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ISA 51ST ANNUAL CONFERENCE

THEORY VS. POLICY? CONNECTING SCHOLARS AND PRACTITIONERS

European Union Conflict Management policy - Case of Georgia

Kornely K. Kakachia

Associate Professor, Tbilisi State University

Department of Political Science

kkakachia@yahoo.com

Paper prepared for International Studies Association 2010: Annual Convention,

New Orleans, February 20, 2010.

draft paper

(SC18)

Impacting Policy Makers: Conflict and Human Rights. Panel discussion. 1:45 PM

Abstract. In less than two decades, International conflict management has become a permanent feature of International

relations and consequently of European Security policy. The main aim of the EU, as stated in its draft treaty, is peace. Thus

conflict resolution p The extensive empirical

involvement of international organizations in attempts at conflict management and prevention, which often see this as

one of their main security tasks and the frequent calls to increase their involvement, as well as the simultaneous relative

lack of systematic comparative research on their involvement in these situations constitute the starting point for this

paper. Paper deals with EU conflict management policy and its effectiveness promoting peace and stability in its backyard

and specifically in Georgia.

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Since the beginning of the European Community, there have been ambitions to develop

Europe into a significant foreign policy actor with its own security and defense policy. The

development of an independent European defense is a key to fulfilling this goal and in fact

Security and defense is the area in which the EU has advanced most in recent years. At the same

time it is a more or less openly stated goal that the EU will also become stronger in military

terms and develop a capacity to intervene far away from its own region. One of the challenging

tasks of European Union is an international crisis management and conflict resolution issues.1

Until recently, the scholarly literature has remained rather underdeveloped in its

conceptualization of the EU as a purposive actor in conflict resolutions.2 However, recent years

studies that focus on the role of the European Union in the resolution of various conflicts have 3 and combined in

their analyses the indirect effects of integration and association with the purposive interventions

of the EU in conflicts.4

In general, crisis management relates to exceptional situations in international politics when

preventive measures have failed and as such it is a response to an actual treat.5 An important

assumption underlying any European approach to international crisis management is that

international crisis often poses a double political problem: EU member states have to arrive at a

common position about what needs to be done about the crisis, and they have to organize

themselves in such a way that, as a collective, they are effective.

1 Conflict resolution scholars offer a variety of intervention options at various levels of conflict. See C.

A. Crocker intervention: toward Best practices and holistic view in C. A. Crocker, F. O. Hampson and

P. All (eds) , Turbulent peace: The challenges of managing International conflict (united States

Institute of Peace, Washington. DC.,2001; D. U. Eralp and N Beriker, Assessing conflict resolution

potential of the EU: The Cyprus conflict and Accession Negotiations. 2005 36 Security dialogue,

pp.175-192; N. Popescu. EU and the Eastern Neighbourhood: Reluctant Involvement in Conflict

Resolution. 2009 Kluwer Law international BV. European Foreign Affairs Review 14; pp. 457 -477;

N.Tocci. The EU and conflict Resolution promo ting peace in the backyard. Routledge. 2007 2 Perhaps the underdeveloped status of the literature could be explained by the fact that until

recently the EU itself was quite hesitant and timid to intervene directly in interstate and intrastate

disputes. 3 G. Noutcheva, N. Tocci, B. Coppieters, T. Kovziridze, M. Emerson and M.Huysseune,

Europeanization and secessionist Conflicts: Concepts and Theories. 2004. Journal on Ethnopolitics

and Minority Issues in Europe, special Focus 1, pp. 1 -35 4 Ayse Betul Celik and Bahar Rumelili. Necessary but not sufficient: The role of the EU in resolving

-Turkish Conflicts. Kluwer Law international BV. European

Foreign Affairs Review11: 2006. 203 -222. See also C. Hill, The EUs Capacity for conflict Prevention.

2001. 6 EFA Rev,pp. 315 -333; and N. Tocci, EU intervention in ethno -political conflicts: The cases of

Cyprus and Serbia -Montenegro. 2004. 9 EFA Rev. Pp.551 -573. 5 Mark Houben. International Crisis Management, The approach of European S tates. 2005. p. 3

Introduction

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While, European Union is comparatively new actor in the field of conflict management since the

mid-1990s it has largely followed the global trend among international organizations of

reforming its structures and building capacities for conflict prevention and management.6 To

have peace within the EU means, to a great extent to have peace outside of it which means that

if a degree of peacefulness does not surround the EU, then those living in non-peaceful

conditions will seek for more peaceful environment in the EU or elsewhere rather than at home.

In order to enhance the peacefulness within the EU as well as outside of it, it is quintessential to

have, especially in the still very diverse but still also divided EU, a solid common basis.7

The Unions foreign policy instruments are well placed to promote structural peace in the

neighborhood. In particular, EU contractual relations-ranging from accession process to looser

forms of association-can play a constructive role in conflict resolution. Moreover, in relation to

third countries the Union is providing the key enablers for peace and stability, ranging from

military operations to police, monitoring and rule-of-law missions. It aims not only strengthening

and enforcing economic development, but also the respect of human rights, democratic values

and the rule of law. For that purpose, the EU has launched various cooperation programs,

designed to assist political and economic transformation in all parts of the world, but in

particular with regard to the Mediterranean area, to Central and Eastern Europe as well as to

the Balkans.8 In some cases, this includes the prospect of EU membership; thus, the EU

enlargement process itself can be seen as a measure of structural conflict prevention (see

Rummel 1996).9

However, i widely believed that the EU continued to largely mismanage the area that the

Lisbon Treaty defines as the Union's top priority - peace. According to Oberg the Treaty itself

defines peace and security predominantly through a military prism and suggests military means

as main conflict-management tools rather than conflict understanding, dialogue, negotiations

and reconciliation. To put it bluntly the Treaty's peace understanding is not state-of-the art and

light years behind the decade-old UN Charter.10

All above said regional stability in European neighborhood is one of the strategic goals of the

European Union. The neighborhood policy presents the EU with huge economic opportunities

6 Ulrich Schneckener, Developing and Applying EU Crisis Management. Test Case Macedonia, ECMI

working paper #14; January 2002, p.3 7 Francesco Marelli, Proposal for a Different European Security Strategy.European Peace University,

Austria p.1 http://www.transnational.org/Resources_EU/Marelli_DiffSecStrategyEU.pdf (accessed on

18 November, 2009) 8 e.g. Phare, Tacis, Meda or Cards programs 9 Rummel, Reinhardt, 1996: "The European Union's Politico -Diplomatic Contribution to the

Prevention of Ethno -National Conflict", in: Chayes/Chayes, 197 -235. (accessed on 23 November, 2009) 10 For the analysis to back up this judgement, see Jan Oberg, Does the European Union Promote

Peace? Analysis, critique and alternatives, The Transnational Foundation & New Agenda,

Copenhagen 2006-

http://www.transnational.org/SAJT/forum/meet/2006/Oberg_EU_P romote_Peace.pdf(accessed on 10

December, 2009)

http://www.transnational.org/Resources_EU/Marelli_DiffSecStrategyEU.pdf

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Beyond

the EUs self image as a normative power which promotes values abroad as ends in themselves,

the EU also has strong interest in promoting peace, democracy and successful transformation in

its near abroad.11 In this respect the EU enlargement process has turned out to be hugely

successful. Especially in the case of the former communist countries that entered the EU in

2004, the lure of membership represented the best incentive to accompany the political and

economic transition of these countries. Their domestic transformation provided the means for

EU to stabilize the region. And overall European political and diplomatic profile emerged

enormously strengthened.12

While EU transformative powers works effectively, violent conflicts in neighborhood threaten

conflicts arise due to a complex set of variables coming together and reinforcing each other at

ment. Conflicts can reduce

growth and discourage investment, destroy human and physical capital, redirect natural

resources to nonproductive uses, and cause a dramatic deterioration in the quality of life.

Furthermore, in the public sector, funds that might otherwise be invested in public goods

necessary for growth are spent on security. And last but not least in countries undergoing

political transition in EU neighborhood, violent conflict has the potential to undermine popular

support for democracy. For these reasons, EU is promoting transformational development and

strengthening fragile regions while supporting EU strategic interests. European Union also is

giving substantial attention to conflict mitigation and management.

Georgia is of fundamental relevance for the EU-not only for reasons of energy security that becomes increasingly important in EU security thinking, but also because Georgia embodies all the (positive and negative) challenges that EU faces as a security actor at the beginning of 21st century.13 of the Georgian government that relations with the EU constitute a major priority of Georgian foreign policy, have made the stability of Georgia a crucial issue in the EU's external relations. With the post revolutionary new government in Georgia, new prospects for the spread of democracy and economic reforms suddenly appeared. However, Russian invasion of Georgia in August 2008 and setback of Georgian democracy revealed fact that while the vast majority of the Georgian people emphatically assert their commitment to European institutions and values, they also understand that these values have not sufficiently taken root in Georgia.14 Georgia is an aspiring democracy, not a consolidated one.

11 Manners, I. Normative power Europe: A contradiction in Terms?, Journal of Common Market

Studies, 2002. P.235 -38 12 For additional assessment of EU transformative power see: Fabrizio Tassinari. Why Europe Fea rs

its neighbors. 2009. p. 1 -9 13 Dov Lynch, Why Georgia matters, in Chaillot Paper, no.86, Paris, February 2006, p.8 14 Ghia Nodia. Russian War and Georgian Democracy, August 22, 2008.

http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/russian -war -and-georgian-democracy (accessed on 8 December,

2009)

http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/russian-war-and-georgian-democracy

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-Soviet

transformation. Indeed the EU is quite clear that one of its objectives in working with Georgia is

ect for human rights in a bid to ensure the 15 for Georgia and the wider region. Generally EU agrees that the Georgian

people share a common destiny with the other peoples of Europe, and that the long term

integration of Georgia into European structures is in the interest of both the EU and Georgia. But

lack of enthusiasm to offer the prospect of membership and its fear of upsetting

Russia has prevented it from thinking strategically about Georgia. Nor has the EU used its

transformative power to underpin reforms in Georgia.16

The paper aims to evaluate the impact of European Union (EU) conflict management policy in

Georgia in order to trace the question of a stronger EU role in conflict resolution, that would not

on a key to the

effectiveness of any external assistance, but also to its proclamation to become more engaged in

conflict resolution itself. Moreover, it explores Member St

South Caucasus because they are relevant for the development of EU activities in the region. It is

also intends to analyze including relations with

Russia and its postwar activities in Georgia.

EU-Russian relationship in Post Soviet space and implications for Georgian Foreign Policy

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, in the period of 1991-94, international organizations

and Western powers started to slowly enter the former Soviet space by opening up regional

offices and local representations. However, apart from symbolic and rather limited activities, the

international community did not take great interest in the fate of the newly independent states.

To the contrary, the persistent Soviet legacy contributed to the perception of these emerging

new states as Russian satellites that belonged to the Russian sphere of influence and required no

external interference in their internal troubles.

The above position of the international community coincided with the active phase of ethno-

political conflicts in the region, allowing power to

mediate the conflicts and even use them for furthering Russia's own strategic interests. As

successor to the Soviet Union, the Kremlin tried to exert control over the new states as if

they were still vassals and tried to keep out foreign influences. Moreover, instead of

fulfilling the function of peacemaker among the various Post Soviet nationalities, Russia took

15 European Union, European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument Georgia Country

Strategy 2007 -2013 http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi_csp_georgia_en.pdf (accessed on

November 29, 2009) 16 Mark Leonard and Charles Grant. ,,

Centre for European Reform; policy brief. Sept.2005 p.3

http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi_csp_georgia_en.pdf

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sides to favor one nationality over another. That only deepened regional conflicts and prompted

participants to search for support and protection in other regions.17

Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the European Union and the Russian Federation have

found it increasingly difficult to develop an institutionalized relationship. The current agenda of

the EU-Russian partnership is full of questions of strategic choice, including, whether and to

what extent Russia it is willing and able to Europeanize itself, i.e. to converge on modern

European values and standards; whether it is willing and able to be part of EU Neighborhood

Policy. While the EU's most successful foreign policy tool is enlargement, it cannot and will not

offer Russia membership, nor is Russia interested in this. Russia sees itself as an independent

player, a regional great power with global aspirations.

In its foreign policy, Russia prioritizes geostrategic and military issues rather than economics, as

would any country that sits on the world's second largest nuclear arsenal but ranks only 16th on

the list of the world's top economies. While, many EU policymakers and most Brussels

bureaucrats believe in postmodern ideas of statecraft, such as mutual interests, shared

sovereignty and win-win solutions, Russia's foreign policy establishment remains wedded to old-

fashioned concepts such as spheres of influence, zero-sum games and strict reciprocity. And the

two sides also have a diametrically opposed approach to the rule of law. Rules and their equal

application are at the heart of the European integration process, while many Russians still

believe in the law of power rather than the power of law.18

Today, EU-Russia relations are characterized by mutual disillusionment and have encountered

numerous stumbling blocks since the 1990s, some with long-lasting effects upon bilateral

relations, such as the Georgian-Russian conflict, energy issue debacles, as well as the frozen

NATO-Russia dialog as most significant amongst others. One of the main divides between Russia

and the EU is the lack of collective bargaining power amongst the states of the latter vis--vis the

former. Some of the EU members see a resurgent Russia as a threat. Others, however, believe it

should not be upset.

The Russian-

of the South Caucasus region as a new flashpoint in the common neighborhood between Russia

and the European Union (EU). What has made the conflict in Georgia so crucial to the EU is the

fact that this is not to be seen as an isolated occurrence. The incidence has repercussions

throughout a region that is marked by a plethora of challenges to political stability and

democratic consolidation-factors that directly affect European security and welfare. Moreover,

Russia's overwhelming military defeat of Georgia made the role and security of current or future

17 Yevgeny Bazhanov. A Smarter Caucasus Policy, Moscow Times, December 3, 2009 p. 2

http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/a -smarter -caucasus-policy/390791.html (accessed on

December 8, 2009)

18 Katinka Barysch, Whither EU -Russian Relations? The Moscow Times, 21 May 2004

http://www.cer.org.uk/articles/barysch_moscowtimes_21may04.html (accessed on January 7,2010)

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pipelines running through that country an issue that weighs heavily on the minds of many in the

EU.

By asserting a sphere of influence, strategists in Moscow hoped to prompt a suitably deferential

reaction from the West, including, perhaps, regional withdrawal.19

not result in such a retreat, and was in fact seen as a challenge to Euro-Atlantic security, it did

not justify NATO intervention. Kremlin also took notice that although French President Nicolas

Sarkozy, whose country then held the rotating Presidency, played the central role in negotiating

a ceasefire between Russia and Georgia, the EU collectively took Georgia's side over the five-day

war, something that has not been forgotten in Moscow.

In contrast to Russia's clear opposition to NATO enlargement, Russia has not yet actively

opposed the EU's enlargement. Moscow has, however, been increasingly uneasy about the

impact of the new EU members on the EU's attitude towards Russia.20 There are deep-seated

doubts that the EU is attempting to undermine Russia's geopolitical dominance in Eastern

Europe and Caucasus.21 Russia

program (EaP),22 which aims to draw the six post-Soviet states of Eastern Europe and the

Caucasus closer to the EU by improving human rights, easing visa regulations, and ensuring

energy security. The EaP is seen by some Russian experts as the EU's attempt to withdraw six

post-Soviet states from Russia's sphere of influence and establish a sort of protectorate for these

countries.

Another reason of the EU interest in the EaP is the construction of alternative oil and gas

pipelines bypassing Russia e.g. Nabucco or White Stream. Georgia and Ukraine are considered

important transit countries, while Azerbaijan can serve both as a source of, and transit point for,

energy supplies. In general, while Moscow's attitude towards the EU fluctuate, all this kind

strategic perceptions and misperceptions plays important role in EU policy initiatives aimed to

enhance regional security in South Caucasus.

19 More details on Russo -Georgian present relationship see: Kornely Kakachia. Can Russia win

ideological battle in Georgia? PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 67.

http://ceres.georgetown.edu/esp/ponarsmemos/page/78361.html (accessed on February 8, 2010)

20 European security and Russia, House of commons, Defence Committee - Tenth Report ,

30 June 2009 Russia: a new confrontation? http://www.parliament.the -stationery -

office.co.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect /cmdfence/276/ 27602.htm (accessed on January 8, 2010)

21 Alexander Sergunin. EU and Russia: an Eastern Partnership Muddling on? Opendemocracy.com.

28 January 2010. http://www.opendemocracy.net/od -russia/alexander -sergunin/eu -and-russia -eastern -

partnership -muddling -on (accessed on 1 February, 2010)

22 The Eastern Partnership is an organization aiming to improve the political and economic trade -

relations of the six Post-Soviet states of "strategic im portance" - Moldova, Azerbaijan,

Ukraine, Belarus, Armenia and Georgia with the European Union. The Eastern Partnership and

European Neighborhood policies of the EU are initiatives to help provide incentives to countries in

the region to become closer to th e EU and Western norms. Such measures have included the

promotion of democracy and good governance, funding for projects to reduce socio -economic

imbalances and increase stability, and fostering alignment with EU declarations in the Common

Foreign and Secu rity Policy arena on a case -by-case basis.

http://ceres.georgetown.edu/esp/ponarsmemos/page/78361.htmlhttp://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/alexander-sergunin/eu-and-russia-eastern-partnership-muddling-onhttp://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/alexander-sergunin/eu-and-russia-eastern-partnership-muddling-on