evidential form composites of rhetorical strategies in kennewick man dispute
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By Citlalin XochimeTRANSCRIPT
EVIDENTIALS FORM COMPOSITES OF RHETORICAL STRATEGIES IN THE
KENNEWICK MAN DISPUTE
BY
CITLALIN XOCHIME, B.S.
A thesis submitted to the Graduate School
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree
Master of Arts
Major Subject: English with an Emphasis in Technical and Professional Communication
New Mexico State University
Las Cruces, NM
December 2005
Copyright 2005 by Citlalin Xochime
“Evidentials Form Composites of Rhetorical Strategies in the Kennewick Man Dispute,” a
thesis prepared by Citlalin Xochime in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree, Master of Arts, has been approved and accepted by the following:
_________________________________________________________________________Linda LaceyDean of the Graduate School
_________________________________________________________________________Barry L. ThatcherChair of the Examining Committee
_________________________________________________________________________Date
Committee in Charge:
Dr. Barry L. Thatcher, Chair
Dr. Eric L. Morgan
Dr. Patricia G. Wojahn
ii
ABSTRACT
EVIDENTIALS FORM COMPOSITES OF RHETORICAL STRATEGIES
IN THE KENNEWICK MAN DISPUTE
BY
CITLALIN XOCHIME, B.S.
Master of Arts
New Mexico State University
Las Cruces, New Mexico, 2005
Dr. Barry L. Thatcher, Chair
This study examines discursive features of rhetorical processes within the
specific cross-cultural context of the Kennewick Man case. This case gained national
prominence in 1996 when an ancient human skeleton was unearthed in Kennewick,
Washington, and a dispute over heritage and ownership of the remains erupted among
local indigenous groups and a group of American scientists. The primary Kennewick
constituencies in the dispute include a group of U.S. scientists, a Native American
tribal coalition, respective lawyers, and agents on behalf of a government program for
the protection of Native American cultural patrimony. Looking at publicized records
including court documents and statements affirmed by the primary constituencies, this
study has a trifold aim: 1) to identify a composite of rhetorical strategies by means of
evidential qualification, 2) to determine whether intercultural communication
variability exists, and 3) to analyze the rhetorical effects on the specific, cross-
iv
cultural communication context of the Kennewick Man dispute. To engage this study,
I use a discourse analysis to examine discursive features and to build a composite of
rhetorical strategies employed. Results show that evidentials of contrast have the
rhetorical effect of problematization; while degree-of-reliability evidentials reinforce
or attenuate other evidentiary proof. Deduction evidentials illustrate how precedence
is used to analyze problematic features of such general or universal premises. Citation
evidentials highlight use of literature proficiency and interact with argumentation;
while induction evidentials have a leap effect on moving an argument from
particular(s) to a generalization that magnifies the interpretation or significance of the
particular(s). All of the evidentials have the effects of circumventing favorably or
unfavorably a constituency's or a counter-constituency's position for Kennewick
custody. Findings from this study may be useful for increasing our understanding of
strategic sources of dominion or suppression in texts that otherwise may remain
hidden in layers of sociopolitical, historical, and legal context. .....................
v
TA B L E O F C O N T E N T S
Page
LIST OF TABLES............................................................................................. viii
LIST OF FIGURES........................................................................................... ix
Chapter
1. INTRODUCTION...................................................................................... 1
Statement of the Problem...................................................................... 1
Research Questions, Aims, and Hypothesis.......................................... 8
Purpose of the Study.............................................................................. 10
2. LITERATURE REVIEW........................................................................... 14
Kennewick Man/Ancient One............................................................... 14
The Native American Graves and Repatriation Act.............................. 15
Culture................................................................................................... 17
Intercultural Communication................................................................ 18
Context................................................................................................... 22
Collectivism versus Individualism........................................................ 23
Particularism versus Universalism........................................................ 31
Analogic versus Analytic Reasoning..................................................... 33
Discourse Analysis/Rationale................................................................ 36
3. RESEARCH METHODS........................................................................... 40
Methodology.......................................................................................... 40
First-Level of Abstraction: Unit of Analysis......................................... 45
Second-Level of Abstraction: Intercultural Communication Variability.... 50
vi
Page
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION................................................................. 52
Evidentials Form Composites of Rhetorical Strategies......................... 52
Evidentials Posture Constituency and Counter-Constituency Argumentations................................................................ 58
Contrast Evidentials and Problematization......................................... 58
Degree-of-Reliability Evidentials and Evidentiary Proof................... 61
Mode of Knowledge Evidentials: Deduction, Citation, and Induction..................................................... 63
The Deductive/Analytical Effect and Use of Precedence................. 63
Citation Evidentials, Literature Proficiency, and Argumentation...... 65
The Inductive Effect: A Leap from Particular(s) to Generalization.. 66
5. CONCLUSION.......................................................................................... 69
Summary of Study, Research Aims, and Purpose.................................. 69
Summary of Results, Discussion, and Implicationsfor the Field of Rhetoric......................................................................... 71
First Level of Abstraction.................................................................... 71
Contrast Evidentials.......................................................................... 71
Degree-of-Reliability Evidentials..................................................... 73
Deduction and Induction Evidentials................................................ 74
Citation Evidentials........................................................................... 76
Second Level of Abstraction................................................................ 77
REFERENCES.................................................................................................. 80
vii
L I S T O F TA B L E S
Table Page
1. American Indian and Anglo Worldviews Contrasted.............................. 25
2. Intercultural Communication Variability and Activity.......................... 49
3. Preliminary Coding Scheme of Intercultural Communication Variables... 50
4. Coding Explication Example...................................................................... 51
viii
L I S T O F F I G U R E S
Figure Page
1. Evidential Coding Scheme......................................................................... 46
2. First-Level of Abstraction: A Comparative Discourse Analysis of Native Americans vs. U.S. Scientists Using Mode of Knowledge Evidentials..................................................................................................... 53
3. First-Level of Abstraction: A Comparative Discourse Analysis of Native Americans vs. U.S. Scientists Using Degree-of-Reliability and Contrast Evidentials............................................................................. 54
4. Abstraction at Two-Levels: Evidentials Marked/Unmarked by Intercultural Communication Variability Among Native Americans vs.U.S. Scientists......................................................................................... 56
5. Abstraction at Two-Levels: Citation Evidentials Marked/Unmarked by Intercultural Communication Variability Among Native Americans vs.U.S. Scientists..................................................................... 57
ix
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Statement of the Problem
This study examines discursive features of rhetorical processes in the legal
dispute over ownership and heritage of the Kennewick Man. I analyze the
arguments for custody of the ancient human remains within a discourse-analysis
framework. The rhetorical situation centers on arguments for custody of the
deceased, on rights to scientific inquiry, and on heritage based claims. This
rhetorical situation is the connective interface between the wider scope of the inter-
cultural communication context and the specific, rich text feature analysis of
evidentials or “attitudes toward knowledge” which illustrate strategic differences in
argumentation and epistemological stance. Findings from this study are used to
build composites of rhetorical strategies and to examine their effects on the specific
cross-cultural communication context of the Kennewick Man case.
This case gained national prominence in 1996 when the well preserved
human skeletal remains of an ancient man were found alongside the Columbia River
on federal land in Kennewick, Washington. The Kennewick remains were radio-
carbon dated between 8,340 to 9,200 calendar years before present (BP) (Taylor,
Kirner, Southon, and Chatter 1171). Initially, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
claimed the remains for local indigenous tribes. The Corps cited the 1990 Native
American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA) and awarded the
remains to the Colville Confederated Tribes, to the confederated tribes of the
Umatilla, to the Yakama Indian Nation and the Nez Perce tribe, and to the Wanapum
band (Crawford 211). Kennewick Man is also known by the tribal coalition as
1
Techaminsh Oytpamanatityt or as the Ancient One (“Kennewick Man Remains” para.
7). Following repatriation, controversy erupted in the scientific community, and a
lawsuit over ownership of Kennewick Man was filed by a group of eight, renowned
Euroamerican scientists seeking custody.
Their lawsuit initiated an eight-year period of litigation that still has an
impact on researchers and indigenous communities today. Indian Affairs Committee
hearings held in July 2005 have initiated redress and reinterpretation of repatriation
law (Jantz para. 3). In the research community, some scientists continue to express
their disapproval of repatriation legislation that would “empty our museums of all
evidence of early peoples’ lives--because some citizens find offensive research that
might contradict their worldview” (Jantz para. 2). Key court documents from the
original lawsuit highlight arguments that reflect on evidentiality or “attitudes toward
knowledge” as well as possible cultural influences on communication. Intersecting
these arguments are conflicts over interpretations of Native American identity and
concerns about the time-frame reach of protective patrimony rights under repatriation
law as well as individual rights under constitutional law.
Lawyers on behalf of the tribal coalition emphasized that NAGPRA was
intended to provide Native Americans with the same burial protection for their
deceased as that offered to other Americans. Yet, controversy over the remains and
the ancestry of Ancient One was stirred by the U.S. scientists seeking the right to
proceed with further invasive study. This experimentation was sought by the
researchers in an effort to rule out alternative theories on the origin of Ancient One
and on the peopling of the New World (Schneider and Barran para. 3; Bonnichsen et
al., v. United States of America, et al. No. 02-35994 & 02-35996. 04 Feb. 2004,
2
1586). These alternative theories are based on skull-size variations found amongst
very ancient human skulls, but not all experts share this view.
Early American expert Christy Turner of the University of Arizona has
reported that “only Indians” were found among New World skulls under study thus
far (qtd. in Morell 280). In genetics, more than a decade of evidence provides no
support for a diverse genetic population in the prehistoric New World other than “a
small number of founding lineages” such as those discussed in the literature “whose
descendants spread throughout North and South America,” remarks David Glenn
Smith, a molecular anthropologist at the University of California, Davis (qtd. in
Morell 280). Approximately 97% of all mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) sampled and
tested from contemporary indigenous based populations shows one of the four major
founding haplogroups identified with New World ancestry (Green, Derr, and Knight
989; Brown et al. 1852). Evidence from other mtDNA studies involving ancient
samples from various regions of the New World, including results from the ancient
remains of the Southwestern Anasazi, Utah Fremont, and Western Illinois Oneota,
confirm the presence of the four founding New World haplogroups (a specific DNA
composite) among ancestral mtDNA as well (O'Rourke et al. 15; Stone and
Stoneking 1153). Furthermore, a few of the very ancient remains have been used in
DNA testing, including the remains of Wizard Beach Mummy, a 9,200-year-old
skeleton from Nevada. All testing thus far shows the same DNA markers among the
ancient samples as seen in contemporary, indigenous populations (qtd. in Morell 191).
Despite surmounting evidence in the literature from multiple scientific
disciplines, the eight U.S. scientists argued that the identities of the founding Native
Americans populations are unknown; thus, the ancestral origin of the Ancient One
3
remains unknown. The scientists opposed the tentative repatriation of Kennewick
Man and claimed that “NAGPRA violates their ‘right’ to [pursue] scientific inquiry”
(Andrews “Part III. Controversies” para. 8). Constituencies involved in the dispute,
including physical anthropologists Douglas W. Owsley of the Smithsonian Institute
and Richard L. Jantz of the University of Tennessee, Knoxville state, “if a pattern of
returning [such ancient] remains without study develops, the loss to science will be
incalculable and we will never have the data required to understand the earliest
populations in America” (qtd. in Slayman para. 16). Concerned about the possible
interference that repatriation would have on scientific endeavor and its public
knowledge base, Jantz reflects on this view adding that
Rare evidence, such as the Kennewick Man, give scientists and the public glimpses of the variety of people who were here prior to modern Indians. How, or whether, these early people were related to modern Indians is not known and can only be learned by scientific study of their remains. (para. 7)
Robson Bonnichsen, another one of the Kennewick constituencies and former
Professor of Anthropology at Oregon State University, states “[Native American]
Repatriation has taken a life of its own and is about to put us out of business as a
profession” (qtd. in Killion 304-5). In support of the plaintiff scientists, Amici
Curiae (friends of the court) and expert linguists Ives Goddard and William Shipley
are concerned
...that if NAGPRA is interpreted in such a way as to extend its reach to the remote past, not now a provision of the law, that access to the past will be lost to science in the attempt to explore our common human patrimony to the detriment of the public not only in the United States, but worldwide.(Bonnichsen et al., v. United States of America, et al. No. 02-35996. Goddard 1-2).
Goddard is Senior Linguist at the Smithsonian Institution, and Shipley is Professor
Emeritus of Linguistics at the University of California, Santa Cruz.
4
In a countering view by the Natives, Umatilla trustee and religious leader
Armand Minthorn remarks, “Some scientists say that if this individual is not studied
further, we, as Indians, will be destroying evidence of our own history. We already
know our history; it is passed on to us through our elders and through our religious
practices” (qtd. in Slayman para.11). Horace Axtell, Nez Perce, conveys a native
cultural view which holds that traditional burial practices are deemed vital to
indigenous livelihood and responsibility:
We have an inherent responsibility to care for those who are no longer with us. Our tradition, spiritual beliefs, practices and culture teach us that when a body goes into the ground, it is meant to stay there until the end of time. When the remains are disturbed above the ground, their spirits are at unrest. To put those spirits at ease, the remains must be returned to the ground as soon as possible. (qtd. in Crawford 213)
In some Native cultural practices, even biological materials drawn from indigenous
people for research purpose still are considered to be “a part of the body” and are to
be treated as such (Foster, Bersten, and Carter 698).
In an article dealing with the body titled “(Re)Constructing Bodies: Semiotic
Sovereignty and the Debate over Kennewick Man,” religious and culture scholar
Suzanne J. Crawford argues that the most prevalent rhetorical aim in support of
awarding Kennewick Man custody to the American scientists is that of a universalist
position. Crawford states that the scientists’ position “is a universalist and
humanistic one reflective of the dominant white culture from which it comes: the
[Kennewick] body belongs not to Native American tribes but to all humanity” (215).
Universalism is a cultural influence on communication that concerns axioms which
apply to everyone in most circumstances, and I discuss this in greater detail in the
literature review. Crawford’s criticisms concerning cross-cultural differences are not
5
unique. Other Native People question how the unearthing and study of their
ancestors benefits and contributes to the “well-being of Indian people” (Mihesuah
“American Indians” 96).
Devon A. Mihesuah, Choctaw member and editor of the Repatriation
Reader, studied the complexity of repatriation in greater detail and identified a
cross-cultural conflict involving
1) some American Indians and sympathizers who want tribal remains and sacred objects repatriated and never studied;
2) some American Indians who are willing to allow the study of remains and certain burial objects but who expect them to be returned to tribes afterward;
3) American Indians who believe remains should be studied for educational purposes and not repatriated;
4) American Indians who object to desecration and scientific study but for religious reasons do not want skeletal remains returned to their tribe;(Introduction 4)
According to Mihesuah’s reader, included in this intercultural conflict are non-
academic grave robbers, amateur archaeologists, the archaeological community,
social scientists, scientists, and museum directors--all of whom take differing stances
concerning repatriation (4). The arrival of Kennewick man onto the repatriation
scene has “resulted in volatile debates [among] those wanting Kennewick Man
repatriated and those who want to retain his remains for scientific study” (Mihesuah
Introduction 9). Mihesuah raises questions that seem to shadow every discussion
concerning Ancient One: “Who ‘owns’ Kennewick Man? Is he European, Asian, or
indigenous to the United States? The answer to this (and who answers it) will have a
strong impact on Native rights and NAGPRA” (Mihesuah Introduction 9).
Reflecting on this conflict, this study begins an inquiry into the rhetorical posturing
6
of the Kennewick dispute to examine such strong tides of contention.
My inquiry takes a closer look at key arguments for Kennewick custody as
they are situated in a greater intercultural communication context. Some of these
arguments are expressive of evidentiality or in conveying attitudes toward knowledge
as well as indicating possible cultural influences on communication.
An overview of key records in the Kennewick case, including court
documents and public statements, reveals a rich cross-cultural discourse that
concerns rhetorical heritages, epistemological stances, cultural worldviews, and
power discourse. These discourse interactions are bound to a common sociopolitical,
historical, and legal context. The Kennewick discourse in particular highlights
questions on whether scientists have privileged rights for custody of ancient human
remains based on their appeal to pursue scientific inquiry as an individualistic right
to know under the law.
In securing this right to scientific inquiry, the scientists reaffirm their
position by holding a view that the origin of Kennewick Man remains unknown to
the world. This form of investigation is instrumental in the professional pursuit of
scientific-knowledge based inquiry and to subsequent publication in scholarly
journals. Research findings enter the social purview of literate specialists thereby
increasing the knowledge base and by driving the professional praxes of research
inquiry and the further publication of findings. In following the scientific method,
knowledge derived by analytical methodology is powerfully viable in sociopolitical
Western spheres. Scientific knowledge is highly regarded as underlying universal
truth, especially in a U.S. court of law. However, from a Native perspective, James
Riding In, a Pawnee repatriation activist and scholar, views scientists’ “professional
7
activities as sacrilegious and destructive” in which “they [profess] a legal and
scientific right to study Indian remains and burial goods” (“Repatriation” 107).
Interestingly, scholarly entitlement in this dispute involves individualistic,
scientific inquiry in order to acquire such knowledge. Individualism is another
cultural influence on communication that reflects a view involving a reliance on the
self rather than on a group in one’s interactions in the surrounding social milieu.
This brings into question whether individualistic study in the form of scientific
inquiry is a strong factor for filling in “gaps-in-knowledge” based claims concerning
ancestry within the legal context of the Kennewick Man case. What does a proposed
scientific inquiry into the identity of ancient human remains tell us about how modes
of knowledge concerning heritage are conveyed or not? For Natives, collective
knowledge in the form of oral tradition informs a community about its creation, its
origin, and thereby its heritage. For the scientists, the answer is in an experiment.
Research Questions, Aims and Hypothesis
In the Kennewick case, the right to scientific inquiry is tied with acquiring
custody of the Dead such that scientists may satisfy knowledge based claims
concerning heritage. Are these eight American scientists expressing universalism
orientated rhetoric in speaking on behalf of the world, since the scientists’ claim is
that the origin and identity of Kennewick Man remains unknown to the world? Is
the rhetoric of the American scientists individualistic in their quest to acquire such
knowledge concerning ancestry and heritage via individualistic inquiry and findings?
What do evidentials tell us about attitudes toward knowledge in the Kennewick
dispute? What rhetorical strategies are employed and what cultural influences on
communication, if any, are evident in this context? Are the U.S. scientists’ intentions
8
and arguments for custody of the Kennewick remains primarily founded on both
individualism and universalism? These questions highlight research aims that I
explore in this study on rhetorical strategies in the Kennewick Man dispute.
Critical ethnographer J. Thomas posits that a principle edifice of inquiry in
this field is that “critical researchers begin from the premise that all cultural life is in
constant tension between control and resistance” (qtd. in Creswell 75). Taiaiake
Alfred, director of the Indigenous Governance Program at the University of Victoria,
observes that what is often viewed as Native resistance is actually “more of a
cultural, or a political, or a social struggle” (qtd. in “Arrests of First Nations”).
Tension, struggle, control, and resistance are all strong vocabulary for conveying that
cultural life is in conflict.
With these concepts of tension and struggle in mind, this study has a trifold
aim: 1) to identify a composite of rhetorical stratagems employed by the
constituencies by examining evidential qualification, 2) to determine whether
rhetorical strategies are marked by intercultural communication variability, and 3) to
analyze the rhetorical effects on the specific, cross-cultural communication context
of the Kennewick dispute. In reaching these aims, this study may expose
communication differences such as a preference for certain types of evidentials over
others as well as preferences marked by cultural influences on communication such
as those to be discussed in the literature review (for example, individualism vs.
collectivism and universalism vs. particularism). These proposed differences might
show that such identifiable orientations are salient in the rhetoric of the American
scientists in contrast to the rhetoric of Native Americans in the Kennewick dispute.
9
To guide these research aims, I look at publicized records including court
documents and press-release statements affirmed by the primary constituencies
involved in the legal dispute. I hypothesize that differences in rhetorical strategies
may emerge as indices of broader cross-cultural communication processes involved.
To engage this study, I use a discourse-analysis framework to resolve discursive
features and to build a composite of rhetorical strategies. The primary Kennewick
constituencies are grouped into two factions: 1) the first group includes U.S.
scientists, their lawyers, and their Amici Curiae scholars; 2) the second group
includes the Native American tribal coalition, their lawyers, and their agents on
behalf of a government program for the protection of Native American cultural
patrimony. From this point on, the respective factions are referred to generally as the
“U.S. Scientists” or as the “Native Americans”; however, these terms specifically
represent a respective faction as explicitly stated here.
Purpose of the Study
Unraveling rhetorical processes of argumentation in text, that are bound
within complex sociopolitical, historical, and legal contexts, involves the analysis of
rhetorical stratagems. Such strategies might implicate key processes that may exhibit
cultural influences on communication--which in turn may drive power-discourse
mechanisms as emergent phenomena in texts. This study examines discursive
features in rhetorical processes and within the specific cross-cultural context of the
Kennewick Man case. Such an examination is purposeful for determining which
rhetorical strategies are employed, how attitudes toward knowledge are conveyed,
and how both queries may reflect on cross-cultural communication variability. This
study is also useful for building a composite of discursive practices and for
10
analyzing rhetorical effects on the Kennewick dispute.
In a study titled “Eurocentric Influences on News Coverage of Native
American Repatriation Issues: A Discourse Analysis,” Cindy L. Killion identifies
“four primary motifs or strategies that functioned to reinforce the dominant
Eurocentric ideology” in the New York Times and Washington Post (iv). These
findings include “an emphasis on scientific method versus other ways of knowing”
(Killion iv). While Killion’s study identifies discursive practices showing how the
privileging of the scientific perspective and its mode of knowing occurs in the media,
the study does not examine rhetorical processes of argumentation between Native
Americans and U.S. scientists. The Killion study also does not focus on intercultural
communication differences among Euroamericans and Native Americans. Such an
investigation of rhetorical processes in argumentation between two cross-cultural
groups might provide an explanation on how strategic differences disempower or
confer power to an opponent.
To examine discursive differences in detail at the level of argument, this
study looks at evidentials that highlight strategic differences in argumentation and
epistemological stance (Barton “Evidentials” 745-769); and, this inquiry takes a step
into a newly chartered zone of work in intercultural communication studies
(Thatcher “L2 Professional Writing” 41-69; Thatcher “Writing Policies” 364-99;
Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner 1-274; Foster, Bernsten, and Carter 696-702).
This study also contributes to works in critical linguistics and discourse analyses
(Dunmire “Constructing” 1-220; Dunmire “Naturalizing” 221-65; Huckin 155-176).
My original hypothesis posits that differences in rhetorical strategies may
arise as indices of the broader intercultural communication variability involved.
11
These proposed rhetorical differences may have fueled the controversy that exists
over the remains and the heritage of Ancient One. Intercultural scholar Barry L.
Thatcher explains that “rhetorical differences [are] rhetorical strategies that originate
in larger cultural-historical contexts… [and] serve as a repertoire of strategies which
writers appropriate and individualize to make sense of everyday rhetorical situations"
(“Writing Policies” 368). On closer reading examination, proposed differences in
this study’s particular rhetorical situation may reveal intricately interwoven
discursive practices. In turn, these processes may arguably emanate from the breadth
of rhetorical patterns possible within the greater mosaic of the cultural-historical
context and cultural system.
Ferdinad de Saussure remarks that “in language there are only differences,”
adding that
Even more important: a difference generally implies positive terms between which the difference is set up; but in language there are only differences without positive terms. Whether we take the signified or the signifier, language has neither ideas nor sounds that existed before the linguistic system, but only conceptual and phonetic differences that have issued fromthe system. (qtd. in Derrida 11)
Jacques Derrida points out that “essentially and lawfully, every concept is inscribed
in a chain or in a system within which it refers to the other, to other concepts, by
means of the systematic play of differences.” Thus “the difference of which
Saussure speaks is itself, therefore, neither a concept nor a word among others” (11).
R.S. Zaharna reminds us that “intercultural scholarship grew out of the
anthropological tradition: rigorous scientific inquiry employing methods of
observation and documentation of ‘Other’ cultures” (92). This discourse analysis
applies that intercultural scholarship and proposes that differences exist in the
12
rhetorics of Native Americans and of U.S. scientists who are involved the
Kennewick custody dispute. This study also seeks to trace the origins and the
connections of proposed differences to the greater intercultural communication
ambience. Understanding the relationship between the text under study and its cross-
cultural/rhetorical context may help mediators to bridge the chasm of contentious
relations amongst indigenous peoples and Americans, whom disputes over heritage
and ancestral claims divide.
My hypothesis that strategic, rhetorical differences springboard from broader
rhetorical landscapes within greater cultural spheres involves the use of a discourse
analysis (DA). DA is useful for resolving discursive features and for building a
composite of rhetorical strategies. Findings from this study may also be useful as
well as purposeful for increasing our understanding of strategic sources of dominion
or suppression in texts; which, otherwise, may appear to be contextually innocuous
or culturally unconnected to broader communication variability; or, that may remain
hidden in layers of wider sociopolitical, historical, and legal contexts.
13
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
Kennewick Man/Ancient One
From the scientific viewpoint, indeed very little is actually known about
Ancient One. Researchers think that Ancient One was a middle-aged hunter with “a
prominent nose and large, muscular legs that most closely match physical
characteristics attributed to present-day Polynesians or SE Asians” (Chatter 307).
Anthropologist James Chatter reports that although born healthy, Ancient One
suffered multiple injuries throughout his life. These injuries were found in the skull,
left arm, chest, and hip, including a spearhead point lodged into his pelvis (Chatter
297). In July of 2001, Constance Holden reported in the Science journal that four
missing leg bones from the original Ancient One skeletal frame had mysteriously
reappeared at the Benton County sheriff’s storage facility in Kennewick, WA. The
four leg bones were documented as missing during an inventory taken in 1997 at the
Battelle Pacific Northwest National Laboratory in Richland, WA where the remains
were temporarily housed. Today, the skeletal remains are stored at University of
Washington’s Burke Museum in Seattle, WA (King para. 1).
Since 1996 when the skeletal remains of Ancient One were exposed and
found in a diminishing embankment alongside the Columbia River in Kennewick,
Washington, the tribal coalition has sought to claim the remains for respectful
reburial. Yet, cross fires of legal action amongst the constituencies have ensued, and
pieces of the skeletal remains have been subject to disappearance, reappearance, and
testing while in the possession of government officials (Holden 27). Beyond this
tumultuous legal backdrop is the historic drive behind NAGPRA enactment and its
14
turbulent record as well.
The Native American Graves and Repatriation Act
The Native American Graves and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA) and
implementation exists for the protection of Native American “burial sites,” “cultural
items,” “sacred objects,” and “cultural patrimony” (NAGPRA as amended).
NAGPRA was established on November 16, 1990 (Public Law 101-601. 25 U.S.C.
3001 et seq.) in response to Native-American activism and copious historical
evidence in U.S. federal archives and in research institutions that Native American
human remains were stolen, tampered, and mishandled throughout the entire colonial
era (“Final Federal Court” para. 1; “Court Ruling” para. 3). “In 1793, Thomas
Jefferson, the father of American archaeology, endorsed burial excavation claiming
he had the right to systematically excavate and remove the remains of over 1,000
known Native American graves on his plantation by ‘virtue of a higher order called
science’” (Andrews “B. Case 2: Group Research” para.1). Countless Native
American remains were ostentatiously displayed, sold, or studied in U.S. American
museums, mercantile industries, or in university laboratories (Gough “Compliance”
para. 9).
A now defunct branch of scientific study in the early 1800s known as
“phrenology” spawned a theory that intelligence was based on race (qtd. in Andrews
“Part III. Controversies” para. 8). “Phrenologists traveled from town to town testing
intelligence levels and personality traits by feeling the shape of people’s skulls”
(Ellis “Test” para. 1). In supporting the theory, phrenologists collected and compared
Native American skulls to European skulls under the societal presupposition that
Europeans represented the standard form of high intelligence and morality (Andrews
15
“Part III. Controversies” para. 8).
In 1868, the Surgeon General called for urgent action on behalf of army
officers to procure “Indian” skulls, native weaponry, and other cultural artifacts for
study (Trope and Echo-Hawk 126; Andrews “Part III. Controversies” para. 8). As
part of the investigation, the Army collected more than 4,000 deceased Native
American bodies from graveyards and battlegrounds to study how modern bullets
damaged the human body (Lawson 2002). Jack F. Trope and Walter R. Echo-Hawk
report that national estimates on the number of “deceased Native people [who] have
been dug up from their graves for storage or display by government agencies,
museums, universities, and tourist attractions” range “between 100,000 and two
million dead” (125).
In tandem with these disturbing historical findings, the status of a Native
American as a recognizable “person within the context of federal law did not occur
until 1879. Thereafter Native Americans were granted U.S. citizenship in 1924”
(qtd. in Trope and Echo-Hawk 130). These events and the documented abuses of
Native Americans paint a somber backdrop and cast a tarnished reflection on the
contentious history of Native American/U.S. Government relations in the course
leading to the drive toward NAGPRA enactment.
The definition of “Native American” within the context and implementation
of NAGPRA is discussed by Francis P. McManamon, a representative from the U.S.
Department of the Interior that administers NAGPRA. McManamon frames the
words “Native American” as a term understood by the U.S. government to mean
human remains relating to tribes, peoples, or cultures that lived in what isnow the United States before the documented arrival of European explorers. The remains would be considered Native America regardless of the time
16
frame when a particular group might have begun to live in this area and regardless of whether these groups were culturally affiliated or biologically related to present-day tribes. (qtd. in Crawford 217)
Culture
Culture has a myriad of definitions, depending on its source, the discipline,
and the lexicographer's philosophy. R. Keesing summarizes four strong theories of
culture in which each view reflects an orientation parallel with its disciplinary
positioning and philosophy:
1) structural functionalism conceptualizes culture as a system that humans utilize to adapt to their environment. A central tenet of the adaptive function of structural functionalism is the role of culture as an organizing regulatory system.
2) ethnoscience offers a view of culture as a cognitive system of shared beliefs and knowledge of shared rules that govern an individual's behavior.
3) classic structuralism views culture as the manifestation of a universal unconsciousness, suggesting that individuals project their own psychological structure onto the world. According to the theory, culture thus becomes a representation of the individual's own super-ego.
4) symbolic structuralism views culture as being composed of symbols and the shared meanings that are attached to those symbols. (qtd. in Rosenthal para. 3)
Native American scholar H. Henrietta Stockel uses a widely shared definition of
culture, emphasizing that
[culture] should be understood to mean the cumulative experiences of a people that are transmitted, verbally and by example, to subsequent generations. As such, a culture is alive and active, always adding or deleting, adapting, adopting accommodating, incorporating, resisting, rejecting; culture is a moving target for change. (XVIII)
Joe and Miller point out that although few anthropologists and sociologists agree on
the finer details of the definition of culture, most “concur on three major concepts:
1) culture includes the rules and symbols by which people organize and assign
17
meanings to their life experiences; 2) culture is learned; and 3) culture is shared” (2).
This study resonates closely with the definition of culture from the symbolic
structuralism view. Sonja K. Foss remarks that “a symbol is something that stands
for or represents something else by virtue of relationship, association, or convention”
(4). We spend our lives immersed in symbols: “How we perceive, what we know,
what we experience, and how we act are the results of the symbols we create and the
symbols we encounter in the world” (Foss 3). This study does not center on the
depth of cultural symbols nor on the breadth of social practices in use today; rather,
it focuses on the rhetorical intricacies of intercultural communication flourishing
within the ideological fabrics of a greater symbolic and cultural ambience.
Intercultural Communication
Intercultural communication research is “concerned with how culture
influences communication” according to communication scholar R. S. Zaharna (86);
and, it is characterized with “documenting the cultural variations in communication
patterns” (87). Zaharna refers to the communication literature in which Oliver
(1962) and Smith (1966) are most frequently cited for proposing a relationship
between culture and communication. As Smith states, “communication and culture
are inseparable” (qtd. in Zaharna 86). Zaharna adds a few brief descriptions of
culture from the literature: “Culture [is] described as a ‘blueprint’ (Folb, 1982), ‘road
map’ (Hall, 1976), ‘imprint’ (Dodd, 1982) and even ‘collective unconscious’
(Barnlund, 1982)” (86). In interdisciplinary fields, culture imparts the “meaning for
various forms of communication behaviors” (Zaharna 87). Zaharna elaborates on
this ubiquitous and underlying connection between culture, communication, and
language:
18
Culture provides the meaning for...communication behaviors such [as] spoken language or nonverbal gestures, as well as the rules and norms that govern when and how these behaviors should be used. Culture’s influence on perception provides clues on how messages [are] structured and interpreted. As numerous intercultural scholars note, each culture has its own unique ‘world view’ or means for making sense of the world. (87)
Early language-study research affirms this relationship between language and
cultural expression. The 20th century linguist and anthropologist E. Sapir
summarized his language-study conclusions rather generally with the now renowned
statement: “Language is a guide to social reality…it powerfully conditions all our
thinking about social problems and processes” (qtd. in Trujillo Sáez). In current
communication research aims, some intercultural studies focus on “exploring
culture’s impact on communication behavior at the individual or interpersonal level”
(Zaharna 86).
Contemporary scholars using the germinal works of “noted anthropologist
Edward T. Hall (1958, 1967)...began exploring how behaviors and their meaning
varied from one culture to the next” (Zaharna 87). During the 1970s, the inter-
cultural communication field blossomed from its central tenet of “increasing [our]
understanding of culturally-mediated communication phenomena” (Zaharna 88) to its
branching pinnacle in Hall’s (1976) observation that
much of a culture's influence was ‘out-of-awareness.’ Even though culture completely surrounded its own members, they lacked an ‘in-awareness’knowledge of its presence and force. Thus, the ultimate goal of intercultural scholars was to expose the hidden dimensions of culture that lay ‘out-of-awareness’ and bring them ‘in-awareness.’ With this goal in mind, three identifiable research avenues emerged: culture-specific, culture-general, and intercultural interaction. (qtd. in Zaharna 88)
These research directives, including culture-specific, culture-general, and inter-
cultural interaction, guided studies in the three important directions. The focus of
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culture-specific studies is on observing and describing “communication behaviors of
a specific culture” (88). Culture-general studies report on “commonalities or
universals across cultures” (89); and, intercultural [interaction] scholars study cross-
cultural interactions between groups and between individuals from different cultures.
(89-90).
Zaharna also provides a concise outline on the pioneers, approaches, and
exemplary works of each of these research directives. Culture-specific studies were
piloted by anthropologists, including Margaret Mead, Gregory Bateson, and Clifford
Geertz, who sought to describe the beliefs and cultural practices of communities.
“Edward T. Hall introduced important concepts such as proxemics and contexting
which gave intercultural scholars important tools with which to discuss the
differences found among cultures” (88). Zaharna notes that the culture-specific
approach continues to stir interest and to expand its scope of inquiry today. He cites
studies that discuss ways for dealing with “Arabs (Nydell, 1987), Australians
(Renwick, 1991), Chinese (Wenzhong and Grove, 1991), Greeks (Broome, 1996),
Mexicans (Condon, 1995), or Russians (Richmond, 1996)” (89).
Culture-general inquiry aimed to introduce methods for explaining and
comparing phenomena across cultures. “Hall’s (1959) cultural map, for example,
identified ten cultural rules for ten human activities: [including] interaction,
association, subsistence, [etc.]...” (89). Other studies envisioned cultural continua for
organizing “cultural variations along a spectrum of behavioral possibilities” (89).
This view shifted study from a focus on “individual behaviors...[to] a look at a broad
spectrum of communication patterns” (89). Some examples and citations of these
continua from Zaharna’s research include (89):
20
· individualism/collectivism (Hui & Triandis, 1986) · high-context/low context (Hall, 1976) · past oriented/future-oriented (Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 1961) · linear/non-linear (Dodd, 1982) · doing/being (Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 1961, Okabe, 1983; Stewart, 1972) · direct/indirect (Levine, 1985)
Intercultural communication research combined benefits of both culture-
specific and culture-general research to frame the study of individuals engaged in
cross-cultural communication interactions. “Instead of looking at cultures separately
(culture-specific) or as static variations (culture-general),” intercultural scholars
studied how cultural influences affected communication between individuals and
between groups:
Focus shifted from individual communication behaviors to exploring on how different behaviors affected the communication process (i.e., Brislin 1982; Gudykunst & Kim, 1984; Samovar et al., 1981). These works include many of the adaptation and adjustment studies. Scholars also used cultural continua to analyze more complex communication contexts such as negotiations, conflict management, and diplomacy (see, Cohen, 1991; Fisher, 1980; Korzenny & Ting-Toomey, 1990; Ting-Toomey, 1985, 1988). (Zaharna 88-9)
In overview of Zaharna’s comprehensive summary, this study employs the third
research directive on the study of interactions in intercultural communication and
also makes use of the second directive and its cultural continua of variation in
communication. With these research directives in mind, a look into the related
literature poses other challenges for pursuing intercultural scholarship. For example,
the early days of intercultural inquiry capture the debate that addresses which
methodology best resolves the study of intercultural phenomena.
Zaharna reflects on this ofttimes searing debate over methodology among
scholars in the quantitative and qualitative research camps: “The quantitative
researchers, who dominated the field, sought to distill cultural theorems and axioms
21
from numerical data obtained through rigorous scientific inquiry” (qtd. in Zaharna
90). This research camp situated themselves apart from the cultural data which they
analyzed in seeking to resolve “cultural ambiguity through precision, objectivity, and
reliability” (90). In contrast, the qualitative researchers situated themselves as
embodied in the “cultural web” of the phenomenon under investigation. The
qualitative camp did not attempt to isolate themselves from “the ambiguities of
cultural phenomena”; rather, they devised methods including “narrative analysis
(Fisher, 1987) and metaphor analysis (Deetz, 1984)” for capturing nuances that
characterized a cultural context under study (90). Recently, intercultural scholars
have come to terms with this debate by recognizing the balanced and
“complementary nature of quantitative and qualitative methods and [by] advocating a
‘triangulation’ of the two approaches which appreciates their separate strengths”
(Zaharna 90).
Context
Edward T. Hall describes context as a property of communication which
comprises a continuum ranging from high context at one end of the spectrum to low
context at the other (60). “A high-context communication or message,” states Hall,
“is one in which most of the information is already in the person, while very little is
in the coded, explicit, transmitted part of the message” (61). Thus, high-context
communicators synthesize meaning based on the communication context combined
with “internalizations of the communicators” (Thatcher “Cultural”). High-context
communications may also be viewed as “indirect, subtle, complex, evasive, and
situational,” according to Thatcher in the article “Cultural and Rhetorical
Adaptations.” A low-context communication is the diametrical difference to a high-
22
context communication. That is, low context is a form of communication where “the
mass of the information is vested in the explicit code” (Hall 61).
Collectivism versus Individualism
Collectivism involves the act of engaging the self, the worldview, and
interactions with the world as originating from within one’s social group or kindred
(Thatcher, “Writing Policies” 370). In contrast, Thatcher describes individualism as
an act of engaging one’s self-identity, one’s worldwide perspective, and “one’s way
of dealing with the world” as originating from “an acknowledged reliance on the
self” (“Writing Policies” 370). Individualism and collectivism are observable
phenomena with defined orientations concerning one’s worldview and interactions
with the world. Differences in these two orientations unfold when different cultures
make contact, bringing their respective orientations into intercultural communication
contexts. An example of this cross-cultural variability in communication is drawn
from an astute observation on U.S. individualism and Diné (Navajo) collectivism in
a second language (L2)-acquisition study by Gloria Dye.
Dye remarks how the U.S. mass-literate society valorizes and legitimates
book knowledge gathered from literate specialists and by method of individual
creativity:
...the mass literate culture that has evolved over the last hundred years validates knowledge that comes from books, and values individual creativity over the collective contribution. The development of Diné literacy creates an awareness of this Western preference for knowledge from literate specialists.(qtd. in Dye 615)
In contrast to this Western preference for individualism, the Diné have knowledge
gathered from the “collective contribution,” which includes oral tradition and their
collective knowledge base (615). Individualism may also be reinforced within the
23
context of the law as exemplified in a statement by a U.S. scientist in the Kennewick
dispute:
As Professor Tribe has noted, ‘[t]he right to know . . . may include an individual’s right to acquire desired information or ideas free of governmental veto, undue hindrance, or unwarranted exposure.’(Bonnichsen et al., v. United States of America, et al. No. 02-35996. Findley.)
In contrast, “collectivism” is reinforced as appropriate in the form of a “joint claim”
filed by Native Americans in a tribal position paper from the Kennewick dispute:
The two principles of interpretation laid out in section I. of this brief - that this is remedial Indian legislation that should be construed liberally and that the agency interpretation is entitled to deference - further support a finding that joint claims such as were presented in this case are appropriate. (Bonnichsen et al., v. United States of America, et al. Nos. 02-35994 & 02-35996. 13 Mar. 2003.)
This study interprets the concepts and phenomena of individualism and collectivism
as both are reinforced within the context defined, discussed, and exemplified here
and as drawn from the subsequent literature cited.
When people with differing cultural orientations make contact, the clash of
worldviews often overlap into all aspects of life, including into discourses on
bioethical concerns.
In a bioethics study looking at native and non-native worldviews, David A.
Rosenthal found differences in cultural orientation concerning the dynamics of
identity, health, and wellness among American Indians in contrast to an Anglo world-
view. Rosenthal remarks, “in the American Indian belief system, health is not only a
physical state but also a spiritual state as well” (para. 7). Some key differences in
cultural orientation are summarized by Joe and Miller in Table 1 (4). This table
highlights characteristics of individualism in the Anglo worldview such as “the
individual is primary”; whereas, collectivism is characterized in the American Indian
24
worldview in the idea that “group life is primary” (Joe and Miller 4).
The Joe and Miller study contrasted the worldviews of American Indians and
Anglo Americans and how each group manages disability. This study found that an
individualistic value-set of the Anglo world “carries with it personal responsibility
and thus personal blame and social stigma” [concerning disability] (8).
Other key research findings point out that if an American worker is injured
on the job, “insurance coverage will provide medical care, re-training, and support.
If, however, the injury is the fault of the individual, such as the result of a suicide
attempt, criminal action, or an accident related to drunkenness, no insurance
coverage would apply and no social support would be readily available” (5-6). This
25
American Indian Worldview Anglo Worldview
Group-life is primary. The individual is primary.
Respects elders, experts, and those with spiritual powers.
Respect youth, success, and social status.
Time and place viewed as being permanent, settled.
Time and place always negotiable; plans for change.
Introverted; avoids ridicule or criticism of others if possible.
Extroverted; seeks analysis and criticisms of situation.
Pragmatic; accepts “what is.” Reformist: changes or “fixes” problems.
Emphasizes responsibility for family and personal sphere.
Emphasizes authority and responsibility over a wide area of social life.
Observes how others behave; emphasis on how others “behave,” not on what they say.
Eager to relate to others, emphasize how others “feel” or “think.”
Incorporates supportive non-family, or other helpers, into the family network.
Keep the networks of family, friends, and acquaintances separate.
Seeks harmony. Seeks progress.
Table 1. American Indian and Anglo Worldviews Contrasted
(Joe and Miller 4)
means that in Anglo culture, the “cause” or “blame” of disability rests on the
individual, and “the consequences [from actions related to the disability] focus
attention upon the victim” (6). “In contrast, the group value set [that is]
characteristic of Indian culture may offer support and relief when supernatural or
cultural taboos are found to be the ‘cause’ of disability” (8).
Seeking out the cause of illness is far more important in American Indian
culture than it is in finding fault in the individual whether or not the disability is
stigmatized. These findings strengthen the position that “American Indian culture
rests upon assumptions of respect for life, spirituality in nature, the primacy of the
group over the individual, and the need to tolerate, accept, and support each other”
(Joe and Miller 27). “Primacy of the group over the individual” is a key feature of
collectivism. Whereas, group privileging is hardly the case from an Anglo world-
view in which one’s identity and ways of coping with the world depend largely on
self-reliance. The social organization of the U.S. reflects this Anglo worldview in its
legal system, which stands primarily on a pillar of individualism that serves such
interests.
Another intercultural communication study by genetics researchers Foster,
Bersten, and Carter illustrates the differences between collectivism and individualism
in western studies of Native American populations. Genetics researchers of
indigenous populations in recent history have opened bioethical debates of interest to
the intercultural communication expert. Often, these bioethical exchanges introduce
questions dealing with “collective risks” as opposed to “individual risks” in human
population studies. Collective risks involve potential damage from research study
that affects all members of a specified group or group rights. Members of the
26
specified group may or may not be research study participants. Individual risks are
potential risks from research study that may affect the actual research study
participant or rights on an individual level (Foster, Bernsten, and Carter 696).
In the Foster, Bernsten, and Carter study, the authors cite the following
questions on the variety of collective and individualistic issues that may arise in a
socially specified population, such as a Native American tribal population under
study:
· What research ethics are appropriate in culturally diverse situations?
· How can the autonomy of both communal and individual decision-making be respected in the recruitment of study participants?
· How can researchers minimize the risks of stigmatizing entire categories of people?
· How can individual privacy be protected in small populations?
· Who should profit from valuable information derived from a unique population?
· Under what conditions can DNA collected for one project later be used for other research? (697)
These questions raise a number of implications for socially identifiable populations
in the literature or for collectivists populations in general under study.
Conventional western medical practice allows for socially defined
populations to be identified ethnically, regionally, genetically, and linguistically in
research databases and in scientific literature for publication purpose. Data from
these publications may suggest a particular genetic predisposition amongst a
specified group that may infringe on the collective concerns of members from within
the identified group (that is, cultural members who never agreed to individual
informed consent). For example, in the 1970s, African Americans were subject to
27
discrimination in employment and in health insurance coverage when the sickle cell
trait was identified in this group (qtd. in Foster, Bernsten, and Carter 697). Still, the
western convention of disclosure of socially identifiable/collectivist populations
under investigation is a standard feature of American study. Individualism in
American medical practice continues to shape subject rights, and “informed consent
by individuals” continues to weakly “address collective issues” (696). Little effort
has been cultivated to address the collective concerns of socially identifiable
populations in which resounding discrimination is evident and in which other
cultural concerns are expressed as the result of study disclosure.
American culture has a central tendency to identify with individualism
(Bennet 7). This orientation includes individualistic thought patterns in research
practices carried out by primary scientific and social investigators who generally
seek individual informed consent. This form of individualism is especially
ubiquitous in the medical profession workplace where the approach and convention
of western medicine ethics involves safeguarding subject rights according to (U.S.)
federally funded research policies. In most cases, the bioethical approach will focus
on addressing individualistic concerns. The Euroamerican paradigm in securing
individualistic rights often does not accommodate collective bioethical issues of
culturally diverse populations under study.
One challenge in addressing collective issues remains in elevating researcher
awareness to avoid applying “foreign social structure” onto study participants from
other cultures (Foster, Bernsten, and Carter 697). This challenge among others was
undertaken in the Foster, Bernsten, and Carter study on communal discourse. These
authors proposed a model for genetic researchers in negotiating an agreement with a
28
Native American tribe (Apache) under study. The negotiations were based on party
collaboration and conjoined efforts on the part of the scientists to encourage
communal discourse that addresses indigenous ethics. Some Native American ethics
include communal decision-making variables that are otherwise nonexistent or short-
sighted in an individualistic rights approach.
In evaluating bioethical implications, U.S. researchers or scientists may view
the western social structure as irresolvable from other cultural frameworks in what
author LaRay M. Barna describes as an “assumption of similarity” attitude (qtd. in
Bennet 173). Barna describes this attitude as an intercultural communication barrier
in which the assumer narrows cultural differences in futile attempts to facilitate
intercultural communication or to lessen the “discomfort of dealing with difference”
(qtd. in Bennet 174). Foster, Bernsten, and Carter reiterate on the charge of Barna’s
intercultural barrier by emphasizing how the genetics researcher must avoid the
superimposition of foreign social apparatus onto Native American cultures under
study (697).
Findings from the Foster, Bernsten, and Carter study allowed for a number of
provisions that were drawn into agreement on behalf of the collective risks raised
among the Apache during preliminary research study deliberations. These provisions
varied in limitations, exclusions, and in foci in comparison with subject and author
rights deliberations from an individualistic approach.
The scope of research investigation was based on Apache concerns that
research undertaken needs to be specific (that is, particular) and relevant to
communal concerns. Additional scientific inquiry aside from this agreement requires
Apache pre-approval. Manuscripts containing Apache findings are required to
29
undergo Apache review in which any objections to the use of the Apache name are
resolved or the results are published without identifying the Apache tribe as the
subject (Foster, Bernsten, and Carter 698). Intellectual property generated by the
study, which remained in the possession of the supporting (university) institution,
was subcontracted to recognize contributing members (such as the primary
investigators and the Apache) in this agreement. This sharing of intellectual property
is highly unusual in observance of well established practice in western medicine “as
well as limited legal precedent” that study participants who donate biological
substances (for example, blood or DNA) have no legal bindings on the intellectual
property generated from their biological samples (qtd. in Foster, Bernsten, and Carter
698).
Overall, the Foster et al. findings bring to light intercultural communication
variability and ramifications that may spring forth from the subject/researcher
relationship in which study participants differ in culture and social apparatus back-
ground from the social conventions of the primary investigators. The Foster et al.
study also showed how the Apache subjects originate from a particularly orientated,
communal identity culture. In contrast, the genetic researchers are schooled in
western medicine ethics and originate from a universally orientated American culture
that operates on individualistic parameters. Foster, Bernsten, and Carter exercise
caution on the researcher assumption that collective issues are automatically
addressed by the western medicine standard of obtaining informed consent of
individuals. Furthermore, the authors’ results indicate that, “in some populations,
private social units may have a larger role in communal decision-making than do
public authorities” (Foster, Bernsten, and Carter 699).
30
Ultimately, the conclusions from this study reinforce the priority of
investigator responsibility in securing that “human subjects who share socially
recognizable identities are protected from collective risks” (Foster, Bernsten, and
Carter 699). Additionally, this study provides an opening view on a cross-cultural
context involving issues of Native American collectivism and U.S.-scientist
individualism and how this intercultural communication context affects discourse
interactions.
Particularism versus Universalism
Thatcher states that collectivist cultures which embody hierarchal, socio-
political schema give rise to particularism, “meaning that laws, policies, and
procedures are applied differently to everyone, depending on that person’s social
standing” (“Writing Policies” 370). In contrast, universalism operates on the premise
that regardless of differences, each person is subject to equal treatment “under the
law or policy” (Thatcher, “Writing Policies” 370). U.S. Equal Opportunity Employer
Laws call attention to some of these differences in the language of employment
hiring policies, which explicitly prohibit discrimination “on the bases of race, color,
national origin, religion, sex, age, or disability” (“Federal” para. 1). With respect to
administrative action, particularism considers such differences while universalism
does not. Simply put then, universalism involves axioms that apply equally to
everyone in most (universal) circumstances; whereas, collectivism involves axioms
that apply differently to each one depending on particular circumstances.
Daniel Callahan imparts the meaning of “universal,” as a concept defining “a
virtue, a rule, a principle, or a moral perspective that is valid under most
circumstances for most people most of the time” (para. 5). This definition is not an
31
absolute term completely since “most” implies “that one can almost always imagine
a possible exception” (Callahan para. 5). Callahan argues that this possible
exception “is not a sufficient reason to reject universals”; and, in fact he remarks,
The U.N. Declaration of Human Rights was shaped by a small group of philosophers, thinkers, and statesmen very much imbued with natural law concepts, with a taste for universal moral truths, and with a belief in certain basic and underlying human needs and desires, true for all times and places. (para. 12).
Callahan’s example demonstrates that the concept of universalism is an observable
phenomenon in the rhetoric of these U.N statesmen, thinkers, and philosophers. In
contrast, the following statements in the Kennewick dispute call for and explicate by
means of particularism:
The trust doctrine has given rise to the principle that enactments dealing with Indian affairs are to be liberally construed for the benefit of Indian people and tribes, (Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976) - a canon of construction similar to that applicable to remedial civil rights legislation.(Bonnichsen et al., v. United States of America, et al. Nos. 02-35994 & 02-35996. 13 Mar. 2003, 8)
Because of its trust responsibility and treaty obligations, the Federal government has assumed the specific responsibility for protecting and fostering the well-being of Indian people, including the continuation of their societies, cultures and communities. (Bonnichsen et al., v. United States of America, et al. Nos. 02-35994 & 02-35996. 13 Mar. 2003, 8)
These two examples from the Kennewick dispute were declared by the Native
American Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation and U.S. Agencies on
behalf of protecting Native American patrimony. Both examples illustrate how
principles and treaty obligations (axioms) are to be administered and upheld with
respect to the particular interests, benefits, and protective rights of “Indian” people.
Another example from the Kennewick dispute illustrates just the opposite in a
statement adhering to universalism: “This trust relationship applies to all Federal
32
agencies and to federal action outside Indian reservations” (Bonnichsen et al., v.
United States of America, et al. Nos. 02-35994. 25 Mar. 2003, 8). Another example
from the Kennewick dispute illustrates how U.S. scientists may reinforce a rule that
applies particularly:
Because of the foregoing considerations, scholars agree that oral traditions cannot be taken as invariably accurate accounts of past events, particularly in the case of traditions that are said to be more than several generations old. (Bonnichsen et al., v. United States of America, et al. No. 02-35996. Simic 8.)
The rule that the rhetor wants reinforced in this example is that scholars cannot
define oral tradition as a constant variable that accurately recounts past events,
particularly when the oral evidence is “several generations old.” All of these
examples illustrate how rhetoric may be oriented toward universalism or
toward particularism when axioms are discussed, interpreted, and reinforced by the
rhetor(s). This study interprets the concepts and phenomena of universalism and
particularism as they are defined, discussed, and exemplified here and as reinforced
in the literature cited.
Analogic versus Analytic Reasoning
Analogism is a method of reasoning or argument on which a basis of
comparison is issued that draws upon “resemblance in some particulars between
things otherwise unlike” (“analogism”). Thus, the core argument of analogism
focuses on drawing relationships among two things on a basis of similarity. For
example, Patrick Glenn in Legal Traditions of the World discusses gyras, which
involve a form of analogical reasoning in the forth component of Islamic legal
tradition.
33
Glenn suggests that this form of analogism is significant in its role of
excluding more absolute forms of thinking (162). Gyras provide space for one
undergoing litigation to argue by means of forming analogy, that is, to call upon
relationships on a platform of similarity and to find characteristics or particularities
among those variables in any such established relationship. The strategy of drawing
upon similarities of two like things is a feature of analogical reasoning present in the
examples from the Kennewick dispute:
(N-100.03) ...there are no provisions for scientific study of inadvertently discovered remains in NAGPRA, and as such, no means by which courts may redress plaintiffs’ alleged harms. Accordingly, plaintiffs are not within the “zone of interest” protected by NAGPRA and their claimed harms cannot adequately be redressed. (Bonnichsen et al., v. United States of America, et al. Nos. 02-35994. 25 Mar. 2003, 11).
(S-100.01) Indeed the spread of legends, one form of oral tradition, is similar to the dissemination of rumors. (Bonnichsen et al., v. United States of America, et al. No. 02-35996. Simic 4)
The first example N-100.03, by Native Americans, illustrates by analogy that the
plaintiff scientists lack “constitutional and prudential standing” to pursue this action.
The analogy is drawn by first making the point that no provisions exist in
repatriation law by which to redress plaintiffs’ alleged claims of harm committed.
Then, this point is extended to another point that is analogous in effect to the first.
That is, the second point is made to reinforce plaintiffs’ lack of coverage under
NAGPRA’s protective “zone of interest.” Both points are similar because both
reinforce that the plaintiffs lack solid standing for pursuing this matter since they
have no protections under repatriation law. The second example (S-100.01) was
made by an amicus curiae scholar on behalf of the plaintiff scientists. This example
clearly positions an analogy between “the spread of legends” and frivolous “rumors”
34
in an effort to discredit oral tradition evidence in the Kennewick case.
In contrast to analogy, analyticity is an analytical approach which is a method
of reasoning based on a material or an abstract entity that is then broken down into
its constituent elements for determination or study of the essential elements
(“analyticity”). Thus the core argument of analyticity involves resolution of
elements in any such analysis. Given that the Kennewick dispute takes place largely
in a court of law within a legal context, the voluminous use of the analytical
approach to reasoning is to be expected. Examples of analytical reasoning in the
Kennewick dispute include samples N-2230.32 and S-2230.45:
(N-2230.32) NAGPRA is remedial Indian human rights legislation, enacted to protect Native American burial sites and the removal of humans remains. As such, Congress foreclosed these academics from asserting the right to challenge repatriations in order to conduct what amounts to peer review of previous government studies of the native remains; consequently, plaintiffs lack prudential standing. (Bonnichsen et al., v. United States of America, et al. Nos. 02-35994 & 02-35996. 13 Mar. 2003, 16)
(S-2230.45) As previously noted, historical accuracy is secondary to the metaphysical, moral or cultural purposes of myths. Consequently, nothing in a myth can be assumed to be factual unless unambiguously confirmed by external sources. (Bonnichsen et al., v. United States of America, et al. No. 02-35996. Simic 25)
In each of the samples N-2230.32 and S-2230.45, a central premise, precedence, or
observation/fact is provided and succeeded by a break down, an abstraction, or by an
analysis of the central premise conveyed. In addition to looking at intercultural
communication variability in the form of the binaries collectivism vs. individualism,
particularism vs. universalism, and analogic vs. analytic reasoning, this study
provides a framework for inquiry by means of a discourse analysis.
35
Discourse Analysis/Rationale
The method of discourse analysis (DA) is used for the following research
aims: 1) to form a composite of rhetorical stratagems employed by the
constituencies by means of evidential qualification, 2) to track discursive features of
intercultural communication variability, and 3) to determine if any rhetorical
differences emerge as a result. Findings from this study are used to draw a
composite of strategies and to analyze their effects on the rhetorical situation.
Rhetorical differences in the arguments under study might contribute to an
explanation on how such effects influenced, reinforced, and established power
relations within the cross-cultural context of the Kennewick Man case.
My original hypothesis posits that differences in rhetorical strategies may
arise as indices of the broader intercultural communication variability in the
Kennewick dispute. Discourse analysis in an examination of evidential qualification
will indicate any emergent rhetorical differences. Understanding these differences in
an intercultural communication context will be useful for interpreting the power
relations and for analyzing the strategic effects on the wider rhetorical patterns
implicated. Resulting differences are thought to be discursive features in forming an
abstraction of the argumentation that each constituency builds. To initiate this
investigation, I begin with a rationale for this methodology of choice.
In the article “Content Analysis: What Texts Talk About,” Thomas Huckin
opens up the discussion in the textbook, What Writing Does and How it Does, with a
point for departure on thinking about “analyzing texts and textual practices”: “The
logical starting point for analyzing texts is to consider the meaning of the text. All
texts are about something (that is, they have content); and the most direct way of
36
taking account of this is through content analysis” (13). Huckin also provides a
synopsis on the development of content analysis as the methodology was first
articulated by communication scholars in the early 20th century:
Content analysis was first used to measure the objective features (article length, size of headline, etc.) of newspaper stories. During World War II its scope was broadened to include various forms of propaganda including non-print discourse. By the 1950s, content analysis had established itself in communication research as virtually synonymous with discourse analysis. (13)
As a type of content analysis, discourse analysis (DA) is an analytical method
employed “in social science fields such as communication studies, sociology, and
anthropology.” DA is a useful method for “research, practical applications, and
pedagogical assessment in composition, education, and applied linguistics/ESL”
(Bazerman and Prior 1). Ellen Barton describes
DA as a method for analyzing the ways that specific features of language contribute to the interpretation of texts in their various contexts. Broadly defined, discourse analysis is the study of the ways that language is organized in texts and contexts. ( “Linguistic” 57)
Barton adds that “discourse analysis pays particular attention to the ways that
language in context is organized at and above the level of the sentence” (“Resources”
para. 3). The scope of DA study “can investigate features of texts and contexts as
small and specific as aspects of sentence structure, or it can investigate features of
texts and contexts as large and diffuse as genres and sociocultural worldviews”
(“Linguistic” 57).
Barton argues that DA “contributes uniquely to our knowledge about the
production, interpretation, and acquisition of written language,” adding that the
research aim “is to describe the conventions of language in context, thereby
articulating the connections between the structure and function of language in use”
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(Barton “Resources” para. 1, 2). Barton suggests that due to its methodological
potential, DA should fill an increasingly useful role in the field of composition,
where it can “answer questions about the production, interpretation, and acquisition
of written language” (“Resources” para. 1). As a generative linguist, Barton
describes how
many linguists investigate language as both a cognitive and social object, viewing language as a set of structures and a variety of functions. Under this view, speakers have internalized the rules and constraints that underlie the grammatical structures of their language, and they have learned various conventions that underlie situational and contextual functions of language in use. Two key terms in linguistics, then, are structure and function: a structure is a unit of language (sound, syllable, word, phrase, clause, sentence); a function is a use of language for a particular purpose, whether that purpose is informational, expressive, or social. (“Linguistic” 58)
As a research method, discourse analysis is useful for analyzing language structure
that contributes effectively to language function and interpretation within the varying
contexts of the oral or written discourse under study. The realm of discourse
analysis includes genre analysis, linguistic discourse analysis, and critical discourse
analysis to specify a few.
Critical discourse analysis (CDA) “offers a powerful arsenal of analytic
tools” which is useful in the study of written and spoken discourse (Huckin 157).
CDA aims to uncover “the discursive sources of power, dominance, inequality, and
bias” embedded within close reading examinations of texts (qtd. in McGregor
“Critical Discourse Analysis”). “Discursive practices refer to specific patterns of
producing, distributing, and consuming knowledge and artifacts within specific fields
of action” (Kamberelis and Luna 252). Huckin affirms that
[CDA] enriches the analysis further by insisting that such close reading be done in conjunction with a broader contextual analysis, including consideration of discursive practices, intertextual relations, and sociocultural
38
factors. To some extent, these activities resemble the sort of analysis done in cultural studies; but CDA puts more emphasis both on the fine-grained details of text and on the political aspects of discursive manipulation. (157)
Central to CDA is exposure of ulterior sources of dominion or suppression in texts
and their method of development within sociopolitical, historical, and legal contexts.
Dunmire argues that several critical linguistic studies on texts have unraveled
the “linguistic devices, processes, and structures” that function in advancing socially
constructed ideology in the media from which these texts originate (“Naturalizing”
para. 1). Findings from Dunmire’s work in a critical linguistic analysis (CLA) of the
Persian Gulf conflict and related high-profile media portrayals have demonstrated
how rhetorical and linguistic processes were activated to create a “projected event as
a factual account” by the New York Times and Washington Post (“Naturalizing” para.
1).
The questions posed in this study aim to examine cross-cultural
communication interactions and to unfold rhetorical processes, in which a discourse
analysis may show emergent discursive differences. These proposed differences may
contribute to a composite of effective rhetorical strategies for custody of Ancient
One. Discursive practices also might be driving rhetorical processes which may be
implicated in orchestrating the power roles in the Kennewick dispute.
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CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODS
Methodology
This study works within the discourse analysis framework of Thomas
Huckin. Huckin’s framework originates from his 1992 work titled “Context
Sensitive Discourse Analysis” and is outlined below.
Context Sensitive Discourse Analysis.
1. selecting an initial corpus that is of intrinsic interest to the audience (in composition studies, many researchers begin with a corpus of student writing, a collection of disciplinary articles in the sciences or humanities, or a set of texts from an institutional workplace);
2. identifying salient patterns, usually by scanning texts holistically;
3. determining “interestingness” (how are the identified patterns interesting in composition studies?);
4. selecting a study corpus (sampling);
5. verifying the pattern (coding, counting, and other forms of empirical analysis);
6. developing a functional-rhetorical analysis (explaining the significance of a pattern in its context). (qtd. in Barton “Linguistic” 66-7)
Huckin’s model renders that “all choices in discourse study must be made with the
larger field of composition and rhetoric in mind” (Barton “Contrastive” 223). The
key phrase in Step 3 is “determining interestingness”; Huckin defines this as
“something that is perceived as both useful to theory-building or pedagogy and [that
is] original [such as in composition]” (qtd. in Barton “Contrastive” 223). Step 6 in
particular “emphasizes the social dimensions of writing” (Barton “Contrastive” 223).
Working within Huckin’s framework, Barton expands on Step 2, “describing what
makes up a salient pattern in more detail” (“Linguistic” 66).
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In her discussion on rich text features, conventions, and patterns, Barton adds
that
Rich text features are particular features in a text or a set of texts that are associated with conventions of meaning and significance in context. Rich features are defined as those features that point to the relation between a text and its context. Rich features have both linguistic integrity (i.e., they have structural features of languages, so they can be defined in linguistic terms and then categorized, coded, counted, and otherwise analyzed empirically) and contextual value (i.e., they can be conventionally connected to matters of function, meaning, interpretation, and significance). The connection between a feature and its contextual value is a convention of language use. In this method, then, the connection between structure and function is the primary focus of [rich text] analysis.
A convention is an interpretive association between the typical use of a feature and its meaning in context.
A pattern is the conventional relationship between a structural feature and its function, meaning, or significance in context. (“Linguistic” 66)
The entire approach that Barton elaborates on is called rich text analysis. This study
adopts Barton’s definition of rich text features and employs her expanded approach
to rich text analysis.
This study also uses Chafe’s definition of evidentiality in its broadest
meaning as “involving expressions of ‘attitudes toward knowledge,’ [in which]
knowledge is defined as information whose status is qualified in one way or another”
(qtd. in Dunmire “Naturalizing” para. 13). Scholarly interest in evidentiality began
with the study of American indigenous languages, “especially those of Northern
California, where the marking of evidentiality through verb suffixes is widespread”
(Chafe and Nichols 20: viii). Evidentials code for “degrees of reliability” of
evidence and for other epistemological considerations including, “mode of knowing,
or the various ways in which knowledge is acquired, and source of knowledge, or the
origination of the information presented” (Dunmire “Naturalizing” para. 13).
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Dunmire notes that “by omitting evidential qualification, information is constructed
as factual or presupposed” (“Constructing” 19). Although English lacks a specific
grammatical category for evidentials, Barton points out that
...a variety of optional, nonpropositional constructions can function as evidentials [in English], including modals such as must or should; sentential adverbs like possibly, normally, and undoubtedly; sentence-initial conjunctions such as but; prepositional phrases like of course and in fact; and predications such as I believe that and X claims that. (“Evidentials” 746)
Barton adds that evidentials include “metadiscourse expressions that express a
writer’s attitude toward knowledge; examples include words and phrases like
probably, generally, I think, I believe, and oddly enough” (“Resources” para. 32).
In her work titled “Linguistic Discourse Analysis,” Barton provides a
typology of evidentials within a working frame that is based on Chafe’s
identification of three general categories of evidentials (72):
1) Degree-of-reliability evidentials evaluate the reliability of knowledge, with expressions such as probably, certainly, generally, and virtually.
2) Evidentials specifying the mode of knowledge--belief, induction, deduction, sensory evidence, and hearsay--cover a range of expressions. Evidentials indicating knowledge based on belief, for instance, include I think, I believe, and in my opinion. Evidentials indicating type of reasoning include seem (induction) and thus (deduction). In written language, evidentials of hearsay include the conventions of citation.
3) Contrast evidentials mark contrast between knowledge and expectation, and include hedges and other contrastive expressions such as of course, in fact, oddly enough, but, however, nevertheless, and actually.
(“Linguistic” 72).
Barton explains that “identifying an evidential in a text is thus a matter both of
analyzing form and interpreting function: an evidential is a nonpropositional word or
phrase used to express an attitude toward knowledge” (“Evidentials” 746).
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In her work titled “Evidentials,” Barton argues that “a discourse analysis of
evidentials reveals the ways that experienced and inexperienced academic writers
take an epistemological stance (a perspective on knowledge-making)” (qtd. in Barton
“Resources” para. 32). Other work on evidentials includes Dunmire’s examination
of evidentials in news articles from the Washington Post and New York Times,
showing how this device was instrumental in fabricating an Iraqi invasion of Saudi
Arabia as if the information and its construction were factual (“Constructing” 17).
Coding evidentials is discussed by a number of discourse scholars. Dunmire
views “evidential coding as a constitutive feature of the discourse through which
different forms and types of knowledge are constructed and accorded varying
degrees of reliability, epistemic stance, and social values” (“Constructing” 18). This
study adopts Dunmire’s approach to evidential coding and employs Chafe typology
of evidentials as elaborated on by Barton (see Figure 1 in this study, page 46) in
“Linguistic Discourse Analysis” (72) and in “Evidentials” (745-769).
In this study, the rhetorical situation centers on arguments for custody of the
deceased, on rights to scientific inquiry, and on heritage based claim which concern
Ancient One. Nelson, Megill, and McCloskey view argument as a genre that can be
illustrated in the study of academic writing:
Argument is more unified than is commonly understood, and far more unified than the fragmentation of academic fields might imply. Every scientist or scholar, regardless of field, relies on common devices of rhetoric: on metaphors, invocations of authority, and appeals to audiences....But...argument is more diverse than is commonly understood....Every field is defined by its own special devices and patterns of rhetoric. (qtd. in Barton “Evidentials” 747)
Barton distinguishes argument from argumentation noting that “argument is a
specific term, describing the presentation and support of a thesis or claim...
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argumentation, in contrast, is a broader term, describing the genre of the entire
essay” (“Evidentials” 747). In composition studies, scholars have made great strides
“in understanding the rhetoric of inquiry and strategies of argumentation in specific
fields (see work by Bazerman and Paradis; Nelson, Megill, and McCloskey; Swales;
Myers; Nash; Jolliffee)” (Barton “Evidentials” 747). In this study, as mentioned
earlier, the rhetorical situation centers on arguments for custody of the deceased, on
rights to scientific inquiry, and on heritage based claims. This rhetorical situation is
the connective interface between the wider scope of the intercultural communication
context and on the specific rich text feature analysis of evidentials or “attitudes
toward knowledge” which illustrate strategic differences in argumentation and
epistemological stance.
Thatcher emphasizes that “the rhetorical situation is the point of interaction
or mediation between the larger rhetorical patterns and the particular, author,
audience, contextual demands and constraints, and local culture” (“L2 Professional
Writing” 42). Rhetoricians have designed research methods for studying the
relationships “between the larger rhetorical patterns and the specific rhetorical
situation”; however, Thatcher points out that “this research has not been cross-
cultural” (“L2 Professional Writing” 42). This study recognizes the rhetorical
situation of argument as the “point of interaction” between the intercultural
communication context of the Kennewick Man case and the specific, rich text
features of evidentials under study. Thus, this view establishes the rhetorical
situation of attitudes toward knowledge and arguments for custodial right with
respect to their relationships between text and context.
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This study aims to apply the methodology of DA to key legal documents
from the Kennewick dispute. Janice Schuetz recounts that “treaties, letters, oral
histories, speeches, ritual performance, media reports, biographical narratives,
protests and demonstrations, political hearings, and legal proceedings are all
rhetorical constructions that influence audiences” (xii). In following Schuetz’s
examples, I gather data and background information from publicized records
including court documents and press-release statements from the constituencies.
However, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has discarded oral history evidence
from the tribal coalition in this case, and the retrieval of these key documents for
data collection purpose is unlikely prior to data analysis.
First-Level of Abstraction: Unit of Analysis
Once gathered, the data are analyzed into rhetorical motifs. These motifs are
discourse constructs containing an argument in the Kennewick dispute which also
reflects on the rhetorical triad of ethos, pathos, and logos in general. Specifically,
each motif expresses solely or in combination evidential qualification that 1) reflects
reliability of knowledge, 2) signifies mode of knowledge, or 3) that marks a contrast
between knowledge and expectation as outlined in Chafe and Barton’s typology of
evidentials in Figure 1.
On further detail, each rhetorical motif is an exemplar or uniform unit
consisting of an independent clause or of a single or a multiple sentence-level
construct taken by a constituency in rhetorical support of a position for custody.
Once identified and sorted, each motif is coded for evidentiality in text and for inter-
cultural communication variability in context. Evidential coding is the first level of
abstraction while intercultural communication variability is discussed at the
45
Evidential Coding Scheme
1000-numbered series Degree-of-reliability
certainly perhapsevidently possiblygenerally probablyin fact undeniablyobviously undoubtedlyof course virtually
2000-numbered series Mode of Knowledge· belief · deduction· induction · hearsay· sensory evidence
3000-numbered series Contrast Evidentials
actually oddly enoughbut of coursehowever neverthelessin fact unfortunately
Hypothesis:“A model is invented that predicts what will or will not count as evidence” (Dunmire “Constructing” Appendix A).
can shouldcould would
presumably
10-numbered series Belief
I believe I guess, I supposeI think in my opinion
20-numbered series Induction
for instanceit appearsit seemsmust
40-numbered series Sensory Evidence
I feelI seeI hear
50-numbered series Hearsay/Citation“in written language,includes the conventions of citation.” (Barton
“Evidentials” 746).
30-numbered series Deduction
as a resultas suchthereforethus
Figure 1. Evidential Coding Scheme. This typology of evidentials is a working frame that is based on Chafe’s identification of three general categories of evidentials. This listing is not exhaustive, but it focuses on the works of Chafe, Barton, and Dunmire (Barton “Evidentials” 745-769, “Linguistic” 72, “Resources” para. 32; Dunmire “Constructing” Appendix A, “Naturalizing” 221).
affirms proclaimsargues proposesasserts saysassumes statesclaims suggestspresumes tells
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second-level of abstraction.
Beginning at the first-level of abstraction, the following sequence of three
sentences in example S-2030.01 is coded as an exemplar rhetorical motif on the basis
of forming a solely expressed rhetorical feature that expounds by logos
generally and that represents the evidential “mode of knowledge” specifically by
means of deduction:
(S-2030.01) Both the 'Windust' and 'Cascade' phases are archaeological analytical units. They are not ethnic categories. As such, it is not scientifically accurate to attempt to link any present-day [Native American] group with any earlier ancient group using the phase concept. (Bonnichsen et al., v. United States of America, et al. No. 02-35996. 28 May 2003. Baker 8.)
In example S-2030.01, this statement by the scientists is denoted with an S label;
and, this motif is numerically categorized as expressing the evidential qualification
of “mode of knowledge” by means of “deduction.” These motifs are numerically
labeled in the mode of knowledge category by the two-thousand numbered series
(2000.00) and by deduction in the thirtieth position (30). Each exemplar unit of
analysis in the thirtieth-position series of deduction is identified by its count in the
ten one-hundredth’s position (0.01). As such, this exemplar construct is then counted
as a unit of analysis. Also at the first-level of abstraction, rhetorical appeal is
founded on the ethics of citation as evoked by scientists in example (S-2050.01):
(S-2050.01) Further, W. Raymond Wood, in an analysis of the utility of the phase concept for studies of ‘ethnogenesis,’ concluded that: Tracing a dynamic social entity such as a ‘tribe’ into a past that is populated by such intuitively derived ‘phases’ transforms ‘interpretation’ into rank speculation. (Bonnichsen et al., v. United States of America, et al. No. 02-35996. Baker 8.)
This motif is numerically identified in the evidential mode of knowledge category by
the two-thousand numbered series and by hearsay (citations) in the fiftieth position
47
(2050.01). Each exemplar unit of analysis in this hearsay category is identified by
its count in the ten one-hundredth’s position (0.01). Evidentials of citation (hearsay)
often overlap or embody one of the other evidentials or may interact with the
author’s argumentation in other ways. For instance, the use of concluded in sample
S-2050.01 emphasizes a strong degree of closure on the discussion of the usefulness
in the “phase concept for studies of ethnogenesis.” Because of the overlap of
interaction between evidential qualifications with regard to motifs in the hearsay/
citation category, analysis of these motifs in this particular category will include
discussion on other notable qualifications as well. Upon definition as a unit of
analysis, both examples S-2030.01 and S-2050.01 are rhetorical motifs subject to
analysis at the second-level of abstraction.
In two more examples of rhetorical appeal that specifies mode of knowledge,
the following statements were issued when the tribal coalition filed a joint claim for
custody, asserting that the remains were those of an ancestor. “Referring to the
skeleton in a tribal position paper, Umatilla trustee and religious leader Armand
Minthorn wrote,” (Slayman para. 10)
(N-2010.01) If this individual is truly over 9,000 years old, that only substantiates our belief that he is Native American. (qtd. in Slayman para. 11)
(N-2010.02) From our oral histories, we know that our people have been part of this land since the beginning of time. (qtd. in Slayman para. 11)
These motifs are defined by appeals founded on belief and are argued by a key
Umatilla trustee and religious leader. Thus, the categorization of these motifs is first
by N for Native American, second by “mode of knowledge” in the 2000-numbered
series, next by its expression of belief in the tenths position, and lastly by its count as
a belief in the ten-hundredth’s position. Evidential qualification of each rhetorical
48
motif as a unit of analysis constitutes the first-level of abstraction. The second-level
of abstraction involves coding for intercultural communication activity in context as
defined in Table 2 and as exemplified earlier in the literature review.
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Table 2. Intercultural Communication Variability and Activity.
Intercultural Communication Variable
Defining Intercultural Communication Variability in a Rhetorical Motif
Analogical Reasoning Function is analogism: a method of reasoning or argument on which a basis of comparison is issued that draws upon similarities among like characteristics of two things
Analytical Reasoning Function is analyticity: an approach based on a material or an abstract entity that is then broken down into its constituent elements for determination or study of theessential elements
Collectivism Collectivism involves the act of engaging the self, the worldview, and interactions with the world as originating from within one’s social group or kindred (Thatcher “Writing Policies” 370).
Individualism Individualism involves the act of engaging oneself, one’s worldwide perspective, and “one’s way of dealing with theworld” as originating from “an acknowledged reliance on the self” (Thatcher “Writing Policies” 370).
Particularism Particularism functions on the premise that “laws, policies, and procedures are applied differently to everyone, depending on that person’s social standing” (Thatcher “Writing Policies” 370).
Universalism Universalism operates on the premise that regardless of social standing, each person is subject to equal treatment “under the law or policy” (Thatcher “Writing Policies” 370).
Second-Level of Abstraction: Intercultural Communication Variability
Tables 2 and 3 outline a preliminary coding scheme of intercultural
communication variables. These variables constitute the second-level of abstraction
in this study. Each unit of analysis at the first-level of abstraction is now subject to
the coding scheme at the second-level of abstraction of cross-cultural communication
variability. Examples of these binaries were drawn from the literature, defined, and
exemplified earlier in this study’s literature review as well. The numerical coding of
these variables in Table 3 is as follows: the 100-numbered series codes analogical
reasoning variability; the 200-numbered series codes the variable of analytical
reasoning; the 300-numbered series codes the variable of collectivism; the
50
Table 3. Preliminary Coding Scheme ofIntercultural Communication Variables.
InterculturalCommunication
Variable
Numbered Series
Analogical Reasoning 100
Analytical Reasoning 200
Collectivism 300
Individualism 400
Particularism 500
Universalism 600
400-numbered series codes the variable of individualism; the 500-numbered series
codes the variable of particularism; the 600-numbered series codes the variable of
universalism. Thus in application, the first rhetorical motif founded on “deduction”
as a “mode of knowledge” evidential qualification and identified as constituting
analytical reasoning is labeled by the numerical value of 2230.01, where the
numerical places explicate as illustrated in Table 4.
Table 4. Coding Explication Example. An example of an abstraction involvingtwo-levels of analysis is as follows.
51
Code 2230.01Analysis
Coding Explication
2000.00 labels it as mode of knowledge (evidential qualification)
200.00 labels it as an example of analytical reasoning (intercultural variable)
30.00 labels it as deductive (mode of knowledge evidential)
2230.01 labels it as the first example of a motif founded on deduction
CHAPTER 4
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Evidentials Form Composites of Rhetorical Strategies
The data on evidentials in this study form composites of rhetorical strategies
used in argumentation between constituencies in the Kennewick dispute.
Argumentation, as previously defined in Research Methods, refers to the genre of an
entire effectual work. A data collection of legal briefs, such as the works examined
in this study, represent an abstraction of argumentation. In contrast, argument refers
to specific developments in framing, supporting, and presenting a thesis or claim
(Barton “Evidentials” 747). This study looked at arguments specifically at two
levels of abstraction to illustrate strategic differences in argumentation and
epistemological stance.
Looking at the first-level of abstraction (Figures 2 and 3), evidentials of
contrast have the rhetorical effect of “problematization”; while degree-of-reliability
evidentials introduce the effects of reinforcing or attenuating other evidentiary proof.
By far the most prevalent evidential or “attitude toward knowledge” is deduction,
mode of knowledge. These evidentials ground argumentation in analytical reasoning
(as discussed at the second-level of abstraction), which is highly regarded as
underlying universal truth in U.S. courts of law. Evidentials of citation have the
effect of highlighting use of literature proficiency. This effect illustrates a
constituency’s literate mastery of recounting historical and legal precedence and
illustrates mastery over the rhetorical situation; this effect also builds on evidentiary
proof by reinforcing argumentation with literature review. Citation evidentials also
interact with a constituency’s argumentation. Evidentials of induction empower a
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53
54
rhetor’s interpretation of a particular that is otherwise undefined by an empirically
derived given or by a sociopolitical, historical, or legal precedence. All of the
evidentials have the effects of circumventing favorably or unfavorably a
constituency’s or a counter-constituency’s position for Kennewick custody.
At the second-level of abstraction, deductive evidentials were all marked by
the variable of analytical reasoning (Figure 4). Deductive/analytical reasoning was
employed strategically by both constituencies as expected given the legal context of
this dispute. In a few instances, citation and degree-of-reliability evidentials were
marked by intercultural communication variability, including universalism,
particularism, and collectivism (Figure 5). Little was gleaned from the remaining
data on intercultural communication variability other than some the variables were
observed but not sufficient enough to draw an interpretation of possible effects on
strategies.
Overall, based on these findings, no firm conclusions can be drawn to suggest
that cultural influences exist in the communications between constituencies involved
in the Kennewick Man dispute. However, the various evidentials do form
empirically sound composites of rhetorical strategies which constituencies
appropriated to advance their argumentation in this case. Although these composites
look the same for both constituencies as both are marked by the same evidential uses
(Figures 2 and 3); nonetheless, as I will now argue, all of these evidentials have the
effects of posturing favorably or unfavorably a constituency’s or a counter-
constituency’s argumentation for Kennewick custody.
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56
57
Evidentials Posture Constituency and Counter- Constituency Argumentations
Contrast Evidentials and Problematization
Evidentials of contrast have the rhetorical effect of “problematization.”
Barton defines problematization as “showing that a prevailing assumption, idea,
view, or situation needs reexamination, reconceptualization, or reevaluation of some
kind” (“Evidentials” 748). Swales, Williams, and MacDonald argue that in the
academy, the strategy of problematization is used to situate and ground an inquiry.
This foregrounding is for the purpose of narrowing a “more specific purpose, thesis,
point, or argument of an essay” (qtd. in Barton “Evidentials” 748). For example,
problematization can be a direct “identification of the problem” as in Example 1:
(Example 1) The idea of competing theories that concerns cultural and linguistic migrations has previously informed us on the hypothesized origins and migrations of Indo-European (IE)-speaking peoples. New findings from research using genetics data combined with linguistic reconstruction theory are increasingly relevant for establishing IE-migration trails across continental Europe and for finding a proto IE-language homeland. These new findings will be useful for introducing genetic evidence which correlates with linguistic evidence to suggest that gaps in the two strongest competing theories leave room for further explication on IE-language origins. (Xochime 2)
Example 1 is a straightforward identification of a problem because it situates what
we already know theoretically about the origins of Indo-European speaking peoples
and then complicates what we know by introducing new evidence. This prepares us
to reconsider and to “reevaluate” the existing evidence, thereby marking this
example as a form of problematization.
Problematization can also be established by use of an evidential of contrast in
a juxtaposition that postures prevailing knowledge in contrast to expectancy. For
example, in the Kennewick dispute, Native Americans used a total of 38 contrast
58
evidentials (Figure 3) of which some were used to problematize scientists’ rights to
study cultural artifacts. Two results, N-3000.01 and N-3000.04, demonstrate how
juxtaposing and contrasting scientists’ rights with expectancy over interpretation of
the law has the rhetorical effect of problematization:
(N-3000.01) There are a number of provisions designed to address concerns of museums and the scientific community, such as provisions dealing with scientific study of cultural items, 25 U.S.C. 3005(b), the standard of repatriation applicable to unassociated funerary objects, sacred objects or objects of cultural patrimony, 25 U.S.C(c) and carefully crafted definition of such terms as “sacred objects”, 25 U.S.C. 3001(3)(C). However, the accommodations made to scientific and museum interests do not in any way detract from a conclusion that the central purpose of NAGPRA - in fact, in the end, the only reason that it even exists - was to rectify centuries of discrimination against Native Americans.
(N-3000.04) The District Court ordered that plaintiffs [scientists] be permitted access to the human remains at issue upon the provisions of 36 C.F.R. Part 79, which, in part, implement the Archaeological Resources Protection Act. 217 F.Supp.2d at 1166-1167. Once the conclusion that NAGPRA applies is made, however, the use of these regulations is simply not warranted.
The use of however is an evidential of contrast feature in these two results because it
functions as a metadiscourse marker to stress problematization of situated or
prevailing knowledge with expectancy over interpretation of the law. This form of
contrast evidential complicates the prevailing assumption concerning scientists’
rights by recalling NAGPRA’s applicability before such rights in N-3000.04 and by
objectifying the purpose of NAGPRA in N-3000.01. Result N-3000.01 is further
qualified by degree-of-reliability evidentiality since the use of in fact further
objectifies and intensifies the foundational purpose of NAGPRA. Degree-of-
reliability evidentials are discussed in greater detail in the next subsection. The next
result S-3000.08, from the scientists, also illustrates the form and function of a
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contrast evidential by means of a juxtaposition in which a prevailing view is
contrasted with expectancy:
(S-3000.08) The comparative method indicated that a certain sound unit should be present in proto-Algonquian yet that particular sound was found in none of the daughter languages.
Here again in S-3000.08, a preexisting assumption is contrasted with expectancy in
the form of a contrast evidential and its effect of twisting that assumption into a new
light. In this result, expectancy for finding a “particular sound” never measures up
with the preexisting assumption. Barton adds that contrast evidentials also mark a
shift between “a neutral description and a critical reconceptualization” (“Evidentials”
748).
For example, the scientists used a total of 25 contrast evidentials (Figure 3)
of which some were used to reconceptualize a preexisting situation or a notion as in
the following results labeled S-3000.06 and S-3000.25:
(S-3000.06) So, too, recognition of the First Amendment's protection for scientific discovery would not absolutely prohibit limits on such discovery, for example, to protect national security. Cf. United States v. Edler Industries, Inc., 579 F.2d 516, 520 (9th Cir. 1978). But such protection would require the court to ‘balance First Amendment rights against governmental regulatory interests.’ Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 765.
(S-3000.25) The Tribal Claimants and Dr. Boxberger claim that these myths are at least 10,000 years old since they refer to floods, volcanic eruptions and other geologic events characteristic of the end of the last Ice Age. DOI 10292. However, such events were not limited to that time period.
In each result, the scientists invoked reconceptualization of a prevailing view by use
of a contrast evidential as marked by sentence initial but or however. Result
S-3000.06 posits a neutral explanation of First Amendment protections, then it
contrasts that explanation with a “critical reconceptualization” in which “such
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protection” incurs court balancing between amendment rights and government
interests. Similarly, result S-3000.25 relays neutral information from Native myths
which retell about natural phenomena of geologic events in the last Ice Age;
following this information is an understanding that “such events” have occurred in
other eras as well, raising a point in which to critically reconceptualize the neutral or
prevailing information. Both of these examples illustrate the effect of contrast
evidentials in shifting discourse between neutral description and critical review.
In this study, contrast evidentials placed second and degree-of-reliability
evidential placed third among evidentiality use by both constituencies (Figure 3).
Contrast evidentials marked shifts in discourse between neutral or prevailing views
to critical reevaluation, while degree-of-reliability evidentials affected the standing of
other evidentiary proof.
Degree-of-Reliability Evidentials and Evidentiary Proof
Scientists used 22 degree-of-reliability evidentials while Native Americans
used 16 of them to introduce the effects of reinforcing or attenuating other
evidentiary proof (Figure 3). This was accomplished by qualifying the extent of
reliability of other proof and claims. Most degree-of-reliability evidentials in use by
the scientists were to reinforce or to discount the reliability of other fundamental
evidence relevant to the Kennewick case as in the results S-1000.02 and S-1000.03:
(S-1000.02) NAGPRA clearly requires appropriate evidentiary support for claims of cultural affiliation.
(S-1000.03) Simply stated, it is impossible to determine with any degree of scientific certainty which ancient group made the weapon that is imbedded in Kennewick Man's pelvis.
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The use of clearly in S-1000.02 and the uses of impossible and degree of scientific
certainty in S-1000.03 all mark these results as degree-of-reliability evidentials in
form and in function. The form is a qualifier (clearly, impossible) and the function
is on the evidentiary proof. That is, these evidentials mark or call it into question
other evidentiary proof by highlighting its reliability or lack thereof. In other results,
Native Americans used several in fact degree-of-reliability evidentials to fortify
other evidentiary proof of relevance as in N-1000.03:
(N-1000.03) In fact, as noted, in the case of inventories Congress specifically made clear its intent not to authorize new scientific studies even in an instance where agencies and museums were being instructed to determine the cultural affiliation of the remains and objects in their possession.
Barton adds that degree-of-reliability evidentials are also used to mark claims within
arguments (“Evidentials” 752) as exemplified in result N-1000.05 by the Native
Americans:
(N-1000.05) Indeed, the commentary to the regulations clearly addressed this question as follows: “[a]nother commentator recommended changing all references to Indian tribe in this section to ‘Indian tribe or tribes’to reflect the fact that Indian tribes may bring joint claims for certain items.”
Result N-1000.05 uses indeed to affirm how “commentary to the regulations” is
qualified clearly in addressing language that bears on a claim--which in turn
reflects its qualification as fact. All combined, degree-of-reliability evidentials were
an effective means by which to strengthen one’s arsenal of strategies or to weaken
the opponent’s. That is, these evidentials function as rhetorical arsenal by marking
claims or other evidentiary proof and by qualifying the reliability of such proof
favorably or unfavorably in another light.
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Degree-of-reliability and contrast evidentials are two of the three types of
evidentials that were described by Chafe. The third “attitude toward knowledge” or
type of evidential as described by Chafe is “mode of knowledge.” These evidentials
are subcategorized as belief, induction, deduction, sensory, and as hearsay/citation
(see Figure 1, page 46).
Mode of Knowledge Evidentials: Deduction, Citation, and Induction
The Deductive/Analytical Effect and Use of Precedence. The most
prevalent evidential or attitude toward knowledge is deduction, mode of knowledge
(Figure 2). These evidentials ground argumentation in analytical reasoning (Figure
4) since deductive reasoning is a component of analytical reasoning. The distinction
between deductive and inductive reasoning is that deductive reasoning begins with a
“given,” or a precedence, or an empirically derived evaluation from which one
“deduces” reasoning. Thereby, deductive reasoning is intrinsically analytical since it
“breaks down” from given knowledge or from general or universal premises. In
contrast, inductive reasoning has no “given,” and therefore, one must induce
reasoning, from particulars to a generalization leap, based on study that does not lead
from direct analysis of given information. Results of deductive evidentials involving
given information in the form of precedence followed by deduction/analytical
qualification include the following two results labeled N-2230.45 and N-2230.24.
Each result is followed by brief discussion:
(N-2230.45) The exacting scientific connection required by the lower court to sustain a link between ancient remains and present day tribes would render NAGPRA a nullity, as no remains older than a few hundred years could ever be repatriated.
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Result N-2230.45 provides given information in the form of a precedence that relays
a lower court’s requirement in establishing a precise, scientific connection between
ancient human remains and modern tribes. Drawing from this requirement, the
Native Americans deduce a hypothetical enforcement of the requirement by the use
of the deduction evidential would. In doing so, the Natives deduce reasoning that
exposes a flaw in the requirement, which compromises the reasoning underlying the
lower court’s ruling (that is the precedence). The next result is N-2230.24:
(N-2230.24) Magistrate Judge Jelderks held that joint claims are permissible under NAGPRA only in very limited circumstances and that the tribes in this case could not file a joint claim. 217 F.Supp.2d at 1141-1143. Again, this interpretation would greatly change how NAGPRA has been implemented since its inception. As the tribes pointed out in their brief, almost 48% of all repatriations have been to joint claims.
Result N-2230.24 reiterates on a ruling (a precedence) by Judge Jelderks in which
the tribal coalition was denied joint-claim filing status. This ruling was due to
Jelderks’ interpretation that NAGPRA has a “limited circumstances” rule concerning
joint claims. This reiteration of the ruling is set up by the Native Americans as given
information that is once again followed by a hypothetical enactment marked by
deductive reasoning. The use of would marks this transition from a given to a
hypothetical enactment that contradicts the “limited circumstances” interpretation.
This hypothetical/deductive effect renders Jelderks’s interpretation and ruling
inconsistent with the “almost 48%” status of all repatriations going to joint claims.
Establishing precedence in the form of given information or in the form of general or
universal premises is a powerful strategy of deductive reasoning that becomes an
important feature in the use of citation evidentials as well.
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Citation Evidentials, Literature Proficiency, and Argumentation. The
tally of citations in this study was reduced to an analysis of in-text citation
evidentials (Figure 2) with distinct, qualifying features. These evidentials were
marked by verbs as listed in Figure 1 and included subjects marked by pronouns
(and antecedents) or named, identifiable institutions, statutes, codes, amendments,
studies, or authorities and such that were not simply parenthesized. These citation
evidentials had the effect of highlighting use of literature proficiency. This effect
illustrates a constituency’s literate mastery of recounting historical and legal
precedence and illustrates mastery over the rhetorical situation; this effect also builds
on evidentiary proof by reinforcing argumentation with literature review as in the
following four results:
(S-2050.49) As Boas observed, avenues of travel and points where people come into frequent contact are major channels for the diffusion of motifs, plots and narrative themes.
(S-2050.51) Thompson concluded that "Language frontiers or even the boundaries of linguistic families have played little role in retarding or facilitating the spread of this tale" across the continent.
(N-2050.33) Nothing in NAGPRA suggests that the evidence cannot point to a reasonable connection between the remains and more than one tribe.
(N-2050.08) Executive Order 13,084 (1998) requires federal agencies to engage in regular and meaningful consultation and collaboration with Indian tribal governments in the development of regulatory practices on Federal matters that significantly or uniquely affect their communities.
Barton argues that evidentials of citation are hardly “neutral expressions used
to introduce source materials”; rather, citation evidentials interact with “the author’s
problematizations and argumentation” (“Evidentials” 751). For example, in result
S-2050.49, “Boas observed, avenues...and points...” indicating that this expert is
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capable of observing broad intersections or key points of interactions “for the
diffusion of motifs, plots and narrative themes.” Thereby, the Boas citation interacts
with the constituency’s argumentation to reflect the quality of expertise cited here.
Result S-2050.51 shows that “Thompson concluded...” suggesting that the topic of
“linguistic families” is going to foreclose on further discussion soon. By sealing off
the discussion with “Thompson’s conclusion,” this result attempts to derail
arguments on “linguistic families” from further contemplation. In result N-2050.08,
the citation evidential “Executive Order 13,084 (1998) requires” invokes strong
vocabulary with legal implication. This result interacts with the constituency’s
argumentation by use of an effective citation that invokes powerful and authoritative
action. All combined, citation evidentials were an effective means by which to high-
light use of literature proficiency, in establishing precedence in particular, as well as
to interact strategically with a constituency’s argumentation.
The Inductive Effect: A Leap from Particular(s) to Generalization.
A rhetor’s interpretation of something particular can be empowered by evidentials of
induction use (Figure 2). This empowerment happens when a rhetor interprets
something particular that is otherwise undefined by an empirically derived given or
by a sociopolitical, historical, or legal precedence. The inductive effect is a leap
from particular(s) to a generalization that magnifies the interpretation or significance
of the particular(s). Result S-2020.04 illustrates this effect:
(S-2020.04) The arbitrary nature of the Secretary’s determination is further under-scored by his statement that the determination he made was ‘informed by, but not controlled by, the evidence as a scholar would weigh it.’COE 26; ER 6. This statement seems to imply that the rational methods developed by scholars for verifying and assessing evidence relating to oral traditions can be ignored by government decision makers at their convenience.
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Result S-2020.04 references a particular statement made by the Secretary in
weighing his determination. This particular reference by the scientists is then
followed by the use of seems to make a leap to a generalization that the Secretary’s
statement implies something more. That implication is that “government decision
makers” can selectively ignore the scientific method for analyzing oral tradition
evidence. No where, in this result, is there given information stating that the
Secretary actually selectively ignored the scientific method for analyzing oral
tradition evidence. Instead, the use of seems magnifies that particular statement and
its interpretive effect in this result. Two more results, S-2020.01 and S-2020.02, also
illustrate the inductive effect in which a particular view is magnified into a grand
generalization, thereby empowering the rhetor’s interpretative leap:
S-2020.01 Tribal claimants persist in viewing Kennewick Man as a relative or family member. While such a view is understandable in light of the historical and religious background of Indian tribes, there simply must come a time at which a skeleton stops being a relative and becomes an artifact. If there is not such a point, all archaeology must come to an end. (Findley 7)
S-2020.02 While in most cases arising from nineteenth century grave-robbing, this point [at which a skeleton become an artifact] will not have been reached, [however] a skeleton which is five times older than Julius Caesar simply must be beyond that point. (Findley 7)
In result S-2020.01, the scientist/rhetor acknowledges a particular view held by tribal
claimants in which Kennewick Man is recognized as kin. Subsequent to pointing out
this particular view, the scientist makes an inductive leap to a generalization that
there is a point at which “a skeleton stops being a relative and becomes an artifact.”
Similarly, result S-2020.02 reiterates on that particular point at which a skeleton is
still a relative, even acknowledging some skeletons as relatives, as in “most cases
arising from nineteenth century grave-robbing.” Then, using the inductive evidential
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must, the scientist leaps to the conclusion that a skeleton “five times older than
Julius Caesar must be” an artifact and is beyond the point at which kinship is
recognized.
In summary of the results on mode of knowledge evidentials found in this
study, deductive evidentials and analytical reasoning were the most salient forms of
rhetorical strategies in use by the constituencies on both sides of the Kennewick
dispute. Deduction is intrinsically analytical and this type of reasoning springs from
given knowledge or from general or universal premises. Citation evidentials had the
effect of highlighting use of literature proficiency for establishing precedence in
particular. This effect illustrates a rhetor’s literate mastery of drawing upon
historical and legal precedence as well as interacting strategically with an opponent’s
argumentation. That is, citation evidentials build on evidentiary proof by reinforcing
argumentation with authority, precedence, and credence. In contrast, the inductive
effect illustrates a particular view that is then magnified into a grand generalization,
thereby empowering the rhetor’s interpretative leap. All of the mode of knowledge
evidentials emphasize authority, precedence, and rhetor empowerment.
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CONCLUSION
Summary of Study, Research Aims, and Purpose
This study examined arguments in an analysis of evidentials in the legal
dispute over ownership and custody of the Kennewick Man. Evidentials express
attitudes toward knowledge by qualifying information that is constructed as factual
or presupposed. Using a discourse-analysis framework and instruments of evidential
qualifications, this study had three aims: 1) to identify a composite of rhetorical
strategies, 2) to analyze the rhetorical effects of arguments on the specific, cross-
cultural communication context of the Kennewick Man dispute, and 3) to determine
whether intercultural influences on communication exist. Results highlighted
composites of rhetorical strategies and formed abstractions of argumentation and
epistemological stances.
Arguments for custody were drawn from a data collection of legal briefings
submitted by constituencies to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Bonnichsen et
al. v. The United States of America et al. For study purposes, the primary
Kennewick constituencies were grouped into two factions and referred to generally
as the “U.S. Scientists” or as the “Native Americans”; however, these terms
specifically represented a respective group that participated in key arguments in
support of plaintiff scientists or Native American defendants in the legal dispute. On
closer examination, this study was conducted using rich text feature analysis of
arguments for Kennewick custody.
Arguments pertained to an aspect in the triad of ethos, pathos, or logos in
general and exemplified evidential qualification in particular. Particular findings
were then used to induce a wider range of explanations of rhetorical effects on the
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specific cross-cultural context of the Kennewick Man dispute. Results on evidential
qualification at the first level of abstraction were also used to examine intercultural
influences on communication at the second level of abstraction. In gathering data,
discourse analysis (DA) was the preferred research method since DA is useful for
analyzing language structure that contribute effectively to language function and
interpretation. “Broadly defined, DA is the study of ways that language is organized
in texts and contexts” (Barton “Linguistic” 57).
The context of this study was framed by the rhetorical situation, which
functioned as the connective interface that anchored the wider scope of the inter-
cultural communication context and the specific, rich text feature analysis of
evidentials under study. Barton argues that “the use of evidentials illuminates
differences between arguments [composed by experienced writers versus
inexperienced writers] and, in so doing, reveals underlying differences in the
epistemological stance of each group” (Barton “Evidentials” 745). Dunmire found
that an examination of evidentials and other linguistic devices showed the
construction of a projected event unfolding as a factual account in which the
“interested status of the speech” was suppressed. Similarly, findings from this study
may be useful for increasing our understanding of strategic sources of dominion or
suppression in texts that otherwise may remain hidden in layers of sociopolitical,
historical, and legal contexts. Although this study did not provide a direct
explanation on strategic sources of dominion or suppression in texts, it offered clues.
These clues include rhetorical effects due to the use of evidentiarys that may
expand or minimize boundaries of rhetorical landscapes. Other effects included the
building up or the leveling of other evidentiary proof as a form of rhetorical arsenal.
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To expand on implications of these findings more closely, results at the first level of
abstraction are summarized next followed by suggested implications for the field of
rhetoric.
Summary of Results, Discussion, and Implications forthe Field of Rhetoric
First Level of Abstraction
Contrast Evidentials. At the first level of abstraction, my results showed
that evidentials of contrast had the rhetorical effect of problematization. Defined
earlier, problematization expresses that a “prevailing assumption, idea, view, or
situation” requires reinvestigation, reevaluation, or reconceptualization. In the
results found, contrast evidentials (see Figure 1, page 46) served as metadiscourse
markers that reflected on shifting discourse boundaries of knowledge and its
interpretation. That is, these evidentials invoked conflict and problematization due to
the close pairing of expressed knowledge with a contrasting point that thwarts
expectancy over interpretation of the knowledge conveyed.
This effect called into question the basis of that knowledge, its scope of
meaning, and/or its supposed interpretation. This in turn provoked
reconceptualization as exemplified in result N-3000.10: “In short, the NAGPRA
process was not designed to be adversarial. Rather, the NAGPRA process was
designed to be cooperative with an agency having an obligation to work closely with
potential tribal claimants.” Result N-3000.10 expresses an artifact of knowledge that
the NAGPRA process was never intended to be adversial. Subsequently, the use of
rather acts a metadiscourse marker which shifts the discourse boundaries of that
knowledge artifact from a relay in discounting the adversial view (what the
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NAGPRA process is not) to an accrediting of a cooperative one (what the NAGPRA
process really is).
Some discourse scholars have argued that the strategy of problematization is
useful in foregrounding an argument’s boundaries. Swales, Williams, and
MacDonald had argued that in the academy, the strategy of problematization is
useful in foregrounding an argument for the purpose of narrowing a “more specific
purpose, thesis, point, or argument of an essay” (qtd. in Barton “Evidentials” 748).
In this study, contrast evidentials most often invoked critical reconceptualization of a
legal right by twisting assumptions about that right in a new light; but in a sense,
contrast evidentials also helped to frame an argument’s boundaries by not allowing
the knowledge conveyed to remain free without questioning or to remain limited,
foreclosed, neutral or static in its scope of meaning or supposed interpretation. This
again was accomplished by expressing an artifact of knowledge, by marking it with a
contrast evidential, and by provoking reinterpretation of that knowledge artifact with
a contrasting point; this, in effect, is problematization in which the expected range of
meaning in context is expanded, restricted, or redefined.
The rhetorical strategy of problematization informs the field of rhetoric on
how prevailing notions, assumptions, and views are disrupted and thwarted into a
new light of critical reconceptualization, often redrawing--minimizing or expanding--
the boundaries of that view’s reach. Contrast evidentials help us to recognize how
boundaries of knowledge artifacts are drawn and redrawn. The implications for
understanding this are many: What knowledge artifacts are important to minimize or
to expand on with regard to interpretation and why? Why is it important to change
boundaries of interpretation? Who benefits from these shifting effects and how so?
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In this study, I found that problematization by means of contrast evidentials marked
shifts in discourse between neutral or prevailing views to critical reevaluation,
altering knowledge boundaries of rhetorical landscapes. Barton found that contrast
evidentials and problematization reflected on the “epistemological stance adopted by
the academy at large”:
Even before an author can attempt to argue for a specific contribution in the form of a thesis, recommendation, or suggestion, the ground has to be laid via problematization. Within this epistemological stance, the primary way of knowing is based on contrast, and scholarly research is framed not by common questions but by critical reconceptualization of prevailing ideas or situations. (“Evidentials” 754)
Further inquiry into the function of contrast evidentials might suggest that the
purpose of foregrounding is to expand or restrict boundaries of meaning from which
knowledge conveyed is granted in argumentation. So, in this study, while contrast
evidentials were rhetorically useful in redrawing boundaries of rhetorical landscapes,
in contrast, degree-of-reliability evidentials were most effective as rhetorical arsenal.
Degree-of-Reliability Evidentials. Degree-of-reliability evidentials
functioned as rhetorical arsenal by marking claims or other evidentiary proof and by
qualifying the reliability of such proof favorably or unfavorably in another light.
These evidentials affected the standing of other evidentiary proof with reinforcement
or attenuation by use of form and function. The form was a qualifier (certainly,
impossibly) and the function was on strengthening or weakening other evidentiary
proof invoked in this dispute. The rhetorical effect was on recasting the knowledge
artifact of other evidentiary proof by empowering or defusing it in another light.
The degree-of-reliability effect was not as broadly effectual as remapping
boundaries of knowledge such as I discussed with contrast evidentials; rather, the
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effect was analogous to creating rhetorical arsenal that targeted specific evidentiary
proof. This opened the possibility for that proof to be defused below or reloaded
beyond its typical effect. Recognizing the degree-of-reliability effect is important for
understanding how other evidentiary proof is orientated to be valued or devalued.
Barton argues that degree-of-reliability evidentials are used to mark claims
within arguments (“Evidentials” 752) by “evaluating the status of knowledge”
(“Evidentials” 746). This is the same finding in this study too in the same sense that
the value of other evidentiary proof is valorized, devalued, and modified accordingly.
This study also finds that degree-of-reliability evidentials manipulated an increase or
a decrease in the rhetorical force of other evidentiary proof. This strategy of
strengthening or weakening other evidentiary proof informs the field of rhetoric on
how knowledge as evidentiary proof is manipulated to increase or to decrease its
rhetorical effectiveness. With further inquiry, a study on degree-of-reliability
evidentials might possibly expose how strategic differences in argumentation confer
power or disempower an opponent, indicating strategic sources of dominion or
suppression in texts. Other strong factors that may possibly contribute to exerting
influences of power on discourse include the use of deduction and induction
evidentials. As mentioned and as illustrated earlier in Figure 1, deduction and
induction evidentials fall under the category of “Mode of Knowledge” in the
evidential coding scheme.
Deduction and Induction Evidentials. Deduction evidentials illustrated
how precedence is useful in the analysis of problematic features of “given
knowledge.” Using an analytical lens in some instances reflected back unfavorably
onto such precedence, general, or universal premises by exposing flaws in them.
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This deductive effect was instrumental in supporting my claim that deduction is
intrinsically analytical since it involves analysis of given knowledge that has been
founded on general or universal premises. Deductive evidentials also inform the
field of rhetoric on how deductive reasoning may actually be useful for marginalized
groups who are overpowered by a dominant discourse community such as may have
occurred in this legal dispute under study. That is, the dominant discourse in a U.S.
court of law is the scientific and legal use of precedence.
Marginalized groups such as Native Americans often are not recognized as
having or as setting precedence; whereas, the dominant discourse community has full
authority or increased binding power on what knowledge artifacts are determined to
be accepted, granted or conceived as setting precedence. So, in the case of the
Kennewick Man dispute, the use of deductive reasoning provided a channel for
Native Americans to challenge the system of precedence set up by the dominant
discourse community of scientific and judicial authorities. Native Americans were
able to turn precedence around and to expose flaws in them by analysis and by
means of deductive reasoning. The alternative was to accept a given artifact of
knowledge as a legally binding precedence that did not necessarily serve the interests
of the marginalized groups of Native Americans in the Kennewick dispute.
In contrast, induction evidentials had a leap effect on moving an argument
from particular(s) to a generalization. The leap effect was instrumental in expanding
the rhetor’s interpretation of a particular(s) reference used in an argument. The leap
effect included 1) magnifying the rhetor’s interpretation of the particular, 2)
magnifying the particular’s significance, and 3) implicating the particular’s meaning
to suggest that it had more meaning or significance in context than actual
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representation in text. Because there were not that many instances of the inductive
effect in the results of this study, further inquiry may help us to understand how the
leap effect is useful in contrast to the use of deductive reasoning. Since deductive
reasoning depends on a given or a precedence and inductive reasoning does not, the
circumstances and choices for using inductive reasoning may rest entirely on the lack
of precedence. Deductive and inductive reasoning reflected on logos while citation
evidentials contributed primarily to ethos and secondly to logos.
Citation Evidentials. Citation evidentials highlighted use of literature
proficiency and interacted with argumentation to build ethos. The citation effect
illustrated a constituency’s mastery of recounting historical and legal precedence and
building on evidentiary proof by reinforcing argumentation. This includes
contributions to the body of deductive reasoning used in argumentation in which
establishing precedence is important. Citation evidentials also inform us about the
level of authority exerted in establishing precedence. In many instances, citation
evidentials focused on statutes, codes, amendments, studies, or authorities, indicating
that authority was at stake. The broader picture suggests a relationship between all
of the evidentials and aspects of ethos and logos in the rhetorical triangle. All of the
different evidentials formed composites of rhetorical strategies that constituencies
appropriated in support of custody in the Kennewick dispute.
All of these evidentials at the first level of abstraction had the global effects
of circumventing favorably or unfavorably a constituency's or a counter-
constituency's position for Kennewick custody. Results on evidential qualification at
the first level of abstraction were then used in a contrastive binary framework at the
second level of abstraction.
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Second-Level of Abstraction
Looking at cultural influences on communication at the second-level of
abstraction, no firm conclusions were drawn to suggest that a composite of cultural
influences exists in the discourse constructs under study. One explanation may be
due to the loss of key court documents in the Kennewick dispute. The documents in
question contained the oral histories of the Native Americans. The loss of these
important records was noted earlier as the The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had
discarded this evidence. This reaction by the Court is perplexing in light of the fact
that the King James version of the Bible that rests inside U.S. courts of law is in fact
a manuscript itself, containing oral histories and legends of an ancient peoples.
Another explanation for not finding a composite of cultural influences on
communication is the choice of methodology. A larger study such as a case study,
involving interviews and extensive content analyses (of media reports, critiques, and
such), may be required to index notable differences and thereby elicit evidence of
intercultural communication variability.
Furthermore, results from the intercultural communication binaries of
individualism vs. universalism and collectivism vs. particularism were insufficient to
draw an interpretation of possible effects on strategies and context. Although,
recurring results were observed in the binary category of analytical versus analogical
reasoning. Recurrence was important in this analysis because argumentation was
defined earlier as the genre of an entire effectual works such as the data collection of
legal briefings analyzed in this study. Furthermore, C. Miller defines genre as
“typified rhetorical actions based in recurrent situations” (qtd. in Dunmire “Genre”
93). By instrument of defintion, the recurrent use of analytical reasoning in these
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legal briefings was identified as the single, key feature of cultural influence on
communication. This study showed that both constituencies strongly exerted the
cultural influence of analytical reasoning in argumentation.
This finding--which showed the recurrent use of analytical reasoning--
suggests that there may be larger sites of inquiry to investigate: hegemony and
assimilation. How far did the Native American constituency go to adapt an
anglicized rhetoric in this legal dispute and was the rhetoric really anglicized? Is
analytical reasoning the hallmark strategy in U.S. courts of law, and if so, what is so
Anglo about analytical reasoning? As mentioned earlier, the U.S. Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals discarded key oral tradition evidence that the Native American
constituency submitted in a text based version to the court. An analysis of those key
documents may have illustrated the recurrent use of analogical reasoning. Why did
the court discard those documents? Does this action by the court reflect on Anglo
hegemony and on a forum exclusive to analytical reasoning in one of the key
branching pinnacles of U.S. government? When is analytical reasoning effective and
when is it not and why? When is analogical reasoning effective and when is it not
and why? Who gets to decide what form of reasoning is most critical in specified
contexts such as legal disputes? If Natives use more analogical reasoning in certain
contexts, then what is so Native about analogical reasoning and why is it more or
less effective in certain contexts more so than others?
As one can imagine, many questions remain that were never answered in this
text based analysis under study. Dunmire reminds us that due to the limitations of
text based renderings, discourse analyses only provide partial explanations of social
actions on specified contexts undertaken for study. Certainly, to the field of rhetoric,
78
this study sheds light on many tangents of inquiry and provides several stepping
stones to larger sites of inquiry on strategic differences in argumentation and
epistemological stances. This possible range of study combined with intercultural
communication inquiry might help us better understand the complex relationship
between a text and its socipolitical, historical, and legal context.
79
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