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eScholarship provides open access, scholarly publishing

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Center for the Study of Law and Society

Jurisprudence and Social Policy Program

UC Berkeley

Title:

The Rule of Law and the European Human Rights Regime

Author:

Goldstein, Leslie, University of Delaware and Visiting Scholar for the Center for the Study of Lawand Society, UC BerkeleyBan, Cornel, University of Delaware

Publication Date:

07-01-2003

Series:

JSP/Center for the Study of Law and Society Faculty Working Papers

Publication Info:

JSP/Center for the Study of Law and Society Faculty Working Papers, Center for the Study of Lawand Society Jurisprudence and Social Policy Program, UC Berkeley

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TOAPPEARIN

ContendingPerspectivesonGlobalGovernance:Coherence,Contestation,andWorldOrder,

ed.MattHoffmanandAliceBa,forthcoming2004.

THERULEOFLAWANDTHEEUROPEANHUMANRIGHTSREGIME

byLeslieFriedmanGoldsteinandCornelBan

DepartmentofPoliticalScienceandInternationalRelations,UniversityofDelaware

Preface(andConclusion)

Manyofthechaptersinthiscollectionseeglobalgovernanceasareferencetotheway

theglobeasawholeglobalsystemisgoverned--inotherwords,asthewaythatso-called

international,orinter-statesystemsareorderedtheworldover.Thischapter,bycontrast,fits

intothatgroupofthechapters(whichincludesthosebyRosenau,Young,andOBrien)thatsee

globalgovernanceasaboutsayingandseeingthatgovernancetakesplaceontheglobeto

anincreasingdegree(notonlybystateandinterstateactors,butalso)bysuprastate,non-state,

andsubstateactors.Thischapterinparticularexaminesthestrengtheningofoneofthese

disaggregatedspheresofauthority(inthephraseofJamesRosenau),oneofthearenas

wheremodesofregulatinghumanbehaviorthatwerepreviouslymonopolizedbystate

sovereignshasbeentakenoverbyatrans-stateactor,theEuropeanCourtofHumanRights.

Weseethestructureofglobalgovernanceasinfactanabsenceofstructureamong

thesedisaggregatedspheres,andtheprocessofglobalgovernanceasvaryingfromoneto

anothersphere.Withintraditionalinternationalorganizations,governanceisexercisedwiththe

rangeoftraditionaltoolsofinternationalrelations,althoughthesetoolsarenowoftenwielded

byanumberofnon-traditionalagents,suchasNGOs.Inaddition,trans-stateregimesof

governancehavemovedrecentlyintoprominence:some,intherealmofpoliticaleconomy

(e.g.,thoseoftheWorldBankandtheIMF);others,intherealmoftrans-statelaw,enforcedby

trans-statecourts.


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Thischapterzeroesinononeofthelatter,inordertoaddressaquestionposedinthe

chapterbyOranYoung:What,inatrans-stateregime,makesforregimeeffectiveness?

Specifically,bywhatprocessesdotrans-statelegalregimesmanagetotakehold?(Wedonot

addressinthischapterthepriorquestionwhysuchtrans-statejudicialgovernanceregimesget

putintoplaceatall;alargeliteratureonthissubjecthasalreadyaccumulated:Moravscik2000

andcitationsinGoldstein2001,Ch.6).

Thevantagepointfromwhichweexaminethegrowthandentrenchmentofthistrans-state

regimeisthatofpubliclaw.Thischapterfocusesonasingletrans-state,rule-of-lawregime,one

implementedbyamixoftrans-stateactorsoftheCouncilofEuropeanddomesticpoliticaland

legalinstitutions,allofwhomarechargedwithmakingandenforcinglaw.

Ourperspectiveonthisparticularpieceofglobalgovernance,andotherslikeit--i.e.,those

regimesconstructedandgovernedbytransnationalcourts,thenormslegitimatingthemandthe

normstheypropound,andtheactorsandinstitutionsthatimplementthesenormschangedin

thecourseofresearchingandwritingthischapter.Webeganpersuadedbythethesisof

variousscholarsininternationalrelations(hereafterIR)thattheareaswherethesetrans-state

judicialregimesmostsuccessfullymanagetotakeholdandtoalterthebehavioroferstwhile

sovereignstatesarethosestateswheredomesticculturealreadyexhibitsawell-entrenched

commitmenttotheruleoflaw.Inotherwords,wesawdomesticcultureatthesociety-wide

levelasdecisiveinshapingthereceptivityofagivenstatetosubordinatingitselftogovernance

byoneofthetrans-statejudiciariesthathavebeenproliferatingandgrowinginstrengtharound

theturnofthetwenty-firstcentury.

Theresearchinthischapterchangedourviewpoint.Wenowbelievethatamultiplicityof

causalvariablesshapethelikelihoodofregimeeffectivenessinthesejudiciallydominatedtrans-

stateregimes:Thedegreeofrule-of-lawcultureisimportant,butitsimpactcanbetrumpedor

bluntedbysuchphenomenaasstrongpoliticalleadership(asitwasinourstudy,onthepartof

judgesonconstitutionalcourtsaswellasindomesticexecutivebranchesandlegislatures)orby


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politicalforcesexogenoustothejudicialsystems(suchas,inourstudy,trans-statepolitical

mood,atleastamongelectedmember-stateleadersduringthemid-tolate-1980s).

1.Introduction

TheEuropeanCourtofHumanRights(hereafterECtHRortheCourt,orStrasbourg,its

home)wasfoundedin1959withinthestructureoftheCouncilofEurope(COE),agroupof

Europeancountriescommittedtotheprotectionofhumanrights(originally,Belgium,Denmark,

France,Ireland,Italy,Luxembourg,theNetherlands,Norway,SwedenandtheUnitedKingdom).

TheECtHRwastofunctionasinterpreterofthe1953EuropeanConventionofHumanRights

(hereafterECHRortheConvention).TheConventionregimebegandesignedlygradually,with

acumbersomeenforcementsystem,manyopt-outpossibilitiesonparticularrights,andan

enforcingcourtthatmetonlytemporarily.(Inthestatesthatchose toaccepttherightof

individualpetition,individualscouldfilecomplaintsagainsttheHighContractingPartiesfor

allegedhumanrightsviolations.Inter-statecomplaintswerealsopermittedagainstanymember

state.ThecomplaintswerefirstreviewedforadmissibilitybytheCommission,aquasi-judicial

body,andifnofriendlysettlementoccurred,theCommissionwouldissueareportstatingthe

factsofthecaseanditsopiniononthemeritsandsendittotheCommitteeofMinisters.Then,

theCommissionand/oranycontractingstateconcernedhadtherighttobringthecasebefore

theCourtforfinaladjudicationwithinthreemonthsfollowingthetransmissionofthereporttothe

CommitteeofMinisters.IfthecasewerenotreferredtotheECtHR,theCommitteeofMinisters

coulddecidewhethertherehadbeenaviolationofthehumanrightsprotectedbythe

Convention.IftheCommitteefoundaviolation,itwouldobligethestatetopaycompensation

tothevictimofthatviolation.IftheECtHRdidhandlethecase,itsdecisionwasfinal.The

CommitteehadtheresponsibilityofmonitoringtheexecutionoftheECtHRsjudgment.The

CouncilofEuropedramaticallystrengthenedthisenforcementsysteminthe1990s,asexplained

below.Asof2003,theAmericanConventiononHumanRights,fortheOrganizationof

AmericanStates,anothertrans-stateregime,operatesinmuchthesameformatastheearly


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ECHR.)Notuntiltheearly1970sdidtheECtHRbegintoissuedecisionswithrealteethinthem

i.e.,decisionsthatproducedpromptpolicycorrectionsbyoffendinggovernments(e.g.,De

Wilde,OomsandVersypv.Belgium,judgment18June1971--legalreformon6Aug.1971;

Ringeisenv.Austria,judgment16July1971promptreversalbyConstitutionalCourt;Golderv.

theUnitedKingdom,judgment21Feb.1975reformon22June1976).

Bytheendof1998,however,theECtHRbecameapermanentcourtandtherightof

individualstopetitionthecourtforviolations,whichhadnotevenexisteduntil1994,now

becamemandatoryonallCOEmembercountries. (Thestepsofchangewereasfollows:

Protocol9,1994,enabledindividualapplicantstobringtheircasesdirectlytotheCourtsubject

toagreementtothissystembytherespondentStateandalsotoacceptanceofthecasebya

ScreeningPanel.ProtocolNo.11,effectiveinNovember1998,replacedtheCommissionwith

whatwasnowapermanentECtHR.Nowtheobligationtopermitindividualcitizenstotake

humanrightscomplaintstothiscourtbecamemandatoryforallsignatoriestotheConvention;

nolongercouldstatesoptout.www.echr.coe.int).ThustheECtHRbecameaneffectiveco-

directoroftheECHRlegalregime,inunofficialpartnershipwiththeEuropeanCourtofJustice

(hereafterECJ),thecourtoftheEuropeanUnionwhoseowndoctrineobligesittohonorthe

ECHRwhenevertheConventionisrelevant.

ByapplyingablendofIRapproacheswithpubliclawanalyses,asrecommendedinrecent

yearsbyanumberofinfluentialIRandinternationallawscholarsofdifferingtheoretical

approaches(Abbot1989;Koskenniemi1990;Slaughter1993;Finnemore1996;Koh1997;Ress-

Smit1997;Keohane1997and2000;Slaughteretal.1998;Byers2000),thispaperexaminesthe

extenttowhichrulesderivedfromthisConventionhavebecomeembeddedinthedomestic

legalorderofthememberstates.Weviewthesetofrulesandtheorganizationalstructure

createdaroundtheConventionasatransnationallegalregime,onegroundedinpost-

EnlightenmentEuropeanculture.AlthoughthatculturehadobviouslybeenscarredbyWorld

WarIIandthecircumstancesthatledtoit, 1thePreambleoftheConventionnonetheless


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explicitlyidentifieditsownfoundationasthespiritualandmoralvalueswhicharethecommon

heritageoftheEuropeanpeopleandthetruesourceofindividualfreedom,politicallibertyand

therule-of-lawprinciplesthatformthebasisofallgenuinedemocracy(Emphasisadded.

www.coe.int).

WithintheIRliterature,acommonlyciteddefinitionofinternationalregimesisthatof

StephenKrasner:theyaresetsofissue-boundedimplicitorexplicitprinciples,norms,rulesand

decision-makingproceduresaroundwhichactorsexpectationsconverge(1983,2).(E.g.,One

oftheguidingprinciplesoftheECHRregimeasarticulatedbytheECtHRisthedoctrineofa

nationalmarginofappreciation;itstatesthatthepreeminenceofagivenConventionnorm

mustbeweighedagainstnationalinterestsandrestrictedtothedegreenecessaryina

democraticsociety,Lawlessv.Ireland,ECtHR1981.Theanalyticframeworkofaninternational

regimereachesbeyondthetraditionalinternationallawstudiesoftheECtHRthatconfinetheir

researchfocustoitslegaldoctrine(e.g.Delmas-Marty1992;Clementsetal.1999;Yourow1996).

ThispaperviewstheConventionandtheCourtaspartofthebroaderEuropeanhumanrights

regime,whichincludesotherorganizationswithwhichtheCourtcooperatesclosely(the

CommitteeofMinisters)orloosely(theEuropeanCourtofJustice,theEuropeanCommission2).

Thisapproachprovidesamorecompletepictureoftheforcesatworkincreatingaruleoflaw

forEuropethanwouldbeavailablethroughmerelydoctrinalanalysis.

WelabeltheECHRregime(i.e.,theregimecreatedaroundtheConventionandtheCourt)

transnationalratherthaninternationalbecauseitsrules,normsandproceduresarenotconfined

tointerstateinteraction.Forinstance,thepartiestotheConventioncommittoavarietyofdue

processmeasuresinArticle5,whichlistconcludeswithfollowing:

Everyonewhoisarrestedshallbeinformedpromptly,inalanguagewhichhe

understands,ofthereasonsforhisarrestandthechargeagainsthim.Everyone

arrestedordetainedinaccordancewiththeprovisionsofparagraph1(c)ofthis

articleshallbebroughtpromptlybeforeajudgeorotherofficerauthorizedby


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lawtoexercisejudicialpowerandshallbeentitledtotrialwithinareasonable

timeortoreleasependingtrial.Releasemaybeconditionedbyguaranteesto

appearfortrial.Everyonewhoisdeprivedofhislibertybyarrestordetentionshall

beentitledtotakeproceedingsbywhichthelawfulnessofhisdetentionshallbe

decidedspeedilybyacourtandhisreleaseorderedifthedetentionisnotlawful.

Everyonewhohasbeenthevictimofarrestordetentionincontraventionofthe

provisionsofthisarticleshallhaveanenforceablerighttocompensation.

(Emphasisadded.)

Thus,thesestatespre-committhemselvestoallowthirdpartytransnationalinstitutionstohold

theirotherwisesovereigninstitutionsliableforcompensatorydamages,tothatdegree

abrogatingsovereignprerogatives.Clearly,thehierarchicalarrangementofthecombined

forceoftheCommitteeofMinistersandtheECtHRvisvisthedomesticcourtsthatimplement

theECtHRrulingsdiffersqualitativelyfromthesheerintergovernmentalismthattypifiespurely

internationalinstitutions.InsteadtheECHRregimestructuresnotsimplystate-to-staterelations

butmultiplepatternsofinteractionthosebetweenindividualsandthestate,between

elementsofcivilsocietyandstate,betweendomesticcourtsandnationalpolitical

constituencies,betweentheEUandindividualstates,andbetweentheECtHR/Committeeof

Ministersandeachoftheaforementionedcategories.TheConventionisoperationalized

primarilythoroughthemediumofdomesticlawandcourts(deBruynetal.1997,2-6),andfew

aspectsofdomesticpolicymakingpertainingtohumanrightsevadethereachofthe

Conventionanditsprotocols.WithintheECHRregime,statesroutinelyactupontheselimitations

oftheirownsovereigntybyconsciouslyshapingtheirpoliciesintopatternsadaptedtoECtHR

jurisprudence.

Significantly,thisisarule-of-lawregimeinthesensethatitgiveslifeviatheprovisionsofthe

Conventiontotheprinciplethattherelationshipsoftheindividualwiththestateshouldbe

regulatedbyaframeworkoflegalruleswhoseinterpretationandapplicationareinthehandsof


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independentjudgesandaretobeappliedeven-handedly(Merrills1993).Thisprincipleis

implicatednotonlyintheobviouscasesoftheprovisionsofArticle5(righttoliberty),Article6

(righttoafairtrial)andArticle7(noretrospectivecriminallaws)butbyallotherprovisionsofthe

Conventionandofits11additionalprotocols.

Thistransnationalregimehasenlargeditsjurisdictionintwosuccessivewavesofintegration.

Thefirstenlargementtookplaceinthe1970sandmovedsouthward.ItincludedSpain(a

dictatorshipfrom1936to1975)andPortugal(adictatorshipfrom1933to1974)--bothinitially

excludedfromtheEuropeanCommunityduetotheirperiodoffascistrulewhosignedthe

ConventiononthedayoftheiraccessiontotheCouncilofEurope,onNovember24,1977and

September22,1976,respectively.ThesamewaveincludedGreece,atthetime,recently

plaguedbyperiodsofinstabilityanddictatorship.(GreecehadsignedontotheConventionin

1950,butdidnotratifyitandthenwithdrewin1969,givingitpracticaleffectonlyin1974.) 3(This

expansionalsoincludedMalta,1967,Cyprus,1962,andSwitzerland,1974.WechoseGreece,

SpainandPortugalnotonlybecausetheyarebiggercountriesthanMaltaandCyprus,butalso

becausetheyrepresentedinterestingtransitionsfromdictatorialtorule-of-lawregimes.)

Thesecondenlargementtookplaceinthe1990s,whenallformercommuniststates,

includingRussia,wereadmittedtotheCouncilofEurope.Afterfiftytoseventyyearsofblatant

disregardforthevaluesprofessedbytheConvention,particularlyfortheruleoflaw,these

countriesformallyadoptedanalternativepoliticalandlegalparadigmfortheprotectionof

humanrights.ThenumberofCouncilofEuropemembersgrewfrom23attheendof1989to43

in2001,andthetotalpopulationofthememberstatesgrewfrom451to772million.Thenumber

ofapplicationstotheCourtgrewfrom1,013in1988to10,486(Report2001,4.)Since2001,three

newcountrieshavesignedontotheECHR:Bosnia,Armenia,andAzerbaijan.These

enlargementsexpandedthedemocraticWesternEuropeannormativecoreto800million

peoplelivingunderlegalregimesofremarkableheterogeneity.

Despitethevariegatedmosaicofdemocraticandlegaltraditionsamassedundertheaegis


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oftheCouncilofEurope,however,theECHRregimebythelateninetieswasbeingacclaimed

asastrikinglysuccessfultransnationalframeworkfortheprotectionoffundamentalhumanrights

andliberties(Gearty1997,x-xv).Itsverysuccessraisesintriguingquestions:Whatholdsit

together?Howdothecommonrule-of-lawstandardsoutlinedbytheEuropeanCourtofHuman

RightsinfactapplytocountriesasdifferentasEnglandandRomania?Isthisregimeembedded

uniformlyorunevenlyinthedomesticorderofthesignatorymembersoftheConvention?Ifitis

indeedunevenlyembedded,whatexplainsthevariations?ThebulkofECtHRstudieseither

describetheCourtsstructure,processesandjurisprudence(Merrills1993;Clements1999;Yourow

1996;RalphBeddard1993);orofferaseriesofcountrybycountrynon-analyticdescriptive

studiesofthereceptionofECtHRlaw(Gardner1993;Barkhuysen1999);ordoboth(Delmas-

Marty1992;Tavernier1996;andGearty1997).Wehavefoundonlytwoanalyticaccountsthat

attempttoexplainpatternsofcross-nationalvariationwithintheECHRregime(Drzemczewski

1983andLembert1999),andneitheroftheseexploresthevariableofexperiencewitharule-of-

lawculture

Toaddressthesequestions,webeganwithahypothesisbuiltontwofoundations.First,a

growingliteraturethatbeganinthemid-90sbothongeneralIRtheoryandspecificallyonEU

integrationpointstotheimportanceofrule-of-law-cultures(Seurin1994,625-636;Weiler1994;

Slaughter1995;Moravscik1995;Shaw1996;Alter1996,476;HelferandSlaughter1997;Goldstein

1996;1997;and2001,158-60).IfthereisvalidityintheclaimsoftheEUandIRliterature

postulatingaconnectionbetweenliberal,rights-respecting,rule-of-lawcultures,ontheone

hand,andacceptanceofintegrationintotheECJandECtHRlegalregimes,ontheother,then

weshouldfindlongerseniorityintheEU(becausethelatterisanassociationofliberal,rights-

respectingcountries)correlatedwithmorecompleteembeddingoftheECHRregime.(This

hypothesisisnotameretautology:Astrongdomesticruleoflawculturedoesnotnecessarily

implyawillingnesstoabrogatetraditionalelementsofsovereigntytothedegreenecessaryfor

acceptanceoftrans-orsupra-nationallegalauthorities.IndeedtheFrenchSupreme


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AdministrativeCourt,theConseildEtat,fordecadesinsistedthatFrenchlawmeantprecisely

thatFrenchsovereigntymustberetained,and,onthisground,openlyresistedclaimsofauthority

fromthetransnationalECJ[Goldstein2001;Alter2001,158-59].)Secondly,theveryfactof

membershipintheEEC/EC/EUhasentailedinvolvementwithpoliticalandlegalprocessesthat

forhalfacenturyhavebeenentrenchingprinciplesoflegitimacythattransfersovereignpower

tosupranationalinstitutions.Onecanplausiblyassumethatsuchinvolvementovertimewould

strengthenamemberstate'stransnationalcommitmenttoaEuropeanlegalidentity,onethat

includesprotectionforfundamentalrights.

Boththeseobservationssupportanexpectationthatthecountrieswithlongesttenureinthe

EEC->EUsystemwouldbetheonesthatmorefullyembeddedtheECHRregimeintotheir

domesticlegalsystem.Ifourhypothesisisborneout,westillwillnotknowifrule-of-lawculture

perseistheprimarycausalvariable,duetoitsco-variancewithlengthofEUtenure.Still,wewill

haveunearthedsomeinitialsupportfortheruleoflawthesis.

Inordertotestthishypothesis,wedividedourcasesintothreecategories,asfollows:

(1)CoreEUmemberstates--France,Germany,andtheNetherlands.Thesestateshavealong

rule-of-lawtradition,albeitonepunctuatedinthecaseofGermany(anditsfellowcoremember

Italy)bytheirFascist/Naziperiodsandalengthyexperiencewithsupranationallegal/political

institutions.(2)StatesthatbecameEUmembersinthe1980s--Portugal,Greece,andSpain.

Thesestatesexperienceddecades-longdiscontinuitiesintheruleoflawandmissedthe

formativeperiodofearlyEuropeanCommunitymembership.(3) MembersoftheCouncilof

EuropefromoutsideWesternEurope(i.e.statesoftheformerSovietbloc)Romania.Whenthey

joinedtheCouncilofEuropeintheearly1990s,thesecountrieshadenduredfiftyyearsof

totalitarianpoliticalabusesandanabysmalrecordofrule-of-lawperformance.Romaniajoined

theCouncilofEuropein1993,ratifiedtheConventioninJune1994,submitteditsapplicationfor

EUmembershipinJune1995,andbeganEUaccessionnegotiationsonFebruary15,2000.

WeinitiallyhadalsoincludedinourstudyanexampleofaformerSovietRepublic(as


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distinguishedfromSovietblocmember),Moldova(BanandGoldstein2002).Itssoviet-style

institutionshavebeenlargelypreservedsinceindependence(1991),eventhoughitjoinedthe

CouncilofEuropein1995andratifiedtheConventionin1997.Furtherreflectioncausedusto

eliminatealloftheformerSovietrepublicsfromthescopeofourstudy,althoughourhypothesis

shouldapplytotheotherSovietbloc(asdistinguishedfromSovietUnion)countriesthatarein

theCouncilofEuropeandtotheBalticRepublics.Thereasonwesegregatedthecasesinthis

wayisourperceptionthattheECtHRforatimewasapparentlyapplyingadoublestandardwith

respecttoformerSovietrepublics,mostnotoriouslyRussia:ForalongtimetheCourtaccepted

nocasesthatpresentedclaimsofviolationsofhumanrightsinthesecountries,evidently

attemptingtogivethesefledglingrule-of-lawregimesextratimetoadapttoWesternrule-of-law

standards.BecausethestandardappliedbytheECtHRtosuchcountriesismarkedlyeasierto

attainthanthestandardappliedtothemoreWesternmemberstates,thereisnotyetaviable

waytomeasure"integration"oftheformerintotheECtHRregime.Ineffect,theCourtseemsto

havegrantedthemsomesortofdefactoapprenticeshipperiod.In2000,forinstance,the

ECtHRregistered1,323applicationstohearcases(i.e.,claimsofhumanrightsabuses)against

Russia.Itacceptednonethatyear.ByAugust2002,incontrast,theECtHRhasissuedtwo

condemnationsofRussia.Forcomparisonpurposes,theyear2000figuresforRomaniaare31

outof639casesaccepted;France,80outof870(www.echr.coe.int).Ifourinferencefromthis

dataiscorrect,thenitwouldseemthattheECtHRitselfisoperating,atleastastoitstreatmentof

Russia,ontheveryassumptionwearetestinginthispaper(viz.,thatcountriesaccustomedto

theruleoflawwillmorereadilythanothersacceptthetransnationalauthorityoftheECtHR.).

Havingselectedexamplesfromeachofthesecategories,wethencomparedboththerate

andthethoroughnesswithwhicheachofthemacceptedECHRnormsintotheirownlegal

systemsasconstraintsontheirownsovereignty.Ourexpectationwasthattheacceptanceof

theECHRlegalregimewouldbedeepestandbroadestinthecoreEUstates,withmorerecent

EUstatesandapplicantstatesfollowinginthatorder.


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Thestructureoftheargumenttofollowlooksfirst,inSection2,attheconstitutionalizationof

theECHRregimebyexamining(1)ECHRcompatibilitywithtextsofnationalconstitutionsand(2)

thereceptionoftheECHRregimebyspecializedconstitutionalcourtsinthosecountriesthat

havesuchcourts.(Inthemajorityofthecountriesweexamined,asinglecourtmonopolizesthis

jurisdiction.Exceptionsarenotedbelow.)ThissectionexaminestheprimacyoftheConvention

overdomesticlawbysurveyingthedegreeofcoherencebetweenthetreatystreatmentin

constitutionaltextandinconstitutionalcourtdoctrine.Nationalconstitutionallawisourfirst

measureoftheembeddednessoftheConvention.

Section3thenexaminesimplementationofECtHRdoctrinebytherestofjudiciary(looking

beyondthespecificallyconstitutionalcourts)ineachofthecountriesofourstudy.Insection4,

wefocusonthequestionofimplementationofECtHRdecisionsbythelegislativeandexecutive

branchesofthememberstates.Section5willpresentourconclusions.

2.ConstitutionalStatusoftheECHRRegime

Asaprefacetotheanalysishere,wepointouttwoelementsofEuropeanlegalcontext.

First,theECtHRtreatsnotonlythetextoftheConventionbutalsoitsowndoctrinaloutputas

thelawoftheConvention(Handysidev.UK,ECtHR1976;Modinosv.Cyprus,22April1993;

Dudgeonv.UnitedKingdom, 22Oct.1981;Norrisv.Ireland,26Oct.1988;ShapiroandStone

Sweet2002,2).ThisaspectofECtHRdoctrinemeritsattentionbecausesomenationalcourts

usedtoclaim,andothersstilldo(atconsiderableexpenseintreasureandcredibility)thatthey

were/areboundonlybythetextoftheConventionandbythoseECtHRdecisionsinwhichtheir

countrywasadefendant.InsupportofthisargumenttheycitedthelanguageofArticle53of

the1950Convention(renumberedin1998tobecomeArt.46),whichspecificallymentionsonly

anobligationofpartiestotheConventiontoobeytheECtHRdecisioninanycasetowhich

theyareparties.TheirbehavioropenlyignorestheECtHRscustomofprefacingitsexamination

ofthefactswithasummaryoftheinterpretationitgavetospecificrelevantcasesinprevious

decisions;by1993,theECtHRwaspointedlycondemningdefendant-statesforneglectofprior


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ECtHRcases.Onemustconcludethatcertainlyby1993theECtHRhadexplicitlyrejecteda

narrowinterpretationofArticle53,andexpecteditsprecedentstobehonored.

Second,theConventionandECtHRjurisprudence,ontheonehand,andtheECJ

jurisprudenceonhumanrights,ontheotherhand,aretightlylinkedtoeachother.Earlyon,the

ECJreferredtotheConventionasafundamentalsourceofCommunityrights(Rutiliv.Ministryof

theInterior1975).Morerecently,the(EU)TreatyofAmsterdam(Art.6)andtherecently-

adoptedEUCharterofFundamentalRightsandFreedoms(Art.47),mandateddeferencetothe

ConventionandtotheCourt.Thus,ECJpracticestrengthensnormsandrulesoftheECHR

regime,alreadytermedbycertainscholars,apartoftheculturalself-definitionofEuropean

civilization"(AlstonandWeiler1999,3;Harmsen2000,34).

A.TheCoreStates

I.France

TheFrenchConstitutionof1958doesnotprivilegetheConventionisascomparedtoother

internationallegalinstruments.UnderArticle55,treatiesprevailovernationallaws(butnot

overtheConstitution).TheConseilConstitutionnel(ConstitutionalCouncil)inafamous1975

decisionacknowledgedthisprimacy,inprinciple(Decision74-74of15Jan.1975),butrefused

theretoreviewthecompatibilityofinternationaltreatieswithnationallaw,groundingitsrefusal

onitsclaimthattreatylawiscontingent,asArt.55putsit,subjecttoitsapplicationbythe

otherparty,therebydecliningtoenforcetheConvention(Steiner1997;Coccozza1996,714-

15).InalatercasethatsameyeartheConseilConstitutionnelrefusedspecificallytoreviewa

FrenchstatutelegalizingabortionforthecompatibilitywiththeConvention(Art.2)provision

protectingtherighttolifeofeveryhumanperson.HeretheConseilsaidsimplythatitsjurisdiction

waslimitedtoclashesbetweentheConstitutionandstatutes,thattreatyinterpretationwasnot

partofitspurview,andthejudgesruledthestatuteconstitutional(Cons.Const.,23July1975,

Decis.75-56;Troper2003,42).

WhathappenednextisthatFrancessupremeappellatecourtforordinarylaw,the


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CourdeCassation,pickeduptheball.In1975,shortlyaftertheabortiondecisionthiscourt

startingstrikingdownFrenchlawsthatconflictedwiththetreatylawoftheEuropean

Community.FromthisactionevolvedthedoctrinethatallFrenchcourtshavethedutytostrike

downastatutethatconflictswithtreatylawconvention-basedjudicialreview(Troperibid.).

In1981FrancelegislativelyacceptedtherightofindividualpetitiontotheECtHR,andin1988the

Secretary-GeneraloftheConseilConstitutionnel,BrunoGenevois,admittedthattheConvention

hadconstitutionalvalueinFranceandthereforecouldnotbeconsideredascontingent."

(Genevois1988;Alter2001,158-59).TheConseilConstitutionnelinthelate1980sofficially

acknowledgeditsdutyunderArticle55oftheConstitutiontoenforceinternationallaw

supremacyoverordinarydomesticstatutes,ingeneral(Decis.86-216,3Sept.1986);Decis.88-

1082/1117,21Oct.1988), andeventuallyenforcedtheConventioninparticular(e.g.,pursuant

toFunke,CrmieuxandMiailhe(no.1)v.France,ECtHRJudgmentsof25Feb.1993).These

prominentshiftsbytheConseilConstitutionnelevidentlyhelpedpersuadetheConseildEtat

(Francessupremecourtforadministrativelaw)by1989toabandonitsearlierprominenthostility

toenforcinginternationaltreaties(Nicolo,"ConseildEtat,5July1989[ECTreatyaboveFrench

Law)];ConseildEtat,21Dec.1990,Decis.283-286[ECHRaboveFrenchLaw];Steiner1997,280).

Still,thewillingnessofthesehighFrenchcourtstoconformtoECtHRrulingshasbeenlargely

limitedtocasesinwhichFranceplayedadirectroleasrespondentstate.Inotherwords,these

courtshavenot,asageneralmatter,treatedECtHRprecedentsfromothercountriesascreating

rulesbindingonFrance.

Despitethisincompletenessofjudicialimplementation,itisfairtosaythatbythelate1980s

formalconstitutionaldoctrineinFrancegavetheConventionpriorityoverFrenchstatutelaw,if

notovertheFrenchConstitution.Thiswasnosmallchangeinacountrywithasstrongatradition

ofParliamentarysovereigntyasFrancehad.

II.Germany

InthetextoftheGermanConstitution(Art.59)thestatusoftheConventionislower,inthat


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treatieshavethesamerankasfederalstatutes.Onlygeneralprinciplesofinternationallawand

theGermanConstitutionitselfareaccordedhigherstatusthandomesticstatutes.Nonetheless,

inGermany,theECHRdidcometoprevailoverdomesticstatutesbywayofinterventionfrom

theGermanConstitutionalCourt.In1987,inaccordancewiththeconstitutionalprinciplethat

theinterpretationthatconformstointernationallawmustprevail,thepowerfulGerman

ConstitutionalCourt(BundesverfassungsgerichtorBVerfG)ineffectbroughttheConvention

regimeintoGermanlawbydecidingthattheBVerfGsinterpretationofthoseConventionrights

thatarelistedintheGermanConstitutionmusthaveregardtoboththeConventionandthe

case-lawthatensuestherefrom(Decis.of26March1987);Schlette1996;BVerfGDecis.on

MaastrichtTreaty12Oct.1993.Moreover,theBVerfG(officiallyappointedguarantorofhuman

rightsinGermanybytheConstitution)ruledthatordinaryGermanstatutesmustbeinterpreted

(whereverpossible)asconformingtotheECHR,nomatterwhetherthelegislationwereprioror

subsequenttotheConvention(Voss1997,155-56).TheBVerfGalsocreatedaspecialappeal

foundedontheprincipleofequalprotectionbeforethelaw,whichwastooperatewhenever

theECHRwasapplicableandhadbeendisregardedbyordinarycourts(Frowein1992,122).This

rulingencouragedtheordinarycourtstotakecaretousetheECHRinorderthattheirjudgments

wouldnotbeoverturnedonappeal.Insum,despiteaconstitutionaltextthataccordedno

specialstatustotheCouncilofEuropetreatyortotheConventionassuch,thehigh

constitutionalcourtofGermanyby1987elevatedtheECHRanditrelatedjurisprudenceto

supremacyoverGermanstatutes.

Itbearsattentionthatthisjudicialmovewasroughlycontemporaneousbothwiththe

movementinthesamedirectionbytheFrenchConseilConstitutionnel,andwiththeadoptionof

theSingleEuorpeanActof1987bytheEuropeanCommunity(eliminatingthevetopowerof

eachmemberstateoftheECoverECpolicies).ThepoliticalmoodinWesternEuropeofthe

late1980s(irrespectiveofdifferentlywordedconstitutions)seemstohavepushedboththese

transnationalevolutionsoflegaldoctrine.


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III.TheNetherlands

Ofoursevencountries,theConstitutionoftheNetherlands,mostclearlysubordinates

nationallawtotheECHRregime.Article94oftheDutchConstitutionunequivocallyprovides

thatdomesticregulationsshallnotbeappliedunlesstheyareinconformitywithprovisionsof

treatiesandresolutionsofinternationalinstitutionsoncethelatterhavebeenpublished,

implicitlyincorporatingtheensembleofECtHRcase-lawwithinthiscategoryofresolutions.As

earlyas1980theHogeRaad(DutchSupremeCourt)interpretedArticle94asestablishing(1)

thatboththetextoftheConventionandECtHRinterpretationsofitaresupremeovernotonly

nationallaws,butevenovertheDutchConstitution;and(2)thattheseECHRrulestakedirect

effectinDutchlawi.e.,nopriorDutchlegislativeoradministrativeimplementationisrequired

inordertogivethemtheforceoflaw(judgmentof23Sept.1980).TheHoge Raadalso

bolsteredthestatusoftheConventionbyitsleadershiprole:itproducedthree-fourthsofallthe

DutchjudicialreferralstotheECtHR(Vervaele1992,211-14;KlerkanddeJonge1997).

ThisDutchconstitutionalframeworkrequiresallDutchjudgestorefusetoapplyany

domesticstatutoryprovisionsorprovisionsoftheConstitutionthatconflictwiththeConvention

(orotherinternationaltreaty,eventhoughtheyarenotsupposedtoruleonconflictsbetween

statutesandtheConstitution).Unliketheothercountriesinoursample,theDutchdonothave

aspecialconstitutionalcourtthatmonopolizesthepowerofconstitution-basedjudicialreview.

Constitution-basedjudicialreview(incontrasttointernational-law-basedjudicialreview)is

forbiddenintheDutchConstitution,Art.111(KlerkanddeJonge1997,111-112).

B. NewerEUStates

I.Spain

SpainisaparagonoftheECHRregime,theConventionbeingeffectivelysupremelawon

thebasisofthewidelypresumedintentofthedraftersofthe1978SpanishConstitutiontobind

thenationalprotectionofhumanrightstointernationalinstruments(CavagnaandMonteiro

1992,177).Interestingly,Article10-2,thelegaltextsupportingthisinterpretation,doesnot


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mentionspecificallyeithertheECHRandorECtHRjurisprudence;itreads,Thenormsrelativeto

basicrightsandlibertieswhicharerecognizedbytheConstitutionshallbeinterpretedin

conformitywiththeUniversalDeclarationofHumanRightsandtheinternationaltreatiesand

agreementsonthosemattersratifiedbySpain.

TheSpanishConstitutionalCourt,however,beginningwithitsfirstcasethatposedtheissue,

in1984,hasconstruedArt.10-2torequireitselfandallotherSpanishcourtstofollowECtHR

caselaw;anyindividualunderthejurisdictionofSpanishcourtsmaytakeaclaimtotheSpanish

ConstitutionalCourtchallengingastatuteasunconstitutionalonthegroundsofconflictwith

ECtHRjurisprudence(ConstitutionalCourt:Judgment114/1984,29Nov.1984;Judgment25Oct.

1993;Judgment259/1994,3Oct.1994;Lembert1999,342,354-55,357).

StrasbourgcaselawtherebyveryquicklybecameaneffectivesourceofSpanish

constitutionallaw.Thisoccurredslightlyinadvanceof,althoughroughlycontemporaneously,

withmovesinthesamedirectionbytheconstitutionalcourtsofFranceandGermany.

II.Portugal

Bycontrast,inPortugal,thereceptionoftheConventionwasuntiltheearlyninetiesmuch

cooler.Foronething,thePortugueseConstitutionspecifiesinitsArticle16.2onlyone

internationaltreatyinharmonywithwhichdomesticstatutesandtheConstitutionmustbe

construed:theUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights.Anattemptedconstitutional

amendmenttoaddtheEuropeanConventionfailedin1982,onthepurportedgroundsthatit

mighthavepermittedderogationfromtheconstitutionalstatusoffundamentalrightsby

introducingtheunforeseenrestraintsofECtHRjurisprudence(CavagnaandMonteiro1992,

171-79).

IncontrasttoSpain,thePortugueseConstitutionalCourtforalongtimedidnotactively

promotetheConventionasanormativeframeworkforPortuguesedomesticcourts.Despiteits

soleconstitutionalauthoritytodecideconflictsbetweendomesticlawandtreaties,thiscourt

classifiedbreachesofatreatybyadomesticstatuteasmattersofindirectconstitutionality,


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whichclassificationputthemintothejurisdictionofordinaryPortuguesecourts,whohave

constitution-interpreting(butnotdirecttreaty-interpreting)authority(ibid.,180).Thus,thiscourt

abandonedtheopportunitytodirectlowercourtjudgesinterpretationoftheConvention,even

thoughtheconstitutionaltextconstraineditspowersnomorethantheGermanorSpanish

constitutionsrestrainedtheConstitutionalCourtthere.

UntiltheearlyninetiesPortugueselegalscholarsandjudgesweremaintainingthattheir

countrysConstitutionsurpassedtheConventionintermsoftheprotectionofindividualrights

(Leandro2000).Thelimitationofthisviewpoint,aswiththatoftheirGermancounterpartson

issuesotherthanArticle6.1oftheConvention(seebelow),isthatitconstruestheConventionas

a(textually)fixedsetofrules,whentherealityisthatofacontinuousprocessof(judicial)

interpretationandexpansionofthoserules.Thatis,evenjudgeswhoheedthetextofthe

ConventionareignoringrightsunderthatConventionthathavebeendevelopedbyECtHR

jurisprudence.Theclearestevidenceofproblemswiththeirapproachisthefactthatboth

GermanyandPortugalexperienceyearlycondemnationsinStrasbourg.

Ontheotherhand,therearesignsofchangeinPortugal,withrespecttoarecent

turnaboutbyitsConstitutionalCourt.In2002theConstitutionalCourtissuedalengthyreportto

aconferenceofconstitutionalcourtsinBrussels,inwhichitdocumentedadecadeofitsown

pro-activeleadershipintermsofrevisingPortuguesecaselawtobringitintoconformitywiththe

ECHR.Moreover,thiscourtspecificallynotedthatwhilethetextofthePortugueseConstitution

offersmoredetailedprotectionofhumanrightsthandoesthelanguageoftheConvention,

nonethelesstheinterpretivecaselawoftheECtHRoughttobeusedtofleshoutthemeaningof

thecorrelativerightsprovisionsinthePortugueseConstitution(ConstitutionalCourtofPortugal

2002,35).

III.Greece

The1975republicanConstitutionofGreecegrantedtointernationallawandall

internationalconventionsenteredbyGreeceself-executingeffectandprimacyoverany


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contraryprovisionofthelaw(Article28.1).WhileGreecelacksaspecificallyconstitutional

court,theGreekSupremeAdministrativeCourtruledthattheexpressionanycontraryprovision

ofthelawistobeconstruedasplacingtheECHRabovealldomesticlawexceptthe

Constitution,andthisinterpretationisacceptedintheotherGreekcourts(Judgments4590/1976

and395/1978,citedinPerrakis1996,174).

Controloverthevalidityofdomesticlawshasseveralunusualfeatures,themostimportant

beingthatunderGreeklawtheECHRisembeddedintwosystemsofcontrol.Thefirstisthe

controlforconstitutionality:allGreekjudgesareobligedtoassurethatdomesticlawsconformto

theConstitution;everyjudicialandadministrativecourtisrequiredbytheConstitution(Art.87.2)

torefusetoapplyanylawthatviolatestheConstitution.Thesecondisthecontrolforconformity

withinternationallaw.ThiscontrolempowersallGreekcourtstoverifywhetherdomesticlaws

complywiththeECHRandrefusetoapplyanydomesticlawthatdoesnot.Thissituationis

distinctfromthatoverconstitutionalitybecausejudgesarerequiredtoexplorethisquestiononly

ifapartytothecaseraisestheissue.Thewaythisdualsystemplaysoutinpracticeisthat,unless

apartyhasraisedaquestionofConventionviolation,Greekcourtsdonotrefusetoapplylaws

thatarecontrarytotheECHRsolongasthecourtfindstheminotherrespectsconstitutional

(Bechlivanou1992;Perrakis1996).Thisapproachseverelyconstrainstheeffectivenessofthe

ConventioninGreece.

Apartfromthislimitation,aconsensusforalongtimeprevailedamongGreekcourtsand

legalscholarsthatsincethelistingofhumanrightsintheGreekConstitutionmatchesthatofthe

ECHR,theirrespectisassuredbymeansofcontroloverconstitutionality,althoughonedoesfind

morerecentscholarshipnowassertingthecontrary(Bechlivanou1992,158;Perrakis1996,187).

AsinthecasewithPortugal,itbecomesincreasinglycostlyforGreekcourtstoignorethelawof

ECtHRrulings:TherightofindividualpetitiontotheECtHRgrantedbyGreecein1985is

producingconsiderablepressure;intheyear2000,Greecefiguredhighonthelist(atno.6)of

statescondemnedbytheECtHRforviolationsoftheConvention.


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C.Non-EUExampleEU-applicant,Romania

InRomaniatheformalstatusoftheECHRbenefitsfromgeneroustreatmentinits

Constitutionof1991(Art.11;Art.20.1):theprotectionofthehumanrightslistedinthe

Constitutionistofollowinternationalhumanrightstreaties;shouldaconflictarisebetweensuch

treatyanddomesticlaw(belowtheConstitution),thetreatyprevails(Deleanu2001).The

RomanianConstitutionalCourt(hereafterCC)hasamonopolyoverquestionsof

constitutionality,includingallhumanrightsissues.Ordinarycourtsarethereforerequiredtorefer

theconflictandcomplywithwhatevertheCCdecides.

EvenbeforeStrasbourgfirstdecidedacomplaintfromRomaniain1998,theCCruledas

earlyas1994(judgmentof14Dec.)thattheECHRshouldguidetheinterpretationofthe

Constitutiononhumanrightsquestions.Thisindependentandactivecourtmanagedtoshape

thepracticeofordinarydomesticcourts,anditsdecisions,afterunevenlevelsofcomplianceby

ordinarycourtsintheearly1990s,arenowtreatedasbindingbyallofthem(e.g.,Curteade

ApelBucuresti,s.pen.,judgments311/2000,1235/2000,and2768,26Nov.1999).4

Still,theCourtsinterpretivestanceismarkedbyatension.Ontheonehand,theCC

approachesgapsintheRomanianConstitutionondueprocessasopportunitiestoenlargethe

impactoftheECHR.Thus,ina2000landmarkdecision(CCjudgment146,14July2000),the

ConstitutionalCourtrejectedtheinterpretationoftheexecutivebranchthataruleofcriminal

procedureisconstitutionalsolongasthehumanrightinvokedtochallengeit(here,reasonable

lengthofcriminalproceedings)isnotexplicitlyforbiddenintheConstitution.TheCourtruled

thatifarightisprotectedbytheECHR,sincetheConventionmustbeeffectiveinRomanianlaw,

anydomesticnorminfringingtherightisunconstitutional.

Ontheotherhand,inmatterswherenosuchgapsexist,theCChasbeeninconsistentin

addressingtherelevanceofthetextoftheECHRandofECtHRjurisprudenceinitsdecisions

(Chirita2003).ItsapplicationoftheConventionvaries:Onmanyoccasionsithasdeclared

unconstitutionaladomesticnormonthegroundsofviolationoftheECHR(CCjudgments234,20


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Dec.1999;145,14July2000;112,19Apr.2001;148,8May2001;255,20Sept.2001)andhaseven

donesoonitsowninitiative(CC,judgment199,23Nov.1999);butatothertimesithas(1)failed

toofferanyguidelinesforapplyingconcededlyrelevantECtHRcaselaw(CC,judgments104,11

Apr.2001,and234,20Dec.1999),(2)failedtociteandapplyobviouslyrelevantECtHRcaselaw

despiteitsobligationtodoso(CC,Judgment55,22Mar.2000,neglectinga1999ECtHRcase

againstRomania[Brumarescuv.Romania]despiteadissentcriticizingthereasoningonthis

grounds(3)dismissedacomplainantsreferencetospecificarticlesoftheConventionasunduly

detailed(CCjudgment82,8Mar.2001)and(4)failedtoaddresslitigants'argumentsbasedon

theConventionandcaselaw(CCjudgments11,9Feb.1999;211,1Nov.2000;171,23May

2001).TheseinconsistenciesweakenedtheEuropeanhumanrightsregimeinRomaniainthat

theyexhibitedpatternsofreasoningthatdepartedfromthoseoftheECtHRandreflectedthe

oldunderstandingofsovereignty.Moreover,totheextentthattheCCassumedtheposture

oftheofficialpromoteroftheECHRinRomanianlaw,itslackofconsistencyinupholdingthe

ECHRregimehaspromotedaclimateinwhichordinarycourtshavenotdiligentlybeenreferring

toitcasesthatposeapotentialconflictbetweentheConventionandRomanianlaw.

Asidefromthesecaveats,onecanconcludethatthisconstitutionalcourthasconsiderably

strengthenedtheECHRregimeinRomania,primarilybecauseithasreversedmanylongstanding

practicesthatwereoutoflinewithECtHRrulings.Italsochallengedacomplacentattitudeof

thejudiciarytowardinternationallegalnorms.

D. ConclusionstoSection2

Atleastattheformallevel,thefindingsinthissectionproducemixedresultsforour

hypothesis.InRomania,notyetintheEU,itsConstitutionalCourthasbeenmarkedlyinconsistent

infollowingtheauthorityoftheECHRandofthecaselawoftheECtHR.So,attheextreme,our

thesisinasenseholds.Ontheotherhand,concerningthecontrastweexpectedbetweenthe

earlier,rule-of-law-entrenchedEUmembers(Germany,theNetherlands,France)andthelater

ones--theoneswithrecentlengthyhistoriesofdictatorialrule(Spain,Portugal,andGreece)at


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leastatthelevelofformalconstitutionallaw,wefoundnoteworthyvariationwithineachgroup,

ratherthantheunidirectionalcontrastweexpected.Specifically,France,withitsdecadesof

formalresistancebyitshigh-leveljudiciarytothewordingofitsownConstitution,whichshould

haveindicatedthattheConventionanditscaselawtookpriorityoverdomesticlaw,tookmuch

longertoaccepttheECHRregime(and,intermsoftreatingcaselawasbindingprecedent,

remainssomewhatresistant)ascomparedtoSpain,whichratifiedtheConventiononlyin1979.

Germany,astalwartoftheECsystemdidnotofficiallyamenditsConstitutiontogivepriorityto

ECHRlawanysoonerthantheFrenchshift,butdidmoveviainterpretivechangeatthehandsof

itsConstitutionalCourtjustaroundthetimethattheFrenchCourtmovedinthesamedirection.

Strikingly,despitethedifferenceintimesofenteringtheCouncilofEurope,theSpanish,French,

andGermanConstitutionalCourtmovedroughlycontemporaneouslytogiveECHRlawpriority

overdomesticlaw,andthisjudicialinitiativeoccurredroughlyatthetimeoftheECsSingle

EuropeanActof1987.TheformalconstitutionallawofbothGreeceandPortugaldoesappear

tohavelaggedbehindtheotherECmembersinoursamplewithrespecttoassimilatingthe

ECHRregime.

3.TheRegimeNormsandRulesinSub-ConstitutionalCourts

Inthesesevencountries(andinmuchoftheworld)thedominantpatternisthatauthorityto

engageinconstitutionalreviewofnationalstatutesisreservedtoasinglespecialcourt.The

threeexceptionsamongoursevenweretheNetherlands,whereconstitution-basedjudicial

reviewofactsofthenationallegislatureisforbidden;Portugal,whereallcourtssharethepower

(althoughtreaty-interpretingpoweris,inprinciple,reservedtoasinglehighcourt);andGreece,

whereallcourtssharethepower(andareinprincipleobligedtoexerciseit)butwhichhasa

body,theSpecialHighestCourtofGreece,thatis,amongotherthings,designatedtoresolve

anydisagreementsonthemeaningoftheConstitutionbetweenanytwoofitsthreehigh

appellatecourts.Theseariseonlyrarely(Bechlivanou1992,169).Thisoverallsituationmeansthat

strongleadership,orlackthereof,bytheConstitutionalCourt(wherethereisone)substantially


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influencessuchquestionsaswhethertheECHRistreatedinfactasbinding,andthatiswhywe

devotedasectiontoconstitutionalcourtsandtheirconstitutions.Theapplicationofthe

Conventionbyordinary(inthesenseoftheotherthanspecialconstitutional)courtscannotbe

ignoredeither.Tothedegreethatsuchpracticeprevails,theECHRmorefullyattainsthestatus

ofbindingnorm,whichtheformalconstitutionalsystemsofallsevencountriesinprinciple

establish.Inthenatureofthings,asinglecourtforawholecountrydoesnothavetimetohear

morethanaverytinyfractionofallcasesthatcomealong.Onlyifordinarydomesticcourts

routinelyapplytheECHR,willthesecountriesinfactattaintheobjectivesetforthbytheECtHR:

tosafeguardtheindividualinrealandpracticalways,establishingnotrightsthatare

theoreticalorillusory,butrightsthatarepracticalandeffective(Articovs.ItalyECtHR1980;

AireyvsIrelandECtHR1979).

UnliketheECJ,whichissuesbindinginterpretationsofEurope-levellawinPreliminaryRulings

tomemberstatecourts,theECtHRhasnomechanismallowingittocommunicatedirectlywith

nationalcourtsand,asaconsequence,facesmoredifficultyinconstructingalegalregime.In

theEUcountries,however,theECtHRpresumablybenefitsfromthecreationbytheECJofa

communityoflawatboththedomesticandtransnationallevel.Theconjecturethatthesame

judgeswhohavebeensocializedinthepracticeofreferringdomesticcasesforinterpretation

bytheECJandwhoaregenerallyaccustomedtomakejudgmentsboundedby(EU)

transnationallawnormswouldbemorelikelytotakeguidancefromsupranationalECHRlaw

thantheoneswhohavenot,thuswasoneofthetwofoundationsforourhypothesisthatlength

ofEUmembershipwouldberelatedtostrengthoftheECHRregimewithinacountry.

A.CoreEUCountries

I.France

TheFrenchSupremeCourtforcivilandcriminallaw,theCourdeCassationhasbeenatthe

forefrontofacknowledgingtheforceofECHRlawinFrance,havingrecognizeditslegalforcein

casesasearlyas1975(Respino,decis.3June1975;Glaeser,decis.30June1976;Judgmentof5


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Dec.1978,citedinSteiner1997,281n.58).TheseearlyforaysintoECHRjurisprudence,however,

wereerraticandmarkedbyambivalence(Steiner1997).OncetheConseilConstitutionnel

changeditsstancetowardtheECHR, however,theCourdeCassationfollowedalong

enthusiastically.Between1987and1997thiscourtissuedmorethan700decisionspertainingto

theapplicabilityoftheConventionandECtHRcaselaw(FabreandGouron-Mazel1998),and

alteringitsownjurisprudenceincaseaftercaseafterFrancelostattheECtHR(e.g.,Courde

Cassationdecis.12June1996pursuanttoFoucherv.FranceECtHR18March1997).

Still,therecordoftheCourdeCassationhasbeenuneven.Onecanpointtonumerous

cases,wherethiscourthasfaithfullyappliedECtHRstandardstoalterFrenchlaw.Forexample,it

declaredArt.546oftheFrenchCodeofCriminalProcedureincompatiblewithECHRArt.6on

theequalityofthepartiesbeforethecourt(Judgment21May1997).Also,thiscourtissueda

rulingtobringFrenchpracticeintoconformitywithECtHRdecisionsonthestandardsof

interrogationsforcriminalproceedings(Judgment26March1998).Butinseveralcaseswhich

aresensitivetothecreationofEuropeanrule-of-lawstandardssuchastherighttodefense

counselandtherighttofileforappeal,theCourdeCassationhasmountedwhatJean-Pierre

Marguenaud(2001)termedarebellionagainsttheECtHR,byrefusingtoconsiderexplicitcase

lawoutlinedbytheECtHRinjudgmentsissuedagainsttheFrenchstateitself.In Poitrimolv.

France(23Nov.1993),Guerinv.France(29July1998)andOmarv.France(29July1998)the

ECtHRcondemnedtheFrenchjudicialruleaccordingtowhichapersonresistingarrestmaynot

fileforappealandberepresentedbyalawyer.TheCourdeCassationrefusedtooverturnthe

rule(Judgmentsof19Jan.1994;15Feb.1994;9Jan.1995;14Nov.1996;18Nov.1997;Gouttes

n.d.).ThiscourtexhibitedsimilarintransigencetowardstheECtHRstandardsofBelletv.France,

(4Dec.1995)initsdecisionsof6Jan.1997,AffaireFondationsaintMarc, "(Gouttesn.d.).

Subsequentlythesamecriminalchamberofthesamecourtyielded,onlytoreversecoursetwo

monthslater,withreferencetothesameArticle6.1,inthewidelytelevised(formerNazi)Papon

case,whentheFrenchjudgesagainignoredtheECHR-relevantPoitrimolcase-law.


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Frenchlowercourtshavetendedsince1988tousetheConventionmoreextensivelythan

before,evenfollowingtheECHRinpreferencetoexplicitFrenchstatutelaw,andcopyingECtHR

reasoningalmostverbatim,althoughoftenwithoutacknowledgingitssource(Margenaud2001,

5-7;Lembert1999,345).Still,theyseemtolimittheirpreferenceforECHRlawtosituationswhere

Frenchlaw(statutoryand/orcaselaw)eitherconfirmsorissilentaboutparticularConvention

provisions(Gouttesn.d.;Lembert1999,349-50).

II.Germany

InGermany,thepracticeofapplyingECtHRjurisprudenceasadirectsourceoflawisrelatively

rarebecauseofthewidespreadbeliefamongGermanjudgesthatthefundamentalrightslisted

intheirFederalConstitutionarewiderinscopethanthosefoundintheConvention(Burkhard

2000;Voss1997,158).Butthisisnotthewholepicture,becausethedetailedguaranteesof

Articles5and6oftheECHRdonotappearintheGermanConstitution.Indeed,despitethis

generalbelief,inanumberofinstancesGermancourts discontinued(well-entrenched)rulesof

pre-trialcriminalproceedingsthatexceededthestandardsofreasonabledetentiontime

(Art.6.1)setbytheECtHR(Frowein1992,126;BGHStV.1992,452-453;BGHRSt.GB46Abs.2

Verfahrenverzogerung3).Ordinarycourts,ontheirown,areapplyinganumberofotherECtHR

standards(e.g.,theArt.6.3ruleonlegalassistancefromPakellivs.Germany,ECtHR,25April

1983)toalterrights-restrictivedomesticstatutes,enforcementpractices,orcaselawthathave

neitherbeenamendedyetbythelegislativepowernorinvalidatedbytheBVerfG(Frowein

1992,126).

III.TheNetherlands

IfGermanordinarycourtsaresophisticatedatapplyingECtHRcase-lawonlywithregardto

Article6.1,6.2,and6.3,theircounterpartsintheNetherlands(whereallthecourtsareordinary

courtsinoursenseoftheword)dosoonasystematicbasiswithregardtoboththeECHRand

ECtHRcaselaw.InthiscountrytheappealscourtofArnhemfirstappliedtheConventionin1978-

79;today,recoursetotheECHRandECtHRjurisprudenceisderigueurforDutchjudges


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(Corstens2000).Thesecourtshavegrownremarkablysophisticatedinmakingjudgmentsbased

ontheConventionandhaveexercisedinterpretiveskillsthatreproducethoseoftheECtHRon

suchdoctrinesasthenationalmarginofappreciation(seeabove)(e.g.,caseof9Jan.1986,

Arrondissementrechtsbank,Zwolle,No.14740/1985,citedinVervaele1992,223.)

Inpart,thissophisticationwithrespecttoECHRlawmustbeattributedtotheDutch

constitutionalprovision(Art.94)thatauthorizesallcourtstoapplyprovisionsoftreatiesor

decisionsofinternationalinstitutions.Wheneverthemeritsofthecasebearonrightsprotected

bytheECHR,thediscussionoftheECHRarticleinpointisstandardprocedure.Onmany

occasions,Dutchlow-levelcourtsorderedahumanrightsprotectionveryshortlyaftertheECtHR

standardsforitwerelaidoutwhetherthedecisiondirectlyconcernedtheNetherlandsas

defendant(asin,e.g.,HogeRaadjudgment2July1990,pursuanttoKostovskiv.the

Netherlands,ECtHR20Nov.1984)orinvolvedachallengetosomeothercountry'spractices.For

instance,theECtHRrulinginAbdulaziz,CabalesandBalkandaliv.UK(28May1985)was

incorporatedintoDutchjurisprudencewithinayear(Vervaele1992:224).

InGermany,theNetherlands,Spainand,toalesserdegreeinFrance,ordinarycourtsnow

factorintotheirjudgmentsstandardsfromECtHRcaselawandhavebecomeremarkably

knowledgeableabouttheECHRregime,capablyapplyingcomplexpatternsofECtHR

reasoning,includingthosewhichdistinguishcaseswhich,althougharguablygermanetothe

caseinhand,differinimportantnuances.

B.NewerEUcountries:Spain,PortugalandGreece

Forthereasonsexplainedinsection2,SpanishordinarycourtsroutinelyusetheECtHRcase

law,whereastheirPortuguesecounterpartsatleastasjudgedbyanalystsintheearly90s

weredoingsoonlyinfrequently(CavagnaandMonteiro1992,179).Therecentlyinvigorated

self-describedleadershipofthePortugueseTribunalConstitucionalnotedabovemaywellbe

triggeringachangeintheordinarycourts(althoughwehavenotyetfoundasecond-party

accountofthelowercourtsreaction).


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UntilGreecerecognizedtherighttoindividualpetitionin1985andlostalonglistofcasesin

Strasbourg,theConventionhadlittleeffectthere(Bechlivanou1992,165-167;Perrakis1996,171).

Foryears,manyordinarycourts'decisionsproducedlawlaterjudgedtobeviolationsofthe

Convention,suchastheinterpretationofArt.6oftheGreekConstitutionasnotprotectingthe

individualagainstcivilimprisonment(SalonikaCourtofAppeal,Judgment7Sept.1990;

ThessolanikiAdministrativeCourtofFirstInstance,Judgment1753/1983,citedbyBechlivanou

1992,164).Insomecases,ordinaryGreekcourtsissuedjudgmentsthatdirectlyviolatedexplicit

standardsfromanECtHRcaseinwhichGreeceitselfhadbeenaplaintiff(e.g.,twodecisions

contrarytoKokkinakisvGreece,25may1993,arecitedinCommitteeofMinistersResolutionDH

97,576of15Dec.1997).Eventoday,ordinaryGreekcourtsoftenrefuseprotectionofa

particularhumanrightguaranteedbytheConventiononthesheergroundsthatthe

Conventionallowsforrestrictions,withoutprovidinganythinglikethekindofjustificationforsuch

restrictionsthatisdemandedbyECtHRjurisprudence,suchastherequisiteexplicationofcriteria

oflegitimacyanddemocraticnecessity(e.g.CreteCourtofAppeal(Efetio),Judgment17

may1987).Mostrecently,aGreekcourt(MisdemeanourCourtofLamia,Judgment5Jan.2000)

defiedaseriesofrepeatedECtHRjudgmentsthattheGreekpracticeinquestionviolatedthe

Convention(Thlimmenosv.Greece,ECtHRdecis.no.34369/1997,6Apr.2000;Kokkinakisv.

Greece,ECtHRR1993).Insum,theGreekjudiciarydoesrelativelylittletoupholdtheECHR

regime.

AswithourdiscussioninSection2,GreeceandPortugalarelaggardsinimplementingthe

ECHRregime,Spaindoesatleastaswellaslong-timeEUmembers,Dutchcourtswereinthe

vanguard,andFranceresiststheECHRregimemorethandoesGermanyorevenSpainaless

longstandingmemberoftheEU.

C.Non-EUcountries--Romania

DespiteECHRratificationin1994,onlyafterthefirstcoupleofECtHRrulingsagainstRomania,

Vasilescuv.Romania22May1998andPetrav.Romania23Sept.1998,didRomaniancourts


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startinnoticeablenumberstoaddresstheECHR.Then,from1999through2002,thebasic

picturewasthataminorityofthejudgesincreasinglyhonoredthelawoftheECHR,whilemost

judgestreateditasjustanotherineffectualinternationaltreaty.Onthepro-ECHRside,for

instance,theSupremeCourt(CurteaSuprema)reversedin2000itspriorjurisprudenceontheuse

oflegalvenuesfortheretrievalofrealestateconfiscatedbythecommunistsaftertheECtHR

adjudgedthislineofprecedentaviolationoftheConvention(Brumarescuv.Romania28

October1999).Also,atleastoneregionalcourtofappealscrafteditspleaofunconstitutionality

attheConstitutionalCourtaroundECtHrcaselaw(e.g.,CurteadeApelBrasov,provisional

judgmentno.515/p/2001).Theseexamples,however,donottypifytheentirejudiciary.

Thedominantpatternsince1999hasbeenthatRomanianlawyersonlysporadicallydeploy

ECHR-basedclaims,duetotheir[accurate]perceptionofwidespreadunresponsivenessbylow-

levelcourtstosucharguments.Indeed,despiteseveralatypicalexamplesonecouldcite,

neithertheSupremenortheintermediatecourtsofappeals,asofthefirsthalfof2003,had

shownanyintenttoincorporatethebodyofECHRlawsystematicallyintoRomanian

jurisprudence.

Mid-year2003,however,seemstobeusheringinanew,moreECHR-friendlyeraforthe

Romanianjudiciary.TheendofJunebroughttwopivotalevents.First,inresponsetoa3June

2003decisionoftheECtHR(Panteav.Romania)thatdeclaredtheRomanianarrestwarrant

systeminconsistentwiththeECHRrequirementofseparationbetweentheexecutiveandjudicial

branches,theRomanianSupremeCourt(on27June2003)releasedajudgearrestedon

corruptioncharges.Indoingso,itdeclaredthatRomanianprosecutorsmustceaseissuingarrest

warrants,despitetheirstatutoryauthorizationtodoso,anddespitethefactthataParliamentary

debatetoamendthisstatutewasinprocessatthetime.Inotherwords,forthefirsttime,the

SupremeCourt(ineffect)declaredvoidaRomanianstatuteonthegroundsofaconflictwith

theECHR(eventhoughtheConstitutionreservesconstitution-basedjudicialreviewtothe

constitutionalcourt).SeverallowercourtsimmediatelyfollowedtheleadoftheSupremeCourt,


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inorderingreleasesofpersonsheldon[newly]improperwarrants.WithinaweekoftheSupreme

Courtaction,theParliamentcompleteditsECHR-stimulatedoverhauloftheCodeofCriminal

Procedure.Thiswholeprocessreceivedenormousmediacoverageandprovokednationwide

publicdiscussion.

Secondly,inearlyJuly,theMinistryofJusticeannouncedthatitplanstosendtoParliament

adraftLawoftheMagistracythatwouldrequirealljudgesandprosecutorstofollowECtHR

jurisprudencein(respectively)theirrulingsandtheirpleadings.Thismoveappearstobeadirect

expressionofthestrongdesireoftheRomanianpoliticalleadershipforEUmembership,pending

in2007andcontingenton,amongotherthings,reformofthejudiciary.Asoffall2003thetop

RomanianlawschoolswillbegintorequirecoverageofECtHRlawinthecurriculum.

D.ConclusionstoSection3 :

AsnotedattheendofSection3.B,thedistinctionweinitiallyhypothesizedbetweenthe

coreEUstatesandthenewerEUmembersdoesnotholdupacrosstheboard.Whilejudgesin

theNetherlandsandGermany,ontheonehand,andPortugalandGreece,ontheotherhand,

indeedformtwodistinctivegroupsalongthepatternweexpected,thecasesofSpainand

Francedonotfitthispattern.Spain,anEUmemberonlysince1986hasmuchmorefully

embeddedtheECHRregimeintoitslawthanhasFrance,afoundingmemberoftheEU.

AsforthethreestateswheretheECHRregimeislesswellentrenchedinjudicialpractice--

Portugal,GreeceandRomaniatheRomanianjudiciaryhasseemedmostweaklycommitted

totheECHRregime,inthesensethatmanyofitsjudgeshavebeenrepeatedlyignoringclearly

relevantECtHRcaselaw.InGreece,whilethereisfrequentjudicialresistancetoor

misapplicationofECtHRlaw,atleasttheECtHRjurisprudencehasbecomeapartoftheactive

vocabularyoftheGreekjudiciary.TheConstitutionalCourtofPortugal,ifonecantrustitsown

report,hastakenlargestridessince1991toentrenchECHRlegaldoctrine(2002).Still,this

movementtookonseriousmomentumonlyadecadeago,whereasECHRlawwasbythenan

oldstoryincountriesliketheNetherlands,Germany,andeven,surprisingly,Spain.


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4.LegislativeandExecutiveBranchImplementationofECtHRdecisions

A.CouncilofEuropeEnforcementRegime

AftertheECtHRhandsdownadecisionagainstasignatorymemberoftheConvention,the

onlyimmediateconcretecompulsionthatthestateconfrontsisitsobligationtopaythejust

satisfactionawardedbytheECtHRtotheapplicant,anobligationstatesfulfillmoreorlesson

time,inlightofthefactthateachcomplainantfunctionsasahighlymotivatedmonitoruntil

thepaymentismade.Havingpaidthecompensatorypenalty,however,thestateisnotthen

utterlyfreetopreserveitsdomesticlegalorderintactandtopersistinthesamehumanrights

violations.

Theobligationtoreformitsstatutesandlegalpractices,implicitinitssigningontothe

Convention,isenforcedthereafterinagentleandgradualistfashionbytheCommitteeof

MinistersoftheCouncilofEurope.ThisCommitteemeetseveryfewmonthsandconsistsofall

theforeignministersofthe(nowforty-six)membercountries.ThisCommitteeofMinisters

receivesareportofeachECtHRjudgmentandrespondstoeachwithaResolutionindicating

thetypeofreformwithinthemembercountrythatisneededtosatisfytheCourtsjudgment

(e.g.,eliminationofaparticularpenalstatute,reformofaparticularpolicepractice,etc.).The

stateisheldaccountableatfuturemeetingsforreportingonwhatprogresshasbeenmadeto

meetthestandardssetforthintheseResolutions.Ineffect,theCommitteeofMinistersactsas

theadministrativearmoftheECHRregimetoimplement,viapublicshaming,therulesimplicitin

thejudgmentoftheECtHR.Shouldthestatedragitsfeetforanunreasonablylongperiodof

time,theCommitteesanctionsitbyadoptinginterimresolutionsthatprovideinformationabout

thelackofprogressinimprovingimplementation(www.coe.int/intro/e-rules-46.htm).

EUorganizations,too,playaroleinthiscomplianceregime.First,EUstatesareindirectly

pressuredtobehave,bothbytheECJ,whichregardsthecaselawoftheECtHRasitsown

minimumhumanrightsstandard,andbypoliticalpressurefromtheeverdeepeningUnion.

Secondly,intheapplicantcountriestheCommissionerforEUenlargementdirectlysupervises


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reform.EachapplicantstateisrequiredtointegratehugeswathsoftheEuropeanlegalorder

structuredin30negotiationchapters,oneofwhichisthatonjusticeanddomesticaffairs,

whichhasarubriconhumanrightsviolations.TheCommissionannuallyreportsonthestateof

thejudiciaryandofhumanrightsandscoldstheapplicantstateifitfailstomakereasonable

andtimelychanges.Thus,theEUintegrationandenlargementprocessesarehighlyintertwined.

Theseinstitutionalforcesengulfthestateinanetworkoftransactionscreatedthebycomplex

interdependenceofEUmembershiporassociatestatus,whichnetworkfurthersthe

entrenchmentoftheECHRinnationalpolicy.

Finally,theECtHRitselfplaysaroleinspeedinglegislativereformbythewayitwordsits

decisions.Ingeneral,theCourtrefrainsfromdirectlystigmatizingadomesticnormasaperse

violationand,therefore,fromprescribingspecificpolicyreforms(Merrills1993,104).Nonetheless,

incertainlandmarkcases,theECtHRtookamoreassertivestanceandnoticeablyadoptedthe

roleofagenda-setter.Inoneinstance,afterhavingconceded,Thestatehasachoiceof

variousmeans,itaddedthataspecificdomesticnormviolatedtheConvention(Marcksvs.

Belgium1979).Thestatecorrectlygraspedthatthisamountedtoastrongrecommendationto

changethatlaw.TheECtHRannouncessuchprescriptivedecisionsforthefulfillmentofpositive

obligationswhenthedomesticorderlacksnormativeprovisionsmeanttosecurerespectforthe

rightsoutlinedintheConvention(X&Yv.Netherlands(1985))orwhenthestatehas

demonstratedneglectfortheprotectionofindividualrights(PlatformArtzefurdasLebenv.

Austria1992;Merrills1993,102-106).

B.Domesticlevellegislativeandexecutiveaction

IftheimpactofECtHRrulingswerelimitedtomonetarydamagestosingleindividualswho

broughtsuit,regimechangewouldbeveryincrementalindeed.Infact,thememberstatesof

theCouncilofEuropetypicallyengageinextensivelegislativeandexecutivebranchreformto

implementECtHRrulings.ToredressandpreventfutureviolationsoftheConvention,legislatures

andexecutiveorgansadoptnewlawsorlegislativeamendments,undertakesystematic


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screeningofdraftlegislation,andsendcircularletterstolawenforcementagenciestobring

theirpracticesintocompliancewiththestandardsofECtHRcase-law.Additionalexecutive

actionhasincludedorderinginclusionoftheConventionandofitscase-lawinthecurriculaof

lawschools,disseminatinginformationconcerningtheCourttothepublicatlarge,

implementingmeasurestoensuretheindependenceandtheprofessionalprestigeofthe

judiciary,and,finally,traininginhumanrightsforsectorsresponsibleforlawenforcement.

Withinthisevolvingtransnationalregime,what,then,arethemechanismspushingtheso-

calledsovereignstatestoadoptlegislativechangeandadministrativereforms?First,the

rationallycalculatingstate,awareofthefinancialconsequencesloominginthepotentialthata

streamoffollow-upcomplaints("repetitiveapplications")maybefiledinStrasbourg,maydecide

thatthecostsofthejustreparationpaymentstobemadewouldoutweighboththematerial

andthenon-materialbenefitsofpreservingthesuccessfullychallengedlegaldomesticnorm.

Secondly,thestatemayabandonitsresistanceandreformthelawafterthepainstakingand

prolongedordealfacedbyitsrepresentatives,obligedtojustifyitsresistancethreeorfourtimes

ayearinlegallanguageunderstoodbytheothermembersoftheCommitteeofMinisters.These

psychicandpoliticalcostsareparticularlyhighforEUapplicantcountries,butevenmember

countriesareawarethatintheextremesituation,anon-complyingcountrycouldgetbooted

outoftheCouncilofEurope.

Ourempiricalexcursus(basedlargelyonsourcesinwww.echr.coe.int)foundamixed

picture:Allthesurveyedstateshavetakensomeextremelypromptcorrectiveactionpursuant

toECtHRdecisionsinanumberofcrucialfieldsofdomesticlaw,andallbutone(Spain!)also

exhibitedinstancesoffootdragging.

Forexample,theNetherlands,widelyperceivedasexemplaryinthedegreeofits

cooperationwiththeECHRregime,inonecase,inanticipationofadecisionoftheECtHR,

correctedachallengedstatutetwoyearsbeforetheStrasbourgCourtruleditaviolation:The

legislaturereformedtherulesonconfinementofthecriminallymentallyilltwoyearsbefore


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Koendjbihariev.theNetherlands(ECtHR1990).YeteventheNetherlandscantakeaslongas

fiveyearsafteranegativeECtHRdecisionforthelegislaturetorespondwithappropriatereform:

Fiveyearselapsed(from1986to1991)beforetheDutchlegislaturechangeditslaborstatutory

regulationssothattheyconformtotheECHRstandardsannouncedinFeldbruggev.the

Netherlands(29May1986).

ThismixedpatternofconductappearstobereplicatedinGermany,France,Portugal,

Greece,andevenRomania.TheRomanianCodeofCivilProcedurewasamendedtoallow

individualsinthefuturetore-opentheiroriginalcasepursuanttoECtHRdecisionsthatsuch

individualshadbeenwronged,inordertoassurefullimplementationofECtHRdecisions.Most

recently,withinweeksofthe3June2003ECtHRdecisiononthearrestwarrantssystem,boththe

legislativeandexecutivebranchesreformedtheCodeofCriminalProceduretoreplace

prosecutorswithjudgesastheissuersofwarrantsforarrests,searches,andwiretaps.Moreover,

theMinistryofJusticeisurgingParliamenttoadoptlegislationthatmandatesadherenceto

ECtHRprecedentbyallprosecutorsandjudges.

Greece,liketheNetherlands,hasproducedsomelegislativereformsinmereanticipationof

anegativeECtHRdecision:Law2298/95of4April1995,reformingpretrialdetention,

anticipatedbyafewmonthsKampanisv.Greeceof13July1995.InotherinstancesGreece

implementedreformswithinayearortwooftheECtHRholding;e.g.,inresponsetoHoly

Monasteriesv.Greece,judgment9Dec.1994,theGreekParliamentadoptedLaw2413/96to

protecttherightsofmonasteries.

PortugaldiligentlyredesigneditsentirejudicialsystempursuanttoECtHRdecisionsSilvia

Pontesv.Portugal(1994),GamaCidraisv.Portugal(1994)andLoboMachadov.Portugal(1996)

(COEPressService2000).

Spainactuallyoverhauledstatutorycodesonthreeseparateoccasionsinanticipationof

anadverseECtHRrulingonthem.TheCodeofCriminalProcedureandtheCriminalCodewere

amended(withrespecttotheactionsofarmedbandsandterrorists)inMayof1988,intheearly


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stagesoftheCaseofBarbera,MessegueandJabardo,judgment6Dec.1988.Similarlyanact

of28Dec.1988re-organizedthejudicialsystem,inanticipationoftheECtHRdecisioninUnion

AlimentariaSandersSAv.Spain, judgmentof7July1989.Spainalsoadoptedalawon9June

1988reformingitsConstitutionalCourtproceduresinanticipationoftheECtHRsRuiz-Mateosv.

Spain,judgment23June1993.

FrancereformedstatutesinresponsetotheECtHRinaslittleasayearstime.Thefirst

StrasbourgdecisionagainstFrenchlawwasKruslinandHuvigv.FranceECtHR24April1990.The

FrenchlegislaturepromptlycompliedbypassingActno.91-646of10July1991(effective1

Oct.1991)ontelecommunicationssecrecy.Onatleastoneoccasionitamendedlegislation

evenbeforetheCourthandeddownadecision:Francealtereditscriminalprocedurelawin

January1993,topreventbreachesoftheprincipleofthepresumptionofinnocenceandallow

forrectifyingmeasures,wellinadvanceofAllenetdeRibemontv.France,ECtHR10Feb.1995.

TheFrenchParliament,facedwiththeerraticbehaviorofitsCourdeCassationandin

deferencetotheECtHR,eventuallyintervenedtoabrogatearticle588ofLeCodede

ProcedurePenale(regardingthepre-triallengthofdetentiontime),whichhadsupplieda

numberofcaseslostbyFranceattheECtHR(Steiner1997,293-94).

GermanyamendedtheprovisionsoftheCourtCostsActandoftheCodeofCriminal

ProcedureconcerninginterpretationcostsinitsActof18Aug.1980,inpromptresponsetothe

28Nov.1978ECtHRjudgmentinLuedicke,BelkacemandKov.Germany.

Similarly,onecanalsopointtoinstancesoffootdraggingintheallcountriesinoursample

exceptSpain:(1)Letellierv.France,ECtHR26June1991.Lawreform:30Dec.1996.(2)Ozturkv.

Germany,ECtHR21Feb.1984:Germanychangedthelawonpaymentofinterpreterfeesin

administrativeproceedingson15June1989.(3)AfterVasilescuv.Romania(ECtHR22May1998)

RomaniastillhasnotamendeditsCodeofCriminalProceduretoallowforappealsagainst

certainprosecutorsacts,asisrequiredbytheCommitteeofMinisters.Also,whilethe

prosecutingarmoftheexecutivebranchincooperationwithacommitteeofParliament


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expeditiouslyproduceddraftsforamendingtheCriminalCodewithreferencetothestandards

forfilingcriminallibelinresponsetotheECtHRsDalbanv.Romania,Sept.1999,therelated

legislationpassedindifferingversionsinthetwolegislativechambersandhasyettobe

reconciledintoavalidlaw.(4)IttooktheNetherlandsfiveyears(from1986to1991)tochange

itslaborstatutoryregulationssothattheyconformtothestandardsin Feldbruggev.the

Netherlands(ECtHR29May1986).(5)AsforGreece,threeyearselapsedbeforeitchangedthe

criminalmilitarycode(from1992to1995)toconformtoHadjianastassiouv.Greece(ECtHR16

Dec.1992).FouryearselapsedbeforeitamendedtheConstitution(Art.93.3)withrespectto

criminalproceduresthathadbeencondemnedinGeorgiadisAnastasiosv.Greece,ECtHR29

May1997.(6)AftertheadverseMatos&Silva,&2others,ECtHR19Sept.1996,Portugaldidnot

rectifytheproblemuntilthefinaljudgmentofthePlenaryAssemblyoftheSupreme

AdministrativeCourt,on21Feb.2001.(7)SpainhasbeentakentotheECtHRinseveninstances,

butinonlythreeofthemdidtheCommitteeofMinistersconsiderlegislativereformnecessary.In

eachofthesecasestheSpanishreformpredatedtheECtHRruling.

Insum,thelengthofdelaybetweenECtHRdecisionandreformatthenationallevelhas

occasionallybeenaslongasfiveyears,butcomplianceinthesenseofdomesticreformwithin

lessthantwoyearsofthedecisionappearstobequitecommon.

C.ConclusionstoSectionFour

Thefindingsinthissectionlacktheclearpatternofvariationacrossthethreecategoriesthat

weinitiallypredicted.IntermsofthepaceofrespondingtotheECtHRwithcooperative

legislativeorexecutivebranchalterationsofthestatusquoante,wehavefailedtoconfirmour

hypothesisthatstateswithamorelengthypriorcommitmenttotheruleoflawdomesticallywill

besignificantlymorereceptivetotheruleoflawoftheECtHRregime.Nosuchpattern

appeared.AllofthelaterjoiningcountriestotheEUandevenapplicantcountryRomaniahave

repeatedlydemonstratedanotablewillingnesstoimplementlegislativeandadministrative

reformsattentivetoECtHRdecisionsandtoCommitteeofMinistersResolutionsimplementing


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them.

5.Conclusion

ThispapertestedtheassumptionthattheEuropeanConventiononHumanRightswouldbe

moreeffectiveinlegalsystemsthatbelongtotheliberalcoreofEurope(asoperationalizedby

lengthofmembershipintheEU),anddidsofortworeasons.Thefirstwasthatthesestateshave

long-termcommitmentstolegalsystemsrespectfulofindividualrights,andacorrelation

betweensuchcommitmentandacceptanceoftransnationalregimesisprominently

hypothesizedintheIRliterature.Secondly,itseemedcommon-sensicalthatlong-term

experiencewithonesupranationallegalregime(thatoftheEU)wouldbelinkedtomoreready

acceptanceofrelatedsupranationallegalregimes(specificallythatoftheECHR).We

examinedsevenCouncilofEuropememberstates,threewithlongrule-of-lawtraditions,and

long-timemembersoftheEEC/EC/EU;threewithshakyrecenthistorieswithrespecttotheruleof

law,andmorerecentmembershipintheEC/EU,andone,anapplicantstatetotheEU,which

hasemergedfromdictatorialruleonlywithinthepastfifteenyears.Weexaminedthemwith

respecttoformalconstitutionalprovisions,legaldoctrinefromconstitutionalcourtsastothe

meaningoftheconstitution,judicialpracticeintheothercourts,andpracticeintheexecutive

andlegislativebranches.

ThepaperfoundaconsiderabledegreeofvariationinjudicialreceptionoftheConvention

acrosslegalsystemswithessentiallythesameconstitutionaltextregardingthehierarchyof

internationalvs.domesticnorms(e.g.,FranceandSpain).Moreover,arestrictiveconstitutional

textvis--visinternationaltreatiesdidnotpreventGermanyfromgrantingconstitutionalvalueto

theConventionbyjudicialinterpretation.Also,wefoundthatwhileseniorityintheEUliberal

coremaybeanimportantvariablecertainlyitpredictedaccuratelythattheRomanian

judiciarywouldlagbehindtheothersinourstudy--theseparationlinesbetweenthefirstand

thesecondgroupseemtobeblurredbythequalityofreceptionoftheConventionregimein

SpainandFrance.Byourprediction,ECtHRruleswouldhavebeenbetterreceivedinFrance,


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butthereverseseemedtobeourfinding,certainlyastooveralltreatmentofthecorpusofECHR

lawbytherespectivejudiciaries.Also,despitequitedifferentconstitutionaltextsonthesubject,

anddespitethemuchlaterentryofSpainintotheEUandECHRsystems,theConstitutionalCourt

ofSpain,ofFrance,andofGermany,allassertedthepriorityofECHRlawoverdomesticlaw

withinroughlythesametimeperiod,theperiodaroundtheSingleEuropeanActof1987.

Moreover,wealsofoundsurprisingcontrastsamongbrancheswithinindividualcountries.

Portugal,forinstance,hasajudiciarythatforalongtimewasquiteresistanttoECtHRrulings,but

onanumberofoccasionsreformeditsexecutiveandlegislativepracticeevenbeforethe

ECtHRreachedthepointofissuingarulingagainstit;inotherwords,themerefactofa

registeredapplicationforacomplainttobeheardatStrasbourgwasenoughtoprovokereform

inPortugalonthematterindispute.Similarly,theFrenchParliamentonoccasionproved

considerablymorecooperativethantheFrenchjudiciarytowardECHR-inspiredreform.

Thesefindingsinviteonetolookbeyondthesimplisticdivisionoftheworldintosimplyrights-

respecting/rule-of-lawstatesvs.therest,thuscallingintoquestionthepredictiveutilityofthe

hypothesisweculledfromtheIRliterature.Itturnsoutthatavarietyofothervariablesmaybe

forcefulenoughtotrumptheimpactofarule-of-lawtradition[oritsabsence].Inoursmall

studyinparticular,variablesthatseemedtobeinfluentialincluded(1)strongleadershipbythe

personnelofconstitutionalcourtsinSpainandGermany,andbythelegislatureofSpain,which

displayedthemostpromptrecordofECtHRcomplianceofanyinourstudy;(2)politicaland

judicialleadershipinthedecadeofthe1990sinPortugal;(3)apoliticalcultureinFrancethat

elevatesstatesovereigntytoalmosticonicstatus,therebyslowingFrenchwillingness,especially

withinthejudiciary,tosubordinatetheFrenchstatetotransnationalauthority;(4)theimpactof

thegeneralpoliticalmoodinWesternEurope,atleastaroundthetimeoftheSingleEuropean

Act;and[5]forthecaseofRomania,pressuretoEuropeanizethetrainingofthejudiciaryand

professionalbarfromtheEuropeanCommission,backedbythecarrotofEUmembershipin

2007,whichpressurehasproducedimportantreforms,asofmid-2003.Explorationsofother


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aspectsofpoliticalculturebesidescommitmenttotheruleoflawandliberalrights,andcareful

attentiontosuchmattersaspoliticalleadership,courtleadership,theinfluenceofparticular

NGOs(suchasthenationalbar),andtheoverallmoodoftheelectorate,cannotsensiblybe

neglectedforthesakeofmonocausalexplanations.

WhiletheclaimsintheIRscholarshipoftheimportanceofarule-of-lawcultureforeasing

transitioninsupranationallegalregimesmayhavesomevaliditynotdiscernibleinastudy

coveringsofewcountriesasthiswithinatimespanasshortasfiftyyears,andcountrieswithsuch

asubstantialculturaloverlap,wecouldnotdemonstrateproofofitsconsistentimpactamong

theCouncilofEuropecountriesweexamined.Ineffect,itpredictedcorrectlyasto

constitutionalandjudicialdoctrineforsomeofthesevencountriesweexamined,anderredas

tosome:theDutchandtheGermandorankabovethoseofPortugalandGreeceonECHR

embeddedness,andRomaniabelowtherest.ButSpaintieswiththeNetherlands,insteadof

beingbelowit(outdoingbothGermanyandFrance),andtheFrenchjudiciarymayapproach

thatofPortugalcertainlyitisbelowSpain.Moreover,thepredictionisaflopastolegislative

andexecutivebranchreforminresponsetoECtHRdecisions;allsevencountriesdoreasonably

well,andSpaindoesexceptionallywell,withnoobviousotherdifferencesdiscernible.

NOTES

1.TwooftheparticipantstothedraftingConference,ItalyandGermany(observer),couldhardlyclaimtobemembersofthisselectclubimmediatelyafterthewar,giventheirformerembraceofFascism(Italy1922-1944)andNazism(Germany:1933-1945).However,thedelegationsofthesetwocountrieswereamongthestrongestsupportersthereforenforceabilityofthehumanrightssystem(Moravscik2000).

2.TheEuropeanCommission,theexecutivebranchoftheEU(notoftheCouncilofEurope),contributestotheimplementationoftheECHRregimeintwoways:First,itdisbursessignificantamountsofmoneytoEUapplicantcountriestoenforcedemocracyandtherule

oflaw,mainlybyfundingjudicialreform.Second,theEUCommissionerforenlargementmonitorstheperformanceoftheapplicantstatesinsecuringtheindependenceofthejudiciaryandfightingagainstcorruptionincourts.Essentiallyutilizingthetechniqueofshaming,theCommissionissuescountryreportsannuallyoneachapplicant(www.europa.eu.int).

3.Greece,despiteitssidingwiththeAllies,hadaNationalSocialist(i.e.fascist)dictatorshipfrom1936until1945,acivilwarfrom1946-1949,thenaconstitutionalmonarchywithParliamentaryruleuntil1967,atwhichtimeitunderwentamilitarycoup.Themilitaryjunta


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exercisedadictatorshipfrom1967until1974.TheGreekThirdRepublicreintroducedtheConventionintoGreecein1974(LawNo.53).

4.Despiteanappointmentprocessgearedtoguaranteeingjudicialindependence,observersdostillnotethatRomaniafacesdifficultiesineliminatingcorruptionfromtheranksofits

judges,aswellasotherpublicofficials(Gall2001).Nonetheless,itisnotobvioustousthat

thecorruptionproblemissubstantiallyworsetherethan,forinstance,inlong-timeEUmember,Italy.

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