eurozone forecast winter 2010 spain
TRANSCRIPT
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Ernst & Young
Eurozone Forecast
Spain
Spring edition, April 2011
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Spain
Portugal
France
Ireland
Finland
Estonia
Netherlands
Belgium
Luxembourg
Slovakia
Austria
Slovenia
Italy
Greece
Malta
Cyprus
Germany
Outlook for Spain
Ernst & Young Eurozone Forecast Spring 2011
Published in collaboration with
17 Eurozone countries
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1Ernst & Young Eurozone Forecast Spring 2011 Spain
Highlights
In the nal three months of 2010, Spanish GDP increased by just 0.2%, only a marginalimprovement from the stagnation seen in Q3 2010. In 2010 as a whole, Spanish GDP shrank
by 0.1%: scal consolidation and private sector deleveraging severely constrained domestic
demand and the pull from foreign trade, which was instrumental in lifting growth in the
other large Eurozone countries, proved too weak an offset. Fiscal consolidation has
proceeded on schedule. Downside risks remain to the fore, related to a bleak outlook for
domestic demand and ongoing uncertainty about the future health of the banking sector.
Spanish GDP is expected to grow by just 0.6% in 2011, markedly underperforming theEurozone average. In 2012, growth is unlikely to exceed 1.1%. Private consumption is
expected to remain depressed, as household income should remain under pressure from
stubbornly high unemployment, which is not expected to decline signicantly from its
current levels, and from the adverse effect of the cut in public sector wages and
government transfers that are part of the scal consolidation process. Moreover,
deleveraging and uncertainty about employment are likely to keep the savings rate high.
Investment should continue its fall this year, dropping by 2.8%. Non-residential investment isexpected to slide marginally, thanks to the improvement in foreign demand, but residential
capital expenditure should fall by another 12%, as the construction industry has to grapple
with a difcult nancial situation and lack of demand.
Export growth is expected to remain moderate, as unwinding the huge competitiveness gapwith the main trade partners, accumulated since the adoption of the euro, needs far-
reaching structural reforms to boost productivity that are only implemented gradually and
take time to bear fruit. However, weak import growth should lead net trade to provide a
signicant contribution to growth.
Since the beginning of 2011, the Government has taken new and important measures torestructure the banking system and, in particular, to strengthen capitalization in the ailing
regional savings banking sector. A key concern is the amount of public money needed to
recapitalize the system, which could escalate to 100 billion, far above the resources made
available by the Government (20 billion planned so far). In the meantime, banks are
regaining access to the interbank market but non-performing loans (NPLs) are increasingand the large exposure to Portuguese debt could lead to a signicant worsening in asset
quality in the event of a debt restructure there. Credit conditions remain tight and this is
going to affect domestic demand negatively going forward.
Preliminary data for 2010 shows that the ambitious scal consolidation plan proceedsaccording to schedule. The budget decit for 2010 has been contained to an estimated 9.2%
of GDP. If scal discipline continues (especially at the regional level), the decit is forecast
to shrink to 6.5% of GDP in 2011, not too far from the Governments 6% target. However,
bond markets remain nervous as the Government has to roll over nearly 25% of total debt in
2011. At over 200 basis points (bp) by the end of February, spreads over German Bunds
have fallen by less than 50bp from the peak observed in the nal months of 2010.
Fiscal consolidation on track, but growth is still missing
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2 Ernst & Young Eurozone Forecast Spring 2011 Spain
Fiscal consolidation on track,
but growth is still missing
Table 1
Spain (annual percentage changes unless specied)
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
GDP -0.1 0.6 1.1 1.8 1.9 1.9
Private consumption 1.2 0.4 0.7 0.8 1.1 1.4
Fixed investment -7.6 -2.8 1.5 3.4 4.4 5.2
Stockbuilding (% of GDP) 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.8 1.1 0.8
Government consumption -0.7 -1.1 -0.9 0.1 1.3 2.3
Exports of goods and services 10.3 6.1 7.0 8.0 6.6 6.7
Imports of goods and services 5.4 1.9 4.7 7.0 7.0 7.0
Consumer prices 2.0 2.9 1.6 1.4 1.5 1.5
Unemployment rate (level) 20.1 20.6 20.0 19.2 18.6 17.7
Current account balance (% of GDP) -4.5 -3.7 -3.1 -2.8 -2.6 -2.1
Government budget (% of GDP) -9.2 -6.5 -4.7 -3.3 -2.8 -2.5
Government debt (% of GDP) 62.0 67.5 70.8 71.8 72.1 72.1
ECB main renancing rate (%) 1.0 1.3 2.3 3.1 3.5 3.9
Euro effective exchange rate (1995 = 100) 120.8 119.4 117.0 116.0 114.9 114.1
Exchange rate ($ per ) 1.33 1.36 1.28 1.25 1.24 1.23
Muted growth at the end of 2010
In the nal three months of 2010, Spanish GDP increased by just
0.2%, only a marginal improvement from the stagnation seen in
Q3 2010. The dynamic of the economy changed little through
2010, with domestic demand dragging down growth and net trade
providing only a small contribution. In 2010 as a whole, Spanish
GDP shrank by 0.1%, as the pull from foreign trade, which was
instrumental in lifting growth in other Eurozone countries, proved
too weak to counter the plunge in domestic demand.
The rst indications for 2011 do not point to a major turnaround.
The Purchasing Managers Index (PMI) for March suggested that
output only increased on account of foreign orders, while spare
capacity remained large. Meanwhile, the services PMI pointed to
only a tiny increase in activity. Both sectors reported a contraction
in labor force. As a result, the unemployment rate has continued to
increase this year, to 20.4% in January (on the International Labor
Organization measure).
and GDP to increase by just 0.6% in 2011
Spanish GDP is forecast to grow by just 0.6%, markedly lower than
the Eurozone average. In 2012, growth is unlikely to exceed 1.1%.
Subdued domestic demand and a positive contribution from net
trade should continue.
Household income is expected remain under pressure from
stubbornly high unemployment, which is not likely to decline
signicantly from its current levels, and from the adverse effects of
the cuts in public sector wages and government transfers that are
part of the scal consolidation process. Growth in private sector
wages are going to be limited by unemployment and the cap
agreed in 2010. In addition, savings are expected to remain high at
around 13% of disposable income, as uncertainty about
employment should encourage precautionary savings. In addition,
deleveraging of the Spanish household sector has barely started.
Household debt has fallen only marginally from the pre-crisis peak
and remains at 90% of GDP, around 20 percentage points (ppt)
above the Eurozone average. As a consequence, privateconsumption is expected to increase by just 0.4% this year.
Investment to continue its slide as the construction
sector remains weak
Investment is expected continue its fall and, in 2011, being 2.8%
lower than the year before. The recovery in exports seen in 2010
has restored protability in the manufacturing sector somewhat;
together with relatively better prospects for demand, this should
help limit the slide in non-residential investment.
By contrast, residential investment is expected decrease by more
than 12% this year. And we do not expect it to start rising before
2013. Saddled with strained balance sheets, the construction
industry faces quite bleak prospects.
The fall in house prices is likely to continue, as price-to-rent ratios
suggest that housing is still overvalued. Tax incentives for house
purchases in place until the end of 2010 and low interest rates are
Source: Oxford Economics
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3Ernst & Young Eurozone Forecast Spring 2011 Spain
likely to have prevented a steeper fall in prices so far. As these
factors no longer support the housing markets, very large declines
in prices seem likely. Moreover, despite the pickup in sales seen in
Q3 2010 (due to the anticipation of the end of tax incentives), the
backlog of unsold homes remains large. According to Bank of
Spains estimates, there are between 700,000 and over a million
unsold homes, corresponding to over three years worth of sales.
Moreover, credit conditions remain tight. According to the latest
Bank of Spains Bank Lending Survey for Q1 2011, the signicant
tightening seen in the rst part of 2010 has not been relaxed, and
the majority of banks continue to report an increase in interest
margins. Tighter and more costly credit is expected to act as an
additional drag on domestic demand and, in turn, threaten the
relative stability of the banking sector.
Investment is forecast to increase by only 1.5% in 2012 and may
accelerate to 3.4% the following year.
Only net exports to provide a positive contribution
to growth
Given bleak prospects for domestic demand, only exports could
provide some pull to the economy, but Spanish exporters have to
grapple with structural competitiveness problems. Between 1999
and 2010, Spains real exchange rate has appreciated by 22%, as
opposed to the 2% appreciation of the Eurozone average and the
over 10% depreciation experienced in Germany. Wage moderation
is expected to bring about some small competitiveness gains going
forward, but undoing the losses accumulated in the past decade
requires substantial improvements in productivity resulting from
structural reforms, which take time to implement and bear fruitonly slowly.
All in all, in the medium term, the Spanish economy is expected see
growth rates much lower than those enjoyed in the boom years,
and we forecast GDP growth below 2% per year until 2015.
Infationexpectedtocomebackdown
Subdued domestic demand should put a lid on ination in the
medium term. The rise in ination since the end of 2010, which
has seen consumer prices increase by 3% year on year in January
(harmonized measure), has been mostly accounted for by the spike
in energy prices and last Julys increase in VAT. Ination should
remain above 3% during H1, but it is expected to come back down
later this year in line with the forecast moderation in energy prices
and as the impact of the VAT increase drops out of the
calculations, averaging 2.9% for the year as a whole. In the medium
term, ination is projected to remain below the Eurozone average,
at around 1.5%, as Spain tries to regain competitiveness.
Health of the banking sector key uncertainty
Our baseline forecast assumes a gradual but effective resolution ofthe problems affecting the banking sector. Some important policy
measures have been taken and, on the whole, the situation has
improved since the nal months of 2010, but the possibility of a
marked deterioration, leading possibly to a state bailout, cannot be
ruled out. The health of the banking sector constitutes a key risk to
our forecast.
The most important policy initiatives taken are aimed at
overhauling the regional savings banking sector (cajas), in order to
tackle its low capitalization and large dependence on wholesale
funding. At the beginning of 2010, the Government implemented a
series of reforms aimed at strengthening the sector, by mergingthe cajas and improving their governance. The number of banks
has dropped from 45 to 17, and average total assets per institution
have more than doubled, which should improve efciency.
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012
% year
Industrial
production
GDP Forecast
5
10
15
20
25
1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012
%
Forecast
Figure 1
GDP and industrial production
Figure 2
Unemployment rate
Source: Oxford Economics Source: Oxford Economics
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4 Ernst & Young Eurozone Forecast Spring 2011 Spain
Fiscal consolidation on track, but growth is still missing
Moreover, in February 2011, new measures were put in place to
strengthen capitalization. Banks will have to raise the capital needed
on the market, sell assets or tap temporarily into a government-
sponsored fund that would amount to a partial nationalization.
According to central bank estimates, the capital shortfall to be lled
by public money will not exceed a manageable 20 billion, but
other analyses put the amount of resources needed as high as
100 billion, given the uncertainty surrounding the quality of assets
linked to the construction sector. Such a sum would far exceed the
amount of resources set aside by the Government to restructure
the banking sector and would jeopardize scal restructuring.
Meanwhile, Spanish banks have succeeded in regaining access to
the interbank market and have greatly reduced their dependence
on the European Central Bank (ECB). In January 2011, loans from
the ECB have dropped to 53 billion, less than half the amount
borrowed at the peak last June. However, the weak economic
situation is continuing to erode the quality of banks assets. InDecember 2010, the ratio of NPLs to total credit climbed to a
15-year high of 5.8%. Bad loans may continue to increase as they
normally lag economic activity.
An additional source of risk stems from the large exposure of the
Spanish banking sector to Portugal. According to analysts
estimates, Spanish banks own roughly a third of Portugals foreign
debt (which is 60% of total debt). Any loss triggered by a
Portuguese debt restructuring would inevitably have a sharp
adverse impact on Spanish banks balance sheets.
Fiscal consolidation appears on track
Better news is coming from public nances. Preliminary data for
2010 shows that the ambitious scal consolidation plan is
proceeding according to schedule. The budget decit for 2010 has
been contained to an estimated 9.2% of GDP. If scal discipline
continues to be enforced, budget decit will shrink to 6.5% of GDP
in 2011, not too far from the Governments 6% target.
However, most of the improvement has come so far from the
better-than-expected performance of the central government.
According to the Ministry of Finance, more than half of the regions
(including the biggest one, Catalunya) have missed their decit
reduction targets and will be obliged to step up the scal
retrenchment measures in 2011.
Yet, the improvement in scal balances has so far failed to impress
bond markets, which remain nervous, as the Government has to
roll over nearly 25% of total debt this year. At over 200bp by the
beginning of March, spreads over German Bunds have fallen byless than 50bp from the peak observed in the nal months of last
year. While they remain low in comparison to those on Portuguese
and Irish bonds, the burden of interest payments on government
nances remains substantial. These latent tensions in the Spanish
government bond markets imply that any slippage in scal
consolidation, for instance from regional governments, could have
a signicant impact on the cost of borrowing and the sustainability
of public nances.
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-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015
% year
Forecast
GDP
Net exports
Domestic
demand
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
% of GDP
Forecast
Government debt(right-hand side)
Government budget balance(left-hand side)
% of GDP
Figure 3
Contributions to GDP growth
Figure 4
Government balance and debt
Source: Oxford Economics Source: Oxford Economics
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