MACARIO KING, ET AL.,

vs.

PEDRO S. HERNAEZ, ETC., ET AL.,

GR L-14859March 31, 1962

Facts:

Macario King became the owner of a grocery wholesale and retail business wherein he had 15 employees, 3 of which were Chinese nationals occupying the following positions: one as purchaser, and two as salesmen. He sought permission to retain the services of these employees, but was denied. Under the Retail Trade Law, retail trade has been completely nationalized in the Philippines, and under CA 108, Sec. 2-A as amended by RA 134, only Philippine citizens may be employed by nationalized businesses, except when they occupy technical positions, in which case, previous authorization must be sought from the President. In this case however, the positions they occupied were not technical positions, and as such, they cannot be permitted to work.

Issue:

Is the employment of aliens in non-control positions in a retail establishment or trade prohibited by CA 108?

Position of Petitioner:

Their continued employment should be allowed, since they occupy non-control positions, and do not participate in the management, operation, administration or control of the trade business, as is prohibited under Section 2-A.Position of Respondent:

The full provision reads, to intervene in the management, operation, administration or control thereof, whether as an officer, employee or laborer therein which signifies the legislative intent to include the entire scale of personnel activity that even laborers are exclude from employment.

Ruling:

The respondents are correct. Applying the principle of redendo singula singulis, the antecedents, management, operation, administration and control and the consequents, officer, employee, and laborer" should be read distributively to the effect that each word is to be applied to the subject to which is appears by context most properly relate, and to which it is most applicable.

When the law says you cannot employ an alien in any position pertaining to management, operation, administration and control, whether as an officer, employee, or labourer therein, it only means one thing: the employment of a person who is not a Filipino citizen even in a minor or clerical or non-control position is prohibited.Exception to Ban on Employment: CA 108, Section 2-A or in any manner permits or allows any person, not possessing the qualifications required by the Constitution or existing laws to acquire, use, exploit or enjoy a right, franchise, privilege, property or business, the exercise and enjoyment of which are expressly reserved by the Constitution or existing laws to citizens of the Philippines or of any other specific country, to intervene in the management, operation, administration or control thereof, whether as an officer, employee or laborer therein, with or without remuneration except technical personnel whose employment may be specifically authorized by the President of the Philippines upon recommendation of the Department Head concernedUNIVERSAL CORN PRODUCTS, INC., ET AL.,

vs.

RICE AND CORN BOARD, ET AL.GR L-21013August 17, 1967

Facts:Universal Corn Products is a corporation the capital stock of which is wholly-owned by citizens of the Philippines, and is engaged in certain lines of activity which are covered by RA 3018. The same law created the Rice and Corn Board, which is authorized to regulate the rice and corn trade in the Philippines. In keeping with this mandate, the board promulgated the question resolution, limiting the employment to Filipino citizens only, in Filipino-owned establishments engaged in the rice and/or corn industry, except for technical personnel with previous authorization from the President. The said resolution merely mirrors the limitations set by the CA 108, as amended by RA 134.Petitioners are alien employees of the corporation, occupying the positions of executive vice-president, comptroller, sales manager, chief warehouseman, assistant plant superintendent, cashier, and sales supervisor. They question the constitutionality of the resolution as violative of due process and equal protection of the laws, and for being made to apply retroactively.

Issue:

Is the assailed resolution unconstitutional?

Ruling: The resolution is constitutional.

A. There is no retroactive application.

Citing Salcedo and Ignacio v. Carpio: We are sorry to say that this contention is not correct. To apply the provision of Republic Act No. 546 to the petitioners is not to apply it retrospectively, because to do so is to make said Act merely effective, not before, but after the date it was approved or became effective, and it will affect their continuance in office, not before, but after the approval of Republic Act No. 546. The fact that they have been appointed prior thereto does not make said Act of retroactive effect."

B. Violation of Constitutional Rights

Citing King v. Hernaez: "It is hard to see how the nationalization of employment in the Philippines can run counter to any provision of our Constitution considering that its aim is not exactly to deprive a citizen of a right that he may exercise under it but rather to promote, enhance and protect those that are expressly accorded to a citizen such as the right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness. The nationalization of an economic measure when founded on grounds of public policy cannot be branded as unjust, arbitrary or oppressive or contrary to the Constitution because its aim is merely to further the material progress and welfare of the citizens of the country. This is what we expressed in no uncertain terms in the Ichong case when we declared constitutional the nationalization of the retail trade. Indeed, we said there that it is a law 'clearly in the interest of the public, nay of the national security itself, and indisputably falls within the scope of police power, through which and by which the State insures its existence and security and the supreme welfare of its citizens.

LUZON STEVEDORING CORPORATION,

vs.

ANTI-DUMMY BOARD

GR L-26094August 18, 1972

Facts:

Plaintiff Luzon Stevedoring Corporation is a public utility corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. Under Section 16(a) of our Public Service Act, public utility corporations, such as plaintiff, may be organized provided that at least 60% of the subscribed or paid-up capital stock thereof belongs entirely to citizens of the Philippines or of the United States, and the remaining 40% of the said subscribed or paid-up capital stock may belong to non-American aliens, which is the case here. The Petitioner has 9 non-American aliens in its employ, and as such, question whether or not the employment of plaintiff's non-American aliens was within the prohibition stated in Section 2-A of the Anti-Dummy Law, as in the ruling in King v. Hernaez.Issue: Whether the prohibition against the employment of non-American aliens in public utility corporations refers only to business, right, franchise or privilege which is completely nationalized.Position of Petitioner:

The ruling in Hernaez should not apply in this case, since the entity therein contemplated was a natural person, well within the scope of the 3rd predicate under Section 2-A. In this case however, an artificial person is involved, and as such, the 3rd predicate prohibiting the employ of non-American aliens shall not apply. Furthermore, the absence of the phrase or to qualified corporations or associations immediately after the phrase citizens of the Philippines or of any other specific country in the 3rd clause shows the intent of Congress to limit the prohibition to public utilities wholly-owned by citizens of the Philippines or of any other specific country.

Ruling:The policy or purpose of the amendatory law, Republic Act No. 134, in inserting Clause 3 in Section 2-A of Commonwealth Act No. 108, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 421, was to plug all loopholes that may be utilized by designing foreigners to circumvent the nationalization laws of the country, regardless of whether such laws provide for complete or only partial nationalization of the right, franchise, privilege, property or business covered thereby. The correct construction should be that all the three clauses including clause 3 of Section 2-A of the Anti-Dummy Law are dependent on and are subordinate to its principal and only opening clause. Tested by the rules of grammar, the three dependent clauses are merely the three different predicates of the same subject, the sole opening clause; because the questioned clause 3, like the first two preceding clauses, cannot stand by itself and is meaningless without, and unless read together with, said opening clause. The three dependent clauses or predicates are three separate criminal acts for which a person, corporation or association mentioned in the opening clause, whether completely or partially nationalized, is liable; because the opening clause includes corporations or associations at least 60 per centum of the capital stock of which is owned by Filipino citizens or of any other specific country.Then again, the term "citizens of the Philippines" as employed in the questioned clause of Section 2-A of the Anti- Dummy Law includes both natural and juridical persons in much the same manner that the term "person" in the due process clause of the Bill of Rights comprehends both human beings and artificial persons.