spontaneous emergence from the course of events. Yet he cannot act in truth if he is blind to the time in ý,, rhich he acts or blinded by prior and un ustified ideological i

CD preferences. If action is to be 'clear enough', the epoch must be understood and its truth sought everywhere :

"If all truths are told, no one will have to be hidden. In man's co-existence with man, of which these years have made us aware, morals, doctrines, thoughts, and customs, laws, works and words all express each other; everything signifies everything else and outside this unique fulguration of existence there is nothing"(19)

As Sartre has said, they were 'hunters of meaning' and did not thus see their political task, as incompatible

with the parallel literary and cultural tasks. 'Conseq-

-1 pursues uently 11erleau-Fonty in the essays of this periot-.

an interrogation of our presence to the world throuc-`i C, -

consideration of literature, cir. ema, visual Frt and the

academic disciplines. Initially he is concerned to

restate the fundamental 'primacy of percept4on': in- a -Pore the Socie"te"' Franc-, Jse de lecture of that title be,

72

Philosophie he reiterated and defended the ce--Lral -L

premisses of his earlier Phenomenol-ogie de la -perceotion

"By these words, the 'primacy of pe-ý--ce-v)tionl we mean that the experience of -percei)tion is our presence at the moment when things, trut?,

_s, values are constituted for us, that -perce-, )tion C::, is a nascent ; that it teaches us, outside all 4ogmatism the true conditions of objectivity itself; that it summons us to the tasks of knowledge and action. It is not a question of reducing human knowledge to sensation but of assisting at the birth of this 1_-: -nowledý-e, to

C__ make it as sensible as the sensible, to recover the consciousness of rationality. '-. -his experience of rationality is lost vrhen i. %re take it for granted as self-evident, but is, on the contrary, rediscoverdd when it is niade to appear against the background of non-human nature'IZ20)'

The perceived, primordial world is not -prior to rer--, -: )on or philosophy for "it is the -umreflected vihich is understood and conquered by reflection". Yet in his study of Cezanne Merleau-Ponty is concerned with the artist's

struggle to express our presence before this primordial

world. Cezanne sought thus to render the object itself

in its solidity and material substance, without, hov! ever, foresaking the Impressionist aesthetic CD

'this painting was paradoxical: he was pursuing reality without giving up the sensuous surface, with no other guide than the immediate impression oi nature, without following the contours, with no outline to enclose the colour, with no perspectival or pictorial arrangement. "(21)

C-- -onty In a 1948 lecture, summarised by J. L. Dumas, 1-erlea-u-l

re-emphasised that, whilst in classical art the mind

imposes its laws upon the object, in modern painting "the

object transcends our partial perspectives; it is no

longer that which thinks itself, but that which sees

itself, -that which uproots us from ourselves. 11(22)

The core of Cezanne's painting is consequently t-', Ie tension,

1) realised in the very process of expression, betvieen

primordial, natural world and the worldl of hur. 7c-. --, -i ideaý3 ---, Id

sciences. Cezanne wished to "confront the sc--*onces

the nature I from w. ich they ca; -, ie (23) and, in avo--, -,.

73

the alternatives of nature v. Composition, seeing v. thinking painter, he did not --r- -, -jloy

thýý internal C

dimensions of his art - chiaroscure anj-,,. --'Line t6 'stirr-es-t' these sensations which would give us de:, -)th shý---. pe

"The lived object is not rediscovered or constructed on the basis of the contribution of the senses; rather Jt presents itself to us from the start as t11-ie centre f-, (, -m hic

-'. ri these contributions radie- tell (24)

From the 1948 lecture there is equal'-, y 'L, -', -ie co-atention that contemporary artists :

"believe neither in finality nor in pre- established harmony, but they are sensible to that vibration vihich g-. ý--,,, es rise to form in taking possession of matter. ý-(25`

The task of expressing, giving form to this) '--, nJividu--ll whole I, this I insurpassable plenitude I is necesS, --, ri1-, -. - inf ini t e. The canvas is never, in a sense, complete. 3ut

with the artist and

"forgetting the viscous, equivocal appearances, we go through them straight to the things they present. The painter recaptures and converts into visible objects what would, without him, remain walled up in the se--)f-rate life of each consciousness: the vibration of appearances which is the cradle of things. Only one emotion is possible for this painter - t, '-e feeling of strangeness - and only one lyricism - that of the continual rebirth of existence"(26

We have seen from a study of the Phenom. enolo, ýy of

Perc that, for Ilerleau-Ponty, the interrogation of

the world is articulated, in this tension between

expression and experience around a notion of meanii. ), ý-. '-Iut

in the context of artistic communicetion t-lais Imeaningi CD

has no independent existence nor does it reside in "that

constituted reason in which 'cultured men' ere content

to shut themselves". The expression o. this z. -iean_-_, - is

an endless project yet it summons men "toward -- rea-son

which contains its own origins. "(27) Moreover tlie

roi,, - individual artist, and indeed any must tl-,

his individual pursuit of meaning also -_--_7)er_`ences

74

CCjSC4oUSn, =cS which will make their idea ta' -e root, in the

-I -- of others. `,, 7hat ITerleau-Ponty sa. 7,7s of 2Cez. -: --- nn e J` Iects

equally upon hiS own tasks as a, I)hiloso; ).., -ie. -L "The reader or s-oectator who follo,.,, -s t'-ie clues of the boA: or painting, b, r, r sett---L-q, 7 up stones end re-bounding -, L --om side to side, guided by the obscure clar--, t, -, 7 o-F a particular style, ýV , rill end bT discovering what the artýst v,. ranted to corý, jn-unicate. The painter can do no more t-'--, a-n construct an irfiage; he rnust i, ý., ait for t-'-iis to come to life for other Deople. 11 en --L

t does, the i, ý, iork of art have united these sep,,, rate lives ... it ý", r i 11 d-, ý,, ell undivided in several minds, 1,7, r. 'th a claii-,. on every possible mind like -, ý,. )erenni. - 1 acquisition. 11 (28",

.1 This effort of comprehension, of corni-., unic, ýtion ý -7

*1 lu-, -i --*, nc-- t e, - the humanist foundation of all such expres, c__ýion for it* everything s-. eaks to man: the : iorld is huii,

-, --L11"10' lAerleau-Ponty's humanism does

C'J

not conceive 01 P, r2-g-LO1 ,V determined humanity but rather of -ý. 11hupir), nity stability, free, inventive and -i, -, c ed 11 130, ceF, selessly m-. - For such a humanity, moreover, the 1, vorld is not 'intelligible by righTl: rathe r it provo-1--es ltl-ie sense o-F

ad of astonishment ai I mystery'. "i e (2 rspectJve It s --n p

of a humanism so defined that 1'erleau-l'onty iltroduces ii s

notion of metaýphysics

"Petaphysics begins from the momeý-it when, ceasing to live in the evidence of the object- whether sensory object or object of science - we app-erceive the radical subjectivity of' . --11 our experience as insep-rable from its truth value"(31)

Thus gestalt psychology has attempted to go beyond ',, ---ýe CD

classical alternatives of objective or introspecti-,. re

psychology by demonstrating as the ob, ýJect of its stud--les CD

the structure of behaviour "acces,,, --,, -ible both irori

ast ie and from iýrithout'1(32) Gestalt has ".., ut into cue GJ-o-

alternative between le. ý. iste. classical . ice Es

11,,: ý ses 'L,. -- b1J sr d e.. con 'existence as consciousness', 4

cation between and P, mixture of oblective -, --id "(33) Again the ý., dv--, -Ices ý--o, e b-. -

sub je c tive. 00 C- a

75

have revealed language to be neit-'Ler t? iing nor idea, but that which :

1-- 1- "Must surround each s-peaking subiect, instrument with its o-,, ýTn inertia, 't s oý, Tn, f7,. ', ý d demands, constraints, and internal loýý, --c,

must nevertheless remain open to t-'qe -, -litiat-. ves of the subject... always c, --,., oable of the dfis:, - placement of meanings, the D, -,, nbi Gý guit-ý es, a-fýad e functional substitutions whic-'a this logic its lurching gait. "(34"

CD In this spirit of the 'metaphysical' 1*'e-,. -1ea., -)--'Po-ri'U. - L'. lso challenges the explanatory " ri ý

_poý, -ier of Dur-!

----ieim1s deL-1- -tion

of the religious by the sac--, -ed and by t-de 3)ocL-1. o-- the I social is not a thing, it is

"not collective consciousness but intersubjecti-., ---*Lt,,,? -, a living relationship and tension amonc; L.

,,,, -. Li-ý,. -\rid-Lua1sII\"35', Sociological knowledge, like psychology and lJnguist-l cs, demands that "we recover the human attitudeý1(36)

In his final chosen example - the possibilities o-1 historical knowledge - 1.1'erleau-Ponty rejects both , --, n-y cl, --,. to "a Universal History completely unfolded before t'f.,,. e historian as it would be before the eyes of God"(37,,, -, nd the presumption that, on the contrary, there is no inner

meaning to history, only a senseless tumult of events. This latter view is particularly illusory insofar as it

ignores the meanings men themselves give to their acts.

The historian must confront such personal interpretations

with the facts and so come to judge events in history. He CD

must in sum

"reawaken the past, reinstate it in the i)resent, recreate the atmosphere of tile age as its contemporaries lived it, without imposing any of our own categories upon it, and, once that has been done, go on to determine whether its contemporaries were mystified and who, of their number or ours, best understood the trut'ý-

of that time. "(38)

The situation of man in the knoiý,, iedge he ', ias of Iii--self

is thus indexed by a communication and not b,, - the pure t)

contemplation of an absolute observer. io2eover

76

"the universality of knowledge is no longer guaranteed in each of us by That stronghold of absolute consciousness in w"ich the": ý' Kantian 'I think' was assured a priori o" being identical to every other possible

L 'I think"(39)

The germ of universality lies rather in the lldialoiue into which our experience of other people us by means of a movement not all of whose sources -::., re ýmown to us. " (40)

1% The critique of the , Fh4nomen. ologie de la -,, Derc etion

ultimately concentrated upon an ambiguity discerned by CD de Waelhens: the rooting of knowledge in ex--oerience me,. ý, nc either that philosophy originates in the concrete and

Cý C)

follows the explication of it, or that we can never leave the immediate and that to render this latter ex-Olicit simply means to live it. Now in I'Le ý'etaphysioue dans 11homme" we have in many ways the pivotal essay of this period, concerning itself as it does with precisely this transmutation of our perceptual awareness of being-to- the-world into the disciplined, ordered and acadenic sciences of man's relation to the world. YI. Ithough in fact Merleau-Ponty reserves for a later work a description of "the passage from perceptual faith to explicit truth on the level of language, the concept and the natural

world"(41), the essay under consideration does neveirtheless

presume the development of a conceptual language which has

some index of truth value.

Now Merleau-Ponty seems to suggest, in its simplest form, ýD

that Truth is nothing more nor less than our primordial

experience of the world made notion, reason. Philosophy

is thus merely this experience elucidated, reason contains

its own origins; and at the same time experience ý--.. nti-

cipates its philosophic realisation, the unreflected

demands to be conquered and understood by reflection.

Individual experience is in itself c insu en t n0

as it is realdy a de-presentation of self, itis a

77

P-rojective experience outwards tow,, -. iý, --';. s tt,

-'--ýe Other

world :

"Both universality and the world lie at tl--ce core of individuality and the subject"', 4. )

The relationship of man to world, the locus of -, e--; - ence ex-, is thus situated at the level oL u ti f inter-s bjec 'transcendental subjectivity is intersubjecti. - ty' On this plane the following can be noted about the re1ct--',: )n between Truth, Reason, the sciences a---id tlie return to perception, our primordial av!. ---reness of t-'--e

, -,, o-L L3 -1d. rs phenomenology although a 'return to the. C) ý-D arises only in the context of a devý:, loped 12 ý--,

t --4 01 -' t, -,, -

"Phenomenology could never have corne about be-. 'ore all the philosophical ef-orts of on--- list tradition, nor prior to the COIIS'LrU. -. tionýý o-L science. It measures the distance betweeýi our experience and this s-cience"(43)

Thus equally :

"the task before Cezanne iý., as first to forget all he had ever learned from science secon,, '- through these sciences to recapture t-lie structure oI-' the landscape as an emerging organism" (44)

Phenomenology is both science's remembrance olf its. roots

and a distinct project in its own right. iýs such it

rejoins the expressive enterprises of art and literature. (45'

If thus, for instance, this philosoPhy shares with cincma

such an undertaking "it is because the philosopher ný-l -t- e

moviemaker share a certain way of being, a certa, --*--ri vie%,; of

the world which belongs to a generation. "(46)

--e - -rid

is inexhaustible2 Secondly this primordial rro

can never become -reflectively iývhat vre are (L'i-ý--re'flýchi`.

11- - ýI Expression is an endless tasl--, it can never fu-ll-,, - fc- C tiC4 -To

encompass the brute A_ty of the ý. -rý d

III There is a world I, or rather: I Jis t-112:

Vlorld' I can never completely accou-nt this ever rated reite assertion n my lf '47)

lelfý ,

The c)anvas is never completed c,. iad '-ruth

fully realises at the level of 1, *'otion o, ---

78

f aith LI Far from th6re being a telos of 1ýý. eascn, L, -,, lere of sens wHich can never su

thus a -, ý. -acs 'L-ie ±I- Of th e natural perceived -, J-o-j-ld.

T

, ýeither --:, s teleological, rather it is full tzi rn ean t which is perpetually irf -e-, -Jence: there 4S a irtianent to ex-. 1 meaning of History because 7

L-1 is t Or -, -iere is

transcendence insofar as philoso-ý, -h-ý, - is conti-nually ----e - begun reflection, and insofar as the 'o-pen' inte-l-rogr- -to,. -1 -7 the world must always reconf-_*-rirt its or-_,,, -, j-j-j n t"e liýe'-. -f- of existence'. The eternal -, ýi-ese; nce of Ithi,:

_:, L world awakens hence a timeless sense of mystery and astonishment in the philosopher, and the I-pi: lo-ý-ressl OT teleology of reason is a return, or iýatcier - tit il e continuing reassertion of the ever--present past

"The history of mankind is then no lon, ýýer t-I-e inevitable advent of modern man in fix-ed stýý, ý. -es starting with the cave men, that imperious, CD growth of ri-iorality and science o-, '-' which all too human' textbooks chatter; it is no', empirical, successive history but the awareness of the secret bond which causes Plato to be still alive in our midst"(48)

Thirdly, there is an apriori judgement upon the natuxe

of consciousness. Merleau-Ponty, as , -%, as seen,

uished a corporeal intentionality - which defined t1ie

activity 6f the body proper and linked the 'lived world' to the body - from an 'intentionality of act'. This

latter - "the only intentionality discussed in the

Critique of Pure Reason"(49) - is refle ctive consciousness

but specifically interpreted by '.. -Ierleau-Fonty in -'K; -7ý. ntiýýM

terms: that is, as constituting, synthetic and jUSt4,

cendent. I-Tow Merleau-Ponty is clearly and - -- b1y

C, CD concerned to establish consciousness against tý, -; o

tendencies: on the one hand, consciousness deffined as

-1 - ub ject Absolute Observer2 above the ý,. rorld, irremed Lably s I sub`ec'ý-, in the insurpassable epis ten, *ologi dualLsm o- Ii

. 'ined as abd object; on the other hand, consciousness deL

"le individual 009itO2 solipsist, irremed4---. 'bly sub-ect 4-, L, - ýi

o "r 71 t'-, ese ontolcgical gulf between subject n%'-ý %-- e0 t-'I

tendencies l, "erleau-Ponty observes in --')artre; but t. ie

against sucl, f. former's concern to guard himsel ---es

79

leads to an ambiguity concern-ing the veiýy consciousness qua consciousness. T-'q usace r- e --- s) e the problem of meaning 'he un - elucidEt2o- L of already resolved at the level of experience, -Is the interface-of body and world. ---s ., -ras seen t ; ý--. e IS ' body as "innate", I view oL I'latent' 'L: no1:, T Il -z;, d

6- eof t', in wor d. Crudely, exper-ience is all we have and yet it caý:: ý---, ne-, -, -2, r exhaust the

"It means two things to say t-', ic--. t ouiý e, -, ---,, er1e-. i-ce is our own: both that it is not the meeasure of all imaginable being in it -I Uself, and t'. LL,. t it is nonetheless co-extencisfve vjith -: ý11 of which we can form. a notion"(50)

In other words the episteri-iological problem rearises at a different level: a certain 'correspondence' of experience with itself :

"E'etaphysics is not a knowledge cor,,, e to co m. plete the edifices of knowledge, but is lucid familiarity with whatever threatens these I "i elds of knowled e and the acute awareness o-' thel. - worth. "(515

Hence there appears of ten a+neasy tension between knowledge - frequently interpreted by l, lerleau-Ponty a hypostasised objectivity - and experience. The former is

an "imposed" order upon the latter and the latter again "threatens" the constructions of the former. :. Toreover,

the other dilemma - individualisation of self/subject - it also re-arises at a new level. Defining intentional. 7 as C)

corporeal, as pertaining to the body-proper, I'lerle--u-2onty

is forced into a conflict between the anonymity, the

'milieu of general. Ltyl of pe-rception, and the necessity to

make of the bodya self, a 'subject': why it is that my

perception is uniquely mine. Now, as Zaner points out,

how can the body be self-aware of itself as subject, and, -7ý ci C again, how can this 'self I be experienced by con usnel., s

as belonging to t--at consciousness. He a,. gues

"The body is not an animate orgeanism because it ýalt`self an intentionalilLr (or even a 11n. -tur tS

but rather becaus e it is tfie -bodl-, I- of

pecific consciousness... 1o matter . I- ; Oil

f-nITI

c, iuotaL, ion marks one places around the ne 4

can never make the body a subject --n 'L-. -'., Le L- -C L, ,; ense. 11)52)

CO

Despite the observed ambicmity in the relation betl,,, -een C)

ud experience, tst knowledge a "erleau-ýeonty still .L "Philosophical self -cons c iousne sc, does not make science's effort at objectification fut L. i-', -e, I philosophy pursues this effort at the Jauman level, since all thought is inevitably objectil- ca ti on: only philosophy knows that on this level ob, ject- ification cannot become carried away and us conquer tile more fundamental relationships o-' r, coexistence"(53)

Certainly I., Ierleau-Ponty is right to assert that consciousness must intercede in the objectivity of what i. - ý -L "1 nown as that which knows and knows itself tQ know. But the failu-, -e to risolv, ý W-it nature vf cc-. n, 5c,, L,, s -)er

IeQUS h, fi-c" rn rn a ! -, eJectionof ex, scieal,, 5m of thýe absolute into a positivfs4 . rn of brute experience . Llic-11 is

simply lived as such. Tillerleau-Ponty wants to dist in,:, 7 -u --*, sh his undertaking from a traditional philosophy of subject and object, subject and others :

"Phenomenological or existential ý)ýiilosophy is largely an expression of surprise at this inherence of self in the world and in others, a description of this paradox and permeation, and an attempt to make us see the bond between subject and world,, ' between subject and others, rather than to explain it as the classical philosophies did by resorting to absolute spirit. "(54)

But the internal failures and shortcomings of classical explanation do not thereby absolve the contemporary philosopher from the labour of an elucidation which goes beyond a

mere vision of what is. We shall see later how I. '-'erleau-Ponty

attempts to r, econcile this problematic of meaning v; ith the

questions of moral, political and historical action.

Sartre, in 1945, is also concerned to discern a historical

meaning to our experience of events and, li'-, -ýe Ferleau-? onty,

Sartre perceived an initial nominal distortion of ideas :

v'We are living in a century o-l-" propoganda" L see all about us only absolute formulas,

patchwork, dishonest compromises, outdated and hastily refurbished myths"(55)

With Merleau-Ponty, Sartre saw the writeils task as -.

i: -e- -4

serving clarity and rigour whilst see'--I- to tell the

truth :

81

"The function of a writer is to cal- a s-riade a spad e. If words are sicl-, -, it is up to us- to cure them... Our first duty as a v, iýiter ýs t-', us

; 11 -ý llý to re-establish language in its di--nityll C) C: ) C-- The writer owes a particular responsibility and none o-f his actions are exempted :

"For us in effect the writer is neither 7.1e s tal nor Ariel: he is danS le coup, v, rhatever he does, marked, compromised, in his furt,,. est retreat ... "The writer is in situation in his epocra: each word has repercussions: each silence also. "(57'

Simone de Beauvoir equally held no belief in t, -ie 'innocence' of language :

"There are words as murderous as gas cl-iai-lbers. Jaures' assassin was armed 1, ý, Tith wo:, --ds, words drove Salengro to suicide"(58')

Sartre, moreover, definitively rejects the 141 tera-ry 'terrorism' - "lighting fires in the bushes of languaC;; ell - which was the mode of re-war writing. Rhetorical ge P Q, - must rather regain its dignity and powers by comi: iunicating with other men through the modest use of the means at hand. (59)

Neither must the artist be made into a monument: Sartre

attacks those critics who bring the unknown judgement of history to bear 'upon present works. History's judgement

cannot be thus known, and to so preempt it marks a trans-

ferenoe of beliefs in immortality into literature : .L "Art cannot be reduced to a dialogue vd-th the

dead and with men not yet born"(60)

Yet the authenticity of the written or spoken word does

still, for Sartre, derive its force from an initial

assumption of the freedom the individual is. in his

search for an ethics and a mode of adequate e: 2--ý--, ression L Sartre preserves the foundation of the free individi-i-ý--,

cogito. The text of an introduction to - selection o"

]Descartes thus serves for a reiteration of the central

tenets of the Sartrean ontology: freedom is one and

__-, 1, L. -; i --, ppecars indivisible, man is "the beii-i- throu,. --' -. -hom trut' -

82

in the world". (61) Descartes is to be adf. --. ir ed for -'--a-, i-i

understood, long before ILTIeidegger, "that the sole foundation of being is freedom. "(62) This entire f-, -eedo:, l. "belongs equally to every man or rather... --*, t is eva-, ent that every man is a freedom. "(63) And, as je-Lq en, -, Nothingness. Sartre seperates a philoso-, 11aic notion of freedom founded in reflection from an ideal of e ":,

'f cc -d- ous free will: autonomy does not coincide with ,,. )i-oductivit,! ý and "the situation of a man and his powers cannot increase or limit his freedom. Descartes has here made, a-`tf: ýr the Stoics, an essential distinction between freedom and power. To be free is not to be able to do what one ,,. rants but to want what one can. "(64)

Yet whilst Being and Nothingness seemed to eaccept the impossibility of ontology to formulate an ethics, the

experiences of the war and occupation, as well as the immediate situation of 1945 did directly pose the nece--ý,, ity for a developed morals and a response to the question of how man who is freedom finds himself in situations distort, divert and deny his freedoms. Again whilst Being and 11"I'othingness failed to realise a universal freedom,

a mutual interaction of freedoms, the situation now demanded that the individual act freely in the name of and to secure the freedom of others.

Indeed from 1945 to 1950 Sartre's explicit concern is

with the writing of a 'morals'. Being_ and lothingness had

announced the discussion "in a future Work" of ethical

questions(65) Le-s 11-Touches(66", can be interpreted in terf. -is

of the 'eidetic of bad faith' constructed by the former

work(67) and in a 1944 interview Sartre described morals

as his "dominant preoccupation. 11(68) His 1745

LIT, ', xýstpntialisme est un humanisme centered pri--, cipally

around the moral problem although it does so by vulg(--r-

ising through simplification the s2lient L'iemes o1-' on

existentialism. Even in 1949 Sartre was still wor. --n, -

his morc-,.. ls and in the context of a public wift! ý-

Lukaos in that year he wrdte : "If I objectively take for an end t-'-ie freEdoin

Z, of the other, I do violence to hif-1.3ut. i take my ovm freedom as an end, it entV-; 7V-s Llrie exigency of all the others as freedom. I--, -i the choice I make of my freedom, that of the others is called for, but then I pass to the level of action, I am obliged to take the C, others as means and not as end. , le are 'Llere evidently in the presence of an antinomy but it is precisely this which constitutes the moral problem. I will examine this antinomy in my 'Morale.. ''1(69)

This work had long been announced under the title ILIHommel on the back of the Gallimard collection 'Biblioth'bque de Philosophi. el, edited by S- , rtre and TvIerleau-Ponty. And, in 1949 again, Combat published a fragment of the work concerned with 'revolutionary violence' and specifically ý-ITith the white op,, --)ress-ion of blacks in the United States. (70)

Then dramatically in 1949 -S)artre abandoned the project of the 'Mo-rals' announcing in his unpublished notes

when "the moral attitude appears Atechnical and social conditions render positive forms of conduct impossible. Ethics is a collection of idealistic tricks intended to enable us to live the life imposed on us by the poverty of our resources and the insufficiency of our techniques"(71)

There is evidence however that Sartre has continued to

write intermittedly on the subject of ethics. But,

importantly, the philosophic context and foundations -or this work underwent a radical transf orra tion after 1950

and such later research will subsequently be examined in

the light of these developments.

For Sartre became conscious that the morals he ,,,, as, affte--r- 4-

ý-ý s- er o 1945, in the process of elaborating stood in da-. C-_-

remaining merely a 'morale dle"crivc4in'. In the first

instance this means that the ambiuit, -,, - at the very hear-, L

of Sartre's on*ology betiý,, ee--. the permanence and reý.! - forces Sart--e into t-'-., e mode o--: ' isation of philosoph, A.

84

i

literary expression. It is the eSL--; enti. al1y lfýtera22- `-, notions of 'bad faith' and 'authenticity, -,, Ti-Jch -'ar ) tre

employs to complete an existential analys-Is of f--i-eed'o--ý, and it is in the limit situatio--ris provided bv 11terF. -l- imagination

- particularly the Chem nins de Libert6 trflor--; - that Sartre attempts to explore the signij-J-crý,, ýL. Jon o. 1-

n" -0 profound failure to secure a synthetic philoso, -, 1, y, of existence. He sees too th--eatre as Iforging q-, ,. -ths' in order to explore in a moral sense the anguished clioic-21 of self by the free man. (72)

Man is undeniably and totally free but it is only in the image of the adventurer that . artre finds some -_-iodel c- the assumption of this freedom: a man ,,,, dio lives cLn impossible condition, aware of its impossibility, see'-_-. ', i, a destiny-yet ever conscious of Ilis freedom, searchir, - Zor a total objectivity, only in order to dissolve it into total subjectivity; a man who

"proves that it is this impossibility of being which is the condition of his existence and that man exists because he is impossible. " (73)

Indeed T. "athieuls freedom is a heroic Pessimism and --'It is

not the literary translation of a sufficient on#logy, but `7 the failure by t, e rather the reflection in metaphor o -L ii

free cogito to effect a synthesis. It is the inabil-Ay

of philosophy to realise itself which causes lfreedor. -ý'

languish' 'choice' 'responsibility' to -Find their confu-:: oed ,T

reflection in the work of art. Tlaurice atanson argues

that the basic confusion and misinterpretations of Sartre's

thought derive from a confounding of his novels and po, -)ul, ---, r

--ie lectures on the one hand and his technical on. -`-olo,,, -, o-, t',

other. 04", But it is imperative to reco--, -, -ise +. -Ir-t S), --rtre fusion b E,

J- himself periý, its such a con firstly 07--

--.: t of defense of his ontology in the cont. L lect, --. --, --e

Lixistentialism and Humanism - an "intellectual st-i2eet-

and popularising its et, -ii-cEl brai, ýil" 11- 7ýII ow in asHe

works like the trilogy, and secO. -Lly -' -rude

admitted later(76) the literary c--, spect to -, -nl- e

85

strictlY philosophic -! ý! ork. It

7S r.

') -(l - --u e MS I ----, -, )s tý respect that -A this t--lf--, e, ý T L _, -__--ls suc7, ---st3 , -)artre is a writer amor--c- : -"-iers philo o Oso-ý---, er ar. riongst with a cc)nser: uent i i---q o . 9, -1 - o met'--. iod in both areas. ' '-e c--" ,

77) 3ut, I) or is not between literature a-,, Id Ili oso-,,, but t! --* -L I-)(-.

)L U ý7-

Lf-i bO as the sign of a deeper ambi CD ý:, ui tv. C- U

Thus the eventual decision not to finisli oJ Ce ct fourth volume o-'L- ' the Roads to se-,, --es --s ý--', oubl, -- significant. On the one hand the serý ece CD sjeico,

Ii I of T, Jeu incarnatinr7 tiae )a of in terms . 'ath -1 s: eIo.. -i CD Roquentin to a positive moralit .

(78'ý -)aiýtre a. ', Ied y

1945 :

"L'Ige de raison and Le Sursis are 0111'v st4111 an inventory of false, mutilated, Licoriplete freedoms, a description of the a-ýorieS of freedom.

. It is only in La Dernj7"re Chance

that the conditions of a veritabie freedom will be defined. "(79)

The subsequent failure of the final volume to apoe-, --. r t.,: -ius corresponds to a failure to describe such conditions -. nd the ultimate failure indeed to describe the passage to

positive morality.

On the other hand, the very form of the novel as such

was, for Sartre, in conflict ý-, -ith the substantive content- R. A fragment of the it could legitimately give itsel. A-

fourth volume appeared in Temps modernes, (80) and '3-Jmone de

Beauvoir gives an account of the projected plot for the

whole volume. All of the leading fic-u27es from 'L. '-ie

three books die and she notes

T'Everyone, or almost everyone, being dead, there was no one left to become involved

problems that arose aft---, r 11, Le ý7, rar. with the L' But they were precisely the problems thEý,

-t at this time interested Sart--, -e; he had no''. -*-. Cý' to say about the Resistance bec. -, --., -, se he cor-ce-i-. red the novel as a -: orm tho-t poses questions, and under the Occupation one Ime,,.,, - exact'L, -. I C" t LO

ý-. t do: there could be no perple----J-t, -,. 7 , no y about how to behave. For his heroes at the end of Drole d'Amitij, the die ial, cast .....

To skip ten years and hurl his chp--, -P-, cters into the anxieties of the -, oresent would ----. v, - been meaningless ... "(81) C> : )artre himself in 1959 explained -', -, is reaso-n 0

"The fourth volume was to talk about the Resistance. The choice then as sii-i-, ple - even if it needed a lot of courage and force to stick to it. One was for or I against the German. It

., Tp-. s 1. -'Tnite or black-. Today - and since 1945 the situation is complicated. Less courage -! )er-',,, -aps is needed to choose, but the choices are much more difficult. I cannot exý, )ress the ambiý-, uities of our epoch in this novel which vrould be situated in 1945.11(82)

In summary then, the literary imperative -,,., rite to clearly express the choices of one's epoch - was in tension with the search for a morality of such choices, The moral problematic was moreover locrnted in the antino! --1y of individual and universal freedom with the -7ormer assumed by Sartre to be the very foundation of tl-ie moral and expressive act. Consequently, when S)artre strove to

4d So establish the necessity of a universal freedom, he d; by examining the very nature of writing itself. 'This is the end of QuIest-ce que la li. tterature? (1948) whose arguments extenct to the philosophic enterprise as a

whole. (83)

Having distinguished prose - the empire of signs which CD

11 1-1 transcend toward the objects named - from poetr, ýr .. r. ', -ich

as meaning - object Sartre dwells within the word itsel-ý

argues that writing is an essential activity which deni-es

the innocence of language :

it.. the writer has chosen to reveal the ý-! orld and particularly to reveal man to other men so that the latter may assume full responsibilit, -,, - before the object which has been thus laid here. "(8L)

-r it er c om, tt iýnl: L But if writing is an enterprise, the v.

himself as a resolute v, rill and as a choice, (85'i it -s ýýIso for o--,. esel- 7

a directed project since one does not v: _, ýite .L E'

- -S t "the operation implies that O-L read4 n"f dialectiml correlative and Vese tý,,, o co-,,, nc. cted

87

acts necessitate the joint ef-lort brings upon the imaginary object mind. "(86)

two distinct ýý----nts. It --s of author and reader scene that concrete c--nd which is the viorl: o--'- t-1. )e

0.

oince the writer's creation only finds its fulfi`llme-ý)-t in being assumed through reading by another,

t1all literary work is an appeal. To vi--r-ite is to make an appeal to t-Jae reader that fle lead into objective existence the revelatJon i,. -hicll-i I have undertaken by means of Thus the writer appeals to the reader's freedom to collaborate in ! he production of

Literature is the assumption of the world by - freedo. i-, which can only be directed to and taken u-,, -. b. -, r anot-, ), er J freedom. The literary work seeks to present or recover

4 the totality of being as having its source and shot through by freedom. 'Thus

"the writer as a free man addressinE free men, has only one subject - freedom"(88)

and writing itself

-'9' "is a certain way of wantimg freedona. 11(kE) C)

Again from a contemporar7 essay :

t1(the writer is) assuming the function of perpetuating, in a world -v., here freedo,, -i is always threatened, the assertion of freedom and the appeal to freedom. "(0-0)

For this very reason, in a famous note Sartre den-*-es t

there can be any "single good novel whose e-, --, )-ess purpose its

was to serve oppression. "(91) This last rerýar! -:, s o- f artless use of 'good', typifies the difficul'--

interpreting a text whose em. -Lployment oLL k-L I r. -1 M,

Cý engagement a--e at once philoso. -L, )'i- c! --l --, -) ' mo-, --ý-Ii- Line 11 L, --LUS S

as one critic of Sartre's aesthetic IIga. u,,. I-i-' me; '

-)-, -oC-l e ed,: ý In 4 convincingly argued, the clainied reca. -,

6nI -* -ce thi-, c' osc--' in fact a false synthesis generate.. C--

"I -. i 0 That is: the -Pree 'c.,. eiý of interioritY.

n- but the abstract reflect-ion not.

wri ter ts own awarene ss of his privi --I- eged -7: -e oý. i . ý, - .-/

Cc

Thus there is no hom. ogeneity Consciousness - non-]ýjositional --, waiýenes-s -7 t- e -e-

4 activity of read2 ,, CD Lng and výiý, iting - d-, scussed I-rs L týýo sections of the work-, and t., --e conci-c-te frec -:,, doras of vC--iiýious historicE.

1-Ily situ, ý-:. tecf` ; ý, roun. s O-L readers which Sartre discusses the latte t boo

711, iich the Tý Tri-L 7' qu- The freed. ý *ter 1) S to v UeL

is the free coP ýito; the freedom to e engage appeals is the his-kLorical poss- jijý C'. -C. 7n0 specific soc-i,.:,, l clasL,.

-I -olf ed rie S L-Aýý, L'Ie`l 3oth are "the work of art is. . an act o-"-' co-, i---ide-, --, ce in the freedom of men"

but the ambiguity ofo the i: ýelationship between t. ie two is shown in :

at the heart of the aesthetic fi-i-: )er, -tý discern the moral impere, t ive. 11 (9 3' ,e

Moreover the ambiguity is d--*Lsýý-uised vithin thie -1. -., ot-*ýo-, --, of ýD generosity derived from Descartes

"a sentiment that each man - 'aEjs of his -J'ree

will and that is joined to the resol-u-tion . -ever to be lacking in it. 11(94)

The same teri--. i applies in literature ,,: rhere

t'readiJn, c:,, is a pact of generosity between au't, -'--or CD and -reader. Each one trusts the other; each

'. -. eo t") one counts on the other, demands of t .. er as much as he demands of him-self. For tý-s confidence is itself generosity. '1(95)

ty is that feeling lliý, Thich hFs ---nd its Generosi

end in freedom"(96). It is thus both confidence in one's

own freedom and the affective transcendence of seL. "

towards other freedoms. As such, S)artrels e-L-lics

grounded in the a priori universal is tendenc, -, - of freedom and Sartre thus affirras his 'Lull accord -,.,., ith . e-ells

statei-ilent: "No-o---., e, no man can be free, if all men E, Lre not

free. "(97) But this innate generos---Lty of freedom --*s

unfounded; confl-1-cts with the u=esjlved o. '

the Other, and rests itself upon a morl!, l presi, I-I.... liberation. T'o--reov-, r t. 1 7 -, da--Vc-,, the project of hi) Lie sco. A.

between the freedom I ýn. m end the h-JI-toric. -I --. '----ee.. ons we &--., e

89

-: 1 forced to be raises the issue of faýeeedo--, -ag, ý-ý: 1.2, nst--ce-11-1

Of alienation. In afoo t-n ote to ee sc. osc ar s 6artre had denied that the fact o -L 4 r'l "a1naoeLe any diminution of the o---, ýi.,, inal of freedom Cý

"To be sure, ri 2. -J! 7-inst there is freedori e --ý e1 But in order for it to be a, Iselff , it must first be freedom. Otherwý se natuiýf oa, externality, therefo--e a radicý-l nezýction of CD the person. Even disarray, t-'n-, -, D. t is t-'--e L-Lternal imitation of externalit, even L, 110-2

presuppose freed om, 11 (91 8ý

And in a remarkable note from '. ' ýulest-ce que -L L, I VT ae ec litterature? Sartre Ooreshado s t-, 'J_I_ 0

-! L, 0fý, i'L - Critique de la raison dialectýr: ue :

"Human enterprise has t,,,, To a Lsp ects: itisbo t-'-- success and failure. The dip, lecticCal scheEie is inadequate for reflecting upon it. e must make our vocabul, --,, ry and the 0- our reason more supple. Some day I r7oll'i(- to try to describe-1hat strange re@. lit"yý, ý IL History, which is neither objective, nor ever quite subjective, in 1, -hich the di.,

-7ýý. lectic

is contested, penetrated, and corroded by a kind of antidialectic but -ý, ihiclh is still c) dialectic. "(99)

Thus Sartre, as later in the Criti r, ue is attemptinc? to CD

preserve the initial moment of radical freedom despite

its 'corrosion', perversion, by objective, exteýL-ior forces. In an anlysis of the collective, historical

phenomenon of anti-semitisim., S)artre consequently proceeds from the premise that anti-semitism is "a free and total

-ation, choice of oneself. "(100) As he did for collabo-L

Sartre views anti-semitism as a 'normal phenomenon' of L society(101) and what occu, )ies flis attention is rLt--er

I the anti-semite. 'ýIu s t-' -* s the individual motivations o-L

ponsibility(102) and his attit latte-r flees res Lludes E. re in

bad faith. (103) Jewishness itself is a soci. -_-_1 and cullural

creation: flif the jew did not exist the ant*-semite . -., --uld

invent him"(104) And the Jew hir. -Iselif faces a choice o-L

authentic or inautheolicaction. 1he authentic Jev. E. ssui-ie.

his jewishness whe-reas t. 1-ie inaut-'iekic jev, - tries

escape by various 'avenues of fl-ight' t-,, e c-' be-_*, _,. ý; Importantly the cla E. -, -- acter --*- st Ji cs:! *I

Jewish. (105) Jew-: 31--ness

p0

"are neither ethnic, nor ps, --c] religious. ', p. t simply the s tu. ý_-_tion 0__ý' L Jew is to beA'mean other men desi -LLe as Je!., i. And it is truly sit-Liation, that's to say, it's not a question for a Jel., -T decla--l-in tha t this attitude is absurd or cri-i. iin-a-1 (alft_`ot- _, E_-I it is) but of surpassJng by strugogle the CDCD conditions the others make for him in fU117

recognising this condition. "(106) CD Yet as Sartre admits 1'ý -I- , the free choice of autlie ticity ýs moral and as such provides no solution on th-e socic. l or political level. (107) Consequently the political recommendations of the work revolve around an abstract belief in a future socialist revolution c-,. s necessary I.. nd sufficient for the suppression of anti-semitisim, and an assertion of the immediacy of anti-semitism as a universal problem. (108)

As ive have seen, the origins o--'-' oS)artre Is onto logi c 1, - 1 CD

project reside within the radical freedoin of reflectJ-ve self-consciousness and this freedom is distinguished L '-'-'0 M a concept of freedom bound to the concrete liberation of man. Yet Sartre seeks vjithin the former notion to

resolve the problems which must necessarily arJ_1se at the

collective and historical level: that of the univers-1ity

of freedom and that of alienation, or freedom against self.

The fundamental character of the movement Sartre intuits

in this original freedom and ý7. rhich is directed towards the

liberation of self and others is moral: indexed by

generosity or authenticity. This impulsion thus devolves

upon dthical action whilst deriving from a freedoll of

consciousness. Sartre is le ý, d hence to defi-ne iý, _'-_Aing or

intellectual production as - and yet still remain

in contradiction between the reflectiv- and tlie creative.

If "the world and man reveal themselves by undertalkin,: -: 0 (109. /

then the "prose writer is a man who has cliosen a cert. -_, in

method of secondary action ý-, rhich i,,! e call . -ctfion 'o,,, -

disclosure. The ,

'committed' wr4fter kno!. -., s tr. t , rioi-ds -_.:,. ýe

He knows that to reveal is to chcn, z-e and t'l, --.. t cr- action*

A. -

can reveal only by planning to change. "(110) Yet --rtre

es the fý, ct tliat, as soc-. -ý precisely recognis --Sm

ol

witness the surpassinc- of anti- s eF. --'L tism s c) ý--o too it only in a socialis-_t collectivity : 4-ould literature, having final- ' -Y- understood its essence and having made the syn-Liesis of Praxis and exis, of negativity and construction, of doing, having, being, deserve the name of total literature. "(111'

Socialism is a historical possibility, a future task o-,: " liberation and man remains to be inlvented. Freedom in its aspect of negativity, in its consciousness of itself must be bound to freedom in its aspect of construct- iveness.

"Now the paradox of our age is that constructive freedom has never been so close to becomino- tz) conscious of itself and never has it been so profoundly alienated. "(112)

The synthesis which Sartre sees as havinE to be made is thus that between "historical relativity and MO-L-1 and metaphysical absolute"(113). The absolute is orio-inal Cartesian freedom; the relativity is the historical

situation in which such a freedom seeks to secure the freedom of self and of all in c, praxis which "as actfon is history on history". (114) Sartre here rejoins Merleau-Ponty in the undertaking which strives to conjoin the individual with the collective, the explanation o_f

what is with the illumination of the historically

possible, the particular experience i, -, ith the univers, _,:: ý_l *fective meaning, morality with politics, freedom vrltll e]'ý

praxis; in sum, the philosopher in reflection and sel'-

expression with the man in action. The nexus of t-'-riese

problems lies in the confrontation with l. '5-, rxism. 3artre's

co-operation during the war with C. N. E. ncd, as ý,: as seen, Ye t

marked the origins of his assocL_ýtion the _ ý, 2. L

on the morrow of the Liberation the -larty's attitude

towards him underwent a radical anol hostile cha-, 2re.

-n only had the Resistance taught "ý-rtre an initial lesso-(ý

-e pos-sible a 'te,. History but its form and size seened to maI, - L the war the co-operation of diverse politic7l elements.

-, us er Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir t, A ertai ne

tt of independent2 sympat"ietic ý3ýip--, ort "or and dreams i-

92

criticism of the 2C. (115) Ejartre was, he s-ays, a convinced libertarian socialist :

"I knew very well that my objectives were not those of the PC but I thought that we could walk the road together. CD This brusclue ruAure deeply disconcerted me. "(116)

Sartre attributes a large part o-L LJ f t-iis sudden distrust to the public recognition of his work. Indeed lit . ý. -as only after the war that Bein(g and Nothingness received real critical acclaim and Sartre found himself thrust for,.,, -ard as the protagonist of a new popular movement of ideas. He had, as early as 1944, felt obliged to respond to various attacks by attempting a definition of existential is m-. The reproachs which the communists in particular had made were to become all too familiar: that existentialism derived inspiration from the Nazi philosopher Heidegger; that it preached a doctrine of despair and anguish; and that it

constituted a literature of the gutter. ': )artre's repl, -,: -, not only refutes such accusations of quietism and decadence, but also attempts to reconcile the general efforts of existentialism and marxism: "existent ialism is

not a morose delectation but a humanist philosophy of

action, effort; struggle and solidarity. 11(117) Yet it is

sign enough of Sartre's political naievty from this period that Simone de Beauvoir notes 'apropos the publication of

the piece :

"Sartre was convinced that henceforth the TJýarxists could no longer consider him an adversary. "(118)

Yet they did so and Sartre's alienation from the Party was

reinforced by precisely the dramatic and unjustified

notoreity which existentialism accuired after '--')eptember

1945. Thus the opening issues of Ten-ps i-iodernes coincided

with publication of Simone de 'ýeauvoirls first novel,

on and Le Sursis, Sartre's as well as '"artre's

lecture upon existentialism :

tt', výie were astonished by the furour we cause4d... sartre was now hurtled brutally into the arena of celebrity... A weel-- never passed -I, -ithout the

93

newspapers discussing us... 0.3-ossip about us 7-- and about our books appeared ever, -, 7'-. r, -)ere. I. Ii the streets photographers -IF CD

'ired aý-. -ay- at us, and strangers rushed up to speah to us. ý. t the Flore people stared at us and w1aispered. When Sartre gave his lecture, so many people turned up that they couldn't all get into the lecture hall; there was a frenzied crush a-ad some women fainted. "(115)

From late 1945 onward was thus the period of existentialism's greatest public exposure, when the very tern,

encompassed everything and anything from Lmerican jazz to avant garde cinema, and when 4. ts op-ponents claimed anguished suicides and the corruption of youth as its direct result.,,,, 120) It was the period VThen Sartre Is,,:, orl- was both put on the Index b,

-,, 7' the Catholic Church and -41ous abuses of of' subjected also to the scurr Licial 7': osco,,.,,

'criticism'. The personal effect of all t1iis upon . -')artre himself was significant;

"a celebrity and a scandal at the same moment, it was not without uneasiness, that Sartre accepted a fame which exceediný-

,- all his old ambitions also contradicted them. "(121)

As Simone de Beauvoir continues, Sartre had previoulslý, nourished the belief that obscurity qnd misunderstanding from one's contemporaries was the necessar,

-,, -, price of a more glorious acclamation and recognition from future

generations. If the fantasy remained, it now had to

reconcile itself to instant stardom: "The rejection of posterity would give me posterity. "(122)

In theoretical terms too Sartre argued against such a -F --'is tor- -I s literary 'inElation' which attempts to prejudge C: '

verdicts and the Pre"sentation of Temps nodernes states the

immediacy of literary tasks :

"We write for our contemporaries, we don't v. ý: ý-, nt to look at our world with future eyes, this

th would be the surest way of killing it, but our eyes of flesh, our true perishable eyes. VIe donl. t hope to win our trial on appeal, -nd we have no use for a posthumous rehabili-F. C. tion: it is here and in our lifetime that the tri!

-7,1 s

are won or lost. "(123)

94

Literature must irremediably choose its epoch very choice constitutes t., -ie absolute: 117, le -oroduce

"or e over absolute as Jourdain produced prose. "(124'. .1

"'de) too, are absolutes, inimitable and incomparable, and our choice of ourselves is an absolute. "(125)

ý 1-I " -r -ed In the defenses of existentialism -, -6-ich Lia--tre is oblic to make during this' e-riod he seeks thus to es-tablis-1-i t-'! --, e transcendence of individual freedoms toý,,! ard the univers, --l the absolute. For example he adopts a notion of t-', -). e hu:. -. ýc, ii condition. If there is no essential human nature "there is

nevertheless a human universality o. 1 condition", that is to

say

"all the limitations which E, priori define man's fundamental situation in the universe. I'L is historical situations are v,? -. riable... but what never vary are the necessities of beinc, in the

C-) world, of having to labout and to die there. "(126) CD

Again from the work on anti-semitism :

"What men have in. common is not a 'nature' but a condition, that is, an ensemble of limits and restrictions: the inevitability of death, the necessity of working for a living, of living in a world already inhabited by other men. Fundamentally this condition is nothing C, more than the basic human situation, or, if you prefer, the ensemble of abstract characteristics common to all situations. ", (127", ',

On the other hand Sartre employs a notion of the or age as implying the universal :

"The age is the intersubjectivit-y-, the liviný-, U C: ý absolute, the dialectical underside of

history" (128)

and as man is not imprisoned in the fact of the human

condition so also

Itto write for one's age is not to reflect *t passively; it is to want to maintain it or change it, thus to go beyond it towards 'u-', -Ie future, and it is this effort to c-`-M--ýiue it CD that places us i--aost dee-ply wit-iin it, fLor it is never reducible to the dead ense. -ible of tools and customs; it is -ý*-IL movement, it is constantly surpassing itsel-lý`; the concrete , )resent and tLe liviio- futtire of (Zý

95

all men 7., ho compose it coincide -rigorously within it. "(129),

This sense of trans ce ---, iding to-,.,, Tard the univý-; rsE-! also defines the very atten, -,, -; t to argue for existentl. ýý--', l-ýý-Sn ýs a, humanism

4- 111, Tan is all the time outside o-. '-' hi:,. -iself: it is in projecting and losing himself beyond, CD CD

himself that he makes maii to exist; , -, -qd, oi-i the other hand, it is by pursuing transcý--_-,, a- dent aims that he himself is able to exist. Since man is thus self-surpassing and can grasp objects only in relation to his self- surpassing, he is himself the heart End C) centre of his tra'_LScendence. There is no other universe except the human un, -verse, 4S the universe of human subjectivity. Thi relation of transcendence as constitutive of man... with subjectivity *00 - it is this that we call existential _', iumanisi-, q. "(130')

In these ideas of condition, epoch a-nd humanism is

-reflected the tension of C--. bsolute and iýýelative, indýividu, --, l

and universal: that if "at the very -', -, eart and centre of existentialism is the absolute character of free

commitment", it arises within a historically relatLve

situation: "one must observe equally the relativity of Cartesianism and the absolute character of the Cartesian

commitment. "(131) It is a tension which reflects that

between philosophic reflection and philosophic permanence,

and, importantly, it is a tension to which T"arxism ap-peared to offer some form of resolution: namely throujsýh the union

of theoretical and practical activity, and in the realisation of the historical mission of the universal class: the proletariat. There is no doubt that Sartre accepted the fundamental role of the working class, and that this

belief was reinforced by the first contacts ,,, ith t1le PC

"He had always supposed the proletariat to be the universal class ... The universality to which, as a bourgeois intellectual, he aspired could now be bestowed on him only by t1ae rien vrho incarnated it on earth. "(132)

Sartre thus saw the future of humanit-,, - as lying vrita-n L/ the future of this class :

"I know there is no other salvation for m. an

0

-16

but the liberation of the ý17orkcing class... I know that our intellectual int-elrest lies ,,.,?. rith the proletariat. " (133) "It must be said without hesitation L, --EL the fate of literature is bound up ,,. T

iu -1 L

that of the working class. "(134" C) j "He (the Triter) must -out himself in the

position of condemning violence from the point of view of the oppressed classes"(135) C: ý,

Sartre had, in addition, already defined socialism as both necessary and sufficient conditions of a total literature and the disappearance of anti-semitisEi. He had moreover come to accept the historicity of all our

t tions: "under the pressure of history we have learnt

th

tha we were historical. "(136) From. the ver-,, T --L: i--Lst numbers

clas

10

e

o of r fT m-s modernes, Sartre had made use of the terms li,., orking

t .00 1ý

clas I and 'bourgeoisie'; yet there was a refusal to see

I r I

the lass struggle as the motor of historical change or CD the p oletariat's historical role as exceptional

11ýýAo not believe in the 'I.. "-ission' of the proletariat, nor that it is endowed with a state of grace; it is made up of men, just and unjust, who can make mistakes and vrho are often mystified. "(137)

As Burnier points out, the philosophy of history whose influence can be found in, What is Literature? and which is implied in Sartre's political terminology, "does not reach the level of the existential ontology. ', (138) Sartre's insistence upon the immediacy of all literary

and political projects has as its corrollary the repre- sentation of History as the immanence to all freedoms of a common contemporaneity. Thus, for example, in Le Sursis History is the War as the omnipresent fact e_-ýperienced now by everyone. Sartre's rejection of a historicism is

understandable but his unwillingness to accept a I ist theory of history was initially conditioned by a philosophical disagreement. Even in 1-P36 in the cOnclLding remarks of Transcendence of the Sartre notes :

t'It has always seemed to me that a i. -, -orkinc::,, hypothesis as fruitful as historical mate--ip-lism

-`ty never needed for a I-oundation the csý-bsurd- which is metaphysical mater-iia-lism. "(13. 0)

0

97

And in his 1946 "'-,: aterialisme et r6volution" . 3aztre

announced once again his profound objection to a "I'letaphysical materialism dissimulated under a positivism"(140" Sartre makes it clear that his qua--,, rel is not wit-Ii Elarx "but against the 1.; arxist scl-iolasticism C) of 1949. Or if you prefer against 1,., Iarx through --,,, Ieo- C: ) Stalinist Ilarxism. "(140) (The article does later suggest (D

an ambiguity in 11arx himself between the T. Iarx before and after the "unfortunate meeting v, --ith Engels. "(142))

The 'metaphysics' of materialism lay for 3artre in its

misuse of the subject-object dualism :

"In order to eliminate subjectivity, the materialist declares that he is an object, that is, the subject matter o-t' science. But once he has elimated subjectivity in favour of the object, insiead of seeing himself as a thing among other things, buffeted about by the physical universe, he makes of himself an o--, I_ective beholder and claims to contemplate nature as it is, in the absolute. 11(143)

Sartre denies that there is a dialectic of and, correspondingly, that Nature proceeds dialectically or

possesses a real history :

"the notion of natural history is absurd. History cannot be characterised by change nor by the pure and simple action of the

_past. It is defined by the deliberate

resumption of the past by the present; only human history is possible. "(144', J

NT either is dialectic progress assimilable to the linear

causality of the sciences and the very use of such terms

as 'reflection' and Ideterl Leveal the deteri-2in--stic Anes'

ground on which such materi(, -ý--, lism places itself. (145)

However ý3artre adds that whilst meteriallism., r--Jý-ht be J (Z)

philosophically JC'alse, it re. -r--a. ins --, recisely as Er-

a -orce mobilising, transforming and o-, ý, E---dsi-ng Vi. ose CD

--er of objective reality is measured L-) te-L.. S 0-, ' -. -ts poi.

ac ti on. " Q14f_, For1.3)ar tr econce iv e ý3 of t-'-- -- suo-t 4- c- C)

materialism as the mode of thinking appropri--tc, to 'Ll-c-

98

work-ing cla, ss(147" and "it is a lact tliat ciateria. li, -ým is ncý,. -. F ula e philosophy of the

_,, rolet, 2--, L L insofar as the proletaxie, -t is iýevoluticcna--, ý.. -, -- there is a, deep relationshL, ) betv. -een t-'-2. e

situation of an oppressed C, , F-ý - s-s E? -n. ', - Taterialist e-. -. -, Dres, --,! on of -2-1 s silt, "Lation. .. Faterialism is 4-nd. isput&. bly the only

U4 that suits revolutionaiýy aýeq iiýeT. -., ents-ý

Sartre is th-L., B caught between a realist -oe--Icept---Lon of the

emancipatory role played by this ideolo, --y end t. L -. tel- e D

lectual reflection uý? on its trutul-ý cont-ýmlnt

"Have I fallen into the unacce--, 'i,, -, ble dilemc-cs. Lmý - of bet-raying the proleta--i-Ii,, -ý, t in o--. -der to

serve the truth or betrayin,: ýz, trut-0 in the C. ) ' name of the proletariat? "(149)

Sartre at least recognises 'LL-Le to 12. e u-iacce- 't- V able, but his atter., ipts to aýesolve it durin-, t-',

-e 1. -te

10,40's remain at the level of his existing ii-reconceptions. He assumes thus that the CP is "the only

party"(150) and that "one can hardly rE:, ach tlie

classes if not through the Party, " (151) Yet the Cý

ideology is mythical and its organisation is aut'r, oritarian

and disciplined: both facts deny the individual freedom o-. "

intellectual reflection and criticism. The intellectual

knows however that he must universalise his ind-Lvidu, -2.1 freedom, he seeks an action. And Sartre admits that in

111ate'rialisi-Lqe et re'volution' he does not attempt "to

describe the Marxists' beliefs, but rather to bring out

the implications of what they do. "(152) In other words

Sartre accepts the validity of disciplined political

actions which may be informed and inspired by illusory

philosophical ideals; he is consequently preoccu-, -)ied -.. -. -ith

the nature of the militant's commitment, and precisely

from the standpoint off the sympathetic bourgeois i-n-tellect- V- 4t)

ual. One can think of Brunet in Les Chemins de liberte 17T 21o - -r t-e

and above all of Les 1.1ains sales(153' -here , r- - deliberately contrasts I'lloederer, old realist le,, ader of

7- 'Jsci cz r -a a proletarian party, with 11ugo, the ý oung

to the party for subjective and ideal-Lstic recs1J-,,. 1-'

qg

It- 71 Ideblo --, T, Ely hero is a young bourgeo-Is v, rho, by -1 c has cor,,,, r.,, it ted hi, ty cý e : ý, - -j- r- -. L

C: u iself to a, )rol LF t, -. but who before the r, --, a1 ii sm demanded b--, action cannot escape from t-'Le --Ldeal-JLst ca-ý-tegories which, prec-Isely, forced him to repudiate his class. From

' -Iience his uneasiness can only finish up in death, "(154-'-

Hugo is indeed conventionally taken as '111-le pLý77-ls hero and it is from this fact that the accus)a-Lions of anti- communism derived. But, in a later interview, '--')artre makes it clear where his sympathies lie :

if I have the greatest understanding --Ciý 111u-ols atoiitude, but you are -wrong to t-iin'-c'I

7 incarnate myself in him. incarnate myself in Hoederer. Ideally, o. + course; don't think Ili: i claiming to be Hoederer, Hoederer, is w'i! -. t I

- r-, would want to be LC I were a revo"-'utio(]-,. -., 7-11(155')

The play is not political; rather it is on politics. The celebrated reference to 'dirty hands' is not thus eithera justification or accusation of amorality in communist, or any other ideology's politics, but rather the motif of a play whose epigraph could be Sa, int-Just's

phrase "No government is innocent"(156) The problem Jrhich the play seeks to pose is that of political action itself: for, in a sense, the gap between free reflection and intellectual creation, and disciplined militant action is

once again the tension of negativity and construction which in turn is in part the conflict of bourgeois and proletariat. As Sartre refused the unacceptable dilemma

of Proletariat or truth, so he rejected that o-: ' adventurer or militant :

"I don't believe in this dilemma. I know too well that an act has two faces: negativity which is adventure, and construction which is discipline. " (157)

Yet since, as Sartre argued later, neither he nor T"erleL, -u*

- iich im- Ponty were true revolutionaries the choice i _posed itself af ter 1945 had to be in the f orm of suc-', -i

''Issued from the middle classes, ý'.: e tried to make the outline of union betv., een t-'ie intellectual petit-bourgeoisie and the communist intellectuals. This bourgeoisie

100

had engendered us. ', ', Te had received -Lts Cult-,

-, -re and values as our heritage. VJ'e- de, -. ie-r-, J-ed our CP friends the necessar.,. T tools to strýU from the bourgeoisie its humanism"(158'

In this sense, the confrontation 1,, T-j-th as a. theoretical and practical reality did not -resolve --or Sartre the -problem of universalising the individual freedom of the -_Lntellectual; on the contrary Lt only J induced a more sharply defined awareness of the original conflict. Sartre himself in his un-oublished notes provides an admirable summation of this problematic of- individual and universal, action and ref Election, bourc-eois-Le c-nd proletariat :

"Let us suppose that this contradiction of vi'-, ich I am an example (torn between bour geoi. -,

ie and proletariat), and which I now know tc be characteristic of our time, instead o-j-' representing a freedom, a positive content, is merely the expression of a very specific and limited way of life (that of the socialistic bourgeois intellectual). What if it were to disappear without a trace in the future? In short, I fluctuate between this first idea; that my privileged position affordS me the means of making a synthesis of formal and material liberties, and this second idea: tha* my contradictory position affords me no liberty at all! It gives me an unhappy consciousness, and there's an end of it. In the second case what disappears is my transcendence. I merely reflect my own situation. All my political efforts are directed toward finding a group

11(159) that will give a meaning to my transcendence.

For Sartre then, the internal meditation upon one's

particular situation had to overflow into a, political

action, which alone could reconcile freedom with its

universal ethics :

ttOne vacillates then between the adoption of an ideological position and action. But if I advocate an ideological position immediately people begin urging me into action. ýý'ulest-ce que la litterature? lead me into the R. D. R. 11(160, '

This final movement onto the plane of political action n the next in the form of the R. D. R. will be considered Ji L,

chapter.

101

Although Merleau-Ponty was himself to later Join it is perhaps ironical that he, :. rliose reflections u-pon political action and historical responsibility are so mature in comparison to those of ])artre's should I'lave engaged himself so little in the public and political activity of the Temps modernes group. For -,,, Lliere Sartre CD

seeks an action adequate to the epoc, --' "erleau-2onty's concern is with the m of this time and his reflections proceed initially from the observed tension between experience and ex-, -)resion, betl.,, reen rUason and t-',. -ie irrational. Thus it is Hegel who, for 1'

- erleau-fo--, ty, s at the source of all the great philosoý)hical -Ldeas of the past century :

"it was he who started the attei-q-, Dt to ex2. lore the irrational and integrate it into an expanded Reason, broader than the understanding which can respect the variety and singularity of individual consciousnesses, civilisa-tions, ways of thinking and historical contingency but which nevertheless does not give up the attempt to master them in order to guide them to their own truth. "(161)

The revolt of life's immediacy, existence, experience against reason, truth and system which I! erleau-Ponty sees expressed in this century's intellectual work(162", .1 suggests an irrevocable dualism, whereas in fact a definition of existentialism might be found in the idea

"of a universality which men affirm or imply by the mere fact of their being and at the

C: ) very moment of their opposition to each other in the idea of a reason immanent in unreason"(163)

This mutual interaction of sens and non-sens - having its 14

, St source in Hegel and defining the existentia __ project is demonstrated throughout the essays collected under that

title and it is revealed no less in tlae politics of our

time :

the political experiences of the past '--i, ound thirty years oblige us to evoke '11ae bacl,,

of non-sense against which everv universal it is undertaking is silhouetted and Ly

threatened with failure. "(164)

L r- CD 'he epoch is com-)-red to And, again, in a striking image, to

102

"a face we don't as yet kno",.

-. T hoý, T -LLO ý70r-'-- OUty but, like a face also, filled vý. -ith possibilities. "(165) Ilerleau-Ponty is thus seeking to pursue on t1de level of morality, politics and history, that meaninc- of -,, P-n's C) being-to-the-world which -ý-,, as before explored in tel-,, ---is of C) arts and metaphysics.

In his sympathetic review of Simone de Beauvoir's L'InviV6e, 1,1erleau-Ponty araues that ý7, rhilst Laextricabl bound to the world and others, our actions are never unambiguous, and that the very freedom which is the condition of all morality is equally the basis of an absolute immoralism. " T, either absolutely innocent nor absolutely guilty, la, Te must create our lives between these two extremes. If there is value, it

"consists of actively being what iý, ie are by chance, of establishing that communication with others and with outselves for which our temporal structure gives us the opportunity and of which our liberty is only t1ae rough outline. 11 (166)

It is perhaps this ultimate ambiguity of ethical action which prompted Jean Wahl to suggest that something is lacking in the existential account: "it is the cateý:, ory CD of: in any case"(167) by which Vlahl intends that

unfounded yet necessary moral purpose viliich was at the

very roots of the Resistance. Now Merleau-Ponty had

concluded his Phenom'e"nologie de la Perceptionidefining

philosophy's function as teaching us to see more clearly

and by arguing that philosophy's realisation entailed its

destroying itself as seperate philosophy; he then added

IyBut what is here required is silence, for only the hero lives out his relation to men and the world. "(168)

and his final quotation is from Saint-Exupery. It is

Saint-Exupery's 1pilote de guerrel who along with

Hemingway's Robert Jordan and T'ýTalrauxls K, -,, To after 1945

, porar. -T hero. typify the anguished choice faced by the conteM

Neither Hegleian nor Nietschzean in character, moder-i.

heroic action cannot take strength from some

103

of the meaning of history; the activity of the hero lies, beyond judgement, in the inextricable li-ni-fing o 4=)

` him s -I to the world and to others n the risk ýe runs 0I TC

death the hero's loyalty is not to a future societ, -, 'T or to a certain history-to-be-made, but to that nat,, nrý7-, -l movement which flings him toward others C--nd th-*! n , -'Ts. If past heroes acted similarly, the. -, T did So in the i-i, --, T--,, e o --E, heaven or history

"This resource is not available to t-ile men of today. The contemporary hero is not Lucifer; he is not even Prometheus; he is man. "(169,

This moral commitment is some response to' 7 'ahl's category' but where before a philosophic silence signalled the abondonment of the stage to heroism) t1'-1e---e

-F is now an image o, -' heroic action which is marl-ed by that same natural movement towards the orld and otaers -hic, indexes the movement of philosophic and --), rtistic expression.

Ifforeover if action is to have a value, it must also be seen to realise a common history. If all truths are to be told and truth itself sought wherever it makes itself

manifest, nevertheless truth must also be secured and philosophy must realise itself. 7, erleau-Ponty foresaw the

problems of political cynicism and opportunism, yet the

question remains of knowing if indeed our actions do

secure the truth. And specifically, if our concern is

with 11arxism, hov; can one -know whether and ý7, -, hen one i-. rill Iredisoover it on the path of prevailing truth'.

Merleau-Ponty confronts Marxism on tvio interwoven levels:

that of theory where he seeks to salvage its veritable

ambiguity from the damage done by modern ort--, odo:,, - ideologists; and that of the practico-historicýýl reý-,, lit, -, 7-

where he explores its contemporary incc-rnations --d future possibilities of action.

-lonty rejects the ide,, - 0- Like Sartre, T. "erleau y

for T. 'arx the - lectic in nature; vehicle of s to--. r ! 7,. nd dia

104

the dialectic is

"man involved in a cert, --, in vie,, 7- of nature in which the mode of his ---elai-ion-s'h-ip with others take shape; it is concaýete hui-ian- intersubjectivity, the succeSEive and simultaneous commulLity of existences Ln ttl-'ae process of self-realisation in a type of ownership which they both submit to e. nd transform, each created by and creatiiri. ý, .. e

t

other. 11 (170)

Materialism is dialectic because consciousness and matter are never considered apart from the one concrete to-the-world of man: I-Larx's r-n. aterialisr-, is a '-: ýractic-, -11 materialism for "matter enters into human lif -1 e 7e ast support and body of pra, xis. 11(171) If

-T c---nnot be interpreted as a crude materialistic doctrine, neither does it represent an exonomic determinism :

"The greatness of Ilarxism. lies not in its having treated economics as the princi

, -), -. 1

or 'unique cause of history but in its treating cultural history and ec. onoi--iic history as two abstract aspectS of a sii-ý-j--I , -e process... Ilarxist materialism consists in admitting that the phenomena of civilisation and concepts of -rights

have a historical anchorage in exonomic Phenomena, by means of which they escape the transitoriness of interior phenomena and are deposited outs-J. -Le as Objective Spirit" (172":

Equally TJarxism in its authentic form cannot make of man a scientific object subject to permanent laws. Indeed

MLarx's entire effort in Capital is directed precisely to showing that these f, -: ), -. qous laws, often presented as the permanent features o--F' aI social nature I, are really the attributes (and the masks: '. of a certain 'social structure'; capit(--lism, 71"lich is evolvin-: ý toward its own destruction. "(173)

F or T. "11. the historic, -, l dete--ciiii, ne. ti on of ef 'ects bY

causes passes through human co--, -lC-)ciousness(174'

CD - been described as c. concrete CaDita has rightll,, 7

Phenomenolo. gý7 of l'ind(175". For ", -: ý., rxisssmi is nei'L, -,, -er philosophy Of the subject nor a -,, )hilo, f--,, opI-1y o-, t---- ob, -ect

4 but a1 ___SM philOSOPI 37 of history: in this

-1, espect

rejoins the general effort of phenomenoloc-4-cE. l C)

105

existentialism and the I. -'Ork o-" 7usserl -or '----e

first time since 2 1-ý tant -pI -i1o C. D I- ec not on subjectivity but on inters,, )b4ectý-,, T-* 77

0*

-I" (176' I lerl, eau-_, ý- T, Ionty thus ergues t, ýD. t ce-tain -, -"-ilosol)h 4C

truths have been re, , ched and c an .9ere ac. e, -I -i ye th e -. 1 e gelo-T, ', -;, ryist ppt, ' Crom the -,,, o--'nt of -i or i phenor-iienology. (177,, Conse. -lue-ýi1ti-:, accepts that is hi, -iself occasior_-, 11,, ý, o

III.; -i ecrfso 'positivistic overtones'(17" -z: i sr. ind,. -lcea by its scientistic prot(-7,, ý-=ists L,

_- r_ýz. ssi --_qilý-ý_ble to CD general crisis of the philosophic cultu_-, -e.

Now what is at stal e is the : ýel, _Iltio '11 1 aslliip J' c'-, 11onty seeks to establish betý,., 'een this -nre7, r, _Ie-, i' d2stort'. o-ii of ideas and the amorality of con t e, i., po-J, _-r_, __r'y ̀ý01iltics, e, nd which tor)-ether establis. Li the -)resent aiLst=icý_1 r CD _'Io, -ýýeiit as ambiguoug and uncertain. Tarxism in", ierec7 in a historical practice and

"the most rigorous Tlfarxism has never been -,, ble either in theory or practice to exclude compromise and the accompanying dera-1-1ment of C) . history which we are now v,. ritnessi=. 11(179ý1

In other ,,, Tords, I'Larxism must account for bot1i 'L, -',, -ie P-reL, -7je-r-,, situation of the --. )ociet Union and the domestic policies

of the FCF.

ý'Since 1917 TvTar"-, ý--ism has had a homeland and is incarnate in a certain part of the world... "(180"

But after 1945 IlTerleau-Ponty's increasing disillusion

with the internal politics of the Soviet Union lead him

to consider its ideology as providi--raý- only a posteriori

'justifications for policies that no longer merit 'lie CD

description of socila-list or dialectic. iind in

gradual repudiation of any dimension o-,, "-' revolutio--,, ý---, -, -T

awareness Merleau-11onty sees comý-. iunis, -, -i as

I'Fas,, Ew4fro m historical reýsponsibilit, -,,, - to discipline, from auto critic is -I to reoudiatio-ri, from Marxism to superstition"(181,

Again :

106

"I'larxism lost conf idence in its ovm daxJ nZ. when it was successful in only one country; it abandoned its own proleta-ian --, et-týods and resumed the classical ones of hierarchy, obedience, r, 17 r th inec-! -ualit. -ý, 7, diplomacy and police. "(182.;

Equally f or "'erleau-Ponty, 1e. r-4 --sm is

-ciecessaril- incarnated in the historical piactice o-L 1et ar i c-- t " the --, )-o

"If one's aim is to liberate the proletarl' -, t it is historically Y ridiculous to try and attain tha by non-proletarian meams. 11`183'

and yet Merleau-Ponty observes t-`-, at 11hr-_, -s c ased

to animate a proletarian politics"(184'J. I`-'ie PC of. "ers dissenting support whilst comýqitted to a role in government, it adds a spurious notion of 'nation, -, -. -, l interest'

onto Marxism and it "acts less than it manouevers"(185). Thus it chooses to pursue classic revolutionary ends, such as supporting a general strike, vrhen the conditions make such moves a gross provocation and when the party itself disavows the political objectives implied. (186)

Merleau-Ponty is not so naive as to measure the theoretýcal

claims of Ilarxism against a criterion of practic, -,, l

efficacy or success, for he interprets ", -,, rxism within the

irresolvable tension of subject and object. Thus in

terms of heroic action, the problem at the very core of Marxism is that between will and fatality: ý, 7ihen to follow

the course of events and when to force them into a certain

channel. (187)

But Merleau-Ponty allows this well-def ined problematic

of historical objectivity and -vrilled subject4; -vity to be

nevertheless infected by a much deeper ambieguitý--: that

which concerns the relationship between and

I Reason. Thus, on the one hand T'erleau-Ponty appe, ýýrs

arxism a h4Lstoricall-, o--, ivile. ---,, C) C: ) committed to conceding 11

status :

TIEnough authors in the past 15 years have falsely 'gone beyond' to us careful to distinguish ourselves from, the-, CD

107

To go beyond a doctrine one must first reach its level and give a better ex-,, lanation of whatever it expla'Ins. "(188')

On the other hand hoii,! eveer, as ., Telve seen, Aýerleau-'Jontl., /- tends to assimilate J. -Tarxism to a more ! ---eneral telos of, CD

, 1I

-

Reason which rejoins the existential project. e. whilst he conceives of Narxism as a historical practice

IT"' he finds it at Present poorly incarnated bo-L-L tile and t1i e PC. Thus he can at one stage charactei, -4-se Marxism as bifurcated between its short and long týGl-i] implications :

"Generally speaking Marxism is weak when faced with concrete events ta-l-en moment by moment. This should not make us forget how strong it appears when applied to a somewhat prolonger sequence of -events. "(189)

And he further suggests that the class struggle be regarded as the general principle and not the essent-Jal fact of history, Marxism itself being st,, ted in teri. is of negative pre-positions rather than providing a positive determination of the future. (190" J

Elsewhere Merleau-Ponty is prepared to arrue that I. T. arx-L: -, ýi. Q CD can encompass the ambiguous nature of the present historical moment. Thus although capitalism is "torn

apart by increasinglt violent c ont-radic t ions" and the

proletariat "is too weakened as a class to reriain

autonomous factor of history at present"" (191", yet

"We are not saying that this fact refutes IvIarxism, since Marx himself pointed out that chaos and absurdity were one of the

possible ways for history to end. 11(1ý`11-)

of Tuk-cs l. -he", er :, re --,. Te Thus Merleau-Ponty as. 1C: s

stage in the evolution of h4 Story of a rie--e d-, ect- c

detour or in fact the abandonj--ient ot 'Lia ve22,,,. - mean-_*., _.,. o--

history and the dialectic. (19',:,

These two - pectives t-ie on., pers_, et of a o-e

seen by 7' !, rxisi. a but eiatc-ilin-c- an end to the -As torical

108

Possibilities of huma-, lity, isc; ---eDP---Cy between the general schel-Ir-_ o-IF' -; te and t-,,, events it

. FTould claim to ý- -I ., - --i - ý.:, C. ýýL -ý -1 - -- - ha- eventual sur c -ý -, -, ,, ý passing o-, E' 4tse--,

-. L - C-L kie L ised in terms of the dialectic of se--Lse

Thus on the one hand all irresolvcble ý--Iistar, -ce o-, ý)ens up between Reason - the historicp,, -' -1-eloLz,: - an' -L-, a L---ie 2-ý - - -- -, -ý at --* c..,. i- U!, lity of the present- and on the otfluei, ý hand

--,. --, e, --, so-o -ý. L-el' is dissolved into a pure there is 'uncertainty in 71rerleau-11onty's account b, --c, --: use lie is undecided v.,, het. Lie-r to e, -, ucte ---t. L- IL L 'eason itself or whether to accord C-, U ýie--ely teo legitimacy and truthfulness -,,,,, iiich is and i--: ýve reflected in the natu7--e of its )rac-co-histo---*ca,, l articulations. 'Thus llerleau-? ontv arrpues f'or t-ýie ambiguity of the histoliceýl f. -ioment but c ons is L. -t E, that ljllarxismý., can and does encompI---, ss the un

"Marxism has never excluded froin tune theoretical plane the a 'r., lbi---uity it encounters in action. *, 1(194ý

Lue in that it. invites -. a, to I'LlIarxism is uniq

J- " make the logic of history triul. tp, -'i ove--, - iL-, CD t) L.,

contingency 1,,, -ithout offering -, ny rqete, -()Ii-, -, Jc-, -I C) guarant ees 11 (l 9 5) 1ý The characteristic thing, about is its admission that hui-ria., -Jity's return to order, the final synthesis is no-, ', - necessitated but depends upon o revolutionary act, -,.,,, hose certainty is not quarainteed by any devine decree or b any metaphysical structure of the world. " 196)

J- Importantly 'Marxism offers such an invitation, encounters

L ultL. a--:. tely such ambiguity precisely in so far as ýt does

depend upon a revolutionarY Will, that. is, in so as I, , -1 it is a historical practice. llence the d-- 01

and -Catalit3T occurrs at the interior of 7-- co.: -,. týitted act. on j- I -ý is o o: ) o and J. 'e"' eau-Ponty concedes tlýiat . --e , -, oble:,,

ed tunismýlleftism' fo-, - instance r--. 7--ise for organi-

revolutionary practice, and coiiseruei7,. t1-, -. -, at t-1--e

very heart of Y'arxism as -ý,. e-f,, so--, -1 e ke., -, s-on, 1-Jes Oek, -.,. -e-en

the masses and theiiý lecaders-iý-p: beti:! e c. t

-' --e co-: iki70

0 rY tle fin -tio, an eilective revolution aný-,. 4.1

109

concepts and direct I*I-. on o onE, J, e cý uteto -', ' - C, -I- A. he re-1- sa such conditions. il-L -cisely --L S

Gitutes the historical, cons' telos, 7- 1eE:

- o n, S rightly concerned with the relations-,. -id-p bet-,., -e, -, --, -l action and historical objecti-v-it-T

"Even if one considers the class stru-; 7-le as the essence Of story cons e ý, ue-, ýitl, -.. - favours proletarian solutions to eacl-i particular problem, ýt remai---s to be seen whether the -:: )roces, ý, - whic-'a will fin 11-- shape Y the broad lines of histol,, y directl,,,, determines this or that individual e of h

But Merleau-Ponty proceeds from c--, n introductio--ý oi- contingency into the 1'arxis, -q Ilocric, towc-, rd -LLI-o very- CD a contingency of I'larxism itself. For, Lri --. o., -. e sce, T, r .. lerleau-Ponty's acceptance of L-axxism is co-, -id--*t-, oii 1

,,, )o- . 16:

it proving itself: the choice of SOCL ': 1iE, S7 0

unknown other future, grounded in a i"arxisi--i, i.,,, ithout illusions, completely experimental and voluiAý--a-, -, -, ý198,

In other words Ilerleau--Lýonty Iwaits on'

an intellectual seeking the basis for effective

action, he concedes the CP and USSR 'breathing space'

whilst pursuing a clarification of the -present mome--t

which necessarily included both these as actual forces.

On the one hand L-Terleau-Ponty's 1. iarxism refused the title

of historical Reason becomes the object of a subjective

and voluntaristic choice; and it is itsel-', --'

"simply the idea that another history is possible, that there is no sucl-. thino- as CD fate, that man's existence is o-0en-ended. It is the resolute try for that futuaýe which no-one in the world or out of the

world can know will come or, if it comes, what it will be. "(199)

And on the other hand, T. 'erleau-10onty see'-, --s to exploa-in

the natuxe of a sympathy for a Tc--, 2xisr. ri dr-es not

, -11 7- .4C', )

constitute the totality of 12, eason, a-,, - is ! --, r-, -. -ely

v, jilled through a 'resolute try'. 17hus he articulates

belief in the possibility of cranting -. o..,. . un i s, -. a a

L6 privileged stctus and still '-'., e

110

universality of intellectual refleCILiOn : "there is real assent , ýThicli can only c-o C-- to seen or li ed things, and once ýý-iven CD

leaves freedom of judgement intact'ý-11(2'-: ý-ý) C) 0 Elsewhere, Merleau-Ponty

-I- II 'rames this possibil- ty in te-r-, -s of the very nature of the intellectual

"The intellectual who refuses his co,, f., i-Attr: ients on tile pretext that his Lunction is to see all sides is in fact contri-\r--inr-7 to live a 1ý1 pleasant life under the guise of obeyinZ a CD

vocation.... If commitment goes beyond reasons, it should never run contrar-v to reason itself, Man's value does not consilst. in either an explosive, maniao since--oity or an unc, uestioned faith. Instead it consists of cý--ý, Jaiý; -`-ier 7 Cý -

awareness which enables him to detei: ýf. -iine t-'le moment when it is reasonable to take thinr, -s on trust and the moment ii. rhen questionin, -, is in order, to combine faith and good faith within himself, and to accept his part, -,. - or his group with open eyes, seeing them for what they are. "(201)

Importantly the real assent which 1,, Terleau-Pont--,, - had ,j

accorded the Soviet Union in 1945 -ýýras radic. -, 7ý-lised by t. 'L-ie

very intellectual freedom he preserved: the early

optimism' of 'Autour de marxisme I and 'Pour la verit is set against the belief by 1948 that T. Iarxism I constituted the "mistaken hope" of his generation, and that novi the

Sovie t system no longer retained any possibility of

securing socialism. (202)

Merleau-Ponty; regarding authentic 7"---. r. --rism as a theoret-

ical practice, saw this practice as betrýiyed 4---n Russ--*L, -2.

and no longer offering itself to the post-1945 .,,, orld :

C- ItIn sum we can neither begin 1S17 over nor believe that cammunism can be ý,., hat it

tion used to want to be ... The i, a=ist trans ý

'IC, from formal liberty to actual liberty I --, s not occurred and in the im7mediate future hc--s no such chance ... we must preserve libert7l

waiting for a fresh historical ii,. ipulse ic-.,. may allow us to engage it in a popular movement without ambiguit, -ý. 11(205;

'Ierlea,, -ý-. -, ýont-, - Is The quotation is from the Preface to'.

ill

I

masterpiece from this period: Humaziisme et Terre,,. )--,, -, d which in the context of an lattentistel or 'wait-f----. d- see' IvIarxism and prompted by the public, --'-ý, on -L-i. 1946 o-IC TT

TT

_oestler's Darkness at -, -ýoon considers t-i- ý-Osco-. - -Lplals. Ihe work reflects at its ver core -Lae , -, -radual JL-ne--, bi'litý- y CD, during this time of T7erleau-Ponty to preserve t. 'L-. e bala-, ce 4 of faith and good faith real assent', and _Mtellectual a) I-

judgement; and Oingeneral the work reflects -L, -, e from a belief in I. -Tarxism as historical Reason to tile belief that I. I. arxism no longer guarantees -, rationý: --l history.

The problems it deals with: the demnands of, ýýn eT)oc., i., historical responsibility and histo,,

--ical : -, re y thus permeat-ed by the two ambiguities discerned in C) Merleau-Ponty's work: that between c-:, notion of hei-olc

action and the limits of philosophic expression, and more centrally that between "arxism as Reason or sur-, ýas-, able moment of Reason. Consequentl, -I- two q j uestions become interwoven and often confused: how can a I, Iarxist c, ct .,,, ith the certainty of securing the history outlined in

that which entails socialism and protects the interests of the proletariat; this question beinj defined by the

4

problem of historical responsibility and admitting

contingency in Marxism. And secondly: can any action at

all secure the history outlined in I! arxism this question

being defined by the problem, of historical rational-ft, -ý, and

admitting the contingency of I'arxism itself.

The work initially str--*Lves to understand ci-ite-I-Ia o-

historical action in an epoch of violence :

f'When one has the misf ortune or the lucl-: to live in an epoch, or one of those moments where the traditional ground of a nc-: -t--*! -on or

I society crumbles and where, for bette-, or worse, man must himself reconstruc* hu,.,, fýn

relations, then the libert-,, - of eac'--ý mortal threc-: -t to the others and viole--ice reappears"(205)

pe,, Jod; so It -s in So it was in Russia in the pre-v., -ar -I- -

112

Post-war Europe and France. nbo t'. 2 e -, ue s tii o _q cses itself: what is the character of a true politics? '.,, Ie ect in the name of a future, but vie must act in a. -_-., iýesent :

"The curse Of politics is precJsely ID U! !, - AJ

must translate values into tae order of facts. the level of Fl, ction, ever-T desire is as good as a foresight a-rid reci'p-, oc, -1-1, -, - C) C) every prognostic is a kind of com-olic' C, i ty. policy therefore cannot be grounded in principle, it must also comprehend -acts Le L of the situation. "(206)

And this 'curse of politics, falls heavýest ? -recisely on those who undert ake to change the course of :

"There is no politician who can flatter himsel' upon his ii1nocence. To govern, -; t has been said, is to forsee, end tiie cannot excuse himself for wi'-lat he has not forseen. Yet, there is always the unforeseeable. There is the tragedy. "(207)

7 We act in a history and prec-sely because we are historically situated our understanding Of h`iStOry S. -iould C. ) be partial. This Ilarxism understands but , ve are not thereby condemned to be locked in subjectivity. Fo-i-

111.1arxism rested on the profound idea that human perspectives, however relativej are absolute because there is nothing else and no destiny... men's mutual praxis is the ab solute. 11 (208)

Koestler's composite BolsheviR, `-iubashov) is indeed no

TAarxist: he wavers between the two poles of a truncated

dialectic - on tile one hand pure subjectivity, t-'-ie '11

discovered and affirmed as i=educible; and on tn'e other

hand History as the clocInvork of ý'Thich the individual ic

only a wheel; a history whose absolute judgement ITRubashov

awaits in fear and trembling.

`Jstor C

Merleau-? onty can quote "It is no' i4t

uses men as a means of achieving-as _L eree. n

1ý C 11''A individual person - its own ends. _Iistor-,, - is not,, --, - ", yet the activity of men in pursuit of t-', aei--- e-, --,, s. 1I'209)

e Koestler's mediocrity as a doesn't obviate

ICII ., rc-ses. problems of historicc-! action vi"' s

11

For what is essential to !. '-a. rxism is the see. -Lse ac k1s acquire in the historical context and the dialectic phase in which they originate. In a ,, Iorld o-L s'L, --r-Lz, 7

, zle

there is no margin of indifferent action; nei-'c-, -., Le-? - is there any absolute impartiality ,.,. -, ith regard to '--, istoL--. -. Yet once again the imperative is to act and tl--e CD of history is precisely

"that a contingent future, once it ente, --s the present, appears real and even necessaryll If there is no science of thle -11-'uture -17e ca-n s

'k, i 11 --. ct

with respect to pers-Dectives, and ;, roba-lol es: co, -!., -ýur is t

L policies do not arbitarily choose t. r-iel-, - ends

"they orient themselves around forces already at work. "(211)

As rootAin history which is contingent we act no-i.,,. - vv-i-t1i no certainty as to the necessary consequences of our d- actions: yet we are irrevocably bound to these consequence. ý3,

which we cannot forswear :

"Thus there is not just destiny involved an external force which breaks the , 7ill but genuine tragedy -a man at grips (n external forces with which he is secretl allied. "(212)

Our actions assume a historical meaning whic-'i vie ca. -. not to

disavow but this is notýconclude that this r. qeanin(-- was Cý intended or willed at the moment ot' action: the con-f-'Iict

between objective meaning and subjective intention is CD

located in the same man who

"cannot disavow the objective )atte---n of his actions, that he is what he is for others in the context of history, and yet tllaat the

_motive of his actions constitute a man's

worth as he himself experiences it. in this

case we no longer have a series of eS between the inward and the external, sub ý-e and objectivity, or judgement and its means but

- -Y) a dialectical relation, that is to

contradiction founded in truth, -in 1.,., '. 4-ch the

same man tries to realise himself on tý,. -, o

levels. "(213) h-s c-ý- ic Trials thus discloses th%- trcc-edy

The MoscOw ýD

114

responsibility - and more s-, oeci---*ically pe,, a,

Of a generation e

Arhich had lost t1le objective co-, -, -, 0 _I-i S Of its own political activity. And it is above Trotsky that I'lerleau-Ponty sees both a ffaith in t-'--e rationality of history and also a hist=icai actor -_`io brings to light the subjectivity and cont, '_'___'. ---, ea in every revolution: "-aistory must be thou-: 7_'. Lt and ---illed bY individuals and must be made through violence. (214, CD Trorsx'-,. y admitted the role of con-tJ-n,, r,; -e--_c, -, '- in

-I')J_sto-,, -- as ly a historian and theoretician, but, displaced historical stage and exiled, I_ ae f o- ic goes this "is analysis becomes rationalistic and his e', li-ics K'C-, iItL ITIen like Trotsky

"have such a tenacious belie-C in th+ation- ality of history that i!,, hen it ceases a while to be rational, they throw themselves into the future they seek rather than have to deal with the compromise and in incoherence. "(21-5. '

In Les A ventures de la dialectique 1'erleau-]-onty returned again to -the key-figure of Trotsky: he f(, J-1ed to ýý, Ct decisively against Stalin and did he indeed understemd the character of the Soviet Thermidor at the time Jit 1:. ras ocurring? It was only in exile and in retrospect tflat history regained for Trotsky its rational ful - character. And we cannot thus simply ret: ýýieve and recover the objectivity of our historical actions :

"Stalin, Trotsky and even Buk-harin eac-',, - had a perspective within the ambiguity of history and each staked his life upon it. The futiLre is only probable but'. it is not any empty zone in which we can construct gratuitous projects; it is s'-etched out before us like the beginnin-il of the d. -T%,, -; rIS end, and its outline is ourselves... 7-1-ie contingency of history is only --- shC--. doi-, F at the edge of a view of `! iistorýT wl,. ich we no more refrain from than we can from breathing. .. The dialectic of 'L, -,, -ie subjective and Ajective is not a sLr--. -; Ie

L contradiction t-,,,, hich leaves the it plays on disjointed, it is rat--'ý. e-,, testimony to our rootedness ii,. truth. 1(216)

115

Sartre -Lýoints out that "'erleau-Ponty 2s

the universal point "We will not be judýged by our intentfons alone. "Ihat reveals our wor Ps , --iuch m ore than tllae -, illed ef ect-s o-,, - ou-,,, ac-,,, -s are the involuntar. -ý, - result, --, guessed) e-, ý-*ploiteaor in case (217

1,11erleau-Ponty would add that as lo-ýi. 7 -ýý, s I . -J- 0-1-- -, - o-: )en,, historical or objective respo-risibility is our i-es_-, oo-,, i, -, - ibility in others' eyes. (218..

And et, thrown into . --listory -as inte_rs,,.,, bj--ctiv-t-,? -i

ýIerleau-Ponty wants to retain the abilit-ý7' to c, '___. 1_len-re C" 'Jistory: ask ? -- _-ri d of it: what constitutes i. qr_ýI'e deto"_i-

what is aimless drifting? il. rhat rei-, ia -: -ý'. S be en lost? v can a society irhich has diýý "ted o-, -'-"' t, -)ý pe 2- t Thus inextricably bound in 7.., ith t_"ie r, -, '(, Jo1-, 5-. lJt-,. r o'T? historical action is for Verlea. u-_-Ionty the on, .1i of 11istory itself. In Humanisi-, qe et Terreu:

_- . 11e_-1e-_x-__-'on1_,.

consequently asks the questLOnS: Is this observe, --ence ', i o-1

revolutionary? Is communism still Did die for the revolution? And if, as '1erle, -, 1-_, -'ont, -., - _71"I's argued throughout, !, Tarxisi-l is neithueý_- e3Conoi_-,, i_c ý-' ete

minism nor a historicism, it can only

llojEfer men a perception _of . 1-iis cII

would continuously clarif, y t-, -ie I-ines o-L force and vectors of the present. 11(210, *ý

To be a 71arxist thus is to J- 6 0" believe tl. at

Gestalt, that is, that it is

"a holistic systei-ii riioving tovrarý--Is a state of 4-

-, 7' 1' -J "-1

equilibrium, the classless societ". .. -,; C.,. l . A. 1-3 .1

cannot be achieve-,! wit-', --iout in didua, 1- action and efforts, but v,, hicL-i is outlined the

present crisis as thei-7- solution. "(22C, '

-0 rýý -,. -) 0 4- 1 -1

1.

Marxism remains the possibilit, -y- o-, -, -e--- but

-" -. ýI -"ý, ýI - T, 7.1 0- tiý e C11- ---I dv importantly one which is tie ful

establis, 'ament of truly human rel-ý---LLions be,,, eu-n

-Le onl,, sto-. --

this sense Marxism offers t.

ttjn this sense 1-ýa, r, -. -isim --Lý3 not . -. -ohi-7 oso -,,, )hv of history; it is of ý-nd

116

to renoixnce it is to dir-, the grave of --ý'easo-r- in history. After t' ý. t the- -e re-Fill dreams or adventu-res. "(221)

After 1945, Merleau-Ponty had refused to se-oeiýate an empirical from a true history. There was or 111-m only one history in 1, ýjrhich eve-a-ything plE:. -, Ted a i-Le striven thus to find this one mea-ain, -; - C: )) -L - -- Lie ambiguity of the centur could be understoc, -I t1ae pcliti C) y actions and commitments 1,,, ý! ould if-'olloý,.,. I'ar. -. 7-ism, seemed initially a justified 'hope' for revealLLC, -ic- suc-1- meaning, and the conditional support o--, -' its

,,, -, -esent incarnations apr-)eared war-ranted. 'et lciie high if its renunciation entailed a renunci, -. ý. 'Llion ol t',,,, e idea of Reason in History itself. "Ihen by 1942, -. e--rleai-, -- Ponty came to seperate the fate of the USISILý, activities of the PC from any possibilities o-f-' he sought consequently to lower these stakes b.,,. -- re-e,: olo-incg' the limits of historical Reason. Thus whilkst the Preface to Sens et non-sens affirms IVIarxism to be the

mistaken I hope of his generation, J!. erleau-Ponty concluded it hy arguing against the citizen i-vho doubts t', at the human world is possible: "But failure is not absolute. Cezanne won out against chanIge, and we, too, can win

provided they will measure the dangers and the task. "(222

However the difficulties of the relationships bet,,, ieen

h eroic action and philosophic expression, historical

responsibility and historical rationality, were only

attenuated by the ultimate disclosure of this central

ambiguous attachment to 11arxism.

Where I-Terleau-Ponty was moving from commitment to

uncertainty, Sartre's progress liýias the reverse. Te

necessity of finding a philosophic basis for the post-,.,., 2. r

commitments had lead Sartre to locate t-', Ie moral antinof. iy

in an apparent contradiction between univers, --. 1 ý. ý--Ld

individual freedom. T, 'Ioreover 'U-',,. e need to ac t ýýolit fca 1ý

forced Sartre to explore t-',,. e conditio-Li ol" S

resultant contradiction once agý--Jn: this time

117

negativity of freedom and "t-'ae cons truc tiveneSS Of disci,,,, -)line and commitment.

Both Sartre and' Terleau-1-onty had ý. _a u-., r)on -LL,.. e Possible relationship betý

-reen the absolt; t., es of histo to - ry, and the relativity of the sý', ec_ý__-ýc c1

situation. eithei- were I, ' I -a--r -ý ists yet bot--)- -. -ere a sense impressed by the ritualý stic tou 'i--iess cand t__ - '_

- ýI "D

ofthePC it spos Ji. tiveco, -, ir. q --*L tm. entdI -i etE,., p Ic al arrogance. Both had, even "s 10 C) t-c so. m. e not- --1 L-%uthen theoretical

-arxism: but .,. rhere "T -'artrels cual: ý---el

I vjllarxism distanced him from its ideolo, -,, -,, -, S fuller understa i s: TL 1) ! _1 -nding of )rovol-ed 0, s- ion at its apparent failures. lt'hilý IJ st ý: D, rtre v, rc. s le,,,. d L-Lito dualistic alternatives, "! 'I"erleau- , -onty -Found hil. 1sel confronted with the possibility of t., -ie dissolu'UL of Reason itself into the landsca,, De of non-sense from, ,,,, hicli it had emerged.

Sartre's progress is personal: t'-, -irough the r. iovemer. t o-

__. J- his own thought, action and self-ex-,, -,, -, -ession. I', 'erlea', -1. -

Tonty sought to discover an action, to co. ý; rý-junic. ý'te and to understand, at the level of the meaning o. ýL -. LiStOry itself.

The writings considered in this chapter constitute

possibly the richest period of the tv, ro authors' c-c-e-z: Jst-

ehc e. The importance both attached to the epoch -,,. J'-'ter

1945 ana their own understanding of it, the -ull-heCarted C) commiýment they gave to the project of le! ýi-. Is i-iiode___e--. -,

stimulated in both a sequence of b-illiai-itly or-'

_pposite essal7. -, s. --, -ie art-cles of

personal and yet aL Sen from 1945 to 10,48, togetner ttie

non-sens t to

_ of Sartre c contemporary -ý! Ior'ý ste

of the f o=, er argue dis, )l! -,,. -

.. I. 11 .--c

a coriabinat L -,, '17. -sics, spec------- ion o' met--,, '-)11

icE

and lucidity unique Li '

-. I

ii1lercature" (223)

118

But althou, 1---h each's es. -DaWC are oOv__ " *ous! Y

drectre_, s, cono . 2' 'Ll -i eDh- _*

Ios0-, 11 C. a t I-, e- are also vý! ritten to speciffic eve-, its

.L- attitudes reflec L t- tne mpact c e-,,, e,. t. ý next cl-Ir--. pter cons-' de-s thus t, 's po! J`Jcýl conLel_ý. '.

1-, 9

Cte- J7,1

7; T TI r7 -SI

.,.,, ien trying to determine a c; - fict-

-1 o -- i; s -, 1e -v -oc-,. - 'I- iono '-, ' -',, -ý -:; -,,, er-, -,, otir--, nal a-ad -olitic, -Fs

titi r-I - C, (-' -* ý-. -I or _3 e ) one de s

-ý, Ou- V0-I'. u i, e- f7' E- 5-1

II -- - i, tre s) u,: 7, -- ec tu ede -I-o- er 1 '-e -1 tse com, ourDel-, j-eL,

vi', )or--i certein African Lsocieties hop-o,. -. -r, e! -. -, -- ý-e. --, - i s, e

* --I , (l 1, all at the t ... e. "

I/ The title even tuý7.. I ly C-1ý7--Ireed u-, -)oa: much of the s_.. _ýe ýýAtl_tude, c. nd, toe t'ýil t r,: ý original su&; estion, reve-. ls tiie ý, ioupfs a -_-_, CneS-, o-, isol_, --ý, ted, independent and c, -ýiite uni, --iue

'ion. intellectuals have always enjoyod, or an exceptionCal status in their society. -. ter 1945 their importance ý,. Tas dis-proportionate, to tl). eii, actua]_

-1 LI size. Of the non-Co,, -, _IF. -iunist left at 'L. -'-lis ti,,, ýe, __, _Lu3C__I remarks :

"In the post-viar -Period, t.. Lis sec. or o--" the French left exercised an Lafluence

' its numericc.! strengt1i 11 excess o-1 C- (I. L. I The combiii. ed circulE, tion of its daily jou C-1s:

f7tne r--. iý 1y d- o ul-) 1e %_1 C, at Franc-Tireur, Liberation, C-,,, -)-d Combl. -

of ilumanite and Le Populaire; and its pe-7, iodiccals:

-nodernes itself : outs tiýip,. )e, -l L -and Temms i

-, e and the "-IO's communist Les Caliers du k-, _o, - -un

isre -U, - e ; 3ocialiste.

"I ""isno--co. -- -Li- J Ihe importance o-, left, -1en, ,,: as not its alectioi, -L-ti,, ý,, o tI Al

ncýlf --i", le JLk, whicL'j. less u-, - iý-s uýon th e inf or. med areas of 'I re-- c-' inf luei. c e

society. " 2

t -, -, ý -ý- -* -- -I For Temps modernes as a, review soucý. ' t. - --. -ir e Lied e p C-1 . olitics, its collective ed-L' -s t .. e

in a political vc-acuum. Raymond kron, fcr

involved with Temps modernes reco'. lec's I L, -L-\" --

120

.,. To nI 'I

!L -- betr ay secreti S- E., I'l. 3t from the tirae I belonged to '---e ed

-o oees cor. a. '-dttee off' tl-ie revil e-. ý. - )s ý? -! e one o; merabers ey., ýresseýd

t' o

irnl)oL-), e on all of us 1, --le obli, ion o

belong to no p. ---aýty. consequence of E, 030-. -nt. ', '

J- 'T 0fea, e, 1-e (3)

-, -- - c:, 0er. te. -, -, 1 -- Demps modernes' i it*al w, C-, ý 1- ýi (J, C-11 s trao t. -', urnier si)nei-- -, »_t uy) t-'lius

,ýnIs "Freedom is on One , I, -lst c-'-ioose o- camp. Th eTe I-Idei2nes ; --7-(, ou,,. --, --, esolut, --Iy chose the caim of deir. iociýacy, dy aT-, ic p democracy capable of ', -, J, 'ie economic and social structure of France(4)

But, as Burnier continues!, the concrete , )oli ' tical conclusions which were drawi-i fron-, ti-. L. -I-s initial st,. -.. Lce were on tl-le whole negative :

ItNo group received t-', ie full c;, Ild ent-r--c accord of Tei, ips modernes. The first nur. -bers of tile

11 -ý review show us an TIRP which is only the F 10,1,1 -, ý ich of traditional reaction, a -D !

hesitates and 1., rhicill fears, in the H, the proletarian spirit it has lost, a Coi., i, ý-ii-i-n-ist Party whose tactical turnabouts are inspired more by the exigencies of USSR's foreign policy than by the interests of the -orking class. "(5)

Sartre makes clear the nature of this 'negative'

commitment :

"In such an epoch as ours, in which there exe various Parties, each advertising itself as the revolution, coi-, ý. -, iitm. ent does not consist

-Jný7 to in joining one of them, but in see- , clarify the conceýptklion, in order to define t. 'L, e situation and at t': ie saiie time to try to influence the d, _*fferent revolutionary parties. It (6)

of The large partkthis rejection of the e:, -sting parties' claims steins from philosophical priorities: namely -IL. -1-e - -I

-'e-r-. 1 au- need to determine the sense of e epocli. . ius I __e, Of ? onty defines lenc-agel hought as Cý CD

"not that pat' etic t-,, Lought which accents t. ', --e political crystallisations, 1--.

--, its itself to choosing between ti--e give-a forces o--- -parties, and finishes by bringing to one off tlliem a týp C)

121

tort ur edsu --l"f rebu'.. a v4. t t, I'L 0ut, )

4 Cal ca'1eofpu ý- 'i-, -, C, -? 2 -, j. tor. -j_e -7 on L. 2, - polit- Pao and economic iaeý_S, LO --ie extent tl_'ýia t -L'I P_ IQ, e

"-- r-, L, ideas by 1-faasking ti'le facts tl, ansic u_-. ý. ese latter into destiny. "(7,;

i-;, 'ýI I--, t The fixed altGr atives n suc. a lv'ý-7'lant t--. o

had to put In question :! ere defineýJl_ on tý--Le one hand b-ý, - tj the existi French c'(1, -1 _1_11ý 1- o1itic1 Pr ous -L on L, --e o 'i CD ler hand, by the confrontation of t_-, Le t-,,., o powers: the United 'Aates e-nd the Soviet Union. ii-. iportantly this confrontation ol extremes , ias attenuated -tc, --i e bejo, innin. cys of the Cold `Is de--)(-rture - 1.1 C) '; ar and tho P `aý o

I- the government. For the former dev, 11opr. -., ent ffi particular meant that thý fate of France could no lonEer be se.,. )er. -__. tQ-, dJ from t inteýfiýationa, l situation. ', "i! it'l the c-, _-nýiounce, _flent of the Marshall Plan and the _'o_-. -iation of it

was the case, as Ritsch argues, that CD

"By the end of 1947, a massive Cold 7,7ý7ýr i.,. ras being waged betwee-,. -i the two 1,3u-Der-2owe-L-s' with the exhausted states of l, "Vestern Euro,, -ýe as the primary prize at stake. "(8)

It was in this context that Sartre and "J"erleau-Ponty

on the sought la troisieme voie (the third pat'., .. international level meant an insistence upon the real possibilities of peace and the necessity of an independent

socialist Europe, which could stand between ti)G two Powers. Sartre castigates those who prepare in fear -or a. war which it is believed is inevitable :

"If we persuade ourselves that it's necessary, in order to try to live, toaviait the end of the next conflict, then we will have rendered the atomic bomb three-quarters useless: there will no lon er be men to 1--ill, it will alread, -, )- be done. "(95

For it is bad faith, the refusal to recocnise our freedom ýatalit, -, -, to enetr-, te t'-e to act which allows historical C- i.

A.

rder of historical causality. And this enslavement to oU

disaster will if no guard is tali:: en ac-e-1-nst it , )j, -ecisely trceaasform itself into the ver, -,, -. disaster. JO) The

historical situation, moreover, not only ambiguous but pregnant with very real dangers. In 1-047 -, u-Pont, -, - e

122

posed the vital rýuestions :

"Is a minimum SOC-L. ----li-St POlitiCS -possible today, and L- ich? In t'ýie Tniddle COUrltl'---LZ: S of Europe is there roon, for so, --iethins: other than the skir-: -, ishes o-l'-' the Great Arm-, es? "(11";

I In response to such (ýuestions -J.

'erleau-Ponty de-fined the

politics o-. -. ý '-'em-ps modernes: not obdurately o--, )-posed to the

,, arshall Plan, but rather to its imperialist and bellicose

utilisation. In general if Lt would be a difficult, dialectic politics, -L a question of the kernel without crushing the almond. 13ut also optimistic, convincing politics, and in the end the only one to give hope. "(12)

Recognising that the '-')oviet syste. -ii has no cl', -1ýý. ---. -Ice o-J! "

realising socie, lism, blerleau-Ponty adds t1iat it ds only the Evil if the US is permitted to play týie role o. - -' God,

and there is the racism and fascism of that countr. y tc be spoken of. 1, ýerleau-Pontyls concern, as alvia. -,,, s, is with the ambiguities of present truth and the tasl-- of faithful elucidation :

"Let us keep to the rule we gave ourselves in the first numbers of thiý§ review: 11, ý'Ie will not have to hide any truth if we speak all the others. ' Let us refuse the alternatives and wor-II. -

to pass beyond. "(13)

Yet the alternatives did increasingly impose themselves

upon the situation, ý,,, rhich, in turn, appeared to demand from the Temps modernes group if not a firm choice for

one or the other at least an awareness of certain

priorities. Indeed such sympathies existed. LE-3jartre's dis7, llusion v., rith the US after his 1945 visit there revealed itself both in his articles foi- '2emps modernes and in t. ', -i ,e strong indictment of racism contained within his Play

I eau-. 1. La Putain respecteuse. (14) In 1945 I-er. -onty had

given the PC's politics his conditional sup. -I. Dort in so far

as in the event of civil war one's choice had to be fo-,, -- the proletariat, and in so far as it believed that tt. -ie Soviet Union genuinely desired an avoidance off conflict. (15)

123

And as early as 1946 theiýe was the -'L:

irst serfous spli't.

within the 'Temps mcdernes group: 1:. ý-7-, ymond Aron and C-) Albert Ollivier, both miovin-- toward er-i can and C-- - guallist positions, departing frorl the edito-ric--:,, l m: --'-, ittee.

CD 1--t the time, as . '3imone de 'L3, eauvoi-r- reports, ', -ý-on

-L L-,,. er siý--. e, in the that whil3t having no aic"IF'ections "or ei"I event of viar he , -; ould be on the s--', --'-e of the

"Sartre replied that he himself -'riad no relish for either Stalinisi-: i or Amei: ýJica, but that war broke out he would be found in the ran---s of the Communists. "(16)

At the same time she adds tliat domestic, -. lly tle 'Aivisions

were also now more marked :

I- -ý fý '-it E-,, nd "In less than two years the words ' (--- Left had resumed their old niep, ý. -iinc-s, and the . 1.1ight was gainiru- ground. 11(17ý C. )

Both Sartre and ", werleau-ilonty viere democratic socialism) and whatever about Stalinist communism, the int

communist left retained a critical of Russia. Ritsch comments

coi-., i,: -, -dtted to a their r es erwlt ions

ellectuals o-l- the noa-

slympathy for the fatý-,

"These intellectuals , ýýiere certain that capitalism presented an even greater danger than Soviet communism to European soci, -), lism; and in the evolving Cold 'Jar, they were convinced that the United ýtates was more of a threat, both economically and militarily, than the UE')SR to European independence. "(18)

Importantly the means to secure such a democratic European socialism lay through leftist solidarity. Siartre

argues that Merleau-Ponty, who throughout this period

almost alone determined Tenps modernes' politic--! outlook

Ithad taken up a position which was tl-iat of many Frenchmen and which consisted in leaning on the PS and even sometimes on the in that tripartist epoch, to try and get closer to the communists. For example, he judged that the rights of I'lan in our bourgeois republic were abstract and empty and he counted on the attraction tiae PC exercised over the two otlaer parties to

1 ts F oblige these latter to give suc-"-I r4l, ý i, --

sociC-: -l content. "(20)

124

Such a politics rested upon and presumed tr-, o.. -rtism, and with the eventual isolation of the -ýC End t-', ie subsequent intractability of its politics, man. -., - c--. i---ie to

see the socialists as a possibl(, -, pivotal force for lel't

unity. And yet whilst the LýC stood apart and alo-, ---, e on the '-jFIO moved to the right, a,,, ) rovin--: ý- O-L' t1rie the left,

C) T7 171 arshall Plan and adopting an anti-, -`oviet rheto-ýc. -... -, -ie years of 1947-1948 are thus marl. -ed by the a. ttem-Lot of the

non-communist left intellectuals to persuade t--ie S`I0 to

give up its bourgeois policies and restrain its anti- communism. Simone de Beauvoir describes how an att, i-. -ipted

the . 3FI0 opposition group solicited the sup_-, port Of

unaffiliated French left to

"draw up together an appeal in favour of peace and the creation of a neutral and socialist Europe. VVe met every we--'-ý: at Izard's house: Rousset, 17. erleau-Ponty, Camus, Breton and a few others. V! e argued over every ,, Tor! --, every U comma. In December the text was finally s-ý,, 7, ---ýed by , Les Temps modernes, Camus, Bourdet, Rousset and published in the press. "(21)

The group subsequently dispersed, but its intentions

were ultimately reflected in the creation of a groul)

which symbolises the political alternatives of the time

and which in its own right decisivly influenced Sartre's

political development: Le Rassemblement Democratique

Revolutionnaire(R. D. R. )

The RDR was founded in early 1948 by journalists and

militants of the non-communist left: prJncipally Altman,

Jean Rous, Rosenthal and Rousset. 'Dartre was not involved

in its initial organisation, but was very shortly ap: Droached L'C and the SFIO - to join. Believing that between the I

there was still 'room for action' (un role a jouer" (22'ý 12

Sartre signed a manifesto which officially associated himself with the group.

' Sartre Is pos t-vvr arv. Torl- ultir-). C, JU-z-; l The contradiction O-f 7 been concentrated in the need to act POlitic-117, and

fl. -, -)DfA Sartre saw a mediation between bourgeois 'Ul7,, --l, "4-sM Emd

125

a doctrinaire comm. mism, be',, een the clair-s o" -L,, e U. il 7- 6-d the USS. L",, and between demociflatic s,. D. d Thus from TLDa's first -, -)ublic stateme-. 1t 0-- -ý-'--"Lent

"Between the decay of capiit, ý-ý-Iist democrac 7- and the -,., veaknesses and de -)rec-J1C. t-Jo= o-L - certain so. C, ..

ial der--iocracy, and tne 1 imi tat ioi. --) of communism in its stalinist --Corni, v, -ie thi-n1- that a grouping of free men ,n or revolutionary democrary is capable of ! D-1vi'Lýi- ne-,, t., r life to the princi. aý ný7 -oles of freedom and humanity, b-, - bin them to the strugý; -le for the soci-c-, -l -revolution. 11(23, <Dc)

This same first public appeal er, -, -phr-.,. s1ses that war : lust and can be avoided; that Ejurope caught betv., een the tl, -, o CD

super-powers is both a, -, -)-Ley E--nJ. a, rnienace to t-'L-ie,., q both- ,I

and that, consequently, only the --oc-'-Iist unific-t4on of Europe can ass-u-re the desired peace. as before,

repudiates the war fatalism. rife a. E, -iongst Iriis coI--te. -q)ora-, -ies: CD "The majority of Europeans seem to have already chosen their conquerors. ', ', fe ý? re in a state of war by interposed persons. POR refuses to range itself on one side or another. It wants to disintoxicate, establish contacts VT ,

1h all democratic european grou 1, ps to place Europe at tHe head of peace. "(24)

Like Merleau-Ponty, Sartre insists that the alternatives are not only to be refused but gone beyond. And in this

context Sartre rejects the appelation Imunichois' for those who seek a peace. In 1938 to make peace was impossible; in the present situation to refuse to c':, ioo., e either the US or the USSR is not to cede to one or the

other :

"It is to make a positive choice: for Europe, socialism and ourselves ... The will to peace today is indistinguishable from the revolutiOln-E, ry

and democratic iý,,! ill-'1(25)

Even in what was his last IRDRI piece, -)artre cont--, -) J . ues to defend this intrans-igent neutralis, '. Ti: he criticises the idealist ideas o--L world government and the IKant-L', -i-,,. I

notion of peace ý'. T. rjich

are implied by -ýE, visl Ciitizens

of the World movement, in v., ich Camus s-, -Lo1:., ed som, e est ' ý-i 4 *-ýte

at t1ie tii, iie. (26)

126

f i-, ýD I' Ii soujo:,, ht to --, uro-, )e not -2. stt, -S a f-d -L 7^ U,, ý, SR but in a refus, -,,! to be -., '-'or one or , --Ie

equally it viTas also neitliar a nor e ---a st 4Sa any party. (27) S)artre m ainte-ins that t,

-'-ý-e ras, semblement I rat-'n-er thazi e-, --)axtlyý28' fLe IIi ls, t', C or 7: 17, Y-- - L /2

division of the existi-ný, - p, ý-:, rties corres -,, o---,. ds to a certain dezree, ý, -. --, e socJ--l s IL uc CD

to a division LI, ,, -I -e

we do not c1 aim to --Z'il 1 ?. ccap ch, so c -ý C1 does not exist. The lacl---

-,! e ý7--r, e to F., C t40 is rather a lacl--- in the order of - -0"(29'

Thus RDRIs concern was to at-ýract to it co-, iiýiuri; a st socialist militants . 7ithout these ceas-*, i, - tl`iereby to be

members of their res-ipective o i-Kc. -a-ri is a, t ions. Ita Sin

genesis a micro-oraanism see'l-ii-r-)- to riediý-, te be'(,,. '., een the C)

extremes of the French Left; it i'vould be t, -'. e e. rr -i e

unificatory impulse on the fragi-iented Left.

-' the Lef tu, on lAoreover it would be the conscience oi one hand, its organisation sought to -provide -, concrete

experience of democracy, lacking in the other pýý-, -ties(30,.

Sartre even presses the argument t-"'Iat it is not the

socialist doctrine nor the necessities of sociaýliqt --. cti-on

which prevent the blossoming of concrete -I'---eedom CD "it is the existence of those c! uasi-institutional political formations vuhich a. -i-le parties. l-(31"

On the o tlier hand -'L, 'ýDR strove ideologically to i2esto-, -e C) the true ideals of revolutionary demiocr. ýý, -cy.

S, orti2e

this meant

"binding revolutionary claifas to the idea of freedom. "(32)

Thus EDIRL offers a mediation bet,. ý.,, een deni-ocratic and

material freedoms, ---nd

"'artre directly f ormal c-.. nd actual I

-te of links freedorn emd ýts clC-I, J-Tns to 'ill-le st-

'iic', - 'a Again, Sartre cites the contradiction l.,. Ti I ev,,. Jf 17 perceives riithin SOC-JL, -lLSM - betwee--I. the id-eals of k;

C1

L 'J- Land the tendency to a st-Aist, tot, -nji-'-, -)rif--ijj or ýýnýSC-L 4 I, -, I. - g-. -- tion oLr and a- socie ie, -- gi, -es

127

that this con t--i-adiction ml-)-st be ýdelý I to- new synthes CD -* - and

sce "It is 'his tra -, -, ence --rl-lic' Js ', -'-. e

of ch -DR and cr.. 11 co-c ee rt eedorý,. Unfortunately, x1-DR was ultimate] e Ly , ý, ims and ideals ,., -jere in Sou, --;. it support o-i III CD

the -, - assesD for t. Lie rege--era" o---, of `-1-1- socialist 2idea

II iv e1 Tant to furnish class 7r 4- ', 1 -LI, Q ves under a renewed form,

_L L, I it ýe c- r. ýe, obecti as the PC : pro-,, Dose, --- in 1923 to and from whicTi it turned. - "(35', j

and it sbu,,,? ht con firii-ilation of its ideals would listen :

fleverywhere i, ýThere mel ý. reject o', ' -)_L)r ess on;

ex, ol oi ta ti on, c ol oniali sm, the to 'L.. -- I universe, there is our -public. "(36,

Yet RLDR was formed * thin vri and -. -emai ned th-ý-ou---. '-Lout its CD existence confined to that small 11ailieu ol L infoiýf---ed

opinion: the journalists, militants and intelle-cu -_1s of '-u. the French non-communist Left. it's inembers. n-i-p vras always small and predominantly middle-class. Li internal

report of the organisation in January 1949 indicatels tflýý, t

its hard-core membership constituted a mere 1,900,1T, "

of whom were manual vrorkers, 33ý, ) union members. TH e Rassemblement included in its ranks 6% militants not belonging to other political organisations. (37) Ti,

lis

lack of any -real foundation in the masses forced 3, s--rtre into a wealk reply to Aron's challenge that the proletari,, _-.

t

didn't care much for RDR :

"to say that the proletar-*, at isn't on Is side isn't the same as saying that the proletariat supi-Ilorts the RPF. 11(38")

And the discrepancy between POIR's ideals and -'(, '--e

possibility of their recei-ving any general support v, ras CD later recognised by Sartre hii-,,, s. -lf in his ubl'-'-led

C) p

notes :

"Circumstances me-rely appeared to be f, -voura'ole

128

to the association. It dia ansr. ýer to an abstract need, defined by the objective situation, but not to any rer---. 1 need Iz- the people. " (39),

1, P. ljoreover RDR's

changes in the the PC fearimr

(D violent car-., ipai,, with the SFIO.

hoe0 ` provokim7 esi C) French Left was misplaced. F-ron, the outset recruitment in sympat-Iielcic m ilieu lead a

Zn against it; -., nd RDR fared lJ-t-tle be'Lt.. -, --, - Sartre comments ajýý-ain C-

"Whilst T""erleau-Ponty and mYselL -e-re at Tem-ps modernes -a review read br1,0)000 people our criticisms didn't even emb, -, --ý-2ýass the community, they even had the interest o-. 1- not being inspired by any party. They even sometimes agreed to reply to thern. From t', ie moment we claimed, in RDR, to

-recruit their militants... they set about pouring fire on US. We weren't very numerous, perha.,: Ds between 10,000 and 20,000. JITo matter, it was an embryonic party and as such vie ý,,. rere attacked. 11 (40)

Merleau-Ponty came into RDR ver, -,, r late so as not to abandon Sartre and Sartre himself suggests that T. T. erleau- Ponty understood full well the impact such an -sation Cý -i J

would have. Or rather, and more significantly, "'erie(-,. u- Ponty perceived the fundamental impotence of the 'Mandarins' :

"In order to live closely to the PC, to make it admit certain criticisms) it was necessary initially for us to be politically ineffective and that there should be felt in us another efficacity. 1-Terleau-Ponty was precisely this, solitary, with neither partisans nor zealots, ý,. rhose always new and always rebegun thought dreviT credit fro. Týi itself. The Rassemblement, on the contrary, however small it was and agreed being,

CD counted on the force of numbers. Thus - and though it wanted to inlimediately su. -pend them - it opened hostilities. "(41;

RDR wished to avoid presenting a direct End hostile

challenge to the existing political forces, but -A- very C) -o -, al-lenrre. form and formation constituted just suc. i a c, L;., - C

The original appeal to peace, a regeneration of the

socialist ideal, a united Europe, the stiou---: -le a-ainst Cý' C-- C-)

129

POlitic, --l fatalism and resi--rnatio---- --L aut- Or' sm and int-L-actable doryma, had been

--raniied at t-, -., e lev-1 o-ý2 philosophical dialogue, throu---'- t' e columns olf an C- independent intellectual revie,,. -, r. "uc. L ed D- ideals de 'l-, realisation, the. 7 IIs but solicited an e"'ective politic the circumstances could not provide any 4"oundati-on fo-- such action and, indeed, turned t1iis action ca-, C-nst itself. Burnier concluded

"At bottorýri, the cold v, rar aý, 7ainst the movement proposed to stru, ý,! -Ple, -ý-ot the better of til-le HDR. "(42",

"I Indeed the RDR did ultimately destroy itsel. t-. e Iacl-- of an objective need to define its activity revealed itself in a fundamental ambiguity of pur-,, -Jose amongst its leaders. Even at the outset these had remained undec-', ded as to, the tactics to be employed. The implicit tension between pro-soviet and pro-a-merican factions v! as not slow to emerge into the open. 1, ousset always seve--ely attacked stalinism internationally and in the internal

attitudes of the PC. 11,11oreover he continued to see I in terms of an eventual mass party, whe re )c-. --""Lre cons ently envisaged it as merely a moderate-sized but dynaiiic

grouping which vfould in the lonc; - terl-, i provol-e the

requisite changes in the organisation of ti-ie -7--enc'i Le-, t.

Eventually in 1949 the POR prepared an I -Liter- ational

of ', 'ýesistance to Dictatorship and *ý',, ', ----, -' .,, rhose proposed

s date - the 30 of April - v,,, as t-, -ie saý--le as o-

own planned Congres ! "ondial des Partisans de ic-,

-ýresence of Th e IDDIR meeting would also be by tlie -4

a! Jerican sneakers. Sartre f ea-, t. 1 1: 1 -- C-1

s assuming refused tott end est tendency RDR 2ic" 1. IFT- -- -, - -, r,. d , rd 1ý-L t meeting, sign-ii- IL

public letter e:. -. L)l--1ii-1ing his --bstention.

C, Tc -L ononee , -he ; -., Ieeting did confi2ýt )cartre Is sus.,

evenprese la t ing tul', -1 e US Is-,, tor: li i : -, bo , 7.17o a, sacI.

an ,- -i c. Lous,,: ), etnono,. r e peace. (43) Bo th i'il tn a

ri fS -c'. 4-, Cý to secu-e lu- htward, li-C-3L --Lýousn-t e

150

Is' <- - -,, t --- -1 ailing from the Amerf- c 10

_7 - -I- ____ --- -ý, 1` 0 -, - r

'_ ,- I-

t nocoj:., v ei-., fi o- an tj C; orý,, L), nisa Lli on. LI I- CD atte, -, --)t thezýe t- cor_ýect e-,. -, - orientc%t -i on o ft L served no -L-)u_2, - - S- ie gr o uP 15 of October 1S, 49 L)-_-, rtre of ficic, _-Ily -L -es e severe d1ver, e ý-, ence bet,, reen t': ýie subs! er: uent -ýI e,: Irs

o _7

and p2 particularly over t'L'14 S SILI 1- 0- _L L- 30 1-1-L car., tp s in the -: ')ovi et Union - ind, ý c, --,, tes 7. Tel' ----e direction in which each wras IL

T'he f P-., i I ure of 1". had a, clecisive

he wrote bitterly in has Un-lubli-, i X, b6d Iiotoa

"Splitting up of Vae ? -rd blo,,, -. e and definitive apprenticesllaý-, -, to One cannot create a r,, ioveme-lit, "(44"

The years aftei2 this experinieý'-A ii-i , t)ol--*LticL.. l oý: gL-, -L-LIsa-' LII Oil

LtiI thus, a dra: ý]at_c transfori, tation in saw, re I ýz po! '-! 7ý t th e ideas. Some have argued i-i-ic-leed t-, -,,

can be isolated as the cause of Sarti2els eventý, f--I decision

in 1952 to become a lcomperrnon de : =te' of the Thu, --, C) Francois Bondy writes

S "A decisive facto---- i-n, Sartre's c! eve'-- t was the realisat]-on that it is impossillble to entice the i-. iasses a,,,,,,, Eiy froi. -i 'L-. 'L--. e coi. i. --unists... It was im ---, ible to estC- ish a -, -, )olitical pos, 1 -,

bl- . 3.

,, ry force, alongside --ýnd inde, )enl7ent revolutiona-- of the comr-imnist party; hence it vý, C-ls necessaýfy

J- Iý p -tly to 21 partly to su Lafluer-ce L-at _dort

and pca-L party. (4-5)

And lj', 'aurice Cranston cornments :

"From the collC-11,, ose of '(-, 'L'-. e d--, -e,. T., one lesson: that henceforth he must collaborate with the ý. oi:, ii-J, lunist and

.,, r, i's this, without actually join-Li-, he has steadfastly done. "(46)

of t', e ""s I- ') -1 It is true th the publ! U-L J- P, - r k, S

of Les Communistes et_la paix in 10-52 s -, I! ed

the revocation of past political c-.! Lic-, ces ý. nd t.,,., e t- *"! --* on Ut- '-

of his close associF, tion the P,.. U-L from 1949 to 1Sý-52 passes t. ii: -our, --? i a peiý--'o--:, of bo, 'Ll,.

C) cant poli tical and -L, )ersona-, l change. i-le

moreover, bear witness to ail.

131

on s attitudes, C1 to some extent in -(-, 'Li-e I --)Ot SU'3EjE, ýC: Uz-; ---L L' -1 -ý -01 t'ýie same -jatli as L' - rtre. boc 1-3 sL "Ut S evolution must be undersitoou-' t-, -'ý'-zouý7'h iteeo CD - C' 2.1 of current evients as +%. ý-, e deve tie easto T 1C

: )FI,

respective philoso-; -. ). L-lic L "'What cha-racterise-i o majoiýity of non-Co-:,. l I, -I =, iun2st -intellectuals in the first half of 1948) was t'r, e teii, --l-c-ity wit ia 1,7,7hi ch they held to -, T-, s-, on of soc ic., 1ist united L=o-, pe, &. ýid to e conviction that Europe choice in the matter. It -1L. 001- t'ae eve-nts

' 1948, L of the summer of L-'- e 0, Atlantic pact to destroy -Lies se illus-

Ritsch documents well the fate of t'l 'de s i, --, - o -p e, --. n, a arnongg these intellectuals: it had domfriý)te, --I, Li- efforts to conceive of a solution to IL-. Le lDroble,. -,. -,, ý--)osed by the Cold War. But just as 'L, -'. -, -Ls sar., ie '-,, 'old ', ', 'ar -`, ---, d ýot

-ri to the better of the RDi-),, so ultimc,. tely it CLý., me i-

0 -0 T' decisive conflict with the ideal ,- Iurope :

"By the sumi. iler of 1-0,49, ec. ch segi-iient of the French Left had clearl7T defined its

U position with resy, )ect to '(, j'-Ie Euro. 'Pean issue, and, significantly, in er--ch. decision,

_ded attitudes toward the Cold *i'iar had -ový the decisive factor. "(48) "In summary, the question o-11' European unif ication - orthe P-, 'uropea. n idea - in the 1947 to 194-3 period, had forced tlaý,.,, French Left to face the reality of the Cold 1, `, 1ar, and, therefore, t-'-,. e -Left had be e -n compelled to respond in te-rms of the Las u- West conflict. "(49)

4 _-L I From Sartre's point of view, the f(:::, ilure of t__ie _L ji. - the failure of any similar oiýga isation in thý- circum. stE. --i-

ces. His aim had never been to rittract the ý, asses, '50'

and he had recognised full iý! ell the i: ole -'ut the illus'- in French political lif e. 3

st clearly the belief of many Fre-, -ich Jntel'-ec-

IýE, I, C. 1-11 eC. L, _- Lo 171 LI was possible at that tire to of d be',,,; een

f -I C the protagonists of both the 'old t'ie _-ý, e, CD

Yet Sartre saw precisely that

132

"a micro-organism v! hi c-', i had asni---a I -j. -- -ti -01qS tO play the role of mediator decor-,, -1-., Do-ed rapidly into t,, uo g_rol)ps: 'ý- 'D the one pro- american, the other , -2--o-sovi

The two blocs were too cleari5r se-, D! ý-, --atOd the years following the 1ZLIa's dissolution eve-, -,,. ts plenty of propaganda for both sides. Cý

1948 had seen the Czech coup, 17 '-a Lsar-, / I- Is su--f-ci, -'. e .L Berlin blockade, and the eme---r--ence Lhe ten C -fon b, -It',, -een

the USSPL and the Titoist 'deviation'. these C-- - facts stood the massacres of 7: -adac-r trie e tnam sc2. and the rise Janu-, --ýr., of "cCarthy"' in t-, --e US. -v 1949 the liCravchenko trial' opened in Paris. -)'imone de Beauvoir comments: it

"was the trial of the US)Sj`L. The anti- Communists ... mobilised hordes of 1.,, -itnes,, -, -e,,,; the Russians on their side sent ý-, Titnesses from 110scow. No-one won. " (52')

And in early 1949 again the communists launched t].. eir much-prepared peace campaign against the bac-Ii., 1-7--ound of the United States' Atlantic Pact.

ithin France where the SFIO had decisively oýjted folý the West and anti-sovietism, and whe-le the -L 'C moved further into a self-imposed exile, the non-comi. iun-ist intellectuals lost any hope of uniting a fragmented Left.

It was the outbreak of the Korean war ir. 1950 iý,., hich

finally crystallised the alternatives v. Thich the ? Cd posed Ii ý%rJ th soc -El i sm. I. Tn as war with capital sm' or 'peace

.L 1948 the uncommitted leftish intellectual had consciously

chosen neutralism as a third alternative: subsequent

events had now denied them this option and yet t-! -, c "4

rei-mining choices were themselves inade, --,; -uate. 3 -. i-ý o --ri ede

Beauvoir writes :

"It was nov: certain beyond doubt thct tl-ýere could be no third course betv., een adher-e-, -ice to one of the two blocs. And the ciioice between them remained impossible. "(53)

133

And Sartre vividly recalls the dilemma of those felt they could offer no firm support to eit-'--lt-zr side

-0 J- " "Hov-! could we not smell tliae ste-: ic-'ri c- L. -rie bourgeois cadaver? And riow could we CD publicly conder. rm slavery in the -L--, a. st 1.,.. -itI-iout abandoning, on our side, the e--'--ploited to CD

their exploitation? "(54)

For both Sartre and ! ý'erleau-Ponty the outb-rea',: -- ol" hostilities in Korea signified the end of a per4lod -*n I- which it had been seemingly possible to i-ia:, ýe certain C-ý

hoL c 'ces. For both the period that novi I'ollo,,,, I.. -ed is one of immediate uncertainty and dissi'llu.: )io-ri. -,, -nd, importantly, for both the directions subsequently adopted follovied upon a decision about the nature of the ýoviet Union and communism.

C-1 ', e initial Both Sartre and Merleau-Ponty proceeded from tl-, premiss that 1917 constituted a historical nioment, of genuine revolutionary marxist inspiration, and t1lat Marxism must remain accountable for its subsequent -Lc-., te. Equally they both accepted that this initial moment had in some sense been 'betrayed' or, at the very le, -;. Q--. t, lost its original character. The question which Sartre E, nd 1,; Terleau-Ponty addressed themselves to was, in crude

th terms: T., `lust iý, re accept this present reality o-r e --)ovie t 4 Union as socialism? Is it still distinguished or

distinguishable from other historical enterprises by the

revolutionary intention to build socialism? Does it, in

other words, still merit a rivileped status in our p CD regard?

If, even in 1945, it was clear that the USý--')P no lon, --er C. ý professed the ideology of its economy, it was eouall, ý

evident to Illerleau-Ponty that it could not be descr--

as limperic--ilist', and that the politics of -1. ussia r-, -ftel- 1917 had been affected by the

double necessity of accomplisnin,. -,, an industrialisation.... and of protecting the new state against a possible coal--*tion of capitalist -Powers. "(55)

134

If Russia's inte-r-na, l policy had deviatted fro. -i t-', --e ide-al i of 1917 this might precisel be ex L-:

--ined by 'L. --, e need to C) yp

construct fi: rst the infr?, structure v. -ithout w-'--ic-',, - could be no socialism. i'-bove e-11, t', Irou, -ý-aout t1--)is ý., Terleau-Ponty insists that no choice can be r. -ýade the charadter of the 'oviet Union is d*sco; uised by C: ) prejudice or ignorance. In 1946

-'-qe poi-, -, ts OUt whilst one cannot be una,.,,! are of -Lie 5 million coil'.. -u-,, --; st voters in France

"we have not knoi, -, rn anything about the for at least six years. "(561

In 1947 'rencontre internationalel 1. 'erlea-, -)--L, -ýont, 7- 1n

notes that the )oviet Union remains for ', 7estern Latellect- uals only a 'notion' ,a Irumourl: "All discussion of the USSR is delerious. 11 Thus meetings iffhere intellectuals C) of West and East can conduct an honest di. -, -. 1ogue help to bring the Soviet Union into the real -ý-, orld: "it , -ould cease to be myth and win the importance 0 -&-' EM 6', --

LS t in, 7 thing. "(57)

In 1948 Merleau-Ponty firmly asserted that the U. 'ý)SR no longer had a chance of realising socialism(58" and C: ) charaoterised the Soviet Union as a power bloc

11ývhich considers the division of the world into two camps a fait accompli, accepts a military solution as inevitable and doesn't count on any awakening of proletariam freedom. . 11 5CO

In 1945-4-6 Merleau-Ponty's position had been, in his

own words, that

I'Soviet society is ambiguous, and that both signs of progress and symptoms of regression CD are found in it. "(60)

But the revelation of the existence of la. boLir camps

in the Soviet Union provoked from Temps moderne,,, ý in As the person of 11erleau-Ponty(61) a --L-e-s-'L,, --.

teriIent of, -1 position in 1950 :

1 -1 e I'We have to admit that tilese facts tlaro,., t tl meaning of the 'ussian system en to

C) L 1, -iol ly o-

135

question again... *, ', '-', iat 1,, re a2ýe sa-, -ý_-nýý- s J that there is no soc-Lý1-4 sm one out of every 20 citizens is in a can-, --N. (62)

However Jt is the albeit mistaken belief t-'aat 'L. -"ae

classless society may yet emerge i-iýo, --, such can. ps which forbids comparincý comý, Iinism to fasc'l i- sin. i. nd it is L. ', ese C) quite distinct ideals, possessed by communism in spite of itself, pursued by it in a contradictory manneiý, which Merleau-Ponty declares himself to slaar e. "o--, - e over he can have nothinc7 in common '--ith most of ocm-, ii-lism's enemies: if we admit that the camps are -ia s colonies, we must)also, acceLpt the V. 'est's colonies as its slave labour camps. (63')

"Whatever the nature of the present ": )oviet society may be, the USSR is on the v! I. -i o1e situated, in the balance of power, on ti? ie side of those who are strugglina against C) C. ý the forms of exploitation known to us... and every position ývhich is defined in opposition to Russia and localises criticism within it is an absolution given to the capitalist world. "(64)

The optimism of 1945-46 which had granted to the USSR

a special status in., its very ambiguity was displaced C)

now by a position in 1948-49 which believed in s. I1o,.,., ing

no indulgence to the USSR but forbad any pact , -vith its

adversaries. As Sartre notes the voice of had lost in the meantime its passion: one had only to

compare the 'We will carry out, vrithout illusions, the

policy of the CPI(1945) with "I'lle have the same values

as a Comi. Qunistl(1950',; in 1945 T. Ierleau-Ponty had forbad

any action harmful to the proletariat, in 1950 he simply

refused to attack oppression in the USSR alone. (65" ': ýI-i e I/ position was nominally the same but the whole tone of

Temps modernes' stance had significantly altered :

t'We hadn't budged an inch, the yes had simply changed to no. In 1945 we said: 'Gentlemen we are everybody's friend, and

'? 1. i., -d above all the friend of ou--,, - dear . -, I f ive years later: "We are enemies of all, the onl ,y privilege of the ?. -rt, 7 is t-1--lat it still deserves our severit, ý,,, -. 1; 1(66)

136

Now it is important to understand this c'---, ange -. -n CD of '; '-erleau-Ponty's philosoi). Inical development. -S s

I seen in the preeding chapter, I-, erlec,. u--. L-ýontyIs --Le tic

understanding of 1'ar-x-ism i-,.,, as maaý! - dee.. ) er1, ý7 ed by I y

ambiguity: between 11; ý: )-rxisri-i as the histoaýical Reasý-ý, n CD 1, Jarxisj7, as merely one cont-nPent o" --, )-eLsI--. n! CD the 'hope' of his generation, the 'resolute f0l, another I ossiblel future; and t-aa. t, consecuený, -L,,., I'erleau-ilonty v7,, C ts-ide 6s uncert to see-- ou I'S terms of T. E,. rxism the conditions of Eý'. -', i-, sto--`cI U -I- -E"- telos, or whether to see within itself 'L,

-'--, e -. )ossibil`ty o-'-' LD the very dissolution of -', --, eason. lrec-ý-se-1,7 ins o iý Eý s -ie

confronted 11arxism on the interwoven levels of t. Le 1, ý nd o r. practice, T, Ierleau-Pontyls understa-ndJin, ý- o-- Russfc, L, nd 7.11

communism was marked by the same fundarierital On the one hand thus he sEýxi 'Russia as t- 'ie sole ind c, ---. -Uion of a possible reconciliation of hur., wr Uý ý- ) Aty itself

socialism, and communism as the only basis -for --, unive-, --

salist politics :

"Since 1917 Marxism- has had a homeland and is incarnate in a certain part of the world. 11(67) "The foundations of the proletarian revolution were laid in Iliussia and nowhere else as yet. ý1(68)

On the other hand however he saw the pro, -, ress) o-, '-: ' __, '. uss-_*a

Jding -itIciin ý-is era and the policies of -the PC as coinc. c, Ij-.. L with 'the more general aims of man: der. qocrýý_cy, socJ_,, _: -. 1isM_,

peace and freedom. Thus 71.1lerleau-1-, onty a-o,,,,, )ends a 1942, note

to his 1946 essay 'Pour la verite' 1.,, r_riich reýr-, C-. rks upo-.. -i the

latter's loptimistic' conte-: 7-t and adds :

"Since then the USSR has miade it neces, sl-, Xy for the non-columunist left to state clearly why it was not coml-unist. '--', -, is does

-not T ritten end mean that when this iý,,! as v. the framework of what -v., T C-s then -ooss-: t, L'i e

fi ed -Tt-titude ex!, ýressed here was not justil- as one which had a chance of seaving both

socialism and libert.,,, -. i-(69' (my

Again in a 194r; essay he distinc-uisaes tv. ro poss-'ble c- cof, lplunist politics after 1945

L tIone would have t, -.!, -en u.. ) ti-)-e cl, ý---ssic revolutio--if-,: ýy

137

themes. It had little c1ae-rice Ln T present state of the V, orld. neo t-', -- e facing up to the ar-, bLýuities o-, tr)-

would have tried to r-, iaj--e derioc--r-ý7. cy t. ýul. -, - live: this- is _tae one_yj_e

_supp-o-rted he_--re

e. in T', em--)11E, -, sJ s

Lerleau-Ponty thus sul 0 (- D--, orted Coý-1-1_, mJst policies

as they accorded withL less 7:? elll-defined -)olitic--,,. l ei-ýds, whilst also givin, 7: coD. F-1unis! -_, i tsop -D o -La CD t0sb1s,

4S itL, --; elf as the true Politics. _ri ot-7: ie-L i.: =ds, -L-, - lattentistel 1:. ýas not one. -,, -- -, ec ts n- k- -ý bu' -OUrSU f014 as to communism's continuino- 0 __CS

t i, Q 4 ible withother ends defined outside co. -: _Iui-_-_s, _-.. this respect that . '--')artre notes that "Ier1eE_, u-i-'o-t-- d

from the 'illusory French after 1945 to -oý_ cI os e I.,,? alongside the 2C and to try to establ_, sli- t1le bas--'s 0 1, 'broad left thouý, -htl. Sartre E,, dds

-', L-ie P. -1 led precisely insofar as 'ýleft-,, -Ting thouF. -i tsia-,, s. s nothing more nor less. " But LIL "arxis-,. i is nowý1960ý becoming in France all of left-VTing tn'ought,

Itwe ove t1ais, in the first place, to a of . ýIhich he (Merleau, i i,, Fas) one.. handful of men,

'Jerleau gave the most basic expresýion to tae common desire for democre. tic union and -'-or reform. "(71) (my emphasis

But whilst he conceives still in some serise of C. s kaccrelits comi-. iunisr. -l w't'' the `, ýeason of History, - _1

J-ýJc cuest-7ons and unique historical status. '-hus ttie sfec- -L- -hich he as'-- Of LU, --CS 'ussia is pursuing i!., about the path i'ý

in 1946 are only "a manner", of posing t", -e s--n7le est --' on: do es L, ts i*- if is the present moment a i-nere detour o,

the onset of historical chaos. (72) In ot,: ier -, o-,, s e

fate of co-,, -ir-ýiunism is assumed here as e- -, --; vale--ýit to t

of TJC,: -, rxJ-sm as the IReason of

-dversai--e in eS S E. -'- S E3 UC' -'D S The I ulty SI-lov., s itse lolg 1

et -i e o, ý tJoi0uon est un coi--, il)licel which clc-. -ci-, --

ýTerleau---ýýonty t 1-i etc the labour ccai", -os- S0V! S -a IIS G- 1 hers 'qpt ": ilss-ý, - e to Trotsky's _, oosition: t E, dek e .,,, o

e P0, I-I _ý eri 'I-- , gtate and that nei'Ll. -le-L 17'ý s td

13%', -

T orms of the and tj'-, OmD be sc r4be-I as e -J` can TT congruent or conv--rgent.

-, 'et ne --. T)-: Dioves . 3" . -rotskyite il-loerat., re of a --Ief- of ens e o-- el. c- - -, -I -. on T'erleaij,; )ont-- er ses t-', -i -, nece ss tyo iii _)

has r-ef -s-, -nr- .,. )o , --. 1 4- 1,

1*cy of blocs , -, n-j UU ---s'r-*ct-'-, -, r-, o-ese reý)orta,,. -, e. o-r- bot). ýýo,,, ý, Te ---r s a. ctu ---. 1s Li, -Z-- ti on L. Le res t is ropaganda and our re, -., -., Ieiýs

-n e deý paper. (7% S) u0 11 ap os, Ji tiof. ) t ýý, i1saY ! -' )-. -1 0S -LD_, ) for the -3oviet Union wI-i-ic', -

de. --, -*Ies -111hat t constitutes any -1 - It* . 1,

- .-c -) ý -1 e, oul teake up this stance w, Cj

-i i1sthebe1ev ti, -., L

at this time the direct. "on ,. ý-u s J- i- ig - , Tc-, s -1, id not

contradict the 1, -,, ore general e-L L -, --d ece0c Ort t07"I, -

and socialism.

In his conclusion to Hur. q, -, --tisii eet Terrem- '11, eiýlea, -, -iýont, -- thus argues that war is to avoided and, Russia cannot be depicted as eit]-ler mongering. The PC, moreover, is comý-itted to En

optimistic I politics of co-operatio. Li V"' bou- . eoi,,

de in ocrcy.

m j-he Korean war finally destroyed the viabil--"ty of suc"I ý-t perspective. For Ilerleau--I Lhe 'ovie t -Ionty it reve, --, led ' Union as prec. isely an aggres. -, -Lve, st -,, )o- e

4 Vd, it

CD '-, D domain of the very real threat of global conflict C)

rational dialogue was, moreover, savaLLeI,,, - c ircuris crib e%-A. if not comPletely curtc-, iled. -)ýrlone de Beauvo-'12: 2ecalls

"The canons speak and silence novr is all our part. ' vý,,, as more or less the subst--nce of his explanation to. us. '-' (74'

Sartre too re c ollec ts tlaa t c--:, t -,,.. IiS tli--,, e -. ý _L . wishea T'N to cease wr4iting on politics Slince the fi C, , p- -a ,i ng C. -

e fo-i-ce w`ii cA . -ill Tt is na" would soon be everywhere: decide and why s,, )eak, since it has no e, ý-ý_rs? 111(75) X'I. US

which considered vv'ar inevitable and necess-_. -Dy; _`_).. d ly

lost, in Yerleau-2ontyls view, ai_-y A For T,.. rerleau, as ot-ýers, 1950 wE,. s the crucial year... at t-,. ls -)e---iod

139

believed that t-'Ie internal oJL j -Listory had definitively perverted its course. it would continue pan-lysed, de-i'lected by its own . 7,., astes, until '(, -'-ie final fall. Thus any reasonable -;; oifý. ds

1--, ý rý " -LisE could only lie. 3ilence, -1 of

complicity was all - mined. 11ý75.. t -em Although 1950 v; as equally a crucial yeE, --, - -: -I for

-Dar e he interl)reted the outbreak. of -Lt,. qe ss L,,. ere'ly closing a certain -_. period

For myself and otIner of m ;I

iy friends t'--* was the end of idealism. I From the tactical point of view '( L Iheif, e luas no difference between politics a-rid war... a certain idealis, -, l it vi, -. ýs th)ouýaht -, )oscible to choose what one could love an, -, ý_ prefer... From 1950 it was understood that it was not a ciues-It. -ion ol' choosing what can be loved. accord'; but choosin-, (D to a much more general point of vie-,,,.,. -(77, /

This discrepancy between politics and miorality Ilerleau-Ponty had seen always as signifyin-r a crisis o-L C, political choice, also forced Sartre into cont--adiction

"There is ýJ-norali ty of politics. .. and when politics must betray its morality, to choose morality is to betray politics. Now find your way out of that one! Particularly when the politics has taken as its goal bringing about the reign of the human. "(78)

Sartre was to decide that the time demanded an exclusively

political choice. But though he had already abandoned his

project of a 'morals' by 1949 he did complete at this time

two works: St. Genet and Le Diable et le Bon -Dieu: which

re - Jod, present the major achievements of tliis 'moral' per- Cme t-'(i od St. Genet, in particular, in its e-,,,. plo-,, ---, t-ion of

A --; I

ýý t

represent-5 a half-wa,. 7.., / point betv-,, een IlEtre et le

and the Critique de la raison dialecticue. cne passa-e '- - ý. cte-, -: of St. Gei-e t reveals fully its trans i tio---iai

between freedom and liberation, the ir-. --JvJdual and

liberty and destiny :

-i :to ind C, -. te "I have tried to do the fbllo1. -. ýJi, _, C on the limit of psychoanalytic-! inte

and 11arxist expl(-: -. nation and to deuionstrate t'-iat

140

freedom alone can account for a -ý)e--, -son in his totality; to show thiis freed I- oi'-'ý at with destiny, crushed at Tirst by its mischances, then turning u-, Do-, -i then. CD .1 digesting them little b little... 11(7c) CD y

And a famous note expresses Sartre's dissati. -,, factio-. --, 1.,,, 4, tl". L

the conventional formulations oL Dle,, ý " ethical pro' is

ýý i , 'The ethical 'problem' ar-lises from the fact that Ethics is for us inevitable a-. =-ý. at the same time impossible. tlctioiri i. -Ilust give itself eth-ical nornis La t. iis cliin-G--te of nontranscendable impossibility. "(80'

The play Le -iiiable et le Bon Dieu forcefully de-, oicts

the transition fr. om, morality to political rea. lism ., ffi]-ch

was to become that of Sartre himself. The ver, -,. r of its central character Goetz represents a pro-res-ive exhaustion of all the possible forms of idea-IL2tic coný--'Iuct and his concluding speech in itself sioni-fies tlie

assumption of a concrete praxis to confront the p-1-oble-As of historical and collective action.

Sartre himself perceived the gap that lay betwee-, i the C4 OUS

moral individualism of Les Fouches and tineefý'-"ica i

praxis of , Le Diable: "Between the two, sevei-i years and

the divorce of the Resistance. "(81)

Yet, as Sartre had seen in the Hoedere-r of Les 1. 'ains sales

the revolutionary he wished to be but could not, so he

made Goetz the perfect er,, ibodiment of the man of action

and t'I made Goetz do what I ýT! as unable to do. "(82', For

Sartre had sought the conditions of an effective and

universal action up to the point of a contradiction %ý,, Iiich

he could not transcend -.

"The contradiction was not one of iidec, s. It was in my bwn being. For --y ! J-berty implied also the liberty of all men. And

all men were not free. I could not subiiit to the discipline of solidaritu, ý, - with all

men without breaking beneath t-'ie stra-in. And I could not be free alo--ie. "(83)

After the dissolution -tre of the -, -ýý2. Sýý---L 1,17 -ý I'practic, -I-! --

g-L I up all political actývity'1(84) -and L7, "e 7 I. ý

141

-ve into a mass-i -0ogra, 'Zie of reE-, d. -n--. readim7 was aquir-ing a direction

"From 1947 on, I had e uble ior '- c-* -)le of reference: T a. lso judg-red my principles in relation Lo t-a I os. - o others - -L, -. oce of 85;

If, his readizir, o-L- 1.1lez, leall-Pont- I s -ýuman-! -s-iie ! -::,, t e 2ý In e lu - oartre had "crossed ti-lis ac-et-e sub- ubicon" o ordination of mo ral tyto 11-ý- J., stor "a J- too"`- to conduct a series of d

-e 1,;;. arxist philotso-pher, Tran

---)ac -'h o `26

y Let, as was seen in the pre-,, -io-us c-'Lia-)ter, , -e a gulf ,. rithin Sartrelý-., i lys4s betý,. -en t' e )-, -v'-1e4,: -D7ed freedom of the bour. (--eois intellectual L,,, -" t': ie h-sto-r`c--l C) needs of the. masses, 'ill]-L C between voluntlrist`c co, - and the disciplined riaembe2ship of a ation, in short betl7een subjective and ob4r-ct-Lve. his preface to Roqer Ste hane's Porti,, ---i-' d'un --'v, --n'u-ier a

artre desc ibes this ý! uali-m -L--L u L, L-on r `-he -'-e--. -, s of a . -L " between r-Liiili tant and adventurer. i-. l thoug-'a he se-s Lic

L- una cce)t, -. JO 1e dilemma of the two ije2ýsoia. --ý,, Iities &"

--ýc 4-1,1

recognising that an act had t,,,, o es, -'Ii, - ,., a,, - ia es

a--e with the adv\-2, -nturer. Thus J'artre dei)icts

.. L- -L- - advI-3nuurer as possessing "all the v-, ces 01' 'he bourgeois t

- th" but tf-'! -, a 7dv---, ýit=er class, egoism, ! Je, bad f. - or ýt he rh c who I i,,, rill folloý7, r in Iiis solitude".

according to "3'artre, lives toeeos

of the humCan condition. - ýS)7' ,, -et still --erceive3

-ýhe 'e--, --)d- o-' his tL. e fisolation' of '-. his f- C-U, ýe r1st -- -C-1 -) -L

r q-., : Th eort, --Lri. ce0 -p co 11 ect, iv ee nd si1 --

it-. s s E. n -'n' ect the adventureaýls action,

-a- li, illn-lin' tioil.

In his sympathetic essay on o--, cc-

a, raj. n distanc, ý-- bet%-, -e 'collect--ive n 'individual action' but W-L --ore --ý.,. btle

e e undezst(-li-idiiiý7, o-. -

; aterialisme et revolution'. t -i- e

142

dilef., ima of ui-i ve -t cuL, i sece o `e c tive iii S0eeon sn pt bi L L" v, aea, ý3 e and ershi-D.

accredits Li! e in ot -0 c. I Li, ia, rc-;, cter of n is c L et first time estall) in the li t o- sn,, I s -o- oes

"''-"he )ressure of ci rcui:! stces c ontrad-4L ct 4-, o ---, so

.1iIL -' ob -ý'e cvfsm ts 17 1--.

I- _f,

j1- hra. ve le, --3, ýd ILI:., en-t e0e se lv - to revalue 0U Elý re-evi ýi at '- ont ul- f-I isE a e! the ore Uic, -1 J, e-L be re-thought; rl-lus t be r -t C: )

However, v,, Thilst ý'_)artre develoed a -fulle-i-

-ism, politicc-2 evýýI-. As oal, ' i---7:, de of 1Jar: 7 L. C"

isolated from its ajýpoij:, ted

.f te, he ,, ___L

bec-, -, )Oolý "JO''- --C relations with tae -cC

personal-Ly and publicly. His -, ubser, U"_ý. L_t defense o. Paul Nizan's memory(O. 0',, his e-,,, ýpress

only furt-1---el, Titoism, the public quarDel w-t-i Lull

T' s distýý_,. -iced hifn froi-ii the Part,.,, . 0-Teover -11ýouý'-ý-_Ou' t

boil-geof period the i)CIs stance toward _L i- intellectuals was abusive and hateful, dis, --iii, ý, -, ive of

sympathetic advances. ý3artre recLalls :

lv',, ý'Ie livecIl in an atmosphere er,, ipoiso-,, led vjJ th thoughts v,, hich weren't resistE-f-it tc examination but ,. ýihich they (the cornmiunists' took good care not to exacnine. tl(91ý, J

- 0- U. L C' -I- '-/ i, a Sartre was not in 1910, co-nvinc:: -, ' by "ie v--y- --i-ev le-, -i'

discussion of '. '; -ý-LLssian occupation of 2'r, -,. nce close

friends' 1, 'j, --=Jngs as to his ov-, -- sC:. Ifety. ut, im onee L ý. -s LLe Beauvoir recounts, they imp-iýessed hL- InsoL

as -ie Cor. -i-iiunists by tre.! 7ý, -tin- it recognised tnat ti Cw: enemy

-. s he Ii, vere orcing hii t6 act E., c tually vTas one. ý--e never put ---iuch faith in the likelihoo\-L a

, -i visag 2-, nf: -: -itas occuj)E,., tion; but e- Cb

enough to iýic, -ý, I, --e feel ver, ý, -

0 the paxadoX.. ic -uý-l't-v of ou'- Sý -9, the s.,, iock it inflicted on a

143

great rol e in hi -- su", -, e -. ý uentt -- evel '. 9 fl '02 "'

For "'P-rtro, f el t C. bove c o------l er-,, -poli tics er- f -1 * tj CC -L 4 divorced from a-ciy i-: O- Lfo-,, inaE- t-- on

itself seemed ii-npos ible Eý-n, --' 2 -r: o iC4 rev, --ale. 'A- as -, nsu--Lr7'- -Lent

17A11 political act had beco: -e for us and even our V-i- ',. -I tri ck. 1 e awaý7 --*, iý, t. o the s,, E-i IJL

-, - -ý :ý- 1-7 Freedom - the very bas-is of S)artre Is ref le ct- J ý-! p1icted:

"In 1944 Sartre could be transc in 1951 lie knevi sometimes steal in that case no

thou--, 11-it

that sf -. L-on --, 1ý -- ', t*

ended b,,;, s-, -, -b j ec; tive e -- -. ort;

that circumstc-, ý,: -, cesj c(--, -: i I- -- -lenc, - -om us, our tiý,, --Sceiý, -, ind Ji v Ji ý -'- -t-, (- I, ]- -v --ý -' oi --i iý, possible, only a. collective

,v ihilst Sartre could not yet do ,. -ThF-. t Goetz -'-iE c! do-. --e

and E. 'erleau-Ponty chose silence, -`em_ý, ý_s r! -, oaeiýnes c-rifted

without a political direction. In his 2re-71-ce to

Sartre --ý2-,. Feals -., -iuc-) Huan Hermanos'la Fin de 11 S in! --,

4-, n, -- 'Iie s of this uncertainty and pesýjimi, ýi, i. L ied

cries of the German Jews, those of the t-', --)e--

-id . jpanish, then Czechs and i, 'oles to t-' -1 e c,,

- u: Les ce --i cei

1-i eý --e -a--ýIs t'-, C-t this impotence of those who a-ear t- ii) 'cry' will soon be ours :

"Afterwards there vrill no lon--er be Tor anyone to shut u, ears. "(95, to cry. TJ-, thei-

As the choice and impossibility of choosin--- forced CD -

Sartre, he 'hung bac'-. -. 1 upon his theii1selves upon -) L neutralism(96). But even his Ineut---, --! -J-,, -, tl articles F. re

I- E, , -) C Cý I_j ]? ermeated with doub t: I-e je c t-L-, --, c; -LLL--ý e -, to c-',, --iol ec-11 s

iýtl-nt-l c a mere Idecoyl(97) and bitterly conde; -, qii-,. -, 7 Cm) Fact: 'henceforth -Lýearl

Harbour is eve-ry-i,,., -lLeiýe fi

Europe. "(98)

In 1947 Sartre had seen t'--. e U, ])ýS. 'Lt as both t'-ýe c---untry e embodying socialism and -s a I)ower hloc p-

viar(99). But now, in 1-050, -)'--, rtre v!, -. s tc c -, et

tj L, . -I L- I- II C-r L that USSR had to Judged solely in of J'-- ex- t

144

realise socialism; had to be seon -ý, s , iýecfseý - of tiiis e-I'-'fort. I I'he choice to be that of i-mpo. J Ible of the e-L a:

ess1veet Eý. ý s P, -::: ct e rL- c le ý- L; ýaý--e c--

of Ghe SOO-, (D o1itces

The re gime if-, 'LL, e US. -I.,, s iý SD 3CS:.

but sociali,, zrl, 1ý -, S L. --e - ý-a by -D-, -, c C ne ces, s, ity of disa, pp-arlnýý- f 20 L of becoming hat it is at cost o -f, des-perate and b1cody

I or t. cerL,, -in circumstances, this reconciliptýon o-F' contradicti, ons may be s. no--rl---. --, o-u.

-s, v-, -L - '-iell. (100'

Moreover worried at', first L-Liat '-'-ie orea, -- 'S ct

of Russian agpres, s; ion, jartre vias led to see -, ussý, - E-s 7To havin. cp been -Orovoked -ýnto conflict b.,

--r CD I Vlest. (101)

The gradual crystallisation of this stance coi., -icid vi t, the furious acceleration in hf-s vioril: -.

"Overhauling his political position he was pursuing at the s, -,,, I'le tirfie an exhausting inner development and -Dtudies which devoured his de,,. -,,, -s. '. 1(102)

If he had located the contradiction as lyin, :. 1 C, -it-iin his

own being and not within his ideas, Sartre nm,, - sr--! I,, ý., t

his previous mistake had been to to resolve it

without transcending his own situation. -ý'e had the

,i ý/- 1 the individual Cogito, 4_n-'', -''ual subjective certaibty oi ý- ý-k - la freedoin and been forced to regard History and '11'r--e class

struggle as absolute Other, as pure objectivity C) - Li "I was the victim of and e-ccomplice in t-, -, e clas's struggle: a victim., because I i-,, TC-Is hated b an entire class. iaa accomplice because I felt both responsible, -:. --La pol.,, Ter- less .... I believed in it (the class

, gle), but I did not ir-ia, ýJne tliat it s trug was total... I discovered it myself. 11 (103)

Sartre had to take some step to hi: ýi, 3elf to-lu--,, --, erl :

"I had to acce-: )t the -, )oint of vie,,. - USSIR in its tot,:, lity --, -)d coui-t on i-ivself alone to i. i,, -,.

Jntain riy own. "(104)

145

In 1952 S'art-re had "reached breakin--ý- -, --t o---i-- 1-4,

J. -. T 8, S tap was all that rerýuired. Guillerni-i's boo Le Cou -p du 2 -L)ecembre convinced hi,,,

- t-',. at t--.. e C) vj---, --tues he had res-pected ., ý. Tere perverted b, -, 7- a

lie na. tion. All ca. pital'I sts s--jea! --- t-', --, e voice c-'-, C whilst remainin, the bourgeois individuals of :, "'les'i ! ý,. --, Id blood. The tension off -eso1, ý- e C". subjective and objective itself through a reve lation of the full natu-iýe o -,

" t'ýi e class struggle the strugple of men ageinst nie-i--.. '105)

Whilst in Italy in the summer of 1952 ---)art-L-e lear-nt o-' t': ýe failure of the CP's demonstrE, týon against and of the farce of Duclos' ai-, ýrest: Jacques

-Juclos, a com--! u--, iJst member of the general assembly vias arrest(,, d despite a supposed parliamentary immunit,,,? - and tv,. -o dead street pigeons found in his car were interprete%-, 'L by the Eutnlorit- ies as beý; q carrier pigeons destined to carr, -,, T 1-!, -., es--C ---es back to Moscow. Sartre, beside hii. iself ,, -, ith an, ý7: er, rusiled back to Paris :

"These sordid:, childish tricks tur. ned my stomach. There may have been more ignoble ones, but none more revelatory. An anti- Communist it a rat. I couldn't see any way out of that one, and I never will... After ten years of ruminating, I had come CD

to the breaking point: one light ta-, ) ý, %re., s all that was required. In the language of the Church, this was my conversion. In 1950, Merleau too, was converted. Each of us was conditioned, but in opposite directions. Our slowly accumulated disgust r--iade the one discover, in an instant, the lior-oiý of Stalinism, and the other, that of his own class. In the name of those -,, -, ýrincipies which it had inculcated into me, in the name of its humanism and its lhur. -ie-11-itiesl, in the name of liberty, equality, I swore to the bourgeoisie a hatred Ach

I' . 'i 'CipiLl would only die ý-itl,, me. "'hen I pre - tousl, ýr returned to Faris, I had to i,. Trite or su]'focate. Day and night, I virote ,

the A et Ic-: (106) part of Les Coi 'i'ý

S -, 0 In his A 'ventures de la dialectique U

. 1, " (- r is t-nc e YJ smi 1-e reason out his disillusion wit'-, li a

of his position from that of 3artre's in h-s Les C0 . -Uý

146

et la Paix.

But the rei!: Pn of the 11,1andariii. C) -I iiias over: its e -y a unique literature of refL- ction and co, -. nentu, and its impact upon French politics e-n-ou, -7.,, to illuminate in retrospect the fu-. nc-:, r-, iental -, -,, -i, )ote. --ce or' its leading figures. -I t- CD its -1-oundat ions had been uni ambiguity, dialogue and mutual exchaný7e. C) C-1

In the trans--*Lent unity of tiie -2--'rench lef by the resistance, 'I"erleau-2onty and S, -, rtre found a basis for their independence. In the eventUr-1 sii--, -. de---, -in- C-L, of this Left's constituent factions ti 0ý1 'ie neces, -ýity firm loyalities not critical s,, Tr-i-,, p2, thies. 7here Ponty saw only debris in 1950, Sartre sai, -., t--Ie ne. -n-J1 to

commit oneself to reconstruction. 1"erleex-! ýont7r felt

mise of un--*t-, -, , ), -, rtre the defeat of universalism in the de, forgot his universalism and chose tho PC in the r, ýI, me o. - -17 that unity. (107)

In the am-Wguity of the historical moment afteiý 1945 t]ae

pursuit of meaning was neither a distraction noiý a luxury,

but the necessary foundations of any action. The events

after 1950 rendered choice and not choosing bot-1-1 impos. ible:

Sartre dhose against himself, "'erleau-Ponty dil sc1E, C,

choice. 1,11here others had been blind in 1945 lvlerleau-? or-ity,

as Sartre expresses it was ohe-eyed. Yet when History

interposed the final veil between itself and Ferle, ---u-2onty,

it provoked in Sartre the Pauline transformation

"When even the best prepared conversions ý12., s'-, ed explode, the joy of the storm is unl

where before there had been only totC--. l darkness without a glimmer of light. "(108'ý

I/

History could not, for either, be waited -Lipon f1, --Qy 1-onaer d CD

and the commitments it now demanded denied for t-', -ie --. orrent

any dimensions of critical judgement. 7o-r, the resý-ýo=-b--I-e,

honest, truth-seeIing judgeme-nt %T,,, hioh had been t-'ie b-, -is

of political thoug-, ht after 1945 , vas not -n 10.5.2 e:.: erc-Lsed

C. ) but conquered by the exigencies of t'. 1.1

147

its -.,. ro4 In 1945 Temps mo-)ernes could make _ce heard respected in the open an'd opt_1. ri, _Lstic exOhanjes about future. If or ! Terleau-Ponty aialogue could e--.. Ibifýace botý, - non-sense and sei-_se, and 1-reserve tr-,, e cor. -di tio_-ý,: ý -Co. -. - tenacious effort of 'L.,, eason to reý-? lise itself. 'o be forced into choice, to have to comic., i-it o_nesr_: ýlff to but, Dne side, destroyed tl-ý possibi suc Cý C. )

lities o-iý - d--, lo. J, - -ue: "In badly posed problems, the adversar, -,, -3 -Iýc e`1 Lacc co riq For Sartre, on the other hand, the __. earc_'-_) for a, veiýEc`ous and effective personal choice had --', tself det-, -r-r-1-inced t-"n-e 1 imits of universality. ýLfter 1952 the sel-L-su-_1__cie.. c,, -

ft'4

of literary creation and action in good f, -., itl could , Io longer be the measure of an effectfve praxis. 0r Merleau-Ponty the dialogue was, 1, n a ver- real sense, over and any action must surrender itself to the cýDnsequences 01 such a failure: cyncism, prejudice and blind f-i'Ll1i. Vhilst Sartre accepted Goetz's declaration: riere _s this war to fight, and I will fight 11 ft" (11C:,, ]R'IerleFýu- Ponty saw the waging war as the death of p1cliloso hy ., oIIP and there remained no 'heroes' for the p1li-ilosoý-)her to

speak b.

For those, like Sartre and '11,,,. erlea- -%-ino -L -ý -''; ý 4 were not TvIcarxists) the sole option ivas to of -Cer coT-, i. '; ', U 11-fff and . 1,: 'arxism the one creditable legacy of - class: bourgeois humanism. For a while the moral im-peratives of middle class thouýcht sought fruitful conjunction with tile

C) political needs of the masses expressed tirou---,, the

Yhe 11 4 dealisim died i-`arty. philosophical dogmatis! -:,, of its I

in 1952 'and politics ý-I. Teresundered from ethics, '-, artre onty "abandone-11- : ýol-ýtics ýýt chose politics and 11erleau-10 %- ý -L -

that moment when he decided that it had i-Aslead

To rethink T"arxism Sartre saw, one had to be in a poL---tion

to urge a change: beside but not within thu. '- t. -IE-it

alone represented the interests of 'Lie p--cie-tc

Merlec. u-Ponty saw the betrayF. ls of coý, r-, u-iisqm --ýS --e t--i-lev- SIl 1ý lir,, oer ed, ably implicc-Aing any hope -'rit -v'e

148

-t, y _. -7. The confront,, 5, tion with 'I'__ ism an,, Iý. -I- c0 ---: -lunJ* =1 both dravm out and extended thei2ý re-LE'lecticns. 0 t_'-I approached tiiem in an ---ra they took to herald e E. t possibilities: for '.,,. '-erleau-? ont, -,, /' in t-LE e---Lo-rLs o-,, ' t---, e faithful, ironic philosopher to as, ýAst, honest dialogue, in the birth of unive-_--sal _; -ý. easUcir, -

"Our time has the incom oarE,,. ble ad-ý7 -AC, -a.. -1s7e over others of having given the public a glimpse into the 1jfings of iL! stor,,, and brought to light a few of its crude triclks. It -]-s up to us to defend this

or Sartre in the effort o--, '--' self -exi)ressiofi cai-idý in. ',.., ie tension of good faith the establishme,, -)t o-f universý' CD

freedom :

"never have men had such a clecr consciousness of their freedom. "(113)

TI his optimism was nurtured by the veif, -T 2-_i-; i_'bi-uJ ! z, nl unresolved character of the epoch. ýu c --i c, mb igu 4 ty ot permitted and circumscribed the total scope of Ponty's thought: the ambiguit'-'17" of his heuiýistic ", -_rxism, the unresolved state of the French left and the Cold the resolve to discuss and define. "erleaii-2ont, --,.. - 1, -. -, s the

lieur: his ver--,, r reflect-Lon dwelt within the continued

coexistence of o -, oosities in the tension of reason P, 2 unreason. He was thus caught precisell-, -, -, s '-;,, c_rtre sa, -s, hanging onto continents of ideas moving ý-,., Ipart: -_-Lussia and

J. L, he US, the PC and the non-communist left, T, ar-irism and -i ' istor., humEa,, Y)ism, &, ýpiri_cal history and a huf,,; _7i h 7'

C-4 rtre was rather the seeker of one trut-i v, -ioEe-re'lections Saý!, I free self- dwelt within the ihdividual impulsion oL

expression toward universality. "rie ambiguý ty o! Ls CD - 4r develOpment, ideas lay within the incompleteness of tlie_

r inents and he could safely 'eli-Iggratel to one of t-(ý-e co t.

as they split apart.

, ýfter 1952 man and the world still demanded to be

thought: the task set by Sextre and Tý6r'

1945. Th ef ---ý, ilur eof the 17. 'an\-'; - arins Iisa sjý-, 1,1-s eý,, by t',,, - e

149

genius o-', '-' the -'r vvork- bli-t t.. -ie 1euee C--) II il so in the incom-r-ilete cha, -j--! ýýcter 3--'L'

the t-', -. e . var- orged. El, rtr ce, a na it E--)

'ý In fact the ccntrad-'ý ction ilot, in us but, be-inning vr4-' t" JQL- -ý -I- -ýOS-Uion.

The position was ýD, rou-adea in `--atellectual -, --ot T)ol--l t

1-orities when the er;?,. -permitted sucn bi- s.

"In I)olit-*-cs one r. fiust -, -)P. y. re weren't ! 71. en L -, of 21ction, but wron,, -, deas are crimes as much as wronr? -acts.

115)

IT

,j and --"-ns I was ll--iiý- d The pE.,,, yiiient of lune

150

Chapter V

COTTV]ýý-)-Ijo-. - LTf) il 1ýýD .1"0

r-T -ýLlj L-

-j -7 c

In a section of his Les A ventures d_e 1-_ diale_ct-_*rue "erleau-Iflonty offers the distinction bet-'ee-n t-c--e takings of ljo-overninýT' and lunveilin, ý)`, bet,.., re, _-_')_ --. e v. r_ C) _0 does and he who sees, in s1lort bet,,,, ieen tLe : j1-, -, ý1esL,.,: _ons of journalism or seeker o-1' trut-i, and pol--a-tician o: -, historical actor. Ivierleau-Ponty ori, ý-ýna! _Iy sar, - Jr., ý, Iarxism týie means to pass be, -Tond t., -, e -, _)robleFi. f.. ti_c seperation of these two ulorids of visJ-of, - -A-)d ý-ction. t once the illusions of 1., ",,,

_? trx1sm haJ_ for been dispelleJ1, there remained only :

"two distinct ways of gointo ILL -i eu

vers. ý, I- one the more direct, consists in r)utting everything into words, the o'L, -,, le--L Ls - coi-, si-st in entering the game, vI - Lty, rith its obscu-, -- and creatin8 there a little bit of truth by she. V audacity. 11(l';

I/ ins The philosopher and hero oncý more follow

L and the divergence reflects retros-Dectively upon the

L project of Temps modernes. For its edito. s believed

-ii-iate precisely that t-'ý., Le pursuit of truth was a legit

and effective political interventioni, and that '. -., e 'Cio-ýiest

political coi,, ii. Jent,! -Dtor 1. ms not merely a vo, -,, -eur but

present as a, historical actor. Thus, -I, 7. rhen defines in Sartre the ultimate myt-'ci' as

"the phantasm of totel '-, -no-rledrý-e pu-, -e which unites CD L

action", he is also illuminating the very l-1i. -its o

-C7 to 'I. 'emp modernes' and his own i,., ork:, that is, n se

found political and historicC-11 action in tI-e EýT iL. _--'--'-

ties

of philosophical refl -ction and --"'----LaIoý-ae-

t- -L

U 7-

The mandoxin is betra7, -ed b-r. 7 Iho, ---__-z, off na2ý-ci -I

Ispec'CPAOr consciJousnessT -akes room `_'or V., ose

_17o"Lloxr (, heý- the world in its unIve-i-se, but c, ý_n on-...

thought. in the end, in see_, _-_ýF, it --, q-ls to se,.: - itself

rI I\ to dc) .(2 and doesn't Imm. ýt

151

The draf.,., a of the bein,!! ý- -'-o see- CD i,, L ao (_1 see3et conclusio, -) ! 7. or --s -erleau-_ý-onty: io_ý- ', _-_ýe -r--tter -philosophical lucidity alone t 2ý -C'

_j t". ie actions t. Lie circu, _, ), st,, _-__c,,; s tted obscurity, iý. ipe_ ',, e eab1etoest f1h c ý_j, --i :E ormer the er-: ý-. tive o-f po Ii ti cF-, l uiol L)"_' e--, -c, _- th, ýýA of seeI. -ing etrut. IL L,. -e c--cep"o- 0 wr C) J- as praxis 1ý., ras aýeveaie fror. -i Col"! cl. ý_L__ctal_ j is for sucla reasons "-iat Ties Cc . --stes et constitutes pri. -in(aril, -, - a ý-)olitic_-, I f-7, ct it ee sen the disavowal of

_ oliticEý,! i: loraiiis. p -ii, of the libý--- -1

reformist left, Of ý_: )artrels ov., _! ýi ol.,.,. Li clasc), 71 _; "I s and, above all, of the alternatives t---, e

allowed themselves. '. -ýartre initially amused rather a! -_,:,. -_red on r. ec. --e-e: the j)

'ý_. C). rjc's Oýf -LV -, ii. i en if the thesis demons trClAed the Lhe ovei'_ against the working class the e-,: -. ý-)ectek, a_ritit_ý)_esis revealing the vileness of the 'L: olitbu_-_, o C conclusion would certainly _L,

'ollov-. (3) Ti-ie, -,! - di. -_1 not L, _nv'__ could not, for Sartre had c-,. bandoned suc-, -i tives o__ intellectual ambiguity, and, if ". 1erleau-i-onty's iýespon,, ýe to the work within Les A -vent-ures

de dialectij'- Lie is intemperate and contradictory it is because lie the legitimacy of the wor'l-s- OA ti-,, o levels: as an _riii. qediL:, L'e political act i. -,, Those foreclosure of alternatives deliJes the

very premiss of philosophicI---,, l wo--k; and O. s ý_, -i)oje, -. iic 1,, iýiose as sv_ý. ap -ions, shortcomings reflect u on jartre's philosophicýý. l p

)uted. which, in turn, TTerleau-Ponty Iiad long disl CD

Yet, at the saiiie t-,;! -,,, e, T'Ierleau--Ponty does -: )erceive ', -. -'ie -1'. -- difficult and uncertain problem of o-der-ln, 2 philoso-, )'Iicý--, ý

and political choice

"Consciousness ma--riages to : -)--, -ose ca transparent glass, 1,,. rhe: oeas it never --eads unambiguously in historical aýý. ctiion.

" -1 -ier acti `-ii ýVe wonder v,,! -1-IetI on does not ---, ve

servitudes and virtues 'Lii, --, t --, -, e entirely different order v., -, ie-u---er

philosophy should not e:,, -plore t1ie-nn. itself - instead of substitutir), 71 (4)

152

Thus when "erleau-Pontly argues that Les Comýaunistes et la constructs an eternal choice - --'Lor communism - upon the t

40S0. ) of events by atomising politicEl. time(5) LI _cý ical nominalism should be seen cas y 2-, , Drec eý le o. ' servitude' to act-' SI -on. : 'or it Ji, ý_- tlae e-.: i, -: -nc_Jes of

era and its particular moment wýiich L 1ý fo: ýce Eartre's philosophy into a straightjac--et vLce ve-, -se, That tile worl,, -, is dated and has been sur)ass-_: ý, -_JL b. -,. 7, subsequent events is what Sartre would ng, 7-, -__j_ýIit. --. us L --, -tre declared bluntly to 17 A Burnier in 19'_ ý1, t'- ýý, t

"his article ceased to be exact at -Li, ',, -, e very moment he -v,, Ta s i., T it. 6

I? His long 1954 article, -or instance, on '(, '-ie 'cLý, usesl o, - the french proletariat's ap-ý),. rent a, ý c11 ly -)at-', -ly rests upon a notion of 111.1-althusianism. ".

"Since production produces the and since I'Lal thus ian is in is the dorri--*L-m-. ---It characteristic of our production, the French proletariat is both the vict-L-i and the product of it. "(7)

Yet in a note added in 1964 Sartre admits :

"Today(1964) this T..,, T-al thus ianism has been left behind"(8)

As Burnier points out, this analysis is understandly influenced by the fact tha, U the years 1951,1952 and 1953 were ones of stagnation and S'artre would per-11-la-Ps

still maintain that Týýalthusianism did beoueath an J important legacy; in terms oL' the present confl4- ctv., 4-th-Ln

L the bourgeoisie between ex-LDansionist neo-capitalisr, 'a ý-, --id

-remaining backward elements; and in t-Lie L-. 1-perative -L'o--

the trade union struggle to adapt itslef to nev, T needs.

I ;!:: 76

However, the ii-nmediate import of t"le Or ag eo has been substantially dirniyrislaed by the pas

- was surpassed bT soc-LE. -I ----d And if the work "ie e-. - economic evolution, it was also affected e

end of Sta-linisri, which hcad --). --ov---*L. 'ied , 'u---Le rs-'ý, r)!, ace

153

the necessity of making brutal, political choices. Tile end of t-'-ie 7rorean -nJ t-, e rz- '- --- subsequent period of c oir, -, Darative co-e. --isi: e--, Ice

-f- 4 f orr. -ried a new bacl--, uround a nd t --i e '-') ovieti-, ýi teo,. -.

Hungary in 1956 1 rially c. 1 osed t, -, is -, )eriod of

Is polit-Ji-cal realism, ' As Bu-rnier su-gests, it S -'I sense that the 4th volume of Les- Co.,. 'i-, 6t -1) ,

IX -L3--n istes E* is in truth 'Le Fant'ýPne de ') 'taline (10',

Finally, the whole worl-. -- is characterilse. --14 by- Sartrels

violent and mordant repudiation of --, is o,, -., n class: t1ie bourgeois. ie. 1ý. s, again, he admits hic

--L-e-,, ct-`! on to the Duclos affair and his v,, Tillinzness t1-iis '(.!

-, -. e to u, ý)

-i2ed of the cause of Illenri I. I. -artin(11' C-ý, Li- t, -L ,, reveal more of I bourgeois behaviour than a -reasoned attrý,, ction to t`ýe

C. (12) Les Corpmunistes et la pa-4L-,, -- is thus si-iot through CD

with very literary passages expressi-ri, --- -,, Strol-Lý--I'r felt C-) - (. 1

class hatred.. Sartre, for example, relates t.:, e

nineteenth century 'Saint Bartholomew' n-iessacres oý' the

'sorking class to the later pres, -ýure exerted on Vliý-, t same

class to ensure a continued low birth rate

"From criminal, our middle class becomes abortionist; by its o,,,, Tn methods it continues the work of its fathers: instead of perp- etrating 'a massac--, -e it compels the adversary to its own decimation. "(13', -

Sartre's reply to Albert Camus, contempo-, -r--, r, -,,: - ,,., it1i this

o -- -- ýý -1 work, (14',, also expresses vTell his contempt ---, d tot, ý

rejection of the bourgeois moralism of lbeFutiful souls'

an ethics in vrhich he im_-, DlicF. tes Camuss -. nd indirect1,7, -,

his own tendencies prior to 1952. It is wort'ýi noting as -? `4 rS t

jually extre --rorl--ed on t-. well that at this time ec r

which, in aut ra draft of his Les 1, '1ots(l5"` Uobio-. 'i c L, - 1

form, contains the same intensel: T felt re-. -)ud--, t-*on o--" t`ýe C

-'ato '-rt- ethics and ethos of the bourgeois class -e

v, ras born. -et ivithin these 141-, -J ts e jari e, --, - 1 C'). 0

-7 -''-icate politico, l and personal emotion the need to

... -iunism did force 1, t-e to beg-*n the politics Of col"? CD

frailling a response to the --Col-

cuest-`-ons:

154

What C-ýýIre the limit's of I-, ode----- c How does and -'(io-, -! cE ue -oousnes th e L 7O`I--'rIcI: I; ') cleý-s come recoý7- *se

itself as a revolution-,., ,-!, E- -,! - en ', ,a -Or-c m--SSI- --I jhere in answer to these does t-'ie -ý--ole o-., -'- -'L--ie Comi-. Lqunist j? arty lie? '-i 1-IJ co --ri cete -11 ýTj -10T. T1

nI -ie preký---jent discourýý,, c, -ei--, ent Of -L-, '--, e T-I-S c- ses --ndi tll-e -LLrilcue status of the 2"arty, -10 such ýluestions '--t-* eeE ri cr ?

The 'presencel oi the and t'-e on o thi s --)resence by the &-Ually -LL, '-, -ie --)ieoc. -u-, ), -. t-'; on of lj, "e-rleau--:,, onty. Inso-far as -, 'artre's sti, ýa 71s to

the mere facts o--ý--' iflodern --i? enc-!,, - society ý7ý. Iid- -ts -, -,, ol-4 Iic1 -ýL

events Ilerleau-Ponty is in agreei-iiel-A 2uC, "It is true t'_ýat todý2_,, /, the , -. cc t acti-\, -e part of the workim-, class adheres to the PC and the CGT. It is -Li, ue t, *.. --, _2L, any failure of the

_PC lessens t,,. e v, rei, -7 ,t of the working class in the politicý_l stru, _ --- -I e

and that those who celebrate as a victol- r0 the v,! orking class the --'Lc-, ilure of E, str'--e called by tcie 'L-C are aba. ndoniiiýý, tISti ae e workinr-, class L, ' t. n L-ie CD ) vvhich is, JOL-1 c ommunis t. 11 (16' )

* t'- ', ---,. rtre the cý, ', It perceive But whilst T. erleau-Ponty mic., fallacy of anti- 0 on, -iunisin, he objects to ", a--,, -tre i-iroceedingr

TI from em observation oL- the solid, -rity bet,,., ec-,

-Licýple of -pol- _c_'1 act- class and 2C to a single 7=-, t 0, ('1

, cts -ill L or., _ý, or it is Sartre i,, rho insists that tiie -n' us :

"in what degree the CP is the necessary expression of -L-, -',, ie v., or! -. ing class and what degree it is the %-,: --r--. ct expression.,? (

In the first article Sartre is only concerned to e: --, ýJose lie convent s sdo-ins. the vacuity of t., iorial anti-co.,

- LC- 0111-V , -uhus t'. -iose who argue tl, -t t. '-, e -'Trenc` c -SS c-

C) t -, e ever 'pulling the chestnuts o-lt of -e

must -,,. )i-ove that the Soviet leaders no lo-, -. ge-, - oe----e-, j-c -q LIU -, -)roof Sts the iýevolutio` ,, To SuC. 1

-C e -, -o) 7d

C- UeIe-, ---, le I of t -et--r-- - ij, j tlaat historlic-, I-ly t': - ---o' *a I

u 77ý J- tse-'--' a be lies ,. I-L, 1 -1 ,) I--- a the USZ)- nd U

155

def ended as at leE,,,,. -., tIco -es, o-

socialf sm. (18"

The ai-i-ti-couni unist ne. intains t, --, --t "'osco,., r the contrary says Sartre,

"For t1rie --d es ,

e ery dc, y. v,

The USS"LL ý-S ted by the l7es t to -L. -ý, o s es s o---, does not -, c'; - force and yet tt, eved0 eý, -

obvious distrust atred. ut and motives are not bellicose

our obsession -vitki F! ---i corres e ponds exactly to t. 'L obsession encirclel-, --ieý-t. "(20',

1.11oreover the French proletarfat no cL, u-, -:, e to 6- and the US propogandists vuill no,, -, --)ersu, -ý, --"Le 't to de', fl-nd the 'cul tural freedoij-is' of t-Iie ', 'J'est, when t-'--, ese be---Iý -, o relation to the real freedoms the ., lýss see'- its very condition. (21,.

When the anti- c ona., -ijunis t asserts that --ie PC F-Ind C,, -; T

needlessly impose the tasks of poliiticc-ý, l de,. I,, 1. onst:! ýc! ý, t1---on

u- G'iat t-y, e ve--. -y . Oon the working class, --Lesponds

,,, )olitics from econo,, -, -iics is w1i, -, t I ýi e seperation of

i '-) &D * 1-1 t-- 0 employing class desires. Furt-I'ler, the L .ýo ib C.

such a seperation defines trade union act -v and , fact,

-`-i-ý)ossible to "the truth is that it is stick to immediate dernands, ''(22,,,

For :

even "all action LP, 00rin. i-ion by L-Le o-. ) )resse-- 's if it is kept strictly . -,, -ithin tne lil-'.

rial claim s, is in --, tsel-., -' -, -ýid as of indust an event of acerta --', ii socta .DoI action: for it -reveals

the dec-ree- o-. C-- -ir- class troops, cohesion of the wor'! --i-L . their moral climate, the stren-'th C- TnolT ýý r-1 an t. (2

extent of the claim-ý. ',, '-ing I --

Moreover) the 2C does o--, -ily ', ia-ve --ecourse -c deý--)-onst---ý--, t-ons

156

and overtly political ý-: -, cts tO interl

L-L -)ret the i: iill of tt'ý-Le

, --, e ý--S- L proportion be 't,,. '. reer- the com-, unic:. -e -t electoral vo-ýý-

measure of its : oeal su- and '--e -7 s

e of the PC demonstrates the -, -)er'-L ect lie o-E c, legally instituted deý-iocrat-Lc ccecoise uo t permanence of ineffective o-, o J I's po" 'tion c.. L k, '-ie forced to assume only fl-), isolates

4 ýt a. -,

d its 3o

gr I -, from other parties and ,:, --)u )in--s in 7ra-rice. (24' C; 1;

If the anti-communist still clai,,. -,, s -LL, -'n-. t 3ns represent the inevitp, ble recourse of t-ae PC to i11eZaLit, -, - and violence, Sartre reminds Iiis readers t-1-ie class war is the sole reality end t-')., -, t thus :

"all violence, directly or ii-iýfi-L -ectl-) T

comes from the proletariat v,, Th --*, ch ves CD

back to us what we have given it. 1, (25')

For the worker lives as violence and internal the oppression which forces him to as-Dume tilie st, -:. 'kus o_7 worker. Insurgent and in struggle agC-linst op, )ress--, on, the worker rejects the inhuman and asserts a -. -)role tý_-, -L -Lan humanism - in violence. The escalation o-LO this violence

and the counter-violence it _provokes -reveal to the -,, --orker

that violence is the law of his action. But :

''In fact, humanism and violence are the two indissoluble aspects of his efforts to get out of his oppressed condition. 11(2ý')

And, importantly, this working class violence is the

'very substance and strength' of the PC, and the

proletariat "recognises itself in the trials o-f' stre-m--tI,. C; -v, -, hich the PC initiates in its name. "(27)

But it is the precJise nature of tuhis self -reco, --,,., -., -tion r-ý, nd

L3 its consequences which form the core of SErtrels secon'

article in les Commnistes et. la : -)ai--.. E. _. 4 -r'-* cle. Sartre made to Claude Lefort's critcisms o-,: '

I" OLI U -; - , These two pieces, together vvitý-i certE, --!.,. i pas, ----, --. -es

U LI third 'Causes' article' undoubtedl-,? - constitutes '11-ie

157

radical origJnalitY Of the , vhole ,,. rork the foundations for th lex e more co.,. i-) o-- týe Crit

Three distinct statements usefully ý-Ieff`ne t-cie -4---)te--, -- related context oi L - these artidles

11 -L

L. he aim of this article is to 7: 1 "I eclare. Lij agreement iý,,, itlli the coim-unists on ce-L t precise and lim.. Lted subjects, reason, n,, - from LL principles and not iro, --q- theirs"(20'i C

I am no tc ons id erinaý -hýý., tistobe desired or the ideal relations-Li, be',

,, een the Party-in-itsel-1- --, a -, 1 .: ' and the Eter

Proletariat. I aj--i tryin, 7. to understa-71-d what is happening in France, today, be-fore our eyes. It (29) "In my view, solitude and uhion are complementary relationships i,, Those con--, ection is the measure of a society's integrý-i, tion... The class struggle: that is the rent in t; ie social cloth: when this rent starts, viiie-L, e will it stop. "(30)

The articles are af irm declaration of solidarit. -; - the PC, which will not admit of, as Lei'o--, -t clai, iis is

necessary and possible, a critical I. I. Tarxist oppos-'I Uiof-, to

Stalinist practice. Yet Sartre wished to avoid -1, j, -posta, -, - ising class and Party as immutable absolutes and sou; 7nt to understand how the class struggle, the

it did in France, could still retain the ineanings

attributed to it by a consistent socialist theo---y. The

C: ins o ar analysis he employed is peculiarly ing --s: sol-'tude, it devolves upon a bipolarity of oppos- ,, Le.

dispersion, isolation and iqas, -.,, ification on t-'L. e one hand;

union, action, praxis and leadership on tl, e ot-, -)er.

. 7s, s as he1P

The problematic Sartre sees such an anal,

to resolve is at once philoso ical an' pol-*, -, -ic-, -, l: "0

is one to comprehend the distinction o-- (-, -e clasll-in-

itself - pure si,, 'ý-, ilarity of objective coiidit4fon

class-for-itself - subjectiv, ý-: -, Ily of its

historical possibilities; and, hw,, Ir is a class L-. at

capitalism is progressivel, CD disorganised and impov--rished to t-, -e -ieans to bec--,.,,,, e

158

revolutionary and -:.,. ctive un-ýt-,, - ca-ble c-" co, -, -. u, --,, -*--. C- - -J. -,

assuming soc-ial -i, )o,, T! er.

Given that Sartre describes IL le Ide-, 7e. -iers-tf-onl 3, cla, ss in teruis of its Iserialisationt 3 -u, e a compact sunImary of his

"the whole analysis _-, -ests on -'---iis -! ý'O' ý L 01", conviction: one can only le---ve L. --ie sI -that is, a class 1,! TIiich is orily eVe addition of the indi-,, rL_'I1-1_- is

. --ý-io ýi c o: : it by an c--,,, lrcýad_. T ConS-kL I. I deserialises it, The class onl,,,, 7u, e part-', ally d, ', -f_, *, _ned as a -t-- I __

-I El. I C' -I'. 10 I, -

t)

to -the extent that ti-ie. -j_-e is a "D. 1,10 UI-) 'j- acts upon the se-, _ ý', sý:! 11 -'31 21ality of tl_ýe cl, \1 For Sartre, the class is de-'ine, -)- y a, -2- -* ti, - I--,, ) u --, ý? dispersion :

"til-ley are a molecuic-r sca-ter-n- aggregate of solitudes, , -)ure p-r--of-uct o" ',.. ie autornation of tasks. "(Y'ýý

"'emand -7 EA al 1

or the masses not. h'in, -, ""3 3) they are only c-:, disj)ersion.

,I This massification is induced in tlie

tj Tosed by tlie lconveyoi2-beltl of semi-skilled jobs ii,. j

technologj, r, of Europe's 'second' indust-, ---*,, Al revolutioii.

'I is a state which is le, 7itj, rn-. send rather clir, nne -J- by the freedoms of economic contract a-, -id politic., ---l

ti-e into The free controc t a detachable atoi. -i.... The 'Lre;, -; -. Lom 0-L'7' -'ý-. L,. e

" -'is loneliness. "(74" worker is . i_ "Democratic liberties a-, ý, p-L-ovee massific-tio... and give tile wo---", -. er a legel ziass S'Lat--', --,

--e : -one! 4 The isolation of f., -, ct becomes t'l --e3s

ol zight. 11 (35)

The masses are thus neve. i2 a collective aubj'ec'ý ,I C: -, A "a e -ýi k.: 7 eo ff object to employers aiiý-_I -Lo t-1.

Vi-e masses' syntlietic -ction, if c,,; )s i1o L, L_, ý, L, 0- _

colIscious a, ssu,. m,,, )tion of collect-*, -ý-, el- Iaelfe enf, ýý, `, u` of cLlL,. L, -,,.,, -c)us i: o --tion 0- C L'i - -C

11 0&

Other to Other: irkit--. tion.

ie e:. i-A that i.,. essi ii c,, - tion -. tes I'llo tý,. -te, bo th iso1, --. ti (D-1 - --Ld f-i-- ̀

ý, e i* c iý- -- e -lb 11 -* ty

159

1: 7, ive- b--*--, --tl-- -to C, - on, as -, a ati o-i-, shý --n the V, ýl Ll S

'4e clasl--, cc J_ mas - 3 GC --eel its a. iýevo activ, T th ee Uri Ct an"a

'3ccause ,, L n vj, - * , - - ----

E! -Iq Oli Wilicil e uaý e , 0- S J_ ý- (--, - _ý - _L ýLO 1' "-'DL

tse' sac 1- 1 his 10,54 L:. --, -'ulole -)ai-L. -j---e '- -1 1.1 -1 ,I co . -I-eal ,s- -c Circumstances may c2:; -,, -stall'sa--' on "'. 16

--into iýevulu-L--io. LiL. x -- J- croý- -ýIs bu ie ad ' , . ý - ýý "I L teaue J- o ra t la es ta, -',, e o. -, CD - nlaz or ii-Eve -u- -, it--hcc c- .-d 1-1 - t-c 0S

Oi rm- Inet -L. ent claaractei..

"juc. 3- b. -- the 'I" s crol -e t-h-reate--ned

u nd ame ri t c, - 1ii. a, o r. q- chee, ierg ed

ýIto t. lie -scont'-nuJ

+ c,, nd d-* - 1, ch, ---ý-r, ac t eris tic o m; ass rnov-nr, (-.,, -Its mu:, -

,, -, i, -,, -refore be add, --d ca cci: t, -ý, in iiistabil--A-v.

rrjI I- -ice s,, ---io-, l is s ir-nif cant -I F -ý-ioii to -I'-,. Ioug-,. l ýý !, _. s coi e C. )

-ie ou 11-,, rtre Is not I-on of I tI pIwthi t-',,. e 1C. 2ii, _ 11. e y_ -hat tI. Le here his -ýoint reii-iaiiis essential- ,

-u I-, iLa on! defed t'- `n "y 0- clas, s- tiiý ---ý te' - un d tj -ua, L ý_ -- -_ _j a --, -i dd

--' s) persion d. 1isticret13 11 0. _Lý T, Ly and

class

e vvroa-li-in -- cý aQss ,,! iie unity o' "l-l- J-. - -C-D . Ký th er ef o -. e itsLiistorica -'! - &fidi *L,., ovinc, 1wth tl, 1

inso-L -- as this -! -S -L- e -. L sd c0n un i ni -'ic, - ch, -ii'-he tic , ct o- Li- on v. ý bv ci, s,; -Li

iiecessarily, is "-e iý-, olss as pure action OM E, Ssio. L-, -.

"'47 P

I- I )- ijIfsnotIiJ! i -i q c- jr- ectJ fi, - the L-ie class c-, fa -, -e7 once ec1 as 9v0u1 ýS t'I r a t',

- iiJA -, cy t-' on. b c-ýý sut,,, e-. L ,,:., ias s --c -

Lle -: ror-, cinc, the -Lc----(-ty, t Cr_L'ý7 ten is: nk. e,,

Iji-f it

vi--nts to breca. L -- 100S thei, ýesononeto

to tllc L

160

class woul-ý-, fall -'f'jito dust. "(43' Indeed, the hypot-Les-4, soe ft class- uni -ie PC is contradictory

"To draw IV-, e -. iassesl to - cojlec-tLjvK-:; repudiation O-E' the -

t, '. E -, -I : "C, nothi-r-ý., - less the Communist lEi. 1--ty i-tSel-if SUý 'J-

And th2: s unit Y O-r-ý cla, ss ",; i-L' L Ii ez-,, - L, - Cý -1 11 --, - --- c C) t- 4J, -Pj - Lin ction to the unmediatr-ýd airi ti, uni crowd - is also the onl Y poss Ible

--,, -, evDiu-L L 10 1L of the class. I", lýor not only is tj-e Cl, --S- no tile i -'arty, but only vrf-th the class-for-i tself

0c

'3to-ý- - Clas s, unity o-, -L -C

masses is revealed in ai-i epoch-, -ic-,, I. ---*, n; ý" operation which reflects an intei-ition; --it can never be seperated from the coý:., Lcrete will that animates it nor from the ends it pursues. ' he proletariat J tself cr. -ýE,. tes itself by its daily actio--ri; it ,, -;, -ists only in action; it is action, if it ceases -LL. 0 If act, it wi ll decompose. ý(45')

organ-, sý-- Sartre has def ined the tasI. o2- -Lon -, --, s ceaseless movement of uprooti-OZ `ý, he cl, --ss -, US) inertia and seriality, the i. iovement w1nich -`. qtensJI_: ies both the class struggle and the- i!. rorI_-ing class'

coherence. But Ln the passage above, as Ilsev, e I '- Jne1 speaks of the proletariat as cacton, as crea,, _ :_- Ij

'L he --- oIeo2,7 t'-i eet At the same tiniae he insists upon

and strenuously denies that a not-Joil o--L Llie s- -oi: i Len--, 0t of the masses can be derived or

or be made to apijly to the facts. (46) '1 Samb si reinforces Sartre's failure to adequatel, ' 3ec

J. distance betý,,,! een Fart, ý,,; - and class, or .o de "zie iý 17 1-1

relationship between organisation and nnass

--i, - -oasso. -Li' - ZI, _L in terr',,,, s of 'action Both Lef k, tzi d 4

_. -cuse e -ably 1 es Eerleaii-Fonty were undel. L. a -- cild ClF-S-3 f simply equating 2k, -rt,,, 0 tý is 4-ýre Mecý_, -_. s b -_4_c, 'L_, t: ie he meant only that the L- L __L

class is formed : wrf tten thfý-t tlie 's '-en-+-'

wihere ha-ve

161

,., *,, r i 'C' , -` It -, s 's

I h' t-ý-re cia,, s lyrr--ýýC3 to Call the t-read v. fh. -i-ch hold, r--, --e asparapu, ý--- tý)geth, -: l, r lbu-nch. C)

But 1--e-leau--onty could still a. ý, -jue t_', -)_a', QL__ _? J-1stinr, --ui2j, ". -1in_-, the ap E, rF,, t uc -'rom t1he 01 E3 S.

-LIS Vas st, ____ dentif I-, yincy tý_ie entire 2,?., -(, -e t i, vith the proletc-;, ri, ý_ý, t. '48' At ', ri e o--L the bunch, t. -Is cl-ose-y, -Lr ead ý- -,, -. 7i, -ý no in dica, t-i on O-L the d -: -, anism ne cE_- 3ý3al- o a. n, jL _arc class --el-Aýon and eq _1r7 L _Luaý- _y -Da- L to F, u est a- - n C -1 I v reý e ., - 2 e -1 _ - ý between `L-.

_ýýie clas, -j C-41 P r'71' nd its 1ea,: ý, _ e Cý 4 IC

t be-L. -,, -,,, een t. rie r., ii1_, '_tan-L CI_ aný the C- as "I. erle(-u-Ponty points ou hold oi: ý break, but it', c---, nno'L slacken or tighten

CD 111US

, 11, Then sroea-'--Is o-E' a, dail, -,, T r en e, k,, ýf a it is a of e: ý;. -p--essinu t-liat 2 r) - CD

,j each CLL-ty it co-tild suddenly bieF-. 'e,, -, but t is not a (-I, uest-on of control. e tw een

the proletarian and t. 1-le i--, -, il-Itants, bet,, -.,, een L. -:,. e militant and I-Iis leaders then there -i-s literally an identification: the.,,,, live in him and he lives in them. " . (49)

-ween Fai2t a- Th is1ac!, -- of c-:, rtic ul ate '-, d J- st r--, n cebe IU nd clL-ý. ss n-' t-C. *-ý reduction of derives ultiri. -Ae-'Ly from Sart-, -, -els

the two teri-i-is to pure act -` on --, ncd. pure dispe-rsion. 20r,

if the class is nothing, a merely statistical ent, Uy, then ".,

-e action of e '? arty p-nea-ý-, s s cre!: 7AJ on e: --

nihilo. Indeed '--)t(----tre , -, ient so fa, --, - as to deny any 0 Ij

di--lec-'Llical relation betweein c! .. sý-- -, -raxis and '- -at Olf. 'ss cl

common ex-L)er-i"ence o--j--' its condit-ion.

ýfit matters little ývhether this or is not eiacendered di,! --, _]ec', --i cal'i from., -the -., ý_-role tarf'! c-, n condi tion.

ntrLry suc-... -L, efort argued in return Lat., c-. -, L t' e co,

dialect, ic genesis ol prax-s is esse-rit. al e: l d

very

-, -role t---'at its '. 'The ex-perience of the 'I u-9, s -Loj- cal mover. prax is t-'Lle i-. -- ý. I.

ient. ra-S t"i L- _L tegrates ts coiqci_-_-t-, om, Of b IliCh it far as e-xistence... ses tself

L1 -7

c orzanis. -ýC-r tse1f and s t- ug, rlh -'s S ii, ý

--C. ) _- , 4t) )

162

and elaborates the sense ol its o2--,,, _)osjtj-ojj

E' -* to capitalism. "(51', i ks Lefort furti-i. er suggests, the ultilaate 0- -Dartre's analysis o-f- the

-riatune "consists in sho,, -, -*, n! 2: us that it Iiý-ýs no nature, in Purify ý--

, in,, the prolel-a-i-t off LI --L -

r-

-L all al(Aachments in ý6ýrder to -prese-, -. t it to us as an act., ", (52)

Lefort's criticisms pushed ý)artre to begi--ri his Te! )ly by emphasising

"I have never denied tl,, _ýe rootednes-) of thLe

worker in society or -the objective foundations o-L 12 the class" (53)

And his clarificc-tion of the process of ssi-ic. -tLion and automation in the 1954 article can be seen solie attempt to answer Lefort. But it rei-iains t-lae leL, j) -i'--lom the 'objective founda, tions' of the class to i subjective self-consciousness which does essentially de Ine the notion of Party as Lefort objects to it. TI-hus

Ci Sartre, for instance, expressly denies the posSessJ-on b

ýT the proletariat of any memory of cumulative experience :

"the proletariat is crushed by a perpetual present"(54)

He further argues against Lefort's belief that concen-

L tration, industrial co-operation or the for. ms of -jork itself can induce the universal-1-ty of class recuired. (55)

And he statek that the class cannot today -perc-----`ve any

real -relation between its ii-, i, -, aediate der., iands revolut-

ionary ends. There is, in short, for Sartre "no pass-,,,.,

over from empirical sociality to the class v! riting its t4

history. "(56) Indeed it is Sartre's conten _Lon that

Lefort errs in trying to make of t-'riis comi-nututatilve

and competitive universali ty the sole basis of and --iia t c,

for a revolutionary class intention. For Le7 ort, sa, -,, -s

Sartre : 4 lf

"the class is the connection _tSý the mediatinc agent. "(57)

For Sartre, such a power of integratioi-, is necessc----!,,, -

163

external and the notions OE* class as -jiý, e o_:, j condition and as pu--Le histo. i-, al sub,, L-c Ll-v-1 E---e equally empty. (58) The former cannot coun'Le-, --a-., ce 'L, -,,, e effort of organisation, and the latter lbeti: ý-. ý-s, as in a L, L Lefort, a secret organicisr. n. (59"; ý

For Sartre, a 'collective subject' as subject of -p-r, --- : is if not aI collective conscious-'fiess' , is necescE. --o4_111. 'T t-',. -ie product of action outside itself.

"The subject is the group brought together C) by the situation, constructed by its very

action, differe-atiated by the objective ex-actions of pra--ý. -is a-rid by the division ol labour, at first improvised, then systemised, which it introduces, a grou-, -) organised by the leaders it chooses or t.. roý. ýs up and finding in them its own unity... the concrete unity of the group is necessarily projective, that is to say it is necessarily external. "(60)

TI hus, for Sartre, class subjectivity is objectified by

and in a Party which still rermins the class' only real

subjectivity :

", 'Insofar as the Party in the heart of the working class is the su ject of its activity, there is in the subjective interiority of this subject a stratum of objectivity and exteriority and this subject cannot be the subject of itself, that is to say, be concerned with its own activity, except insofar as it is object for another subject. 11 (61)

And if the PC is that Other which induces a sub-'ectivity

of class, so too, for Sartre, the -v., orking class discovers

itself as an object for the Other class: the bourgeo-4, Se

Oppressed, alienated, and isolated, the -pi-oletariat

itself as belonging in its essence to Ot-; 'Ler. H Ce; nce t--e

class struggle becomes for the worl., I. ers

"a struggle to tear their objective re, _-. lity

from the Other, to re-interiorise their

-ice and to oppose to the c1,:. sq-_1, -, L-_itsc_I-_ esseLL the class avvare of itself and cl. -. im-ing -, -ts being. "(62)

consequently in t-', -le moveme-at of revolutionarl-. - patio-n A.

164

wia icH -- -L

"a double fý-iovement vihJch leads it- to aýe2 je c being a thing e-nd to assume ag. -., a-n or -t s el inC the objective ch-ai-, -,, c Lei: 1ist- s mi Dosed o, -. ý it, t-n-e , ý)roletariat cu es itself as concciousne-s. Its Sj ubecv is both the negat*on o L, -Li ec uias c c, -. ý si-c ss of the Oti - ier cand of i-L-, s own sub -ectiv-t-.

_; _nst t- a -]. e conce, )t-2on ofý clr; S_, s as . _-ý, eiýe d-: speiýsion. Sartre here introduces class sub: ecL_J1-; i_--_ V. 11- Cýi

Leriorised and a--, - iU _S an in' kJu,! ie d ob: ec tiv ty .. Ti hich

turn, is created by the op-press-_*on 01E' tiýie O'L1? _1e-_

(bourZeoisie

and instituted L-i the Other (o-r, -, -,,. nisat1 Par tyý 311 t -i on, precisely because '3C,

_,, _ I ie '-rtre denies that 'Lie clasý e: ý: per nce of its oppression gives r_*_1se dialec-1C_*ýc--,

_-11,,, r to class praxis (subject) and because he defJ_nel- t1le distcnce betl.,,! een the class r-and its Other as -rising within t1le ve. -7 subjectivity o-L L' the class thýýre is nothing to

thiin the oi: ", stop t-,,. -ie Other sL-Q-, ply collapsimý- back v, ---L- CD C_ se 11 .--c- -- Jna, -,. ) ýý ers tile proletari t once In other words, L as nothing it has no nature, it -4s not -1-ooted - and

everything it is the : P. -,, rty -,,. s action, c! ý;, s pure self- CD creation.

CI Sartrc, ls atteiiipt to understE_', -id hmlr tAe conformitl-,, of

objective and subjective is re--, lised in -: -, ass CD

ta croate-, - experLeice and ac ion left thus onl, C o-opear- between t-e ti., -Iro 'e---, ms. Since hs_, ccoun' gUlL L

to oscill,.,., te beti,, Teen botý'_, _ of these poles, -_ýs 'a accused n 'o un. -L e undeTS Uc-ýý, ndable that : _)Etrtre t', _as -E

-I t1a volu'l, s 21 or Les Comi-nunistes et 1! -', -paix o-, - 00 IL V-1 SIT Q64' i IL -i e -,,, ne hand a_r, _, L a ý_-et-_'sh_J*L. --,! - Jhype_ý,. ---subject_*L_ -; o-

ti sses fled ana io-s--i1d*c? 3_is- 01 he or ve c

L -i o -ý`s jut -t is ', rcrleal, t-k,

other. '65", --Fon d --ie obacts; vism , ýi ext exý, _I'_eme subjý, cti t1re

coIIIf,,., IoI-i ý:: -ou-ftd 4tD L

, 7-

pure oo, ýec e

Zae -ar esubj ý3 ctC, j, -, 1os ophy o -,

ter a7 0 l-" c66

2 or "Do LQu -)

nec -1--fuse to Uý t Pa2 ac 0nst0ct0n

-r CU ine an CD

Iderl e on t" i,,, - I sh es4c ate c 0.. -. II

ý- 0 -L- - L, . Uý_- -, ý ý, i

C. 6 -, - C1 -1 --

LL I ul, s

coilcn-i- OUJ-S. L u

ero CD

re J- j-, -ble CD SLI hi1oo j-) - ý, - i -ý -, 1-r' -* -', me-., -i *7 S -1 (-, S wholly c e as 1 -"it LD o J- - Ui osec! so1 -u. C? S be1c

absolu-, -,, wei- CD -Th t an I- CD t'idness

,, hat S-Sartre Ocannot, c0 ril-.. -) r el- ee x-p 1ajS t". -- wo-'-1-1 0 r,

il el M, -ýaning, of express-2, on, of

J-S this he 0 1, jc-"ts t-Iae in e -7 ortC6 2) t t! And.

-7- -- c -, -bove C-L. d i, -: ) L, -1 ii! 7, 'U -1- ishes

or (3 Via s j LI a, d there 19-t-o-be of is not, ac0 Ii

ins -'Uitutions. -iLjis tor., C-17 -'s no longer for

,, artiýe, a-S it was Jf'-'or 'D xed- rfi-. * lieu L J. Lc, ý-ý) -,, mi.. ). .L nL:. 0S ei t1i er v,, -, 1 ere I

"L" J "I 1ý'ý3 nor per --: -, t ci

are absorbaý--`,,. and t: 2L-i I I., ýi- i, e6 decL. ý-,,, but are some-c--*1ýI. -, -; ---j'-so e L) o 2- 1 and

I t- ex.,,, cel-b. aýLed, LI-11-ed to one e ilý-iultiplied t. 11--OLý (--I" -. o-,. -le '69)

to -!, --, ý-ow ! ý'The que, ---., tion C------e onl-- qen ---"I , Dar Lre sc-,,, there C, J

e 11-; 10 L, hii-il'ls, or whet-he-I ie e cal vorld, vihic. ' --0-

s ymb 0 113) hl , tr ut 11, to-be -ma de (70)

C) C0 rL S0 o'o, eSE? j - L) ei e, ý,, U-2ont, ý -00 LOS P, I*ý0S0 jj)'j' tr eIsfi rmily in hJ s of the ccýýD c-, -L

ec on -s el -r e a, de c-,, o-F -7- dJv very iL

ly -Ilool, 1--, een philoso. -, phical ouý. L/ 4 onty c, I p, ,e C, tsedl- b,. - nhs rie-. -c),. qe--

-j- U-c- d '7 ccen-tioA. L

re-, -)a! esent,. -,., -e --ll- Cl- is ai- che c, e ý2? t el- te-j. -fiis, -Lie source 0--

c (Drl sý c q., ue nces

-ess --, Lt-c2venes, doý n con cc -Jh e. us

LL --ereicm I egislaL, 0 IL L-3 C- SO -, s aý so CD

IýT ý -, 4 , -s u sli e is co-L. sc-c

'Y 0 c au -. 0 ol e, bec. %, use it -s ilot jec L- ---ecomi-sc-7 is all 110t. 11-1-9.

66

co (67 it --) .t ýý 'ah ,, es coc CD

Ce cýan nuýýnc 771 1" th eco o Oý-Lly co-. -i ceS, -o Ist a-I 00t li e i, s . -e meelrj--ngs CD 44- can f-*-r-j *tsel- such 8,

-2L 2'rei-, -om of C.

-IL, c, ý7-ý- neve- iD e p 0, -r e lr"Ol' -'L'rý-- edoi, t a -ia -Lsel - CE, --

never e.,, --ia's v alue, e -: D e -n -' e r-,, -Y 0-

. -- tsEýl --ii es re -1 o an ol 1yatte. to e ---i ) -% ,ý r'l 1: -1 ý -, - orJnP, -o-- er of

c. Lio: L c

"'Freec' oi.. ' _* Ls thus n ever-, -: -.. c tlion ý-: -nd in noi-ie never co m, nev, _-L 10SL., neveavea1 (ay ssir1a73,

IndeedassuchSfeedoie "l s .,, v1t aa. ' -, e1 conc: L, etc- action

m: mc. ý, C(J )is -iever beco, --. Qes v! hEt L. pe o-, -

freedom i VVz, V, 1) it does. I L ,t is never a do-'--,; -r one cannot

even ee vý-ihat ti is word i--, r. t. i- rr iean for Its c-, c tio;. I,. I, to nat iuLý,. s to be done not siL. -, ialtaneous1,, r re, -)i,, -, sen`, -, ed e-,. s e J-1 J-reedom L,., -j-at -, L, iever becoý--iies

-'; 'les'-, i-ievc-, ---

s c, ý c ur es anyti'lip-g and never comnproi, ilses tOel- if . J-ý '--le --reedoi, - to wiui-i pmier is in

"74' -is have. jud, -'e, C. 1-1 even slaves n chail

Co. --,, )ito cannot actioi-i -L I

"'There is no other trut-Iri than thu of co-r-, sc--ousness, and do. iý is -bsolute

'ative rootless init-

it is solely the IjDoi',,, er I o--'L7' cri m-, of ref le c ti on f---- C) C-

i: ý ebo ta a. to t . 1e

., hich the wo-Lýld, history aiil' tI ler

Jve2 or) in ': -)'a 2ý t re 'seed cý rcmove and iiij. iýied-, ! 7-Lel v T-. )

vi, ithoutiI. ed --*, L atioii -Ic i P". -j- eis-, aot iý u P- -La. nsce--,, de----cE;

c.. L conscioulsnesl-ýý tt Se'', On er s nothiný:, but arl, opening, since L. ý. ere is

j-10 OpECity -ij it to hol' *, a, ads tý--: - ce ceft ii)i e e-7- -I-, sthe., J? S 1. ý I _LrorA

tt-L', as C, 2,1, pe-rf -, Ctly ýD wýiere are outs-ýde- BIT t,

ci k-. L -ý-ac 4o en this is e h, t does- no'

-I, ld-, vifl-, -Cil croes L)e-, -L-)-riý-l its Onto -Llle 1ý\-. cm) C/ k -1

,01 ie, -, -I-ý it ý-ac t! .- co-

caoacit, ý .L '76'

exe7. : --, -i t -1.1 e, o -ý-

1a, ý, iý er-., ---v t!

C nsl- Sort un. en z:, crn. onty1s -4S4--p" S; L. U_ ý, 1. 'Iýs výjo2ld - oi` ot, 'ae- 0- -i -I- t-LIC"t t-

167

uaC; t "I t e ,. ec an mal-_ e c., -. oicess rid -xed oi,,. l y 'o-, -: -he ii-,, over,, ient -ýnte2oe, uo I ,, - ,,, r

c tJ on. "'onsciousnes - does not u-, pen ont Lýý, iiu neit-Lier can it _-Cin-f- any otlner alrea, _1611- deterr,, iined 10y 2, ts -ie c ,, ito. u _L o -E. L 0 r7,

'u-Ilus

"decides to loolc to i, -I-to-; -"y (, -)nl, -- 'I '-J

Anat- on of o aran, ýa ý-T-L ýe ci: i-ý,, -ýL, ac-i. e--s tile I and. Other - care I -ecidle.. a a by- means of I-ef-lection. "'77'

In other 1 ejn o VTOrds the prob I lor Eý re H'story pose, -! no questions viiìicii wei2c., noý, al-Leady pr-seint L, t, h e, problem of 'lie Other: in J-tse1-; '--' de--Jncýd vil'i fre - ir 11 _L_ en ., ai-tre cons ciousnes,, _3 -ì-om individual in his LL major woi-l.: Tra, nscendance de (7 8'

_. ýocia, lit,, a-D. vays re. r, -i. ý_ý, J_n a scandal' ioa- 1, `ý-_e co, --; ito and t-, -- C

"the socigl- i,,, kiole never starts mov'Ing- -pj itself, i-,, -ever y--'-elds more rr. ovement 'u-. E,, -n it has received from Iìn, -ý, ssimilable`l and "ir-, -educible"I consciousnesses, --, -id if it escapes fror, -i eq -*t can only be

, uivocalness, . I., - ive 0 throu(ý. ýI, L L-n absolut JL n it i a, n the ar t

C) IP of sub j ec ts. (79ý,

Ionty illuminates -1--me aad a-crain tý---- -, -et,

if !,., Ierlea, u-I Cý i it ideas, it subjective and solipsisit --Ldealism of Sartre's -

'-'f c ! -:., le e-x-tent t-l-laii, he can sl-iovi still Iivs el -, ct only to 1.

-Lr-, J! s ý3art: cels er-,, --ors to 4, mpl--co. te com. -ý, 2or t-f, -ie d-stance

between Sartre -A-ld 'I,. -, Larx must to demonstiýe, t-e t., ae

), I tre I- I Ly of itself by --, -eve,?., I-'ng irripossibil C) failui--e as necesssx.,,, in univc2sa. l c-., s v-ell as pe-so--, -. --tl

--lec, u-òn'-ý- 'artre's -ià-`ýure is t 6, -p, I's Me

svir, it-. otomatic rj ýL-- ot'.. Lei, extreae T's, )2Are's 1--reasons' 9,, -e G-,, t Ll--

J- 's beca,, ase ta-- -ism, axid - i- - froin tiiose, oI -'- -: -I -Pen' s Js broke-- e def d-;, -o-,, lec -c aown than

-ý N 0o f--lmuil ist ool , ti cs ("'. 0. /' i,,,,, hat jar-ju-- nt-, -*butes is br-, -, -L on eco. Th e t1le dialectic .... tlae f 11 re o aI--I

Ctic 4S accorp-Lolislaed open!, " of tl)Le d--j-ale C- I-' clendes', 4-n-, ely t1le Sartre and c

coi.,, iiun is ts- f' So 6s ght n crr o und in iu a-S!,

. 'r t

n -n, 7 'ý's II lils

r' _-_. S wl- -I ý: - j- he does, COT111,11,1, C:

168

itse -'

f a, s ii sýý, -, rtrels myth o- , Ct4. onf -*S -lultL-abolshevis- precisely becF. use LL it Co" ws as E. 1-. -hole Eho itself to hcave foresa, '-

, en truth -t'i e -jhiloso- .1 --s L, 02"- 0 Lý,,, nd the dialect-I ont-TrIs 02 4-

I L-story no ong---, - 1)resents a rat-, --onal wia en --: a cs I o- L -LL nc, c, --ý, n no1on ý--, e rJ terifýe-'-- te and : *n ý--. --enesis D-:?

trut: ) c 011,11il-a -, i seeks its ol-., -n absolute v -n ca -L 01a no. is indexed oi, -Lly by t-ie )u: ýýe con-Dcious-iess 0-

bei ag in the trutli. S)artre Is pu-, -, e cz- c ti on c-ad s.,, -, ontIII i'l- CD -. L eous gene:, oation of History --, nd (..,, lass are only the . -. 1ost obýTious ajd notý-',; - T ,,,

1eo. ý- I-i eI -p o. - A- -t': Lýuits o-

truth'. History becomes merely a corn, -L ; -iunity o" events sustained b-,,,, the action of t', --- e few. The revolut on itself, as in Sartre, becomes an absent and lncý--,. lculipble

I. uture removec-1- from the present day stri-iggle ý,. rhose only i, -iotýf is now - action -S I -I tý-ie sole poss--b-*-Iý-ty.

ý-'I L, "-- 3artre's recourse to a cla3 ed and universal his'o-,,.

disguises the re, --ý. l nominal', -siii and prgai-iF-A- b Jsm of I-lis

political practice: Lefor-It teripis it an em-, -ric- denies t1leory. (83) '-bo,, re C-1-1, for -erleai-, -ýonty, Sartre

main t ns ', -, Ile dichotof, 'j,, o rad: cal cortJngency -and i-, iytdice! C/ - -- CD

TLC rationc-5i1it., whic. "-I "er'leaiý-: Ponty sees as the outv-rd s-*-i.,

of coi-i-i: -fiunism's crisis

J Revolution as a lperhý,, _psl

s action 'u-- -1- ed a. - disjointed betý,, Teen a, utopia si

, nfinity ar-I comletelly d--L-Lerenu -,! Dresent tlý, L: t it sanct-*f-es.

7 ý1' one `ias to class 0- -L

--

-, --c the revolutionEx-i, , io., Iect-c as 'opt-*Piis--* - the t vi d1eetusno II ongers Ii e a. 11r: o

-,, evolut-, on.. (84)

t -e-le. - s0 th eo ry c--. - :j1, ý- -- it is to t-', -iis C-r-s- qd ce alect -I ru ponty turlis throughout Ais

- es A_. vertures de la. d

tutess0t const--ý eed cand wh-'- --)

ila hý s liurl-. "'Lisme et Terreur, 'For, as -I--

I- ut-l-le--ritic cl'c t-* Oil or collfrorits Lae lie cess ty

t --'ie outset of t. 7-e 4 sto,

ration"ality of hl

169

employs Alain's d. -stinction between a. 1., jhich total4ses ae hole of 'Iisto2ý-- -J e ti -)Oli, ics of understanding - which_i tall--es as -'-i e is, au an obscure WO-L-1d) resolving problems o-, --, e , ---t at I*, LI C 17erleau-Ponty demonstrC-: ý, Ites that eithe--o -pol-ILt-ics the question of the ot. '. -1er: those 7-,, ho es-pouse t_--c -. -, olit-_cS of understanding aro not able to tal--e, tl-le ev. 1z Dly --it as it is, and those who practise the -pol -. son I tics o-F' rpust live their time, for an a, 7ý-: ýeement OIL ult end. does not give accord on the si,, ecific patAs to be

"Politics, wheti-Ler of understand, C-1 or re-son, oscillate between the world of reElit, that of values betl, ý; een in-Jviduc-ý-. l and common action, present aiid future... Each political 2ct engages the ý7hole o' history, but this totc--,, lity oes not give us a rule on which ,,. Ile can rely. "(85)

And if the "whole of history is still action and action is already history"-, how are ,,. re to discover a --'istory that is both object and ourselves, lmo-ý. ý., n anU lived. It is in the I: ork of 'Veber initially th, -t T. erlea-u-ilonty finds

an attempt to resolve this dilemma of historics. 1 un,,., le7,, - standing and action, and this dualisý, between a. histoýL-y

we are a part of, which we evaluate, 'ual---, e up, and a history that is complete in itself, objective and known at

a distance. ',,, rhat 1,7eber oID-,, --)oses to both notions is the

idea of our interest in the past: that is, it is ours -Ti

and we are its. Thus 13eber calls upon -ý-i story to testify

concerning itself. The men of the past caught a glimpse

of the truth of their own era and consequently the

attempt to put the facts of tfie past into an orde--r- capý-ures

the very movement of the past. 14-istory is a spectacle

only to those placed ecually before all soluti, -ý-nýi. Trut---,

says 'g'eber,

tlis that v,, T-', -iich seeks to be recogr-lse, -, - b

I all those who seek the truth. "(86',

Historical understandin7 only presuj)rýoses the -)OSS-11bility CD I/ ., ) te that we have a past w'riich is ours F. --, -ýd t-i, ý--A v. -e recL, --,,

in our freedom the v, ork o-f' so ot"-k, -:! -- f"-reedoms.

170

0

History is not a. -, --j extei-nal (37od, hiade-,. -i reas--n but t-'ie metaphysical fact tniat the same life, our o,. -n) --ed y. spI-, out both within us and outside us in our resent E. 'r)-J nd in 10 our past. ý7 '\ It is the fact that %ý! e have felioi,,, : i-ien. (\, 8/) But if we can assur ne others, lives tal-e up our, very Ol, ', --.. L past still we cannot posit an end to build on the ast and --jLve ourselves tas',.,

-, -- ie future

"History e12; minates ti-icý irrý-t4ojý--, J.. "but' C- it does not have the po,. -7er ore la c nc-ý- false i, ý, iith true.; I(c`8) .Y --- '"Veber's lDhenomenolog, -,;. - does not li`e "fegel's lead to an Bbsolute -n, o .-1ee8

History for 'v'leber is not a single cohel-ent sy,. _,; t e! l, i "historical epochs becoi-Ir-e ordered a-. -ound a questioning of human po. -Dsibilities o. -f CD

which each has its fori-mle, rat-Iier tLi. -ift around an immanent solution o---' wl'-iich history would be an manifestation. "(O-, Oý

With Weber's 'liberalism' the politics o-, '-' underst, --., nd--`, I-I-r-, - recognises its limits: if history has meanin. 7 not directioll

what makes a olitics important is not the -ailo-op'i, o

history which inspires it, but the prese-i-it universality of its actions and the

-personal qualities of its --

]: ý t-

icipants. Weber left his personal beliefs outside of t. lie

classroom and, as Trerleau-Ponty explains, ', ',, 'eber de-ý,, ion-

strated that a philosophy o-L" history

"does not break the circle of kno, , T. rledge and reality but is rather a meditation upon that circle. "(91)

Can one go beyond this relativisr, of past and present

presents and discover an absolute in the -r-elative? --For

-1 e, il-, ter-* al s: n, Lukacs, Verleau-Ponty's next chosen exaFip. " Jve response ' '-14 J --y. is the basis of a pos-1-t- k1o tills -,, _u-, -

the relations between men -,, DE?, ss throuý-h things and tl--, at L there is thus an exchange between huma- existe-rces ---- e

as things and material things possessinc- an ndep-, -.. -,, ', -ent

life founds, histcý y. -41 S t: )r c for him, the unity o---'L 2 -o materialism is not the reduction o khe -'aistory of ., en

ee that of i,,,, -tter: r. -ther, it uncovers SI be-tv,

1.71

subject and object c ,. t t-"ie bottom o' +-'-, e s ýý, lienation o, sub2ect in ob-"ect ___c_-i, -ers ed will be ti,

-e basis I-a re --teý77a e 0-1 on f -LL

. a, n. All p-, -- -:

---oble, ýas are al 1 philosophic, ýý, l since -For r-clsely o, ec4-s I- ces become institutions. 7-,,.

-'Li eree t7,. To --ioments per-, -etue, lýy suceeding b-,. i-t- CA

a higher level: a, hJstor-:, allows its -ý--)h-*i

readJn o losopha-cal ..... ýean in o 1D o e: E ýI i,

and a return to 'L, -J-e IGts -sent

r phi1osop hy a -,, ý. -Lp ea --r- as --i istoT? Sý 2

When 'arxism cla4 ms to f ind P_ rpe a-n ý ng 3-',

0 is not conceived as an L2_-cesistible on ý_LS a certain end. It is not thouT_rht 3b! ems 2, solved in adv.,, V i. ý t -rice but rather t_`iat tliere is no which does hot bring furt-lier 1DTEýci sion to ', -ie : )ý:, oblem of knowing what -man and his socfety L_-Pe.

Importantly history ca-ý, n thus be read as it is accorr, -I--, - lished because the proletr, -, -5- - or -Cs

1ýot-- is the

subject and object of 1-, -iiow-.

'L- edge, bece-use it Js an 'intention of totality' Or in intention'. --ft e 'historical mission' of the proletariat --*, s to,.,, Brd -', i e

absol class c-tnd, at t--ie sa-,. ie t. *. -, e, -t -ute negation of s L trutl a-, J, ca, ph--,. losophical mis, --,, ion toward the advent o-. -i

the realisation or negation of philoso-, )j-l-. -. T. n HuTýý-, -, -ij sme

et Terreur F, erleau-Ponty had clearly asserted that, U

-ýo-l - 'F-, t "the Ilarxist L, ', -eory of t"ie ,, )- . is not an L-,, p-[)endix or a- addendui-]. Tt

is truly the core of the doctrine because it is in the condition o-l' the -orolet! --, riIý--. t

"e and that abstract concepts come to lii life itself becoiies al,. Tc, -, -enessý'. (093),

and again in concrete terins C) '? it is diMcult to deny t`iat Ps ýs

t ns pý- at r e, -,, E, the oroletL, -4- thereco il tionoc, -nbE, - humanit. -)., or remains a dree. ý,, -, oi-ý i-ýýj, -,,, -stific, --tion.

111, "94)

-ýiýoduces .; fe History La cons ci oas-n e ss of itse'

proletariat: yet tiýiis clc-ss cr--nnot be t-'ie

172

histor-r - it is Iot e be Leed to mý-; e to a cleE--Ir c-) Lsc--- 0 ts "assion. IlL IS --'lf mous sente-7ce

The týues t--l-on ip, not C --; %I ,; Eý t, oEc e-iv-* s- f or t' e -L4 be4--i-- ea n L, -1

b

rb of t. he t0 -)roleta, f-: b tj -ie -ro7 et

as a -nole. I 1ý e ciuest-lon is --s 4e

-ý)iýole t

coLI S 411 0

action be forced hý-storic-j to teJ I- c0n0t C,;, "T"ith J ts ovun ture. ; "(95)

But is 'ý-, he 'secret oý eo1et'stecc to 'isclosed only to te -1 be at]. C- 0retiCLs

I-leg , vý __ -L 7Ve -el r-M historica. l r__t4 op_! ý' e" la- and jý-re. -,. --oga, tive of tf' eo CD ie jD-iiloso_,. )iieI_. f'orms a response: theor-

--L'! -,. IS eor c) i expression of iuhat -_ý_s l--,

-v ed bty L pro1e i-, -:. n 3s ta, neously the proleta-r-A- c- U -ý-: A's life is olito t-Ile

level of olitical Gonsenuý. _. _' -1, t

-the profound philoso Jri-ic-l o- the notion of 2-S to lace us an order J- s i-- ott ia t o-., - -, -i ol5-, I-ed,. --, f-

icý-.. ti or but r, --, Alier t'i-at of com, -, un and as,, --, ociati-on. -f 96;

it is the, is this COIQj'U,. LiC__tion, this Party 1. vhic'L,.

exchange: the theoreticians lead but do not manouevre,

of 2-he ý., F. 3 thep-are one ste-P but only one ste-) --, sse

and it is the i., iasses w. -io alon. ýý, b-L-_JL_r_1-- the seal of to t1ae politics of tL, Le P, 7,. rt7r. (97', ',

The proletari, at can - in unicue ect-i cFl L, nýc! e C-ý with its Party - iCul't"ill the historic-,, --'- missio-a becaaSI, Z-, - it is alone the cl-ýss v7i, hich C, --t,, -ecates

isel" as ID cle--ýý,

because it Jls in histo----,, T the very 111-170-ý-! -- 0--

negativity'.

c -L-* r, E L

Yet Lul-cacs' the t. Leoa! et-c -- . 73 c

-C- of Soviet coi-, munis. -ýo, --ý-, as reý-)u,, Jiated. l--

too, real4sm c-,, ),, )eared to re-,, -)udi-ýý-te -', ----e L di,,:,, lectic- '-, 'or T'-erl co u---i j-i rs er- ts

tj

as a systei-. -, i,. - intellectuall, , 1, ý- 0

173

. I- I_ J disedec TL -, c by tc, -, "-'--e suecajud ýý-, e i e- -n. tc e whicia leads on-. 4e c) e to be \r e contL inues to fur_ýc- ue and ticie r., iystr-. j O'L-Is _Lýtu t'- a systeý-_-, honours t, -- ed1ec1c 1) -uý annuls it as a, nstu-. i e!

. ýO!: ' Tlerlcý-ý, u-! IontZý tI. -iis- 0-- -S aIect*c rooted in a c-Ieeý-)eaý e,, tufvocet-ýýo- 71 0 I--I -L' -1

0-

-ýe --ý

- ý-ý 11 ('-- - -- )

the revoluti oz--, 21 s p--, (-, es ent e J'- as t-ie, -ýT-'iui IC, ofS i- (D LL

ca=ied -vT-, thin the co-urs-e of event, sa ii c- . -), ) e -'ýI J, on when certain external ý: --vents e-, 2ýe un- te-d: on "'-'i e eo', ' hand, t, -. iough, obJective conditionsý on consciou: 3A-ess,

aen wiio mak r it is nevertheless r. -istory: t--c, -e 'S -e the4 an I int%ernal

--r., -., echan--j-srn' mc,.! --es 'L-,, -ie r. --vol-ý-, tion 0 beyond the strict frai-, ieviorI: of the average ob. 1 ect-, ve conditions.

This is moreover representative of an -P, T22L,

- Cý .. I W- 1 a- c ! -I ,;. erleau-Ponty sees revealed in T, -,: ýxs own i, ý--e one f inds

"the same discordancy betv. reen na, --; ve re.. "Lism and dialectical inspiration. 7'(99)

The conflict between Luk-acs' Testern 1.18, X: ý-i, - " 1, ý, 111 and

orthodox Leninism can already be "'ound thus J-'o---es'-, -, Jo'.,. Ted r -lodox,. 7- elin-linoted I in 'I"arz: the Lenininist orti -- (--. ý,,

heresy just as ', iLl `5 0ho '. 'a= him-self el-imL,. -, Eted aftez 1 first 'philosoPhical conclusions. (100)

Merleau-Ponty in fact offers no more taC-: --i nomi. -,,,. 1 evidence

T it matters little thi- of such a., s.,, )lit in ilarx, but )j L, eo1e context since his p--imary concern is

o. L-., ty historical movernent of arxism, U, perceives what he considers to be the unresolved te-sý*-on

between dialectical thou. glit and naturalisir. 'i.

-en b7. the a' is tfie work of negativity undert-'-,, V-

11 _n then tl; ie revolution can only subs e(,, -ý uently bet---a, -i7- tse!

tsel-L 'bed obieCt-.. *L,,., e"-- t--e by represent-, -ig L-,, s insc-------L -T e eal., - 11, D n very order of t-, L-, --. )gs. o :. role c-

174

suppress its el-f as class t-, e _-2art, - C retur.. iu 21 thi iýi t'- erevo1ut J_ o n, pa st-Eto. --. to 'L e positive. Ii -e histor Ji c,, --- ee-: ) e t, _: ý ties0 assert t. -i e-i-iselves even i-n=e, st_-L-omý-'Iy e L LI

_. L I-- 01

positivity.

-Thus all med -ýiate identif JL cati on3 of t-e d i,?., l ect 21 c a, e tra

.j'- --I or. -ed to 2r-al identities: the PartY s t' -L -e --iroleta. -J-at, the proletarirýý. t is the rev',,. (lion, tý-ie ýlut leaders are the jDa, ]ýt:, r. tf(lol)

r Whilst in the proletariat as an e... 4_st_i-i, -- 13, torica. 1

-7 confi, --yuration is concent--ated all 'L-'-ie ncg,, -,. t--*vi'u, -- CD

ineaning of history, those --ho re poý-. -er y receive absolutely positive control, since

other than the prolet&riat is _ý,, Z_) enem, 7. ": it -hout

-e c, --,, -i be, "or 'Iei-lea on t-- opposition or ireedojý the L no dialectic. Thus, as estf--,. blished regimes, --, -evolut-I ons

can never be what the, -,; - were as movei_qei-its :

"Revolutions are true as movements and f,, -. lse

as regimes. Thus the cluestion arises whether there is not moiýe of Ca future Li a regime that does not intend to rel, ialhe history from the ground up but', only to change it and this is not 'he regime that one must look for, instead of once again enterinýc, the circle of CD revolution. ',, '(102)

This quotation from the lEpilogue-1 of Les A,. ven-turLes de

la dialectique marks '. erleati-2ontyls decision to fores. -__I_t5 .. L-

further reflection upon the course of, ̀7 revolutionary

politics: the moment of 1ý-17 can neither be renel,. -ed

-egime w-ýaic_', i does not recreated. The future lies in a I-L

CD

intend to remake history from the grou. -i, -I u, CD p

Ponty did not entirely thereafter ignore politics in -', -iis

Fr e i, writing: his o-,? position to the c-, .! a2

to the re-emergence of Gaullism was a, -ý -P_ý`Inc_` pled -s's

of his old colleagues at Ie-. -, -, )s , iodernes, Hen colice-1--ried fre. n himself wit--' the fate of France's colon D -L et0,

-i - he rc. -io-e or ti-le ground of olitical. philoso.,, ). L ma p

less silent until his deat-'a and this reticence r,., - _-es

Les A-ventures all the more o-_, C a_ci unseA_LS2C_:. Ct0_, __.. '__ -... -Or

175

It is unfortunate t-i!, t he --; -----, - `- ýý I ---ý

os+ shoul. ý. L-'Ve S Lie book, n the trenchezif t1 P-- e1ymersac upon Sartre Is 'ul ý. -j--ab olshev; s. -: ý bec&,,

-ýse 'L-,. e critique derives ý-i-uch of its --F'orce a concern the more --ene--, 'al -, -es of' )---t, -e s ontology; secondly, because t-1-e object of t--iis atte-C1-

'-pre eminently the v! or of circu. s+, 1-, --,, ---ces E. ttitudl-s whose nature ly ""erleau-Ponty see-i to f'--ý11 comprehend; and t-iirdly, becauslýý, ti'dis cL-i, -a, )ter ts inclusion only by ? -. ro'u-*, -L, -,, - tha-',, - E)', -------tre ' -; I-)OSI --10-0- . -,. Le JI El r-1 L

latest revealing outrage o-E c o.:, i t e, ---L_L C d"alect-, philosophy -a premiss which is assuiiied t--'-i_E, n C sustained, and which misreprese-rats ti"ie re! -D. -1 o-LC Sartre's relation to the PC P, -nd

to 1-arxil-)r. -i.

Les A. '. ventures is unsatisfactor, -, i- . aorcový--r bocC--,, use ',,, ', ie chosen ground for I. Terleau-Ponty's publ' c sepe- ,:, t-" on from the cause of communism is in itself c--nd in t. le c0 11 tt of his earlier Humanisme et ter---eur 0ff62SC, , DO 0rste

f or the fundamental debates -vTitj"Iin hiL-: ) -! DOlit-JCý-a oII_jj0s0, )17'jI'-' Thus the argument which proceeds from the -ý)ref., ýiss t: -ie

-Ule conclus- all proletariat is negativity to Ci Jon t' ,

instituted revolutions Must necessarily betray tL-Leir

Origins is a curious and limp mixture of tie p--i-obleii-i o, - the end of History - foreshadowed -, perliaps in oje-\re's

reading of Hegel - and an abstract general iLsation froi tiie

fate of the Soviet revolution. i'ol,,. There does . 1erlea,, 1--2ontY

display the subtlety of thought i, ýThici-i 1-ie devotes in

work to the dialectic of -Party and class in a -L,, --, -e-

revolutionary situation and ý-vrhicn' could -', -E,, ve have be-en

L ", Gages of co, -. -, -. lu-, -i* L Le st creatively ai)plied to a study of t! 1,17, L- ol t "i e the peculiar situation

Of 17"USSi ainL

I- - o-' ---c-*, --lisn. the European evolution, tile illusory

in one country, etc.

Yet in one pas-age fro, -, the -L. J wh- see-: s c

to explain his transitioin fro--( -eur, te-_-_

I, Ierleau-2onty does give some clue E,, q to L,..,. e -ý: ki-Idei2lýr-_):,

176

conceims of Les . 4. Teaturtes :

-AS c ,,, J_ 'The

ev, _ ob 1 e, -l us Lo cons-, Lro., outside,

- ob ec ti-,; -ely, o-J S _7 -L' see us n L_ie e----, d

I corii a of _JLnte_-_., ý, __ lif

In o'L e -,, Tord ssto 2ý 71- c , her 1'45 avo. ------l

ttitudýe- to-,. 7! ard COIýI(IUIi LCEiýi auI -i e : L, -4 S1 -1 C of resi, ý to

c about the aut-Inentic co,, ---, is "I ý.. -r, - ---, 3-3 L r-,,, 7- C, ý-- i, omised. -its o-j wee ieev

C), "is ,0 --L -- coulý be 1,,. --Tte- o-i no of sucil ý hope. L, C-- -- CD And Ji story st cr -C -f in itue

lori, ii an indissoluble uail., eeIt 'i e L.: ýie..,. uh, in t. Lie critiqu. 1 C -, .I I-, - e I --e--L- c's e itsvL' ---)uces

I A? -ITiSto-, _, - COUý

iI! 71 __- ; '0 -, e defects of -action.. 10 -LIS 2-

-e ro T-,, enS c onfý Vý- est susceptible to an inte--i-ical c. ' ýý vr o1d its thew2et. -Lcal contradictions c., s 200tjS O-L practical failure.

mI "'ei:, lc, -,, ý-ý-17onty coi., --Iucts h4 s , he unidoly haste , -, Tit. 'I

divorce from 'ý', 'eber, Lukacs, 12-rotsky, -., nd

e tr4---. 1 o. '

Sartre are curious v.? tnesLý, s tl e

dialectic a show piece :

One d2jy ! -'erleal, -Fontv becc-:,,, L,, ie furious v f tiie dialectio and

-L --! ý, -7 -- -L "

tiIL, reniarlý-s utthisr.,. 1tr ea ;- ii 1c, o L; ý rofiection of tile failure, e., -, , -, ]2ou-

Q L: j

s"udy, of ',. IerIe,, 1. -L, -2ontyIs -, -,, olitic2,1 to

unambiguously in -j--elation to :. 'arxisin.

e re-. D red to V6 ,, LerleL--, ILI--L'ont7 c_ s

jýoliticL, j philosophy vdiose -, ý)r L i, ie. eit j_; e ; '1 1et

c 1, it*c ý-, Iref1ec -'C, io-, -I C, - 1- -1 dI ý-- ý0 L-: ") -E, ,0 -'. -. V", * C" C-1

s --- en _acy

Li ven-, - 0 S" coiiting, it's 01-j-

s ra et -04-1-st

ev, -- subjective . 12 911 Ga t oil- as it is

s el -L, ees 05' develop its owi 00

177

I In 0 L-La, -L- S

i-L )u"; 'I tC '-iout hsc LILý e a z I ' , 600

Cd 0- V! t

-7- _

tC t

undei loil ) - . i t : ýf s

i- oeo4, e xp ab '7 r) e

t

-eve- oil 1)hiloso -, -jh-, -c e

L tt0a --,, e -, -, rnevt s-'I r o-I -b -CL7.

Wflilst C '), I rx

-L

of all humanisi his d-e cýv C0111, Le consequences of its C), -Tý- 01 011. Humanisine et terOeuýc st i -e ýD "o I -. ) jj --"T 0-, - 1, ýý k, J -L

")

S liould be replaced by so., me ot-iei-,

that there is no h istc)--,. y the advent of humanity am-l tLe i, iutual recognition of iiien as f.,, -ieýi. "(107) CD

-n

;, jý -- -L-'0 -'-) -'- --

. Even in the Lýilogue to Les A'-vent-u-res ierleEýýl can say :

Even if the ' i-arxist dialect--c iiot-

take possession of ouj, - histo-r ,,, G -ýr en j) if we have nowhere , il t seen adveiit o- 7 the proleta--riat as --, -ulinL, clasc-.;, -IL-, ---, e dialectic continues to unaj, 'r at ca-i'-li-' L, L society, it ifeta-ns its full v, -ýiue r-ý's negation; it remain -* Stoaýy s true '(, h, --, t a in which -L. Iie prolet '- j *Lat is notiiliý; - : _s a-r- n o, t C--,, hum ý,. ni his - 10

Yet in -Lis same e-pilogue, erleau, on'--- is

precisely that t-lie aix-! st philoso-)l--. -, of histo-_, - bo

eiý ai LL repl, aced by some o -id fin iý c s,, -:; yJ t', Leor-. 7 C 11

opaqueness of 7---, 2=ist ti n-V 4SC0

C, _L _, _ 'or and reflect-ýon o-, -- ti-Le evi-ý_ence _L I. J distance from events: its -e tc tE'--e pos. 3 -, ss-'c-, - co

rI our hi'story'. In 1945 1 lerl -Pont,,,, -, ý,., c, s ol--. ts- '-, e sm

-p-cojective 1*_ý, L "I e by mort(--,, -, jn(7 its --, i ns S1. S tc future -,, ret claimed to

1- -7 Eeý-leý,, -L-_-Ponty JdZSI -i -Iý. 1c, - and convictions. e

178

if e unco-lies-i eý ve bt -, l citly ste-1, inherence in a, c yorec-,! - et

T longer displa, - ed easo --, 2 or lo c tae CD e. io us 1 -, E, f'o rd,: 1atoco,, t-., I -i- -i -un -: - r: -i -i o 1-- 7', -re-, -; -* cuu -Io- ý-4- ,--?, com, muni-CM -I sl--Culý- bececenie

terms. (-, Or,; ',. ý I/

iz, ip or tan t1r e t" 2, C2U -ure , L., is Lut refl--ctioiat-) s-D!: ý c

c oi--l-'un: Ls,, -, -i' s pos sibilitfies as, t-'ios ýý 0 1. a -- Es -0i i-, - - virill--no- and C) reflection s Is, -u-n, ý e - -

or erleau -Ilonty fl poiit-*Cý3 literature to be but two lay e--s of aS -* Th us

, If the conditions o-F eu t-'--, eties that this symbolic life is torn one cannot at tlie saý'. -ie ti, -., e be boLL I,

J, %Tr iter and a communist, o_- a coL-, i,,. ', ui--ist an opi)ositionist, the 11-arx-ist which united these op - )osit-Le. --, will not be -replaced by an exhaustill" oscill. -, -tion betiveen them; they ýuill not be aýeconciled by force. One must the-i , --o

bacL. -, attac"- obliquely what could not be chaiaged CD frontally and look or an act-Lo. i than co, Lý, ainunist c-c-It-ion. "(110"

Yet the recourse to politicc-1 pragma-t-ism an, -_. itýý "rom wrlting _-ý-efloct uiýon 1'erleaý - sundering of politics L

2onty's previous failure to ever give -, L. -, self, a

ý.,,, riter, to the .,, arxiist unity of reI'1ý_Lction ý_, nd action.

ý1_ r- - -' 4 7, "_ --. -M CS IS r He was, as Sartre observes, nevC-_iý a

---p52- et _J, _ c F-. ' I-"e observes t is of the third person. I- a. s eaýa of-l-'ers it a reprieve, considers t, 'iie p--, -oble,,, -.. s o f. i

ectý,;. -ic ar-,, _sým, with ho: -, e_-DLi1 and lool[ý-s forward to (e, 11 L, ýv _ý V But he seeks truth beside s M. aii, -1, -ono

his ti; ýie the truth whicl', L i-imst be soug. 1it everyiý-,,, '*iere I

Ji c1i r Z' iiarhs his era --Ds everything, -i epoc o, -

violence) one i, ýmicli sharply raises IE'.. ý. e _Lssues 0- E,. ut_i, _-nt-_'c

action; and a trut,. v_i_c_, i is on t_ý-ie Of t'. -e

fuý. _-, _-e

is the cor. truth i,,, 1'ic' , ii-iZ-to-be of

-"----leau-z, onty the of TI-ILls for I ý, . 1'.. ý -i-

179

"the conviction of beLr, --n otL truth, but on tlae t'. Liflesý--, -ol ý -L - -ý- , -L 0-L,

-, U. L--.

and yet only five CD es pages on in --es A

lipresents empirical hj-LC, ýtor-"- -3 -t-, -e of truth. ! (112). cm:

Both in a truth that becomkes and on 3-- truth theat is yet to co. --ie, '5erlec-:. u-? on-'c, -, 7 ,

', r- slr. ý!

discloses its fundarp , ental it -Ct- 'o-L-i n the ratio-,, iC,,. lity ol Cj-d to seco-2(-- history it

HO could Korea, and subseruent evcnts 73E_ý le o-, -- I ý_-, et "S! too many o-IC History or even a betr, -, 7,? _ al of sý)ec_, al Merleau, , 'onty gave himself no mcans o. Li-i on rr : -is tolýy betrays because JLt is L-Fistory. Loc-ic ---, 'Id co_, ). -in: c, -enc-, Cý - C) ýF

are compossibles of 1,. L I listory: th, 1,7,, al-e ý. Lot ----ed a IJ hierarchy of final order. fet e: t- i e: 0 11 Ot L

perhaps finally resolve the tension oi- philosopny L,,, _f_1a action - of being in Truth and acting in Being. If li,, -e C) Bukharin, Trotsky and SAalin, we do stake our lives in the ambiguity of history we cannot blaý, -Ie histor, -j- foi- our failure nor can we avoid the choices which iriiplic, -ý,, te US in that same history.

IvIerleau-Pont, 11T did not, like Kosetler and others, sir. i-oly

attach himself to a God which failed. Yet there is

evident in his attitudes to communism an element of

speculative fa, ith which perhaps explains at one P-nd the

same time this deep understandiný--, of its inner con-ý, --Lctions C.; P and the permanent doubt, the ironic attitude, v., '-J-cli

distanced him from a full immersion in its t`L-eoretJ-c?,! - practices. Tnus there is the description of

as 'that unknown other future,, the essc--. v upon lfait-ý, -

and good faith', and the move in the 1950's to

I'secularisation" of communism and the srbsequent m--. in-

-its obvious reso, ----,, -, -ces of tenýýnce of a communism', with

Ia theisra'. (113)

-'on ý, Ireiigious, -y felt Like W-ny sympatiisers, fdrieai,. -

180

c0ramunism's ultimate truth ,,, ras consecrated L- its institutional ceremonies of -. -1 est-text-coný, 11*or I. Terleau-Ponty, to 'be co, -. ir)lete-I-, - true,

"must be evolved not only in t,, -e sol4tar, -T thoughts of tlae philoso-, Df-)er rirjen-d C) it and who has understood everything, but

also in the relationship beti. -reen the leader ,, iho thinks and explains it a--, ýid the proletariat lives and ado-pts -Jt., I(ii4`

Me-rieau-Ponty understood that politics, lil ' -e rel"ious violence, is action dominated by the conviction of bei-ý., in the truth.

"The assurance of beiný, 7 the carri-e--, - of trut-'ri is vertiginous. it is in itself violence., I(il. ý), '

If Marxism theoretically conceded a role to co--itir-Fency, it could never in struggle a-nd throljo-h the ±arty ýýdý'J t CD CD I--,

its possible falseness. ITerleau-Pont,, r nuotes with 11 -L sympathetic understanding '-L'rotsky's quote tc t1ae ef-, ýý'ect that the Party's truth in battle is not absolute, yet battle it has absolute value. Qiib)

Merleau-2onty understood both the philosophical imper, -ý, t-*i-ve to sustain ambiguity, and the politic. 1 tive to

maintain complete assurance. But he came to understf-ý, nýi. the latter with sympathies for Marxism which, as Sartre

says, were probably strongest before the i,,,! ar and in 1945 were already invaded by the doubts -provoked b, -, r t-, e fAoscow trials. (il7) I'lerleau-Ponty was, inasense, 3

working out his residual, sympathies for Tarxism. 1-nd

Sartre describes how close after the 'rerleau-Pont, -;

was to various leading comi-ýiunist figures: Yerlee., _1 -. eon ty

C-- could feel, given his sympatýiies, that he rl r-, ctive

_participant in the post-ý7,., ar debates upon coi7. --iunj':, -, ' in

which his Humanism-e et terreur did indeed constitil-te --

- 10 _-; - eC closed significant intervention. When, aftei -,

49) tý-,

, de contr, -cts, PI "y ranks and circumscribed its outsJ- on

was isolated from that vital milieu

__is words been the , oxygen,, of nis politicýýI

reflections henceforth lacl, --ed -ý re, -. 1- context -. n. -J4 'ed

181

instead upon the , combutsf-ble g7, -,,. s of sol-ftar-r

Sartrej on the other hand, had a1w,: ---, ys been throughout t'ris period closer closer to (=1 Yet the -ý,,! ork which so provoked not E" full Ilarxist treatise

-mportantl, e Jiitds n- -s esa I--. failure as P., Ierleau-Ponty's res-oect to coý:, '---unisr. -.. Bot. n Sartre and TTerleau--Eonty v! ere overim. n-ressed b, -,, -, t',

-e I'C's status and Russia's symbolic value. Tne. -/, -', r. d bot-', ý, - been struck by the

-FCIs importpnce durJYI, - t-*, -ie t-*-me

resistance and the abd-icat--, on of the soc 4-s ts er the war vacated the arena of lef t-v), Jing politi-cs to t-'- E C)

monopoly of the -Lýarty.

Th e s---,. -,,, -t-ýifes of 194, ) 4tic-I entitled them, they felt, merely to offer -i e1 -r cr

-p -1 "1 friendshi - L" p whilst completely accept*n,, T its monli"ic

presence Merleau-Ponty already knew ---)(--, rtre dýscovered

s-kkbsequently that any challenge to this presence, J-1 tl'ie

form of R. D. R., revealed only their impotence --s left-

wing intellectuals.

'11hus if both felt that the essence of revolutionary

politics lay in the relation between ýarty and class, th(. -;.,,; r

could never offer a satisfactory critique of the actual

incarnation of this relation: precisely by admitting

possibilities other than the fC. Sartre's criticisms of

the Trotslkyist position inLuommunistes et la paix and

Nierleau-Ponty's conclusions in Les Aventures represent

the same inability to see beyond and outside the 2arty.

As Sartre now admits, up to 1968 the cori-i-unist moven-I-ent

seemed to constitute the entire Left, and to reject t_h_e

f't to t'-! e party would have entailed exile or a slo7., dri-

right. DIoreover, in the vC were re-presented the heroes, L: I-

the pure actors whom Sartre and !,, Ierlea-ýi-Pont. y as intellect-

uals felt they owed a certain deference to. -b, 7 aef eult

they offered it a certain theoretical deference :

"Between 145 and 15u the working class vics heroes fascinated by the ±, C, tne -o, -, rt, ot

the party of resistants. And the same .,, --t for us classical 411-tellectuals .... FA the

182

time we far fro; m. believinjc7 tr2. t C. ý the ilarty's thought, despite-cert, ý--in deviations 1, vas the formed thou --- 'n 2 ght of t-le working class. i hadn't unaerstood neither bad IL., 2 t"') ler! eau -Ponty ý-nd others, t an apparatus possesses the of i tLS structures, and that the st2ucturecs-ý of t `-I e Party, ossified, bureuacratised, stronply hierarchical would produce -In---i-e-rarchice-I and bureucratic thoughts com--oletelv- CD

opposed to popular thought.,, (! 19) CD

Takin. a the fCIs ideology, faute de mieux, as that ci' C) the working class bartre, s and ! Ierleau-fontyls whatever its caý. --)acity desi--le I- ýT

for criticý. s--I primarily marked by its failure to raise the problem of the fC's legitimacy.

rl I

'The events of Budapest stimulated S-? rtre, ,,, ho at least been forced into a, serious readin7 of bt-- "li-S

fell ow- travelling, to re-consider the prob-le, --. s of

xist -,,, -)ers-nect4-ve. class consciousness from a truly ITar., I The analysis of the Critique surpasses the c-LasF'-Jc, --', -' antinomy of spontaneity and party b. 7,, (--dmitting t'--lat tine

. týarty is not simply a pure moment of ordered actJon but

can itself become serialised, become an institution, ýýnd

that the masses are not simply pure inertia, but crrl, of

themselves, generate significant moments of cohesive,

collective action. 'The Critique was thus beoun in 1957,

the year after tiungary and

"represented for me a way of settling my C-) accounts with my own thought outside of the Communist ±arty's sphere of influence over thought. .. ehe Critique is -ý rIarxist work- written against the cor. timuni-sts. -, (120')

In the non-revolutionary period of t-'qe 19ý(-s the rC -J-i--, '

not raise the issue of revolution, it was --rather -= -oarti

d, attente"2 which, as nerleau-. eonty complc-4-ned, -_ý-ele, 7ateJ

socialism to a rqere 'perhaps- at the far hori7on of t-ie

present struggles. in such a situation it could not

claim c--- legitimacy simply from its -nreseiýice and ti-1-s

The wait-and-see party can onl7,. 7" be 41-1-1ý-ed 4

on its action: it is -not lecritir,,! -, 'ý-, e

183

itself. it is for tiis reason t-*,, E. t o---), e cannot conceive of rep-, llrý--, -ý--reser-t,?. t-; -ves --- I- of the proletariat in 1, rraitinp or dictator shin of the stalinist ty--, , .. e. -LII1 S reflection upon the notion of is what is I-acking in uommu-nistes et 1!

--. CD

. paix. -- (12-L)

6artre couid thus write tiae uritioue -ý)recisel., -r t-'arouý-ý') I

an uWersta, ndinq of the real and -oretended c-LeIris CD -1 nature of the PC. i! erleau-±ýont, -ý7-ls steZir- of -oolJ-tical reflection in a, -. ositivist -,, -)Y)reciation of the ; 7ýctu---' p 'tical IL ol-L orces condemned in aavcnce Iiis s.,. -rý_,, -);? tneti-c

and ex-pectazit narxism to bein7, out+-*-Ia. --ql--ecL by event-: -- cnd

reduced to a theoreticai vacuity. jýoth bartre

bilerleau--ýonty were, like mnny classicF-L intellect-ýI-f-ý--Ls) the

victims of tfteir own politicel pragmatism- anj- -positl-viý7rý,

7 where Sartre won the opportunity to refi-ect outsi-cle o--

his nominal commitments iýqerleau-ronty, s politic, '7ý1 comm-it- ments and political reflections were both irre-, narrbl,,,, -

-r , impoverished by the ultimate exposure of theý ---ým b i- uo us

relation.

184

Chapte2ý VI

SEkRCH FOR A IIEEHOD

The attack upon Sartre contained in ! Jerleau-Pont'ý. -Is Les Aventures de la dialectique provoked fro -1 m ýý-, lmone de Beauvoir a stern rejoinder(l), but, as Burnier comments

"This was the only public quarrel betv., -een Merleau-Ponty and Temps modernes. Each was quick to f orget it: theiý-ewould iiever be another one. "(2)

In truth, Merleau-Ponty's defection from Temps modernes dated from his unwillingness in 1950 to offer any further political comment upon what he saw as an unsurpassable situation of global conflict. His silence condemned the review to a stalemate which was resolved only thro-Li-ii the assumption of its political direction b:, 7 a nev,, and much younger editorial team.

Sartre comments :

"In short, during the interregnum betlýjreen 1950 and 1952 a vessel without a captain recruited, b. -,.,, itself, the officers who saved it from perdition. "(3)

Figures such as Marcel Peju and Claude Lanzmann subsequently helped Sartre to Irepoliticisel Temps modernes towards the

position of critical f ell ow- travelling. (4) As Sartre

reveals, Ilerleau. -Ponty continued to be present at Temps

modernes despite the insurmountable disparity of views. Sartre and Merleau-Ponty were, as the forirer says, working

through a necessary I'labour of rupture. "(5) Eventuali, -ý-

an incident intervened which served to crystallise their

differences. Merleau-Ponty had prefaced an article for

Temps- modernes, on the contradictions of capitalism, wit. a

an admonition to its author for not mentioning the contra-

dictions of socialism. Sartre, in Merle au-11onty's Cabsence,

sent the article to press without this headin, q, and

Merleau-Ponty, receiving the proofs of the review as

whole, tendered his resignation to Sartre. (6)

185

Without Merleau-Ponty's presence and witL--, the collaboration of his new team Sartre could develop the politics already set forth with omuiunistes et la Paix. 1952 to 1.0.56 thus constitutes a period of critical fellow-travelling, and yet, these four to five years out of a political career which has extended from 1945 to the present day have cas-tt a grotesquely outsized shadow over too many inter-)retations of Sartre. The implied stain of collaboration with the communists has not been erased. As an instarice, the following quotations are from an article written in 1967 by Francois Bondy

5 "Sartre only once failed to approve of totalitarian rule exercised ih the name of the 'project' of revolution b-, - which men determine their future. "(Bondy means 1956) "In his major works Sartre justified the totalitarian element in communism... "(7)

Apart from the palpable falsity of such gross general- isation, such statements, not untypical of commentary upon Sartre's Politics) represent a misleading reconstruction of Sartre's attitudes. In the first instance, Bondy's use of 'approve of' and 'justified' insinuate that Sartre's

position on communism was grounded in certain misplaced moral priorities. On the contrary, when Sartre, as he does

now, offers a criticism of his views in the 1950's it is for the absence of an efficacious ethics. The 'moralism'

of, for instance, Camus and the liberal left was renounced in the name of an extreme and unsatisfactory political

realism. (8) Nevertheless Sartre's attack upon such moralism

was precisely that it itself concealed an implicJt political

position - either an unfounded acceptance of the principles

of Western democracy or an abstention from the practical

conflicts of history. Thus when Sartre attacks those

'freedoms' of the West defended by anti-communists it is

to remind his adversaries that by such freedoms are meant

the very limited choices available in realitv to the

citizen of a bourgeois system.

However the central thrust of Bondy's reproaches are

186

centered around the implicit use of the pe. jorative term 'fellow-traveller', to which many other con. --, entators subscribe. Not only are wholly disparate political careers amalgamated under such a term, but generalised motivations are then attributed to what is now a malaise: the need for a distant Fatherland, a vague desire for social justice and harmony lacking concretisation, the guilt complex arising from bourgeois origins, the search C)

for a palliative against the afflictions of intellectual isd-ation, etc. (9)

It is certainly permissible to argue that If ellow- travellers' were politically blind or myopic, but it is indefensible to regard such short-sightedness as always being the result of intellectual hypocrisy or self- deception by claiming that conscious intellectual decisJons

are subordinated to supposed unconscious needs for

'identification', 'solidarity' etc. Critics of Sartre find

evidence of such 'hypocrisy' in his inconsistency and his

failure to criticise the shortcomings of instituted

socialism with the same venom he directed against the

'democracies! In the first place, Sartre made no secret

of his objective sympathies for what he saw as the symbol

of the proletariat's accession to political power and the

real hope of socialism. Sartre's communism, like

Merleau-Ponty's Marxism, had the first right to a reprieve.

Sartre's orientation moreover had practical historical

support: in the context of the Atlantic Alliance, Cold 'Nar

propaganda, together with the PCF's isolation and the

strength of the rightist Gaullist movement in France,

dispassionate criticism of communism was a dispensable

luxury. Indeed Sartre's sympathies for communism had

strong roots in his intensely felt anti-anti-commun, sm,

his total repudiation of that, -anti-communist hysteria for

which :

tta communist is a devil; he isn't judged on

what he says, what he says is judged on

what he is. "(10)

187

It is also certainly true that Sartre felt any judgement of communism only possessed a genuine critical value if it was made from a position of sympathetic understanding and commitment. Sartre thus reminded Camus :

"Our freedom today is nothing other than the free choice to struggle to become free *" It's not a question, you see, of ýaging

my contemp , oraries: they're already in the cage; it is rather a question of uniting ourselves to them in order to break the bars... to merit the right to influence the men who struggle, one must first participate in their struggle, one must first accept many things if one wants to change a few of them. "(11)

The last phrase in particular damns Sartre no more than it does the democrat who tolerates the excesses comriitted in a democracy by and through the democratic guarantees that change is possible.

Sartre, like Merleau-Ponty, was moreover quick to discover lapses in the writings of the 'unbiased' liberals: the principled enemies of communist tyranny who ignored the crimes of colonialism. Merleau-Ponty had thus

attacked Rousset for forgetting the existence of Greek

and Spanish prisoners as much as Pierre Daix for ignoring

the Soviet labour camps. (12) Sartre too sets the

Hungarian events of 1956 against the background of the

Western intervention at Suez without suggesting that the

latter absolves the former from criticism. (13) Sartre was

also quick to notice at this time that anti-communist

polemic frequenUy accompanied a silence about the French

crimes in Algeria.

What is certainly false is the suggestion that Sartre's

f ellow- travelling derived from pure political manicheism

or was entirely affective in character. I'licaud writes

for instance :

"Sartre's tempestuous relations with the

L te love affair Communists suggest a passJona more than a detached evaluation of a potential business partner(sic)"(14)

188

And Varaigne writes that Sartre was the victim of "the myth of the Left'l, bewitched by the Communist experiment" (15).

It is evident from Simone de Beauvoir's autobiography 'D

alone that, throughout this period, Sartre and his colleauges at Temps modernes considered deeply and thoroughly all the issued that arose from their position of fellow'travelling. This entailed, for the first tirme perhaps in Tem-ps modernes' history, a really complete analysis of the problems facing the French Left and its confrontation with the State over the Alcerian involvement. C--

"I desire the birth of an independent Left in close liaison with the Communist Party"(16)

declared Saxtre whilst retaining Temps modernes right to

critical independence. And whilst Sartre was personally troubled by the anti-semitism prevalent in the USSR and the writings of Herve", for instance(17), he woulC'k not publicly condemn such facts in the tone and terms tkýa. t Mauriac rhetorically demanded from him :

"I will address myself to my friends of the Left, communists or not, Jewish or not, for it is them whom the problem concerns and it is f or them alone that it takes the form of a drama. They alone, and not M. Mauriac, have the right to question me on what I thinký, l and it is they alone whom I hope to question about their thought. "(18)

To work thus with the Communists without renouncing one's

judgement was, as Simone de Beauvoir observed, no easier

in the 1950's than it had been immediately after the war. (19)

But the obvious response to the detractions of Bondy and "' this

others is that no-one was more clearly conscious of

than Sartre. It is agreed that he publicly reconciled

himself with Louis Aragon, the defamer of Paul Nizan's

memory, and that, in 1954, he gave, on his return from a

trip to Russia, an uncharacteristically naive account of

Soviet progress (he was admittedly ver, v ill at the time

of the interview). (20)

189

But the nature of his equally public rebukes to Kanapa, Herve* and Naville cannot then be simply seen as a necessary counterpoint to the previous praise: establishin7. Sartre's credibility as an 'independent' fellow-traveller. These' Litter articles are very much attempts to define the limits and nature of critical sup-oort for the PC.

Hence he attacks Jean Kanapa for wilfully misunderstandin,. 7 those intellectuals who do not intend to join the Party but who all the same desire close and mutually understanding relations. The gratuitous insults of Kanapa only serve to sabotage such relations. (21) Again Sartre berates Herve" for initiating a debate about communism whilst adressing himself to those outside the Party, those

who might form a Popular Front of the future. Whilst Sartre concedes that internal party discipline is not his

concern, he laments that it was the CP's very limmobilismel

and narrow dogmatism which had helped to create both Herve, and Besse whose violent repudiation of Herve was the PC's only ooncession to the debate. (22)

Sartre's dismay at Naville's outburst is precisely that

Stalinism should have created adversaries in its own image - obstinate, dogmatic and intractable, individuals

who in their impassioned will to criticise Stalinism

could no longer affirm anything positive. (23) Sartre

clearly had an image of the Left which he feared was only

too vulnerable to the stupidities of the PC on the one

hand and the Herve''s and Naville's on the other. It was

in Italy that Sartre found confirmation and concretisation

of such an imagined Left. Simone de Beauvoir recalls :

"What Sartre had tried to bring about in France he could see here in reality. Almos t

all the intellectuals were in sympath7 with the Communists and the Communists had

remained faithful to their humanist traditions. This alliance with the CP, so austere in France, found expression here in warm and open-hearted discussions. Sartre responded verý- strongly to this friendly atmosphere. "(24)

190

The insistent need to continually define and defend such a practical Left politics in France is evident in

Temps modernes' work throughout the period in question. The worsening Algerian situation only further polarised French opinion and the upsurge of T, 'endes - France's "Nouvelle Gauche" - with which TýIerleau-Ponty associp. ted himself - forced Temps. modernes to define its position by elucidating the meaning of 'Left'. Simone de Beauvoir contributed to a special issues of Temps modernes - I'La Gauche" - whose conclusions Pointed forward to a 'Popular Front' which could organise the left around opposition to the Algerian War. (25)

It was the tragic events in Budapest which finally ended this period of constructive hope.

"At Budapest it was a question of aggression and war. And it was a socialist nation which took the initiative for this intervention and which was deliberately opposed to the structures and principles of socialism. "(26)

Sartre quite clearly and unambiguously condemned the

Soviet action. In an article for Ll ress Sartre

described the intervention as a "crime", adding :

"It is an abject lie to claim that the workers are fighting on the side of the soviet troops... It was against the whole people that the Red Army came to shoot"(27)

Sartre signed with other French writers a joint protest

against the Russian action and, in the national council

of the 'Mouvement de la PaixI Sartre and others managed

to get adopted a resolution demanding the withdrawal of

soviet troops. (28)

But the point is not to find evidence of ethical

principles by which Sartre could offer such condemnation

of the events. For at the very outset of his analysis

of the uprising, Sartre returns to the problem of the

relationship between morals and politics: praxis cont, --. i---s

implicitly within itself its own moral evaluation and,

jcýj

importantly, f or such an appreciation Sartre adds that 11socialism is an absolute reference. "(29)

It is socialism alone as a total historical movement of ideas and practices which, for Sartre, grants legj: ýýý to political undertakings, which remains the 'absolute reference'. Sartre condemned the events of 1956 as a Marxist, not as a philosopher with certain

abstract moral preferences. 11oreover, it is misleadiný7 to argue, as David Caute does, that Sartre's ! ý`arxism reflects simply the degree of his fellow-travelling

"There is no doubt that his estimation of the strengths and weaknesses of modern Marxist thought constantly reflected his opinion of the communists in action. "(30)

On the contrary, as Burnier points out : "The periods of philosophical -rapprochement are not necessarily periods of political agreement and vice versa. "(31)

Whilst Sartre's 1952 piece owed most to the internal movement of Sartre's existentialism, that of 1956

explicitly defers to the principles of Marxism and socialism. Sartre, as did Merleau-Ponty, certainly felt that Marxism was accountable for and to its historical inherences, but both were able to seperate the philosophical content of Marxism from the practices of communism - although in Merl eau-Ponty", s case this meant. -, only the

salvaging offaute de mieux, a purely heuristic Marxism.

Sartre and Merleau-Ponty equally belonged to ageneration

which had come to an appreciation of Marxism through the

work of Hegel, Husserl, and Heidegger. Like the German

School of Korsch and Lukacs they were thus concerned to

rescue Marxism from the dogmatic orthodoxies of Communist

polemic. In this sense the progress of Marxist theory

remained independent from that of communism itself.

George Lichtein writes :

"Although politically it is true to say that the peak of Communist influence had

192

been passed by 1948, it does not -, 'ollow that the same applies to !,,., --xxjsm, i- Indeed the post-Stalin disclosures of 1953-1956 Produced immense confusion precisely because :

"they discredited communism just when Marxism was gaining fresh ground. 11(32) C) C) In his articles of the 1950's Sartre does thus attempt to resolve this confusion. He defines the milieu o-` all intellectual thought as Marxism; Marxism is alone that culture permitting an understanding of men, works and events. (33) Yet whilst the PC "manifests an extra- ordinary objective intelligence" and is rarely mistaken(34), its intellectuals have placed 11arxism on the defensive by refusing to meet the challenge posed by the 'death' of bourgeois thought. It has been left to the non- marxists - Bloch, Lefebvre, Levi-Strauss, Guillemin, for instance - to do the implicitly Marxist work that the Communists have 2d-led to undertake. (35)

Sartre is here identifying a crisis interior to I! axxism at a time when the opportunities are ripe for a blossoming

of Marxist culture. Sartre indicts on the one hand the

academic institutions whose traditional prejudices

militated against the Hegelian and Marxist currents of thought :

"We were made cartesians in spite of ourselves and to fill our igno-rances after 1945 we were made autodidacts. "(36)

On the other hand Sartre argues that the PC had developed

its political position at the expense of a stratification,

isolation and intractibility which made the development

of progressive theoretical work diflicult if not

impossible. (37)

Whilst not offering himself as mentor nor offering

existentialism as a simply alternative, Sartre's appeal

on the level is f or the opening up of the

field of thought vacated by bourgeois orthodoxy and as

193

yet unfilled by original 111arxist research.

But Sartre's Marxism is always indexed by the revelation of one primary historical fact: the class struggle. In his own personal research after 1952, having read and re. read everything, Sartre

"only had Ariadne's thread, but it sufficed, as it was the inexhaustible and difficult class struggle. "(38)

In his first confrontation with Marxism 11 j; - "at"erialisme

et revolution" - Sartre had conceived of communism as the ideological formation appropriate to and congruent with the proletariat's historical struggle; in

Les Communistes et la paix he had tried to understand how the Party's leadership could conform to the patterns of working class activity. And in the conclusion to his Le Fantýme de Staline he once again approached the

crucial problem of revolutionary politics - mass and

party. In 1956 this problem was dominated by the

monolithic and retarding presence of the Party :

"This monstrous Party which freezes 5 million votes, demobilis-*. es the working class, and ahandons mass action. "(39)

Just like Merleau-Ponty, Sartre saw the issue of

Hungary as raising in France the problem of de-Stalin-

isation, of realising a Popular Front, a left unity

which could break the frozen forms imposed upon it by

the PC

"A Leftist is a man who desires the success of de-Stalinisation -a de-Stalinisation which is unchecked, consequential and extended beyond the frontiers of communism to the whole left that communism has frozen"(40(Merleau-Ponty)). flit (de-Stalinisation) is the only effective policy which is at the present moment useful to socialism, peace, bringing together working class parties: with our resources as intellectuals, read by intellectuals, we shall tr-.? - to help

with the de-Stalinisation of the French

party. "(41)(Sartre)

194

As Burnier notes, the two political i-tineraries of French existentialism had here rapidly crossed; and 'Or the last time. (42) For to the _philosophical

imperative to lay the foundations of an 'open' 11arxism, Sartre now added the political or sociological need to understand the degeneration of instituted communism, and to begin a fresh analysis of the forms working class consciousness can take in organised action. It is these two complementary strands which define Sartre's Critique de la raison dialec

0

TepIps modernes maintained close contacts with Polish intellectuals - it had dedicated its Feb-Ilarch 1957 issue to Poland - and as a result of these the Polish review Tworoose asked Sartre to write an article on the relationship between Marxism and existentialism. The piece Question de methode forms the introductory manifesto to the Criti

CD _que itself, and permitted Sartre to begin an

initial clarification of his own philosophical position as an existentialist within a milieu which he toolk to be insurpassably Marxist.

"Marxism is History taking consciousness of itself"(43)

and History is the self-creation of man through temporalising praxis. Thus philosophy in its moment of practical

self-consciousness is not inert passivity, a fixed

entity in-itself, but movement. A philosophical crisis is

the expression and incarnation of a social crisis.

Diogenes could demonstrate movement by walking; thus the

failure of Marxism to incorporate the insurpassable

singularity of the individual as knowledge of the knower

represents not a localised void but a general practi-cal

anemia. (44) Marxism is no longer seen to be movement.

Concrete thought which temporalises and totýýIises itself-

must be born from praxis and History must becoTie sell"

conscious through the movement of man nritiin and t-aough C)

theory. Historical 11'arxism has feiled to include

195

his opaque particularity and concrete real-: (. ', -; - have instead been endowed 1., fith the platonic esse--icc; I s of simplistic Marxist theory. Val er ' 7, r is a petit-bour--ý-eols intellectual, but not every petit bourgeois intellecti-1---. 1 is Valery(45): we must reconstitute Valery in his singularity without denying any oL r the universa-1--A-, of the petit-bourgeois experience whic-', -i flo-s is 'rom t-'i-* lif e adventure.

The liquidation of particularit-T in a. sc-'-ol?: --t-c4 si-1 o

the totality corresponds to the physical liquidation of individuals and of individuality within the totalit: v of the Stalinist state. (46) But the profundity of LL--e world is that of m-an(47) and the absence of i-tC--. n in his depth of freedom from the T: a2", r. --ism of the Stalinist, - era has lead existentialism outside the historical- tct(-Iisat--ion of knowledge. IiIarxism

-rediscovering man as L-. e ontol- C: ) ogical and epistemological ori-c-in of its moverient can will once more become a totalisation of ---'-Ieing Knowledge. For the very existence of existent 41-e,, lisiýi

seperate ideology with its insisterice, particularly through the mediation of psychoanalysis, upon the

individual whose Knowledge is also that of the Ymower

signifies the very same scherosis of

As philosophy in realising itself abolishes itself . -: nd

realises itself in abolishing itself, so too the actu, --ýI-

isation of exist entialis m entails its d-issolution -fn and

assimilation to Farxism, and the abolition of exfste-, it-

ialism as distinct ideology entails the realisation of

man as the foundation of anthropology: not ýýs obiect of

knowledge but as the organisný ýroducin, -- Knowled, 'ý-e .s

moment of its praxis; that It,, --nov-rledge bei-n--ý- o. A- --'-stor,,, -

the very moment of its creation by i-E)-o Ehe C'r-&-g. ",

"'thode thus defines forýthe i task of ý)Uestions de me T"

exa-Mining the means of cons ti tu a structural ard

historical anthropology. Refle-, --ively too, t-', -, e Cr Licue . A. CD

196

defines Sartre's task as inserting h4l e1 -f --* -n toe historical movement of philosophy as sel-L L L'-actual- sa" on. To re-employ the metaphor of Dfogenes: must be seen as -practical movemerLt and Sa-rtre's -praxis must be translucid consciousness of that movement at t-iie saime

-L time as it is a very part o-" tilaat movemelIL.

In his 'Introduction' to the Critique consiý-. ers in much greater detail the character of current retardation: this section, on the philosophical level, quite clearly constitutes the most o-----*L, c, -inal pC-rt of the work and is analysed in much g-reate-r detail in Chapter VII.

In short though, Sartre locates the or-,, -, r*in o-f "Parxist

culture's crisis within the paradoxical character of" historical materialism itself which is

"at one and the same time the sole truth of History and a total indetermination of the Truth. 11 (48)

The Marxist philosopher in his totalising thought founds everything except the truth of what he sa,, /rs. For,

above all

"dialectical knowledge of objects is inextricable from knowledge of the dialectic. The dialectic is method of knowing and a movement in the object known. "(49)

Yet the critique of dialectic Reason by dialectical

L reasoning has, up till now been blocked by a suppression

of the dialectic in dogmatism. For Sartre, iýarxls ap-ainst fundamental originality lies in his aff-L I- CD

Hegel's dogmatic idealism that Histor,, T ongoin; -, and

that Being remains irreducible to -T`--yiov. rin---. Yet, if -,,,, e

are to avoid Hegel's ontological monism of t-! --ou, -7- t

being) how are we to avoid ,:,, ith IL,, Iaxxls dual-LE-iff. -, 7all-; -n I r-

either into idealism by conjoining thoug., L'it and bein- in

their movement or into empiricism by allov,, in, a bei-Ini. or to

develop according to its own laws. For Sartre the problem

is resolved by realising that ý, 'Fx. -ý--ist moni,;: ým is du, -, l-'st

_2, auf e Lt is monist

197

"Marx defined his ontological monism in C, affirming the irreducibility ol be-i-no- to thought and on the other hand reinteý CD ýLrrati--- the thoughts into the real as a cf:, rtain t-,. -pe of human ac-fivity. "(50)

Contemporary Ilarxists have denied thought itself any CD dialectical activity and have dissolved it in the universal dialectic: Being evolves accordfng 'LOJ AS 0'-7-'-1 ---:? 01 laws and Knowledge as a certain relpt-fon of man to CD

surroundings disa pears since man himself no lonc: -er 0 p- exis ts. For these reasons Sartre refuses the dialectic in Nature, a purely metaphysical proposition ý1, hJch is established not as a synthesis of human knovrled7e but as a fact become objective vTorld. The revealin- of the world to itself and to nobody is wllý, -, t Sartre terms transcendental dialectical materialisrp. (51)

Dialectic universality must thus be

as a necessity, not as constitutive to experience, but contained in and If being remains irreducible to kno,

the only possibility of a dialectic

dialectic :

imposed ?. prior. -, - pr-'riciples ýý-ý-nterior overflowing ex-Ier, ence.

ýiiný: r, nevertheless CD exist-Ing is itself

"The only possible unity of the dialectic as law of historical development and of the dialectic as knowledge of this development must be in the unity of a dialectical movement. 11 (52)

Thus

t1man, suffers the dialectic in so far as he

makes it and makes it in so fpr as he

suf f ers it. 11 (53)

Sartre retains the materialist epistemology of the C_-t'

S4 tS

dialectic by insisting that thought discover _ ovin

necessity in its material object. That is, the episte-

mological point of departure is the consciousness, but

only insofar as the object it gives itself is the

singular adventure, the objective being of the ýuestioner

who lives all the categories of histor, v. I, ýlls catestioner,

198

"find myself dialectically conditioned by the totalised and totalising past of the human adventure: I totalise myself in terms of this history and to the extent of my cult,,,,; -re

I totalise this experience. t'(54)

But if History is ongoinýý totalisation the discovery

of this totalisation in each is not sufficient and we must establish the practical multiplicity of individual totalisations realises the necessity of one History. The first volume of the Critique is thus defined as the regressive moment of the dialectic: it

stops at the moment when the 'place of History' is

achieved, the intelligible bases of a structural anthropology having been found in the individual totalisations. The diachronic construction of one History with one truth and one intelligibility Will be achieved through the progressive moment of the dialectic promised in the

second volume; but if

"The whole historical dialectic rests on individual -praxis in so far as this is already dialectic"

the problem is

"what will be the dialectic if there are only men and they are all dialectic. "(55)

The first moment hence of Sartre's dialectic is individual

praxis realising through need a relation of univocal interiority with the surrounding materiality. In so far

as this inorganic environ contains the possibility of non-being

"the man of need is an organic totality which perpetually makes itself its own tool in the milieu of exteriority. "(56)

The praxis born of this negation of negation - need as negation of possible non-being of man - transforms

practically the material world into a totality. This

inert Plurality becomes unity - that is, unity of

resources and means to man's self-perpetuation - is the domain of passivity: the practico-inert which supports

199

in exteriority the made totality of human praxis. (57)

Praxis in this project of totalisation imposes upon the

enveloped inanimate thing a pseudo-organic unity, a unity which is nevertheless social and human: the passive reflection of praxis. It is like the act of sealing wherein the wax 'returns' the original act, its inertness

reflecting the action, the doing, as pure being-there. (58)

Thus, for example, the individual actions, irreducible

and identical, of Chineses peasants in cutting down trees to clear their land are united by the matter which they

unify as the absence of trees, as systematic deforestation, Moreover this material unity of human actions as inert

synthesis comes to represent a social future: the floods

which result from the lack of trees and subsequent soil slip are both absurd since they come from the inhuman to the human, and rational since they implicate only the

essential traits of a social practice.

The practico-inert transforms human praxis into anti- praxis, that is, praxis without author. (59) In losing their human properties the projects of men are engraved in Being. Weber and Durkheim are both equally depassed

in that social facts are things to the extent that all things directly or indirectly are social facts. (60)

But this univocal relation of surrounding matter - the

practico-inert - to man manifests itself in our history

under a particular and contingent form since human

activity is a struggle against scarcity. Scarcity as contingency - there may logically be other words where it does not exist - founds the possibility and the necessity of human history. (61) In the milieu of scarcity the individual discovers in the Other the material possibility of his own destruction through the consumption by the Other of an object of primary necessity. (62) Each is inhuman other for the other and the scandal is thus, for

Sartre, not, as Hegel believed, the mere existence of

200

Other but the interiorisation in violence by each of the fact of scarcity which gives the Other in his freedom as the possible negation of my own freedom. (63)

"Nothing, in fact neither wild beasts nor microbe can be more terrible for man than a, species that is intelligent, flesh-eating, cruel, a species whose goal would be precisely the destruction of man. That species is obviously ours, taking hold of every man among others in the environment of scarcity. "(64)

And again CD "The negative unity of scarcity, interiorised in the reification of reciprocity, re-exteriorises itself for us all in the unity of the world as the common ground of our oppositions; and we re-interiorise this unity into a new negative unity: we are united by the fact that we all inhabit a world defined by scarcity. 11 (65)

This collective interiorisation of scarcity provides the intelleigibility of "negativity as the implicit

motor of the historical dialectic" for

"in the milieu of scarcity the structures of a determined society rest on its mode of production. "(66)

Thus man is of need and scarcity but his activity derives

not directly from these, but from the unifying and totalising tension of the social field created by them through the practico-inert. (67) That is, the exigencies of a particular mode of production are inscribed in Being and social objects are by their fundamental

structure beings of the practico-inert field. (68) In the indistinction of a totality the interpenetration of a multiplicity of individuals is realised. Thus the

second moment of the dialectic experience is the serial collective: that material object which realises the unity of practical individuals in structuring their relations

acoording to the rule of the series. (69)

Sartre takes the example of a group waiting for the bus

201

on the Saint-Germain square: first of all they constitute a plurality of solitudes, each noý caring about the

others, nor speaking nor even looking at the others. It represents reciprocity denied and in a sen5e these

reciprocal solitudes signify the integration of the individuals into the same society, that is, the same manner of living in interiority and as reciprocity the

exteriorised negation of all interiority. (70) But this

collection of individuals form a group in so far as they have a common interest: they are waiting for the same bus. Now this bus in designating them as users constitutes them in their interchangeability. Moreover the practico- inert exigency emerges from scarcity: there is not enough room for everyone and in their waiting the members of the queue accept the impossibility of deciding who is in excess in terms of the intrinsic qualities of the

individual. Alterity as ordination - if I am tenth and there arý ten places - becomes the negative principle of

union and of the determination of each as Other by each Other as Other: I am tenth by the Others in so far as they are Other than themselves. (71) The real bond

between the members of the series is hence that of impotence. (72)

This leads Sartre to the third and f inal moment of dialectic experience: the group as the radical impossib-

ility of living. The possibility of such a group, though not its necessity, is given in the serial

collective f-or the group is constituted as the determin-

ation and negation of the collective. (73)

The origin of the group is a symthetic transformation in

response to a danger which takes place in the context of

scarcity and Sartre's chosen example is that of the

storming of the Bastille. Here each individual reacts

not as an individual nor as serial other but as I'singular

incarnation of the common person. "(74) There is given

what Mairaux in LIEspoir termed the Apocalypse: that is,

the dissolution of the series into the group in -fusion.

202

In the serial relation unity as Reason of the series is always elsewhere; in Apocalyp*e "the synthetic unit-T is always present here". (75) The synthetic unity of t-'. --je group is present in each liberty as free synthetic development of the common act which is the same. For

each, interiorising the number of the group as means, acts as multiple, noý isolated or hundredth, but as a hundred. Each. discovers his praxis in the other not as his Being-Other but as his own liberty. (76)

Yet the tension within the group member of the group as both quasi-object and quasi-subject, as both trans-

cendent and immanent, is constituted in the impossibility

of the group achieving practical unity. For the intelligibility of the group as praxis is founded on the intell-

igibility of singular praxis: it is a relation of

constituted reason to constituting reason. (77)

Thus, with the removal of the common danger which forced

the group's synthesis, the problem of the group's survival is bound to the problem of being and permanence. The

moment of survival as practical exigency occurs though

the interiorisation of the dangers of seriality as

suspicion and distrust of the future(78) and when freedom

becomes a common praxis in order to establish the group's

permanence producing an inertness by itself, the new

status is called the oath. (79) The oath consists

precisely in the free pledging by each individual against

the future dispersion of the group into seriality as

inert impossibility. The group thus poses itself for

itself and lorganisation' comes to designate in part the

new interior action by which the group effects and defines

its structures.

Yet because the group cannot have the ontological status

it claims in its praxis, there is in each such con-munitv

a kind of interior emptiness, of uneasiness, which gives C) rise to the transfer of the common being of the group-

203

regulative freedom and impossible ontological unity - to the group as such. Hence the practice of Terror which is the group regulating its own praxis in its essentiality and being by producing its members as the inorganic and inessential instruments of this practice. (80) The organised group's further petrification into froup- institution marks precisely the re-emergence of seriality, but at a new level. The constitution of the group and its re-assimilation by the serial collective does not, for Sartre, mark out a chronological sequence nor the logical anteriority of seriality. Rather, in

proceeding from the abstract to the concrete, we are novr able to totalise the social reality in its particularity as both group and seriality. (81) Thus, class for Sartre

comprises elements of serial mass, groups in fusion,

and institutionalised groups. (82) Class is not a totality but a totalisation demanding comprehension of individual

praxis at all these levels. For such reasons the dilemma

of spontaneity versus party is a falsely constituted problem: in terms of its self-consciousness the class does

not appear homogenous but rather as an ensemble of

elements :

"The working class can never express itself completely as an active political subject: there will always be zones or regions or sectors which, because of historical reasons of development, will remain serialised, massified, alien to the achievement of consciousness .... In other words the class struggle is virtually possible everywhere in the capitalist system, but really exists only where the struggle is actually being carried on. "(83)

We have thus reached the place of History and the

transcendent future of humanity within the universal

class of the proletariat in so far as this class struggles to realise itself, in all places and at all levels. And

this, in itself, represents the totality of Sartre's

Crit - the inert skeleton of its structure. In

Sartrean terms this intellection in exteriority of the

Crit must itself be reinteriorised in a totalising

204

comprehension and re-exteriorised as critique Of the Critique.

0

It is insufficient to argue, as does notably Raymond Aron(84), that there is no decisive difference between the individual praxis or constitutent dialectic

A

of the Critique and the pour-soi of L'Etre et le Neant. That there are and always have been permanencies in Sartre's philosophy should not conceal the very real changes contained within the Critique: ones that go beyond mere terminological re-definitions. These can be illuminated in several areas: Being and materiality; exteriority of freedom; temporalisation and History; humanism and anthropology; Marxism and Dialectic Reason;

and philosophy and freedom.

0 The ontological project of LIEtre et le Neant had

revealed against Hegel that Being is and consciousness is not

'. There was an irreducible dualism. Though it

is consciousness which discovers that there is a world of objects, this for-itself can never achieve synthesis with the in-itself: this perpetual failure hence charact-

erised human reality, as was seen, as impossibility and hopeless passion.

In the Critique Sartre insists upon matter as the

essential mediation between consciousness and Other, and between consciousness and itself in the realisation of the project :

"Matter as synthetic, passive unity upholding the seal of human praxis is a unity which disguises a molecular dispersion and which conditions the totalisations of organisms whose dispersion cannot mask their profound bond of interiority... Moreover in so far as inorganic matter is negation of man and yet is the condition of the possibility of the totalising unity of History... man meets man through the negation of man. 11 (85)

205

Yet, as can be seen in Ckaptar 0, the crucial categorial distinction between totalit7 and totalisation does not successfully establish Sartre's required materialist ontolog Seeking to avoid both the Cartesian dualism of mind and matter, and the crudest Ilarxist epistemology of material priority, Sartre succeeds only in inducing a com lete equivocation between p Matter and Being), which finds its exact reflection 'n the

equivocation between act/praxis as physical labour(work)

and as activity of consciousness.

Thus Sartre is ambiguous between according to Nature the status of pure passivity, fixed in itself, and

accepting the consequences of a thorough Marxist CD

materialism: man, qua praxis, finds nature only as it is

worked by man, only in so far as it is a social and human nature. Sartre wants to retain the phenomonological CD

premiss of the world as already there. Moreover even

within his dialectic he presents the world of nature as

already worked. But ontologically Sartre preserves the

abstract moment of matter as 'negation of man': that is,

a pure passivity ruled by laws of exteriority. Ilan

'comes to matter', not in the historical or temporal

sense (beginning of work), but in so far as there is a

movement of recognition of self in matter through the

product of one's labour. And since work is irremediably

social - Sartre, like Marx, attacking the 'Robinsonnadel

myths of isolated work - man 'meets' man through matter.

Yet, whilst Sartre refers to matter 'upholding' the seal

of human praxis, he suggests a concrete priority of

unworked matter to labour. Such a notion of prior and

pure matter, whilst abstract, allows Sartre to retain

the ambiguity of matter as apart from man yet really

there, present-as-worked. He can then attack Hiegel for C)

suppressing the mediation of matter between men(86), ý-nsist

upon the materialist character of his dialectic and at

the same time depict matter as ruled in e: ---terJ-orJt-%r by

laws of analytic Reason, as a pure succession of ev--nts.

206

However matter as pure passivity yields little intelligibility. Sartre's chosen example of the Chinese peasants is opportunely lucid, but for volcanoes, earthquakes etc, the laws rendering such events intelligible are those of analytic Reason, which latter remains a moment of dialectic Reason as the translucidity of praxis to itself.

The image or metaphor of the 'seal' suggests moreover a certain malleability to matter's pure passivity. Yet

within Sartre's schema such qualitiative differences in matter are comprehensible only as differences internal to praxis: work-undertaken-on-matter. It is this difficulty which provoked Garaudy to suggest to Sartre, in rather simple terms, that nature sometimes says 'yes'

not always Inol. (87) And Catesson, in similar te=s,

argues that Sartre does not like Hegal fully grasp the

opposition of the natural and the human, of a natural cyclical time and a historical time. 11here Sart-re offers a radical dualism, there is rather between the historical

moment and the natural moment an interior bond and a contingent liaison:

"The presen**. (",,, e of nature in the course of history, is not indifferent, or rather its indifference is precisely a positive characteristic. "(88)

The duality of praxis and exis, nature and man,

reinforces that of interiority and exteriority ,,, rhereas Sartre seeks in the very notion of praxis to make real the exteriorisatign of interiority. In Llýtre et le 11e"ant the end of action was absorbed into the interiority of

reflective consciousness and measured there, ýust as facticity and situation received their definf-tion in

their assumption and surpassment b, -, ý- týie foiýý-itself.

-: -, i -, essin Sartre in the Critique wishes to give conscioiL, - its project a moment of radical exter4orf-ty: t-lie real

goal o-', -' action is outside, to be achieved, --Freedorý

is shaped in the pursuit o-'Iý the end. if t. 0-e re&. 1 a-, ý. -J- t., --ýe

207

-L poss-ible axe to be distin,, ruished, co_-,, scf_ou.,: --, -_r__, ess , ýsk. ex,, ternalise itself in the very rnovený, -ý--t of self ation. Yet, if ultimately matter seemed t: ý re i ri

_4 ts

consistency only as t'' . __e abstract mor. ieLat of consciousness as

totallsation, so equ-_-_l ccl'isclous-

ness itself remains rooted in the 7ý2ese-ce to self. Doubrovsky perha-ps exaggerates vlhen he clai! ý'js L: CD that the concession to materiFlism makes nonse_-1ý13e o! " the primary intelligence of the copito(89) but it is exactly the incarnation of consciou-sness in c-,. material

CD

body which remains i-or Sartre a, source of -:, -. cute te ýnsion. As Arthur Lessing points out :

"The body is factually there in, the world but consciousness does its best to evade it or transcend it altogether... The cogito fundamentally must negate its own incarnation. "(90) CD

The cogito is constituted distinct from body//natu--, e: hence the body is exteriorised as instrumentality in the

same way as a tool :

"The organic totality acts upon inert bodies through the intermediary of the inert body which it is and which it makes itself to be. "(91)

Labour is "the organism ? ýeducing itself to an inertia directed to act upon an inertia and satisfy itself as need. "(92)

It is man reducing himself

Iýto inorganic materiality in, order to act materially upon matter and change his material life. "(93)

In none of this is there T. "arx's sensual appropria t4 on

of the world, no-r IvIerleau-Ponty's conception o--, -' lbod, yl

as the very mode of being-in-the-vTo2ld. There reýiains

within Sartre what Doubrovsky, again, terns his cal

puritanism" which distances self-consciousness fron eny fleshy incarnation. 11'any critics have noted t1le absence

I'I of sexuality) corporeality and sensuality _L YC L, 17om iýtiýe s

reflections.

208

oreover Sartre's 'isolated cogitol is rer7, _ov: ý1-d not only from the body-in-exteriority, but als"o t1rie consciousness of Other. There is no concession ý7! _J`Cnin the Critique to intersubjectivity, trans-subjectivity or an interpentration of subjectivities. 'The crroup as 'impossible passion' proceeds directly from Sartlýels formulation of Llic ol I` the dialect ' individual praxis eind his explicit refusal to recog nise either lcontrF, ctualism- or an 'accord of minds' as intelligible. (0,4) Perheps it is the very evident ontological tension rTithin the CD

'group' which has led Burlx,. -le and others to aescribe the group as Sartre's "Ideal" of social unity(95): that is, Sartre's frustrated attempt to escape the subjectiv-_*Lst trap set by his Carteýian foundations.

But Sartre is no closer than in L'Etre et le neant to

accepting a notion of 11itsein: the group is ý,, constituted reality: its singular praxis is a construction, ý- fusion

and not the dissolution of individual freedoms, -j"'or the latter are ontologically primary. It is indeed precisely because the group cannot have the ontolo, --ical status it

claims in its praxis, that such a. comr, -,. unity ý, ill experiei-ice the tension of immanence - transcendence which drives it

to institutionalisation or dissolution.

C, Moreover the group is generated on the ground of threc-A

which is incarnated in Other: the group finds its initial C)

unitary identity in the conflict with anot-'aer group.

Sartre has not resolved but merely raised to another

level the problem of radical otherness. As Levi- Strai)ss * Jse complains, Sartre sociologises but does not soci-al-

the cogito. (96)

Since it would appear that the plurality o-L consc-fousness

remains as an ontological scandal, -artre's notion of A.

species remains that of LIEtre et le neant: ý-ý, bstr, -. ct

and ideal ensemble of individual cho--4ces :

flit is necessary to understand

20 Q-

does not exist... the dialectic must come from individuals. "(97)

Yet now the species receives the merely negative Unit,, r imposed by common habitation of a world ruled by

scarcity.

Importantly, Sartre envisages a sort of gap bet,, -een egocentric philosophy which takes the cogito as its

starting-point, and homocentrio anthroploo-y which takes

man as a real existing totality. Thus althouah the Cr set itself the task of answering the question: "Do we today have the means to constitute a structural

and historical anthropology? "(98), it is anthropology

which must subject itself to philosophic criticue and not

vice versa :

"The philosophic f ield is man, that is to say, every other problem can only be conceived in relation to man... The man of anthropology is object, the man of philosophy is object-subject. 11(09)

Anthropology, Sartre would argue, gives itself man as

object, man as conditioned in exteriority. Philosophy

. re-appropriates this man-object in the subjectivity of

lived experience. The field of philosophy is thus the

concrete singular universal, and philosophy itself

"is not knowledge of object or subject, but knowledge which determines what can be achieved considering man is at once and the same time object, quasi-object and subject. "(100)

And it is insofar that man is praxis that

'Iman is the depth of the world and the world is the depth of man. "(101)

However Sartre's use of 'man' , and consequently that of

'human' and 'inhuman', remains fundamentally unclear

whilst he denies the existence of any human nature, and

accords to anthropology its secondarýr status. Thus man's

'inhumanity' does not derive from any 'nature' it is

rathery under the rule of scarcity, "an inert structure"

210

which is nothing other than "the material negation" interiorised. (102) Now this structure is necessaxil V internal to man as totality. Otherwise consciousnes. z. - would have to grasp itself as split into the inert structure of inhumanity and human reciProcit. -, -. Thus inhumanity is consciousness seizing itself for 4tself in its inert structure. But man as praxis is totalisation

which hence continually transcends itself as totality,

as structure of inhumanity.

Moreover Sartre can give no teleological presentation of humanity, qua historical man realised, since it is the intelligibility of this history which Sartre seeks: that is, that ruled by scarcity which itself governs the

C. ) extent and import of the notions, humanity and inhuiiý, -nity.

Sartre specifically sepe-. ýates the notion of 'human' from

ethical precepts. Thus he leaves the notion with its

affective resonances whilst it is in fact equivalent only to the simple reflexive grasping b7T consciousness of its

own continually surpassed inert structure, inhumanit,..,.

For Sartre inhumanity is further a relation of man to

man and "can be that"(103) and he rejects any

construction of the idea of humanity upon man's treatment

of non-humans, animals for example. (104) The contrast of

the "human relation of reciprocity" and "inhuman relation

of scarcity" only suggests at a disparity of man and

nature, for it is scarcity interiorised which defines

inhumanity, and the notion of the counter-man (acts of

Other as of Other species and I as Other) remains rooted

in the same idealist position. The famous quoted image

of man as a cruel and predatory species reduces to merely

the consciousness of species as othe-r species bein, ý, - the

consciousness (of) self as inhuman other - as inert

structure of this same totalising consciousness - in

reciprocity. And this reciprocity is false ; --, -)sofar as

consciousness remains the simple carteslan presence to

211

self, for whom the other is problematic.

This essential subjectivism is what many claim leads Sartre to posit a total and known history. LIEtre et le --Teent confirmed the pour-soi in its temporalising act--*vity, but Sartre did not give týie pour-soi the ability to disengage

I= any historical meaning from the action. The problems of CD

historical reason and historical finitude were t-I'llemselves historical and as such without answer. (105)

Sartre, in the Critique, believes that the cogito can have a dialectic intellection of historical meanina which both subsumes and transcends the com-orehension it has of its own temporalising project. Here Sartre follows Kojeve in maintaining that the Philosophy or Reason of History

should be grasped in the totalising movement of one self- consciousness. Moreover :

"It is not the real history of the human species that we wisla to restitute; it is the Truth of History that we will try to establish. 11 (106)

In other words history is a totalising truth which can be

seized in the interiority of the totalising praxis of

each individual. Sartre in the Critique preserves from

L'Etre et le Neant the necessity of man as temporalising

action. But he sees against Kojeve the dangers of

equating temporality and historicity wherein the end of

History is the end of Time and consequently of man. Thus

Sartre insists that in the last instance the possession

by man of a historical character is contingent - upon

scarcity. Scarcity founds the possibility of human

history but it does not found

"for a historian situated in 1957 the possibility of all History for we have no means of knowing whether - for other organisms on other planets or for our descendants in the event that technical and social transformations should destro, v the context of scarcity - another History constituted on another basis v., ith other motivating forces and other inner schemes, is or is not logically conce--, -vable.

"(107'.

212

This single long sentence is of extraordinar ,v im-. -ý, ort.

Sartre has argued that his aim is to establish t-'-le Truth of one History and yet here he makes the distinctio-, i between all

, History - presumably the temporalisation o--, -'

all possible human existence - and History based upon scarcity as its negative motor. Thus Sartre's 'One' truth applies only to the latter, for dialectic intell- igiblity is yielded only in and by our world - that ot scarcity.

Sartre concedes moreover that as a result of certain 'social and technical transformations' scarcity may be abolished. The human future which IT= saw as determined by control of the productive forces is assessed b,,,, - Sartre as an indeterminacy in the future development oi- the productive forces, and hence a total indeterminacy of the human future: one which reinforces Sartre's inability to characterise the reign of the human in a tele. ological form.

Sartre's noted scepticism about the possibility of socialism ending all forms of human alienation(108) can now be set in context. For Sartre, socialism is a conclusion to our History. Against Marx, it does not signal the end of pre-History and the beginning of History

proper. Socialism is merely a in the context of all History, and, set against the abolition of scarcity, it has only the force of contingency and voluntarism.

It is, further, not, as in Marx, the development of the

productive forces which concludes with the establishment

of socialism but rather socialism which serve to develop

the productive forces so as to abolish scarcity, thus

instituting the reign of another History. In the context

of all History and thus confronted with Marxism, Sartre's

position yields a total indeterminacy.

For Sartre, man is thus not ontolo, -, -icalli-y historical and

his difficulties show in his treatment off societies 4in

213

equilibrium, non-progressing societies. On tine one hand, C) he suggests that if such an equilibrium is maintained, it is as exis(109) that is, not as praxis which defines man as man, as properly human. On the other hand, Sartre attacks the position that such societies can be defined as those where History has stood still - that is def--l-ning them as Historical by their very absence of History. Sartre criticises the "a priori will to establish History as essential necessity. "(110) Yet man remains ontologically temporal, for temporality is established c. s essential necessity by the very notion of project.

This crucial disjunction of Temporality and Historicity is only resolved by Sartre dissolving Histor, N, r into the reason of History. That is, History is the rational dialectic intelligibility yielded by the temporalising

actions of essentially temporalising beings. History, for Sartre, is, in a sense, the limit of social action internalised as the ultimate and total rationality of all such action. History is the Truth of History and where History was contingent, the Reason of History is imposed as essential necessity.

Now History itself was contingent upon the possibility of scarcity and thus the Reason of History has limited

and circular intelligibility. History is contingent upon factors which cannot lie outside History - the Reason

of History is universal, a priori, and total - and yet

can be defined only by making the notion of History

circular. History is contingent upon all the factors

which the (Reason of) History accounts for.

It is worth adding in this report that Sartre appears to

confuse history with historiography: the use of material from Braudel and Guerin in the Critique suggests that

Sartre equates the data of historians with simple

historical givens2 or is merely performing some form of

meta-historical analysis. Again it is signi--'icant that

214

Sartre has discharged himself from the responsibilfty o-" C-) writing the second volume of the Critique whose object would have been the concrete reconstitution of History in itself.

It is these failures which have lead to the accusations of a 'Critique of Historical Reason'(111) and have prompted Levi-Strauss to declare that History in Sartre plays the role of myth. Levi-Strauss adds that truly Total History would cancel itself out and that History must always be History-for. Sartre's inability to develop the III of his philosophy into a genuine 'We' means that the potentiality of a true History-for-us

C

becomes in effect a mythical History-for-me. (112)

Michel Foucault has equally clearly seen the relationship between subject-centered philosophy and the myth of total history :

"Continuous history is the indispensable correlate of the founding function of the subject: the guarantee that everything that has eluded him may be restored to him; the certainty that time will dispense nothing without restoring it in a reconstituting unity; the promise that one day the subject - in the form of historical consciousness - will once again be able to appropriate, to bring back under his sway all those things that are kept at a distance by difference and find in them what might be called his abode. Making historical analysis the discourse of the continuous and making human consciousness the original subject of all historical development are the two sides of the same system of thought. "(113)

Sartre's notion of Historical Reason enters into his

elucidation of the relationship between Marxism and Scarcity. In ten important Pages Sartre confronts this

problem by making both epistemological remarks about the

intelligibility of the class struggle in explaininf--

social structure, and the notions of transformation and

change2 and ontological remarks concerning the distinction cwý between the rationality of temporal sequences - processes

215

and the Truth of History: Reason.

Sartre initially offers a critique of 111-arx and Engels who judged "historical materialism applicable to all the moments of the historical process" (114) Yet P rx provided in his analysis of Roman society, -cLor e-, ý--ample, an explanation - proletarianisation of the iýýoman peasantry - by analogy from outside: the lack of industrie. 1- isation in roman society is an exterior negation. Such explanations furbish merely a negative intellýc-ibilitv of the form: Waterloo was lost for want of aeroi-)lanes. But, Sartre argues Roman society must C) 7

"found of itself its own positive sources of intelligibility. "(115)

Though Marx and Engels both promise intelli--Tibilit,, - in their historical analyses, they are for Sartre positivist, probabilistic and empirical, thus yieldin: 7 only the "total contingency of the temporal histories. " (116) Ilarx

and Engels, in other words, offer only analytic laws to

govern certain limited historical 'processes', whereas, for Sartre, History should fýLrnish, as a totality, its

own intelligibility.

Sartre accepts with Marx that the mode of production

generates that societal scarcity of products which in

turn determines the social division of class, but adds that this raises the central problem of the necessary

change from positive to negative. (117)

Thus, against Marx and Engels, Sartre maintains that

historic Reason must not simply account for such and such

a defined process, but rather should present itself as tAe

very foundation of all intelligibility in History.

Further the negation which alone explains t,, e change froiri

positive to negative must be given at the very first: t', --s

original negation is the fact of scarcity. (118',

Sartre insists that scarcity re-discovered ýfor S)artre

scarcity was assumed býT II-arx through classical political

216

economy if not always fully asserted) does

"not claim at all to contradict the ITarxist theory, nor to complete it. "(119)

For the essential discovery of I! arxisr7i, remains that I'labour... is the real basis of the organisation of social relations. "(120) CD

Yet the contradictory nature of these same relations derives from the original negation: scarcit, V interiorised. Such that, f or Sartre

"In the environment of scarcity all the structur'es of a determined societ rest upon its mode of production. " (121ý

Now, Sartre's criticism of partial historical narratives in Marx and 'Engels may indeed be well founded. That Js in so far as a certain materialism (as the Reason of History) is introduced from without as an a priori, a materialism whose heuristic efficiency is retro-active, having been established from the viewpoint of the modern capitalist economy. A pre-industrial social formation

must found its own source of intelligibility. But even CD those purely analytic laws governing historical processes are, in Sartre's own account, assimilable to and surpassable by a comprehensive Dialectic Reason.

Sartre Is real charge agains t Marx and IEngels is that they

sought in an incremental fashion, empirically, to discover

the laws of each individual historical process, wh*1st

already possessing the premiss that such laws should be

susceptible to the law of the dialectic. For Sartre,

Historical Reason emerges through and in eacn period not

as an external unificatory princIple - historicist

idealism - but as the original and founding intellig-*b-ýlit, - C) CD of the very possibility of History itself. Yet the

History difficulties Sartre encountered in his notion of '. ý

obscure the force of such criticism; furthermore his

employment of the terms 'positive' and Ine. oativel to

consolidate the claim of scarcýtv as 'ori.: rinal negatioiiI

is either self-referring or involves t. fte introductýon o, '

unfounded characterisations. Il' the fact oj_: ' --carci t, -. - is

217

taken as negative, then the objectification of man throu"--, - the creation of goods and tools is certaini ** Y positive: negation of the original negation, scaxcit.,, T. ISociety, again, interiorising the negative fact of scarc-; t, -, -, designates certain groups of underconsuming producers: the existence of classes is negative. But then, I! = Engels' 'problem' of the transformations of positive- negative are of Sartre's construction. The validity of the formers' accounts can surely be measured i t_`I or without Sartre's 'positive-negative' addendum. Ifideed L, -,, -Ie problematic of such a 'positive-necrativel trans-L , ti on C) fori.,, - is indexed only by the positing of a total history

., J-hich demands an immanent negation; when, further, Sartre characterises violence as 'negative' in order to ý, )oL-A up a defect in Engel's analysis, he only moves from uratýounded assertion to what seems to be the illicit intro'l J_uction Of affective or evaluative characterisations.

Indeed Sartre's claim neither to contradict nor to

complete the Marxist theory gives crede-L-Lce to tLose o2 his critics who find his sympathies for Eaaotherls philosophical work more dangerously ambiguous than his

complete disagreement. Sartre's Critique functions

extremely well as a critique of both soviet marxist

orthodoxY(122) and various contemporary sociological

errors. But his affirmed acceptance of is F. -iad-e

without reference to any political econo!; ýT(123) a-nd by the

adoption of disparate theoreticF-1 ý.,,, orks. .,, 124)

t'L -i -* ted- 'e Critique is 14-m-L Clearly the ariabitious nature of by Sartre's own personal assimilation, of various cur. -ents

'l its reflect upon the ve-L,., poý-- of thought, but such lirr, 3 ities of the Critique being taken up by others as the

c foundation of a universal methodology. There is t', --- -', i perhaps admirable metaphysical S-mbition beh-in,. its

writings, but Sartre Iicas not entered into o-pen -ý-jLtblic

contestation of its contents and the modLF-'-cations he

might, accept seem only reflexive upon tnE

218

philosophical adventure of the C;

'isolated cogitol. thus easy to slL Ide into rlea. -n Daniel Reynaud's isation of the Critinue as "escap--*Ln(rr all ifiscourse" a self-enclosed silence of T)ure being.., "125)

-C CD ý

For, at best, the Criticue seems readable as c-, - dial ect-, c of ontological constru ent of _Cts. It seeks the a Truth of History as the total-LsinZ project of Saitre) within the confines of a philoso-Qhical idealism which identifies consciousness of History i,. riJt_', -L consc-o-L)c-ness of self as praxis in pure interiority. It is in this sense that Lichteim claims that Sartre i5 Kantian: seekiil, ý Lo t elaborate a unified world view from self-evident proposit- ions, the posed questions - 'How is History

L', ossible? ', 'How is the dialectic possible? ' - beinsý resolved at the interior of a previously constructed ontolo. uy. (126) Lefebvre's comment was more direct

"Precisely because he pursues speculatively the search for the foundations, he does not attain anything fundamental. "(127)

In other terms, Sartre's ultimate though unexpressed comi-nitment is to the permanence of philosophy end yet the emancipatory notions of the Critique must entail some teleological notion of philosophy's realisation and dissolution. And it is in this sense that Sartre's

philosophy of freedom remains bedevilled by its Caxtesian

f oundations.

It is upon individual praxis as alread-, r dialectic- tile L/

free cogito - that the whole historicEýl dialectic rests. (128)

x The dialectic -rationality of cor. mon pra... is does not *ty of individual it is transcend the rationali

constituted. (129) In other 1-1-ords, Sartre does not _'ound

the intelligibility of History and Conic-u, -ity in t', -. e self- I -n cr, but u generative activity of species - bei__C:, -non the

E' individual moment of sell-reflection.

Again, Sartre has always tended to define consc--*ousness

219

as that Cartesian activity of self -ý,! jdliich excludes from itself all materiality. it is doubt, med--*Lte. tion thought which define trl-e cogito. Sartre c' indeed ': '

rl Loes indict Descartes of driving

. conscious-, less , body out from

with which no bond will ever unite it, but it is Sz,, rtre himself who fails to constitute reflective consciousness as already_ engaged in the world of strua-gle and labour. CDCD In the Critique it is work w1ii-ch mediates consciousness as praxis and matter; it is not a, consciousness , ý, -hich 4-s already engaged in the process of soci-(----,. l lebour.

Sartre's freedom is this consciousness - d--, -se----, c-,, -ý-, -ed flror. ri

the world and species - to the precise e-,, --tent he

believes only such a free reflective consciousness founds the possibility of philosophy. Hence Sartre's ultinnate and insoluble problems with the realisation olf' For Sartre in the Critique :

"Freedom does not mean possibility of option but necessity of living the constraint under the form of exigency to fulfill by a praxis. "(130)

Q Such an apparent paradox f orces Sartre to make the very

vital distinction between freedom and liberation. Thus

man is not free. On the contrary :

ttmen are all slaves in so far as their vital experience unfolds on the practico-inert f ield and to the express extent that this field is originally conditioned by scarc-, -ty.

"(131)

Yet

"praxis alone .... is in its dialectic freedom the real and permanent 'foundation. .. of all the inhuman sentences that men carry out on men through worked matter. "(132)

Thus there is, on the one hand, the founding necessity of C) the free cogito - praxis in its dialectic freedom, - and,

on the other hand, the concrete enslavement of man: a

fact revealed precisely through that philosophic project

which has its origins in the cogito. ': ')i%--rnific; ý-.. ntly in

hy of ,,,: uestion de methode Sartre talks of a Dhilosop,

freedom which will take the place of 71arxism when -(I. -e

220

latter has lived out its span :

"But we have no means, no intellectual instrument, no concrete exper-ience -,.,. -Irlich will allow us to conceive of this freedon. or of this philosophy. " (133)

Just as Reason's supreme triumph is to know that there

are limits to Reason, so too the synthesis ef "fected by the cogito knows its limits to be realisation in a new free cogito. Question de methode seeks to reinstate the individual consciousness and its reflective a.,,,. -,, 2reness of the lived - le ve'cu - in its own synthetic project, whose meaning is Marxism and human history as a whole. But as long as this freedom is the cogito of Cartesian reflection, the -philosophy which it founds cannot counteneaice its ovm

realisation. For Sartre's freedom is a philosophical freedom which founds its own servitudes and yet which then seeks its own liberation: which latter is necessarily the death of philosophy. Freedom as consciousness cannoty in other words, guarantee the realisation of the

philosophy such a free consciousness generates.

Yet, if there is an ultimate failure to realise the

philosophic enterprise, Sartre has nevertheless convincingly

demonstrated the need for a philosophy which has its

source in the freedom of reflective consciousness to

transform itself from an ontological project of freedom

into a critical project of human emancipation and

liberation.

221

Chapter VII

rij ,,

T INTRODUCTION TO ICRITIXE DE LA RAISOTT DIALEC, - k-jE'

Dogmatic Dialectic and Critical Dialectic

"Everything we established in ',, uestions de methode proceeds from our agreement in principle with historical materialism. But in so far as we present this a, crreement as a simple option, amongst other possible options, v, -ýe will have done nothing. 11(l)

-!.., ', uestions de me"t1iode(1957',,

although a "work of circumstance", provides the methodological manifesto of existentialist marxism. But it is

a manifesto without "critical foundations", v,, hich has not founded itself. Further it poses a question wiaich has

ion not resolved itself within the terms Ln which the cuest- can be posed: I'marxism as the indepassable philoson1hy of our time". (3) Question or questions?: the fact that Question de methode appears on the title page and Questions de meothode appears within the text and index is

not merely a typographical ambiguity. The work of 1957

attempted to bring to light "the internal conflicts of

anthropology" and sketched out the "provisional solutions

of these difficulties". (4) But in the end it was one

question that was being asked of contemporary research: "One alone: do we, today, have the means to constitute a

structural and historical anthropology? "(5). The

solution must found itself in a movement of Being and Knowing, a moving relation which does not offer itself as

a 'simple option', amongst others, but as a Reason which

reveals itself as neither partial nor contingent but as total, synthetic and necessary: a Reason which founds its

own legitimacy. In other words the question becomes:

flis there a dialectic Reasonll?. (16)

Sartre's attempt to found this Reason All thus be

critical : "in that it will try to detern-. ine the validity

and the limits of dialectic Reason". (7) Such a critical

222

intention is equally marked by the determination oj--" opposing 'reasons' which claim the status of historical

or anthropological truth (or truthes). Hence throughout CD

the Critioue there are central passages which concern (D

themselves with Behaviorism, Gestalt sociology; with political liberalism or Stalinism; and with 'dogmatic' Marxism.

The 'critique' has parameters (rather than criteria)

and dimensions (rather than definitions):

Firstly: Reason must be synthetic, unitar, - and necessary: there is One Truth.

Secondly: internally reflexive, Reason must found itself.

Thirdly: Reason must ground itself in the Itotalisation'

of Being and Knowing. It is only in the light of these

sometimes hidden considerations that the employment of terms such as 'necessity', 'intelligibility' 'rational'

can be understood.

If Reason can be revealed, or rather if Reason can accomplish itself, as one, as grounding itself and so doing within the totalising unity of Being and Knowing, then we will have done everything: for we will have

uncovered the Truth of History.

I. pp-115-118:, Problem: defined and posed

The methodological proposals of Questions de methode - namely the analytico-synthetic and regressive-progressive CD method - must be comprehensible within a totalising Truth,

Cý one which, moreover, founds itself upon the premiss that historical materialism is true. Others may indeed have

adopted the dialectic but they have done so partially: there are those, like Georges Lefebvre, who present historical events in the polyvalism of disparate causes and results. Their method does not take up such moments into the synthetic unity of the same progression: 111,7hat they reject is the monism of interpretation". (8) There

are those who admit the presence of dialectic elements

223

in science, but who seek to ground the inclusion of CD

such elements analytically, by empirical induction: those like Gurvitch who indeed defines his own sociological method as a 'dialectic hyperempiricism'. Both methods seek rational justification for the exclusive recourse to analytic Reason or dialectic Reason: this lacking, they have recourse to an admixture of the two which in fact rests upon an analytic, empiricist, positivist rationality. The dialectic, if employed, must be

established, induced, extrapolated.

But "whatever are, in effect, the liaisons established in experience, they will never be in sufficient number to f ound a dialectic materialism; an extrapolation of such width - that is to say infinitely infinite - is

radically distinct from scientific induction". (9) In

other words, the demands put upon empiricism, in the intention to f ound the dialectic empirically, by their

very nature already empiricism and are equivalent to demanding of the marxist that he found his method a priori. (This emphasis upon radical distinctness brings to light Desan's misunderstanding of Sartre's

remarks: "The grounds for this dialectical approach could eventually be demonstrated by induction but in Sartre's

view this would be an endless task, and for all practical purposes it need only be stated a priori": (10) this is to reduce Sartre's dialectic from untranslatable language to merely a complex shorthind).

II. Task: object of Critique pp. 118-120

The dialectic must thusri unlike scientifically constituted principles, found itself as true: "In effect scientific research is not necessarily conscious of its principal characteristics: on the contrary dialectic knoviledio-e is

C- in fact knowledge of dialectictl. (11) And yet, if we look to historical materialism, we find that it has "This

paradoxical characteristic of being at one and the same time the sole truth of History and a total indetermination

224

of the Truth. This totalising thought has founded

everything except its own existence". (12) And yet it C)

is neither a question of receiving dialectic Reason as

a revealed Truth - as constituting Reason- nor a question

of seeing dialectic Reason empirically established - constitute(i Reason: "It is Reason constituting itself

in the world and by it in dissolving in it all the

constituted Reasons in order to constitute from them new

ones which it depasses and dissolves in its turn. "(13)

The initial problem must hence be taken up again: what CD

are the limits, validity and extent of dialectic Reason? This is the task of critique and a task which has up until now been blocked by dogmatism. (14)

III. p. 120-121: Obstacle: its source; Hegalian idealism

"The origin of this dogmatism must be sought in the fundamental difficulty of 'dialectical materialism' 11(15)

which in turn derives from its 'inversion' or 'overthrow'

of Hegelian idealism. In this, and the following section, Sartre is attempting to deal with what he regards as the dilemma of epistemology: if the latter is to be regarded as the relation between subject and object, knower and known, Knowing and Being, and if, further, the poles of this dyad are irreducibles, epistemology can resolve itself only by affording a priority to one of its two terms: both of which solutions can be seen as philosophical absurdities. And yet such a dualism can be observed wherever Knowing affords a regulated form and Being is conceded an ultimate and final inaccesibility: "Kant

can preserve the dualism of noumena and phenomena because in him the unification of sensible experience is effected by formal and intemporal principles: the content of Knowledge cannot change the mode of knowing. "(16)

The resolution of this dilemma is ontological and in CD this respect Hegel's contribution is threefold: Firstly: the relation of subject to object is within History, not ruled by the a temporal Kantian a priorils.

225

Yet Hegel is, in this very regard, guilty of what Sartre, in LIEtre et Neant(17), termed an "ontological optimism" and what, in the Critique is rejected as its dogmat-; sm. J CD For in Hegel Truth is complete in so far as the philosopher places himself, so he believes, at the beginning

of the end of History. Judgement can be made "because

nothing will subsequently come to put the philosopher and his judgement into question again. "(18) Secondly: the necessity of Truth is not that of a pure conceptual activity býtt "must be undergone in being in order to be recognised in the development of Knowledge, C) CD it must be lived in the movement of knowledge in order for the development of the object to be able to be

affirmed. "(19) Hegel's ultimate failure was to reduce the process of being to that of Knowing, to identify Knowledge with its object: "consciousness is consciousness of the Other and Other is the being-other of consciousness. "(20) Thirdly: it is consciousness in absolute freedom which grasps the rigorous necessity of the development of the World because it is consciousness which constitutes itself for itself as absolute Knowledge.

IV. p. 121-122: Obstacle: its source; Marxist materialism

"Marx's originality is to establish irrefutably against Hegel that History is ongoinp (en cours), that being

remains irreducible to Kn and, at one and the same time, to want to preserve the dialectic movement

* in

being and in Knowing". (21) The problem is clear: for Hegel, philosophy, which equals Absolute Knowledgge, is the reflective moment of a closed History, and yet, if

we are to avoid the positivist traps - all historical

prediction is itself historical and the future is merely the repetition of the past - we must -preserve both a historical future which is new, irreducible to the present and establish against positivism "how dialectic Reason cl-. i-, set forth even today, if not, certainly, the whole Truth,

at least totalising truths. "(22)

226

p. 122-123: Solution

This initial examination has permitted 'Lie problem to

clarify itself: Being and Knowing are bound in the same movement which is the Truth of t1istory it is to be made

and which is dialectic in its Progress. 'Let the -L, -. ilure

of Hegelian idealism was the identif -ca

'Lion of and knowiný3,, against which `-, --i: ýx stated thce,

material existffnce is irreducible to 1: -=,, ýledc-e. But

precisely, if Knowledge is to leave bei-fic- to develop CD ID -

according to its own laws, how can ,, ie avoid ti'-ie processeb being yielded as empiricaj-? TI-le solution is to de-oass this "old dogmatic dual J-srj-.: - ý2 3' The eniste, ý, ologic. -, -'- dyad - in itself irresol-vable - is -bolished; rýt the

same time it is preserved - BeinL,. - remains irreducible to Knowing - but at a higher level: epistei-nology is C) CDU dissolved into ontology; an ontology, preciselly, of human

activity which is real and vihich, yet, knov, rs Jits--elf to be dialectic in the reflective mome-rit of free selL-consc---ous- -r-' - ness. Thus, marxist monism is still a. dual. -Lsm :

"in fact it is monist and dualist at one and the same time. It is dualist because monist. T..: Tarx defined his ontological monism in affirming the irreducibility of being to thought and in, on the contrary, reintegrating the thoughts into the real as a certain type of human activity. "

"in a word materialist monisrq has very happily suppressed the dualism of thought

-F and being to the pro. -it of total being, ýD thus seized. in its materiality. But it is order to reestablish by way of antimony - at least apparent - the dualism of Being and Truth. "(24)

. 7ithout such a character o-L monistic dualism, dialectic materialism as the ideology of the rising class can only be the sim ple inert expression of this ascension, it cannot turn back upon itself to illuminate itself, to reveal itself, and the dialectic cannot be presented --s the real movement of History revealing itself.

227

VI. pp. 123-124: Contemporar: ýr Error

Th edJIfic ul ty ofseen, -ý tfle, t ep J! i _, -_1 -L ste ---to 1o gy isi Lac t -f auf UUisn-L gehoben by ontology: 'hat is, e-, -)is'e-, qoloo-,

_ * ei theiý

abolished nor preserved, but both at the ontolozicl, ýýl level: has been insurmountable to conte, -_, ý., por2iýy m.. =--ists. - -r- Confronted with what t, Liey believe to be an indepassable

epistemological dualism they have sup -ýts pressCed one of -1 terms: thought is thus refused all dialectic activity and is dissolved into the universal dialectic.

"Thus they can substitute Bein-, r for Truth. There is no longer, properly speaking,

. Being no longer ma., T know _i'ests itself, in whatever manner this should be:

it evolves according to its own le,, vls; the dialectic of Nature is Nature without men ... For Knowledge, under whatever forii it should'- be, is a certain relation of man with the world which surrounds him: if man no longer exists, this relation disappears. "(25)

The dialectic of Nature establishes a mere organisation of facts from which all knowing subjects are absent. CD And Sartre names this attempt to let the JUorid reveal itself of itself and to nob : dialectical materialism from without or transcendental materia-lisr. (26)

VII. p. 124-126: Contemporary Error: error of 1'. 'arx

Unhappily it is 1,11arx himself who permits this definition :

"The materialist conception of the world simply signifies the conception of Ilature such as it is, without any foreign addition. "(27)

C. ) Man is merely an absolute ob at the heart of Nature

and human History is simply a specification of this

nature: the "foreign addition" excluded from this world is

"nothing other than the concrete, living man, with his human relations, his true or false thoughts, his real objectives" (28)

for the human subject, the experiencing individual, is

no more than the 'reflection', the Iseat of reactions', of a development in exterioi-ity of the object. 0

228

And yet it is clear that such an attit-o-de involves a dogmatic idealism, for what is established is a Trut-".,,. of Being which Mind can only reflect or represent. Since

F scientific laws are experimental h, ý, Tpotheses verified by facts and the Dialectic is held to be an a-(--)ý-,, ro-priation of total Truth by a universal consciousness the affiri-E, tion of a Dialectic of Nature curiousl ' -11, resembles the Kantian

, ideas which he took to be

-regulatory and 1-!, rhich, ho-,. -: ever, no singular experience could justify.

This is in no way to chall-enge the kinetic theory of gasses, for instance, but it is worth remernberin '7

that both Hegel and IT= discovered and defined the dialectic in t he relations of man to matter and in those of men between themselves.

VIII. p. 126-128: Contemporary Error: Engels; the disoovery of irrationality

It might appear strange that the contemporary error of CD the Dialectic of Nature should be termed an lidealism',

when its most immediate character is that of a rigid realism. And yet remembering the significance of the

ontological depassment of epistemology, it should be

clear that

"materialism in itself is not opposed to idealism"(29)

Indeed there is :

fla materialist idealism which is at bottom only a discourse on the idea of matter"(30)

Just as Gurvitch and Lefebvres were guilty of employing the language of the dialectic to designate the contents of non-dialectic thought, so in the case of Pierre Naville (Introduction generale a I'La Dialectiq e de la Nature" de Frederic Engels,, 1950) and Engels, what we are dealing

with is an idealism which has 'stolen' the words o-C science in order to designate ideas of little or no content. And yet the language emploý7ed cannot guarantee an escape from the problem of the True.

229

How can Naville's individual, a mere Icentre of reaction', on whom the law of the dialectic is

' imDosed, be the

means of distinguishing, the True from the Talse?

"How can a man lost in the world, traversed by an absolute movement which comes to him from everywhere, also be that sure consciousness of itself and of the Truth? "(31)

Naville's "theft" of the language of contemporary behavioural Psychology with its emphasis upon the Inarrow conditioning of organic behaviour' cannot conceal its theoretical foundation: the irrational theory of the reflection which makes of thought

C-- Ita behaviour riorously conditioned by the 0, 1c'' world (which it is) in

, ommitting to tell us that. it is also knowledge of the world"(32)

Such a knowledge is both the passive and received effect of exterior causes and - in the certainty of dialectic knowledge - the de-situated contemplation of a worl... in -1 which thought doesn't exist.

Such a theory is irrational in so far as dialectic Reason

must prove its rationality by furnishing Reason with its

own reasons. Engels induction of dialectical 'laws' can provide only probabilities which leave the fact in itself inexplicable and contingent. For, as we have seen, science does nct have to provide a reason for the facts

which it uncovers: it merely establishes their existence and their relations with other facts. Like Gurvitch and Lefebvres again, by trying to analytically establish the dialectic, Engels makes of dialectic rationality a contingent law of which it is said that it is thus and not otherwise. Unable to account for itself, Reason b, ecomes merely a fact without knowable necessity, and rationality merely

Ilan indepassable and universal law, thus a pure and simple irrationality"(33)

The 'dogmatic dialectic' has thus revealeditself as irrational inasmuch as the demand for rationality is

230

internal to Reason and derives from the established depassment of the simple Being and Knowýing dualism. For, each form of the dogmatic dialectic considered has

ended uP in the irrational :

"either in suppressing the thought of the empirical man, or in creating a noumenal consciousness which imposes its law ag a caprice or in refinding in the ý'Tature Iwithout foreign addition' the laVTS of dialectic Reason under the form of contingent facts"(34)

IX. p. 129-135: Restatement of Task- (object of Critique)

and its Implications

Whether the affirmation of a Dialectic of Nature ultimately manifests a profound irrationality, the denial of dialectic relations in inanimate Nature is unfounded: for

each is free to believe in it or not believe in it. (35)

But belief, precisely, is not in question: the dialectic

must remain necessary as law of intelligibility and as rational structure of being. For this reason a materialist dialectic only has meaning at the interior of human history as a historical materialism: one which is made and endured, lived and known.

The Dialectic of Nature, in such a perspective, can only be the object of a "metaphysical hypothesis"(36) for we

seek to impose the blind law of the dialectic where it

does not give itself to be seen. And, given that we do

not reject a priori the possibility that such a concrete dialectic of Nature should one day reveal itself, we must

say that there is not yet any dialectical materialism. (37)

This discovery of irrationality in dogmatism or

analytical prodedure shows only too clearly that dialectic

Reason must found itself, and found itself dialecticaliv.

1. This means that

"dialectic universality must impose itself a, priori as a necessity"(38)

Such a necessity must, of course, avoid idealist sclutions:

231

our apodictic evidence must not, like Husserl, be found

in the achievem-nts of pure formal consciousness, but in the concrete world of History and as overflowing each experience of this world. 2. We must maintain the epistemological dualism of knowing and being only within the ontological monism of the real :

"the only possible unity of the dialectic as law of historical development and of the dialectic as knowledge in movement of this development must be the unity of one dialectic movement. Being is negation of knowing and draws its being from the negation of being,, "(39)

3. But if transcendental materialism was reproached with having excluded from the Truth the lived experience of the singular individual, it must necessarily be

recognised that dialectic Reason is the Reason of History; that is, the dialectic issues from the singulax actions of many men and yet is one. And if we are to avoid irrational dogmatism, we must establish how the dialectic

"can be at one and the same time resultant without being passive mean and totalising force without being transcendant fatality . 11(40)

4. The dialectic is materialist, which means that thought discovers the necessity of its object, in so far as thought is itself a material . And it is

only in an ontology of the real, the concrete, that thought is a moment of action and the dialectic

method is not distinguished from the dialectic movement. It is only in such an ontology that, in the unity of

apodictic experience, each praxis discovers the reality

of the Other and of inorganic materiality. 5. To summarise: the dialectic is a reason and not

a blind law; and yet the dialectic movement is a reality. The dialectic is one, but not as a unitary force which

reveals itself as the divine will behindýHistory I

"The dialectic, if it exists, can only be the totalisation of concrete totalisations effected by a, mu tiplicity of totalising singularities" (41)

232

And the dialectic experience is grasped as both necessity and as intelligibility. !, 7hich latter means t'ýat the dialectic movement must be discovered by each individual

as the necessity o-, '-' his own : but not in so --Ear as it appears to a contemplative or passive Reason. The dialectic is the "living logic of action"(42) and it is in the course of action that the individual dsicovers the dialectic to be the rational transDarence of this action: intell_ýgibility. And yet the individual suffers the dialectic as an absolute

, necess which escapes him,

precisely in so far as it is made by others.

But though the dialectic-is the adventure of the singular object, the Reason of History is one and draws its beinsx

C-) from the multiplicity of totalising sinc, ):.,, ularities: the

universal singulari ses itself in the intelligibility of individual praxis and the singular universalises itself in the necessity of dialectic Reason :

"exterior to all because interior to each and ongoing totalisation but without totalisator of all the totalised totalisations and of all the detotalised totalities" (43)

Summary of 'Dogmatic Dialectic and Critical Dialectic'

We have seen that the methodological advances of Questions de methode derived from a concurrence with historical materialism: but nothing would have been

achieved if this accord could only be presented as mere

choice; whereas everything, would be accomplished if

historical materialism could be revealed as the Reason

of History-universal, necessary and total.

The 'dogmatic' dialectic of orthodox Marxism does indeed

offer a 'necessity' but either by failing to found its

necessity, or by inducing this 'necessity' from the

fundamental contingency of the fact.

Dialectic Reason can thus neither affirm itself as beyond

-D choice nor present itself as one choice of analytic Reason.

233

The first immediate task of "critiquet' is consequently to reveal the irrationality of such dogmatic attempts but by, simultaneously, uncovering the exigencies of rationality the parameters and dimensions of the 'critique' which are One Truth which founds itself as necessary.

In other words Reason must provide its cwn critique, and in one and the same movement: knowledge of the dialectic is itself dialectic.

This monism could not be countenanced within the traditional epistemological dualism of Being and Knowing

which characterised the historical advances of 'idealism'

and 'materialism': hence the ontological depassment of epistemolog . But this must be an- ontology of the real, the concrete and the historic, -. 1.

All the apparent contradictions immanent to an abstract consideration of this dialectic Reason, namely those of necessity and intelligibility, interiority and exteriority, singularity and universality, materialism and idealism,

and which are, in some sense, articulations of this

primary lindepassable' dyad, show themselves capable of resolution at the level of dialectic experience.

In the first stage of the Critique the abstract conditions which must be fulfilled for this experience to be possible have been demonstrated. But this demonstration remains at the formal and abstract level of inquiry, the accord with historical materialism shows itself to be not a choice nor 4-ogmatic assertion, but to require the total translucidity of the Reason of History to the experience of each.

"I have said and I repeat that the sole valid interpretation of human history was historice-I materialism... But, if one wants to sum up this introduction, one could say that historical materialism is its own proof in the milieu of dialectic rationality but that it does not

234

found this rationality... Marxism is --ITLis tor ,v itself becoming conscious of itself"(44)

In other words, the critique of the dogmatic dialectic and the first outlines of a critique of the critical dialectic have uncovered the demand for a critical ontology of the real which in turn calls for the revelation of a critical experience. And, of capital importance, this experience is ours and must be ours to

accomplish :

"If dialectic Reason is to be possible as the adventure of all and as the freedom of each, as experience and as necessity, if we have to be able to show at one and the same time its total translucid'ity... and its indepassable rigour...., if we must found it as rationality of , of the totalisation and of the social future, if we must subsequentl ,y subject it to cri quer) as has been done with analytic Reason... the situated experience of its a odicitY must be realised by ourselves'1(45ý

The critical task is ours to achieve but its end remains theoretical: the Preface spoke of one problem and one alone: Do we today have the means to constitute a structural and historical anthropology? The critique -remains unitary but, in its first stage, it has manifested dimensions :

"on what conditions is knowledge of one history possible? Within what limits can the relations brought to light be necessary? What is dialectic rationality, what are its limits and its foundation? "(46)

But our experience of this dialectic will remain within His and within a given moment of social development:

it cannot hope to reconstitute the real movement of History in its development.

"But I am far from believing that the isolated effort of one individual could furnish a satisfactory response - be it partial - to so broad a question and one which brings into play the totality of History. If only these first researchs have allowed me to make the problem precise, through provisional establishments of fact which are there to be

235

contested and modified, if these give rise to discussion and - in the best of cases - if this discussion is lead collectively in some work groups, I will stand satisfied"(47)

Critique of Critical experience 1. p. 135-136: Restatement of the Critical Dialectic: Critical Experience

"If this experience is to be possible, we know the abstract conditions it must fulfill. But these exigencies leave it underdetermined in its singular reality"(48)

As in the first discussion of the Critical dialectic the

opening definition of the problem followed from the

conclusions of Questions de methode, so here the initial

exploration of dialectic Reason has permitted a re-definition of the 'critique'. The critical dialectic was left formalised, abstract and possible. The task of the following section must be to determine this critical experience in its concrete singularity: in short, what forms of experimentation, instruments, what types of fact, extrapolation, proof are adequate to the dialectic

process? 2. p. 136-137: The Nature of Critical Exper ence The "Critique of Dialectic Reason"-has become necessarily the "Critique of Critical Dialectic Experience": that is,

dialectic Reason has been shown to yield itself to

apodictic experience in its very intelligibility. This

intelligible experience -remains a knowing but not as the

iAsolated term of the old epistemological dualism :

"It is not a question of establishing its (dialectic Reason's) existEnce, but of, without empirical discovery, experiencing CF-prouve s existence through its intelligibility"(49)

The epistemological dualism is maintained in the movement

of one and the same dialectic, which signifies that

"if the dialectic is the reason of be--'. -'-nq and CD

of knowing... it must manifest itself as double intelligibility"(50)

236

the intelligibility of the dialectic as o" 'U-',. -ie and of knowledge; and the intelli(, c., ibility of tI-Le

-facts, as for instance a historical process. 3ut this disjunction is maintained only at the ontological level

of the real, in which the dialectic thought, as praxis of the theoretician, is itself a dialectic process and founds its own intelligibility : CD

"Thus the fundamental intelligibility of dialectic Reason - if this is to exist - is that of a totalisation. Or, to come back to the distinction of being and CD knowing, there is a dialectic if there exists at least in an ontological sector C, a totalisation in progress which --'Ls immediately accessible to a thought which ceaselessly totalises itself in its very comprehension of the totalisation from which it emanates and which makes itself its object. "(51)

Those 'laws' or 'principles' of the dialectic claimed by Engels and others are in fact no more than induced

rules, 'categories' of thought, which like those of positivist Reason derive their authority from the

maintenance of the epistemological dualism: such regulatory principles rest upon the supposed intelli, -ibility of dialectic knowing, where the thought remains unintegrated to the movement of being. Such 'laws' only rediscover their intelligibility from the point of vievr of total-

isation, and if we are to pose the question of critical

experience as dialectic knowledge of the dialectic, 1., re

must do so at the ontoloý-D-ical level CD

"does a sector of being exist in which the totalisation is the very form of existence? "(52,

p. 138-139: Totality and Totalisation

The categorial disti-niction which Ejartre now introduces in

Ole forrnaý terms Js perhaps ti-Le m-as t im-portant o. the

volume for:

Firstly: It is only in the perspective of 'L, -'ie to'L, --'--*-, -, a', --*-, c)-. i

that any claimed 'laws of the dialectic' can --fi-n-d '(, 'l-e4---,,

intelligibility the distinction betv, -een totalit-v and tot Secondly: 11 ur-: 2 -- t -- on

237

grounds the central Uisjunction between a-ý-al. -Ttic Ea dialectic Reason, and -renders i-n-tellicri

,, -ble t--e-,

relationshi,,, -). Thirdly: it is the notion of total

-,, ýý-ýati on ; ýe J ts the maintenamce 0 -CL t -ie eiste c);:; 7 kc, -aI d tlE I

ontological monism of one di, -, lectic: --L2o--. - CD C)

revealed as a tota, lisinc), --,. ctivi-t, -J, - is LIO CD the totalisation of being , ýrhich thou! ý, --, -Lt ]-, Edý--es its

C-D object. Fourthly: itis on the plan e of F, O t, '-'l -LS ---,

t ion ti-lat ie

nature of the critical experience is

- the universal and necessaaýy knov, ýrledge of ti-le dialect-ic CD

n iree is reconciled with the si. -gular experience of the C)

individual

- the critical experience is universalisable, of

anyone at all

- subsequently the Lovestigator is not the 'privileged C) CD

witness' of the dialectic, but his -project - the C-itique

itself - is the singulari sing totalisation of t-', --e univel: ýseal (and universalisable) experience of all

- in totalisation the necessity of the dialectic is

conjoined without contradiction to its intellirJbility.

Totality is defined as

"a being, radically distinct from the sum of its parts, which is comple te. .. in each of these parts.. " (all em-phasis my own),

it

"can only exist within the imaginary -* that is,

as the correlative of an act of the imagination"

11

As such "it claims the ontolo, ý_,, ical st-atus of t'r-,, e

in-itself, of the inert".

Moreover

Othe synthetic unity, which will %(-)earance of total2ty cannot be L

pas t act ion.... w at remains of - By its being-in-externali-ICy, t-'--ie the in-itself gnaws away at. this

ve tota! -* ty i of unity; the passi I

-rxoduce its . A- an act, but

inert--'L, --. of ap oea ---an ce

s il fa c

238

11 gnawed away by an infinite divisibil *, I

The active power which holds together t1nese TL)a, its is CD

J- the correlative of an act of imagination lust, as L'Imaginaire showed the symphony o-L ti'de paintlim, - to be e', ý (D

imaginaries projected throu,., c: rh the cornplex of scu-., -, ds, o---

colours, which serve as their analogue. r-I

These inert totalities possess a major im-portFnce since it is they which create among men that relation C) Sartre will later term the practico-inert. In short, the

totality is a human product and serves as a regulative

princLple of totalisation.

"If indeed something must exist which resents C-- P itself as the synthetic of the diverse, this can only be a unification in process, that is, an act"

Thus the totalisation, like the totality, is a 'synthetic

labourl

t1which makes of each part a manifestation of the whole, and which relates the whole to itself through the mediation of the parts. "(53)

But the totalisation, unlike the totality, is an

ong_oing, (en cours) act without which the multiplicity

returns to its original status. In other words, within

a practical field, the act of totalisation attempts the

most rigorous synthesis of the most highly differentiated

multiplicity :

"thus, by a double movement, the multiplicity multiplies itself to infinity, every part opposes itself to every other part and to the whole which is in the process of formation, while the totalising activity tightens all the bonds, making of each differentiated element its immediate expression and its mediation as well in relation to other elements"(54)

Subsequently dialectic reason can be seen as this very

synthetic movement of totalisation :

IlIf dialectic reason exists, it can only be (from the ontological viewpoint) the

239 Mý

totalisation in process, taking place where the totalisation occurs"(55)

Now Sartre clearly avoids any Cartesian dualism of ; - "ind

and 1,, 'Iatter in which totality coulJ- be presented as pure matter and tota-lisation as pure mind. Yet to take th-e

example Sartre offers and ,, Thich is adopted by Desan :

"That synthetic unity of a habitat is not simply the labour that has produced it, but also the act of inhabiting: left to itself it returns to the multiplicity of inertia"(56')

the metal of the house corrodes and the wood rots as the

result of a surrounding atmos here constituted in C-) p industrial production carried on elsewhere: the effects of totalising human labour are present here, if the wcrý-- is executed over there. Sartre cannot intend totalisation to be direct action upon or with the object: this begs too many questions and anyway his subsequent use of the

notion is proof enough that he refuses such a limited

interpretation. The same form of reply would apply to

the characterisation of totalisation as intended action.

Moreover Sartre does not say that the uninhabited house

has the status of totality, but that "left to itself it

returns to the multiplicity of inertial'. In this respect Desan seems to misrepresent totalisation as direct

intended human labour and totality as presently unworked

matter. It should be remembered that both totality and totalisation are synthetic labours: the former that of

imagination, the latter simply an ongoing act. ;, ý. That

Sartre's distinction does is merely raise the problem of

critical experience to another level: that of human

acti

The totality can only have an ontological status: for as

construct of an imaginary act, it is immediately

dissolvable in an act in process: and Sartre is consec-

uently not delineating a material sector of existence -

which might be seen as the Cartesian trap - but ra. tllier

240

an ontological sector of critical experience. '. 'i'hat gives the definition its fundamental ambiguity is tlileA Sartre is prepared to employ material, meLaphors to illuminate the notion of totality; and t', --, Lls, in turn, derives from an equivocation between the conceDts of Matter/Nature and Being.

C)

For if Sartre wants to be able to describe material products (as he later does with his example of forest- clearing) and cultural products (ideology; social relations; ethics etc. ) as equally oppressive, standing against praxis, then the notion of totality is vital. Hence, the totality is inscribed in and supported 1: ýy the

practico-inert(57) and in such a use the practico-inert means both Pure Matter (negation of Mind) as object for

and 'negation of physical labour as praxis, and Pure Being (negation of Knowing) as object for and negation of consciousness as praxis. Hence with the latter the Being

which is "poured into the world of meansing"(58) is 111-hat

of positivity, plenitude and en-soi.

The equivocation between Matter and Being thus finds its

exact reflection in the equivocation between act/praxis as physical labour (work) and as activity of consciousness.

This central failure on Sartre's part can be seen in

large part to proceed from a confusion of, on the one hand, the Heideggerian insight that man is both Being

CD and non-Being, and on the other hand, what Sartre takes

to be Marx's insight: man is that material being who can

refleot upon matter.

4. p. 139-140: Critical Experience and Totalisation

But to return to the problem of critical experience as know

ItSince it is inadmissable that the totalisirE knowledge arrive at the ontological totalisation as a new totalisation of the latter... "(59)

241

As in Llýtre et le N6ant(60) where knowledge add. 7 nothjn-ý- to being, so here Knowing as totalisation of Being as C-- totalisation cannot add anything to the latter

Cýý It.. the dialectibial knowledge must be a moment of totalisation or, if you prefer, the totalisation must include its reflective totalisation within itself, as an indispensable structure and as a totalisin

'sy process within the process as a whole. "(61)

In other words, critical experience as knowing is the

reflective moment of experience as the movement of being

and knowing: or, phenomenologically, consciousness in CD

act ( totalisation of being and knowing) is self-conscious- CD ness in act (totalisation of knowing).

Clearly Sartre wants to be able to deal with false or

partial consciousness as the alienated moment of self-

consciousness in act. Hence the dialectic has

"rules produced by the totalisation in process"

which are

t1concerned with the relations between the unification and the unified"

that is

"the modes of effective presence of a process of becoming which totalises those parts which are totalised"(62)

Knowledge is

"the totalisation itself, inso-Lar as the latter is present in certain partial structures of a specific chaxacter"(63)

Reflective critical experience as the (knowing) moment

of the totalisation in process is

"realised through the mediation of certain of these (parts of totalisation) as synthetic knowledge of itself. "(64)

All these terms: "modes of effective presence'12 "certain

partial structures of a specific structure", I'mediation

of certain of these": introduce a general idea o--l the

242

permeability of Beina , -.., Iiich in turn permits Sartre to

retain the epistemological dyad of the real and the thought within the one totalisation. The retention ot the former is necessary to explain any disjunction between the two terms as ideology, false consciousness, partial or alienated consciousness. T! oreover the reve 1-

ation of Being as totalisation (Consciousness in Act) to Knowing as totalisation (Self-Consciousnesýý in Act) through modes of effective presence can be historically

significant :

"The critical experience can be but a moment of that adventure, or, if you prefer, that totalising adventure produces itself a, s the critical experience of itself at a certain moment of its develoPment"(65)

This observation is clearly of crucial importance for the reflexive account of the appearance of the CritiQue itself.

And, again, this whole argument can only derive its force from an ongoing loyalty to the phenomenological

account of consciousness, in which the reflective

experience is not seperated from the ongoing totalisation

"I have shown elsewhere that one must think of reflection, not as a parasitical and seperate consciousness, but as the particular structure of certain 'consciousnesses"'(66)

p. 140-141: Singular universal

"If the totalisation is in process in any sector whatever of reality, this totalisation can only be a singular adventure under singular conditions, and, from the epistemological point of view, it produces universals which illuminate it, and singularises these by making them internal.. "(67)

At the epistemological moment - which is that (historicall. v

conditioned) moment of reflective awareness - the total-

isation produces 'rules of the dialectic' which are

necessarily universal in import; but at the ontological

moment - totalisation of both being and knowing - such

243

rules are singularised within the adventure oL -0 one process.

6. p-141-142: No matter who But

"If the totalisation claims a moment'. of the critical consciousness, as the necessary avatar of the totalising praxis, it goes without saying that this moment cannot appear at any time, or any place, whatever. It is conditioned, in its deep reality as well as in the modes of its appearance, by the synthetic rule, characterising this totalisation, as well as by the prior circumstances which it must transcend and retain within itself according to that very rule. 11 (68)

In other words: the moment of reflective awareness is conditioned in its appearance,, 'effective presence' by the very totalisation of which it is a part. So that it is not enough to know, one must also know that one knows (i. e. knows the Truth) but one cannot know why one knows that one knows: this lies in the movement of being which by definition lies

, outside, or rather beyond, the

becoming aware of this movement. This represents a curious shift into historical objectivism which is not mitigated by Sartre's subsequent explanation of the Critique's appearance

it *0 . the critique of dialectical reason cannot appear before the historical totalisation has produced that singularised universal which we call dialectic, that is, before it is established, through the philosophies of Hegel and of Marx. Nor can it appear before the abuses which have obscured the very notion of dialectic reality and have produced a new schism between the praxis and the knowledge which illuminates it... In other words, the critical experience could not take place in our history before Stalinist idealism had rigidified both epistemological practices and epistemological methods"(69)

Now since dialectic is the movement of Being as cri,, 74-inal

and ongoing totalisation by man of his world in History

and we have analysed this totalisation as cons C40U sness in act, the realisation of self-consciousness in act

244

(which is Marx's 'discovery' of the dialectic) is historically determined: that is, the modes of effective presence of consciousness in act to itself as dialectic knowledge of the dialectic are determined: but by what? If it is the practico-inert which, totalised, does not yield the effective presence of dialectic in this totalisation's structure of reflective consciousness, then how are we to avoid either objective materialism or theoretical relativism?

Sartre offers no explanation -LIor the conce origin of the dialectic in Marx and by the same token can provide no explanation of the origin of the Critique, nor, more importantly, the relationship between the development of Stalinism as socioleconomic structure and the rigidif- ication of epistemological method and practice.

This is all the more striking as Sartre goes on to describe the critical experience as "the intellectual

expression of the straightening out (remise en ordre) which in this 'one world' of ours, characterises the

post-Stalinist world"(70) and yet this repair is given no socio-eoonomic or political character: nowhere in the Critique is there indicated a programme of revolutionary

or collective action, of which any methodological

purification would be the necessary "intellectual

expression".

And yet, Sartre can maintain that this critical exp-er- ienoe can be realised by any one at all toda :

"any one human life whatever, if the historical totalisation must be able to occur, is the direct and indirect expression of the whole (the totalising movement) and of every life.. "(71)

Moreover, the 'divorce' or 'contradiction' between

"blind and principle-less praxis", that is totalising

and unreflective activity, and the 11rigidified thou, 1_n-ht1f, is

245

"lived through in uneasiness and sometimes as heart-rending" (72)

an unease which is generally felt for

11we see today the birth off numerous attempts - all interesting and all (including, of course, the present one: ) debatable - to question the- dialectic about itselflf(73)

It is worth, thus, summaxily recon6idering the whole Itn1importe quit' argu. ment: the ontolopical monism of Cý being and knowing could not ultimately accomodate the historical chaxacter of conc_ptual production. For it

permits Sartre to tell us what it is to dialectically know; but he offers no real explanation of what it is to know truly,. And yet we can realise a disjunction between no-t-knowing ("blind and principle-less praxis") and knowing falsely (11rigidified thought"); and we precisely realise this disjunction in anguish through an affective structure of consciousness!

At the root of this failure is a wavering between

recourse to some form of objectivism: the historical

appearance of dialectic knowledge - the 'moment' of Marx - is determined by an unreflective moment of being (= social, economic, cultural conditions unknowable to themselves), and a theoretical idealism or relativismo. the ideological debate is uprooted from any social or political foundation, and Sartre's initiative becomes as "debatable" as any other.

What in turn roots this equivocation is Sartre's attempt to universalise (or make universalisable) the necessarily individual project of the critical intellectual.

It. . the appearance in each person of the reflective and critical consciousness defines itself as an individual attempt to grasp, through one's own real life (conceived as an expression of the whole), the moment of historical totalisation. Thus, in its most immediate and superficial character, the critical experience of totalisation is the very life of the investigator, insofar as

246

this life criticises itself reflectively. "(74)

which signifies, if Sartre, is to retain the consistency

of anyone at all, that anýyone can make himself investi

and hence have critical experience of the historical totalisation through reflective self-criticism. Wew 111

return to this central aspect of reflexi in Sartre's

project.

P. 142-143: The Life

"But we are not concerned, at this point, with the questioning of consciousness about itself:

. the ob jedt that it ought to claim

is precisely , that is, the objective being of the investigator in the world of Others, inasmuch as this being has been totalisiný)- itself since birth and will do CD

so until death. "(75)

It might appear that this sentence was directed against Hegelian idealism, wherein the dialectic is of the interiority of consciousness with a false exteriority: the self-alienation of consciousness. In that sense Sartre would be insisting upon the mediation of consciousness-in-interiority by the body experienced as exteriority through work on Nature.

Certainly when Sartre continues by characterising this

critical experience as starting from the point when :

"the individual disappears from historical categories.. "

and the individual Is 11

"comprehension of his own life must go so far as to deny its singular determination, in order to seek its dialectical intelligibility in the whole of the human adventure"(76)

Lionel Abel can legitimately ask what exactly an individual life is which is bereft of its particular qualifications. But there is, precisely, a distinction between particular qualifications and singular determin-

ations :

"And I am not considering here that coming to

247

awareness which would make him grasp the content of that life... "

On the level of a materialist epistemology the individual

may indeed be defined as a specific material be , but

on the ontological level, it is a Logos of 3eing which is revealed through and in the singularity of the CD

individual being.

"We are not trying to reconstruct the real history of the human species; rather we are attempting to establish the Truth of His (77)

Of course, Sartre maintains against Hegel the Kierkegaardian irreducibility of the lived experience

L, of the individual: the knowing being is not tne mere cipher of revealed Being. But the experience of exteriority is already lived in interiority through relations CD of Other and class. The individual is thus that "living

mediation" between the Reason of the whole and that of the part.

And, as this relation is already lived in interiority, the investigator can give himself his own singular existence as negating itself qua singularity in the

affirmed movement of universal Hilstory :

"Inverting the synthetic movement of the dialectic as method (that is, inverting the Marxist movement of thought which goes from production and relations of production to the structures of the groups, then to the interior contradictions of the latter, then to the milieu and, should the occasion arise, to the individual) the critical experience will start out from the immediate, that is, from the individual attaining himself in his abstract praxis, to rediscover, through deeper and deeper conditionings, the totality of his practical links with others, and thereby the structures of the diverse practical multiplicities eanld) through the contradictions and struggles among these, the concrete absolute: histo-, -ic-ý man. That is tantamount to sa7f--ný- that thie individual - the uestioner I", 'rho is oi-? -estioned N . is myself and is no-one. ý1(78,,

7 8. -, o. 145-147: Critical Exloer2. e,, Lce and Teý-, i_, jo--, ---L,

But this dissolution of EL sj,, -, uui--rity 21-, to ")e u-nivei-sal , ý, - C, I- -L - L1.1- 1-

248

- -1: 11-, c ý) 2ý f has been accomplished solely on the onic level:

that is conter. r---porP-;. --, -ieous social -! "o--ý-, --atio-ris. Cc, uldn It it be argued 't-'rice-t my life is too E-i a -'L vent ur eto

-) t'-I-e diacl-Ironic a, '. 1-venture of -I. --')e tol-a-I hope to ri -- C)

However, i2or :. aiýtre, thiS is to

structure of dJ ac? ir o -i-* c ex--)e-2' -)u ano It ence; ol-) h e-I this experience considered sync'n-ronic, -211

'i(: -; id 7 07ý7 constitutes a, cult-u-r, --,, l --t - culture does not mec-n -- `, e subjective the disparate knowledge of ar- erc--, noi. I-L-L

collection of my knoi, 1, Tled,, Te, J-or culture is Cý "itself temporalising End totalisinrý- totalisationil (79) C-ý

It is objective Culture in which the, t culti--. re i c, --,, ll

my own, Or of my era's, is a certain v, ri-J-ch defines me. For, at the interior of this objec, -. -ive

cultural field :

"wha tI do know must be dialectically conditioned by what I do not know 11 (

ý'J' 0

Consequently :

"I find myself dialectically conditioned by the totalised and totalising past of the human adventure: as a man of culture (this expression fits every man, whatever his culture may be, even the illiterate), I totalise myself from a whole past and to the extent of my culture, I totalise this experience"(81)

In other words, the dissolution of singularity into the

universal on the plane of a synchronic ontolocv is CD (,

reflected at the level of a temporal isingý ontology:

"The individual is only the point of depaiý-'Uure methodologically and his short life is dissolved into the human and pluxidimensional whole which temporalises his total-isation and totalises his tem-

, porality"(82),

Moreover this universal is not an abstract but erea, supposition of total knov,, -ledge

"Far from supposing, as cert, 7-, in philosoýý. 'aers have done, that v,., e know nothin,, cr,, we should at the limit (but this is impossible*, ' suppcse

249

that we know every t-ýi in, ýi7- 1 (, -'3': Cl ,ý I/ -L - And yet, once again, the same ambi,, -rui bet,,.,., ee-n on L, -, -e

one hand, not knowing how it isz) t o-ne lalm-s on the other hand, knowing that one doesl--ýItt I-LI-10VT 01' one knows fC-ýý, lsely, re-emerges. ence C)

Itthe first use of culture must be the unreflected content of critical reflection... "(84'

and the Ilexordium.: -Let's su, as negation of culture, a certain moment of the alisation - choosing to own benefit"(85) CD

p pose -. e knoi-. nothi-no-I is only culture - in totalisEtoi, y tempor- ip, no--re itself for its CD

The latter remarks must be related to Sartre's propos- itions regarding anyone at all, for cleE-, rly in this latest stage the access of individual critical experie-,, --ce to the historical totalisation (supposition that ý, ve know everything) is culturally determined. Yet ---ý. t is the meaning of culture

' choosing to ignore itself lor its

own benefit? The use of words suggest intentionality and conscious del-iberation. But, regarded negatively, the

origin of Marxism cannot be ascribed to t-', -ie bourgeoisikin its cultural hegemony choosing not to Jlu--nore the critical experience which Marxism is! In fact, iSartre's use of intentional language here would appear to serve an exhortative purpose: if we can know all and anyone at all can know all, the work of the Critique is not the exercise of theoretical privilege but the illumination of universal possibilities.

But even so 'culture' is employed both as the abstract necessity o -P total objective knowledge, and as the -pa-rtial and concrete states of research

"Each praxis uses the whole culture.. "

in the sense in Which this is total Ikmowledge (pe--, --haps unilluminated but possible), and at the same tii-ýle

"our experience is itself a fact of culture"(86ý

There is no adequate explanation o-17' hol, a, ctual ',, -ro,: r1ea, 7e

250

paxticipates 2--. - that object've culture, noo- ho, "

this latter is L --ce permeable to ex- e, present critical as a concrete enterprise.

Sartre further(87) t4lks of that reconstituti-ct, 7 of critical experience which mall I- nest such ý: es use o- praxes as its diachronic depth :

"Thus, the reflective critioue becomes critical and quasi reflective imoý,, rledlge C: ) when it is from objective Culture that it demands its exam-ples and its illuminations"(88')

I But, precisely, as with the Inlimporte ruil passage, -;, -ovi are we to know that we are indeed askin-c auestions of CD - objective Cultý)re when it is possible for this 1F. tter to determine the effective presence of partial or false knowledges whose concrete appearances masks the "unreflected content" of true knowledge?

9. P. 147-152: Critical Experience and Critique of Positivism

This section might indeed be titled "Positivism recon- sidered in the light of totalisation": moreover, as the

earlier critique of the dogmatic dialectic revealed the first intelligibility of the critical dialectic, so this

restatement of the failure of positivism must yield that

second intelligibility of the dialectic which is

"the intelligibility of the partial moments of the totalisation thanks to the totalisation itself in its temporal isation. 11 (89)

Clearly too, such an intelligibility mus t answer the

problem of true knowledge up until now unsatisfactorily ressolved: that is, we know those (reflective) moments of the totalisation to be dialectic know by their

very dialectic intelligibility.

But to do this, Sartre constitutes a previously unestablished dualism between dialectic and positivist reason :

".. this dialectic Reason must prove its

251

superiority in every case in the intell-J. --- ibility of historical facts: it must dissolve the positivist and analytic interpretation at the heart of its own totalising activity'1(90'ý CD

And such a superiority lies precisely in the abilit, -,, r of dialectic Reason to define itself as "t-Iie absolute intelligibility of am irreducible neýmessll, wl'-(iere positivism limits itself to illuminating new facts by

referring them back- to previously established --Loacts.

Now further :

"analytic Reason is a synthetic transfornation with which thought intentionally affects itself" Itanalytic Reason.. is only the result o-i--' a, synthetic transforr. ation or, if it's preferred, only a practical moment of dialectic Reason'1(91ý

Since thought is self-consciousness as the reflective

structure of consciousness in act, only consciousness as

praxis can intentionally affect itself with such a transformation. Put another way, if thought affects itself with a synthetic transformation we can only be

dealing with a totalisation which can totalise itself in

this manner. That is, since dialectic Reason is a

movement of Being and Knowing as totalisation, analytic Reason must equally be a unity of Being and I'nowing

finding its false s, -,,,, nthetic unity - consistency of proof, logic af discovery etc. - in a totali

Now this result either produces a sort of theoretical

manicheism which Levi-Strauss attacks or the relat. -on is

in fact to be understood in the following way : analytic Reason is the praxis of consciousness in (false) act

seizing the world as totality: that is, as pure exteriority affected with necessity, inertness, atemporality, having the ontological status of the en-soi. 3ut this

totality is continually totalised and re-totalised by

praxis as consciousness in act, through its temporalisation of these fixed inert unities (objects considered

as things in themselves in the natural milieu of

a-temporal exteriority). This central theme of

252

temporalisation is reinforced by the discussion o--'L' newness in the notion of intelligible necessity, and finds a further reflection in the characterisation of Nature as pure succession.

However Sartre also wants to make of analytic Reason a historical moment of philosophy and yet again we need an explanation of why consciousness in act can at certain significant moments reflectively seize itself through

an imaginative (and therefore false) act as totality;

and moreover a, totality which possesses cultural permanence. For when thought makes itself a thin, c- it does so both in the sense of giving itself the ontological CD status of plenitude and positivity (necessarily a- temporal), and in the sense of being an ideological and CD lasting product with a temporal duration: its dissolution in critique is a historically specific moment. Once again CD the difficulty derives from having to consider totelity

as a product and as the regulative princip e of the totalisation.

10. p. 152-156: Project of volume None of the critical remarks made so far are taken to

prejudge the critical experience to be undertaken and they indicate solely its intentions and its dimensions. They key concepts to be employed: group, series, process etc. are outlined with the repeated rider that what is to be accomplished is not the concrete reconstitution of human history but its formal intelligibility :

ItIn a word we are tackling neither human history, nor sociology, nor ethnography: we would claim rather, to parody a title of Kant's, to throw down the foundations of 'Prolegomena to all future anthropology'"(92)

The first volume of the Critique will have completed its task when it stops at the 'place of history' , by

seeking the intelligible foundations of a structural anthropology: such was the problem posed by Questions de methode

It is the second volume which will trace out the st, -, F, -es

253

of the critical ]2rogression :

"It will try to establish that there is one human histor With one truth and one intelýic-- ib il i ty. 11 (9 3ý

11. p. 156-160: Necessity and Intelligibility

"The locus of our critical experience is nothing other than the fundamental identi[y of one singular life and human history. "(94)

The necessity of universal truth which, precisely, constitutes its rationality is nevertheless seized through the translucidity of individual praxis as totalisation :

"If the dialectic exists, we must endure it as insurmountable rigour of the totalisation which totalises us and grasp it in its free practical spontaneity which we are"(95)

The necessity of the dialectic is lived thus neither as the Cunning of Reason escaping all individuals, nor as C: ) the determination of truth in pure subjectivity; rather it is imposed

"in the interiorisation of the exterior and the exteriorisation of the interior"(96)

Thus since the dialectic is the logic of action as the logic of freedom, we can understand 'subjectivity' as

"the condemnation which obliges is to freely realise and by ourselves the sentence which an society in process has carried out on us and which defines us a priori in our being. "(97)

This close connection between Sartre's reconsideration of subjective freedom in the light of necessity and intelligibility will be discussed furtý_, er; but it is

worth noting in passing the role Sartre assigns to

evidende in this dichotomy. In an important foot-note

on his distinction Sartre remarks :

"Intelligibility gives the perfect evidence of the new in terms of the old... evidence tends to refuse (refuser) apodicity to the very extent that necessity tends to reject (repousser) the evidence. "(98)

254

Sartre can hence make intelligible (evident! ) the intelligibility/necessity d,,, Iad on what essentia-11-y is no more than a sophistic distinction. Thus it is difficult to see how apodictic: 11of clear demonstration;

clearly established" (O. E. D. ): tends to 'push back' 'repel' 'reject' 'refuse' the evident: obvious, clear, manifest. Of course Sartre is talking about the I'demarches de la pense'ell and consequently can talk of intelligibility as the pýroduction of '.. le new in terms of previously defined factors. Thus apodicity/necessity refer to the logic of the casual sequence in which events/phenomena are represented to mind as bound together by the laws asbtracted by mind (i. e. in exteriority). The evidence, translucidity of these links is in interiority: "in the light of the totalisation". That is, those rules of mind as consciousness (of) itself, of rules of reflexive self-consciousness. But once more we fall into the idealist trap of praxis as mere reflexive

consciousness, taken as rule-making, discerning,

discriminating and ordering.

Certainly at the end of this note Sartre introduces as

an "image" rather than "example" the tofalisation

involved in reading a literary work: an intellection of the conducts and events in such a work as both the

11translucidity of the unforeseeable" and the "impossibility

suffered (by immediate memory) that this moment should

not have been what it was". Here at least the distinction

is more manifest and yet we equally have the perfect image of either idealism: a sequence of events as product

of mind: or objectivism: an understanding of that one did not oneself produce.

12. p. 160-162: Comprehension and Intellection

III name thus intellection all the tem oralising and P C) dialectic evidences in so far as they must be able to

totalise all the practical realities and I reserve the

name comprehension for the totalising grasp of each praxis V

in so far as this is intentionally produced by its or

255

their authors. "(99)

These lines which conclude the Introduction are an unintentionally apt summation of Sartre's profound methodological failure. For if the critical experience is possible it should not be necessary to distingguish between comprehension: the translucidity of praxis to itself: and intellection: the intelligibility of dialectic knowledge.

But, as we have seen, the problem of true knowledge has

not been resolved and its persistenc- has revealed itself in such lines as :

''The constituting dialectic (such that it grasps itself in its abstract translucidity

. thro individual praxis) ... 11(1001

The emphasis upon through rather than as uncovers the tendency to reify the dialectic as an independent movement

which, qua Hegel, "comes to itself" using individual

consciousnesses as mere ciphers.

In parallel, if there are "free vagabond and authorless

actions"(101) their intellection must grasp their permeability to "the totalising anthropology"(102). Such

language suggests that dialectic knowledge subjected to

critique has ceased to be the universalised possibility

of singular critical experiences and has instead become

the appropriation of a single constituted and reified Truth. If this is indeed the case then the Truth of

History will be suffered as a necessity which is intell-

igible only at certain moments and, more importantly, only

to certain inquirors. The subsumed accord with historical

materialism will have been discovered to be, certainly,

not a mere choice amongst others but an unfounded

assertion reflexive upon one historical singularity: CD

Sartre himself.

256

CONCLUSION

"But we have nothing more to say to the young: 50 years of life in this backward province that France has become, is degrading. We have shouted, protested, signed, countersigned, we have, according to our various ways of thoughtt declared "it is not acceptable" or "the proletariat WI-11 not accept And in the end here we are; so we have accepted everything. Can we communicate to the unknown young our wisdom and the fine fruits of our experience? From defeat to defeat we have learnt only one thing: our complete impotence. 11(l)

This was how, in 1960, Sartre chose to recall the political impact and legacy of his generation. The Self-critical

summation vvas offered in a piece dedicated to the remembrance of his former close friend and colleague: Paul Nizan. For Sartre, Nizan remained the sole exception to a generation which had aquiesced in the hypocrisy of a pre-war era, whose peaceful aspect had concealed its militaristic intentions. This same generation had not, as it believed, profited from its misjudgementst but had only betrayed the immense possibilities of the post-war period. The aspirations of 1945 - founded in the solidarity, commitment and heroism of the Resistance - were finally dispersed in the antagonisms and disillusionment of the 19501s.

Merleau-Ponty replied to Sartre's recriminations by disput- ing his personal memories of Nizan and by denying that Sartre's

contemporary-guilt reflected accurately the real chances for

progress which had existed after 1945. History, for Merleau- Ponty at least, was not such a severe or direct educator:

"History never confesses, not even her lost illusions, but neither does she dream of them again. "(2)

Lost illusions and betrayed hopes are the respective matrices of each thinker's recollections. And the two pieces provide the last, if indirect, dialogue between the two fo. A. , -- in 1961 Merleau-Ponty died. Moreover even Sartre's subsequent prolific work has been written very much in the spirit of a closing chapter. Simone de Beauvoir describes after 1957 Sartre's

"exhausting race against time, against death"

257

to express himself - Ill-h, -=-alth hc-. s hampered his work and most recently the onset of almost total blindness has forced

Sartre to declare finis to his creative efforts. On the

occasion of his 70th birthday he declared:

"I have decided that I have said everything I had to say. This decision implies that I will cut off all that I might still have said, and that I will not say it, because I consider what I have already written to be the essential. "(3)

Much of the fine writing of the 1960's have their roots in

pre-1960 reflections though, and even the dramatic reconsideration of the role of the intellectual after the events of 1968 must be understood in terms of Sartre's forgoing political experience. Again the be"**te noi: rp-of his recent years, the

massive Flaubert, constitutes the product of a. whole lifetime's preoccupation with that writer, and was itself begun before 1960. The works which Sartre cites now as those he

would like the new generation to take up show clearly where the fulcrum of Sartre's work lies: Saint Genet, the Critique, Le Diable at le bon Dieu, La Nausee, Situations. (4)

What is significant is the ironic conjunction of the Critique's

publication in 1960 - with its insistence that man's contemporary alienation is not immutable, that human emancipation remains a real future possiblity, that Marxism itself is 'open' and can be made receptive to the complexities of modern so'cial organisation - and Sartre's own personal resignation at this same time evidenced in the piece upon Nizan. There Sartre testifies to the radical impotence of his contemporaries throughout their political careers and who now can offer nothing of a legitimate or viable political legacy to the rising youth. Moreover the young, for Sartret appear to need ho such education:

"Their point of departure is my point of arrival. They don't come to me to ask for lessons but to discuss on an equal footing with me. "(5)

The combination of philosophical confidence and political diffidence in Sartre demonstrates well the preoccupation which lies at the virtuc-il centre of the existentialists,

258

reflections: one which constituted the ambition of the

'Mcandarinslq which makes 1968 significant for Sartre, which

emerges even in Y-erleau-pontyls last wri-t-oings, which serves to define themes in philosophy from Pl-to to the present day,

and which assists in an understanding of 1-1arxism's preeminent attractiveness to the existentialists. Namely the problemat--c of philosophy and politicst reason and the ruler, theoria

and praxis. It was Merleau-Ponty who felt forced to concede in 1960 that the spheres of philosophical understanding and political action are incommensurable:

IID3 iL not an incredible misunderstanding that all, or almost allq philosophers have felt obliged to have a politics, whereas politics arises from the 'Practice of life' and escapes understanding? The politics of philosophers is what no one practices. "(6)

Sartre, on the other hand, haqto the present day, sought to demystify the universalising vanities of the intellectual,

to contextualise his reflections and to urge political involvement as the corporeal presence of philosophic under--

standing. Both Sartre and M-erleau-Ponty had written for, within, and about the er% in which they lived. In the work of both

the remarkable conjunction of philosophic thought, political

commentary and cultural criticism reflected an effort to

understand and illuminate their epoch, to uncover the choices

and actions best suited to its needs. In short, both

strove to render meaningful the Age by giving meaning to

their own experience of it. Sartre's description of his

latest planned project a 10 part series on French Television

covering this century

"I chose to recall history as it had developed since 1905, to tell how I lived it and how it h-, ý. d changed me. "(7)

echoes the words of a 1953 interview:

"Through my history I want to transcribe that of my epoch"(8)

and finds a form in the language of the Critique wherein the individual's comprehension of his own life

259

"must go so far as to deny its singular determination in order to seek its dialectic intelligibility in the whole of the human adventure. "(9)

For both T--ýerleau-Ponty and Sartre, the 'whole human e.... venturel

retained its intelligibility only by remaining the adventure

of man himself. Theirs was fundamentally a humanist view of history. For,, as Sartre reminded Camus:

"Has Fistory a mef?, ning, you ask, has it an end? For myself, it is the question which lacks meaning, for History outside of man who makes it is only an abstract and static concept, of which one can say neither that it has an end, nor that it doesn't have one. And the problem, -is not to know its end, but to it one. "(10)

The combined efforts of imparting meaning to and disclosing

meaning within History had their f'ocal point in the fecundity

of ideas developed at Temps modernes. The subsequent parting

of Sartre's and Merleau-Ponty's politico-philosophical itinezies not only shows up their profound differences during

their most productive co-operation, but serves to illustr-ote

and universalise that same pervasive and continuing tension

between politics and philosophy. For Sartre, -, he initial

certaint y, the primary intelligence of philosophy remains the cogito, the 'hegomonic, presence to self. Social and

political events receive their meaning circularly, that is,

effected in the synthetic project of philosophy and returning to re-confirm the first moment of philosophy. For Sartre,

this first moment can never be threatened; consciousness is

singular, unitary and effective. His problems with the antidialectic, the perversion of freedom by itself, and the

'scandal' of the Other reflect his unwillingness to dispute

his first premiss. For Merleau-Ponty, on the other hand, consciousness is never

satisfied within itself. It is Unruhe, unrest, its momentum is always away from itself out into the world of me? ning and

others. Consciousness is already de-centered, committed

neither simply to itself nor fully to the world it confronts.

For IvTerleau-Ponty, as for the Montaigne he admires,

"consciousness is not mind from the outset; 4t is tied down at the same time it is free, and in one sole ambiguous act, it opens to external objects- If7nd

260

experiences itself as alien to them. Montaigne does not -ession, which know that resting place, th,:. t self-pos.

is Cartesian understanding. The world is not for him a system of objects the idea of which he has in his possession; the self is not for him the purity of an intellectual consciousness. For Montaigne - as for Pascal later on - we are interested in a world we do not have the key to. We are equally incapabie of dwelling in oursleves and in things, and are referred from them to ourselves and from- ourselves to them"(11)

"To be conscious is, among other thing., to be somewhere else. "(12)

Merleau-Ponty's freedom is permanently at risk, for, without the tenuous and ambiguous roots that it thrusts into the

world, it would not be freedom at all. (13) Sartre's freedom

is sovereign and engages itself; Merleau-Ponty's freedom is

vulnerable by being already engaged. Sartre's freedom-: 7

chooses the world; T"erleau-Ponty's freedom cannot refuse itself the world. Thus, Sartre's freedom discovers, set against itself, a

public world of common objects: History and Society tend

to become the absolute Others of the I. But where Sartre can then find the world and History intelligible because he is

intelligible In them, History's ambiguity penetrated to the

very core of Merleau-Ponty's belief in the undertaking of Reason. Sartre's unassailable freedom preserves its sanctity

amidst the political events, whereas Merleau-Ponty's freedom

struggles to find itself beset by these same events. Like

Montaigne again

"he entered the bewitched realm of public life; he did not withole-, himself"

"Others threaten our freedom? But 'we must live among the living'. We risk slavery there? But there is no true freedom without risk. "(14)

For Y-erleau-Ponty, our historical responsibility is always the judgement of Others and the tragedy of politics is its

permanent possibility. For Sartre, as Merleau-Ponty arguess, the Other is absolute and: problematic, the individuC-'l thus

confronting History with a certain violence -

In ItTerleau-ponty, the c-elf is immersed and submerged within language, which is the very rese*oir and resource of ell

261

meaning(15). In Sartre language is instrumentaV-y, exterior to reflecting consciousness, to be u-sed by it as eý creative tool (16). As with consciousness and language, so too,

perhaps with free, -om and the world of politics. Ironically, Merleau-Ponty's philosophical 'engagement' in the world was at the expense of an increasing retirement from its political ambiguities and paradoxes. As events betrayed their expected rationality, Merleau-Ponty withdrew into and drew solace from the sceptical isolation of the

philosopher. Thus he was as Yontaigne I'dimultaneously ironic and solemn, faithful and free"(17)

and he perceived in Machiavelli's notion of virtu the

difficult means of politically living with others:

"There is a way of affirming oneself which aims to suppress the other person and which makes him a slave. And there is a relationship of consultation and exchange with others which is not the death but the very act of pelf. "(18)

For Merleau-Ponty, to affirm any myth of pre-established harmony in History betrayed the vocation of the philosopher

and betrayed the cause of a true humanism.

"The remedy we seek does not lie in rebellion but in unremitting virtu"(19)

Disclosure of the ultimate ambiguity of human action made Merleau-Ponty a compassionate yet distanced commentator of his times. His era was, for him, one in which truth did not

reside in the actions of politicians and in which the

philosopher of action was at the furthest remove from action. Plato urged philosophers to become kings or kings to learn

to philosophise. To Mc-ýrleau-Ponty, IU-he man of action in his

era no longer heeded the philosophic imperatives -nd philosophy

could not in good conscience- urge firm principled commitments.

Sceptical and agnostic, Yerleau-Ponty's political philosophy

was thus founded in dialogue, consultation and mutual under-

standing. Assured end committed, Sartre rather sough-t like

Descartes to be the indivi6, ua, l architect of a unified system

of thought:

262

"I have always considered, eand sstill consider, the Truth to be a whole ... M-erleau-Ilonty, on the contrary, fouiid his security in a multiplicity of perspectives, seeing in them the different facets of being. "(20)

Merleau-Ponty was politically the lieur-that 'sacred personnegel- by whom all ties are made and broken. The very ambiguity of hiS, political idealism permitted and assisted the post-war discussions. (21) For Sartre

"every thought translated a prejudice, or tried to be a weapon; not a tie was formed without others being broken. "(22)

But Sartre's individualising freedom has plunged into

political causes at the philosophical expenIse, perhaps, of

any commitment to that community of commonly held precepts. Though Sartre declares that

"today there are only two ways of Speaking of self, the third person singular and the first person plural. "(23)

I it is important to learn where the collective character of Sartre's philosophical enterprise lies. He argues that

critical experience can and should be the reflective experience

of anyone at all (24) in so far as

"any human life whatever .... is the direct and indirect expression of the whole. "(25)

As, in his own terms, the taking of the Bastille does not belong to the first to shout 'Run to the Bastille', so too

the reconquest of Marxism by man cannot belong to the first

expressed formu2atLoii of this critical experience, Yet Sartre

equally maintains that, failing the construction of such a rationality of experience

"not a word spoken or written tod'ay ... not a phr!:: ýSe, not a word is other than a gross error. "(26)

If this is no more than truth on Sartre's terms, we are left

with a solipsist idealism which merits Stuart H--nrhirels

accusation:

"Sartre's philosophy amounts to a defense of the freedom of the solitary sage to specuIte without the risk of being proved wrong. "(27)

263

But Verleau-Ponty's c(-)ncessions to the 1sh'. _: 'red canons o---

co-operative inquiry, are sustained by perhaps no more than

the insistence that philosophy is the source of C-__ll knowleý, ge. (28)

For 11-erleau-Ponty's philosophy restores the primordi al sense

of man in the world and, in this sense, there is no teleological

rationality but rather the revelation th,?.. t philosophy hl! -s,

and always has had, a secret centre and unity. (29) If Sartre's

individualistic ambitions conceal an arrogant and sequestered

solipsism, then does not Yerleau-Pontyls philosophicýai fra-ternaiism '_ýnJ_ self-abnegation in dialogue conceal only a. brute positivism?

"At the conclusion of F. reflection, which at first isolated him, the philosopher ... finds neither the depth of himself nor absolute knowledge but a renev., ed image of the world and himself placed within it among others. "(30)

Yet both Sartre's and Yerleau-Ponty's emphasis is ultimately

upon the humanist basis of philosophy: it is man who is at the centre of ref-L---- ction. For !, "erleau-Ponty

"The philosopher is the man who wakes up and speaks. "(31)

12ýartrels philosophic enterprise is indexed And the whole of , by the imperative to universalise the particular, to

reconcile the Kierkegaardian certainty of subjective self- knmTledge with the objective rationality of History and Society. Sartre's insistence in L'ExiStentialisme est un humanisme that

It precisely we are on a plane where there are only men"

provoked from Heidegger the direct retort:

"precisely we are on a plane where there is mainly Being. "(32)

Again, as Sartre comments , though Merleau-Ponty c2me cl, os er to Heidegger in his later years

I'Merlec-u never stopped being humC-:.. nist".

For him

11TVIan is (-7; esignated by his fundamental vocation which is to institute being, but equally So, being ts desigred

264

by its destiny which is to effect itself through man. "(33)

Existentialism has been unjustly stigmatised as an individualism,

an6 it is worth stressing that through Sartre and. 1. lerleau-Ponty it represents the profoundest of contemporary humanisms: with its insistence that man possesses no immutable nature, iss not simply an animal 3apecies, can never be the object of e uriverdal concept, but is rather both knower and known, the absolute of philosophy end the depth of the world, And through an atheistic humanism, the existentialists have

sought to salvage mor; a. lity from the revealed imperatives of transcendent authority and from a relativistic scepticism. No man is discharged from the universal respoAsibilities of moral action, and the antinomies of Good and Evil are to be found nowhere but in the tangled and unclear fabric of our own world. Since for Yerleau-Ponty that freedom which is the

condition of all morality is equally the basis for an absolute immoralism, so there is neither absolute innocence nor absolute guilt. (34) And Sartre declares through Goetz in Le Diable

et le bon Dieu:

"I tell you Good is possible, every day, at every hour, at this very moment. "(35)

but, as with Merleau-Ponty, only through the assumption of that freedom which throws us out into the world of others.

In Sartre's 'bad faith' is the universalisable, moral demand

that each realise in its full value the freedom that is ours. Importantly, neither Sartre nor Tylerleau-Ponty urged upon their readership the monopoly of their own productions: the

world is not played out upon a single scale of philosophy for the latter's voice echoes in and from many other spheres. Ncither is the writer a superman, the secret of whose exemplary

work lies beyond his empirical life. (36) For the writer,

above all

"can give no one a dispensation from the work of reading and the lbour of living. "(37)

Though Merleau. -Ponty may seem to delegate the tas'-. ýs of action to the 'hero' and though Sartre may appear to offer 'consecrated

roles' to such as Genet and Nizan, the re, ý-ýlm of both remains

265

the factual conditi. -)n of man as a whole. They will not, thus, whilst assuming the specific tasks of their profession

as writers, discharge anyone from the responsibility of

authentically living out their relation to the world and to

others. Sartre and Merleau-Ponty areq as such, witnesses rather than

guides. Since sartre terms ?_- ierkegaard the "privileged

witness" of subjectivity - as subjective witness of his own

subjectivity (38) - we must understand Sartre's enci Yerleau-

Ponty's philosophic efforts as the attempts to make their

political, moral and social experiences the subject of

meditatioJi, to appropriate themselves in depth, so as to make them the testimony of and for all men. As witnesses of the

events of their age, they made use. of that 'concrete imagination'

which is best deployed and typified in the name and content

of Sartre's collected essays-, Situations. These, in the wor-, As

of George Steiner:

"constitute an act of total attention to v: hý-t iý-- going on in the world that it would be very difficult to match, either in regard to concrete detail or to the philosophic implication. " (39)

As Steiner adds, the peril of such m rk is that it puts

everything on "the same level of _hngnitude -. nd abstraction",

or as Stuart Hampshire notesq , appears as "one of the

unavoidable forms of experience and his (Sartrels) first way

of coping with reality. "(40) But even in so far as Sartre,

and Merleau-'11ýonty to a lesser extent, are amongst the last

of the great metaphysical craftsmen, their eppetite for

- reveal univers2l description and interpret(? tion serves to

the world of meaning as an indivisible-whole: not yet completely

partitioned off by the territorial claims of each -pecialised discipline.

For Sartre and Merleau-Ponty are equally the witnesses of,, k-

common inteliectual heritage. Thus _Tlerleeýu-Ponty wrote:

"We men who have lived as our problem the development of com, týir, -Asm and the War, emd *o have read Gide, erd Valery P. nd Prý--ust and Hucsserl and Heidegger anc. Freud are the same. "(41)

266

And Sartre, who defined his receptivity to '1%1'arxism in terms

of his awareness of the presence of the working class, could also note:

"I slowly came to Marxism bringing with me everything I had acquired until then. I think thet it was my reading of Freudq Kafka and Joyce ... among other things, which lead me to Marxism. "(42)

The new intellectual climate of the twentieth century - compounded of both cultural and philosophical forces - is

reflected in all of Sartre's and Merleau-Ponty's work: the intuition above all, that the traditional categorial distinctions of materialism, and idealism, body and soul, consciousness and language etq were breaking down. It is thus certainly clear that a predominant sub-theme in their work is the ambiguous legacy of Freud. Ambiguous because whilst accepting the revolutionary descriptions of abnormal behaviour and many of its implications for a notion of man as psycho-physical totality, both Sartre and Merleau-Ponty were concerned with its mechanistic language and the obtrusive notion of the unconscious. (43)

Sartre hasq in particular, declared himself

"itot a 'false fri, end' of psychoanalysis but a critical fellow-traveller. "(44)

and has appealed to Marxism to open itself to the challenge of Freud: to combine the psychoanalytic investigation of the

singular autonomous individual - the signification he gives his own personal experience - with the necessarily Marxist illumination of the social, cultural and historical context in which the individual must discover and understand such signific4tions. But, though Sartre has described well the intellectual shock of passing from the atmosphere of Cartesian rationalism into his first reading as a student of the Intcrpretation of Dreams (45), Sartre's refusal of the notion of the unconscious and his frequent patent disregard for the specificity of the Freudian text are such that he can maintain:

"Psychoanalysis has no. *: principles, it has no theoretical base: it is just as if it were accompanied ... by a perfectly inoffensive mvthOlOgY. "(46)

267

The work of contemporary French psychoanalysis, particulý-rly that of' Jacques La. can (47), points however to a. iruch more

complex relationship between the FreuCliam legacy 2nC- other

philosophical work. Ccrtainly the debate between T-, acan and Sartre raises questions v; hich go beyond a mere dispute over Freud: invý)lving as it does, issues of rationE.,. lism, cogitog

self, History and Truth, which, in turn, demand more considered

attention. In the light of the preoccupations of Yerleau-r

Ponty's later years such issues also point once again to the

fundamental ambiguity within the existentielist Ifegacy.

Sartre's increasing emphasis in latter years upon a distinction

between consciousness and the lived experience - le vecu - shows some awareness of such problems. (48)

Within the field of political philosophy, however, it is

Sartre's and Merleau-Ponty's confrontation with Marxism

which occupies foremost attention* Above all, both thinkers

approached Marxism as both ,a

common his of practices,

struggles and institutions, and as a philosophical legacy

whose form often seemed best suited to resolve the theoretical

problems they faced. Sartre and Y. erleau-Ponty directed their

, total attention, to analysing the historical inherences of Marxism, the fate of its insubstantiations in the rea: 1 world - particularly the progress of Russia and communism - without

ever forgetting that Marxism is still a theoretical practice. Perhaps political naivety led them not to raise in, the correct

manner or at the right time the central issues of legitimacy,

leadership, organisationp and collective action. But such

naivete was the failure of the Mandarins who sought to discover

the limits of 'Reason in political history whilst never fundamentally approaching the problematic of corgruence between History and Philosophy. Ylerleau-Ponty confessed his failure in 1960:

"Our times have not swallo,, mtup philosophy: philosophy does not loom over our times. It is neither historyls servant nor its master. The relationship between philosophy and hJstory is less simple tY-an wass believed. It is in the strict sense an action at a distance, ec-:, ch from the depths of its difference requiring inter-mingling and promiscuity. We have yet to learn the prober use of this encroachment. "(49)

268

At least, though, an enduring legacy of the existentialists for all thi. c was its salvaging of theoretical Marxism from the orthodox monopoly of the PC. Sartre and -,, '-erleau-

Ponty assisted in that post-war assimilation of Ylarxism

which overturned the previous distinction between Communist

Marxists on the one hand and the non-Yarxist Left remainder

on the other. (50) The existentialists served in France to

make a rejuvenated Marxism the locus of all Left. -; -wing thought.

The notion of legacy merits however some claril Merleau-Ponty wrote of Husserl:

"With regard to a philosopher whose enterprise has awoken so many echoes and is apparently so far from its starting point all commemoration is betrayal, whether we give him the very superfluous hommage of our thoughts

**" or whether, on the contrary, we reduce him to strictly what he has himself said and meant. "(51)

This is not an injunction against philosophical comment but a reminder that authentic criticism should sympathetically take up the movement of a thought, understand it both as a

contribution to the cultural world and as the opening up of

a field of inquiry. Merleau-Ponty himself employs Husserl's

term Stiftung - foundation or institution -

"to designate that fecundity of the products of culture which continue to have a value after their historical appearance and open up a field of work beyond and the same as their own. "(52)

For the critic and the present philosopher, such an institution

presents

"a tradition ,,

that is, Husserl says, the power to forget origins, the duty to start over again and give th past,

-- survival, Ahich is the hypocritical form of forgetfulness, but the efficacy of renewal or 'repetition, which is the noble form of memory. " (53)

In this instance the obligatiol of the critic is to point to

a renewal or repetition' of the existentiE. 1 work. And it

lies fundamentElly in this, that man is at one and the same time the object and the subject of knowledge. The existentialist passion to understand man was always conditioned by the

awareness that the knowledge man haEý aciquirýýd of himself -

269

through literature, art ---s well as phil,, -,, sophyf sociology,

and anthropology - are of no worth if man himself, the living,

conscious being in all his opaque individuality is submerged beneeth them and thus disappears.

The realm of the existentialists was the factual condition

of man, and their task was to present a lucid, faithful and honest temoignage of this condition, to render it meaningful

without circumscribing any significant experience or denying the continued presence of man himself in all reflection. But the insistent warning of their work remains: philosophy

seeks to be at the centre of the world, history and others,

yet often it can only act at a distance upon this world. When

reason is not completely immanent to being, when theory and

praxis are not fully reconciled, philosophy (54

between idealism and positivism, realism and transcerýtalism,

between being the,, --servant and the master of events. We have

indeed perhaps not yet learnt the proper use of this incroach-

ment, of philosophy upon history anC- vice versa. For, in

political philosophy, if we give ourselves the task of

critically reflecting upon History and our own actions within it, we either suffer the betrayal Cf History at the very roots

of our thinking and condemn ourselves to silence, or we

preserve the intelligibility of our theoret-ýcCal practice at the price of a merely subjective certainty and at the expense

of a. very real ignorance of History and collective politics. The dilema is an unacceptable one but its presence is

nevertheless deeply felt. In their respective responses to

its challenge Sartre and Mer1eau-Ponty were indeed not so badly adapted.

270

r-O T-, r-11(ý -( T -'ri-T OTLE) -' , 1--i"

J- Y. Frid: Fil. -ii -phy o--f' Unbeiis-, ' di ce: loso-1- Jean--, Iaul Sartre and Contem. -,,, ýoi-aiýnr --3o-Luc,, -, eo--I-s

V-ý Individual i sm" : The__!, odern i-), aiý, te aý L J- no. 3, summeiý 1947, p. 223.

Rairmiond Aron at the bel7innl-n-ýý- of s 1S46 U J- -1 - --itJ e" c-* tes lecture on 111ýaxxisnne e L, ex-,., D'Le-,

very similar matC--rial -Pro Fravda E-, ndd e- periodical. See Aron's "-P, 2ýý--. ismes p. 27-30.

-, .I. (2) L'Lxiste-nt--', p5, lisrqe est un hu-----iE-nJ sme; ýditfons Nagel; 1946 -n. 15-16.

Axon, 1. c. p. 30.

(4' "Un auteur scandaleux, " : Sens et non-ce--ý- (hereafter "-' ) p. 84. SITS La Force des choses (hereafter FC), Gall imc, 2ýd 1963, p. 50.

-1 (6 "Questions de m"ethodell : Les Temps- riode---nes, nos. 139 and 140,1957; published in Critirue de la raison dialectigue, Gall-! miard, 1960.

"Philoso -loý---, t: Le, 7, no. 3, phie de lle-xistencell: ýD-j C (december 1966), T). 307-322.

Jean Hyppolite: "Existence et diCalectin-ue d(, --l-, -is

I la philosophie de j, Terleau-'-Ponty"-': Les Temps modernes, l7e annee, nos. 184-185, octobre 1961; reprinted in his Figures de 1, - pensee politioue, II (hereafter FDLPPII p. 687. Ilichel-Antoine Burnier: Les Existentialistes et

. la politique, Gallimard, p. 11-12.

(10) Aa= Gurwitsch: Revieýv, of Phenomer-olo--r o+' 9L -I Ferc ion: Philosophicaj Reviel. v (July 1964) p. 418.

Philip Thody: Jean-Paul Sartre: 1`1- Lýterp. r, -ý, --nd -7-T- I- Hamish bon, Political Stjý-dj \,, London,

p. 142.

arable mistake is the su-, 7ges tion (12) A com -p J- nate L. --e Hedegger's Nazi sympathies incrir: d-

political beliefs of all wl-Lo derive inspiration from his work.

Georý---es Lukacs: Existential--sme c. u 4 sme- Paris, 1c-, 48.

(14) George Novacl: s (ed" : c- I ! ý' II 7: '-, -is ten tial i--m v, UiN:

, Marxism: Conflicting Views on jell, New York, 1966.

271

(15) Adam Schaf f "T, II -' s llarxism and Exf stentil e.

Yonthly. Reviell,, T XIV (T'e,, 7--Jur-e 1962)

(16) Aime' Patri: "Le i7---:,, ifýxisme e-.,: istentie. lis&" Prevues, no. 114 (auot 1960", -o. 63-60

Richard Bernstein: Reviev, r o-i" Cri de la raison dialectiQue: , --1), eview oi no. 3,1962, p. 529.

I (18) Sidney Finkelstein: 11.3-jartre: E-111istentieli. S sm cal, d

1, -Iaxxismtl : Political Affa-irs, vol. 44, no. -IO, October 1965, p. 52-64.

(19) Walter OcL-a, jnyk: Marxism and Ezy: istentialisrn, New York, 1965, pJ--8.

(20) Wilfred Desan: New York, 1965,

The 1.1a,, rxism of Jean-Paul '--). =tre, p. 55.

(21) See for example his "Four la, veritb"I (19,46) in

(22) See Finkelstein, Schaff, Desan, Odajny-l'--, cited above.

(23) "Merleau-Ponty" in Situations IV, Gal-l-imard, 1964, p. 287.

(24) ibid p. 257.

(25) ibid p. 2,

(26) Memoires La Force La Force Tout Com,

87.

d1une jeune fille rangee(1959); de l'Age (1960); des Choses (1963);

pte Fait (1972). All editions Gallimard.

(27) "Sur Claudell' in Paris, Gallimard, 1960 (hereafter S).

(28) I'llerleau-Ponty", J. c. p. 234.

(29) Les Mots; Gallimard, Paris, 1963.

(30) ttMerleau-Ponty", l. c. p-190-191.

ttPrefacett, S p. 25; see also: Ilaurice de Gandillac: 'in Memoriam': Revue Philosophique de lp. France

et de lletranger, jan-mars 1962, -! D. 103-106.

(32) Les Mots, p. 211.

(33) Interview with 1, T-erleau-Ponty in : 77adeline Chapsal: Les 6crivains en -perso-q---te, Paris, 1960, p. 148.

272

(34) For circumstances of their first mee'LI--, -,, c- J-2-1 which Sartre apparently rescued T! erleau-Pon'LI, -. - and a comrade from azi anx7rv mob of normaliens, C-- U see 11erleau-Ponty: "Un auteur scandaleux"

, p. 73.

(35) "Preface", SD p. 21.

(36) "Le reformisme et les fetiches", Situations VII, Gall imard , 19 6 5.

(37) "Preface", S p. 10-11.

(38) Les Communistes ont peur de la revolution; Editions John Didier, 1963, re-orinted in Situations VIII, p. 208-225.

(39) "Llidee, neuve de mai 196811, Le Mouvel Observateur, 26 juin-2 juillet 1968, reprinted in Situations VIII p. 193-207.

(40) see On a raison de se revolter.

(41) "Llimagination au pouvoir". Intervie, ý,, r of Touvel Daniel Coln-Bendit by Sartre. Le ,

special, 20 mai 1968. Observateur, supplement . (42) see "Les Bastilles de Raymond Aron", Le lJouvel

Observateur, 19-25 juin 1968: reprinted in MtTT, tions VIII, p-175-192. and Ila jeunesse piegeell, Le Nouvel Observateur, 17-23 mars 1969; reprinted in Situations VIII, p. 239-261.

(43) I'Llintellectuel face a la revolution", Le Point, no. 13, janvier 1968 & I'Llami du peuple" Llidiot international, octobre 1970 & reprinted in Situations VIII p. 456-476.

(44) see "Masses, spontaneite partill, Il Ilanifesto, 4 septembre 1969: reprinted in Situations VIII p. 262-290.

(45) ItJean-Paul Sartre re-r)ond", L'Arc, numero special, no. 30 (octobre 1966) p. 87-96. & "Entretiens sur llanthropologiell, Philo , no. 2-3, fevrier 1966, reprinted in Situations IX p. 83-98.

Cahiers de p. 3-12:

(46) for details ot relevant texts see Conte-A and Rybalka: Les Ecrits de Sartre p. 343-352.

Preface to Les Damne""s de la terre b- (47) y Frantz Reprinted in Situations V.

(48) see especially all pieces in. Situations V.

273

(49) "Jean-Paul Sartre slexplioue sur _Les __otsI., interview by Jacqueline Piat--*Ler; Le onde, 18 avril. 1964.

(50) see especially: "Ll6crivain doit refuser de se laisser transformer en instit-i-ition"; Le "onJIe 24 octobre 1964. Reprinted iM Cont, -.. t Rybalka, p. 402-404.

see especial!, -j- : "Le Genocide", Les Tem-ps modernes, no. 259, decembre 1967, p. 953-971; reprinted.. in Situations VIII, p. 100-124. I'De 1, Turembergr a Stockholm'', Tricontinental, no. 3, nov-dec 1967 p. 7-19 reprinted in Situations VIII p-78-99. I'Douze hommes sans c ell, Le Nouvel Observateur 24-30 mar 1967, reprinted in Situations VIII p. 58-69. 111, e Crime'', interview, Le Nouvel Observateur, 30 nov-6 dec 1966. reprinted in Situations VIII p. 27-4-1.

274

NOTE,, --')' TO CHAP'-. 'i-', R I

(1) Fragement of a letter in : "Enquete des etudiants dlaujourd'huill, conducted by Roal Alix in Le-s Nouvelles litteraires, 2 fevr4, er 1929; text reproduced in Simone de Beauvoir: ',, '., emoires d1une ILT-

_j_eune fille rangee, p. 341-3,12.

(2) Simone de Beauvoir: La Force de 1Age (hereafter FA) p. 19.

(3) ibid.

rl -ý Trý (4) Merleau-Ponty: I'La Guerre a eu lieu" p. 245 and p. 247.

FA p. 18.

Paul Nizan : Aden-Arabie, Paris, 1960.

"Avant propos a Aden-Arabiell in Situations IV, Gallimard, 1964, -p. 134.

(6) FA p. 84.

(9) Burnier, 1c. p. 14.

(10) FA p-187.

(11) FC p. 15.

(12) Les Mots, p. 208.

"Avant propos a Aden-Arabiell, 1c. p. 147.

(14) "LlAnge de morbidell : La Revue sans titre, 15 janvier 1923; reprinted in Contat and gybalka: Les Ecrits de Sartre, Gallimard 1970 (hereafter

) P. 501-505.

"Leigende de la verit"elt: Bifur, no. 8, juin 1931; reprinted in C&2 p. 531-545.

(16) fj p. 333.

(17) see : John Heckman: "Hyppolite and the Hegel Revival in France" Telos, no. 16, summer 1973 P. 130-131.

(18) IfAminadab ou du fantastique considere langagell "Un nouveau mystiquell IfAll, er et retour" "Explication de 1'Etranger" I'Llhomme et les choses"; all articles Gallimard) 1947.

comme un

ý -, --) Sit ua t 4-ons I

275

(19) "Aller et retour", lc. p. 231.

(20) l'Aminadab ou du fantastioue considere-"comp. e un langagell, lc.

(21) "Aller et retour" lc. p. 189.

(22) "Explication de 1'Etranger", 1c.

(23) "A propos de John Das Fassos et de 191911 : Situations I, p. 14-25.

(24) I'La cons . I- -piration ar Paul Nizan" Situations I, p. 26-30.

(25) "American Novelists in French eyes" Atlantic Monthj-, ý)., vol-178, no. 2 (aug,

, ust 1946) p. 114.

(26) ibid p-117.

(27) I'M. Francois Mauriac et la libertell Situations I p-57-

(28) I'M. Jean Girado-ux et 14 philosophie d'Ar-; stote A propos de Choix des elues" Situations I p. 82-98.

(29) "La chronique de J-P Sartrell review of Nabokov: C&R p-73-74.

(30) "A qui les lauriers des Goncourts Femina, Renaudot, Interalli6l', article interivew by Claudine Chomez Ilarianne, 7 decembre 1938, quoted C&R p. 65.

(31) "Une idbe fondamentale de la phenomenologie de Husserl : 11intentionalite"I : Situations I p. 31-35.

(32) t? Sartorts par William Faulknert', "Apropos de Le Bruit et la fureur : la temporalite chez Faulknert'. "A propos de John Dos Passos et de 191911 All in Situations I.

(33) IlVisages" "Portraits officiels" Both in -, Verve, no. 5-6.1939.

(34) t'Nourritures" : Verve, no. 4,1938, p. 115-116; reprinted in C&R -P-553-556.

(35) La Nausee, Gallimard, 1938.

(36) Herbert Dieckmann : "French Existentialism. before Sartrell : Yale French Studies, vol. 1, no. 1 (Spring-summer 1948).

(37) ibid.

276

(38) "La Transcendance de llego: esquisse dlune description phenomenologiquell : Recherches

-Philosophique, no. 6,1937-1937, p-85-123; reissued as : La Transcendance de 1 Libraire philosophique Vrin, 1965.

(39) Bifur, no. 8, juin 1931; see C&R p. 52-53.

(40) Martin Heidegger: QuIest-ce que la metpphysioue? (tr. H. Corbin), Gallimard, 1938.

(41) Herbert Spiegelberg : The Phenomenological l'ovement A historical introduction, The Hague, 1960, vol. 2, p. 403. see also Sartre's criticism of Bataille's use of Corbin's translation (ipseity) in : "Un nouveau mystique", 1c. P. 159. note also Geraets : Vers une nouvelle philosophie transcendentale, La Haye, 1961, p. 133. Merleau-Ponty assisted at Hurvitch's lectures on Heidegger, but the former's comparative ignorance at this time of Heidegger is evidenced in La Structure du comportement.

(42) Georges Gurvitch : Les tendanc es actuelles de la philosophie allemande.

(43) Geraets (l. c. p-7) notes that Merleau-Ponty assisted at these despite an i(, E: )ýnorance of German.

(44) see Spiegelberg, l. c. p. 404.

(45) Spiegelberg l. c. p. 530: see : "Maurice Merleau-Ponty et les a Louvain". Revue de m6tap oct-dec 1962, p. 410-430.

H. L. Van Breda : Archives - Husserl

sique et de morale

(46) Memoires d1une jeune fille rang6e; English translation: Memoirs of a Dutiful Da (Penguin, London, 1963) p. 236-237. See also Merleau-Ponty: "Philosophie de llexistencell l. c.

11 (47) Alexandre Koyre : "Rapport sur lletat des etudes hegeliennes en France" : Revue d'Histoire de la, Philos , vol-1 (avril-juin 1931), p. 147.

(48) Jean Hyppolite I'La Thenomenologiel de Hegel et la pensee franýais contemporaire", FDLPP I.

(49) Lucien Herr : "Hegel" Grande Encyclopedie. T. XIX, p. 997-1003.

(50) Jean Wahl: le Malheur de la Conscience dans la Philosophie de Hegel, Paris, 1929.

277

(51) Jean Hyppolite : "La 111henomenologiel et la , pensee francais contemporaine", l. c. (52) Jean.,,, Hyppolite : "Hegel et Kierkegaard de-ns la

pensee francais 1 contemporaine", FDLP2 I. 17

(53) Jean Hyppolite : -4'1) 7 'P ?7 "Hegel 'a l'Ouestfl Ij- 1 _ ,_ . -0 (54) JeanElyppolite : "La 'Phe'nomenolo7iell et la

pensee francaise contemporainelf, i. c. (55) Alexandre Kojeve Introduction I la lecture

de Hegel; Gallim ard, 1947 (hereafter Intro. )

(56) Stuart Hampshire "Sartre's Cage" : New York Review of Books, vol. IV, no. 9 (June 3,1965).

(57) George Lichteim "Rebel" New York Review of Books, vol. III, no. 8.

(58) Intro. P. 39.

(59) Kojeve : "Hegel, 1,, Tarx et Chris tianismell CritiOue, ler anne, no. 3-4, au"ot-septembre 1946, p. 339-366; hereafter ItH. M. et C. "

(60) Intro. p. 265 and p. 267.

11H. M. et C", 1c.

(62) , p. 397.

(63) IIH. M. et C", 1c.

(64) Intro p. 64.

(65) Intro p. 380.

(66) Intro p. 388.

(67) Jean , Hyppolite : "La 'Phenome"nologiell et la

pensee francaise contemporaine", 1; c;

(68) Jean Hyppolite "Humanisme et Hegelianisme", FDLPPI.

(69) Intro p. 165.

(70) Intro p. 327.

Jean Hvppolite I'Dialectique et dialogue dans I.. C; la 'Phenomenologie de lle5prWll, FDLFFI.

(72) Jean Hyppolite IlLe phe'nomene de la universellelt dans llexperrence humainell;

(73) Jean Hyppolite : IfRuse de la raison et histoire chez Hegel"; FDLPPI.

278

(74) Henri Niel : "Llinter-pretation de --ýegelll Critique, III no. 8 (1ý47).

(75 John Heckmann, ic. p. 141,

(76) On all these points see ibid. p. 12S-145.

Le Tjonde. Octobre 31,196, -/',,, (77) quoted ibid.

ý). 134.

(78) Memoir, s of a Dutiful Daughter, p. 236-237.

(79) see : George Licheim : Iaarxism in T, Iodern France, 1966, Columbia Univ. Press, p. 86-7; and David Caute : Communism and the French Intellectuals, London, 1964. p. 263.

(80) see : "Avant-propos a Ade-r-i-Arabiell, 1c.

(81) FA p. 25 : Simone de Beauvoir also notes that Politzer's flaming red hair was the model for that of 'Roquentin' in La Naus-'ee.

(82) Caute, Ic. p. 264-266.

(83) Auguste Comu : Karl Illarx, s Alcan, Paris, 1934. H. LefE Karl Marx, Jorceaux choisis,

(84) "Merleau-Ponty", 1c. p. 204.

(85) "Le Reformisme et les fetiches", P. 110.

oeuvre, Guteman Paris, 1934.

Situations'VII,

(86) Paul Nizan : Les Chiens de garde, Paris, 1960.

(87) "Merleau-Ponty", lc. p. 191 ; see also Jacques Havex: "French Philosophical Tradition Between the Two Wars" in M. Farber(ed) Philosophic Thought am France and US.

(88) "Philosophie de l1existence", 1c. p. 308-310; see also : Albert Rabil : Merleau-P Existentialist of the Social 77orld, New York,

p. 3-4.

(89) ibid. p. 311.

o-i e (90) Review of L'Imagination : Journal de Psycholo. Normale et Pathol , 33,19-36.

(91) see for instance the section on ""er7son in EloRie de la so-phie et autre essais -p-ris 7 Gallimard, 1960.

(92) III. T. erleau-Ponty", 1c. p. 190.

(93) 'Spiegelberg, 1c. p. 406.

I

vie et son vre and N. Gall imard ,

27-0

I (94) La Transcendance de 11 , Pa2ýis, 1965 (hereafter

p. 13.

(95) ibid. P. 15m.

(96) L'Imaginaire, psycholo CD ie phenonienolo_i2ý--i-ue de llimagination; Gallimard, 1940 p. 11. -- C: ) 3

(97) Esquis, se dlune theorie des t. -iot. ions: Hermann, Paris, 1939 p. 24-29.

(98) TE p. 23.

(99) ibid p. 24.

(100) ibid p. 74.

(101) ibid p-74. (102) ib id p. 8 0.

(103) ibid p. 84.

(104) ibid p. 87.

(105) ibid p. 86-87.

(106) LlEtre et le N6'ant, Essai dlontolo, 7--Le phdnomenologique; Gallimard, 1943 (hereafter EN) p. 667.

(107) "Une idee fondam. entale de la phänom'enologie de Husserl : 11intentionalitellý lc. p. 129.

(108) Forrest Williams and Robert Kirkpatri c', ---

their Introduction to English translation The Transcendance of t, Ilew 1957.

(109) "Une idee fondamentale 4e la, phänom-enolo�--2-e de , Illintentionalite"11 lc. p. 30. Husserli

(110) Gilbert Varet : L'ontologie de Sartre, Farýs, 1948, p-17.

TE o. 87.

(112) EN p. 330; see also p. 308.

(11 "Aller -et retour", lc. p. 235-'-, 36.

ibid p. 236.

(115) TE, see supra.

"Nourritures" o-, _).

cit.

11'oby Dick d'Hen,, an b. 'el-T-111-0 -lus culun cl--e-L, d'oeuvre un formýd-ble mo 4,., nu,

280

Nouvelle serie, no.!, 21 juin 1047

ee (118) see La ,i -us 1 13 47; (119' FA see also -, ). 50 accc)-d-- to i, --. r ts

rrecollection at J- c4_1 acnbe--- their a sim-Ole revision.

12 O"i iatj arri; Li L ýbr-, --, -e Feli: -- Ic-,, 1 19

Spi eý---elber-, -, (1 ic. z-O'-4"

(122"': FA p. 25-2ýý, -p-1370

(123) "Un nouvea, u -- ticue"

(124) see all his litera-, --y c --,, itcS r-,. ';. lso note ',. -'-, -at Sartre, at an early sta. c-. e, , Cco-_-deýl Ii i&-i . -, ossibilities to cinemc_ I'Ll , ". L . -10 . -L_, 1i 1- L, C: L' - il-- CO - gra,, hique" in

(125) Geraets, 1c. p. 10-11 c-., -, Id -i-). l88-lc8.7ie of Paul Guillame iS also ii-,, -)ortant c-'-t th-*,

-. - tirie.

(126) ibid p. 12-13.

(127 "Quelc; ues Eý, s-, i-)ec'(, s et qtiell--,. ue develol, -) perients de la psychologie de lE., lo--L-ri, le" Psvohologie norrnale et 19'-5 65 p. 413-4 7 1. See 2, lso Geraets, p. 175.

(128)

(129'ý

(130)

(131)

(132),

(133)

(134)

"Chris tiani. -r-, -i e et ressentiment" La. v--., e Intellectuelle, no. 7,10 juin 19-3ý--,, p.? -D7o ibid

_p, 306.

IlLa -, r)hiloso-l(ýhie de lle. --. i-ste--, 2cell, lc. p. 312-314-.

"Etre et avoir", : octobre 10,1936)

ibid p. 100.

ibid p. 100-101.

ibid p. 103.

--rL,, a vie Intellec tuelle, no. 8,

(135) L'Imagination, 1936 revieý-r by Journal de nsvcholocie norr-, 2F,. Ie et La t-,, -, oIo, u, e 33) 1936.

ell - -K., ie et., la (136) "Les . 'Sciences de ll-. io,, - English translation In The o-` I- Perce. tion ai -ý -ý 1, C, s M. e -p -1d Ot', '-ier Ess, -). v

1: T--p ý -*

t 2- -1 C, Evanston, Northwesteri __. L_vers-,,.,. , ---ess, ---. 6--

(herec, -., -j'- ter Pr. P). p. 59.

281

(137) Sketch for a Theory- of t--L--- iii lotions -p. 25.

(138) ibid. p. 31.

(139 Pr-P, p. 73.

(140) Les -"iventures de _la

di-alec'i, --, -u-e, --1 -- - --9 1955 (hereafter

Chris tiamisme et res. 5e--rltinent'?, 1c. p. 28c-, 'e

(142', Z'ýeview of L'Imagination, 1c. -n. 760.

(143) La Structure du Com-, porternent, Paris : Iýresses universitaires de France 1042 (he-, -eý--'ter S, -)

2.

(144) Titres et Travaux (TT', ', cited in Gerc-ets -p. 32.

(145) TT : Geraets p. 34.

(146) Geraets p. 31-37 and p-. 182-187-

(147) Sq p-13.

(148) ibid p- 59.

(149) ibid ID. 84.

(150) ibid p-97.

(151) ibid p. 113.

(152) ibid p. 136.

(153) ibid p. 138.

(154) ibid p. 143.

(155) ibid Ip. 147.

(156) ibid P. 172.

(157ý ibid p-179.

(158) ibid p. 195-196.

(159) ibid p. 198.

(160) ibid p. 199.

(161) Geraets, p-76.

(162) ýc P. 1')9-

(163' ) ibid p. 210.

282

(164) ibid D. 224.

ibid p. 229.

(166ý ibid p. 235.

(167) ibid p. 240.

(168 ibid p. 241.

283

0T TO

(1) Lk, Force de 47

(2) ±'Elll p. 291.

(3) ibid p. 663.

(4) p. 86. Sartre r-lade it clear -l, o Con-L(-. f---L(, Ryba, lka that he used --- -* c, -P IIL rO M e f or LN.

(5) p. 663.

(6) ibid p-722. (7) ibid p. 484 n. (1).

(8) Geraets 1c : see especially p. 135ff.

(9) Spiegelberg 1c. p. 516.

(10) Van Breda lo. p. 410-4-30; Gera. ets 1c. pl35-l. -OO.

(11) Van Breda 1c. ibid.

(12) Geraets 1c. p. 1-1/0.

(13"'1 Pr -Pp. 3.

(14) ibid p. 4-5-

(15) TT, cited by Geraets, p. 185.

(16) ibid, p. 32.

(17) PP, p. 254; see also Geraets p. 161.

(18) ibid P. XV.

ibid p. xvi.

(20) Husserl - 1., Ieditations carte siaii, -l es, p. 33.

(21) Pl' p-77.

(22) ibid p. 75-76.

(23) Aron Gurwitsch : Review of Phenomenoloc-, r of Perception Philosophica2 Rev-ýevr. IT

(July 10,64) .. 422.

(24) PP p. 413.

(25) ibid p. vii.

(26) ibid p. 160.

284

(27) ibid p. 466.

(28) ibid P. xii-xiii.

(29) see Geraets, P. 172.

(30) PP p. 378.

(31) ibid p. 381.

(32) ibid p. 492.

(33) ibid p. 491.

(34) Geraets, p. 187.

(35) Eugene F. Kaelin 11", erleau-Pont und-, n I- -1 Ontologist" Jý ;T an cl 1:, forld vol. 3, F, -_11 19170,

(36) PF p. xiv there is perhaps in this e-. -; )iýession 'condemned to meani ng" a deliberate ref, -rence to Sartre's well-known dictum 111.7le c-:, re conde(-,, ýed to freedom'.

(37) EN p. 38.

(38) ibid p. 57.

(39) ibid p-. 60.

(40D ibid p, 511.

(41ý ibid p. 512.

(42) ibid p. 527.

(43) ibid p. 518.

(44) ibid p. 516.

(45) ibid p. 543.

(46) ibid p. 562.

(47) ibid p. 614-615.

(48) ibid p. 560-, 9 (49) ibid P. 575.

(50) ibid p. 271.

(51) ibid p. 291.

(52) ibid p. 300.

53) ibid p. 431.

285

(54) ibid p. 502.

(55) ibid p-708.

(56) ibid p. 134.

(57) ibid p. 721-722.

(58) ibid p. 484 n. (l).

(59), TE p. 87.

(60) EN p. 300.

(61) ibid p. 308.

(62) "Sartre par Sartre"; Situations IX, Gall Paris, 1972 p. 102.

(63) Alfred Schuetz : "Sartre's Theory of the Alter Ego" Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,

C11 vol. IX, no. 2, December 1948, p. 181-199.

(64) ib id.

(65ý EN p. 501.

(66) ibid p. 601; note also p. 342 : "our present study does not aim at constituting an anthropolocry". C--

(67) ibid p. 582.

(68) ibid p. 629.

(69) see : ibid p. 220-228; 268-271.

(70) 1/211 Van de Fitte : I'Sartre as Transcendental Realist" : Journal of the British Society

-o, '

Phenomenology, vol. 1, May 1970.

Maurice Natanson :A Critigue of Jean-Pa, ul Sartre's OntoloZy; 1951, p. 92.

(72) Al]ýhonse de Waelhens : "Jean-Paul Sartre's LlEtre et le

' Ne"anttl Erasmus, vol. 1, nos. 9T-m! 10

(May 1947) p. 53.

(73ý AD, p. 269.

(74) EN p. 694.

(75) PP p. 158.

(76) ibid p. 417.

(77) Richard Zaner : The Problerris of E, -ýibodime-, --, t: The Hague, 1964, p. 203.

286

(78) Pjý P. Viii-ix.

(79) ibid p. xiii. (80) Gurvitsch :, Theorie du Champ de la Consc--: ence.

p. 245; cited by Zaner 1c. P. 2, i, -, 6.

(81) Zaner, p. 140.

(82) ibid p. 205.

(83) PP -p. 269.

(84) ibid p. 275.

(85) ibid p. xi-xii.

(86) Pierre Fontan : 1"Le Primat de l1acte sur 1'erionce.

A propos Phe'nomenologie de la perception" Les Etudes Philosophiques, III, no. 3-A (July-Dec. 1948) p. 297-374.

(87) PP P. ix.

(88) ibid p. 512.

(89) Alphonse de Waelhens : Une Philosophie de l1ambiguite, Louvain, 1 9512 p. 386.

(90) PP p. 520.

(91) ibid.

(92) Zaner, lo. p. 199.

(93) "Sur Claudel", S P. 397.

(94) FA p. 381-382.

(95) ibid p. 442.

(96) ibid p. 493.

(97) On a raison de se revolter, Gallimard, 1974, p. 24.

(98) ttFin de la. guerre" Situations III, Gall i,. -i, --xd, 1949, p. 66.

(99) "Preface", S, p. 43.

(100) "La guer-re a eu lieu" : SNS p-245..

(101) ibid P-257.

(102) ibid p. 258-259.

D3) IlParis sous 110ccuPation" : Situations ! II, p-37.

287

(104) "Qelest-ce qulun collaborateur? tl Situations I p. 52.

(105) I'La guerre a eu lieull : p. 258. (106) I'La Republique de la silencelt Situations TTT

P. 11.

(107) I'Sartre par Sartre" Situations IX- -o. 100. .L (108) "La Guerre a eu lieut' : "S'ITS) p. 261.

(109) I'La Re"publique de la silence", 1-c. p. 12. (110) ib id p. 13.

(111) Barlona : in C&R p. 565-633.

(112) FC p. 16.

(113) I'La Republique de la silence", 1c. p. 14.

(114) FC p. 16.

(115) I'La Guerre a eu lieu" SITS p. 251.

(116) Letter to Brice Parain quoted in FA D. 443.

(117) "Fin de la guerre", 1c. p. 67.

(118) "La Guerre a eu lieu" : SNS p. 250-254.

(119) "Qelest-ce quIun collaborateur? ", 1c. p. 46.

(120) ibid 49-50.

(121) ibid p. 43.

(122) ItDrieu la Rochelle ou la haine de soil' : Les Lettres frangaises, no. 6, avril 1943; C&R p. 650-652.

(123) FA p. 496.

(124) C&R p. 81.

(125) ibid they cite Dominique Desanti 'Le S)aartre que je connais" : Jeune Afrique, 8 novembre 1964--

(126) FA p. 504.

(127) ibid p. 514.

(128) ibid p. 513; On a raison de se revolter, p. 24.

(129) see Ch. IV "The French Communists in the 14 -_

,? ý ! -. liie Resistance" of : Alfred Rieber, Sta- ýnd _French

Communist Party, 1941-1947,

288

(130) FA p-514. (131) On a raison de se revolter, p. 25.

(132) "Merleau-Ponty", 1c. p-194.

(133) On a raison de se revolter, p. 25.

(134) FA, p-578.

(135) see : Entretiens sur la -politique, Gallimard, 1949, p. 71-72.

(136) ItLa litterature, cette libertell Les Lettres francaises. no. 15, avril 1944, p. 8; quoted C&R, p. 97.

(137) Les Mouches, Gallimard, 1943.

(138) see "Preface" to Gallimard edition; and interview quoted in C&R p. 90.

(139) Francis Jeanson : Sartre_par lud-meme, 1955, P. 15.

(140) "Paris sous lloccupation" 1c. p. 30.

(141) "Fin de la guerrell 1c. P. 64.

(142) ibid p. 65.

(143) ItLa guerre a eu lieu" : SNS p. 265-266.

(144) see : "Un Promeneur dans Paris Insurgell : Combat aout-septembre 1944; quoted C&R P-103-1060

(145) "La guerre a eu lieu" : SNS p. 268.

289

NOTES TO CHAP'--ER III

(1) 'Burnier op cit p. 13.

(2) "Merleau-Ponty" 1c. p-193.

(3) FC p. 25.

(4) I'La Guerre a eu lieu" SNS p. 263.

(5) On a raison de se revolter, p. 26-27.

(6) I'Merleau-Ponty" 1c. p. 206.

(7) ibid p. 197.

(8) ibid p. 206.

(9) ibid p. 206-207.

(10) ibid p. 199.

(11) see "Pour la verite"I SNS.

(12) I'La Guerre a eu lieu" SNS p. 267.

(13) "Pour la veritet' SNS p. 274ff.

(14) ibid p. 277ff.

(15) ibid p. 303.

(16) ibid p. 301-302.

(17) quoted Burnier p. 35.

(18) ibid.

(19) t'La Guerre a eu lieu" SNS p. 269.

(20) Pr. P p. 25.

(21) I'La Doute de Cezanne" : SNS p. 21.

(22) "Les Conferences" La Nef, auot 1948 (5: 45), p. 150.

(23) I'La Doute de Cezanne" : SNS p. 23.

(24) ibid p. 26.

(25) "Les Conferences") p. 151.

(26) I'La Doute de Cezanne" : SNS p. 30-

(27) ibid p. 32.

28) ibid p. 33-34.

290

(29) "Les Conferences", p-151. (30) ibid.

(31) I'La Metaphysique dans 11hommelf S I-S. p. 16 3. (32) Pr. P p. 23.

T (33) I'La Iletaphysique dans 11hommell p. 150-151. (34) ibid p-153. (35) ibid p-157- (36) ibid p. 158.

(37) ibid.

(38) ibid p. 161.

(39) ibid p. 163.

(40) ib id.

(41) ibid p. 165 n. l.

(42) PP p. 46 5.

(43) p. 29.

(44) "La Doute de Cezannet' : SNS p. 29.

(45) PP P. xvi.

(46) ItLe cinema et la nouvelle ps, -N,., chologiell SNS p. 106. (47) Fr P. Xii. (48) "La Metaphysique dans 11hommell SNS p. 165-166.

(49) PP P. Xiii. (50) "La Metaphysique dans 11hommell SNS p. 163-164.

(51) ibid p. 168.

(52) Zaner, op cit p. 219-220.

(53) IlLa Metaphysique dans llhommell SNS p. 170.

(54) "Le cinema et la nouvelle psycholo,, --, iell

P. 105.

(55) "Qulest-oe que, la litterature? " : Les Temps modernes nos. 17,18,19,20,21 (fevrier-juillet

c 1947). In Situations II, Gallimard, 194ýý,

91

Also as : QeIest-ce que -

la litte-rature", Gallimard, 1948 (hereaft-e-r-, ý, ý, 'ýp. 208,215.

(56) ibid p. 210.

(57) "Pre'osentation" : Les Temps modernes nos. 1 (ler octobre 19457 p. 3 & p. -I-5. (58) FC p. 33 : this was also the basis

-for a Tundamental disagreement between Simone de 4 Beauvoir and Camus, over the latter's sic-n_Ln, -- Cý 7 a petition of clemency for the Collaboration'st

writer, Brasillach.

(59) "La Nationalisation de la littýrature" : Les Temps modernes, no. 2 (ler novembre 1945) p- 194.

(60) "Ecri-re pour son epoque" -a fragment of QuIest-ce que la litte'rature? which did not appear in the published volume and is -printed .L in C&R; p. 670.

(61) "La liberte cartesienne" : Situations I, p-317.

(62) ibid p. 335.

(63) ibid p. 318.

(64) ibid p. 319.

(65) 1ý11 p. 722.

Cormance (66) Les Mouches, Gallimard, 1943; first per-L 3 june, 1943.

(67) see Preface to recording of Huis Clos, cited P. 101.

(68) Interview : Mondes nouveaux, no. 2,21 decennbre 1944; cited C&R p. 108.

(69) "Pour Lukacs la terre ne tourne pas", interview by Francois Erval Combat, 3 fevrier, 1949; quoted C&R p. 210.

(70) I'Le Noir et le Blanc'aux Etats-Unis" Cor-býý, t, 16 juin 1949; quoted C&R p. 215-216.

(71) unpublished notes FC p. 218-

tSO. LC (72) "Forgers of Myths the young plapvri. ýý--- France" Theatre Arts, vol. 30, no. 6, June 1946.

(73) "Portrait d1un adventurler" Situations III,

p. 21; this is the preface to a worlk by Roger Stephane which deals --. i-ion, cý-st o'L--, ers, T. E. Lawrence.

292

Lawrence was described by Sartre in "Existentialism is a humanisr. n, " lecture as an existentialist. All reference to I-a:,,, -, e----, ce was ommitted in the published text. See p. 131.

(74)

(75)

(76)

Natanson : Critique of J-P Sartre's Ont0lo_-, -, -y p. 12.

see : Richard Sherridan : Sartre the Ra dical Conversion; Ohio University Press, 1

"L'ecrivain et sa languell Situati p. 56. -on s

(77) Alisdair MacIntyre : "Sartre as a Soci-al Theorist" The Listener 67,22 I-larch 1962, p. 512-513.

(78) llý qui les lauriers des Goncourt, --ý'emin: -,

Renaudot, Interallie? " , interview by Claudine Chonez : Marianne, 7 decer2bre 1938; quoted C&R p. 131.

(79) Interview by Christian Grisoli : Paru, no. 13, decembre 1945: quoted C&R p. 115.

(80) "Drole dlamitiell : extracts from vol-IV 0-1- Les Chemins de la liberte' : Les Te; -ips modernes, no. 49, novembre 1949, P. 769-806; no. 50, decembre 1949, p. 1009-1039.

(81) FC p. 214; see also ý&R p. 220-221.

(82) Inter*iew by Robert Kanters : LlExpress, 17 septembre 1959: quoted C&R p. 221.

(83) Sartre frequently refers to "works of mind".

(84) ý, DL p. 31.

(85) ibid p. 44.

(86) ibid p. 55.

(87) ibid p. 59.

(88) ibid p. 81.

(89) ibid p. 82.

(90) "La responsBbilite de llecrivain" .n translation in : Reflections oi' Gar , ',.. -e (Lond-),

---, Allen Wingate, 1948), p. 74.

QL p. 80n. (3).

293

(92) Christine Glucksmann gauchisme 'estheticuell CD - mars 1966, p-173-174.

(93) QL p-79.

"J. -F. Sartre et le La -'Touveýý-, Crit4cue,

(94) quoted in "La liberte cartesiennell `itu, -t-ons p. 296.

(95) QL p-70.

(96) ibid p. 64.

(97) "Jean-Paul Sartre 'a" Berlin : Discussion autour des I)Iouchesll Verger, vol. 1, no. 5,1-0.48; nuoted

p. 189.

(98) "La liberfe cartesienne", p. 308 n. l.

(99) QL p. 25 n. l.

(100) Reflexions sur la , -,,, uestion Juive, Gallimard, 1954 (hereafter Rý, -'J'l p. 18.

(101) Interview on the jewish question : L. --, Revue juive de Ge-n'eve, 10e annee, no. 6-7, juý-, )-Juillet 1947 : quoted C&R p. 167-168.

(102) p. 31.

(103) ibid p. 62-64.

(104) ibid p-14.

(105) see ibid p. 165-167.

(106) "Une lettre de Jean-Paul Sartre" : Hillel, no. 3, decembre 1946 - janvier 1947, p. 29; quoted C&R p. 141-142.

(107) RQJ p-171.

(108) ibid p. 150-157.

(109) ýL p. 176.

(110) ibid p. 29-30.

(111) ibid p. 177.

(112) ibid p-173.

(113) ibid p. 176.

ibid.

L15) EC p. 18.

cl '

(116) On a raison de se revolter p. 26.

(117) llý propos de llexistentialisme: I'lise au point" : Action, no. 17,29 decembre 19,44, p- 658.

(118) FC p. 19.

(119 ý ibid p. 50-51.

(120) "Fame, for me, was hatred", Sartre wrote later in his notes : FC p. 57.

(121) FC p. 52.

(122) ibid p. 53.

(123) "Presentation" Situations II p. 6.

(124) "Ecrire pour son epoquell : C&R o. 671.

(125) ibid p. 672.

(126) LlExistentialisme est un humanisme, p. 68.

(127) RQJ p-72-73.

(128) "Ecrire pour son epoquell C&R p. 672.

(129) ibid p. 674.

(130) LlExistentialisme est un humanisme, p. 92-93.

(131) ibid p. 69.

(132) FC p-17.

(133) "Mateýrialisme et revolution" Situations III, p. 172.

(134) QL p. 187.

(135) "Responsibility of the I, i'llriterll, le. -n. 83.

(136) "Presentation", Situations II p. 20.

(137) , -, ýL p. 182.

(138) Burnier op cit p-31.

(139) TE p. 86.

(140) I'Mat6rialisme et revolution" Situations p. 140.

( >141)

ibid p. 135 n. 1.

295

(142) ibid P. 213 n. l.

(143) ibid p. 141.

(144) ibid p. 148.

(145) ibid p. 156-168.

(146) ibid -p. 169.

(147) see RQJ p. 42.

(148) "Materialisme et revolution", -o-174-175.

(149) ibid p. 173.

(150) ibid p. 224.

(151) QL p. 196.

(152) "Materialisme et re'volutionfl, p. 224.

(153) Les Mains Sales; Gallimard, 1948 : first performance on 2 April, 1948.

(154) Interview by Pierre-Andre Baude : Llllube, ler avril, 1948 : quoted C&R p. 180.

(155) Interview by Paob Caruso in Italian edition of Les Mains sales; quoted C&R p. 183.

(156) Interview by Guy Dornand : Franc-Tireur, 25 mars 1948; quoted C&R p. 178.

(157) "Portrait d1un adventurier" Situations VI, p. 22.

(158) "Merl eau-Ponty" : Situations IV p. 219-220.

(159) unpublished notes FC p. 164.

(160) ibid.

'j; S p. 109-110. I'Llexistentialisme chez Hegel"

(162) "Preface" : SNS p. 7.

(163) I'Llexistentialisme chez Hegel" : SITS, -p. 121.


(165) "Complicite" objective" : Les Temps odernez, 4: 34 (July 1948), p-1-2.

(166) 'tLe Roman et la 1. I. letaphysiquell : J_ýý, -ý p. 71.

296

(167) Jean Wahl "A propos d1une conference Je L Maurice I. Terleau-Ponty sur les aspects -, -01-L

et sociales de llexistent.! -, --,

lismellý : Foný! -7--, ne, 9: 51, avril 1946, p. 678.

(168) PP p. 520.

(169) IlLe Heros, l'Homme;! : p. 331.

(170) 111,11arxisme et philoso-ohiell: SIT3, p. 228.

(171ý ib id p. 2 31.

(172) l'Autour de marxismie`I : SNS p. 1cý�9.

(173) I'Marxisme et philosophie', ' : SNS p. 2122-223. (174) 9lAutour de marxisme ll : SNS p. 186.

o (175) I'llarxisme et philoso-phiell p-236.

(176) ibid p. 237.

(177) ibid p. 241.

(178) ibid p. 224.

(179ý "Pour la verite/11 SNS p. 288-289.

(180) ibid p. 276.

(181) I'Marxisme et superstition" S) p. 330.

(182) "Preface": SNS p. 9-10.

(183) "Autour de marxismell : SNS p. 205. TS (184) "Four la veritell S-21i p. 285.

(185) tTEn un combat douteux" Les '-'em-, Ds modernec; 3: 27 (decem-bre 1947).

(186) ibid.

(187ý I'LlHeros, 1'Hominell SNS -, ). 327.

(188) "Four la veritell SNS -, o. 30? -.

(1891 ) l'Autour de marxismell : p. 217.

(190", ibid p. 213-214.

"Pour la veritell

(192) ib id.

297

(19 3' "Deux philos 11 o-jhie, -) de

. E: -. istentialisi--ae)ll iýe c on L eg, I C', I. Z; -,

Internation-a-les- de Geneve.

j .ý -o. 2'S; 4. (194) "Poux ver te

(195) I'La Querelle de 1.1ex7stent-f-l-, sn-ie" : p. -! -42. (196') , li-Luto= ,, -e (197 ', ý2our la verite"

(198" ,, lutour de

(199) ibid' -f-), 209.

(200) llPour les recontres : lies Tel! ý modernes 4: 34 l-'ý. 4 -

(201) 1, Foi et bonne Foi"- "ý)-ýT] -p-317-319. -I -.., r , -ý (202) Pref L, i face" ", Coi--i-plic-i-tive ob. 'ec"voll. 1c.

-', obleme (203) Human-isme et TerreH-27., e sEl-J- le ----, --- 7--- -- --. - ,

---ýuniste, Paris, Gallila-L,, -

1'. . e- co ni, P. xxiii.

c- - (204) Humanisme et Terreur consists of ý- ticIe L-7 originally published in Les Tem-i)-ý mod--aýýaes I'Le Yogi et. le -, -)roletairel: T-1,11 2: 13 (octobre 1946) p, 1-29; 2: 14--Tnoveribre 1? 46,. p. 253-287; 2: 16 ja-nvier 1947) p. 67C-711; "Apprendre cr\i, lire", Tli 2: 29 (jul-7- 1c-, '47)

(205) HT p. xvii.

(206) ibid p. xxxv.

(207) ibid p. xxxiii.

(208) ibid p. 18.

(209 ibid p. 1-7.

(210) ibid p. 42.

(211) ibid p. 58.

(212) ibid p. 66.

(213) ibid P. 62-63.

(214) ibid p. 88.

(215) ibid _p.

80.

"216) ibid -, ). 95-06.

298

(217' ', ', l,,; erleau-Pontv-" SituL"* ons I p. 216.

(218) ) --'LlT p. 31.

(219) ib id P. 9 8.

(220) ibid p. 130.

(221) ibid p. 153.

(222" Ili-refacell j! ). 10.

(223) Hubert L. Dreyfus -, nd us Introduction to their cf -3e-. qse c-pý-J-

-, Dense Evanston, Non -

T -VT 1 -1 --

J .. orth est Un- 964, p. ix. Press, 1

9 9,

TM rp 1-1 R--

La Force des Choses, -- )-321.

F. Ritl-. )c'- The (2) Frederich -t-e European Idea, 1947-1cP4'--,

New York, 1966, -; -). 192.

Raymond Aron : 7'arf-ismes imaginaires, 1970; p. 60.

(4'ý Burnier p. 30.

ibid p. 34-35.

Ll--'Lý'xistentialisme est un Hume, n-isrie, -o. lC5.

tive" Les Te,, -. -, --, os rioderncýi, (7) "Complicitie object -ý-l si, --, ed 4: 34 (July 1948) (edJtoi2. -C--. C-- 'I

(8) Ritsch op cit -p ,. 9.

(9) "La Guerre et la peur" : Fr(--, r-ch-, se, no. 5, C

T-

nov-dec 1946 ; quoted 152

(10" -: Combat, 18 oct Interview by Louis Pauwel.., klobre 1947; quoted Cc'.. R p. 169-170.

IlEn un combat doutexull Les nodernes, -ed

74 3: 27 (dec 1947); editorial sij. ýrp

(12) "Complicite objective" p-7.

(13) ibid P. 11.

(14) see his articles on the U. S. in Sitý. ctio---is and his La Putain res-pecteuse (1946., -

T

(15) see his IfFour lc--, verite"I :

(16) FC p. 108.

(17) ibid.

(18) Ritsch P. 195.

(19, On a raison de se revolter, P-27.

(20'; FC p-154.

(21) ibid p. 163.

k, 0c e -ssemble, -ten' --'em, -L-tJvue (22) Appel Du Comit ' Pour le, 77)

Revolutionnaire; quoted C&R T) . 19-7-1-0-9.

300

(23) Press Conference of Sartre, Rous and r-11 Ousset Franc-Tirreux, 11

-mars 1948; r, *-uo te R 200.

(24) "Il nous faut la -paix riour --refa-*re le r. io--,,, -', e. Response a ceux qu-L nous pellent Franc e-Tirreur, 10 decembre 1S48: quoted C, "-. -cý

(25) "Jean-Paul Sartre ouvre un dia_ý ocruell no. 11 18-191 juin 1949; cuoteý du Ilonde,

p. 217 - (26) Entretiens sur la politique, -v: ith David Rouszet

and Gerard Rosenthal, Gallimaiýd, 1949, p-97-98.

(27) ibid p. 9-16.

(28) ibid p. 84.

(29) ibid P. 28.

(30) ibid p. 104.

(31 ) t'Le R. D. R. et le probl'erne de la, libert'ell -. La Pensee socialiste, no. 19,1948; cýuoted

p. 200.

(32) ibid o (33) Entretiens, P. 102.

(34) ibid p. 204.

(35) "Il faut que nous mentions cette lutte en comj-. qun" La Gauche, no. 10) 20 dec. 1048; quoted C& p. 204.

(36) Burnier, p-70.

(37) cited Burnier p. 70.


(39) On a raison, p. 29.

(40) "Merl eau -Ponty" : Situations IV, p. 223.

Burnier, p. 75.

(42) ibid p. 73.

(43) u. n. : FC p. 194.

(44) Francois Bondy : "Jean-Paul Sartre -, -rid -'olit-. cs" Journal of Contemporex,,,, -, Hýstory, vol. 2, April 1967 2. p. 25-48.

301

(45) Maurice Cranston "Jean-Paul April 1963, p. 34-35.

I- (46) Ritsch, p. 209.

(47) ibid p. 234.

(48) ibid p. 230.

(49) FC P. 194.

(50) On a ra.. -i s on, -p - 30.

(51) FC p. 191.

(52) ibid p. 217.

(53) "Merlea, u-Ponty" p. 230-231.

(54) l'Autour de marxisme-" : SNS -o. 215.

(55) ,

"Pour la veritell : p-300.

(56) "Pour les rencontres internationales" : Les Temps modernes, 2: 19 (avril 1947).

(57) "Complicite objective" Les Te-, aps r. iodernes, 4: 34 (July 1948).


(59) "Les Jours de notre vie" : Les Temps modernes, janvier 1950, no. 51; reprinted in Signes under title IILIU. R. S. S. et les camps" : p. 265.

(60) Although the oricinal T11 article appe, -red ,,. rJ th the double signature of Sartre and er le ý7. - i) -Pon the latter alone was responsible fo. drafting and hence its inclusion in his Signes. See for information on circumstances of this article "Merle au-Ponty" p. 225-227.

(61) IILIU. RAiS. S. et les camps" p. 332.

(62) ibid p. 340.

(63) ibid p-338.

(64) III: -Ilerleau-Ponty" p. 225.

(65) ibid p. 230.

(66) ttPour la veritell : SNS P. 276.

(67) "Autour de marxismell : SIIS p. 214.

(68) "Four la. veritell SNS p. 303 n. l.

302

(69) "En un combat douteitx Les -ý F., iold ernes 3: 27 (dec 1947), T). 964. -- I (70) t'Merleau-Ponty" p. 222.

I'Deux philosophies de 1'. Ll: ii-i--ope (, 'arxisne- Exi-stentialisme)" : La Nef: Rencontres Internationales de G7e--neve. '-

(72)

(73)

(74)

(75)

(76)

(77)

(78)

(79)

(80)

(81)

(82)

(83)

(84)

"LlAdversaire est complice" Les Terri--)s moalernes. 1 5: 57 (July 1950',,, p. 11.

FC p. 249.

"Merleau-Ponty" p. 236.

ibid p. 237.

Interview with Burnier (March 1961": cited -'ri Burnier, p. 80.

"Merleau-Ponty" p. 230.

Saint Genet 1952, p. 536

ibid p-177.

Comedien et Mart 0

unpublished notes : FC p. 261.

ibid p. 262.

ibid.

ibid p. 217.

ibid p. 164.

Gall

(85) see FC p. 218 these were intended for eventual publication. But Sartre "thought his discussions so feeble that he opposed their public ati on", Thao then sued Sartre for a million francs in damages QC p. 243).

(86) "Introduction 'a Portrait de l1aventurier de Roger Stephane" Situations VI, p. 20.

(87) ibid p-17.

Situations (88) "Faux savants ou faux lie'vres". JL p. 66.

(89) see "Le cas Nizan" Les Temi)s modernes, no. 22, juillet 1947, p. 181-184.

(90) On a raison p. 35; see also Entretien -s so politique, p-70-78 for detail

relations with the communists.

303

(91) FC p. 252.

(92) 'ibid p. 274.

(93) ibid p. 261.

(94) "Preface a La Fin de lles-poir de Ju: ýl -ý it Situations VI, p-79.

(95) IlIvIlerleau-Pontyll p. 94.

(96) "The Chances of Peace" The NE-tion, 3ý, ' dec 1950: quoted C&R p. 2281229.

(97) Re ponse a un questionnaire : I'La neutr--ý-, Lite est-elle possible? " :, L'Observateur, no. 9, 8 juin 1950, p. 31; quoted CLR p. 226-227.

(98) see FC p. 153.

(99) ibid p. 219.

(100) Sartre had been disturbed b, -, ' - the fe. ct triat the North Koreans had been the first to cross the border (see FC p. 251 and "Merleau-Ponty vivcnt" p. 238-239).

(101) FC p. 275.


(103) ibid p. 282.

(104) ibid p. 281.

(105) "Merleau-Ponty" p. 248-249.

(106) see ibid p. 254-257.

(107) ibid p. 249.

(108) "LlAdversaire est complice', : Les Temps modernes, 5: 57 (July 1950', ',,,, p. 11.

(109) Le Diable et le Bon Dieu (19511,,, Gall ir--n, ý:,. rd, first performance 7 June 1951.

(110) "Merleau-Ponty" p. 242.

"Indochine S. O. Stl : Les Temps modernes, 2: 1E, in . 3i: --nes. 'arch 1947). As "Sur l'Indochinell

(112) from transcript of 1950 fiL7 by `icoýe Vedres La Vie commence demain : C&R p-702.

(113) "Merleau-Pontytf p. 255.

(114) ibid P-240.

304

NOTES TO C-Hk? ', -''ER V

(1) Les Aventures de la dialecticue, Par-i: -s, Galli7me. ro, 1955 (hereafter AD) p. 23 .

ibid.

(3) "Merleau-Pontyll Situations !Vp. 250.

(4) AD p. 254.

(5) ibid p-159 &D , 144.

(6) Burnier op cit p. 92 n. 5.

"Les Communistes et la paix" Situations III p. 156.

ibid p. 384 n. l.

(9) Burnier op cit p. 92 n. 5 : Situations Vl p. 384 n. l.

(10) Burnier op cit -p. 95.

(11) see esp. L'Affaire Henri Martin, Cor-imentaire de Jean-Paul Sartre; Gallimard, 1953.

(12) On a raison de se revolter, p. 30.

(13) "Les Communistes et la paix" Situations VI, p. 149.

"Reponse a Albert Camus" Situations IV p. 90-125.

see for example : "Jean-Paul slexplique sur Les Mots", interview by Jacqueline Piatier Le Monde, 18 avril 1964.

(16) AD p. 139.

"Les Communistes et la paix" Situations VI p. 88.

(18) ibid p. 92-93.

(19) ibid p. 97.

(20) ibid p. 105.

(21) ibid p. 113-116.

(22) ibid p. 123.

(23) ibid p. 127.

305

(24) ibid p-134-137. (25) ibid p. 143.

(26) ib id p-150-151.

(27) ibid p. 151.

(28) ibid p. 168.

(29) ibid p. 238.

(30) "Reponse a Claude Lefort" -77 Situations -p-7- (31) Burnier op cit p. 94.

(32) "Les Communistes et la -paix" Situations VI P. 185.

(33) ibid p. 248.

(34) ibid p. 244.

(35) ibid p. 245-

(36) ibid p. 186-

(37) ibid p. 246.

(38) ibid p. 156.

(39) ibid p. 187.

(40) ibid.

(41) ibid p. 249-

(42) ibid p. 195.

(43) ibid P-250.

(44) ibid p. 210.

(45) ibid p. 207.

(46) ibid p. 211 ff.

(47) t'Reponse 'a Claude Lefort" Situations VII P-8.

(48) AD p. 150.

(49) ibid p. 203-

(50) "Les' Communistes et la paix" P. 209.

(51) Claude Lef ort I'Le Marxisme et Saitre" --es ' - Temp modernes, no. 89, avril 5. 5, p. 15: 195

306

(52) ibid p. 1543.

4% il - i-I

(53) IIII: reponse a Claude Lef ort" Situa4 ons "T 10-7. (54) ibid p. 18.

(55) ibid p. 24-30.

(56) ibid p-56.

(57) ibid p. 48.

(58) ib id p. 56-57.

(59) ibid p. 52.

(60) I'Les Communistes et la paix" Situations VI p. 372 n. 1.

(61) "Reponse a Claude Lefort" Situations VI p- 73-74.

(62) ibid p. 46.

(63) ibid p. 46-47.

(64) "Masses, spontaneite, partill Situations VIII p. 262-263 : IIIJ Manifesto".

(65) see for instance contributors to special issue of La Nouvelle Critique2 mars2 1966.

(66) AD p. 134-

(67) ibid p-168.

(68) ibid p. 191-

(69) ibid _p.

168.

(70) ibid p. 269.

(71) PF : Part IIIy Ch. 1 I'Le cogito"..

(72) : LD p. 214.

(73) ibid p. 255.

(74) ibid p. 264.

(75) ibid p. 185 n.

(76) ibid p. 266 n.

(77) ibid p. 261.

(78) ibid p. 253.

307

(79) ibid p. 188.

(80) ibid p. 165.

(81) ibid p. 134.

(82) ibid p. 136.

(83) Claude Lefork, op cit.

(84) AD p. 225.

(85) ibid p. 11.

(86) quoted in AD p. 30.

(87) AD p. 32.

(88) ibid p. 33.

(89) ibid p. 36.

(90) ibid.

(91) ibid p. 42.

(92) ibid p. 49.

(93) HT p. 113.

(94) ibid p. 155.

(95) quoted in AD p. 46.

(96) AD p-70-

(97) ibid p-72.

(98) ibid p. 98.

(99) ibid p. 84.

(100) ibid p. 87-

(101) ibid p. 122.

(102) ibid p. 279-

(103) ibid p. 312.

(104) "Merl e au-Ponty" Situations I-T p. 268.

(105) HT p. 156.

(106) AD p. 11.

(107) HT p. 155-156.

308

(108) AD p. 307.

(109) ibid p. 216.

(110) ibid p. 271.

(111) ibid p-74.

(112) ibid p-79.

(113) ibid p. 306-313.

(114) ibid p. 177-178.

(115) ibid p. 175.

(116) ibid p. 205.

(117) "Merl eau-Ponty" 13ituations IV p. 204.

(118) ibid p. 233-234.

(119) On a raison de se revolter p. 37.

(120) "Ce que je suis" interview with I'ichel Contat, Le Nouvel Observateur, 23 juin 1975.

(121) Burnier op cit p. 96.

I

309

NOTES TO CHAPTER VI

Simone de Beauvoir ', "T,, erleau-. L 'ont-,, - et le pseudo-Sartrelf Les Temps moderne . s, jliiý, juiller 1955, pp. 2072-2122-0

(2) Michel-Antoine Burniner : Les existential is tes et la politique, p. 103.

(3) "Merl eau-Pontyll

(4) EC p. 271.

(5) "Merl eau-Pontyll

: Situations IV p. 246.

: Situations IV p. 258.

see ibid pp. 259-260.

Bondy, Francois : "Jean-Paul Sartre and Politics" , Journal of Contemporary 'LIL*story, vol. 2, no. 2, April 1967, pp. 25-48.

(8) see On a raison de se revolter, p-78-79. (9) see: Caute, David, The Fellow Travellers: it,

PostScript to the Enlightenment, 1973, esi). pp. 344-355; Micaud, Charles A., "French Intellectuals and Communism", Social Research XXI, no. 3 (autumn 1954) pp. 286-296; Varaigne, Roland, I'Sartre and the Communists"; Problems of Communism, March-April 1955, p. 24-31.

(10" I'Le Congres de Vienne" Le Monde, ler janvier 1953; p. 257-258.

(11) "Reponse 'a Albert Camus" Situations IV p. 110.

(12) IILIURSS et les camps", Signes.

"Le Fant"o"me de Stalinell Situations VII, Gallimard, 1965.

(14) Micaud, Charles : Communism and the French Left, 1963. Ch. IV : 'IF-rench Intellectuals : The Socialisation of Anguish", p-161.

Varaigne, Roland, "Sartre and the Comr. wnists"

Problems of Communism, March-April 1955, p-31.

"Reponse 'a Mauriac", L'Observateur, 19 -i-. rs 1953.

(17) FC p. 312.

-rcel Pe, -*u a`4 (18) *Reponse a Ilauriac" 1c; in fc ct write an article on the Slans',. --, r clear"... condemning anti-semitism, 1953: cf. Burnier, p. 99,

310

FC p. 312.

(20) "Les impressions de Jean-Pa. ul Sartre sur s--n voyage en U. R. S. S. 11, Propose recueillis Jean Bedel, Liberation, 14-20 juillet 19-5", on Sartre's illness at this time and circumstances of interviev.. r see '-, orce o-F Circums tan c e.

(21) 110-peration Kanapall : Situa tions VII.

(22) I'Le R'eformisme et, les fetiches" Situations

(23) "Reponse a* Pierre Havillell Situations VII.

(24) FC p. 378.

(25) see FC-P-340; and Burnier, p-113-114. (26) Interview with Burnier, p. 114.

(27) IlAprýýs Budapest, Sartre parle", LlEx-oress, 9 novembre 1956.

(28) see Burnier p. 115.

(29) "Le fant"O"me de Staline", Situations VII, p. 149.

(30) Caute, David; Communism and the French Intellectuals, p. 257.

Burnier p. 47.

(32) Lichteim, George Marxism in modern France,, p. 80.

(33) "Le R(ýformisme et les fetiches", p. 110.

(34) ibid.

(35) ibid p. 112-113.

(36) "Reponse a Pierre 'T'Javillell Situations VII p-133.

(37) ibid p. 127.

(38) "Merleau-Ponty", p. 250.

(39) IlLe fantÖ"Me de Stalinelt, -, 3.301.

(40) "Sur la destalinisation", S p-385.

Le fant'O'me de Staline, p. 307.

(42) Burnier p. 117.

(43) Critique de la raison dialectique, 9.134 (her after CRD). -

311

(44) "Questions de methodell p. 109.

(45) ibid p. 44.

(46) ibid p. 28.

(47) ibid p. 92.

(48) P. 118.

(49) ibid P. 119.

(50) ibid p. 123.

(51) ib id p. 124.

(52) ibid p. 131.

(53) ibid

(54) ibid p. 145.

(55) CRD p. 165-166.

(56) ibid p. 167.

(57) ibid p. 171.

(58) ibid p. 231-232.

(59) ibid p. 231-236.

(60) ibid p. 245-247.

(61) ibid p. 201.

(62) 'ibid p. 204.

(63) ibid p-752-753.

(64) ibid p. 208.

(65) ibid p. 211.

(66) ibid p. 224 n.

(67) ibid p. 252.

(68) ibid p. 306.

(69) ibid p. 308.

(70) ibid p. 308-310.

(71) ibid p. 310-313.

(72) ibid p. 325.

312

(73) ibid p. 381.

(74) ibid p. 391.

(75) ibid P. 391.

(76) ibid p. 417-418.

(77) ibid P. 433.

(78) ibid P-435-437. (79) ibid

-P. 438-439.

(80) ibid p-578-580.

(81) ibid p. 642-643.

(82) ibid p. 647.

(83) "Masses, spontaneit6` et partill Situations VIII p. 270.

(84) Aron, Raymond "Jean-Paul Sartre et le marxismett, Le Figaro Litteraire, 29 oct - 4 nov 1964; and in his Marxismes Lrn. ý_,. ---, inaires (1970), p. 163-191.

(85) p. 200.

(86) ibid p. 190.

(87) see Garaudy's reply to Sartre in 1, "arxisme et Existentialisme: Controverse sur la_dialectinue 1962.

(88) Catesson, Jean: "Theorie des ensembles practiQues et philosophie", Critioue 17 (1-0/61) p. 356. For a general view see* partic. : Schmidt, Alfred The Concept of Nature-jin "'arx.

(89) Doubrovsky, Serge IIJ-P Sartre et le de la raison dialectiquell Nouvelle Revue Francýý-. ls,, anne 9, vol. 18 (19617-, p. 491-501; 607-698; 879-888.

(90) Lessing, Arthur "Marxist Existenti, sm Review of Týetaphysics, 20 (1966-67)

(91) P. 167.

(92) ibid p. 212.

(93) ibid p. 246.

(94) see: Gurvich, Geor,, ue I'La d L-lectique che oi --- 0 "' -* s J-P Sartre", Paxt Iph. ix, Ap: ), nd-

313

Dialectique et sociologie (196 -j-, - 157-176: ff I- 171 2)

De Tollenare: nt ersub ýn cti -v-* ty -j rj- J-P Sartrell International -Ei

1,1 i1o

Quarterl , vol. 5

(95) Burkle, Howard R. "Sartre's 'Ideýý.!, o---:, If Social Unity" in '. ', 'arnock, ;..,, (ea-) re S, L Collection of Critical Essays.

(96) Levi-Strauss, dialectiquell 1962.

(97) CRD p. 131.

(98) ibid p. 9.

Claude: Ch. ij,; 'Histoire et of his La Fensek

-sauvaý7e, Paris,

, -I (99) "Entretien sur llanthro-oolo,, -Tiell, Situ-,! ýtions Lý, p. 83.

(100) ib id.

(101) "LlEcrivain et sa languell qjtuatioi -is !.. 'I- p. 53.

(102) CRD p. 207.

(103) ibid.

(104) ibid; see Champign Robert : Huri--isi-1) Human Racism (19: 70ý Cham-pigny acc-ýis , es of 'human racism'.

(105) EN p. 629.

(106) CRD p. 142.

(107) ibid p.? 02.

(108) ibid p. 349 n. l.

(109) ibid p. 203-

(110) ibid.

It' -ý ism see Krieger, L. "History and s

". ton

in Sartre" in Vvlolff and T! oore (ed) Critical SIp. 23'_-`-266.

'o, ell (112) Levi-Strauss, Claude "Histoi-re et di,, ý_, lecu, ', pp. cit.

(113) , -_2cha. eolo. 7ie d-, i Foucault, T'ichel r Gallimard, 1960. lIntroduction'.

CRDp. 214.

ibid p. 215.

314

(116) ibid p. 216.

(117) ibid -,, ). 219.

(118) ibid p. 220; 223.

ibid p. 224 n. l.

(120) ib id.

(121) ibid.

(122) see Blakeley, Thor.,,, as J- ''D I C__. iý tr e ue de la rai son diEý_le ctique I -_-ý, _Tid tiie- C-)ac, ,o lsfný Ilarxi smi-Lenin "tudie. s i-i-i ýýo--_*Let June-` epternber 10&ý, vol. T

(123) see Hincker, Fransois: It- 1 11 1- 1- , -. c et. 11histoire", '. ýouvelle Critioue, 19,66, 173-174, ni)-157-166. L-

(124) Levi-, ") traus s disoutes ti-ic: usc,, )c,, e o- Ls -e. 3 by Sartre.

(125"! Reynaud, Jea-n-Dcý, -,! -Lel!

". ':: ýocý-olocýie et -. i,, -., on diale c tio ue", , Revue cE- --' ýs de sociologie

vol. II (1961'), no. 1 p. 50-66.

(12 6 Lichteim, Georp:,, e: "Sa-T-tro, ll., -, iýxi sm and no. 2 History and Theory, vol. III (196'3-lcý('j4'

_pp. 222-246.

(127) Lefebvre; quoted in Lichteii, ýi, above.

(128) p. 165.

(129) p. 532.

(130ý ibid p. 365.

(131) ibid p. 370.

(132) ibid.

(133) uestionsdeod e", CI-, f) 3 2.

315

TTC, rr-!, rpr, r 7T

Critique de le, raiisondjallecti!, ue e a, fterC ELY) *

(2) ibid p. 9.

(3) ibid.

(4 ib id 10.

ibid

(6), ibid P. 10.

(7) ibid P. 11.

(8) ibid p. 115.

(9) ibid -,, ). lj-8 (my emphr--, ---ýs).

rr (10) Desan : The lllar, ] - --of

Jean-2,,, uý-- New York, jD-7C-

(11 ý CRD, _p.

llSo

(12) ib id p. 118.

(13) ibid p. 119.

(14) ibid p. 120.

(15"") ib id.

(16) ibid p. 121.

EN p. 299.

(18) CRD p. 120.

(19) ibid p. 121.

(20) ib id.

(21' ) ib id.

(22) ibid p. 12- 1-1 z', -'2. (23) ibid p. 123.

(24) ibid.

(25) ibid 4. p. 123-12'

(26', ibid p. 124.

(27) c,, -uote

d ibid p. 124.

316

(28) ibid p. 12-55o

(29) ibid p. 126.

(30) ibid.

(31) ibid.

(32) ibid _p.

127.

(33" ibid p. 128.

(34) ibid.

(35'ý ibid P. 129.

(36) ibid.

(37) J-bid p. 130.

(38) ibid.

(39) ibid p. 131.

(40"ý ibido

(41) ibid p. 132 (my emphasis')

(42) ibid p. 133.

(43) ibid p. 134.

(44) ibid.

(45) ibid.

(46) ibid p. 135.

(47) ibid.

(48) ibid.

(49) ibid p. 137.

(50) ibid.

(51, 'ý, ibid.

(52) ibid.

(53) all q uotes -p.

138.

(54) ibid p. 138-139. )

(55) fs ibid p. 139; my

(56) ibid p. 138.

317

(57) ibid P-171-172; D. 200. (58) ibid p. 246.

(59) ib id p. I

(60) EN -. o. 227-228.

(61) CPJD p. 139.

(62) ibid p. 139-140.

(63) ibid , -j. 140.

(64') ibid.

(65) ibid.

(66) ibid.

(67) ibid.

(68) ibid p. 141.

(69ý, ibid.

(70',, ýý ibid.

(71), ibid.

(72) ibid p. 142.

(73) ibid; last emphasis mine.

(74) ibid.

(75) ibid.

(76) ibid.

(77) ibid.

(78) ibid p. 143.

(79) ibid p. 144.

(80) ibid.

(81) ibid.

(82'ý ibid p. 145.

(83) ibid.

(84) ibid; my emphasis.

(85) ibid.

318

(86) ibid; my emphasis.

(87) ibid p. 146.

(88) ibid.

(89) ibid p. 147.

(90" ibid.

(91"ý ibid p. 148.

(92) ibid p-153-

(93) ibid p. 156.

(94) ibid.

(95) ibid p. 157.

(96) ibid.

(97) ibid p. 157-158.

(98) ibid -p.

159 n. l.

(99) ibid p. 162.

(100) ibid p. 154; my emphasis.

(101) ibid p. 161.

(102) ibid.

319

-, TOT7, '-ý 1"' CO-TCLUSION

"Paul Nizan" Situations -o-138-139.

(2) "Preface", Signes p. 47.

t "Ce c, , ue je suis", intervie-, 11--chel 'ont, ýA., Le Nouvel Observ?:, '(, eur 23 juin 1075, p-85.

(4) ibid 30 juin 1975, p. 64.

"Llalibill : Situations VIII p-130.

"Preface", ; 31, mesp. 10. r-,

quoted in report: The Guar4JP-. n, 24 September 1975 p. 2.

(8) Interview with ll'aul T, lorell-e, Liberation, 4 nov. 1953; quoted Contat and Ryb,,

--. 11-, a, p. 269.

Critique de la raison dialectiQue, p. 426.

1 2 4. (10) "Re'ponse a, Albert Camus" Sit-L, -,?, tion, -, 'L'[ -o. 1t-

(11) "Lecture de hlontaignell : Signes, p. 251.

(12) ibid p. 252.

(13) PP 'p.

520.

ji (14 ý IlLebture de l, "ontaignell, p. 263; -fo. 265.

see La Prose du monde, edited by Claude Lefort) 1969, Paris, Gallirrerd.

see "LlEcrivain et sa languell - L' (16) c p. 40-82.

"Lect-u, -re de 1. ýlontaignell -p. 266.

-p. 271. "Note sur Ilachiavel", -SiLL). es

(19) "Preface", Signes p. 47.

(20) "Merle au-Ponty" : Situations-T-. ' p. 194.

ibid p. 243.

(22) ibid p. 243-244.

IV -p. 80. (23) Desra, tsetdesI-io ri i: ,es 11 ý-, i ýt t, lo: jý

(2C Critique de la raison dJý7-lecticue p. 14). J

(25) ibid p. 142.

320

ibid -o. 74.

re, Harrroshi Stuart 'Y"ork -r Review-g-' I Books, vo'- . IV, no. 9 Iz ic I-I,

(28) see IlLe philoso hie et le. sociolorriell: -, -. -----es p p. 138.

(29 see "Avant-proposl-' to Les Philoso , -, D., les cel, -ebre, -ý; l'-, - 'fLa Philosophie et la- 3-ehorstl, T) -0

(30) Elogie de la, Philoso, - D. 0/0/-loo. phi e

(31) ibid _p.

100.

(32) Uber den Humanismus, Paris 19/57; quotw--d -'n -T C 51 Robert Champigny: Humanism and 'EuMan

S tre ýIa Critical Study of E-Dý3a. ys by Oar 1972 p. 51 n. 11.

(33) IIM. erleau-Pontyll, -n. 276-277.

-P, r (34) see I'Le Roman et la 1-tetaphysiquell in '--)'ens ot non-sens.

(35) Le Diable et le bon Dieu, Act II, ID'cene (36) I'Le Langage indirect et les voix du silence",

. C) Signes, p. 72.

(37) "Sur Claudel", Signes p. 397.

(38) I'Lluniversel singulier", Situations IX p. 154-155.

(39) George Steiner, The Listener, 26 June 1975, p. 851.

(40) Stuart Hampshire, "Sartre's Cege", 1c.

"LlHomme et lladve-rsit'e", -r). 286.

(42) "Entretien a Prague sur la notion de decadence", La Nouvelle Critioue, no. 156-157, juin-juillet 1964, p-71-84.

(43) see "LlHomme et l1adversit-'e", p. 2cý8-Lf.

Situations (44) "LlHomme au Y-agnetophone", C--

hought", Ne'r- Le"t (45) "Itinerary of at no. 58no v- dec 19 60trin3 1-t ia p. 104.

Critique de la raison dialecti,,, ue -p. '7. (46) 4

(47) Lacan, Jacques Les -Lc"its.

321

(48) see "Itinerary of a, thouglit, 11 -D GI-ý- n P.

(49) "Pre"face", Signes p. 20.

(50) see: Lichteim, George: ', IarxiSm in "rcaern C> P. 90.

"Le Philosophe et son or. -ibre", p. 201.

(52) Signes p. 74.

(53) ib id.

(54) Elop, ýe de la, Philosophie, p. 92.

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30

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t'Le cas Nizantl : Les Tegps modernes, no. 22, juillet 1947, p. 181-184.

Interview on jewish question: La Revue 4,, ). ive, e 10 I P. nnee, no. 6-7, juin-juillet 1947, p. 212-213; C ("I ' R p. 167-167.

"Pour un th6atre de situations": La Rue, no. 12, novembre 1947, p. 81 C&Rp. 683-684.

Les Mainssales; Theatre, Gallimard, 1962.

Situations II; Gallimard, 1948.

"Conscience de soi et connaissance de soil' : Bulletin de la Societe francaise de Philos XLIIe annee, no. 3, avril-juin 1948, p. 49-91.

. En. tretiens sur la politique, with David Rousset and

Gerard Rosenthal, Gallimard, 1949.

"Il nous fait la paix pour refa-tre le monde. Reponse a ceux qui nous appellent munichois": Franc Tireur,

10 decembre, 1948, C &- R p. 690-693.

La Mort dan3 ll. ýmj. e, t. III of Les Chemins de la libert6; Gallimard, 1949.

Situations III; Gallimard, 1949.

"Jean-Paul Sartre reproche a Georges Lukacs de ne pas 'etre marxiste", interview Combat, 20 janvier 1949; extracts in C&Rp. 209-210.

11ýour Lukacs la terre ne tourne pas", intervie,,. -,. Coiab-. t, 3 fevrier 1949, extracts in C&R p-210-211;

"Defense de la culture francaise par la culture europeenne" Folitique 6trang, 6re,, 14 annee, no. 3, juin 19. "9,

extracts in C&Rp. 212-215.

I'Le Noir et le Blanc aux - 'uj Etats-UnJ s", : ý, ombat , 16

1949; extracts in C &Rp. 215-217.

331

"Dr'o-le d'a'r., i iti(Eýl : extracts v0e de la liberte. Les ', er-. -os novembre 1949, n o. p. 1109-1139. cecemb-e

t'De la, vocation d' crJvai-n": -r 1ý9 5C y

e euf 2 p. 35-36; CR -ý, D. 694-Grý80

"The Chances -)f Peacell: 'The 3-C D -ecember -1950, p. 696- 700.

.1 "\ Le Diable et le Bon Dieu; Theatre; Galliý:. ar\', 1962. , -I Saint Genet, Come'dien et i'lartyr; 1952.

"Intervention de 11.,!. J. P. S , artrell : -?. t openffnýý- sess'on o-' Vienna Peace Con-, rress, 12, dece-, ber 195"'; -D extracts in C (7, ciý p. 253-254.

I'Le Congre%s de Vienne" : Le Illonde, ler ý, -;, nviier 195, C&Rp. 256-259.

L'Affaire Henri Martin, Gallimard, 1953. it . 00, Reponse a M. Ilauriaoll : L'Observateur, 1-ý mars 1957.

"Les Amimaux maleades de la --, -age": Liberation, 22 ýuý-n 1953; C&Rp. 704-708.

. oe Theatre, Gal-Limaxd, 1963.

i 195A, "A nos lecteurs" : Les Temps mod ernes, no. 102, p. 1923-1924.

Nekrassov; Gallimard, 1956.

"Le Chine que j'ai vuell: France Observateur, ler dece,, -lbyc 1955; 8 decembre 1955.

"Sartre Views the New China" : I, Iew 3)tatesman, 3 decembcr 1955.

Interventions in a colloquium organised bl, tne Soci-ete CD 'I

europeenne de Culture at Venice from 25 to 31 1956: extracts in C&Rp. 300-304.

llknrýs Budapest, Sartre parle": L'ExT)B_ess, F to no. 281,9 november, 1956.

"Jean-Paul Sartre on his autob. The Li3tener, 6 June 1957, p. 915-016.

eT -1 1-) S

modernes, no IIRýeponse ý Daniel Guerin": Les decembre 1957, p. 1137.

Th"Fttre-, 7962. Les Seques_tr6s d'Altona;. e -T

332

I'Maxxisme et philosophie de llexiste-ncell: etter

'I r-

published in: Roger GaTaajy, ves e 11hom..,,! ie; PUF, 1959 P-111-114. -

CritLque de la raison dialecti-ue, 'o ce ,: ý =ae ae Question de 7ethode. TI "Theorie des ensembles practiques-11; Ga-11imard, 1960.

I'Sartre talks to Tynan" 25 June 1961. : The Q)s -rver, 18 Jure 1961:

Marxisme et existentialisme : Controverse sur la dial ec a7 with Roger Garg,, u'-,, 6 ean ., y-o po1 -1. te Jean-Pierre Vigier, Je, --. n Orf, elý, z-_,, 1962. 21or

"Encounter with Jean-Paul Sartrell The Quarterly, vol. III no. 8, October-Decem', I)er 1). 246-248.

Les Mots; Gallimard, 1964.

Situations IV; Gallimard, 1964.

Situations VI; Problemes du I; Gral! Jri--, rcl, 1964.

f "Jean-Paul Sartre slexplique sur Les-7ots", interview by Jacqueline Piatier, Le TIonde, 18 . --, vr-il 1964.

1%

"Entretien a Prague sur la notion de decadence" La Nouvelle Critique, no. 156-157, -iuin-4uillet 1964, P. 71-84.

"L"ecrivain doit refuser de se laisser transfor, -ier en institution" Le T., londe, 24 octobre 1964; R p. 402-404.

Les Troyennes; Gallimard, 1966.

"Culture de poche et culture de masse" LesTe, i

, modernes, no. 228) mai 1965, p. 1994-2'; "!.

-1 Cormiiunication to colloquiurr, 'Yorale et soc -et e" organised by the Gramsci Institute --, t Rome, 22-24 May 1964: C&R. p. 735-745.

Situations VIII : autouT de 68, Gallii-ýard, 1972.

Situations IX: m'elanges, Gallimard) 19172.

L'Idiot de la Famille,; Gallimard, 1971-72; 3

On a raison de se revolter; Gallimard, 1974*

, ichel ý, -'. ontat "Ce que je suis": interview with - Le Nouvel Observateur 23 juiii 1975.

333

existential and marxism: a critical study of the philosophy of jean-paul sartre and maurice...

Documents

thesis wc s

political of jean

political thinkers

political science

political optimism

political philosophies

maurice merleauponty

paul sartre